,,prima ,,secundae7999999 by ,david ,mc,clamrock ,,summa ,,theologica ,,part ,i-,,ii 7,prima ,secundae7 ,translated by ,fathers of the ,english ,dominican ,province ,,benziger ,,brothers ,,new ,,york ,,dedication ,to the ,blessed ,virgin ,mary ,immaculate ,seat of ,wisdom ,,note ,,to ,,this ,,electronic ,,edition ,the text of this electronic edition was originally produced by ,sandra ,k4 ,perry1 ,perrysburg1 ,ohio1 and made available through the ,christian ,classics ,ethereal ,library http3_/_/www4ccel4org4 ,i have eliminated unnecessary formatting in the text1 corrected some errors in transcription1 and added the dedication1 tables of contents1 ,prologue1 and the numbers of the questions and articles1 as they appeared in the printed translation published by ,benziger ,brothers4 ,each article is now designated by part1 question number1 and article number in brackets1 like this3 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,supreme ,good1 ,god1 ,is the ,cause of ,evil8 ,in a few places1 where obvious errors appeared in the ,benziger ,brothers edition1 ,i have corrected them by reference to a ,latin text of the ,summa4 ,these corrections are indicated by ,english text in brackets4 ,for example1 in ,part ,i1 ,question #de1 ,article #b1 the first sentence in the ,benziger ,brothers edition begins3 ,not only is it impossible that anything should be created by ,god4444 ,by reference to the ,latin1 non solum non est impossibile a ,deo aliquid creari 7emphasis added71 this has been corrected to ,not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by ,god4444 ,this electronic edition also differs from the ,benziger ,brothers edition in the following details 7as well as the obvious lack of the original page numbers and headers73 99 ,the repetitive expression ,we proceed thus to the next ,article does not appear directly below the title of each article4 99 ,italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end1 like this4 ,quotations and other quotable matter1 however1 are ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this edition1 in accordance with common ,english usage1 even where they were set in italics with no quotation marks in the ,benziger ,brothers edition4 ,titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear in the text with no parentheses1 but not when the books are cited in parentheses4 99 ,bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated by colons1 like this3 ,dan4 #g3aj--not like this3 ,dan4 vii4 #aj4 ,small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in citations to books other than the ,bible4 99 ,any matter that appeared in a footnote in the ,benziger ,brothers edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the footnote mark appeared4 99 ,greek words are presented in ,roman transliteration4 99 ,paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines4 99 ,numbered topics1 set forth at the beginning of each question and at certain other places1 are ordinarily presented on a separate line for each topic4 99 ,titles of questions are in all caps4 ,anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to the content of the ,benziger ,brothers edition may be regarded as a defect in this edition and attributed to me 7,david ,mc,clamrock74 ,,contents ,,first ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,part 7,,qq4 #a-aad7 ,question #a4 ,of ,man's ,last ,end #b4 ,of ,those ,things in ,which ,man's ,happiness ,consists #c4 ,what ,is ,happiness #d4 ,of ,those ,things ,that ,are ,required for ,happiness #e4 ,of the ,attainment of ,happiness #f4 ,of the ,voluntary and the ,involuntary #g4 ,of the ,circumstances of ,human ,acts #h4 ,of the ,will1 in ,regard to ,what ,it ,wills #i4 ,of ,that ,which ,moves the ,will #aj4 ,of the ,manner in ,which the ,will ,is ,moved #aa4 ,of ,enjoyment1 ,which ,is an ,act of the ,will #ab4 ,of ,intention #ac4 ,of ,choice1 ,which ,is an ,act of the ,will with ,regard to the ,means #ad4 ,of ,counsel1 ,which ,precedes ,choice #ae4 ,of ,consent1 ,which ,is an ,act of the ,will in ,regard to the ,means #af4 ,of ,use1 ,which ,is an ,act of the ,will in ,regard to the ,means #ag4 ,of the ,acts ,commanded by the ,will #ah4 ,of the ,good and ,evil of ,human ,acts1 in ,general #ai4 ,of the ,goodness and ,malice of the ,interior ,act of the ,will #bj4 ,of ,goodness and ,malice in ,external ,human ,actions #ba4 ,of the ,consequences of ,human ,actions by ,reason of ,their ,goodness and ,malice #bb4 ,of the ,subject of the ,soul's ,passions #bc4 ,how the ,passions ,differ from ,one ,another #bd4 ,of ,good and ,evil in the ,passions of the ,soul #be4 ,of the ,order of the ,passions to ,one ,another #bf4 ,of the ,passions of the ,soul in ,particular3 and ,first1 of ,love #bg4 ,of the ,cause of ,love #bh4 ,of the ,effects of ,love #bi4 ,of ,hatred #cj4 ,of ,concupiscence #ca4 ,of ,delight ,considered in ,itself #cb4 ,of the ,cause of ,pleasure #cc4 ,of the ,effects of ,pleasure #cd4 ,of the ,goodness and ,malice of ,pleasures #ce4 ,of ,pain or ,sorrow1 in ,itself #cf4 ,of the ,causes of ,sorrow or ,pain #cg4 ,of the ,effects of ,pain or ,sorrow #ch4 ,of the ,remedies of ,sorrow or ,pain #ci4 ,of the ,goodness and ,malice of ,sorrow or ,pain #dj4 ,of the ,irascible ,passions1 and ,first1 of ,hope and ,despair #da4 ,of ,fear1 in ,itself #db4 ,of the ,object of ,fear #dc4 ,of the ,cause of ,fear #dd4 ,of the ,effects of ,fear #de4 ,of ,daring #df4 ,of ,anger1 in ,itself #dg4 ,of the ,cause ,that ,provokes ,anger1 and of the ,remedies of ,anger #dh4 ,of the ,effects of ,anger ,,treatise ,,on ,,habits #di4 ,of ,habits in ,general1 ,as to ,their ,substance #ej4 ,of the ,subject of ,habits #ea4 ,of the ,cause of ,habits1 ,as to ,their ,formation #eb4 ,of the ,increase of ,habits #ec4 ,how ,habits ,are ,corrupted or ,diminished #ed4 ,of the ,distinction of ,habits #ee4 ,of the ,virtues1 ,as to ,their ,essence #ef4 ,of the ,subject of ,virtue #eg4 ,of the ,intellectual ,virtues #eh4 ,of the ,difference ,between ,moral and ,intellectual ,virtues #ei4 ,of the ,moral ,virtues in ,relation to the ,passions #fj4 ,how the ,moral ,virtues ,differ from ,one ,another #fa4 ,of the ,cardinal ,virtues #fb4 ,of the ,theological ,virtues #fc4 ,of the ,cause of ,virtues #fd4 ,of the ,mean of ,virtue #fe4 ,of the ,connection of ,virtues #ff4 ,of ,equality ,among the ,virtues #fg4 ,of the ,duration of ,virtues ,after ,this ,life #fh4 ,of the ,gifts #fi4 ,of the ,beatitudes #gj4 ,of the ,fruits of the ,holy ,ghost #ga4 ,of ,vice and ,sin ,considered in ,themselves #gb4 ,of the ,distinction of ,sins #gc4 ,of the ,comparison of ,one ,sin with ,another #gd4 ,of the ,subject of ,sin #ge4 ,of the ,causes of ,sin1 in ,general #gf4 ,of the ,causes of ,sin1 in ,particular #gg4 ,of the ,cause of ,sin1 on the ,part of the ,sensitive ,appetite #gh4 ,of ,that ,cause of ,sin ,which ,is ,malice #gi4 ,of the ,external ,causes of ,sin #hj4 ,of the ,cause of ,sin1 ,as ,regards the ,devil #ha4 ,of the ,cause of ,sin1 on the ,part of ,man #hb4 ,of ,original ,sin1 ,as to ,its ,essence #hc4 ,of the ,subject of ,original ,sin #hd4 ,of the ,cause of ,sin1 in ,respect of ,one ,sin ,being the ,cause of ,another #he4 ,of the ,effects of ,sin1 and1 ,first1 of the ,corruption of the ,good of ,nature #hf4 ,of the ,stain of ,sin #hg4 ,of the ,debt of ,punishment #hh4 ,of ,venial and ,mortal ,sin #hi4 ,of ,venial ,sin in ,itself ,,treatise ,,on ,,law #ij4 ,of the ,essence of ,law #ia4 ,of the ,various ,kinds of ,law #ib4 ,of the ,effects of ,law #ic4 ,of the ,eternal ,law #id4 ,of the ,natural ,law #ie4 ,of ,human ,law #if4 ,of the ,power of ,human ,law #ig4 ,of ,change in ,laws #ih4 ,of the ,old ,law #ii4 ,of the ,precepts of the ,old ,law #ajj4 ,of the ,moral ,precepts of the ,old ,law #aja4 ,of the ,ceremonial ,precepts in ,themselves #ajb4 ,of the ,causes of the ,ceremonial ,precepts #ajc4 ,of the ,duration of the ,ceremonial ,precepts #ajd4 ,of the ,judicial ,precepts #aje4 ,of the ,reason for the ,judicial ,precepts #ajf4 ,of the ,law of the ,gospel1 ,called the ,new ,law1 ,considered in ,itself #ajg4 ,of the ,new ,law ,as ,compared with the ,old #ajh4 ,of ,those ,things ,that ,are ,contained in the ,new ,law #aji4 ,of the ,necessity of ,grace #aaj4 ,of the ,grace of ,god as ,regards ,its ,essence #aaa4 ,of the ,division of ,grace #aab4 ,of the ,cause of ,grace #aac4 ,of the ,effects of ,grace #aad4 ,of ,merit ,,first ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,part ,i-,,ii1 ,prima ,secundae ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,last ,,end 7,,qq4 #a-e7 ,,prologue ,since1 as ,damascene states 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab71 man is said to be made in ,god's image1 in so far as the image implies an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement3 now that we have treated of the exemplar1 i4e4 ,god1 and of those things which came forth from the power of ,god in accordance with ,his will2 it remains for us to treat of ,his image1 i4e4 man1 inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions1 as having free-will and control of his actions4 ,,of ,,man',s ,,last ,,end 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,in this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life2 and secondly1 those things by means of which man may advance towards this end1 or stray from the path3 for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end4 ,and since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness1 we must consider 7#a7 the last end in general2 7#b7 happiness4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether it belongs to man to act for an end8 7#b7 ,whether this is proper to the rational nature8 7#c7 ,whether a man's actions are specified by their end8 7#d7 ,whether there is any last end of human life8 7#e7 ,whether one man can have several last ends8 7#f7 ,whether man ordains all to the last end8 7#g7 ,whether all men have the same last end8 7#h7 ,whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,it ,belongs to ,man to ,act for an ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end4 ,for a cause is naturally first4 ,but an end1 in its very name1 implies something that is last4 ,therefore an end is not a cause4 ,but that for which a man acts1 is the cause of his action2 since this preposition for indicates a relation of causality4 ,therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is itself the last end is not for an end4 ,but in some cases the last end is an action1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 i1 #a74 ,therefore man does not do everything for an end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 then does a man seem to act for an end1 when he acts deliberately4 ,but man does many things without deliberation1 sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing2 for instance when one moves one's foot or hand1 or scratches one's beard1 while intent on something else4 ,therefore man does not do everything for an end4 ,on the contrary1 ,all things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus4 ,now the end is the principle in human operations1 as the ,philosopher states 7,phys4 ii1 #i74 ,therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end4 ,i answer that1 ,of actions done by man those alone are properly called human1 which are proper to man as man4 ,now man differs from irrational animals in this1 that he is master of his actions4 ,wherefore those actions alone are properly called human1 of which man is master4 ,now man is master of his actions through his reason and will2 whence1 too1 the free-will is defined as the faculty and will of reason4 ,therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will4 ,and if any other actions are found in man1 they can be called actions of a man1 but not properly human actions1 since they are not proper to man as man4 ,now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power1 are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object4 ,but the object of the will is the end and the good4 ,therefore all human actions must be for an end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the end be last in the order of execution1 yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention4 ,and it is this way that it is a cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if any human action be the last end1 it must be voluntary1 else it would not be human1 as stated above4 ,now an action is voluntary in one of two ways3 first1 because it is commanded by the will1 e4g4 to walk1 or to speak2 secondly1 because it is elicited by the will1 for instance the very act of willing4 ,now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end4 ,for the object of the will is the end1 just as the object of sight is color3 wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing1 because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object2 so the first appetible1 i4e4 the end1 cannot be the very act of willing4 ,consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end1 it must be an action commanded by the will3 so that there1 some action of man1 at least the act of willing1 is for the end4 ,therefore whatever a man does1 it is true to say that man acts for an end1 even when he does that action in which the last end consists4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,such like actions are not properly human actions2 since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason1 which is the proper principle of human actions4 ,therefore they have indeed an imaginary end1 but not one that is fixed by reason4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,it ,is ,proper to the ,rational ,nature to ,act for an ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end4 ,for man1 to whom it belongs to act for an end1 never acts for an unknown end4 ,on the other hand1 there are many things that have no knowledge of an end2 either because they are altogether without knowledge1 as insensible creatures3 or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such1 as irrational animals4 ,therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to act for an end is to order one's action to an end4 ,but this is the work of reason4 ,therefore it does not belong to things that lack reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good and the end is the object of the will4 ,but the will is in the reason 7,de ,anima iii1 #i74 ,therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 ii1 #e7 that not only mind but also nature acts for an end4 ,i answer that1 ,every agent1 of necessity1 acts for an end4 ,for if1 in a number of causes ordained to one another1 the first be removed1 the others must1 of necessity1 be removed also4 ,now the first of all causes is the final cause4 ,the reason of which is that matter does not receive form1 save in so far as it is moved by an agent2 for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act4 ,but an agent does not move except out of intention for an end4 ,for if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect1 it would not do one thing rather than another3 consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect1 it must1 of necessity1 be determined to some certain one1 which has the nature of an end4 ,and just as this determination is effected1 in the rational nature1 by the rational appetite1 which is called the will2 so1 in other things1 it is caused by their natural inclination1 which is called the natural appetite4 ,nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end1 by its action or movement1 in two ways3 first1 as a thing1 moving itself to the end1 as man2 secondly1 as a thing moved by another to the end1 as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end4 ,therefore those things that are possessed of reason1 move themselves to an end2 because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will1 which is the faculty of will and reason4 ,but those things that lack reason tend to an end1 by natural inclination1 as being moved by another and not by themselves2 since they do not know the nature of an end as such1 and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end1 but can be ordained to an end only by another4 ,for the entire irrational nature is in comparison to ,god as an instrument to the principal agent1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b1 ad #d2 ,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end1 as directing 7agens7 and leading itself to the end3 whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end1 as directed or led by another1 whether it apprehend the end1 as do irrational animals1 or do not apprehend it1 as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a man of himself acts for an end1 he knows the end3 but when he is directed or led by another1 for instance1 when he acts at another's command1 or when he is moved under another's compulsion1 it is not necessary that he should know the end4 ,and it is thus with irrational creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end3 whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which is directed by another to an end4 ,and this can belong to an irrational nature1 but owing to some one possessed of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the object of the will is the end and the good in universal4 ,consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect1 since they cannot apprehend the universal2 but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite1 determinate to some particular good4 ,now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause3 thus the governor of a city1 who intends the common good1 moves1 by his command1 all the particular departments of the city4 ,consequently all things that lack reason are1 of necessity1 moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good1 namely by the ,divine will4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,human ,acts ,are ,specified by ,their ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human acts are not specified by their end4 ,for the end is an extrinsic cause4 ,but everything is specified by an intrinsic principle4 ,therefore human acts are not specified by their end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which gives a thing its species should exist before it4 ,but the end comes into existence afterwards4 ,therefore a human act does not derive its species from the end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one thing cannot be in more than one species4 ,but one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends4 ,therefore the end does not give the species to human acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,mor4 ,eccl4 et ,manich4 ii1 #ac73 ,according as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or praise4 ,i answer that1 ,each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality2 wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms4 ,and this is also to be observed in proper movements4 ,for since movements are1 in a way1 divided into action and passion1 each of these receives its species from an act2 action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting1 and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement4 ,wherefore heating1 as an action1 is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat1 while heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat3 and it is the definition that shows the specific nature4 ,and either way1 human acts1 whether they be considered as actions1 or as passions1 receive their species from the end4 ,for human acts can be considered in both ways1 since man moves himself1 and is moved by himself4 ,now it has been stated above 7,a4 #a7 that acts are called human1 inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will4 ,now the object of the will is the good and the end4 ,and hence it is clear that the principle of human acts1 in so far as they are human1 is the end4 ,in like manner it is their terminus3 for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end2 thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator4 ,and since1 as ,ambrose says 7,prolog4 super ,luc47 morality is said properly of man1 moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end1 for moral acts are the same as human acts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the end is not altogether extrinsic to the act1 because it is related to the act as principle or terminus2 and thus it just this that is essential to an act1 viz4 to proceed from something1 considered as action1 and to proceed towards something1 considered as passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the end1 in so far as it pre-exists in the intention1 pertains to the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,and it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one and the same act1 in so far as it proceeds once from the agent1 is ordained to but one proximate end1 from which it has its species3 but it can be ordained to several remote ends1 of which one is the end of the other4 ,it is possible1 however1 that an act which is one in respect of its natural species1 be ordained to several ends of the will3 thus this act to kill a man1 which is but one act in respect of its natural species1 can be ordained1 as to an end1 to the safeguarding of justice1 and to the satisfying of anger3 the result being that there would be several acts in different species of morality3 since in one way there will be an act of virtue1 in another1 an act of vice4 ,for a movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally1 but only from that which is its per se terminus4 ,now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing1 and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality4 ,consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species1 should not be diverse1 considered in their moral species1 and conversely4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,is ,one ,last ,end of ,human ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no last end of human life1 but that we proceed to infinity4 ,for good is essentially diffusive1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good1 the latter must needs diffuse some other good3 so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely4 ,but good has the nature of an end4 ,therefore there is an indefinite series of ends4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity3 thus mathematical quantities have no limit4 ,for the same reason the species of numbers are infinite1 since1 given any number1 the reason can think of one yet greater4 ,but desire of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason4 ,therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good and the end is the object of the will4 ,but the will can react on itself an infinite number of times3 for ,i can will something1 and will to will it1 and so on indefinitely4 ,therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will1 and there is no last end of the human will4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 ii1 #b7 that to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good4 ,but the good is that which has the nature of an end4 ,therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely4 ,therefore it is necessary to fix one last end4 ,i answer that1 ,absolutely speaking1 it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends1 from any point of view4 ,for in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another1 if the first be removed1 those that are ordained to the first1 must of necessity be removed also4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #e7 that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement1 because then there would be no first mover1 without which neither can the others move1 since they move only through being moved by the first mover4 ,now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order of intention and the order of execution3 and in either of these orders there must be something first4 ,for that which is first in the order of intention1 is the principle1 as it were1 moving the appetite2 consequently1 if you remove this principle1 there will be nothing to move the appetite4 ,on the other hand1 the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning2 and if this principle be taken away1 no one will begin to work4 ,now the principle in the intention is the last end2 while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end4 ,consequently1 on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end1 nothing would be desired1 nor would any action have its term1 nor would the intention of the agent be at rest2 while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end1 none would begin to work at anything1 and counsel would have no term1 but would continue indefinitely4 ,on the other hand1 nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally2 for accidental causes are indeterminate4 ,and in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends1 and of things ordained to the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the very nature of good is that something flows from it1 but not that it flows from something else4 ,since1 therefore1 good has the nature of end1 and the first good is the last end1 this argument does not prove that there is no last end2 but that from the end1 already supposed1 we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end4 ,and this would be true if we considered but the power of the ,first ,good1 which is infinite4 ,but1 since the ,first ,good diffuses itself according to the intellect1 to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form2 it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the ,first ,good from ,which all other goods share the power of diffusion4 ,consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but1 as it is written 7,wis4 #aa3ba71 ,god disposes all things in number1 weight and measure4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in things which are of themselves1 reason begins from principles that are known naturally1 and advances to some term4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher proves 7,poster4 i1 #c7 that there is no infinite process in demonstrations1 because there we find a process of things having an essential1 not an accidental1 connection with one another4 ,but in those things which are accidentally connected1 nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely4 ,now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number1 as such1 that quantity or unity be added to it4 ,wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself1 is accidental to the order of ends4 ,this is clear from the fact that in regard to one and the same end1 the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,one ,man ,can ,have ,several ,last ,ends8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things1 as last ends4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #a7 that some held man's last end to consist in four things1 viz4 in pleasure1 repose1 the gifts of nature1 and virtue4 ,but these are clearly more than one thing4 ,therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another4 ,now there are many things which are not in opposition to one another4 ,therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by the fact that it places its last end in one thing1 the will does not lose its freedom4 ,but before it placed its last end in that thing1 e4g4 pleasure1 it could place it in something else1 e4g4 riches4 ,therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure1 a man can at the same time place his last end in riches4 ,therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things1 as last ends4 ,on the contrary1 ,that in which a man rests as in his last end1 is master of his affections1 since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life4 ,hence of gluttons it is written 7,phil4 #c3ai73 ,whose god is their belly3 viz4 because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly4 ,now according to ,matt4 #f3bd1 ,no man can serve two masters1 such1 namely1 as are not ordained to one another4 ,therefore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one another4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things1 as last ends4 ,three reasons may be assigned for this4 ,first1 because1 since everything desires its own perfection1 a man desires for his ultimate end1 that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good4 ,hence ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #a73 ,in speaking of the end of good we mean now1 not that it passes away so as to be no more1 but that it is perfected so as to be complete4 ,it is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite1 that nothing is left besides it for man to desire4 ,which is not possible1 if something else be required for his perfection4 ,consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things1 as though each were its perfect good4 ,the second reason is because1 just as in the process of reasoning1 the principle is that which is naturally known1 so in the process of the rational appetite1 i4e4 the will1 the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired4 ,now this must needs be one3 since nature tends to one thing only4 ,but the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end4 ,therefore that to which the will tends1 as to its last end1 is one4 ,the third reason is because1 since voluntary actions receive their species from the end1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 they must needs receive their genus from the last end1 which is common to them all3 just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form4 ,since1 then1 all things that can be desired by the will1 belong1 as such1 to one genus1 the last end must needs be one4 ,and all the more because in every genus there is one first principle2 and the last end has the nature of a first principle1 as stated above4 ,now as the last end of man1 simply as man1 is to the whole human race1 so is the last end of any individual man to that individual4 ,therefore1 just as of all men there is naturally one last end1 so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom1 by those who placed in them the last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another1 yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good1 that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time4 ,which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends1 as has been shown above 7ad #b74 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,man ,wills ,all1 ,whatsoever ,he ,wills1 for the ,last ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man does not will all1 whatsoever he wills1 for the last end4 ,for things ordained to the last end are said to be serious matter1 as being useful4 ,but jests are foreign to serious matter4 ,therefore what man does in jest1 he ordains not to the last end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says at the beginning of his ,metaphysics 7i4 #b7 that speculative science is sought for its own sake4 ,now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end4 ,therefore man does not desire all1 whatsoever he desires1 for the last end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whosoever ordains something to an end1 thinks of that end4 ,but man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires or does4 ,therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #a73 ,that is the end of our good1 for the sake of which we love other things1 whereas we love it for its own sake4 ,i answer that1 ,man must1 of necessity1 desire all1 whatsoever he desires1 for the last end4 ,this is evident for two reasons4 ,first1 because whatever man desires1 he desires it under the aspect of good4 ,and if he desire it1 not as his perfect good1 which is the last end1 he must1 of necessity1 desire it as tending to the perfect good1 because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion2 as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art4 ,wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end4 ,secondly1 because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite1 as the first mover in other movements4 ,now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover4 ,therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite1 except as ordained to the first object of the appetite1 which is the last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end2 but merely to the good of the jester1 in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation4 ,but man's consummate good is his last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same applies to speculative science2 which is desired as the scientist's good1 included in complete and perfect good1 which is the ultimate end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one need not always be thinking of the last end1 whenever one desires or does something3 but the virtue of the first intention1 which was in respect of the last end1 remains in every desire directed to any object whatever1 even though one's thoughts be not actually directed to the last end4 ,thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,all ,men ,have the ,same ,last ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all men have not the same last end4 ,for before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man4 ,but some turn away from the unchangeable good1 by sinning4 ,therefore all men have not the same last end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man's entire life is ruled according to his last end4 ,if1 therefore1 all men had the same last end1 they would not have various pursuits in life4 ,which is evidently false4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the end is the term of action4 ,but actions are of individuals4 ,now although men agree in their specific nature1 yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals4 ,therefore all men have not the same last end4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #c7 that all men agree in desiring the last end1 which is happiness4 ,i answer that1 ,we can speak of the last end in two ways3 first1 considering only the aspect of last end2 secondly1 considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is realized4 ,so1 then1 as to the aspect of last end1 all agree in desiring the last end3 since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection1 and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,but as to the thing in which this aspect is realized1 all men are not agreed as to their last end3 since some desire riches as their consummate good2 some1 pleasure2 others1 something else4 ,thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some1 the sweetness of wine is most pleasant1 to others1 the sweetness of honey1 or of something similar4 ,yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things1 in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure4 ,in like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists3 but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end1 which intention they mistakenly seek in other things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although actions are of individuals1 yet their first principle of action is nature1 which tends to one thing1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,other ,creatures ,concur in ,that ,last ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all other creatures concur in man's last end4 ,for the end corresponds to the beginning4 ,but man's beginning--i4e4 ,god--is also the beginning of all else4 ,therefore all other things concur in man's last end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that ,god turns all things to ,himself as to their last end4 ,but ,he is also man's last end2 because ,he alone is to be enjoyed by man1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e1 #bb74 ,therefore other things1 too1 concur in man's last end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man's last end is the object of the will4 ,but the object of the will is the universal good1 which is the end of all4 ,therefore other things1 too1 concur in man's last end4 ,on the contrary1 man's last end is happiness2 which all men desire1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #c1 #d74 ,but happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #e74 ,therefore other things do not concur in man's last end4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #b71 the end is twofold--the end for which and the end by which2 viz4 the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good1 and the use or acquisition of that thing4 ,thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as thing1 or to be in a lower place1 as use2 and the end of the miser is money as thing1 or possession of money as use4 ,if1 therefore1 we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end1 thus all other things concur in man's last end1 since ,god is the last end of man and of all other things4 ,if1 however1 we speak of man's last end1 as of the acquisition of the end1 then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end4 ,for man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving ,god3 this is not possible to other creatures1 which acquire their last end1 in so far as they share in the ,divine likeness1 inasmuch as they are1 or live1 or even know4 ,hence it is evident how the objections are solved3 since happiness means the acquisition of the last end4 ,,question #b ,,of ,,those ,,things ,,in ,,which ,,man',s ,,happiness ,,consists 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we have now to consider happiness3 and 7#a7 in what it consists2 7#b7 what it is2 7#c7 how we can obtain it4 ,concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether happiness consists in wealth8 7#b7 ,whether in honor8 7#c7 ,whether in fame or glory8 7#d7 ,whether in power8 7#e7 ,whether in any good of the body8 7#f7 ,whether in pleasure8 7#g7 ,whether in any good of the soul8 7#h7 ,whether in any created good8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in ,wealth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth4 ,for since happiness is man's last end1 it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man's affections4 ,now this is wealth3 for it is written 7,eccles4 #aj3ai73 ,all things obey money4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in wealth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 iii71 happiness is a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things4 ,now money seems to be the means of possessing all things3 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #e71 money was invented1 that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires4 ,therefore happiness consists in wealth4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since the desire for the sovereign good never fails1 it seems to be infinite4 ,but this is the case with riches more than anything else2 since a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches 7,eccles4 #e3i74 ,therefore happiness consists in wealth4 ,on the contrary1 ,man's good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it4 ,but as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 ii71 wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding3 for the miser is hateful1 whereas the generous man is applauded4 ,therefore man's happiness does not consist in wealth4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for man's happiness to consist in wealth4 ,for wealth is twofold1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c71 viz4 natural and artificial4 ,natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants3 such as food1 drink1 clothing1 cars1 dwellings1 and such like1 while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature1 as money1 but is invented by the art of man1 for the convenience of exchange1 and as a measure of things salable4 ,now it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural wealth4 ,for wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else1 viz4 as a support of human nature3 consequently it cannot be man's last end1 rather is it ordained to man as to its end4 ,wherefore in the order of nature1 all such things are below man1 and made for him1 according to ,ps4 #h3h3 ,thou hast subjected all things under his feet4 ,and as to artificial wealth1 it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth2 since man would not seek it except because1 by its means1 he procures for himself the necessaries of life4 ,consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end4 ,therefore it is impossible for happiness1 which is the last end of man1 to consist in wealth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all material things obey money1 so far as the multitude of fools is concerned1 who know no other than material goods1 which can be obtained for money4 ,but we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise3 just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order1 to judge whether a thing is palatable4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all things salable can be had for money3 not so spiritual things1 which cannot be sold4 ,hence it is written 7,prov4 #ag3af73 ,what doth it avail a fool to have riches1 seeing he cannot buy wisdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the desire for natural riches is not infinite3 because they suffice for nature in a certain measure4 ,but the desire for artificial wealth is infinite1 for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence1 which is not curbed1 as the ,philosopher makes clear 7,polit4 i1 #c74 ,yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good4 ,for the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed1 the more it is loved1 and other things despised3 because the more we possess it1 the more we know it4 ,hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #bd3bi73 ,they that eat me shall yet hunger4 ,whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods1 the contrary is the case3 for when we already possess them1 we despise them1 and seek others3 which is the sense of ,our ,lord's words 7,john #d3ac73 ,whosoever drinketh of this water1 by which temporal goods are signified1 shall thirst again4 ,the reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them3 and this very fact shows that they are imperfect1 and the sovereign good does not consist therein4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in ,honors8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in honors4 ,for happiness or bliss is the reward of virtue1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #i74 ,but honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74 ,therefore happiness consists especially in honor4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which belongs to ,god and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness1 which is the perfect good4 ,but that is honor1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74 ,moreover1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #a3ag73 ,to 4 4 4 the only ,god be honor and glory4 ,therefore happiness consists in honor4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which man desires above all is happiness4 ,but nothing seems more desirable to man than honor3 since man suffers loss in all other things1 lest he should suffer loss of honor4 ,therefore happiness consists in honor4 ,on the contrary1 ,happiness is in the happy4 ,but honor is not in the honored1 but rather in him who honors1 and who offers deference to the person honored1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #e74 ,therefore happiness does not consist in honor4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for happiness to consist in honor4 ,for honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him2 and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored4 ,now a man's excellence is in proportion1 especially to his happiness1 which is man's perfect good2 and to its parts1 i4e4 those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness4 ,and therefore honor can result from happiness1 but happiness cannot principally consist therein4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #e71 honor is not that reward of virtue1 for which the virtuous work3 but they receive honor from men by way of reward1 as from those who have nothing greater to offer4 ,but virtue's true reward is happiness itself1 for which the virtuous work3 whereas if they worked for honor1 it would no longer be a virtue1 but ambition4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,honor is due to ,god and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing3 not that honor makes them excellent4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that man desires honor above all else1 arises from his natural desire for happiness1 from which honor results1 as stated above4 ,wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise1 on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in ,fame or ,glory8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in glory4 ,for happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world4 ,but this is glory3 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3ah73 ,the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come1 that shall be revealed in us4 ,therefore happiness consists in glory4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 good is diffusive of itself1 as stated by ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else3 since1 according to ,ambrose 99,augustine1 ,contra ,maxim4 ,arian4 ii4 #ac1 glory consists in being well known and praised4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in glory4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness is the most enduring good4 ,now this seems to be fame or glory2 because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion4 ,hence ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 ii73 ,you seem to beget unto yourselves eternity1 when you think of your fame in future time4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory4 ,on the contrary1 ,happiness is man's true good4 ,but it happens that fame or glory is false3 for as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii71 many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people4 ,can anything be more shameful8 ,for those who receive false fame1 must needs blush at their own praise4 ,therefore man's happiness does not consist in fame or glory4 ,i answer that1 ,man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory4 ,for glory consists in being well known and praised1 as ,ambrose 99,augustine1 ,contra ,maxim4 ,arian4 ii1 #ac says4 ,now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to ,god's knowledge3 for human knowledge is caused by the things known1 whereas ,god's knowledge is the cause of the things known4 ,wherefore the perfection of human good1 which is called happiness1 cannot be caused by human knowledge3 but rather human knowledge of another's happiness proceeds from1 and1 in a fashion1 is caused by1 human happiness itself1 inchoate or perfect4 ,consequently man's happiness cannot consist in fame or glory4 ,on the other hand1 man's good depends on ,god's knowledge as its cause4 ,and therefore man's beatitude depends1 as on its cause1 on the glory which man has with ,god2 according to ,ps4 #ij3ae1 #af3 ,i will deliver him1 and ,i will glorify him2 ,i will fill him with length of days1 and ,i will show him my salvation4 ,furthermore1 we must observe that human knowledge often fails1 especially in contingent singulars1 such as are human acts4 ,for this reason human glory is frequently deceptive4 ,but since ,god cannot be deceived1 ,his glory is always true2 hence it is written 7#b ,cor4 #aj3ah73 ,he 4 4 4 is approved 4 4 4 whom ,god commendeth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle speaks1 then1 not of the glory which is with men1 but of the glory which is from ,god1 with ,his ,angels4 ,hence it is written 7,mk4 #h3ch73 ,the ,son of ,man shall confess him in the glory of ,his ,father1 before ,his angels 99,st4 ,thomas joins ,mk4 #h3ch with ,luke #ab3h owing to a possible variant in his text1 or to the fact that he was quoting from memory4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man's good which1 through fame or glory1 is in the knowledge of many1 if this knowledge be true1 must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself3 and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness4 ,but if the knowledge be false1 it does not harmonize with the thing3 and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous4 ,hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,fame has no stability2 in fact1 it is easily ruined by false report4 ,and if sometimes it endures1 this is by accident4 ,but happiness endures of itself1 and for ever4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that happiness consists in power4 ,for all things desire to become like to ,god1 as to their last end and first beginning4 ,but men who are in power1 seem1 on account of the similarity of power1 to be most like to ,god3 hence also in ,scripture they are called gods 7,ex4 #bb3bh71 ,thou shalt not speak ill of the gods4 ,therefore happiness consists in power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is the perfect good4 ,but the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others2 which belongs to those who are in power4 ,therefore happiness consists in power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since happiness is supremely desirable1 it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned4 ,but1 more than aught else1 men shun servitude1 which is contrary to power4 ,therefore happiness consists in power4 ,on the contrary1 ,happiness is the perfect good4 ,but power is most imperfect4 ,for as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii71 the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care1 nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety3 and further on3 ,think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants1 whom he inspires with fear indeed1 but whom he fears still more8 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for happiness to consist in power2 and this for two reasons4 ,first because power has the nature of principle1 as is stated in ,metaph4 v1 #ab1 whereas happiness has the nature of last end4 ,secondly1 because power has relation to good and evil3 whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good4 ,wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power1 which is by virtue1 rather than in power itself4 ,now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods4 ,first1 because1 since happiness is man's supreme good1 it is incompatible with any evil4 ,now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men4 ,secondly1 because1 since it is the nature of happiness to satisfy of itself1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #g1 having gained happiness1 man cannot lack any needful good4 ,but after acquiring any one of the foregoing1 man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him2 for instance1 wisdom1 bodily health1 and such like4 ,thirdly1 because1 since happiness is the perfect good1 no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom4 ,this cannot be said of the foregoing3 for it is written 7,eccles4 #e3ab7 that riches are sometimes kept to the hurt of the owner2 and the same may be said of the other three4 ,fourthly1 because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him2 since he is ordained thereto naturally4 ,now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes1 and in most cases to fortune2 for which reason they are called goods of fortune4 ,therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god's power is ,his goodness3 hence ,he cannot use ,his power otherwise than well4 ,but it is not so with men4 ,consequently it is not enough for man's happiness1 that he become like ,god in power1 unless he become like ,him in goodness also4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many1 so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it4 ,and so it is that power is towards good and evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power3 therefore is it that men naturally shun it2 not because man's supreme good consists in power4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in ,any ,bodily ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods4 ,for it is written 7,ecclus4 #cj3af73 ,there is no riches above the riches of the health of the body4 ,but happiness consists in that which is best4 ,therefore it consists in the health of the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v71 that to be is better than to live1 and to live is better than all that follows4 ,but for man's being and living1 the health of the body is necessary4 ,since1 therefore1 happiness is man's supreme good1 it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more universal a thing is1 the higher the principle from which it depends2 because the higher a cause is1 the greater the scope of its power4 ,now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something1 so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite4 ,therefore1 just as the ,first ,cause is that which flows into all things1 so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all4 ,but being itself is that which is most desired by all4 ,therefore man's happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being1 such as the health of the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness4 ,but in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals2 for instance1 by the elephant in longevity1 by the lion in strength1 by the stag in fleetness4 ,therefore man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for man's happiness to consist in the goods of the body2 and this for two reasons4 ,first1 because1 if a thing be ordained to another as to its end1 its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being4 ,hence a captain does not intend as a last end1 the preservation of the ship entrusted to him1 since a ship is ordained to something else as its end1 viz4 to navigation4 ,now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course1 so man is given over to his will and reason2 according to ,ecclus4 #ae3ad3 ,god made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel4 ,now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end3 since man is not the supreme good4 ,therefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the preservation of man's being4 ,secondly1 because1 granted that the end of man's will and reason be the preservation of man's being1 it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body4 ,for man's being consists in soul and body2 and though the being of the body depends on the soul1 yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body1 as shown above 7,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b72 and the very body is for the soul1 as matter for its form1 and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion1 that by their means he may do his work4 ,wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul1 as to their end4 ,consequently happiness1 which is man's last end1 cannot consist in goods of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as the body is ordained to the soul1 as its end1 so are external goods ordained to the body itself4 ,and therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods1 which are signified by riches1 just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,being taken simply1 as including all perfection of being1 surpasses life and all that follows it2 for thus being itself includes all these4 ,and in this sense ,dionysius speaks4 ,but if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing1 which does not possess the whole perfection of being1 but has imperfect being1 such as the being of any creature2 then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent4 ,hence in the same passage ,dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist1 and intelligent better than living things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the end corresponds to the beginning2 this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being1 in ,whom every perfection of being is3 ,whose likeness1 according to their proportion1 some desire as to being only1 some as to living being1 some as to being which is living1 intelligent and happy4 ,and this belongs to few4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure4 ,for since happiness is the last end1 it is not desired for something else1 but other things for it4 ,but this answers to pleasure more than to anything else3 for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased 7,ethic4 x1 #b74 ,therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause 7,de ,causis i74 ,now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite4 ,therefore1 seemingly that which moves most the appetite1 answers to the notion of the last end4 ,now this is pleasure3 and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason1 that it causes him to despise other goods4 ,therefore it seems that man's last end1 which is happiness1 consists principally in pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since desire is for good1 it seems that what all desire is best4 ,but all desire delight2 both wise and foolish1 and even irrational creatures4 ,therefore delight is the best of all4 ,therefore happiness1 which is the supreme good1 consists in pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii73 ,any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses1 will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending3 and if they can render a man happy1 there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too4 ,i answer that1 ,because bodily delights are more generally known1 the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them 7,ethic4 vii1 #ac71 although other delights excel them3 and yet happiness does not consist in them4 ,because in every thing1 that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident3 thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal1 and another that he is a risible animal4 ,we must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness1 or from some part of happiness2 since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good1 either in reality1 or in hope1 or at least in memory4 ,now a fitting good1 if indeed it be the perfect good1 is precisely man's happiness3 and if it is imperfect1 it is a share of happiness1 either proximate1 or remote1 or at least apparent4 ,therefore it is evident that neither is delight1 which results from the perfect good1 the very essence of happiness1 but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident4 ,but bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way4 ,for it results from a good apprehended by sense1 which is a power of the soul1 which power makes use of the body4 ,now good pertaining to the body1 and apprehended by sense1 cannot be man's perfect good4 ,for since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter1 that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ1 has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body3 just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things1 since a form is1 after a fashion1 contracted and bounded by matter1 so that a form which is independent of matter is1 in a way1 infinite4 ,therefore sense1 which is a power of the body1 knows the singular1 which is determinate through matter3 whereas the intellect1 which is a power independent of matter1 knows the universal1 which is abstracted from matter1 and contains an infinite number of singulars4 ,consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body1 and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense1 is not man's perfect good1 but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul4 ,hence it is written 7,wis4 #g3i7 that all gold in comparison of her1 is as a little sand4 ,and therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself1 nor a proper accident of happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it comes to the same whether we desire good1 or desire delight1 which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good3 thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there4 ,consequently just as good is desired for itself1 so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else1 if the preposition for denote the final cause4 ,but if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause1 thus delight is desirable for something else1 i4e4 for the good1 which is the object of that delight1 and consequently is its principle1 and gives it its form3 for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses1 through being the principles of our knowledge1 are more perceptible4 ,and so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all desire delight in the same way as they desire good3 and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely1 as stated above 7ad #a74 ,consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good1 but that every delight results from some good1 and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,some ,good of the ,soul ,constitutes ,man's ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness4 ,for happiness is man's good4 ,now this is threefold3 external goods1 goods of the body1 and goods of the soul4 ,but happiness does not consist in external goods1 nor in goods of the body1 as shown above 7,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,therefore it consists in goods of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we love that for which we desire good1 more than the good that we desire for it3 thus we love a friend for whom we desire money1 more than we love money4 ,but whatever good a man desires1 he desires it for himself4 ,therefore he loves himself more than all other goods4 ,now happiness is what is loved above all3 which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired4 ,therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself3 not1 however1 in goods of the body2 therefore1 in goods of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected4 ,but happiness is a perfection of man4 ,therefore happiness is something belonging to man4 ,but it is not something belonging to the body1 as shown above 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore it is something belonging to the soul2 and thus it consists in goods of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bb71 that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake4 ,but man is not to be loved for his own sake1 but whatever is in man is to be loved for ,god's sake4 ,therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h71 the end is twofold3 namely1 the thing itself1 which we desire to attain1 and the use1 namely1 the attainment or possession of that thing4 ,if1 then1 we speak of man's last end1 it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it4 ,because the soul1 considered in itself1 is as something existing in potentiality3 for it becomes knowing actually1 from being potentially knowing2 and actually virtuous1 from being potentially virtuous4 ,now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment1 that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end4 ,therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end4 ,in like manner neither can anything belonging to it1 whether power1 habit1 or act4 ,for that good which is the last end1 is the perfect good fulfilling the desire4 ,now man's appetite1 otherwise the will1 is for the universal good4 ,and any good inherent to the soul is a participated good1 and consequently a portioned good4 ,therefore none of them can be man's last end4 ,but if we speak of man's last end1 as to the attainment or possession thereof1 or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end1 thus does something of man1 in respect of his soul1 belong to his last end3 since man attains happiness through his soul4 ,therefore the thing itself which is desired as end1 is that which constitutes happiness1 and makes man happy2 but the attainment of this thing is called happiness4 ,consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul2 but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire1 thus the good of the soul is not only power1 habit1 or act1 but also the object of these1 which is something outside4 ,and in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as far as the proposed objection is concerned1 happiness is loved above all1 as the good desired2 whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired2 and thus1 too1 man loves himself4 ,consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases4 ,as to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of ,charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,happiness1 itself1 since it is a perfection of the soul1 is an inherent good of the soul2 but that which constitutes happiness1 viz4 which makes man happy1 is something outside his soul1 as stated above4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,any ,created ,good ,constitutes ,man's ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 that ,divine wisdom unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things1 from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature4 ,but man's highest good is happiness4 ,since then the angel is above man in the order of nature1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a71 it seems that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the last end of each thing is that which1 in relation to it1 is perfect3 hence the part is for the whole1 as for its end4 ,but the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm1 is compared to man who is called the microcosm 7,phys4 viii1 #b71 as perfect to imperfect4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire4 ,but man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity4 ,since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation1 it seems that man can be made happy by some created good4 ,consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #bf73 ,as the soul is the life of the body1 so ,god is man's life of happiness3 of ,whom it is written3 ',happy is that people whose ,god is the ,lord' 7,ps4 #adc3ae74 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness4 ,for happiness is the perfect good1 which lulls the appetite altogether2 else it would not be the last end1 if something yet remained to be desired4 ,now the object of the will1 i4e4 of man's appetite1 is the universal good2 just as the object of the intellect is the universal true4 ,hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will1 save the universal good4 ,this is to be found1 not in any creature1 but in ,god alone2 because every creature has goodness by participation4 ,wherefore ,god alone can satisfy the will of man1 according to the words of ,ps4 #ajb3e3 ,who satisfieth thy desire with good things4 ,therefore ,god alone constitutes man's happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature1 by a kind of likeness2 but man does not rest there as in his last end1 but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good1 which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed1 as being the infinite and perfect good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if a whole be not the last end1 but ordained to a further end1 then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself1 but something else4 ,now the universe of creatures1 to which man is compared as part to whole1 is not the last end1 but is ordained to ,god1 as to its last end4 ,therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe1 but ,god himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,created good is not less than that good of which man is capable1 as of something intrinsic and inherent to him3 but it is less than the good of which he is capable1 as of an object1 and which is infinite4 ,and the participated good which is in an angel1 and in the whole universe1 is a finite and restricted good4 ,,question #c ,,what ,,is ,,happiness 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we have now to consider 7#a7 what happiness is1 and 7#b7 what things are required for it4 ,concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether happiness is something uncreated8 7#b7 ,if it be something created1 whether it is an operation8 7#c7 ,whether it is an operation of the sensitive1 or only of the intellectual part8 7#d7 ,if it be an operation of the intellectual part1 whether it is an operation of the intellect1 or of the will8 7#e7 ,if it be an operation of the intellect1 whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect8 7#f7 ,if it be an operation of the speculative intellect1 whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences8 7#g7 ,whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz4 angels8 7#h7 ,whether it consists in the sole contemplation of ,god seen in ,his ,essence8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,happiness ,is ,something ,uncreated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that happiness is something uncreated4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii73 ,we must needs confess that ,god is happiness itself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is the supreme good4 ,but it belongs to ,god to be the supreme good4 ,since1 then1 there are not several supreme goods1 it seems that happiness is the same as ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness is the last end1 to which man's will tends naturally4 ,but man's will should tend to nothing else as an end1 but to ,god1 ,who alone is to be enjoyed1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e1 #bb74 ,therefore happiness is the same as ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,nothing made is uncreated4 ,but man's happiness is something made2 because according to ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #c73 ,those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy4 ,therefore happiness is not something uncreated4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g71 our end is twofold4 ,first1 there is the thing itself which we desire to attain3 thus for the miser1 the end is money4 ,secondly there is the attainment or possession1 the use or enjoyment of the thing desired2 thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money2 and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable4 ,in the first sense1 then1 man's last end is the uncreated good1 namely1 ,god1 ,who alone by ,his infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will4 ,but in the second way1 man's last end is something created1 existing in him1 and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end4 ,now the last end is called happiness4 ,if1 therefore1 we consider man's happiness in its cause or object1 then it is something uncreated2 but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness1 then it is something created4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is happiness by ,his ,essence3 for ,he is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else1 but by ,his ,essence4 ,on the other hand1 men are happy1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii71 by participation2 just as they are called gods1 by participation4 ,and this participation of happiness1 in respect of which man is said to be happy1 is something created4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,happiness is called man's supreme good1 because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,happiness is said to be the last end1 in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,happiness ,is an ,operation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that happiness is not an operation4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #f3bb73 ,you have your fruit unto sanctification1 and the end1 life everlasting4 ,but life is not an operation1 but the very being of living things4 ,therefore the last end1 which is happiness1 is not an operation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii7 that happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things4 ,but state does not indicate operation4 ,therefore happiness is not an operation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness signifies something existing in the happy one3 since it is man's final perfection4 ,but the meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in the operator1 but rather something proceeding therefrom4 ,therefore happiness is not an operation4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 happiness remains in the happy one4 ,now operation does not remain1 but passes4 ,therefore happiness is not an operation4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 to one man there is one happiness4 ,but operations are many4 ,therefore happiness is not an operation4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly4 ,but human operation is often interrupted2 for instance1 by sleep1 or some other occupation1 or by cessation4 ,therefore happiness is not an operation4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7 that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,in so far as man's happiness is something created1 existing in him1 we must needs say that it is an operation4 ,for happiness is man's supreme perfection4 ,now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual2 since potentiality without act is imperfect4 ,consequently happiness must consist in man's last act4 ,but it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator1 wherefore the ,philosopher calls it second act 7,de ,anima ii1 #a73 because that which has a form can be potentially operating1 just as he who knows is potentially considering4 ,and hence it is that in other things1 too1 each one is said to be for its operation 7,de ,coel ii1 #c74 ,therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,life is taken in two senses4 ,first for the very being of the living4 ,and thus happiness is not life3 since it has been shown 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #e7 that the being of a man1 no matter in what it may consist1 is not that man's happiness2 for of ,god alone is it true that ,his ,being is ,his ,happiness4 ,secondly1 life means the operation of the living1 by which operation the principle of life is made actual3 thus we speak of active and contemplative life1 or of a life of pleasure4 ,and in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end1 as is clear from ,john #ag3c3 ,this is eternal life1 that they may know ,thee1 the only true ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,boethius1 in defining happiness1 considered happiness in general3 for considered thus it is the perfect common good2 and he signified this by saying that happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things1 thus implying that the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good4 ,but ,aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness1 showing by what man is established in this state1 and that it is by some kind of operation4 ,and so it is that he proves happiness to be the perfect good 7,ethic4 i1 #g74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in ,metaph4 ix1 #g action is twofold4 ,one proceeds from the agent into outward matter1 such as to burn and to cut4 ,and such an operation cannot be happiness3 for such an operation is an action and a perfection1 not of the agent1 but rather of the patient1 as is stated in the same passage4 ,the other is an action that remains in the agent1 such as to feel1 to understand1 and to will3 and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent4 ,and such an operation can be happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since happiness signifies some final perfection2 according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection1 so must there be various meanings applied to happiness4 ,for in ,god there is happiness essentially2 since ,his very ,being is ,his operation1 whereby ,he enjoys no other than ,himself4 ,in the happy angels1 the final perfection is in respect of some operation1 by which they are united to the ,uncreated ,good3 and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting4 ,but in men1 according to their present state of life1 the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to ,god3 but this operation neither can be continual1 nor1 consequently1 is it one only1 because operation is multiplied by being discontinued4 ,and for this reason in the present state of life1 perfect happiness cannot be attained by man4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher1 in placing man's happiness in this life 7,ethic4 i1 #aj71 says that it is imperfect1 and after a long discussion1 concludes3 ,we call men happy1 but only as men4 ,but ,god has promised us perfect happiness1 when we shall be as the angels 4 4 4 in heaven 7,matt4 #bb3cj74 ,consequently in regard to this perfect happiness1 the objection fails3 because in that state of happiness1 man's mind will be united to ,god by one1 continual1 everlasting operation4 ,but in the present life1 in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness4 ,nevertheless it is a participation of happiness3 and so much the greater1 as the operation can be more continuous and more one4 ,consequently the active life1 which is busy with many things1 has less of happiness than the contemplative life1 which is busied with one thing1 i4e4 the contemplation of truth4 ,and if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation1 yet since he can always easily turn to it1 and since he ordains the very cessation1 by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise1 to the aforesaid occupation1 the latter seems1 as it were1 continuous4 ,from these remarks the replies to ,objections #e and #f are evident4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,happiness ,is an ,operation of the ,sensitive ,part1 or of the ,intellective ,part ,only8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also4 ,for there is no more excellent operation in man than that of the senses1 except the intellective operation4 ,but in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive3 since we cannot understand without a phantasm 7,de ,anima iii1 #g74 ,therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii7 that happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things4 ,but some goods are sensible1 which we attain by the operation of the senses4 ,therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness is the perfect good1 as we find proved in ,ethic4 i1 #g3 which would not be true1 were not man perfected thereby in all his parts4 ,but some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations4 ,therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us3 but they have not happiness in common with us4 ,therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may belong to happiness in three ways3 7#a7 essentially1 7#b7 antecedently1 7#c7 consequently4 ,now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially4 ,for man's happiness consists essentially in his being united to the ,uncreated ,good1 ,which is his last end1 as shown above 7,a4 #a73 to ,which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses4 ,again1 in like manner1 because1 as shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #e71 man's happiness does not consist in goods of the body1 which goods alone1 however1 we attain through the operation of the senses4 ,nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness1 both antecedently and consequently3 antecedently1 in respect of imperfect happiness1 such as can be had in this life1 since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense2 consequently1 in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven2 because at the resurrection1 from the very happiness of the soul1 as ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,dioscor47 the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow1 so as to be perfected in their operations2 a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection 7,suppl4 ,,qq4 #hb-he74 ,but then the operation whereby man's mind is united to ,god will not depend on the senses4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness1 such as can be had in this life4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,perfect happiness1 such as the angels have1 includes the aggregate of all good things1 by being united to the universal source of all good2 not that it requires each individual good4 ,but in this imperfect happiness1 we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in perfect happiness the entire man is perfected1 in the lower part of his nature1 by an overflow from the higher4 ,but in the imperfect happiness of this life1 it is otherwise2 we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #d ,whether1 ,if ,happiness ,is in the ,intellective ,part1 ,it ,is an ,operation of the ,intellect or of the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #aj1 #aa71 that man's happiness consists in peace2 wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #adg3c73 ,who hath placed peace in thy end ,douay3 'borders'4 ,but peace pertains to the will4 ,therefore man's happiness is in the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is the supreme good4 ,but good is the object of the will4 ,therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the last end corresponds to the first mover3 thus the last end of the whole army is victory1 which is the end of the general1 who moves all the men4 ,but the first mover in regard to operations is the will3 because it moves the other powers1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #i1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,therefore happiness regards the will4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if happiness be an operation1 it must needs be man's most excellent operation4 ,but the love of ,god1 which is an act of the will1 is a more excellent operation than knowledge1 which is an operation of the intellect1 as the ,apostle declares 7#a ,cor4 #ac74 ,therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #e7 that happy is he who has whatever he desires1 and desires nothing amiss4 ,and a little further on 7#f7 he adds3 ,he is most happy who desires well1 whatever he desires3 for good things make a man happy1 and such a man already possesses some good--i4e4 a good will4 ,therefore happiness consists in an act of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,john #ag3c73 ,this is eternal life3 that they may know ,thee1 the only true ,god4 ,now eternal life is the last end1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,therefore man's happiness consists in the knowledge of ,god1 which is an act of the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #f7 two things are needed for happiness3 one1 which is the essence of happiness3 the other1 that is1 as it were1 its proper accident1 i4e4 the delight connected with it4 ,i say1 then1 that as to the very essence of happiness1 it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will4 ,for it is evident from what has been said 7,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g7 that happiness is the attainment of the last end4 ,but the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will4 ,for the will is directed to the end1 both absent1 when it desires it2 and present1 when it is delighted by resting therein4 ,now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end1 but is a movement towards the end3 while delight comes to the will from the end being present2 and not conversely1 is a thing made present1 by the fact that the will delights in it4 ,therefore1 that the end be present to him who desires it1 must be due to something else than an act of the will4 ,this is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends4 ,for if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will1 the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it4 ,but at the moment it is far from him2 and he attains it1 by grasping it in his hand1 or in some like manner2 and then he delights in the money got4 ,and so it is with an intelligible end4 ,for at first we desire to attain an intelligible end2 we attain it1 through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect2 and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained4 ,so1 therefore1 the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect3 but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will4 ,in this sense ,augustine says 7,confess4 x1 #bc7 that happiness is joy in truth1 because1 to wit1 joy itself is the consummation of happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,peace pertains to man's last end1 not as though it were the very essence of happiness2 but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto3 antecedent1 in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end3 consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end1 he remains at peace1 his desire being at rest4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will's first object is not its act3 just as neither is the first object of the sight1 vision1 but a visible thing4 ,wherefore1 from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will1 as the will's first object1 it follows that it does not belong to it as its act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellect apprehends the end before the will does3 yet motion towards the end begins in the will4 ,and therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end1 viz4 delight or enjoyment4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,love ranks above knowledge in moving1 but knowledge precedes love in attaining3 for naught is loved save what is known1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a74 ,consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect2 just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,he who has whatever he desires1 is happy1 because he has what he desires3 and this indeed is by something other than the act of his will4 ,but to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness1 as a necessary disposition thereto4 ,and a good will is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy1 forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will3 just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus1 for instance1 alteration to the genus quality4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,happiness ,is an ,operation of the ,speculative1 or of the ,practical ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect4 ,for the end of every creature consists in becoming like ,god4 ,but man is like ,god1 by his practical intellect1 which is the cause of things understood1 rather than by his speculative intellect1 which derives its knowledge from things4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is man's perfect good4 ,but the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect1 which is ordained to the true4 ,hence we are said to be good1 in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect1 but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect1 according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness is a good of man himself4 ,but the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man2 whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself1 viz4 his operations and passions4 ,therefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #h7 that contemplation is promised us1 as being the goal of all our actions1 and the everlasting perfection of our joys4 ,i answer that1 ,happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect4 ,this is evident for three reasons4 ,first because if man's happiness is an operation1 it must needs be man's highest operation4 ,now man's highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object3 and his highest power is the intellect1 whose highest object is the ,divine ,good1 which is the object1 not of the practical but of the speculative intellect4 ,consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation1 viz4 in the contemplation of ,divine things4 ,and since that seems to be each man's self1 which is best in him1 according to ,ethic4 ix1 #h1 and x1 #g1 therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him4 ,secondly1 it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake4 ,but the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action3 and these very actions are ordained to some end4 ,consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life1 which pertains to the practical intellect4 ,thirdly1 it is again evident1 from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him1 viz4 with ,god and the angels1 to whom he is made like by happiness4 ,but in things pertaining to the active life1 other animals also have something in common with man1 although imperfectly4 ,therefore the last and perfect happiness1 which we await in the life to come1 consists entirely in contemplation4 ,but imperfect happiness1 such as can be had here1 consists first and principally1 in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #g1 #h4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the asserted likeness of the practical intellect to ,god is one of proportion2 that is to say1 by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows1 as ,god does to what ,he knows4 ,but the likeness of the speculative intellect to ,god is one of union and information2 which is a much greater likeness4 ,and yet it may be answered that1 in regard to the principal thing known1 which is ,his ,essence1 ,god has not practical but merely speculative knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it3 but the speculative intellect has good within it1 viz4 the contemplation of truth4 ,and if this good be perfect1 the whole man is perfected and made good thereby3 such a good the practical intellect has not2 but it directs man thereto4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument would hold1 if man himself were his own last end2 for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions would be his happiness4 ,but since man's last end is something outside of him1 to wit1 ,god1 to ,whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect2 therefore1 man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,happiness ,consists in the ,consideration of ,speculative ,sciences8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7 that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue4 ,and in distinguishing the virtues1 he gives no more than three speculative virtues--knowledge1 wisdom and understanding1 which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which all desire for its own sake1 seems to be man's final happiness4 ,now such is the consideration of speculative sciences2 because1 as stated in ,metaph4 i1 #a1 all men naturally desire to know2 and1 a little farther on 7#b71 it is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes4 ,therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness is man's final perfection4 ,now everything is perfected1 according as it is reduced from potentiality to act4 ,but the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences1 man's final happiness consists4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 #i3bc73 ,let not the wise man glory in his wisdom3 and this is said in reference to speculative sciences4 ,therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the consideration of these4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #d71 man's happiness is twofold1 one perfect1 the other imperfect4 ,and by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness2 and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto1 but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness4 ,thus perfect prudence is in man1 with whom is the idea of things to be done2 while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals1 who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence4 ,accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,to prove this1 we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science3 since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles4 ,now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses1 as the ,philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the ,metaphysics 7i1 #a71 and at the end of the ,posterior ,analytics 7ii1 #ae74 ,wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead4 ,now man's final happiness1 which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles4 ,for a thing is not perfected by something lower1 except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher4 ,now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible1 is lower than man4 ,consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone1 as such1 but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect1 viz4 the intelligible light1 or something of the kind4 ,now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself4 ,therefore man's final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect4 ,but it has been shown 7,i1 ,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #b71 that man cannot acquire through sensibles1 the knowledge of separate substances1 which are above the human intellect4 ,consequently it follows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences4 ,however1 just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances1 so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in his book on ,ethics the ,philosopher treats of imperfect happiness1 such as can be had in this life1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not only is perfect happiness naturally desired1 but also any likeness or participation thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,our intellect is reduced to act1 in a fashion1 by the consideration of speculative sciences1 but not to its final and perfect act4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,happiness ,consists in the ,knowledge of ,separate ,substances1 ,namely1 ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances1 namely1 angels4 ,for ,gregory says in a homily 7xxvi in ,evang473 ,it avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men1 if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels2 by which he means final happiness4 ,but we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them4 ,therefore it seems that man's final happiness consists in contemplating the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle3 wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect figure1 because its beginning and end coincide4 ,but the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels1 by whom men are enlightened1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv74 ,therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 each nature is perfect1 when united to a higher nature2 just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual nature4 ,but above the human intellect1 in the natural order1 are the angels4 ,therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 #i3bd73 ,let him that glorieth1 glory in this1 that he understandeth and knoweth ,me4 ,therefore man's final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #f71 man's perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation1 but in that which is so by its essence4 ,now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that power belongs to it4 ,now the proper object of the intellect is the true4 ,therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth1 does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection4 ,since1 therefore1 the order of things is the same in being and in truth 7,metaph4 ii1 #a72 whatever are beings by participation1 are true by participation4 ,now angels have being by participation3 because in ,god alone is ,his ,being ,his ,essence1 as shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a74 ,it follows that contemplation of ,him makes man perfectly happy4 ,however1 there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels2 and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we shall take part in the feasts of the angels1 by contemplating not only the angels1 but1 together with them1 also ,god ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels1 it seems fitting enough1 that man's happiness should consist in the contemplation of the angels1 in the union1 as it were1 of man with his beginning4 ,but this is erroneous1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with ,god1 ,who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment4 ,whereas the angel enlightens as a minister1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,consequently1 by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness2 but he is not the object of man's happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the lower nature may reach the higher in two ways4 ,first1 according to a degree of the participating power3 and thus man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels4 ,secondly1 as the object is attained by the power3 and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,man's ,happiness ,consists in the ,vision of the ,divine ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,myst4 ,theol4 i7 that by that which is highest in his intellect1 man is united to ,god as to something altogether unknown4 ,but that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown4 ,therefore the final perfection of the intellect1 namely1 happiness1 does not consist in ,god being seen in ,his ,essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature4 ,but to see ,his own ,essence is the perfection proper to the ,divine intellect4 ,therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this1 but consists in something less4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,john #c3b73 ,when ,he shall appear1 we shall be like to ,him2 and ,vulg43 'because' we shall see ,him as ,he is4 ,i answer that1 ,final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,to make this clear1 two points must be observed4 ,first1 that man is not perfectly happy1 so long as something remains for him to desire and seek3 secondly1 that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object4 ,now the object of the intellect is what a thing is1 i4e4 the essence of a thing1 according to ,de ,anima iii1 #f4 ,wherefore the intellect attains perfection1 in so far as it knows the essence of a thing4 ,if therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect1 whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause1 i4e4 to know of the cause what it is2 that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply1 although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge that the cause is4 ,consequently1 when man knows an effect1 and knows that it has a cause1 there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause1 what it is4 ,and this desire is one of wonder1 and causes inquiry1 as is stated in the beginning of the ,metaphysics 7i1 #b74 ,for instance1 if a man1 knowing the eclipse of the sun1 consider that it must be due to some cause1 and know not what that cause is1 he wonders about it1 and from wondering proceeds to inquire4 ,nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause4 ,if therefore the human intellect1 knowing the essence of some created effect1 knows no more of ,god than that ,he is2 the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the ,first ,cause1 but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause4 ,wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy4 ,consequently1 for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very ,essence of the ,first ,cause4 ,and thus it will have its perfection through union with ,god as with that object1 in which alone man's happiness consists1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #g2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #h74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h71 the end has a twofold acceptation4 ,first1 as to the thing itself which is desired3 and in this way1 the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature1 and indeed of all things1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h74 ,secondly1 as to the attainment of this thing2 and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower1 according to their respective habitudes to that thing4 ,so then in the happiness of ,god1 ,who1 in understanding his ,essence1 comprehends ,it1 is higher than that of a man or angel who sees ,it indeed1 but comprehends ,it not4 ,,question #d ,,of ,,those ,,things ,,that ,,are ,,required ,,for ,,happiness 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we have now to consider those things that are required for happiness3 and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether delight is required for happiness8 7#b7 ,which is of greater account in happiness1 delight or vision8 7#c7 ,whether comprehension is required8 7#d7 ,whether rectitude of the will is required8 7#e7 ,whether the body is necessary for man's happiness8 7#f7 ,whether any perfection of the body is necessary8 7#g7 ,whether any external goods are necessary8 7#h7 ,whether the fellowship of friends is necessary8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,delight ,is ,required for ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that delight is not required for happiness4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #h7 that vision is the entire reward of faith4 ,but the prize or reward of virtue is happiness1 as the ,philosopher clearly states 7,ethic4 i1 #i74 ,therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is the most self-sufficient of all goods1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 i1 #g74 ,but that which needs something else is not self-sufficient4 ,since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing ,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h72 it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered 7,ethic4 vii1 #ac74 ,but delight hinders the operation of the intellect3 since it destroys the estimate of prudence 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,therefore delight is not necessary for happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 x1 #bc7 that happiness is joy in truth4 ,i answer that1 ,one thing may be necessary for another in four ways4 ,first1 as a preamble and preparation to it3 thus instruction is necessary for science4 ,secondly1 as perfecting it3 thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body4 ,thirdly1 as helping it from without3 thus friends are necessary for some undertaking4 ,fourthly1 as something attendant on it3 thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire4 ,and in this way delight is necessary for happiness4 ,for it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained4 ,wherefore1 since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the ,sovereign ,good1 it cannot be without concomitant delight4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from the very fact that a reward is given to anyone1 the will of him who deserves it is at rest1 and in this consists delight4 ,consequently1 delight is included in the very notion of reward4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the very sight of ,god causes delight4 ,consequently1 he who sees ,god cannot need delight4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it1 rather does it perfect it1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #d3 since what we do with delight1 we do with greater care and perseverance4 ,on the other hand1 delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto3 sometimes by distracting the attention because1 as already observed1 we are more attentive to those things that delight us2 and when we are very attentive to one thing1 we must needs be less attentive to another3 sometimes on account of opposition2 thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason1 hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #b ,whether in ,happiness ,vision ,ranks ,before ,delight8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in happiness1 delight ranks before vision4 ,for delight is the perfection of operation 7,ethic4 x1 #d74 ,but perfection ranks before the thing perfected4 ,therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect1 i4e4 vision4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that by reason of which a thing is desirable1 is yet more desirable4 ,but operations are desired on account of the delight they afford3 hence1 too1 nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species1 lest animals should disregard such operations4 ,therefore1 in happiness1 delight ranks before the operation of the intellect1 which is vision4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 vision corresponds to faith2 while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity4 ,but charity ranks before faith1 as the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ac74 ,therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision4 ,on the contrary1 ,the cause is greater than its effect4 ,but vision is the cause of delight4 ,therefore vision ranks before delight4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,philosopher discusses this question 7,ethic4 x1 #d71 and leaves it unsolved4 ,but if one consider the matter carefully1 the operation of the intellect which is vision1 must needs rank before delight4 ,for delight consists in a certain repose of the will4 ,now that the will finds rest in anything1 can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes4 ,if therefore the will reposes in an operation1 the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation4 ,nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose2 for thus the very act of the will would be the end1 which has been disproved above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d73 but it seeks to be at rest in the operation1 because that operation is its good4 ,consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth1 because it is a result of youth4 ,consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision2 but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good1 but to some particular good which is delightful4 ,and consequently1 according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals1 operations are sought for the sake of delight4 ,but the intellect apprehends the universal good1 the attainment of which results in delight3 wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight4 ,hence it is that the ,divine intellect1 which is the ,author of nature1 adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations4 ,and we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite1 but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,charity does not seek the beloved good for the sake of delight3 it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good gained which it loves4 ,thus delight does not answer to charity as its end1 but vision does1 whereby the end is first made present to charity4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,comprehension ,is ,necessary for ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness4 ,for ,augustine says 7,ad ,paulinam de ,videndo ,deum2 99,cf4 ,serm4 xxxciii ,de ,verb4 ,dom473 ,to reach ,god with the mind is happiness1 to comprehend ,him is impossible4 ,therefore happiness is without comprehension4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part1 wherein there are no other powers than the intellect and will1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,,qq4 #gi and following74 ,but the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing ,god1 and the will by enjoying ,him4 ,therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 happiness consists in an operation4 ,but operations are determined by their objects3 and there are two universal objects1 the true and the good3 of which the true corresponds to vision1 and good to delight4 ,therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #i3bd73 ,so run that you may comprehend ,douay3 'obtain'4 ,but happiness is the goal of the spiritual race3 hence he says 7#b ,tim4 #d3g1 #h73 ,i have fought a good fight1 ,i have finished my course1 ,i have kept the faith2 as to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice4 ,therefore comprehension is necessary for ,happiness4 ,i answer that1 ,since ,happiness consists in gaining the last end1 those things that are required for ,happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end4 ,now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect1 and partly through his will3 through his intellect1 in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect3 through the will1 first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything2 secondly1 by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved1 which relation may be threefold4 ,for sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover3 and then it is no longer sought for4 ,sometimes it is not present1 and it is impossible to attain it3 and then1 too1 it is not sought for4 ,but sometimes it is possible to attain it1 yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer1 so that he cannot have it forthwith2 and this is the relation of one that hopes1 to that which he hopes for1 and this relation alone causes a search for the end4 ,to these three1 there are a corresponding three in ,happiness itself4 ,for perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge2 presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope2 but delight in the end now present results from love1 as already stated 7,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,and therefore these three must concur with ,happiness2 to wit1 vision1 which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end2 comprehension1 which implies presence of the end2 and delight or enjoyment1 which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,comprehension is twofold4 ,first1 inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor2 and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite1 is itself finite4 ,wherefore ,god cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect4 ,secondly1 comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed3 thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend 99,in ,english we should say 'catch4' him when he lays hold on him4 ,and in this sense comprehension is necessary for ,happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as hope and love pertain to the will1 because it is the same one that loves a thing1 and that tends towards it while not possessed1 so1 too1 comprehension and delight belong to the will1 since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision2 but a certain relation to the end already gained4 ,wherefore even vision itself1 or the thing seen1 inasmuch as it is present1 is the object of comprehension4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,rectitude of the ,will ,is ,necessary for ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for ,happiness4 ,for ,happiness consists essentially in an operation of the intellect1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,but rectitude of the will1 by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart1 is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect3 for ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #d7 ,i do not approve of what ,i said in a prayer3 ,o ,god1 ,who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth4 ,for it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart1 know many truths4 ,therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what precedes does not depend on what follows4 ,but the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will4 ,therefore ,happiness1 which is the perfect operation of the intellect1 does not depend on rectitude of the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is ordained to another as its end1 is not necessary1 when the end is already gained2 as a ship1 for instance1 after arrival in port4 ,but rectitude of will1 which is by reason of virtue1 is ordained to ,happiness as to its end4 ,therefore1 ,happiness once obtained1 rectitude of the will is no longer necessary4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #e3h73 ,blessed are the clean of heart2 for they shall see ,god3 and 7,heb4 #ab3ad73 ,follow peace with all men1 and holiness2 without which no man shall see ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,rectitude of will is necessary for ,happiness both antecedently and concomitantly4 ,antecedently1 because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end4 ,now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter4 ,wherefore1 just as matter cannot receive a form1 unless it be duly disposed thereto1 so nothing gains an end1 except it be duly ordained thereto4 ,and therefore none can obtain ,happiness1 without rectitude of the will4 ,concomitantly1 because as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h71 final ,happiness consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 ,which is the very essence of goodness4 ,so that the will of him who sees the ,essence of ,god1 of necessity1 loves1 whatever he loves1 in subordination to ,god2 just as the will of him who sees not ,god's ,essence1 of necessity1 loves whatever he loves1 under the common notion of good which he knows4 ,and this is precisely what makes the will right4 ,wherefore it is evident that ,happiness cannot be without a right will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of knowledge of truth that is not the essence of goodness itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect3 but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the intellect4 ,for the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness4 ,and consequently right inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness1 just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not everything that is ordained to the end1 ceases with the getting of the end3 but only that which involves imperfection1 such as movement4 ,hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained3 but the due order to the end is necessary4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,body ,is ,necessary for ,man's ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the body is necessary for ,happiness4 ,for the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature4 ,but ,happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace4 ,now the soul1 without the body1 has not the perfection of nature2 since it is naturally a part of human nature1 and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole4 ,therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,happiness is a perfect operation1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,,aa4 #b1 #e74 ,but perfect operation follows perfect being3 since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being4 ,since1 therefore1 the soul has not perfect being1 while it is separated from the body1 just as neither has a part1 while separate from its whole2 it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,happiness is the perfection of man4 ,but the soul1 without the body1 is not man4 ,therefore ,happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the body4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #ac7 the operation of bliss1 in which operation happiness consists1 is not hindered4 ,but the operation of the separate soul is hindered2 because1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce71 the soul has a natural desire to rule the body1 the result of which is that it is held back1 so to speak1 from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey1 i4e4 to the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire4 ,but this cannot be said of the separated soul2 for it yet desires to be united to the body1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce74 ,therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 in ,happiness man is equal to the angels4 ,but the soul without the body is not equal to the angels1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce74 ,therefore it is not happy4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,apoc4 #ad3ac73 ,happy ,douay3 'blessed' are the dead who die in the ,lord4 ,i answer that1 ,happiness is twofold2 the one is imperfect and is had in this life2 the other is perfect1 consisting in the vision of ,god4 ,now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life4 ,for the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect1 either speculative or practical4 ,and the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm1 which is only in a bodily organ1 as was shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #f1 #g74 ,consequently that happiness which can be had in this life1 depends1 in a way1 on the body4 ,but as to perfect ,happiness1 which consists in the vision of ,god1 some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body2 and have said that the souls of saints1 when separated from their bodies1 do not attain to that ,happiness until the ,day of ,judgment1 when they will receive their bodies back again4 ,and this is shown to be false1 both by authority and by reason4 ,by authority1 since the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #e3f73 ,while we are in the body1 we are absent from the ,lord2 and he points out the reason of this absence1 saying3 ,for we walk by faith and not by sight4 ,now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight1 bereft of the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 we are not present to the ,lord4 ,but the souls of the saints1 separated from their bodies1 are in ,god's presence2 wherefore the text continues3 ,but we are confident and have a good will to be absent 4 4 4 from the body1 and to be present with the ,lord4 ,whence it is evident that the souls of the saints1 separated from their bodies1 walk by sight1 seeing the ,essence of ,god1 wherein is true ,happiness4 ,again this is made clear by reason4 ,for the intellect needs not the body1 for its operation1 save on account of the phantasms1 wherein it looks on the intelligible truth1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,now it is evident that the ,divine ,essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore1 since man's perfect ,happiness consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 it does not depend on the body4 ,consequently1 without the body the soul can be happy4 ,we must1 however1 notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways4 ,first1 as constituting the essence thereof2 thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection4 ,secondly1 as necessary for its well-being3 thus1 beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection4 ,wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human ,happiness1 yet it does in the second way4 ,for since operation depends on a thing's nature1 the more perfect is the soul in its nature1 the more perfectly it has its proper operation1 wherein its happiness consists4 ,hence1 ,augustine1 after inquiring 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce7 whether that perfect ,happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies1 answers that they cannot see the ,unchangeable ,substance1 as the blessed angels see ,it2 either for some other more hidden reason1 or because they have a natural desire to rule the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect1 in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body2 but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body4 ,wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it1 though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts3 for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part3 wherefore1 either the part ceases altogether to be1 when the whole is destroyed1 just as the parts of an animal1 when the animal is destroyed2 or1 if they remain1 they have another actual being1 just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line4 ,but the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body3 and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter1 and this is the being of the composite4 ,now the soul subsists in its own being1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b74 ,it follows1 therefore1 that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation2 although it has not the perfect specific nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect3 and1 therefore1 since the intellect remains1 it can have ,happiness4 ,thus the teeth of an ,ethiopian1 in respect of which he is said to be white1 can retain their whiteness1 even after extraction4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,one thing is hindered by another in two ways4 ,first1 by way of opposition2 thus cold hinders the action of heat3 and such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to ,happiness4 ,secondly1 by way of some kind of defect1 because1 to wit1 that which is hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way3 and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with ,happiness1 but prevents it from being perfect in every way4 ,and thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,for the soul desires to enjoy ,god in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body1 as far as possible4 ,and therefore1 as long as it enjoys ,god1 without the fellowship of the body1 its appetite is at rest in that which it has1 in such a way1 that it would still wish the body to attain to its share4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest1 as regards the thing desired2 since1 to wit1 it has that which suffices its appetite4 ,but it is not wholly at rest1 as regards the desirer1 since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it4 ,consequently1 after the body has been resumed1 ,happiness increases not in intensity1 but in extent4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the statement made 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce7 to the effect that the souls of the departed see not ,god as the angels do1 is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity2 because even now some souls of the ,blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels1 thus seeing ,god more clearly than the lower angels4 ,but it refers to inequality of proportion3 because the angels1 even the lowest1 have every perfection of ,happiness that they ever will have1 whereas the separated souls of the saints have not4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,perfection of the ,body ,is ,necessary for ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man's perfect ,happiness4 ,for perfection of the body is a bodily good4 ,but it has been shown above 7,q4 #b7 that ,happiness does not consist in bodily goods4 ,therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man's ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man's ,happiness consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h74 ,but the body has no part in this operation1 as shown above 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for ,happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more the intellect is abstracted from the body1 the more perfectly it understands4 ,but ,happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect4 ,therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way4 ,therefore1 in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for ,happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,happiness is the reward of virtue2 wherefore it is written 7,john #ac3ag73 ,you shall be blessed1 if you do them4 ,but the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy ,god1 but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed2 for it is written 7,isa4 #ff3ad73 ,you shall see and your heart shall rejoice1 and your bones shall flourish like a herb4 ,therefore good disposition of the body is necessary for ,happiness4 ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life1 it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it4 ,for this happiness consists1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7 in an operation according to perfect virtue2 and it is clear that man can be hindered1 by indisposition of the body1 from every operation of virtue4 ,but speaking of perfect ,happiness1 some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for ,happiness2 indeed1 that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body4 ,hence ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxii1 #bf7 quotes the words of ,porphyry who said that for the soul to be happy1 it must be severed from everything corporeal4 ,but this is unreasonable4 ,for since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body2 it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection4 ,consequently1 we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary1 both antecedently and consequently1 for that ,happiness which is in all ways perfect4 ,antecedently1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce71 if the body be such1 that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome1 like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul1 the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven4 ,whence he concludes that1 when this body will no longer be 'natural1' but 'spiritual1' then will it be equalled to the angels1 and that will be its glory1 which erstwhile was its burden4 ,consequently1 because from the ,happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body1 so that this too will obtain its perfection4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,dioscor47 that ,god gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object3 but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to ,happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the body has no part in that operation of the intellect whereby the ,essence of ,god is seen1 yet it might prove a hindrance thereto4 ,consequently1 perfection of the body is necessary1 lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul2 but not from the spiritual body1 which will be wholly subject to the spirit4 ,on this point we shall treat in the ,third ,part of this work 7,suppl41 ,q4 #hb1 seqq474 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,any ,external ,goods ,are ,necessary for ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that external goods also are necessary for ,happiness4 ,for that which is promised the saints for reward1 belongs to ,happiness4 ,but external goods are promised the saints2 for instance1 food and drink1 wealth and a kingdom3 for it is said 7,luke #bb3cj73 ,that you may eat and drink at ,my table in ,my kingdom3 and 7,matt4 #f3bj73 ,lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven3 and 7,matt4 #be3cd73 ,come1 ye blessed of ,my ,father1 possess you the kingdom4 ,therefore external goods are necessary for ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 iii73 happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things4 ,but some of man's goods are external1 although they be of least account1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai74 ,therefore they too are necessary for ,happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #e3ab73 ,your reward is very great in heaven4 ,but to be in heaven implies being in a place4 ,therefore at least external place is necessary for ,happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #gb3be73 ,for what have ,i in heaven8 and besides ,thee what do ,i desire upon earth8 ,as though to say3 ,i desire nothing but this1 --,it is good for me to adhere to my ,god4 ,therefore nothing further external is necessary for ,happiness4 ,i answer that1 ,for imperfect happiness1 such as can be had in this life1 external goods are necessary1 not as belonging to the essence of happiness1 but by serving as instruments to happiness1 which consists in an operation of virtue1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #ac4 ,for man needs in this life1 the necessaries of the body1 both for the operation of contemplative virtue1 and for the operation of active virtue1 for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations4 ,on the other hand1 such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect ,happiness1 which consists in seeing ,god4 ,the reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body2 or for certain operations which belong to human life1 which we perform by means of the animal body3 whereas that perfect ,happiness which consists in seeing ,god1 will be either in the soul separated from the body1 or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual4 ,consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that ,happiness1 since they are ordained to the animal life4 ,and since1 in this life1 the felicity of contemplation1 as being more ,godlike1 approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect ,happiness1 therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #h4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all those material promises contained in ,holy ,scripture1 are to be understood metaphorically1 inasmuch as ,scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal1 in order that from things we know1 we may rise to the desire of things unknown1 as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xi in ,evang474 ,thus food and drink signify the delight of ,happiness2 wealth1 the sufficiency of ,god for man2 the kingdom1 the lifting up of man to union of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these goods that serve for the animal life1 are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect ,happiness consists4 ,nevertheless in that ,happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things1 because whatever good there be in these things1 we shall possess it all in the ,supreme ,fount of goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #e71 it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints1 but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods4 ,nevertheless a bodily place1 viz4 the empyrean heaven1 will be appointed to the ,blessed1 not as a need of ,happiness1 but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,fellowship of ,friends ,is ,necessary for ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that friends are necessary for ,happiness4 ,for future ,happiness is frequently designated by ,scripture under the name of glory4 ,but glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many4 ,therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius 99,seneca1 ,ep4 #f says that there is no delight in possessing any good whatever1 without someone to share it with us4 ,but delight is necessary for ,happiness4 ,therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is perfected in ,happiness4 ,but charity includes the love of ,god and of our neighbor4 ,therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for ,happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #g3aa73 ,all good things came to me together with her1 i4e4 with divine wisdom1 which consists in contemplating ,god4 ,consequently nothing else is necessary for ,happiness4 ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of the happiness of this life1 the happy man needs friends1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #i71 not1 indeed1 to make use of them1 since he suffices himself2 nor to delight in them1 since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue2 but for the purpose of a good operation1 viz4 that he may do good to them2 that he may delight in seeing them do good2 and again that he may be helped by them in his good work4 ,for in order that man may do well1 whether in the works of the active life1 or in those of the contemplative life1 he needs the fellowship of friends4 ,but if we speak of perfect ,happiness which will be in our heavenly ,fatherland1 the fellowship of friends is not essential to ,happiness2 since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in ,god4 ,but the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of ,happiness4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #be7 that the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity1 truth1 and charity of the ,creator4 ,but if they can be said to be helped from without1 perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in ,god1 at their fellowship4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that glory which is essential to ,happiness1 is that which man has1 not with man but with ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy4 ,this does not apply to the question under consideration2 because man possesses in ,god a sufficiency of every good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,perfection of charity is essential to ,happiness1 as to the love of ,god1 but not as to the love of our neighbor4 ,wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying ,god1 it would be happy1 though having no neighbor to love4 ,but supposing one neighbor to be there1 love of him results from perfect love of ,god4 ,consequently1 friendship is1 as it were1 concomitant with perfect ,happiness4 ,,question #e ,,of ,,the ,,attainment ,,of ,,happiness 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider the attainment of ,happiness4 ,under this heading there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether man can attain ,happiness8 7#b7 ,whether one man can be happier than another8 7#c7 ,whether any man can be happy in this life8 7#d7 ,whether ,happiness once had can be lost8 7#e7 ,whether man can attain ,happiness by means of his natural powers8 7#f7 ,whether man attains ,happiness through the action of some higher creature8 7#g7 ,whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain ,happiness of ,god8 7#h7 ,whether every man desires ,happiness8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,man ,can ,attain ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man cannot attain happiness4 ,for just as the rational is above the sensible nature1 so the intellectual is above the rational1 as ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 vi1 vii7 in several passages4 ,but irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only1 cannot attain the end of the rational nature4 ,therefore neither can man1 who is of rational nature1 attain the end of the intellectual nature1 which is ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,true ,happiness consists in seeing ,god1 ,who is pure ,truth4 ,but from his very nature1 man considers truth in material things3 wherefore he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm 7,de ,anima iii1 #g74 ,therefore he cannot attain ,happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,happiness consists in attaining the ,sovereign ,good4 ,but we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle4 ,since1 therefore1 the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between ,god and human nature2 it seems that he cannot attain ,happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ic3ab73 ,blessed is the man whom ,thou shalt instruct1 ,o ,lord4 ,i answer that1 ,happiness is the attainment of the ,perfect ,good4 ,whoever1 therefore1 is capable of the ,perfect ,good can attain ,happiness4 ,now1 that man is capable of the ,perfect ,good1 is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good1 and because his will can desire it4 ,and therefore man can attain ,happiness4 ,this can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing ,god1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #a73 in which vision1 as we stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h7 man's perfect ,happiness consists4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the rational exceeds the sensitive nature1 otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational4 ,for the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge3 since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal1 whereas the reason has knowledge thereof4 ,but the intellectual surpasses the rational nature1 as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth3 for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason1 as was made clear in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps4 ,consequently the rational nature can attain ,happiness1 which is the perfection of the intellectual nature3 but otherwise than the angels4 ,because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation3 whereas man attains if after a time4 ,but the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms4 ,but after this state of life1 he has another natural way1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally4 ,but he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect1 by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy2 and when he has attained it1 he will be perfectly happy4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,one ,man ,can ,be ,happier ,than ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one man cannot be happier than another4 ,for ,happiness is the reward of virtue1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #i74 ,but equal reward is given for all the works of virtue2 because it is written 7,matt4 #bj3aj7 that all who labor in the vineyard received every man a penny2 for1 as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xix in ,evang471 each was equally rewarded with eternal life4 ,therefore one man cannot be happier than another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,happiness is the supreme good4 ,but nothing can surpass the supreme4 ,therefore one man's ,happiness cannot be surpassed by another's4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since ,happiness is the perfect and sufficient good 7,ethic4 i1 #g7 it brings rest to man's desire4 ,but his desire is not at rest1 if he yet lacks some good that can be got4 ,and if he lack nothing that he can get1 there can be no still greater good4 ,therefore either man is not happy2 or1 if he be happy1 no other ,happiness can be greater4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,john #ad3b73 ,in ,my ,father's house there are many mansions2 which1 according to ,augustine 7,tract4 lxvii in ,joan47 signify the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life4 ,but the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit1 is ,happiness itself4 ,therefore there are diverse degrees of ,happiness1 and ,happiness is not equally in all4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g71 ,happiness implies two things1 to wit1 the last end itself1 i4e4 the ,sovereign ,good2 and the attainment or enjoyment of that same ,good4 ,as to that ,good itself1 ,which is the object and cause of ,happiness1 one ,happiness cannot be greater than another1 since there is but one ,sovereign ,good1 namely1 ,god1 by enjoying ,whom1 men are made happy4 ,but as to the attainment or enjoyment of this ,good1 one man can be happier than another2 because the more a man enjoys this ,good the happier he is4 ,now1 that one man enjoys ,god more than another1 happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of ,him4 ,and in this sense one man can be happier than another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the one penny signifies that ,happiness is one in its object4 ,but the many mansions signify the manifold ,happiness in the divers degrees of enjoyment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,happiness is said to be the supreme good1 inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the ,supreme ,good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,none of the ,blessed lacks any desirable good2 since they have the ,infinite ,good ,itself1 ,which is the good of all good1 as ,augustine says 7,enarr4 in ,ps4 #acd74 ,but one is said to be happier than another1 by reason of diverse participation of the same good4 ,and the addition of other goods does not increase ,happiness1 since ,augustine says 7,confess4 v1 #d73 ,he who knows ,thee1 and others besides1 is not the happier for knowing them1 but is happy for knowing ,thee alone4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,one ,can ,be ,happy in ,this ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,happiness can be had in this life4 ,for it is written 7,ps4 #aah3a73 ,blessed are the undefiled in the way1 who walk in the law of the ,lord4 ,but this happens in this life4 ,therefore one can be happy in this life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 imperfect participation in the ,sovereign ,good does not destroy the nature of ,happiness1 otherwise one would not be happier than another4 ,but men can participate in the ,sovereign ,good in this life1 by knowing and loving ,god1 albeit imperfectly4 ,therefore man can be happy in this life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is said by many cannot be altogether false3 since what is in many1 comes1 apparently1 from nature2 and nature does not fail altogether4 ,now many say that ,happiness can be had in this life1 as appears from ,ps4 #adc3ae3 ,they have called the people happy that hath these things1 to wit1 the good things in this life4 ,therefore one can be happy in this life4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,job #ad3a73 ,man born of a woman1 living for a short time1 is filled with many miseries4 ,but ,happiness excludes misery4 ,therefore man cannot be happy in this life4 ,i answer that1 ,a certain participation of ,happiness can be had in this life3 but perfect and true ,happiness cannot be had in this life4 ,this may be seen from a twofold consideration4 ,first1 from the general notion of happiness4 ,for since happiness is a perfect and sufficient good1 it excludes every evil1 and fulfils every desire4 ,but in this life every evil cannot be excluded4 ,for this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils2 to ignorance on the part of the intellect2 to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite1 and to many penalties on the part of the body2 as ,augustine sets forth in ,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #d4 ,likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life4 ,for man naturally desires the good1 which he has1 to be abiding4 ,now the goods of the present life pass away2 since life itself passes away1 which we naturally desire to have1 and would wish to hold abidingly1 for man naturally shrinks from death4 ,wherefore it is impossible to have true ,happiness in this life4 ,secondly1 from a consideration of the specific nature of ,happiness1 viz4 the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 which man cannot obtain in this life1 as was shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #aa74 ,hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect ,happiness in this life4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some are said to be happy in this life1 either on account of the hope of obtaining ,happiness in the life to come1 according to ,rom4 #h3bd3 ,we are saved by hope2 or on account of a certain participation of ,happiness1 by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the ,sovereign ,good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the imperfection of participated ,happiness is due to one of two causes4 ,first1 on the part of the object of ,happiness1 which is not seen in ,its ,essence3 and this imperfection destroys the nature of true ,happiness4 ,secondly1 the imperfection may be on the part of the participator1 who indeed attains the object of ,happiness1 in itself1 namely1 ,god3 imperfectly1 however1 in comparison with the way in which ,god enjoys ,himself4 ,this imperfection does not destroy the true nature of ,happiness2 because1 since ,happiness is an operation1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #b71 the true nature of ,happiness is taken from the object1 which specifies the act1 and not from the subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life1 on account of a certain likeness to true ,happiness4 ,and thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,happiness ,once ,had ,can ,be ,lost8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,happiness can be lost4 ,for ,happiness is a perfection4 ,but every perfection is in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter4 ,since then man is1 by his nature1 changeable1 it seems that ,happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner4 ,and consequently it seems that man can lose ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,happiness consists in an act of the intellect2 and the intellect is subject to the will4 ,but the will can be directed to opposites4 ,therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy3 and thus man will cease to be happy4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the end corresponds to the beginning4 ,but man's ,happiness has a beginning1 since man was not always happy4 ,therefore it seems that it has an end4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #be3df7 of the righteous that they shall go 4 4 4 into life everlasting1 which1 as above stated 7,a4 #b71 is the ,happiness of the saints4 ,now what is eternal ceases not4 ,therefore ,happiness cannot be lost4 ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of imperfect happiness1 such as can be had in this life1 in this sense it can be lost4 ,this is clear of contemplative happiness1 which is lost either by forgetfulness1 for instance1 when knowledge is lost through sickness2 or again by certain occupations1 whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation4 ,this is also clear of active happiness3 since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue1 in whose act that happiness principally consists4 ,if1 however1 the virtue remain unimpaired1 outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness1 in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue2 but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue1 whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner4 ,and since the happiness of this life can be lost1 a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness1 therefore did the ,philosopher state 7,ethic4 i1 #aj7 that some are happy in this life1 not simply1 but as men1 whose nature is subject to change4 ,but if we speak of that perfect ,happiness which we await after this life1 it must be observed that ,origen 7,peri ,archon4 ii1 #c71 following the error of certain ,platonists1 held that man can become unhappy after the final ,happiness4 ,this1 however1 is evidently false1 for two reasons4 ,first1 from the general notion of happiness4 ,for since happiness is the perfect and sufficient good1 it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude every evil4 ,now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has1 and to have the surety of his holding3 else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of losing it1 or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it4 ,therefore it is necessary for true ,happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses4 ,if this opinion be true1 it follows that he never will lose happiness3 but if it be false1 it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion3 because the false is the evil of the intellect1 just as the true is its good1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #b4 ,consequently he will no longer be truly happy1 if evil be in him4 ,secondly1 it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of ,happiness4 ,for it has been shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h7 that man's perfect ,happiness consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,now it is impossible for anyone seeing the ,divine ,essence1 to wish not to see ,it4 ,because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without1 is either insufficient1 something more sufficing being desired in its stead2 or else has some inconvenience attached to it1 by reason of which it becomes wearisome4 ,but the vision of the ,divine ,essence fills the soul with all good things1 since it unites it to the source of all goodness2 hence it is written 7,ps4 #af3ae73 ,i shall be satisfied when ,thy glory shall appear2 and 7,wis4 #g3aa73 ,all good things came to me together with her1 i4e4 with the contemplation of wisdom4 ,in like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it2 because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom 7,wis4 #h3af73 ,her conversation hath no bitterness1 nor her company any tediousness4 ,it is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake ,happiness of his own accord4 ,moreover1 neither can he lose ,happiness1 through ,god taking it away from him4 ,because1 since the withdrawal of ,happiness is a punishment1 it cannot be enforced by ,god1 the just ,judge1 except for some fault2 and he that sees ,god cannot fall into a fault1 since rectitude of the will1 of necessity1 results from that vision as was shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #d74 ,nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent4 ,because the mind that is united to ,god is raised above all other things3 and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union4 ,therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on1 man should pass from happiness to misery1 and vice versa2 because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time and movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,happiness is consummate perfection1 which excludes every defect from the happy4 ,and therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably3 this is done by the ,divine power1 which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will can be directed to opposites1 in things which are ordained to the end2 but it is ordained1 of natural necessity1 to the last end4 ,this is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator3 but it has no end by reason of the condition of the good1 the participation of which makes man happy4 ,hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause1 its endlessness is from another4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,man ,can ,attain ,happiness by ,his ,natural ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man can attain ,happiness by his natural powers4 ,for nature does not fail in necessary things4 ,but nothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end4 ,therefore this is not lacking to human nature4 ,therefore man can attain ,happiness by his natural powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since man is more noble than irrational creatures1 it seems that he must be better equipped than they4 ,but irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers4 ,much more therefore can man attain ,happiness by his natural powers4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,happiness is a perfect operation1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #ac74 ,now the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof4 ,since1 therefore1 the imperfect operation1 which is as the beginning in human operations1 is subject to man's natural power1 whereby he is master of his own actions2 it seems that he can attain to perfect operation1 i4e4 ,happiness1 by his natural powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,man is naturally the principle of his action1 by his intellect and will4 ,but final ,happiness prepared for the saints1 surpasses the intellect and will of man2 for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #b3i7 ,eye hath not seen1 nor ear heard1 neither hath it entered into the heart of man1 what things ,god hath prepared for them that love ,him4 ,therefore man cannot attain ,happiness by his natural powers4 ,i answer that1 ,imperfect happiness that can be had in this life1 can be acquired by man by his natural powers1 in the same way as virtue1 in whose operation it consists3 on this point we shall speak further on 7,q4 #fc74 ,but man's perfect ,happiness1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h71 consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,now the vision of ,god's ,essence surpasses the nature not only of man1 but also of every creature1 as was shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d74 ,for the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance3 thus it is said of the intelligence 7,de ,causis2 ,prop4 viii7 that it knows things that are above it1 and things that are below it1 according to the mode of its substance4 ,but every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance1 falls short of the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 which infinitely surpasses all created substance4 ,consequently neither man1 nor any creature1 can attain final ,happiness by his natural powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as nature does not fail man in necessaries1 although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing1 as it provided other animals1 because it gave him reason and hands1 with which he is able to get these things for himself2 so neither did it fail man in things necessary1 although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain ,happiness3 since this it could not do4 ,but it did give him free-will1 with which he can turn to ,god1 that ,he may make him happy4 ,for what we do by means of our friends1 is done1 in a sense1 by ourselves 7,ethic4 iii1 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the nature that can attain perfect good1 although it needs help from without in order to attain it1 is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good1 but attains some imperfect good1 although it need no help from without in order to attain it1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,coel4 ii1 #ab74 ,thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health1 albeit by means of medicine1 than he who can attain but imperfect health1 without the help of medicine4 ,and therefore the rational creature1 which can attain the perfect good of happiness1 but needs the ,divine assistance for the purpose1 is more perfect than the irrational creature1 which is not capable of attaining this good1 but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when imperfect and perfect are of the same species1 they can be caused by the same power4 ,but this does not follow of necessity1 if they be of different species3 for not everything1 that can cause the disposition of matter1 can produce the final perfection4 ,now the imperfect operation1 which is subject to man's natural power1 is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness3 since operation takes its species from its object4 ,consequently the argument does not prove4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,man ,attains ,happiness ,through the ,action of ,some ,higher ,creature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature1 viz4 an angel4 ,for since we observe a twofold order in things--one1 of the parts of the universe to one another1 the other1 of the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe2 the former order is ordained to the second as to its end 7,metaph4 xii1 #aj74 ,thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to the general4 ,but the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b73 while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe1 i4e4 ,god4 ,therefore man is made happy1 through a higher creature1 viz4 an angel1 acting on him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is such in potentiality1 can be reduced to act1 by that which is such actually3 thus what is potentially hot1 is made actually hot1 by something that is actually hot4 ,but man is potentially happy4 ,therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is actually happy4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,but an angel can enlighten man's intellect as shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore an angel can make a man happy4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #hc3ab73 ,the ,lord will give grace and glory4 ,i answer that1 ,since every creature is subject to the laws of nature1 from the very fact that its power and action are limited3 that which surpasses created nature1 cannot be done by the power of any creature4 ,consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature1 it is done by ,god immediately2 such as raising the dead to life1 restoring sight to the blind1 and such like4 ,now it has been shown above 7,a4 #e7 that ,happiness is a good surpassing created nature4 ,therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature3 but by ,god alone is man made happy1 if we speak of perfect ,happiness4 ,if1 however1 we speak of imperfect happiness1 the same is to be said of it as of the virtue1 in whose act it consists4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another1 that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end1 while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end1 by causing a disposition thereto3 thus to the art of sailing1 which commands the art of shipbuilding1 it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made4 ,thus1 too1 in the order of the universe1 man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end1 in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto3 whereas he attains the last end itself through the ,first ,agent1 which is ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when a form exists perfectly and naturally in something1 it can be the principle of action on something else3 for instance a hot thing heats through heat4 ,but if a form exist in something imperfectly1 and not naturally1 it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated to something else3 thus the intention of color which is in the pupil1 cannot make a thing white2 nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else2 for if they could1 enlightening and heating would go on to infinity4 ,but the light of glory1 whereby ,god is seen1 is in ,god perfectly and naturally2 whereas in any creature1 it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation4 ,consequently no creature can communicate its ,happiness to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel1 as to certain notions of the ,divine works3 but not as to the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a73 since in order to see this1 all are immediately enlightened by ,god4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,any ,good ,works ,are ,necessary ,that ,man ,may ,receive ,happiness from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain ,happiness from ,god4 ,for since ,god is an agent of infinite power1 ,he requires before acting1 neither matter1 nor disposition of matter1 but can forthwith produce the whole effect4 ,but man's works1 since they are not required for ,happiness1 as the efficient cause thereof1 as stated above 7,a4 #f71 can be required only as dispositions thereto4 ,therefore ,god who does not require dispositions before acting1 bestows ,happiness without any previous works4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as ,god is the immediate cause of ,happiness1 so is ,he the immediate cause of nature4 ,but when ,god first established nature1 ,he produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature1 but made each one perfect forthwith in its species4 ,therefore it seems that ,he bestows ,happiness on man without any previous works4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #d3f7 that ,happiness is of the man to whom ,god reputeth justice without works4 ,therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining ,happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,john #ac3ag73 ,if you know these things1 you shall be blessed if you do them4 ,therefore ,happiness is obtained through works4 ,i answer that1 ,rectitude of the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #d71 is necessary for ,happiness2 since it is nothing else than the right order of the will to the last end2 and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end1 just as the right disposition of matter1 in order to receive the form4 ,but this does not prove that any work of man need precede his ,happiness3 for ,god could make a will having a right tendency to the end1 and at the same time attaining the end2 just as sometimes ,he disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form4 ,but the order of ,divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus2 for as is stated in ,de ,coelo ii1 #ab1 of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good1 one has it without movement1 some by one movement1 some by several4 ,now to possess the perfect good without movement1 belongs to that which has it naturally3 and to have ,happiness naturally belongs to ,god alone4 ,therefore it belongs to ,god alone not to be moved towards ,happiness by any previous operation4 ,now since ,happiness surpasses every created nature1 no pure creature can becomingly gain ,happiness1 without the movement of operation1 whereby it tends thereto4 ,but the angel1 who is above man in the natural order1 obtained it1 according to the order of ,divine wisdom1 by one movement of a meritorious work1 as was explained in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #e72 whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits4 ,wherefore also according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #i71 happiness is the reward of works of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,works are necessary to man in order to gain ,happiness2 not on account of the insufficiency of the ,divine power which bestows ,happiness1 but that the order in things be observed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith1 without any previous disposition or operation of the creature2 because ,he instituted the first individuals of the various species1 that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny4 ,in like manner1 because ,happiness was to be bestowed on others through ,christ1 who is ,god and ,man1 ,who1 according to ,heb4 #b3aj1 had brought many children into glory2 therefore1 from the very beginning of ,his conception1 ,his soul was happy1 without any previous meritorious operation4 ,but this is peculiar to ,him3 for ,christ's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of ,happiness1 though they have no merits of their own2 because by ,baptism they are made members of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,apostle is speaking of the ,happiness of ,hope1 which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace1 which is not given on account of previous works4 ,for grace is not a term of movement1 as ,happiness is2 rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards ,happiness4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,every ,man ,desires ,happiness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all desire ,happiness4 ,for no man can desire what he knows not2 since the apprehended good is the object of the appetite 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj74 ,but many know not what ,happiness is4 ,this is evident from the fact that1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #d71 some thought that ,happiness consists in pleasures of the body2 some1 in a virtue of the soul2 some in other things4 ,therefore not all desire ,happiness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the essence of ,happiness is the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h74 ,but some consider it impossible for man to see the ,divine ,essence2 wherefore they desire it not4 ,therefore all men do not desire ,happiness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #e7 that happy is he who has all he desires1 and desires nothing amiss4 ,but all do not desire this2 for some desire certain things amiss1 and yet they wish to desire such things4 ,therefore all do not desire ,happiness4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #c73 ,if that actor had said3 ',you all wish to be happy2 you do not wish to be unhappy1' he would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will4 ,therefore everyone desires to be happy4 ,i answer that1 ,happiness can be considered in two ways4 ,first according to the general notion of happiness3 and thus1 of necessity1 every man desires happiness4 ,for the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,but since good is the object of the will1 the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will4 ,consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied4 ,and this everyone desires4 ,secondly we may speak of ,happiness according to its specific notion1 as to that in which it consists4 ,and thus all do not know ,happiness2 because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found4 ,and consequently1 in this respect1 not all desire it4 ,wherefore the reply to the first ,objection is clear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason2 just as it happens that where there is no real distinction1 there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason2 so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in one way1 and not desired in another4 ,so that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good1 which is the general notion of happiness3 and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends thereto1 as stated above4 ,again it can be considered under other special aspects1 either on the part of the operation itself1 or on the part of the operating power1 or on the part of the object2 and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this definition of ,happiness given by some--,happy is the man that has all he desires1 or1 whose every wish is fulfilled1 is a good and adequate definition1 if it be understood in a certain way2 but an inadequate definition if understood in another4 ,for if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite1 thus it is true that he who has all that he desires1 is happy3 since nothing satisfies man's natural desire1 except the perfect good which is ,happiness4 ,but if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason1 thus it does not belong to ,happiness1 to have certain things that man desires2 rather does it belong to unhappiness1 in so far as the possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally2 thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth4 ,and it was through taking this into consideration that ,augustine added so as to include perfect ,happiness--that he desires nothing amiss3 although the first part suffices if rightly understood1 to wit1 that happy is he who has all he desires4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,human ,,acts3 ,,acts ,,peculiar ,,to ,,man 7,,qq4 #f-ba7 ,,question #f ,,of ,,the ,,voluntary ,,and ,,the ,,involuntary 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,since therefore ,happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts1 we must in due sequence consider human acts1 in order to know by what acts we may obtain ,happiness1 and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it4 ,but because operations and acts are concerned with things singular1 consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail4 ,the study of ,morals1 therefore1 since it treats of human acts1 should consider first the general principles2 and secondly matters of detail4 ,in treating of the general principles1 the points that offer themselves for our consideration are 7#a7 human acts themselves2 7#b7 their principles4 ,now of human acts some are proper to man2 others are common to man and animals4 ,and since ,happiness is man's proper good1 those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with ,happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals4 ,first1 then1 we must consider those acts which are proper to man2 secondly1 those acts which are common to man and the other animals1 and are called ,passions4 ,the first of these points offers a twofold consideration3 7#a7 ,what makes a human act8 7#b7 ,what distinguishes human acts8 ,and since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary1 because the will is the rational appetite1 which is proper to man2 we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary4 ,first1 then1 we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general2 secondly1 those acts which are voluntary1 as being elicited by the will1 and as issuing from the will immediately2 thirdly1 those acts which are voluntary1 as being commanded by the will1 which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers4 ,and because voluntary acts have certain circumstances1 according to which we form our judgment concerning them1 we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary1 and afterwards1 the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is anything voluntary in human acts8 7#b7 ,whether in irrational animals8 7#c7 ,whether there can be voluntariness without any action8 7#d7 ,whether violence can be done to the will8 7#e7 ,whether violence causes involuntariness8 7#f7 ,whether fear causes involuntariness8 7#g7 ,whether concupiscence causes involuntariness8 7#h7 ,whether ignorance causes involuntariness8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,anything ,voluntary in ,human ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts4 ,for that is voluntary which has its principle within itself4 as ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,natura ,hom4 xxxii41 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd71 and ,aristotle 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 declare4 ,but the principle of human acts is not in man himself1 but outside him3 since man's appetite is moved to act1 by the appetible object which is outside him1 and is as a mover unmoved 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj74 ,therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,phys4 viii1 #b7 proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from without4 ,but all human acts are new1 since none is eternal4 ,consequently1 the principle of all human acts is from without3 and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 he that acts voluntarily1 can act of himself4 ,but this is not true of man2 for it is written 7,john #ae3e73 ,without ,me you can do nothing4 ,therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation4 ,now such are human acts4 ,therefore there is something voluntary in human acts4 ,i answer that1 ,there must needs be something voluntary in human acts4 ,in order to make this clear1 we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent1 or that which is moved2 whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside4 ,for when a stone is moved upwards1 the principle of this movement is outside the stone3 whereas when it is moved downwards1 the principle of this movement is in the stone4 ,now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle1 some move themselves1 some not4 ,for since every agent or thing moved1 acts or is moved for an end1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b72 those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle1 whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end4 ,now in order for a thing to be done for an end1 some knowledge of the end is necessary4 ,therefore1 whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle1 that it has some knowledge of the end1 has within itself the principle of its act1 so that it not only acts1 but acts for an end4 ,on the other hand1 if a thing has no knowledge of the end1 even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement1 nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing1 but in something else1 by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing1 but in something else1 by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it4 ,wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves1 but to be moved by others4 ,but those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end4 ,and consequently1 since both are from an intrinsic principle1 to wit1 that they act and that they act for an end1 the movements of such things are said to be voluntary3 for the word voluntary implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination4 ,hence it is that1 according to the definitions of ,aristotle1 ,gregory of ,nyssa1 and ,damascene 99,see ,objection #a1 the voluntary is defined not only as having a principle within the agent1 but also as implying knowledge4 ,therefore1 since man especially knows the end of his work1 and moves himself1 in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every principle is a first principle4 ,therefore1 although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent1 nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle3 because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle4 ,yet again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first in a genus1 but not first simply3 thus in the genus of things subject to alteration1 the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body1 which nevertheless is not the first mover simply1 but is moved locally by a higher mover4 ,and so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act1 i4e4 the cognitive and appetitive power1 is the first principle in the genus of appetitive movement1 although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,new movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without2 and this in two respects4 ,first1 in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible1 which1 on being apprehended1 moves the appetite4 ,thus a lion1 on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him1 begins to be moved towards the stag4 ,secondly1 in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body1 as in the case of cold or heat2 and through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body1 the sensitive appetite which is the power of a bodily organ1 is also moved indirectly2 thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of something4 ,but this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness1 as stated above 7ad #a71 for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god moves man to act1 not only by proposing the appetible to the senses1 or by effecting a change in his body1 but also by moving the will itself2 because every movement either of the will or of nature1 proceeds from ,god as the ,first ,mover4 ,and just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from ,god as the ,first ,mover1 inasmuch as nature is an instrument of ,god moving it3 so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act1 that it proceed from ,god1 inasmuch as the will is moved by ,god4 ,nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common1 that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,is ,anything ,voluntary in ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals4 ,for a thing is called voluntary from voluntas 7will74 ,now since the will is in the reason 7,de ,anima iii1 #i71 it cannot be in irrational animals4 ,therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according as human acts are voluntary1 man is said to be master of his actions4 ,but irrational animals are not masters of their actions2 for they act not2 rather are they acted upon1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bg74 ,therefore there is no such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 #bd7 that voluntary acts lead to praise and blame4 ,but neither praise nor blame is due to the acts of irrational minds4 ,therefore such acts are not voluntary4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #b7 that both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary4 ,the same is said by ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 #bd7 and ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxii44 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent1 together with some knowledge of the end4 ,now knowledge of the end is twofold2 perfect and imperfect4 ,perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end1 but also in knowing it under the aspect of end1 and the relationship of the means to that end4 ,and such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature4 ,but imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end1 without knowing it under the aspect of end1 or the relationship of an act to the end4 ,such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals1 through their senses and their natural estimative power4 ,consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary2 inasmuch as1 having apprehended the end1 a man can1 from deliberating about the end and the means thereto1 be moved1 or not1 to gain that end4 ,but imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary2 inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end1 but does not deliberate1 and is moved to the end at once4 ,wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature3 whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will is the name of the rational appetite2 and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason4 ,but the word voluntary is derived from voluntas 7will71 and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will1 by way of likeness thereto4 ,it is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals1 in so far as they are moved to an end1 through some kind of knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that man is master of his actions1 is due to his being able to deliberate about them3 for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things1 the will can be inclined to either4 ,but it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act1 wherein is the perfect voluntary2 such as is not to be found in irrational animals4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,voluntariness ,without ,any ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act4 ,for that is voluntary which proceeds from the will4 ,but nothing can proceed from the will1 except through some act1 at least an act of the will4 ,therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as one is said to wish by an act of the will1 so when the act of the will ceases1 one is said not to wish4 ,but not to wish implies involuntariness1 which is contrary to voluntariness4 ,therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 knowledge is essential to the voluntary1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but knowledge involves an act4 ,therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act4 ,on the contrary1 ,the word voluntary is applied to that of which we are masters4 ,now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act1 to will and not to will4 ,therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary1 so also are not to act and not to will4 ,i answer that1 ,voluntary is what proceeds from the will4 ,now one thing proceeds from another in two ways4 ,first1 directly2 in which sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts2 for instance1 heating from heat4 ,secondly1 indirectly2 in which sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting2 thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman1 from his having ceased to steer4 ,but we must take note that the cause of what follows from want of action is not always the agent as not acting2 but only then when the agent can and ought to act4 ,for if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him1 the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him1 although it might be due to his absence from the helm4 ,since1 then1 the will by willing and acting1 is able1 and sometimes ought1 to hinder not-willing and not-acting2 this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to1 as though proceeding from1 the will4 ,and thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act2 sometimes without outward act1 but with an interior act2 for instance1 when one wills not to act2 and sometimes without even an interior act1 as when one does not will to act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we apply the word voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly1 as from its action2 but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not to wish is said in two senses4 ,first1 as though it were one word1 and the infinitive of ,i-do-not-wish4 ,consequently just as when ,i say ,i do not wish to read1 the sense is1 ,i wish not to read2 so not to wish to read is the same as to wish not to read1 and in this sense not to wish implies involuntariness4 ,secondly it is taken as a sentence3 and then no act of the will is affirmed4 ,and in this sense not to wish does not imply involuntariness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will2 namely1 in order that it be in one's power to consider1 to wish and to act4 ,and then1 just as not to wish1 and not to act1 when it is time to wish and to act1 is voluntary1 so is it voluntary not to consider4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,violence ,can ,be ,done to the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that violence can be done to the will4 ,for everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful4 ,but there is something1 namely1 ,god1 that is more powerful than the human will4 ,therefore it can be compelled1 at least by ,him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every passive subject is compelled by its active principle1 when it is changed by it4 ,but the will is a passive force3 for it is a mover moved 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj74 ,therefore1 since it is sometimes moved by its active principle1 it seems that sometimes it is compelled4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 violent movement is that which is contrary to nature4 ,but the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature2 as is clear of the will's movement to sin1 which is contrary to nature1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1 #bj74 ,therefore the movement of the will can be compelled4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #aj7 that what is done by the will is not done of necessity4 ,now1 whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity3 consequently what is done by the will1 cannot be compelled4 ,therefore the will cannot be compelled to act4 ,i answer that1 ,the act of the will is twofold3 one is its immediate act1 as it were1 elicited by it1 namely1 to wish2 the other is an act of the will commanded by it1 and put into execution by means of some other power1 such as to walk and to speak1 which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power4 ,as regards the commanded acts of the will1 then1 the will can suffer violence1 in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command4 ,but as to the will's own proper act1 violence cannot be done to the will4 ,the reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge3 just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge4 ,now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle4 ,consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act1 that it should be subject to compulsion and violence3 just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or movement4 ,for a stone may have an upward movement from violence1 but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible4 ,in like manner a man may be dragged by force3 but it is contrary to the very notion of violence1 that he be dragged of his own will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god ,who is more powerful than the human will1 can move the will of man1 according to ,prov4 #ba3a3 ,the heart of the king is in the hand of the ,lord2 whithersoever ,he will ,he shall turn it4 ,but if this were by compulsion1 it would no longer be by an act of the will1 nor would the will itself be moved1 but something else against the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not always a violent movement1 when a passive subject is moved by its active principle2 but only when this is done against the interior inclination of the passive subject4 ,otherwise every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent3 whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition4 ,in like manner when the will is moved1 according to its own inclination1 by the appetible object1 this movement is not violent but voluntary4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that to which the will tends by sinning1 although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature1 nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature1 in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,violence ,causes ,involuntariness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness4 ,for we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect of the will4 ,but violence cannot be done to the will1 as shown above 7,a4 #d74 ,therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is done involuntarily is done with grief1 as ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd7 and the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #e7 say4 ,but sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby4 ,therefore violence does not cause involuntariness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is from the will cannot be involuntary4 ,but some violent actions proceed from the will3 for instance1 when a man with a heavy body goes upwards2 or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility4 ,therefore violence does not cause involuntariness4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 and ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd7 say that things done under compulsion are involuntary4 ,i answer that1 ,violence is directly opposed to the voluntary1 as likewise to the natural4 ,for the voluntary and the natural have this in common1 that both are from an intrinsic principle2 whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle4 ,and for this reason1 just as in things devoid of knowledge1 violence effects something against nature3 so in things endowed with knowledge1 it effects something against the will4 ,now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural2 and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be involuntary4 ,therefore violence causes involuntariness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the involuntary is opposed to the voluntary4 ,now it has been said 7,a4 #d7 that not only the act1 which proceeds immediately from the will1 is called voluntary1 but also the act commanded by the will4 ,consequently1 as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will1 violence cannot be done to the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #d73 wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary4 ,but as to the commanded act1 the will can suffer violence3 and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as that is said to be natural1 which is according to the inclination of nature2 so that is said to be voluntary1 which is according to the inclination of the will4 ,now a thing is said to be natural in two ways4 ,first1 because it is from nature as from an active principle3 thus it is natural for fire to produce heat4 ,secondly1 according to a passive principle2 because1 to wit1 there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle3 thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural1 by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement2 although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent4 ,in like manner an act is said to be voluntary in two ways4 ,first1 in regard to action1 for instance1 when one wishes to be passive to another4 ,hence when action is brought to bear on something1 by an extrinsic agent1 as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject1 there is not violence simply3 for although the patient does nothing by way of action1 he does something by being willing to suffer4 ,consequently this cannot be called involuntary4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 viii1 #d7 the movement of an animal1 whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body1 although it is not natural to the body1 is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal1 to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite4 ,accordingly this is violent1 not simply but in a certain respect4 ,the same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition4 ,for this is violent in a certain respect1 i4e4 as to that particular limb2 but not simply1 i4e4 as to the man himself4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,fear ,causes ,involuntariness ,simply8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply4 ,for just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the time1 so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will4 ,but violence causes involuntariness simply4 ,therefore fear too causes involuntariness simply4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is such of itself1 remains such1 whatever be added to it3 thus what is hot of itself1 as long as it remains1 is still hot1 whatever be added to it4 ,but that which is done through fear1 is involuntary in itself4 ,therefore1 even with the addition of fear1 it is involuntary4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is such1 subject to a condition1 is such in a certain respect2 whereas what is such1 without any condition1 is such simply3 thus what is necessary1 subject to a condition1 is necessary in some respect3 but what is necessary absolutely1 is necessary simply4 ,but that which is done through fear1 is absolutely involuntary2 and is not voluntary1 save under a condition1 namely1 in order that the evil feared may be avoided4 ,therefore that which is done through fear1 is involuntary simply4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxx4 and the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 say that such things as are done through fear are voluntary rather than involuntary4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii7 and likewise ,gregory of ,nyssa in his book on ,man 7,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxx71 such things are done through fear are of a mixed character1 being partly voluntary and partly involuntary4 ,for that which is done through fear1 considered in itself1 is not voluntary2 but it becomes voluntary in this particular case1 in order1 namely1 to avoid the evil feared4 ,but if the matter be considered aright1 such things are voluntary rather than involuntary2 for they are voluntary simply1 but involuntary in a certain respect4 ,for a thing is said to be simply1 according as it is in act2 but according as it is only in apprehension1 it is not simply1 but in a certain respect4 ,now that which is done through fear1 is in act in so far as it is done4 ,for1 since acts are concerned with singulars2 and the singular1 as such1 is here and now2 that which is done is in act1 in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances4 ,and that which is done through fear is voluntary1 inasmuch as it is here and now1 that is to say1 in so far as1 under the circumstances1 it hinders a greater evil which was feared2 thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm1 through fear of the danger3 wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply4 ,and hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary1 because its principle is within4 ,but if we consider what is done through fear1 as outside this particular case1 and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will1 this is merely a consideration of the mind4 ,and consequently what is done through fear is involuntary1 considered in that respect1 that is to say1 outside the actual circumstances of the case4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time1 but also in this1 that the will does not consent1 but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion3 whereas what is done through fear1 becomes voluntary1 because the will is moved towards it1 albeit not for its own sake1 but on account of something else1 that is1 in order to avoid an evil which is feared4 ,for the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied1 if it be done on account of something else voluntary3 since the voluntary is not only what we wish1 for its own sake1 as an end1 but also what we wish for the sake of something else1 as an end4 ,it is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion1 the will does nothing inwardly2 whereas in what is done through fear1 the will does something4 ,accordingly1 as ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxx4 says1 in order to exclude things done through fear1 a violent action is defined as not only one1 the principle whereof is from without1 but with the addition1 in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all2 because the will of him that is in fear1 does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,things that are such absolutely1 remain such1 whatever be added to them2 for instance1 a cold thing1 or a white thing3 but things that are such relatively1 vary according as they are compared with different things4 ,for what is big in comparison with one thing1 is small in comparison with another4 ,now a thing is said to be voluntary1 not only for its own sake1 as it were absolutely2 but also for the sake of something else1 as it were relatively4 ,accordingly1 nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing1 from becoming voluntary when compared with another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which is done through fear1 is voluntary without any condition1 that is to say1 according as it is actually done3 but it is involuntary1 under a certain condition1 that is to say1 if such a fear were not threatening4 ,consequently1 this argument proves rather the opposite4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,concupiscence ,causes ,involuntariness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness4 ,for just as fear is a passion1 so is concupiscence4 ,but fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent4 ,therefore concupiscence does so too4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed1 so does the incontinent1 through concupiscence4 ,but fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent4 ,therefore concupiscence does so also4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 knowledge is necessary for voluntariness4 ,but concupiscence impairs knowledge2 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that delight1 or the lust of pleasure1 destroys the judgment of prudence4 ,therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd73 ,the involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence1 and is done with regret4 ,but neither of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence4 ,therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness4 ,i answer that1 ,concupiscence does not cause involuntariness1 but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary4 ,for a thing is said to be voluntary1 from the fact that the will is moved to it4 ,now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence4 ,therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fear regards evil1 but concupiscence regards good4 ,now evil of itself is counter to the will1 whereas good harmonizes with the will4 ,therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does1 considered in itself4 ,but he that acts from concupiscence1 e4g4 an incontinent man1 does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence2 for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated4 ,accordingly1 that which is done out of fear is involuntary1 to a certain extent1 but that which is done from concupiscence is nowise involuntary4 ,for the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first1 but not counter to that which he desires now2 whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether1 as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad1 it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness4 ,and yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary1 because in things bereft of reason1 there is neither voluntary nor involuntary4 ,but sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence1 knowledge is not completely destroyed1 because the power of knowing is not taken away entirely1 but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act4 ,nevertheless1 this itself is voluntary1 according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will1 for example not to act or not to will1 and in like manner not to consider2 for the will can resist the passion1 as we shall state later on 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #gg1 ,a47 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,ignorance ,causes ,involuntariness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness4 ,for the involuntary act deserves pardon1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd74 ,but sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon1 according to #a ,cor4 #ad3ch3 ,if any man know not1 he shall not be known4 ,therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin implies ignorance2 according to ,prov4 #ad3bb3 ,they err1 that work evil4 ,if1 therefore1 ignorance causes involuntariness1 it would follow that every sin is involuntary3 which is opposed to the saying of ,augustine1 that every sin is voluntary 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 involuntariness is not without sadness1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd74 ,but some things are done out of ignorance1 but without sadness3 for instance1 a man may kill a foe1 whom he wishes to kill1 thinking at the time that he is killing a stag4 ,therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd7 and the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 say that what is done through ignorance is involuntary4 ,i answer that1 ,if ignorance causes involuntariness1 it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge1 which is a necessary condition of voluntariness1 as was declared above 7,a4 #a74 ,but it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge4 ,accordingly1 we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will3 in one way1 concomitantly2 in another1 consequently2 in a third way1 antecedently4 ,concomitantly1 when there is ignorance of what is done2 but1 so that even if it were known1 it would be done4 ,for then1 ignorance does not induce one to wish this to be done1 but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done1 and not known3 thus in the example given 7,obj4 #c7 a man did indeed wish to kill his foe1 but killed him in ignorance1 thinking to kill a stag4 ,and ignorance of this kind1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iii1 #a71 does not cause involuntariness1 since it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will3 but it causes non-voluntariness1 since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed4 ,ignorance is consequent to the act of the will1 in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary3 and this happens in two ways1 in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary 7,a4 #c74 ,first1 because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance3 as when a man wishes not to know1 that he may have an excuse for sin1 or that he may not be withheld from sin2 according to ,job #ba3ad3 ,we desire not the knowledge of ,thy ways4 ,and this is called affected ignorance4 ,secondly1 ignorance is said to be voluntary1 when it regards that which one can and ought to know3 for in this sense not to act and not to will are said to be voluntary1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,and ignorance of this kind happens1 either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider2 this is called ignorance of evil choice1 and arises from some passion or habit3 or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have2 in which sense1 ignorance of the general principles of law1 which one to know1 is voluntary1 as being due to negligence4 ,accordingly1 if in either of these ways1 ignorance is voluntary1 it cannot cause involuntariness simply4 ,nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect1 inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act1 which movement would not be1 if there were knowledge4 ,ignorance is antecedent to the act of the will1 when it is not voluntary1 and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will otherwise4 ,thus a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act1 which he was not bound to know1 the result being that he does that which he would not do1 if he knew of that circumstance2 for instance1 a man1 after taking proper precaution1 may not know that someone is coming along the road1 so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by4 ,such ignorance causes involuntariness simply4 ,from this may be gathered the solution of the objections4 ,for the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know4 ,the second1 with ignorance of choice1 which is voluntary to a certain extent1 as stated above4 ,the third1 with that ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will4 ,,question #g ,,of ,,the ,,circumstances ,,of ,,human ,,acts 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the circumstances of human acts3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is a circumstance8 7#b7 ,whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts8 7#c7 ,how many circumstances are there8 7#d7 ,which are the most important of them8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,circumstance ,is an ,accident of a ,human ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act4 ,for ,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhetor4 i7 that a circumstance is that from which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument4 ,but oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing1 such as the definition1 the genus1 the species1 and the like1 from which also ,tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments4 ,therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to be in is proper to an accident4 ,but that which surrounds 7circumstat7 is rather out than in4 ,therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human acts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an accident has no accident4 ,but human acts themselves are accidents4 ,therefore the circumstances are not accidents of acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,the particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents4 ,but the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 calls the circumstances particular things 99ta kath' ekasta1 i4e4 the particular conditions of each act4 ,therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts4 ,i answer that1 ,since1 according to the ,philosopher 7,peri ,herm4 i71 words are the signs of what we understand1 it must needs be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge4 ,now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less known4 ,accordingly with us1 names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious3 and hence it is that1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 #d1 the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally1 to all kinds of opposition3 and in like manner words that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements1 because bodies which are circumscribed by place1 are best known to us4 ,and hence it is that the word circumstance has passed from located things to human acts4 ,now in things located1 that is said to surround something1 which is outside it1 but touches it1 or is placed near it4 ,accordingly1 whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act1 and yet in some way touch the human act1 are called circumstances4 ,now what is outside a thing's substance1 while it belongs to that thing1 is called its accident4 ,wherefore the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the orator gives strength to his argument1 in the first place1 from the substance of the act2 and secondly1 from the circumstances of the act4 ,thus a man becomes indictable1 first1 through being guilty of murder2 secondly1 through having done it fraudulently1 or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place1 and so forth4 ,and so in the passage quoted1 it is said pointedly that the orator adds strength to his argument1 as though this were something secondary4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways4 ,first1 from being in that thing3 thus1 whiteness is said to be an accident of ,socrates4 ,secondly1 because it is together with that thing in the same subject3 thus1 whiteness is an accident of the art of music1 inasmuch as they meet in the same subject1 so as to touch one another1 as it were4 ,and in this sense circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7ad #b71 an accident is said to be the accident of an accident1 from the fact that they meet in the same subject4 ,but this happens in two ways4 ,first1 in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject1 without any relation to one another2 as whiteness and the art of music in ,socrates4 ,secondly1 when such accidents are related to one another2 as when the subject receives one accident by means of the other2 for instance1 a body receives color by means of its surface4 ,and thus also is one accident said to be in another2 for we speak of color as being in the surface4 ,accordingly1 circumstances are related to acts in both these ways4 ,for some circumstances that have a relation to acts1 belong to the agent otherwise than through the act2 as place and condition of person2 whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act1 as the manner in which the act is done4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,theologians ,should ,take ,note of the ,circumstances of ,human ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts4 ,because theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil4 ,but it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts2 for a thing is never qualified1 formally speaking1 by that which is outside it2 but by that which is in it4 ,therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 circumstances are the accidents of acts4 ,but one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents2 hence the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vi1 #b7 that no art or science considers accidental being1 except only the art of sophistry4 ,therefore the theologian has not to consider circumstances4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator4 ,but oratory is not a part of theology4 ,therefore it is not a theologian's business to consider circumstances4 ,on the contrary1 ,ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bd7 and ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxi44 ,but involuntariness excuses from sin1 the consideration of which belongs to the theologian4 ,therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian4 ,i answer that1 ,circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian1 for a threefold reason4 ,first1 because the theologian considers human acts1 inasmuch as man is thereby directed to ,happiness4 ,now1 everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to that end4 ,but acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness1 which results from the due circumstances4 ,hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances4 ,secondly1 because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil1 better or worse3 and this diversity depends on circumstances1 as we shall see further on 7,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #aj1 #aa2 ,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #g74 ,thirdly1 because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit1 which is proper to human acts2 and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary4 ,now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary1 according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances1 as stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,good directed to the end is said to be useful2 and this implies some kind of relation3 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #f7 that the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful4 ,now1 in the genus relation a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing1 but also according to that which is extrinsic to it3 as may be seen in the expressions right and left1 equal and unequal1 and such like4 ,accordingly1 since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end1 nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art1 by reason of their uncertainty and infinity4 ,but such like accidents are not what we call circumstances2 because circumstances although1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 they are extrinsic to the act1 nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it1 by being related to it4 ,proper accidents1 however1 come under the consideration of art4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist1 the politician1 and the orator4 ,to the moralist1 in so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions4 ,to the politician and to the orator1 in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame1 of excuse or indictment4 ,in different ways1 however3 because where the orator persuades1 the politician judges4 ,to the theologian this consideration belongs1 in all the aforesaid ways3 since to him all the other arts are subservient3 for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts1 just as the moralist does2 and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,circumstances ,are ,properly ,set ,forth in the ,third ,book of ,ethics8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in ,ethic4 iii1 #a4 ,for a circumstance of an act is described as something outside the act4 ,now time and place answer to this description4 ,therefore there are only two circumstances1 to wit1 when and where4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done4 ,but this belongs to the mode of an act4 ,therefore all the circumstances are included under one1 which is the mode of acting4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 circumstances are not part of the substance of an act4 ,but the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance4 ,therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself4 ,accordingly1 neither who1 nor why1 nor about what1 are circumstances3 since who refers to the efficient cause1 why to the final cause1 and about what to the material cause4 ,on the contrary is the authority of the ,philosopher in ,ethic4 iii1 #a4 ,i answer that1 ,tully1 in his ,rhetoric 7,de ,invent4 ,rhetor4 i71 gives seven circumstances1 which are contained in this verse3 ,quis1 quid1 ubi1 quibus auxiliis1 cur1 quomodo1 quando-- ,who1 what1 where1 by what aids1 why1 how1 and when4 ,for in acts we must take note of who did it1 by what aids or instruments he did it1 what he did1 where he did it1 why he did it1 how and when he did it4 ,but ,aristotle in ,ethic4 iii1 #a adds yet another1 to wit1 about what1 which ,tully includes in the circumstance what4 ,the reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows4 ,for a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act1 and yet in a way touching it4 ,now this happens in three ways3 first1 inasmuch as it touches the act itself2 secondly1 inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act2 thirdly1 inasmuch as it touches the effect4 ,it touches the act itself1 either by way of measure1 as time and place2 or by qualifying the act as the mode of acting4 ,it touches the effect when we consider what is done4 ,it touches the cause of the act1 as to the final cause1 by the circumstance why2 as to the material cause1 or object1 in the circumstance about what2 as to the principal efficient cause1 in the circumstance who2 and as to the instrumental efficient cause1 in the circumstance by what aids4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,time and place surround 7circumstant7 the act by way of measure2 but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way1 while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this mode well or ill is not a circumstance1 but results from all the circumstances4 ,but the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a special circumstance2 for instance1 that a man walk fast or slowly2 that he strike hard or gently1 and so forth4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a condition of the cause1 on which the substance of the act depends1 is not a circumstance2 it must be an additional condition4 ,thus1 in regard to the object1 it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's property1 for this belongs to the substance of the act2 but that it be great or small4 ,and the same applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference to the other causes4 ,for the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance1 but some additional end4 ,thus1 that a valiant man act valiantly for the sake of the good of the virtue of fortitude1 is not a circumstance2 but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state1 or of ,christendom1 or some such purpose4 ,the same is to be said with regard to the circumstance what2 for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him1 is not a circumstance of the washing2 but that in doing so he give him a chill1 or scald him2 heal him or harm him1 these are circumstances4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,most ,important ,circumstances ,are ,why and ,in ,what the ,act ,consists8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that these are not the most important circumstances1 namely1 why and those in which the act is1 99hen ois e praxis as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #a4 ,for those in which the act is seem to be place and time3 and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances1 since1 of them all1 they are the most extrinsic to the act4 ,therefore those things in which the act is are not the most important circumstances4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the end of a thing is extrinsic to it4 ,therefore it is not the most important circumstance4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing1 is its cause and its form4 ,but the cause of an act is the person that does it2 while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done4 ,therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest importance4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxi4 says that the most important circumstances are why it is done and what is done4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a71 acts are properly called human1 inasmuch as they are voluntary4 ,now1 the motive and object of the will is the end4 ,therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end1 viz4 the circumstance why3 and the second in importance1 is that which touches the very substance of the act1 viz4 the circumstance what he did4 ,as to the other circumstances1 they are more or less important1 according as they more or less approach to these4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by those things in which the act is the ,philosopher does not mean time and place1 but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself4 ,wherefore ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxi1 as though he were explaining the dictum of the ,philosopher1 instead of the latter's term--in which the act is--said1 what is done4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the end is not part of the substance of the act1 yet it is the most important cause of the act1 inasmuch as it moves the agent to act4 ,wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the person that does the act is the cause of that act1 inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end2 and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act2 while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act4 ,as to the mode1 it is not the substantial form of the act1 for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end2 but it is1 as it were1 a certain accidental quality of the act4 ,,question #h ,,of ,,the ,,will1 ,,in ,,regard ,,to ,,what ,,it ,,wills 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must now consider the different acts of the will2 and in the first place1 those acts which belong to the will itself immediately1 as being elicited by the will2 secondly1 those acts which are commanded by the will4 ,now the will is moved to the end1 and to the means to the end2 we must therefore consider3 7#a7 those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end2 and 7#b7 those whereby it is moved to the means4 ,and since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end2 viz4 volition1 enjoyment1 and intention2 we must consider3 7#a7 volition2 7#b7 enjoyment2 7#c7 intention4 ,concerning the first1 three things must be considered3 7#a7 ,of what things is the will8 7#b7 ,by what is the will moved8 7#c7 ,how is it moved8 ,under the first head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the will is of good only8 7#b7 ,whether it is of the end only1 or also of the means8 7#c7 ,if in any way it be of the means1 whether it be moved to the end and to the means1 by the same movement8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,will ,is of ,good ,only8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not of good only4 ,for the same power regards opposites2 for instance1 sight regards white and black4 ,but good and evil are opposites4 ,therefore the will is not only of good1 but also of evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 ix1 #b74 ,but the will is a rational power1 since it is in the reason1 as is stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #i4 ,therefore the will can be directed to opposites2 and consequently its volition is not confined to good1 but extends to evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 good and being are convertible4 ,but volition is directed not only to beings1 but also to non-beings4 ,for sometimes we wish not to walk1 or not to speak2 and again at times we wish for future things1 which are not actual beings4 ,therefore the will is not of good only4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil is outside the scope of the will1 and that all things desire good4 ,i answer that1 ,the will is a rational appetite4 ,now every appetite is only of something good4 ,the reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing4 ,now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined4 ,since1 therefore1 everything1 inasmuch as it is being and substance1 is a good1 it must needs be that every inclination is to something good4 ,and hence it is that the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #a7 that the good is that which all desire4 ,but it must be noted that1 since every inclination results from a form1 the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things3 while the sensitive appetite1 as also the intellective or rational appetite1 which we call the will1 follows from an apprehended form4 ,therefore1 just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing2 so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended4 ,consequently1 in order that the will tend to anything1 it is requisite1 not that this be good in very truth1 but that it be apprehended as good4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #c7 that the end is a good1 or an apparent good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the same power regards opposites1 but it is not referred to them in the same way4 ,accordingly1 the will is referred both to good and evil3 but to good by desiring it3 to evil1 by shunning it4 ,wherefore the actual desire of good is called volition 99,in ,latin1 'voluntas'4 ,to avoid confusion with voluntas 7the will7 ,st4 ,thomas adds a word of explanation1 which in the translation may appear superfluous41 meaning thereby the act of the will2 for it is in this sense that we are now speaking of the will4 ,on the other hand1 the shunning of evil is better described as nolition3 wherefore1 just as volition is of good1 so nolition is of evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes1 but to those which are contained under its proper object2 for no power seeks other than its proper object4 ,now1 the object of the will is good4 ,wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as are contained under good1 such as to be moved or to be at rest1 to speak or to be silent1 and such like3 for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which is not a being in nature1 is considered as a being in the reason1 wherefore negations and privations are said to be beings of reason4 ,in this way1 too1 future things1 in so far as they are apprehended1 are beings4 ,accordingly1 in so far as such like are beings1 they are apprehended under the aspect of good2 and it is thus that the will is directed to them4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that to lack evil is considered as a good4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,volition ,is of the ,end ,only1 or ,also of the ,means8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that volition is not of the means1 but of the end only4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #b7 that volition is of the end1 while choice is of the means4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,for objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul 7,ethic4 vi1 #a74 ,now1 the end and the means are in different genera of good3 because the end1 which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure1 is in the genus quality1 or action1 or passion2 whereas the good which is useful1 and is directed to and end1 is in the genus relation 7,ethic4 i1 #f74 ,therefore1 if volition is of the end1 it is not of the means4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 habits are proportionate to powers1 since they are perfections thereof4 ,but in those habits which are called practical arts1 the end belongs to one1 and the means to another art2 thus the use of a ship1 which is its end1 belongs to the 7art of the7 helmsman2 whereas the building of the ship1 which is directed to the end1 belongs to the art of the shipwright4 ,therefore1 since volition is of the end1 it is not of the means4 ,on the contrary1 ,in natural things1 it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space1 and arrives at the terminus4 ,but the means are a kind of middle space1 through which one arrives at the end or terminus4 ,therefore1 if volition is of the end1 it is also of the means4 ,i answer that1 ,the word voluntas sometimes designates the power of the will1 sometimes its act 99,see note to ,a4 #a1 ,reply ,obj4 #a4 ,accordingly1 if we speak of the will as a power1 thus it extends both to the end and to the means4 ,for every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever3 thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored4 ,now the aspect of good1 which is the object of the power of the will1 may be found not only in the end1 but also in the means4 ,if1 however1 we speak of the will in regard to its act1 then1 properly speaking1 volition is of the end only4 ,because every act denominated from a power1 designates the simple act of that power3 thus to understand designates the simple act of the understanding4 ,now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power4 ,but that which is good and willed in itself is the end4 ,wherefore volition1 properly speaking1 is of the end itself4 ,on the other hand1 the means are good and willed1 not in themselves1 but as referred to the end4 ,wherefore the will is directed to them1 only in so far as it is directed to the end3 so that what it wills in them1 is the end4 ,thus1 to understand1 is properly directed to things that are known in themselves1 i4e4 first principles3 but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles1 except in so far as we see the principles in those things4 ,for in morals the end is what principles are in speculative science 7,ethic4 viii1 #h74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will2 not in reference to the power of the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are on an equality2 for instance1 sound and color are different genera of sensibles1 to which are referred hearing and sight4 ,but the useful and the righteous are not on an equality1 but are as that which is of itself1 and that which is in relation to another4 ,now such like objects are always referred to the same power2 for instance1 the power of sight perceives both color and light by which color is seen4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not everything that diversifies habits1 diversifies the powers3 since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts4 ,moreover1 every practical art considers both the end and the means4 ,for the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end1 as that which it effects2 and the means1 as that which it commands4 ,on the other hand1 the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects2 but it considers that which is the end1 as that to which it refers what it effects4 ,and again1 in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong properly to that art4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by the ,same ,act to the ,end and to the ,means8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is moved by the same act1 to the end and to the means4 ,because according to the ,philosopher 7,topic4 iii1 #b7 where one thing is on account of another there is only one4 ,but the will does not will the means save on account of the end4 ,therefore it is moved to both by the same act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the end is the reason for willing the means1 just as light is the reason of seeing colors4 ,but light and colors are seen by the same act4 ,therefore it is the same movement of the will1 whereby it wills the end and the means4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle space to the terminus4 ,but the means are in comparison to the end1 as the middle space is to the terminus4 ,therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the means4 ,on the contrary1 ,acts are diversified according to their objects4 ,but the end is a different species of good from the means1 which are a useful good4 ,therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act4 ,i answer that1 ,since the end is willed in itself1 whereas the means1 as such1 are only willed for the end1 it is evident that the will can be moved to the end1 without being moved to the means2 whereas it cannot be moved to the means1 as such1 unless it is moved to the end4 ,accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways3 first1 to the end absolutely and in itself2 secondly1 as the reason for willing the means4 ,hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement1 to the end1 as the reason for willing the means2 and to the means themselves4 ,but it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely4 ,and sometimes this act precedes the other in time2 for example when a man first wills to have health1 and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed1 wills to send for the doctor to heal him4 ,the same happens in regard to the intellect3 for at first a man understands the principles in themselves2 but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions1 inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument holds in respect of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing the means4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whenever color is seen1 by the same act the light is seen2 but the light can be seen without the color being seen4 ,in like manner whenever a man wills the means1 by the same act he wills the end2 but not the conversely4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the execution of a work1 the means are as the middle space1 and the end1 as the terminus4 ,wherefore just as natural movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus2 so sometimes one is busy with the means1 without gaining the end4 ,but in willing it is the reverse3 the will through 7willing7 the end comes to will the means2 just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions through the principles which are called means4 ,hence it is that sometimes the intellect understands a mean1 and does not proceed thence to the conclusion4 ,and in like manner the will sometimes wills the end1 and yet does not proceed to will the means4 ,the solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,for the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree1 but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else3 wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other2 but not conversely4 ,,question #i ,,of ,,that ,,which ,,moves ,,the ,,will 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider what moves the will3 and under this head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the will is moved by the intellect8 7#b7 ,whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite8 7#c7 ,whether the will moves itself8 7#d7 ,whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle8 7#e7 ,whether it is moved by a heavenly body8 7#f7 ,whether the will is moved by ,god alone as by an extrinsic principle8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect4 ,for ,augustine says on ,ps4 #aah3bj3 ,my soul hath coveted to long for ,thy justifications3 ,the intellect flies ahead1 the desire follows sluggishly or not at all3 we know what is good1 but deeds delight us not4 ,but it would not be so1 if the will were moved by the intellect3 because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover4 ,therefore the intellect does not move the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will1 stands in relation to the will1 as the imagination in representing the appetible object to the sensitive appetite4 ,but the imagination1 in presenting the appetible object1 does not remove the sensitive appetite3 indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture1 and moves us not at all 7,de ,anima ii1 #c74 ,therefore neither does the intellect move the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing4 ,but the will moves the intellect2 for we exercise the intellect when we will4 ,therefore the intellect does not move the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj7 that the appetible object is a mover not moved1 whereas the will is a mover moved4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things2 for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual2 and to do this is to move4 ,now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways3 first1 with regard to acting and not acting2 secondly1 with regard to this or that action4 ,thus the sight sometimes sees actually1 and sometimes sees not3 and sometimes it sees white1 and sometimes black4 ,it needs therefore a mover in two respects1 viz4 as to the exercise or use of the act1 and as to the determination of the act4 ,the first of these is on the part of the subject1 which is sometimes acting1 sometimes not acting3 while the other is on the part of the object1 by reason of which the act is specified4 ,the motion of the subject itself is due to some agent4 ,and since every agent acts for an end1 as was shown above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b71 the principle of this motion lies in the end4 ,and hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end1 by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means2 just as the art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding 7,phys4 ii1 #b74 ,now good in general1 which has the nature of an end1 is the object of the will4 ,consequently1 in this respect1 the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts1 for we make use of the other powers when we will4 ,for the end and perfection of every other power1 is included under the object of the will as some particular good3 and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs1 moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end4 ,thus the leader of an army1 who intends the common good--i4e4 the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains1 who intends the order of one company4 ,on the other hand1 the object moves1 by determining the act1 after the manner of a formal principle1 whereby in natural things actions are specified1 as heating by heat4 ,now the first formal principle is universal being and truth1 which is the object of the intellect4 ,and therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will1 as presenting its object to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage quoted proves1 not that the intellect does not move1 but that it does not move of necessity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness1 does not move the sensitive appetite2 so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability4 ,hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves1 but the practical intellect 7,de ,anima iii1 #i74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act2 since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect1 is included in the universal good1 as a particular good4 ,but as to the determination of the act1 which the act derives from the object1 the intellect moves the will2 since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true4 ,it is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by the ,sensitive ,appetite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite4 ,for to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #af74 ,but the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite2 just as sense is less excellent than intellect4 ,therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no particular power can produce a universal effect4 ,but the sensitive appetite is a particular power1 because it follows the particular apprehension of sense4 ,therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will1 which movement is universal1 as following the universal apprehension of the intellect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as is proved in ,phys4 viii1 #e1 the mover is not moved by that which it moves1 in such a way that there be reciprocal motion4 ,but the will moves the sensitive appetite1 inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason4 ,therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,james #a3ad73 ,every man is tempted by his own concupiscence1 being drawn away and allured4 ,but man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence1 unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite1 wherein concupiscence resides4 ,therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 that which is apprehended as good and fitting1 moves the will by way of object4 ,now1 that a thing appear to be good and fitting1 happens from two causes3 namely1 from the condition1 either of the thing proposed1 or of the one to whom it is proposed4 ,for fitness is spoken of by way of relation2 hence it depends on both extremes4 ,and hence it is that taste1 according as it is variously disposed1 takes to a thing in various ways1 as being fitting or unfitting4 ,wherefore as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e73 ,according as a man is1 such does the end seem to him4 ,now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition4 ,wherefore according as man is affected by a passion1 something seems to him fitting1 which does not seem so when he is not so affected3 thus that seems good to a man when angered1 which does not seem good when he is calm4 ,and in this way1 the sensitive appetite moves the will1 on the part of the object4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself1 from being less excellent in a certain respect4 ,accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite3 but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant1 in so far as he is subject to that passion1 the sensitive appetite is more excellent4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars4 ,wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power1 it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise1 in particular cases4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b71 the reason1 in which resides the will1 moves1 by its command1 the irascible and concupiscible powers1 not1 indeed1 by a despotic sovereignty1 as a slave is moved by his master1 but by a royal and politic sovereignty1 as free men are ruled by their governor1 and can nevertheless act counter to his commands4 ,hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will3 and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,will ,moves ,itself8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will does not move itself4 ,for every mover1 as such1 is in act3 whereas what is moved1 is in potentiality2 since movement is the act of that which is in potentiality1 as such 99,aristotle1 ,phys4 iii1 #a4 ,now the same is not in potentiality and in act1 in respect of the same4 ,therefore nothing moves itself4 ,neither1 therefore1 can the will move itself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the movable is moved on the mover being present4 ,but the will is always present to itself4 ,if1 therefore1 it moved itself1 it would always be moving itself1 which is clearly false4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the will is moved by the intellect1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,if1 therefore1 the will move itself1 it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers2 which seems unreasonable4 ,therefore the will does not move itself4 ,on the contrary1 ,the will is mistress of its own act1 and to it belongs to will and not to will4 ,but this would not be so1 had it not the power to move itself to will4 ,therefore it moves itself4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 it belongs to the will to move the other powers1 by reason of the end which is the will's object4 ,now1 as stated above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #b71 the end is in things appetible1 what the principle is in things intelligible4 ,but it is evident that the intellect1 through its knowledge of the principle1 reduces itself from potentiality to act1 as to its knowledge of the conclusions2 and thus it moves itself4 ,and1 in like manner1 the will1 through its volition of the end1 moves itself to will the means4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved3 wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same4 ,but forasmuch as it actually wills the end1 it reduces itself from potentiality to act1 in respect of the means1 so as1 in a word1 to will them actually4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the power of the will is always actually present to itself2 but the act of the will1 whereby it wills an end1 is not always in the will4 ,but it is by this act that it moves itself4 ,accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will is moved by the intellect1 otherwise than by itself4 ,by the intellect it is moved on the part of the object3 whereas it is moved by itself1 as to the exercise of its act1 in respect of the end4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by an ,exterior ,principle8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior4 ,for the movement of the will is voluntary4 ,but it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle1 just as it is essential to the natural act4 ,therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the will cannot suffer violence1 as was shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d74 ,but the violent act is one the principle of which is outside the agent 99,aristotle1 ,ethic4 iii1 #a4 ,therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is sufficiently moved by one mover1 needs not to be moved by another4 ,but the will moves itself sufficiently4 ,therefore it is not moved by anything exterior4 ,on the contrary1 ,the will is moved by the object1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but the object of the will can be something exterior1 offered to the sense4 ,therefore the will can be moved by something exterior4 ,i answer that1 ,as far as the will is moved by the object1 it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior4 ,but in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act1 we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle4 ,for everything that is at one time an agent actually1 and at another time an agent in potentiality1 needs to be moved by a mover4 ,now it is evident that the will begins to will something1 whereas previously it did not will it4 ,therefore it must1 of necessity1 be moved by something to will it4 ,and1 indeed1 it moves itself1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means4 ,now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel3 for when a man wills to be healed1 he begins to reflect how this can be attained1 and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician3 and this he wills4 ,but since he did not always actually will to have health1 he must1 of necessity1 have begun1 through something moving him1 to will to be healed4 ,and if the will moved itself to will this1 it must1 of necessity1 have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition4 ,but this process could not go on to infinity4 ,wherefore we must1 of necessity1 suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover1 as ,aristotle concludes in a chapter of the ,eudemian ,ethics 7vii1 #ad74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent3 but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another4 ,wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle1 nevertheless its first principle is from without4 ,thus1 too1 the first principle of the natural movement is from without1 that1 to wit1 which moves nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,for an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic1 but we must add without the concurrence of him that suffers violence4 ,this does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle3 for it is the will that wills1 though moved by another4 ,but this movement would be violent1 if it were counter to the movement of the will3 which in the present case is impossible2 since then the will would will and not will the same thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will moves itself sufficiently in one respect1 and in its own order1 that is to say as proximate agent2 but it cannot move itself in every respect1 as we have shown4 ,wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by a ,heavenly ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body4 ,for all various and multiform movements are reduced1 as to their cause1 to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens1 as is proved in ,phys4 viii1 #i4 ,but human movements are various and multiform1 since they begin to be1 whereas previously they were not4 ,therefore they are reduced1 as to their cause1 to the movement of the heavens1 which is uniform according to its nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d7 the lower bodies are moved by the higher4 ,but the movements of the human body1 which are caused by the will1 could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens1 as to their cause1 unless the will too were moved by the heavens4 ,therefore the heavens move the human will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts1 which are caused by the will4 ,but this would not be so1 if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will4 ,therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #g7 that the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts4 ,but they would be1 if the will1 which is the principle of human acts1 were moved by the heavenly bodies4 ,therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies4 ,i answer that1 ,it is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object2 that is to say1 in so far as exterior bodies1 which move the will1 through being offered to the senses1 and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers1 are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies4 ,but some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will1 in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will1 as to the exercise of its act4 ,but this is impossible4 ,for the will1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #i1 is in the reason4 ,now the reason is a power of the soul1 not bound to a bodily organ3 wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial4 ,but it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal1 but rather the reverse3 because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever4 ,therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will4 ,for this reason ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 #c7 ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense1 the theory that such is the will of men1 as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on 99,odyssey xviii4 #ace 7referring to ,jupiter1 by whom they understand the entire heavens74 ,for all the sensitive powers1 since they are acts of bodily organs1 can be moved accidentally1 by the heavenly bodies1 i4e4 through those bodies being moved1 whose acts they are4 ,but since it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that the intellectual appetite is moved1 in a fashion1 by the sensitive appetite1 the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will2 in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause1 which1 however1 is above the intellect and will4 ,this can be said1 not of any body1 but of some superior immaterial substance4 ,therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens1 as to its cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the movements of the human body are reduced1 as to their cause1 to the movement of a heavenly body1 in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement1 is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies2 also1 in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies2 and again1 in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies1 at whose presence1 the will begins to will or not to will something2 for instance1 when the body is chilled1 we begin to wish to make the fire4 ,but this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without3 not on the part of an inward instigation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #f1 #g71 the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ4 ,wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence1 or some like passion1 by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies1 just as by reason of his natural complexion4 ,but the majority of men are led by the passions1 which the wise alone resist4 ,consequently1 in the majority of cases predictions about human acts1 gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies1 are fulfilled4 ,nevertheless1 as ,ptolemy says 7,centiloquium v71 the wise man governs the stars2 which is a though to say that by resisting his passions1 he opposes his will1 which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens1 to such like effects of the heavenly bodies4 ,or1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #ae73 ,we must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers1 this is due to some most hidden inspiration1 to which the human mind is subject without knowing it4 ,and since this is done in order to deceive man1 it must be the work of the lying spirits4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by ,god ,alone1 ,as ,exterior ,principle8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not moved by ,god alone as exterior principle4 ,for it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior3 thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies4 ,but there is something which is higher than the will of man and below ,god1 namely1 the angel4 ,therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also1 as exterior principle4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the act of the will follows the act of the intellect4 ,but man's intellect is reduced to act1 not by ,god alone1 but also by the angel who enlightens it1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv74 ,for the same reason1 therefore1 the will also is moved by an angel4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god is not the cause of other than good things1 according to ,gen4 #a3ca3 ,god saw all the things that ,he had made1 and they were very good4 ,if1 therefore man's will were moved by ,god alone1 it would never be moved to evil3 and yet it is the will whereby we sin and whereby we do right1 as ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #i74 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,phil4 #b3ac73 ,it is ,god ,who worketh in us ,vulg4'you' both to will and to accomplish4 ,i answer that1 ,the movement of the will is from within1 as also is the movement of nature4 ,now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing1 without being the cause of the thing moved1 yet that alone1 which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature1 can cause a natural movement in that thing4 ,for a stone is moved upwards by a man1 who is not the cause of the stone's nature1 but this movement is not natural to the stone2 but the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature4 ,wherefore it is said in ,phys4 vii1 #d1 that the generator moves locally heavy and light things4 ,accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause2 but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will1 is impossible4 ,now the cause of the will can be none other than ,god4 ,and this is evident for two reasons4 ,first1 because the will is a power of the rational soul1 which is caused by ,god alone1 by creation1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,secondly1 it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good4 ,wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will1 except ,god ,himself1 ,who is the universal good3 while every other good is good by participation1 and is some particular good1 and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination4 ,hence neither can primary matter1 which is potentiality to all forms1 be created by some particular agent4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,an angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will1 as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms1 from which result the natural movements of natural bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man's intellect is moved by an angel1 on the part of the object1 which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's knowledge4 ,and in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god moves man's will1 as the ,universal ,mover1 to the universal object of the will1 which is good4 ,and without this universal motion1 man cannot will anything4 ,but man determines himself by his reason to will this or that1 which is true or apparent good4 ,nevertheless1 sometimes ,god moves some specially to the willing of something determinate1 which is good2 as in the case of those whom ,he moves by grace1 as we shall state later on 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b74 ,,question #aj ,,of ,,the ,,manner ,,in ,,which ,,the ,,will ,,is ,,moved 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the manner in which the will is moved4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the will is moved to anything naturally8 7#b7 ,whether it is moved of necessity by its object8 7#c7 ,whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite8 7#d7 ,whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved to ,anything ,naturally8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally4 ,for the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent1 as stated at the beginning of ,phys4 ii1 #a4 ,therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is natural is in a thing always3 as being hot is in fire4 ,but no movement is always in the will4 ,therefore no movement is natural to the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nature is determinate to one thing3 whereas the will is referred to opposites4 ,therefore the will wills nothing naturally4 ,on the contrary1 ,the movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect4 ,but the intellect understands some things naturally4 ,therefore the will1 too1 wills some things naturally4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,boethius says 7,de ,duabus ,nat47 and the ,philosopher also 7,metaph4 v1 #d7 the word nature is used in a manifold sense4 ,for sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things4 ,in this sense nature is either matter or the material form1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #a4 ,in another sense nature stands for any substance1 or even for any being4 ,and in this sense1 that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance4 ,and this is that which of itself is in a thing4 ,now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are1 are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing1 as to their principle4 ,wherefore1 taking nature in this sense1 it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing1 be a natural principle4 ,this is evident in regard to the intellect3 for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known4 ,in like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed4 ,now this is good in general1 to which the will tends naturally1 as does each power to its object2 and again it is the last end1 which stands in the same relation to things appetible1 as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible3 and1 speaking generally1 it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature4 ,for it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires1 but also that which pertains to each power1 and to the entire man4 ,wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will1 but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers2 such as the knowledge of truth1 which befits the intellect2 and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being2 all of which are included in the object of the will1 as so many particular goods4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another2 for some things happen naturally and some are done voluntarily4 ,there is1 however1 another manner of causing that is proper to the will1 which is mistress of its act1 besides the manner proper to nature1 which is determinate to one thing4 ,but since the will is founded on some nature1 it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will1 to some extent3 just as what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause4 ,because in every thing1 being itself1 which is from nature1 precedes volition1 which is from the will4 ,and hence it is that the will wills something naturally4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the case of natural things1 that which is natural1 as a result of the form only1 is always in them actually1 as heat is in fire4 ,but that which is natural as a result of matter1 is not always in them actually1 but sometimes only in potentiality3 because form is act1 whereas matter is potentiality4 ,now movement is the act of that which is in potentiality 7,aristotle1 ,phys4 iii1 #a74 ,wherefore that which belongs to1 or results from1 movement1 in regard to natural things1 is not always in them4 ,thus fire does not always move upwards1 but only when it is outside its own place4 99,the ,aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven1 i4e4 the ,empyrean4 ,and in like manner it is not necessary that the will 7which is reduced from potentiality to act1 when it wills something71 should always be in the act of volition2 but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition4 ,but ,god's will1 which is pure act1 is always in the act of volition4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to every nature there is one thing corresponding1 proportionate1 however1 to that nature4 ,for to nature considered as a genus1 there corresponds something one generically2 and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically2 and to the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual4 ,since1 therefore1 the will is an immaterial power like the intellect1 some one general thing corresponds to it1 naturally which is the good2 just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing1 which is the true1 or being1 or what a thing is4 ,and under good in general are included many particular goods1 to none of which is the will determined4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved1 of ,necessity1 by ,its ,object8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the will is moved1 of necessity1 by its object4 ,for the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #aj4 ,but a mover1 if it be sufficient1 moves the movable of necessity4 ,therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as the will is an immaterial power1 so is the intellect3 and both powers are ordained to a universal object1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,but the intellect is moved1 of necessity1 by its object3 therefore the will also1 by its object4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever one wills1 is either the end1 or something ordained to an end4 ,but1 seemingly1 one wills an end necessarily3 because it is like the principle in speculative matters1 to which principle one assents of necessity4 ,now the end is the reason for willing the means2 and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily4 ,therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object4 ,on the contrary1 ,the rational powers1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 ix1 #b7 are directed to opposites4 ,but the will is a rational power1 since it is in the reason1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #i4 ,therefore the will is directed to opposites4 ,therefore it is not moved1 of necessity1 to either of the opposites4 ,i answer that1 ,the will is moved in two ways3 first1 as to the exercise of its act2 secondly1 as to the specification of its act1 derived from the object4 ,as to the first way1 no object moves the will necessarily1 for no matter what the object be1 it is in man's power not to think of it1 and consequently not to will it actually4 ,but as to the second manner of motion1 the will is moved by one object necessarily1 by another not4 ,for in the movement of a power by its object1 we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power4 ,for the visible moves the sight1 under the aspect of color actually visible4 ,wherefore if color be offered to the sight1 it moves the sight necessarily3 unless one turns one's eyes away2 which belongs to the exercise of the act4 ,but if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually1 but only so in some respects1 and in other respects not1 the sight would not of necessity see such an object3 for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored1 and thus it would not see it4 ,now just as the actually colored is the object of sight1 so is good the object of the will4 ,wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view1 the will tends to it of necessity1 if it wills anything at all2 since it cannot will the opposite4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view1 it will not tend to it of necessity4 ,and since lack of any good whatever1 is a non-good1 consequently1 that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing1 is such a good that the will cannot not-will it3 and this is ,happiness4 ,whereas any other particular goods1 in so far as they are lacking in some good1 can be regarded as non-goods3 and from this point of view1 they can be set aside or approved by the will1 which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sufficient mover of a power is none but that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is lacking in any respect1 it will not move of necessity1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellect is moved1 of necessity1 by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true3 but not by that which may be either true or false--viz4 by that which is contingent3 as we have said of the good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the last end moves the will necessarily1 because it is the perfect good4 ,in like manner whatever is ordained to that end1 and without which the end cannot be attained1 such as to be and to live1 and the like4 ,but other things without which the end can be gained1 are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end3 just as he who assents to the principle1 does not necessarily assent to the conclusions1 without which the principles can still be true4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved1 of ,necessity1 by the ,lower ,appetite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3ai73 ,the good which ,i will ,i do not2 but the evil which ,i will not1 that ,i do3 and this is said by reason of concupiscence1 which is a passion4 ,therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #e1 according as a man is1 such does the end seem to him4 ,but it is not in man's power to cast aside a passion at once4 ,therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect1 except by means of a particular cause3 wherefore the universal reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #aa4 ,but as the universal reason is to the particular estimation1 so is the will to the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore the will is not moved to will something particular1 except through the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore1 if the sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something1 by reason of a passion1 the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #d3g73 ,thy lust ,vulg4 ',the lust thereof' shall be under thee1 and thou shalt have dominion over it4 ,therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #b71 the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will1 in so far as the will is moved by its object3 inasmuch as1 to wit1 man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion1 judges something to be fitting and good1 which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion4 ,now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways4 ,first1 so that his reason is wholly bound1 so that he has not the use of reason3 as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane1 just as they may from some other bodily disorder2 since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body4 ,and of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals1 which follow1 of necessity1 the impulse of their passions3 for in them there is neither movement of reason1 nor1 consequently1 of will4 ,sometimes1 however1 the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion1 so that the judgment of reason retains1 to a certain extent1 its freedom3 and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree4 ,accordingly in so far as the reason remains free1 and not subject to the passion1 the will's movement1 which also remains1 does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it4 ,consequently1 either there is no movement of the will in that man1 and the passion alone holds its sway3 or if there be a movement of the will1 it does not necessarily follow the passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising1 of which the ,apostle says3 ,the evil which ,i will not1 that ,i do--i4e4 ,i desire2 yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence4 ,and thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since there is in man a twofold nature1 intellectual and sensitive2 sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul3 either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to his reason1 as in the virtuous2 or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion1 as in a madman4 ,but sometimes1 although reason is clouded by passion1 yet something of this reason remains free4 ,and in respect of this1 man can either repel the passion entirely1 or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion4 ,for when thus disposed1 since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul1 a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason1 than it does according to a passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason1 but also by good apprehended by sense4 ,wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite4 ,for we will and do many things without passion1 and through choice alone2 as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved of ,necessity by the ,exterior ,mover ,which ,is ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is moved of necessity by ,god4 ,for every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity4 ,but ,god cannot be resisted1 because ,his power is infinite2 wherefore it is written 7,rom4 #i3ai73 ,who resisteth ,his will8 ,therefore ,god moves the will of necessity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,but whatever ,god does in a thing is natural to it1 as ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxvi1 #c74 ,therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which ,god moves it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a thing is possible1 if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed4 ,but something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which ,god moves it3 because in that case ,god's operation would be ineffectual4 ,therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which ,god moves it4 ,therefore it wills it of necessity4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ae3ad73 ,god made man from the beginning1 and left him in the hand of his own counsel4 ,therefore ,he does not of necessity move man's will4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 it belongs to ,divine providence1 not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things4 ,wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions2 so that from necessary causes through the ,divine motion1 effects follow of necessity2 but from contingent causes1 effects follow contingently4 ,since1 therefore1 the will is an active principle1 not determinate to one thing1 but having an indifferent relation to many things1 ,god so moves it1 that ,he does not determine it of necessity to one thing1 but its movement remains contingent and not necessary1 except in those things to which it is moved naturally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which ,he moves1 but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing4 ,and therefore it would be more repugnant to the ,divine motion1 for the will to be moved of necessity1 which is not fitting to its nature2 than for it to be moved freely1 which is becoming to its nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that is natural to a thing1 which ,god so works in it that it may be natural to it3 for thus is something becoming to a thing1 according as ,god wishes it to be becoming4 ,now ,he does not wish that whatever ,he works in things should be natural to them1 for instance1 that the dead should rise again4 ,but this ,he does wish to be natural to each thing--that it be subject to the ,divine power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if ,god moves the will to anything1 it is incompatible with this supposition1 that the will be not moved thereto4 ,but it is not impossible simply4 ,consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by ,god necessarily4 ,,question #aa ,,of ,,enjoyment 99,or1 ,fruition1 ,,which ,,is ,,an ,,act ,,of ,,the ,,will 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider enjoyment3 concerning which there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power8 7#b7 ,whether it belongs to the rational creature alone1 or also to irrational animals8 7#c7 ,whether enjoyment is only of the last end8 7#d7 ,whether it is only of the end possessed8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #a ,whether to ,enjoy ,is an ,act of the ,appetitive ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power4 ,for to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the fruit4 ,but it is the intellect1 in whose act ,happiness consists1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d71 that receives the fruit of human life1 which is ,happiness4 ,therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power1 but of the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 each power has its proper end1 which is its perfection3 thus the end of sight is to know the visible2 of the hearing1 to perceive sounds2 and so forth4 ,but the end of a thing is its fruit4 ,therefore to enjoy belongs to each power1 and not only to the appetite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 enjoyment implies a certain delight4 ,but sensible delight belongs to sense1 which delights in its object3 and for the same reason1 intellectual delight belongs to the intellect4 ,therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive1 and not to the appetitive power4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #d2 and ,de ,trin4 x1 #aj1 #aa73 ,to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake4 ,but love belongs to the appetitive power4 ,therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power4 ,i answer that1 ,fruitio 7enjoyment7 and fructus 7fruit7 seem to refer to the same1 one being derived from the other2 which from which1 matters not for our purpose2 though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known1 was first named4 ,now those things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses3 wherefore it seems that the word fruition is derived from sensible fruits4 ,but sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last place1 and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived4 ,hence fruition seems to have relation to love1 or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term1 which is the end4 ,now the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power4 ,wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging1 under different aspects1 to different powers4 ,accordingly the vision of ,god1 as vision1 is an act of the intellect1 but as a good and an end1 is the object of the will4 ,and as such is the fruition thereof3 so that the intellect attains this end1 as the executive power1 but the will as the motive power1 moving 7the powers7 towards the end and enjoying the end attained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power1 as the proper is contained in the common1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence the perfection and end of each power1 in so far as it is a good1 belongs to the appetitive power4 ,wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends2 and itself realizes the end1 when each of them reaches the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in delight there are two things3 perception of what is becoming2 and this belongs to the apprehensive power2 and complacency in that which is offered as becoming3 and this belongs to the appetitive power1 in which power delight is formally completed4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #b ,whether to ,enjoy ,belongs to the ,rational ,creature ,alone1 or ,also to ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #bb7 that it is given to us men to enjoy and to use4 ,therefore other animals cannot enjoy4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to enjoy relates to the last end4 ,but irrational animals cannot obtain the last end4 ,therefore it is not for them to enjoy4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite1 so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive4 ,if1 therefore1 to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite1 it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite4 ,but this is evidently false1 since the latter cannot delight in anything4 ,therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy3 and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cj73 ,it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure4 ,i answer that1 ,as was stated above 7,a4 #a7 to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor1 but of the power that commands the achievement2 for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power4 ,now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way of execution1 as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency1 whereas a light body has an upward tendency4 ,yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them1 but in some higher nature1 which moves all nature by its command1 just as in things endowed with knowledge1 the appetite moves the other powers to their acts4 ,wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge1 although they attain an end1 have no enjoyment of the end3 this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge4 ,now knowledge of the end is twofold3 perfect and imperfect4 ,perfect knowledge of the end1 is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good1 but also the universal formality of the end and the good2 and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone4 ,on the other hand1 imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular4 ,such knowledge is in irrational animals3 whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom1 but are moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend4 ,consequently1 enjoyment belongs to the rational nature1 in a perfect degree2 to irrational animals1 imperfectly2 to other creatures1 not at all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,enjoyment need not be of the last end simply2 but of that which each one chooses for his last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sensitive appetite follows some knowledge2 not so the natural appetite1 especially in things void of knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment4 ,this is clear from his way of speaking3 for he says that it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy1 that is1 as it would be1 if one were to say that they use4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,enjoyment ,is ,only of the ,last ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,philem4 #bj73 ,yea1 brother1 may ,i enjoy thee in the ,lord4 ,but it is evident that ,paul had not placed his last end in a man4 ,therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what we enjoy is the fruit4 ,but the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3bb73 ,the fruit of the ,spirit is charity1 joy1 peace1 and other like things1 which are not in the nature of the last end4 ,therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the acts of the will reflect on one another2 for ,i will to will1 and ,i love to love4 ,but to enjoy is an act of the will3 since it is the will with which we enjoy1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aj74 ,therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment4 ,but the last end of man is not enjoyment1 but the uncreated good alone1 which is ,god4 ,therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa73 ,a man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else4 ,but the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else4 ,therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a7 the notion of fruit implies two things3 first that it should come last2 second1 that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight4 ,now a thing is last either simply or relatively2 simply1 if it be referred to nothing else2 relatively1 if it is the last in a particular series4 ,therefore that which is last simply1 and in which one delights as in the last end1 is properly called fruit2 and this it is that one is properly said to enjoy4 ,but that which is delightful not in itself1 but is desired1 only as referred to something else1 e4g4 a bitter potion for the sake of health1 can nowise be called fruit4 ,and that which has something delightful about it1 to which a number of preceding things are referred1 may indeed be called fruit in a certain manner2 but we cannot be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aj7 that we enjoy what we know1 when the delighted will is at rest therein4 ,but its rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end3 for as long as something is looked for1 the movement of the will remains in suspense1 although it has reached something4 ,thus in local movement1 although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end1 yet it is not considered as an actual end1 except when the movement stops there4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cc71 if he had said1 ',may ,i enjoy thee1' without adding 'in the ,lord1' he would seem to have set the end of his love in him4 ,but since he added that he set his end in the ,lord1 he implied his desire to enjoy ,him3 as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a means4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it1 and another to man that enjoys it4 ,to the tree indeed that bore it1 it is compared as effect to cause2 to the one enjoying it1 as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight4 ,accordingly these fruits mentioned by the ,apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the ,holy ,ghost in us1 wherefore they are called fruits of the spirit3 but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end4 ,or we may say with ,ambrose that they are called fruits because we should desire them for their own sake3 not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end2 but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g71 we speak of an end in a twofold sense3 first1 as being the thing itself2 secondly1 as the attainment thereof4 ,these are not1 of course1 two ends1 but one end1 considered in itself1 and in its relation to something else4 ,accordingly ,god is the last end1 as that which is ultimately sought for3 while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end4 ,and so1 just as ,god is not one end1 and the enjoyment of ,god1 another3 so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy ,god1 and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of ,god4 ,and the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,enjoyment ,is ,only of the ,end ,possessed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a7 that to enjoy is to use joyfully1 with the joy1 not of hope1 but of possession4 ,but so long as a thing is not had1 there is joy1 not of possession1 but of hope4 ,therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end3 because this alone gives rest to the appetite4 ,but the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end4 ,therefore enjoyment1 properly speaking1 is only of the end possessed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit4 ,but one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end4 ,therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed4 ,on the contrary1 to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #d74 ,but this is possible1 even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession4 ,therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed4 ,i answer that1 ,to enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end1 according as the will has something by way of last end4 ,now an end is possessed in two ways2 perfectly and imperfectly4 ,perfectly1 when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality2 imperfectly1 when it is possessed in intention only4 ,perfect enjoyment1 therefore1 is of the end already possessed3 but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really1 but only in intention4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will is hindered in two ways from being at rest4 ,first on the part of the object2 by reason of its not being the last end1 but ordained to something else3 secondly on the part of the one who desires the end1 by reason of his not being yet in possession of it4 ,now it is the object that specifies an act3 but on the agent depends the manner of acting1 so that the act be perfect or imperfect1 as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent4 ,therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking1 as falling short of the nature of enjoyment4 ,but enjoyment of the last end1 not yet possessed1 is enjoyment properly speaking1 but imperfect1 on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one is said to lay hold of or to have an end1 not only in reality1 but also in intention1 as stated above4 ,,question #ab ,,of ,,intention 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider ,intention3 concerning which there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will8 7#b7 ,whether it is only of the last end8 7#c7 ,whether one can intend two things at the same time8 7#d7 ,whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means8 7#e7 ,whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,intention ,is an ,act of the ,intellect or of the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that intention is an act of the intellect1 and not of the will4 ,for it is written 7,matt4 #f3bb73 ,if thy eye be single1 thy whole body shall be lightsome3 where1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ac7 the eye signifies intention4 ,but since the eye is the organ of sight1 it signifies the apprehensive power4 ,therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ac7 that ,our ,lord spoke of intention as a light1 when ,he said 7,matt4 #f3bc73 ,if the light that is in thee be darkness1 etc4 ,but light pertains to knowledge4 ,therefore intention does too4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end4 ,but to ordain is an act of reason4 ,therefore intention belongs not to the will but to the reason4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 an act of the will is either of the end or of the means4 ,but the act of the will in respect of the end is called volition1 or enjoyment2 with regard to the means1 it is choice1 from which intention is distinct4 ,therefore it is not an act of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xi1 #d1 #h1 #i7 that the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen2 and the images retained in the memory1 to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought4 ,therefore intention is an act of the will4 ,i answer that1 ,intention1 as the very word denotes1 signifies1 to tend to something4 ,now both the action of the mover and the movement of thing moved1 tend to something4 ,but that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything1 is due to the action of the mover4 ,consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end3 hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in authority1 by his command moves others to that which he intends4 ,now the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end1 as shown above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore it is evident that intention1 properly speaking1 is an act of the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the eye designates intention figuratively1 not because intention has reference to knowledge1 but because it presupposes knowledge1 which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves2 thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends4 ,wherefore works are called darkness because a man knows what he intends1 but knows not what the result may be1 as ,augustine expounds 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ac74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will does not ordain1 but tends to something according to the order of reason4 ,consequently this word intention indicates an act of the will1 presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,intention is an act of the will in regard to the end4 ,now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end4 ,first1 absolutely2 and thus we have volition1 whereby we will absolutely to have health1 and so forth4 ,secondly1 it considers the end1 as its place of rest2 and thus enjoyment regards the end4 ,thirdly1 it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained2 and thus intention regards the end4 ,for when we speak of intending to have health1 we mean not only that we have it1 but that we will have it by means of something else4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,intention ,is ,only of the ,last ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that intention is only of the last end4 ,for it is said in the book of ,prosper's ,sentences 7,sent4 #ajj73 ,the intention of the heart is a cry to ,god4 ,but ,god is the last end of the human heart4 ,therefore intention is always regards the last end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 intention regards the end as the terminus1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #d74 ,but a terminus is something last4 ,therefore intention always regards the last end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as intention regards the end1 so does enjoyment4 ,but enjoyment is always of the last end4 ,therefore intention is too4 ,on the contrary1 ,there is but one last end of human wills1 viz4 ,happiness1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #g74 ,if1 therefore1 intentions were only of the last end1 men would not have different intentions3 which is evidently false4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #d71 intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will4 ,now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways4 ,first1 the very last terminus1 when the movement comes to a stop2 this is the terminus of the whole movement4 ,secondly1 some point midway1 which is the beginning of one part of the movement1 and the end or terminus of the other4 ,thus in the movement from ,a to ,c through ,b1 ,c is the last terminus1 while ,b is a terminus1 but not the last4 ,and intention can be both4 ,consequently though intention is always of the end1 it need not be always of the last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intention of the heart is called a cry to ,god1 not that ,god is always the object of intention1 but because ,he sees our intention4 ,or because1 when we pray1 we direct our intention to ,god1 which intention has the force of a cry4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a terminus is something last1 not always in respect of the whole1 but sometimes in respect of a part4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,enjoyment implies rest in the end2 and this belongs to the last end alone4 ,but intention implies movement towards an end1 not rest4 ,wherefore the comparison proves nothing4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,one ,can ,intend ,two ,things at the ,same ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ad1 #af1 #ag7 that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to ,god and to bodily benefits4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 neither to any other two things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus4 ,now there cannot be several termini in the same direction of one movement4 ,therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect4 ,but it is not possible to understand several things at the same time1 according to the ,philosopher 7,topic4 ii1 #aj74 ,therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time4 ,on the contrary1 ,art imitates nature4 ,now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument3 thus the tongue is for the purpose of taste and speech 7,de ,anima ii1 #h74 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends3 so that one can intend several ends at the same time4 ,i answer that1 ,the expression two things may be taken in two ways3 they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained4 ,and if they be ordained to one another1 it is evident1 from what has been said1 that a man can intend several things at the same time4 ,for intention is not only of the last end1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 but also of an intermediary end4 ,now a man intends at the same time1 both the proximate and the last end2 as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health4 ,but if we take two things that are not ordained to one another1 thus also a man can intend several things at the same time4 ,this is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two4 ,now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes3 wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another1 because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available3 so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to ,god and to bodily benefits1 as to two last ends3 since1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #e71 one man cannot have several last ends4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there can be several termini ordained to one another1 of the same movement and in the same direction2 but not unless they be ordained to one another4 ,at the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason4 ,now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,wherefore where we have many things in reality1 we may take them as one term of intention1 in so far as the reason takes them as one3 either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole1 as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health2 or because two things are included in one which may be intended4 ,for instance1 the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth1 as in something common to both2 wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth1 from intending both the others4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #aj2 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #d71 it is possible to understand several things at the same time1 in so far as1 in some way1 they are one4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,intention of the ,end ,is the ,same ,act ,as the ,volition of the ,means8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xi1 #f7 that the will to see the window1 has for its end the seeing of the window2 and is another act from the will to see1 through the window1 the passersby4 ,but that ,i should will to see the passersby1 through the window1 belongs to intention2 whereas that ,i will to see the window1 belongs to the volition of the means4 ,therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 acts are distinct according to their objects4 ,but the end and the means are distinct objects4 ,therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the willing of the means is called choice4 ,but choice and intention are not the same4 ,therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,the means in relation to the end1 are as the mid-space to the terminus4 ,now it is all the same movement that passes through the mid-space to the terminus1 in natural things4 ,therefore in things pertaining to the will1 the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means4 ,i answer that1 ,the movement of the will to the end and to the means can be considered in two ways4 ,first1 according as the will is moved to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself4 ,and thus there are really two movements of the will to them4 ,secondly1 it may be considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end3 and thus the movement of the will to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same thing4 ,for when ,i say3 ,i wish to take medicine for the sake of health1 ,i signify no more than one movement of my will4 ,and this is because the end is the reason for willing the means4 ,now the object1 and that by reason of which it is an object1 come under the same act2 thus it is the same act of sight that perceives color and light1 as stated above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,and the same applies to the intellect2 for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely1 it considers each by a distinct act2 but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles1 there is but one act of the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing1 through the window1 the passersby1 according as the will is moved to either absolutely4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the end1 considered as a thing1 and the means to that end1 are distinct objects of the will4 ,but in so far as the end is the formal object in willing the means1 they are one and the same object4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a movement which is one as to the subject1 may differ1 according to our way of looking at it1 as to its beginning and end1 as in the case of ascent and descent 7,phys4 iii1 #c74 ,accordingly1 in so far as the movement of the will is to the means1 as ordained to the end1 it is called choice3 but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means1 is called intention4 ,a sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,intention ,is ,within the ,competency of ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that irrational animals intend the end4 ,for in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational nature1 than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals4 ,but nature intends the end even in things void of reason1 as is proved in ,phys4 ii1 #h4 ,much more1 therefore1 do irrational animals intend the end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as intention is of the end1 so is enjoyment4 ,but enjoyment is in irrational animals1 as stated above 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore intention is too4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end2 since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something4 ,but irrational animals act for an end2 for an animal is moved either to seek food1 or to do something of the kind4 ,therefore irrational animals intend an end4 ,on the contrary1 ,intention of an end implies ordaining something to an end3 which belongs to reason4 ,since therefore irrational animals are void of reason1 it seems that they do not intend an end4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 to intend is to tend to something2 and this belongs to the mover and to the moved4 ,according1 therefore1 as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end1 thus nature is said to intend an end1 as being moved to its end by ,god1 as the arrow is moved by the archer4 ,and in this way1 irrational animals intend an end1 inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural instinct4 ,the other way of intending an end belongs to the mover2 according as he ordains the movement of something1 either his own or another's1 to an end4 ,this belongs to reason alone4 ,wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way1 which is to intend properly and principally1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another1 as intention does1 but absolute repose in the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,irrational animals are moved to an end1 not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement2 this belongs to one that intends2 but through desiring the end by natural instinct1 they are moved to an end1 moved1 as it were1 by another1 like other things that are moved naturally4 ,,question #ac ,,of ,,choice1 ,,which ,,is ,,an ,,act ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,with ,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,means 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means4 ,there are three of them3 to choose1 to consent1 and to use4 ,and choice is preceded by counsel4 ,first of all1 then1 we must consider choice3 secondly1 counsel2 thirdly1 consent2 fourthly1 use4 ,concerning choice there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,of what power is it the act2 of the will or of the reason8 7#b7 ,whether choice is to be found in irrational animals8 7#c7 ,whether choice is only the means1 or sometimes also of the end8 7#d7 ,whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves8 7#e7 ,whether choice is only of possible things8 7#f7 ,whether man chooses of necessity or freely8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,choice ,is an ,act of ,will or of ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that choice is an act1 not of will but of reason4 ,for choice implies comparison1 whereby one is given preference to another4 ,but to compare is an act of reason4 ,therefore choice is an act of reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism1 and to draw the conclusion4 ,but1 in practical matters1 it is the reason that forms syllogisms4 ,since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #c1 it seems that it is an act of reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power4 ,now there is an ignorance of choice1 as is stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #a4 ,therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c7 that choice is the desire of things in our power4 ,but desire is an act of will4 ,therefore choice is too4 ,i answer that1 ,the word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect1 and something belonging to the will3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b7 that choice is either intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect4 ,now whenever two things concur to make one1 one of them is formal in regard to the other4 ,hence ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxiii4 says that choice is neither desire only1 nor counsel only1 but a combination of the two4 ,for just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body1 and that it is neither a mere body1 nor a mere soul1 but both2 so is it with choice4 ,now we must observe1 as regards the acts of the soul1 that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit1 receives a form or species from a higher power or habit1 according as an inferior is ordained by a superior3 for if a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love of ,god1 that act is materially an act of fortitude1 but formally1 an act of charity4 ,now it is evident that1 in a sense1 reason precedes the will and ordains its act3 in so far as the will tends to its object1 according to the order of reason1 since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite4 ,accordingly1 that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good1 through being ordained to the end by the reason1 is materially an act of the will1 but formally an act of the reason4 ,now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power4 ,wherefore choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will3 for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen4 ,consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,choice implies a previous comparison2 not that it consists in the comparison itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism2 and it is called a decision or judgment1 to be followed by choice4 ,and for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice1 as to that which results from it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in speaking of ignorance of choice1 we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge1 but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,choice ,is to ,be ,found in ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that irrational animals are able to choose4 ,for choice is the desire of certain things on account of an end1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #b1 #c4 ,but irrational animals desire something on account of an end3 since they act for an end1 and from desire4 ,therefore choice is in irrational animals4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the very word electio 7choice7 seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others4 ,but irrational animals take something in preference to others3 thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another4 ,therefore choice is in irrational animals4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,ethic4 vi1 #ab1 it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means4 ,but prudence is found in irrational animals3 hence it is said in the beginning of ,metaph4 i1 #a that those animals which1 like bees1 cannot hear sounds1 are prudent by instinct4 ,we see this plainly1 in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals1 such as bees1 spiders1 and dogs4 ,for a hound in following a stag1 on coming to a crossroad1 tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road3 and if he find that the stag has not passed there1 being thus assured1 takes to the third road without trying the scent2 as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion1 arguing that the stag must have passed by this way1 since he did not pass by the others1 and there is no other road4 ,therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxiii4 says that children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice4 ,therefore choice is not in irrational animals4 ,i answer that1 ,since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen4 ,consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice4 ,now the difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c71 the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing1 according to the order of nature2 whereas the will1 although determinate to one thing in general1 viz4 the good1 according to the order of nature1 is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods4 ,consequently choice belongs properly to the will1 and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have4 ,wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice3 there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from another4 ,and this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another1 because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing4 ,wherefore as soon as an animal1 whether by its sense or by its imagination1 is offered something to which its appetite is naturally inclined1 it is moved to that alone1 without making any choice4 ,just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards1 without its making any choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in ,phys4 iii1 #c movement is the act of the movable1 caused by a mover4 ,wherefore the power of the mover appears in the movement of that which it moves4 ,accordingly1 in all things moved by reason1 the order of reason which moves them is evident1 although the things themselves are without reason3 for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target1 as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course4 ,the same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man4 ,now as artificial things are in comparison to human art1 so are all natural things in comparison to the ,divine art4 ,and accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature1 just as in things moved by reason1 as is stated in ,phys4 ii4 ,and thus it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity1 in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the ,supreme art4 ,for which reason1 too1 certain animals are called prudent or sagacious2 and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things4 ,this is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature1 invariably act in the same way4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,choice ,is ,only of the ,means1 or ,sometimes ,also of the ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that choice is not only of the means4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #ab7 that virtue makes us choose aright2 but it is not the part of virtue1 but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake4 ,but that for the sake of which something is done is the end4 ,therefore choice is of the end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 choice implies preference of one thing to another4 ,but just as there can be preference of means1 so can there be preference of ends4 ,therefore choice can be of ends1 just as it can be of means4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #b7 that volition is of the end1 but choice of the means4 ,i answer that1 ,as already stated 7,a4 #a1 ad #b71 choice results from the decision or judgment which is1 as it were1 the conclusion of a practical syllogism4 ,hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism1 is the matter of choice4 ,now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle1 not of a conclusion1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #i74 ,wherefore the end1 as such1 is not a matter of choice4 ,but just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science1 from being the conclusion of another demonstration or science2 while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science2 so too that which is the end in one operation1 may be ordained to something as an end4 ,and in this way it is a matter of choice4 ,thus in the work of a physician health is the end3 wherefore it is not a matter of choice for a physician1 but a matter of principle4 ,now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul1 consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health1 health or sickness may be a matter of choice2 for the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #ab3aj73 ,for when ,i am weak1 then am ,i powerful4 ,but the last end is nowise a matter of choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the proper ends of virtues are ordained to ,happiness as to their last end4 ,and thus it is that they can be a matter of choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #e71 there is but one last end4 ,accordingly wherever there are several ends1 they can be the subject of choice1 in so far as they are ordained to a further end4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,choice ,is of ,those ,things ,only ,that ,are ,done by ,us8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts4 ,for choice regards the means4 ,now1 not only acts1 but also the organs1 are means 7,phys4 ii1 #c74 ,therefore choice is not only concerned with human acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 action is distinct from contemplation4 ,but choice has a place even in contemplation2 in so far as one opinion is preferred to another4 ,therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 men are chosen for certain posts1 whether secular or ecclesiastical1 by those who exercise no action in their regard4 ,therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #b7 that no man chooses save what he can do himself4 ,i answer that1 ,just as intention regards the end1 so does choice regard the means4 ,now the end is either an action or a thing4 ,and when the end is a thing1 some human action must intervene2 either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end1 as the physician produces health 7wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the physician72 or in so far as man1 in some fashion1 uses or enjoys the thing which is the end2 thus for the miser1 money or the possession of money is the end4 ,the same is to be said of the means4 ,for the means must needs be either an action2 or a thing1 with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means1 or puts it to some use4 ,and thus it is that choice is always in regard to human acts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the organs are ordained to the end1 inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion4 ,it is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to contemplation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state1 he chooses to name that man to that post4 ,else1 if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official1 he would have no right to choose4 ,likewise1 whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another1 it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,choice ,is ,only of ,possible ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that choice is not only of possible things4 ,for choice is an act of the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now there is a willing of impossibilities 7,ethic4 iii1 #b74 ,therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 choice is of things done by us1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,therefore it matters not1 as far as the act of choosing is concerned1 whether one choose that which is impossible in itself1 or that which is impossible to the chooser4 ,now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose3 so that this proves to be impossible to us4 ,therefore choice is of the impossible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to try to do a thing is to choose to do it4 ,but the ,blessed ,benedict says 7,regula lxviii7 that if the superior command what is impossible1 it should be attempted4 ,therefore choice can be of the impossible4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #b7 that there is no choice of impossibilities4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d71 our choice is always concerned with our actions4 ,now whatever is done by us1 is possible to us4 ,therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things4 ,moreover1 the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end4 ,but what is impossible cannot conduce to an end4 ,a sign of this is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible to them1 they depart1 as being unable to proceed with the business4 ,again1 this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason4 ,for the means1 which are the object of choice1 are to the end1 as the conclusion is to the principle4 ,now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle4 ,wherefore an end cannot be possible1 unless the means be possible4 ,now no one is moved to the impossible4 ,consequently no one would tend to the end1 save for the fact that the means appear to be possible4 ,therefore the impossible is not the object of choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will stands between the intellect and the external action3 for the intellect proposes to the will its object1 and the will causes the external action4 ,hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect1 which apprehends something under the universal notion of good3 but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing2 for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing4 ,consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do4 ,now this cannot be something impossible4 ,wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills4 ,but the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible2 and by some is called velleity1 because1 to wit1 one would will 7vellet7 such a thing1 were it possible4 ,but choice is an act of the will1 fixed on something to be done by the chooser4 ,and therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since the object of the will is the apprehended good1 we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended4 ,and so1 just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good1 and yet is not really good2 so is choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser1 and yet impossible to him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible2 but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,man ,chooses of ,necessity or ,freely8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man chooses of necessity4 ,for the end stands in relation to the object of choice1 as the principle of that which follows from the principles1 as declared in ,ethic4 vii1 #h4 ,but conclusions follow of necessity from their principles4 ,therefore man is moved of necessity from 7willing7 the end of the choice 7of the means74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b71 choice follows the reason's judgment of what is to be done4 ,but reason judges of necessity about some things3 on account of the necessity of the premises4 ,therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if two things are absolutely equal1 man is not moved to one more than to the other2 thus if a hungry man1 as ,plato says 7,cf4 ,de ,coelo ii1 #ac71 be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance1 he is not moved towards one more than to the other2 and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world4 ,now1 if that which is equally 7eligible7 with something else cannot be chosen1 much less can that be chosen which appears as less 7eligible74 ,therefore if two or more things are available1 of which one appears to be more 7eligible71 it is impossible to choose any of the others4 ,therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of necessity4 ,but every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better4 ,therefore every choice is made necessarily4 ,on the contrary1 ,choice is an act of a rational power2 which according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 ix1 #b7 stands in relation to opposites4 ,i answer that1 ,man does not choose of necessity4 ,and this is because that which is possible not to be1 is not of necessity4 ,now the reason why it is possible not to choose1 or to choose1 may be gathered from a twofold power in man4 ,for man can will and not will1 act and not act2 again1 he can will this or that1 and do this or that4 ,the reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason4 ,for the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good4 ,now the reason can apprehend as good1 not only this1 viz4 to will or to act1 but also this1 viz4 not to will or not to act4 ,again1 in all particular goods1 the reason can consider an aspect of some good1 and the lack of some good1 which has the aspect of evil3 and in this respect1 it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided4 ,the perfect good alone1 which is ,happiness1 cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil1 or as lacking in any way4 ,consequently man wills ,happiness of necessity1 nor can he will not to be happy1 or to be unhappy4 ,now since choice is not of the end1 but of the means1 as stated above 7,a4 #c72 it is not of the perfect good1 which is ,happiness1 but of other particular goods4 ,therefore man chooses not of necessity1 but freely4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the principles1 but only when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not true4 ,in like manner1 the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means1 because the means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them2 or1 if they be such1 they are not always considered in that light4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us4 ,in such matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary1 but from such as are so conditionally2 as1 for instance1 ,if he runs1 he is in motion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if two things be proposed as equal under one aspect1 nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority1 so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other4 ,,question #ad ,,of ,,counsel1 ,,which ,,precedes ,,choice 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider counsel2 concerning which there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether counsel is an inquiry8 7#b7 ,whether counsel is of the end or of the means8 7#c7 ,whether counsel is only of things that we do8 7#d7 ,whether counsel is of all things that we do8 7#e7 ,whether the process of counsel is one of analysis8 7#f7 ,whether the process of counsel is indefinite8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,counsel ,is an ,inquiry8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that counsel is not an inquiry4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that counsel is an act of the appetite4 ,but inquiry is not an act of the appetite4 ,therefore counsel is not an inquiry4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect3 for which reason it is not found in ,god1 ,whose knowledge is not discursive1 as we have shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #g74 ,but counsel is ascribed to ,god3 for it is written 7,eph4 #a3aa7 that ,he worketh all things according to the counsel of ,his will4 ,therefore counsel is not inquiry4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 inquiry is of doubtful matters4 ,but counsel is given in matters that are certainly good2 thus the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #g3be73 ,now concerning virgins ,i have no commandment of the ,lord3 but ,i give counsel4 ,therefore counsel is not an inquiry4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxiv4 says3 ,every counsel is an inquiry2 but not every inquiry is a counsel4 ,i answer that1 ,choice1 as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,a4 #c71 follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done4 ,now there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done2 because actions are concerned with contingent singulars1 which by reason of their vicissitude1 are uncertain4 ,now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment1 without previous inquiry3 wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice2 and this inquiry is called counsel4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #b7 that choice is the desire of what has been already counselled4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the acts of two powers are ordained to one another1 in each of them there is something belonging to the other power3 consequently each act can be denominated from either power4 ,now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means1 and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction1 are ordained to one another4 ,consequently there is to be found something of the reason1 viz4 order1 in that act of the will1 which is choice3 and in counsel1 which is an act of reason1 something of the will--both as matter 7since counsel is of what man wills to do7--and as motive 7because it is from willing the end1 that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means74 ,and therefore1 just as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b7 that choice is intellect influenced by appetite1 thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing2 so ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that counsel is appetite based on inquiry1 so as to show that counsel belongs1 in a way1 both to the will1 on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made1 and to the reason that executes the inquiry4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the things that we say of ,god must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us3 thus in us science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects3 but science when said of ,god means sure knowledge of all effects in the ,first ,cause1 without any reasoning process4 ,in like manner we ascribe counsel to ,god1 as to the certainty of ,his knowledge or judgment1 which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel4 ,but such inquiry has no place in ,god2 wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to ,god3 in which sense ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb73 ,god takes not counsel3 those only take counsel who lack knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion of many1 or at least of carnal-minded men4 ,consequently in such things counsel may be given4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,counsel ,is of the ,end1 or ,only of the ,means8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end4 ,for whatever is doubtful1 can be the subject of inquiry4 ,now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means4 ,since therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel1 it seems that counsel can be of the end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the matter of counsel is human actions4 ,but some human actions are ends1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #a4 ,therefore counsel can be of the end4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxiv4 says that counsel is not of the end1 but of the means4 ,i answer that1 ,the end is the principle in practical matters3 because the reason of the means is to be found in the end4 ,now the principle cannot be called in question1 but must be presupposed in every inquiry4 ,since therefore counsel is an inquiry1 it is not of the end1 but only of the means4 ,nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things1 is ordained to something else2 just as also what is the principle of one demonstration1 is the conclusion of another3 and consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry1 may be looked upon as the means in another2 and thus it will become an object of counsel4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that which is looked upon as an end1 is already fixed3 consequently as long as there is any doubt about it1 it is not looked upon as an end4 ,wherefore if counsel is taken about it1 it will be counsel not about the end1 but about the means4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,counsel is about operations1 in so far as they are ordained to some end4 ,consequently if any human act be an end1 it will not1 as such1 be the matter of counsel4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,counsel ,is ,only of ,things ,that ,we ,do8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do4 ,for counsel implies some kind of conference4 ,but it is possible for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement1 and are not the result of our actions1 such as the nature of various things4 ,therefore counsel is not only of things that we do4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law2 hence we speak of counsel at law4 ,and yet those who seek counsel thus1 have nothing to do in making the laws4 ,therefore counsel is not only of things that we do4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some are said to take consultation about future events2 which1 however1 are not in our power4 ,therefore counsel is not only of things that we do4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if counsel were only of things that we do1 no one would take counsel about what another does4 ,but this is clearly untrue4 ,therefore counsel is not only of things that we do4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxiv4 says3 ,we take counsel of things that are within our competency and that we are able to do4 ,i answer that1 ,counsel properly implies a conference held between several2 the very word 7consilium7 denotes this1 for it means a sitting together 7considium71 from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another4 ,now we must take note that in contingent particular cases1 in order that anything be known for certain1 it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration1 which it is not easy for one to consider1 but are considered by several with greater certainty1 since what one takes note of1 escapes the notice of another2 whereas in necessary and universal things1 our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple1 so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things4 ,wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned1 properly speaking1 with contingent singulars4 ,now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself1 as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary2 but it is desired as being useful towards action1 because actions bear on things singular and contingent4 ,consequently1 properly speaking1 counsel is about things done by us4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,counsel implies conference1 not of any kind1 but about what is to be done1 for the reason given above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel1 nevertheless it directs him in his action3 since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,counsel is not only about what is done1 but also about whatever has relation to what is done4 ,and for this reason we speak of consulting about future events1 in so far as man is induced to do or omit something1 through the knowledge of future events4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,we seek counsel about the actions of others1 in so far as they are1 in some way1 one with us2 either by union of affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend1 as though it concerned himself2 or after the manner of an instrument1 for the principal agent and the instrument are1 in a way1 one cause1 since one acts through the other2 thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,counsel ,is ,about ,all ,things ,that ,we ,do8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do4 ,for choice is the desire of what is counselled as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but choice is about all things that we do4 ,therefore counsel is too4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 counsel implies the reason's inquiry4 ,but1 whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion1 we act in virtue of the reason's inquiry4 ,therefore there is counsel about everything that we do4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c7 that if it appears that something can be done by more means than one1 we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best2 but if it can be accomplished by one means1 how it can be done by this4 ,but whatever is done1 is done by one means or by several4 ,therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxxiv4 says that counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art4 ,i answer that1 ,counsel is a kind of inquiry1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt2 hence the process of inquiry1 which is called an argument1 is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt 99,cicero1 ,topic4 ad ,trebat44 ,now1 that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt1 arises from a twofold source4 ,first1 because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means3 as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action2 thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters1 for this is determined by art4 ,secondly1 from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way2 this occurs in minute matters1 which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at2 and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings4 ,consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel1 although they conduce to the end1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c73 namely1 minute things1 and those which have a fixed way of being done1 as in works produced by art1 with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine1 commerce1 and the like1 as ,gregory of ,nyssa says 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxiv44 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision4 ,consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry1 there is no need for the inquiry of counsel4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in matters that are evident1 the reason makes no inquiry1 but judges at once4 ,consequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when a thing can be accomplished by one means1 but in different ways1 doubt may arise1 just as when it can be accomplished by several means3 hence the need of counsel4 ,but when not only the means1 but also the way of using the means1 is fixed1 then there is no need of counsel4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,process of ,counsel ,is ,one of ,analysis8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis4 ,for counsel is about things that we do4 ,but the process of our actions is not one of analysis1 but rather one of synthesis1 viz4 from the simple to the composite4 ,therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of analysis4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 counsel is an inquiry of the reason4 ,but reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow1 according to the more appropriate order4 ,since then1 the past precedes the present1 and the present precedes the future1 it seems that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future3 which is not an analytical process4 ,therefore the process of counsel is not one of analysis4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 counsel is only of such things as are possible to us1 according to ,ethic4 iii1 #c4 ,but the question as to whether a certain thing is possible to us1 depends on what we are able or unable to do1 in order to gain such and such an end4 ,therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c7 that he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze4 ,i answer that1 ,in every inquiry one must begin from some principle4 ,and if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being1 the process is not analytic1 but synthetic3 because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically1 since causes are more simple than effects4 ,but if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being1 the process is one of analysis1 as when our judgment deals with effects1 which by analysis we trace to their simple causes4 ,now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end1 which precedes indeed in intention1 but comes afterwards into execution4 ,hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis1 beginning that is to say1 from that which is intended in the future1 and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,counsel is indeed about action4 ,but actions take their reason from the end2 and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reason begins with that which is first according to reason2 but not always with that which is first in point of time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible1 if it were not suitable for gaining that end4 ,hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end1 before considering whether it be possible4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,process of ,counsel ,is ,indefinite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite4 ,for counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action is concerned4 ,but singulars are infinite4 ,therefore the process of counsel is indefinite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done1 but how to avoid obstacles4 ,but every human action can be hindered1 and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason4 ,therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely1 because one can come to principles that are self-evident1 which are absolutely certain4 ,but such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars1 which are variable and uncertain4 ,therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely4 ,on the contrary1 ,no one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach 7,de ,coelo i1 #g74 ,but it is impossible to pass through the infinite4 ,if therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite1 no one would begin to take counsel4 ,which is clearly untrue4 ,i answer that1 ,the inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides1 on that of its principle and on that of its term4 ,for a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel4 ,one is proper to it1 and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation3 this is the end which is not the matter of counsel1 but is taken for granted as its principle1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,the other principle is taken from another genus1 so to speak2 thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another1 without inquiring into them4 ,now these principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses--for instance1 that this is bread or iron3 and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science2 for instance1 that adultery is forbidden by ,god1 or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment4 ,of such things counsel makes no inquiry4 ,but the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once4 ,for just as the end is considered in the light of a principle1 so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion4 ,wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first1 holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end4 ,nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially1 for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,singulars are infinite2 not actually1 but only potentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although human action can be hindered1 the hindrance is not always at hand4 ,consequently it is not always necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in contingent singulars1 something may be taken for certain1 not simply1 indeed1 but for the time being1 and as far as it concerns the work to be done4 ,thus that ,socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement2 but that he is sitting1 as long as he continues to sit1 is necessary2 and this can be taken for a certain fact4 ,,question #ae ,,of ,,consent1 ,,which ,,is ,,an ,,act ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,means 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider consent2 concerning which there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power8 7#b7 ,whether it is to be found in irrational animals8 7#c7 ,whether it is directed to the end or to the means8 7#d7 ,whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,consent ,is an ,act of the ,appetitive or of the ,apprehensive ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 ascribes consent to the higher reason4 ,but the reason is an apprehensive power4 ,therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 consent is co-sense4 ,but sense is an apprehensive power4 ,therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as assent is an application of the intellect to something1 so is consent4 ,but assent belongs to the intellect1 which is an apprehensive power4 ,therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges1 there is no sentence1 i4e4 consent4 ,but affection belongs to the appetitive power4 ,therefore consent does also4 ,i answer that1 ,consent implies application of sense to something4 ,now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present2 for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things1 even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness2 while the intellect apprehends universal ideas1 which it can apprehend indifferently1 whether the singulars be present or absent4 ,and since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself1 the application of the appetitive power to the thing1 in so far as it cleaves to it1 gets by a kind of similitude1 the name of sense1 since1 as it were1 it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves1 in so far as it takes complacency in it4 ,hence it is written 7,wis4 #a3a73 ,think of 7,sentite7 the ,lord in goodness4 ,and on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #i1 the will is in the reason4 ,hence1 when ,augustine ascribes consent to the reason1 he takes reason as including the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sense1 properly speaking1 belongs to the apprehensive faculty2 but by way of similitude1 in so far as it implies seeking acquaintance1 it belongs to the appetitive power1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,assentire 7to assent7 is1 to speak1 ad aliud sentire 7to feel towards something72 and thus it implies a certain distance from that to which assent is given4 ,but consentire 7to consent7 is to feel with1 and this implies a certain union to the object of consent4 ,hence the will1 to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself1 is more properly said to consent3 whereas the intellect1 whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing1 but rather the reverse1 as we have stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #b71 is more properly said to assent3 although one word is wont to be used for the other 99,in ,latin rather than in ,english44 ,we may also say that the intellect assents1 in so far as it is moved by the will4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,consent ,is to ,be ,found in ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals4 ,for consent implies a determination of the appetite to one thing4 ,but the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing4 ,therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if you remove what is first1 you remove what follows4 ,but consent precedes the accomplished act4 ,if therefore there were no consent in irrational animals1 there would be no act accomplished2 which is clearly false4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 men are sometimes said to consent to do something1 through some passion2 desire1 for instance1 or anger4 ,but irrational animals act through passion4 ,therefore they consent4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that after judging1 man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling1 and this is called the sentence1 i4e4 consent4 ,but counsel is not in irrational animals4 ,therefore neither is consent4 ,i answer that1 ,consent1 properly speaking1 is not in irrational animals4 ,the reason of this is that consent implies an application of the appetitive movement to something as to be done4 ,now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something1 belongs to the subject in whose power it is to move the appetite3 thus to touch a stone is an action suitable to a stick1 but to apply the stick so that it touch the stone1 belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick4 ,but irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement2 for this is in them through natural instinct4 ,hence in the irrational animal1 there is indeed the movement of the appetite1 but it does not apply that movement to some particular thing4 ,and hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent3 this is proper to the rational nature1 which has the command of the appetitive movement1 and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive3 whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite1 which is active rather than merely passive4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the first be removed1 then what follows is removed1 provided that1 properly speaking1 it follow from that only4 ,but if something can follow from several things1 it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed2 thus if hardening is the effect of heat and of cold 7since bricks are hardened by the fire1 and frozen water is hardened by the cold71 then by removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening4 ,now the accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent1 but also from the impulse of the appetite1 such as is found in irrational animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion3 whereas irrational animals have not that power4 ,hence the comparison fails4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,consent ,is ,directed to the ,end or to the ,means8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that consent is directed to the end4 ,because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such4 ,but it is on account of the end that we consent to the means4 ,therefore1 still more do we consent to the end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the act of the intemperate man is his end1 just as the act of the virtuous man is his end4 ,but the intemperate man consents to his own act4 ,therefore consent can be directed to the end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 desire of the means is choice1 as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a74 ,if therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice4 ,and this is proved to be false by the authority of ,damascene who says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that after the approval which he calls the sentence1 comes the choice4 ,therefore consent is not only directed to the means4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that the sentence1 i4e4 the consent1 takes place when a man approves and embraces the judgment of his counsel4 ,but counsel is only about the means4 ,therefore the same applies to consent4 ,i answer that1 ,consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application4 ,now the order of action is this3 ,first there is the apprehension of the end2 then the desire of the end2 then the counsel about the means2 then the desire of the means4 ,now the appetite tends to the last end naturally3 wherefore the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent1 but of simple volition4 ,but as to those things which come under consideration after the last end1 in so far as they are directed to the end1 they come under counsel3 and so counsel can be applied to them1 in so far as the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from counsel4 ,but the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel3 rather is counsel applied to it1 because counsel presupposes the desire of the end4 ,on the other hand1 the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel4 ,and therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent1 properly speaking4 ,consequently1 since counsel is only about the means1 consent1 properly speaking1 is of nothing else but the means4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science1 whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science1 but something higher1 namely1 understanding2 so do we consent to the means on account of the end1 in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater1 namely1 volition4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,delight in his act1 rather than the act itself1 is the end of the intemperate man1 and for sake of this delight he consents to that act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,choice includes something that consent has not1 namely1 a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred3 and therefore after consent there still remains a choice4 ,for it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end1 and through each of these meeting with approval1 consent has been given to each3 but after approving of many1 we have given our preference to one by choosing it4 ,but if only one meets with approval1 then consent and choice do not differ in reality1 but only in our way of looking at them2 so that we call it consent1 according as we approve of doing that thing2 but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,consent to the ,act ,belongs ,only to the ,higher ,part of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason4 ,for delight follows action1 and perfects it1 just as beauty perfects youth 99oion tois akmaiois he hora--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime 7,ethic4 x1 #d74 ,but consent to delight belongs to the lower reason1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab74 ,therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary4 ,but it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts4 ,therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g74 ,but man often consents to an act not for eternal1 but for temporal reasons1 or even on account of some passion of the soul4 ,therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab73 ,it is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin1 unless that mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members to1 or restraining them from1 act1 yield to the evil deed and become its slave4 ,i answer that1 ,the final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place1 and to whom it belongs to judge of the others2 for as long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced1 the final decision has not been given4 ,now it is evident that it belongs to the higher reason to judge of all3 since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things2 and of things pertaining to human principles we judge according to ,divine principles1 which is the function of the higher reason4 ,wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not1 according to ,divine principles1 no judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision4 ,now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act4 ,therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason2 but in that sense in which the reason includes the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason1 as also does consent to the work2 but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower reason1 just as to the lower reason it belongs to think4 ,nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking1 considered as an action2 and in like manner on the delight that results4 ,but in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act1 it belongs to the lower reason4 ,for that which is ordained to something else1 belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained3 hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them1 it does not follow that consent is an act of each power1 but of the will which is in the reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a71 and from which the voluntary act is named4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act1 according to the eternal reasons2 but also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons4 ,,question #af ,,of ,,use1 ,,which ,,is ,,an ,,act ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,in ,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,means 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider use2 concerning which there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether use is an act of the will8 7#b7 ,whether it is to be found in irrational animals8 7#c7 ,whether it regards the means only1 or the end also8 7#d7 ,of the relation of use to choice4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,use ,is an ,act of the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that use is not an act of the will4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #d7 that to use is to refer that which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else4 ,but to refer something to another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to compare and to direct4 ,therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that man goes forward to the operation1 and this is called impulse2 then he makes use 7of the powers7 and this is called use4 ,but operation belongs to the executive power2 and the act of the will does not follow the act of the executive power1 on the contrary execution comes last4 ,therefore use is not an act of the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cj73 ,all things that were made were made for man's use1 because reason with which man is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them4 ,but judgment of things created by ,god belongs to the speculative reason2 which seems to be altogether distinct from the will1 which is the principle of human acts4 ,therefore use is not an act of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa73 ,to use is to apply to something to purpose of the will4 ,i answer that1 ,the use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation3 hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called its use2 thus the use of a horse is to ride1 and the use of a stick is to strike4 ,now we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of action1 viz4 the powers of the soul or the members of the body2 as the intellect1 to understand2 and the eye1 to see2 but also external things1 as a stick1 to strike4 ,but it is evident that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the interior principles which are either the powers of the soul1 or the habits of those powers1 or the organs which are parts of the body4 ,now it has been shown above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a7 that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts1 and this is to apply them to operation4 ,hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to the will as first mover2 to the reason1 as directing2 and to the other powers as executing the operation1 which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act1 as the instruments are compared to the principal agent4 ,now action is properly ascribed1 not to the instrument1 but to the principal agent1 as building is ascribed to the builder1 not to his tools4 ,hence it is evident that use is1 properly speaking1 an act of the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason does indeed refer one thing to another2 but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else4 ,and in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging4 ,consequently the speculative reason is said to use1 in so far as it is moved by the will1 in the same way as the other powers4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,use ,is to ,be ,found in ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals4 ,for it is better to enjoy than to use1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aj73 ,we use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy4 ,but enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals1 as stated above 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #b74 ,much more1 therefore1 is it possible for them to use4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to apply the members to action is to use them4 ,but irrational animals apply their members to action2 for instance1 their feet1 to walk2 their horns1 to strike4 ,therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cj73 ,none but a rational animal can make use of a thing4 ,i answer that1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 to use is to apply an active principle to action3 thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something1 as stated above 7,q4 #ae1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,now he alone who has the disposal of a thing1 can apply it to something else2 and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else1 which is an act of the reason4 ,and therefore none but a rational animal consents and uses4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible3 whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else4 ,if therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects1 enjoyment is better than use2 because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else4 ,but if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them1 greater excellence is required on the part of use3 because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason2 whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct2 not through knowing the relation of their members to these operations4 ,wherefore1 properly speaking1 they do not apply their members to action1 nor do they use them4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,use ,regards ,also the ,last ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that use can regard also the last end4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa73 ,whoever enjoys1 uses4 ,but man enjoys the last end4 ,therefore he uses the last end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to use is to apply something to the purpose of the will 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa74 ,but the last end1 more than anything else1 is the object of the will's application4 ,therefore it can be the object of use4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 ii7 that ,eternity is in the ,father1 ,likeness in the ,image1 i4e4 in the ,son1 ,use in the ,gift1 i4e4 in the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost1 since ,he is ,god1 is the last end4 ,therefore the last end can be the object of use4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cj73 ,no one rightly uses ,god1 but one enjoys ,him4 ,but ,god alone is the last end4 ,therefore we cannot use the last end4 ,i answer that1 ,use1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 implies the application of one thing to another4 ,now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of means to an end2 and consequently use always regards the means4 ,for this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said to be useful2 in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use4 ,it must1 however1 be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways3 first1 simply2 secondly1 in respect of an individual4 ,for since the end1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g71 signifies sometimes the thing itself1 and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing 7thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of it72 it is evident that1 simply speaking1 the last end is the thing itself2 for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money4 ,but in regard to the individual1 the obtaining of money is the last end2 for the miser would not seek for money1 save that he might have it4 ,therefore1 simply and properly speaking1 a man enjoys money1 because he places his last end therein2 but in so far as he seeks to possess it1 he is said to use it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of use in general1 in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks in that end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the end is applied to the purpose of the will1 that the will may find rest in it4 ,consequently this rest in the end1 which is the enjoyment thereof1 is in this sense called use of the end4 ,but the means are applied to the will's purpose1 not only in being used as means1 but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the words of ,hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end2 just as1 speaking in a general sense1 one may be said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it1 as stated above4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj7 that this love1 delight1 felicity1 or happiness1 is called use by him4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,use ,precedes ,choice8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that use precedes choice4 ,for nothing follows after choice1 except execution4 ,but use1 since it belongs to the will1 precedes execution4 ,therefore it precedes choice also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the absolute precedes the relative4 ,therefore the less relative precedes the more relative4 ,but choice implies two relations3 one1 of the thing chosen1 in relation to the end2 the other1 of the thing chosen1 in respect of that to which it is preferred2 whereas use implies relation to the end only4 ,therefore use precedes choice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them4 ,but the will moves itself1 too1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore it uses itself1 by applying itself to act4 ,but it does this when it consents4 ,therefore there is use in consent4 ,but consent precedes choice as stated above 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,therefore use does also4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation1 and afterwards it uses 7the powers74 ,therefore use follows choice4 ,i answer that1 ,the will has a twofold relation to the thing willed4 ,one1 according as the thing willed is1 in a way1 in the willing subject1 by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed4 ,wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain end1 are said to desire that end naturally4 ,yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly4 ,now every imperfect thing tends to perfection4 ,and therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have the end in reality2 and this is to have it perfectly4 ,this is the second relation of the will to the thing willed4 ,now the thing willed is not only the end1 but also the means4 ,and the last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means1 is choice2 for there the will becomes fully proportionate1 by willing the means fully4 ,use1 on the other hand1 belongs to the second relation of the will1 in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed4 ,wherefore it is evident that use follows choice2 provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in moving it4 ,but since the will1 in a way1 moves the reason also1 and uses it1 we may take the use of the means1 as consisting in the consideration of the reason1 whereby it refers the means to the end4 ,in this sense use precedes choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the motion of the will to the execution of the work1 precedes execution1 but follows choice4 ,and so1 since use belongs to that very motion of the will1 it stands between choice and execution4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what is essentially relative is after the absolute2 but the thing to which relation is referred need not come after4 ,indeed1 the more a cause precedes1 the more numerous the effects to which it has relation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,choice precedes use1 if they be referred to the same object4 ,but nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice of another4 ,and since the acts of the will react on one another1 in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use2 so that we may say that the will consents to choose1 and consents to consent1 and uses itself in consenting and choosing4 ,and such acts as are ordained to that which precedes1 precede also4 ,,question #ag ,,of ,,the ,,acts ,,commanded ,,by ,,the ,,will 7,in ,nine ,articles7 ,we must now consider the acts commanded by the will2 under which head there are nine points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether command is an act of the will or of the reason8 7#b7 ,whether command belongs to irrational animals8 7#c7 ,of the order between command and use2 7#d7 ,whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct8 7#e7 ,whether the act of the will is commanded8 7#f7 ,whether the act of the reason is commanded8 7#g7 ,whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded8 7#h7 ,whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded8 7#i7 ,whether the acts of the external members are commanded8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,command ,is an ,act of the ,reason or of the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will4 ,for command is a kind of motion2 because ,avicenna says that there are four ways of moving1 by perfecting1 by disposing1 by commanding1 and by counselling4 ,but it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore command is an act of the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject1 so1 seemingly1 to command belongs to that which is most free4 ,but the root of liberty is especially in the will4 ,therefore to command belongs to the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 command is followed at once by act4 ,but the act of the reason is not followed at once by act3 for he who judges that a thing should be done1 does not do it at once4 ,therefore command is not an act of the reason1 but of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xvi4 and the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7 say that the appetite obeys reason4 ,therefore command is an act of the reason4 ,i answer that1 ,command is an act of the reason presupposing1 however1 an act of the will4 ,in proof of this1 we must take note that1 since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another1 in so far as the reason reasons about willing1 and the will wills to reason1 the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will1 and conversely4 ,and since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows1 it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason1 as we have stated in reference to use and choice2 and conversely1 that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the will4 ,now1 command is essentially indeed an act of the reason3 for the commander orders the one commanded to do something1 by way of intimation or declaration2 and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason4 ,now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways4 ,first1 absolutely3 and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood1 as when one person says to another3 ,this is what you should do4 ,sometimes1 however1 the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto2 and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood2 as when it is said to someone3 ,do this4 ,now the first mover1 among the powers of the soul1 to the doing of an act is the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,since therefore the second mover does not move1 save in virtue of the first mover1 it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding1 is due to the power of the will4 ,consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason1 presupposing an act of the will1 in virtue of which the reason1 by its command1 moves 7the power7 to the execution of the act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to command is to move1 not anyhow1 but by intimating and declaring to another2 and this is an act of the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof2 but it is the reason as its cause4 ,for the will can tend freely towards various objects1 precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good4 ,hence philosophers define the free-will as being a free judgment arising from reason1 implying that reason is the root of liberty4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely1 but with a kind of motion as stated above4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,command ,belongs to ,irrational ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that command belongs to irrational animals4 ,because1 according to ,avicenna1 the power that commands movement is the appetite2 and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves4 ,but both powers are in irrational animals4 ,therefore command is to be found in irrational animals4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands4 ,but the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his master1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b74 ,therefore the body is commanded by the soul1 even in irrational animals1 since they are composed of soul and body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by commanding1 man has an impulse towards an action4 ,but impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb74 ,therefore command is to be found in irrational animals4 ,on the contrary1 ,command is an act of reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but in irrational animals there is no reason4 ,neither1 therefore1 is there command4 ,i answer that1 ,to command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something1 by a certain motion of intimation4 ,now to direct is the proper act of reason4 ,wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way1 since they are devoid of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the appetitive power is said to command movement1 in so far as it moves the commanding reason4 ,but this is only in man4 ,in irrational animals the appetitive power is not1 properly speaking1 a commanding faculty1 unless command be taken loosely for motion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the body of the irrational animal is competent to obey2 but its soul is not competent to command1 because it is not competent to direct4 ,consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded2 but only of mover and moved4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man4 ,for the impulse of man to action arises from the directing reason2 wherefore his impulse is one of command4 ,on the other hand1 the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural instinct2 because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting1 their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid4 ,wherefore they are directed by another to act2 and they themselves do not direct themselves to act4 ,consequently in them is impulse but not command4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,use ,precedes ,command8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that use precedes command4 ,for command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but1 as we have already shown 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a71 use is an act of the will4 ,therefore use precedes command4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 command is one of those things that are ordained to the end4 ,but use is of those things that are ordained to the end4 ,therefore it seems that use precedes command4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every act of a power moved by the will is called use2 because the will uses the other powers1 as stated above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a74 ,but command is an act of the reason as moved by the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore command is a kind of use4 ,now the common precedes the proper4 ,therefore use precedes command4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that impulse to action precedes use4 ,but impulse to operation is given by command4 ,therefore command precedes use4 ,i answer that1 use of that which is directed to the end1 in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end1 precedes choice1 as stated above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #d74 ,wherefore still more does it precede command4 ,on the other hand1 use of that which is directed to the end1 in so far as it is subject to the executive power1 follows command2 because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used2 for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick4 ,but command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given3 for it naturally precedes its fulfilment1 sometimes1 indeed1 by priority of time4 ,consequently it is evident that command precedes use4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command2 but an act of the will precedes1 viz4 choice2 and an act of the will follows1 viz4 use4 ,because after counsel's decision1 which is reason's judgment1 the will chooses2 and after choice1 the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen2 and then1 last of all1 someone's will begins to use1 by executing the command of reason2 sometimes it is another's will1 when one commands another2 sometimes the will of the one that commands1 when he commands himself to do something4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as act ranks before power1 so does the object rank before the act4 ,now the object of use is that which is directed to the end4 ,consequently1 from the fact that command itself is directed to the end1 it may be concluded that command precedes1 rather than that it follows use4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command1 precedes the command2 so also we may say that this act whereby the will uses the reason1 is preceded by a command of reason2 since the acts of these powers react on one another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,command and the ,commanded ,act ,are ,one ,act1 or ,distinct8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself4 ,for the acts of different powers are themselves distinct4 ,but the commanded act belongs to one power1 and the command to another2 since one is the power that commands1 and the other is the power that receives the command4 ,therefore the commanded act is not one with the command4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever things can be separate from one another1 are distinct3 for nothing is severed from itself4 ,but sometimes the commanded act is separate from the command3 for sometimes the command is given1 and the commanded act follows not4 ,therefore command is a distinct act from the act commanded4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent1 are distinct4 ,but command naturally precedes the commanded act4 ,therefore they are distinct4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 iii1 #b7 that where one thing is by reason of another1 there is but one4 ,but there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command4 ,therefore they are one4 ,i answer that1 ,nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect1 and one in another respect4 ,indeed1 every multitude is one in some respect1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 xiii74 ,but a difference is to be observed in this1 that some are simply many1 and one in a particular aspect3 while with others it is the reverse4 ,now one is predicated in the same way as being4 ,and substance is being simply1 whereas accident or being of reason is a being only in a certain respect4 ,wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply1 though many in a certain respect4 ,thus1 in the genus substance1 the whole composed of its integral or essential parts1 is one simply3 because the whole is being and substance simply1 and the parts are being and substances in the whole4 ,but those things which are distinct in substance1 and one according to an accident1 are distinct simply1 and one in a certain respect3 thus many men are one people1 and many stones are one heap2 which is unity of composition or order4 ,in like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many simply1 and one in a certain respect3 since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason4 ,now just as in the genus of natural things1 a whole is composed of matter and form 7e4g4 man1 who is one natural being1 though he has many parts1 is composed of soul and body72 so1 in human acts1 the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power1 in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it3 for thus also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument4 ,hence it is evident that command and the commanded act are one human act1 just as a whole is one1 yet in its parts1 many4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if the distinct powers are not ordained to one another1 their acts are diverse simply4 ,but when one power is the mover of the other1 then their acts are1 in a way1 one3 since the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act 7,phys4 iii1 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts4 ,because the parts of a man can be separated from one another1 and yet they form one whole4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in those things that are many in parts1 but one as a whole1 nothing hinders one part from preceding another4 ,thus the soul1 in a way1 precedes the body2 and the heart1 the other members4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,act of the ,will ,is ,commanded8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the act of the will is not commanded4 ,for ,augustine says 7,confess4 viii1 #i73 ,the mind commands the mind to will1 and yet it does not4 ,but to will is the act of the will4 ,therefore the act of the will is not commanded4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command4 ,but the will cannot understand the command2 for the will differs from the intellect1 to which it belongs to understand4 ,therefore the act of the will is not commanded4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if one act of the will is commanded1 for the same reason all are commanded4 ,but if all the acts of the will are commanded1 we must needs proceed to infinity2 because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding1 as stated above 7,a4 #a72 for if that act of the will be also commanded1 this command will be preceded by another act of the reason1 and so on to infinity4 ,but to proceed to infinity is not possible4 ,therefore the act of the will is not commanded4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is in our power1 is subject to our command4 ,but the acts of the will1 most of all1 are in our power2 since all our acts are said to be in our power1 in so far as they are voluntary4 ,therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing1 with a certain motion1 something to act4 ,now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the will3 for just as it can judge it to be good to will something1 so it can direct by commanding man to will4 ,from this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,confess4 viii1 #i7 when the mind commands itself perfectly to will1 then already it wills3 but that sometimes it commands and wills not1 is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly4 ,now imperfect command arises from the fact that the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command3 wherefore it fluctuates between the two1 and fails to command perfectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body2 thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees2 so is it with the powers of the soul4 ,for the intellect understands1 not for itself alone1 but for all the powers2 and the will wills not only for itself1 but for all the powers too4 ,wherefore man1 in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will1 commands the act of the will for himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since command is an act of reason1 that act is commanded which is subject to reason4 ,now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature1 or of a higher cause1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,act of the ,reason ,is ,commanded8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded4 ,for it seems impossible for a thing to command itself4 ,but it is the reason that commands1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the act of the reason is not commanded4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is essential is different from that which is by participation4 ,but the power whose act is commanded by reason1 is rational by participation1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #ac4 ,therefore the act of that power1 which is essentially rational1 is not commanded4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that act is commanded1 which is in our power4 ,but to know and judge the truth1 which is the act of reason1 is not always in our power4 ,therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded4 ,on the contrary1 ,that which we do of our free-will1 can be done by our command4 ,but the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will3 for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that by his free-will man inquires1 considers1 judges1 approves4 ,therefore the acts of the reason can be commanded4 ,i answer that1 ,since the reason reacts on itself1 just as it directs the acts of other powers1 so can it direct its own act4 ,consequently its act can be commanded4 ,but we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways4 ,first1 as to the exercise of the act4 ,and considered thus1 the act of the reason can always be commanded3 as when one is told to be attentive1 and to use one's reason4 ,secondly1 as to the object2 in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed4 ,one is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something4 ,this act is not in our power3 because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light4 ,consequently in this respect1 the act of the reason is not in our power1 and cannot be commanded4 ,the other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends4 ,if1 therefore1 that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto1 e4g4 the first principles1 it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like3 assent follows naturally1 and consequently1 properly speaking1 is not subject to our command4 ,but some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent1 or at least suspend its assent or dissent1 on account of some cause or other2 and in such things assent or dissent is in our power1 and is subject to our command4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason commands itself1 just as the will moves itself1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #c71 that is to say1 in so far as each power reacts on its own acts1 and from one thing tends to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,on account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason1 nothing prevents the reason from participating in itself3 thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions4 ,the reply to the third object is evident from what has been said4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,act of the ,sensitive ,appetite ,is ,commanded8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3ae73 ,for ,i do not that good which ,i will3 and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts1 although he wills not to lust4 ,but to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 corporeal matter obeys ,god alone1 to the effect of formal transmutation1 as was shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body1 consisting in heat or cold4 ,therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination4 ,but it is not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination4 ,therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xvi4 says3 ,that which obeys reason is twofold1 the concupiscible and the irascible1 which belong to the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason4 ,i answer that1 ,an act is subject to our command1 in so far as it is in our power1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason1 we must consider in what manner it is in our power4 ,now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective appetite1 which is called the will1 in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ1 whereas the will is not4 ,again1 every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ1 depends not only on a power of the soul1 but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ3 thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight1 and on the condition of the eye1 which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act4 ,consequently the act of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power1 but also on the disposition of the body4 ,now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act1 follows apprehension4 ,and the apprehension of the imagination1 being a particular apprehension1 is regulated by the apprehension of reason1 which is universal2 just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power4 ,consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason4 ,on the other hand1 condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason3 and consequently in this respect1 the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason4 ,moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense4 ,and then such movement occurs without the command of reason3 although reason could have prevented it1 had it foreseen4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b7 that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a despotic supremacy1 which is that of a master over his slave2 but by a politic and royal supremacy1 whereby the free are governed1 who are not wholly subject to command4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that man lusts1 although he wills not to lust1 is due to a disposition of the body1 whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason4 ,hence the ,apostle adds 7,rom4 #g3ae73 ,i see another law in my members1 fighting against the law of my mind4 ,this may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite4 ,first1 as preceding it3 thus a man may be disposed in one way or another1 in respect of his body1 to this or that passion4 ,secondly1 as consequent to it3 thus a man becomes heated through anger4 ,now the condition that precedes1 is not subject to the command of reason3 since it is due either to nature1 or to some previous movement1 which cannot cease at once4 ,but the condition that is consequent1 follows the command of reason3 since it results from the local movement of the heart1 which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses1 it is not in our power to apprehend anything by the senses1 unless the sensible be present2 which presence of the sensible is not always in our power4 ,for it is then that man can use his senses if he will so to do2 unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ4 ,on the other hand1 the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason1 in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power4 ,for that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers1 is either because they cannot be imagined1 such as incorporeal things2 or because of the weakness of the imaginative power1 due to some organic indisposition4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,act of the ,vegetal ,soul ,is ,commanded8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason4 ,for the sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers4 ,but the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason4 ,much more1 therefore1 are the powers of the vegetal soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man is called a little world 99,aristotle1 ,phys4 viii4 #b1 because the soul is in the body1 as ,god is in the world4 ,but ,god is in the world in such a way1 that everything in the world obeys ,his command4 ,therefore all that is in man1 even the powers of the vegetal soul1 obey the command of reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason4 ,but in the acts of the nutritive and generative power1 there is room for praise and blame1 virtue and vice3 as in the case of gluttony and lust1 and their contrary virtues4 ,therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxii4 says that the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason has no control4 ,i answer that1 ,some acts proceed from the natural appetite1 others from the animal1 or from the intellectual appetite3 for every agent desires an end in some way4 ,now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension1 as do the animal and the intellectual appetite4 ,but the reason commands by way of apprehensive power4 ,wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite1 can be commanded by reason3 but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite4 ,and such are the acts of the vegetal soul2 wherefore ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxii7 says that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers4 ,consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the more immaterial an act is1 the more noble it is1 and the more is it subject to the command of reason4 ,hence the very fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason1 shows that they rank lowest4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the comparison holds in a certain respect3 because1 to wit1 as ,god moves the world1 so the soul moves the body4 ,but it does not hold in every respect3 for the soul did not create the body out of nothing1 as ,god created the world2 for which reason the world is wholly subject to ,his command4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,virtue and vice1 praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power1 i4e4 digestion1 and formation of the human body2 but they affect the acts of the sensitive part1 that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition2 for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation1 and the right or wrong use thereof4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #i ,whether the ,acts of the ,external ,members ,are ,commanded8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts4 ,for it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason1 than the powers of the vegetal soul4 ,but the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #h74 ,therefore much less do the members of the body obey4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the heart is the principle of animal movement4 ,but the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason3 for ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxii4 says that the pulse is not controlled by reason4 ,therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #af7 that the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired2 sometimes when sought it fails1 and whereas the heart is warm with desire1 the body remains cold4 ,therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 viii1 #i73 ,the mind commands a movement of the hand1 and so ready is the hand to obey1 that scarcely can one discern obedience from command4 ,i answer that1 ,the members of the body are organs of the soul's powers4 ,consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason1 so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof4 ,since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason1 whereas the natural powers are not2 therefore all movements of members1 that are moved by the sensitive powers1 are subject to the command of reason2 whereas those movements of members1 that arise from the natural powers1 are not subject to the command of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the members do not move themselves1 but are moved through the powers of the soul2 of which powers1 some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in things pertaining to intellect and will1 that which is according to nature stands first1 whence all other things are derived3 thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known1 is derived knowledge of the conclusions2 and from volition of the end naturally desired1 is derived the choice of the means4 ,so also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature4 ,now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart4 ,consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature1 and not according to the will3 for like a proper accident1 it results from life1 which follows from the union of soul and body4 ,thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form3 for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator1 as the ,philosopher states 7,phys4 viii1 #d74 ,wherefore this movement is called vital4 ,for which reason ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxii7 says that1 just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason1 so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement4 ,by the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ag1 #bj7 it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason3 in this sense1 that the soul is punished for its rebellion against ,god1 by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity4 ,but because1 as we shall state later on1 the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself1 through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which ,god had bestowed on man1 we must consider the natural cause of this particular member's insubmission to reason4 ,this is stated by ,aristotle 7,de ,causis ,mot4 ,animal47 who says that the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary1 and that the reason of this is as follows4 ,these members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension2 in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul1 of which passions these movements are a consequence4 ,but they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect1 because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold1 which change is not subject to the command of reason4 ,this is the case with these two organs in particular1 because each is as it were a separate animal being1 in so far as it is a principle of life2 and the principle is virtually the whole4 ,for the heart is the principle of the senses2 and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue1 which is virtually the entire animal4 ,consequently they have their proper movements naturally3 because principles must needs be natural1 as stated above 7,reply ,obj4 #b74 ,,question #ah ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,and ,,evil ,,of ,,human ,,acts1 ,,in ,,general 7,in ,eleven ,articles7 ,we must now consider the good and evil of human acts4 ,first1 how a human act is good or evil2 secondly1 what results from the good or evil of a human act1 as merit or demerit1 sin and guilt4 ,under the first head there will be a threefold consideration3 the first will be of the good and evil of human acts1 in general2 the second1 of the good and evil of internal acts2 the third1 of the good and evil of external acts4 ,concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether every human action is good1 or are there evil actions8 7#b7 ,whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object8 7#c7 ,whether it is derived from a circumstance8 7#d7 ,whether it is derived from the end8 7#e7 ,whether a human action is good or evil in its species8 7#f7 ,whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end8 7#g7 ,whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object1 as under its genus1 or conversely8 7#h7 ,whether any action is indifferent in its species8 7#i7 ,whether an individual action can be indifferent8 7#aj7 ,whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil8 7#aa7 ,whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse1 places the moral action in the species of good or evil8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,every ,human ,action ,is ,good1 or ,are ,there ,evil ,actions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every human action is good1 and that none is evil4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil acts not1 save in virtue of the good4 ,but no evil is done in virtue of the good4 ,therefore no action is evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing acts except in so far as it is in act4 ,now a thing is evil1 not according as it is in act1 but according as its potentiality is void of act2 whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act1 it is good1 as stated in ,metaph4 ix1 #i4 ,therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil1 but only according as it is good4 ,therefore every action is good1 and none is evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 evil cannot be a cause1 save accidentally1 as ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but every action has some effect which is proper to it4 ,therefore no action is evil1 but every action is good4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,john #c3bj73 ,every one that doth evil1 hateth the light4 ,therefore some actions of man are evil4 ,i answer that1 ,we must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things3 because such as everything is1 such is the act that it produces4 ,now in things1 each one has so much good as it has being3 since good and being are convertible1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #e1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,but ,god alone has the whole plenitude of ,his ,being in a certain unity3 whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity4 ,wherefore it happens with some things1 that they have being in some respect1 and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them4 ,thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body1 having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement3 wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these1 he is lacking in something due to the fulness of his being4 ,so that as much as he has of being1 so much has he of goodness3 while so far as he is lacking in goodness1 and is said to be evil3 thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives2 and of evil1 inasmuch as he lacks sight4 ,that1 however1 which has nothing of being or goodness1 could not be said to be either evil or good4 ,but since this same fulness of being is of the very essence of good1 if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being1 it is not said to be good simply1 but in a certain respect1 inasmuch as it is a being2 although it can be called a being simply1 and a non-being in a certain respect1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,we must therefore say that every action has goodness1 in so far as it has being2 whereas it is lacking in goodness1 in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being2 and thus it is said to be evil3 for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason1 or its due place1 or something of the kind4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness4 ,for if there were nothing of good there1 there would be neither being nor possibility of action4 ,on the other hand if good were not deficient1 there would be no evil4 ,consequently the action done is a deficient good1 which is good in a certain respect1 but simply evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect1 so that it can act2 and in a certain respect deficient in act1 so as to cause a deficient act4 ,thus a blind man has in act the power of walking1 whereby he is able to walk2 but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an evil action can have a proper effect1 according to the goodness and being that it has4 ,thus adultery is the cause of human generation1 inasmuch as it implies union of male and female1 but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,good or ,evil of a ,man's ,action ,is ,derived from ,its ,object8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object4 ,for the object of any action is a thing4 ,but evil is not in things1 but in the sinner's use of them1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 iii1 #ab74 ,therefore the good or evil of a human action is not derived from their object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object is compared to the action as its matter4 ,but the goodness of a thing is not from its matter1 but rather from the form1 which is an act4 ,therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause4 ,but the goodness of a cause does not depend on its effect2 rather is it the reverse4 ,therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,osee #i3aj73 ,they became abominable as those things which they loved4 ,now man becomes abominable to ,god on account of the malice of his action4 ,therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves4 ,and the same applies to the goodness of his action4 ,i answer that1 as stated above 7,a4 #a7 the good or evil of an action1 as of other things1 depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness4 ,now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species4 ,and just as a natural thing has its species from its form1 so an action has its species from its object1 as movement from its term4 ,and therefore just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form1 which gives it its species1 so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object3 hence some call such an action good in its genus2 for instance1 to make use of what is one's own4 ,and just as1 in natural things1 the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form 7for instance1 if instead of a man1 something else be generated72 so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object1 for instance1 to take what belongs to another4 ,and this action is said to be evil in its genus1 genus here standing for species1 just as we apply the term mankind to the whole human species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although external things are good in themselves1 nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action4 ,and so1 inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions1 they have not the quality of goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object is not the matter of which 7a thing is made71 but the matter about which 7something is done72 and stands in relation to the act as its form1 as it were1 through giving it its species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the object of the human action is not always the object of an active power4 ,for the appetitive power is1 in a way1 passive2 in so far as it is moved by the appetible object2 and yet it is a principle of human actions4 ,nor again have the objects of the active powers always the nature of an effect1 but only when they are already transformed3 thus food when transformed is the effect of the nutritive power2 whereas food before being transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation4 ,now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power1 it follows that it is the term of its action1 and consequently that it gives it its form and species1 since movement derives its species from its term4 ,moreover1 although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect1 yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect4 ,consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,man's ,action ,is ,good or ,evil from a ,circumstance8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance4 ,for circumstances stand around 7circumstant7 an action1 as being outside it1 as stated above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,but good and evil are in things themselves1 as is stated in ,metaph4 vi1 #d4 ,therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals4 ,but since circumstances are accidents of actions1 it seems that they are outside the scope of art3 because no art takes notice of what is accidental 7,metaph4 vi1 #b74 ,therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which belongs to a thing1 in respect of its substance1 is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident4 ,but good and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance2 because an action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance4 ,on the contrary1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #c7 that a virtuous man acts as he should1 and when he should1 and so on in respect of the other circumstances4 ,therefore1 on the other hand1 the vicious man1 in the matter of each vice1 acts when he should not1 or where he should not1 and so on with the other circumstances4 ,therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances4 ,i answer that1 ,in natural things1 it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing1 is not from the mere substantial form1 that gives it its species2 since a thing derives much from supervening accidents1 as man does from shape1 color1 and the like2 and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion1 evil is the result4 ,so it is with action4 ,for the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species1 but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents3 and such are its due circumstances4 ,wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,circumstances are outside an action1 inasmuch as they are not part of its essence2 but they are in an action as accidents thereof4 ,thus1 too1 accidents in natural substances are outside the essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every accident is not accidentally in its subject2 for some are proper accidents2 and of these every art takes notice4 ,and thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since good and being are convertible2 according as being is predicated of substance and of accident1 so is good predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being1 and in respect of its accidental being2 and this1 both in natural things and in moral actions4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,human ,action ,is ,good or ,evil from ,its ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that nothing acts with a view to evil4 ,if therefore an action were good or evil from its end1 no action would be evil4 ,which is clearly false4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the goodness of an action is something in the action4 ,but the end is an extrinsic cause4 ,therefore an action is not said to be good or bad according to its end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end1 as when a man gives an alms from vainglory2 and conversely1 an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end1 as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor4 ,therefore an action is not good or evil from its end4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,differ4 ,topic4 ii7 that if the end is good1 the thing is good1 and if the end be evil1 the thing also is evil4 ,i answer that1 ,the disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being4 ,now in some things the being does not depend on another1 and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely4 ,but there are things the being of which depends on something else1 and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends4 ,now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent1 and the form1 so the goodness of a thing depends on its end4 ,hence in the ,divine ,persons1 ,whose goodness does not depend on another1 the measure of goodness is not taken from the end4 ,whereas human actions1 and other things1 the goodness of which depends on something else1 have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend1 besides that goodness which is in them absolutely4 ,accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action4 ,first1 that which1 as an action1 it derives from its genus2 because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,secondly1 it has goodness according to its species2 which is derived from its suitable object4 ,thirdly1 it has goodness from its circumstances1 in respect1 as it were1 of its accidents4 ,fourthly1 it has goodness from its end1 to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the good in view of which one acts is not always a true good2 but sometimes it is a true good1 sometimes an apparent good4 ,and in the latter event1 an evil action results from the end in view4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the end is an extrinsic cause1 nevertheless due proportion to the end1 and relation to the end1 are inherent to the action4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the ways mentioned above1 from lacking goodness in another way4 ,and thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end1 or vice versa4 ,however1 an action is not good simply1 unless it is good in all those ways3 since evil results from any single defect1 but good from the complete cause1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #e ,whether a ,human ,action ,is ,good or ,evil in ,its ,species8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species4 ,for the existence of good and evil in actions is in conformity with their existence in things1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but good and evil do not make a specific difference in things2 for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man4 ,therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since evil is a privation1 it is a non-being4 ,but non-being cannot be a difference1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 iii1 #c74 ,since therefore the difference constitutes the species1 it seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being evil4 ,consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 acts that differ in species produce different effects4 ,but the same specific effect results from a good and from an evil action3 thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock4 ,therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but since a circumstance is an accident1 it does not give an action its species4 ,therefore human actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic ii4 #a7 like habits produce like actions4 ,but a good and a bad habit differ in species1 as liberality and prodigality4 ,therefore also good and bad actions differ in species4 ,i answer that1 ,every action derives its species from its object1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,hence it follows that a difference of object causes a difference of species in actions4 ,now1 it must be observed that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions1 according as the latter are referred to one active principle1 which does not cause a difference in actions1 according as they are referred to another active principle4 ,because nothing accidental constitutes a species1 but only that which is essential2 and a difference of object may be essential in reference to one active principle1 and accidental in reference to another4 ,thus to know color and to know sound1 differ essentially in reference to sense1 but not in reference to the intellect4 ,now in human actions1 good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason2 because as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 the good of man is to be in accordance with reason1 and evil is to be against reason4 ,for that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form2 and evil1 that which is against the order of its form4 ,it is therefore evident that the difference of good and evil considered in reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to reason2 that is to say1 according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason4 ,now certain actions are called human or moral1 inasmuch as they proceed from the reason4 ,consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions2 since essential differences cause a difference of species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even in natural things1 good and evil1 inasmuch as something is according to nature1 and something against nature1 diversify the natural species2 for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species4 ,in like manner1 good1 inasmuch as it is in accord with reason1 and evil1 inasmuch as it is against reason1 inasmuch as it is against reason1 diversify the moral species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,evil implies privation1 not absolute1 but affecting some potentiality4 ,for an action is said to be evil in its species1 not because it has no object at all2 but because it has an object in disaccord with reason1 for instance1 to appropriate another's property4 ,wherefore in so far as the object is something positive1 it can constitute the species of an evil act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the conjugal act and adultery1 as compared to reason1 differ specifically and have effects specifically different2 because the other deserves praise and reward1 the other1 blame and punishment4 ,but as compared to the generative power1 they do not differ in species2 and thus they have one specific effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object1 as compared to reason2 and then it can specify a moral act4 ,and it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil2 for a circumstance would not make an action evil1 except through being repugnant to reason4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #f ,whether an ,action ,has the ,species of ,good or ,evil from ,its ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions4 ,for actions derive their species from the object4 ,but the end is altogether apart from the object4 ,therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of an action4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is accidental does not constitute the species1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,but it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end2 for instance1 to give alms from vainglory4 ,therefore actions are not diversified as to species1 according to the good and evil which are from the end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 acts that differ in species1 can be ordained to the same end3 thus to the end of vainglory1 actions of various virtues and vices can be ordained4 ,therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end1 do not diversify the species of action4 ,on the contrary1 ,it has been shown above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c7 that human actions derive their species from the end4 ,therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of actions4 ,i answer that1 ,certain actions are called human1 inasmuch as they are voluntary1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a74 ,now1 in a voluntary action1 there is a twofold action1 viz4 the interior action of the will1 and the external action3 and each of these actions has its object4 ,the end is properly the object of the interior act of the will3 while the object of the external action1 is that on which the action is brought to bear4 ,therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears2 so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end1 as from its own proper object4 ,now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action3 because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments2 nor have external actions any measure of morality1 save in so far as they are voluntary4 ,consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end1 but materially with regard to the object of the external action4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #b7 that he who steals that he may commit adultery1 is strictly speaking1 more adulterer than thief4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the end also has the character of an object1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end1 it is not accidental to the interior act of the will1 which act is compared to the external act1 as form to matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when many actions1 differing in species1 are ordained to the same end1 there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions2 but unity of species on the part of the internal action4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,species ,derived from the ,end ,is ,contained ,under the ,species ,derived from the ,object1 ,as ,under ,its ,genus1 or ,conversely8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object1 as a species is contained under its genus2 for instance1 when a man commits a theft in order to give alms4 ,for an action takes its species from its object1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #f74 ,but it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species1 if this species be not contained under the proper species of that thing2 because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another4 ,therefore the species which is taken from the end1 is contained under the species which is taken from the object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the last difference always constitutes the most specific species4 ,but the difference derived from the end seems to come after the difference derived from the object3 because the end is something last4 ,therefore the species derived from the end1 is contained under the species derived from the object1 as its most specific species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more formal a difference is1 the more specific it is3 because difference is compared to genus1 as form to matter4 ,but the species derived from the end1 is more formal than that which is derived from the object1 as stated above 7,a4 #f74 ,therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object1 as the most specific species is contained under the subaltern genus4 ,on the contrary1 ,each genus has its determinate differences4 ,but an action of one same species on the part of its object1 can be ordained to an infinite number of ends3 for instance1 theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends4 ,therefore the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object1 as under its genus4 ,i answer that1 ,the object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will3 first1 as being of itself ordained thereto2 thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory2 secondly1 as being ordained thereto accidentally2 thus to take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms4 ,now the differences that divide a genus1 and constitute the species of that genus1 must1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vii1 #ab71 divide that genus essentially3 and if they divide it accidentally1 the division is incorrect3 as1 if one were to say3 ,animals are divided into rational and irrational2 and the irrational into animals with wings1 and animals without wings2 for winged and wingless are not essential determinations of the irrational being4 ,but the following division would be correct3 ,some animals have feet1 some have no feet3 and of those that have feet1 some have two feet1 some four1 some many3 because the latter division is an essential determination of the former4 ,accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end1 the specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end1 nor is the reverse the case4 ,wherefore one of these species is not under the other2 but then the moral action is contained under two species that are disparate1 as it were4 ,consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery1 is guilty of a twofold malice in one action4 ,on the other hand1 if the object be of itself ordained to the end1 one of these differences is an essential determination of the other4 ,wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other4 ,it remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other4 ,in order to make this clear1 we must first of all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken1 the more specific is the difference4 ,secondly1 that the more universal an agent is1 the more universal a form does it cause4 ,thirdly1 that the more remote an end is1 the more universal the agent to which it corresponds2 thus victory1 which is the last end of the army1 is the end intended by the commander in chief2 while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers4 ,from all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end1 is more general2 and that the difference derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end1 is a specific difference in relation to the former4 ,for the will1 the proper object of which is the end1 is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul1 the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one and the same thing1 considered in its substance1 cannot be in two species1 one of which is not subordinate to the other4 ,but in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance1 one thing can be contained under different species4 ,thus one and the same fruit1 as to its color1 is contained under one species1 i4e4 a white thing3 and1 as to its perfume1 under the species of sweet-smelling things4 ,in like manner an action which1 as to its substance1 is in one natural species1 considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it1 can belong to two species1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the end is last in execution2 but first in the intention of the reason1 in regard to which moral actions receive their species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,difference is compared to genus as form to matter1 inasmuch as it actualizes the genus4 ,on the other hand1 the genus is considered as more formal than the species1 inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted4 ,wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause1 as is stated in ,phys4 ii1 #c4 ,and in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the species2 and so much the more formal1 as it is more universal4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,any ,action ,is ,indifferent in ,its ,species8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no action is indifferent in its species4 ,for evil is the privation of good1 according to ,augustine 7,enchiridion xi74 ,but privation and habit are immediate contraries1 according to the ,philosopher 7,categor4 viii74 ,therefore there is not such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species1 as though it were between good and evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 human actions derive their species from their end or object1 as stated above 7,a4 #f2 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c74 ,but every end and every object is either good or bad4 ,therefore every human action is good or evil according to its species4 ,none1 therefore1 is indifferent in its species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 an action is said to be good1 when it has its due complement of goodness2 and evil1 when it lacks that complement4 ,but every action must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness1 or lack it in some respect4 ,therefore every action must needs be either good or bad in its species1 and none is indifferent4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte ii1 #ah7 that there are certain deeds of a middle kind1 which can be done with a good or evil mind1 of which it is rash to form a judgment4 ,therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #e71 every action takes its species from its object2 while human action1 which is called moral1 takes its species from the object1 in relation to the principle of human actions1 which is the reason4 ,wherefore if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order of reason1 it will be a good action according to its species2 for instance1 to give alms to a person in want4 ,on the other hand1 if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason1 it will be an evil act according to its species2 for instance1 to steal1 which is to appropriate what belongs to another4 ,but it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason2 for instance1 to pick up a straw from the ground1 to walk in the fields1 and the like3 and such actions are indifferent according to their species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,privation is twofold4 ,one is privation as a result 7privatum esse71 and this leaves nothing1 but takes all away3 thus blindness takes away sight altogether2 darkness1 light2 and death1 life4 ,between this privation and the contrary habit1 there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject4 ,the other is privation in process 7privari73 thus sickness is privation of health2 not that it takes health away altogether1 but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health1 occasioned by death4 ,and since this sort of privation leaves something1 it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit4 ,in this way evil is a privation of good1 as ,simplicius says in his commentary on the ,categories3 because it does not take away all good1 but leaves some4 ,consequently there can be something between good and evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every object or end has some goodness or malice1 at least natural to it3 but this does not imply moral goodness or malice1 which is considered in relation to the reason1 as stated above4 ,and it is of this that we are here treating4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species4 ,wherefore although an action's specific nature may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness1 it is not therefore an action specifically bad2 nor is it specifically good4 ,thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #i ,whether an ,individual ,action ,can ,be ,indifferent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an individual action can be indifferent4 ,for there is no species that does not1 or cannot1 contain an individual4 ,but an action can be indifferent in its species1 as stated above 7,a4 #h74 ,therefore an individual action can be indifferent4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 individual actions cause like habits1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #a4 ,but a habit can be indifferent3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil2 and yet it is evident that they are not good1 since they depart from virtue2 and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit4 ,therefore some individual actions are indifferent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 moral good belongs to virtue1 while moral evil belongs to vice4 ,but it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end4 ,therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says in a homily 7vi in ,evang473 ,an idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility4 ,but an idle word is an evil1 because men 4 4 4 shall render an account of it in the day of judgment 7,matt4 #ab3cf73 while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility1 it is good4 ,therefore every word is either good or bad4 ,for the same reason every other action is either good or bad4 ,therefore no individual action is indifferent4 ,i answer that1 ,it sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species1 but considered in the individual it is good or evil4 ,and the reason of this is because a moral action1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 derives its goodness not only from its object1 whence it takes its species2 but also from the circumstances1 which are its accidents1 as it were2 just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents1 which does not belong to him by reason of his species4 ,and every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad1 at least in respect of the intention of the end4 ,for since it belongs to the reason to direct2 if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end1 it is1 by that fact alone1 repugnant to reason1 and has the character of evil4 ,but if it be directed to a due end1 it is in accord with reason2 wherefore it has the character of good4 ,now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end4 ,consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason1 if it be considered in the individual1 must be good or bad4 ,if1 however1 it does not proceed from deliberate reason1 but from some act of the imagination1 as when a man strokes his beard1 or moves his hand or foot2 such an action1 properly speaking1 is not moral or human2 since this depends on the reason4 ,hence it will be indifferent1 as standing apart from the genus of moral actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,for an action to be indifferent in its species can be understood in several ways4 ,first in such a way that its species demands that it remain indifferent2 and the objection proceeds along this line4 ,but no action can be specifically indifferent thus3 since no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil1 either through its end or through a circumstance4 ,secondly1 specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far as its species is concerned1 it is neither good nor bad4 ,wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else4 ,thus man1 as far as his species is concerned1 is neither white nor black2 nor is it a condition of his species that he should not be black or white2 but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,philosopher states that a man is evil1 properly speaking1 if he be hurtful to others4 ,and accordingly1 he says that the prodigal is not evil1 because he hurts none save himself4 ,and the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men4 ,but we say here that evil1 in general1 is all that is repugnant to right reason4 ,and in this sense every individual action is either good or bad1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason1 it belongs either to the good of some virtue1 or to the evil of some vice4 ,thus1 if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body1 it is also directed to the good of virtue1 provided he direct his body itself to the good of virtue4 ,the same clearly applies to other actions4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #aj ,whether a ,circumstance ,places a ,moral ,action in the ,species of ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil4 ,for the species of an action is taken from its object4 ,but circumstances differ from the object4 ,therefore circumstances do not give an action its species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action1 as stated above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,but an accident does not constitute the species4 ,therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one thing is not in several species4 ,but one action has several circumstances4 ,therefore a circumstance does not place a moral action in a species of good or evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,place is a circumstance4 ,but place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil2 for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege4 ,therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad4 ,i answer that1 ,just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms1 so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason1 as is evident from what was said above 7,a4 #e74 ,but since nature is determinate to one thing1 nor can a process of nature go on to infinity1 there must needs be some ultimate form1 giving a specific difference1 after which no further specific difference is possible4 ,hence it is that in natural things1 that which is accidental to a thing1 cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species4 ,but the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term1 for at any point it can still proceed further4 ,and consequently that which1 in one action1 is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action1 can again be taken by the directing reason1 as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species4 ,thus to appropriate another's property is specified by reason of the property being another's1 and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft2 and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time1 then this will be an additional circumstance4 ,but since the reason can direct as to place1 time1 and the like1 it may happen that the condition as to place1 in relation to the object1 is considered as being in disaccord with reason3 for instance1 reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place4 ,consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason4 ,and thus place1 which was first of all considered as a circumstance1 is considered here as the principal condition of the object1 and as itself repugnant to reason4 ,and in this way1 whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason1 either for or against1 it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a circumstance1 in so far as it specifies an action1 is considered as a condition of the object1 as stated above1 and as being1 as it were1 a specific difference thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a circumstance1 so long as it is but a circumstance1 does not specify an action1 since thus it is a mere accident3 but when it becomes a principal condition of the object1 then it does specify the action4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil2 since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason4 ,consequently1 although one action may have many circumstances1 it does not follow that it is in many species4 ,nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several1 even disparate1 moral species1 as said above 7,a4 #g1 ad #a2 ,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #aa ,whether ,every ,circumstance ,that ,makes an ,action ,better or ,worse1 ,places a ,moral ,action in a ,species of ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil1 specifies an action4 ,for good and evil are specific differences of moral actions4 ,therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action1 causes a specific difference1 which is the same as to make it differ in species4 ,now that which makes an action better or worse1 makes it differ in goodness and malice4 ,therefore it causes it to differ in species4 ,therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse1 constitutes a species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an additional circumstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice1 or it has not4 ,if not1 it cannot make the action better or worse2 because what is not good1 cannot make a greater good2 and what is not evil1 cannot make a greater evil4 ,but if it has in itself the character of good or evil1 for this very reason it has a certain species of good or evil4 ,therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse1 constitutes a new species of good or evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 evil is caused by each single defect4 ,now every circumstance that increases malice1 has a special defect4 ,therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin4 ,and for the same reason1 every circumstance that increases goodness1 seems to add a new species of goodness3 just as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number2 since the good consists in number1 weight1 and measure 7,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e74 ,on the contrary1 ,more and less do not change a species4 ,but more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice4 ,therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse1 places it in a species of good or evil4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #aj71 a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action1 in so far as it regards a special order of reason4 ,now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil1 except on the supposition of another previous circumstance1 from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil4 ,thus to take something in a large or small quantity1 does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil1 except a certain other condition be presupposed1 from which the action takes its malice or goodness2 for instance1 if what is taken belongs to another1 which makes the action to be discordant with reason4 ,wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity1 does not change the species of the sin4 ,nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin4 ,the same applies to other evil or good actions4 ,consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse1 changes its species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in things which can be more or less intense1 the difference of more or less does not change the species3 thus by differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color4 ,in like manner that which makes an action to be more or less good or evil1 does not make the action differ in species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a circumstance that aggravates a sin1 or adds to the goodness of an action1 sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself1 but in regard to some other condition of the action1 as stated above4 ,consequently it does not add a new species1 but adds to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own2 sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else4 ,in like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection1 except in reference to something else4 ,and1 for as much as it does1 although it may add to the goodness or malice1 it does not always change the species of good or evil4 ,,question #ai ,,of ,,the ,,goodness ,,and ,,malice ,,of ,,the ,,interior ,,act ,,of ,,the ,,will 7,in ,ten ,articles7 ,we must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will2 under which head there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the goodness of the will depends on the object8 7#b7 ,whether it depends on the object alone8 7#c7 ,whether it depends on reason8 7#d7 ,whether it depends on the eternal law8 7#e7 ,whether erring reason binds8 7#f7 ,whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of ,god8 7#g7 ,whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means1 depends on the intention of the end8 7#h7 ,whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention8 7#i7 ,whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the ,divine ,will8 7#aj7 ,whether it is necessary for the human will1 in order to be good1 to be conformed to the ,divine ,will1 as regards the thing willed8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,goodness of the ,will ,depends on the ,object8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object4 ,for the will cannot be directed otherwise than to what is good3 since evil is outside the scope of the will1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,if therefore the goodness of the will depended on the object1 it would follow that every act of the will is good1 and none bad4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 good is first of all in the end3 wherefore the goodness of the end1 as such1 does not depend on any other4 ,but1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #e71 goodness of action is the end1 but goodness of making is never the end3 because the latter is always ordained to the thing made1 as to its end4 ,therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 such as a thing is1 such does it make a thing to be4 ,but the object of the will is good1 by reason of the goodness of nature4 ,therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will4 ,therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object4 ,on the contrary1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that justice is that habit from which men wish for just things3 and accordingly1 virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things4 ,but a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue4 ,therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good4 ,i answer that1 ,good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will4 ,because good and evil of themselves regard the will2 just as truth and falsehood regard reason2 the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood1 for as much as an opinion is said to be true or false4 ,consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species4 ,now the specific difference in acts is according to objects1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will is not always directed to what is truly good1 but sometimes to the apparent good2 which has indeed some measure of good1 but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired4 ,hence it is that the act of the will is not always good1 but sometimes evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although an action can1 in a certain way1 be man's last end2 nevertheless such action is not an act of the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,good is presented to the will as its object by the reason3 and in so far as it is in accord with reason1 it enters the moral order1 and causes moral goodness in the act of the will3 because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #b ,whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone4 ,for the end has a closer relationship to the will than to any other power4 ,but the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end1 as we have shown above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the goodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #c74 ,but according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will3 for instance1 if a man will1 when he ought1 where he ought1 as much as he ought1 and how he ought1 or if he will as he ought not4 ,therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on the object1 but also on the circumstances4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h74 ,but it would not be so1 unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances4 ,therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on the circumstances1 and not only on the object4 ,on the contrary1 ,an action does not take its species from the circumstances as such1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #aj1 ad #b74 ,but good and evil are specific differences of the act of the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend1 not on the circumstances1 but on the object alone4 ,i answer that1 ,in every genus1 the more a thing is first1 the more simple it is1 and the fewer the principles of which it consists3 thus primary bodies are simple4 ,hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus1 are1 in some way1 simple and consist of one principle4 ,now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will4 ,consequently the goodness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing2 while the goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things4 ,now that one thing which is the principle in each genus1 is not something accidental to that genus1 but something essential thereto3 because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential1 as to its principle4 ,therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone1 which of itself causes goodness in the act2 and that one thing is the object1 and not the circumstances1 which are accidents1 as it were1 of the act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the end is the object of the will1 but not of the other powers4 ,hence1 in regard to the act of the will1 the goodness derived from the object1 does not differ from that which is derived from the end1 as they differ in the acts of the other powers2 except perhaps accidentally1 in so far as one end depends on another1 and one act of the will on another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,given that the act of the will is fixed on some good1 no circumstances can make that act bad4 ,consequently when it is said that a man wills a good when he ought not1 or where he ought not1 this can be understood in two ways4 ,first1 so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed4 ,and thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good3 since to will to do something when it ought not to be done1 is not to will something good4 ,secondly1 so that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing4 ,and thus1 it is impossible to will something good when one ought not to1 because one ought always to will what is good3 except1 perhaps1 accidentally1 in so far as a man by willing some particular good1 is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time4 ,and then evil results1 not from his willing that particular good1 but from his not willing the other4 ,the same applies to the other circumstances4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will1 in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed3 that is to say1 in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,goodness of the ,will ,depends on ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason4 ,for what comes first does not depend on what follows4 ,but the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason1 as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b7 that the goodness of the practical intellect is a truth that is in conformity with right desire4 ,but right desire is a good will4 ,therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will1 rather than conversely4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the mover does not depend on that which is moved1 but vice versa4 ,but the will moves the reason and the other powers1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 x73 ,it is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason4 ,but the goodness of the will consists in not being unruly4 ,therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the goodness of the will depends properly on the object4 ,now the will's object is proposed to it by reason4 ,because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will2 while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will but to the sensitive appetite3 since the will can tend to the universal good1 which reason apprehends2 whereas the sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good1 apprehended by the sensitive power4 ,therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason1 in the same way as it depends on the object4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the good considered as such1 i4e4 as appetible1 pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason4 ,but considered as true it pertains to the reason1 before1 under the aspect of goodness1 pertaining to the will3 because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended by reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect1 in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means3 for in this respect it is perfected by prudence4 ,now in regard to the means1 the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end3 nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will moves the reason in one way3 the reason moves the will in another1 viz4 on the part of the object1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,goodness of the ,will ,depends on the ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law4 ,because to one thing there is one rule and one measure4 ,but the rule of the human will1 on which its goodness depends1 is right reason4 ,therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured 7,metaph4 x1 #a74 ,but the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human will4 ,therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a measure should be most certain4 ,but the eternal law is unknown to us4 ,therefore it cannot be the measure on which the goodness of our will depends4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg7 that sin is a deed1 word or desire against the eternal law4 ,but malice of the will is the root of sin4 ,therefore1 since malice is contrary to goodness1 the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law4 ,i answer that1 ,wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another1 the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause3 since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first4 ,now it is from the eternal law1 which is the ,divine ,reason1 that human reason is the rule of the human will1 from which the human derives its goodness4 ,hence it is written 7,ps4 #d3f1 #g73 ,many say3 ,who showeth us good things8 ,the light of ,thy countenance1 ,o ,lord1 is signed upon us3 as though to say3 ,the light of our reason is able to show us good things1 and guide our will1 in so far as it is the light 7i4e4 derived from7 ,thy countenance4 ,it is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason3 and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the ,eternal ,reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to one thing there are not several proximate measures2 but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured2 a remote measure is not4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the ,divine ,mind3 nevertheless1 it becomes known to us somewhat1 either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image2 or by some sort of additional revelation4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,will ,is ,evil ,when ,it ,is at ,variance with ,erring ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason4 ,because the reason is the rule of the human will1 in so far as it is derived from the eternal law1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,but erring reason is not derived from the eternal law4 ,therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will4 ,therefore the will is not evil1 if it be at variance with erring reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,augustine1 the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority3 for instance1 if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor4 ,but erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power1 namely1 ,god ,whose power is supreme4 ,therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind4 ,consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every evil will is reducible to some species of malice4 ,but the will that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to some species of malice4 ,for instance1 if a man's reason err in telling him to commit fornication1 his will in not willing to do so1 cannot be reduced to any species of malice4 ,therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #ac71 conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action4 ,now knowledge is in the reason4 ,therefore when the will is at variance with erring reason1 it is against conscience4 ,but every such will is evil2 for it is written 7,rom4 #ad3bc73 ,all that is not of faith--i4e4 all that is against conscience--is sin4 ,therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason4 ,i answer that1 ,since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason1 for it is an application of knowledge to action1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #ac71 to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason1 is the same as to inquire whether an erring conscience binds4 ,on this matter1 some distinguished three kinds of actions3 for some are good generically2 some are indifferent2 some are evil generically4 ,and they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically1 there is no error3 and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically2 since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil4 ,on the other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in itself2 or that what is good in itself1 is forbidden1 then his reason or conscience errs4 ,in like manner if a man's reason or conscience tell him1 that what is indifferent in itself1 for instance to raise a straw from the ground1 is forbidden or commanded1 his reason or conscience errs4 ,they say1 therefore1 that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference1 either by commanding or by forbidding them1 binds3 so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful4 ,but they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself1 or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation1 it does not bind2 wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is not evil4 ,but this is unreasonable4 ,for in matters of indifference1 the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience1 is evil in some way on account of the object1 on which the goodness or malice of the will depends2 not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature2 but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid4 ,and since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil1 the will by tending thereto becomes evil4 ,and this is the case not only in indifferent matters1 but also in those that are good or evil in themselves4 ,for not only indifferent matters can receive the character of goodness or malice accidentally2 but also that which is good1 can receive the character of evil1 or that which is evil1 can receive the character of goodness1 on account of the reason apprehending it as such4 ,for instance1 to refrain from fornication is good3 yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason4 ,if1 therefore1 the erring reason propose it as an evil1 the will tends to it as to something evil4 ,consequently the will is evil1 because it wills evil1 not indeed that which is evil in itself1 but that which is evil accidentally1 through being apprehended as such by the reason4 ,in like manner1 to believe in ,christ is good in itself1 and necessary for salvation3 but the will does not tend thereto1 except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason4 ,consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil1 the will tends to it as to something evil3 not as if it were evil in itself1 but because it is evil accidentally1 through the apprehension of the reason4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #i7 that properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason2 but accidentally1 he is also one who does not follow false reason4 ,we must therefore conclude that1 absolutely speaking1 every will at variance with reason1 whether right or erring1 is always evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from ,god1 yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being true1 and consequently as being derived from ,god1 from ,whom is all truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the saying of ,augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of the higher authority4 ,but if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor1 in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor4 ,in like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating something contrary to ,god's commandment1 he would not be bound to abide by reason3 but then reason would not be entirely erroneous4 ,but when erring reason proposes something as being commanded by ,god1 then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whenever reason apprehends something as evil1 it apprehends it under some species of evil2 for instance1 as being something contrary to a divine precept1 or as giving scandal1 or for some such like reason4 ,and then that evil is reduced to that species of malice4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,will ,is ,good ,when ,it ,abides by ,erring ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason4 ,for just as the will1 when at variance with the reason1 tends to that which reason judges to be evil2 so1 when in accord with reason1 it tends to what reason judges to be good4 ,but the will is evil when it is at variance with reason1 even when erring4 ,therefore even when it abides by erring reason1 the will is good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the will is always good1 when it abides by the commandment of ,god and the eternal law4 ,but the eternal law and ,god's commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason1 even when it errs4 ,therefore the will is good1 even when it abides by erring reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason4 ,if1 therefore1 the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason1 it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason3 so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma1 and1 of necessity1 would sin3 which is unreasonable4 ,therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,the will of those who slew the apostles was evil4 ,and yet it was in accord with the erring reason1 according to ,john #af3b3 ,the hour cometh1 that whosoever killeth you1 will think that he doth a service to ,god4 ,therefore the will can be evil1 when it abides by erring reason4 ,i answer that1 ,whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring whether an erring conscience binds2 so this question is the same as inquiring whether an erring conscience excuses4 ,now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance4 ,for it was said 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h7 that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary1 and sometimes not4 ,and since moral good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary1 as was stated above 7,a4 #b72 it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary1 it takes away the character of moral good and evil2 but not1 when it does not cause the act to be involuntary4 ,again1 it has been stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h7 that when ignorance is in any way willed1 either directly or indirectly1 it does not cause the act to be involuntary4 ,and ,i call that ignorance directly voluntary1 to which the act of the will tends3 and that1 indirectly voluntary1 which is due to negligence1 by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know1 as stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h74 ,if then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary1 either directly1 or through negligence1 so that one errs about what one ought to know2 then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will1 that abides by that erring reason or conscience1 from being evil4 ,but if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance1 and without any negligence1 so that it cause the act to be involuntary1 then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will1 that abides by that erring reason1 from being evil4 ,for instance1 if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another man's wife1 the will that abides by that erring reason is evil2 since this error arises from ignorance of the ,divine ,law1 which he is bound to know4 ,but if a man's reason1 errs in mistaking another for his wife1 and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it1 his will is excused from being evil3 because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance1 which ignorance excuses1 and causes the act to be involuntary4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 good results from the entire cause1 evil from each particular defect4 ,consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil1 it suffices1 either that it be evil in itself1 or that it be apprehended as evil4 ,but in order for it to be good1 it must be good in both ways4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the eternal law cannot err1 but human reason can4 ,consequently the will that abides by human reason1 is not always right1 nor is it always in accord with the eternal law4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as in syllogistic arguments1 granted one absurdity1 others must needs follow2 so in moral matters1 given one absurdity1 others must follow too4 ,thus suppose a man to seek vainglory1 he will sin1 whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he omit to do it4 ,nor is he in a dilemma about the matter3 because he can put aside his evil intention4 ,in like manner1 suppose a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance1 then evil must needs result in the will4 ,nor is this man in a dilemma3 because he can lay aside his error1 since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,goodness of the ,will1 ,as ,regards the ,means1 ,depends on the ,intention of the ,end8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end4 ,for it has been stated above 7,a4 #b7 that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone4 ,but as regards the means1 the object of the will is one thing1 and the end intended is another4 ,therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to wish to keep ,god's commandment1 belongs to a good will4 ,but this can be referred to an evil end1 for instance1 to vainglory or covetousness1 by willing to obey ,god for the sake of temporal gain4 ,therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as good and evil diversify the will1 so do they diversify the end4 ,but malice of the will does not depend on the malice of the end intended2 since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms1 has an evil will1 although he intends a good end4 ,therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 ix1 #c7 that ,god rewards the intention4 ,but ,god rewards a thing because it is good4 ,therefore the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end4 ,i answer that1 ,the intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will2 first1 as preceding it1 secondly as following 99,leonine edn43 'accompanying' it4 ,the intention precedes the act of the will causally1 when we will something because we intend a certain end4 ,and then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed3 for instance1 when a man wills to fast for ,god's sake2 because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very fact that it is done for ,god's sake4 ,wherefore1 since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 it must1 of necessity1 depend on the intention of the end4 ,on the other hand1 intention follows the act of the will1 when it is added to a preceding act of the will2 for instance1 a man may will to do something1 and may afterwards refer it to ,god4 ,and then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention1 except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the intention is the cause of the act of willing1 the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the object1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the act of the will cannot be said to be good1 if an evil intention is the cause of willing4 ,for when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory1 he wills that which is good in itself1 under a species of evil2 and therefore1 as willed by him1 it is evil4 ,wherefore his will is evil4 ,if1 however1 the intention is subsequent to the act of the will1 then the latter may be good3 and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded1 but that which is repeated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as we have already stated 7,a4 #f1 ad #a71 evil results from each particular defect1 but good from the whole and entire cause4 ,hence1 whether the will tend to what is evil in itself1 even under the species of good2 or to the good under the species of evil1 it will be evil in either case4 ,but in order for the will to be good1 it must tend to the good under the species of good2 in other words1 it must will the good for the sake of the good4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,degree of ,goodness or ,malice in the ,will ,depends on the ,degree of ,good or ,evil in the ,intention8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention4 ,because on ,matt4 #ab3ce1 ,a good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good1 a gloss says3 ,a man does as much good as he intends4 ,but the intention gives goodness not only to the external action1 but also to the act of the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his intention4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if you add to the cause1 you add to the effect4 ,but the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will4 ,therefore a man's will is good1 according as his intention is good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in evil actions1 a man sins in proportion to his intention3 for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous intention1 he would be guilty of murder4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 in good actions1 the will is good in proportion to the good intended4 ,on the contrary1 ,the intention can be good1 while the will is evil4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 the intention can be better1 and the will less good4 ,i answer that1 ,in regard to both the act1 and the intention of the end1 we may consider a twofold quantity3 one1 on the part of the object1 by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater2 the other1 taken from the intensity of the act1 according as a man wills or acts intensely2 and this is more on the part of the agent4 ,if then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object1 it is evident that the quantity in the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention4 ,with regard to the external act this may happen in two ways4 ,first1 through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end2 for instance1 if a man were to give ten pounds1 he could not realize his intention1 if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds4 ,secondly1 on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action1 which obstacles we are unable to remove3 for instance1 a man intends to go to ,rome1 and encounters obstacles1 which prevent him from going4 ,on the other hand1 with regard to the interior act of the will1 this happens in only one way3 because the interior acts of the will are in our power1 whereas the external actions are not4 ,but the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end3 and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely1 is not so good as the intention4 ,yet because the intention also belongs1 in a way1 to the act of the will1 inasmuch1 to wit1 as it is the reason thereof2 it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will2 that is to say1 in so far as the will wills some great good for an end1 although that by which it wills to gain so great a good1 is not proportionate to that good4 ,but if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act1 according to their respective intensity1 then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will3 since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form1 as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f74 ,and yet considered materially1 while the intention is intense1 the interior or exterior act may be not so intense1 materially speaking3 for instance1 when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health4 ,nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely1 redounds1 as a formal principle1 upon the intense volition of medicine4 ,we must observe1 however1 that the intensity of the interior or exterior act1 may be referred to the intention as its object3 as when a man intends to will intensely1 or to do something intensely4 ,and yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely2 because the quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity of the good intended1 as is shown above4 ,and hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit3 because the quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act1 as we shall show later on 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of ,god1 ,who considers principally the intention of the end4 ,wherefore another gloss says on the same passage that the treasure of the heart is the intention1 according to which ,god judges our works4 ,for the goodness of the intention1 as stated above1 redounds1 so to speak1 upon the goodness of the will1 which makes even the external act to be meritorious in ,god's sight4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will4 ,hence the argument does not prove4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil3 and therefore too1 the will is as evil as the intention is evil4 ,but the same reasoning does not apply to goodness1 as stated above 7ad #b74 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #i ,whether the ,goodness of the ,will ,depends on ,its ,conformity to the ,divine ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the ,divine will4 ,because it is impossible for man's will to be conformed to the ,divine will2 as appears from the word of ,isa4 #ee3i3 ,as the heavens are exalted above the earth1 so are ,my ways exalted above your ways1 and ,my thoughts above your thoughts4 ,if therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the ,divine will1 it would follow that it is impossible for man's will to be good4 ,which is inadmissible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as our wills arise from the ,divine will1 so does our knowledge flow from the ,divine knowledge4 ,but our knowledge does not require to be conformed to ,god's knowledge2 since ,god knows many things that we know not4 ,therefore there is no need for our will to be conformed to the ,divine will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the will is a principle of action4 ,but our action cannot be conformed to ,god's4 ,therefore neither can our will be conformed to ,his4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #bf3ci73 ,not as ,i will1 but as ,thou wilt3 which words ,he said1 because ,he wishes man to be upright and to tend to ,god1 as ,augustine expounds in the ,enchiridion 99,enarr4 in ,ps4 #cb1 serm4 i44 ,but the rectitude of the will is its goodness4 ,therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the ,divine will4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #g71 the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end4 ,now the last end of the human will is the ,sovereign ,good1 namely1 ,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the ,sovereign ,good1 that is1 to ,god4 ,now this ,good is primarily and essentially compared to the ,divine will1 as its proper object4 ,again1 that which is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus4 ,moreover1 everything attains to rectitude and goodness1 in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure4 ,therefore1 in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed to the ,divine will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the human will cannot be conformed to the will of ,god so as to equal it1 but only so as to imitate it4 ,in like manner human knowledge is conformed to the ,divine knowledge1 in so far as it knows truth3 and human action is conformed to the ,divine1 in so far as it is becoming to the agent3 and this by way of imitation1 not by way of equality4 ,from the above may be gathered the replies to the ,second and ,third ,objections4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,it ,is ,necessary for the ,human ,will1 in ,order to ,be ,good1 to ,be ,conformed to the ,divine ,will1 ,as ,regards the ,thing ,willed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the ,divine will1 as regards the thing willed4 ,for we cannot will what we know not3 since the apprehended good is the object of the will4 ,but in many things we know not what ,god wills4 ,therefore the human will cannot be conformed to the ,divine will as to the thing willed4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god wills to damn the man whom ,he foresees about to die in mortal sin4 ,if therefore man were bound to conform his will to the ,divine will1 in the point of the thing willed1 it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation4 ,which is inadmissible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one is bound to will what is against filial piety4 ,but if man were to will what ,god wills1 this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety3 for instance1 when ,god wills the death of a father3 if his son were to will it also1 it would be against filial piety4 ,therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the ,divine will1 as to the thing willed4 ,on the contrary1 7#a7 ,on ,ps4 #cb3a1 ,praise becometh the upright1 a gloss says3 ,that man has an upright heart1 who wills what ,god wills4 ,but everyone is bound to have an upright heart4 ,therefore everyone is bound to will what ,god wills4 7#b7 ,moreover1 the will takes its form from the object1 as does every act4 ,if therefore man is bound to conform his will to the ,divine will1 it follows that he is bound to conform it1 as to the thing willed4 7#c7 ,moreover1 opposition of wills arises from men willing different things4 ,but whoever has a will in opposition to the ,divine will1 has an evil will4 ,therefore whoever does not conform his will to the ,divine will1 as to the thing willed1 has an evil will4 ,i answer that1 ,as is evident from what has been said above 7,,aa4 #c1 #e71 the will tends to its object1 according as it is proposed by the reason4 ,now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason1 so as to appear good from one point of view1 and not good from another point of view4 ,and therefore if a man's will wills a thing to be1 according as it appears to be good1 his will is good3 and the will of another man1 who wills that thing not to be1 according as it appears evil1 is also good4 ,thus a judge has a good will1 in willing a thief to be put to death1 because this is just3 while the will of another--e4g4 the thief's wife or son1 who wishes him not to be put to death1 inasmuch as killing is a natural evil1 is also good4 ,now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect2 the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good1 the more universal the good to which the will tends4 ,this is evident in the example given above3 because the judge has care of the common good1 which is justice1 and therefore he wishes the thief's death1 which has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate2 whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private good of the family1 and from this point of view she wishes her husband1 the thief1 not to be put to death4 ,now the good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by ,god1 ,who is the ,maker and ,governor of all things3 hence whatever ,he wills1 ,he wills it under the aspect of the common good2 this is ,his own ,goodness1 which is the good of the whole universe4 ,on the other hand1 the apprehension of a creature1 according to its nature1 is of some particular good1 proportionate to that nature4 ,now a thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect1 and yet not good under a universal aspect1 or vice versa1 as stated above4 ,and therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect1 which thing ,god wills not1 under a universal aspect1 and vice versa4 ,and hence too it is1 that various wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things1 for as much as1 under various aspects1 they wish a particular thing to be or not to be4 ,but a man's will is not right in willing a particular good1 unless he refer it to the common good as an end3 since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole4 ,now it is the end that supplies the formal reason1 as it were1 of willing whatever is directed to the end4 ,consequently1 in order that a man will some particular good with a right will1 he must will that particular good materially1 and the ,divine and universal good1 formally4 ,therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the ,divine will1 as to that which is willed formally1 for it is bound to will the ,divine and universal good2 but not as to that which is willed materially1 for the reason given above4 ,at the same time in both these respects1 the human will is conformed to the ,divine1 in a certain degree4 ,because inasmuch as it is conformed to the ,divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed1 it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end4 ,while1 inasmuch as it is not conformed to the ,divine will in the thing willed materially1 it is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause2 since the proper inclination consequent to nature1 or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing1 comes to a thing from ,god as its efficient cause4 ,hence it is customary to say that a man's will1 in this respect1 is conformed to the ,divine will1 because it wills what ,god wishes him to will4 ,there is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause1 consisting in man's willing something from charity1 as ,god wills it4 ,and this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity1 that is in respect of the last end1 which is the proper object of charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we can know in a general way what ,god wills4 ,for we know that whatever ,god wills1 ,he wills it under the aspect of good4 ,consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good1 has a will conformed to the ,divine will1 as to the reason of the thing willed4 ,but we know not what ,god wills in particular3 and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the ,divine will4 ,but in the state of glory1 every one will see in each thing that he wills1 the relation of that thing to what ,god wills in that particular matter4 ,consequently he will conform his will to ,god in all things not only formally1 but also materially4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god does not will the damnation of a man1 considered precisely as damnation1 nor a man's death1 considered precisely as death1 because1 ,he wills all men to be saved 7#a ,tim4 #b3d72 but ,he wills such things under the aspect of justice4 ,wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of ,god's justice and of the natural order4 ,wherefore the reply to the ,third ,objection is evident4 ,to the first argument advanced in a contrary sense1 it should be said that a man who conforms his will to ,god's1 in the aspect of reason of the thing willed1 wills what ,god wills1 more than the man1 who conforms his will to ,god's1 in the point of the very thing willed2 because the will tends more to the end1 than to that which is on account of the end4 ,to the second1 it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally1 rather than from the object considered materially4 ,to the third1 it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things1 but not under the same aspect3 but there is opposition of wills1 when under one and the same aspect1 one man wills a thing which another wills not4 ,but there is no question of this here4 ,,question #bj ,,of ,,goodness ,,and ,,malice ,,in ,,external ,,human ,,actions 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions3 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will1 or in the external action8 7#b7 ,whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will8 7#c7 ,whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action8 7#d7 ,whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act8 7#e7 ,whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice8 7#f7 ,whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,goodness or ,malice ,is ,first in the ,action of the ,will1 or in the ,external ,action8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will4 ,for the will derives goodness from its object1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but the external action is the object of the interior act of the will3 for a man is said to will to commit a theft1 or to will to give an alms4 ,therefore good and evil are in the external action1 prior to being in the act of the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the aspect of good belongs first to the end3 since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to the end4 ,now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b71 the act of another power can be an end4 ,therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f74 ,but that which is formal is subsequent2 since form is something added to matter4 ,therefore good and evil are in the external action1 prior to being in the act of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #i7 that it is by the will that we sin1 and that we behave aright4 ,therefore moral good and evil are first in the will4 ,i answer that1 ,external actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways4 ,first1 in regard to their genus1 and the circumstances connected with them3 thus the giving of alms1 if the required conditions be observed1 is said to be good4 ,secondly1 a thing is said to be good or evil1 from its relation to the end3 thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil4 ,now1 since the end is the will's proper object1 it is evident that this aspect of good or evil1 which the external action derives from its relation to the end1 is to be found first of all in the act of the will1 whence it passes to the external action4 ,on the other hand1 the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself1 on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances1 is not derived from the will1 but rather from the reason4 ,consequently1 if we consider the goodness of the external action1 in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and apprehension1 it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will3 but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action done1 it is subsequent to the goodness of the will1 which is its principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the exterior action is the object of the will1 inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason1 as good apprehended and ordained by the reason3 and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will4 ,but inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action1 it is an effect of the will1 and is subsequent to the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the end precedes in the order of intention1 but follows in the order of execution4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a form as received into matter1 is subsequent to matter in the order of generation1 although it precedes it in the order of nature3 but inasmuch as it is in the active cause1 it precedes in every way4 ,now the will is compared to the exterior action1 as its efficient cause4 ,wherefore the goodness of the act of the will1 as existing in the active cause1 is the form of the exterior action4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,whole ,goodness and ,malice of the ,external ,action ,depends on the ,goodness of the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will4 ,for it is written 7,matt4 #g3ah73 ,a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit1 neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit4 ,but1 according to the gloss1 the tree signifies the will1 and fruit signifies works4 ,therefore1 it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good1 and the external action evil1 or vice versa4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #i7 that there is no sin without the will4 ,if therefore there is no sin in the will1 there will be none in the external action4 ,and so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act4 ,now differences make an essential division in a genus1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 vii1 #ab74 ,since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary1 it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,mendac4 vii71 that there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action3 one in respect of due matter and circumstances2 the other in respect of the order to the end4 ,and that which is in respect of the order to the end1 depends entirely on the will3 while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances1 depends on the reason3 and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will1 in so far as the will tends towards it4 ,now it must be observed1 as was noted above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a71 that for a thing to be evil1 one single defect suffices1 whereas1 for it to be good simply1 it is not enough for it to be good in one point only1 it must be good in every respect4 ,if therefore the will be good1 both from its proper object and from its end1 if follows that the external action is good4 ,but if the will be good from its intention of the end1 this is not enough to make the external action good3 and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end1 or by reason of the act willed1 it follows that the external action is evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if the good tree be taken to signify the good will1 it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from the end intended4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man sins by his will1 not only when he wills an evil end2 but also when he wills an evil act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will1 but also to external actions1 inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the reason4 ,consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,goodness and ,malice of the ,external ,action ,are the ,same ,as ,those of the ,interior ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external action4 ,for the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul2 whereas the principle of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement4 ,now where the principles of action are different1 the actions themselves are different4 ,moreover1 it is the action which is the subject of goodness or malice3 and the same accident cannot be in different subjects4 ,therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that of the external action4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,a virtue makes that1 which has it1 good1 and renders its action good also 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,but the intellective virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded1 as is declared in ,ethic4 i1 #ac4 ,therefore the goodness of the interior act1 which belongs to the commanding power1 is distinct from the goodness of the external action1 which belongs to the power commanded4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same thing cannot be cause and effect2 since nothing is its own cause4 ,but the goodness of the interior act is the cause of the goodness of the external action1 or vice versa1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore it is not the same goodness in each4 ,on the contrary1 ,it was shown above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f7 that the act of the will is the form1 as it were1 of the external action4 ,now that which results from the material and formal element is one thing4 ,therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #d71 the interior act of the will1 and the external action1 considered morally1 are one act4 ,now it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice1 and sometimes that it has but one4 ,hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external action1 and sometimes not4 ,for as we have already said 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 these two goodnesses or malices1 of the internal and external acts1 are ordained to one another4 ,now it may happen1 in things that are subordinate to something else1 that a thing is good merely from being subordinate2 thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures health4 ,wherefore there are not two goodnesses1 one the goodness of health1 and the other the goodness of the draught2 but one and the same4 ,on the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else1 has some aspect of goodness in itself1 besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good3 thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good1 besides being conducive to health4 ,we must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only1 then there is but one and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end1 and of the external action1 which regards the end through the medium of the act of the will4 ,but when the external action has goodness or malice of itself1 i4e4 in regard to its matter and circumstances1 then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness of the will in regarding the end2 yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external action1 and the goodness of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument proves that the internal and external actions are different in the physical order3 yet distinct as they are in that respect1 they combine to form one thing in the moral order1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #ab1 a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue1 which act is the end1 as it were1 of that virtue2 whereas prudence1 which is in the reason1 is ordained to things directed to the end4 ,for this reason various virtues are necessary4 ,but right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue1 in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when a thing is derived by one thing from another1 as from a univocal efficient cause1 then it is not the same in both3 thus when a hot thing heats1 the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated1 although it be the same specifically4 ,but when a thing is derived from one thing from another1 according to analogy or proportion1 then it is one and the same in both3 thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the healthiness of the animal's body2 nor is health as applied to urine and medicine1 distinct from health as applied to the body of an animal1 of which health medicine is the cause1 and urine the sign4 ,it is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the will1 and vice versa2 viz4 according to the order of one to the other4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,external ,action ,adds ,any ,goodness or ,malice to ,that of the ,interior ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the external action does not add any goodness or malice to that of the interior action4 ,for ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xix in ,matt473 ,it is the will that is rewarded for doing good1 or punished for doing evil4 ,now works are the witnesses of the will4 ,therefore ,god seeks for works not on ,his own account1 in order to know how to judge2 but for the sake of others1 that all may understand how just ,he is4 ,but good or evil is to be estimated according to ,god's judgment rather than according to the judgment of man4 ,therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the goodness and malice of the interior and external acts are one and the same1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but increase is the addition of one thing to another4 ,therefore the external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the entire goodness of created things does not add to the ,divine ,goodness1 because it is entirely derived therefrom4 ,but sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the interior act1 and sometimes conversely1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other4 ,on the contrary1 ,every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil4 ,if therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be added1 it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will1 does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed4 ,which is unreasonable4 ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from the will tending to the end1 then the external action adds nothing to this goodness1 unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in good things1 or worse in evil things4 ,this1 seemingly1 may happen in three ways4 ,first in point of number2 if1 for instance1 a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view1 and does not do it then1 but afterwards wills and does it1 the act of his will is doubled and a double good1 or a double evil is the result4 ,secondly1 in point of extension3 when1 for instance1 a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end1 and is hindered by some obstacle1 whereas another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed2 it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good or evil1 and in this respect1 is better or worse4 ,thirdly1 in point of intensity3 for there are certain external actions1 which1 in so far as they are pleasurable1 or painful1 are such as naturally to make the will more intense or more remiss2 and it is evident that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil1 the better or worse it is4 ,on the other hand1 if we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from its matter and due circumstances1 thus it stands in relation to the will as its term and end4 ,and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will2 because every inclination or movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term4 ,wherefore the will is not perfect1 unless it be such that1 given the opportunity1 it realizes the operation4 ,but if this prove impossible1 as long as the will is perfect1 so as to realize the operation if it could2 the lack of perfection derived from the external action1 is simply involuntary4 ,now just as the involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds1 so neither does it lessen reward or punishment1 if a man through simple involuntariness fail to do good or evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will is complete1 and does not refrain from the deed save through the impossibility of achievement4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument applies to that goodness which the external action derives from the will as tending to the end4 ,but the goodness which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances1 is distinct from that which it derives from the end2 but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed1 to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,from this the reply to the ,third ,objection is evident4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,consequences of the ,external ,action ,increase ,its ,goodness or ,malice8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice4 ,for the effect pre-exists virtually in its cause4 ,but the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause4 ,therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions4 ,now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue1 since a virtue makes that which has it to be good 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher4 ,but such goods as these redound to the merit of the preacher1 as is evident from ,phil4 #d3a3 ,my dearly beloved brethren1 my joy and my crown4 ,therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 punishment is not increased1 unless the fault increases3 wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #be3b73 ,according to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be4 ,but the punishment is increased on account of the consequences2 for it is written 7,ex4 #ba3bi73 ,but if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before1 and they warned his master1 and he did not shut him up1 and he shall kill a man or a woman1 then the ox shall be stoned1 and his owner also shall be put to death4 ,but he would not have been put to death1 if the ox1 although he had not been shut up1 had not killed a man4 ,therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if a man do something which may cause death1 by striking1 or by sentencing1 and if death does not ensue1 he does not contract irregularity3 but he would if death were to ensue4 ,therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,the consequences do not make an action that was evil1 to be good2 nor one that was good1 to be evil4 ,for instance1 if a man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin1 this does not undo the good done by the giver2 and1 in like manner1 if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him1 the wrongdoer is not thereby excused4 ,therefore the consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice4 ,i answer that1 ,the consequences of an action are either foreseen or not4 ,if they are foreseen1 it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice4 ,for when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action1 and yet does not therefore desist therefrom1 this shows his will to be all the more inordinate4 ,but if the consequences are not foreseen1 we must make a distinction4 ,because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases1 in this respect1 the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action3 for it is evident that an action is specifically better1 if better results can follow from it2 and specifically worse1 if it is of a nature to produce worse results4 ,on the other hand1 if the consequences follow by accident and seldom1 then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action3 because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident1 but only according to that which belongs to it of itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause1 not by that which results by accident4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good actions done by the hearers1 result from the preacher's words1 as an effect that flows from their very nature4 ,hence they redound to the merit of the preacher3 especially when such is his intention4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished1 both follow from the nature of the cause1 and are supposed to be foreseen4 ,for this reason they are reckoned as punishable4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault4 ,but it is not the result of the fault1 but of the fact1 and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,one and the ,same ,external ,action ,can ,be ,both ,good and ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one and the same external action can be both good and evil4 ,for movement1 if continuous1 is one and the same 7,phys4 v1 #d74 ,but one continuous movement can be both good and bad3 for instance1 a man may go to church continuously1 intending at first vainglory1 and afterwards the service of ,god4 ,therefore one and the same action can be both good and bad4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iii1 #c71 action and passion are one act4 ,but the passion may be good1 as ,christ's was2 and the action evil1 as that of the ,jews4 ,therefore one and the same act can be both good and evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since a servant is an instrument1 as it were1 of his master1 the servant's action is his master's1 just as the action of a tool is the workman's action4 ,but it may happen that the servant's action result from his master's good will1 and is therefore good3 and from the evil will of the servant1 and is therefore evil4 ,therefore the same action can be both good and evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,the same thing cannot be the subject of contraries4 ,but good and evil are contraries4 ,therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,the same thing cannot be the subject of contraries4 ,but good and evil are contraries4 ,therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil4 ,i answer that1 ,nothing hinders a thing from being one1 in so far as it is in one genus1 and manifold1 in so far as it is referred to another genus4 ,thus a continuous surface is one1 considered as in the genus of quantity2 and yet it is manifold1 considered as to the genus of color1 if it be partly white1 and partly black4 ,and accordingly1 nothing hinders an action from being one1 considered in the natural order2 whereas it is not one1 considered in the moral order2 and vice versa1 as we have stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #a2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #g1 ad #a74 ,for continuous walking is one action1 considered in the natural order3 but it may resolve itself into many actions1 considered in the moral order1 if a change take place in the walker's will1 for the will is the principle of moral actions4 ,if therefore we consider one action in the moral order1 it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil4 ,whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity1 it can be both good and evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this continual movement which proceeds from various intentions1 although it is one in the natural order1 is not one in the point of moral unity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,action and passion belong to the moral order1 in so far as they are voluntary4 ,and therefore in so far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ1 they are two distinct things1 and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the action of the servant1 in so far as it proceeds from the will of the servant1 is not the master's action3 but only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command4 ,wherefore the evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect4 ,,question #ba ,,of ,,the ,,consequences ,,of ,,human ,,actions ,,by ,,reason ,,of ,,their ,,goodness ,,and ,,malice 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice3 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil8 7#b7 ,whether it thereby deserves praise or blame8 7#c7 ,whether accordingly1 it is meritorious or demeritorious8 7#d7 ,whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,human ,action ,is ,right or ,sinful1 in ,so ,far ,as ,it ,is ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that a human action is not right or sinful1 in so far as it is good or evil4 ,for monsters are the sins of nature 7,phys4 ii1 #h74 ,but monsters are not actions1 but things engendered outside the order of nature4 ,now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature 7,phys4 ii1 #h74 ,therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #h occurs in nature and art1 when the end intended by nature or art is not attained4 ,but the goodness or malice of a human action depends1 before all1 on the intention of the end1 and on its achievement4 ,therefore it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the malice of an action makes it sinful1 it follows that wherever there is evil1 there is sin4 ,but this is false3 since punishment is not a sin1 although it is an evil4 ,therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,as shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d71 the goodness of a human action depends principally on the ,eternal ,law3 and consequently its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the ,eternal ,law4 ,but this is the very nature of sin2 for ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg7 that sin is a word1 deed1 or desire1 in opposition to the ,eternal ,law4 ,therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil4 ,i answer that1 ,evil is more comprehensive than sin1 as also is good than right4 ,for every privation of good1 in whatever subject1 is an evil3 whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end1 and lacking due order to that end4 ,now the due order to an end is measured by some rule4 ,in things that act according to nature1 this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end4 ,when therefore an action proceeds from a natural force1 in accord with the natural inclination to an end1 then the action is said to be right3 since the mean does not exceed its limits1 viz4 the action does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end4 ,but when an action strays from this rectitude1 it comes under the notion of sin4 ,now in those things that are done by the will1 the proximate rule is the human reason1 while the supreme rule is the ,eternal ,law4 ,when1 therefore1 a human action tends to the end1 according to the order of reason and of the ,eternal ,law1 then that action is right3 but when it turns aside from that rectitude1 then it is said to be a sin4 ,now it is evident from what has been said 7,q4 #ai1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d7 that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the ,eternal ,law1 is evil1 and that every good action is in accord with reason and the ,eternal ,law4 ,hence it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,monsters are called sins1 inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature's action4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the end is twofold2 the last end1 and the proximate end4 ,in the sin of nature1 the action does indeed fail in respect of the last end1 which is the perfection of the thing generated2 but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever2 since when nature works it forms something4 ,in like manner1 the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended1 because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness1 which is the last end3 and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end3 intended and achieved by the will4 ,wherefore also1 since the very intention of this end is ordained to the last end1 this same intention may be right or sinful4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,each thing is ordained to its end by its action3 and therefore sin1 which consists in straying from the order to the end1 consists properly in an action4 ,on the other hand1 punishment regards the person of the sinner1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d2 ,a4 #f1 ad #c74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #b ,whether a ,human ,action ,deserves ,praise or ,blame1 by ,reason of ,its ,being ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil4 ,for sin happens even in things done by nature 7,phys4 ii1 #h74 ,and yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame 7,ethic4 iii1 #e74 ,therefore a human action does not deserve blame1 by reason of its being evil or sinful2 and1 consequently1 neither does it deserve praise1 by reason of its being good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as sin occurs in moral actions1 so does it happen in the productions of art3 because as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #h it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly1 and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine4 ,but the artist is not blamed for making something bad3 because the artist's work is such1 that he can produce a good or a bad thing1 just as he lists4 ,therefore it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action1 in the fact that it is evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil is weak and incapable4 ,but weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes guilt4 ,therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,virt4 et ,vit4 i7 that virtuous deeds deserve praise1 while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame4 ,but good actions are virtuous2 because virtue makes that which has it1 good1 and makes its action good 7,ethic4 ii1 #f73 wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil4 ,therefore a human action deserves praise or blame1 through being good or evil4 ,i answer that1 ,just as evil is more comprehensive than sin1 so is sin more comprehensive than blame4 ,for an action is said to deserve praise or blame1 from its being imputed to the agent3 since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action4 ,now an action is imputed to an agent1 when it is in his power1 so that he has dominion over it3 because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions1 as was made clear above 7,q4 #a1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,hence it follows that good or evil1 in voluntary actions alone1 renders them worthy of praise or blame3 and in such like actions1 evil1 sin and guilt are one and the same thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent3 since the action of nature is determinate4 ,and1 therefore1 although there be sin in natural actions1 there is no blame4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reason stands in different relations to the productions of art1 and to moral actions4 ,in matters of art1 reason is directed to a particular end1 which is something devised by reason3 whereas in moral matters1 it is directed to the general end of all human life4 ,now a particular end is subordinate to the general end4 ,since therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 sin may occur in two ways1 in a production of art4 ,first1 by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist3 and this sin will be proper to the art2 for instance1 if an artist produce a bad thing1 while intending to produce something good2 or produce something good1 while intending to produce something bad4 ,secondly1 by a departure from the general end of human life3 and then he will be said to sin1 if he intend to produce a bad work1 and does so in effect1 so that another is taken in thereby4 ,but this sin is not proper to the artist as such1 but as man4 ,consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist2 while for the latter he is blamed as a man4 ,on the other hand1 in moral matters1 where we take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human life1 sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of human life4 ,wherefore man is blamed for such a sin1 both as man and as a moral being4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that in art1 he who sins voluntarily is preferable2 but in prudence1 as in the moral virtues1 which prudence directs1 he is the reverse4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,weakness that occurs in voluntary evils1 is subject to man's power3 wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,human ,action ,is ,meritorious or ,demeritorious in ,so ,far ,as ,it ,is ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice4 ,for we speak of merit or demerit in relation to retribution1 which has no place save in matters relating to another person4 ,but good or evil actions are not all related to another person1 for some are related to the person of the agent4 ,therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master3 thus if a man destroys what belongs to him1 he is not punished1 as if he had destroyed what belongs to another4 ,but man is master of his own actions4 ,therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward1 through putting his action to a good or evil purpose4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a man acquire some good for himself1 he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man3 and the same applies to evil4 ,now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent3 while an inordinate action is his evil4 ,therefore a man does not merit or demerit1 from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,isa4 #c3aj1 #aa73 ,say to the just man that it is well2 for he shall eat the fruit of his doings4 ,woe to the wicked unto evil2 for the reward of his hands shall be given him4 ,i answer that1 ,we speak of merit and demerit1 in relation to retribution1 rendered according to justice4 ,now1 retribution according to justice is rendered to a man1 by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt4 ,it must1 moreover1 be observed that every individual member of a society is1 in a fashion1 a part and member of the whole society4 ,wherefore1 any good or evil1 done to the member of a society1 redounds on the whole society3 thus1 who hurts the hand1 hurts the man4 ,when1 therefore1 anyone does good or evil to another individual1 there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in his action3 first1 in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm2 secondly1 in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society4 ,now when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society1 retribution is owed to him1 before and above all1 by the whole society2 secondarily1 by all the parts of society4 ,whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage1 then again is retribution owed to him1 in so far as this too affects the community1 forasmuch as he is a part of society3 although retribution is not due to him1 in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual1 who is identical with the agent3 unless1 perchance1 he owe retribution to himself1 by a sort of resemblance1 in so far as man is said to be just to himself4 ,it is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or blame1 in so far as it is in the power of the will3 that it is right or sinful1 according as it is ordained to the end2 and that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a man's good or evil actions1 although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual1 are nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of another1 i4e4 the community4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man is master of his actions2 and yet1 in so far as he belongs to another1 i4e4 the community1 of which he forms part1 he merits or demerits1 inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill3 just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his1 in respect of which he is bound to serve the community4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this very good or evil1 which a man does to himself by his action1 redounds to the community1 as stated above4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,human ,action ,is ,meritorious or ,demeritorious ,before ,god1 ,according ,as ,it ,is ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man's actions1 good or evil1 are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of ,god4 ,because1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another4 ,but a man's action1 good or evil1 does no good or harm to ,god2 for it is written 7,job #ce3f1 #g73 ,if thou sin1 what shalt thou hurt ,him8 4 4 4 ,and if thou do justly1 what shalt thou give ,him8 ,therefore a human action1 good or evil1 is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it2 because the entire action of the instrument belongs to the user4 ,now when man acts he is the instrument of the ,divine power which is the principal cause of his action2 hence it is written 7,isa4 #aj3ae73 ,shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it8 ,or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn8 where man while acting is evidently compared to an instrument4 ,therefore man merits or demerits nothing in ,god's sight1 by good or evil deeds4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else4 ,but not all human actions are ordained to ,god4 ,therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in ,god's sight4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eccles4 #ab3ad73 ,all things that are done1 ,god will bring into judgment 4 4 4 whether it be good or evil4 ,now judgment implies retribution1 in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit4 ,therefore every human action1 both good and evil1 acquires merit or demerit in ,god's sight4 ,i answer that1 ,a human action1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 acquires merit or demerit1 through being ordained to someone else1 either by reason of himself1 or by reason of the community3 and in each way1 our actions1 good and evil1 acquire merit or demerit1 in the sight of ,god4 ,on the part of ,god ,himself1 inasmuch as ,he is man's last end2 and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #aj74 ,consequently1 whoever does an evil deed1 not referable to ,god1 does not give ,god the honor due to ,him as our last end4 ,on the part of the whole community of the universe1 because in every community1 he who governs the community1 cares1 first of all1 for the common good2 wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community4 ,now ,god is the governor and ruler of the whole universe1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #e73 and especially of rational creatures4 ,consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to ,him3 else it would follow that human actions are no business of ,god's4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god in ,himself neither gains nor loses anything by the action of man3 but man1 for his part1 takes something from ,god1 or offers something to ,him1 when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man is so moved1 as an instrument1 by ,god1 that1 at the same time1 he moves himself by his free-will1 as was explained above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #f1 ad #c74 ,consequently1 by his action1 he acquires merit or demerit in ,god's sight4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man is not ordained to the body politic1 according to all that he is and has2 and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic4 ,but all that man is1 and can1 and has1 must be referred to ,god3 and therefore every action of man1 whether good or bad1 acquires merit or demerit in the sight of ,god1 as far as the action itself is concerned4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,passions 7,,qq4 #bb-dh7 ,,question #bb ,,of ,,the ,,subject ,,of ,,the ,,soul',s ,,passions 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must now consider the passions of the soul3 first1 in general2 secondly1 in particular4 ,taking them in general1 there are four things to be considered3 7#a7 ,their subject3 7#b7 ,the difference between them3 7#c7 ,their mutual relationship3 7#d7 ,their malice and goodness4 ,under the first head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is any passion in the soul8 7#b7 ,whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part8 7#c7 ,whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite1 which is called the will8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,any ,passion ,is in the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no passion in the soul4 ,because passivity belongs to matter4 ,but the soul is not composed of matter and form1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore there is no passion in the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 passion is movement1 as is stated in ,phys4 iii1 #c4 ,but the soul is not moved1 as is proved in ,de ,anima i1 #c4 ,therefore passion is not in the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 passion is the road to corruption2 since every passion1 when increased1 alters the substance1 as is stated in ,topic4 vi1 #f4 ,but the soul is incorruptible4 ,therefore no passion is in the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3e73 ,when we were in the flesh1 the passions of sins which were by the law1 did the work in our members4 ,now sins are1 properly speaking1 in the soul4 ,therefore passions also1 which are described as being of sins1 are in the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,the word passive is used in three ways4 ,first1 in a general way1 according as whatever receives something is passive1 although nothing is taken from it3 thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up4 ,but this is to be perfected rather than to be passive4 ,secondly1 the word passive is employed in its proper sense1 when something is received1 while something else is taken away3 and this happens in two ways4 ,for sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing3 thus when an animal's body is healed1 and loses sickness4 ,at other times the contrary occurs3 thus to ail is to be passive2 because the ailment is received and health is lost4 ,and here we have passion in its most proper acceptation4 ,for a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent3 and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it1 then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else4 ,moreover in ,de ,generat4 i1 #c it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent1 we have generation simply1 and corruption in a particular respect3 whereas the reverse is the case1 when from a more excellent thing1 a less excellent is generated4 ,in these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul4 ,for in the sense of mere reception1 we speak of feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion 7,de ,anima i1 #e74 ,but passion1 accompanied by the loss of something1 is only in respect of a bodily transmutation2 wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul1 save accidentally1 in so far1 to wit1 as the composite is passive4 ,but here again we find a difference2 because when this transmutation is for the worse1 it has more of the nature of a passion1 than when it is for the better3 hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted3 hence this happens only in those things that are composed of matter and form4 ,but passivity1 as implying mere reception1 need not be in matter1 but can be in anything that is in potentiality4 ,now1 though the soul is not composed of matter and form1 yet it has something of potentiality1 in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive1 according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #d4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved1 yet it belongs accidentally as stated in ,de ,anima i1 #c4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse4 ,and passion1 in this sense1 is not found in the soul1 except accidentally3 but the composite1 which is corruptible1 admits of it by reason of its own nature4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,passion ,is in the ,appetitive ,rather ,than in the ,apprehensive ,part8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive4 ,because that which is first in any genus1 seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus1 and to be their cause1 as is stated in ,metaph4 ii1 #a4 ,now passion is found to be in the apprehensive1 before being in the appetitive part3 for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part4 ,therefore passion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is more active is less passive2 for action is contrary to passion4 ,now the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part4 ,therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ1 so is the power of sensitive apprehension4 ,but passion in the soul occurs1 properly speaking1 in respect of a bodily transmutation4 ,therefore passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #d7 that the movement of the soul1 which the ,greeks called pathe1 are styled by some of our writers1 ,cicero 99,those things which the ,greeks call pathe1 we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases 7,tusc4 iv4 #e7 for instance1 disturbances2 by some1 affections or emotions2 while others rendering the ,greek more accurately1 call them passions4 ,from this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as affections4 ,but affections manifestly belong to the appetitive1 and not to the apprehensive part4 ,therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have already stated 7,a4 #a7 the word passion implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent4 ,now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power3 because the soul has1 through its appetitive power1 an order to things as they are in themselves3 hence the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vi1 #d7 that good and evil1 i4e4 the objects of the appetitive power1 are in things themselves4 ,on the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing1 as it is in itself2 but knows it by reason of an intention of the thing1 which intention it has in itself1 or receives in its own way4 ,hence we find it stated 7,metaph4 vi1 #d7 that the true and the false1 which pertain to knowledge1 are not in things1 but in the mind4 ,consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive1 rather than with the apprehensive part4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in things relating to perfection the case is the opposite1 in comparison to things that pertain to defect4 ,because in things relating to perfection1 intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle2 to which the nearer a thing approaches1 the more intense it is4 ,thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with light in a supreme degree1 to which the nearer a thing approaches the more light it possesses4 ,but in things that relate to defect1 intensity depends1 not on approach to something supreme1 but on receding from that which is perfect2 because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect4 ,wherefore the less a thing recedes from that which stands first1 the less intense it is3 and the result is that at first we always find some small defect1 which afterwards increases as it goes on4 ,now passion pertains to defect1 because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality4 ,wherefore in those things that approach to the ,supreme ,perfection1 i4e4 to ,god1 there is but little potentiality and passion3 while in other things1 consequently1 there is more4 ,hence also1 in the supreme1 i4e4 the apprehensive1 power of the soul1 passion is found less than in the other powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the appetitive power is said to be more active1 because it is1 more than the apprehensive power1 the principle of the exterior action3 and this for the same reason that it is more passive1 namely1 its being related to things as existing in themselves3 since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #c7 the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways4 ,first1 by a spiritual change1 in respect of which the organ receives an intention of the object4 ,and this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension3 thus is the eye changed by the object visible1 not by being colored1 but by receiving an intention of color4 ,but the organs are receptive of another and natural change1 which affects their natural disposition2 for instance1 when they become hot or cold1 or undergo some similar change4 ,and whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension2 for instance1 if the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object3 on the other hand1 it is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite2 wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part1 is the natural change of the organ2 for instance1 anger is said to be a kindling of the blood about the heart4 ,hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite1 than with that of the sensitive apprehension1 although both are actions of a corporeal organ4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,passion ,is in the ,sensitive ,appetite ,rather ,than in the ,intellectual ,appetite1 ,which ,is ,called the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite4 ,for ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 ii7 ,hierotheus to be taught by a kind of yet more ,godlike instruction2 not only by learning ,divine things1 but also by suffering 7patiens7 them4 ,but the sensitive appetite cannot suffer ,divine things1 since its object is the sensible good4 ,therefore passion is in the intellectual appetite1 just as it is also in the sensitive appetite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more powerful the active force1 the more intense the passion4 ,but the object of the intellectual appetite1 which is the universal good1 is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite1 which is a particular good4 ,therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 joy and love are said to be passions4 ,but these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive appetite3 else they would not be ascribed by the ,scriptures to ,god and the angels4 ,therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb71 while describing the animal passions3 ,passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil3 in other words1 passion is a movement of the irrational soul1 when we think of good or evil4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a7 passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation4 ,this corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite1 and is not only spiritual1 as in the sensitive apprehension1 but also natural4 ,now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite3 because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ4 ,it is therefore evident that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite1 than in that of the intellectual appetite2 and this is again evident from the definitions of ,damascene quoted above4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by suffering ,divine things is meant being well affected towards them1 and united to them by love3 and this takes place without any alteration in the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent1 but also on the passibility of the patient3 because things that are disposed to passion1 suffer much even from petty agents4 ,therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite1 yet the sensitive appetite is more passive4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when love and joy and the like are ascribed to ,god or the angels1 or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite1 they signify simple acts of the will having like effects1 but without passion4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e73 ,the holy angels feel no anger while they punish 4 4 4 no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy3 and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name1 because1 although they have none of our weakness1 their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours4 ,,question #bc ,,how ,,the ,,passions ,,differ ,,from ,,one ,,another 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider how the passions differ from one another3 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part8 7#b7 ,whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil8 7#c7 ,whether there is any passion that has no contrary8 7#d7 ,whether1 in the same power1 there are any passions1 differing in species1 but not contrary to one another8 ,,question #bc ,whether the ,passions of the ,concupiscible ,part ,are ,different from ,those of the ,irascible ,part8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #e7 that the passions of the soul are those emotions which are followed by joy or sorrow4 ,but joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part4 ,therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part1 and not some in the irascible1 others in the concupiscible part4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 on the words of ,matt4 #ac3cc1 ,the kingdom of heaven is like to leaven1 etc41 ,jerome's gloss says3 ,we should have prudence in the reason2 hatred of vice in the irascible faculty2 desire of virtue1 in the concupiscible part4 ,but hatred is in the concupiscible faculty1 as also is love1 of which it is the contrary1 as is stated in ,topic4 ii1 #g4 ,therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects4 ,but the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same1 viz4 good and evil4 ,therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties4 ,on the contrary1 ,the acts of the different powers differ in species2 for instance1 to see1 and to hear4 ,but the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore1 since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c71 the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part4 ,i answer that1 ,the passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty4 ,for since different powers have different objects1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c71 the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects4 ,much more1 therefore1 do the passions of different faculties differ in species2 since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of the powers1 than to diversify the species of passions or actions4 ,for just as in the physical order1 diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter1 while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter2 so in the acts of the soul1 those that belong to different powers1 differ not only in species but also in genus1 while acts and passions regarding different specific objects1 included under the one common object of a single power1 differ as the species of that genus4 ,in order1 therefore1 to discern which passions are in the irascible1 and which in the concupiscible1 we must take the object of each of these powers4 ,for we have stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b71 that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil1 simply apprehended as such1 which causes pleasure or pain4 ,but1 since the soul must1 of necessity1 experience difficulty or struggle at times1 in acquiring some such good1 or in avoiding some such evil1 in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid2 therefore this very good or evil1 inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature1 is the object of the irascible faculty4 ,therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely1 belong to the concupiscible power2 for instance1 joy1 sorrow1 love1 hatred1 and such like3 whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous1 through being difficult to obtain or avoid1 belong to the irascible faculty2 such are daring1 fear1 hope and the like4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b71 the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals1 in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object1 either by making some good difficult to obtain1 or by making some evil hard to avoid4 ,the result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions3 and thus it is that even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty1 not by reason of hatred1 which is properly a concupiscible passion2 but on account of the struggle1 which belongs to the irascible power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,good1 inasmuch as it is delightful1 moves the concupiscible power4 ,but if it prove difficult to obtain1 from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power3 and hence the need of another power tending to that good4 ,the same applies to evil4 ,and this power is the irascible faculty4 ,consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,contrariety of the ,irascible ,passions ,is ,based on the ,contrariety of ,good and ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil4 ,for the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,but the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil2 take1 for instance1 love and hatred1 joy and sorrow4 ,therefore the same applies to the irascible passions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 passions differ according to their objects2 just as movements differ according to their termini4 ,but there is no other contrariety of movements1 except that of the termini1 as is stated in ,phys4 v1 #c4 ,therefore there is no other contrariety of passions1 save that of the objects4 ,now the object of the appetite is good or evil4 ,therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal1 as ,avicenna declares in his sixth book of ,physics4 ,now approach results from the apprehension of good2 withdrawal1 from the apprehension of evil3 since just as good is what all desire 7,ethic4 i1 #a71 so evil is what all shun4 ,therefore1 in the passions of the soul1 there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,fear and daring are contrary to one another1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #g4 ,but fear and daring do not differ in respect of good and evil3 because each regards some kind of evil4 ,therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil4 ,i answer that1 ,passion is a kind of movement1 as stated in ,phys4 iii1 #c4 ,therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements or changes4 ,now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements1 as stated in ,phys4 v1 #e4 ,one is according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term3 and this contrariety belongs properly to changes1 i4e4 to generation1 which is a change to being1 and to corruption1 which is a change from being4 ,the other contrariety is according to opposition of termini1 and belongs properly to movements3 thus whitening1 which is movement from black to white1 is contrary to blackening1 which is movement from white to black4 ,accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul3 one1 according to contrariety of objects1 i4e4 of good and evil2 the other1 according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term4 ,in the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found2 viz4 that which is based on the objects3 whereas in the irascible passions1 we find both forms of contrariety4 ,the reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 is sensible good or evil considered absolutely4 ,now good1 as such1 cannot be a term wherefrom1 but only a term whereto1 since nothing shuns good as such2 on the contrary1 all things desire it4 ,in like manner1 nothing desires evil1 as such2 but all things shun it3 wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto1 but only of a term wherefrom4 ,accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good1 tends to it1 as love1 desire and joy2 while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil1 tends from it1 as hatred1 avoidance or dislike1 and sorrow4 ,wherefore1 in the concupiscible passions1 there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object4 ,on the other hand1 the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil1 considered not absolutely1 but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness4 ,now the good which is difficult or arduous1 considered as good1 is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it1 which tendency pertains to the passion of hope2 whereas1 considered as arduous or difficult1 it makes us turn from it2 and this pertains to the passion of despair4 ,in like manner the arduous evil1 considered as an evil1 has the aspect of something to be shunned2 and this belongs to the passion of fear3 but it also contains a reason for tending to it1 as attempting something arduous1 whereby to escape being subject to evil2 and this tendency is called daring4 ,consequently1 in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil 7as between hope and fear73 and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term 7as between daring and fear74 ,from what has been said the replies to the objections are evident4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,passion of the ,soul ,has ,no ,contrary8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary4 ,for every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety4 ,therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object2 for these are the common objects of the appetitive part4 ,but a passion having good for its object1 is contrary to a passion having evil for its object4 ,therefore every passion has a contrary4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,but every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal1 and vice versa4 ,therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary4 ,on the contrary1 ,anger is a passion of the soul4 ,but no passion is set down as being contrary to anger1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #e4 ,therefore not every passion has a contrary4 ,i answer that1 ,the passion of anger is peculiar in this1 that it cannot have a contrary1 either according to approach and withdrawal1 or according to the contrariety of good and evil4 ,for anger is caused by a difficult evil already present3 and when such an evil is present1 the appetite must needs either succumb1 so that it does not go beyond the limits of sadness1 which is a concupiscible passion2 or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil1 which movement is that of anger4 ,but it cannot have a movement of withdrawal3 because the evil is supposed to be already present or past4 ,thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal4 ,in like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil4 ,because the opposite of present evil is good obtained1 which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty4 ,nor1 when once good is obtained1 does there remain any other movement1 except the appetite's repose in the good obtained2 which repose belongs to joy1 which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty4 ,accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger1 and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto2 thus the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c7 that calm is contrary to anger1 by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation4 ,from what has been said the replies to the objections are evident4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #d ,whether in the ,same ,power1 ,there ,are ,any ,passions1 ,specifically ,different1 but ,not ,contrary to ,one ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be1 in the same power1 specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another4 ,for the passions of the soul differ according to their objects4 ,now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil2 and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions4 ,therefore no passions of the same power1 that are not contrary to one another1 differ specifically4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 difference of species implies a difference of form4 ,but every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 #h4 ,therefore passions of the same power1 that are not contrary to one another1 do not differ specifically4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil1 it seems that every difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil2 or from the difference of approach and withdrawal2 or from degrees in approach or withdrawal4 ,now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul1 as stated above 7,a4 #b73 whereas the third difference does not diversify the species2 else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite4 ,therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power to differ in species1 without being contrary to one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,love and joy differ in species1 and are in the concupiscible power2 and yet they are not contrary to one another2 rather1 in fact1 one causes the other4 ,therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another4 ,i answer that1 ,passions differ in accordance with their active causes1 which1 in the case of the passions of the soul1 are their objects4 ,now1 the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways3 first1 from the point of view of their species or nature1 as fire differs from water2 secondly1 from the point of view of the difference in their active power4 ,in the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power1 as if they were natural agents4 ,for every mover1 in a fashion1 either draws the patient to itself1 or repels it from itself4 ,now in drawing it to itself1 it does three things in the patient4 ,because1 in the first place1 it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover3 thus a light body1 which is above1 bestows lightness on the body generated1 so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above4 ,secondly1 if the generated body be outside its proper place1 the mover gives it movement towards that place4 ,thirdly1 it makes it to rest1 when it shall have come to its proper place3 since to the same cause are due1 both rest in a place1 and the movement to that place4 ,the same applies to the cause of repulsion4 ,now1 in the movements of the appetitive faculty1 good has1 as it were1 a force of attraction1 while evil has a force of repulsion4 ,in the first place1 therefore1 good causes1 in the appetitive power1 a certain inclination1 aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good3 and this belongs to the passion of love3 the corresponding contrary of which is hatred in respect of evil4 ,secondly1 if the good be not yet possessed1 it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved3 and this belongs to the passion of desire or concupiscence3 and contrary to it1 in respect of evil1 is the passion of aversion or dislike4 ,thirdly1 when the good is obtained1 it causes the appetite to rest1 as it were1 in the good obtained3 and this belongs to the passion of delight or joy2 the contrary of which1 in respect of evil1 is sorrow or sadness4 ,on the other hand1 in the irascible passions1 the aptitude1 or inclination to seek good1 or to shun evil1 is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty1 which regards good or evil absolutely4 ,and in respect of good not yet obtained1 we have hope and despair4 ,in respect of evil not yet present we have fear and daring4 ,but in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion3 because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but evil already present gives rise to the passion of anger4 ,accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions2 viz4 love and hatred1 desire and aversion1 joy and sadness4 ,in like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty2 viz4 hope and despair1 fear and daring1 and anger which has no contrary passion4 ,consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically2 six in the concupiscible faculty1 and five in the irascible2 and under these all the passions of the soul are contained4 ,from this the replies to the objections are evident4 ,,question #bd ,,of ,,good ,,and ,,evil ,,in ,,the ,,passions ,,of ,,the ,,soul 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul3 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul8 7#b7 ,whether every passion of the soul is morally evil8 7#c7 ,whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act8 7#d7 ,whether any passion is good or evil specifically8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,moral ,good and ,evil ,can ,be ,found in the ,passions of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil4 ,for moral good and evil are proper to man3 since morals are properly predicated of man1 as ,ambrose says 7,super ,luc4 ,prolog474 ,but passions are not proper to man1 for he has them in common with other animals4 ,therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the good or evil of man consists in being in accord1 or in disaccord with reason1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now the passions of the soul are not in the reason1 but in the sensitive appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore they have no connection with human1 i4e4 moral1 good or evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #e7 that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions4 ,but we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil4 ,therefore the passions are not morally good or evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g7 while speaking of the passions of the soul3 ,they are evil if our love is evil2 good if our love is good4 ,i answer that1 ,we may consider the passions of the soul in two ways3 first1 in themselves2 secondly1 as being subject to the command of the reason and will4 ,if then the passions be considered in themselves1 to wit1 as movements of the irrational appetite1 thus there is no moral good or evil in them1 since this depends on the reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e74 ,if1 however1 they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will1 then moral good and evil are in them4 ,because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will2 and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil1 inasmuch as they are voluntary4 ,much more1 therefore1 may the passions1 in so far as they are voluntary1 be called morally good or evil4 ,and they are said to be voluntary1 either from being commanded by the will1 or from not being checked by the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these passions1 considered in themselves1 are common to man and other animals3 but1 as commanded by the reason1 they are proper to man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even the lower appetitive powers are called rational1 in so far as they partake of reason in some sort 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely2 but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame1 in so far as they are subordinate to reason4 ,hence he continues3 ,for the man who fears or is angry1 is not praised 4 4 4 or blamed1 but the man who is angry in a certain way1 i4e4 according to1 or against reason4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,every ,passion of the ,soul ,is ,evil ,morally8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #d7 that some call the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul 99,cf4 ,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b1 footnote4 ,but every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil4 ,therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that movement in accord with nature is an action1 but movement contrary to nature is passion4 ,but in movements of the soul1 what is against nature is sinful and morally evil3 hence he says elsewhere 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d7 that the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature4 ,therefore these passions are morally evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever leads to sin1 has an aspect of evil4 ,but these passions lead to sin3 wherefore they are called the passions of sins 7,rom4 #g3e74 ,therefore it seems that they are morally evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #i7 that all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed 4 4 4 ,for they fear to sin1 they desire to persevere2 they grieve for sin1 they rejoice in good works4 ,i answer that1 ,on this question the opinion of the ,stoics differed from that of the ,peripatetics3 for the ,stoics held that all passions are evil1 while the ,peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good4 ,this difference1 although it appears great in words1 is nevertheless1 in reality1 none at all1 or but little1 if we consider the intent of either school4 ,for the ,stoics did not discern between sense and intellect2 and consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appetite4 ,hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will1 in so far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite1 while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite3 but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will1 while they called passion1 a movement that exceeds the limits of reason4 ,wherefore ,cicero1 following their opinion 7,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 iii1 #d7 calls all passions diseases of the soul3 whence he argues that those who are diseased are unsound2 and those who are unsound are wanting in sense4 ,hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense of being unsound4 ,on the other hand1 the ,peripatetics give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite4 ,wherefore they esteem them good1 when they are controlled by reason2 and evil when they are not controlled by reason4 ,hence it is evident that ,cicero was wrong in disapproving 7,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 iii1 #d7 of the ,peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions1 when he says that every evil1 though moderate1 should be shunned2 for1 just as a body1 though it be moderately ailing1 is not sound2 so1 this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul1 is not sound4 ,for passions are not called diseases or disturbances of the soul1 save when they are not controlled by reason4 ,hence the reply to the ,first ,objection is evident4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart1 according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation2 and hence it derives the character of passion4 ,but there is no need for passion to deviate always from the order of natural reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the passions of the soul1 in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason1 incline us to sin3 but in so far as they are controlled by reason1 they pertain to virtue4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,passion ,increases or ,decreases the ,goodness or ,malice of an ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action4 ,for anything that hinders the judgment of reason1 on which depends the goodness of a moral act1 consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act4 ,but every passion hinders the judgment of reason3 for ,sallust says 7,catilin473 ,all those that take counsel about matters of doubt1 should be free from hatred1 anger1 friendship and pity4 ,therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more a man's action is like to ,god1 the better it is3 hence the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3a73 ,be ye followers of ,god1 as most dear children4 ,but ,god and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish 4 4 4 no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e74 ,therefore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason1 so also does moral good4 ,but moral evil is lessened by passion3 for he sins less1 who sins from passion1 than he who sins deliberately4 ,therefore he does a better deed1 who does well without passion1 than he who does with passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e7 that the passion of pity is obedient to reason1 when pity is bestowed without violating right1 as when the poor are relieved1 or the penitent forgiven4 ,but nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good4 ,therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil1 they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act2 since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether1 or makes it to be less good4 ,and this is true indeed1 if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite1 considered as disturbances or ailments4 ,but if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite1 then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason4 ,for since man's good is founded on reason as its root1 that good will be all the more perfect1 according as it extends to more things pertaining to man4 ,wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good1 that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason4 ,hence1 since the sensitive appetite can obey reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #g71 it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good1 that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason4 ,accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act2 so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good1 that man should be moved unto good1 not only in respect of his will1 but also in respect of his sensitive appetite2 according to ,ps4 #hc3c3 ,my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living ,god3 where by heart we are to understand the intellectual appetite1 and by flesh the sensitive appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason4 ,first1 antecedently3 and thus1 since they obscure the judgment of reason1 on which the goodness of the moral act depends1 they diminish the goodness of the act2 for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity4 ,in the second place1 consequently3 and this in two ways4 ,first1 by way of redundance3 because1 to wit1 when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything1 the lower part also follows that movement3 and thus the passion that results in consequence1 in the sensitive appetite1 is a sign of the intensity of the will1 and so indicates greater moral goodness4 ,secondly1 by way of choice2 when1 to wit1 a man1 by the judgment of his reason1 chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite4 ,and thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in ,god and the angels there is no sensitive appetite1 nor again bodily members3 and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions1 as it does in us4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a passion that tends to evil1 and precedes the judgment of reason1 diminishes sin2 but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above 7,reply ,obj4 #a71 it aggravates the sin1 or else it is a sign of its being more grievous4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,any ,passion ,is ,good or ,evil in ,its ,species8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species4 ,because moral good and evil depend on reason4 ,but the passions are in the sensitive appetite2 so that accordance with reason is accidental to them4 ,since1 therefore1 nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species1 it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 acts and passions take their species from their object4 ,if1 therefore1 any passion were good or evil1 according to its species1 it would follow that those passions the object of which is good1 are specifically good1 such as love1 desire and joy3 and that those passions1 the object of which is evil1 are specifically evil1 as hatred1 fear and sadness4 ,but this is clearly false4 ,therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals4 ,but moral good is in man alone4 ,therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e7 that pity is a kind of virtue4 ,moreover1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #g7 that modesty is a praiseworthy passion4 ,therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species4 ,i answer that1 ,we ought1 seemingly1 to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts 7,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #e1 #f2 ,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #a7--viz4 that the species of a passion1 as the species of an act1 can be considered from two points of view4 ,first1 according to its natural genus2 and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion4 ,secondly1 according to its moral genus1 inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason4 ,in this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion1 in so far as the object to which a passion tends1 is1 of itself1 in harmony or in discord with reason3 as is clear in the case of shame which is base fear2 and of envy which is sorrow for another's good3 for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers the passions in their natural species1 in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself4 ,but in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason1 good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite1 but essentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,passions having a tendency to good1 are themselves good1 if they tend to that which is truly good1 and in like manner1 if they turn away from that which is truly evil4 ,on the other hand1 those passions which consist in aversion from good1 and a tendency to evil1 are themselves evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason4 ,nevertheless1 in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power1 which is subject to a higher1 i4e4 the ,divine reason1 there is a certain likeness of moral good in them1 in regard to the soul's passions4 ,,question #be ,,of ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,the ,,passions ,,to ,,one ,,another 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the order of the passions to one another3 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,the relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions2 7#b7 ,the relation of the concupiscible passions to one another2 7#c7 ,the relation of the irascible passions to one another2 7#d7 ,the four principal passions4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,irascible ,passions ,precede the ,concupiscible ,passions1 or ,vice ,versa8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions4 ,for the order of the passions is that of their objects4 ,but the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good1 which seems to be the highest good4 ,therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mover precedes that which is moved4 ,but the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible1 as mover to that which is moved3 since it is given to animals1 for the purpose of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a2 ,i1 ,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b74 ,now that which removes an obstacle1 is a kind of mover 7,phys4 viii1 #d74 ,therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 joy and sadness are concupiscible passions4 ,but joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 that retaliation causes anger to cease1 because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain4 ,therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions4 ,on the contrary1 ,the concupiscible passions regard the absolute good1 while the irascible passions regard a restricted1 viz4 the difficult1 good4 ,since1 therefore1 the absolute good precedes the restricted good1 it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible4 ,i answer that1 ,in the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty4 ,for in the former we find something relating to movement--e4g4 desire2 and something belonging to repose1 e4g4 joy and sadness4 ,but in the irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose1 and only that which belongs to movement4 ,the reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing1 we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous2 whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty4 ,now since rest is the end of movement1 it is first in the order of intention1 but last in the order of execution4 ,if1 therefore1 we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good1 it is evident that in the order of execution1 the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty3 thus hope precedes joy1 and hence causes it1 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #ab3ab73 ,rejoicing in hope4 ,but the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil1 viz4 sadness1 comes between two irascible passions3 because it follows fear2 since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared3 while it precedes the movement of anger2 since the movement of self-vindication1 that results from sadness1 is the movement of anger4 ,and because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us2 when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices4 ,thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest1 viz4 either in joy or in sadness4 ,but if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement1 then it is clear that the latter take precedence3 because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty2 just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty4 ,thus hope adds to desire a certain effort1 and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good4 ,in like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits1 on account of difficulty in shunning the evil4 ,accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil1 and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil4 ,and it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument would prove1 if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous1 just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous4 ,but because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely1 it naturally precedes the object of the irascible1 as the common precedes the proper4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover3 and here we are speaking of passions as directly related to one another4 ,moreover1 the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object4 ,wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest4 ,the third objection leads to the same conclusion4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,love ,is the ,first of the ,concupiscible ,passions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions4 ,for the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence1 which is the same passion as desire4 ,but things are named from their chief characteristic 7,de ,anima ii1 #d74 ,therefore desire takes precedence of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love implies a certain union2 since it is a uniting and binding force1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired4 ,therefore desire precedes love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the cause precedes its effect4 ,but pleasure is sometimes the cause of love3 since some love on account of pleasure 7,ethic4 viii1 #c1 #d74 ,therefore pleasure precedes love2 and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i7 that all the passions are caused by love3 since love yearning for the beloved object1 is desire2 and1 having and enjoying it1 is joy4 ,therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions4 ,i answer that1 ,good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty4 ,now good naturally precedes evil2 since evil is privation of good4 ,wherefore all the passions1 the object of which is good1 are naturally before those1 the object of which is evil--that is to say1 each precedes its contrary passion3 because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil4 ,now good has the aspect of an end1 and the end is indeed first in the order of intention1 but last in the order of execution4 ,consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution4 ,in the order of execution1 the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end4 ,now it is evident that whatever tends to an end1 has1 in the first place1 an aptitude or proportion to that end1 for nothing tends to a disproportionate end2 secondly1 it is moved to that end2 thirdly1 it rests in the end1 after having attained it4 ,and this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love1 which is complacency in good2 while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence2 and rest in good is joy or pleasure4 ,accordingly in this order1 love precedes desire1 and desire precedes pleasure4 ,but in the order of intention1 it is the reverse3 because the pleasure intended causes desire and love4 ,for pleasure is the enjoyment of the good1 which enjoyment is1 in a way1 the end1 just as the good itself is1 as stated above 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we name a thing as we understand it1 for words are signs of thoughts1 as the ,philosopher states 7,peri ,herm4 i1 #a74 ,now in most cases we know a cause by its effect4 ,but the effect of love1 when the beloved object is possessed1 is pleasure3 when it is not possessed1 it is desire or concupiscence3 and1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #ab71 we are more sensible to love1 when we lack that which we love4 ,consequently of all the concupiscible passions1 concupiscence is felt most2 and for this reason the power is named after it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the union of lover and beloved is twofold4 ,there is real union1 consisting in the conjunction of one with the other4 ,this union belongs to joy or pleasure1 which follows desire4 ,there is also an affective union1 consisting in an aptitude or proportion1 in so far as one thing1 from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another1 partakes of it3 and love betokens such a union4 ,this union precedes the movement of desire4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pleasure causes love1 in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,hope ,is the ,first of the ,irascible ,passions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions4 ,because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger4 ,since1 therefore1 things are names from their chief characteristic 7cf4 ,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #a71 it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous4 ,now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us1 which pertains to daring2 or an evil actually present1 which pertains to anger2 than to strive simply to obtain some good4 ,again1 it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil1 than a future evil4 ,therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring1 and daring1 than hope4 ,and consequently it seems that hope does not precede them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 when a thing is moved towards an end1 the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach4 ,but fear and despair imply withdrawal from something2 while daring and hope imply approach towards something4 ,therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring4 ,on the contrary1 ,the nearer a thing is to the first1 the more it precedes others4 ,but hope is nearer to love1 which is the first of the passions4 ,therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a7 all irascible passions imply movement towards something4 ,now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes3 one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end2 and this pertains to love or hatred2 the other is the presence of good or evil itself1 and this belongs to sadness or joy4 ,as a matter of fact1 the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d72 but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger4 ,since then in the order of generation or execution1 proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end2 it follows that1 of all the irascible passions1 anger is the last in the order of generation4 ,and among the other passions of the irascible faculty1 which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil1 those whose object is good1 viz4 hope and despair1 must naturally precede those whose object is evil1 viz4 daring and fear3 yet so that hope precedes despair2 since hope is a movement towards good as such1 which is essentially attractive1 so that hope tends to good directly2 whereas despair is a movement away from good1 a movement which is consistent with good1 not as such1 but in respect of something else1 wherefore its tendency from good is accidental1 as it were4 ,in like manner fear1 through being a movement from evil1 precedes daring4 ,and that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil1 so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring3 because daring arises from the hope of victory1 and fear arises from the despair of overcoming4 ,lastly1 anger arises from daring3 for no one is angry while seeking vengeance1 unless he dare to avenge himself1 as ,avicenna observes in the sixth book of his ,physics4 ,accordingly1 it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions4 ,and if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation1 love and hatred are first2 desire and aversion1 second2 hope and despair1 third2 fear and daring1 fourth2 anger1 fifth2 sixth and last1 joy and sadness1 which follow from all the passions1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #e3 yet so that love precedes hatred2 desire precedes aversion2 hope precedes despair2 fear precedes daring2 and joy precedes sadness1 as may be gathered from what has been stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,because anger arises from the other passions1 as an effect from the causes that precede it1 it is from anger1 as being more manifest than the other passions1 that the power takes its name4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire4 ,consequently hope1 which regards good more directly1 takes precedence3 although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object2 its movement from evil results from this4 ,for the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion1 not to natural movement1 but to the intention of nature1 which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary1 which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,these ,are the ,four ,principal ,passions3 ,joy1 ,sadness1 ,hope and ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that joy1 sadness1 hope and fear are not the four principal passions4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #c1 #g sqq47 omits hope and puts desire in its place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul3 the order of intention1 and the order of execution or generation4 ,the principal passions should therefore be taken1 either in the order of intention2 and thus joy and sadness1 which are the final passions1 will be the principal passions2 or in the order of execution or generation1 and thus love will be the principal passion4 ,therefore joy and sadness1 hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as daring is caused by hope1 so fear is caused by despair4 ,either1 therefore1 hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions1 since they cause others3 or hope and daring1 from being akin to one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 i7 in enumerating the four principal passions1 says3 ,banish joys3 banish fears3 ,away with hope3 away with tears4 ,i answer that1 ,these four are commonly called the principal passions4 ,two of them1 viz4 joy and sadness1 are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end2 wherefore they arise from all the other passions1 as is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #e4 ,fear and hope are principal passions1 not because they complete the others simply1 but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something3 for in respect of good1 movement begins in love1 goes forward to desire1 and ends in hope2 while in respect of evil1 it begins in hatred1 goes on to aversion1 and ends in fear4 ,hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future3 for movement regards the future1 while rest is in something present3 so that joy relates to present good1 sadness relates to present evil2 hope regards future good1 and fear1 future evil4 ,as to the other passions that regard good or evil1 present or future1 they all culminate in these four4 ,for this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions1 because they are general passions2 and this is true1 provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope1 in so far as they seem to regard the same object1 viz4 some future good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these are called principal passions1 in the order of intention and completion4 ,and though fear and hope are not the last passions simply1 yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future4 ,nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger3 yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion1 because it is an effect of daring1 which cannot be a principal passion1 as we shall state further on 7,reply ,obj4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,despair implies movement away from good2 and this is1 as it were1 accidental3 and daring implies movement towards evil2 and this too is accidental4 ,consequently these cannot be principal passions2 because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal4 ,and so neither can anger be called a principal passion1 because it arises from daring4 ,,question #bf ,,of ,,the ,,passions ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,,particular3 ,,and ,,first1 ,,of ,,love 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the soul's passions in particular1 and 7#a7 the passions of the concupiscible faculty2 7#b7 the passions of the irascible faculty4 ,the first of these considerations will be threefold3 since we shall consider 7#a7 ,love and hatred2 7#b7 ,desire and aversion2 7#c7 ,pleasure and sadness4 ,concerning love1 three points must be considered3 7#a7 ,love itself2 7#b7 ,the cause of love2 7#c7 ,the effects of love4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether love is in the concupiscible power8 7#b7 ,whether love is a passion8 7#c7 ,whether love is the same as dilection8 7#d7 ,whether love is properly divided into love of friendship1 and love of concupiscence8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,love ,is in the ,concupiscible ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power4 ,for it is written 7,wis4 #h3b73 ,her1 namely wisdom1 have ,i loved1 and have sought her out from my youth4 ,but the concupiscible power1 being a part of the sensitive appetite1 cannot tend to wisdom1 which is not apprehended by the senses4 ,therefore love is not in the concupiscible power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love seems to be identified with every passion3 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g73 ,love1 yearning for the object beloved1 is desire2 having and enjoying it1 is joy2 fleeing what is contrary to it1 is fear2 and feeling what is contrary to it1 is sadness4 ,but not every passion is in the concupiscible power2 indeed1 fear1 which is mentioned in this passage1 is in the irascible power4 ,therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 mentions a natural love4 ,but natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers1 which belong to the vegetal soul4 ,therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 ii1 #g7 that love is in the concupiscible power4 ,i answer that1 ,love is something pertaining to the appetite2 since good is the object of both4 ,wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites4 ,for there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing1 not in the subject of the appetite1 but in some other3 and this is called the natural appetite4 ,because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature1 by reason of an apprehension which is not in them1 but in the ,author of their nature1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a1 #c74 ,and there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite1 but from necessity and not from free-will4 ,such is1 in irrational animals1 the sensitive appetite1 which1 however1 in man1 has a certain share of liberty1 in so far as it obeys reason4 ,again1 there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite4 ,and this is the rational or intellectual appetite1 which is called the will4 ,now in each of these appetites1 the name love is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved4 ,in the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends1 and may be called natural love3 thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre1 is by reason of its weight and may be called natural love4 ,in like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good1 that is to say1 its very complacency in good is called sensitive love1 or intellectual or rational love4 ,so that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite1 just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite4 ,and it belongs to the concupiscible power1 because it regards good absolutely1 and not under the aspect of difficulty1 which is the object of the irascible faculty4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,love is spoken of as being fear1 joy1 desire and sadness1 not essentially but causally4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul1 but in all the soul's powers1 and also in all the parts of the body1 and universally in all things3 because1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 ,beauty and goodness are beloved by all things2 since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,love ,is a ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is not a passion4 ,for no power is a passion4 ,but every love is a power1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore love is not a passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love is a kind of union or bond1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 viii1 #aj74 ,but a union or bond is not a passion1 but rather a relation4 ,therefore love is not a passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that passion is a movement4 ,but love does not imply the movement of the appetite2 for this is desire1 of which movement love is the principle4 ,therefore love is not a passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #e7 that love is a passion4 ,i answer that1 ,passion is the effect of the agent on the patient4 ,now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient3 for in the first place it gives it the form2 and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form4 ,thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight3 so that weight1 from being the principle of movement to the place1 which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight1 can1 in a way1 be called natural love4 ,in the same way the appetible object gives the appetite1 first1 a certain adaptation to itself1 which consists in complacency in that object2 and from this follows movement towards the appetible object4 ,for the appetitive movement is circular1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #aj2 because the appetible object moves the appetite1 introducing itself1 as it were1 into its intention2 while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object1 so that the movement ends where it began4 ,accordingly1 the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called love1 and is nothing else than complacency in that object2 and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object1 and this movement is desire2 and lastly1 there is rest which is joy4 ,since1 therefore1 love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object1 it is evident that love is a passion3 properly so called1 according as it is in the concupiscible faculty2 in a wider and extended sense1 according as it is in the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since power denotes a principle of movement or action1 ,dionysius calls love a power1 in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite1 the lover stands in relation to that which he loves1 as though it were himself or part of himself4 ,hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union1 but that union is a result of love4 ,hence1 too1 ,dionysius says that love is a unitive force 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 and the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 ii1 #a7 that union is the work of love4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object1 yet it denotes that movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object1 so as to have complacency therein4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,love ,is the ,same ,as ,dilection8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is the same as dilection4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that love is to dilection1 as four is to twice two1 and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines4 ,but these have the same meaning4 ,therefore love and dilection denote the same thing4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects4 ,but the objects of dilection and love are the same4 ,therefore these are the same4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if dilection and love differ1 it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that dilection refers to good things1 love to evil things1 as some have maintained1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g74 ,but they do not differ thus2 because as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g7 the holy ,scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things4 ,therefore love and dilection do not differ3 thus indeed ,augustine concludes 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g7 that it is not one thing to speak of love1 and another to speak of dilection4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that some holy men have held that love means something more ,godlike than dilection does4 ,i answer that1 ,we find four words referring in a way1 to the same thing3 viz4 love1 dilection1 charity and friendship4 ,they differ1 however1 in this1 that friendship1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #e71 is like a habit1 whereas love and dilection are expressed by way of act or passion2 and charity can be taken either way4 ,moreover these three express act in different ways4 ,for love has a wider signification than the others1 since every dilection or charity is love1 but not vice versa4 ,because dilection implies1 in addition to love1 a choice 7electionem7 made beforehand1 as the very word denotes3 and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power1 but only in the will1 and only in the rational nature4 ,charity denotes1 in addition to love1 a certain perfection of love1 in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price1 as the word itself implies 99,referring to the ,latin carus 7dear74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius is speaking of love and dilection1 in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite2 for thus love is the same as dilection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object of love is more general than the object of dilection3 because love extends to more than dilection does1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,love and dilection differ1 not in respect of good and evil1 but as stated4 ,yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same as dilection4 ,and it is in this sense that ,augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted3 hence a little further on he adds that a right will is well-directed love1 and a wrong will is ill-directed love4 ,however1 the fact that love1 which is concupiscible passion1 inclines many to evil1 is the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the reason why some held that1 even when applied to the will itself1 the word love signifies something more ,godlike than dilection1 was because love denotes a passion1 especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite2 whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of reason4 ,but it is possible for man to tend to ,god by love1 being as it were passively drawn by ,him1 more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason1 which pertains to the nature of dilection1 as stated above4 ,and consequently love is more ,godlike than dilection4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,love ,is ,properly ,divided into ,love of ,friendship and ,love of ,concupiscence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence4 ,for love is a passion1 while friendship is a habit1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #e74 ,but habit cannot be the member of a division of passions4 ,therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division2 for man is not a member of the same division as animal4 ,but concupiscence is a member of the same division as love1 as a passion distinct from love4 ,therefore concupiscence is not a division of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #c7 friendship is threefold1 that which is founded on usefulness1 that which is founded on pleasure1 and that which is founded on goodness4 ,but useful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence4 ,therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship4 ,on the contrary1 ,we are said to love certain things1 because we desire them3 thus a man is said to love wine1 on account of its sweetness which he desires2 as stated in ,topic4 ii1 #c4 ,but we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things1 as stated in ,ethic4 viii1 #b4 ,therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d71 to love is to wish good to someone4 ,hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency3 towards the good which a man wishes to someone 7to himself or to another7 and towards that to which he wishes some good4 ,accordingly1 man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another1 and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good4 ,now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary3 since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself2 whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence1 is loved1 not simply and for itself1 but for something else4 ,for just as that which has existence1 is a being simply1 while that which exists in another is a relative being2 so1 because good is convertible with being1 the good1 which itself has goodness1 is good simply2 but that which is another's good1 is a relative good4 ,consequently the love with which a thing is loved1 that it may have some good1 is love simply2 while the love1 with which a thing is loved1 that it may be another's good1 is relative love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence1 but into love of friendship1 and love of concupiscence4 ,for a friend is1 properly speaking1 one to whom we wish good3 while we are said to desire1 what we wish for ourselves4 ,hence the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure1 a man does indeed wish his friend some good3 and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved4 ,but since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use1 the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant1 in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence1 loses the character to true friendship4 ,,question #bg ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,love 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of love3 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether good is the only cause of love8 7#b7 ,whether knowledge is a cause of love8 7#c7 ,whether likeness is a cause of love8 7#d7 ,whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,good ,is the ,only ,cause of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that good is not the only cause of love4 ,for good does not cause love1 except because it is loved4 ,but it happens that evil also is loved1 according to ,ps4 #aj3f3 ,he that loveth iniquity1 hateth his own soul3 else1 every love would be good4 ,therefore good is not the only cause of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that we love those who acknowledge their evils4 ,therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that not the good only but also the beautiful is beloved by all4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 viii1 #c73 ,assuredly the good alone is beloved4 ,therefore good alone is the cause of love4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a71 ,love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty4 ,wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act4 ,therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object4 ,now the proper object of love is the good2 because1 as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved1 and to everything1 that thing is a good1 which is akin and proportionate to it4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that good is the proper cause of love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evil is never loved except under the aspect of good1 that is to say1 in so far as it is good in some respect1 and is considered as being good simply4 ,and thus a certain love is evil1 in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good4 ,it is in this way that man loves iniquity1 inasmuch as1 by means of iniquity1 some good is gained2 pleasure1 for instance1 or money1 or such like4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who acknowledge their evils1 are beloved1 not for their evils1 but because they acknowledge them1 for it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults1 in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the beautiful is the same as the good1 and they differ in aspect only4 ,for since good is what all seek1 the notion of good is that which calms the desire2 while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire1 by being seen or known4 ,consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful1 which are the most cognitive1 viz4 sight and hearing1 as ministering to reason2 for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds4 ,but in reference to the other objects of the other senses1 we do not use the expression beautiful1 for we do not speak of beautiful tastes1 and beautiful odors4 ,thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty3 so that good means that which simply pleases the appetite2 while the beautiful is something pleasant to apprehend4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,knowledge ,is a ,cause of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love4 ,for it is due to love that a thing is sought4 ,but some things are sought without being known1 for instance1 the sciences2 for since to have them is the same as to know them1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ce71 if we knew them we should have them1 and should not seek them4 ,therefore knowledge is not the cause of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it4 ,but some things are loved more than they are known3 thus in this life ,god can be loved in ,himself1 but cannot be known in ,himself4 ,therefore knowledge is not the cause of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if knowledge were the cause of love1 there would be no love1 where there is no knowledge4 ,but in all things there is love1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv72 whereas there is not knowledge in all things4 ,therefore knowledge is not the cause of love4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine proves 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a1 #b7 that none can love what he does not know4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 good is the cause of love1 as being its object4 ,but good is not the object of the appetite1 except as apprehended4 ,and therefore love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ix1 #e1 #ab7 says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love3 and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love4 ,accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is1 which can be loved only if known4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who seeks science1 is not entirely without knowledge thereof3 but knows something about it already in some respect1 either in a general way1 or in some one of its effects1 or from having heard it commended1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a1 #b74 ,but to have it is not to know it thus1 but to know it perfectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,something is required for the perfection of knowledge1 that is not requisite for the perfection of love4 ,for knowledge belongs to the reason1 whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united1 and to unite together1 after a fashion1 things that are distinct1 by comparing one with another4 ,consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing1 such as its parts1 powers1 and properties4 ,on the other hand1 love is in the appetitive power1 which regards a thing as it is in itself3 wherefore it suffices1 for the perfection of love1 that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself4 ,hence it is1 therefore1 that a thing is loved more than it is known2 since it can be loved perfectly1 even without being perfectly known4 ,this is most evident in regard to the sciences1 which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them3 for instance1 they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others2 and this is what they love in rhetoric4 ,the same applies to the love of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even natural love1 which is in all things1 is caused by a kind of knowledge1 not indeed existing in natural things themselves1 but in ,him ,who created their nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a2 cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #f1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,likeness ,is a ,cause of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that likeness is not a cause of love4 ,for the same thing is not the cause of contraries4 ,but likeness is the cause of hatred2 for it is written 7,prov4 #ac3aj7 that among the proud there are always contentions2 and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #a7 that potters quarrel with one another4 ,therefore likeness is not a cause of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv1 #ad7 that a man loves in another that which he would not be himself3 thus he loves an actor1 but would not himself be an actor4 ,but it would not be so1 if likeness were the proper cause of love2 for in that case a man would love in another1 that which he possesses himself1 or would like to possess4 ,therefore likeness is not a cause of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everyone loves that which he needs1 even if he have it not3 thus a sick man loves health1 and a poor man loves riches4 ,but in so far as he needs them and lacks them1 he is unlike them4 ,therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that we love those who bestow money and health on us2 and also those who retain their friendship for the dead4 ,but all are not such4 ,therefore likeness is not a cause of love4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ac3ai73 ,every beast loveth its like4 ,i answer that1 ,likeness1 properly speaking1 is a cause of love4 ,but it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold4 ,one kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually3 for example1 two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be alike4 ,another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination1 a quality which the other has actually3 thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place3 or again1 according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act2 since act is contained1 in a manner1 in the potentiality itself4 ,accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being4 ,for the very fact that two men are alike1 having1 as it were1 one form1 makes them to be1 in a manner1 one in that form3 thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity1 and two white men are one thing in whiteness4 ,hence the affections of one tend to the other1 as being one with him2 and he wishes good to him as to himself4 ,but the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence1 or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure3 because whatever is in potentiality1 as such1 has the desire for its act2 and it takes pleasure in its realization1 if it be a sentient and cognitive being4 ,now it has been stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #d71 that in the love of concupiscence1 the lover1 properly speaking1 loves himself1 in willing the good that he desires4 ,but a man loves himself more than another3 because he is one with himself substantially1 whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form4 ,consequently1 if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form1 hinders him from gaining the good that he loves1 he becomes hateful to him1 not for being like him1 but for hindering him from gaining his own good4 ,this is why potters quarrel among themselves1 because they hinder one another's gain3 and why there are contentions among the proud1 because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet4 ,hence the ,reply to the ,first ,objection is evident4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself1 there is a certain likeness of proportion3 because as the latter is to that which is loved in him1 so is the former to that which he loves in himself3 for instance1 if a good singer love a good writer1 we can see a likeness of proportion1 inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that loves what he needs1 bears a likeness to what he loves1 as potentiality bears a likeness to its act1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,according to the same likeness of potentiality to its act1 the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal1 in so far as he expects from him something which he desires4 ,the same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant4 ,for in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness4 ,we might also say that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit1 yet they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason1 in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man1 as being in conformity with his own natural reason4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,any ,other ,passion of the ,soul ,is a ,cause of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love4 ,for the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 viii1 #c7 says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure they give4 ,but pleasure is a passion4 ,therefore another passion is a cause of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 desire is a passion4 ,but we love some because we desire to receive something from them3 as happens in every friendship based on usefulness4 ,therefore another passion is a cause of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a73 ,when we have no hope of getting a thing1 we love it but half-heartedly or not at all1 even if we see how beautiful it is4 ,therefore hope too is a cause of love4 ,on the contrary1 ,all the other emotions of the soul are caused by love1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i74 ,i answer that1 ,there is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind4 ,the reason is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something1 or rest in something4 ,now every movement towards something1 or rest in something1 arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing2 and in this does love consist4 ,therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love4 ,but it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love3 just as one good is the cause of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords1 his love is indeed caused by pleasure2 but that very pleasure is caused1 in its turn1 by another preceding love2 for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing4 ,but desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being loved2 thus he that desires money1 for this reason loves him from whom he receives it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope causes or increases love2 both by reason of pleasure1 because it causes pleasure2 and by reason of desire1 because hope strengthens desire1 since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving4 ,nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved4 ,,question #bh ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,love 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we now have to consider the effects of love3 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether union is an effect of love8 7#b7 ,whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love8 7#c7 ,whether ecstasy is an effect of love8 7#d7 ,whether zeal is an effect of love8 7#e7 ,whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover8 7#f7 ,whether love is cause of all that the lover does8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,union ,is an ,effect of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that union is not an effect of love4 ,for absence is incompatible with union4 ,but love is compatible with absence2 for the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #d3ah73 ,be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always 7speaking of himself1 according to a gloss71 and not only when ,i am present with you4 ,therefore union is not an effect of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every union is either according to essence1 thus form is united to matter1 accident to subject1 and a part to the whole1 or to another part in order to make up the whole3 or according to likeness1 in genus1 species1 or accident4 ,but love does not cause union of essence2 else love could not be between things essentially distinct4 ,on the other hand1 love does not cause union of likeness1 but rather is caused by it1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore union is not an effect of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the sense in act is the sensible in act1 and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood4 ,but the lover in act is not the beloved in act4 ,therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that every love is a unitive love4 ,i answer that1 ,the union of lover and beloved is twofold4 ,the first is real union2 for instance1 when the beloved is present with the lover4 ,the second is union of affection3 and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension2 since movement of the appetite follows apprehension4 ,now love being twofold1 viz4 love of concupiscence and love of friendship2 each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover4 ,for when we love a thing1 by desiring it1 we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being4 ,in like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship1 he wills good to him1 just as he wills good to himself3 wherefore he apprehends him as his other self1 in so far1 to wit1 as he wills good to him as to himself4 ,hence a friend is called a man's other self 7,ethic4 ix1 #d71 and ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv1 #f71 ,well did one say to his friend3 ,thou half of my soul4 ,the first of these unions is caused effectively by love2 because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved1 as of something suitable and belonging to him4 ,the second union is caused formally by love2 because love itself is this union or bond4 ,in this sense ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 viii1 #aj7 that love is a vital principle uniting1 or seeking to unite two together1 the lover1 to wit1 and the beloved4 ,for in describing it as uniting he refers to the union of affection1 without which there is no love3 and in saying that it seeks to unite1 he refers to real union4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is true of real union4 ,that is necessary to pleasure as being its cause2 desire implies the real absence of the beloved3 but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,union has a threefold relation to love4 ,there is union which causes love2 and this is substantial union1 as regards the love with which one loves oneself2 while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things1 it is the union of likeness1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c74 ,there is also a union which is essentially love itself4 ,this union is according to a bond of affection1 and is likened to substantial union1 inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love1 as to himself1 if it be love of friendship2 as to something belonging to himself1 if it be love of concupiscence4 ,again there is a union1 which is the effect of love4 ,this is real union1 which the lover seeks with the object of his love4 ,moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love3 for as the ,philosopher relates 7,polit4 ii1 #a71 ,aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one1 but since this would result in either one or both being destroyed1 they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together1 speak together1 and be united together in other like things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united1 through its likeness1 to the knower4 ,but the effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved1 is1 in a way1 united to the lover1 as stated above4 ,consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,mutual ,indwelling ,is an ,effect of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling1 so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa4 ,for that which is in another is contained in it4 ,but the same cannot be container and contents4 ,therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling1 so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing can penetrate within a whole1 except by means of a division of the whole4 ,but it is the function of the reason1 not of the appetite where love resides1 to divide things that are really united4 ,therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa1 it follows that the beloved is united to the lover1 in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved4 ,but the union itself is love1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love2 which is evidently false4 ,therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,john #d3af73 ,he that abideth in charity abideth in ,god1 and ,god in him4 ,now charity is the love of ,god4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 every love makes the beloved to be in the lover1 and vice versa4 ,i answer that1 ,this effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power4 ,because1 as to the apprehensive power1 the beloved is said to be in the lover1 inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover1 according to ,phil4 #a3g1 ,for that ,i have you in my heart3 while the lover is said to be in the beloved1 according to apprehension1 inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved1 but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved1 so as to penetrate into his very soul4 ,thus it is written concerning the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is ,god's ,love1 that ,he searcheth all things1 yea the deep things of ,god 7#a ,cor4 #b3aj74 ,as the appetitive power1 the object loved is said to be in the lover1 inasmuch as it is in his affections1 by a kind of complacency3 causing him either to take pleasure in it1 or in its good1 when present2 or1 in the absence of the object loved1 by his longing1 to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence1 or towards the good that he wills to the beloved1 with the love of friendship3 not indeed from any extrinsic cause 7as when we desire one thing on account of another1 or wish good to another on account of something else71 but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart4 ,for this reason we speak of love as being intimate2 and of the bowels of charity4 ,on the other hand1 the lover is in the beloved1 by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship1 but not in the same way4 ,for the love of concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved2 but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly1 by penetrating into his heart1 as it were4 ,whereas1 in the love of friendship1 the lover is in the beloved1 inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend1 as being so to himself2 and his friend's will as his own1 so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend4 ,hence it is proper to friends to desire the same things1 and to grieve and rejoice at the same1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #c and ,rhet4 ii1 #d74 ,consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself1 the lover seems to be in the beloved1 as though he were become one with him3 but in so far as1 on the other hand1 he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake1 looking on his friend as identified with himself1 thus the beloved is in the lover4 ,in yet a third way1 mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love3 inasmuch as friends return love for love1 and both desire and do good things for one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the beloved is contained in the lover1 by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency4 ,on the other hand1 the lover is contained in the beloved1 inasmuch as the lover penetrates1 so to speak1 into the beloved4 ,for nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways3 just as a genus is contained in its species1 and vice versa4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love4 ,consequently1 just as the reason divides1 so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved1 as was explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling1 which is not to be found in every kind of love4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,ecstasy ,is an ,effect of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love4 ,for ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason4 ,but love does not always result in loss of reason3 for lovers are masters of themselves at times4 ,therefore love does not cause ecstasy4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the lover desires the beloved to be united to him4 ,therefore he draws the beloved to himself1 rather than betakes himself into the beloved1 going forth out from himself as it were4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love unites the beloved to the lover1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,if1 therefore1 the lover goes out from himself1 in order to betake himself into the beloved1 it follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than himself3 which is evidently false4 ,therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the ,divine love produces ecstasy1 and that ,god ,himself suffered ecstasy through love4 ,since therefore according to the same author 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 every love is a participated likeness of the ,divine ,love1 it seems that every love causes ecstasy4 ,i answer that1 ,to suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself4 ,this happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power4 ,as to the apprehensive power1 a man is said to be placed outside himself1 when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him4 ,this may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge2 thus1 a man is said to suffer ecstasy1 inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason1 when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason3 or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement2 thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy1 when he is overcome by violent passion or madness4 ,as to the appetitive power1 a man is said to suffer ecstasy1 when that power is borne towards something else1 so that it goes forth out from itself1 as it were4 ,the first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far1 namely1 as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things4 ,the second ecstasy is caused by love directly2 by love of friendship1 simply2 by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense4 ,because in love of concupiscence1 the lover is carried out of himself1 in a certain sense2 in so far1 namely1 as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has1 he seeks to enjoy something outside himself4 ,but since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself1 he does not go out from himself simply1 and this movement remains finally within him4 ,on the other hand1 in the love of friendship1 a man's affection goes out from itself simply2 because he wishes and does good to his friend1 by caring and providing for him1 for his sake4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument applies to love of concupiscence1 which1 as stated above1 does not cause ecstasy simply4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who loves1 goes out from himself1 in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it4 ,yet he does not will the good of his friend more than his own good3 and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,zeal ,is an ,effect of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that zeal is not an effect of love4 ,for zeal is a beginning of contention2 wherefore it is written 7#a ,cor4 #c3c73 ,whereas there is among you zeal ,douay3 'envying' and contention1 etc4 ,but contention is incompatible with love4 ,therefore zeal is not an effect of love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of love is the good1 which communicates itself to others4 ,but zeal is opposed to communication2 since it seems an effect of zeal1 that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another3 thus husbands are said to be jealous of 7zelare7 their wives1 because they will not share them with others4 ,therefore zeal is not an effect of love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is no zeal without hatred1 as neither is there without love3 for it is written 7,ps4 #gb3c73 ,i had a zeal on occasion of the wicked4 ,therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,god is said to be a zealot1 on account of his great love for all things4 ,i answer that1 ,zeal1 whatever way we take it1 arises from the intensity of love4 ,for it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything1 the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance4 ,since therefore love is a movement towards the object loved1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ce71 an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it4 ,but this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence1 and love of friendship4 ,for in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely1 is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love4 ,it is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives1 lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights4 ,in like manner those who seek to excel1 are moved against those who seem to excel1 as though these were a hindrance to their excelling4 ,and this is the zeal of envy1 of which it is written 7,ps4 #cf3a73 ,be not emulous of evil doers1 nor envy 7zelaveris7 them that work iniquity4 ,on the other hand1 love of friendship seeks the friend's good3 wherefore1 when it is intense1 it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good4 ,in this respect1 a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend1 when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good4 ,in this way1 too1 a man is said to be zealous on ,god's behalf1 when he endeavors1 to the best of his means1 to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of ,god2 according to #c ,kings #ai3ad3 ,with zeal ,i have been zealous for the ,lord of hosts4 ,again on the words of ,john #b3ag3 ,the zeal of ,thy house hath eaten me up1 a gloss says that a man is eaten up with a good zeal1 who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives2 and if he cannot1 bears with it and laments it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy2 which is indeed the cause of contention1 not against the object of love1 but for it1 and against that which is opposed to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover4 ,consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication1 becomes hateful4 ,thus zeal arises from love of good4 ,but through defect of goodness1 it happens that certain small goods cannot1 in their entirety1 be possessed by many at the same time3 and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy4 ,but it does not arise1 properly speaking1 in the case of those things which1 in their entirety1 can be possessed by many3 for no one envies another the knowledge of truth1 which can be known entirely by many2 except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love1 is the effect of love4 ,hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,love ,is a ,passion ,that ,wounds the ,lover8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love wounds the lover4 ,for languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes4 ,but love causes languor3 for it is written 7,cant #b3e73 ,stay me up with flowers1 compass me about with apples2 because ,i languish with love4 ,therefore love is a wounding passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 melting is a kind of dissolution4 ,but love melts that in which it is3 for it is written 7,cant #e3f73 ,my soul melted when my beloved spoke4 ,therefore love is a dissolvent3 therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fervor denotes a certain excess of heat2 which excess has a corruptive effect4 ,but love causes fervor3 for ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 in reckoning the properties belonging to the ,seraphim's love1 includes hot and piercing and most fervent4 ,moreover it is said of love 7,cant #h3f7 that its lamps are fire and flames4 ,therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that everything loves itself with a love that holds it together1 i4e4 that preserves it4 ,therefore love is not a wounding passion1 but rather one that preserves and perfects4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #a71 love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good4 ,now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it2 rather1 if possible1 it is perfected and bettered4 ,but if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable to it1 it is hurt and made worse thereby4 ,consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover2 but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover1 wounds and worsens him4 ,wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of ,god3 but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin1 according to ,osee #i3aj3 ,they became abominable1 as those things which they loved4 ,and let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element1 i4e4 in regard to the appetite4 ,but in respect of the material element in the passion of love1 i4e4 a certain bodily change1 it happens that love is hurtful1 by reason of this change being excessive3 just as it happens in the senses1 and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ4 ,in reply to the objections1 it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love3 viz4 melting1 enjoyment1 languor1 and fervor4 ,of these the first is melting1 which is opposed to freezing4 ,for things that are frozen1 are closely bound together1 so as to be hard to pierce4 ,but it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is loved1 inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love3 while melting denotes a softening of the heart1 whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved4 ,if1 then1 the beloved is present and possessed1 pleasure or enjoyment ensues4 ,but if the beloved be absent1 two passions arise2 viz4 sadness at its absence1 which is denoted by languor 7hence ,cicero in ,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 iii1 #aa applies the term ailment chiefly to sadness72 and an intense desire to possess the beloved1 which is signified by fervor4 ,and these are the effects of love considered formally1 according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object4 ,but in the passion of love1 other effects ensue1 proportionate to the above1 in respect of a change in the organ4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,love ,is ,cause of ,all ,that the ,lover ,does8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the lover does not do everything from love4 ,for love is a passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #b74 ,but man does not do everything from passion3 but some things he does from choice1 and some things from ignorance1 as stated in ,ethic4 v1 #h4 ,therefore not everything that a man does1 is done from love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #aj4 ,if1 therefore1 whatever a man does is done from love1 the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes4 ,but some things are done from hatred4 ,therefore all things are not done from love4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that all things1 whatever they do1 they do for the love of good4 ,i answer that1 ,every agent acts for an end1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b74 ,now the end is the good desired and loved by each one4 ,wherefore it is evident that every agent1 whatever it be1 does every action from love of some kind4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite4 ,but here we are speaking of love in a general sense1 inasmuch as it includes intellectual1 rational1 animal1 and natural love3 for it is in this sense that ,dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of ,de ,divinis ,nominibus4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #e2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d7 desire1 sadness and pleasure1 and consequently all the other passions of the soul1 result from love4 ,wherefore every act that proceeds from any passion1 proceeds also from love as from a first cause3 and so the other passions1 which are proximate causes1 are not superfluous4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hatred also is a result of love1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #b74 ,,question #bi ,,of ,,hatred 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider hatred3 concerning which there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred8 7#b7 ,whether love is the cause of hatred8 7#c7 ,whether hatred is stronger than love8 7#d7 ,whether a man can hate himself8 7#e7 ,whether a man can hate the truth8 7#f7 ,whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,evil ,is the ,cause and ,object of ,hatred8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred4 ,for everything that exists1 as such1 is good4 ,if therefore evil be the object of hatred1 it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred3 which is clearly untrue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hatred of evil is praiseworthy2 hence 7#b ,macc4 #c3a7 some are praised for that the laws were very well kept1 because of the godliness of ,onias the high-priest1 and the hatred of their souls ,douay3 'his soul' had no evil4 ,if1 therefore1 nothing but evil be the object of hatred1 it would follow that all hatred is commendable3 and this is clearly false4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil4 ,but the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects4 ,therefore hatred is not only of evil1 but also of good4 ,on the contrary1 ,hatred is the opposite of love4 ,but the object of love is good1 as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the object of hatred is evil4 ,i answer that1 ,since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension 7though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appetite71 it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite1 applies also to the animal appetite1 which does result from an apprehension in the same subject1 as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a74 ,now1 with regard to the natural appetite1 it is evident1 that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it1 wherein consists natural love2 so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it2 and this is natural hatred4 ,so1 therefore1 in the animal appetite1 or in the intellectual appetite1 love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable2 while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful4 ,now1 just as whatever is suitable1 as such1 bears the aspect of good2 so whatever is repugnant1 as such1 bears the aspect of evil4 ,and therefore1 just as good is the object of love1 so evil is the object of hatred4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,being1 as such1 has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness2 because being is common to all things4 ,but being1 inasmuch as it is this determinate being1 has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being4 ,and in this way1 one being is hateful to another1 and is evil2 though not in itself1 but by comparison with something else4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as a thing may be apprehended as good1 when it is not truly good2 so a thing may be apprehended as evil1 whereas it is not truly evil4 ,hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful3 in respect of the natural appetite1 owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing1 and naturally unsuitable to another3 thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water3 and in respect of the animal appetite1 owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good1 by another as bad4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,love ,is a ,cause of ,hatred8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is not a cause of hatred4 ,for the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous 7,praedic4 x74 ,but love and hatred are opposite members of a division1 since they are contrary to one another4 ,therefore they are naturally simultaneous4 ,therefore love is not the cause of hatred4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 of two contraries1 one is not the cause of the other4 ,but love and hatred are contraries4 ,therefore love is not the cause of hatred4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes4 ,but hatred precedes love1 seemingly3 since hatred implies a turning away from evil1 whereas love implies a turning towards good4 ,therefore love is not the cause of hatred4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i7 that all emotions are caused by love4 ,therefore hatred also1 since it is an emotion of the soul1 is caused by love4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved1 while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance4 ,now we should consider in each thing1 what agrees with it1 before that which disagrees3 since a thing disagrees with another1 through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it4 ,consequently love must needs precede hatred2 and nothing is hated1 save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved4 ,and hence it is that every hatred is caused by love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous1 both really and logically2 e4g4 two species of animal1 or two species of color4 ,sometimes they are simultaneous logically1 while1 in reality1 one precedes1 and causes the other2 e4g4 the species of numbers1 figures and movements4 ,sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically2 e4g4 substance and accident2 for substance is in reality the cause of accident2 and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident1 by a priority of reason1 because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance4 ,now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous1 logically but not really4 ,wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing4 ,but if taken in respect of contraries1 they are not themselves contrary1 but consequent to one another3 for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing1 or that one hate its contrary4 ,thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the order of execution1 the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other4 ,but the reverse is the case in the order of intention3 since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other4 ,now the appetitive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution4 ,wherefore love precedes hatred3 because each is an appetitive movement4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,hatred ,is ,stronger ,than ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hatred is stronger than love4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cf73 ,there is no one who does not flee from pain1 more than he desires pleasure4 ,but flight from pain pertains to hatred2 while desire for pleasure belongs to love4 ,therefore hatred is stronger than love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the weaker is overcome by the stronger4 ,but love is overcome by hatred3 when1 that is to say1 love is turned into hatred4 ,therefore hatred is stronger than love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects4 ,but man insists more on repelling what is hateful1 than on seeking what is pleasant3 thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip1 as ,augustine instances 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cf74 ,therefore hatred is stronger than love4 ,on the contrary1 ,good is stronger than evil2 because evil does nothing except in virtue of good1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and evil4 ,therefore love is stronger than hatred4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause4 ,now every hatred arises from some love as its cause1 as above stated 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely4 ,but furthermore1 love must needs be1 absolutely speaking1 stronger than hatred4 ,because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means4 ,now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good4 ,wherefore1 absolutely speaking1 the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil4 ,nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because hatred is more keenly felt than love4 ,for1 since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression2 when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it4 ,hence the heat of a hectic fever1 though greater1 is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever2 because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature4 ,for this reason1 love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved2 thus ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #ab7 that love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love4 ,and for the same reason1 the unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved4 ,secondly1 because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding4 ,because1 according to different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred4 ,wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love1 moves us more than a lesser love4 ,hence it is clear how to reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,for the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation1 to which corresponds flight from pain4 ,wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hatred would never overcome love1 were it not for the greater love to which that hatred corresponds4 ,thus man loves himself1 more than he loves his friend3 and because he loves himself1 his friend is hateful to him1 if he oppose him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason why we act with greater insistence in repelling what is hateful1 is because we feel hatred more keenly4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,man ,can ,hate ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man can hate himself4 ,for it is written 7,ps4 #aj3f73 ,he that loveth iniquity1 hateth his own soul4 ,but many love iniquity4 ,therefore many hate themselves4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 him we hate1 to whom we wish and work evil4 ,but sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself1 e4g4 a man who kills himself4 ,therefore some men hate themselves4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 ii7 that avarice makes a man hateful2 whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser4 ,but some men are misers4 ,therefore they hate themselves4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3bi7 that no man ever hated his own flesh4 ,i answer that1 ,properly speaking1 it is impossible for a man to hate himself4 ,for everything naturally desires good1 nor can anyone desire anything for himself1 save under the aspect of good3 for evil is outside the scope of the will1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now to love a man is to will good to him1 as stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #d74 ,consequently1 a man must1 of necessity1 love himself2 and it is impossible for a man to hate himself1 properly speaking4 ,but accidentally it happens that a man hates himself3 and this in two ways4 ,first1 on the part of the good which a man wills to himself4 ,for it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect1 is simply evil2 and in this way1 a man accidentally wills evil to himself2 and thus hates himself4 ,secondly1 in regard to himself1 to whom he wills good4 ,for each thing is that which is predominant in it2 wherefore the state is said to do what the king does1 as if the king were the whole state4 ,now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man4 ,and it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature4 ,wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be1 while they hate that which they really are1 by desiring what is contrary to reason4 ,and in both these ways1 he that loveth iniquity hateth not only his own soul1 but also himself4 ,wherefore the reply to the ,first ,objection is evident4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,no man wills and works evil to himself1 except he apprehend it under the aspect of good4 ,for even they who kill themselves1 apprehend death itself as a good1 considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the miser hates something accidental to himself1 but not for that reason does he hate himself3 thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very reason that he loves himself4 ,or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others1 but not to himself4 ,in fact1 it is caused by inordinate self-love1 in respect of which1 man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #e ,whether a ,man ,can ,hate the ,truth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man cannot hate the truth4 ,for good1 true1 and being are convertible4 ,but a man cannot hate good4 ,neither1 therefore1 can he hate the truth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,all men have a natural desire for knowledge1 as stated in the beginning of the ,metaphysics 7i1 #a74 ,but knowledge is only of truth4 ,therefore truth is naturally desired and loved4 ,but that which is in a thing naturally1 is always in it4 ,therefore no man can hate the truth4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that men love those who are straightforward4 ,but there can be no other motive for this save truth4 ,therefore man loves the truth naturally4 ,therefore he cannot hate it4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #d3af73 ,am ,i become your enemy because ,i tell you the truth8 99,st4 ,thomas quotes the passage1 probably from memory1 as though it were an assertion3 ,i am become1 etc4 ,i answer that1 ,good1 true and being are the same in reality1 but differ as considered by reason4 ,for good is considered in the light of something desirable1 while being and true are not so considered3 because good is what all things seek4 ,wherefore good1 as such1 cannot be the object of hatred1 neither in general nor in particular4 ,being and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred3 because disagreement is the cause of hatred1 and agreement is the cause of love2 while being and truth are common to all things4 ,but nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred1 in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant2 since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion of being and truth1 as they are with the notion of good4 ,now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love4 ,first1 according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin4 ,and thus man sometimes hates a particular truth1 when he wishes that what is true were not true4 ,secondly1 according as truth is in man's knowledge1 which hinders him from gaining the object loved3 such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith1 that they may sin freely2 in whose person it is said 7,job #ba3ad73 ,we desire not the knowledge of ,thy ways4 ,thirdly1 a particular truth is hated1 as being repugnant1 inasmuch as it is in the intellect of another man3 as1 for instance1 when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin1 he hates that anyone should know the truth about his sin4 ,in this respect1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 x1 #bc7 that men love truth when it enlightens1 they hate it when it reproves4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the knowledge of truth is lovable in itself3 hence ,augustine says that men love it when it enlightens4 ,but accidentally1 the knowledge of truth may become hateful1 in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth1 and the knowledge of the truth1 considered in itself1 is a desirable thing4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,anything ,can ,be an ,object of ,universal ,hatred8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred4 ,because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite1 which is moved by an apprehension in the senses4 ,but the senses cannot apprehend the universal4 ,therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hatred is caused by disagreement2 and where there is disagreement1 there is nothing in common4 ,but the notion of universality implies something in common4 ,therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the object of hatred is evil4 ,but evil is in things1 and not in the mind 7,metaph4 vi1 #d74 ,since therefore the universal is in the mind only1 which abstracts the universal from the particular1 it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that anger is directed to something singular1 whereas hatred is also directed to a thing in general2 for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two ways of speaking of the universal3 first1 as considered under the aspect of universality2 secondly1 as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed3 for it is one thing to consider the universal man1 and another to consider a man as man4 ,if1 therefore1 we take the universal1 in the first way1 no sensitive power1 whether of apprehension or of appetite1 can attain the universal3 because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter1 on which every sensitive power is based4 ,nevertheless the sensitive powers1 both of apprehension and of appetite1 can tend to something universally4 ,thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically2 not that the sight is cognizant of universal color1 but because the fact that color is cognizant by the sight1 is attributed to color1 not as being this particular color1 but simply because it is color4 ,accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally3 because this thing1 by reason of its common nature1 and not merely as an individual1 is hostile to the animal--for instance1 a wolf in regard to a sheep4 ,hence a sheep hates the wolf universally4 ,on the other hand1 anger is always caused by something in particular3 because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us2 and actions proceed from individuals4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that anger is always directed to something singular1 whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general4 ,but according as hatred is in the intellectual part1 since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect1 it can regard the universal in both ways4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the senses do not apprehend the universal1 as such3 but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred4 ,but nothing hinders a thing from being common to many1 and at variance with others1 so as to be hateful to them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality3 and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite4 ,,question #cj ,,of ,,concupiscence 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have now to consider concupiscence3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only8 7#b7 ,whether concupiscence is a specific passion8 7#c7 ,whether some concupiscences are natural1 and some not natural8 7#d7 ,whether concupiscence is infinite8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,concupiscence ,is in the ,sensitive ,appetite ,only8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite4 ,for there is a concupiscence of wisdom1 according to ,wis4 #f3ba3 ,the concupiscence ,douay3 'desire' of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom4 ,but the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom4 ,therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the desire for the commandments of ,god is not in the sensitive appetite3 in fact the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3ah73 ,there dwelleth not in me1 that is to say1 in my flesh1 that which is good4 ,but desire for ,god's commandments is an act of concupiscence1 according to ,ps4 #aah3bj3 ,my soul hath coveted 7concupivit7 to long for thy justifications4 ,therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to each power1 its proper good is a matter of concupiscence4 ,therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul1 and not only in the sensitive appetite4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason1 is divided into the faculties of concupiscence and anger4 ,this is the irrational part of the soul1 passive and appetitive4 ,therefore concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa71 concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant4 ,now pleasure is twofold1 as we shall state later on 7,q4 #ca1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d73 one is in the intelligible good1 which is the good of reason2 the other is in good perceptible to the senses4 ,the former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone3 whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body3 because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ3 wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite4 ,now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure1 since it belongs to the united soul and body1 as is implied by the ,latin word concupiscentia4 ,therefore1 properly speaking1 concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite1 and in the concupiscible faculty1 which takes its name from it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the craving for wisdom1 or other spiritual goods1 is sometimes called concupiscence2 either by reason of a certain likeness2 or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite1 so that the latter also1 in its own way1 tends to the spiritual good1 following the lead of the higher appetite1 the result being that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters1 according to ,ps4 #hc3c3 ,my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,properly speaking1 desire may be not only in the lower1 but also in the higher appetite4 ,for it does not imply fellowship in craving1 as concupiscence does2 but simply movement towards the thing desired4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite1 which does not arise from apprehension4 ,but the craving for good1 by the animal appetite1 which arises from apprehension1 belongs to the appetitive power alone4 ,and to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses1 wherein concupiscence properly consists1 belongs to the concupiscible power4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,concupiscence ,is a ,specific ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power4 ,for passions are distinguished by their objects4 ,but the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses2 and this is also the object of concupiscence1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cc7 that covetousness is the love of transitory things3 so that it is not distinct from love4 ,but all specific passions are distinct from one another4 ,therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible faculty4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,but no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that good when desired gives rise to concupiscence2 when present1 it gives joy3 in like manner1 the evil we apprehend makes us fear1 the evil that is present makes us sad3 from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy1 so is fear contrary to concupiscence4 ,but fear is not in the concupiscible1 but in the irascible part4 ,therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty4 ,on the contrary1 ,concupiscence is caused by love1 and tends to pleasure1 both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty4 ,hence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions1 as a specific passion4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a71 the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty4 ,hence the various concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good4 ,now the diversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the object1 or from a diversity in its active power4 ,the diversity1 derived from the nature of the active object1 causes a material difference of passions3 while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions1 in respect of which the passions differ specifically4 ,now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good1 differs according as it is really present1 or absent3 because1 according as it is present1 it causes the faculty to find rest in it2 whereas1 according as it is absent1 it causes the faculty to be moved towards it4 ,wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love1 inasmuch as1 so to speak1 it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself2 it causes concupiscence1 inasmuch as1 when absent1 it draws the faculty to itself2 and it causes pleasure1 inasmuch as1 when present1 it makes the faculty to find rest in itself4 ,accordingly1 concupiscence is a passion differing in species from both love and pleasure4 ,but concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ in number4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence1 not absolutely1 but considered as absent3 just as the sensible1 considered as past1 is the object of memory4 ,for these particular conditions diversify the species of passions1 and even of the powers of the sensitive part1 which regards particular things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the passage quoted we have causal1 not essential predication3 for covetousness is not essentially love1 but an effect of love4 ,we may also say that ,augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense1 for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to come3 so that it includes both love and hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name1 and stands in relation to evil1 as concupiscence in regard to good4 ,but since1 like fear1 it regards the absent evil2 sometimes it goes by the name of fear1 just as hope is sometimes called covetousness4 ,for a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing3 and consequently every movement of the appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear1 which regard good and evil as arduous4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,some ,concupiscences ,are ,natural1 and ,some ,not ,natural8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not4 ,for concupiscence belongs to the animal appetite1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,but the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite4 ,therefore no concupiscence is natural4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 material differences makes no difference of species1 but only numerical difference2 a difference which is outside the purview of science4 ,but if some concupiscences are natural1 and some not1 they differ only in respect of their objects2 which amounts to a material difference1 which is one of number only4 ,therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and those that are not4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 reason is contrasted with nature1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #e4 ,if therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is not natural1 it must needs be rational4 ,but this is impossible3 because1 since concupiscence is a passion1 it belongs to the sensitive appetite1 and not to the will1 which is the rational appetite4 ,therefore there are no concupiscences which are not natural4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #aa and ,rhetor4 i1 #aa7 distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good4 ,now a thing is pleasurable in two ways4 ,first1 because it is suitable to the nature of the animal2 for example1 food1 drink1 and the like3 and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be natural4 ,secondly1 a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal3 as when one apprehends something as good and suitable1 and consequently takes pleasure in it3 and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural1 and is more wont to be called cupidity4 ,accordingly concupiscences of the first kind1 or natural concupiscences1 are common to men and other animals3 because to both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature3 and in these all men agree2 wherefore the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #aa7 calls them common and necessary4 ,but concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men1 to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable1 beyond that which nature requires4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa7 that the former concupiscences are irrational1 but the latter1 rational4 ,and because different men reason differently1 therefore the latter are also called 7,ethic4 iii1 #aa7 peculiar and acquired1 i4e4 in addition to those that are natural4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the same thing that is the object of the natural appetite1 may be the object of the animal appetite1 once it is apprehended4 ,and in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food1 drink1 and the like1 which are objects of the natural appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not1 is not merely a material difference2 it is also1 in a way1 formal1 in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object4 ,now the object of the appetite is the apprehended good4 ,hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension3 according as a thing is apprehended as suitable1 either by absolute apprehension1 whence arise natural concupiscences1 which the ,philosopher calls irrational 7,rhet4 i1 #aa72 or by apprehension together with deliberation1 whence arise those concupiscences that are not natural1 and which for this very reason the ,philosopher calls rational 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man has not only universal reason1 pertaining to the intellectual faculty2 but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #c73 so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite4 ,moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason also1 through the medium of the particular imagination4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,concupiscence ,is ,infinite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that concupiscence is not infinite4 ,for the object of concupiscence is good1 which has the aspect of an end4 ,but where there is infinity there is no end 7,metaph4 ii1 #b74 ,therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 concupiscence is of the fitting good1 since it proceeds from love4 ,but the infinite is without proportion1 and therefore unfitting4 ,therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is no passing through infinite things3 and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them4 ,but the subject of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term4 ,therefore1 if concupiscence were infinite1 no delight would ever ensue4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c7 that since concupiscence is infinite1 men desire an infinite number of things4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 concupiscence is twofold2 one is natural1 the other is not natural4 ,natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite3 because it is of that which nature requires2 and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed4 ,hence man never desires infinite meat1 or infinite drink4 ,but just as in nature there is potential successive infinity1 so can this kind of concupiscence be infinite successively2 so that1 for instance1 after getting food1 a man may desire food yet again2 and so of anything else that nature requires3 because these bodily goods1 when obtained1 do not last for ever1 but fail4 ,hence ,our ,lord said to the woman of ,samaria 7,john #d3ac73 ,whosoever drinketh of this water1 shall thirst again4 ,but non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite4 ,because1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 it follows from the reason1 and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity4 ,hence he that desires riches1 may desire to be rich1 not up to a certain limit1 but to be simply as rich as possible4 ,another reason may be assigned1 according to the ,philosopher 7,polit4 i1 #c71 why a certain concupiscence is finite1 and another infinite4 ,because concupiscence of the end is always infinite3 since the end is desired for its own sake1 e4g4 health3 and thus greater health is more desired1 and so on to infinity2 just as1 if a white thing of itself dilates the sight1 that which is more white dilates yet more4 ,on the other hand1 concupiscence of the means is not infinite1 because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end4 ,consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches2 whereas those who desire riches1 on account of the necessities of life1 desire a finite measure of riches1 sufficient for the necessities of life1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c74 ,the same applies to the concupiscence of any other things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite3 either because it is finite in reality1 as being once actually desired2 or because it is finite as apprehended4 ,for it cannot be apprehended as infinite1 since the infinite is that from which1 however much we may take1 there always remains something to be taken 7,phys4 iii1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason is possessed of infinite power1 in a certain sense1 in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely1 as appears in the addition of numbers and lines4 ,consequently1 the infinite1 taken in a certain way1 is proportionate to reason4 ,in fact the universal which the reason apprehends1 is infinite in a sense1 inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in order that a man be delighted1 there is no need for him to realize all that he desires3 for he delights in the realization of each object of his concupiscence4 ,,question #ca ,,of ,,delight 99,or1 ,pleasure ,,considered ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider delight and sadness4 ,concerning delight four things must be considered3 7#a7 ,delight in itself2 7#b7 ,the causes of delight2 7#c7 ,its effects2 7#d7 ,its goodness and malice4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether delight is a passion8 7#b7 ,whether delight is subject to time8 7#c7 ,whether it differs from joy8 7#d7 ,whether it is in the intellectual appetite8 7#e7 ,of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower2 7#f7 ,of sensible delights compared with one another2 7#g7 ,whether any delight is non-natural8 7#h7 ,whether one delight can be contrary to another8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,delight ,is a ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that delight is not a passion4 ,for ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 distinguishes operation from passion1 and says that operation is a movement in accord with nature1 while passion is a movement contrary to nature4 ,but delight is an operation1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #ab2 x1 #e74 ,therefore delight is not a passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,to be passive is to be moved1 as stated in ,phys4 iii1 #c4 ,but delight does not consist in being moved1 but in having been moved2 for it arises from good already gained4 ,therefore delight is not a passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted2 since it perfects operation1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #d1 #e4 ,but to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered1 as stated in ,phys4 vii1 #c and ,de ,anima ii1 #e4 ,therefore delight is not a passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #b2 xiv1 #e seqq7 reckons delight1 joy1 or gladness among the other passions of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,the movements of the sensitive appetite1 are properly called passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c74 ,now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension1 is a movement of the sensitive appetite3 and this must needs be said of delight1 since1 according to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 i1 #aa7 delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once1 in keeping with the nature of the thing4 ,in order to understand this1 we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections1 so does this happen in animals4 ,and though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once1 yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once4 ,now there is this difference between animals and other natural things1 that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature1 they do not perceive it1 whereas animals do4 ,and from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite2 which movement is called delight4 ,accordingly by saying that delight is a movement of the soul1 we designate its genus4 ,by saying that it is an establishing in keeping with the thing's nature1 i4e4 with that which exists in the thing1 we assign the cause of delight1 viz4 the presence of a becoming good4 ,by saying that this establishing is all at once1 we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment1 but as in the fact of complete establishment1 in the term of the movement1 as it were3 for delight is not a becoming as ,plato 99,phileb4 #cb1 #cc maintained1 but a complete fact1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ab4 ,lastly1 by saying that this establishing is sensible1 we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight4 ,it is therefore evident that1 since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense1 it is a passion of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,connatural operation1 which is unhindered1 is a second perfection1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 #a3 and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation1 delight follows1 which consists in a state of completion1 as observed above4 ,accordingly when we say that delight is an operation1 we designate1 not its essence1 but its cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a twofold movement is to be observed in an animal3 one1 according to the intention of the end1 and this belongs to the appetite2 the other1 according to the execution1 and this belongs to the external operation4 ,and so1 although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights1 the movement of execution ceases1 by which he tends to the end2 yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease1 since1 just as before it desired that which it had not1 so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses4 ,for though delight is a certain repose of the appetite1 if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite1 nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object1 by reason of which delight is a kind of movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency1 such as bodily ailments1 as also sadness and fear in the soul2 yet some passions have a tendency to something good1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d73 and in this sense delight is called a passion4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,delight ,is in ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that delight is in time4 ,for delight is a kind of movement1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,but all movement is in time4 ,therefore delight is in time4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time4 ,but some pleasures are called morose4 ,therefore pleasure is in time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the passions of the soul are of one same genus4 ,but some passions of the soul are in time4 ,therefore delight is too4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 that no one takes pleasure according to time4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may be in time in two ways3 first1 by itself2 secondly1 by reason of something else1 and accidentally as it were4 ,for since time is the measure of successive things1 those things are of themselves said to be in time1 to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential3 such are movement1 repose1 speech and such like4 ,on the other hand1 those things are said to be in time1 by reason of something else and not of themselves1 to which succession is not essential1 but which are subject to something successive4 ,thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive2 since it is not a movement1 but the term of a movement or change1 viz4 of this being begotten3 yet1 because human being is subject to changeable causes1 in this respect1 to be a man is in time4 ,accordingly1 we must say that delight1 of itself indeed1 is not in time3 for it regards good already gained1 which is1 as it were1 the term of the movement4 ,but if this good gained be subject to change1 the delight therein will be in time accidentally3 whereas if it be altogether unchangeable1 the delight therein will not be in time1 either by reason of itself or accidentally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #g1 movement is twofold4 ,one is the act of something imperfect1 i4e4 of something existing in potentiality1 as such3 this movement is successive and is in time4 ,another movement is the act of something perfect1 i4e4 of something existing in act1 e4g4 to understand1 to feel1 and to will and such like1 also to have delight4 ,this movement is not successive1 nor is it of itself in time4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,delight is said to be long lasting or morose1 according as it is accidentally in time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,other passions have not for their object a good obtained1 as delight has4 ,wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight4 ,and consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,delight ,differs from ,joy8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy4 ,because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects4 ,but delight and joy have the same object1 namely1 a good obtained4 ,therefore joy is altogether the same as delight4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one movement does not end in two terms4 ,but one and the same movement1 that of desire1 ends in joy and delight4 ,therefore delight and joy are altogether the same4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if joy differs from delight1 it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness1 exultation1 and cheerfulness from delight1 so that they would all be various passions of the soul4 ,but this seems to be untrue4 ,therefore joy does not differ from delight4 ,on the contrary1 ,we do not speak of joy in irrational animals2 whereas we do speak of delight in them4 ,therefore joy is not the same as delight4 ,i answer that1 ,joy1 as ,avicenna states 7,de ,anima iv71 is a kind of delight4 ,for we must observe that1 just as some concupiscences are natural1 and some not natural1 but consequent to reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #c71 so also some delights are natural1 and some are not natural but rational4 ,or1 as ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ac7 and ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xviii4 put it1 some delights are of the body1 some are of the soul2 which amounts to the same4 ,for we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally1 when we get them1 and in those things which we desire as a result of reason4 ,but we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason2 and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals1 but only delight4 ,now whatever we desire naturally1 can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight1 but not vice versa4 ,consequently whatever can be the object of delight1 can also be the object of joy in rational beings4 ,and yet everything is not always the object of joy2 since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body1 without rejoicing thereat according to reason4 ,and accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good1 diversity of apprehension pertains1 in a way1 to diversity of the object4 ,and so delights of the soul1 which are also called joys1 are distinct from bodily delights1 which are not called otherwise than delights3 as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also3 so that delight corresponds to concupiscence1 while joy corresponds to desire1 which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul4 ,hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight2 for laetitia 7gladness7 is derived from the dilation of the heart1 as if one were to say latitia2 exultation is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight1 which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds2 and cheerfulness is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness4 ,yet all these names seem to belong to joy2 for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,delight ,is in the ,intellectual ,appetite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite4 ,because the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa7 that delight is a sensible movement4 ,but sensible movement is not in an intellectual power4 ,therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 delight is a passion4 ,but every passion is in the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore delight is only in the sensitive appetite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 delight is common to us and to the irrational animals4 ,therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common with irrational animals4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #cf3d73 ,delight in the ,lord4 ,but the sensitive appetite cannot reach to ,god2 only the intellectual appetite can4 ,therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason4 ,now on the reason apprehending something1 not only the sensitive appetite is moved1 as regards its application to some particular thing1 but also the intellectual appetite1 which is called the will4 ,and accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy1 but not bodily delight4 ,however1 there is this difference of delight in either power1 that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation1 whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #f7 that desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in this definition of the ,philosopher1 he uses the word sensible in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception4 ,for he says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 that delight is attendant upon every sense1 as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation4 ,or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,delight has the character of passion1 properly speaking1 when accompanied by bodily transmutation4 ,it is not thus in the intellectual appetite1 but according to simple movement3 for thus it is also in ,god and the angels4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ad7 that ,god rejoices by one simple act3 and ,dionysius says at the end of ,de ,coel4 ,hier41 that the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight1 but rejoice together with ,god with the gladness of incorruption4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in us there is delight1 not only in common with dumb animals1 but also in common with angels4 ,wherefore ,dionysius says 7,de ,coel4 ,hier47 that holy men often take part in the angelic delights4 ,accordingly we have delight1 not only in the sensitive appetite1 which we have in common with dumb animals1 but also in the intellectual appetite1 which we have in common with the angels4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,bodily and ,sensible ,pleasures ,are ,greater ,than ,spiritual and ,intellectual ,pleasures8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures4 ,for all men seek some pleasure1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 x1 #b1 #d74 ,but more seek sensible pleasures1 than intelligible spiritual pleasures4 ,therefore bodily pleasures are greater4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the greatness of a cause is known by its effect4 ,but bodily pleasures have greater effects2 since they alter the state of the body1 and in some they cause madness 7,ethic4 vii1 #c74 ,therefore bodily pleasures are greater4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked1 by reason of their vehemence3 whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures4 ,therefore bodily pleasures are greater4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #aah3ajc73 ,how sweet are ,thy words to my palate2 more than honey to my mouth6 ,and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #g7 that the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known4 ,now1 in the operations of the soul1 especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul1 it must be noted that1 since they do not pass into outward matter1 they are acts or perfections of the agent1 e4g4 to understand1 to feel1 to will and the like3 because actions which pass into outward matter1 are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed2 for movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved 7,phys4 iii1 #c74 ,accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul1 are themselves a certain good of the agent1 and are known by sense and intellect4 ,wherefore from them also does pleasure arise1 and not only from their objects4 ,if therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures1 according as we delight in the very actions1 for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge2 without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures4 ,for man takes much more delight in knowing something1 by understanding it1 than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense4 ,because intellectual knowledge is more perfect2 and because it is better known1 since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does4 ,moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved3 for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision1 as beasts or fools are deprived thereof1 as ,augustine says in ,de ,civ4 ,dei 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #ad74 ,if1 however1 intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures1 then1 in themselves and absolutely speaking1 spiritual pleasures are greater4 ,and this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure1 viz4 the good which is brought into conjunction1 that to which it is conjoined1 and the conjunction itself4 ,for spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good3 a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures1 rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good4 ,likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty4 ,also the conjunction is more intimate1 more perfect and more firm4 ,more intimate1 because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing1 whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence2 for the object of the intellect is what a thing is4 ,more perfect1 because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement1 which is an imperfect act3 wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once1 but some part of them is passing away1 while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized1 as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures3 whereas intelligible things are without movement3 hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once4 ,more firm2 because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible1 and soon pass away2 whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible4 ,on the other hand1 in relation to us1 bodily pleasures are more vehement1 for three reasons4 ,first1 because sensible things are more known to us1 than intelligible things4 ,secondly1 because sensible pleasures1 through being passions of the sensitive appetite1 are accompanied by some alteration in the body3 whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures1 save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower4 ,thirdly1 because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles1 whence various griefs arise4 ,wherefore bodily pleasures1 by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind1 are felt the more1 and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures1 which have no contrary griefs1 as we shall state farther on 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally3 and1 again1 because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness3 and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures1 which are proper to the virtuous1 hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures1 inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason3 wherefore they need to be tempered and checked by reason4 ,but spiritual pleasures are in the mind1 which is itself the rule3 wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,pleasures of ,touch ,are ,greater ,than the ,pleasures ,afforded by the ,other ,senses8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses4 ,because the greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end4 ,but such is the pleasure afforded by the sight1 according to the words of ,tob4 #e3ab3 ,what manner of joy shall be to me1 who sit in darkness1 and see not the light of heaven8 ,therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every one finds treasure in what he loves1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,but of all the senses the sight is loved most 99,metaph4 i1 #a4 ,therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight4 ,but pleasure is the cause of such friendship4 ,therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj71 that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a71 everything gives pleasure according as it is loved4 ,now1 as stated in ,metaph4 i1 #a1 the senses are loved for two reasons3 for the purpose of knowledge1 and on account of their usefulness4 ,wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways4 ,but because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good1 it follows that the former pleasures of the senses1 i4e4 those which arise from knowledge1 are proper to man3 whereas pleasures of the senses1 as loved for their usefulness1 are common to all animals4 ,if therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of knowledge1 it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than any other sense4 ,on the other hand1 if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness1 then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch4 ,for the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature4 ,now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness3 for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal1 namely1 of things hot and cold and the like4 ,wherefore in this respect1 the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end4 ,for this reason1 too1 other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness1 derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch3 for dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares1 but in eating them2 4 4 4 nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox1 but in devouring it 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj74 ,since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness1 and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect of knowledge2 if anyone wish to compare these two1 he will find that the pleasure of touch is1 absolutely speaking1 greater than the pleasure of sight1 so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure4 ,because it is evident that in everything1 that which is natural is most powerful3 and it is to these pleasures of the touch that the natural concupiscences1 such as those of food1 sexual union1 and the like1 are ordained4 ,if1 however1 we consider the pleasures of sight1 inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind1 then the pleasures of sight are greater1 forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,joy1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 denotes pleasure of the soul2 and this belongs principally to the sight4 ,but natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the sight is loved most1 on account of knowledge1 because it helps us to distinguish many things1 as is stated in the same passage 7,metaph4 i1 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pleasure causes carnal love in one way2 the sight1 in another4 ,for pleasure1 especially that which is afforded by the touch1 is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant3 whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its beginning1 inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image1 which entices him to love it and to seek its delight4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,any ,pleasure ,is ,not ,natural8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no pleasure is not natural4 ,for pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies4 ,but the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place4 ,neither1 therefore1 can the repose of the animal appetite1 which is pleasure1 be elsewhere than in something connatural4 ,therefore no pleasure is non-natural4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is against nature is violent4 ,but whatever is violent causes grief 7,metaph4 v1 #e74 ,therefore nothing which is unnatural can give pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the fact of being established in one's own nature1 if perceived1 gives rise to pleasure1 as is evident from the ,philosopher's definition quoted above 7,a4 #a74 ,but it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature2 because natural movement tends to a natural end4 ,therefore every pleasure is natural4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #e1 #f7 that some things are pleasant not from nature but from disease4 ,i answer that1 ,we speak of that as being natural1 which is in accord with nature1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #a4 ,now1 in man1 nature can be taken in two ways4 ,first1 inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature1 since in respect thereof he has his own specific nature4 ,and in this sense1 those pleasures may be called natural to man1 which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his reason3 for instance1 it is natural to man to take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue4 ,secondly1 nature in man may be taken as contrasted with reason1 and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals1 especially that part of man which does not obey reason4 ,and in this sense1 that which pertains to the preservation of the body1 either as regards the individual1 as food1 drink1 sleep1 and the like1 or as regards the species1 as sexual intercourse1 are said to afford man natural pleasure4 ,under each kind of pleasures1 we find some that are not natural speaking absolutely1 and yet connatural in some respect4 ,for it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted1 so that something which is contrary to the specific nature1 becomes accidentally natural to this individual3 thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat4 ,consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man1 either in regard to reason1 or in regard to the preservation of the body1 becomes connatural to this individual man1 on account of there being some corruption of nature in him4 ,and this corruption may be either on the part of the body--from some ailment2 thus to a man suffering from fever1 sweet things seem bitter1 and vice versa--or from an evil temperament2 thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like2 or on the part of the soul2 thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast1 or other such things1 which are not in accord with human nature4 ,this suffices for the answers to the objections4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,one ,pleasure ,can ,be ,contrary to ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another4 ,because the passions of the soul derive their species and contrariety from their objects4 ,now the object of pleasure is the good4 ,since therefore good is not contrary to good1 but good is contrary to evil1 and evil to good1 as stated in ,praedic4 viii2 it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to one thing there is one contrary1 as is proved in ,metaph4 x1 #d4 ,but sadness is contrary to pleasure4 ,therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if one pleasure is contrary to another1 this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure4 ,but this difference is material3 whereas contrariety is a difference of form1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 #d4 ,therefore there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another4 ,on the contrary1 ,things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries1 as the ,philosopher states 7,phys4 viii1 #h74 ,but some pleasures impede one another1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #e4 ,therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another4 ,i answer that1 ,pleasure1 in the emotions of the soul1 is likened to repose in natural bodies1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini2 thus1 repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place 7,phys4 v1 #f74 ,wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying of the ,philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices3 because one vice may be contrary to another vice1 whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue4 ,but in other things nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another1 such as hot and cold1 of which the former is good in relation to fire1 the latter1 in relation to water4 ,and in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another4 ,that this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue1 is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one thing--i4e4 the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,pleasure1 in the emotions of the soul1 is likened to natural repose in bodies3 because its object is something suitable and connatural1 so to speak4 ,but sadness is like a violent repose2 because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite1 just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite4 ,now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body1 and to the natural repose of another1 as stated in ,phys4 v1 #f4 ,wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the things in which we take pleasure1 since they are the objects of pleasure1 cause not only a material1 but also a formal difference1 if the formality of pleasurableness be different4 ,because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d2 ,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b74 ,,question #cb ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,pleasure 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider the causes of pleasure3 and under this head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure8 7#b7 ,whether movement is a cause of pleasure8 7#c7 ,whether hope and memory cause pleasure8 7#d7 ,whether sadness causes pleasure8 7#e7 ,whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us8 7#f7 ,whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure8 7#g7 ,whether likeness is a cause of pleasure8 7#h7 ,whether wonder is a cause of pleasure8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,operation ,is the ,proper ,cause of ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa71 pleasure consists in a perception of the senses1 since knowledge is requisite for pleasure1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,but the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves4 ,therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 pleasure consists especially in an end gained3 since it is this that is chiefly desired4 ,but the end is not always an operation1 but is sometimes the effect of the operation4 ,therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 leisure and rest consist in cessation from work3 and they are objects of pleasure 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ab1 #ac2 x1 #d7 that pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a71 two things are requisite for pleasure3 namely1 the attainment of the suitable good1 and knowledge of this attainment4 ,now each of these consists in a kind of operation3 because actual knowledge is an operation2 and the attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation4 ,moreover1 the proper operation itself is a suitable good4 ,wherefore every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us2 either by knowledge alone1 as when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things2 or in some other way in addition to knowledge2 as when a man takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches1 honor1 or the like2 which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as possessed4 ,for as the ,philosopher observes 7,polit4 ii1 #b7 we take great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own1 by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves4 ,now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them3 and this is through some operation4 ,wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even when it is not an operation1 but the effect of an operation1 that is the end1 this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed or effected3 and this implies use or operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,operations are pleasant1 in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent4 ,now1 since human power is finite1 operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure4 ,wherefore if it exceed that measure1 it will be no longer proportionate or pleasant1 but1 on the contrary1 painful and irksome4 ,and in this sense1 leisure and play and other things pertaining to repose1 are pleasant1 inasmuch as they banish sadness which results from labor4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,movement ,is a ,cause of ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure4 ,because1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a71 the good which is obtained and is actually possessed1 is the cause of pleasure3 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ab7 that pleasure is not compared with generation1 but with the operation of a thing already in existence4 ,now that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet2 but1 so to speak1 is being generated in its regard1 forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement1 as stated in ,phys4 viii1 #c4 ,therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works4 ,but operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable4 ,therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 movement implies a certain innovation1 which is the opposite of custom4 ,but things which we are accustomed to1 are pleasant1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 viii1 #c73 ,what means this1 ,o ,lord my ,god1 whereas ,thou art everlasting joy to ,thyself1 and some things around ,thee evermore rejoice in ,thee8 ,what means this1 that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and reconciled8 ,from these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations3 and therefore movement seems to cause pleasure4 ,i answer that1 ,three things are requisite for pleasure2 two1 i4e4 the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him2 and a third1 which is knowledge of this conjunction3 and in respect of these three1 movement is pleasant1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ad and ,rhetor4 i1 #aa74 ,for as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned1 change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable3 for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another2 thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer4 ,again1 on the part of the pleasing good which is united to us1 change is pleasant4 ,because the continued action of an agent increases its effect3 thus the longer a person remains near the fire1 the more he is warmed and dried4 ,now the natural mode of being consists in a certain measure2 and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode of being1 the removal of that object becomes pleasant4 ,on the part of the knowledge itself 7change becomes pleasant71 because man desires to know something whole and perfect3 when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole1 change in such a thing is pleasant1 so that one part may pass and another succeed1 and thus the whole be perceived4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv1 #aa73 ,thou wouldst not have the syllables stay1 but fly away1 that others may come1 and thou hear the whole4 ,and so whenever any one thing is made up of many1 all of which do not exist together1 all would please collectively more than they do severally1 if all could be perceived collectively4 ,if therefore there be any thing1 whose nature is unchangeable2 the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of any pleasing object2 and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once--to such a one change will afford no delight4 ,and the more any pleasures approach to this1 the more are they capable of being continual4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved1 nevertheless it is beginning to have something thereof3 and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure4 ,but it falls short of the perfection of pleasure2 because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable4 ,moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure1 in so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable1 becomes suitable or ceases to be1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,movement causes toil and fatigue1 when it exceeds our natural aptitude4 ,it is not thus that it causes pleasure1 but by removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,what is customary becomes pleasant1 in so far as it becomes natural3 because custom is like a second nature4 ,but the movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom1 but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of being1 that might result from continued operation4 ,and thus from the same cause of connaturalness1 both custom and movement become pleasant4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,hope and ,memory ,cause ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure4 ,because pleasure is caused by present good1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab74 ,but hope and memory regard what is absent3 since memory is of the past1 and hope of the future4 ,therefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the same thing is not the cause of contraries4 ,but hope causes affliction1 according to ,prov4 #ac3ab3 ,hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul4 ,therefore hope does not cause pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good1 so also do desire and love4 ,therefore hope should not be assigned as a cause of pleasure1 any more than desire or love4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #ab3ab73 ,rejoicing in hope2 and 7,ps4 #gf3d73 ,i remembered ,god1 and was delighted4 ,i answer that1 ,pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good1 in so far as it is felt1 or perceived in any way4 ,now a thing is present to us in two ways4 ,first1 in knowledge--i4e4 according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness2 secondly1 in reality--i4e4 according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another1 either actually or potentially4 ,and since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness1 which is the conjunction of knowledge2 and again1 since actual is greater than potential conjunction3 therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object4 ,the second place belongs to the pleasure of hope1 wherein there is pleasurable conjunction1 not only in respect of apprehension1 but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object4 ,the third place belongs to the pleasure of memory1 which has only the conjunction of apprehension4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,hope and memory are indeed of things which1 absolutely speaking1 are absent3 and yet those are1 after a fashion1 present1 i4e4 either according to apprehension only2 or according to apprehension and possibility1 at least supposed1 of attainment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing prevents the same thing1 in different ways1 being the cause of contraries4 ,and so hope1 inasmuch as it implies a present appraising of a future good1 causes pleasure2 whereas1 inasmuch as it implies absence of that good1 it causes affliction4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,love and concupiscence also cause pleasure4 ,for everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover1 since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved4 ,in like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires1 since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure4 ,however hope1 as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good1 that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence1 is reckoned in preference to them as causing pleasure2 and also in preference to memory1 which is of that which has already passed away4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #d ,whether sadness causes pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure4 ,for nothing causes its own contrary4 ,but sadness is contrary to pleasure4 ,therefore it does not cause it4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 contraries have contrary effects4 ,but pleasures1 when called to mind1 cause pleasure4 ,therefore sad things1 when remembered1 cause sorrow and not pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as sadness is to pleasure1 so is hatred to love4 ,but hatred does not cause love1 but rather the other way about1 as stated above 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore sadness does not cause pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #da3d73 ,my tears have been my bread day and night3 where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure4 ,therefore tears1 which arise from sadness1 can give pleasure4 ,i answer that1 ,sadness may be considered in two ways3 as existing actually1 and as existing in the memory3 and in both ways sadness can cause pleasure4 ,because sadness1 as actually existing1 causes pleasure1 inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved1 the absence of which causes sadness2 and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure4 ,the recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure1 on account of the deliverance which ensued3 because absence of evil is looked upon as something good2 wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain1 so much reason has he to rejoice4 ,hence ,augustine says in ,de ,civ4 ,dei xxii1 #ca 99,gregory1 ,moral4 iv4 that oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad things 4 4 4 and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain 4 4 4 and in proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness3 and again 7,confess4 viii1 #c7 he says that the more peril there was in the battle1 so much the more joy will there be in the triumph4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary3 thus that which is cold sometimes causes heat1 as stated in ,phys4 viii1 #a4 ,in like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure1 in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of something pleasant4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sad things1 called to mind1 cause pleasure1 not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things2 but in so far as man is delivered from them4 ,in like manner the recollection of pleasant things1 by reason of these being lost1 may cause sadness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hatred also can be the accidental cause of love3 i4e4 so far as some love one another1 inasmuch as they agree in hating one and the same thing4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,actions of ,others ,are a ,cause of ,pleasure to ,us8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us4 ,because the cause of pleasure is our own good when conjoined to us4 ,but the actions of others are not conjoined to us4 ,therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the action is the agent's own good4 ,if1 therefore1 the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us1 for the same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us3 which is evidently untrue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit2 hence it is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #c that we must reckon the pleasure which follows after action1 as being the sign of a habit existing in us4 ,but the actions of others do not proceed from habits existing in us1 but1 sometimes1 from habits existing in the agents4 ,therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us1 but to the agents themselves4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written in the second canonical epistle of ,john 7verse #d73 ,i was exceeding glad that ,i found thy children walking in truth4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a71 two things are requisite for pleasure1 namely1 the attainment of one's proper good1 and the knowledge of having obtained it4 ,wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways4 ,first1 from the fact that we obtain some good through the action of another4 ,and in this way1 the actions of those who do some good to us1 are pleasing to us3 since it is pleasant to be benefited by another4 ,secondly1 from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good3 and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by others1 because1 to wit1 they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves4 ,and since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men1 hence men take greater pleasure in being praised and honored by them4 ,and because a flatterer appears to praise1 therefore flattery is pleasing to some4 ,and as love is for something good1 while admiration is for something great1 so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others1 inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness1 through their giving pleasure to others4 ,thirdly1 from the fact that another's actions1 if they be good1 are reckoned as one's own good1 by reason of the power of love1 which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself4 ,and on account of hatred1 which makes one to reckon another's good as being in opposition to oneself1 the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure3 whence it is written 7#a ,cor4 #ac3f7 that charity rejoiceth not in iniquity1 but rejoiceth with the truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,another's action may be conjoined to me1 either by its effect1 as in the first way1 or by knowledge1 as in the second way2 or by affection1 as in the third way4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument avails for the third mode1 but not for the first two4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me1 yet they either produce in me something that gives pleasure2 or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind2 or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,doing ,good to ,another ,is a ,cause of ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure4 ,because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper good1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #e2 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,but doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good4 ,therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #a7 that illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality4 ,now it is a mark of prodigality to do good to others2 while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good4 ,since therefore everyone takes pleasure in a connatural operation1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ad and x1 #d1 it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 contrary effects proceed from contrary causes4 ,but man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing1 such as overcoming1 contradicting or scolding others1 or1 if he be angry1 in punishing them1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 ii1 #b7 that it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers4 ,i answer that1 ,doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways4 ,first1 in consideration of the effect1 which is the good conferred on another4 ,in this respect1 inasmuch as through being united to others by love1 we look upon their good as being our own1 we take pleasure in the good we do to others1 especially to our friends1 as in our own good4 ,secondly1 in consideration of the end2 as when a man1 from doing good to another1 hopes to get some good for himself1 either from ,god or from man3 for hope is a cause of pleasure4 ,thirdly1 in consideration of the principle3 and thus1 doing good to another1 can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle4 ,one is the faculty of doing good3 and in this regard1 doing good to another becomes pleasant1 in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him1 whereof he is able to give others a share4 ,wherefore men take pleasure in their children1 and in their own works1 as being things on which they bestow a share of their own good4 ,another principle is man's habitual inclination to do good1 by reason of which doing good becomes connatural to him3 for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others4 ,the third principle is the motive3 for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves1 to do good to someone3 for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant1 because love is the principal cause of pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good4 ,but in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of sadness2 for instance when it is excessive4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prodigality is an excessive spending1 which is unnatural3 wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to overcome1 to contradict1 and to punish1 give pleasure1 not as tending to another's ill1 but as pertaining to one's own good1 which man loves more than he hates another's ill4 ,for it is naturally pleasant to overcome1 inasmuch as it makes a man to appreciate his own superiority4 ,wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery1 and a possibility of winning it1 afford the greatest pleasure3 and speaking generally all contests1 in so far as they admit hope of victory4 ,to contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways4 ,first1 as making man imagine himself to be wise and excellent2 since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold4 ,secondly1 in so far as by scolding and reproving1 one does good to another3 for this gives one pleasure1 as stated above4 ,it is pleasant to an angry man to punish1 in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight1 which seems to be due to a previous hurt3 for when a man is hurt by another1 he seems to be slighted thereby2 and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying back the hurt4 ,and thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant3 whereas doing evil to another is not pleasant1 except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,likeness ,is a ,cause of ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure4 ,because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness4 ,but it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding1 as stated in ,rhetor4 i1 #aa4 ,therefore unlikeness1 rather than likeness1 is a cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow4 ,but those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ad74 ,therefore unlikeness1 rather than likeness1 is a cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those who are satiated with certain delights1 derive not pleasure but disgust from them2 as when one is satiated with food4 ,therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,likeness is a cause of love1 as above stated 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c73 and love is the cause of pleasure4 ,therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure4 ,i answer that1 ,likeness is a kind of unity2 hence that which is like us1 as being one with us1 causes pleasure2 just at it causes love1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c74 ,and if that which is like us does not hurt our own good1 but increase it1 it is pleasurable simply2 for instance one man in respect of another1 one youth in relation to another4 ,but if it be hurtful to our own good1 thus accidentally it causes disgust or sadness1 not as being like and one with us1 but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us4 ,now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good4 ,first1 by destroying the measure of our own good1 by a kind of excess2 because good1 especially bodily good1 as health1 is conditioned by a certain measure3 wherefore superfluous good or any bodily pleasure1 causes disgust4 ,secondly1 by being directly contrary to one's own good3 thus a potter dislikes other potters1 not because they are potters1 but because they deprive him of his own excellence or profits1 which he seeks as his own good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since ruler and subject are in communion with one another1 there is a certain likeness between them3 but this likeness is conditioned by a certain superiority1 since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good3 because they belong to men who are wise and better than others2 the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence4 ,another reason is that by ruling and presiding1 a man does good to others1 which is pleasant4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man1 though it be unlike sorrow1 bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful3 because sorrows are contrary to his own good4 ,wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good1 in so far as it is a remedy for its contrary4 ,and this is why bodily pleasures1 which are contrary to certain sorrows1 are more sought than intellectual pleasures1 which have no contrary sorrow1 as we shall state later on 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #e74 ,and this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure3 because animals ever work through sense and movement4 ,for this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures2 on account of the many changes to which they are subject1 while yet growing4 ,moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures1 in order to drive away sorrow3 because his body is corroded by a base humor1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ad4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure3 wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good1 and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow1 through being contrary to the proper good of man4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,wonder ,is a ,cause of ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure4 ,because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something1 as ,damascene says4 ,but knowledge1 rather than ignorance1 is a cause of pleasure4 ,therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 wonder is the beginning of wisdom1 being as it were1 the road to the search of truth1 as stated in the beginning of ,metaph4 i1 #b4 ,but it is more pleasant to think of what we know1 than to seek what we know not1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #g73 since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances1 in the former not2 while pleasure arises from an operation which is unhindered1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ab1 #ac4 ,therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to3 wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom1 are pleasant4 ,but we wonder at what is unwonted1 as ,augustine says 7,tract4 xxiv in ,joan474 ,therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa7 that wonder is the cause of pleasure4 ,i answer that1 ,it is pleasant to get what one desires1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d73 and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved1 the greater the pleasure when it is attained3 indeed the very increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure1 according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved1 since it was stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #c7 that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure4 ,now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge2 a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him1 or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding4 ,consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure1 in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have4 ,for this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing1 for instance things that are scarce4 ,also1 representations of things1 even of those which are not pleasant in themselves1 give rise to pleasure2 for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another1 because comparison of one thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason1 as the ,philosopher says 7,poet4 iv74 ,this again is why it is more delightful to be delivered from great danger1 because it is something wonderful1 as stated in ,rhetor4 i1 #aa4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,wonder gives pleasure1 not because it implies ignorance1 but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause1 and in so far as the wonderer learns something new1 i4e4 that the cause is other than he had thought it to be4 99,according to another reading3--that he is other than he thought himself to be4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,pleasure includes two things2 rest in the good1 and perception of this rest4 ,as to the former therefore1 since it is more perfect to contemplate the known truth1 than to seek for the unknown1 the contemplation of what we know1 is in itself more pleasing than the research of what we do not know4 ,nevertheless1 as to the second1 it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally1 in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire3 for greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance4 ,this is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the first time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is pleasant to do what we are wont to do1 inasmuch as this is connatural to us1 as it were4 ,and yet things that are of rare occurrence can be pleasant1 either as regards knowledge1 from the fact that we desire to know something about them1 in so far as they are wonderful2 or as regards action1 from the fact that the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #d1 since more perfect operation causes more perfect pleasure4 ,,question #cc ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,pleasure 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the effects of pleasure2 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether expansion is an effect of pleasure8 7#b7 ,whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself8 7#c7 ,whether pleasure hinders the use of reason8 7#d7 ,whether pleasure perfects operation8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,expansion ,is an ,effect of ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure4 ,for expansion seems to pertain more to love1 according to the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #f3aa73 ,our heart is enlarged4 ,wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #aah3if7 concerning the precept of charity3 ,thy commandment is exceeding broad4 ,but pleasure is a distinct passion from love4 ,therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more4 ,but receiving pertains to desire1 which is for something not yet possessed4 ,therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 contraction is contrary to expansion4 ,but contraction seems to belong to pleasure1 for the hand closes on that which we wish to grasp firmly3 and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it4 ,therefore expansion does not pertain to pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,in order to express joy1 it is written 7,isa4 #fj3e73 ,thou shall see and abound1 thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged4 ,moreover pleasure is called by the name of laetitia as being derived from dilatatio 7expansion71 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,i answer that1 ,breadth 7latitudo7is a dimension of bodily magnitude3 hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul1 save metaphorically4 ,now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth2 and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite for pleasure4 ,one of these is on the part of the apprehensive power1 which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good4 ,as a result of this apprehension1 man perceives that he has attained a certain perfection1 which is a magnitude of the spiritual order3 and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure4 ,the other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power1 which acquiesces in the pleasurable object1 and rests therein1 offering1 as it were1 to enfold it within itself4 ,and thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure1 as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to different likenesses4 ,and in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out1 in so far as the affection of the lover spreads out to others1 so as to care1 not only for his own interests1 but also for what concerns others4 ,on the other hand expansion pertains to pleasure1 in so far as a thing becomes more ample in itself so as to become more capacious4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired2 but this expansion increases at the presence of the pleasurable object3 because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it1 than when it desires it before possessing it2 since pleasure is the end of desire4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast1 by clinging to it with all his might3 but he opens his heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,pleasure ,causes ,thirst or ,desire for ,itself8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself4 ,because all movement ceases when repose is reached4 ,but pleasure is1 as it were1 a certain repose of the movement of desire1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached4 ,therefore pleasure does not cause desire4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing does not cause its contrary4 ,but pleasure is1 in a way1 contrary to desire1 on the part of the object3 since desire regards a good which is not yet possessed1 whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed4 ,therefore pleasure does not cause desire for itself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 distaste is incompatible with desire4 ,but pleasure often causes distaste4 ,therefore it does not cause desire4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,john #d3ac73 ,whosoever drinketh of this water1 shall thirst again3 where1 according to ,augustine 7,tract4 xv in ,joan471 water denotes pleasures of the body4 ,i answer that1 ,pleasure can be considered in two ways2 first1 as existing in reality2 secondly1 as existing in the memory4 ,again thirst1 or desire1 can be taken in two ways2 first1 properly1 as denoting a craving for something not possessed2 secondly1 in general1 as excluding distaste4 ,considered as existing in reality1 pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself1 but only accidentally2 provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed3 because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something actually present4 ,but it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed3 and this may be on the part of the thing possessed1 or on the part of the possessor4 ,on the part of the thing possessed1 this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole2 wherefore one obtains possession of it successively1 and while taking pleasure in what one has1 one desires to possess the remainder3 thus if a man is pleased with the first part of a verse1 he desires to hear the second part1 as ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv1 #aa74 ,in this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves1 until they are fully realized1 because pleasures of this kind arise from some movement3 as is evident in pleasures of the table4 ,on the part of the possessor1 this happens when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself1 yet does not possess it perfectly1 but obtains possession of it little by little4 ,thus in this life1 a faint perception of ,divine knowledge affords us delight1 and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge2 in which sense we may understand the words of ,ecclus4 #bd3bi3 ,they that drink me shall yet thirst4 ,on the other hand1 if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion1 that excludes distaste1 thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves4 ,because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being1 when they are increased or even when they are protracted2 as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table4 ,this is why1 when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily pleasures1 he wearies of them1 and sometimes desires another kind4 ,spiritual pleasures1 on the contrary1 do not exceed the natural mode of being1 but perfect nature4 ,hence when their point of perfection is reached1 then do they afford the greatest delight3 except1 perchance1 accidentally1 in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers1 which tire from protracted activity4 ,and in this sense also we may understand those words of ,ecclus4 #bd3bi3 ,they that drink me shall yet thirst3 for1 even of the angels1 who know ,god perfectly1 and delight in ,him1 it is written 7#a ,pet4 #a3ab7 that they desire to look at ,him4 ,lastly1 if we consider pleasure1 not as existing in reality1 but as existing in the memory1 thus it has of itself a natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself3 when1 to wit1 man returns to that disposition1 in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is past4 ,but if he be changed from that disposition1 the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure1 but distaste3 for instance1 the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when pleasure is perfect1 then it includes complete rest2 and the movement of desire1 tending to what was not possessed1 ceases4 ,but when it is imperfect1 then the desire1 tending to what was not possessed1 does not cease altogether4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which is possessed imperfectly1 is possessed in one respect1 and in another respect is not possessed4 ,consequently it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pleasures cause distaste in one way1 desire in another1 as stated above4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,pleasure ,hinders the ,use of ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason4 ,because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason3 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vii1 #c7 that while we sit and rest1 the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence2 and it is written 7,wis4 #h3af73 ,when ,i go into my house1 ,i shall repose myself with her1 i4e4 wisdom4 ,but pleasure is a kind of repose4 ,therefore it helps rather than hinders the use of reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries1 do not hinder one another4 ,but pleasure is in the appetitive faculty1 while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power4 ,therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is hindered by another1 seems to be moved1 as it were1 thereby4 ,but the use of an apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than is moved by it3 because it is the cause of pleasure4 ,therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e71 that pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence4 ,i answer that1 ,as is stated in ,ethic4 x1 #e1 appropriate pleasures increase activity 4 4 4 whereas pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to activity4 ,accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason1 as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning3 and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason1 but helps it2 because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure1 and attention fosters activity4 ,on the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways4 ,first1 by distracting the reason4 ,because1 as we have just observed1 we attend much to that which pleases us4 ,now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing1 it is either weakened in respect of other things1 or it is entirely withdrawn from them2 and thus if the bodily pleasure be great1 either it entirely hinders the use of reason1 by concentrating the mind's attention on itself2 or else it hinders it considerably4 ,secondly1 by being contrary to reason4 ,because some pleasures1 especially those that are in excess1 are contrary to the order of reason3 and in this sense the ,philosopher says that bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence1 but not the speculative estimate1 to which they are not opposed1 for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles4 ,in the first sense1 however1 they hinder both estimates4 ,thirdly1 by fettering the reason3 in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body1 greater even than in the other passions1 in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing4 ,now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason2 as may be seen in the case of drunkards1 in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure2 which repose is sometimes contrary to reason2 but on the part of the body it always implies alteration4 ,and in respect of both points1 it hinders the use of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts1 but belonging to the one soul4 ,consequently when the soul is very intent on the action of one part1 it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers1 which are exercised through a bodily organ4 ,consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason1 because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,pleasure ,perfects ,operation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation4 ,for every human operation depends on the use of reason4 ,but pleasure hinders the use of reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore pleasure does not perfect1 but weakens human operation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing perfects itself or its cause4 ,but pleasure is an operation 7,ethic4 vii1 #ab2 x1 #d71 i4e4 either in its essence or in its cause4 ,therefore pleasure does not perfect operation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if pleasure perfects operation1 it does so either as end1 or as form1 or as agent4 ,but not as end2 because operation is not sought for the sake of pleasure1 but rather the reverse1 as stated above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b73 nor as agent1 because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure3 nor again as form1 because1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 x1 #d71 pleasure does not perfect operation1 as a habit does4 ,therefore pleasure does not perfect operation4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 that pleasure perfects operation4 ,i answer that1 ,pleasure perfects operation in two ways4 ,first1 as an end3 not indeed according as an end is that on account of which a thing is2 but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it1 can be called its end4 ,and in this sense the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 that pleasure perfects operation 4 4 4 as some end added to it3 that is to say1 inasmuch as to this good1 which is operation1 there is added another good1 which is pleasure1 denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed4 ,secondly1 as agent2 not indeed directly1 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 that pleasure perfects operation1 not as a physician makes a man healthy1 but as health does3 but it does so indirectly2 inasmuch as the agent1 through taking pleasure in his action1 is more eagerly intent on it1 and carries it out with greater care4 ,and in this sense it is said in ,ethic4 x1 #e that pleasures increase their appropriate activities1 and hinder those that are not appropriate4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason1 but only bodily pleasure2 for this arises1 not from the act of reason1 but from the act of the concupiscible faculty1 which act is intensified by pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 pleasure that arises from the act of reason1 strengthens the use of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #c two things may be causes of one another1 if one be the efficient1 the other the final cause4 ,and in this way1 operation is the efficient cause of pleasure1 while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause1 as stated above4 ,the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is evident for what has been said4 ,,question #cd ,,of ,,the ,,goodness ,,and ,,malice ,,of ,,pleasures 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether every pleasure is evil8 7#b7 ,if not1 whether every pleasure is good8 7#c7 ,whether any pleasure is the greatest good8 7#d7 ,whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,every ,pleasure ,is ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every pleasure is evil4 ,for that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason1 seems to be evil in itself3 since man's good is to be in accord with reason1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason2 and so much the more1 as the pleasure is greater3 wherefore in sexual pleasures1 which are the greatest of all1 it is impossible to understand anything1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #aa4 ,moreover1 ,jerome says in his commentary on ,matthew 99,origen1 ,hom4 vi in ,num4 that at the time of conjugal intercourse1 the presence of the ,holy ,ghost is not vouchsafed1 even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty4 ,therefore pleasure is evil in itself2 and consequently every pleasure is evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which the virtuous man shuns1 and the man lacking in virtue seeks1 seems to be evil in itself1 and should be avoided2 because1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #e the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions2 and the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #b3ae73 ,the spiritual man judgeth all things4 ,but children and dumb animals1 in whom there is no virtue1 seek pleasure3 whereas the man who is master of himself does not4 ,therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,but no art is ordained to pleasure4 ,therefore pleasure is not something good4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #cf3d73 ,delight in the ,lord4 ,since1 therefore1 ,divine authority leads to no evil1 it seems that not every pleasure is evil4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #b1 #c1 some have maintained that all pleasure is evil4 ,the reason seems to have been that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest2 since1 also in other respects1 the ancient philosophers did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible1 nor between intellect and sense 7,de ,anima iii1 #c74 ,and they held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad1 and thus that man1 being prone to immoderate pleasures1 arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure4 ,but they were wrong in holding this opinion4 ,because1 since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure1 if they who teach that all pleasures are evil1 are found in the act of taking pleasure2 men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their words3 since1 in human actions and passions1 wherein experience is of great weight1 example moves more than words4 ,we must therefore say that some pleasures are good1 and that some are evil4 ,for pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good1 and resulting from some operation2 wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion4 ,the first is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure4 ,for good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e73 just as in the order of nature1 a thing is said to be natural1 if it agrees with nature1 and unnatural1 if it disagrees4 ,accordingly1 just as in the natural order there is a certain natural repose1 whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature1 for instance1 when a heavy body rests down below2 and again an unnatural repose1 whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature1 as when a heavy body rests up aloft3 so1 in the moral order1 there is a good pleasure1 whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason2 and an evil pleasure1 whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of ,god4 ,the second reason can be found by considering the actions1 some of which are good1 some evil4 ,now pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions1 than desires1 which precede them in point of time4 ,wherefore1 since the desires of good actions are good1 and of evil actions1 evil2 much more are the pleasures of good actions good1 and those of evil actions evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #c71 it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason1 that hinder the reason or destroy prudence1 but extraneous pleasures1 such as the pleasures of the body4 ,these indeed hinder the use of reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #c71 either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason1 which makes the pleasure morally bad2 or by fettering the reason3 thus in conjugal intercourse1 though the pleasure be in accord with reason1 yet it hinders the use of reason1 on account of the accompanying bodily change4 ,but in this case the pleasure is not morally evil2 as neither is sleep1 whereby the reason is fettered1 morally evil1 if it be taken according to reason3 for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times4 ,we must add1 however1 that although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice1 since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin2 yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice1 namely1 from the sin of our first parent2 because1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ih1 ,a4 #b7 the case was different in the state of innocence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the temperate man does not shun all pleasures1 but those that are immoderate1 and contrary to reason4 ,the fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures1 does not prove that all pleasures are evil3 because they have from ,god their natural appetite1 which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,art is not concerned with all kinds of good1 but with the making of external things1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #c74 ,but actions and passions1 which are within us1 are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art4 ,nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure1 namely1 the art of cookery and the art of making arguments1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ab4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,every ,pleasure ,is ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every pleasure is good4 ,because as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #f7 there are three kinds of good3 the virtuous1 the useful1 and the pleasant4 ,but everything virtuous is good2 and in like manner everything useful is good4 ,therefore also every pleasure is good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is not sought for the sake of something else1 is good in itself1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #f1 #g4 ,but pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else2 for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased4 ,therefore pleasure is good in itself4 ,now that which is predicated of a thing considered in itself1 is predicated thereof universally4 ,therefore every pleasure is good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is desired by all1 seems to be good of itself3 because good is what all things seek1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #a4 ,but everyone seeks some kind of pleasure1 even children and dumb animals4 ,therefore pleasure is good in itself3 and consequently all pleasure is good4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #b3ad73 ,who are glad when they have done evil1 and rejoice in most wicked things4 ,i answer that1 ,while some of the ,stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil1 the ,epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself1 and that consequently all pleasures are good4 ,they seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply1 and that which is good in respect of a particular individual4 ,that which is good simply1 is good in itself4 ,now that which is not good in itself1 may be good in respect of some individual in two ways4 ,in one way1 because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now1 which disposition1 however1 is not natural3 thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous1 which are not suitable simply to the human temperament4 ,in another way1 through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable4 ,and since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good1 if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply1 the pleasure will be pleasure simply1 and good simply4 ,but if a man's appetite repose in that which is good1 not simply1 but in respect of that particular man1 then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply1 but a pleasure to him2 neither will it be good simply1 but in a certain respect1 or an apparent good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason1 and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful1 without being good4 ,but the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite1 which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason4 ,consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end4 ,now the end may be either good or evil2 although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man3 and so too with regard to pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good3 since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good4 ,but1 just as it happens that not every good which is desired1 is of itself and verily good2 so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,pleasure ,is the ,greatest ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good4 ,because nothing generated is the greatest good3 since generation cannot be the last end4 ,but pleasure is a consequence of generation3 for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its own nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore no pleasure is the greatest good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition4 ,but pleasure is made better by addition2 since pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue4 ,therefore pleasure is not the greatest good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is the greatest good is universally good1 as being good of itself3 since that which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally4 ,but pleasure is not universally good1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore pleasure is not the greatest good4 ,on the contrary1 ,happiness is the greatest good3 since it is the end of man's life4 ,but ,happiness is not without pleasure3 for it is written 7,ps4 #ae3aa73 ,thou shalt fill me with joy with ,thy countenance2 at ,thy right hand are delights even to the end4 ,i answer that1 ,plato held neither with the ,stoics1 who asserted that all pleasures are evil1 nor with the ,epicureans1 who maintained that all pleasures are good2 but he said that some are good1 and some evil2 yet1 so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good4 ,but1 judging from his arguments1 he fails in two points4 ,first1 because1 from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain movement and becoming1 as is evident in satiety from eating and the like2 he concluded that all pleasure arises from some becoming and movement3 and from this1 since becoming and movement are the acts of something imperfect1 it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection4 ,but this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures3 because one takes pleasure1 not only in the becoming of knowledge1 for instance1 when one learns or wonders1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #h1 ad #b72 but also in the act of contemplation1 by making use of knowledge already acquired4 ,secondly1 because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply1 i4e4 the good as existing apart from1 and unparticipated by1 all else1 in which sense ,god is the ,supreme ,good2 whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things4 ,now the greatest good of everything is its last end4 ,and the end1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g7 is twofold2 namely1 the thing itself1 and the use of that thing2 thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money4 ,accordingly1 man's last end may be said to be either ,god ,who is the ,supreme ,good simply2 or the enjoyment of ,god1 which implies a certain pleasure in the last end4 ,and in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every pleasure arises from a becoming2 for some pleasures result from perfect operations1 as stated above4 ,accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good1 although every pleasure is not such4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument is true of the greatest good simply1 by participation of which all things are good2 wherefore no addition can make it better3 whereas in regard to other goods1 it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another good4 ,moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue1 but that it accompanies it1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #h4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure1 but to the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good4 ,hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good1 or even good at all4 ,thus a certain science is supremely good1 but not every science is4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,pleasure ,is the ,measure or ,rule by ,which to ,judge of ,moral ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil4 ,because that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest 7,metaph4 x1 #a74 ,but pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus1 for it is preceded by love and desire4 ,therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a measure or rule should be uniform2 hence that movement which is the most uniform1 is the measure and rule of all movements 7,metaph4 x1 #a74 ,but pleasures are various and multiform3 since some of them are good1 and some evil4 ,therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect4 ,now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure3 because those pleasures are good which result from good operations1 and those are evil which arise from evil operations1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #e4 ,therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine1 commenting on ,ps4 #g3aj ,the searcher of hearts and reins is ,god1 says3 ,the end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving4 ,and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #aa7 that pleasure is the architect1 i4e4 the principal1 end 99,st4 ,thomas took finis as being the nominative1 whereas it is the genitive--tou telous2 and the ,greek reads ,he 7i4e4 the political philosopher71 is the architect of the end41 in regard to which1 we say absolutely that this is evil1 and that1 good4 ,i answer that1 ,moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #a72 and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil4 ,now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes3 and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure4 ,and therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will2 since that man is good and virtuous1 who takes pleasure in the works of virtue2 and that man evil1 who takes pleasure in evil works4 ,on the other hand1 pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice2 since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men4 ,but the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason1 to which the will of the evil man gives no heed4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation4 ,but pleasure precedes them in the order of the end1 which serves a principle in actions2 and it is by the principle1 which is the rule and measure of such matters1 that we form our judgment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good3 and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure4 ,because that man is good1 whose will rests in the true good3 and that man evil1 whose will rests in evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since pleasure perfects operation as its end1 as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #d72 an operation cannot be perfectly good1 unless there be also pleasure in good3 because the goodness of a thing depends on its end4 ,and thus1 in a way1 the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation4 ,,question #ce ,,of ,,pain ,,or ,,sorrow1 ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we have now to consider pain and sorrow3 concerning which we must consider3 7#a7 ,sorrow or pain in itself2 7#b7 ,its cause2 7#c7 ,its effects2 7#d7 ,its remedies2 7#e7 ,its goodness or malice4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether pain is a passion of the soul8 7#b7 ,whether sorrow is the same as pain8 7#c7 ,whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure8 7#d7 ,whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure8 7#e7 ,whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation8 7#f7 ,whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought8 7#g7 ,whether exterior pain is greater than interior8 7#h7 ,of the species of sorrow4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,pain ,is a ,passion of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul4 ,because no passion of the soul is in the body4 ,but pain can be in the body1 since ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xii71 that bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul1 by making evil use of it1 made subject to corruption4 ,therefore pain is not a passion of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty4 ,but pain does not belong to the appetitive1 but rather to the apprehensive part3 for ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni xx7 that bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body4 ,therefore pain is not a passion of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite4 ,but pain does not belong to the animal appetite1 but rather to the natural appetite2 for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #ad73 ,had not some good remained in nature1 we should feel no pain in being punished by the loss of good4 ,therefore pain is not a passion of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #h7 reckons pain among the passions of the soul2 quoting ,virgil 7,aeneid1 vi1 #gcc73 hence wild desires and grovelling fears ,and human laughter1 human tears4 ,translation3 ,conington4 ,i answer that1 ,just as two things are requisite for pleasure2 namely1 conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction2 so also two things are requisite for pain3 namely1 conjunction with some evil 7which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good71 and perception of this conjunction4 ,now whatever is conjoined1 if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined1 cannot cause pleasure or pain4 ,whence it is evident that something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain4 ,but good and evil1 as such1 are objects of the appetite4 ,consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite4 ,now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension1 belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite3 since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite1 but to the apprehension of another1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ajc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject1 it is evident that pain1 like pleasure1 is in the intellective or sensitive appetite4 ,again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c73 and especially those which tend to some defect4 ,consequently pain1 according as it is in the sensitive appetite1 is most properly called a passion of the soul3 just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body4 ,hence ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #h 99,quoting ,cicero7 reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we speak of the body1 because the cause of pain is in the body3 as when we suffer something hurtful to the body4 ,but the movement of pain is always in the soul2 since the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it1 as ,augustine says 7,super ,psalm4 #hg3d74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we speak of pain of the senses1 not as though it were an act of the sensitive power2 but because the senses are required for bodily pain1 in the same way as for bodily pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature1 not because pain is an act of the natural appetite1 but because nature desires something as good1 the removal of which being perceived1 there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,sorrow ,is the ,same ,as ,pain8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is not pain4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g7 that pain is used to express bodily suffering4 ,but sorrow is used more in reference to the soul4 ,therefore sorrow is not pain4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 pain is only in respect of present evil4 ,but sorrow can refer to both past and future evil3 thus repentance is sorrow for the past1 and anxiety for the future4 ,therefore sorrow is quite different from pain4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch4 ,but sorrow can arise from all the senses4 ,therefore sorrow is not pain1 and extends to more objects4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #i3b73 ,i have great sorrow ,douay3 'sadness' and continual pain ,douay3 'sorrow' in my heart1 thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain4 ,i answer that1 ,pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension1 namely1 from the apprehension of an exterior sense2 and from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination4 ,now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension3 because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension1 come under the interior1 but not conversely4 ,consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is called joy1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #c73 and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension1 is called sorrow4 ,and just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension1 is called pleasure but not joy2 so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension1 is called pain indeed but not sorrow4 ,accordingly sorrow is a species of pain1 as joy is a species of pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking there of the use of the word3 because pain is more generally used in reference to bodily pains1 which are better known1 than in reference to spiritual pains4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,external sense perceives only what is present2 but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present1 past and future4 ,consequently sorrow can regard present1 past and future3 whereas bodily pain1 which follows apprehension of the external sense1 can only regard something present4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sensibles of touch are painful1 not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power1 but also in so far as they are contrary to nature3 whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power1 but they are not contrary to nature1 save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch4 ,consequently man alone1 who is a perfectly cognizant animal1 takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake2 whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #aj4 ,accordingly1 in referring to the objects of the other senses1 we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure3 but rather of sorrow1 which is contrary to joy4 ,so then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain1 which is its more usual meaning1 then it is contrasted with sorrow1 according to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension2 although1 on the part of the objects1 pleasure extends further than does bodily pain4 ,but if pain be taken in a wide sense1 then it is the genus of sorrow1 as stated above4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sorrow or ,pain ,is ,contrary to ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure4 ,for one of two contraries is not the cause of the other4 ,but sorrow can be the cause of pleasure2 for it is written 7,matt4 #e3e73 ,blessed are they that mourn1 for they shall be comforted4 ,therefore they are not contrary to one another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one contrary does not denominate the other4 ,but to some1 pain or sorrow gives pleasure3 thus ,augustine says 7,confess4 iii1 #b7 that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure3 and 7,confess4 iv1 #e7 that weeping is a bitter thing1 and yet it sometimes pleases us4 ,therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one contrary is not the matter of the other2 because contraries cannot co-exist together4 ,but sorrow can be the matter of pleasure2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,poenit4 xiii73 ,the penitent should ever sorrow1 and rejoice in his sorrow4 ,the ,philosopher too says 7,ethic4 ix1 #d7 that1 on the other hand1 the evil man feels pain at having been pleased4 ,therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #f7 that joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish3 and that sorrow is the volition of dissent from the things we do not wish4 ,but consent and dissent are contraries4 ,therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one another4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 x1 #d71 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form4 ,now the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from the object or term4 ,consequently1 since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain1 viz4 present good and present evil1 are contrary to one another1 it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally3 and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure4 ,in one way1 in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something1 or at the presence of its contrary1 one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant3 thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink1 as a remedy for the pain he suffers4 ,in another way1 in so far as1 from a strong desire for a certain pleasure1 one does not shrink from undergoing pain1 so as to obtain that pleasure4 ,in each of these ways1 the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the future life4 ,because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins1 or for the delay of glory1 he merits the consolation of eternity4 ,in like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder1 as in stage-plays2 or in so far as it recalls a beloved object to one's memory1 and makes one feel one's love for the thing1 whose absence gives us pain4 ,consequently1 since love is pleasant1 both pain and whatever else results from love1 forasmuch as they remind us of our love1 are pleasant4 ,and1 for this reason1 we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage3 in so far as1 in witnessing them1 we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will and the reason reflect on their own acts1 inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the aspect of good or evil4 ,in this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure1 or vice versa1 not essentially but accidentally3 that is1 in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all ,sorrow ,is ,contrary to ,all ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure4 ,because1 just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color1 so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions4 ,but whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another4 ,therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 remedies are made of things contrary 7to the evil74 ,but every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 vii1 #ad74 ,therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 contraries are hindrances to one another4 ,but every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure3 as is evident from ,ethic4 x1 #e4 ,therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,the same thing is not the cause of contraries4 ,but joy for one thing1 and sorrow for the opposite thing1 proceed from the same habit3 thus from charity it happens that we rejoice with them that rejoice1 and weep with them that weep 7,rom4 #ab3ae74 ,therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 x1 #d71 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form4 ,now a form may be generic or specific4 ,consequently things may be contraries in respect of a generic form1 as virtue and vice2 or in respect of a specific form1 as justice and injustice4 ,now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms1 e4g4 substances and qualities2 whereas other things are specified in relation to something extrinsic1 e4g4 passions and movements1 which derive their species from their terms or objects4 ,accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms1 it happens that species contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific nature3 but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or fittingness to one another4 ,for intemperance and justice1 which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice1 are not contrary to one another in respect of their specific nature2 and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another4 ,on the other hand1 in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic1 it happens that species belonging to contrary genera1 are not only not contrary to one another1 but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness4 ,the reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries1 there is contrariety2 e4g4 to approach to a white thing1 and to approach to a black thing1 are contraries2 whereas contrary relations to contrary things1 implies a certain likeness1 e4g4 to recede from something white1 and to approach to something black4 ,this is most evident in the case of contradiction1 which is the principle of opposition3 because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing1 e4g4 white and non-white2 while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other1 as1 if ,i were to say black and not white4 ,now sorrow and pleasure1 being passions1 are specified by their objects4 ,according to their respective genera1 they are contrary to one another3 since one is a kind of pursuit1 the other a kind of avoidance1 which are to the appetite1 what affirmation and denial are to the intellect 7,ethic4 vi1 #b74 ,consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object1 are specifically contrary to one another3 whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate1 are not specifically contrary to one another1 but are also disparate2 for instance1 sorrow at the death of a friend1 and pleasure in contemplation4 ,if1 however1 those diverse objects be contrary to one another1 then pleasure and sorrow are not only specifically contrary1 but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity3 for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic1 as pleasure and sorrow do3 wherefore the comparison does not hold4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,genus is taken from matter1 as is stated in ,metaph4 viii1 #b2 and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter4 ,now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another4 ,consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure3 because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses1 and in every sorrow1 as avoiding it4 ,and therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow1 and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure3 but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically4 ,wherefore the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is evident4 ,or we may say that1 although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every pleasure1 yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects3 since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature1 while the other results in a kind of discomfort4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,is ,any ,sorrow ,contrary to the ,pleasure of ,contemplation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #g3aj73 ,the sorrow that is according to ,god1 worketh penance steadfast unto salvation4 ,now to look at ,god belongs to the higher reason1 whose act is to give itself to contemplation1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #c1 #d74 ,therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 contrary things have contrary effects4 ,if therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure1 the other contrary will give sorrow3 and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the object of pleasure is good1 so the object of sorrow is evil4 ,but contemplation can be an evil3 since the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 xii1 #i7 that it is unfitting to think of certain things4 ,therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 any work1 so far as it is unhindered1 can be a cause of pleasure1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ab1 #ac2 x1 #d4 ,but the work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways1 either so as to destroy it altogether1 or as to make it difficult4 ,therefore in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow4 ,but1 as it is written 7,eccles4 #ab3ab7 much study is an affliction of the flesh4 ,therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #h3af73 ,her1 i4e4 wisdom's1 conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness2 but joy and gladness4 ,now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation4 ,therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,i answer that1 ,the pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways4 ,in one way1 so that contemplation is the cause1 but not the object of pleasure3 and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated4 ,now it is possible to contemplate something harmful and sorrowful1 just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant4 ,consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in this way1 nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,in another way1 the pleasure of contemplation is understood1 so that contemplation is its object and cause2 as when one takes pleasure in the very act of contemplating4 ,and thus1 according to ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xviii41 no sorrow is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation3 and the ,philosopher says the same 7,topic4 i1 #ac2 ,ethic4 x1 #c74 ,this1 however1 is to be understood as being the case properly speaking4 ,the reason is because sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object3 thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold4 ,but there is no contrary to the object of contemplation3 because contraries1 as apprehended by the mind1 are not contrary1 but one is the means of knowing the other4 ,wherefore1 properly speaking1 there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation4 ,nor has it any sorrow annexed to it1 as bodily pleasures have1 which are like remedies against certain annoyances2 thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst1 but when the thirst is quite driven out1 the pleasure of drinking ceases also4 ,because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance1 but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself3 for pleasure is not a becoming but a perfect operation1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,accidentally1 however1 sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation2 and this in two ways3 first1 on the part of an organ1 secondly1 through some impediment in the apprehension4 ,on the part of an organ1 sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension1 directly1 as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part1 which have a bodily organ2 either from the sensible object disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ1 as the taste of something bitter1 and the smell of something foul2 or from the sensible object1 though agreeable1 being so continuous in its action on the sense1 that it exceeds the normal condition of the organ1 as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #b71 the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious4 ,but these two things cannot occur directly in the contemplation of the mind2 because the mind has no corporeal organ3 wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above that intellectual contemplation has neither bitterness1 nor tediousness4 ,since1 however1 the human mind1 in contemplation1 makes use of the sensitive powers of apprehension1 to whose acts weariness is incidental2 therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with contemplation4 ,nevertheless1 in neither of these ways1 is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation1 contrary to the pleasure thereof4 ,because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation1 is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation1 but rather is in affinity and in harmony with it1 as is evident from what has been said above 7,a4 #d73 while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness1 does not belong to the same genus1 wherefore it is altogether disparate4 ,accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation2 nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sorrow which is according to ,god1 is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation1 but by something which the mind contemplates3 viz4 by sin1 which the mind considers as contrary to the love of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind3 for things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought2 indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other4 ,hence one and the same science considers contraries4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,contemplation1 in itself1 is never evil1 since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth1 which is the good of the intellect3 it can1 however1 be evil accidentally1 i4e4 in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object2 or on the part of the object contemplated1 to which the appetite is inordinately attached4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation1 is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation1 but is in harmony with it1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly1 as stated above4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,sorrow ,is to ,be ,shunned ,more ,than ,pleasure ,is to ,be ,sought8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #fc73 ,there is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure4 ,now that which all agree in doing1 seems to be natural4 ,therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement3 for hot water freezes quicker and harder1 as the ,philosopher says 7,meteor4 i1 #ab74 ,but the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow2 whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety1 but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object4 ,therefore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason1 the more worthy is he of praise1 and the more virtuous3 since virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,but the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow1 is more virtuous than the temperate man1 who resists the movement of desire for pleasure3 since the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that the brave and the just are chiefly praised4 ,therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure4 ,on the contrary1 ,good is stronger than evil1 as ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which is its object2 whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil4 ,therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of sorrow4 ,i answer that1 ,the desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow4 ,the reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a suitable good2 while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil4 ,now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any repugnance at all3 but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way4 ,wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect3 whereas sorrow is always partial4 ,therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow4 ,another reason is because the good1 which is the object of pleasure1 is sought for its own sake3 whereas the evil1 which is the object of sorrow1 is to be shunned as being a privation of good3 and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else4 ,moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements4 ,for every natural movement is more intense in the end1 when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature1 than at the beginning1 when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature3 as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it1 than in shunning what is unsuitable4 ,therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is1 of itself1 more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow4 ,but it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure3 and this for three reasons4 ,first1 on the part of the apprehension4 ,because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #ab71 love is felt more keenly1 when we lack that which we love4 ,now from the lack of what we love1 sorrow results1 which is caused either by the loss of some loved good1 or by the presence of some contrary evil4 ,but pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved1 for it rests in possession of it4 ,since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow1 the latter is the more shunned1 according as love is the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it4 ,secondly1 on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain1 which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure4 ,for we love the natural well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating3 and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like1 from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes1 which are contrary to the well-being of the body4 ,thirdly1 on the part of the effect3 namely1 in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure1 but all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the saying of ,augustine that sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought is true accidentally but not simply4 ,and this is clear from what he says after3 ,since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain1 which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not the same with movement from within and movement from without4 ,for movement from within tends to what is suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable2 as we remarked above in regard to natural movement4 ,but movement from without is intensified by the very opposition3 because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it1 as aiming at its own preservation4 ,hence violent movement is intense at first1 and slackens towards the end4 ,now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within3 since it tends from the soul to the object4 ,consequently pleasure is1 of itself1 more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned4 ,but the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without1 as it were from the object of the soul4 ,consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt4 ,and then too1 accidentally1 in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain1 pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a brave man is not praised because1 in accordance with reason1 he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever1 but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death4 ,and this kind of sorrow is more shunned1 than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought1 which latter pleasures are the object of temperance3 thus life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure4 ,but the temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures of touch1 more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them1 as is stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #aa4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,outward ,pain ,is ,greater ,than ,interior ,sorrow8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart4 ,because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant to the well-being of the body in which is life3 whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination4 ,since1 therefore1 life is loved more than an imagined good1 it seems that1 according to what has been said above 7,a4 #f71 outward pain is greater than interior sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the reality moves more than its likeness does4 ,but outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary2 whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary4 ,therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a cause is known by its effect4 ,but outward pain has more striking effects3 since man dies sooner of outward pain than of interior sorrow4 ,therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #be3ag73 ,the sadness of the heart is every wound ,douay3 'plague'1 and the wickedness of a woman is all evil4 ,therefore1 just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness1 as the text implies2 so sadness of the heart surpasses every outward wound4 ,i answer that1 ,interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two4 ,they agree in this1 that each is a movement of the appetitive power1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure2 namely1 in respect of the cause1 which is a conjoined good or evil2 and in respect of the apprehension4 ,for the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the body2 while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite4 ,again1 outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense1 chiefly of touch2 while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension1 of the imagination or of the reason4 ,if then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain1 the former belongs1 of itself1 to the appetite to which both these pains belong3 while the latter belongs to the appetite directly4 ,because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite itself1 while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite1 through being repugnant to the body4 ,now1 that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another4 ,wherefore1 from this point of view1 inward pain surpasses outward pain4 ,in like manner also on the part of apprehension3 because the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch4 ,consequently inward pain is1 simply and of itself1 more keen than outward pain3 a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward pain3 and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite1 it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy4 ,sometimes1 however1 outward pain is accompanied by inward pain1 and then the pain is increased4 ,because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain1 it is also more universal3 since whatever is repugnant to the body1 can be repugnant to the interior appetite2 and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason1 but not conversely4 ,hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively3 ,sadness of the heart is every wound1 because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life4 ,and then the comparison of inward to outward pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain2 but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing3 for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself1 but by the thing which the likeness represents4 ,and this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness1 as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract4 ,consequently inward pain is1 of itself1 greater1 as being caused by a greater evil1 forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain1 both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally1 which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch2 and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the inward sense1 just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective4 ,for this reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #e71 the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite3 and1 in like manner1 from outward than from inward pain4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,there ,are ,only ,four ,species of ,sorrow8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,damascene's 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ad7 division of sorrow into four species is incorrect2 viz4 into torpor1 distress1 which ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xix4 calls anxiety1--pity1 and envy4 ,for sorrow is contrary to pleasure4 ,but there are not several species of pleasure4 ,therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,repentance is a species of sorrow2 and so are indignation and jealousy1 as the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #i1 #aa74 ,but these are not included in the above species4 ,therefore this division is insufficient4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another4 ,but these species are not opposed to one another4 ,for according to ,gregory 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xix4 torpor is sorrow depriving of speech2 anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down2 envy is sorrow for another's good2 pity is sorrow for another's wrongs4 ,but it is possible for one to sorrow for another's wrongs1 and for another's good1 and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly1 and outwardly to be speechless4 ,therefore this division is incorrect4 ,on the contrary1 stands the twofold authority of ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius and of ,damascene4 ,i answer that1 ,it belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus4 ,but a thing can be added to a genus in two ways4 ,first1 as something belonging of itself to the genus1 and virtually contained therein3 thus rational is added to animal4 ,such an addition makes true species of a genus3 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vii1 #ab2 viii1 #b1 #c74 ,but1 secondly1 a thing may be added to a genus1 that is1 as it were1 foreign to the notion conveyed by that genus3 thus white or something of the kind may be added to animal4 ,such an addition does not make true species of the genus1 according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species4 ,but sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus1 through having something foreign to that genus indeed1 but to which the notion of that genus is applicable3 thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire1 because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign matter4 ,in like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics1 inasmuch as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter4 ,in accordance with this manner of speaking1 the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign to it4 ,this foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object1 or of the effect4 ,for the proper object of sorrow is one's own evil4 ,hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own2 and thus we have pity which is sorrow for another's evil1 considered1 however1 as one's own3 or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own1 but another's good1 considered1 however1 as one's own evil3 and thus we have envy4 ,the proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain flight of the appetite4 ,wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow1 may be taken so as to affect the first part only1 by excluding flight3 and thus we have anxiety which weighs on the mind1 so as to make escape seem impossible3 hence it is also called perplexity4 ,if1 however1 the mind be weighed down so much1 that even the limbs become motionless1 which belongs to torpor1 then we have the foreign element affecting both1 since there is neither flight1 nor is the effect in the appetite4 ,and the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire1 not only in men1 but also in other animals1 as is stated in ,polit4 i1 #a4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,pleasure is caused by good1 which has only one meaning3 and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is2 for the latter is caused by evil1 which happens in many ways1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,repentance is for one's own evil1 which is the proper object of sorrow3 wherefore it does not belong to these species4 ,jealousy and indignation are included in envy1 as we shall explain later 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this division is not according to opposite species2 but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of sorrow is applied1 as stated above4 ,,question #cf ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,sorrow ,,or ,,pain 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the causes of sorrow3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil8 7#b7 ,whether desire is a cause of sorrow8 7#c7 ,whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow8 7#d7 ,whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,sorrow ,is ,caused by the ,loss of ,good or by the ,presence of ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de viii ,,qq4 ,dulcit4 qu4 #a7 that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 every sorrow is caused by the loss of some good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it was said above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #d7 that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure1 has the same object as that pleasure4 ,but the object of pleasure is good1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i71 love is the cause of sorrow1 as of the other emotions of the soul4 ,but the object of love is good4 ,therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that the dreaded evil gives rise to fear1 the present evil is the cause of sorrow4 ,i answer that1 ,if privations1 as considered by the mind1 were what they are in reality1 this question would seem to be of no importance4 ,for1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #aj2 ,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #c71 evil is the privation of good3 and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit2 so that1 in this respect1 to sorrow for the loss of good1 would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil4 ,but sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension3 and even a privation1 as apprehended1 has the aspect of a being1 wherefore it is called a being of reason4 ,and in this way evil1 being a privation1 is regarded as a contrary4 ,accordingly1 so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned1 it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly1 the present evil or the good which is lost4 ,again1 since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul1 as natural movement in natural things2 the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements4 ,for if1 in natural movements1 we observe those of approach and withdrawal1 approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature2 while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to nature2 thus a heavy body1 of itself1 withdraws from a higher place1 and approaches naturally to a lower place4 ,but if we consider the cause of both these movements1 viz4 gravity1 then gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place1 since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward tendency4 ,accordingly1 since1 in the movements of the appetite1 sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal1 while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or approach2 just as pleasure regards first the good possessed1 as its proper object1 so sorrow regards the evil that is present4 ,on the other hand love1 which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow1 regards good rather than evil3 and therefore1 forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion1 the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or pain1 than the good which is lost4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil1 just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good3 and in this sense ,augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object1 but under contrary aspects3 because if the presence of a particular thing be the object of pleasure1 the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow4 ,now one contrary includes the privation of the other1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 #d3 and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is1 in a way1 directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when many movements arise from one cause1 it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly1 but only the first of them4 ,and each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,desire ,is a ,cause of ,sorrow8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow4 ,because sorrow of itself regards evil1 as stated above 7,a4 #a73 whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good4 ,now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the other contrary4 ,therefore desire is not a cause of pain4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 pain1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab71 is caused by something present2 whereas the object of desire is something future4 ,therefore desire is not a cause of pain4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain4 ,but desire is pleasant in itself1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #aa74 ,therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion xxiv73 ,when ignorance of things necessary to be done1 and desire of things hurtful1 found their way in3 error and pain stole an entrance in their company4 ,but ignorance is the cause of error4 ,therefore desire is a cause of sorrow4 ,i answer that1 ,sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite4 ,now1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite2 a likeness1 that may be assigned to a twofold cause2 one1 on the part of the end1 the other1 on the part of the principle of movement4 ,thus1 on the part of the end1 the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place2 while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity4 ,now the cause of the appetitive movement1 on the part of the end1 is the object of that movement4 ,and thus1 it has been said above 7,a4 #a7 that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil4 ,on the other hand1 the cause1 by way of principle1 of that movement1 is the inward inclination of the appetite2 which inclination regards1 first of all1 the good1 and in consequence1 the rejection of a contrary evil4 ,hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love1 which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good3 while the second principle is hatred1 which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil4 ,but since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love1 which gives rise to the greatest pleasure1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #f72 hence it is that ,augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love1 as was also stated 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b73 and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow4 ,sometimes1 however1 desire taken in its proper sense1 is the cause of sorrow4 ,because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement4 ,now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite1 is a cause of sorrow4 ,consequently1 desire becomes a cause of sorrow1 in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good1 or for its entire removal4 ,but it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow3 since we sorrow more for the loss of present good1 in which we have already taken pleasure1 than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil1 as stated above4 ,and hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good1 are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which is desired1 though really future1 is1 nevertheless1 in a way1 present1 inasmuch as it is hoped for4 ,or we may say that although the desired good itself is future1 yet the hindrance is reckoned as present1 and so gives rise to sorrow4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,desire gives pleasure1 so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired4 ,but1 when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle1 desire causes sorrow4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,craving for ,unity ,is a ,cause of ,sorrow8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #c7 that this opinion1 which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure1 and division 99,aristotle wrote endeian1 'want'2 ,st4 ,thomas1 in the ,latin version1 read 'incisionem'2 should he have read 'indigentiam'81 the cause of sorrow1 seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with food4 ,but not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind4 ,therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow2 since repletion pertains to unity1 and division is the cause of multitude4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every separation is opposed to unity4 ,if therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity1 no separation would be pleasant3 and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil4 ,but as conjunction regards unity1 since it is a kind of union2 so separation is contrary to unity4 ,therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned1 rather than the craving for separation1 as causing sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #bc71 that from the pain that dumb animals feel1 it is quite evident how their souls desire unity1 in ruling and quickening their bodies4 ,for what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption8 ,i answer that1 ,forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow1 so must a craving for unity1 and love1 be accounted as causing sorrow4 ,because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity1 inasmuch as each thing has1 united in itself1 the elements of which its perfection consists3 wherefore the ,platonists held that one is a principle1 just as good is4 ,hence everything naturally desires unity1 just as it desires goodness3 and therefore1 just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow1 so also is the love or craving for unity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every kind of union causes perfect goodness1 but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends4 ,hence neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow1 as some have maintained3 whose opinion is refuted by the ,philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant2 for instance1 when a man has eaten to repletion1 he takes no further pleasure in eating2 because repletion or union of this kind1 is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being4 ,consequently sorrow is caused by the craving1 not for any kind of unity1 but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,separation can be pleasant1 either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection1 or because it has some union connected with it1 such as union of the sense to its object4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired1 in so far as they destroy the unity which is due4 ,wherefore the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow1 whereas the craving for unity is4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #d ,whether an ,irresistible ,power ,is a ,cause of ,sorrow8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow4 ,for that which is in the power of the agent is not present but future4 ,but sorrow is for present evil4 ,therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow4 ,but hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power4 ,therefore a greater power should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite4 ,but a greater power is something external4 ,therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni xx73 ,sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power3 while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 a present evil1 is cause of sorrow or pain1 by way of object4 ,therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present1 should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow4 ,now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be united with a present evil3 and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action of something stronger4 ,wherefore ,augustine reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow4 ,but it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will be no longer repugnance or violence3 thus if a stronger agent1 by its action on a heavy body1 deprives it of its downward tendency1 its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it4 ,accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite1 their respective inclinations1 pain or sorrow will not result therefrom2 such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains4 ,and hence ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni xx7 that sorrow is caused by the will resisting a stronger power3 for were it not to resist1 but to yield by consenting1 the result would be not sorrow but pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a greater power causes sorrow1 as acting not potentially but actually1 i4e4 by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater1 from being greater in some respect3 and accordingly it is able to inflict some harm4 ,but if it be nowise stronger1 it can do no harm at all3 wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,external agents can be the causes of appetitive movements1 in so far as they cause the presence of the object3 and it is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow4 ,,question #cg ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,pain ,,or ,,sorrow 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether pain deprives one of the power to learn8 7#b7 ,whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul8 7#c7 ,whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity8 7#d7 ,whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,pain ,deprives ,one of the ,power to ,learn8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn4 ,for it is written 7,isa4 #bf3i73 ,when ,thou shalt do ,thy judgments on the earth1 the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice3 and further on 7verse #af73 ,in the tribulation of murmuring ,thy instruction was with them4 ,but the judgments of ,god and tribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts4 ,therefore pain or sorrow1 far from destroying1 increases the power of learning4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,isa4 #bh3i73 ,whom shall ,he teach knowledge8 ,and whom shall ,he make to understand the hearing8 ,them that are weaned from the milk1 that are drawn away from the breasts1 i4e4 from pleasures4 ,but pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure2 since sorrow hinders all pleasure1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ad3 and 7,ecclus4 #aa3bi7 it is stated that the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great delights4 ,therefore pain1 instead of taking away1 increases the faculty of learning4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 inward sorrow surpasses outward pain1 as stated above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #g74 ,but man can learn while sorrowful4 ,much more1 therefore1 can he learn while in bodily pain4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 i1 #ab73 ,although during those days ,i was tormented with a violent tooth-ache1 ,i was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those ,i had already learnt2 and as to learning anything1 ,i was quite unequal to it1 because it required undivided attention4 ,i answer that1 ,since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul1 it must needs happen1 when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power1 that it is withdrawn from the action of another power3 because the soul1 being one1 can only have one intention4 ,the result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul1 or a great portion thereof1 anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith4 ,now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself2 because it is natural for each thing to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it1 as may be observed even in natural things4 ,it is likewise evident that in order to learn anything new1 we require study and effort with a strong intention1 as is clearly stated in ,prov4 #b3d1 #e3 ,if thou shalt seek wisdom as money1 and shall dig for her as for a treasure1 then shalt thou understand learning ,vulg3 'the fear of the ,lord'4 ,consequently if the pain be acute1 man is prevented at the time from learning anything3 indeed it can be so acute1 that1 as long as it lasts1 a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already4 ,however a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering3 because the greater his love1 the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,moderate sorrow1 that does not cause the mind to wander1 can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow4 ,and thus1 in the tribulation of murmuring1 men are more apt to be taught by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,both pleasure and pain1 in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention1 hinder the reason from the act of consideration1 wherefore it is stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #aa that in the moment of sexual pleasure1 a man cannot understand anything4 ,nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does3 thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural body is more intense in regard to its contrary2 for instance1 hot water is more accessible to the action of cold1 and in consequence freezes harder4 ,if therefore pain or sorrow be moderate1 it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning1 in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure4 ,but1 of itself1 it is a hindrance2 and if it be intense1 it prevents it altogether4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,external pain arises from hurt done to the body1 so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does3 and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain1 which belongs to the soul4 ,consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose1 than inward sorrow is4 ,nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense1 it attracts the intention1 so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time3 wherefore on account of sorrow ,gregory interrupted his commentary on ,ezechiel 7,hom4 xxii in ,ezechiel74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,effect of ,sorrow or ,pain ,is to ,burden the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #g3aa73 ,behold this self-same thing1 that you were made sorrowful according to ,god1 how great carefulness it worketh in you3 yea1 defence1 yea indignation1 etc4 ,now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted1 which is contrary to being depressed4 ,therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sorrow is contrary to pleasure4 ,but the effect of pleasure is expansion3 the opposite of which is not depression but contraction4 ,therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith1 as may be gathered from the words of the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #b3g73 ,lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow4 ,but that which is depressed is not consumed2 nay1 it is weighed down by something heavy1 whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer4 ,therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xix4 and ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ad7 speak of depressing sorrow4 ,i answer that1 ,the effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically1 from a likeness to sensible bodies3 for the reason that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite4 ,and in this way fervor is ascribed to love1 expansion to pleasure1 and depression to sorrow4 ,for a man is said to be depressed1 through being hindered in his own movement by some weight4 ,now it is evident from what has been said above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #a7 that sorrow is caused by a present evil3 and this evil1 from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will1 depresses the soul1 inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy4 ,and if the evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it1 although the soul be depressed in so far as1 for the present1 it fails to grasp that which it craves for2 yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion1 then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered1 so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that4 ,sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed1 so that a man becomes completely stupefied4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to ,god1 because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as far as the movement of the appetite is concerned1 contraction and depression amount to the same3 because the soul1 through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things1 withdraws to itself1 closing itself up as it were4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sorrow is said to consume man1 when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion3 and thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time4 ,for certain things1 taken metaphorically1 imply one another1 which taken literally1 appear to exclude one another4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sorrow or ,pain ,weakens ,all ,activity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity4 ,because carefulness is caused by sorrow1 as is clear from the passage of the ,apostle quoted above 7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #a74 ,but carefulness conduces to good work3 wherefore the ,apostle says 7#b ,tim4 #b3ae73 ,carefully study to present thyself 4 4 4 a workman that needeth not to be ashamed4 ,therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work1 but helps one to work well4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sorrow causes desire in many cases1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #ad4 ,but desire causes intensity of action4 ,therefore sorrow does too4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as some actions are proper to the joyful1 so are others proper to the sorrowful2 for instance1 to mourn4 ,now a thing is improved by that which is suitable to it4 ,therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #d7 that pleasure perfects action1 whereas on the other hand1 sorrow hinders it 7,ethic4 x1 #e74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul1 so as to shut out all movement1 internal or external2 but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself4 ,accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow4 ,first1 as being the object of sorrow3 and thus sorrow hinders any action3 for we never do that which we do with sorrow1 so well as that which we do with pleasure1 or without sorrow4 ,the reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions3 and consequently when we do something that gives pain1 the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence4 ,secondly1 action stands in relation to sorrow1 as to its principle and cause3 and such action must needs be improved by sorrow3 thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing1 the more one strives to shake off sorrow1 provided there is a hope of shaking it off3 otherwise no movement or action would result from that sorrow4 ,from what has been said the replies to the objections are evident4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,sorrow ,is ,more ,harmful to the ,body ,than the ,other ,passions of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body4 ,for sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul4 ,but those things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body3 as is evident with regard to the images of colors1 which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies4 ,therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further if it be harmful to the body1 this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it4 ,but bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #c7 that anger and desire drive some to madness3 which seems to be a very great harm1 since reason is the most excellent thing in man4 ,moreover1 despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow2 for it is the cause of sorrow4 ,therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #ag3bb73 ,a joyful mind maketh age flourishing3 a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones3 and 7,prov4 #be3bj73 ,as a moth doth by a garment1 and a worm by the wood3 so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart3 and 7,ecclus4 #ch3ai73 ,of sadness cometh death4 ,i answer that1 ,of all the soul's passions1 sorrow is most harmful to the body4 ,the reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its movement1 and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity1 as is the case with the other passions of the soul4 ,for man's life consists in a certain movement1 which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body3 and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure4 ,consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure1 it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of quantity2 but not in respect of its specific character3 whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress1 it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species4 ,now it must be noted that1 in all the passions of the soul1 the bodily transmutation which is their material element1 is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement1 which is the formal element3 just as in everything matter is proportionate to form4 ,consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something1 are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species1 but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure3 such are love1 joy1 desire and the like2 wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body2 though1 if they be excessive1 they may be harmful to it4 ,on the other hand1 those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction1 are repugnant to the vital movement1 not only as regards its measure1 but also as regards its species2 wherefore they are simply harmful3 such are fear and despair1 and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil1 which makes a stronger impression than future evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since the soul naturally moves the body1 the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation4 ,nor is there any parallel with spiritual images1 because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement3 whereas sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason1 than to destroy life3 since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason1 before depriving one of life4 ,nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body1 by reason of the sorrow which they imply1 and which arises from the absence of the thing desired4 ,moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason3 as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness4 ,,question #ch ,,of ,,the ,,remedies ,,of ,,sorrow ,,or ,,pain 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow3 under which head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure8 7#b7 ,whether it is assuaged by weeping8 7#c7 ,whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends8 7#d7 ,whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth8 7#e7 ,whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,pain or ,sorrow ,is ,assuaged by ,every ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow4 ,for pleasure does not assuage sorrow1 save in so far as it is contrary to it3 for remedies work by contraries 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,but not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow2 as stated above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which causes sorrow does not assuage it4 ,but some pleasures cause sorrow2 since1 as stated in ,ethic4 ix1 #d1 the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased4 ,therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv1 #g7 that he fled from his country1 where he had been wont to associate with his friend1 now dead3 for so should his eyes look for him less1 where they were not wont to see him4 ,hence we may gather that those things which united us to our dead or absent friends1 become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence4 ,but nothing united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common4 ,therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us when we mourn4 ,therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ad7 that sorrow is driven forth by pleasure1 both by a contrary pleasure and by any other1 provided it be intense4 ,i answer that1 ,as is evident from what has been said above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d71 pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good2 while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite4 ,consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow1 what1 in bodies1 repose is to weariness1 which is due to a non-natural transmutation2 for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty4 ,therefore just as all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness1 ensuing from any non-natural cause2 so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow1 due to any cause whatever4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow1 yet it is generically1 as stated above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #d74 ,and consequently1 on the part of the disposition of the subject1 any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed1 but afterwards3 that is to say1 in so far as wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure4 ,this sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when there are two causes inclining to contrary movements1 each hinders the other2 yet the one which is stronger and more persistent1 prevails in the end4 ,now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or absent friend1 there are two causes producing contrary movements4 ,for the thought of the friend's death or absence1 inclines him to sorrow3 whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure4 ,consequently each is modified by the other4 ,and yet1 since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the past1 and since love of self is more persistent than love of another2 hence it is that1 in the end1 the pleasure drives out the sorrow4 ,wherefore a little further on 7,confess4 iv1 #h7 ,augustine says that his sorrow gave way to his former pleasures4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,pain or ,sorrow ,is ,assuaged by ,tears8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow4 ,because no effect diminishes its cause4 ,but tears or groans are an effect of sorrow4 ,therefore they do not diminish sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow1 so laughter is an effect of joy4 ,but laughter does not lessen joy4 ,therefore tears do not lessen sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 when we weep1 the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination4 ,but the image of that which saddens us increases sorrow1 just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy4 ,therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv1 #g7 that when he mourned the death of his friend1 in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment4 ,i answer that1 ,tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow3 and this for two reasons4 ,first1 because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up1 because the soul is more intent on it3 whereas if it be allowed to escape1 the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things1 so that the inward sorrow is lessened4 ,this is why men1 burdened with sorrow1 make outward show of their sorrow1 by tears or groans or even by words1 their sorrow is assuaged4 ,secondly1 because an action1 that befits a man according to his actual disposition1 is always pleasant to him4 ,now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain2 and consequently they become pleasant to him4 ,since then1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat1 it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man4 ,for every effect is suited to its cause1 and consequently is pleasant to it2 but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows4 ,hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is4 ,for this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect1 on account of the aforesaid contrariety4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it3 because in each case the one agrees with the other4 ,now every like thing increases its like4 ,therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other effects of joy3 except they be excessive1 in which case1 accidentally1 they lessen it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the image of that which saddens us1 considered in itself1 has a natural tendency to increase sorrow3 yet from the very fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state1 he feels a certain amount of pleasure4 ,for the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep1 he is sorry for it1 as having done something unbecoming to him1 as ,cicero says 7,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 iii1 #bg74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,pain or ,sorrow ,are ,assuaged by the ,sympathy of ,friends8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow4 ,for contraries have contrary effects4 ,now as ,augustine says 7,confess4 viii1 #d71 when many rejoice together1 each one has more exuberant joy1 for they are kindled and inflamed one by the other4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 when many are sorrowful1 it seems that their sorrow is greater4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 friendship demands mutual love1 as ,augustine declares 7,confess4 iv1 #i74 ,but a sympathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes4 ,consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes1 to the friend in sorrow1 a further cause of sorrow3 so that1 his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend1 as though it affected oneself3 since a friend is one's other self 7,ethic4 ix1 #d1 #i74 ,but sorrow is an evil4 ,therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympathizes4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #aa7 that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them4 ,i answer that1 ,when one is in pain1 it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation3 whereof the ,philosopher indicates a twofold reason 7,ethic4 ix1 #aa74 ,the first is because1 since sorrow has a depressing effect1 it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves3 so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow1 it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him1 striving1 as it were1 to lessen its weight2 wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him3 something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens4 ,the second and better reason is because when a man's friends condole with him1 he sees that he is loved by them1 and this affords him pleasure1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #e74 ,consequently1 since every pleasure assuages sorrow1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in either case there is a proof of friendship1 viz4 when a man rejoices with the joyful1 and when he sorrows with the sorrowful4 ,consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow3 but consideration of its cause1 viz4 his love1 gives rise rather to pleasure4 ,and this suffices for the reply to the ,third ,objection4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,pain and ,sorrow ,are ,assuaged by the ,contemplation of ,truth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow4 ,for it is written 7,eccles4 #a3ah73 ,he that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow ,vulg43 'labor'4 ,but knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth4 ,therefore the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect4 ,but the speculative intellect is not a principle of movement2 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #aa4 ,therefore1 since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul1 it seems that the contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails4 ,but contemplation of truth is in the intellect4 ,therefore it does not assuage bodily pain1 which is in the senses4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 i1 #ab73 ,it seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds1 either ,i should not feel that pain1 or at least that pain would seem nothing to me4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e71 the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth4 ,now every pleasure assuages pain as stated above 7,a4 #a73 hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow1 and the more so1 the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom4 ,and therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of ,divine things and of future ,happiness1 according to ,james #a3b3 ,my brethren1 count it all joy1 when you shall fall into divers temptations3 and1 what is more1 even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found2 as the martyr ,tiburtius1 when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals1 said3 ,methinks1 ,i walk on roses1 in the name of ,jesus ,christ4 99,cf4 ,dominican ,breviary1 ,august #aath1 commemoration of ,st4 ,tiburtius4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he that addeth knowledge1 addeth sorrow1 either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth2 or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will4 ,accordingly1 on the part of the things known1 knowledge causes sorrow3 but on the part of the contemplation of truth1 it causes pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated3 but on the part of contemplation itself1 which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers3 and accordingly1 the pleasure of contemplation1 which is in the higher part1 overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,pain and ,sorrow ,are ,assuaged by ,sleep and ,baths8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow4 ,for sorrow is in the soul3 whereas sleep and baths regard the body4 ,therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes4 ,but these1 being bodily things1 are incompatible with the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sorrow and pain1 in so far as they affect the body1 denote a certain transmutation of the heart4 ,but such remedies as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs1 rather than to the interior disposition of the heart4 ,therefore they do not assuage sorrow4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 ix1 #ab73 ,i had heard that the bath had its name 99,balneum1 from the ,greek balaneion 4 4 4 from the fact of its driving sadness from the mind4 ,and further on1 he says3 ,i slept1 and woke up again1 and found my grief not a little assuaged3 and quotes the words from the hymn of ,ambrose 99,cf4 ,sarum ,breviary3 ,first ,sunday after the octave of the ,epiphany1 ,hymn for first ,vespers1 in which it is said that ,sleep restores the tired limbs to labor1 refreshes the weary mind1 and banishes sorrow4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #d71 sorrow1 by reason of its specific nature1 is repugnant to the vital movement of the body2 and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement1 is opposed to sorrow and assuages it4 ,moreover such remedies1 from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state1 are causes of pleasure2 for this is precisely in what pleasure consists1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore1 since every pleasure assuages sorrow1 sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the normal disposition of the body1 so far as it is felt1 is itself a cause of pleasure1 and consequently assuages sorrow4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #h71 one pleasure hinders another2 and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow4 ,consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which hinder one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart1 which is the beginning and end of bodily movements1 as stated in ,de ,causa ,mot4 ,animal4 xi4 ,,question #ci ,,of ,,the ,,goodness ,,and ,,malice ,,of ,,sorrow ,,or ,,pain 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether all sorrow is evil8 7#b7 ,whether sorrow can be a virtuous good8 7#c7 ,whether it can be a useful good8 7#d7 ,whether bodily pain is the greatest evil8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,all ,sorrow ,is ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all sorrow is evil4 ,for ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xix4 says3 ,all sorrow is evil1 from its very nature4 ,now what is naturally evil1 is evil always and everywhere4 ,therefore1 all sorrow is evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which all1 even the virtuous1 avoid1 is evil4 ,but all avoid sorrow1 even the virtuous1 since as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #aa1 though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure1 yet he aims at avoiding sorrow4 ,therefore sorrow is evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain1 so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in the soul4 ,but every bodily pain is a bodily evil4 ,therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil4 ,but pleasure in evil is evil3 wherefore in condemnation of certain men1 it is written 7,prov4 #b3ad71 that they were glad when they had done evil4 ,therefore sorrow for evil is good4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may be good or evil in two ways3 first considered simply and in itself2 and thus all sorrow is an evil1 because the mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil1 is itself an evil1 because it hinders the response of the appetite in good4 ,secondly1 a thing is said to be good or evil1 on the supposition of something else3 thus shame is said to be good1 on the supposition of a shameful deed done1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #i4 ,accordingly1 supposing the presence of something saddening or painful1 it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil4 ,for if he were not to be in sorrow or pain1 this could only be either because he feels it not1 or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming1 both of which are manifest evils4 ,consequently it is a condition of goodness1 that1 supposing an evil to be present1 sorrow or pain should ensue4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #ad73 ,it is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost3 for had not some good remained in his nature1 he could not be punished by the loss of good4 ,because1 however1 in the science of ,morals1 we consider things individually--for actions are concerned about individuals--that which is good on some supposition1 should be considered as good3 just as that which is voluntary on some supposition1 is judged to be voluntary1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #a1 and likewise above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it1 but not on the part of the subject that feels and rejects the evil4 ,and from this point of view1 all shun sorrow1 inasmuch as they shun evil3 but they do not shun the perception and rejection of evil4 ,the same also applies to bodily pain3 because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of nature4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,second and ,third ,objections4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,sorrow ,can ,be a ,virtuous ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good4 ,for that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good4 ,but1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #cc71 ,jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow1 and so1 instead of entering into the rest of the blessed1 be consigned to the hell of sinners4 ,therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious4 ,but sorrow lessens praise or merit3 for the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #i3g73 ,everyone1 as he hath determined in his heart1 not with sadness1 or of necessity4 ,therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ae71 sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will4 ,but not to will those things which are actually taking place1 is to have a will opposed to the decree of ,god1 to ,whose providence whatever is done is subject4 ,since1 then1 conformity of the human to the ,divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #i71 it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will1 and that consequently it is not virtuous4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous4 ,but such is sorrow2 as is evident from ,matt4 #e3e3 ,blessed are they that mourn1 for they shall be comforted4 ,therefore sorrow is a virtuous good4 ,i answer that1 ,in so far as sorrow is good1 it can be a virtuous good4 ,for it has been said above 7,a4 #a7 that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil4 ,these two things1 as regards bodily pain1 are a proof of the goodness of nature1 to which it is due that the senses perceive1 and that nature shuns1 the harmful thing that causes pain4 ,as regards interior sorrow1 perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason2 while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will1 well disposed and detesting that evil4 ,now every virtuous good results from these two things1 the rectitude of the reason and the will4 ,wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason1 which is the root of the virtuous good2 but excessive sorrow1 of which ,augustine is speaking1 oversteps this rule1 and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason1 which detest the evil1 so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse reason and will1 which detest the good4 ,consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good2 for instance1 when a man gives an alms sorrowfully4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some things do actually happen1 not because ,god wills1 but because ,he permits them to happen--such as sins4 ,consequently a will that is opposed to sin1 whether in oneself or in another1 is not discordant from the ,divine will4 ,penal evils happen actually1 even by ,god's will4 ,but it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will1 that man should will them in themselves3 but only that he should not revolt against the order of ,divine justice1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #aj74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sorrow ,can ,be a ,useful ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good4 ,for it is written 7,ecclus4 #cj3be73 ,sadness hath killed many1 and there is no profit in it4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 choice is of that which is useful to an end4 ,but sorrow is not an object of choice2 in fact1 a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow 7,topic4 iii1 #b74 ,therefore sorrow is not a useful good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,everything is for the sake of its own operation1 as stated in ,de ,coelo ii1 #c4 ,but sorrow hinders operation1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #e4 ,therefore sorrow is not a useful good4 ,on the contrary1 ,the wise man seeks only that which is useful4 ,but according to ,eccles4 #g3e1 the heart of the wise is where there is mourning1 and the heart of fools where there is mirth4 ,therefore sorrow is useful4 ,i answer that1 ,a twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil4 ,one is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil2 and1 in this respect1 sorrow is of no use2 because that which is present1 cannot be not present4 ,the other movement arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil3 and1 in this respect1 sorrow is of use1 if it be for something which ought to be avoided4 ,because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing4 ,first1 because it should be avoided in itself1 on account of its being contrary to good2 for instance1 sin4 ,wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin3 hence the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #g3i73 ,i am glad3 not because you were made sorrowful1 but because you were made sorrowful unto penance4 ,secondly1 a thing is to be avoided1 not as though it were evil in itself1 but because it is an occasion of evil2 either through one's being attached to it1 and loving it too much1 or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil1 as is evident in the case of temporal goods4 ,and1 in this respect1 sorrow for temporal goods may be useful2 according to ,eccles4 #g3c3 ,it is better to go to the house of mourning1 than to the house of feasting3 for in that we are put in mind of the end of all4 ,moreover1 sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful1 since it adds another motive for avoiding it4 ,because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided3 while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake1 just as everyone seeks the good1 and pleasure in the good4 ,therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly1 so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow1 which consumes the soul3 for such sorrow paralyzes the soul1 and hinders it from shunning evil1 as stated above 7,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow1 so that which ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow3 and1 in this respect1 sorrow is useful4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sorrow caused by an action hinders that action3 but sorrow for the cessation of an action1 makes one do it more earnestly4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,bodily ,pain ,is the ,greatest ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pain is the greatest evil4 ,because the worst is contrary to the best 7,ethic4 viii1 #aj74 ,but a certain pleasure is the greatest good1 viz4 the pleasure of bliss4 ,therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 happiness is man's greatest good1 because it is his last end4 ,but man's ,happiness consists in his having whatever he will1 and in willing naught amiss1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d1 ,obj4 #e2 ,q4 #e1 ,a4 #h1 ,obj4 #c74 ,therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will4 ,now pain consists in something happening contrary to the will1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #f1 #ae74 ,therefore pain is man's greatest evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine argues thus 7,soliloq4 i1 #ab73 ,we are composed of two parts1 i4e4 of a soul and a body1 whereof the body is the inferior4 ,now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part3 while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part4 ,but wisdom is the greatest good of the soul2 while the worst thing in the body is pain4 ,therefore man's greatest good is to be wise3 while his greatest evil is to suffer pain4 ,on the contrary1 ,guilt is a greater evil than punishment1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #f74 ,but sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin1 just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xii73 ,what is pain of the soul1 except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy1 or had hoped to enjoy8 ,and this is all that is called evil1 i4e4 sin1 and the punishment of sin4 ,therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil4 ,for all sorrow or pain is either for something that is truly evil1 or for something that is apparently evil1 but good in reality4 ,now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil3 for there is something worse1 namely1 either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil1 or not to reject it4 ,again1 sorrow or pain1 for that which is apparently evil1 but really good1 cannot be the greatest evil1 for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good4 ,hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common3 namely1 a true judgment concerning good and evil2 and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil4 ,thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good1 by the removal of which they become worse3 and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure1 by the removal of which the pleasure is better4 ,consequently1 a pleasure can be man's highest good1 in the way above stated 7,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #c73 whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good4 ,and for this reason1 sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil2 because it has an admixture of good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse4 ,now a thing is called evil because it harms1 as ,augustine says 7,enchiridion xii74 ,therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body4 ,therefore this argument does not prove3 nor does ,augustine give it as his own1 but as taken from another 99,cornelius ,celsus4 ,,question #dj ,,of ,,the ,,irascible ,,passions1 ,,and ,,first1 ,,of ,,hope ,,and ,,despair 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider the irascible passions3 7#a7 ,hope and despair2 7#b7 ,fear and daring2 7#c7 ,anger4 ,under first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity8 7#b7 ,whether hope is in the apprehensive1 or in the appetitive faculty8 7#c7 ,whether hope is in dumb animals8 7#d7 ,whether despair is contrary to hope8 7#e7 ,whether experience is a cause of hope8 7#f7 ,whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards8 7#g7 ,concerning the order of hope to love2 7#h7 ,whether love conduces to action8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,hope ,is the ,same ,as ,desire or ,cupidity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity4 ,because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions4 ,but ,augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #c1 #g74 ,therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 passions differ according to their objects4 ,but the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire1 viz4 the future good4 ,therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire4 ,obj4 #c3 ,if it be said that hope1 in addition to desire1 denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good2 on the contrary1 whatever is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion4 ,but possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good1 which is the object of cupidity or desire1 and of hope4 ,therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity4 ,on the contrary1 ,to different powers belong different species of passions4 ,but hope is in the irascible power2 whereas desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible4 ,therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity4 ,i answer that1 ,the species of a passion is taken from the object4 ,now1 in the object of hope1 we may note four conditions4 ,first1 that it is something good2 since1 properly speaking1 hope regards only the good2 in this respect1 hope differs from fear1 which regards evil4 ,secondly1 that it is future2 for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed3 in this respect1 hope differs from joy which regards a present good4 ,thirdly1 that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain1 for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles1 which are in one's power to have at any time3 in this respect1 hope differs from desire or cupidity1 which regards the future good absolutely3 wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible1 while hope belongs to the irascible faculty4 ,fourthly1 that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain3 for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all3 and1 in this respect1 hope differs from despair4 ,it is therefore evident that hope differs from desire1 as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible4 ,for this reason1 moreover1 hope presupposes desire3 just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine mentions desire instead of hope1 because each regards future good2 and because the good which is not arduous is reckoned as nothing3 thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good1 to which hope tends likewise4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object of hope is the future good considered1 not absolutely1 but as arduous and difficult of attainment1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire1 but also difficulty3 and this makes hope belong to another power1 viz4 the irascible1 which regards something difficult1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b74 ,moreover1 possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power3 because the appetite is a principle of movement2 and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being possible2 for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get4 ,consequently hope differs from despair according to the difference of possible and impossible4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,hope ,is in the ,apprehensive or in the ,appetitive ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power4 ,because hope1 seemingly1 is a kind of awaiting2 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3be73 ,if we hope for that which we see not2 we wait for it with patience4 ,but awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power1 which we exercise by looking out4 ,therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 apparently hope is the same as confidence2 hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident1 as though to hope and to be confident were the same thing4 ,but confidence1 like faith1 seems to belong to the cognitive power4 ,therefore hope does too4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 certainty is a property of the cognitive power4 ,but certainty is ascribed to hope4 ,therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power4 ,on the contrary1 ,hope regards good1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now good1 as such1 is not the object of the cognitive1 but of the appetitive power4 ,therefore hope belongs1 not to the cognitive1 but to the appetitive power4 ,i answer that1 ,since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good1 it evidently belongs to the appetitive power2 since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite3 whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things1 but rather according as the things known are in the knower4 ,but since the cognitive power moves the appetite1 by presenting its object to it2 there arise in the appetite various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object4 ,for the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite1 while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another3 in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension of something present and of something future2 of something considered absolutely1 and of something considered as arduous2 of something possible1 and of something impossible4 ,and accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good1 difficult but possible to obtain2 namely1 a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since hope regards a possible good1 there arises in man a twofold movement of hope2 for a thing may be possible to him in two ways1 viz4 by his own power1 or by another's4 ,accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power1 he is not said to wait for it1 but simply to hope for it4 ,but1 properly speaking1 he is said to await that which he hopes to get by another's help1 as though to await 7exspectare7 implied keeping one's eyes on another 7ex alio spectare71 in so far as the apprehensive power1 by going ahead1 not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get1 but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it2 according to ,ecclus4 #ea3aj1 ,i looked for the succor of men4 ,wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation1 on account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it1 he believes that he can get it1 he believes that he will get it2 and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power1 the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence4 ,because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it1 as an effect from a cause which is better known2 for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,certainty is ascribed to the movement1 not only of the sensitive1 but also of the natural appetite2 thus we say that a stone is certain to tend downwards4 ,this is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,hope ,is in ,dumb ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals4 ,because hope is for some future good1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab74 ,but knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals1 whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future4 ,therefore there is no hope in dumb animals4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of hope is a future good1 possible of attainment4 ,but possible and impossible are differences of the true and the false1 which are only in the mind1 as the ,philosopher states 7,metaph4 vi1 #d74 ,therefore there is no hope in dumb animals1 since they have no mind4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #ad7 that animals are moved by the things that they see4 ,but hope is of things unseen3 for what a man seeth1 why doth he hope for8 7,rom4 #h3bd74 ,therefore there is no hope in dumb animals4 ,on the contrary1 ,hope is an irascible passion4 ,but the irascible faculty is in dumb animals4 ,therefore hope is also4 ,i answer that1 ,the internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements3 from which it is clear that hope is in dumb animals4 ,for if a dog see a hare1 or a hawk see a bird1 too far off1 it makes no movement towards it1 as having no hope to catch it3 whereas1 if it be near1 it makes a movement towards it1 as being in hopes of catching it4 ,because as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #a71 the sensitive appetite of dumb animals1 and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things1 result from the apprehension of an intellect1 just as the appetite of the intellectual nature1 which is called the will4 ,but there is a difference1 in that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject2 whereas the movement of the natural appetite results from the apprehension of the separate ,intellect1 ,who is the ,author of nature2 as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals1 who act from a certain natural instinct4 ,consequently1 in the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things1 we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of art3 and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although dumb animals do not know the future1 yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future1 as though it foresaw the future4 ,because this instinct is planted in them by the ,divine ,intellect that foresees the future4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true1 for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate to a subject4 ,the object of hope is the possible as compared to a power4 ,for such is the division of the possible given in ,metaph4 v1 #ab1 i4e4 into the two kinds we have just mentioned4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight2 nevertheless through seeing something present1 an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,despair ,is ,contrary to ,hope8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that despair is not contrary to hope4 ,because to one thing there is one contrary 7,metaph4 x1 #e74 ,but fear is contrary to hope4 ,therefore despair is not contrary to hope4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 contraries seem to bear on the same thing4 ,but hope and despair do not bear on the same thing3 since hope regards the good1 whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good4 ,therefore hope is not contrary to despair4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 movement is contrary to movement3 while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof4 ,but despair seems to imply immobility rather than movement4 ,therefore it is not contrary to hope1 which implies movement of stretching out towards the hoped-for good4 ,on the contrary1 ,the very name of despair 7desperatio7 implies that it is contrary to hope 7spes74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b71 there is a twofold contrariety of movements4 ,one is in respect of approach to contrary terms3 and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible passions1 for instance between love and hatred4 ,the other is according to approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term2 and is to be found in the irascible passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b74 ,now the object of hope1 which is the arduous good1 has the character of a principle of attraction1 if it be considered in the light of something attainable2 and thus hope tends thereto1 for it denotes a kind of approach4 ,but in so far as it is considered as unobtainable1 it has the character of a principle of repulsion1 because1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #c1 when men come to an impossibility they disperse4 ,and this is how despair stands in regard to this object1 wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal3 and consequently it is contrary to hope1 as withdrawal is to approach4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fear is contrary to hope1 because their objects1 i4e4 good and evil1 are contrary3 for this contrariety is found in the irascible passions1 according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible4 ,but despair is contrary to hope1 only by contrariety of approach and withdrawal4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,despair does not regard evil as such2 sometimes however it regards evil accidentally1 as making the difficult good impossible to obtain4 ,but it can arise from the mere excess of good4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,despair implies not only privation of hope1 but also a recoil from the thing desired1 by reason of its being esteemed impossible to get4 ,hence despair1 like hope1 presupposes desire2 because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire to have4 ,for this reason1 too1 each of them regards the good1 which is the object of desire4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,experience ,is a ,cause of ,hope8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that experience is not a cause of hope4 ,because experience belongs to the cognitive power2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #a7 that intellectual virtue needs experience and time4 ,but hope is not in the cognitive power1 but in the appetite1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore experience is not a cause of hope4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #ac7 that the old are slow to hope1 on account of their experience2 whence it seems to follow that experience causes want of hope4 ,but the same cause is not productive of opposites4 ,therefore experience is not a cause of hope4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,coel4 ii1 #e7 that to have something to say about everything1 without leaving anything out1 is sometimes a proof of folly4 ,but to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes2 while folly arises from inexperience4 ,therefore inexperience1 rather than experience1 seems to be a cause of hope4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 some are hopeful1 through having been victorious often and over many opponents3 which seems to pertain to experience4 ,therefore experience is a cause of hope4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the object of hope is a future good1 difficult but possible to obtain4 ,consequently a thing may be a cause of hope1 either because it makes something possible to a man3 or because it makes him think something possible4 ,in the first way hope is caused by everything that increases a man's power2 e4g4 riches1 strength1 and1 among others1 experience3 since by experience man acquires the faculty of doing something easily1 and the result of this is hope4 ,wherefore ,vegetius says 7,de ,re ,milit4 i73 ,no one fears to do that which he is sure of having learned well4 ,in the second way1 hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something3 and thus both teaching and persuasion may be a cause of hope4 ,and then again experience is a cause of hope1 in so far as it makes him reckon something possible1 which before his experience he looked upon as impossible4 ,however1 in this way1 experience can cause a lack of hope3 because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible2 so1 conversely1 experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible4 ,accordingly experience causes hope in two ways1 despair in one way3 and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge2 it also causes a certain habit1 by reason of custom1 which renders the action easier4 ,moreover1 the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease3 because it shows something to be possible2 and thus is a cause of hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the old are wanting in hope because of their experience1 in so far as experience makes them think something impossible4 ,hence he adds 7,rhet4 ii1 #ac7 that many evils have befallen them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were1 by removing the knowledge which would help one to judge truly a thing to be impossible4 ,wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope1 for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,hope ,abounds in ,young ,men and ,drunkards8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope4 ,because hope implies certainty and steadiness2 so much so that it is compared to an anchor 7,heb4 #f3ai74 ,but young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness2 since their minds are easily changed4 ,therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #e71 the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one's power4 ,but youth and drunkenness are united to weakness4 ,therefore they are not causes of hope4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 experience is a cause of hope1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,but youth lacks experience4 ,therefore it is not a cause of hope4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 that drunken men are hopeful3 and 7,rhet4 ii1 #ab7 that the young are full of hope4 ,i answer that1 ,youth is a cause of hope for three reasons1 as the ,philosopher states in ,rhet4 ii1 #ab3 and these three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope--namely1 that it is future1 arduous and possible1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,for youth has much of the future before it1 and little of the past3 and therefore since memory is of the past1 and hope of the future1 it has little to remember and lives very much in hope4 ,again1 youths1 on account of the heat of their nature1 are full of spirit2 so that their heart expands3 and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous2 wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful4 ,likewise they who have not suffered defeat1 nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts1 are prone to count a thing possible to them4 ,wherefore youths1 through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings1 easily count a thing possible2 and consequently are of good hope4 ,two of these causes are also in those who are in drink--viz4 heat and high spirits1 on account of wine1 and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings4 ,for the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality1 yet they are steady in their own estimation1 for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for4 ,in like manner1 in reply to the ,second ,objection1 we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality3 but1 in their own estimation1 they are capable1 for they know not their shortcomings4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not only experience1 but also lack of experience1 is1 in some way1 a cause of hope1 as explained above 7,a4 #e1 ad #c74 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,hope ,is a ,cause of ,love8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope is not a cause of love4 ,because1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i71 love is the first of the soul's emotions4 ,but hope is an emotion of the soul4 ,therefore love precedes hope1 and consequently hope does not cause love4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 desire precedes hope4 ,but desire is caused by love1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore hope1 too1 follows love1 and consequently is not its cause4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hope causes pleasure1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #c74 ,but pleasure is only of the good that is loved4 ,therefore love precedes hope4 ,on the contrary1 ,the gloss commenting on ,matt4 #a3b1 ,abraham begot ,isaac1 and ,isaac begot ,jacob1 says1 i4e4 faith begets hope1 and hope begets charity4 ,but charity is love4 ,therefore love is caused by hope4 ,i answer that1 ,hope can regard two things4 ,for it regards as its object1 the good which one hopes for4 ,but since the good we hope for is something difficult but possible to obtain2 and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us1 not through ourselves but through others2 hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us4 ,in so far1 then1 as hope regards the good we hope to get1 it is caused by love3 since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love4 ,but in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us1 love is caused by hope1 and not vice versa4 ,because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone1 we are moved towards him as to our own good2 and thus we begin to love him4 ,whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him1 except accidentally1 that is1 in so far as we think that he returns our love4 ,wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him2 but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him4 ,wherefore the ,replies to the ,objections are evident4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,hope ,is a ,help or a ,hindrance to ,action8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action4 ,because hope implies security4 ,but security begets negligence which hinders action4 ,therefore hope is a hindrance to action4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sorrow hinders action1 as stated above 7,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #c74 ,but hope sometimes causes sorrow3 for it is written 7,prov4 #ac3ab73 ,hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul4 ,therefore hope hinders action4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 despair is contrary to hope1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,but despair1 especially in matters of war1 conduces to action2 for it is written 7#b ,kings #b3bf71 that it is dangerous to drive people to despair4 ,therefore hope has a contrary effect1 namely1 by hindering action4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,cor4 #i3aj7 that he that plougheth should plough in hope 4 4 4 to receive fruit3 and the same applies to all other actions4 ,i answer that1 ,hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense3 and this for two reasons4 ,first1 by reason of its object1 which is a good1 difficult but possible4 ,for the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention2 while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort4 ,hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action4 ,secondly1 on account of its effect4 ,because hope1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #c71 causes pleasure2 which is a help to action1 as stated above 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore hope is conducive to action4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,hope regards a good to be obtained2 security regards an evil to be avoided4 ,wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong to hope4 ,yet security does not beget negligence1 save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty3 whereby it also lessens the character of hope3 for the things in which a man fears no hindrance1 are no longer looked upon as difficult4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope of itself causes pleasure2 it is by accident that it causes sorrow1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,despair threatens danger in war1 on account of a certain hope that attaches to it4 ,for they who despair of flight1 strive less to fly1 but hope to avenge their death3 and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely1 and consequently prove dangerous to the foe4 ,,question #da ,,of ,,fear1 ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider1 in the first place1 fear2 and1 secondly1 daring4 ,with regard to fear1 four things must be considered3 7#a7 ,fear1 in itself2 7#b7 ,its object2 7#c7 ,its cause2 7#d7 ,its effect4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether fear is a passion of the soul8 7#b7 ,whether fear is a special passion8 7#c7 ,whether there is a natural fear8 7#d7 ,of the species of fear4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,fear ,is a ,passion of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #bc7 that fear is a power1 by way of systole--i4e4 of contraction--desirous of vindicating nature4 ,but no virtue is a passion1 as is proved in ,ethic4 ii1 #e4 ,therefore fear is not a passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent4 ,but fear is not of something present1 but of something future1 as ,damascene declares 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab74 ,therefore fear is not a passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite1 in consequence of an apprehension of the senses4 ,but sense apprehends1 not the future but the present4 ,since1 then1 fear is of future evil1 it seems that it is not a passion of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #e1 seqq47 reckons fear among the other passions of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,among the other passions of the soul1 after sorrow1 fear chiefly has the character of passion4 ,for as we have stated above 7,q4 #bb71 the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power--i4e4 of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle3 since passion is the effect of an agent4 ,in this way1 both to feel and to understand are passions4 ,secondly1 more properly speaking1 passion is a movement of the appetitive power2 and more properly still1 it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ1 such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation4 ,and1 again1 most properly those movements are called passions1 which imply some deterioration4 ,now it is evident that fear1 since it regards evil1 belongs to the appetitive power1 which of itself regards good and evil4 ,moreover1 it belongs to the sensitive appetite3 for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation--i4e4 contraction--as ,damascene says 7,cf4 ,obj4 #a74 ,again1 it implies relation to evil as overcoming1 so to speak1 some particular good4 ,wherefore it has most properly the character of passion2 less1 however1 than sorrow1 which regards the present evil3 because fear regards future evil1 which is not so strong a motive as present evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue denotes a principle of action3 wherefore1 in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action1 they are called virtues4 ,but the ,philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent1 so is the passion of the soul due to the agent being present to the soul1 although neither corporally nor really present3 that is to say1 in so far as the evil which is really future1 is present in the apprehension of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the senses do not apprehend the future3 but from apprehending the present1 an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good1 or to fear a future evil4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,fear ,is a ,special ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear is not a special passion4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cc7 that the man who is not distraught by fear1 is neither harassed by desire1 nor wounded by sickness--i4e4 sorrow--nor tossed about in transports of empty joys4 ,wherefore it seems that1 if fear be set aside1 all the other passions are removed4 ,therefore fear is not a special but a general passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b7 that pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in the intellect4 ,but denial is nothing special in the intellect1 as neither is affirmation1 but something common to many4 ,therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite4 ,but fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil4 ,therefore it is not a special passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if fear were a special passion1 it would be chiefly in the irascible part4 ,but fear is also in the concupiscible3 since the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that fear is a kind of sorrow2 and ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #bc7 that fear is a power of desire3 and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore fear is not a special passion1 since it belongs to different powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul1 as is clear from ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab1 #ae74 ,i answer that1 ,the passions of the soul derive their species from their objects3 hence that is a special passion1 which has a special object4 ,now fear has a special object1 as hope has4 ,for just as the object of hope is a future good1 difficult but possible to obtain2 so the object of fear is a future evil1 difficult and irresistible4 ,consequently fear is a special passion of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the passions of the soul arise from one source1 viz4 love1 wherein they are connected with one another4 ,by reason of this connection1 when fear is put aside1 the other passions of the soul are dispersed2 not1 however1 as though it were a general passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not every avoidance in the appetite is fear1 but avoidance of a special object1 as stated4 ,wherefore1 though avoidance be something common1 yet fear is a special passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,fear is nowise in the concupiscible3 for it regards evil1 not absolutely1 but as difficult or arduous1 so as to be almost unavoidable4 ,but since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty1 and terminate therein1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a72 hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear4 ,for fear is called sorrow1 in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present3 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that fear arises from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful4 ,in like manner desire is ascribed by ,damascene to fear1 because just as hope arises from the desire of good1 so fear arises from avoidance of evil2 while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good1 as is evident from what has been said above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is a ,natural ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is a natural fear4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #bc7 that there is a natural fear1 through the soul refusing to be severed from the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fear arises from love1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,but there is a natural love1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore there is also a natural fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fear is opposed to hope1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a74 ,but there is a hope of nature1 as is evident from ,rom4 #d3ah1 where it is said of ,abraham that against hope of nature1 he believed in hope of grace4 ,therefore there is also a fear of nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,that which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate4 ,but fear is not in things inanimate4 ,therefore there is no natural fear4 ,i answer that1 ,a movement is said to be natural1 because nature inclines thereto4 ,now this happens in two ways4 ,first1 so that it is entirely accomplished by nature1 without any operation of the apprehensive faculty3 thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire1 and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants4 ,secondly1 a movement is said to be natural1 if nature inclines thereto1 though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone3 since1 as stated above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #a71 the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle4 ,in this way1 even the acts of the apprehensive power1 such as understanding1 feeling1 and remembering1 as well as the movements of the animal appetite1 are sometimes said to be natural4 ,and in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear2 and it is distinguished from non-natural fear1 by reason of the diversity of its object4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 there is a fear of corruptive evil1 which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist2 and such fear is said to be natural4 ,again1 there is a fear of painful evil1 which is repugnant not to nature1 but to the desire of the appetite2 and such fear is not natural4 ,in this sense we have stated above 7,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #g7 that love1 desire1 and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural4 ,but in the first sense of the word natural1 we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural1 as love1 desire1 and hope2 whereas the others cannot be called natural4 ,the reason of this is because love and hatred1 desire and avoidance1 imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil2 which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also4 ,consequently there is a natural love2 while we may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge4 ,on the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements1 whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient4 ,this is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these passions 7thus we have said1 ,q4 #ca1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #a1 that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow71 wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful3 or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination3 for instance1 despair flies from good on account of some difficulty2 and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil2 both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature4 ,wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings4 ,thus the ,replies to the ,objections are evident4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,species of ,fear ,are ,suitably ,assigned8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ae72 namely1 laziness1 shamefacedness1 shame1 amazement1 stupor1 and anxiety4 ,because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 fear regards a saddening evil4 ,therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow4 ,now there are four species of sorrow1 as stated above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which consists in an action of our own is in our power4 ,but fear regards an evil that surpasses our power1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore laziness1 shamefacedness1 and shame1 which regard our own actions1 should not be reckoned as species of fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fear is of the future1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but shame regards a disgraceful deed already done1 as ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xx4 says4 ,therefore shame is not a species of fear4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 fear is only of evil4 ,but amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things1 whether good or evil4 ,therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth1 as stated in the beginning of ,metaph4 ,but fear leads to flight rather than to search4 ,therefore amazement is not a species of fear4 ,on the contrary suffices the authority of ,damascene and ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius 7,cf4 ,obj4 #a1 #c74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears1 so that it is irresistible4 ,now man's evil1 like his good1 may be considered either in his action or in external things4 ,in his action he has a twofold evil to fear4 ,first1 there is the toil that burdens his nature3 and hence arises laziness1 as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil4 ,secondly1 there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others4 ,and thus1 if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done1 there is shamefacedness2 if1 however1 it be a deed already done1 there is shame4 ,on the other hand1 the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways4 ,first by reason of its magnitude2 when1 that is to say1 a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge3 and then there is amazement4 ,secondly1 by reason of its being unwonted2 because1 to wit1 some unwonted evil arises before us1 and on that account is great in our estimation3 and then there is stupor1 which is caused by the representation of something unwonted4 ,thirdly1 by reason of its being unforeseen3 thus future misfortunes are feared1 and fear of this kind is called anxiety4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects1 but from the diversity of effects1 and for certain special reasons4 ,consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear1 which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a deed considered as being actually done1 is in the power of the doer4 ,but it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed1 and surpassing the faculty of the doer1 for which reason he shrinks from the deed4 ,it is in this sense that laziness1 shamefacedness1 and shame are reckoned as species of fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace3 and in this sense shame is a species of fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,not every amazement and stupor are species of fear1 but that amazement which is caused by a great evil1 and that stupor which arises from an unwonted evil4 ,or else we may say that1 just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work1 so amazement and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing1 whether good or evil3 so that amazement and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect1 as laziness does to external work4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,he who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him1 fearing to fall short of the truth1 but inquires afterwards3 whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present1 and to inquire afterwards4 ,wherefore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research3 whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto4 ,,question #db ,,of ,,the ,,object ,,of ,,fear 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the object of fear3 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether good or evil is the object of fear8 7#b7 ,whether evil of nature is the object of fear8 7#c7 ,whether the evil of sin is an object of fear8 7#d7 ,whether fear itself can be feared8 7#e7 ,whether sudden things are especially feared8 7#f7 ,whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,object of ,fear ,is ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that good is the object of fear4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #hc7 that we fear nothing save to lose what we love and possess1 or not to obtain that which we hope for4 ,but that which we love is good4 ,therefore fear regards good as its proper object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that power and to be above another is a thing to be feared4 ,but this is a good thing4 ,therefore good is the object of fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there can be no evil in ,god4 ,but we are commanded to fear ,god1 according to ,ps4 #cc3aj3 ,fear the ,lord1 all ye saints4 ,therefore even the good is an object of fear4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that fear is of future evil4 ,i answer that1 ,fear is a movement of the appetitive power4 ,now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #b3 and pursuit is of good1 while avoidance is of evil4 ,consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit1 has some good for its object3 and whatever movement implies avoidance1 has an evil for its object4 ,wherefore1 since fear implies an avoidance1 in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object4 ,it can1 however1 regard good also1 in so far as referable to evil4 ,this can be in two ways4 ,in one way1 inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good4 ,now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good4 ,wherefore1 since evil is shunned because it is evil1 it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof4 ,and in this sense ,augustine says that there is no cause for fear1 save loss of the good we love4 ,in another way1 good stands related to evil as its cause3 in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love3 and so1 just as hope1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #g71 regards two things1 namely1 the good to which it tends1 and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired good2 so also does fear regard two things1 namely1 the evil from which it shrinks1 and that good which1 by its power1 can inflict that evil4 ,in this way ,god is feared by man1 inasmuch as ,he can inflict punishment1 spiritual or corporal4 ,in this way1 too1 we fear the power of man2 especially when it has been thwarted1 or when it is unjust1 because then it is more likely to do us a harm4 ,in like manner one fears to be over another1 i4e4 to lean on another1 so that it is in his power to do us a harm3 thus a man fears another1 who knows him to be guilty of a crime1 lest he reveal it to others4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,evil of ,nature ,is an ,object of ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that fear makes us take counsel4 ,but we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #c4 ,therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man4 ,if therefore such like evils were an object of fear1 man would needs be always in fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nature does not move to contraries4 ,but evil of nature is an effect of nature4 ,therefore if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof1 this is not an effect of nature4 ,therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature2 and yet it seems that it should be4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #f7 that the most terrible of all things is death1 which is an evil of nature4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 fear is caused by the imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful4 ,now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will1 so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature3 and this is the evil of nature4 ,consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear4 ,but it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause2 and then it is called evil of nature1 not merely from being a privation of the good of nature1 but also from being an effect of nature2 such are natural death and other like defects4 ,but sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause2 such as violent death inflicted by an assailant4 ,in either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent1 and to a certain extent not4 ,for since fear arises from the imagination of future evil1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 whatever removes the imagination of the future evil1 removes fear also4 ,now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be4 ,first1 through being remote and far off3 for1 on account of the distance1 such a thing is considered as though it were not to be4 ,hence we either do not fear it1 or fear it but little2 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 we do not fear things that are very far off2 since all know that they shall die1 but as death is not near1 they heed it not4 ,secondly1 a future evil is considered as though it were not to be1 on account of its being inevitable1 wherefore we look upon it as already present4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that those who are already on the scaffold1 are not afraid1 seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape2 but in order that a man be afraid1 there must be some hope of escape for him4 ,consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future3 but if evil of nature1 that is corruptive1 be apprehended as near at hand1 and yet with some hope of escape1 then it will be feared4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature1 as stated above4 ,but in so far as it is an effect of nature1 although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely1 yet it may be possible to delay it4 ,and with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although evil of nature ever threatens1 yet it does not always threaten from near at hand3 and consequently it is not always feared4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature2 and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can4 ,accordingly1 from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils1 when present2 fear when threatening in the future4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,evil of ,sin ,is an ,object of ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear4 ,for ,augustine says on the canonical ,epistle of ,john 7,tract4 ix71 that by chaste fear man fears to be severed from ,god4 ,now nothing but sin severs us from ,god2 according to ,isa4 #ei3b3 ,your iniquities have divided between you and your ,god4 ,therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,cicero says 7,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #d1 #f7 that we fear when they are yet to come1 those things which give us pain when they are present4 ,but it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin4 ,therefore one can also fear the evil of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hope is contrary to fear4 ,but the good of virtue can be the object of hope1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 ix1 #d73 and the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3aj73 ,i have confidence in you in the ,lord1 that you will not be of another mind4 ,therefore fear can regard evil of sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 shame is a kind of fear1 as stated above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #d74 ,but shame regards a disgraceful deed1 which is an evil of sin4 ,therefore fear does so likewise4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that not all evils are feared1 for instance that someone be unjust or slow4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b71 as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain1 so the object of fear is a future evil1 arduous and not to be easily avoided4 ,from this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will1 is not an object of fear2 and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause4 ,now human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin3 and consequently evil of sin1 properly speaking1 is not an object of fear4 ,but since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause2 if this cause have a strong power of inclination1 in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin1 in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause3 as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men1 lest he be led by them to sin4 ,but1 properly speaking1 a man thus disposed1 fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature1 i4e4 as a voluntary act2 for considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,separation from ,god is a punishment resulting from sin3 and every punishment is1 in some way1 due to an extrinsic cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sorrow and fear agree in one point1 since each regards evil3 they differ1 however1 in two points4 ,first1 because sorrow is about present evil1 whereas fear is future evil4 ,secondly1 because sorrow1 being in the concupiscible faculty1 regards evil absolutely2 wherefore it can be about any evil1 great or small2 whereas fear1 being in the irascible part1 regards evil with the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty2 which difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will4 ,consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present1 make us fear when they are yet to come1 but only some things1 namely1 those that are difficult4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope is of good that is obtainable4 ,now one may obtain a good either of oneself1 or through another3 and so1 hope may be of an act of virtue1 which lies within our own power4 ,on the other hand1 fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power3 and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause2 while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b1 #c71 shame is not fear of the very act of sin1 but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom1 and which is due to an extrinsic cause4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,fear ,itself ,can ,be ,feared8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear cannot be feared4 ,for whatever is feared1 is prevented from being lost1 through fear thereof3 thus a man who fears to lose his health1 keeps it1 through fearing its loss4 ,if therefore a man be afraid of fear1 he will keep himself from fear by being afraid3 which seems absurd4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fear is a kind of flight4 ,but nothing flies from itself4 ,therefore fear cannot be the object of fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fear is about the future4 ,but fear is present to him that fears4 ,therefore it cannot be the object of his fear4 ,on the contrary1 ,a man can love his own love1 and can grieve at his own sorrow4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 he can fear his own fear4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 nothing can be an object of fear1 save what is due to an extrinsic cause2 but not that which ensues from our own will4 ,now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause1 and is partly subject to the will4 ,it is due to an extrinsic cause1 in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil4 ,in this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear1 i4e4 a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing1 through being assailed by some great evil4 ,it is subject to the will1 in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason2 wherefore man is able to drive fear away4 ,in this sense fear cannot be the object of fear1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cc74 ,lest1 however1 anyone make use of his arguments1 in order to prove that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear1 we must add a solution to the same4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every fear is identically the same2 there are various fears according to the various objects of fear4 ,nothing1 then1 prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing1 by fearing another1 so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which he has not4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil2 it does not follow that a thing flies from itself1 or that it is the same flight in both cases4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,on account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to 7ad #b7 a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,sudden ,things ,are ,especially ,feared8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared4 ,because1 as hope is about good things1 so fear is about evil things4 ,but experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things4 ,therefore it also adds to fear in evil things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that those are feared most1 not who are quick-tempered1 but who are gentle and cunning4 ,now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions4 ,therefore sudden things are less to be feared4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we think less about things that happen suddenly4 ,but the more we think about a thing1 the more we fear it2 hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 that some appear to be courageous through ignorance1 but as soon as they discover that the case is different from what they expected1 they run away4 ,therefore sudden things are feared less4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 ii1 #f73 ,fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden1 which endanger things beloved1 and takes forethought for their safety4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b71 the object of fear is an imminent evil1 which can be repelled1 but with difficulty4 ,now this is due to one of two causes3 to the greatness of the evil1 or to the weakness of him that fears2 while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes4 ,first1 it helps an imminent evil to seem greater4 ,because all material things1 whether good or evil1 the more we consider them1 the smaller they seem4 ,consequently1 just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time1 as ,cicero states 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iii1 #cj72 so1 too1 fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand4 ,secondly1 unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears1 in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil1 were it not for the evil taking him by surprise4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain4 ,consequently whatever increases a man's power1 is of a nature to increase hope1 and1 for the same reason1 to diminish fear1 since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled4 ,since1 therefore1 experience increases a man's power of action1 therefore1 as it increases hope1 so does it diminish fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger2 wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden1 as not to be foreseen4 ,on the other hand1 those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger2 wherefore the harm which may be impending from them1 cannot be foreseen1 but takes one by surprise4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher says that such men are feared more than others4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bodily good or evil1 considered in itself1 seems greater at first4 ,the reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary4 ,hence1 when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth1 he thinks more of his wealth on account of his previous poverty3 while1 on the other hand1 the rich man who suddenly becomes poor1 finds poverty all the more disagreeable4 ,for this reason sudden evil is feared more1 because it seems more to be evil4 ,however1 it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden2 for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush3 and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,those ,things ,are ,more ,feared1 for ,which ,there ,is ,no ,remedy8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that those things are not more to be feared1 for which there is no remedy4 ,because it is a condition of fear1 that there be some hope of safety1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,but an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape4 ,therefore such things are not feared at all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no remedy for the evil of death3 since1 in the natural course of things1 there is no return from death to life4 ,and yet death is not the most feared of all things1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e74 ,therefore those things are not feared most1 for which there is no remedy4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #f7 that a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day3 nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting3 and the same applies to evil4 ,but things that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things1 merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever4 ,consequently they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared4 ,on the contrary1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right 4 4 4 or for which there is no help1 or which are not easy4 ,i answer that1 ,the object of fear is evil3 consequently whatever tends to increase evil1 conduces to the increase of fear4 ,now evil is increased not only in its species of evil1 but also in respect of circumstances1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #c74 ,and of all the circumstances1 longlastingness1 or even everlastingness1 seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil4 ,because things that exist in time are measured1 in a way1 according to the duration of time3 wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time1 we should reckon the evil doubled1 if it be suffered for twice that length of time4 ,and accordingly1 to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time1 i4e4 for ever1 implies1 so to speak1 an infinite increase4 ,now those evils which1 after they have come1 cannot be remedied at all1 or at least not easily1 are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time3 for which reason they inspire the greatest fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,remedy for an evil is twofold4 ,one1 by which a future evil is warded off from coming4 ,if such a remedy be removed1 there is an end to hope and consequently to fear2 wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind4 ,the other remedy is one by which an already present evil is removed3 and of such a remedy we speak now4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although death be an evil without remedy1 yet1 since it threatens not from near1 it is not feared1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves1 i4e41 good specifically4 ,and such like good is no better for lasting long or for ever3 its goodness depends on its very nature4 ,,question #dc ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,fear 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of fear3 under which head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether love is the cause of fear8 7#b7 ,whether defect is the cause of fear8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,love ,is the ,cause of ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that love is not the cause of fear4 ,for that which leads to a thing is its cause4 ,but fear leads to the love of charity as ,augustine says on the canonical epistle of ,john 7,tract4 ix74 ,therefore fear is the cause of love1 and not conversely4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil4 ,but the dread of evil being caused by someone1 makes us hate rather than love him4 ,therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it has been stated above 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #c7 that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful4 ,but that which we do from love1 is done from our inmost heart4 ,therefore fear is not caused by love4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cc73 ,there can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love1 when we possess it1 or the failure to obtain what we hope for4 ,therefore all fear is caused by our loving something3 and consequently love is the cause of fear4 ,i answer that1 ,the objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial3 because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects1 as the aforesaid things do from their forms4 ,therefore1 just as whatever is a cause of the form1 is a cause of the thing constituted by that form1 so whatever is a cause1 in any way whatever1 of the object1 is a cause of the passion4 ,now a thing may be a cause of the object1 either by way of efficient cause1 or by way of material disposition4 ,thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined3 and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction1 or the suitableness1 or goodness1 or apprehension of that good thing2 while its cause by way of material disposition1 is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such4 ,accordingly1 as to the matter in question1 the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come1 near at hand and difficult to avoid4 ,therefore that which can inflict such an evil1 is the efficient cause of the object of fear1 and1 consequently1 of fear itself4 ,while that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him1 is a cause of fear and of its object1 by way of material disposition4 ,and thus it is that love causes fear3 since it is through his loving a certain good1 that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him1 and that consequently he fears it as an evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #a71 fear1 of itself and in the first place1 regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good3 and thus fear1 of itself1 is born of love4 ,but1 in the second place1 it regards the cause from which that evil ensues3 so that sometimes1 accidentally1 fear gives rise to love2 in so far as1 for instance1 through fear of ,god's punishments1 man keeps ,his commandments1 and thus begins to hope1 while hope leads to love1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #g74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he1 from whom evil is expected1 is indeed hated at first2 but afterwards1 when once we begin to hope for good from him1 we begin to love him4 ,but the good1 the contrary evil of which is feared1 was loved from the beginning4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared3 whereas love causes fear by way of material disposition1 as stated above4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,defect ,is the ,cause of ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that defect is not a cause of fear4 ,because those who are in power are very much feared4 ,but defect is contrary to power4 ,therefore defect is not a cause of fear4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme4 ,but such like do not fear as stated in ,rhet4 ii1 #e4 ,therefore defect is not a cause of fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 contests arise from strength not from defect4 ,but those who contend fear those who contend with them 7,rhet4 ii1 #e74 ,therefore defect is not a cause of fear4 ,on the contrary1 ,contraries ensue from contrary causes4 ,but wealth1 strength1 a multitude of friends1 and power drive fear away 7,rhet4 ii1 #e74 ,therefore fear is caused by lack of these4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 fear may be set down to a twofold cause3 one is by way of a material disposition1 on the part of him that fears2 the other is by way of efficient cause1 on the part of the person feared4 ,as to the first then1 some defect is1 of itself1 the cause of fear3 for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil4 ,and yet1 in order to cause fear1 this defect must be according to a measure4 ,for the defect which causes fear of a future evil1 is less than the defect caused by evil present1 which is the object of sorrow4 ,and still greater would be the defect1 if perception of the evil1 or love of the good whose contrary is feared1 were entirely absent4 ,but as to the second1 power and strength are1 of themselves1 the cause of fear3 because it is owing to the fact that the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful1 that its effect cannot be repulsed4 ,it may happen1 however1 in this respect1 that some defect causes fear accidentally1 in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another2 for instance1 by reason of injustice1 either because that other has already done him a harm1 or because he fears to be harmed by him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is true of the cause of fear1 on the part of the efficient cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who are already being executed1 are actually suffering from a present evil2 wherefore their defect exceeds the measure of fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those who contend with one another are afraid1 not on account of the power which enables them to contend3 but on account of the lack of power1 owing to which they are not confident of victory4 ,,question #dd ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,fear 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the effects of fear3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether fear causes contraction8 7#b7 ,whether it makes men suitable for counsel8 7#c7 ,whether it makes one tremble8 7#d7 ,whether it hinders action8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,fear ,causes ,contraction8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear does not cause contraction4 ,for when contraction takes place1 the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn inwardly4 ,but accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body1 dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring1 as may be seen in those who are angered3 while the contrary happens in those who are afraid4 ,therefore fear does not cause contraction4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 when1 as a result of contraction1 the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts1 man cries out1 as may be seen in those who are in pain4 ,but those who fear utter nothing3 on the contrary they lose their speech4 ,therefore fear does not cause contraction4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 shame is a kind of fear1 as stated above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #d74 ,but those who are ashamed blush1 as ,cicero 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #h71 and the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #i7 observe4 ,but blushing is an indication1 not of contraction1 but of the reverse4 ,therefore contraction is not an effect of fear4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bc7 that fear is a power according to systole1 i4e4 contraction4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #e71 in the passions of the soul1 the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power1 while the bodily transmutation is the material element4 ,both of these are mutually proportionate2 and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement4 ,now1 as to the appetitive movement of the soul1 fear implies a certain contraction3 the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel1 as stated above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b74 ,but that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power1 as stated above 7,q4 #dc1 ,a4 #b73 and the weaker a power is1 the fewer the things to which it extends4 ,wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite4 ,thus we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly1 on account of the lack of power3 and again we see the inhabitants of a city1 when seized with fear1 leave the outskirts1 and1 as far as possible1 make for the inner quarters4 ,it is in resemblance to this contraction1 which pertains to the appetite of the soul1 that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxvii1 #c71 although in those who fear1 the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of the body1 yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid4 ,for in those who are angry1 by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits1 which result from the craving for vengeance1 the inward movement has an upward direction3 wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart3 the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking4 ,but in those who are afraid1 on account of the condensation caused by cold1 the vital spirits have a downward movement2 the said cold being due to the imagined lack of power4 ,consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it3 the result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack1 but is more inclined to run away4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to everyone that is in pain1 whether man or animal1 it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that causes pain but its presence3 thus we observe that animals1 when in pain1 attack with their jaws or with their horns4 ,now the greatest help for all purposes1 in animals1 is heat and vital spirits3 wherefore when they are in pain1 their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them1 in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxvii1 #i7 when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together within1 they require to find a vent in the voice3 for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud4 ,on the other hand1 in those who are afraid1 the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards1 as stated above 7ad #a73 wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth3 the result being that fear makes its subject speechless4 ,for this reason1 too1 fear makes its subject tremble1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxvii1 #a1 #f1 #g74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul1 but also to nature4 ,consequently in such like fear1 there is contraction not only in the appetite1 but also in the corporeal nature3 for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death1 it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body1 as though it were threatened by a natural death4 ,hence it is that those who are in fear of death turn pale 7,ethic4 iv1 #i74 ,but the evil that shame fears1 is contrary1 not to nature1 but only to the appetite of the soul4 ,consequently there results a contraction in this appetite1 but not in the corporeal nature2 in fact1 the soul1 as though contracted in itself1 is free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement1 so that they spread to the outward parts of the body3 the result being that those who are ashamed blush4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,fear ,makes ,one ,suitable for ,counsel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel4 ,for the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel1 and a hindrance thereto4 ,but fear hinders counsel3 because every passion disturbs repose1 which is requisite for the good use of reason4 ,therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 counsel is an act of reason1 in thinking and deliberating about the future4 ,but a certain fear drives away all thought1 and dislocates the mind1 as ,cicero observes 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #h74 ,therefore fear does not conduce to counsel1 but hinders it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil1 so do we1 in order to attain good things4 ,but whereas fear is of evil to be avoided1 so is hope of good things to be obtained4 ,therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel1 than hope is4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that fear makes men of counsel4 ,i answer that1 ,a man of counsel may be taken in two ways4 ,first1 from his being willing or anxious to take counsel4 ,and thus fear makes men of counsel4 ,because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c71 we take counsel on great matters1 because therein we distrust ourselves4 ,now things which make us afraid1 are not simply evil1 but have a certain magnitude1 both because they seem difficult to repel1 and because they are apprehended as near to us1 as stated above 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #b74 ,wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid4 ,secondly1 a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel3 and in this sense1 neither fear nor any passion makes men of counsel4 ,because when a man is affected by a passion1 things seem to him greater or smaller than they really are3 thus to a lover1 what he loves seems better2 to him that fears1 what he fears seems more dreadful4 ,consequently owing to the want of right judgment1 every passion1 considered in itself1 hinders the faculty of giving good counsel4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the stronger a passion is1 the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it4 ,consequently1 when fear is intense1 man does indeed wish to take counsel1 but his thoughts are so disturbed1 that he can find no counsel4 ,if1 however1 the fear be slight1 so as to make a man wish to take counsel1 without gravely disturbing the reason2 it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel1 by reason of his ensuing carefulness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope also makes man a good counsellor3 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e71 no man takes counsel in matters he despairs of1 nor about impossible things1 as he says in ,ethic4 iii1 #c4 ,but fear incites to counsel more than hope does4 ,because hope is of good things1 as being possible of attainment2 whereas fear is of evil things1 as being difficult to repel1 so that fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does4 ,and it is in matters of difficulty1 especially when we distrust ourselves1 that we take counsel1 as stated above4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,fear ,makes ,one ,tremble8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear4 ,because trembling is occasioned by cold2 thus we observe that a cold person trembles4 ,now fear does not seem to make one cold1 but rather to cause a parching heat3 a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty1 especially if their fear be very great1 as in the case of those who are being led to execution4 ,therefore fear does not cause trembling4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat2 hence laxative medicines are generally warm4 ,but these evacuations are often caused by fear4 ,therefore fear apparently causes heat2 and consequently does not cause trembling4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in fear1 the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body4 ,if1 therefore1 man trembles in his outward parts1 through the heat being withdrawn thus2 it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members4 ,but such is not the case4 ,therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear4 ,on the contrary1 ,cicero says 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #h7 that fear is followed by trembling1 pallor and chattering of the teeth4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body1 the result being that the outer parts become cold2 and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts1 being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members3 which lack of power is due to the want of heat1 which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 #d4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts1 the inward heat increases1 especially in the inferior or nutritive parts4 ,consequently the humid element being spent1 thirst ensues2 sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels1 and urinary or even seminal evacuation4 ,or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxii1 #aa74 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in fear1 heat abandons the heart1 with a downward movement3 hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles1 as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides4 ,hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech1 on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart4 ,the lower lip1 too1 and the lower jaw tremble1 through their connection with the heart2 which explains the chattering of the teeth4 ,for the same reason the arms and hands tremble4 ,or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile4 ,for which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid1 according to ,isa4 #ce3c3 ,strengthen ye the feeble hands1 and confirm the trembling ,vulg43 'weak' knees4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,fear ,hinders ,action8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fear hinders action4 ,for action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason1 which directs action4 ,but fear disturbs reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore fear hinders action4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those who fear while doing anything1 are more apt to fail3 thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft1 easily falls through fear2 whereas1 if he were to walk on the same plank down below1 he would not fall1 through not being afraid4 ,therefore fear hinders action4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 laziness or sloth is a kind of fear4 ,but laziness hinders action4 ,therefore fear does too4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,phil4 #b3ab73 ,with fear and trembling work out your salvation3 and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work4 ,therefore fear does not hinder a good action4 ,i answer that1 ,man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover1 but by the bodily members as instruments4 ,now action may be hindered both by defect of the instrument1 and by defect of the principal mover4 ,on the part of the bodily instruments1 fear1 considered in itself1 is always apt to hinder exterior action1 on account of the outward members being deprived1 through fear1 of their heat4 ,but on the part of the soul1 if the fear be moderate1 without much disturbance of the reason1 it conduces to working well1 in so far as it causes a certain solicitude1 and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention4 ,if1 however1 fear increases so much as to disturb the reason1 it hinders action even on the part of the soul4 ,but of such a fear the ,apostle does not speak4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he that falls from a plank placed aloft1 suffers a disturbance of his imagination1 through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,everyone in fear shuns that which he fears3 and therefore1 since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome1 it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it4 ,but fear of other things conduces to action1 in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears4 ,,question #de ,,of ,,daring 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider daring3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether daring is contrary to fear8 7#b7 ,how is daring related to hope8 7#c7 ,of the cause of daring2 7#d7 ,of its effect4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,daring ,is ,contrary to ,fear8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that daring is not contrary to fear4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ca7 that daring is a vice4 ,now vice is contrary to virtue4 ,since1 therefore1 fear is not a virtue but a passion1 it seems that daring is not contrary to fear4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to one thing there is one contrary4 ,but hope is contrary to fear4 ,therefore daring is not contrary to fear4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every passion excludes its opposite4 ,but fear excludes safety2 for ,augustine says 7,confess4 ii1 #f7 that fear takes forethought for safety4 ,therefore safety is contrary to fear4 ,therefore daring is not contrary to fear4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that daring is contrary to fear4 ,i answer that1 ,it is of the essence of contraries to be farthest removed from one another1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 #d4 ,now that which is farthest removed from fear1 is daring3 since fear turns away from the future hurt1 on account of its victory over him that fears it2 whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger4 ,consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,anger1 daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways4 ,first1 as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect of some object1 good or bad3 and thus they are names of passions4 ,secondly1 as denoting besides this movement1 a straying from the order of reason3 and thus they are names of vices4 ,it is in this sense that ,augustine speaks of daring3 but we are speaking of it in the first sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to one thing1 in the same respect1 there are not several contraries2 but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries4 ,accordingly it has been said above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #d7 that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety3 one1 according to the opposition of good and evil1 and thus fear is contrary to hope3 the other1 according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal1 and thus daring is contrary to fear1 and despair contrary to hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,safety does not denote something contrary to fear1 but merely the exclusion of fear3 for he is said to be safe1 who fears not4 ,wherefore safety is opposed to fear1 as a privation3 while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary4 ,and as contrariety implies privation1 so daring implies safety4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,daring ,ensues from ,hope8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that daring does not ensue from hope4 ,because daring regards evil and fearful things1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #g4 ,but hope regards good things1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order4 ,therefore daring does not ensue from hope4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as daring is contrary to fear1 so is despair contrary to hope4 ,but fear does not ensue from despair3 in fact1 despair excludes fear1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e74 ,therefore daring does not result from hope4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 daring is intent on something good1 viz4 victory4 ,but it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult4 ,therefore daring is the same as hope2 and consequently does not result from it4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h7 that those are hopeful are full of daring4 ,therefore it seems that daring ensues from hope4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have often stated 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #a71 all these passions belong to the appetitive power4 ,now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance4 ,again1 pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else4 ,by reason of itself1 good is the object of pursuit1 and evil1 the object of avoidance3 but by reason of something else1 evil can be the object of pursuit1 through some good attaching to it2 and good can be the object of avoidance1 through some evil attaching to it4 ,now that which is by reason of something else1 follows that which is by reason of itself4 ,consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good2 and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil4 ,now these four things belong to four passions1 since pursuit of good belongs to hope1 avoidance of evil to fear1 the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring1 and the avoidance of good to despair4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that daring results from hope2 since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear1 that one attacks it boldly4 ,but despair results from fear3 since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument would hold1 if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects4 ,but because evil has a certain relation to good1 since it comes after good1 as privation comes after habit2 consequently daring which pursues evil1 comes after hope which pursues good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although good1 absolutely speaking1 is prior to evil1 yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good2 just as the pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil4 ,consequently just as hope precedes daring1 so fear precedes despair4 ,and just as fear does not always lead to despair1 but only when it is intense2 so hope does not always lead to daring1 save only when it is strong4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the object of daring is an evil to which1 in the estimation of the daring man1 the good of victory is conjoined2 yet daring regards the evil1 and hope regards the conjoined good4 ,in like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from1 while fear regards the conjoined evil4 ,hence1 properly speaking1 daring is not a part of hope1 but its effect3 just as despair is an effect1 not a part1 of fear4 ,for this reason1 too1 daring cannot be a principal passion4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,some ,defect ,is a ,cause of ,daring8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that some defect is a cause of daring4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxvii1 #d7 that lovers of wine are strong and daring4 ,but from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness4 ,therefore daring is caused by a defect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that those who have no experience of danger are bold4 ,but want of experience is a defect4 ,therefore daring is caused by a defect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring2 like the beasts when beaten1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #e4 ,but the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect4 ,therefore daring is caused by a defect4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that the cause of daring is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh1 and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off4 ,but anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of the means of safety1 or the proximity of something to be feared4 ,therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b7 daring results from hope and is contrary to fear3 wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear1 is a cause of daring4 ,since1 however1 fear and hope1 and also daring1 being passions1 consist in a movement of the appetite1 and in a certain bodily transmutation2 a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways1 whether by raising hope1 or by banishing fear2 in one way1 in the part of the appetitive movement2 in another way1 on the part of the bodily transmutation4 ,on the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension1 hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon victory as possible4 ,such things regard either our own power1 as bodily strength1 experience of dangers1 abundance of wealth1 and the like2 or they regard the powers of others1 such as having a great number of friends or any other means of help1 especially if a man trust in the ,divine assistance3 wherefore those are more daring1 with whom it is well in regard to godlike things1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e74 ,fear is banished1 in this way1 by the removal of threatening causes of fear2 for instance1 by the fact that a man has no enemies1 through having harmed nobody1 so that he is not aware of any imminent danger2 since those especially appear to be threatened by danger1 who have harmed others4 ,on the part of the bodily transmutation1 daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear1 by those things which raise the temperature about the heart4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,part4 ,animal4 iii1 #d7 that those whose heart is small in size1 are more daring2 while animals whose heart is large are timid2 because the natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart2 just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it does a small house4 ,he says also 7,de ,problem4 xxvii1 #d71 that those whose lungs contain much blood1 are more daring1 through the heat in the heart that results therefrom4 ,he says also in the same passage that lovers of wine are more daring1 on account of the heat of the wine3 hence it has been said above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #f7 that drunkenness conduces to hope1 since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope1 by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,drunkenness causes daring1 not through being a defect1 but through dilating the heart3 and again through making a man think greatly of himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who have no experience of dangers are more daring1 not on account of a defect1 but accidentally1 i4e4 in so far as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings1 nor the dangers that threaten4 ,hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives rise to daring4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 those who have been wronged are courageous1 because they think that ,god comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly4 ,hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally1 i4e4 in so far as some excellence attaches thereto1 real or imaginary1 either in oneself or in another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,brave ,are ,more ,eager at ,first ,than in the ,midst of ,danger8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger4 ,because trembling is caused by fear1 which is contrary to daring1 as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #c74 ,but the daring sometimes tremble at first1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxvii1 #c74 ,therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 passion is intensified by an increase in its object3 thus since a good is lovable1 what is better is yet more lovable4 ,but the object of daring is something difficult4 ,therefore the greater the difficulty1 the greater the daring4 ,but danger is more arduous and difficult when present4 ,it is then therefore that daring is greatest4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds4 ,but anger causes daring2 for the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #e7 that anger makes man bold4 ,therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten1 then is he most daring4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in ,ethic4 iii1 #g that the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger1 yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof4 ,i answer that1 ,daring1 being a movement of the sensitive appetite1 follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty4 ,but the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons1 nor can it inquire into circumstances2 its judgment is instantaneous4 ,now it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation3 hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger2 so that when he comes to experience the danger1 he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected1 and so gives way4 ,on the other hand1 reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation4 ,consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason1 at first seem slack1 because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation4 ,yet when they are in the midst of danger1 they experience nothing unforeseen1 but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated2 wherefore they are more persevering4 ,moreover1 it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will1 however great the danger may prove3 whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,trembling does occur in men of daring1 on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body1 as occurs also in those who are afraid4 ,but in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart2 whereas in those who are afraid1 it withdraws to the inferior parts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object of love is good simply1 wherefore if it be increased1 love is increased simply4 ,but the object of daring is a compound of good and evil2 and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good4 ,if1 therefore1 so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope1 the movement of daring does not ensue1 but fails4 ,but if the movement of daring does ensue1 the greater the danger1 the greater is the daring considered to be4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope1 as we shall see later on 7,q4 #df1 ,a4 #a74 ,consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory1 anger does not ensue4 ,it is true1 however1 that if anger does ensue1 there will be greater daring4 ,,question #df ,,of ,,anger1 ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider anger3 and 7#a7 anger in itself2 7#b7 the cause of anger and its remedy2 7#c7 the effect of anger4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether anger is a special passion8 7#b7 ,whether the object of anger is good or evil8 7#c7 ,whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty8 7#d7 ,whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason8 7#e7 ,whether anger is more natural than desire8 7#f7 ,whether anger is more grievous than hatred8 7#g7 ,whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice8 7#h7 ,of the species of anger4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,anger ,is a ,special ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger is not a special passion4 ,for the irascible power takes its name from anger 7ira74 ,but there are several passions in this power1 not only one4 ,therefore anger is not one special passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to every special passion there is a contrary passion2 as is evident by going through them one by one4 ,but no passion is contrary to anger1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore anger is not a special passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one special passion does not include another4 ,but anger includes several passions3 since it accompanies sorrow1 pleasure1 and hope1 as the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #b74 ,therefore anger is not a special passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 calls anger a special passion3 and so does ,cicero 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #g74 ,i answer that1 ,a thing is said to be general in two ways4 ,first1 by predication2 thus animal is general in respect of all animals4 ,secondly1 by causality2 thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below1 according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,because just as a genus contains potentially many differences1 according to a likeness of matter2 so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its active power4 ,now it happens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes2 and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect1 we may say that1 in yet a third way1 an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes1 has a certain generality1 inasmuch as several causes are1 in a fashion1 actually existing therein4 ,accordingly in the first way1 anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,in like manner1 neither is it in the second way3 since it is not a cause of the other passions4 ,but in this way1 love may be called a general passion1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #g1 #i71 because love is the primary root of all the other passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d74 ,but1 in a third way1 anger may be called a general passion1 inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions4 ,because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted1 and unless there be desire and hope of revenge3 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b71 the angry man hopes to punish2 since he craves for revenge as being possible4 ,consequently if the person1 who inflicted the injury1 excel very much1 anger does not ensue1 but only sorrow1 as ,avicenna states 7,de ,anima iv1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the irascible power takes its name from ira 7anger71 not because every movement of that power is one of anger2 but because all its movements terminate in anger2 and because1 of all these movements1 anger is the most patent4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions1 i4e4 by hope1 which is of good1 and by sorrow1 which is of evil1 it includes in itself contrariety3 and consequently it has no contrary outside itself4 ,thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety1 except that of the simple colors from which they are made4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,anger includes several passions1 not indeed as a genus includes several species2 but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,object of ,anger ,is ,good or ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the object of anger is evil4 ,for ,gregory of ,nyssa says 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxi4 that anger is the sword-bearer of desire1 inasmuch1 to wit1 as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire4 ,but an obstacle has the character of evil4 ,therefore anger regards evil as its object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 anger and hatred agree in their effect1 since each seeks to inflict harm on another4 ,but hatred regards evil as its object1 as stated above 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore anger does also4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anger arises from sorrow2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #f7 that anger acts with sorrow4 ,but evil is the object of sorrow4 ,therefore it is also the object of anger4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 ii1 #f7 that anger craves for revenge4 ,but the desire for revenge is a desire for something good3 since revenge belongs to justice4 ,therefore the object of anger is good4 ,moreover1 anger is always accompanied by hope1 wherefore it causes pleasure1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b74 ,but the object of hope and of pleasure is good4 ,therefore good is also the object of anger4 ,i answer that1 ,the movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power4 ,now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in two ways4 ,first1 by way of an incomplex object1 as when we understand what a man is2 secondly1 by way of a complex object1 as when we understand that whiteness is in a man4 ,consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil3 by way of a simple and incomplex object1 when the appetite simply follows and adheres to good1 or recoils from evil3 and such movements are desire1 hope1 pleasure1 sorrow1 and so forth3 by way of a complex object1 as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in1 or being done to1 another1 either seeking this or recoiling from it4 ,this is evident in the case of love and hatred3 for we love someone1 in so far as we wish some good to be in him2 and we hate someone1 in so far as we wish some evil to be in him4 ,it is the same with anger2 for when a man is angry1 he wishes to be avenged on someone4 ,hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency3 viz4 to vengeance itself1 which it desires and hopes for as being a good1 wherefore it takes pleasure in it2 and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance1 as to something contrary and hurtful1 which bears the character of evil4 ,we must1 however1 observe a twofold difference in this respect1 between anger on the one side1 and hatred and love on the other4 ,the first difference is that anger always regards two objects3 whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object1 as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind1 or to hate it4 ,the second difference is1 that both the objects of love are good3 since the lover wishes good to someone1 as to something agreeable to himself3 while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil3 for the man who hates1 wishes evil to someone1 as to something disagreeable to him4 ,whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil1 viz4 the noxious person1 on whom it seeks to be avenged4 ,consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,anger ,is in the ,concupiscible ,faculty8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty4 ,for ,cicero says 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #i7 that anger is a kind of desire4 ,but desire is in the concupiscible faculty4 ,therefore anger is too4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says in his ,rule1 that anger grows into hatred3 and ,cicero says 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #i7 that hatred is inveterate anger4 ,but hatred1 like love1 is a concupiscible passion4 ,therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 and ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxi4 say that anger is made up of sorrow and desire4 ,both of these are in the concupiscible faculty4 ,therefore anger is a concupiscible passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,the concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty4 ,if1 therefore1 anger were in the concupiscible power1 the irascible would not take its name from it4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a71 the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty1 in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered1 whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness4 ,now it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that anger regards two objects3 viz4 the vengeance that it seeks2 and the person on whom it seeks vengeance2 and in respect of both1 anger requires a certain arduousness3 for the movement of anger does not arise1 unless there be some magnitude about both these objects2 since we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,rhet4 ii1 #b74 ,it is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible1 but in the irascible faculty4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good1 without discriminating between that which is arduous and that which is not4 ,accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire1 inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance4 ,in this sense1 however1 desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,anger is said to grow into hatred1 not as though the same passion which at first was anger1 afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate2 but by a process of causality4 ,for anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire1 not as though they were its parts1 but because they are its causes3 and it has been said above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b7 that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,anger ,requires an ,act of ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger does not require an act of reason4 ,for1 since anger is a passion1 it is in the sensitive appetite4 ,but the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension1 not of reason1 but of the sensitive faculty4 ,therefore anger does not require an act of reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 dumb animals are devoid of reason3 and yet they are seen to be angry4 ,therefore anger does not require an act of reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 drunkenness fetters the reason2 whereas it is conducive to anger4 ,therefore anger does not require an act of reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that anger listens to reason somewhat4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 anger is a desire for vengeance4 ,now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that anger1 as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person1 is therefore immediately exasperated4 ,now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason4 ,therefore anger1 in a fashion1 requires an act of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways4 ,in the first way1 it follows the reason in so far as the reason commands3 and thus the will follows reason1 wherefore it is called the rational appetite4 ,in another way1 it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces1 and thus anger follows reason4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 xxviii1 #c7 that anger follows reason1 not in obedience to reason's command1 but as a result of reason's denouncing the injury4 ,because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason1 not immediately but through the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the ,divine ,reason1 in virtue of which they are gifted with movements1 both internal and external1 like unto rational movements1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #f1 anger listens somewhat to reason in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted1 but listens not perfectly1 because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance4 ,anger1 therefore1 requires an act of reason2 and yet proves a hindrance to reason4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,problem4 iii1 #b1 #bg7 that whose who are very drunk1 so as to be incapable of the use of reason1 do not get angry3 but those who are slightly drunk1 do get angry1 through being still able1 though hampered1 to form a judgment of reason4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,anger ,is ,more ,natural ,than ,desire8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger is not more natural than desire4 ,because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal4 ,but gentleness is contrary to anger1 as the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #c74 ,therefore anger is no more natural than desire1 in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 reason is contrasted with nature3 since those things that act according to reason1 are not said to act according to nature4 ,now anger requires an act of reason1 but desire does not1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #f4 ,therefore desire is more natural than anger4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anger is a craving for vengeance3 while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch1 viz4 for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures4 ,but these things are more natural to man than vengeance4 ,therefore desire is more natural than anger4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that anger is more natural than desire4 ,i answer that1 ,by natural we mean that which is caused by nature1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #a4 ,consequently the question as to whether a particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion4 ,now the cause of a passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #b71 may be considered in two ways3 first1 on the part of the object2 secondly1 on the part of the subject4 ,if then we consider the cause of anger and of desire1 on the part of the object1 thus desire1 especially of pleasures of the table1 and of sexual pleasures1 is more natural than anger2 in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance4 ,if1 however1 we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject1 thus anger1 in a manner1 is more natural2 and1 in a manner1 desire is more natural4 ,because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic1 or as to the specific nature1 or again as to the particular temperament of the individual4 ,if then we consider the generic nature1 i4e4 the nature of this man considered as an animal2 thus desire is more natural than anger2 because it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual4 ,if1 however1 we consider the specific nature1 i4e4 the nature of this man as a rational being2 then anger is more natural to man than desire1 in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 that revenge which pertains to anger is more natural to man than meekness3 for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful4 ,and if we consider the nature of the individual1 in respect of his particular temperament1 thus anger is more natural than desire2 for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger1 more than desire1 or any other passion1 is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire1 which tendencies result from a man's individual temperament4 ,because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament2 and of all the humors1 the bile moves quickest2 for it is like fire4 ,consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with anger1 than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire1 is inflamed with desire3 and for this reason the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child1 than a disposition to desire4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body1 and the reason4 ,on the part of the bodily temperament1 a man1 considered specifically1 does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion1 on account of the moderation of his temperament4 ,but other animals1 for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition1 are naturally disposed to some excess of passion1 such as the lion in daring1 the hound in anger1 the hare in fear1 and so forth4 ,on the part of reason1 however1 it is natural to man1 both to be angry and to be gentle3 in so far as reason somewhat causes anger1 by denouncing the injury which causes anger2 and somewhat appeases anger1 in so far as the angry man does not listen perfectly to the command of reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reason itself belongs to the nature of man3 wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason1 it follows that it is1 in a manner1 natural to man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,anger ,is ,more ,grievous ,than ,hatred8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred4 ,for it is written 7,prov4 #bg3d7 that anger hath no mercy1 nor fury when it breaketh forth4 ,but hatred sometimes has mercy4 ,therefore anger is more grievous than hatred4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it1 than merely to suffer it4 ,but when a man hates1 he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil3 whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d74 ,therefore1 anger is more grievous than hatred4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up3 thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused by several acts4 ,but anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions1 as stated above 7,a4 #a73 whereas hatred is not4 ,therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine1 in his ,rule1 compares hatred to a beam1 but anger to a mote4 ,i answer that1 ,the species and nature of a passion are taken from its object4 ,now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of hatred2 since1 just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates1 so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry4 ,but there is a difference of aspect3 for the hater wishes evil to his enemy1 as evil1 whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry1 not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good1 that is1 in so far as he reckons it as just1 since it is a means of vengeance4 ,wherefore also it has been said above 7,a4 #b7 that hatred implies application of evil to evil1 whereas anger denotes application of good to evil4 ,now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice1 is a lesser evil1 than simply to seek evil to someone4 ,because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice1 may be according to the virtue of justice1 if it be in conformity with the order of reason2 and anger fails only in this1 that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance4 ,consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in anger and hatred two points may be considered3 namely1 the thing desired1 and the intensity of the desire4 ,as to the thing desired1 anger has more mercy than hatred has4 ,for since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake1 it is satisfied with no particular measure of evil3 because those things that are desired for their own sake1 are desired without measure1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4 i1 #c71 instancing a miser with regard to riches4 ,hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #ab3af73 ,an enemy 4 4 4 if he find an opportunity1 will not be satisfied with blood4 ,anger1 on the other hand1 seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance4 ,consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the angry man1 then he has mercy4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that the angry man is appeased if many evils befall1 whereas the hater is never appeased4 ,as to the intensity of the desire1 anger excludes mercy more than hatred does2 because the movement of anger is more impetuous1 through the heating of the bile4 ,hence the passage quoted continues3 ,who can bear the violence of one provoked8 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above1 an angry man wishes evil to someone1 in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance4 ,now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment3 and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will1 painful1 and inflicted for some fault4 ,consequently an angry man desires this1 that the person whom he is hurting1 may feel it and be in pain1 and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the other4 ,the hater1 on the other hand1 cares not for all this1 since he desires another's evil as such4 ,it is not true1 however1 that an evil is worse through giving pain3 because injustice and imprudence1 although evil1 yet1 being voluntary1 do not grieve those in whom they are1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,rhet4 ii1 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which proceeds from several causes1 is more settled when these causes are of one kind3 but it may be that one cause prevails over many others4 ,now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does4 ,because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted2 whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man1 by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him4 ,consequently1 as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit1 so anger is less lasting than hatred2 although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that hatred is more incurable than anger4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,anger ,is ,only ,towards ,those to ,whom ,one ,has an ,obligation of ,justice8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice4 ,for there is no justice between man and irrational beings4 ,and yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings2 thus1 out of anger1 a writer throws away his pen1 or a rider strikes his horse4 ,therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no justice towards oneself 4 4 4 nor is there justice towards one's own 7,ethic4 v1 #f74 ,but sometimes a man is angry with himself2 for instance1 a penitent1 on account of his sin2 hence it is written 7,ps4 #d3e73 ,be ye angry and sin not4 ,therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class1 or a whole community3 for instance1 when the state injures an individual4 ,but anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual1 as the ,philosopher states 7,rhet4 ii1 #d74 ,therefore properly speaking1 anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice4 ,the contrary1 however1 may be gathered from the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 ii1 #b1 #c74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #f71 anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance4 ,consequently1 anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust3 since vengeance is an act of justice1 and wrong-doing is an act of injustice4 ,therefore both on the part of the cause1 viz4 the harm done by another1 and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man1 it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d1 ad #b71 anger1 though it follows an act of reason1 can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason1 in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action4 ,since then in man there is both reason and imagination1 the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways4 ,first1 when only his imagination denounces the injury3 and1 in this way1 man is aroused to a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings1 which movement is like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them4 ,secondly1 by the reason denouncing the injury3 and thus1 according to the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 ii1 #c71 it is impossible to be angry with insensible things1 or with the dead3 both because they feel no pain1 which is1 above all1 what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry3 and because there is no question of vengeance on them1 since they can do us no harm4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #aa71 metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and himself1 in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul4 ,and in this sense a man is said to be avenged on himself1 and consequently1 to be angry with himself4 ,but properly1 and in accordance with the nature of things1 a man is never angry with himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 assigns as one difference between hatred and anger1 that hatred may be felt towards a class1 as we hate the entire class of thieves2 whereas anger is directed only towards an individual4 ,the reason is that hatred arises from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition2 and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular4 ,anger1 on the other hand1 ensues from someone having injured us by his action4 ,now all actions are the deeds of individuals3 and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual4 ,when the whole state hurts us1 the whole state is reckoned as one individual 99,cf4 ,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #f4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,species of ,anger ,are ,suitably ,assigned8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 unsuitably assigns three species of anger--wrath1 ill-will and rancor4 ,for no genus derives its specific differences from accidents4 ,but these three are diversified in respect of an accident3 because the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath 7cholos71 if anger continue it is called ill-will 7menis72 while rancor 7kotos7 is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance4 ,therefore these are not different species of anger4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,cicero says 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv1 #i7 that excandescentia 7irascibility7 is what the ,greeks call thymosis1 and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently2 while according to ,damascene thymosis1 is the same as kotos 7rancor74 ,therefore kotos does not bide its time for taking vengeance1 but in course of time spends itself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxi1 #d7 gives three degrees of anger1 namely1 anger without utterance1 anger with utterance1 and anger with perfection of speech1 corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by ,our ,lord 7,matt4 #e3bb73 ,whosoever is angry with his brother 7thus implying anger without utterance71 and then1 whosoever shall say to his brother1 ',raca' 7implying anger with utterance yet without full expression71 and lastly1 whosoever shall say ',thou fool' 7where we have perfection of speech74 ,therefore ,damascene's division is imperfect1 since it takes no account of utterance4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 and ,gregory of ,nyssa 99,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom4 xxi44 ,i answer that1 ,the species of anger given by ,damascene and ,gregory of ,nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger4 ,this happens in three ways4 ,first from facility of the movement itself1 and he calls this kind of anger cholos 7bile7 because it quickly aroused4 ,secondly1 on the part of the grief that causes anger1 and which dwells some time in the memory2 this belongs to menis 7ill-will7 which is derived from menein 7to dwell74 ,thirdly1 on the part of that which the angry man seeks1 viz4 vengeance2 and this pertains to kotos 7rancor7 which never rests until it is avenged 99,eph4 #d3ca3 ,let all bitterness and anger and indignation 4 4 4 be put away from you44 ,hence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 calls some angry persons akrocholoi 7choleric71 because they are easily angered2 some he calls pikroi 7bitter71 because they retain their anger for a long time2 and some he calls chalepoi 7ill-tempered71 because they never rest until they have retaliated 99,cf4 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aeh1 ,a4 #e4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger2 and consequently nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,irascibility1 which ,cicero mentions1 seems to pertain to the first species of anger1 which consists in a certain quickness of temper1 rather than to rancor 7furor74 ,and there is no reason why the ,greek thymosis1 which is denoted by the ,latin furor1 should not signify both quickness to anger1 and firmness of purpose in being avenged4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger2 and not according to degrees of perfection in the very movement of anger4 ,,question #dg ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,that ,,provokes ,,anger1 ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,remedies ,,of ,,anger 7,in ,four ,articles7 99,there is no further mention of these remedies in the text1 except in ,a4 #d4 ,we must now consider the cause that provokes anger1 and its remedies4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry8 7#b7 ,whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger8 7#c7 ,of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person2 7#d7 ,of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,motive of ,anger ,is ,always ,something ,done ,against the ,one ,who ,is ,angry8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry4 ,because man1 by sinning1 can do nothing against ,god2 since it is written 7,job #ce3f73 ,if thy iniquities be multiplied1 what shalt thou do against ,him8 ,and yet ,god is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin1 according to ,ps4 #aje3dj3 ,the ,lord was exceedingly angry with ,his people4 ,therefore it is not always on account of something done against him1 that a man is angry4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 anger is a desire for vengeance4 ,but one may desire vengeance for things done against others4 ,therefore we are not always angry on account of something done against us4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 man is angry especially with those who despise what he takes a great interest in2 thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy1 and so forth4 ,but contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher4 ,therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 he that holds his tongue when another insults him1 provokes him to greater anger1 as ,chrysostom observes 7,hom4 xxii1 in ,ep4 ad ,rom474 ,but by holding his tongue he does the other no harm4 ,therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #d7 that anger is always due to something done to oneself3 whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us1 for we hate a man simply because we think him such4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #df1 ,a4 #f71 anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance4 ,now unless some injury has been done1 there is no question of vengeance3 nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance1 but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance3 for just as everything naturally seeks its own good1 so does it naturally repel its own evil4 ,but injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him4 ,consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we speak of anger in ,god1 not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice1 inasmuch as ,he wills to take vengeance on sin4 ,because the sinner1 by sinning1 cannot do ,god any actual harm3 but so far as he himself is concerned1 he acts against ,god in two ways4 ,first1 in so far as he despises ,god in ,his commandments4 ,secondly1 in so far as he harms himself or another2 which injury redounds to ,god1 inasmuch as the person injured is an object of ,god's providence and protection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if we are angry with those who harm others1 and seek to be avenged on them1 it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us3 either by some kinship or friendship1 or at least because of the nature we have in common4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when we take a very great interest in a thing1 we look upon it as our own good2 so that if anyone despise it1 it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt1 as though his anger were slighted3 and a slight is an action4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,sole ,motive of ,anger ,is ,slight or ,contempt8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 that we are angry when we suffer1 or think that we are suffering1 an injury4 ,but one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted4 ,therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject4 ,but dumb animals do not desire honor4 ,therefore they are not grieved by being slighted4 ,and yet they are roused to anger1 when wounded1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #h74 ,therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 gives many other causes of anger1 for instance1 being forgotten by others2 that others should rejoice in our misfortunes2 that they should make known our evils2 being hindered from doing as we like4 ,therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 that anger is a desire1 with sorrow1 for vengeance1 on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly4 ,i answer that1 ,all the causes of anger are reduced to slight4 ,for slight is of three kinds1 as stated in ,rhet4 ii1 #b1 viz4 contempt1 despiteful treatment1 i4e4 hindering one from doing one's will1 and insolence3 and all motives of anger are reduced to these three4 ,two reasons may be assigned for this4 ,first1 because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance3 wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just4 ,now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done unjustly2 hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c7 that men are not angry1--if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account2 because there is no anger at what is just4 ,now injury is done to another in three ways3 namely1 through ignorance1 through passion1 and through choice4 ,then1 most of all1 a man does an injustice1 when he does an injury from choice1 on purpose1 or from deliberate malice1 as stated in ,ethic4 v1 #h4 ,wherefore we are most of all angry with those who1 in our opinion1 have hurt us on purpose4 ,for if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion1 either we are not angry with them at all1 or very much less3 since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury1 and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness4 ,those1 on the other hand1 who do an injury on purpose1 seem to sin from contempt2 wherefore we are angry with them most of all4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c7 that we are either not angry at all1 or not very angry with those who have acted through anger1 because they do not seem to have acted slightingly4 ,the second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence3 because men think little of things that are not worth much ado 7,rhet4 ii1 #b74 ,now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods4 ,consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us1 in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence1 seems to savor of a slight4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,any other cause1 besides contempt1 through which a man suffers an injury1 takes away from the notion of injury3 contempt or slight alone adds to the motive of anger1 and consequently is of itself the cause of anger4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such1 yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority1 and is angry with anything derogatory thereto4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight4 ,thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem1 for the more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory4 ,again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another1 this seems to show that he thinks little of him3 and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune1 seem to care little about his good or evil4 ,again he that hinders another from carrying out his will1 without deriving thereby any profit to himself1 seems not to care much for his friendship4 ,consequently all those things1 in so far as they are signs of contempt1 provoke anger4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,man's ,excellence ,is the ,cause of ,his ,being ,angry8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 that some are angry especially when they are grieved1 for instance1 the sick1 the poor1 and those who are disappointed4 ,but these things seem to pertain to defect4 ,therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 that some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion2 but if they think they excel in those points1 they do not trouble4 ,but a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect4 ,therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being angry4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful4 ,but the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c7 that men are not angry when they play1 make jokes1 or take part in a feast1 nor when they are prosperous or successful1 nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded hope4 ,therefore excellence is not a cause of anger4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #i7 that excellence makes men prone to anger4 ,i answer that1 ,the cause of anger1 in the man who is angry1 may be taken in two ways4 ,first in respect of the motive of anger3 and thus excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered4 ,because the motive of anger is an unjust slight1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,now it is evident that the more excellent a man is1 the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels4 ,consequently those who excel in any matter1 are most of all angry1 if they be slighted in that matter2 for instance1 a wealthy man in his riches1 or an orator in his eloquence1 and so forth4 ,secondly1 the cause of anger1 in the man who is angry1 may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid4 ,now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him3 while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief2 since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt4 ,and this is why men who are weak1 or subject to some other defect1 are more easily angered1 since they are more easily grieved4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly1 he does not consider himself the loser thereby1 and therefore is not grieved3 and in this respect he is less angered4 ,but in another respect1 in so far as he is more undeservedly despised1 he has more reason for being angry3 unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance1 or some other like cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow4 ,but in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger1 because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,person's ,defect ,is a ,reason for ,being ,more ,easily ,angry with ,him8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c7 that we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves2 on the contrary1 we are gentle with them4 ,wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down4 ,but these things savor of littleness and defect4 ,therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no greater defect than death4 ,but anger ceases at the sight of death4 ,therefore defect of a person does not provoke anger against him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him4 ,but we are more angry with friends1 if they offend us or refuse to help us2 hence it is written 7,ps4 #ed3ac73 ,if my enemy had reviled me ,i would verily have borne with it4 ,therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 that the rich man is angry with the poor man1 if the latter despise him2 and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c7 unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger4 ,consequently deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry1 tends to increase our anger1 in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised4 ,for just as the higher a man's position is1 the more undeservedly he is despised2 so the lower it is1 the less reason he has for despising4 ,thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant2 a wise man1 if by a fool2 a master1 if by a servant4 ,if1 however1 the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt1 then it does not increase but lessens anger4 ,in this way those who repent of their ill-deeds1 and confess that they have done wrong1 who humble themselves and ask pardon1 mitigate anger1 according to ,prov4 #ae3a3 ,a mild answer breaketh wrath3 because1 to wit1 they seem not to despise1 but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death4 ,one is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation2 and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered4 ,another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of evils4 ,hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt1 in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity4 ,consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help1 we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us4 ,,question #dh ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,anger 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the effects of anger3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether anger causes pleasure8 7#b7 ,whether above all it causes heat in the heart8 7#c7 ,whether above all it hinders the use of reason8 7#d7 ,whether it causes taciturnity8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,anger ,causes ,pleasure8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger does not cause pleasure4 ,because sorrow excludes pleasure4 ,but anger is never without sorrow1 since1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #f1 everyone that acts from anger1 acts with pain4 ,therefore anger does not cause pleasure4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 that vengeance makes anger to cease1 because it substitutes pleasure for pain3 whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance1 and that vengeance quells his anger4 ,therefore on the advent of pleasure1 anger departs3 and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no effect hinders its cause1 since it is conformed to its cause4 ,but pleasure hinders anger as stated in ,rhet4 ii1 #c4 ,therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 quotes the saying that anger is ,sweet to the soul as honey to the taste 7,iliad1 xviii1 #aji1 trl4 ,pope74 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #ad71 pleasures1 chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures1 are remedies against sorrow3 and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety1 the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it1 as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink4 ,now it is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c71 that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow1 for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy4 ,consequently as soon as vengeance is present1 pleasure ensues1 and so much the greater according as the sorrow was greater4 ,therefore if vengeance be really present1 perfect pleasure ensues1 entirely excluding sorrow1 so that the movement of anger ceases4 ,but before vengeance is really present1 it becomes present to the angry man in two ways3 in one way1 by hope2 because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance1 as stated above 7,q4 #df1 ,a4 #a72 in another way1 by thinking of it continually1 for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he desires2 wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant4 ,accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance4 ,this pleasure1 however1 is not perfect1 so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing2 he grieves for the wrong done1 while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance4 ,consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning2 while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance1 which banishes anger altogether4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing1 and consequently is a hindrance to anger4 ,but pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,anger ,above ,all ,causes ,fervor in the ,heart8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger4 ,for fervor1 as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #b71 belongs to love4 ,but love1 as above stated1 is the beginning and cause of all the passions4 ,since then the cause is more powerful than its effect1 it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those things which1 of themselves1 arouse fervor1 increase as time goes on2 thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts4 ,but in course of time anger grows weaker2 for the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c7 that time puts an end to anger4 ,therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor4 ,but the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger1 as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #c74 ,therefore anger does not cause fervor4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 that anger is fervor of the blood around the heart1 resulting from an exhalation of the bile4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a71 the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite4 ,now it is evident that every appetite1 even the natural appetite1 tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it1 if it be present3 hence we see that hot water freezes harder1 as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object4 ,since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by some injury inflicted1 as by a contrary that is present2 it follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance2 and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger4 ,and because the movement of anger is not one of recoil1 which corresponds to the action of cold1 but one of prosecution1 which corresponds to the action of heat1 the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital spirits around the heart1 which is the instrument of the soul's passions4 ,and hence it is that1 on account of the heart being so disturbed by anger1 those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members4 ,for1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #cj7 the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick1 the body trembles1 the tongue stammers1 the countenance takes fire1 the eyes grow fierce1 they that are well known are not recognized4 ,with the mouth indeed he shapes a sound1 but the understanding knows not what it says4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved1 as ,augustine observes 7,de ,trin4 x1 #ab74 ,consequently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves1 he feels his love thereof the more3 the result being that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love2 so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to be felt more4 ,nevertheless1 the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger4 ,because the fervor of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness2 for it tends to the good that one loves3 whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood4 ,for this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love2 and hence the saying that love springs from the liver1 because of the blood being formed there4 ,on the other hand1 the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy1 for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil3 whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile1 and for this reason ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #af7 that it results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name chole4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,time1 of necessity1 weakens all those things1 the causes of which are impaired by time4 ,now it is evident that memory is weakened by time2 for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory4 ,but anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done4 ,consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on1 until at length it vanishes altogether4 ,moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt2 and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past4 ,the same applies to love1 so long as the cause of love is in the memory alone2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #e7 that if a friend's absence lasts long1 it seems to make men forget their friendship4 ,but in the presence of a friend1 the cause of friendship is continually being multiplied by time3 wherefore the friendship increases3 and the same would apply to anger1 were its cause continually multiplied4 ,nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor3 for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt up all the fuel2 so too anger1 by reason of its vehemence1 soon dies away4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every power that is divided in itself is weakened4 ,consequently if a man being already angry with one1 becomes angry with another1 by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened4 ,especially is this so if his anger in the second case be greater3 because the wrong done which aroused his former anger1 will1 in comparison with the second wrong1 which is reckoned greater1 seem to be of little or no account4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,anger ,above ,all ,hinders the ,use of ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason4 ,because that which presupposes an act of reason1 does not seem to hinder the use of reason4 ,but anger listens to reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #f4 ,therefore anger does not hinder reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more the reason is hindered1 the less does a man show his thoughts4 ,but the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that an angry man is not cunning but is open4 ,therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason1 as desire does2 for desire is cunning1 as he also states 7,ethic4 vii1 #f474 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary3 because contraries stand out more clearly when placed beside one another4 ,but this also increases anger3 for the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 ii1 #b7 that men are more angry if they receive unwonted treatment2 for instance1 honorable men1 if they be dishonored3 and so forth4 ,therefore the same cause increases anger1 and facilitates the judgment of reason4 ,therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #cj7 that anger withdraws the light of understanding1 while by agitating it troubles the mind4 ,i answer that1 ,although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act1 yet1 since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act1 the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed1 it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason2 as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep4 ,now it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that anger1 above all1 causes a bodily disturbance in the region of the heart1 so much as to effect even the outward members4 ,consequently1 of all the passions1 anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason1 according to ,ps4 #cj3aj3 ,my eye is troubled with wrath4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the beginning of anger is in the reason1 as regards the appetitive movement1 which is the formal element of anger4 ,but the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason1 as though it listened but imperfectly to reason1 on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action1 which commotion is the material element of anger4 ,in this respect it hinders the judgment of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angry man is said to be open1 not because it is clear to him what he ought to do1 but because he acts openly1 without thought of hiding himself4 ,this is due partly to the reason being hindered1 so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly1 nor to devise the means of hiding2 and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger3 wherefore the ,philosopher says of the magnanimous man 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that he is open in his hatreds and his friendships 4 4 4 and speaks and acts openly4 ,desire1 on the other hand1 is said to lie low and to be cunning1 because1 in many cases1 the pleasurable things that are desired1 savor of shame and voluptuousness1 wherein man wishes not to be seen4 ,but in those things that savor of manliness and excellence1 such as matters of vengeance1 man seeks to be in the open4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7ad #a71 the movement of anger begins in the reason1 wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another facilitates the judgment of reason1 on the same grounds as it increases anger4 ,for when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth1 suffers a loss therein1 the loss seems all the greater1 both on account of the contrast1 and because it was unforeseen4 ,consequently it causes greater grief3 just as a great good1 through being received unexpectedly1 causes greater delight4 ,and in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes1 anger is increased also4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,anger ,above ,all ,causes ,taciturnity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity4 ,because taciturnity is opposed to speech4 ,but increase in anger conduces to speech2 as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by ,our ,lord 7,matt4 #e3bb73 where ,he says3 ,whosoever is angry with his brother2 and 4 4 4 whosoever shall say to his brother1 ',raca'2 and 4 4 4 whosoever shall say to his brother1 ',thou fool4' ,therefore anger does not cause taciturnity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 through failing to obey reason1 man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words3 hence it is written 7,prov4 #be3bh73 ,as a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls1 so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking4 ,but anger1 above all1 hinders the judgment of reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words4 ,therefore it does not cause taciturnity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7,matt4 #ab3cd73 ,out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh4 ,but anger1 above all1 causes a disturbance in the heart1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore above all it conduces to speech4 ,therefore it does not cause taciturnity4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #cj7 that when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips1 inwardly it burns the more fiercely4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #df1 ,a4 #d71 anger both follows an act of reason1 and hinders the reason3 and in both respects it may cause taciturnity4 ,on the part of the reason1 when the judgment of reason prevails so far1 that although it does not curb the appetite in its inordinate desire for vengeance1 yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech4 ,wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #cj73 ,sometimes when the mind is disturbed1 anger1 as if in judgment1 commands silence4 ,on the part of the impediment to reason because1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members1 and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart1 such as the eyes1 face and tongue2 wherefore1 as observed above 7,a4 #b71 the tongue stammers1 the countenance takes fire1 the eyes grow fierce4 ,consequently anger may cause such a disturbance1 that the tongue is altogether deprived of speech2 and taciturnity is the result4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue3 but sometimes it goes yet farther1 so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members4 ,and this suffices for the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart4 ,thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members2 and sometimes even death4 ,if1 however1 the disturbance be not so great1 then out of the abundance of the heart thus disturbed1 the mouth proceeds to speak4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,habits 7,,qq4 #di-ed7 ,,question #di ,,of ,,habits ,,in ,,general1 ,,as ,,to ,,their ,,substance 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after treating of human acts and passions1 we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts1 and firstly of intrinsic principles1 secondly of extrinsic principles4 ,the intrinsic principle is power and habit2 but as we have treated of powers in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gg1 seqq471 it remains for us to consider them in general3 in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits1 which are the principles of human acts4 ,concerning habits in general there are four points to consider3 ,first1 the substance of habits2 second1 their subject2 third1 the cause of their generation1 increase1 and corruption2 fourth1 how they are distinguished from one another4 ,under the first head1 there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether habit is a quality8 7#b7 ,whether it is a distinct species of quality8 7#c7 ,whether habit implies an order to an act8 7#d7 ,of the necessity of habit4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,habit ,is a ,quality8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habit is not a quality4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #gc73 this word 'habit' is derived from the verb 'to have4' ,but to have belongs not only to quality1 but also to the other categories3 for we speak of ourselves as having quantity and money and other like things4 ,therefore habit is not a quality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments2 as may be clearly seen in the ,book on the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi74 ,but one predicament is not contained under another4 ,therefore habit is not a quality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every habit is a disposition1 as is stated in the ,book of the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi74 ,now disposition is the order of that which has parts1 as stated in ,metaph4 v1 text4 #bd4 ,but this belongs to the predicament ,position4 ,therefore habit is not a quality4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says in the ,book of ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi7 that habit is a quality which is difficult to change4 ,i answer that1 ,this word habitus 7habit7 is derived from habere 7to have74 ,now habit is taken from this word in two ways2 in one way1 inasmuch as man1 or any other thing1 is said to have something2 in another way1 inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation 7se habet7 either in regard to itself1 or in regard to something else4 ,concerning the first1 we must observe that to have1 as said in regard to anything that is had1 is common to the various predicaments4 ,and so the ,philosopher puts to have among the post-predicaments1 so called because they result from the various predicaments2 as1 for instance1 opposition1 priority1 posterity1 and such like4 ,now among things which are had1 there seems to be this distinction1 that there are some in which there is no medium between the haver and that which is had3 as1 for instance1 there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity4 ,then there are some in which there is a medium1 but only a relation3 as1 for instance1 a man is said to have a companion or a friend4 ,and1 further1 there are some in which there is a medium1 not indeed an action or passion1 but something after the manner of action or passion3 thus1 for instance1 something adorns or covers1 and something else is adorned or covered3 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be7 that a habit is said to be1 as it were1 an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had2 as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves4 ,and therefore these constitute a special genus of things1 which are comprised under the predicament of habit3 of which the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be7 that there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed4 ,but if to have be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else2 in that case habit is a quality2 since this mode of having is in respect of some quality3 and of this the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be7 that habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill1 and this1 either in regard to itself or in regard to another3 thus health is a habit4 ,and in this sense we speak of habit now4 ,wherefore we must say that habit is a quality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument takes to have in the general sense3 for thus it is common to many predicaments1 as we have said4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver1 and that which is had3 and in this sense it is a predicament1 as we have said4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,disposition does always1 indeed1 imply an order of that which has parts3 but this happens in three ways1 as the ,philosopher goes on at once to says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be73 namely1 either as to place1 or as to power1 or as to species4 ,in saying this1 as ,simplicius observes in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments1 he includes all dispositions3 bodily dispositions1 when he says 'as to place1' and this belongs to the predicament ,position1 which is the order of parts in a place3 when he says 'as to power1' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness1 such as inchoate science and virtue3 and when he says1 'as to species1' he includes perfect dispositions1 which are called habits1 such as perfected science and virtue4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,habit ,is a ,distinct ,species of ,quality8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality4 ,because1 as we have said 7,a4 #a71 habit1 in so far as it is a quality1 is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill4 ,but this happens in regard to any quality3 for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape1 and in like manner1 in regard to heat and cold1 and in regard to all such things4 ,therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says in the ,book of the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi71 that heat and cold are dispositions or habits1 just as sickness and health4 ,therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 difficult to change is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality1 but rather to movement or passion4 ,now1 no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus2 but differences should be proper to a genus1 as the ,philosopher says in ,metaph4 vii1 text4 #db4 ,therefore1 since habit is a quality difficult to change1 it seems not to be a distinct species of quality4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says in the ,book of the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi7 that one species of quality is habit and disposition4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,philosopher in the ,book of ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi7 reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality4 ,now ,simplicius1 in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments1 explains the difference of these species as follows4 ,he says that some qualities are natural1 and are in their subject in virtue of its nature1 and are always there3 but some are adventitious1 being caused from without1 and these can be lost4 ,now the latter1 i4e4 those which are adventitious1 are habits and dispositions1 differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost4 ,as to natural qualities1 some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality2 and thus we have the second species of quality3 while others regard a thing which is in act2 and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface4 ,if deeply rooted1 we have the third species of quality3 if on the surface1 we have the fourth species of quality1 as shape1 and form which is the shape of an animated being4 ,but this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable4 ,for there are many shapes1 and passion-like qualities1 which are not natural but adventitious3 and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural1 as health1 beauty1 and the like4 ,moreover1 it does not suit the order of the species1 since that which is the more natural is always first4 ,therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities4 ,for quality1 properly speaking1 implies a certain mode of substance4 ,now mode1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #c71 is that which a measure determines3 wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure4 ,therefore1 just as that in accordance with which the material potentiality 7potentia materiae7 is determined to its substantial being1 is called quality1 which is a difference affecting the substance1 so that1 in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being1 is called an accidental quality1 which is also a kind of difference1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #ai74 ,now the mode or determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject1 or in regard to action1 and passion resulting from its natural principles1 which are matter and form2 or again in regard to quantity4 ,if we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity1 we shall then have the fourth species of quality4 ,and because quantity1 considered in itself1 is devoid of movement1 and does not imply the notion of good or evil1 so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed1 nor quickly or slowly transitory4 ,but the mode or determination of the subject1 in regard to action or passion1 is considered in the second and third species of quality4 ,and therefore in both1 we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty2 whether it be transitory or lasting4 ,but in them1 we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil3 because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end1 whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end4 ,on the other hand1 the mode or determination of the subject1 in regard to the nature of the thing1 belongs to the first species of quality1 which is habit and disposition3 for the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag71 when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body1 that they are dispositions of the perfect to the best2 and by perfect ,i mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature4 ,and since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is made 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #be71 therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good1 and also changeableness1 whether easy or difficult2 inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement4 ,and so the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be7 defines habit1 a disposition whereby someone is disposed1 well or ill2 and in ,ethic4 ii1 #d1 he says that by habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions4 ,for when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature1 it has the aspect of good3 and when it is unsuitable1 it has the aspect of evil4 ,and since nature is the first object of consideration in anything1 for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,disposition implies a certain order1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality except in relation to something else4 ,and if we add well or ill1 which belongs to the essential notion of habit1 we must consider the quality's relation to the nature1 which is the end4 ,so in regard to shape1 or heat1 or cold1 a man is not said to be well or ill disposed1 except by reason of a relation to the nature of a thing1 with regard to its suitability or unsuitability4 ,consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities1 in so far as they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing1 belong to habits or dispositions3 for shape and color1 according to their suitability to the nature of thing1 concern beauty2 while heat and cold1 according to their suitability to the nature of a thing1 concern health4 ,and in this way heat and cold are put1 by the ,philosopher1 in the first species of quality4 ,wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection3 though some give another solution1 as ,simplicius says in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this difference1 difficult to change1 does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality1 but from disposition4 ,now disposition may be taken in two ways2 in one way1 as the genus of habit1 for disposition is included in the definition of habit 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be73 in another way1 according as it is divided against habit4 ,again1 disposition1 properly so called1 can be divided against habit in two ways3 first1 as perfect and imperfect within the same species2 and thus we call it a disposition1 retaining the name of the genus1 when it is had imperfectly1 so as to be easily lost3 whereas we call it a habit1 when it is had perfectly1 so as not to be lost easily4 ,and thus a disposition becomes a habit1 just as a boy becomes a man4 ,secondly1 they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern genus3 so that we call dispositions1 those qualities of the first species1 which by reason of their very nature are easily lost1 because they have changeable causes2 e4g4 sickness and health3 whereas we call habits those qualities which1 by reason of their very nature1 are not easily changed1 in that they have unchangeable causes1 e4g4 sciences and virtues4 ,and in this sense1 disposition does not become habit4 ,the latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of ,aristotle3 for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking1 according to which1 when a quality is1 by reason of its nature1 easily changeable1 and1 through some accident1 becomes difficultly changeable1 then it is called a habit3 while the contrary happens in regard to qualities1 by reason of their nature1 difficultly changeable3 for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly1 so as to be liable to lose it easily1 we say that he is disposed to that science1 rather than that he has the science4 ,from this it is clear that the word habit implies a certain lastingness3 while the word disposition does not4 ,nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences 7of a quality71 although they belong to passion and movement1 and not the genus of quality4 ,for these differences1 though apparently accidental to quality1 nevertheless designate differences which are proper and essential to quality4 ,in the same way1 in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of substantial differences1 in so far as by the former1 essential principles are designated4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,habit ,implies ,order to an ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habit does not imply order to an act4 ,for everything acts according as it is in act4 ,but the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text #h71 that when one is become knowing by habit1 one is still in a state of potentiality1 but otherwise than before learning4 ,therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is put in the definition of a thing1 belongs to it essentially4 ,but to be a principle of action1 is put in the definition of power1 as we read in ,metaph4 v1 text4 #ag4 ,therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially4 ,now that which is essential is first in every genus4 ,if therefore1 habit also is a principle of act1 it follows that it is posterior to power4 ,and so habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 health is sometimes a habit1 and so are leanness and beauty4 ,but these do not indicate relation to an act4 ,therefore it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xxi7 that habit is that whereby something is done when necessary4 ,and the ,commentator says 7,de ,anima iii7 that habit is that whereby we act when we will4 ,i answer that1 ,to have relation to an act may belong to habit1 both in regard to the nature of habit1 and in regard to the subject in which the habit is4 ,in regard to the nature of habit1 it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act4 ,for it is essential to habit to imply some relation to a thing's nature1 in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto4 ,but a thing's nature1 which is the end of generation1 is further ordained to another end1 which is either an operation1 or the product of an operation1 to which one attains by means of operation4 ,wherefore habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing1 but also1 consequently1 to operation1 inasmuch as this is the end of nature1 or conducive to the end4 ,whence also it is stated 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be7 in the definition of habit1 that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed1 is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself1 that is to its nature1 or in regard to something else1 that is to the end4 ,but there are some habits1 which even on the part of the subject in which they are1 imply primarily and principally relation to an act4 ,for1 as we have said1 habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature4 ,if therefore the nature of a thing1 in which the habit is1 consists in this very relation to an act1 it follows that the habit principally implies relation to an act4 ,now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act4 ,wherefore every habit is subjected in a power1 implies principally relation to an act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,habit is an act1 in so far as it is a quality3 and in this respect it can be a principle of operation4 ,it is1 however1 in a state of potentiality in respect to operation4 ,wherefore habit is called first act1 and operation1 second act2 as it is explained in ,de ,anima ii1 text4 #e4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not the essence of habit to be related to power1 but to be related to nature4 ,and as nature precedes action1 to which power is related1 therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,health is said to be a habit1 or a habitual disposition1 in relation to nature1 as stated above4 ,but in so far as nature is a principle of act1 it consequently implies a relation to act4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,hist4 ,animal4 x1 #a71 that man1 or one of his members1 is called healthy1 when he can perform the operation of a healthy man4 ,and the same applies to other habits4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,habits ,are ,necessary8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habits are not necessary4 ,for by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something1 as stated above4 ,but a thing is well or ill disposed by its form3 for in respect of its form a thing is good1 even as it is a being4 ,therefore there is no necessity for habits4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habit implies relation to an act4 ,but power implies sufficiently a principle of act3 for even the natural powers1 without any habits1 are principles of acts4 ,therefore there was no necessity for habits4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as power is related to good and evil1 so also is habit3 and as power does not always act1 so neither does habit4 ,given1 therefore1 the powers1 habits become superfluous4 ,on the contrary1 ,habits are perfections 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag74 ,but perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing3 since it is in the nature of an end4 ,therefore it is necessary that there should be habits4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature1 and to its operation or end1 by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto4 ,now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else1 three conditions are necessary4 ,the first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed2 and so1 that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act4 ,whence1 if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act1 and whose substance is its own operation1 which itself is for itself1 there we can find no room for habit and disposition1 as is clearly the case in ,god4 ,the second condition is1 that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else1 be capable of determination in several ways and to various things4 ,whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else1 but in regard to that only1 there we find no room for disposition and habit3 for such a subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act4 ,wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form1 since that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form1 as we said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #b7 there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form1 or even in respect of operation1 since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement4 ,the third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality1 several things should occur1 capable of being adjusted in various ways3 so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation4 ,wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way1 are not called dispositions or habits1 but simple qualities3 but we call dispositions or habits1 such things as health1 beauty1 and so forth1 which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #bd1 #be7 that habit is a disposition3 and disposition is the order of that which has parts either as to place1 or as to potentiality1 or as to species1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,wherefore1 since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability1 it follows that habit is necessary4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by the form the nature of a thing is perfected3 yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition4 ,but the form itself is further ordained to operation1 which is either the end1 or the means to the end4 ,and if the form is limited to one fixed operation1 no further disposition1 besides the form itself1 is needed for the operation4 ,but if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways1 as the soul2 it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,power sometimes has a relation to many things3 and then it needs to be determined by something else4 ,but if a power has not a relation to many things1 it does not need a habit to determine it1 as we have said4 ,for this reason the natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits3 because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same habit has not a relation to good and evil1 as will be made clear further on 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #c73 whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil4 ,and1 therefore1 habits are necessary that the powers be determined to good4 ,,question #ej ,,of ,,the ,,subject ,,of ,,habits 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we consider next the subject of habits3 and under this head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is a habit in the body8 7#b7 ,whether the soul is a subject of habit1 in respect of its essence or in respect of its power8 7#c7 ,whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit8 7#d7 ,whether there is a habit in the intellect8 7#e7 ,whether there is a habit in the will8 7#f7 ,whether there is a habit in separate substances8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is a ,habit in the ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is not a habit in the body4 ,for1 as the ,commentator says 7,de ,anima iii71 a habit is that whereby we act when we will4 ,but bodily actions are not subject to the will1 since they are natural4 ,therefore there can be no habit in the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all bodily dispositions are easy to change4 ,but habit is a quality1 difficult to change4 ,therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all bodily dispositions are subject to change4 ,but change can only be in the third species of quality1 which is divided against habit4 ,therefore there is no habit in the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says in the ,book of ,predicaments 7,de ,categor4 vi7 that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #di1 ,,aa4 #b seqq471 habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation4 ,therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to operation1 no habit is principally in the body as its subject4 ,for every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body4 ,consequently1 as to those operations which proceed from its nature1 the body is not disposed by a habit3 because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation2 and we have already said 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d7 that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required4 ,as to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body1 they belong principally to the soul1 and secondarily to the body4 ,now habits are in proportion to their operations3 whence by like acts like habits are formed 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b74 ,and therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul4 ,but they can be secondarily in the body3 to wit1 in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul4 ,if1 however1 we speak of the disposition of the subject to form1 thus a habitual disposition can be in the body1 which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form4 ,and in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions4 ,yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly3 because their causes1 of their very nature1 are easily changeable4 ,on the other hand1 as ,simplicius reports in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments1 ,alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body3 and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone4 ,and he held that ,aristotle mentions health and sickness in the ,book on the ,predicaments not as though they belonged to the first species of quality1 but by way of example3 so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change1 so also are all the qualities of the first species1 which are called habits and dispositions4 ,but this is clearly contrary to the intention of ,aristotle3 both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples1 as of virtue and science2 and because in ,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag1 he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation1 and of those actions of the body which are from nature3 but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul1 and the principle of which is the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes4 ,but they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject1 because1 to wit1 as long as such a subject endures1 they cannot be removed2 or because they are difficult to change1 by comparison to other dispositions4 ,but qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change1 on account of the unchangeableness of the subject4 ,and therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply3 but that it is as a habit1 as we read in the ,greek 99isos hexin 7,categor4 viii74 ,on the other hand1 the qualities of the soul are called habits simply4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality1 as some maintained1 differ from qualities of the third species1 in this1 that the qualities of the third species consist in some becoming and movement1 as it were1 wherefore they are called passions or passible qualities4 ,but when they have attained to perfection 7specific perfection1 so to speak71 they have then passed into the first species of quality4 ,but ,simplicius in his ,commentary disapproves of this2 for in this way heating would be in the third species1 and heat in the first species of quality2 whereas ,aristotle puts heat in the third4 ,wherefore ,porphyrius1 as ,simplicius reports 7,commentary71 says that passion or passion-like quality1 disposition and habit1 differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness4 ,for when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated1 and not so as to be able to give heat1 then we have passion1 if it is transitory2 or passion-like quality if it is permanent4 ,but when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else1 then it is a disposition2 and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change1 then it will be a habit3 so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality1 and habit an intensity or disposition4 ,but ,simplicius disapproves of this1 for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself1 but on the part of the diverse participation thereof by the subject2 so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality4 ,and therefore we must say otherwise that1 as was explained above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a71 the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves1 according to their suitability to nature1 implies the notion of disposition3 and so1 when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities1 which are heat and cold1 moisture and dryness1 there results a change as to sickness and health4 ,but change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions1 primarily and of themselves4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 art4 #b ,whether the ,soul ,is the ,subject of ,habit in ,respect of ,its ,essence or in ,respect of ,its ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers4 ,for we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #b74 ,but nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers2 because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof4 ,therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 accident is not the subject of accident4 ,now habit is an accident4 ,but the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident1 as we have said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #a1 ad #e74 ,therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the subject is prior to that which is in the subject4 ,but since habit belongs to the first species of quality1 it is prior to power1 which belongs to the second species4 ,therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #ac7 puts various habits in the various powers of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #di1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c71 habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation4 ,if therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature1 it cannot be in the soul--that is1 if we speak of human nature3 for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature2 so that1 regarded in this way1 habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul1 than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body4 ,but if we speak of a higher nature1 of which man may become a partaker1 according to #b ,pet4 #a1 that we may be partakers of the ,divine ,nature3 thus nothing hinders some habit1 namely1 grace1 from being in the soul in respect of its essence1 as we shall state later on 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #d74 ,on the other hand1 if we take habit in its relation to operation1 it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul3 in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation1 but is indifferent to many1 which is a condition for a habit1 as we have said above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d74 ,and since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers1 therefore1 regarded in this sense1 habits are in the soul in respect of its powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the essence of the soul belongs to human nature1 not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further1 but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,accident is not of itself the subject of accident4 ,but since among accidents themselves there is a certain order1 the subject1 according as it is under one accident1 is conceived as the subject of a further accident4 ,in this way we say that one accident is the subject of another2 as superficies is the subject of color1 in which sense power is the subject of habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,habit takes precedence of power1 according as it implies a disposition to nature3 whereas power always implies a relation to operation1 which is posterior1 since nature is the principle of operation4 ,but the habit whose subject is a power1 does not imply relation to nature1 but to operation4 ,wherefore it is posterior to power4 ,or1 we may say that habit takes precedence of power1 as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete1 and as act takes precedence of potentiality4 ,for act is naturally prior to potentiality1 though potentiality is prior in order of generation and time1 as stated in ,metaph4 vii1 text4 #ag2 ix1 text4 #ac4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,any ,habits in the ,powers of the ,sensitive ,part8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part4 ,for as the nutritive power is an irrational part1 so is the sensitive power4 ,but there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part4 ,therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes4 ,but there are not any habits in brutes3 for in them there is no will1 which is put in the definition of habit1 as we have said above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues3 and just as science is related to the apprehensive power1 so it virtue related to the appetitive power4 ,but in the sensitive powers there are no sciences3 since science is of universals1 which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend4 ,therefore1 neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj7 that some virtues1 namely1 temperance and fortitude1 belong to the irrational part4 ,i answer that1 ,the sensitive powers can be considered in two ways3 first1 according as they act from natural instinct3 secondly1 according as they act at the command of reason4 ,according as they act from natural instinct1 they are ordained to one thing1 even as nature is2 but according as they act at the command of reason1 they can be ordained to various things4 ,and thus there can be habits in them1 by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason1 and therefore there are no habits in them4 ,but the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason2 and therefore habits can be in them3 for in so far as they obey reason1 in a certain sense they are said to be rational1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #ac4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason2 but if they are left to themselves1 such animals act from natural instinct3 and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations4 ,there are in them1 however1 certain dispositions in relation to nature1 as health and beauty4 ,but whereas by man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way1 so in this sense1 to a certain extent1 we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals3 wherefore ,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf73 ,we find the most untamed beasts1 deterred by fear of pain1 from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure2 and when this has become a custom in them1 we say that they are tame and gentle4 ,but the habit is incomplete1 as to the use of the will1 for they have not that power of using or of refraining1 which seems to belong to the notion of habit3 and therefore1 properly speaking1 there can be no habits in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #eg3 but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers4 ,and therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension1 since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason4 ,and yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension1 we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory1 thought or imagination3 wherefore also the ,philosopher says 7,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 ii7 that custom conduces much to a good memory3 the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason4 ,on the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers1 as sight1 hearing and the like1 are not susceptible of habits1 but are ordained to their fixed acts1 according to the disposition of their nature1 just as the members of the body1 for there are no habits in them1 but rather in the powers which command their movements4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,is ,any ,habit in the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are no habits in the intellect4 ,for habits are in conformity with operations1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but the operations of man are common to soul and body1 as stated in ,de ,anima i1 text4 #fd4 ,therefore also are habits4 ,but the intellect is not an act of the body 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #f74 ,therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is in a thing1 is there according to the mode of that in which it is4 ,but that which is form without matter1 is act only3 whereas what is composed of form and matter1 has potentiality and act at the same time4 ,therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only1 but only in that which is composed of matter and form4 ,now the intellect is form without matter4 ,therefore habit1 which has potentiality at the same time as act1 being a sort of medium between the two1 cannot be in the intellect2 but only in the conjunction1 which is composed of soul and body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something1 as is said 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be74 ,but that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body3 wherefore also it is stated 7,de ,anima ii1 text4 #id7 that we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted4 ,therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect1 which is separate1 but in some power which is the act of some part of the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #b1 #c1 #aj7 puts science1 wisdom and understanding1 which is the habit of first principles1 in the intellective part of the soul4 ,i answer that1 concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions4 ,some1 supposing that there was only one possible 99,see ,first ,part1 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b intellect for all men1 were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself1 but in the interior sensitive powers4 ,for it is manifest that men differ in habits2 and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that1 which1 being only one1 would be common to all men4 ,wherefore if there were but one single possible intellect of all men1 the habits of science1 in which men differ from one another1 could not be in the possible intellect as their subject1 but would be in the interior sensitive powers1 which differ in various men4 ,now1 in the first place1 this supposition is contrary to the mind of ,aristotle4 ,for it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational1 not by their essence1 but only by participation 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,now the ,philosopher puts the intellectual virtues1 which are wisdom1 science and understanding1 in that which is rational by its essence4 ,wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers1 but in the intellect itself4 ,moreover he says expressly 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #h1 #ah7 that when the possible intellect is thus identified with each thing1 that is1 when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species1 then it is said to be in act1 as the knower is said to be in act2 and this happens when the intellect can act of itself1 i4e4 by considering3 and even then it is in potentiality in a sense2 but not in the same way as before learning and discovering4 ,therefore the possible intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science1 by which the intellect1 even though it be not actually considering1 is able to consider4 ,in the second place1 this supposition is contrary to the truth4 ,for as to whom belongs the operation1 belongs also the power to operate1 belongs also the habit4 ,but to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect4 ,therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some said1 as ,simplicius reports in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments1 that1 since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the conjunctum1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 text4 #fd72 therefore no habit is in the soul only1 but in the conjunctum4 ,and from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect1 for the intellect is separate1 as ran the argument1 given above4 ,but the argument is not cogent4 ,for habit is not a disposition of the object to the power1 but rather a disposition of the power to the object3 wherefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act1 and not in that which is compared to the power as its object4 ,now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body1 except in respect of the phantasm1 as is stated in ,de ,anima1 text4 #ff4 ,but it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #c1 #ci74 ,whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself2 and not on the part of the phantasm1 which is common to soul and body4 ,and therefore we must say that the possible intellect is the subject of habit1 which is in potentiality to many3 and this belongs1 above all1 to the possible intellect4 ,wherefore the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter1 so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect4 ,wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the possible intellect1 for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect1 therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers1 to which the good disposition of the body cooperates1 that man is rendered apt to understand4 ,and so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers4 ,but principally it is in the possible intellect4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,any ,habit ,is in the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is not a habit in the will4 ,for the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species1 by means of which the intellect actually understands4 ,but the will does not act by means of species4 ,therefore the will is not the subject of habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no habit is allotted to the active intellect1 as there is to the possible intellect1 because the former is an active power4 ,but the will is above all an active power1 because it moves all the powers to their acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore there is no habit in the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the natural powers there is no habit1 because1 by reason of their nature1 they are determinate to one thing4 ,but the will1 by reason of its nature1 is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs4 ,therefore there is no habit in the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,justice is a habit4 ,but justice is in the will2 for it is a habit whereby men will and do that which is just 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,therefore the will is the subject of a habit4 ,i answer that1 ,every power which may be variously directed to act1 needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act4 ,now since the will is a rational power1 it may be variously directed to act4 ,and therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act4 ,moreover1 from the very nature of habit1 it is clear that it is principally related to the will2 inasmuch as habit is that which one uses when one wills1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object2 so in the will1 and in every appetitive power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object2 for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination1 as we have said above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,and therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power itself1 the power needs no quality to incline it4 ,but since it is necessary1 for the end of human life1 that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed1 to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power1 which has a relation to many and various things1 therefore it is necessary that1 in the will and in the other appetitive powers1 there be certain qualities to incline them1 and these are called habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the active intellect is active only1 and in no way passive4 ,but the will1 and every appetitive power1 is both mover and moved 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ed74 ,and therefore the comparison between them does not hold2 for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will from the very nature of the power is inclined to the good of the reason4 ,but because this good is varied in many ways1 the will needs to be inclined1 by means of a habit1 to some fixed good of the reason1 in order that action may follow more promptly4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,there ,are ,habits in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are no habits in the angels4 ,for ,maximus1 commentator of ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 says3 ,it is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual 7i4e4 spiritual7 powers in the divine intelligences 7i4e4 in the angels7 after the manner of accidents1 as in us3 as though one were in the other as in a subject3 for accident of any kind is foreign to them4 ,but every habit is an accident4 ,therefore there are no habits in the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv73 ,the holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate1 above all other things1 in ,god's goodness4 ,but that which is of itself 7per se7 is prior to and more powerful than that which is by another 7per aliud74 ,therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with ,god1 and therefore not by means of habits4 ,and this seems to have been the reasoning of ,maximus1 who in the same passage adds3 ,for if this were the case1 surely their essence would not remain in itself1 nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 habit is a disposition 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #be74 ,but disposition1 as is said in the same book1 is the order of that which has parts4 ,since1 therefore1 angels are simple substances1 it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 that the angels of the first hierarchy are called3 ,fire-bearers and ,thrones and ,outpouring of ,wisdom1 by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits4 ,i answer that1 ,some have thought that there are no habits in the angels1 and that whatever is said of them1 is said essentially4 ,whence ,maximus1 after the words which we have quoted1 says3 ,their dispositions1 and the powers which are in them1 are essential1 through the absence of matter in them4 ,and ,simplicius says the same in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments3 ,wisdom which is in the soul is its habit3 but that which is in the intellect1 is its substance4 ,for everything divine is sufficient of itself1 and exists in itself4 ,now this opinion contains some truth1 and some error4 ,for it is manifest from what we have said 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d7 that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit4 ,so the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances1 and that there is no material potentiality in them1 and on that account1 excluded from them habit and any kind of accident4 ,yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels1 there is still some potentiality in them 7for to be pure act belongs to ,god alone71 therefore1 as far as potentiality is found to be in them1 so far may habits be found in them4 ,but because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind4 ,whence1 ,simplicius says in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments that3 ,the habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below1 but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself4 ,however1 the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit4 ,for the human intellect1 being the lowest in the intellectual order1 is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things1 just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms2 and therefore for the understanding of all things1 it needs some habit4 ,but the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things1 but as an act2 not indeed as pure act 7for this belongs to ,god alone71 but with an admixture of some potentiality3 and the higher it is1 the less potentiality it has4 ,and therefore1 as we said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #a71 so far as it is in potentiality1 so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation3 but so far as it is in act1 through its own essence it can understand some things1 at least itself1 and other things according to the mode of its substance1 as stated in ,de ,causis3 and the more perfect it is1 the more perfectly will it understand4 ,but since no angel attains to the perfection of ,god1 but all are infinitely distant therefrom2 for this reason1 in order to attain to ,god ,himself1 through intellect and will1 the angels need some habits1 being as it were in potentiality in regard to that ,pure ,act4 ,wherefore ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 that their habits are godlike1 that is to say1 that by them they are made like to ,god4 ,but those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels1 since they are immaterial4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying of ,maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as to that which belongs to angels by their essence1 they do not need a habit4 ,but as they are not so far beings of themselves1 as not to partake of ,divine wisdom and goodness1 therefore1 so far as they need to partake of something from without1 so far do they need to have habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in angels there are no essential parts3 but there are potential parts1 in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species1 and in so far as their will has a relation to several things4 ,,question #ea ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,habits1 ,,as ,,to ,,their ,,formation 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must next consider the cause of habits3 and firstly1 as to their formation2 secondly1 as to their increase2 thirdly1 as to their diminution and corruption4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether any habit is from nature8 7#b7 ,whether any habit is caused by acts8 7#c7 ,whether any habit can be caused by one act8 7#d7 ,whether any habits are infused in man by ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,any ,habit ,is from ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no habit is from nature4 ,for the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will4 ,but habit is that which we use when we will1 as the ,commentator says on ,de ,anima iii4 ,therefore habit is not from nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nature does not employ two where one is sufficient4 ,but the powers of the soul are from nature4 ,if therefore the habits of the powers were from nature1 habit and power would be one4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nature does not fail in necessaries4 ,but habits are necessary in order to act well1 as we have stated above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d74 ,if therefore any habits were from nature1 it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits3 but this is clearly false4 ,therefore habits are not from nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,in ,ethic4 vi1 #f1 among other habits1 place is given to understanding of first principles1 which habit is from nature3 wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally4 ,i answer that1 ,one thing can be natural to another in two ways4 ,first in respect of the specific nature1 as the faculty of laughing is natural to man1 and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency4 ,secondly1 in respect of the individual nature1 as it is natural to ,socrates or ,plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health1 in accordance with their respective temperaments4 ,again1 in respect of both natures1 something may be called natural in two ways3 first1 because it entirely is from the nature2 secondly1 because it is partly from nature1 and partly from an extrinsic principle4 ,for instance1 when a man is healed by himself1 his health is entirely from nature2 but when a man is healed by means of medicine1 health is partly from nature1 partly from an extrinsic principle4 ,thus1 then1 if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature1 it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways4 ,for there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species1 so that no man can be without it4 ,and this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature4 ,but since such a disposition has a certain latitude1 it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature4 ,and this disposition may be either entirely from nature1 or partly from nature1 and partly from an extrinsic principle1 as we have said of those who are healed by means of art4 ,but the habit which is a disposition to operation1 and whose subject is a power of the soul1 as stated above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #b71 may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature3 in respect of the specific nature1 on the part of the soul itself1 which1 since it is the form of the body1 is the specific principle2 but in respect of the individual nature1 on the part of the body1 which is the material principle4 ,yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man1 so that they be entirely from nature4 ,in the angels1 indeed1 this does happen1 since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them1 which cannot be said of the human soul1 as we have said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #c74 ,there are1 therefore1 in man certain natural habits1 owing their existence1 partly to nature1 and partly to some extrinsic principle3 in one way1 indeed1 in the apprehensive powers2 in another way1 in the appetitive powers4 ,for in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning1 both in respect of the specific nature1 and in respect of the individual nature4 ,this happens with regard to the specific nature1 on the part of the soul itself3 thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit4 ,for it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man1 having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part1 should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part3 and in like manner with regard to other such principles4 ,yet what is a whole1 and what is a part--this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms3 and for this reason1 the ,philosopher at the end of the ,posterior ,analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses4 ,but in respect of the individual nature1 a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning1 in so far as one man1 from the disposition of his organs of sense1 is more apt than another to understand well1 since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect4 ,in the appetitive powers1 however1 no habit is natural in its beginning1 on the part of the soul itself1 as to the substance of the habit2 but only as to certain principles thereof1 as1 for instance1 the principles of common law are called the nurseries of virtue4 ,the reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects1 which seems to be the beginning of a habit1 does not belong to the habit1 but rather to the very nature of the powers4 ,but on the part of the body1 in respect of the individual nature1 there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings4 ,for some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection takes nature as divided against reason and will2 whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power1 while it cannot belong to the power itself4 ,for instance1 with regard to the angels1 it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things3 for thus it would have to be the act of all things1 which belongs to ,god alone4 ,because that by which something is known1 must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known3 whence it would follow1 if the power of the angel knew all things by itself1 that it was the likeness and act of all things4 ,wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power1 some intelligible species1 which are likenesses of things understood3 for it is by participation of the ,divine wisdom and not by their own essence1 that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand4 ,and so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits3 since some can be caused by nature1 and some not1 as we have said above4 ,and so it does not follow that because some habits are natural1 therefore all are natural4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,any ,habit ,is ,caused by ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no habit is caused by acts4 ,for habit is a quality1 as we have said above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #a74 ,now every quality is caused in a subject1 according to the latter's receptivity4 ,since then the agent1 inasmuch as it acts1 does not receive but rather gives3 it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality1 as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled3 whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality1 moves1 as may be seen in that which heats or cools4 ,if therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act1 it would follow that the same would be mover and moved1 active and passive3 which is impossible1 as stated in ,physics iii1 #h4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the effect cannot be more noble than its cause4 ,but habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit2 as is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts4 ,therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b7 teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts4 ,i answer that1 ,in the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act3 for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating4 ,and in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act3 for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed1 as is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #a4 ,but a certain agent is to be found1 in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act1 as we see in human acts4 ,for the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object3 and further1 the intellective power1 according as it reasons about conclusions1 has1 as it were1 an active principle in a self-evident proposition4 ,wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents2 not indeed with regard to the first active principle1 but with regard to that principle of the act1 which principle is a mover moved4 ,for everything that is passive and moved by another1 is disposed by the action of the agent2 wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved1 which quality is called a habit3 just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers1 according as they are moved by the reason1 and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect1 according as it is moved by first propositions4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the agent1 as agent1 does not receive anything4 ,but in so far as it moves through being moved by another1 it receives something from that which moves it3 and thus is a habit caused4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same thing1 and in the same respect1 cannot be mover and moved2 but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects1 as is proved in ,physics viii1 text4 #bh1 #bi4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the act which precedes the habit1 in so far as it comes from an active principle1 proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby3 just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts1 and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,habit ,can ,be ,caused by ,one ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a habit can be caused by one act4 ,for demonstration is an act of reason4 ,but science1 which is the habit of one conclusion1 is caused by one demonstration4 ,therefore habit can be caused by one act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity4 ,but a habit is caused by multiplication of acts4 ,therefore also if an act be very intense1 it can be the generating cause of a habit4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 health and sickness are habits4 ,but it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill1 by one act4 ,therefore one act can cause a habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #g73 ,as neither does one swallow nor one day make spring3 so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy4 ,but happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue 7,ethic4 i1 #g1 #aj1 #ac74 ,therefore a habit of virtue1 and for the same reason1 other habits1 is not caused by one act4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said already 7,a4 #b71 habit is caused by act1 because a passive power is moved by an active principle4 ,but in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive4 ,whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible1 it does not enkindle at once2 but it gradually expels contrary dispositions1 so that by overcoming it entirely1 it may impress its likeness on it4 ,now it is clear that the active principle which is reason1 cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act3 because the appetitive power is inclined variously1 and to many things2 while the reason judges in a single act1 what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances4 ,wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome1 so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing1 in the majority of cases2 which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue4 ,therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act1 but only by many4 ,but in the apprehensive powers1 we must observe that there are two passive principles3 one is the possible 7,see ,first ,part1 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b7 intellect itself2 the other is the intellect which ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bj7 calls passive1 and is the particular reason1 that is the cogitative power1 with memory and imagination4 ,with regard then to the former passive principle1 it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome1 by one act1 the power of its passive principle3 thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect1 so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion1 but a probable proposition cannot do this4 ,wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason1 even on the part of the possible intellect3 whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason1 so far as the possible intellect is concerned4 ,but with regard to the lower apprehensive powers1 the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory4 ,and so the ,philosopher says 7,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 #a7 that meditation strengthens memory4 ,bodily habits1 however1 can be caused by one act1 if the active principle is of great power3 sometimes1 for instance1 a strong dose of medicine restores health at once4 ,hence the solutions to the objections are clear4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,any ,habits ,are ,infused in ,man by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no habit is infused in man by ,god4 ,for ,god treats all equally4 ,if therefore ,he infuses habits into some1 ,he would infuse them into all3 which is clearly untrue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature3 for it belongs to ,divine providence to preserve nature1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but habits are naturally caused in man by acts1 as we have said above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore ,god does not cause habits to be in man except by acts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if any habit be infused into man by ,god1 man can by that habit perform many acts4 ,but from those acts a like habit is caused 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b74 ,consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man1 one acquired1 the other infused4 ,now this seems impossible3 for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject4 ,therefore a habit is not infused into man by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #ae3e73 ,god filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding4 ,now wisdom and understanding are habits4 ,therefore some habits are infused into man by ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,some habits are infused by ,god into man1 for two reasons4 ,the first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature1 namely1 the ultimate and perfect happiness of man1 as stated above 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e74 ,and since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them1 therefore is it necessary that those habits1 which dispose to this end1 exceed the proportion of human nature4 ,wherefore such habits can never be in man except by ,divine infusion1 as is the case with all gratuitous virtues4 ,the other reason is1 because ,god can produce the effects of second causes1 without these second causes1 as we have said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #f74 ,just as1 therefore1 sometimes1 in order to show ,his power1 ,he causes health1 without its natural cause1 but which nature could have caused1 so also1 at times1 for the manifestation of ,his power1 ,he infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power4 ,thus ,he gave to the apostles the science of the ,scriptures and of all tongues1 which men can acquire by study or by custom1 but not so perfectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god1 in respect of ,his ,nature1 is the same to all1 but in respect of the order of ,his ,wisdom1 for some fixed motive1 gives certain things to some1 which ,he does not give to others4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that ,god works in all according to their mode1 does not hinder ,god from doing what nature cannot do3 but it follows from this that ,he does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,acts produced by an infused habit1 do not cause a habit1 but strengthen the already existing habit2 just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally health1 do not cause a kind of health1 but give new strength to the health he had before4 ,,question #eb ,,of ,,the ,,increase ,,of ,,habits 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the increase of habits2 under which head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether habits increase8 7#b7 ,whether they increase by addition8 7#c7 ,whether each act increases the habit8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,habits ,increase8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habits cannot increase4 ,for increase concerns quantity 7,phys4 v1 text4 #ah74 ,but habits are not in the genus of quantity1 but in that of quality4 ,therefore there can be no increase of habits4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habit is a perfection 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag1 #ah74 ,but since perfection conveys a notion of end and term1 it seems that it cannot be more or less4 ,therefore a habit cannot increase4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration3 for that which from being less hot becomes more hot1 is said to be altered4 ,but in habits there is no alteration1 as is proved in ,phys4 vii1 text4 #ae1 #ag4 ,therefore habits cannot increase4 ,on the contrary1 ,faith is a habit1 and yet it increases3 wherefore the disciples said to our ,lord 7,luke #ag3e73 ,lord1 increase our faith4 ,therefore habits increase4 ,i answer that1 ,increase1 like other things pertaining to quantity1 is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things1 on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things1 which come under the imagination4 ,now in corporeal quantities1 a thing is said to be great1 according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it2 wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man1 which is not reputed great in an elephant4 ,and so also in forms1 we say a thing is great because it is perfect4 ,and since good has the nature of perfection1 therefore in things which are great1 but not in quantity1 to be greater is the same as to be better1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #h74 ,now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways3 first1 in respect of the form itself3 secondly1 in respect of the participation of the form by its subject4 ,in so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself1 thus the form is said to be little or great3 for instance great or little health or science4 ,but in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject1 it is said to be more or less3 for instance more or less white or healthy4 ,now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject1 but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature1 and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject4 ,in this way1 then1 there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms1 as ,simplicius relates in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments4 ,for ,plotinus and the other ,platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less1 for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness1 on account of the infinity of matter4 ,others1 on the contrary1 held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more or less2 but that the things affected by them 7qualia7 are said to be more or less1 in respect of the participation of the subject3 that1 for instance1 justice is not more or less1 but the just thing4 ,aristotle alludes to this opinion in the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi74 ,the third opinion was that of the ,stoics1 and lies between the two preceding opinions4 ,for they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less1 for instance1 the arts2 and that some are not1 as the virtues4 ,the fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less1 but that material forms are4 ,in order that the truth in this matter be made clear1 we must observe that that1 in respect of which a thing receives its species1 must be something fixed and stationary1 and as it were indivisible3 for whatever attains to that thing1 is contained under the species1 and whatever recedes from it more or less1 belongs to another species1 more or less perfect4 ,wherefore1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 viii1 text4 #aj7 that species of things are like numbers1 in which addition or subtraction changes the species4 ,if1 therefore1 a form1 or anything at all1 receives its specific nature in respect of itself1 or in respect of something belonging to it1 it is necessary that1 considered in itself1 it be something of a definite nature1 which can be neither more nor less4 ,such are heat1 whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else3 and much more so1 substance1 which is per se being4 ,but those things which receive their species from something to which they are related1 can be diversified1 in respect of themselves1 according to more or less3 and nonetheless they remain in the same species1 on account of the oneness of that to which they are related1 and from which they receive their species4 ,for example1 movement is in itself more intense or more remiss3 and yet it remains in the same species1 on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified4 ,we may observe the same thing in health2 for a body attains to the nature of health1 according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal's nature1 to which various dispositions may be suitable2 which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less1 and withal the nature of health remains4 ,whence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #b1 #c73 ,health itself may be more or less3 for the measure is not the same in all1 nor is it always the same in one individual2 but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health4 ,now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect3 wherefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure1 then we should not speak of health as greater or less4 ,thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease of itself1 and how it cannot4 ,but if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject1 thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less1 and some not4 ,now ,simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less1 because it is per se being4 ,and therefore every form which is participated substantially by its subject1 cannot vary in intensity and remission3 wherefore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less4 ,and because quantity is nigh to substance1 and because shape follows on quantity1 therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less4 ,whence the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ae7 that when a thing receives form and shape1 it is not said to be altered1 but to be made4 ,but other qualities which are further removed from quantity1 and are connected with passions and actions1 are susceptible of more or less1 in respect of their participation by the subject4 ,now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity4 ,for1 as we have said1 that from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible4 ,wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or less4 ,first because the participator has its species in respect of that form4 ,and for this reason no substantial form is participated more or less4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 viii1 text4 #aj7 that1 as a number cannot be more or less1 so neither can that which is in the species of substance1 that is1 in respect of its participation of the specific form3 but in so far as substance may be with matter1 i4e4 in respect of material dispositions1 more or less are found in substance4 ,secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible3 wherefore if anything participate that form1 it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility4 ,for this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or less2 because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity4 ,the same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity1 which are denominated from numbers1 as two-cubits-long1 three-cubits-long1 and of relations of quantity1 as double and treble1 and of figures of quantity1 as triangle and tetragon4 ,this same explanation is given by ,aristotle in the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi71 where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less1 he says3 ,things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle1 are accordingly triangles and circles3 to wit1 because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such1 wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility4 ,it is clear1 therefore1 since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag71 that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions4 ,first1 in respect of the habit itself3 thus1 for instance1 we speak of greater or less health2 greater or less science1 which extends to more or fewer things4 ,secondly1 in respect of participation by the subject3 in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another1 according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature1 or from custom4 ,for habit and disposition do not give species to the subject3 nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility4 ,we shall say further on 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #a7 how it is with the virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the word great is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms2 so also is the word growth1 the term of which is something great4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,habit is indeed a perfection1 but not a perfection which is the term of its subject2 for instance1 a term giving the subject its specific being4 ,nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term1 as do the species of numbers4 ,wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species2 but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species3 for1 supposing an alteration as to hot and cold1 there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness4 ,in like manner1 if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite1 or the sensitive powers of apprehension1 an alteration follows as to science and virtue 7,phys4 viii1 text4 #bj74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,habit ,increases by ,addition8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition4 ,for the word increase1 as we have said1 is transferred to forms1 from corporeal quantities4 ,but in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition3 wherefore 7,de ,gener4 i1 text4 #ca7 it is said that increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing4 ,therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habit is not increased except by means of some agent4 ,but every agent does something in the passive subject3 for instance1 that which heats1 causes heat in that which is heated4 ,therefore there is no increase without addition4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as that which is not white1 is in potentiality to be white3 so that which is less white1 is in potentiality to be more white4 ,but that which is not white1 is not made white except by the addition of whiteness4 ,therefore that which is less white1 is not made more white1 except by an added whiteness4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iv1 text4 #hd73 ,that which is hot is made hotter1 without making1 in the matter1 something hot1 that was not hot1 when the thing was less hot4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase4 ,i answer that1 ,the solution of this question depends on what we have said above 7,a4 #a74 ,for we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness1 happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself1 through the diverse participation thereof by the subject4 ,wherefore such increase of habits and other forms1 is not caused by an addition of form to form2 but by the subject participating more or less perfectly1 one and the same form4 ,and just as1 by an agent which is in act1 something is made actually hot1 beginning1 as it were1 to participate a form1 not as though the form itself were made1 as is proved in ,metaph4 vii1 text4 #cb1 so1 by an intense action of the agent1 something is made more hot1 as it were participating the form more perfectly1 not as though something were added to the form4 ,for if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition1 this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject4 ,if it be understood of the form itself1 it has already been stated 7,a4 #a7 that such an addition or subtraction would change the species2 even as the species of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes white4 ,if1 on the other hand1 this addition be understood as applying to the subject1 this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously 7thus we may say cold increases in a man who1 after being cold in one part of his body1 is cold in several parts71 or because some other subject is added sharing in the same form 7as when a hot thing is added to another1 or one white thing to another74 ,but in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing1 but a greater white or hot thing4 ,since1 however1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less1 in some of these we may find increase by addition4 ,for movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts1 or to the course it follows3 and yet the species remains the same on account of the oneness of the term4 ,yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject3 i4e4 in so far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily4 ,in like manner1 science can increase in itself by addition2 thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry1 the same specific habit of science increases in that man4 ,yet a man's science increases1 as to the subject's participation thereof1 in intensity1 in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions4 ,as to bodily habits1 it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition4 ,for an animal is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful1 unless it be such in all its parts4 ,and if it be brought to a more perfect measure1 this is the result of a change in the simple qualities1 which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them4 ,how this question affects virtues we shall state further on 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even in bodily bulk increase is twofold4 ,first1 by addition of one subject to another2 such is the increase of living things4 ,secondly1 by mere intensity1 without any addition at all2 such is the case with things subject to rarefaction1 as is stated in ,phys4 iv1 text4 #fc4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the cause that increases a habit1 always effects something in the subject1 but not a new form4 ,but it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form1 or it makes the form to extend further4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,what is not already white1 is potentially white1 as not yet possessing the form of whiteness3 hence the agent causes a new form in the subject4 ,but that which is less hot or white1 is not in potentiality to those forms1 since it has them already actually3 but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation2 and this it receives through the agent's action4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,every ,act ,increases ,its ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every act increases its habit4 ,for when the cause is increased the effect is increased4 ,now acts are causes of habits1 as stated above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 of like things a like judgment should be formed4 ,but all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b74 ,therefore if some acts increase a habit1 every act should increase it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 like is increased by like4 ,but any act is like the habit whence it proceeds4 ,therefore every act increases the habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,opposite effects do not result from the same cause4 ,but according to ,ethic4 ii1 #b1 some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed1 for instance if they be done carelessly4 ,therefore it is not every act that increases a habit4 ,i answer that1 ,like acts cause like habits 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b74 ,now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being the same or various1 but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation4 ,for it is not only black that is unlike white1 but also less white is unlike more white1 since there is movement from less white to more white1 even as from one opposite to another1 as stated in ,phys4 v1 text4 #eb4 ,but since use of habits depends on the will1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #e72 just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it2 so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit4 ,accordingly1 if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit1 or even surpass it1 every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof1 if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal4 ,for not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone3 but the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body4 ,so1 too1 repeated acts cause a habit to grow4 ,if1 however1 the act falls short of the intensity of the habit1 such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit1 but rather to a lessening thereof4 ,from this it is clear how to solve the objections4 ,,question #ec ,,how ,,habits ,,are ,,corrupted ,,or ,,diminished 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must now consider how habits are lost or weakened2 and under this head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether a habit can be corrupted8 7#b7 ,whether it can be diminished8 7#c7 ,how are habits corrupted or diminished8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,habit ,can ,be ,corrupted8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted4 ,for habit is within its subject like a second nature2 wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit4 ,now so long as a thing is1 its nature is not corrupted4 ,therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whenever a form is corrupted1 this is due either to corruption of its subject1 or to its contrary3 thus sickness ceases through corruption of the animal1 or through the advent of health4 ,now science1 which is a habit1 cannot be lost through corruption of its subject3 since the intellect1 which is its subject1 is a substance that is incorruptible 7,de ,anima i1 text4 #fe74 ,in like manner1 neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary3 since intelligible species are not contrary to one another 7,metaph4 vii1 text4 #eb74 ,therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all corruption results from some movement4 ,but the habit of science1 which is in the soul1 cannot be corrupted by a direct movement of the soul itself1 since the soul is not moved directly4 ,it is1 however1 moved indirectly through the movement of the body3 and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect3 since the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species2 for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death4 ,therefore science cannot be corrupted4 ,for the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted1 since they also are in the rational soul1 and1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 i1 #aj71 virtue is more lasting than learning4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,long4 et ,brev4 ,vitae ii7 that forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science4 ,moreover1 by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue3 and again1 virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts 7,ethic4 ii1 #b74 ,i answer that1 ,a form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary2 indirectly1 through its subject being corrupted4 ,when therefore a habit has a corruptible subject1 and a cause that has a contrary1 it can be corrupted both ways4 ,this is clearly the case with bodily habits--for instance1 health and sickness4 ,but those habits that have an incorruptible subject1 cannot be corrupted indirectly4 ,there are1 however1 some habits which1 while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject1 reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject2 such is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the possible intellect1 but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension1 as stated above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly1 on the part of the possible intellect1 but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers4 ,we must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly4 ,if then there be a habit having a contrary1 either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause1 it can be corrupted directly3 but if it has no contrary1 it cannot be corrupted directly4 ,now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the possible intellect1 has no contrary2 nor can the active intellect1 which is the cause of that species1 have a contrary4 ,wherefore if in the possible intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect1 such a habit is incorruptible both directly and indirectly4 ,such are the habits of the first principles1 both speculative and practical1 which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever3 even as the ,philosopher says about prudence 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that it cannot be lost by being forgotten4 ,there is1 however1 in the possible intellect a habit caused by the reason1 to wit1 the habit of conclusions1 which is called science1 to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways4 ,first1 on the part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the reason3 for the assertion ,good is not good is contrary to the assertion ,good is good 7,peri ,herm4 ii74 ,secondly1 on the part of the process of reasoning2 forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism4 ,wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science4 ,hence the ,philosopher1 as stated above1 says that deception is the corruption of science4 ,as to virtues1 some of them are intellectual1 residing in reason itself1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #a3 and to these applies what we have said of science and opinion4 ,some1 however1 viz4 the moral virtues1 are in the appetitive part of the soul2 and the same may be said of the contrary vices4 ,now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason4 ,therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice1 may be corrupted by a judgment of reason1 whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue1 whether through ignorance1 passion or deliberate choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #aj1 a habit is like a second nature1 and yet it falls short of it4 ,and so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing1 a habit is removed1 though with difficulty4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although there is no contrary to intelligible species1 yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,science is not taken away by movement of the body1 if we consider the root itself of the habit1 but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science2 in so far as the intellect1 in its act1 has need of the sensitive powers1 which are impeded by corporal transmutation4 ,but the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science1 even as regards the very root of the habit4 ,in like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted4 ,nevertheless when it is said that virtue is more lasting than learning1 this must be understood in respect1 not of the subject or cause1 but of the act3 because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life1 whereas the use of learning does not4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #b ,whether a ,habit ,can ,diminish8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a habit cannot diminish4 ,because a habit is a simple quality and form4 ,now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all4 ,therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if a thing is befitting an accident1 this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject4 ,now a habit does not become more or less intense by reason of itself2 else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less4 ,and if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject1 it would follow that something is accidental to a habit1 proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject4 ,now whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject1 that form can be separate1 as stated in ,de ,anima i1 text4 #ac4 ,hence it follows that a habit is a separable form2 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident1 is inherence in a subject3 wherefore any accident is defined with reference to its subject4 ,therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself1 neither can it in its inherence in its subject3 and consequently it will be nowise less intense4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing4 ,now increase and decrease are contraries4 ,since therefore a habit can increase1 it seems that it can also diminish4 ,i answer that1 ,habits diminish1 just as they increase1 in two ways1 as we have already explained 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #a74 ,and since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them1 so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them3 since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption1 even as1 on the other hand1 the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a habit1 considered in itself1 is a simple form4 ,it is not thus that it is subject to decrease2 but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it4 ,this is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate1 through its being able to participate a form in various ways1 or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument would hold1 if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease4 ,this we do not say2 but that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin1 not in the habit1 but in its subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no matter how we take an accident1 its very notion implies dependence on a subject1 but in different ways4 ,for if we take an accident in the abstract1 it implies relation to a subject1 which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject3 for whiteness is that whereby a thing is white4 ,accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract1 we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition1 viz4 the genus2 but we give it the second place1 which is that of the difference2 thus we say that simitas is a curvature of the nose4 ,but if we take accidents in the concrete1 the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete1 the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident3 for a white thing is something that has whiteness4 ,accordingly in defining this kind of accident1 we place the subject as the genus1 which is the first part of a definition2 for we say that a simum is a snub-nose4 ,accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject1 but is not of the very essence of the accident1 is ascribed to that accident1 not in the abstract1 but in the concrete4 ,such are increase and decrease in certain accidents3 wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing4 ,the same applies to habits and other qualities2 save that certain habits and other qualities2 save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition1 as we have already clearly explained 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,habit ,is ,corrupted or ,diminished ,through ,mere ,cessation from ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act4 ,for habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities1 as we have explained above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c2 ,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #a74 ,but passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act3 for whiteness is not lessened through not affecting the sight1 nor heat through ceasing to make something hot4 ,therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 corruption and diminution are changes4 ,now nothing is changed without a moving cause4 ,since therefore cessation from act does not imply a moving cause1 it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time4 ,now those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time4 ,neither1 therefore1 are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of time1 if one fails for long to exercise them4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,long4 et ,brev4 ,vitae ii7 that not only deception1 but also forgetfulness1 is the corruption of science4 ,moreover he says 7,ethic4 viii1 #e7 that want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship4 ,in like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated in ,phys4 vii1 text4 #bg1 a thing is a cause of movement in two ways4 ,first1 directly2 and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper form2 thus fire causes heat4 ,secondly1 indirectly2 for instance1 that which removes an obstacle4 ,it is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act1 in so far1 to wit1 as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit4 ,for it has been stated 7,a4 #a7 that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency4 ,consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits1 are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act1 as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue4 ,for it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions4 ,and when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds1 the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue1 by reason of the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies4 ,wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act4 ,the same applies to the intellectual habits1 which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination4 ,hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits1 strange fancies1 sometimes in opposition to them1 arise in his imagination2 so that unless those fancies be1 as it were1 cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits1 man becomes less fit to judge aright1 and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary1 and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat1 if1 for this same reason1 cold which is destructive of heat were to increase4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,cessation from act is a moving cause1 conducive of corruption or diminution1 by removing the obstacles thereto1 as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellectual part of the soul1 considered in itself1 is above time1 but the sensitive part is subject to time1 and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part1 and also as to the powers of apprehension4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iv4 text4 #aag7 that time makes us forget4 ,,question #ed ,,of ,,the ,,distinction ,,of ,,habits 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the distinction of habits2 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether many habits can be in one power8 7#b7 ,whether habits are distinguished by their objects8 7#c7 ,whether habits are divided into good and bad8 7#d7 ,whether one habit may be made up of many habits8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,many ,habits ,can ,be in ,one ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power4 ,for when several things are distinguished in respect of the same thing1 if one of them be multiplied1 the others are too4 ,now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing1 viz4 their acts and objects4 ,therefore they are multiplied in like manner4 ,therefore there cannot be many habits in one power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a power is a simple force4 ,now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents2 for the subject is the cause of its accidents2 and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause4 ,therefore there cannot be many habits in one power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as the body is informed by its shape1 so is a power informed by a habit4 ,but one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes4 ,therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits4 ,therefore several habits cannot be at the same time in one power4 ,on the contrary1 ,the intellect is one power2 wherein1 nevertheless1 are the habits of various sciences4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d71 habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something1 either to nature1 or to operation1 which is the end of nature4 ,as to those habits which are dispositions to nature1 it is clear that several can be in one same subject3 since in one subject we may take parts in various ways1 according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits4 ,thus1 if we take the humors as being parts of the human body1 according to their disposition in respect of human nature1 we have the habit or disposition of health3 while1 if we take like parts1 such as nerves1 bones1 and flesh1 the disposition of these in respect of nature is strength or weakness2 whereas1 if we take the limbs1 i4e4 the hands1 feet1 and so on1 the disposition of these in proportion to nature1 is beauty3 and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject4 ,if1 however1 we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation1 and belong properly to the powers2 thus1 again1 there may be several habits in one power4 ,the reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power1 as stated above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #b73 for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit1 as was clearly shown above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #b74 ,now a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any species1 as matter to form3 because1 just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent1 so1 too1 is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one4 ,wherefore1 just as several objects can move one passive power1 so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse4 ,now habits are qualities or forms adhering to a power1 and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species4 ,consequently several habits1 even as several specifically different acts1 can belong to one power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even as in natural things1 diversity of species is according to the form1 and diversity of genus1 according to matter1 as stated in ,metaph4 v1 text4 #cc 7since things that differ in matter belong to different genera73 so1 too1 generic diversity of objects entails a difference of powers 7wherefore the ,philosopher says in ,ethic4 vi1 #a1 that those objects that differ generically belong to different departments of the soul72 while specific difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts1 and consequently of habits also4 ,now things that differ in genus differ in species1 but not vice versa4 ,wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species3 but it does not follow that different habits are in different powers1 for several can be in one power4 ,and even as several genera may be included in one genus1 and several species be contained in one species2 so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although a power is simple as to its essence1 it is multiple virtually1 inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different acts4 ,consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries3 whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power1 but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term4 ,consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same time1 except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another2 just as neither can a body have several shapes1 save in so far as one shape enters into another1 as a three-sided in a four-sided figure4 ,for the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time actually2 and yet it can know several things at the same time habitually4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,habits ,are ,distinguished by ,their ,objects8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects4 ,for contraries differ in species4 ,now the same habit of science regards contraries3 thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy4 ,therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 different sciences are different habits4 ,but the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences3 thus both the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 text4 #ag4 ,therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 wherever the act is the same1 the object is the same4 ,but the same act can belong to different habits of virtue1 if it be directed to different ends2 thus to give money to anyone1 if it be done for ,god's sake1 is an act of charity2 while1 if it be done in order to pay a debt1 it is an act of justice4 ,therefore the same object can also belong to different habits4 ,therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects4 ,on the contrary1 ,acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e74 ,but habits are dispositions to acts4 ,therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects4 ,i answer that1 ,a habit is both a form and a habit4 ,hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically2 or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits4 ,accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles1 since every agent produces its like in species4 ,habits1 however1 imply order to something3 and all things that imply order to something1 are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained4 ,now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order3 viz4 to nature and to an operation consequent to nature4 ,accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things4 ,first1 in respect of the active principles of such dispositions2 secondly1 in respect of nature2 thirdly1 in respect of specifically different objects1 as will appear from what follows4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in distinguishing powers1 or also habits1 we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect1 which may differ in species or even in genus4 ,and though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both known under one aspect1 since one is known through the other4 ,and consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility1 they belong to one cognitive habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the physicist proves the earth to be round by one means1 the astronomer by another3 for the latter proves this by means of mathematics1 e4g4 by the shapes of eclipses1 or something of the sort2 while the former proves it by means of physics1 e4g4 by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center1 and so forth4 ,now the whole force of a demonstration1 which is a syllogism producing science1 as stated in ,poster4 i1 text4 #e1 depends on the mean4 ,and consequently various means are as so many active principles1 in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #hi2 ,ethic4 vii1 #h71 the end is1 in practical matters1 what the principle is in speculative matters4 ,consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues1 even as diversity of active principles does4 ,moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts1 with which1 above all1 the virtues are concerned1 as is evident from what has been said 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #d74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,habits ,are ,divided into ,good and ,bad8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad4 ,for good and bad are contraries4 ,now the same habit regards contraries1 as was stated above 7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #a74 ,therefore habits are not divided into good and bad4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 good is convertible with being2 so that1 since it is common to all1 it cannot be accounted a specific difference1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,topic4 iv74 ,again1 evil1 since it is a privation and a non-being1 cannot differentiate any being4 ,therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there can be different evil habits about one same object2 for instance1 intemperance and insensibility about matters of concupiscence3 and in like manner there can be several good habits2 for instance1 human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue1 as the ,philosopher clearly states 7,ethic4 vii1 #a74 ,therefore1 habits are not divided into good and bad4 ,on the contrary1 ,a good habit is contrary to a bad habit1 as virtue to vice4 ,now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles1 but also in their relation to nature4 ,now1 this happens in two ways4 ,first1 by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature4 ,in this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit3 since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent's nature1 while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature4 ,thus1 acts of virtue are suitable to human nature1 since they are according to reason1 whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature1 since they are against reason4 ,hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad4 ,secondly1 habits are distinguished in relation to nature1 from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature1 while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature4 ,and thus human virtue1 which disposes to an act befitting human nature1 is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue1 which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect4 ,never1 however1 does it happen that contrary habits are in one species3 since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect4 ,accordingly habits are divided into good and bad1 namely1 inasmuch as one habit is good1 and another bad2 but not by reason of one habit being about something good1 and another about something bad4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not the good which is common to every being1 that is a difference constituting the species of a habit2 but some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate1 viz4 the human1 nature4 ,in like manner the evil that constitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation1 but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures1 as stated above4 ,but several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with nature3 thus1 various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,one ,habit ,is ,made ,up of ,many ,habits8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one habit is made up of many habits4 ,for whatever is engendered1 not at once1 but little by little1 seems to be made up of several parts4 ,but a habit is engendered1 not at once1 but little by little out of several acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore one habit is made up of several4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a whole is made up of its parts4 ,now many parts are assigned to one habit3 thus ,tully assigns many parts of fortitude1 temperance1 and other virtues4 ,therefore one habit is made up of many4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge4 ,but many conclusions belong to but one science1 to geometry1 for instance1 or to arithmetic4 ,therefore one habit is made up of many4 ,on the contrary1 ,a habit1 since it is a quality1 is a simple form4 ,but nothing simple is made up of many4 ,therefore one habit is not made up of many4 ,i answer that1 ,a habit directed to operation1 such as we are chiefly concerned with at present1 is a perfection of a power4 ,now every perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects4 ,hence1 just as a power1 while it is one1 extends to many things1 in so far as they have something in common1 i4e4 some general objective aspect1 so also a habit extends to many things1 in so far as they are related to one1 for instance1 to some specific objective aspect1 or to one nature1 or to one principle1 as was clearly stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,if then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object1 we shall find a certain multiplicity therein4 ,but since this multiplicity is directed to one thing1 on which the habit is chiefly intent1 hence it is that a habit is a simple quality1 not composed to several habits1 even though it extend to many things4 ,for a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one1 whence it derives its unity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that a habit is engendered little by little1 is due1 not to one part being engendered after another1 but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition2 and also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the subject1 and is gradually perfected4 ,the same applies to other qualities4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue1 are not integral parts that combine to form a whole2 but subjective or potential parts1 as we shall explain further on 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #f1 ad #d2 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in any science1 he who acquires1 by demonstration1 scientific knowledge of one conclusion1 has the habit indeed1 yet imperfectly4 ,and when he obtains1 by demonstration1 the scientific knowledge of another conclusion1 no additional habit is engendered in him3 but the habit which was in him previously is perfected1 forasmuch as it has increased in extent2 because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate1 and one flows from another4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,habits ,,in ,,particular 7,,qq4 #ee-hi73 ,,good ,,habits1 i4e41 ,,virtues 7,,qq4 #ee-gj7 ,,question #ee ,,of ,,the ,,virtues1 ,,as ,,to ,,their ,,essence 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we come now to the consideration of habits specifically4 ,and since habits1 as we have said 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #c71 are divided into good and bad1 we must speak in the first place of good habits1 which are virtues1 and of other matters connected with them1 namely the ,gifts1 ,beatitudes and ,fruits2 in the second place1 of bad habits1 namely of vices and sins4 ,now five things must be considered about virtues3 7#a7 the essence of virtue2 7#b7 its subject2 7#c7 the division of virtue2 7#d7 the cause of virtue2 7#e7 certain properties of virtue4 ,under the first head1 there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether human virtue is a habit8 7#b7 ,whether it is an operative habit8 7#c7 ,whether it is a good habit8 7#d7 ,of the definition of virtue4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,human ,virtue ,is a ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human virtue is not a habit3 ,for virtue is the limit of power 7,de ,coelo i1 text4 #aaf74 ,but the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit2 as a point is reducible to the genus of line4 ,therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power1 and not to the genus of habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii7 99,retract4 ix2 cf4 ,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai that virtue is good use of free-will4 ,but use of free-will is an act4 ,therefore virtue is not a habit1 but an act4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we do not merit by our habits1 but by our actions3 otherwise a man would merit continually1 even while asleep4 ,but we do merit by our virtues4 ,therefore virtues are not habits1 but acts4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 xv7 that virtue is the order of love1 and 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cj7 that the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy1 and using what we ought to use4 ,now order1 or ordering1 denominates either an action or a relation4 ,therefore virtue is not a habit1 but an action or a relation4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 just as there are human virtues1 so are there natural virtues4 ,but natural virtues are not habits1 but powers4 ,neither therefore are human virtues habits4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,categor4 vi7 that science and virtue are habits4 ,i answer that1 ,virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power4 ,now a thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end4 ,but the end of power is act4 ,wherefore power is said to be perfect1 according as it is determinate to its act4 ,now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts2 for instance1 the active natural powers4 ,and therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues4 ,but the rational powers1 which are proper to man1 are not determinate to one particular action1 but are inclined indifferently to many3 and they are determinate to acts by means of habits1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore human virtues are habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed1 namely1 either to its object1 or to its act3 for instance1 we give the name ,faith1 to that which we believe1 or to the act of believing1 as also to the habit by which we believe4 ,when therefore we say that virtue is the limit of power1 virtue is taken for the object of virtue4 ,for the furthest point to which a power can reach1 is said to be its virtue2 for instance1 if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more1 his virtue 99,in ,english we should say 'strength1' which is the original signification of the ,latin 'virtus'3 thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power1 to indicate its 'strength' is put at a hundredweight1 and not at sixty4 ,but the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good use of free-will is said to be a virtue1 in the same sense as above 7ad #a72 that is to say1 because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act4 ,for the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we are said to merit by something in two ways4 ,first1 as by merit itself1 just as we are said to run by running2 and thus we merit by acts4 ,secondly1 we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit1 as we are said to run by the motive power2 and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love1 we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered3 because in us love is set in order by virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act3 not so the rational powers4 ,and so there is no comparison1 as we have said4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,human ,virtue ,is an ,operative ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit4 ,for ,tully says 7,tuscul4 iv7 that as health and beauty belong to the body1 so virtue belongs to the soul4 ,but health and beauty are not operative habits4 ,therefore neither is virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act1 but also in reference to being3 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,de ,coelo i71 since some have a virtue to be always1 while some have a virtue to be not always1 but at some definite time4 ,now as natural virtue is in natural things1 so is human virtue in rational beings4 ,therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act1 but also to being4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag7 that virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best4 ,now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is ,god ,himself1 as ,augustine proves 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 #c1 #f1 #ad7 to ,whom the soul is disposed by being made like to ,him4 ,therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to ,god1 likening it1 as it were1 to ,him2 and not in reference to operation4 ,it is not1 therefore1 an operative habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 says that virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good4 ,i answer that1 ,virtue1 from the very nature of the word1 implies some perfection of power1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a74 ,wherefore1 since power 99,the one ,latin word potentia is rendered 'potentiality' in the first case1 and 'power' in the second is of two kinds1 namely1 power in reference to being1 and power in reference to act2 the perfection of each of these is called virtue4 ,but power in reference to being is on the part of matter1 which is potential being1 whereas power in reference to act1 is on the part of the form1 which is the principle of action1 since everything acts in so far as it is in act4 ,now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter1 the soul that of form4 ,the body1 indeed1 man has in common with other animals2 and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body3 and only those forces which are proper to the soul1 namely1 the rational forces1 belong to man alone4 ,and therefore1 human virtue1 of which we are speaking now1 cannot belong to the body1 but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul4 ,wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being1 but rather to act4 ,consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent3 for such as a thing is1 such is its act4 ,and therefore1 since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation1 there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition4 ,now virtue causes an ordered operation4 ,therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul1 in so far as1 to wit1 the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another1 and to that which is outside4 ,hence virtue1 inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul1 is like health and beauty1 which are suitable dispositions of the body4 ,but this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man2 but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason1 which are proper to man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,god's substance is ,his act1 the highest likeness of man to ,god is in respect of some operation4 ,wherefore1 as we have said above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #b71 happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to ,god1 and which is the end of human life1 consists in an operation4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,human ,virtue ,is a ,good ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit4 ,for sin is always taken in a bad sense4 ,but there is a virtue even of sin2 according to #a ,cor4 #ae3ef3 ,the virtue ,douay3 'strength' of sin is the ,law4 ,therefore virtue is not always a good habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,virtue corresponds to power4 ,but power is not only referred to good1 but also to evil3 according to ,isa4 #e3 ,woe to you that are mighty to drink wine1 and stout men at drunkenness4 ,therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #ab3i73 ,virtue ,douay3 'power' is made perfect in infirmity4 ,but infirmity is an evil4 ,therefore virtue is referred not only to good1 but also to evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 vi73 ,no one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good3 and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f73 ,virtue is that which makes its possessor good1 and his work good likewise4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,a4 #a71 virtue implies a perfection of power3 wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power 7,de ,coelo i74 ,now the limit of any power must needs be good3 for all evil implies defect2 wherefore ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,hom4 ii7 that every evil is a weakness4 ,and for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good4 ,therefore human virtue which is an operative habit1 is a good habit1 productive of good works4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect1 so are they said to be good3 for we speak of a perfect thief or robber2 and of a good thief or robber1 as the ,philosopher explains 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #ba74 ,in this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things3 so that the virtue of sin is said to be law1 in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law1 so as to attain to the limit of its possibility4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the evil of drunkenness and excessive drink1 consists in a falling away from the order of reason4 ,now it happens that1 together with this falling away from reason1 some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind1 even in direct opposition to reason1 or with some falling away therefrom4 ,but the perfection of that power1 since it is compatible with a falling away from reason1 cannot be called a human virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reason is shown to be so much the more perfect1 according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers4 ,and therefore human virtue1 which is attributed to reason1 is said to be made perfect in infirmity1 not of the reason indeed1 but of the body and of the lower powers4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,virtue ,is ,suitably ,defined8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the definition1 usually given1 of virtue1 is not suitable1 to wit3 ,virtue is a good quality of the mind1 by which we live righteously1 of which no one can make bad use1 which ,god works in us1 without us4 ,for virtue is man's goodness1 since virtue it is that makes its subject good4 ,but goodness does not seem to be good1 as neither is whiteness white4 ,it is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a good quality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no difference is more common than its genus2 since it is that which divides the genus4 ,but good is more common than quality1 since it is convertible with being4 ,therefore good should not be put in the definition of virtue1 as a difference of quality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #c73 ,when we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field1 it is something appertaining to the mind4 ,but there are virtues even of the irrational parts2 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj74 ,every virtue1 therefore1 is not a good quality of the mind4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 righteousness seems to belong to justice2 whence the righteous are called just4 ,but justice is a species of virtue4 ,it is therefore unsuitable to put righteous in the definition of virtue1 when we say that virtue is that by which we live righteously4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whoever is proud of a thing1 makes bad use of it4 ,but many are proud of virtue1 for ,augustine says in his ,rule1 that pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them4 ,it is untrue1 therefore1 that no one can make bad use of virtue4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 man is justified by virtue4 ,but ,augustine commenting on ,john #ae3aa3 ,he shall do greater things than these1 says 99,tract4 xxvii in ,joan43 ,serm4 xv de ,verb4 ,ap4 #aa3 ,he who created thee without thee1 will not justify thee without thee4 ,it is therefore unsuitable to say that ,god works virtue in us1 without us4 ,on the contrary1 ,we have the authority of ,augustine from whose words this definition is gathered1 and principally in ,de ,libero ,arbitrio ii1 #ai4 ,i answer that1 ,this definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue4 ,for the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes4 ,now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue4 ,for the formal cause of virtue1 as of everything1 is gathered from its genus and difference1 when it is defined as a good quality3 for quality is the genus of virtue1 and the difference1 good4 ,but the definition would be more suitable if for quality we substitute habit1 which is the proximate genus4 ,now virtue has no matter out of which it is formed1 as neither has any other accident2 but it has matter about which it is concerned1 and matter in which it exists1 namely1 the subject4 ,the matter about which virtue is concerned is its object1 and this could not be included in the above definition1 because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species1 and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general4 ,and so for material cause we have the subject1 which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality of the mind4 ,the end of virtue1 since it is an operative habit1 is operation4 ,but it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil1 as vicious habits3 others are sometimes referred to good1 sometimes to evil2 for instance1 opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue3 whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good3 and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil1 is expressed in the words by which we live righteously3 and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good1 sometimes unto evil1 in the words1 of which no one makes bad use4 ,lastly1 ,god is the efficient cause of infused virtue1 to which this definition applies2 and this is expressed in the words which ,god works in us without us4 ,if we omit this phrase1 the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general1 whether acquired or infused4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that which is first seized by the intellect is being3 wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being1 and consequently as one1 and as good1 which are convertible with being4 ,wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good2 and that oneness is being and one and good3 and in like manner goodness4 ,but this is not the case with specific forms1 as whiteness and health2 for everything that we apprehend1 is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy4 ,we must1 however1 observe that1 as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings1 not as if they themselves had being1 but because things are by them2 so also are they called good or one1 not by some distinct goodness or oneness1 but because by them something is good or one4 ,so also is virtue called good1 because by it something is good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good1 which is put in the definition of virtue1 is not good in general which is convertible with being1 and which extends further than quality1 but the good as fixed by reason1 with regard to which ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul1 except in so far as this participates in the reason 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,and therefore reason1 or the mind1 is the proper subject of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use1 and are the proper matter of justice1 as we shall show further on 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #b2 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #h74 ,but the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the ,divine law1 which is the rule of the human will1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d71 is common to all virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,one can make bad use of a virtue objectively1 for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue1 e4g4 by hating it1 or by being proud of it3 but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action1 so that an act of virtue be evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,infused virtue is caused in us by ,god without any action on our part1 but not without our consent4 ,this is the sense of the words1 which ,god works in us without us4 ,as to those things which are done by us1 ,god causes them in us1 yet not without action on our part1 for ,he works in every will and in every nature4 ,,question #ef ,,of ,,the ,,subject ,,of ,,virtue 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we now have to consider the subject of virtue1 about which there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul8 7#b7 ,whether one virtue can be in several powers8 7#c7 ,whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue8 7#d7 ,whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue8 7#e7 ,whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue8 7#f7 ,whether the will can be the subject of virtue8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,subject of ,virtue ,is a ,power of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai7 that virtue is that by which we live righteously4 ,but we live by the essence of the soul1 and not by a power of the soul4 ,therefore virtue is not a power1 but in the essence of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that virtue is that which makes its possessor good1 and his work good likewise4 ,but as work is set up by power1 so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul4 ,therefore virtue does not belong to the power1 any more than to the essence of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 power is in the second species of quality4 ,but virtue is a quality1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d73 and quality is not the subject of quality4 ,therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,virtue is the limit of power 7,de ,coelo ii74 ,but the limit is in that of which it is the limit4 ,therefore virtue is in a power of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,it can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul4 ,first1 from the notion of the very essence of virtue1 which implies perfection of a power2 for perfection is in that which it perfects4 ,secondly1 from the fact that virtue is an operative habit1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b73 for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power4 ,thirdly1 from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best3 for the best is the end1 which is either a thing's operation1 or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power4 ,therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to live may be taken in two ways4 ,sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing3 in this way it belongs to the essence of the soul1 which is the principle of existence in the living thing4 ,but sometimes to live is taken for the operation of the living thing3 in this sense1 by virtue we live righteously1 inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good is either the end1 or something referred to the end4 ,and therefore1 since the good of the worker consists in the work1 this fact also1 that virtue makes the worker good1 is referred to the work1 and consequently1 to the power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one accident is said to be the subject of another1 not as though one accident could uphold another2 but because one accident inheres to substance by means of another1 as color to the body by means of the surface2 so that surface is said to be the subject of color4 ,in this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,one ,virtue ,can ,be in ,several ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one virtue can be in several powers4 ,for habits are known by their acts4 ,but one act proceeds in various way from several powers3 thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing1 from the will as moving1 and from the motive power as executing4 ,therefore also one habit can be in several powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #d7 that three things are required for virtue1 namely3 to know1 to will1 and to work steadfastly4 ,but to know belongs to the intellect1 and to will belongs to the will4 ,therefore virtue can be in several powers4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prudence is in the reason since it is the right reason of things to be done 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,and it is also in the will3 for it cannot exist together with a perverse will 7,ethic4 vi1 #ab74 ,therefore one virtue can be in two powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,the subject of virtue is a power of the soul4 ,but the same accident cannot be in several subjects4 ,therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,it happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two4 ,first1 so that it is in both on an equal footing4 ,in this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers3 since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects1 while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof3 and so wherever there is diversity of powers1 there is diversity of habits2 but not vice versa4 ,in another way one thing can be subjected in two or more1 not on an equal footing1 but in a certain order4 ,and thus one virtue can belong to several powers1 so that it is in one chiefly1 while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion1 or by way of a disposition1 in so far as one power is moved by another1 and one power receives from another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one act cannot belong to several powers equally1 and in the same degree2 but only from different points of view1 and in various degrees4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to know is a condition required for moral virtue1 inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason4 ,but moral virtue is essentially in the appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prudence is really subjected in reason3 but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will1 as we shall see further on 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #d74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,intellect ,can ,be the ,subject of ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 xv7 that all virtue is love4 ,but the subject of love is not the intellect1 but the appetitive power alone4 ,therefore no virtue is in the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is referred to good1 as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c74 ,now good is not the object of the intellect1 but of the appetitive power4 ,therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect1 but the appetitive power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 virtue is that which makes its possessor good1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,but the habit which perfects the intellect does not make its possessor good3 since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his art4 ,therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,the mind is chiefly called the intellect4 ,but the subject of virtue is the mind1 as is clear from the definition1 above given1 of virtue 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c71 a virtue is a habit by which we work well4 ,now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways4 ,first1 in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act2 for instance1 by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly4 ,but grammar does not make a man always speak correctly3 for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism3 and the case is the same with other sciences and arts4 ,secondly1 a habit may confer not only aptness to act1 but also the right use of that aptness3 for instance1 justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions1 but also makes him act justly4 ,and since good1 and1 in like manner1 being1 is said of a thing simply1 in respect1 not of what it is potentially1 but of what it is actually3 therefore from having habits of the latter sort1 man is said simply to do good1 and to be good2 for instance1 because he is just1 or temperate2 and in like manner as regards other such virtues4 ,and since virtue is that which makes its possessor good1 and his work good likewise1 these latter habits are called virtuous simply3 because they make the work to be actually good1 and the subject good simply4 ,but the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply3 because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness1 nor do they make their possessor good simply4 ,for through being gifted in science or art1 a man is said to be good1 not simply1 but relatively2 for instance1 a good grammarian or a good smith4 ,and for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue2 while at other times they are called virtues 7,ethic4 vi1 #b74 ,hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense1 can be the intellect1 and not only the practical intellect1 but also the speculative1 without any reference to the will3 for thus the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #c7 holds that science1 wisdom and understanding1 and also art1 are intellectual virtues4 ,but the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply1 can only be the will1 or some power in so far as it is moved by the will4 ,and the reason of this is1 that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational1 as we have said above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ag1 ,,aa4 #a1 #e2 ,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #d73 and therefore if man do well actually1 this is because he has a good will4 ,therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually1 and not merely to have the aptness to do well1 must be either in the will itself2 or in some power as moved by the will4 ,now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will1 just as are the other powers3 for a man considers something actually1 because he wills to do so4 ,and therefore the intellect1 in so far as it is subordinate to the will1 can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called4 ,and in this way the speculative intellect1 or the reason1 is the subject of ,faith3 for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith3 for no man believeth1 unless he will 99,augustine3 ,tract4 xxvi in ,joan44 ,but the practical intellect is the subject of prudence4 ,for since prudence is the right reason of things to be done1 it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done1 that is in regard to their ends1 to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will1 just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect4 ,and therefore as the subject of science1 which is the right reason of speculative truths1 is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect1 so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the saying of ,augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called3 not that every virtue is love simply3 but that it depends in some way on love1 in so far as it depends on the will1 whose first movement consists in love1 as we have said above 7,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d2 ,i1 ,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good of each thing is its end3 and therefore1 as truth is the end of the intellect1 so to know truth is the good act of the intellect4 ,whence the habit1 which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth1 whether speculative or practical1 is a virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection considers virtue simply so called4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,irascible and ,concupiscible ,powers ,are the ,subject of ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue4 ,for these powers are common to us and dumb animals4 ,but we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man1 since for this reason it is called human virtue4 ,it is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite1 as we have said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ4 ,but the good of virtue cannot be in man's body3 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g73 ,i know that good does not dwell in my flesh4 ,therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine proves 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 v7 that virtue is not in the body but in the soul1 for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul3 wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body3 ,for instance1 if my coachman1 through obedience to my orders1 guides well the horses which he is driving2 this is all due to me4 ,but just as the soul rules the body1 so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled1 is entirely due to the rational powers4 ,now virtue is that by which we live rightly1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers1 but only in the rational powers4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the principal act of moral virtue is choice 7,ethic4 viii1 #ac74 ,now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers1 but of the rational power1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers1 but in the reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,fortitude is assigned to the irascible power1 and temperance to the concupiscible power4 ,whence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj7 says that these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,the irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways4 ,first1 in themselves1 in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite3 and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue4 ,secondly1 they can be considered as participating in the reason1 from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason4 ,and thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue3 for1 in so far as it participates in the reason1 it is the principle of a human act4 ,and to these powers we must needs assign virtues4 ,for it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers4 ,because an act1 which proceeds from one power according as it is moved by another power1 cannot be perfect1 unless both powers be well disposed to the act3 for instance1 the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act4 ,therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers1 according as they are moved by reason1 there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well1 not only the reason1 but also the irascible and concupiscible powers4 ,and since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved1 depends on its conformity with the power that moves it3 therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves1 as parts of the sensitive appetite1 are common to us and dumb animals4 ,but in so far as they are rational by participation1 and are obedient to the reason1 they are proper to man4 ,and in this way they can be the subject of human virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue1 but is made the instrument of a virtuous act1 inasmuch as being moved by reason1 we yield our members to serve justice2 so also1 the irascible and concupiscible powers1 of themselves indeed1 have not the good of virtue1 but rather the infection of the fomes3 whereas1 inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason1 the good of reason is begotten in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the body is ruled by the soul1 and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason1 but in different ways4 ,for the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction1 in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul3 whence the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c7 that the soul rules the body with a despotic command as the master rules his slave3 wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul4 ,for this reason virtue is not in the body1 but in the soul4 ,but the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly2 on the contrary1 they have their own proper movements1 by which1 at times1 they go against reason1 whence the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c7 that the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command such as that by which free men are ruled1 who have in some respects a will of their own4 ,and for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers1 by which these powers are well disposed to act4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in choice there are two things1 namely1 the intention of the end1 and this belongs to the moral virtue2 and the preferential choice of that which is unto the end1 and this belongs to prudence 7,ethic4 vi1 #b1 #e74 ,but that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul1 is due to the good disposition of these powers4 ,and therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers1 but prudence is in the reason4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,sensitive ,powers of ,apprehension ,are the ,subject of ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension4 ,for the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue1 in so far as it obeys reason4 ,but the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason3 for the powers of imagination1 of cogitation1 and of memory 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d act at the command of reason4 ,therefore in these powers there can be virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the rational appetite1 which is the will1 can be hindered or helped in its act1 by the sensitive appetite1 so also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above4 ,as1 therefore1 there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite1 so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prudence is a virtue1 of which ,cicero 7,de ,invent4 ,rhetor4 ii7 says that memory is a part4 ,therefore also in the power of memory there can be a virtue3 and in like manner1 in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension4 ,on the contrary1 ,all virtues are either intellectual or moral 7,ethic4 ii1 #a74 ,now all the moral virtues are in the appetite2 while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason1 as is clear from ,ethic4 vi1 #a4 ,therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension4 ,i answer that1 ,in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits4 ,and this is made clear principally from what the ,philosopher says 7,de ,memoria ii71 that in remembering one thing after another1 we become used to it2 and use is a second nature4 ,now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use1 which is like unto nature4 ,wherefore ,tully says of virtue in his ,rhetoric that it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason4 ,yet1 in man1 that which he acquires by use1 in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension1 is not a habit properly so called1 but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers1 they cannot be virtues4 ,for virtue is a perfect habit1 by which it never happens that anything but good is done3 and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act4 ,but the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension3 for such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge4 ,and therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues1 by which we know truth3 these are rather in the intellect or reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sensitive appetite is related to the will1 which is the rational appetite1 through being moved by it4 ,and therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite3 and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue4 ,whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it2 for the reason that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul1 as colors to sight 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ah74 ,and therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect2 and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself1 or the reason4 ,and thus is made clear the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,memory is not a part of prudence1 as species is of a genus1 as though memory were a virtue properly so called3 but one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory2 so that1 in a fashion1 it is after the manner of an integral part4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,will ,can ,be the ,subject of ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue4 ,because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature4 ,but since the will is in the reason1 it is of the very essence of the will1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #db71 to tend to that which is good1 according to reason4 ,and to this good every virtue is ordered1 since everything naturally desires its own proper good2 for virtue1 as ,tully says in his ,rhetoric1 is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason4 ,therefore the will is not the subject of virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every virtue is either intellectual or moral 7,ethic4 i1 #ac2 ii1 #a74 ,but intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and reason1 and not in the will3 while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation4 ,therefore no virtue is subjected in the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all human acts1 to which virtues are ordained1 are voluntary4 ,if therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of some human acts1 in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts4 ,either1 therefore1 there will be no virtue in any other power1 or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act1 which seems unreasonable4 ,therefore the will cannot be the subject of virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved4 ,but the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers4 ,much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers4 ,i answer that1 ,since the habit perfects the power in reference to act1 then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well1 which habit is a virtue1 when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose4 ,now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object4 ,since1 therefore1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c71 the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will1 in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it4 ,but if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity1 whether as regards the whole human species1 such as ,divine good1 which transcends the limits of human nature1 or as regards the individual1 such as the good of one's neighbor1 then does the will need virtue4 ,and therefore such virtues as those which direct man's affections to ,god or to his neighbor are subjected in the will1 as charity1 justice1 and such like4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good2 such as temperance and fortitude1 which are concerned with the human passions1 and the like1 as is clear from what we have said 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but the appetitive power altogether1 i4e4 in its entirety 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,now the will is included in the appetitive power4 ,and therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue1 unless it be theological1 as we shall see later on 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion1 which is the proper good of this or that man3 and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will1 for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose1 as we have said4 ,this need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good4 ,,question #eg ,,of ,,the ,,intellectual ,,virtues 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we now have to consider the various kinds of virtue3 and 7#a7 the intellectual virtues2 7#b7 the moral virtues2 7#c7 the theological virtues4 ,concerning the first there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues8 7#b7 ,whether they are three1 namely1 wisdom1 science and understanding8 7#c7 ,whether the intellectual habit1 which is art1 is a virtue8 7#d7 ,whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art8 7#e7 ,whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man8 7#f7 ,whether eubulia1 synesis and gnome are virtues annexed to prudence8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,habits of the ,speculative ,intellect ,are ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues4 ,for virtue is an operative habit1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b74 ,but speculative habits are not operative3 for speculative matter is distinct from practical1 i4e4 operative matter4 ,therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed3 for happiness is the reward of virtue 7,ethic4 i1 #i74 ,now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods1 by which man acquires happiness1 but rather things pertaining to nature or to ,god4 ,therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 science is a speculative habit4 ,but science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate1 as the ,philosopher proves in ,topic4 iv4 ,therefore speculative habits are not virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,the speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are4 ,now the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #a7 places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are4 ,therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,since every virtue is ordained to some good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c71 a habit1 as we have already observed 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c71 may be called a virtue for two reasons3 first1 because it confers aptness in doing good2 secondly1 because besides aptness1 it confers the right use of it4 ,the latter condition1 as above stated 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c71 belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul3 since it is the soul's appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses4 ,since1 then1 the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part1 nor affect it in any way1 but only the intellective part2 they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work1 viz4 the consideration of truth 7since this is the good work of the intellect73 yet they are not called virtues in the second way1 as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit4 ,for if a man possess a habit of speculative science1 it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it1 but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge3 that he make use of the knowledge which he has1 is due to the motion of his will4 ,consequently a virtue which perfects the will1 as charity or justice1 confers the right use of these speculative habits4 ,and in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits1 if they be done out of charity3 thus ,gregory says 7,moral4 vi7 that the contemplative life has greater merit than the active life4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,work is of two kinds1 exterior and interior4 ,accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty1 is concerned with exterior work1 to which the speculative habit is not ordained4 ,yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth4 ,and in this way it is an operative habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,virtue is about certain things in two ways4 ,in the first place a virtue is about its object4 ,and thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy2 except perhaps1 in so far as the word whereby indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness1 i4e4 ,god1 ,who is the supreme object of contemplation4 ,secondly1 a virtue is said to be about its acts3 and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy2 both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious1 as stated above1 and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss1 which consists in the contemplation of truth1 as we have already stated 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense1 wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,only ,three ,habits of the ,speculative ,intellect1 ,viz4 ,wisdom1 ,science and ,understanding8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect1 viz4 wisdom1 science and understanding4 ,because a species is a kind of science1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #g4 ,therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in differentiating powers1 habits and acts in respect of their objects1 we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects1 as we have already explained 7,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore diversity of habits is taken1 not from their material objects1 but from the formal aspect of those objects4 ,now the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known4 ,therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty4 ,now even the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument1 just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism4 ,therefore as science1 which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism1 is set down as an intellectual virtue1 so also should opinion be4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #a7 reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues1 viz4 wisdom1 science and understanding4 ,i answer that1 ,as already stated 7,a4 #a71 the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth3 for this is its good work4 ,now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration--as known in itself1 and as known through another4 ,what is known in itself1 is as a principle1 and is at once understood by the intellect3 wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called understanding1 which is the habit of principles4 ,on the other hand1 a truth which is known through another1 is understood by the intellect1 not at once1 but by means of the reason's inquiry1 and is as a term4 ,this may happen in two ways3 first1 so that it is the last in some particular genus2 secondly1 so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge4 ,and1 since things that are knowable last from our standpoint1 are knowable first and chiefly in their nature 7,phys4 i1 text4 #b1 #c72 hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge1 is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature4 ,and about these is wisdom1 which considers the highest causes1 as stated in ,metaph4 i1 #a1 #b4 ,wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order1 because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes4 ,but in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter1 it is science which perfects the intellect4 ,wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter1 there are different habits of scientific knowledge2 whereas there is but one wisdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,wisdom is a kind of science1 in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences2 viz4 to demonstrate conclusions from principles4 ,but since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences1 inasmuch as it judges of them all1 not only as to their conclusions1 but also as to their first principles1 therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act1 there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object3 thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color1 and light1 which is the formal aspect under which color is seen1 and is seen at the same time as the color4 ,on the other hand1 the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart1 without the conclusion being considered at all4 ,again they can be considered together with the conclusions1 since the conclusions can be deduced from them4 ,accordingly1 to consider the principles in this second way1 belongs to science1 which considers the conclusions also3 while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding4 ,consequently1 if we consider the point aright1 these three virtues are distinct1 not as being on a par with one another1 but in a certain order4 ,the same is to be observed in potential wholes1 wherein one part is more perfect than another2 for instance1 the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul2 and the sensitive1 than the vegetal4 ,for it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree3 and both of these depend on wisdom1 as obtaining the highest place1 and containing beneath itself both understanding and science1 by judging both of the conclusions of science1 and of the principles on which they are based4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good1 and is nowise referable to evil4 ,now the good of the intellect is truth1 and falsehood is its evil4 ,wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues1 whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood4 ,but opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood3 and so1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #c1 they are not intellectual virtues4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,intellectual ,habit1 ,art1 ,is a ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ah1 #ai7 that no one makes bad use of virtue4 ,but one may make bad use of art3 for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art4 ,therefore art is not a virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no virtue of a virtue4 ,but there is a virtue of art1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,therefore art is not a virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts4 ,but just as the mechanical arts are practical1 so the liberal arts are speculative4 ,therefore1 if art were an intellectual virtue1 it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #c1 #d7 says that art is a virtue2 and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues1 which1 according to him1 reside in the scientific part of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,art is nothing else but the right reason about certain works to be made4 ,and yet the good of these things depends1 not on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way1 but on the goodness of the work done4 ,for a craftsman1 as such1 is commendable1 not for the will with which he does a work1 but for the quality of the work4 ,art1 therefore1 properly speaking1 is an operative habit4 ,and yet it has something in common with the speculative habits3 since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also1 but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object4 ,for as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth1 it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected1 whether he be joyful or angry3 even as neither does this matter in a craftsman1 as we have observed4 ,and so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits1 in so far1 to wit1 as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit1 which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite1 but only as regards the aptness to work well4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship1 this is not the work of that art1 in fact it is contrary to the art3 even as when a man lies1 while knowing the truth1 his words are not in accord with his knowledge1 but contrary thereto4 ,wherefore1 just as science has always a relation to good1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c71 so it is with art3 and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue4 ,and yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue1 because it does not make its possessor to use it well2 for which purpose something further is requisite3 although there cannot be a good use without the art4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in order that man may make good use of the art he has1 he needs a good will1 which is perfected by moral virtue2 and for this reason the ,philosopher says that there is a virtue of art2 namely1 a moral virtue1 in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue4 ,for it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice1 which rectifies his will1 to do his work faithfully4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in speculative matters there is something by way of work3 e4g4 the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech1 or the work of counting or measuring4 ,hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason1 are1 by a kind of comparison1 called arts indeed1 but liberal arts1 in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body1 which arts are1 in a fashion1 servile1 inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul1 and man1 as regards his soul1 is free 7liber74 ,on the other hand1 those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work1 are called sciences simply1 and not arts4 ,nor1 if the liberal arts be more excellent1 does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,prudence ,is a ,distinct ,virtue from ,art8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art4 ,for art is the right reason about certain works4 ,but diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art2 since there are various arts about works widely different4 ,since therefore prudence is also right reason about works1 it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have2 for they are both about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are 7,ethic4 vi1 #d1 #e74 ,now some speculative habits are called arts4 ,much more1 therefore1 should prudence be called an art4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs to prudence1 to be of good counsel 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,but counselling takes place in certain arts also1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #c1 e4g4 in the arts of warfare1 of seamanship1 and of medicine4 ,therefore prudence is not distinct from art4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher distinguishes prudence from art 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,i answer that1 ,where the nature of virtue differs1 there is a different kind of virtue4 ,now it has been stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c7 that some habits have the nature of virtue1 through merely conferring aptness for a good work3 while some habits are virtues1 not only through conferring aptness for a good work1 but also through conferring the use4 ,but art confers the mere aptness for good work2 since it does not regard the appetite2 whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work1 but also the use3 for it regards the appetite1 since it presupposes the rectitude thereof4 ,the reason for this difference is that art is the right reason of things to be made2 whereas prudence is the right reason of things to be done4 ,now making and doing differ1 as stated in ,metaph4 ix1 text4 #af1 in that making is an action passing into outward matter1 e4g4 to build1 to saw1 and so forth2 whereas doing is an action abiding in the agent1 e4g4 to see1 to will1 and the like4 ,accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions1 consisting in the use of powers and habits1 as art does to outward making3 since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned4 ,but perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters1 depend on the principles from which reason argues2 just as we have said above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b7 that science depends on and presupposes understanding1 which is the habit of principles4 ,now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #h4 ,consequently1 it is requisite for prudence1 which is right reason about things to be done1 that man be well disposed with regard to the ends3 and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite4 ,wherefore1 for prudence there is need of a moral virtue1 which rectifies the appetite4 ,on the other hand the good of things made by art is not the good of man's appetite1 but the good of those things themselves3 wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite4 ,the consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly1 than to one who is unwillingly2 whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly1 since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence1 but not to art4 ,accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the various kinds of things made by art are all external to man3 hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue4 ,but prudence is right reason about human acts themselves3 hence it is a distinct kind of virtue1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has1 if we consider their subject and matter3 for they are both in the thinking part of the soul1 and about things that may be otherwise than they are4 ,but if we consider them as virtues1 then art has more in common with the speculative habits1 as is clear from what has been said4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life1 and the end of human life4 ,but in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts4 ,hence some men1 in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare1 or seamanship1 are said to be prudent officers or pilots1 but not simply prudent3 only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,prudence ,is a ,virtue ,necessary to ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life4 ,for as art is to things that are made1 of which it is the right reason1 so is prudence to things that are done1 in respect of which we judge of a man's life3 for prudence is the right reason about these things1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #e4 ,now art is not necessary in things that are made1 save in order that they be made1 but not after they have been made4 ,neither1 therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life1 after he has become virtuous2 but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,it is by prudence that we are of good counsel1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #e4 ,but man can act not only from his own1 but also from another's good counsel4 ,therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life1 but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth1 and never a falsehood4 ,but this does not seem to be the case with prudence3 for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done2 since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are4 ,hence it is written 7,wis4 #i3ad73 ,the thoughts of mortal men are fearful1 and our counsels uncertain4 ,therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life1 when it is written 7,wis4 #h3g7 of ,divine ,wisdom3 ,she teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude1 which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life4 ,i answer that1 ,prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life4 ,for a good life consists in good deeds4 ,now in order to do good deeds1 it matters not only what a man does1 but also how he does it2 to wit1 that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion4 ,and1 since choice is about things in reference to the end1 rectitude of choice requires two things3 namely1 the due end1 and something suitably ordained to that due end4 ,now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part1 the object of which is the good and the end4 ,and to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason1 because counsel and choice1 which are about things ordained to the end1 are acts of the reason4 ,consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason1 to perfect the reason1 and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end2 and this virtue is prudence4 ,consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the good of an art is to be found1 not in the craftsman1 but in the product of the art1 since art is right reason about things to be made3 for since the making of a thing passes into external matter1 it is a perfection not of the maker1 but of the thing made1 even as movement is the act of the thing moved3 and art is concerned with the making of things4 ,on the other hand1 the good of prudence is in the active principle1 whose activity is its perfection3 for prudence is right reason about things to be done1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act1 but that his work be good4 ,rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well 7e4g4 that a knife should carve well1 or that a saw should cut well71 if it were proper to such things to act1 rather than to be acted on1 because they have not dominion over their actions4 ,wherefore the craftsman needs art1 not that he may live well1 but that he may produce a good work of art1 and have it in good keeping3 whereas prudence is necessary to man1 that he may lead a good life1 and not merely that he may be a good man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when a man does a good deed1 not of his own counsel1 but moved by that of another1 his deed is not yet quite perfect1 as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him4 ,wherefore1 if he do a good deed1 he does not do well simply2 and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #b1 truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect4 ,because the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing4 ,and since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters1 but only in necessary matters1 therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue1 but only such as is about necessary things4 ,on the other hand1 the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite4 ,this conformity has no place in necessary matters1 which are not affected by the human will2 but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us1 whether they be matters of interior action1 or the products of external work4 ,hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect1 viz4 art1 as regards things to be made1 and prudence1 as regards things to be done4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,eubulia1 ,synesis1 and ,gnome ,are ,virtues ,annexed to ,prudence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that eubulia1 synesis1 and gnome are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence4 ,for eubulia is a habit whereby we take good counsel 7,ethic4 vi1 #i74 ,now it belongs to prudence to take good counsel1 as stated 7,ethic4 vi1 #i74 ,therefore eubulia is not a virtue annexed to prudence1 but rather is prudence itself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to the higher to judge the lower4 ,the highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment4 ,now synesis enables us to judge well4 ,therefore synesis is not a virtue annexed to prudence1 but rather is a principal virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as there are various matters to pass judgment on1 so are there different points on which one has to take counsel4 ,but there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel4 ,therefore1 in order to judge well of what has to be done1 there is no need1 besides synesis1 of the virtue of gnome4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,cicero 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 iii7 mentions three other parts of prudence2 viz4 memory of the past1 understanding of the present1 and foresight of the future4 ,moreover1 ,macrobius 7,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a7 mentions yet others3 viz4 caution1 docility1 and the like4 ,therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #i1 #aj1 #aa71 who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence4 ,i answer that1 ,wherever several powers are subordinate to one another1 that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act4 ,now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man3 the first of these is counsel2 the second1 judgment2 the third1 command4 ,the first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect1 which are inquiry and judgment1 for counsel is a kind of inquiry3 but the third is proper to the practical intellect1 in so far as this is ordained to operation2 for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do4 ,now it is evident that in things done by man1 the chief act is that of command1 to which all the rest are subordinate4 ,consequently1 that virtue which perfects the command1 viz4 prudence1 as obtaining the highest place1 has other secondary virtues annexed to it1 viz4 eustochia1 which perfects counsel2 and synesis and gnome1 which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment1 and of whose distinction we shall speak further on 7ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,prudence makes us be of good counsel1 not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel1 but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue1 viz4 euboulia4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further3 for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment is sound1 while his execution is wrong4 ,the matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles4 ,but inquiry does not reach to the proper principles3 because1 if we were in possession of these1 we should need no more to inquire1 the truth would be already discovered4 ,hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel1 wheres there are two virtues for good judgment3 because difference is based not on common but on proper principles4 ,consequently1 even in speculative matters1 there is one science of dialectics1 which inquires about all matters2 whereas demonstrative sciences1 which pronounce judgment1 differ according to their different objects4 ,synesis and gnome differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based3 for synesis judges of actions according to the common law2 while gnome bases its judgment on the natural law1 in those cases where the common law fails to apply1 as we shall explain further on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,memory1 understanding and foresight1 as also caution and docility and the like1 are not virtues distinct from prudence3 but are1 as it were1 integral parts thereof1 in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence4 ,there are1 moreover1 subjective parts or species of prudence1 e4g4 domestic and political economy1 and the like4 ,but the three first names are1 in a fashion1 potential parts of prudence2 because they are subordinate thereto1 as secondary virtues to a principal virtue3 and we shall speak of them later 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #dh1 seqq474 ,,question #eh ,,of ,,the ,,difference ,,between ,,moral ,,and ,,intellectual ,,virtues 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider moral virtues4 ,we shall speak 7#a7 of the difference between them and intellectual virtues2 7#b7 of their distinction1 one from another1 in respect of their proper matter2 7#c7 of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others4 ,under the first head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether every virtue is a moral virtue8 7#b7 ,whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue8 7#c7 ,whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue8 7#d7 ,whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue8 7#e7 ,whether1 on the other hand1 there can be intellectual without moral virtue8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,every ,virtue ,is a ,moral ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue4 ,because moral virtue is so called from the ,latin mos1 i4e4 custom4 ,now1 we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues4 ,therefore every virtue is a moral virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that moral virtue is a habit of choosing the rational mean4 ,but every virtue is a habit of choosing3 since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice4 ,and1 moreover1 every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way1 as we shall explain further on 7,q4 #fd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,therefore every virtue is a moral virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,cicero says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that virtue is a habit like a second nature1 in accord with reason4 ,but since every human virtue is directed to man's good1 it must be in accord with reason3 since man's good consists in that which agrees with his reason1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore every virtue is a moral virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #ac73 ,when we speak of a man's morals1 we do not say that he is wise or intelligent1 but that he is gentle or sober4 ,accordingly1 then1 wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues3 and yet they are virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,in order to answer this question clearly1 we must consider the meaning of the ,latin word mos2 for thus we shall be able to discover what a moral virtue is4 ,now mos has a twofold meaning4 ,for sometimes it means custom1 in which sense we read 7,acts #ae3a73 ,except you be circumcised after the manner 7morem7 of ,moses1 you cannot be saved4 ,sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action1 in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals4 ,thus we read 7#b ,macc4 #a3b7 that rushing violently upon the enemy1 like lions 99,leonum more1 i4e4 as lions are in the habit of doing1 they slew them3 and the word is used in the same sense in ,ps4 #fg3g1 where we read3 ,who maketh men of one manner 7moris7 to dwell in a house4 ,for both these significations there is but one word in ,latin2 but in the ,greek there is a distinct word for each1 for the word ethosis written sometimes with a long1 and sometimes a short e4 ,now moral virtue is so called from mos in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action4 ,and the other meaning of mos1 i4e4 custom1 is akin to this3 because custom becomes a second nature1 and produces an inclination similar to a natural one4 ,but it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power1 whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts1 as explained above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue1 but only those that are in the appetitive faculty4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument takes mos in the sense of custom4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every act of virtue can be done from choice3 but no virtue makes us choose aright1 save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul3 for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore a habit of choosing1 i4e4 a habit which is the principle whereby we choose1 is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty3 although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nature is the principle of movement 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #c74 ,now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power4 ,consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason1 is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,moral ,virtue ,differs from ,intellectual ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei iv1 #ba7 that virtue is the art of right conduct4 ,but art is an intellectual virtue4 ,therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some authors put science in the definition of virtues3 thus some define perseverance as a science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold2 and holiness as a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to ,god4 ,now science is an intellectual virtue4 ,therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 i1 #f7 that virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason4 ,but this belongs to the intellectual virtues1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #ac4 ,therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition4 ,but intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it4 ,now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue1 belongs to an intellectual virtue1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #ac4 ,therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated in ,ethic4 i1 #ac that there are two kinds of virtue3 some we call intellectual2 some moral4 ,i answer that1 ,reason is the first principle of all human acts2 and whatever other principles of human acts may be found1 they obey reason somewhat1 but in various ways4 ,for some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever3 such are the limbs of the body1 provided they be in a healthy condition1 for as soon as reason commands1 the hand or the foot proceeds to action4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c7 that the soul rules the body like a despot1 i4e4 as a master rules his slave1 who has no right to rebel4 ,accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way4 ,if this were true1 for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect4 ,consequently1 since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions1 it would follow that it is only in the reason1 so that there would be none but intellectual virtues4 ,this was the opinion of ,socrates1 who said every virtue is a kind of prudence1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #ac4 ,hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge1 he cannot sin2 and that every one who sins1 does so through ignorance4 ,now this is based on a false supposition4 ,because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason1 not blindly1 but with a certain power of opposition2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #c7 that reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power1 whereby a man rules over subjects that are free1 having a certain right of opposition4 ,hence ,augustine says on ,ps4 #aah 7,serm4 #h7 that sometimes we understand 7what is right7 while desire is slow1 or follows not at all1 in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action4 ,and in this way1 there is some truth in the saying of ,socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin3 provided1 however1 that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice4 ,accordingly for a man to do a good deed1 it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue2 but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue4 ,and so moral differs from intellectual virtue1 even as the appetite differs from the reason4 ,hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts1 in so far as it partakes of reason1 so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine usually applies the term art to any form of right reason2 in which sense art includes prudence which is the right reason about things to be done1 even as art is the right reason about things to be made4 ,accordingly1 when he says that virtue is the art of right conduct1 this applies to prudence essentially2 but to other virtues1 by participation1 for as much as they are directed by prudence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all such definitions1 by whomsoever given1 were based on the ,socratic theory1 and should be explained according to what we have said about art 7ad #a74 ,the same applies to the ,third ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue1 not as part of its essence1 but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues1 in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,virtue ,is ,adequately ,divided into ,moral and ,intellectual8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual4 ,for prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue1 since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues 7,ethic4 vi1 #c1 #e72 and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues1 which are moral virtues1 as we shall show further on 7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral1 as though there were no mean between them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 continency1 perseverance1 and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues4 ,yet neither are they moral virtues2 since they do not reduce the passions to a mean1 and are consistent with an abundance of passion4 ,therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 faith1 hope1 and charity are virtues4 ,yet they are not intellectual virtues3 for there are only five of these1 viz4 science1 wisdom1 understanding1 prudence1 and art1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #e74 ,neither are they moral virtues2 since they are not about the passions1 which are the chief concern of moral virtue4 ,therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #a7 that virtue is twofold1 intellectual and moral4 ,i answer that1 ,human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds4 ,now1 in man there are but two principles of human actions1 viz4 the intellect or reason and the appetite3 for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #dh4 ,consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles4 ,accordingly if it perfects man's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good1 it will be an intellectual virtue3 whereas if it perfects his appetite1 it will be a moral virtue4 ,it follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue4 ,but considered on the part of its matter1 it has something in common with the moral virtues3 for it is right reason about things to be done1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #d74 ,it is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,continency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite4 ,this is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man1 which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason4 ,continency and perseverance are1 however1 perfections of the rational faculty1 and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray4 ,but they fall short of being virtues3 since intellectual virtue1 which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters1 presupposes a right appetite of the end1 so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles1 i4e4 the ends1 on which it builds its argument3 and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man4 ,nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect1 unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation3 thus1 however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument1 it will produce an imperfect effect1 if the instrument be not well disposed also4 ,hence if the sensitive faculty1 which is moved by the rational faculty1 is not perfect2 however perfect the rational faculty may be1 the resulting action will be imperfect3 and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue4 ,and for this reason1 continency1 desisting from pleasures1 and perseverance in the midst of pains1 are not virtues1 but something less than a virtue1 as the ,philosopher maintains 7,ethic4 vii1 #a1 #i74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,faith1 hope1 and charity are superhuman virtues3 for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of ,god4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,moral ,without ,intellectual ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue4 ,because moral virtue1 as ,cicero says 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason4 ,now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it1 there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject1 as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge4 ,therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature1 inclining him to consent to his reason1 without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason4 ,but it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to ,god1 without being vigorous in the use of reason4 ,therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works4 ,but some1 without depending on the judgment of reason1 have a natural inclination to do good works4 ,therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxii7 that the other virtues1 unless we do prudently what we desire to do1 cannot be real virtues4 ,but prudence is an intellectual virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues1 viz4 wisdom1 science1 and art2 but not without understanding and prudence4 ,moral virtue cannot be without prudence1 because it is a habit of choosing1 i4e4 making us choose well4 ,now in order that a choice be good1 two things are required4 ,first1 that the intention be directed to a due end2 and this is done by moral virtue1 which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason1 which is a due end4 ,secondly1 that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end3 and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel1 judge and command aright1 which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,,aa4 #e1 #f74 ,wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence3 and consequently neither can there be without understanding4 ,for it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters4 ,consequently just as right reason in speculative matters1 in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles1 presupposes the understanding of those principles1 so also does prudence1 which is the right reason about things to be done4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice3 wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason4 ,but the inclination of moral virtue is with choice3 and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything1 provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously4 ,in this way all virtuous men have full use of reason4 ,hence those who seem to be simple1 through lack of worldly cunning1 may possibly be prudent1 according to ,matt4 #aj3af3 ,be ye therefore prudent 7,douay3 'wise'7 as serpents1 and simple as doves4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue1 but is not perfect virtue4 ,for the stronger this inclination is1 the more perilous may it prove to be1 unless it be accompanied by right reason1 which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end4 ,thus if a running horse be blind1 the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall1 and the more grievously will it be hurt4 ,and consequently1 although moral virtue be not right reason1 as ,socrates held1 yet not only is it according to right reason1 in so far as it inclines man to that which is1 according to right reason1 as the ,platonists maintained 99,cf4 ,plato1 ,meno xli42 but also it needs to be joined with right reason1 as ,aristotle declares 7,ethic4 vi1 #ac74 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,intellectual ,without ,moral ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue4 ,because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows4 ,now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite4 ,therefore intellectual virtue1 which is a perfection of the reason1 does not depend on moral virtue1 which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty2 and can be without it4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 morals are the matter of prudence1 even as things makeable are the matter of art4 ,now art can be without its proper matter1 as a smith without iron4 ,therefore prudence can be without the moral virtues1 although of all the intellectual virtues1 it seems most akin to the moral virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 prudence is a virtue whereby we are of good counsel 7,ethic4 vi1 #i74 ,now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues4 ,therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,to wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue2 and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue4 ,now it is contrary to prudence to sin willingly 7,ethic4 vi1 #e74 ,therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,other intellectual virtues can1 but prudence cannot1 be without moral virtue4 ,the reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done 7and this1 not merely in general1 but also in particular72 about which things actions are4 ,now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue4 ,and when reason argues about particular cases1 it needs not only universal but also particular principles4 ,as to universal principles of action1 man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles1 whereby he understands that he should do no evil2 or again by some practical science4 ,but this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases4 ,for it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle1 known by means of understanding or science1 is destroyed in a particular case by a passion3 thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence1 when he is overcome thereby1 the object of his desire seems good1 although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason4 ,consequently1 as by the habit of natural understanding or of science1 man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action2 so1 in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action1 viz4 the ends1 he needs to be perfected by certain habits1 whereby it becomes connatural1 as it were1 to man to judge aright to the end4 ,this is done by moral virtue3 for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue1 because such a man is1 such does the end seem to him 7,ethic4 iii1 #e74 ,consequently the right reason about things to be done1 viz4 prudence1 requires man to have moral virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason1 as apprehending the end1 precedes the appetite for the end3 but appetite for the end precedes the reason1 as arguing about the choice of the means1 which is the concern of prudence4 ,even so1 in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art1 as it does1 when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters3 in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone4 ,hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite1 as prudence does4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel1 but also to judge and command well4 ,this is not possible unless the impediment of the passions1 destroying the judgment and command of prudence1 be removed2 and this is done by moral virtue4 ,,question #ei ,,of ,,moral ,,virtue ,,in ,,relation ,,to ,,the ,,passions 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another4 ,and since those moral virtues which are about the passions1 differ accordingly to the difference of passions1 we must consider 7#a7 the relation of virtue to passion2 7#b7 the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions4 ,under the first head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether moral virtue is a passion8 7#b7 ,whether there can be moral virtue with passion8 7#c7 ,whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue8 7#d7 ,whether every moral virtue is about a passion8 7#e7 ,whether there can be moral virtue without passion8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,moral ,virtue ,is a ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtue is a passion4 ,because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes4 ,but moral virtue is a mean between two passions4 ,therefore moral virtue is a passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue and vice1 being contrary to one another1 are in the same genus4 ,but some passions are reckoned to be vices1 such as envy and anger4 ,therefore some passions are virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 pity is a passion1 since it is sorrow for another's ills1 as stated above 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #h74 ,now ,cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue1 as ,augustine states in ,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e4 ,therefore a passion may be a moral virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #e that passions are neither virtues nor vices4 ,i answer that1 ,moral virtue cannot be a passion4 ,this is clear for three reasons4 ,first1 because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c73 whereas moral virtue is not a movement1 but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite1 being a kind of habit4 ,secondly1 because passions are not in themselves good or evil4 ,for man's good or evil is something in reference to reason3 wherefore the passions1 considered in themselves1 are referable both to good and evil1 for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason4 ,now nothing of this sort can be a virtue3 since virtue is referable to good alone1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c74 ,thirdly1 because1 granted that some passions are1 in some way1 referable to good only1 or to evil only2 even then the movement of passion1 as passion1 begins in the appetite1 and ends in the reason1 since the appetite tends to conformity with reason4 ,on the other hand1 the movement of virtue is the reverse1 for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite1 inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason4 ,hence the definition of moral virtue 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 states that it is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue is a mean between passions1 not by reason of its essence1 but on account of its effect2 because1 to wit1 it establishes the mean between passions4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds1 it is evident that no passion is a vice4 ,but if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act1 nothing hinders a passion from being a vice1 or1 on the other hand1 from concurring in an act of virtue2 in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pity is said to be a virtue1 i4e4 an act of virtue1 in so far as that movement of the soul is obedient to reason2 viz4 when pity is bestowed without violating right1 as when the poor are relieved1 or the penitent forgiven1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #e74 ,but if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably1 nothing hinders pity1 in this sense1 from being a virtue4 ,the same applies to similar passions4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,moral ,virtue with ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 iv7 that a gentle man is one who is not passionate2 but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way4 ,the same applies to all the moral virtues4 ,therefore all moral virtues are without passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is a right affection of the soul1 as health is to the body1 as stated ,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag3 wherefore virtue is a kind of health of the soul1 as ,cicero says 7,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv74 ,but the soul's passions are the soul's diseases1 as he says in the same book4 ,now health is incompatible with disease4 ,therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters4 ,but the passions are an obstacle to this3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #e7 that pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence3 and ,sallust says 7,catilin47 that when they1 i4e4 the soul's passions1 interfere1 it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth4 ,therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #f73 ,if the will is perverse1 these movements1 viz4 the passions1 are perverse also3 but if it is upright1 they are not only blameless1 but even praiseworthy4 ,but nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue4 ,therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions1 but is consistent with them4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,stoics and ,peripatetics disagreed on this point1 as ,augustine relates 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #d74 ,for the ,stoics held that the soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man3 whereas the ,peripatetics1 who were founded by ,aristotle1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #d71 maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue1 if they be reduced to the mean4 ,this difference1 as ,augustine observes 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #d71 was one of words rather than of opinions4 ,because the ,stoics1 through not discriminating between the intellective appetite1 i4e4 the will1 and the sensitive appetite1 which is divided into irascible and concupiscible1 did not1 as the ,peripatetics did1 distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul1 in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite1 whereas the other emotions of the soul1 which are not passions1 are movements of the intellective appetite or will2 but only in the point of the passions being1 as they maintained1 any emotions in disaccord with reason4 ,these emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately3 while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man1 if they arose suddenly3 because1 in the words of ,aulus ,gellius 99,noct4 ,attic4 xix1 #a1 quoted by ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #d71 it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul1 known as its fancies2 and when they arise from awesome things1 they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man1 so that he is slightly startled by fear1 or depressed with sorrow1 in so far as these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto4 ,accordingly1 if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions1 they cannot be in a virtuous man1 so that he consent to them deliberately2 as the ,stoics maintained4 ,but if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite1 they can be in a virtuous man1 in so far as they are subordinate to reason4 ,hence ,aristotle says 7,ethic4 ii1 #c7 that some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance2 this is incorrect1 because the assertion should be qualified3 they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions that are not as they should be as to manner and time4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher quotes this1 as well as many other examples in his books on ,logic1 in order to illustrate1 not his own mind1 but that of others4 ,it was the opinion of the ,stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue3 and the ,philosopher rejects this opinion 7,ethic4 ii1 #c71 when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion4 ,it may be said1 however1 that when he says a gentle man is not passionate1 we are to understand this of inordinate passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this and all similar arguments which ,tully brings forward in ,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 iv take the passions in the execution of reason's command4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when a passion forestalls the judgment of reason1 so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent1 it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason4 ,but when it follows that judgment1 as through being commanded by reason1 it helps towards the execution of reason's command4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sorrow ,is ,compatible with ,moral ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue4 ,because the virtues are effects of wisdom1 according to ,wis4 #h3g3 ,she1 i4e4 ,divine wisdom1 teacheth temperance1 and prudence1 and justice1 and fortitude4 ,now the conversation of wisdom hath no bitterness1 as we read further on 7verse #af74 ,therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sorrow is a hindrance to work1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vii1 #ac2 x1 #e74 ,but a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue4 ,therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind 7,de ,tusc4 ,quaest4 iv74 ,but disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue1 which is a good condition of the mind4 ,therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it4 ,on the contrary1 ,christ was perfect in virtue4 ,but there was sorrow in ,him1 for ,he said 7,matt4 #bf3ch73 ,my soul is sorrowful even unto death4 ,therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #h71 the ,stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three eupatheiai1 i4e4 three good passions1 in place of the three disturbances3 viz4 instead of covetousness1 desire2 instead of mirth1 joy2 instead of fear1 caution4 ,but they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because sorrow is for an evil that is already present4 ,now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man3 for they thought that1 just as man's only good is virtue1 and bodily goods are no good to man2 so man's only evil is vice1 which cannot be in a virtuous man4 ,but this is unreasonable4 ,for1 since man is composed of soul and body1 whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body1 is some good to man2 yet not his supreme good1 because he can abuse it4 ,consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man1 and can cause him moderate sorrow4 ,again1 although a virtuous man can be without grave sin1 yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins1 according to #a ,john #a3h3 ,if we say that we have no sin1 we deceive ourselves4 ,a third reason is because a virtuous man1 though not actually in a state of sin1 may have been so in the past4 ,and he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin1 according to #b ,cor4 #g3aj3 ,the sorrow that is according to ,god worketh penance steadfast unto salvation4 ,fourthly1 because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin4 ,therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason4 ,their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present1 whereas fear is for evil to come3 even as pleasure is about a present good1 while desire is for a future good4 ,now the enjoyment of a good possessed1 or the desire to have good that one possesses not1 may be consistent with virtue3 but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil1 is altogether contrary to reason3 wherefore it is incompatible with virtue4 ,but this is unreasonable4 ,for there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man1 as we have just stated2 which evil is rejected by reason4 ,wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil2 yet moderately1 according as reason dictates4 ,now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful1 is a mark of virtue2 as also the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f1 #g74 ,moreover1 this proves useful for avoiding evil3 since1 just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure1 so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow4 ,accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue3 since virtue rejoices in its own4 ,on the other hand1 virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue1 no matter how4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom4 ,yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom4 ,consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed1 in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful3 but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind3 but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind1 according to the present state of life4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all the ,moral ,virtues ,are ,about the ,passions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #c7 that moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow4 ,but pleasure and sorrow are passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ce1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,but the passions are in this part of the soul1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore every moral virtue is about the passions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some passion is to be found in every moral virtue3 and so either all are about the passions1 or none are4 ,but some are about the passions1 as fortitude and temperance1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #f1 #aj4 ,therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions4 ,on the contrary1 ,justice1 which is a moral virtue1 is not about the passions2 as stated in ,ethic4 v1 #a1 seqq4 ,i answer that1 ,moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason4 ,now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason4 ,consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason's direction and moderation4 ,now reason directs1 not only the passions of the sensitive appetite1 but also the operations of the intellective appetite1 i4e4 the will1 which is not the subject of a passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions1 but some are about passions1 some about operations4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows1 as being their proper matter2 but as being something resulting from their proper acts4 ,for every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue1 and sorrows for the contrary4 ,hence the ,philosopher1 after the words quoted1 adds1 if virtues are about actions and passions2 now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow1 so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows1 viz4 as about something that results from virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions1 is rational by participation1 but also the will1 where there are no passions1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some virtues have passions as their proper matter1 but some virtues not4 ,hence the comparison does not hold for all cases4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,moral ,virtue ,without ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtue can be without passion4 ,for the more perfect moral virtue is1 the more does it overcome the passions4 ,therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 then is a thing perfect1 when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary4 ,now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue3 hence 7,rom4 #g3e7 they are called passions of sins4 ,therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is by virtue that we are conformed to ,god1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 vi1 xi1 xiii74 ,but ,god does all things without passion at all4 ,therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion4 ,on the contrary1 ,no man is just who rejoices not in his deeds1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #h4 ,but joy is a passion4 ,therefore justice cannot be without passion2 and still less can the other virtues be4 ,i answer that1 ,if we take the passions as being inordinate emotions1 as the ,stoics did1 it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions4 ,but if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite1 it is plain that moral virtues1 which are about the passions as about their proper matter1 cannot be without passions4 ,the reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle3 whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities1 but to make them execute the commands of reason1 by exercising their proper acts4 ,wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts1 so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements4 ,those moral virtues1 however1 which are not about the passions1 but about operations1 can be without passions4 ,such a virtue is justice3 because it applies the will to its proper act1 which is not a passion4 ,nevertheless1 joy results from the act of justice2 at least in the will1 in which case it is not a passion4 ,and if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice1 it will overflow into the sensitive appetite2 in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow1 the more perfect a virtue is1 the more does it cause passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue overcomes inordinate passion2 it produces ordinate passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is inordinate1 not ordinate1 passion that leads to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the good of anything depends on the condition of its nature4 ,now there is no sensitive appetite in ,god and the angels1 as there is in man4 ,consequently good operation in ,god and the angels is altogether without passion1 as it is without a body3 whereas the good operation of man is with passion1 even as it is produced with the body's help4 ,,question #fj ,,how ,,the ,,moral ,,virtues ,,differ ,,from ,,one ,,another 7,,five ,,articles7 ,we must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another3 under which head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is only one moral virtue8 7#b7 ,whether those moral virtues which are about operations1 are distinct from those which are about passions8 7#c7 ,whether there is but one moral virtue about operations8 7#d7 ,whether there are different moral virtues about different passions8 7#e7 ,whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,one ,moral ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is only one moral virtue4 ,because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues2 so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues4 ,but there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts1 viz4 prudence4 ,therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habits differ1 not in respect of their material objects1 but according to the formal aspect of their objects4 ,now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed1 is one thing1 viz4 the mean defined by reason4 ,therefore1 seemingly1 there is but one moral virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things pertaining to morals are specified by their end1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c74 ,now there is but one common end of all moral virtues1 viz4 happiness1 while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number4 ,but the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number4 ,therefore it seems that there is but one4 ,on the contrary1 ,one habit cannot be in several powers1 as stated above 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul1 which is divided into several powers1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hj1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c71 the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty4 ,now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects1 as stated above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b74 ,again1 the species of the object of appetite1 as of any thing1 depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent4 ,but we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent4 ,for sometimes it receives the form of the agent1 in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form1 as happens with all univocal agents1 so that if the agent be one specifically1 the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one3 thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire4 ,sometimes1 however1 the matter receives the form from the agent1 but not in the same kind specifically as the agent1 as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation3 thus an animal is generated by the sun4 ,in this case the forms received into matter are not of one species1 but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent3 for instance1 we see that owing to the one action of the sun1 animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter4 ,now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover1 while the appetitive power is commanded and moved4 ,but the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say2 because it is rational1 not essentially1 but by participation 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species1 according to their various relations to reason3 so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the object of the reason is truth4 ,now in all moral matters1 which are contingent matters of action1 there is but one kind of truth4 ,consequently1 there is but one virtue to direct all such matters1 viz4 prudence4 ,on the other hand1 the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good1 which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason1 the directing power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this formal element is one generically1 on account of the unity of the agent3 but it varies in species1 on account of the various relations of the receiving matter1 as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,moral matters do not receive their species from the last end1 but from their proximate ends3 and these1 although they be infinite in number1 are not infinite in species4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,moral ,virtues ,about ,operations ,are ,different from ,those ,that ,are ,about ,passions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #c7 that moral virtue is an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow4 ,now pleasure and sorrow are passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations1 since it is an operative habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the passions are principles of external action4 ,if therefore some virtues regulate the passions1 they must1 as a consequence1 regulate operations also4 ,therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation4 ,now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions4 ,therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher reckons justice to be about operations2 and temperance1 fortitude and gentleness1 about passions 7,ethic4 ii1 #c1 #g2 v1 #a1 seqq474 ,i answer that1 ,operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue4 ,first1 as its effects2 and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product2 and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a74 ,secondly1 operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned3 and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions4 ,the reason for this is that good and evil1 in certain operations1 are taken from the very nature of those operations1 no matter how man may be affected towards them3 viz4 in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else4 ,in operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves3 such are buying and selling1 and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another4 ,for this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter4 ,on the other hand1 in some operations1 good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent4 ,consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them4 ,and for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul1 as is evidently the case with temperance1 fortitude and the like4 ,it happens1 however1 in operations which are directed to another1 that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion of the soul4 ,in such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed3 while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure4 ,thus when through anger1 one man strikes another1 justice is destroyed in the undue blow2 while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger4 ,the same may be clearly applied to other virtues4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,for the first considers operations as the effect of virtue1 while the other two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect4 ,but in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations1 in others1 about passions1 for the reason given above4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,one ,moral ,virtue ,about ,operations8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations4 ,because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice4 ,now justice is but one virtue4 ,therefore there is but one virtue about operations4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those operations seem to differ most1 which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual1 and on the other to the good of the many4 ,but this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that legal justice1 which directs human acts to the common good1 does not differ1 save logically1 from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only4 ,therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if there are various moral virtues about various operations1 diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations4 ,but this is clearly untrue3 for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations1 and again in distributions1 as is set down in ,ethic4 v1 #b4 ,therefore there are not different virtues about different operations4 ,on the contrary1 ,religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety1 both of which are about operations4 ,i answer that1 ,all the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice1 which is in respect of something due to another3 but they differ in respect of various special notions4 ,the reason for this is that in external operations1 the order of reason is established1 as we have stated 7,a4 #b71 not according as how man is affected towards such operations1 but according to the becomingness of the thing itself2 from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice3 for1 seemingly1 it pertains to justice that a man give another his due4 ,wherefore all such virtues as are about operations1 bear1 in some way1 the character of justice4 ,but the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues3 for something is due to an equal in one way1 to a superior1 in another way1 to an inferior1 in yet another2 and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract1 a promise1 or a favor already conferred4 ,and corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues3 e4g4 ,religion whereby we pay our debt to ,god2 ,piety1 whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country2 ,gratitude1 whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors1 and so forth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,justice properly so called is one special virtue1 whose object is the perfect due1 which can be paid in the equivalent4 ,but the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered3 in this sense it is not as a special virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual3 wherefore common right differs from private right2 and ,tully 7,de ,inv4 ii7 reckons as a special virtue1 piety which directs man to the good of his country4 ,but that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command3 since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end1 viz4 the common good4 ,and the virtues1 in so far as they are commanded by that justice1 receive the name of justice3 so that virtue does not differ1 save logically1 from legal justice2 just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself1 and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice4 ,consequently1 there is the same virtue of justice1 especially in regard to commutations4 ,for it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice2 but about this we shall inquire later on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #a74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,are ,different ,moral ,virtues ,about ,different ,passions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions4 ,for there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end3 as is evident especially in the case of sciences4 ,but the passions all concur in one source1 viz4 love2 and they all terminate in the same end1 viz4 joy or sorrow1 as we stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #d2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if there were different moral virtues about different passions1 it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions4 ,but this clearly is not the case3 since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions2 namely1 fortitude1 about fear and daring2 temperance1 about pleasure and sorrow4 ,therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love1 desire1 and pleasure are passions of different species1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,now there is but one virtue about all these three1 viz4 temperance4 ,therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions4 ,on the contrary1 ,fortitude is about fear and daring2 temperance about desire2 meekness about anger2 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #f1 #aj2 iv1 #e4 ,i answer that1 ,it cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions3 since some passions are not in the same power as other passions2 for some belong to the irascible1 others to the concupiscible faculty1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,on the other hand1 neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues4 ,first1 because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another1 such as joy and sorrow1 fear and daring1 and so on4 ,about such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue4 ,because1 since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean1 the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both1 even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries1 e4g4 between black and white4 ,secondly1 because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner1 e4g4 by impelling to that which is contrary to reason1 or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason4 ,wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues1 because their movements follow one another in a certain order1 as being directed to the one same thing1 viz4 the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil3 thus from love proceeds desire1 and from desire we arrive at pleasure2 and it is the same with the opposite passions1 for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike1 and this leads to sorrow4 ,on the other hand1 the irascible passions are not all of one order1 but are directed to different things3 for daring and fear are about some great danger2 hope and despair are about some difficult good2 while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm4 ,consequently there are different virtues about such like passions3 e4g4 temperance1 about the concupiscible passions2 fortitude1 about fear and daring2 magnanimity1 about hope and despair2 meekness1 about anger4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the passions concur in one common principle and end2 but not in one proper principle or end3 and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other2 and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio2 so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue1 which1 like a second nature1 consents to reason's dictates4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order1 as stated above3 and so they belong to the same virtue4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,moral ,virtues ,differ in ,point of the ,various ,objects of the ,passions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions4 ,for just as there are objects of passions1 so are there objects of operations4 ,now those moral virtues that are about operations1 do not differ according to the objects of those operations3 for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice4 ,therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of those passions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite4 ,now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts4 ,hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions1 do not diversify the species of moral virtue3 so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure1 and the same applies to the other passions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 more or less do not change a species4 ,now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable4 ,therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue3 and for the same reason so do all fearful objects1 and the same applies to others4 ,therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 virtue hinders evil1 even as it produces good4 ,but there are various virtues about the desires for good things3 thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch1 and eutrapelia about pleasures in games4 ,therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils4 ,on the contrary1 ,chastity is about sexual pleasures1 abstinence about pleasures of the table1 and eutrapelia about pleasures in games4 ,i answer that1 ,the perfection of a virtue depends on the reason2 whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite4 ,consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason1 but the passions according to their relation to the appetite4 ,hence the objects of the passions1 according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite1 cause the different species of passions3 while1 according as they are related to reason1 they cause the different species of virtues4 ,now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite4 ,wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions1 without causing diversity of virtues1 as when one virtue is about several passions1 as stated above 7,a4 #d72 and again1 a difference of objects from causing different virtues1 without causing a difference of passions1 since several virtues are directed about one passion1 e4g4 pleasure4 ,and because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers1 always belong to diverse virtues1 as stated above 7,a4 #d72 therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues--for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking1 and that which is good and difficult to obtain4 ,moreover since the reason rules man's lower powers in a certain order1 and even extends to outward things2 hence1 one single object of the passions1 according as it is apprehended by sense1 imagination1 or reason1 and again1 according as it belongs to the soul1 body1 or external things1 has various relations to reason1 and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues4 ,consequently man's good which is the object of love1 desire and pleasure1 may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense1 or to the inner apprehension of the mind3 and this same good may be directed to man's good in himself1 either in his body or in his soul1 or to man's good in relation to other men4 ,and every such difference1 being differently related to reason1 differentiates virtues4 ,accordingly1 if we take a good1 and it be something discerned by the sense of touch1 and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species1 such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse1 it will belong to the virtue of temperance4 ,as regards the pleasures of the other senses1 they are not intense1 and so do not present much difficulty to the reason3 hence there is no virtue corresponding to them2 for virtue1 like art1 is about difficult things 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,on the other hand1 good discerned not by the senses1 but by an inner power1 and belonging to man in himself1 is like money and honor2 the former1 by its very nature1 being employable for the good of the body1 while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind4 ,these goods again may be considered either absolutely1 in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty1 or as being difficult to obtain1 in which way they belong to the irascible part3 which distinction1 however1 has no place in pleasurable objects of touch2 since such are of base condition1 and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals4 ,accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely1 as an object of desire1 pleasure1 or love1 there is liberality3 but if we consider this good as difficult to get1 and as being the object of our hope1 there is magnificence 99megaloprepeia4 ,with regard to that good which we call honor1 taken absolutely1 as the object of love1 we have a virtue called philotimia1 i4e4 love of honor3 while if we consider it as hard to attain1 and as an object of hope1 then we have magnanimity4 ,wherefore liberality and philotimia seem to be in the concupiscible part1 while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible4 ,as regards man's good in relation to other men1 it does not seem hard to obtain1 but is considered absolutely1 as the object of the concupiscible passions4 ,this good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter1 in actions1 to wit1 that are directed by reason to a due end1 or in playful actions1 viz4 that are done for mere pleasure1 and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former4 ,now one man behaves towards another in serious matters1 in two ways4 ,first1 as being pleasant in his regard1 by becoming speech and deeds3 and this belongs to a virtue which ,aristotle 7,ethic4 ii1 #g7 calls friendship 99philia1 and may be rendered affability4 ,secondly1 one man behaves towards another by being frank with him1 in words and deeds3 this belongs to another virtue which 7,ethic4 iv1 #g7 he calls truthfulness 99aletheia4 ,for frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure1 and serious matters than play4 ,hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games1 which the ,philosopher calls eutrapelia 7,ethic4 iv1 #h74 ,it is therefore evident that1 according to ,aristotle1 there are ten moral virtues about the passions1 viz4 fortitude1 temperance1 liberality1 magnificence1 magnanimity1 philotimia1 gentleness1 friendship1 truthfulness1 and eutrapelia1 all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter1 passions1 or objects3 so that if we add justice1 which is about operations1 there will be eleven in all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason3 not so all the objects of the same specific passion2 because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,more and less do not cause a difference of species1 unless they bear different relations to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,good is a more potent mover than evil3 because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason1 so as to require virtues unless that evil be great2 there being1 seemingly1 one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion4 ,hence there is but one virtue1 meekness1 for every form of anger2 and1 again1 but one virtue1 fortitude1 for all forms of daring4 ,on the other hand1 good involves difficulty1 which requires virtue1 even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion4 ,consequently there are various moral virtues about desires1 as stated above4 ,,question #fa ,,of ,,the ,,cardinal ,,virtues 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cardinal virtues3 under which head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues8 7#b7 ,of their number2 7#c7 ,which are they8 7#d7 ,whether they differ from one another8 7#e7 ,whether they are fittingly divided into social1 perfecting1 perfect1 and exemplar virtues8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,moral ,virtues ,should ,be ,called ,cardinal or ,principal ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues4 ,for the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous 7,categor4 x71 so that one is not principal rather than another4 ,now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus virtue4 ,therefore none of them should be called principal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the end is principal as compared to the means4 ,but the theological virtues are about the end2 while the moral virtues are about the means4 ,therefore the theological virtues1 rather than the moral virtues1 should be called principal or cardinal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation4 ,but the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational3 whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore the intellectual virtues are principal1 rather than the moral virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose in explaining the words1 ,blessed are the poor in spirit 7,luke #f3bj7 says3 ,we know that there are four cardinal virtues1 viz4 temperance1 justice1 prudence1 and fortitude4 ,but these are moral virtues4 ,therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,when we speak of virtue simply1 we are understood to speak of human virtue4 ,now human virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c71 is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue1 which requires rectitude of the appetite3 for such like virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well1 but also causes the good deed done4 ,on the other hand1 the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue1 and does not require rectitude of the appetite3 because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done4 ,now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect3 and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues4 ,such are the moral virtues1 and prudence alone1 of the intellectual virtues1 for it is also something of a moral virtue1 as was clearly shown above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #d74 ,consequently1 those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a univocal genus is divided into its species1 the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea2 although considered in their nature as things1 one species may surpass another in rank and perfection1 as man in respect of other animals4 ,but when we divide an analogous term1 which is applied to several things1 but to one before it is applied to another1 nothing hinders one from ranking before another1 even in the point of the generic idea2 as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident4 ,such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue3 since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the theological virtues are above man1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,hence they should properly be called not human1 but super-human or godlike virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the intellectual virtues1 except in prudence1 rank before the moral virtues1 in the point of their subject1 they do not rank before them as virtues2 for a virtue1 as such1 regards good1 which is the object of the appetite4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,are ,four ,cardinal ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues4 ,for prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues1 as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #d74 ,but that which directs other things ranks before them4 ,therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the principal virtues are1 in a way1 moral virtues4 ,now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason1 and by a right appetite1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #b4 ,therefore there are only two cardinal virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another4 ,but in order that a virtue be principal1 it needs not to rank above all the others1 but above some4 ,therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii73 ,the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles1 or according to the subjects in which they are3 and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues4 ,for the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason2 which good is considered in two ways4 ,first1 as existing in the very act of reason3 and thus we have one principal virtue1 called ,prudence4 ,secondly1 according as the reason puts its order into something else2 either into operations1 and then we have ,justice2 or into passions1 and then we need two virtues4 ,for the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason3 and this occurs in two ways4 ,first1 by the passions inciting to something against reason1 and then the passions need a curb1 which we call ,temperance4 ,secondly1 by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason1 e4g4 through fear of danger or toil3 and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates1 lest he turn back2 and to this end there is ,fortitude4 ,in like manner1 we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue4 ,for there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now3 viz4 the power which is rational in its essence1 and this is perfected by ,prudence2 and that which is rational by participation1 and is threefold1 the will1 subject of ,justice1 the concupiscible faculty1 subject of ,temperance1 and the irascible faculty1 subject of ,fortitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply4 ,the others are principal1 each in its own genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the other virtues among which one ranks before another1 are reducible to the above four1 both as to the subject and as to the formal principle4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,other ,virtues ,should ,be ,called ,principal ,rather ,than ,these8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these4 ,for1 seemingly1 the greatest is the principal in any genus4 ,now magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74 ,therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue4 ,but such is humility3 for ,gregory says 7,hom4 iv in ,ev47 that he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind4 ,therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is most perfect seems to be principal4 ,but this applies to patience1 according to ,james #a3d3 ,patience hath a perfect work4 ,therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,cicero reduces all other virtues to these four 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues1 in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now4 ,these principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions4 ,thus the good which exists in the act of reason1 is found chiefly in reason's command1 but not in its counsel or its judgment1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #f74 ,again1 good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due1 is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person1 and on a basis of equality4 ,the good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb1 viz4 in the pleasures of touch4 ,the good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason1 against the impulse of passion1 is found chiefly in perils of death1 which are most difficult to withstand4 ,accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways4 ,first1 in respect of their common formal principles4 ,in this way they are called principal1 being general1 as it were1 in comparison with all the virtues3 so that1 for instance1 any virtue that causes good in reason's act of consideration1 may be called prudence2 every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation1 be called justice2 every virtue that curbs and represses the passions1 be called temperance2 and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever1 be called fortitude4 ,many1 both holy doctors1 as also philosophers1 speak about these virtues in this sense3 and in this way the other virtues are contained under them4 ,wherefore all the objections fail4 ,secondly1 they may be considered in point of their being denominated1 each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter1 and thus they are specific virtues1 condivided with the others4 ,yet they are called principal in comparison with the other virtues1 on account of the importance of their matter3 so that prudence is the virtue which commands2 justice1 the virtue which is about due actions between equals2 temperance1 the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch2 and fortitude1 the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death4 ,thus again do the objections fail3 because the other virtues may be principal in some other way1 but these are called principal by reason of their matter1 as stated above4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,four ,cardinal ,virtues ,differ from ,one ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxii1 #a73 ,there is no true prudence1 unless it be just1 temperate and brave2 no perfect temperance1 that is not brave1 just and prudent2 no sound fortitude1 that is not prudent1 temperate and just2 no real justice1 without prudence1 fortitude and temperance4 ,but this would not be so1 if the above virtues were distinct from one another3 since the different species of one genus do not qualify one another4 ,therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another4 ,but the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude3 for ,ambrose says 7,de ,offic4 xxxvi73 ,rightly do we call it fortitude1 when a man conquers himself1 and is not weakened and bent by any enticement4 ,and of temperance he says 7,de ,offic4 xliii1 xlv7 that it safeguards the manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say4 ,therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #d7 that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all that a man should have knowledge2 secondly1 that he should exercise choice for a particular end2 thirdly1 that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and steadfastness4 ,but the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done2 the second1 i4e4 choice1 belongs to temperance1 whereby a man1 holding his passions on the curb1 acts1 not from passion but from choice2 the third1 that a man should act for the sake of a due end1 implies a certain rectitude1 which seemingly belongs to justice2 while the last1 viz4 firmness and steadfastness1 belongs to fortitude4 ,therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues4 ,therefore they are not distinct from one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 xi7 that there are four virtues1 corresponding to the various emotions of love1 and he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above4 ,therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 these four virtues are understood differently by various writers4 ,for some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind1 to be found in all the virtues3 so that1 to wit1 prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever2 justice1 a certain rectitude of the mind1 whereby a man does what he ought in any matters2 temperance1 a disposition of the mind1 moderating any passions or operations1 so as to keep them within bounds2 and fortitude1 a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason1 against any assaults of the passions1 or the toil involved by any operations4 ,to distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice1 temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits3 because it is fitting that every moral virtue1 from the fact that it is a habit1 should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary3 and this1 we have said1 belongs to fortitude4 ,moreover1 inasmuch as it is a virtue1 it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due2 and this1 we have said1 belongs to justice4 ,again1 owing to the fact that it is a moral virtue partaking of reason1 it observes the mode of reason in all things1 and does not exceed its bounds1 which has been stated to belong to temperance4 ,it is only in the point of having discretion1 which we ascribed to prudence1 that there seems to be a distinction from the other three1 inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason2 whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application 7of reason7 to passions or operations4 ,according to the above explanation1 then1 prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues3 but these would not be distinct from one another2 for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit1 and virtue1 and moral virtue4 ,others1 however1 with better reason1 take these four virtues1 according as they have their special determinate matter2 each of its own matter1 in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,in this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits1 differentiated in respect of their diverse objects4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above4 ,it may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow4 ,for the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence4 ,and each of the others overflows on to the rest1 for the reason that whoever can do what is harder1 can do what is less difficult4 ,wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch1 so that they keep within bounds1 which is a very hard thing to do1 for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death1 so as not to go too far1 which is much easier2 and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate4 ,again1 temperance is said to be brave1 by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance3 in so far1 to wit1 as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death1 which is a matter of very great difficulty1 is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures2 for as ,cicero says 7,de ,offic4 i71 it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear1 and yet vanquished by cupidity2 or that he should be conquered by lust1 after showing himself to be unconquered by toil4 ,from this the ,reply to the ,second ,objection is clear4 ,for temperance observes the mean in all things1 and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures1 either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue1 or in the sense that they overflow on to one another1 as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these four general conditions of virtue set down by the ,philosopher1 are not proper to the aforesaid virtues4 ,they may1 however1 be appropriated to them1 in the way above stated4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,cardinal ,virtues ,are ,fittingly ,divided into ,social ,virtues1 ,perfecting1 ,perfect1 and ,exemplar ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues1 perfecting virtues1 perfect virtues1 and social virtues4 ,for as ,macrobius says 7,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a71 the exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of ,god4 ,now the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #h7 that it is absurd to ascribe justice1 fortitude1 temperance1 and prudence to ,god4 ,therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the perfect virtues are those which are without any passion3 for ,macrobius says 7,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a7 that in a soul that is cleansed1 temperance has not to check worldly desires1 for it has forgotten all about them3 fortitude knows nothing about the passions2 it does not have to conquer them4 ,now it was stated above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #e7 that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions4 ,therefore there is no such thing as perfect virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 he says 7,macrobius3 ,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a7 that the perfecting virtues are those of the man who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of ,god4 ,but it seems wrong to do this1 for ,cicero says 7,de ,offic4 i73 ,i reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise1 but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire1 viz4 power and office4 ,therefore there are no perfecting virtues4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 he says 7,macrobius3 ,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a7 that the social virtues are those whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city4 ,but it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,therefore other virtues should not be called social4 ,on the contrary1 ,macrobius says 7,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a73 ,plotinus1 together with ,plato foremost among teachers of philosophy1 says3 ',the four kinds of virtue are fourfold3 ,in the first place there are social99 virtues2 secondly1 there are perfecting virtues 99,virtutes purgatoriae3 literally meaning1 cleansing virtues2 thirdly1 there are perfect 99,virtutes purgati animi3 literally1 virtues of the clean soul virtues2 and fourthly1 there are exemplar virtues4' 99,cf4 ,chrysostom's fifteenth homily on ,st4 ,matthew1 where he says3 ,the gentle1 the modest1 the merciful1 the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself 4 4 4 ,he that is clean of heart and peaceful1 and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth1 lives for the common weal4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 vi71 the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue3 this something is ,god3 if we follow ,him we shall live aright4 ,consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in ,god1 just as in ,him pre-exist the types of all things4 ,accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in ,god1 and thus we speak of exemplar virtues3 so that in ,god the ,divine ,mind itself may be called prudence2 while temperance is the turning of ,god's gaze on ,himself1 even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason4 ,god's fortitude is ,his unchangeableness2 ,his justice is the observance of the ,eternal ,law in ,his works1 as ,plotinus states 7,cf4 ,macrobius1 ,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a74 ,again1 since man by his nature is a social 99,see above note on ,chrysostom animal1 these virtues1 in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature1 are called social virtues2 since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs4 ,it is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now4 ,but since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to ,divine things1 as even the ,philosopher declares in ,ethic4 x1 #g1 and as ,scripture often admonishes us--for instance3 ,be ye 4 4 4 perfect1 as your heavenly ,father is perfect 7,matt4 #e3dh71 we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues1 and the exemplar virtues which are ,divine4 ,now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term3 so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the ,divine similitude2 and these are called perfecting virtues4 ,thus prudence1 by contemplating the things of ,god1 counts as nothing all things of the world1 and directs all the thoughts of the soul to ,god alone3 temperance1 so far as nature allows1 neglects the needs of the body2 fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things2 and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed4 ,besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the ,divine similitude3 these are called the perfect virtues4 ,thus prudence sees nought else but the things of ,god2 temperance knows no earthly desires2 fortitude has no knowledge of passion2 and justice1 by imitating the ,divine ,mind1 is united thereto by an everlasting covenant4 ,such as the virtues attributed to the ,blessed1 or1 in this life1 to some who are at the summit of perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs2 for instance1 justice1 about buying and selling2 fortitude1 about fear2 temperance1 about desires2 for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,human virtues1 that is to say1 virtues of men living together in this world1 are about the passions4 ,but the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions4 ,hence ,plotinus says 7,cf4 ,macrobius1 ,super ,somn4 ,scip4 #a7 that the social virtues check the passions1 i4e4 they bring them to the relative mean2 the second kind1 viz4 the perfecting virtues1 uproot them2 the third kind1 viz4 the perfect virtues1 forget them2 while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind1 viz4 the exemplar virtues4 ,it may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked2 otherwise it is virtuous4 ,hence ,cicero says a little earlier3 ,perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning2 as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health1 or for some other yet weightier motive2 when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority4 ,this agrees with what ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ai73 ,the love of truth demands a hallowed leisure2 charity necessitates good works4 ,if no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth2 but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,legal justice alone regards the common weal directly3 but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,for we must take note that it concerns the human virtues1 as we understand them here1 to do well not only towards the community1 but also towards the parts of the community1 viz4 towards the household1 or even towards one individual4 ,,question #fb ,,of ,,the ,,theological ,,virtues 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the ,theological ,virtues3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there are any theological virtues8 7#b7 ,whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues8 7#c7 ,how many1 and which are they8 7#d7 ,of their order4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,are ,any ,theological ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not any theological virtues4 ,for according to ,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag1 virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best3 and by perfect1 ,i mean that which is disposed according to nature4 ,but that which is ,divine is above man's nature4 ,therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 theological virtues are quasi-,divine virtues4 ,but the ,divine virtues are exemplars1 as stated above 7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #e71 which are not in us but in ,god4 ,therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to ,god1 ,who is the first beginning and last end of all things4 ,but by the very nature of his reason and will1 man is directed to his first beginning and last end4 ,therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue1 to direct the reason and will to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,the precepts of the ,law are about acts of virtue4 ,now the ,divine ,law contains precepts about the acts of faith1 hope1 and charity3 for it is written 7,ecclus4 #b3h1 seqq473 ,ye that fear the ,lord believe ,him1 and again1 hope in ,him1 and again1 love ,him4 ,therefore faith1 hope1 and charity are virtues directing us to ,god4 ,therefore they are theological virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,man is perfected by virtue1 for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness1 as was explained above 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #g74 ,now man's happiness is twofold1 as was also stated above 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e74 ,one is proportionate to human nature1 a happiness1 to wit1 which man can obtain by means of his natural principles4 ,the other is a happiness surpassing man's nature1 and which man can obtain by the power of ,god alone1 by a kind of participation of the ,godhead1 about which it is written 7#b ,pet4 #a3d7 that by ,christ we are made partakers of the ,divine nature4 ,and because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature1 man's natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity1 do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness4 ,hence it is necessary for man to receive from ,god some additional principles1 whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness1 even as he is directed to his connatural end1 by means of his natural principles1 albeit not without ,divine assistance4 ,such like principles are called theological virtues3 first1 because their object is ,god1 inasmuch as they direct us aright to ,god3 secondly1 because they are infused in us by ,god alone3 thirdly1 because these virtues are not made known to us1 save by ,divine revelation1 contained in ,holy ,writ4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways4 ,first1 essentially3 and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man4 ,secondly1 by participation1 as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire3 and thus1 after a fashion1 man becomes a partaker of the ,divine ,nature1 as stated above3 so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the ,nature of which he is made a partaker4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these virtues are called ,divine1 not as though ,god were virtuous by reason of them1 but because of them ,god makes us virtuous1 and directs us to ,himself4 ,hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason and will are naturally directed to ,god1 inasmuch as ,he is the beginning and end of nature1 but in proportion to nature4 ,but the reason and will1 according to their nature1 are not sufficiently directed to ,him in so far as ,he is the object of supernatural happiness4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,theological ,virtues ,are ,distinct from the ,intellectual and ,moral ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues4 ,for the theological virtues1 if they be in a human soul1 must needs perfect it1 either as to the intellective1 or as to the appetitive part4 ,now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual2 and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part1 are called moral4 ,therefore1 the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the theological virtues are those which direct us to ,god4 ,now1 among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to ,god3 this is wisdom1 which is about ,divine things1 since it considers the highest cause4 ,therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,moribus ,eccl4 xv7 shows how the four cardinal virtues are the order of love4 ,now love is charity1 which is a theological virtue4 ,therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological4 ,on the contrary1 ,that which is above man's nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature4 ,but the theological virtues are above man's nature2 while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature1 as clearly shown above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore they are distinct from one another4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a71 habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects4 ,now the object of the theological virtues is ,god ,himself1 ,who is the last end of all1 as surpassing the knowledge of our reason4 ,on the other hand1 the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason4 ,wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature2 the theological virtues1 supernaturally4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the wisdom which the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #c1 #g7 reckons as an intellectual virtue1 considers ,divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason4 ,theological virtue1 on the other hand1 is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,though charity is love1 yet love is not always charity4 ,when1 then1 it is stated that every virtue is the order of love1 this can be understood either of love in the general sense1 or of the love of charity4 ,if it be understood of love1 commonly so called1 then each virtue is stated to be the order of love1 in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions2 and love is the root and cause of every emotion1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #f1 ad #b2 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,if1 however1 it be understood of the love of charity1 it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially3 but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way1 as we shall show further on 7,q4 #fe1 ,,aa4 #b1 #e2 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #g74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,faith1 ,hope1 and ,charity ,are ,fittingly ,reckoned ,as ,theological ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith1 hope1 and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues4 ,for the theological virtues are in relation to ,divine happiness1 what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end4 ,now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue1 viz4 the understanding of principles4 ,therefore there should be but one theological virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues4 ,now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues1 but is something less than a virtue1 since it is imperfect knowledge4 ,likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues1 but is something less than a virtue1 since it is a passion4 ,much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the theological virtues direct man's soul to ,god4 ,now man's soul cannot be directed to ,god1 save through the intellective part1 wherein are the intellect and will4 ,therefore there should be only two theological virtues1 one perfecting the intellect1 the other1 the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ac73 ,now there remain faith1 hope1 charity1 these three4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end4 ,now the latter happens in respect of two things4 ,first1 in respect of the reason or intellect1 in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect1 and which are reason's starting-point1 both in speculative and in practical matters4 ,secondly1 through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason4 ,but these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness1 according to #a ,cor4 #b3i3 ,the eye hath not seen1 nor ear heard1 neither hath it entered into the heart of man1 what things ,god hath prepared for them that love ,him4 ,consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end4 ,first1 as regards the intellect1 man receives certain supernatural principles1 which are held by means of a ,divine light3 these are the articles of faith1 about which is faith4 ,secondly1 the will is directed to this end1 both as to that end as something attainable--and this pertains to hope--and as to a certain spiritual union1 whereby the will is1 so to speak1 transformed into that end--and this belongs to charity4 ,for the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally2 and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand3 consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power4 ,but the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end1 both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end4 ,but the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects1 for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature4 ,consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith and hope imply a certain imperfection3 since faith is of things unseen1 and hope1 of things not possessed4 ,hence faith and hope1 in things that are subject to human power1 fall short of the notion of virtue4 ,but faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man1 according to #a ,cor4 #a3be3 ,the weakness of ,god is stronger than men4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,two things pertain to the appetite1 viz4 movement to the end1 and conformity with the end by means of love4 ,hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite1 namely1 hope and charity4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,faith ,precedes ,hope1 and ,hope ,charity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope1 and hope charity4 ,for the root precedes that which grows from it4 ,now charity is the root of all the virtues1 according to ,eph4 #c3ag3 ,being rooted and founded in charity4 ,therefore charity precedes the others4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i73 ,a man cannot love what he does not believe to exist4 ,but if he believes and loves1 by doing good works he ends in hoping4 ,therefore it seems that faith precedes charity1 and charity hope4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love is the principle of all our emotions1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,now hope is a kind of emotion1 since it is a passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore charity1 which is love1 precedes hope4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle enumerates them thus 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ac73 ,now there remain faith1 hope1 charity4 ,i answer that1 ,order is twofold3 order of generation1 and order of perfection4 ,by order of generation1 in respect of which matter precedes form1 and the imperfect precedes the perfect1 in one same subject faith precedes hope1 and hope charity1 as to their acts3 because habits are all infused together4 ,for the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything1 either by hoping or loving1 unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect4 ,now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love4 ,hence in the order of generation1 faith precedes hope and charity4 ,in like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good4 ,now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone1 he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own4 ,hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone1 he proceeds to love him3 so that in the order of generation1 hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts4 ,but in the order of perfection1 charity precedes faith and hope3 because both faith and hope are quickened by charity1 and receive from charity their full complement as virtues4 ,for thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues1 inasmuch as it is the form of them all1 as we shall state further on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #h74 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already3 this belongs to hope quickened by and following charity4 ,but it is possible for a man before having charity1 to hope through merits not already possessed1 but which he hopes to possess4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #g71 in treating of the passions1 hope regards two things4 ,one as its principal object1 viz4 the good hoped for4 ,with regard to this1 love always precedes hope3 for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved4 ,hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good4 ,with regard to this1 hope precedes love at first2 though afterwards hope is increased by love4 ,because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone1 he begins to love him3 and from the fact that he loves him1 he then hopes all the more in him4 ,,question #fc ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,virtues 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of virtues2 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether virtue is in us by nature8 7#b7 ,whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation8 7#c7 ,whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion8 7#d7 ,whether virtue acquired by habituation1 is of the same species as infused virtue8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,virtue ,is in ,us by ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that virtue is in us by nature4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #ad73 ,virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us4 ,and ,antony says in his sermon to the monks3 ,if the will contradicts nature it is perverse1 if it follow nature it is virtuous4 ,moreover1 a gloss on ,matt4 #d3bc1 ,jesus went about1 etc41 says3 ,he taught them natural virtues1 i4e4 chastity1 justice1 humility1 which man possesses naturally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the virtuous good consists in accord with reason1 as was clearly shown above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b74 ,but that which accords with reason is natural to man2 since reason is part of man's nature4 ,therefore virtue is in man by nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us4 ,now virtues are in some from birth3 for it is written 7,job #ca3ah73 ,from my infancy mercy grew up with me2 and it came out with me from my mother's womb4 ,therefore virtue is in man by nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is in man by nature is common to all men1 and is not taken away by sin1 since even in the demons natural gifts remain1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but virtue is not in all men2 and is cast out by sin4 ,therefore it is not in man by nature4 ,i answer that1 ,with regard to corporeal forms1 it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within1 by those1 for instance1 who upheld the theory of latent forms 99,anaxagoras2 ,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #d4 ,others held that forms are entirely from without1 those1 for instance1 who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause4 ,others1 however1 esteemed that they are partly from within1 in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter2 and partly from without1 in so far as they are brought into act by the agent4 ,in like manner with regard to sciences and virtues1 some held that they are wholly from within1 so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally1 but that the hindrances to science and virtue1 which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body1 are removed by study and practice1 even as iron is made bright by being polished4 ,this was the opinion of the ,platonists4 ,others said that they are wholly from without1 being due to the inflow of the active intellect1 as ,avicenna maintained4 ,others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature1 so far as we are adapted to them1 but not in their perfection3 this is the teaching of the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #a71 and is nearer the truth4 ,to make this clear1 it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man2 one is according to his specific nature1 the other according to his individual nature4 ,and1 since each thing derives its species from its form1 and its individuation from matter1 and1 again1 since man's form is his rational soul1 while his matter is his body1 whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul1 is natural to him in respect of his specific nature2 while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body1 is natural to him in respect of his individual nature4 ,for whatever is natural to man in respect of his body1 considered as part of his species1 is to be referred1 in a way1 to the soul1 in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul4 ,in both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively4 ,this is so in respect of the specific nature1 in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action1 which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues1 and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason4 ,again1 this is so in respect of the individual nature1 in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body1 some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues3 because1 to wit1 certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body1 according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts1 and1 in consequence1 the rational powers also1 which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist4 ,in this way one man has a natural aptitude for science1 another for fortitude1 another for temperance3 and in these ways1 both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude1 inchoatively1 but not perfectly1 since nature is determined to one1 while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action1 but on various modes1 in respect of the various matters1 which constitute the sphere of virtue's action1 and according to various circumstances4 ,it is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature1 according to aptitude and inchoation1 but not according to perfection1 except the theological virtues1 which are entirely from without4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,for the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature1 inasmuch as we are rational beings4 ,the third objection must be taken in the sense that1 owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth1 one has an aptitude for pity1 another for living temperately1 another for some other virtue4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,any ,virtue ,is ,caused in ,us by ,habituation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation4 ,because a gloss of ,augustine 99,cf4 ,lib4 ,sentent4 ,prosperi cvi4 commenting on ,rom4 #ad3bc1 ,all that is not of faith is sin1 says3 ,the whole life of an unbeliever is a sin3 and there is no good without the ,sovereign ,good4 ,where knowledge of the truth is lacking1 virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people4 ,now faith cannot be acquired by means of works1 but is caused in us by ,god1 according to ,eph4 #b3h3 ,by grace you are saved through faith4 ,therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin and virtue are contraries1 so that they are incompatible4 ,now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of ,god1 according to ,wis4 #h3ba3 ,i knew that ,i could not otherwise be continent1 except ,god gave it4 ,therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation1 but only by the gift of ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 actions which lead toward virtue1 lack the perfection of virtue4 ,but an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause4 ,therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that good is more efficacious than evil4 ,but vicious habits are caused by evil acts4 ,much more1 therefore1 can virtuous habits be caused by good acts4 ,i answer that1 ,we have spoken above 7,q4 #ea1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c7 in a general way about the production of habits from acts2 and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue1 we must take note that1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 man's virtue perfects him in relation to good4 ,now since the notion of good consists in mode1 species1 and order1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,nat4 ,boni4 iii7 or in number1 weight1 and measure1 as expressed in ,wis4 #aa3ba1 man's good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule4 ,now this rule is twofold1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 viz4 human reason and ,divine ,law4 ,and since ,divine ,law is the higher rule1 it extends to more things1 so that whatever is ruled by human reason1 is ruled by the ,divine ,law too2 but the converse does not hold4 ,it follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts3 inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason1 by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established4 ,on the other hand1 virtue which directs man to good as defined by the ,divine ,law1 and not by human reason1 cannot be caused by human acts1 the principle of which is reason1 but is produced in us by the ,divine operation alone4 ,hence ,augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words1 which ,god works in us without us 7,super ,ps4 #aah1 ,serm4 xxvi74 ,it is also of these virtues that the ,first ,objection holds good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue1 especially if this be considered in its perfect state4 ,but actual sin1 even mortal1 is compatible with humanly acquired virtue2 because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will1 as stated above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #c73 and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue1 since it is not an act but a habit1 that is directly contrary to a habit4 ,wherefore1 though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace1 so as never to sin mortally1 yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue1 whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases1 and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason4 ,there are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace1 those1 namely1 which are directly opposed to the theological virtues1 which are in us through the gift of grace4 ,this1 however1 will be more fully explained later 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #a71 certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature4 ,these principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them3 thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions1 and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through the appetite partaking of reason1 which rectification belongs to moral virtue4 ,accordingly human acts1 in so far as they proceed from higher principles1 can cause acquired human virtues4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,moral ,virtues ,are in ,us by ,infusion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by ,god4 ,because ,god does not do by ,himself1 save perhaps sometimes miraculously1 those things that can be done by second causes2 for1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv71 it is ,god's rule to bring about extremes through the mean4 ,now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 much less superfluity is found in ,god's works than in the works of nature4 ,now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good4 ,therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nature does not employ two means where one suffices3 much less does ,god4 ,but ,god sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls1 according to a gloss on ,heb4 #a 99,cf4 ,jerome on ,gal4 #a3 #ae1 #af4 ,therefore it is unfitting for ,him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #h3g73 ,she teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude4 ,i answer that1 ,effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles4 ,now all virtues1 intellectual and moral1 that are acquired by our actions1 arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us1 as above stated 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #a73 instead of which natural principles1 ,god bestows on us the theological virtues1 whereby we are directed to a supernatural end1 as stated 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore we need to receive from ,god other habits corresponding1 in due proportion1 to the theological virtues1 which habits are to the theological virtues1 what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions3 but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues4 ,therefore it was necessary for us to receive1 from ,god immediately1 others that are proportionate to these virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end1 inchoatively3 i4e4 to ,god ,himself immediately4 ,but the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things1 yet in relation to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature4 ,consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,virtue by ,habituation ,belongs to the ,same ,species ,as ,infused ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue4 ,because acquired and infused virtues1 according to what has been said 7,a4 #c71 do not differ seemingly1 save in relation to the last end4 ,now human habits and acts are specified1 not by their last1 but by their proximate end4 ,therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habits are known by their acts4 ,but the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same1 viz4 to moderate desires of touch4 ,therefore they do not differ in species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by ,god immediately1 from that which is wrought by a creature4 ,but the man whom ,god made1 is of the same species as a man begotten naturally2 and the eye which ,he gave to the man born blind1 as one produced by the power of generation4 ,therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species4 ,on the contrary1 ,any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species4 ,but the definition of infused virtue contains the words1 which ,god works in us without us1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore acquired virtue1 to which these words cannot apply1 is not of the same species as infused virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,there is a twofold specific difference among habits4 ,the first1 as stated above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #a71 is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects4 ,now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter3 thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch4 ,the formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences3 while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences4 ,now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason1 is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to ,divine rule4 ,for instance1 in the consumption of food1 the mean fixed by human reason1 is that food should not harm the health of the body1 nor hinder the use of reason3 whereas1 according to the ,divine rule1 it behooves man to chastise his body1 and bring it into subjection 7#a ,cor4 #i3bg71 by abstinence in food1 drink and the like4 ,it is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species2 and the same applies to the other virtues4 ,the other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed3 for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species1 on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed4 ,in the same sense1 the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #c7 that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government4 ,in the same way1 too1 those infused moral virtues1 whereby men behave well in respect of their being fellow-citizens with the saints1 and of the household ,douay3 'domestics' of ,god 7,eph4 #b3ai71 differ from the acquired virtues1 whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end1 but also in relation to their proper objects1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch1 but for different reasons1 as stated3 wherefore their respective acts are not identical4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally3 consequently it was of the same species4 ,it would be the same if ,god wished to give a man miraculously virtues1 such as those that are acquired by acts4 ,but the case is not so in the question before us1 as stated4 ,,question #fd ,,of ,,the ,,mean ,,of ,,virtue 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the properties of virtues3 and 7#a7 the mean of virtue1 7#b7 the connection between virtues1 7#c7 equality of virtues1 7#d7 the duration of virtues4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether moral virtue observes the mean8 7#b7 ,whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean8 7#c7 ,whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean8 7#d7 ,whether the theological virtues do8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,moral ,virtues ,observe the ,mean8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean4 ,for the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme4 ,now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme2 for it is stated in ,de ,coelo i that virtue is the limit of power4 ,therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the maximum is not a mean4 ,now some moral virtues tend to a maximum3 for instance1 magnanimity to very great honors1 and magnificence to very large expenditure1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #b1 #c4 ,therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean1 it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected1 but the contrary corrupted1 through tending to something extreme4 ,now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme2 thus virginity1 which abstains from all sexual pleasure1 observes the extreme1 and is the most perfect chastity3 and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality4 ,therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean4 ,i answer that1 ,as already explained 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c71 the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good4 ,now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter3 and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason4 ,but the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule3 thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of art4 ,consequently1 in things of this sort1 evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure4 ,now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it2 as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured4 ,hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason4 ,now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity4 ,therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason1 while its matter consists in passions or operations4 ,if therefore we compare moral virtue to reason1 then1 if we look at that which it has of reason1 it holds the position of one extreme1 viz4 conformity2 while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme1 viz4 deformity4 ,but if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter1 then it holds the position of mean1 in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that virtue1 as to its essence1 is a mean state1 in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter3 but it is an extreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent1 ' viz4 as to its conformity with reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances3 hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance1 while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances1 through being in conformity with reason4 ,this is the case with magnanimity and magnificence4 ,for if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues1 we shall call it an extreme and a maximum3 but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances1 then it has the character of a mean3 since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason1 i4e4 where it is right1 when it is right1 and for an end that is right4 ,there will be excess1 if one tends to this maximum when it is not right1 or where it is not right1 or for an undue end2 and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto where one ought1 and when one ought4 ,this agrees with the saying of the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #c7 that the magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity1 but the mean in the right mode of his action4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity4 ,for virginity abstains from all sexual matters1 and poverty from all wealth1 for a right end1 and in a right manner1 i4e4 according to ,god's word1 and for the sake of eternal life4 ,but if this be done in an undue manner1 i4e4 out of unlawful superstition1 or again for vainglory1 it will be in excess4 ,and if it be not done when it ought to be done1 or as it ought to be done1 it is a vice by deficiency3 for instance1 in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,mean of ,moral ,virtue ,is the ,real ,mean1 or the ,rational ,mean8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean1 but the real mean4 ,for the good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean4 ,now1 good1 as stated in ,metaph4 ii1 text4 #h1 is in things themselves4 ,therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the reason is a power of apprehension4 ,but moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions1 but rather a mean between operations or passions4 ,therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational1 but the real mean4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean4 ,now such is the mean of justice1 as stated in ,ethic4 v1 #c4 ,therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational1 but the real mean4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f7 that moral virtue observes the mean fixed1 in our regard1 by reason4 ,i answer that1 ,the rational mean can be understood in two ways4 ,first1 according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason1 as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean3 in this sense1 since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason1 but the act of the appetitive power1 the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean4 ,secondly1 the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter4 ,in this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean1 since1 as above stated 7,a4 #a71 moral virtue is said to observe the mean1 through conformity with right reason4 ,but it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean3 in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean1 for instance1 in justice4 ,on the other hand1 sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean1 but is considered in relation to us3 and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues4 ,the reason for this is that justice is about operations1 which deal with external things1 wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely1 as stated above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #b73 wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean1 in so far1 to wit as justice gives to each one his due1 neither more nor less4 ,but the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the same way1 since men are variously situated in relation to their passions2 hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions1 with due regard to us1 who are moved in respect of the passions4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,for the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason1 while the third argues from the mean of justice4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,intellectual ,virtues ,observe the ,mean8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean4 ,because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason4 ,but the intellectual virtues are in reason itself1 so that they seem to have no higher rule4 ,therefore the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue3 for it is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #f1 that virtue observes the mean appointed by reason1 as a prudent man would appoint it4 ,if therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean1 this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue1 so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a mean is1 properly speaking1 between contraries1 as the ,philosopher explains 7,metaph4 x1 text4 #bb1 #bc74 ,but there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect2 since contraries themselves1 as they are in the intellect1 are not in opposition to one another1 but are understood together1 as white and black1 healthy and sick4 ,therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,art is an intellectual virtue2 and yet there is a mean in art 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,therefore also intellectual virtue observes the mean4 ,i answer that1 ,the good of anything consists in its observing the mean1 by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or deficient1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now intellectual virtue1 like moral virtue1 is directed to the good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean1 in so far as it is subject to a measure4 ,now the good of intellectual virtue is the true2 in the case of contemplative virtue1 it is the true taken absolutely 7,ethic4 vi1 #b72 in the case of practical virtue1 it is the true in conformity with a right appetite4 ,now truth apprehended by our intellect1 if we consider it absolutely1 is measured by things2 since things are the measure of our intellect1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #e2 because there is truth in what we think or say1 according as the thing is so or not4 ,accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean1 by way of conformity with things themselves1 in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are1 or as not being what they are not3 and it is in this that the nature of truth consists4 ,there will be excess if something false is affirmed1 as though something were1 which in reality it is not3 and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied1 and declared not to be1 whereas in reality it is4 ,the truth of practical intellectual virtue1 if we consider it in relation to things1 is by way of that which is measured2 so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues1 the mean consists in conformity with things4 ,but if we consider it in relation to the appetite1 it has the character of a rule and measure4 ,consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue1 and also the mean of prudence--of prudence as ruling and measuring1 of moral virtue1 as ruled and measured by that mean4 ,in like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,intellectual virtues also have their measure1 as stated1 and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there is no need for an indefinite series of virtues3 because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue1 but things themselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind1 because one is the reason for knowing the other3 nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation1 which are contraries1 as stated at the end of ,peri ,hermeneias4 ,for though to be and not to be are not in contrary1 but in contradictory opposition to one another1 so long as we consider their signification in things themselves1 for on the one hand we have being and on the other we have simply non-being2 yet if we refer them to the act of the mind1 there is something positive in both cases4 ,hence to be and not to be are contradictory3 but the opinion stating that good is good is contrary to the opinion stating that good is not good3 and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,theological ,virtues ,observe the ,mean8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that theological virtue observes the mean4 ,for the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean4 ,now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness4 ,therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason2 while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being measured by things4 ,now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore theological virtue also observes the mean4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hope1 which is a theological virtue1 is a mean between despair and presumption4 ,likewise faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies1 as ,boethius states 7,de ,duab4 ,natur4 vii73 thus1 by confessing one ,person and two natures in ,christ1 we observe the mean between the heresy of ,nestorius1 who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures1 and the heresy of ,eutyches1 who held to one person and one nature4 ,therefore theological virtue observes the mean4 ,on the contrary1 ,wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency4 ,but there is no sinning by excess against ,god1 ,who is the object of theological virtue3 for it is written 7,ecclus4 #dc3cc73 ,blessing the ,lord1 exalt ,him as much as you can3 for ,he is above all praise4 ,therefore theological virtue does not observe the mean4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue's rule or measure1 in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule4 ,now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold4 ,one is taken from the very nature of virtue1 and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is ,god ,himself3 because our faith is ruled according to ,divine truth2 charity1 according to ,his goodness2 hope1 according to the immensity of ,his omnipotence and loving kindness4 ,this measure surpasses all human power3 so that never can we love ,god as much as ,he ought to be loved1 nor believe and hope in ,him as much as we should4 ,much less therefore can there be excess in such things4 ,accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean1 but increases the more we approach to the summit4 ,the other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us3 for although we cannot be borne towards ,god as much as we ought1 yet we should approach to ,him by believing1 hoping and loving1 according to the measure of our condition4 ,consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue1 accidentally and in reference to us4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded3 whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue1 considered in itself1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule2 whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure4 ,wherefore the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hope observes the mean between presumption and despair1 in relation to us1 in so far1 to wit1 as a man is said to be presumptuous1 through hoping to receive from ,god a good in excess of his condition2 or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he might hope for4 ,but there can be no excess of hope in comparison with ,god1 ,whose goodness is infinite4 ,in like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies1 not by comparison with its object1 which is ,god1 in ,whom we cannot believe too much2 but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions1 as was explained above4 ,,question #fe ,,of ,,the ,,connection ,,of ,,virtues 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider the connection of virtues3 under which head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the moral virtues are connected with one another8 7#b7 ,whether the moral virtues can be without charity8 7#c7 ,whether charity can be without them8 7#d7 ,whether faith and hope can be without charity8 7#e7 ,whether charity can be without them8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,moral ,virtues ,are ,connected with ,one ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another4 ,because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts1 as is proved in ,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b4 ,but man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue1 without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue4 ,therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues4 ,now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #b1 #c7 that a poor man cannot be magnificent1 and yet he may have other virtues2 and 7,ethic4 iv7 that he who is worthy of small things1 and so accounts his worth1 is modest1 but not magnanimous4 ,therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul1 so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part4 ,but the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected3 since we may have one science1 without having another4 ,neither1 therefore1 are the moral virtues connected with one another4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the moral virtues are mutually connected1 this can only be because they are united together in prudence4 ,but this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together4 ,for1 seemingly1 one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue1 without being prudent in those that concern another virtue3 even as one may have the art of making certain things1 without the art of making certain others4 ,now prudence is right reason about things to be done4 ,therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says on ,luke #f3bj3 ,the virtues are connected and linked together1 so that whoever has one1 is seen to have several3 and ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #d7 that the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another3 and ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxii1 #a7 that one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever1 or very imperfect3 and ,cicero says 7,quaest4 ,tusc4 ii73 ,if you confess to not having one particular virtue1 it must needs be that you have none at all4 ,i answer that1 ,moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect4 ,an imperfect moral virtue1 temperance for instance1 or fortitude1 is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed1 whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation4 ,if we take the moral virtues in this way1 they are not connected3 since we find men who1 by natural temperament or by being accustomed1 are prompt in doing deeds of liberality1 but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity4 ,but the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well2 and if we take moral virtues in this way1 we must say that they are connected1 as nearly as all are agreed in saying4 ,for this two reasons are given1 corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues4 ,for1 as we stated above 7,q4 #fa1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues3 for instance1 by saying that discretion belongs to prudence1 rectitude to justice1 moderation to temperance1 and strength of mind to fortitude1 in whatever matter we consider these properties to be4 ,in this way the reason for the connection is evident3 for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous1 if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion3 and so forth4 ,this1 too1 is the reason assigned for the connection by ,gregory1 who says 7,moral4 xxii1 #a7 that a virtue cannot be perfect as a virtue1 if isolated from the others3 for there can be no true prudence without temperance1 justice and fortitude3 and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues 7cf4 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #d1 ,obj4 #a74 ,augustine also gives the same reason 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #d74 ,others1 however1 differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters1 and it is in this way that ,aristotle assigns the reason for their connection 7,ethic4 vi1 #ac74 ,because1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #d71 no moral virtue can be without prudence2 since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice1 for it is an elective habit4 ,now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end1 which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue1 but also correct choice of things conducive to the end1 which choice is made by prudence1 that counsels1 judges1 and commands in those things that are directed to the end4 ,in like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues3 since prudence is right reason about things to be done1 and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done1 to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue4 ,hence1 just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles1 so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues3 and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state1 in other words1 with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life4 ,hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues4 ,and if he exercise himself1 by good deeds1 in all such matters1 he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues4 ,but if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter1 but not in regard to another1 for instance1 by behaving well in matters of anger1 but not in matters of concupiscence2 he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger2 but this habit will lack the nature of virtue1 through the absence of prudence1 which is wanting in matters of concupiscence4 ,in the same way1 natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue1 if prudence be lacking4 ,but there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state1 such as magnificence and magnanimity2 and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues1 it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues1 without actually having the habits of these virtues--provided we speak of acquired virtue4 ,nevertheless1 when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality4 ,because when1 by practice1 a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure1 if he were to come in for a large sum of money1 he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice3 even as a geometrician1 by dint of little study1 acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before4 ,now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it1 according to the saying of the ,philosopher 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #ef73 ,that which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another1 as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts4 ,hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues1 which are about passions and operations1 that are clearly related to one another4 ,for all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions1 viz4 love and hatred1 and terminate in certain others1 viz4 pleasure and sorrow4 ,in like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another1 and to the passions4 ,hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence4 ,nevertheless1 all intelligible things are related to first principles4 ,and in this way1 all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles2 even as prudence depends on the moral virtues1 as stated4 ,on the other hand1 the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles1 do not depend on the conclusions1 which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues1 as do the moral virtues depend on prudence1 because the appetite1 in a fashion1 moves the reason1 and the reason the appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #e1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those things to which the moral virtues incline1 are as the principles of prudence3 whereas the products of art are not the principles1 but the matter of art4 ,now it is evident that1 though reason may be right in one part of the matter1 and not in another1 yet in no way can it be called right reason1 if it be deficient in any principle whatever4 ,thus1 if a man be wrong about the principle1 ,a whole is greater than its part1 he cannot acquire the science of geometry1 because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion4 ,moreover1 things done are related to one another1 but not things made1 as stated above 7ad #c74 ,consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done1 would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done3 whereas this does not occur in things to be made4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,moral ,virtues ,can ,be ,without ,charity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that moral virtues can be without charity4 ,for it is stated in the ,liber ,sentent4 ,prosperi vii1 that every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad4 ,but charity can be in none except the good1 as stated in the same book4 ,therefore the other virtues can be had without charity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b1 whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion1 according to ,rom4 #e3e3 ,the charity of ,god is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost ,who is given to us4 ,therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the moral virtues are connected together1 through depending on prudence4 ,but charity does not depend on prudence2 indeed1 it surpasses prudence1 according to ,eph4 #c3ai3 ,the charity of ,christ1 which surpasseth all knowledge4 ,therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity1 and can be without it4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,john #c3ad73 ,he that loveth not1 abideth in death4 ,now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues1 since it is by them that we lead a good life1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ag1 #ai74 ,therefore they cannot be without the love of charity4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #b71 it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues1 in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man3 and when they are acquired thus1 they can be without charity1 even as they were in many of the ,gentiles4 ,but in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end1 thus they have the character of virtue1 truly and perfectly2 and cannot be acquired by human acts1 but are infused by ,god4 ,such like moral virtues cannot be without charity4 ,for it has been stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e7 that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence2 and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues1 because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends1 which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence4 ,now for prudence to proceed aright1 it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end1 which is the effect of charity1 than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends1 which is the effect of moral virtue3 just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle1 that contradictories cannot both be true at the same time4 ,it is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity2 nor1 consequently1 the other moral virtues1 since they cannot be without prudence4 ,it is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect1 and deserve to be called virtues simply3 since they direct man well to the ultimate end4 ,but the other virtues1 those1 namely1 that are acquired1 are virtues in a restricted sense1 but not simply3 for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action1 but not in respect of the last end simply4 ,hence a gloss of ,augustine 99,cf4 ,lib4 ,sentent4 ,prosperi cvi4 on the words1 ,all that is not of faith is sin 7,rom4 #ad3bc71 says3 ,he that fails to acknowledge the truth1 has no true virtue1 even if his conduct be good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue1 in the words quoted1 denotes imperfect virtue4 ,else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state1 it makes its possessor good1 and consequently cannot be in the wicked4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,though charity surpasses science and prudence1 yet prudence depends on charity1 as stated3 and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,charity ,can ,be ,without ,moral ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues4 ,for when one thing suffices for a certain purpose1 it is superfluous to employ others4 ,now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue1 as is clear from #a ,cor4 #ac3d1 seqq43 ,charity is patient1 is kind1 etc4 ,therefore it seems that if one has charity1 other virtues are superfluous4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue1 and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake3 hence pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,now many have charity1 being free from mortal sin1 and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue2 nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake1 but only for the sake of charity4 ,therefore many have charity without the other virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is to be found in every saint3 and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues4 ,for ,bede says 7on ,luke #ag3aj7 that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues1 than rejoiced at the virtues they have4 ,therefore1 if a man has charity1 it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,the whole ,law is fulfilled through charity1 for it is written 7,rom4 #ac3h73 ,he that loveth his neighbor1 hath fulfilled the ,law4 ,now it is not possible to fulfil the whole ,law1 without having all the moral virtues3 since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue1 as stated in ,ethic4 v1 #a1 #b4 ,therefore he that has charity1 has all the moral virtues4 ,moreover1 ,augustine says in a letter 7,epis4 clxvii7 99,cf4 ,serm4 xxxix and xlvi de ,temp4 that charity contains all the cardinal virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,all the moral virtues are infused together with charity4 ,the reason for this is that ,god operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature4 ,now1 in the works of nature1 we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works1 it has also whatever is necessary for their execution3 thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do4 ,now it is evident that charity1 inasmuch as it directs man to his last end1 is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end4 ,wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity1 since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work4 ,it is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected1 not only through prudence1 but also on account of charity3 and1 again1 that whoever loses charity through mortal sin1 forfeits all the infused moral virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in order that the act of a lower power be perfect1 not only must there be perfection in the higher1 but also in the lower power3 for if the principal agent were well disposed1 perfect action would not follow1 if the instrument also were not well disposed4 ,consequently1 in order that man work well in things referred to the end1 he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end1 but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end3 for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end4 ,therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it happens sometimes that a man who has a habit1 finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit1 and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act1 on account of some impediment supervening from without3 thus a man who has a habit of science1 finds it difficult to understand1 through being sleepy or unwell4 ,in like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works1 by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts4 ,this difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue3 because the repeated acts by which they are acquired1 remove also the contrary dispositions4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,certain saints are said not to have certain virtues1 in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues1 for the reason stated2 although they have the habits of all the virtues4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,faith and ,hope ,can ,be ,without ,charity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith and hope are never without charity4 ,because1 since they are theological virtues1 they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues4 ,but the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity4 ,neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man believes unwillingly as ,augustine says 7,tract4 xxvi in ,joan474 ,but charity is in the will as a perfection thereof1 as stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore faith cannot be without charity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion viii7 that there can be no hope without love4 ,but love is charity3 for it is of this love that he speaks4 ,therefore hope cannot be without charity4 ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on ,matt4 #a3b says that faith begets hope1 and hope1 charity4 ,now the begetter precedes the begotten1 and can be without it4 ,therefore faith can be without hope2 and hope1 without charity4 ,i answer that1 ,faith and hope1 like the moral virtues1 can be considered in two ways2 first in an inchoate state2 secondly1 as complete virtues4 ,for since virtue is directed to the doing of good works1 perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work1 and this consists in not only doing what is good1 but also in doing it well4 ,else1 if what is done is good1 but not well done1 it will not be perfectly good2 wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act1 have the perfect character of virtue4 ,for instance1 if a man do what is just1 what he does is good3 but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well1 i4e4 by choosing rightly1 which is the result of prudence2 for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence4 ,accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity3 but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity4 ,for1 since the act of faith is to believe in ,god2 and since to believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will3 to will not as one ought1 will not be a perfect act of faith4 ,to will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will3 since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #i74 ,hence faith may be without charity1 but not as a perfect virtue3 just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence4 ,the same applies to hope4 ,because the act of hope consists in looking to ,god for future bliss4 ,this act is perfect1 if it is based on the merits which we have2 and this cannot be without charity4 ,but to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet1 but which one proposes to acquire at some future time1 will be an imperfect act2 and this is possible without charity4 ,consequently1 faith and hope can be without charity2 yet1 without charity1 they are not virtues properly so-called2 because the nature of virtue requires that by it1 we should not only do what is good1 but also that we should do it well 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,moral virtue depends on prudence3 and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity2 for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle1 viz4 the ultimate end4 ,on the other hand faith and hope1 as such1 do not depend either on prudence or charity2 so that they can be without charity1 although they are not virtues without charity1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already2 and this is not without charity4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,charity ,can ,be ,without ,faith and ,hope8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that charity can be without faith and hope4 ,for charity is the love of ,god4 ,but it is possible for us to love ,god naturally1 without already having faith1 or hope in future bliss4 ,therefore charity can be without faith and hope4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 charity is the root of all the virtues1 according to ,eph4 #c3ag3 ,rooted and founded in charity4 ,now the root is sometimes without branches4 ,therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope1 and the other virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there was perfect charity in ,christ4 ,and yet ,he had neither faith nor hope3 because ,he was a perfect comprehensor1 as we shall explain further on 7,,iii1 ,q4 #g1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,therefore charity can be without faith and hope4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aa3f73 ,without faith it is impossible to please ,god2 and this evidently belongs most to charity1 according to ,prov4 #h3ag3 ,i love them that love me4 ,again1 it is by hope that we are brought to charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope4 ,i answer that1 ,charity signifies not only the love of ,god1 but also a certain friendship with ,him2 which implies1 besides love1 a certain mutual return of love1 together with mutual communion1 as stated in ,ethic4 viii1 #b4 ,that this belongs to charity is evident from #a ,john #d3af3 ,he that abideth in charity1 abideth in ,god1 and ,god in him1 and from #a ,cor4 #a3i1 where it is written3 ,god is faithful1 by ,whom you are called unto the fellowship of ,his ,son4 ,now this fellowship of man with ,god1 which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with ,him1 is begun here1 in this life1 by grace1 but will be perfected in the future life1 by glory2 each of which things we hold by faith and hope4 ,wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible1 if one disbelieved in1 or despaired of1 the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy2 so too1 friendship with ,god1 which is charity1 is impossible without faith1 so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with ,god1 and to hope to attain to this fellowship4 ,therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,charity is not any kind of love of ,god1 but that love of ,god1 by which ,he is loved as the object of bliss1 to which object we are directed by faith and hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,charity is the root of faith and hope1 in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue4 ,but faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity1 as stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #d71 and so charity is impossible without them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in ,christ there was neither faith nor hope1 on account of their implying an imperfection4 ,but instead of faith1 ,he had manifest vision1 and instead of hope1 full comprehension 99,see above1 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c3 so that in ,him was perfect charity4 ,,question #ff ,,of ,,equality ,,among ,,the ,,virtues 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider equality among the virtues3 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether one virtue can be greater or less than another8 7#b7 ,whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal8 7#c7 ,of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue2 7#d7 ,of the moral virtues as compared with one another2 7#e7 ,of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another2 7#f7 ,of the theological virtues in comparison with one another4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,one ,virtue ,can ,be ,greater or ,less ,than ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another4 ,for it is written 7,apoc4 #ba3af7 that the sides of the city of ,jerusalem are equal2 and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues4 ,therefore all virtues are equal2 and consequently one cannot be greater than another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing that1 by its nature1 consists in a maximum1 cannot be more or less4 ,now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum1 for virtue is the limit of power1 as the ,philosopher states 7,de ,coelo i1 text4 #aaf72 and ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai7 that virtues are very great boons1 and no one can use them to evil purpose4 ,therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent4 ,but perfect1 viz4 infused virtues1 are from ,god ,whose power is uniform and infinite4 ,therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another4 ,on the contrary1 ,wherever there can be increase and greater abundance1 there can be inequality4 ,now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase3 for it is written 7,matt4 #e3bj73 ,unless your justice abound more than that of the ,scribes and ,pharisees1 you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven3 and 7,prov4 #ae3e73 ,in abundant justice there is the greatest strength 7virtus74 ,therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another4 ,i answer that1 ,when it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another1 the question can be taken in two senses4 ,first1 as applying to virtues of different species4 ,in this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another2 since a cause is always more excellent than its effect2 and among effects1 those nearest to the cause are the most excellent4 ,now it is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #b7 that the cause and root of human good is the reason4 ,hence prudence which perfects the reason1 surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power1 in so far as it partakes of reason4 ,and among these1 one is better than another1 according as it approaches nearer to the reason4 ,consequently justice1 which is in the will1 excels the remaining moral virtues2 and fortitude1 which is in the irascible part1 stands before temperance1 which is in the concupiscible1 which has a smaller share of reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #f4 ,the question can be taken in another way1 as referring to virtues of the same species4 ,in this way1 according to what was said above 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #a71 when we were treating of the intensity of habits1 virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways3 first1 in itself2 secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it4 ,if we consider it in itself1 we shall call it great or little1 according to the things to which it extends4 ,now whosoever has a virtue1 e4g4 temperance1 has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to4 ,but this does not apply to science and art3 for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar4 ,and in this sense the ,stoics said rightly1 as ,simplicius states in his ,commentary on the ,predicaments1 that virtue cannot be more or less1 as science and art can2 because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum4 ,if1 however1 we consider virtue on the part of the subject1 it may then be greater or less1 either in relation to different times1 or in different men4 ,because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason2 and this1 on account of either greater habituation1 or a better natural disposition1 or a more discerning judgment of reason1 or again a greater gift of grace1 which is given to each one according to the measure of the giving of ,christ1 as stated in ,eph4 #d3i4 ,and here the ,stoics erred1 for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous1 unless he were1 in the highest degree1 disposed to virtue4 ,because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point1 as the ,stoics thought2 but it is enough that he should approach the mean1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #f4 ,moreover1 one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another3 as may be seen when several archers aim at a fixed target4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this equality is not one of absolute quantity1 but of proportion3 because all virtues grow in a man proportionately1 as we shall see further on 7,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this limit which belongs to virtue1 can have the character of something more or less good1 in the ways explained above3 since1 as stated1 it is not an indivisible limit4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god does not work by necessity of nature1 but according to the order of ,his wisdom1 whereby ,he bestows on men various measures of virtue1 according to ,eph4 #d3g3 ,to every one of you ,vulg43 'us' is given grace according to the measure of the giving of ,christ4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,all the ,virtues ,that ,are ,together in ,one ,man1 ,are ,equal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #g3g73 ,everyone hath his proper gift from ,god2 one after this manner1 and another after that4 ,now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man1 if ,god infused all the virtues equally into each man4 ,therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man1 it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue1 would surpass him in all the others4 ,but this is clearly not the case3 since various saints are specially praised for different virtues2 e4g4 ,abraham for faith 7,rom4 #d71 ,moses for his meekness 7,num4 #g3c71 ,job for his patience 7,tob4 #b3ab74 ,this is why of each ,confessor the ,church sings3 ,there was not found his like in keeping the law of the most ,high1 99,see ,lesson in the ,mass ,statuit 7,dominican ,missal71 since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other4 ,therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more intense a habit is1 the greater one's pleasure and readiness in making use of it4 ,now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another4 ,therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #d7 that those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance1 and so on4 ,now it would not be so1 unless all the virtues in one man were equal4 ,therefore all virtues are equal in one man4 ,i answer that1 ,as explained above 7,a4 #a71 the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways4 ,first1 as referring to their specific nature3 and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another1 for example1 charity1 than faith and hope4 ,secondly1 it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject1 according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss in its subject4 ,in this sense all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion1 in so far as their growth in man is equal3 thus the fingers are unequal in size1 but equal in proportion1 since they grow in proportion to one another4 ,now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues2 for equality among virtues is their connection as to greatness4 ,now it has been stated above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a7 that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned4 ,the first is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues1 each of which is found together with the other in any matter4 ,in this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal4 ,augustine alludes to this kind of equality 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #d7 when he says3 ,if you say these men are equal in fortitude1 but that one is more prudent than the other2 it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent4 ,consequently they are not really equal in fortitude1 since the former's fortitude is more prudent4 ,you will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way4 ,the other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters 7,q4 #fe1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,in this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence1 and1 as to the infused virtues1 from charity1 and not from the inclination1 which is on the part of the subject1 as stated above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence1 in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues3 for in one and the same man1 so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection1 the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue4 ,but in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues1 viz4 the inclination to the virtuous act1 one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue1 than the act of another virtue1 and this either from nature1 or from habituation1 or again by the grace of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying of the ,apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace1 which are not common to all1 nor are all of them equal in the one same subject4 ,we might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace1 by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man1 on account of his greater abundance of prudence1 or also of charity1 in which all the infused virtues are connected4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one saint is praised chiefly for one virtue1 another saint for another virtue1 on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,third ,objection4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,moral ,virtues ,are ,better ,than the ,intellectual ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual4 ,because that which is more necessary1 and more lasting1 is better4 ,now the moral virtues are more lasting even than the sciences 7,ethic4 i7 which are intellectual virtues3 and1 moreover1 they are more necessary for human life4 ,therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue is defined as that which makes its possessor good4 ,now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue1 and art in respect of intellectual virtue1 except perhaps in respect of prudence alone4 ,therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the end is more excellent than the means4 ,but according to ,ethic4 vi1 #ab1 moral virtue gives right intention of the end2 whereas prudence gives right choice of the means4 ,therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence1 which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters4 ,on the contrary1 ,moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation2 while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #ac4 ,now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation4 ,therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways3 first1 simply2 secondly1 relatively4 ,for nothing hinders something from being better simply1 e4g4 learning than riches1 and yet not better relatively1 i4e4 for one who is in want 99,aristotle1 ,topic4 iii44 ,now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature4 ,accordingly1 a virtue takes its species from its object1 as explained above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence1 speaking simply1 that virtue is more excellent1 which has the more excellent object4 ,now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite3 since the reason apprehends things in the universal1 while the appetite tends to things themselves1 whose being is restricted to the particular4 ,consequently1 speaking simply1 the intellectual virtues1 which perfect the reason1 are more excellent than the moral virtues1 which perfect the appetite4 ,but if we consider virtue in its relation to act1 then moral virtue1 which perfects the appetite1 whose function it is to move the other powers to act1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a71 is more excellent4 ,and since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action1 for it is the perfection of a power1 it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue1 though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits1 simply speaking4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues1 because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community4 ,yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences1 which are necessary and invariable1 are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue1 which are certain particular matters of action4 ,that the moral virtues are more necessary for human life1 proves that they are more excellent1 not simply1 but relatively4 ,indeed1 the speculative intellectual virtues1 from the very fact that they are not referred to something else1 as a useful thing is referred to an end1 are more excellent4 ,the reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason why man is said to be good simply1 in respect of moral virtue1 but not in respect of intellectual virtue1 is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore this argument1 too1 proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means1 but also in appointing the end4 ,now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue2 which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #f2 vi1 #ac4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,justice ,is the ,chief of the ,moral ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues4 ,for it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is due4 ,now the former belongs to liberality1 the latter to justice4 ,therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the chief quality of a thing is1 seemingly1 that in which it is most perfect4 ,now1 according to ,jam4 #a3d1 ,patience hath a perfect work4 ,therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #c4 ,therefore it magnifies even justice4 ,therefore it is greater than justice4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that justice is the most excellent of the virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,a virtue considered in its species may be greater or less1 either simply or relatively4 ,a virtue is said to be greater simply1 whereby a greater rational good shines forth1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,in this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues1 as being most akin to reason4 ,this is made evident by considering its subject and its object3 its subject1 because this is the will1 and the will is the rational appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #a73 its object or matter1 because it is about operations1 whereby man is set in order not only in himself1 but also in regard to another4 ,hence justice is the most excellent of virtues 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,among the other moral virtues1 which are about the passions1 the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason1 so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each4 ,now in things touching man1 the chief of all is life1 on which all other things depend4 ,consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death1 holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions1 but is subordinate to justice4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 #a7 that those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise3 since virtue is a power of doing good4 ,hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others2 because the former1 i4e4 fortitude1 is useful in war1 and the latter1 i4e4 justice1 both in war and in peace4 ,after fortitude comes temperance1 which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life1 in the one individual1 or in the one species1 viz4 in matters of food and of sex4 ,and so these three virtues1 together with prudence1 are called principal virtues1 in excellence also4 ,a virtue is said to be greater relatively1 by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue3 even as substance is more excellent simply than accident3 and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice1 for a man is not liberal in giving1 unless he gives of his own 7,polit4 ii1 #c74 ,hence there could be no liberality apart from justice1 which discerns between meum and tuum3 whereas justice can be without liberality4 ,hence justice is simply greater than liberality1 as being more universal1 and as being its foundation3 while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,patience is said to have a perfect work1 by enduring evils1 wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge1 which is also excluded by justice2 not only hatred1 which is also suppressed by charity2 nor only anger1 which is calmed by gentleness2 but also inordinate sorrow1 which is the root of all the above4 ,wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter4 ,it is not1 however1 more perfect than all the other virtues simply4 ,because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed1 but also fights against it if necessary4 ,hence whoever is brave is patient2 but the converse does not hold1 for patience is a part of fortitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there can be no magnanimity without the other virtues1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #c4 ,hence it is compared to them as their ornament1 so that relatively it is greater than all the others1 but not simply4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,wisdom ,is the ,greatest of the ,intellectual ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues4 ,because the commander is greater than the one commanded4 ,now prudence seems to command wisdom1 for it is stated in ,ethic4 i1 #b that political science1 which belongs to prudence 7,ethic4 vi1 #h71 orders that sciences should be cultivated in states1 and to which of these each individual should devote himself1 and to what extent4 ,since1 then1 wisdom is one of the sciences1 it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness3 because virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best1 as stated in ,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag4 ,now prudence is right reason about things to be done1 whereby man is brought to happiness3 whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts1 whereby man attains happiness4 ,therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more perfect knowledge is1 the greater it seems to be4 ,now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs1 which are the subject of science1 than of ,divine things1 which are the object of wisdom1 which is the distinction given by ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ad73 because ,divine things are incomprehensible1 according to ,job #bf3bf3 ,behold ,god is great1 exceeding our knowledge4 ,therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions4 ,but wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding1 even as other sciences do4 ,therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #g7 that wisdom is the head among the intellectual virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 the greatness of a virtue1 as to its species1 is taken from its object4 ,now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues3 because wisdom considers the ,supreme ,cause1 which is ,god1 as stated at the beginning of the ,metaphysics4 ,and since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect1 and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects2 hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues1 directs them all1 and is the architect of them all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since prudence is about human affairs1 and wisdom about the ,supreme ,cause1 it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom1 unless1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #g1 man were the greatest thing in the world4 ,wherefore we must say1 as stated in the same book 7,ethic4 vi71 that prudence does not command wisdom1 but vice versa3 because the spiritual man judgeth all things2 and he himself is judged by no man 7#a ,cor4 #b3ae74 ,for prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom3 but its command covers things directed to wisdom1 viz4 how men are to obtain wisdom4 ,wherefore prudence1 or political science1 is1 in this way1 the servant of wisdom2 for it leads to wisdom1 preparing the way for her1 as the doorkeeper for the king4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness1 but wisdom considers the very object of happiness1 viz4 the ,supreme ,intelligible4 ,and if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object1 there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom3 but as1 in this life1 the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object1 which is ,god1 it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness1 so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 text4 #a71 one knowledge is preferable to another1 either because it is about a higher object1 or because it is more certain4 ,hence if the objects be equally good and sublime1 that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge4 ,but a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object1 is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,coelo ii1 text4 #fj7 that it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings1 though it be based on weak and probable reasoning2 and again 7,de ,part4 ,animal4 i1 #e7 that it is better to know a little about sublime things1 than much about mean things4 ,accordingly wisdom1 to which knowledge about ,god pertains1 is beyond the reach of man1 especially in this life1 so as to be his possession3 for this belongs to ,god alone 7,metaph4 i1 #b73 and yet this little knowledge about ,god which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms3 for as soon as we know what is a whole1 and what is a part1 we know at once that every whole is greater than its part4 ,now to know the meaning of being and non-being1 of whole and part1 and of other things consequent to being1 which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted1 is the function of wisdom3 since universal being is the proper effect of the ,supreme ,cause1 which is ,god4 ,and so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding1 not only by drawing conclusions from them1 as other sciences do1 but also by passing its judgment on them1 and by vindicating them against those who deny them4 ,hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,charity ,is the ,greatest of the ,theological ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues4 ,because1 since faith is in the intellect1 while hope and charity are in the appetitive power1 it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity1 as intellectual to moral virtue4 ,now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue1 as was made evident above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore faith is greater than hope and charity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 when two things are added together1 the result is greater than either one4 ,now hope results from something added to charity2 for it presupposes love1 as ,augustine says 7,enchiridion viii71 and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved4 ,therefore hope is greater than charity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a cause is more noble than its effect4 ,now faith and hope are the cause of charity3 for a gloss on ,matt4 #a3c says that faith begets hope1 and hope charity4 ,therefore faith and hope are greater than charity4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ac73 ,now there remain faith1 hope1 charity1 these three2 but the greatest of these is charity4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 the greatness of a virtue1 as to its species1 is taken from its object4 ,now1 since the three theological virtues look at ,god as their proper object1 it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object1 but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object2 and in this way charity is greater than the others4 ,because the others1 in their very nature1 imply a certain distance from the object3 since faith is of what is not seen1 and hope is of what is not possessed4 ,but the love of charity is of that which is already possessed3 since the beloved is1 in a manner1 in the lover1 and1 again1 the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved2 hence it is written 7#a ,john #d3af73 ,he that abideth in charity1 abideth in ,god1 and ,god in him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue2 and for two reasons4 ,first1 because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul3 whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man4 ,now in things that are above man1 to love them is more excellent than to know them4 ,because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower3 whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved4 ,now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man3 since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container4 ,but it is the other way about in things beneath man4 ,secondly1 because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues1 whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to ,god1 which movement belongs to the theological virtues3 it only shows the object4 ,and this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge1 according to ,eph4 #c3ai3 ,the charity of ,christ which surpasseth all knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain2 and such love is love of concupiscence1 whereby he who desires good1 loves himself rather than something else4 ,on the other hand1 charity implies love of friendship1 to which we are led by hope1 as stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an efficient cause is more noble than its effect3 but not a disposing cause4 ,for otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul1 to which the heat disposes the matter4 ,it is in this way that faith begets hope1 and hope charity3 in the sense1 to wit1 that one is a disposition to the other4 ,,question #fg ,,of ,,the ,,duration ,,of ,,virtues ,,after ,,this ,,life 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the duration of virtues after this life1 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the moral virtues remain after this life8 7#b7 ,whether the intellectual virtues remain8 7#c7 ,whether faith remains8 7#d7 ,whether hope remains8 7#e7 ,whether anything remains of faith or hope8 7#f7 ,whether charity remains8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,moral ,virtues ,remain ,after ,this ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after this life4 ,for in the future state of glory men will be like angels1 according to ,matt4 #bb3cj4 ,but it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels 99,whatever relates to moral action is petty1 and unworthy of the gods 7,ethic4 x1 #h71 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #h4 ,therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 moral virtues perfect man in the active life4 ,but the active life does not remain after this life3 for ,gregory says 7,moral4 iv1 #ah73 ,the works of the active life pass away from the body4 ,therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 temperance and fortitude1 which are moral virtues1 are in the irrational parts of the soul1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj74 ,now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted1 when the body is corrupted3 since they are acts of bodily organs4 ,therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #a3ae7 that justice is perpetual and immortal4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #i71 ,cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life2 and that1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #i71 in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature1 than which nothing is better or more lovable1 that ,nature1 to wit1 which created all others4 ,afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life1 but after a different manner4 ,in order to make this evident1 we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element1 and a quasi-material element4 ,the material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode3 and since this mode is fixed by reason1 the formal element is precisely this order of reason4 ,accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life1 as regards their material element4 ,for in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex2 nor fear and daring about dangers of death2 nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life4 ,but1 as regards the formal element1 they will remain most perfect1 after this life1 in the ,blessed1 in as much as each one's reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life3 and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason1 in things pertaining to that same state4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #i7 that prudence will be there without any danger of error2 fortitude1 without the anxiety of bearing with evil2 temperance1 without the rebellion of the desires3 so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to ,god2 fortitude will adhere to ,him most steadfastly2 and temperance will delight in ,him ,who knows no imperfection4 ,as to justice1 it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life1 viz4 to be subject to ,god3 because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues1 as to their material element2 thus he speaks of justice1 as regards commutations and distributions2 of fortitude1 as to matters of terror and danger2 of temperance1 in respect of lewd desires4 ,the same applies to the ,second ,objection4 ,for those things that concern the active life1 belong to the material element of the virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is a twofold state after this life2 one before the resurrection1 during which the soul will be separate from the body2 the other1 after the resurrection1 when the souls will be reunited to their bodies4 ,in this state of resurrection1 the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs1 just as they now are4 ,hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible1 and temperance in the concupiscible part1 in so far as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the reason4 ,but in the state preceding the resurrection1 the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually1 but only radically in its essence1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #h74 ,wherefore neither will these virtues be actually1 but only in their root1 i4e4 in the reason and will1 wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a74 ,justice1 however1 will remain because it is in the will4 ,hence of justice it is specially said that it is perpetual and immortal2 both by reason of its subject1 since the will is incorruptible2 and because its act will not change1 as stated4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,intellectual ,virtues ,remain ,after ,this ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3h1 #i7 that knowledge shall be destroyed1 and he states the reason to be because we know in part4 ,now just as the knowledge of science is in part1 i4e4 imperfect2 so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues1 as long as this life lasts4 ,therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,categor4 vi7 that since science is a habit1 it is a quality difficult to remove3 for it is not easily lost1 except by reason of some great change or sickness4 ,but no bodily change is so great as that of death4 ,therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well4 ,now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life1 since the soul understands nothing without a phantasm 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #cj72 and1 after this life1 the phantasms do not remain1 since their only subject is an organ of the body4 ,therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life4 ,on the contrary1 ,the knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things4 ,now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life2 for instance1 the knowledge of what one has done or suffered1 according to ,luke #af3be3 ,son1 remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time1 and likewise ,lazarus evil things4 ,much more1 therefore1 does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain1 which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #f7 some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands2 and that so long as actual consideration ceases1 the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs1 viz4 in the powers of imagination and memory4 ,now these powers cease when the body is corrupted3 and consequently1 according to this opinion1 neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted4 ,but this opinion is contrary to the mind of ,aristotle1 who states 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #h7 that the possible intellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it2 and yet1 even then1 it is in potentiality to consider it actually4 ,it is also contrary to reason1 because intelligible species are contained by the possible intellect immovably1 according to the mode of their container4 ,hence the possible intellect is called the abode of the species 7,de ,anima iii7 because it preserves the intelligible species4 ,and yet the phantasms1 by turning to which man understands in this life1 by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a1 ad #e71 cease as soon as the body is corrupted4 ,hence1 so far as the phantasms are concerned1 which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues1 these latter cease when the body is destroyed3 but as regards the intelligible species1 which are in the possible intellect1 the intellectual virtues remain4 ,now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues4 ,therefore these remain after this life1 as regards their formal element1 just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues 7,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the saying of the ,apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science1 and to the mode of understanding2 because1 to it1 neither do the phantasms remain1 when the body is destroyed2 nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element1 viz4 the phantasms1 but not as to the intelligible species1 which are in the possible intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #a71 the separated soul has a mode of understanding1 other than by turning to the phantasms4 ,consequently science remains1 yet not as to the same mode of operation2 as we have stated concerning the moral virtues 7,a4 #a74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,faith ,remains ,after ,this ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that faith remains after this life4 ,because faith is more excellent than science4 ,now science remains after this life1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore faith remains also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7#a ,cor4 #c3aa73 ,other foundation no man can lay1 but that which is laid2 which is ,christ ,jesus1 i4e4 faith in ,jesus ,christ4 ,now if the foundation is removed1 that which is built upon it remains no more4 ,therefore1 if faith remains not after this life1 no other virtue remains4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect4 ,now imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowledge3 thus in an angel there can be evening and morning knowledge 99,cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #f2 and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism1 together with opinion through a probable syllogism1 about one same conclusion4 ,therefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge of glory4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #e3f1 #g73 ,while we are in the body1 we are absent from the ,lord3 for we walk by faith and not by sight4 ,but those who are in glory are not absent from the ,lord1 but present to ,him4 ,therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory4 ,i answer that1 ,opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another1 in so far1 to wit1 as wherever two things are opposite to one another1 we find opposition of affirmation and negation4 ,now in some things we find opposition in respect of contrary forms2 thus in colors we find white and black4 ,in others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection3 wherefore in alterations1 more and less are considered to be contraries1 as when a thing from being less hot is made more hot 7,phys4 v1 text4 #ai74 ,and since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another1 it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time4 ,now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing's very nature1 and belongs to its species3 even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox4 ,and since a thing1 so long as it remains the same identically1 cannot pass from one species to another1 it follows that if such an imperfection be removed1 the species of that thing is changed3 even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse1 were it to be rational4 ,sometimes1 however1 the imperfection does not belong to the specific nature1 but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else2 even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man1 because he is asleep1 or because he is drunk1 or for some like reason2 and it is evident1 that if such an imperfection be removed1 the thing remains substantially4 ,now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith3 for it is included in its definition2 faith being defined as the substance of things to be hoped for1 the evidence of things that appear not 7,heb4 #aa3a74 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,tract4 xl in ,joan473 ,what is faith8 ,believing without seeing4 ,but it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen4 ,consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith3 therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same4 ,but we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge3 for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge4 ,accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways3 first1 on the part of the knowable object2 secondly1 on the part of the medium2 thirdly1 on the part of the subject4 ,the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the morning and evening knowledge of the angels3 for the morning knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the ,word1 while the evening knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures1 which being is imperfect in comparison with the ,first ,being4 ,on the part of the medium1 perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium1 and through a probable medium4 ,on the part of the subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion1 faith1 and science4 ,for it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other1 so that our adhesion is not firm3 to science it is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision1 for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of principles3 while faith holds a middle place1 for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm1 but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision4 ,now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect2 yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing4 ,accordingly1 knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object2 but they are compatible with one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject3 for nothing hinders a man from having at one and the same time1 through one and the same medium1 perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things1 one perfect1 the other imperfect1 e4g4 about health and sickness1 good and evil4 ,in like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium3 but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the same subject3 for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium4 ,again1 knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject4 ,now faith1 of its very nature1 contains an imperfection on the part of the subject1 viz4 that the believer sees not what he believes3 whereas bliss1 of its very nature1 implies perfection on the part of the subject1 viz4 that the ,blessed see that which makes them happy1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h74 ,hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one and the same subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,faith is more excellent than science1 on the part of the object1 because its object is the ,first ,truth4 ,yet science has a more perfect mode of knowing its object1 which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness1 as the mode of faith is incompatible4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge3 consequently when this knowledge is perfected1 the foundation will be perfected also4 ,the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is clear from what has been said4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,hope ,remains ,after ,death1 in the ,state of ,glory8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that hope remains after death1 in the state of glory4 ,because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues4 ,but the moral virtues remain after this life1 as ,augustine clearly states 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #i74 ,much more then does hope remain4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fear is opposed to hope4 ,but fear remains after this life3 in the ,blessed1 filial fear1 which abides for ever--in the lost1 the fear of punishment4 ,therefore1 in a like manner1 hope can remain4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as hope is of future good1 so is desire4 ,now in the ,blessed there is desire for future good2 both for the glory of the body1 which the souls of the ,blessed desire1 as ,augustine declares 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ce72 and for the glory of the soul1 according to ,ecclus4 #bd3bi3 ,they that eat me1 shall yet hunger1 and they that drink me1 shall yet thirst1 and #a ,pet4 #a3ab3 ,on ,whom the angels desire to look4 ,therefore it seems that there can be hope in the ,blessed after this life is past4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3bd73 ,what a man seeth1 why doth he hope for8 ,but the ,blessed see that which is the object of hope1 viz4 ,god4 ,therefore they do not hope4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 that which1 in its very nature1 implies imperfection of its subject1 is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that subject4 ,thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject1 since it is the act of that which is in potentiality as such 7,phys4 iii73 so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act1 the movement ceases2 for a thing does not continue to become white1 when once it is made white4 ,now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed1 as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope 7,q4 #dj1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore when we possess that which we hope for1 viz4 the enjoyment of ,god1 it will no longer be possible to have hope4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object1 which is ,god4 ,but the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of happiness1 as the act of hope is2 except perhaps1 as regards their matter1 in respect of which they do not remain4 ,for moral virtue perfects the appetite1 not only in respect of what is not yet possessed1 but also as regards something which is in our actual possession4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fear is twofold1 servile and filial1 as we shall state further on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #b74 ,servile fear regards punishment1 and will be impossible in the life of glory1 since there will no longer be possibility of being punished4 ,filial fear has two acts3 one is an act of reverence to ,god1 and with regard to this act1 it remains3 the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from ,god1 and as regards this act1 it does not remain4 ,because separation from ,god is in the nature of an evil3 and no evil will be feared there1 according to ,prov4 #a3cc3 ,he 4 4 4 shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils4 ,now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a71 and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope4 ,in the lost there can be fear of punishment1 rather than hope of glory in the ,blessed4 ,because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments1 so that the notion of something future remains there1 which is the object of fear3 but the glory of the saints has no succession1 by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity1 wherein there is neither past nor future1 but only the present4 ,and yet1 properly speaking1 neither in the lost is there fear4 ,for1 as stated above 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #b71 fear is never without some hope of escape3 and the lost have no such hope4 ,consequently neither will there be fear in them2 except speaking in a general way1 in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as to the glory of the soul1 there can be no desire in the ,blessed1 in so far as desire looks for something future1 for the reason already given 7ad #b74 ,yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary1 and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels4 ,with regard to the glory of the body1 there can be desire in the souls of the saints1 but not hope1 properly speaking2 neither as a theological virtue1 for thus its object is ,god1 and not a created good2 nor in its general signification4 ,because the object of hope is something difficult1 as stated above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a73 while a good whose unerring cause we already possess1 is not compared to us as something difficult4 ,hence he that has money is not1 properly speaking1 said to hope for what he can buy at once4 ,in like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not1 properly speaking1 said to hope for the glory of the body1 but only to desire it4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,anything of ,faith or ,hope ,remains in ,glory8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory4 ,for when that which is proper to a thing is removed1 there remains what is common2 thus it is stated in ,de ,causis that if you take away rational1 there remains living1 and when you remove living1 there remains being4 ,now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude1 viz4 knowledge3 and there is something proper to it1 viz4 darkness1 for faith is knowledge in a dark manner4 ,therefore1 the darkness of faith removed1 the knowledge of faith still remains4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 faith is a spiritual light of the soul1 according to ,eph4 #a3ag1 #ah3 ,the eyes of your heart enlightened 4 4 4 in the knowledge of ,god2 yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of glory1 of which it is written 7,ps4 #ce3aj73 ,in ,thy light we shall see light4 ,now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes3 for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays appear4 ,therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter3 for a man may retain the habit of liberality1 though he have lost his money3 yet he cannot exercise the act4 ,now the object of faith is the ,first ,truth as unseen4 ,therefore when this ceases through being seen1 the habit of faith can still remain4 ,on the contrary1 ,faith is a simple habit4 ,now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely1 or remains entirely4 ,since therefore faith does not remain entirely1 but is taken away as stated above 7,a4 #c71 it seems that it is withdrawn entirely4 ,i answer that1 ,some have held that hope is taken away entirely3 but that faith is taken away in part1 viz4 as to its obscurity1 and remains in part1 viz4 as to the substance of its knowledge4 ,and if this be understood to mean that it remains the same1 not identically but generically1 it is absolutely true2 since faith is of the same genus1 viz4 knowledge1 as the beatific vision4 ,on the other hand1 hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss3 because it is compared to the enjoyment of bliss1 as movement is to rest in the term of movement4 ,but if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same1 this is absolutely impossible4 ,because when you remove a specific difference1 the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same3 thus if you remove the difference constituting whiteness1 the substance of color does not remain identically the same1 as though the identical color were at one time whiteness1 and1 at another1 blackness4 ,the reason is that genus is not related to difference as matter to form1 so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same1 when the difference is removed1 as the substance of matter remains identically the same1 when the form is changed3 for genus and difference are not the parts of a species1 else they would not be predicated of the species4 ,but even as the species denotes the whole1 i4e4 the compound of matter and form in material things1 so does the difference1 and likewise the genus2 the genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is material2 the difference1 by signifying that which is formal2 the species1 by signifying both4 ,thus1 in man1 the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature1 and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature1 rational of that which has an intellectual nature1 and man of that which has both4 ,so that the one same whole is denoted by these three1 but not under the same aspect4 ,it is therefore evident that1 since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed1 the substance of the genus cannot remain the same3 for the same animal nature does not remain1 if another kind of soul constitute the animal4 ,hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge1 which was previously obscure1 to become clear vision4 ,it is therefore evident that1 in heaven1 nothing remains of faith1 either identically or specifically the same1 but only generically4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if rational be withdrawn1 the remaining living thing is the same1 not identically1 but generically1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight1 since they do not regard the same subject3 whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject4 ,consequently they are incompatible with one another1 just as light and darkness in the air4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money1 and therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to remain4 ,but in the state of glory not only is the object of faith1 which is the unseen1 removed actually1 but even its possibility1 by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss3 and so such a habit would remain to no purpose4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,charity ,remains ,after ,this ,life1 in ,glory8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that charity does not remain after this life1 in glory4 ,because according to #a ,cor4 #ac3aj1 when that which is perfect is come1 that which is in part1 i4e4 that which is imperfect1 shall be done away4 ,now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect4 ,therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 habits and acts are differentiated by their objects4 ,but the object of love is good apprehended4 ,since therefore the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come1 it seems that charity is not the same in both cases4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase4 ,but the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven1 however much it be increased4 ,therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3h73 ,charity never falleth away4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature1 there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection1 even as man is perfected by growth1 and whiteness by intensity4 ,now charity is love1 the nature of which does not include imperfection1 since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed1 either seen or not seen4 ,therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory1 but remains identically the same4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the imperfection of charity is accidental to it2 because imperfection is not included in the nature of love4 ,now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn1 the substance remains4 ,hence the imperfection of charity being done away1 charity itself is not done away4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object of charity is not knowledge itself2 if it were1 the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of heaven3 its object is the thing known1 which remains the same1 viz4 ,god ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven1 is a difference on the part of the cause3 for vision is a cause of love1 as stated in ,ethic4 ix1 #e3 and the more perfectly we know ,god1 the more perfectly we love ,him4 ,,question #fh ,,of ,,the ,,gifts 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we now come to consider the ,gifts2 under which head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ,gifts differ from the virtues8 7#b7 ,of the necessity of the ,gifts8 7#c7 ,whether the ,gifts are habits8 7#d7 ,which1 and how many are they8 7#e7 ,whether the ,gifts are connected8 7#f7 ,whether they remain in heaven8 7#g7 ,of their comparison with one another2 7#h7 ,of their comparison with the virtues4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,gifts ,differ from the ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues4 ,for ,gregory commenting on ,job #a3b1 ,there were born to him seven sons1 says 7,moral4 i1 #ab73 ,seven sons were born to us1 when through the conception of heavenly thought1 the seven virtues of the ,holy ,ghost take birth in us3 and he quotes the words of ,isa4 #aa3b1 #c3 ,and the ,spirit 4 4 4 of understanding 4 4 4 shall rest upon him1 etc4 where the seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are enumerated4 ,therefore the seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are virtues4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine commenting on ,matt4 #ab3de1 ,then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits1 etc41 says 7,de ,quaest4 ,evang4 i1 qu4 #h73 ,the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the ,holy ,ghost1 i4e4 to the seven gifts4 ,now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues1 commonly so called4 ,therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things whose definitions are the same1 are themselves the same4 ,but the definition of virtue applies to the gifts2 for each gift is a good quality of the mind1 whereby we lead a good life1 etc4 99,cf4 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d4 ,likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues3 for a gift is an unreturnable giving1 according to the ,philosopher 7,topic4 iv1 #d74 ,therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another4 ,obj4 #d3 ,several of the things mentioned among the gifts1 are virtues3 for1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #b71 wisdom1 understanding1 and knowledge are intellectual virtues1 counsel pertains to prudence1 piety to a kind of justice1 and fortitude is a moral virtue4 ,therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 i1 #ab7 distinguishes seven gifts1 which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of ,job1 from the three theological virtues1 which1 he says1 are signified by ,job's three daughters4 ,he also distinguishes 7,moral4 ii1 #bf7 the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues1 which he says were signified by the four corners of the house4 ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves1 there is no opposition between them4 ,because the word virtue conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing1 while the word gift refers to the cause from which it proceeds4 ,now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing3 especially as we have already stated 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #c7 that some virtues are infused into us by ,god4 ,wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues4 ,consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues4 ,but there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve2 for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not2 and why among the gifts there are some1 fear1 for instance1 that are not reckoned virtues4 ,hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues2 yet they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction1 a reason1 to wit1 which would apply either to all the virtues1 and to none of the gifts1 or vice versa4 ,for1 seeing that of the seven gifts1 four belong to the reason1 viz4 wisdom1 knowledge1 understanding and counsel1 and three to the appetite1 viz4 fortitude1 piety and fear2 they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason1 while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will3 since they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect1 viz4 faith and prudence1 the others being in the appetitive power or the affections4 ,if this distinction were true1 all the virtues would have to be in the appetite1 and all the gifts in the reason4 ,others observing that ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #bf7 that the gift of the ,holy ,ghost1 by coming into the soul endows it with prudence1 temperance1 justice1 and fortitude1 and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by ,his sevenfold gift1 said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works1 and the gifts1 that we may resist temptation4 ,but neither is this distinction sufficient4 ,because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues2 for everything naturally resists its contrary3 which is especially clear with regard to charity1 of which it is written 7,cant4 #h3g73 ,many waters cannot quench charity4 ,others again1 seeing that these gifts are set down in ,holy ,writ as having been in ,christ1 according to ,isa4 #aa3b1 #c1 said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works1 but the gifts1 in order to conform us to ,christ1 chiefly with regard to ,his ,passion1 for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor4 ,yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction4 ,because ,our ,lord ,himself wished us to be conformed to ,him1 chiefly in humility and meekness1 according to ,matt4 #aa3bi3 ,learn of ,me1 because ,i am meek and humble of heart1 and in charity1 according to ,john #ae3ab3 ,love one another1 as ,i have loved you4 ,moreover1 these virtues were especially resplendent in ,christ's ,passion4 ,accordingly1 in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues1 we must be guided by the way in which ,scripture expresses itself1 for we find there that the term employed is spirit rather than gift4 ,for thus it is written 7,isa4 #aa3b1 #c73 ,the spirit 4 4 4 of wisdom and of understanding 4 4 4 shall rest upon him1 etc43 from which words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by ,divine inspiration4 ,now inspiration denotes motion from without4 ,for it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement1 one within him1 viz4 the reason2 the other extrinsic to him1 viz4 ,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f73 moreover the ,philosopher says this in the chapter ,on ,good ,fortune 7,ethic4 ,eudem4 vii1 #h74 ,now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover3 and the perfection of the mobile as such1 consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover4 ,hence the more exalted the mover1 the more perfect must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover3 thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master4 ,now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions4 ,consequently man needs yet higher perfections1 whereby to be disposed to be moved by ,god4 ,these perfections are called gifts1 not only because they are infused by ,god1 but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the ,divine inspiration1 according to ,isa4 #ej3e3 ,the ,lord 4 4 4 hath opened my ear1 and ,i do not resist2 ,i have not gone back4 ,even the ,philosopher says in the chapter ,on ,good ,fortune 7,ethic4 ,eudem41 vii1 #h7 that for those who are moved by ,divine instinct1 there is no need to take counsel according to human reason1 but only to follow their inner promptings1 since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason4 ,this then is what some say1 viz4 that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sometimes these gifts are called virtues1 in the broad sense of the word4 ,nevertheless1 they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way1 in so far as they are ,divine virtues1 perfecting man as moved by ,god4 ,hence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #a7 above virtue commonly so called1 places a kind of heroic or divine virtue 99arete heroike kai theia1 in respect of which some men are called divine4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the vices are opposed to the virtues1 in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason2 but they are opposed to the gifts1 in as much as they are opposed to the ,divine instinct4 ,for the same thing is opposed both to ,god and to reason1 whose light flows from ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense4 ,consequently1 if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts1 we must explain the words1 whereby we lead a good life as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason4 ,likewise the gifts1 as distinct from infused virtue1 may be defined as something given by ,god in relation to ,his motion2 something1 to wit1 that makes man to follow well the promptings of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,wisdom is called an intellectual virtue1 so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason3 but it is called a gift1 according as its work proceeds from the ,divine prompting4 ,the same applies to the other virtues4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,gifts ,are ,necessary to ,man for ,salvation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation4 ,because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue4 ,now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue2 because such perfection falls1 not under the precept1 but under a counsel4 ,therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is enough1 for man's salvation1 that he behave well in matters concerning ,god and matters concerning man4 ,now man's behavior to ,god is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues2 and his behavior towards men1 by the moral virtues4 ,therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #bf7 that the ,holy ,ghost gives wisdom against folly1 understanding against dullness1 counsel against rashness1 fortitude against fears1 knowledge against ignorance1 piety against hardness of our heart1 and fear against pride4 ,but a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues4 ,therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation4 ,on the contrary1 ,of all the gifts1 wisdom seems to be the highest1 and fear the lowest4 ,now each of these is necessary for salvation3 since of wisdom it is written 7,wis4 #g3bh73 ,god loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom2 and of fear 7,ecclus4 #a3bh73 ,he that is without fear cannot be justified4 ,therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary for salvation4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the gifts are perfections of man1 whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of ,god4 ,wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient1 and there is need for the prompting of the ,holy ,ghost1 there is1 in consequence1 need for a gift4 ,now man's reason is perfected by ,god in two ways3 first1 with its natural perfection1 to wit1 the natural light of reason2 secondly1 with a supernatural perfection1 to wit1 the theological virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #a74 ,and1 though this latter perfection is greater than the former1 yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter3 because man has the former in his full possession1 whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly1 since we love and know ,god imperfectly4 ,now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly1 can of itself work according to them3 not1 however1 excluding the operation of ,god1 ,who works inwardly in every nature and in every will4 ,on the other hand1 that which has a nature1 or form1 or virtue imperfectly1 cannot of itself work1 unless it be moved by another4 ,thus the sun which possesses light perfectly1 can shine by itself2 whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly1 sheds only a borrowed light4 ,again1 a physician1 who knows the medical art perfectly1 can work by himself2 but his pupil1 who is not yet fully instructed1 cannot work by himself1 but needs to receive instructions from him4 ,accordingly1 in matters subject to human reason1 and directed to man's connatural end1 man can work through the judgment of his reason4 ,if1 however1 even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from ,god1 this will be out of ,god's superabundant goodness3 hence1 according to the philosophers1 not every one that had the acquired moral virtues1 had also the heroic or divine virtues4 ,but in matters directed to the supernatural end1 to which man's reason moves him1 according as it is1 in a manner1 and imperfectly1 informed by the theological virtues1 the motion of reason does not suffice1 unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the ,holy ,ghost1 according to ,rom4 #h3ad1 #ag3 ,whosoever are led by the ,spirit of ,god1 they are sons of ,god 4 4 4 and if sons1 heirs also3 and ,ps4 #adb3aj3 ,thy good ,spirit shall lead me into the right land1 because1 to wit1 none can receive the inheritance of that land of the ,blessed1 except he be moved and led thither by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore1 in order to accomplish this end1 it is necessary for man to have the gift of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues1 not as regards the kind of works 7as the counsels surpass the commandments71 but as regards the manner of working1 in respect of man being moved by a higher principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the theological and moral virtues1 man is not so perfected in respect of his last end1 as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the ,holy ,ghost1 for the reason already given4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection1 or as perfected by the theological virtues1 it does not know all things1 nor all possible things4 ,consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection4 ,god1 however1 to ,whose knowledge and power all things are subject1 by ,his motion safeguards us from all folly1 ignorance1 dullness of mind and hardness of heart1 and the rest4 ,consequently the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 which make us amenable to ,his promptings1 are said to be given as remedies to these defects4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,gifts of the ,holy ,ghost ,are ,habits8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are not habits4 ,because a habit is a quality abiding in man1 being defined as a quality difficult to remove1 as stated in the ,predicaments 7,categor4 vi74 ,now it is proper to ,christ that the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost rest in ,him1 as stated in ,isa4 #aa3b1 #c3 ,he upon ,whom thou shalt see the ,spirit descending and remaining upon ,him1 ,he it is that baptizeth2 on which words ,gregory comments as follows 7,moral4 ii1 #bg73 ,the ,holy ,ghost comes upon all the faithful2 but1 in a singular way1 ,he dwells always in the ,mediator4 ,therefore the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are not habits4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the ,spirit of ,god1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but in so far as man is moved by the ,spirit of ,god1 he is somewhat like an instrument in ,his regard4 ,now to be perfected by a habit is befitting1 not an instrument1 but a principal agent4 ,therefore the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are not habits4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are due to ,divine inspiration1 so is the gift of prophecy4 ,now prophecy is not a habit3 for the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets1 as ,gregory states 7,hom4 i in ,ezechiel74 ,neither1 therefore1 are the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord in speaking of the ,holy ,ghost said to ,his disciples 7,john #ad3ag73 ,he shall abide with you1 and shall be in you4 ,now the ,holy ,ghost is not in a man without ,his gifts4 ,therefore ,his gifts abide in man4 ,therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the gifts are perfections of man1 whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,now it is evident from what has been already said 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b71 that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason1 in so far1 to wit1 as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason4 ,accordingly the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 as compared with the ,holy ,ghost ,himself1 are related to man1 even as the moral virtues1 in comparison with the reason1 are related to the appetitive power4 ,now the moral virtues are habits1 whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly4 ,therefore the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory solves this objection 7,moral4 ii1 #bg7 by saying that by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life1 the ,holy ,ghost ever abides in all the elect1 but not by ,his other gifts4 ,now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore1 with regard to them1 the ,holy ,ghost ever abides in holy men4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument holds1 in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action1 but only of being acted upon4 ,but man is not an instrument of that kind2 for he is so acted upon1 by the ,holy ,ghost1 that he also acts himself1 in so far as he has a free-will4 ,therefore he needs a habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the ,spirit1 not for the necessity of salvation3 hence the comparison fails4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,seven ,gifts of the ,holy ,ghost ,are ,suitably ,enumerated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are unsuitably enumerated4 ,for in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues1 viz4 wisdom1 understanding1 knowledge1 and counsel1 which corresponds to prudence2 whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art1 which is the fifth intellectual virtue4 ,moreover1 something is included corresponding to justice1 viz4 piety1 and something corresponding to fortitude1 viz4 the gift of fortitude2 while there is nothing to correspond to temperance4 ,therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 piety is a part of justice4 ,but no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto1 but fortitude itself4 ,therefore justice itself1 and not piety1 ought to have been set down4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the theological virtues1 more than any1 direct us to ,god4 ,since1 then1 the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by ,god1 it seems that some gifts1 corresponding to the theological virtues1 should have been included4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 even as ,god is an object of fear1 so is ,he of love1 of hope1 and of joy4 ,now love1 hope1 and joy are passions condivided with fear4 ,therefore1 as fear is set down as a gift1 so ought the other three4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 wisdom is added in order to direct understanding2 counsel1 to direct fortitude2 knowledge1 to direct piety4 ,therefore1 some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear4 ,therefore the seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are unsuitably enumerated4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of ,holy ,writ 7,isa4 #aa3b1 #c74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the ,holy ,ghost1 even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason4 ,now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason1 so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of ,god1 as by a superior power4 ,therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions1 can also be the subjects of gifts1 even as they are virtues2 and such powers are the reason and appetite4 ,now the reason is speculative and practical3 and in both we find the apprehension of truth 7which pertains to the discovery of truth71 and judgment concerning the truth4 ,accordingly1 for the apprehension of truth1 the speculative reason is perfected by understanding2 the practical reason1 by counsel4 ,in order to judge aright1 the speculative reason is perfected by wisdom2 the practical reason by knowledge4 ,the appetitive power1 in matters touching a man's relations to another1 is perfected by piety2 in matters touching himself1 it is perfected by fortitude against the fear of dangers2 and against inordinate lust for pleasures1 by fear1 according to ,prov4 #ae3bg3 ,by the fear of the ,lord every one declineth from evil1 and ,ps4 #aah3abj3 ,pierce ,thou my flesh with ,thy fear3 for ,i am afraid of ,thy judgments4 ,hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues1 both intellectual and moral1 extend4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life3 whereas art is not directed to such matters1 but to external things that can be made1 since art is the right reason1 not about things to be done1 but about things to be made 7,ethic4 vi1 #d74 ,however1 we may say that1 as regards the infusion of the gifts1 the art is on the part of the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is the principal mover1 and not on the part of men1 who are ,his organs when ,he moves them4 ,the gift of fear corresponds1 in a manner1 to temperance3 for just as it belongs to temperance1 properly speaking1 to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason1 so does it belong to the gift of fear1 to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason1 and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift4 ,but the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country4 ,and since ,god is the ,father of all1 the worship of ,god is also called piety1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #a74 ,therefore the gift whereby a man1 through reverence for ,god1 works good to all1 is fittingly called piety4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the mind of man is not moved by the ,holy ,ghost1 unless in some way it be united to ,him3 even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman1 unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them4 ,now the primal union of man with ,god is by faith1 hope and charity3 and1 consequently1 these virtues are presupposed to the gifts1 as being their roots4 ,therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues1 as being derived therefrom4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,love1 hope and joy have good for their object4 ,now ,god is the ,sovereign ,good3 wherefore the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to ,god4 ,on the other hand1 the object of fear is evil1 which can nowise apply to ,god3 hence fear does not denote union with ,god1 but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for ,god4 ,hence it does not give its name to a theological virtue1 but to a gift1 which withdraws us from evil1 for higher motives than moral virtue does4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man4 ,hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing principle2 on the part of the intellect1 the gift of understanding2 on the part of the affections1 the gift of fear4 ,because the principal reason for fearing ,god is taken from a consideration of the ,divine excellence1 which wisdom considers4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,gifts of the ,holy ,ghost ,are ,connected8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gifts are not connected1 for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ab3h73 ,to one 4 4 4 by the ,spirit1 is given the word of wisdom1 and to another1 the word of knowledge1 according to the same ,spirit4 ,now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are given to divers men1 and are not connected together in the same man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #a7 that many of the faithful have not knowledge1 though they have faith4 ,but some of the gifts1 at least the gift of fear1 accompany faith4 ,therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 i7 that wisdom is of small account if it lack understanding1 and understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom 4 4 4 ,counsel is worthless1 when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto 4 4 4 and fortitude is very weak if it be not supported by counsel 4 4 4 ,knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety 4 4 4 and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge 4 4 4 and assuredly1 unless it has these virtues with it1 fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action3 from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without another4 ,therefore the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are not connected4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory prefaces the passage above quoted1 with the following remark3 ,it is worthy of note in this feast of ,job's sons1 that by turns they fed one another4 ,now the sons of ,job1 of whom he is speaking1 denote the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are connected together by strengthening one another4 ,i answer that1 ,the true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down4 ,for it has been stated 7,a4 #c7 that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason1 so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,now the ,holy ,ghost dwells in us by charity1 according to ,rom4 #e3e3 ,the charity of ,god is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is given to us1 even as our reason is perfected by prudence4 ,wherefore1 just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence1 so the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are connected together in charity3 so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 none of which can one possess without charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces1 in so far1 to wit1 as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things ,divine and human1 that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever4 ,it is in this sense that the ,apostle speaks1 in this passage1 about wisdom and knowledge3 hence he mentions pointedly the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge4 ,they may be taken in another way for the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost3 and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind1 rendering it amenable to the promptings of the ,holy ,ghost in the knowledge of things ,divine and human4 ,consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine is speaking there of knowledge1 while expounding the passage of the ,apostle quoted above 7,obj4 #a73 hence he is referring to knowledge1 in the sense already explained1 as a gratuitous grace4 ,this is clear from the context which follows3 ,for it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life1 which is no other than eternal life2 and another1 to know how to impart this to godly souls1 and to defend it against the ungodly1 which latter the ,apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is1 in a manner1 perfected by another1 as stated above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a72 so ,gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts1 in the same way1 from the fact that one cannot be perfect without the other4 ,hence he had already observed that each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute1 unless one virtue lend its support to another4 ,we are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another2 but that if understanding were without wisdom1 it would not be a gift2 even as temperance1 without justice1 would not be a virtue4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,gifts of the ,holy ,ghost ,remain in ,heaven8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost do not remain in heaven4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #bf7 that by means of ,his sevenfold gift the ,holy ,ghost instructs the mind against all temptations4 ,now there will be no temptations in heaven1 according to ,isa4 #aa3i3 ,they shall not hurt1 nor shall they kill in all ,my holy mountain4 ,therefore there will be no gifts of the ,holy ,ghost in heaven4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost are habits1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but habits are of no use1 where their acts are impossible4 ,now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven2 for ,gregory says 7,moral4 i1 #ae7 that understanding 4 4 4 penetrates the truths heard 4 4 4 counsel 4 4 4 stays us from acting rashly 4 4 4 fortitude 4 4 4 has no fear of adversity 4 4 4 piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy1 all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state4 ,therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life1 e4g4 wisdom and understanding3 and some in the active life1 e4g4 piety and fortitude4 ,now the active life ends with this as ,gregory states 7,moral4 vi74 ,therefore not all the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost will be in the state of glory4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,spiritu ,sancto i1 #bj73 ,the city of ,god1 the heavenly ,jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly river3 it is the ,holy ,ghost1 of ,whose outpouring we but taste1 ,who1 proceeding from the ,fount of life1 seems to flow more abundantly in those celestial spirits1 a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,we may speak of the gifts in two ways3 first1 as to their essence2 and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven1 as may be gathered from the passage of ,ambrose1 just quoted4 ,the reason for this is that the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost render the human mind amenable to the motion of the ,holy ,ghost3 which will be especially realized in heaven1 where ,god will be all in all 7#a ,cor4 #ae3bh71 and man entirely subject unto ,him4 ,secondly1 they may be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are3 and thus1 in the present life they have an operation about a matter1 in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory4 ,considered in this way1 they will not remain in the state of glory2 just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues 7,q4 #fg1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state3 for it is thus that they afford us protection against evil temptations4 ,but in the state of glory1 where all evil will have ceased1 we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,gregory1 in almost every gift1 includes something that passes away with the present state1 and something that remains in the future state4 ,for he says that wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things2 of which two1 hope passes1 and certainty remains4 ,of understanding1 he says that it penetrates the truths heard1 refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness1 of which1 hearing passes away1 since they shall teach no more every man 4 4 4 his brother 7,jer4 #ca3c1 #d72 but the enlightening of the mind remains4 ,of counsel he says that it prevents us from being impetuous1 which is necessary in the present life2 and also that it makes the mind full of reason1 which is necessary even in the future state4 ,of fortitude he says that it fears not adversity1 which is necessary in the present life2 and further1 that it sets before us the viands of confidence1 which remains also in the future life4 ,with regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing1 viz4 that she overcomes the void of ignorance1 which refers to the present state4 ,when1 however1 he adds in the womb of the mind1 this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge1 which belongs to the future state4 ,of piety he says that it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy4 ,these words taken literally refer only to the present state3 yet the inward regard for our neighbor1 signified by the inmost heart1 belongs also to the future state1 when piety will achieve1 not works of mercy1 but fellowship of joy4 ,of fear he says that it oppresses the mind1 lest it pride itself in present things1 which refers to the present state1 and that it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future1 which also belongs to the present state1 as regards hope1 but may also refer to the future state1 as regards being strengthened for things we hope are here1 and obtain there4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers the gifts as to their matter4 ,for the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life2 but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life1 which is the life of heavenly bliss4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,gifts ,are ,set ,down by ,isaias in ,their ,order of ,dignity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gifts are not set down by ,isaias in their order of dignity4 ,for the principal gift is1 seemingly1 that which1 more than the others1 ,god requires of man4 ,now ,god requires of man fear1 more than the other gifts3 for it is written 7,deut4 #aj3ab73 ,and now1 ,israel1 what doth the ,lord thy ,god require of thee1 but that thou fear the ,lord thy ,god8 and 7,malachi #a3f73 ,if 4 4 4 ,i be a master1 where is ,my fear8 ,therefore it seems that fear1 which is mentioned last1 is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 piety seems to be a kind of common good2 since the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #d3h73 ,piety ,douay3 ',godliness' is profitable to all things4 ,now a common good is preferable to particular goods4 ,therefore piety1 which is given the last place but one1 seems to be the most excellent gift4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 knowledge perfects man's judgment1 while counsel pertains to inquiry4 ,but judgment is more excellent than inquiry4 ,therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel2 and yet it is set down as being below it4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 fortitude pertains to the appetitive power1 while science belongs to reason4 ,but reason is a more excellent power than the appetite4 ,therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude2 and yet the latter is given the precedence4 ,therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 99,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d3 ,it seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the ,holy ,ghost1 of which ,isaias speaks1 agrees in degrees and expression with these 7of which we read in ,matt4 #e3c73 but there is a difference of order1 for there 7viz4 in ,isaias7 the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts1 here1 with the lower gifts4 ,i answer that1 ,the excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways3 first1 simply1 viz4 by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from their principles2 secondly1 relatively1 viz4 by comparison to their matter4 ,if we consider the excellence of the gifts simply1 they follow the same rule as the virtues1 as to their comparison one with another2 because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul's powers1 even as the virtues do1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,hence1 as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues1 and among the intellectual virtues1 the contemplative are preferable to the active1 viz4 wisdom1 understanding and science to prudence and art 7yet so that wisdom stands before understanding1 and understanding before science1 and prudence and synesis before eubulia73 so also among the gifts1 wisdom1 understanding1 knowledge1 and counsel are more excellent than piety1 fortitude1 and fear2 and among the latter1 piety excels fortitude1 and fortitude fear1 even as justice surpasses fortitude1 and fortitude temperance4 ,but in regard to their matter1 fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety3 because fortitude and counsel are concerned with difficult matters1 whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters4 ,consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated2 but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the others1 their excellence is considered simply1 while1 so far1 as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety1 it is considered with regard to their matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fear is chiefly required as being the foundation1 so to speak1 of the perfection of the other gifts1 for the fear of the ,lord is the beginning of wisdom 7,ps4 #aaj3aj2 ,ecclus4 #a3af71 and not as though it were more excellent than the others4 ,because1 in the order of generation1 man departs from evil on account of fear 7,prov4 #af3af71 before doing good works1 and which result from the other gifts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the words quoted from the ,apostle1 piety is not compared with all ,god's gifts1 but only with bodily exercise1 of which he had said it is profitable to little4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment1 yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter3 for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty 7,ethic4 iii1 #c71 whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts1 if we consider them in relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers1 because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled4 ,but on the part of the matter1 counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive1 and so is knowledge united to piety3 because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty1 while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters4 ,hence counsel together with fortitude1 by reason of their matter1 are given the preference to knowledge and piety4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,virtues ,are ,more ,excellent ,than the ,gifts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ah7 while speaking of charity3 ,no gift of ,god is more excellent than this4 ,it is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation4 ,other gifts are bestowed by the ,holy ,ghost1 but1 without charity1 they avail nothing4 ,but charity is a virtue4 ,therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is first naturally1 seems to be more excellent4 ,now the virtues precede the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost2 for ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii1 #bf7 that the gift of the ,holy ,ghost in the mind it works on1 forms first of all justice1 prudence1 fortitude1 temperance 4 4 4 and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues 7viz4 the gifts71 so as against folly to bestow wisdom2 against dullness1 understanding2 against rashness1 counsel2 against fear1 fortitude2 against ignorance1 knowledge2 against hardness of heart1 piety2 against piety1 fear4 ,therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #ai7 that the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose4 ,but it is possible to make evil use of the gifts1 for ,gregory says 7,moral4 i1 #ah73 ,we offer up the sacrifice of prayer 4 4 4 lest wisdom may uplift2 or understanding1 while it runs nimbly1 deviate from the right path2 or counsel1 while it multiplies itself1 grow into confusion2 that fortitude1 while it gives confidence1 may not make us rash2 lest knowledge1 while it knows and yet loves not1 may swell the mind2 lest piety1 while it swerves from the right line1 may become distorted2 and lest fear1 while it is unduly alarmed1 may plunge us into the pit of despair4 ,therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,on the contrary1 ,the gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects1 as is shown in the passage quoted 7,obj4 #b71 so that1 seemingly1 they accomplish what the virtues cannot4 ,therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues4 ,i answer that1 ,as was shown above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #a71 there are three kinds of virtues3 for some are theological1 some intellectual1 and some moral4 ,the theological virtues are those whereby man's mind is united to ,god2 the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected2 and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason4 ,on the other hand the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the ,divine motion4 ,accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues1 by which man is united to the ,holy ,ghost his ,mover1 in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues1 which perfect the reason1 the moving principle of the moral virtues4 ,wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them1 so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost and regulate them4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,moral4 i1 #ab7 that the seven sons1 i4e4 the seven gifts1 never attain the perfection of the number ten1 unless all they do be done in faith1 hope1 and charity4 ,but if we compare the gifts to the other virtues1 intellectual and moral1 then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues4 ,because the gifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the ,holy ,ghost their ,mover2 whereas the virtues perfect1 either the reason itself1 or the other powers in relation to reason3 and it is evident that the more exalted the mover1 the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed4 ,therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,charity is a theological virtue2 and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there are two ways in which one thing precedes another4 ,one is in order of perfection and dignity1 as love of ,god precedes love of our neighbor3 and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues1 but follow the theological virtues4 ,the other is the order of generation or disposition3 thus love of one's neighbor precedes love of ,god1 as regards the act3 and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts1 since man1 through being well subordinate to his own reason1 is disposed to be rightly subordinate to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 according as they are quickened by charity1 which dealeth not perversely 7#a ,cor4 #ac3d74 ,consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose1 in so far as they are gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but1 lest they depart from the perfection of charity1 they assist one another4 ,this is what ,gregory means to say4 ,,question #fi ,,of ,,the ,,beatitudes 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the beatitudes3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues8 7#b7 ,of the rewards of the beatitudes3 whether they refer to this life8 7#c7 ,of the number of the beatitudes2 7#d7 ,of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,beatitudes ,differ from the ,virtues and ,gifts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d7 assigns the beatitudes recited by ,matthew 7v #c1 seqq47 to the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost2 and ,ambrose in his commentary on ,luke #f3bj1 seqq41 ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there1 to the four cardinal virtues4 ,therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there are but two rules of the human will3 the reason and the eternal law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason2 while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the ,holy ,ghost1 as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #fh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c1 seqq474 ,therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will1 besides the virtues and gifts4 ,therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 among the beatitudes are included meekness1 justice1 and mercy1 which are said to be virtues4 ,therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts4 ,on the contrary1 ,certain things are included among the beatitudes1 that are neither virtues nor gifts1 e4g4 poverty1 mourning1 and peace4 ,therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a71 happiness is the last end of human life4 ,now one is said to possess the end already1 when one hopes to possess it2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #i7 that children are said to be happy because they are full of hope2 and the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3bd73 ,we are saved by hope4 ,again1 we hope to obtain an end1 because we are suitably moved towards that end1 and approach thereto2 and this implies some action4 ,and a man is moved towards1 and approaches the happy end by works of virtue1 and above all by the works of the gifts1 if we speak of eternal happiness1 for which our reason is not sufficient1 since we need to be moved by the ,holy ,ghost1 and to be perfected with ,his gifts that we may obey and follow him4 ,consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts1 not as habit from habit1 but as act from habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine and ,ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues1 as acts are ascribed to habits4 ,but the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #h74 ,wherefore ,ambrose1 in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng1 assigns them to the cardinal virtues1 whereas ,augustine1 who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain1 and so to those who were more perfect1 ascribes them to the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument proves that no other habits1 besides the virtues and gifts1 rectify human conduct4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness3 and the same applies to justice and mercy4 ,and though these might seem to be virtues1 they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts1 because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him1 as stated above 7,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #b74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,rewards ,assigned to the ,beatitudes ,refer to ,this ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life4 ,because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now the object of hope is future happiness4 ,therefore these rewards refer to the life to come4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes1 ,luke #f3be1 where we read3 ,woe to you that are filled2 for you shall hunger4 ,woe to you that now laugh1 for you shall mourn and weep4 ,now these punishments do not refer to this life1 because frequently men are not punished in this life1 according to ,job #ba3ac3 ,they spend their days in wealth4 ,therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix7 99,cf4 ,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #a4 ,again1 abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come1 according to ,ps4 #af3ae3 ,i shall be filled ,douay3 'satisfied' when ,thy glory shall appear4 ,again1 it is only in the future life that we shall see ,god1 and that our ,divine sonship will be made manifest1 according to #a ,john #c3b3 ,we are now the sons of ,god2 and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be4 ,we know that1 when ,he shall appear1 we shall be like to ,him1 because we shall see ,him as ,he is4 ,therefore these rewards refer to the future life4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d73 ,these promises can be fulfilled in this life1 as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles4 ,for no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel1 which is promised to us after this life4 ,i answer that1 ,expounders of ,holy ,writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards4 ,for some1 with ,ambrose 7,super ,luc4 v71 hold that all these rewards refer to the life to come2 while ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d7 holds them to refer to the present life2 and ,chrysostom in his homilies 7,in ,matth4 xv7 says that some refer to the future1 and some to the present life4 ,in order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons4 ,first1 by reason of our having a preparation for1 or a disposition to future happiness2 and this is by way of merit2 secondly1 by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men1 even in this life4 ,for it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit1 when the leaves begin to appear1 and another1 when we see the first signs of the fruit4 ,accordingly1 those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes1 are a kind of preparation for1 or disposition to happiness1 either perfect or inchoate3 while those that are assigned as rewards1 may be either perfect happiness1 so as to refer to the future life1 or some beginning of happiness1 such as is found in those who have attained perfection1 in which case they refer to the present life4 ,because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts1 it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection1 both as a wayfarer1 and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,hope regards future happiness as the last end3 yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that end1 according to ,ps4 #bg3g3 ,in ,him hath my heart hoped1 and ,i have been helped4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life1 yet they suffer spiritual punishment4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,confess4 i73 ,thou hast decreed1 and it is so1 ,lord--that the disordered mind should be its own punishment4 ,the ,philosopher1 too1 says of the wicked 7,ethic4 ix1 #d7 that their soul is divided against itself 4 4 4 one part pulls this way1 another that2 and afterwards he concludes1 saying3 ,if wickedness makes a man so miserable1 he should strain every nerve to avoid vice4 ,in like manner1 although1 on the other hand1 the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in this life1 yet they never lack spiritual rewards1 even in this life1 according to ,matt4 #ai3bi1 and ,mk4 #aj3cj3 ,ye shall receive a hundred times as much even in this time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come3 but meanwhile they are1 in a manner1 begun1 even in this life4 ,because the kingdom of heaven1 as ,augustine says 7loc4 cit471 can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom1 in so far as the spirit begins to reign in men4 ,the possession of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that rests1 by its desire1 on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance1 signified by the land4 ,they are comforted in this life1 by receiving the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is called the ,paraclete1 i4e4 the ,comforter4 ,they have their fill1 even in this life1 of that food of which ,our ,lord said 7,john #d3cd73 ,my meat is to do the will of ,him that sent ,me4 ,again1 in this life1 men obtain ,god's ,mercy4 ,again1 the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding1 we can1 so to speak1 see ,god4 ,likewise1 in this life1 those who are the peacemakers of their own movements1 approach to likeness to ,god1 and are called the children of ,god4 ,nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,beatitudes ,are ,suitably ,enumerated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated4 ,for the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,now some of the gifts1 viz4 wisdom and understanding1 belong to the contemplative life3 yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of contemplation1 for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life4 ,therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life1 but also some of the directive gifts1 e4g4 knowledge and counsel3 yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel4 ,therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently indicated4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 among the executive gifts connected with the active life1 fear is said to be connected with poverty1 while piety seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy3 yet nothing is included directly connected with justice4 ,therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 many other beatitudes are mentioned in ,holy ,writ4 ,thus1 it is written 7,job #e3ag73 ,blessed is the man whom ,god correcteth2 and 7,ps4 i1 #a73 ,blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly2 and 7,prov4 #c3ac73 ,blessed is the man that findeth wisdom4 ,therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated4 ,obj4 #e3 ,on the other hand1 it seems that too many are mentioned4 ,for there are seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost3 whereas eight beatitudes are indicated4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of ,luke4 ,therefore the seven or eight mentioned in ,matthew #e are too many4 ,i answer that1 ,these beatitudes are most suitably enumerated4 ,to make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things3 for some have ascribed it to a sensual life1 some1 to an active life1 and some1 to a contemplative life 99,see ,q4 #c4 ,now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude1 by hoping for which we are said to be happy4 ,because sensual happiness1 being false and contrary to reason1 is an obstacle to future beatitude2 while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude2 and contemplative happiness1 if perfect1 is the very essence of future beatitude1 and1 if imperfect1 is a beginning thereof4 ,and so ,our ,lord1 in the first place1 indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness4 ,for a life of pleasure consists of two things4 ,first1 in the affluence of external goods1 whether riches or honors2 from which man is withdrawn--by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation--and by a gift1 in a more excellent way1 so that he despises them altogether4 ,hence the first beatitude is3 ,blessed are the poor in spirit1 which may refer either to the contempt of riches1 or to the contempt of honors1 which results from humility4 ,secondly1 the sensual life consists in following the bent of one's passions1 whether irascible or concupiscible4 ,from following the irascible passions man is withdrawn--by a virtue1 so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason--and by a gift1 in a more excellent manner1 so that man1 according to ,god's will1 is altogether undisturbed by them3 hence the second beatitude is3 ,blessed are the meek4 ,from following the concupiscible passions1 man is withdrawn--by a virtue1 so that man uses these passions in moderation--and by a gift1 so that1 if necessary1 he casts them aside altogether2 nay more1 so that1 if need be1 he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow 99,cf4 ,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #c2 hence the third beatitude is3 ,blessed are they that mourn4 ,active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor1 either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity4 ,to the former we are disposed--by a virtue1 so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor1 which pertains to justice--and by a gift1 so that we do the same much more heartily1 by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire1 even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite4 ,hence the fourth beatitude is3 ,blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice4 ,with regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected--by a virtue1 so that we give where reason dictates we should give1 e4g4 to our friends or others united to us2 which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift1 so that1 through reverence for ,god1 we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty3 hence it is written 7,luke #ad3ab1 #ac73 ,when thou makest a dinner or supper1 call not thy friends1 nor thy brethren1 etc 4 4 4 but 4 4 4 call the poor1 the maimed1 etc42 which1 properly1 is to have mercy3 hence the fifth beatitude is3 ,blessed are the merciful4 ,those things which concern the contemplative life1 are either final beatitude itself1 or some beginning thereof3 wherefore they are included in the beatitudes1 not as merits1 but as rewards4 ,yet the effects of the active life1 which dispose man for the contemplative life1 are included in the beatitudes4 ,now the effect of the active life1 as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself1 is the cleansing of man's heart1 so that it is not defiled by the passions3 hence the sixth beatitude is3 ,blessed are the clean of heart4 ,but as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor1 the effect of the active life is peace1 according to ,isa4 #cb3ag3 ,the work of justice shall be peace3 hence the seventh beatitude is ,blessed are the peacemakers4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits3 but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards1 for the reason given above4 ,because to see ,god corresponds to the gift of understanding2 and to be like ,god by being adoptive children of ,god1 corresponds to the gift of wisdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in things pertaining to the active life1 knowledge is not sought for its own sake1 but for the sake of operation1 as even the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1 #b74 ,and therefore1 since beatitude implies something ultimate1 the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life1 such acts1 to wit1 as are elicited by those gifts1 as1 e4g4 to counsel is the act of counsel1 and to judge1 the act of knowledge3 but1 on the other hand1 they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction1 as1 e4g4 mourning in respect of knowledge1 and mercy in respect of counsel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things4 ,one is likeness of matter4 ,in this way all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles3 whereas they must be distributed among the executive gifts3 so that1 to wit1 hunger and thirst for justice1 and mercy too1 correspond to piety1 which perfects man in his relations to others2 meekness to fortitude1 for ,ambrose says on ,luke #f3bb3 ,it is the business of fortitude to conquer anger1 and to curb indignation1 fortitude being about the irascible passions3 poverty and mourning to the gift of fear1 whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world4 ,secondly1 we may consider the motives of the beatitudes3 and1 in this way1 some of them will have to be assigned differently4 ,because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for ,god1 which belongs to piety4 ,the chief motive for mourning is knowledge1 whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things1 according to ,eccles4 #a3ah3 ,he that addeth knowledge1 addeth also sorrow ,vulg3 labor4 ,the principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul3 and the chief motive for being merciful is ,god's counsel1 according to ,dan4 #d3bd3 ,let my counsel be acceptable to the king ,vulg3 to thee1 ,o king3 and redeem thou thy sins with alms1 and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor4 ,it is thus that ,augustine assigns them 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all the beatitudes mentioned in ,holy ,writ must be reduced to these1 either as to the merits or as to the rewards3 because they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life4 ,accordingly1 when we read1 ,blessed is the man whom the ,lord correcteth1 we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning3 when we read1 ,blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly1 we must refer it to cleanness of heart3 and when we read1 ,blessed is the man that findeth wisdom1 this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude4 ,the same applies to all others that can be adduced4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede4 ,because from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit1 meekness1 and the rest1 it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them4 ,hence the eighth beatitude corresponds1 in a way1 to all the preceding seven4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,luke relates ,our ,lord's sermon as addressed to the multitude 7,luke #f3ag74 ,hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude1 who know no other happiness than pleasure1 temporal and earthly3 wherefore by these four beatitudes ,our ,lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness4 ,the first of these is abundance of external goods1 which he sets aside by saying3 ,blessed are ye poor4 ,the second is that man be well off as to his body1 in food and drink1 and so forth2 this he excludes by saying in the second place3 ,blessed are ye that hunger4 ,the third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart1 and this he puts aside by saying3 ,blessed are ye that weep now4 ,the fourth is the outward favor of man2 and this he excludes1 saying1 fourthly3 ,blessed shall you be1 when men shall hate you4 ,and as ,ambrose says on ,luke #f3bj1 poverty corresponds to temperance1 which is unmoved by delights2 hunger1 to justice1 since who hungers is compassionate and1 through compassion gives2 mourning1 to prudence1 which deplores perishable things2 endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,rewards of the ,beatitudes ,are ,suitably ,enumerated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated4 ,because the kingdom of heaven1 which is eternal life1 contains all good things4 ,therefore1 once given the kingdom of heaven1 no other rewards should be mentioned4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward1 both of the first and of the eighth beatitude4 ,therefore1 on the same ground it should have been assigned to all4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order1 as ,augustine remarks 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #d73 whereas the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order1 since to possess the land is less than to possess the kingdom of heaven4 ,therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of ,our ,lord ,who propounded these rewards4 ,i answer that1 ,these rewards are most suitably assigned1 considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness indicated above 7,a4 #c74 ,for the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists3 which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire1 not where he should seek it1 viz4 in ,god1 but in temporal and perishable things4 ,wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness4 ,for men seek in external things1 viz4 riches and honors1 a certain excellence and abundance1 both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven1 whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in ,god4 ,hence ,our ,lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit4 ,again1 cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security for themselves4 ,hence ,our ,lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living1 whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted4 ,again1 men seek consolation for the toils of the present life1 in the lusts and pleasures of the world4 ,hence ,our ,lord promises comfort to those that mourn4 ,two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness1 which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor3 from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good4 ,hence ,our ,lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them4 ,for there are some who recede from acts of justice1 and instead of rendering what is due1 lay hands on what is not theirs1 that they may abound in temporal goods4 ,wherefore ,our ,lord promised those who hunger after justice1 that they shall have their fill4 ,some1 again1 recede from works of mercy1 lest they be busied with other people's misery4 ,hence ,our ,lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy1 and be delivered from all misery4 ,the last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude3 hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions included in the merit4 ,for cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly3 hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see ,god4 ,again1 to make peace either in oneself or among others1 shows a man to be a follower of ,god1 ,who is the ,god of unity and peace4 ,hence1 as a reward1 he is promised the glory of the ,divine sonship1 consisting in perfect union with ,god through consummate wisdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xv in ,matth471 all these rewards are one in reality1 viz4 eternal happiness1 which the human intellect cannot grasp4 ,hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us1 while observing due proportion to the merits to which those rewards are assigned4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes1 so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes4 ,hence it returns to the first1 that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence4 ,or else1 according to ,ambrose 7,super ,luc4 v71 the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit1 as regards the glory of the soul2 but to those who suffer persecution in their bodies1 it is promised as regards the glory of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the rewards are also arranged in ascending order4 ,for it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it3 since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully4 ,again1 it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it1 for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow4 ,again1 it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted1 because fulness implies abundance of comfort4 ,and mercy surpasses satiety1 for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire4 ,and yet more is it to see ,god1 even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court1 but also sees the king's countenance4 ,lastly1 the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son4 ,,question #gj ,,of ,,the ,,fruits ,,of ,,the ,,holy ,,ghost 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the ,fruits of the ,holy ,ghost3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the fruits of the ,holy ,ghost are acts8 7#b7 ,whether they differ from the beatitudes8 7#c7 ,of their number8 7#d7 ,of their opposition to the works of the flesh4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,fruits of the ,holy ,ghost ,which the ,apostle ,enumerates 7,gal4 #e7 ,are ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the fruits of the ,holy ,ghost1 enumerated by the ,apostle 7,gal4 #e3bb1 #bc71 are not acts4 ,for that which bears fruit1 should not itself be called a fruit1 else we should go on indefinitely4 ,but our actions bear fruit3 for it is written 7,wis4 #c3ae73 ,the fruit of good labor is glorious1 and 7,john #d3cf73 ,he that reapeth receiveth wages1 and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting4 ,therefore our actions are not to be called fruits4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aj71 we enjoy 99',fruimur'1 from which verb we have the ,latin 'fructus' and the ,english 'fruit' the things we know1 when the will rests by rejoicing in them4 ,but our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake4 ,therefore our actions should not be called fruits4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 among the fruits of the ,holy ,ghost1 the ,apostle numbers certain virtues1 viz4 charity1 meekness1 faith1 and chastity4 ,now virtues are not actions but habits1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the fruits are not actions4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #ab3cc73 ,by the fruit the tree is known2 that is to say1 man is known by his works1 as holy men explain the passage4 ,therefore human actions are called fruits4 ,i answer that1 ,the word fruit has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world4 ,now fruit1 among material things1 is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection1 and has a certain sweetness4 ,this fruit has a twofold relation3 to the tree that produces it1 and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree4 ,accordingly1 in spiritual matters1 we may take the word fruit in two ways3 first1 so that the fruit of man1 who is likened to the tree1 is that which he produces2 secondly1 so that man's fruit is what he gathers4 ,yet not all that man gathers is fruit1 but only that which is last and gives pleasure4 ,for a man has both a field and a tree1 and yet these are not called fruits2 but that only which is last1 to wit1 that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree4 ,in this sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment4 ,if1 however1 by man's fruit we understand a product of man1 then human actions are called fruits3 because operation is the second act of the operator1 and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him4 ,if then man's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason1 it is said to be the fruit of his reason3 but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power1 which is the power of the ,holy ,ghost1 then man's operation is said to be the fruit of the ,holy ,ghost1 as of a ,divine seed1 for it is written 7#a ,john #c3i73 ,whosoever is born of ,god1 committeth no sin1 for ,his seed abideth in him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since fruit is something last and final1 nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit1 even as one end is subordinate to another4 ,and so our works1 in so far as they are produced by the ,holy ,ghost working in us1 are fruits3 but1 in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life1 they should rather be called flowers3 hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #bd3bc73 ,my flowers are the fruits of honor and riches4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake1 this may be understood in two ways4 ,first1 so that the expression for the sake of be taken to designate the final cause2 and in this way1 man delights in nothing for its own sake1 except the last end4 ,secondly1 so that it expresses the formal cause2 and in this way1 a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form4 ,thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health1 for its own sake1 as in an end2 in a nice medicine1 not as in an end1 but as in something tasty2 and in a nasty medicine1 nowise for its own sake1 but only for the sake of something else4 ,accordingly we must say that man must delight in ,god for ,his own sake1 as being his last end1 and in virtuous deeds1 not as being his end1 but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous4 ,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,parad4 xiii7 that virtuous deeds are called fruits because they refresh those that have them1 with a holy and genuine delight4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions3 thus ,augustine writes 7,tract4 xl in ,joan473 ,faith is to believe what thou seest not2 and 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 iii1 #aj73 ,charity is the movement of the soul in loving ,god and our neighbor4 ,it is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,fruits ,differ from the ,beatitudes8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes4 ,for the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts1 as stated above 7,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,but the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession1 so are the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present life1 which are based on hope4 ,now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude4 ,therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful4 ,now this is the very nature of beatitude1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature1 and consequently should not be distinguished from one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,things divided into different species1 differ from one another4 ,but fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts1 as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated4 ,therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes4 ,i answer that1 ,more is required for a beatitude than for a fruit4 ,because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful2 whereas for a beatitude1 it must be something perfect and excellent4 ,hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits1 but not vice versa4 ,for the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights3 whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works1 and which1 by reason of their perfection1 are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues1 as already stated 7,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits1 but not that all the fruits are beatitudes4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply3 hence it nowise differs from future beatitude4 ,on the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect2 wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,more is required for a beatitude than for a fruit1 as stated4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,fruits ,are ,suitably ,enumerated by the ,apostle8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the ,apostle 7,gal4 #e3bb1 #bc74 ,because1 elsewhere1 he says that there is only one fruit of the present life2 according to ,rom4 #f3bb3 ,you have your fruit unto sanctification4 ,moreover it is written 7,isa4 #bg3i73 ,this is all the fruit 4 4 4 that the sin 4 4 4 be taken away4 ,therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fruit is the product of spiritual seed1 as stated 7,a4 #a74 ,but ,our ,lord mentions 7,matt4 #ac3bc7 a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground1 viz4 hundredfold1 sixtyfold1 and thirtyfold4 ,therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful4 ,but this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the ,apostle3 for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object1 while faith is not something ultimate1 but rather something primary and fundamental4 ,therefore too many fruits are enumerated4 ,obj4 #d3 ,on the other hand1 ,it seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely4 ,for it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that all the beatitudes may be called fruits2 yet not all are mentioned here4 ,nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom1 and of many other virtues4 ,therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated4 ,i answer that1 ,the number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the ,apostle is suitable1 and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is written 7,apoc4 #bb3b73 ,on both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits4 ,since1 however1 a fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root1 the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the ,holy ,ghost proceeds in us3 which process consists in this1 that the mind of man is set in order1 first of all1 in regard to itself2 secondly1 in regard to things that are near it2 thirdly1 in regard to things that are below it4 ,accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things4 ,now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love1 which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d74 ,wherefore among the fruits of the ,holy ,ghost1 we reckon charity1 wherein the ,holy ,ghost is given in a special manner1 as in ,his own likeness1 since ,he ,himself is love4 ,hence it is written 7,rom4 #e3e73 ,the charity of ,god is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is given to us4 ,the necessary result of the love of charity is joy3 because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved4 ,now charity has always actual presence in ,god ,whom it loves1 according to #a ,john #d3af3 ,he that abideth in charity1 abideth in ,god1 and ,god in ,him3 wherefore the sequel of charity is joy4 ,now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects4 ,first1 as regards freedom from outward disturbance2 for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good1 if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof2 and again1 if a man's heart is perfectly set at peace in one object1 he cannot be disquieted by any other1 since he accounts all others as nothing2 hence it is written 7,ps4 #aah3afe73 ,much peace have they that love ,thy ,law1 and to them there is no stumbling-block1 because1 to wit1 external things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of ,god4 ,secondly1 as regards the calm of the restless desire3 for he does not perfectly rejoice1 who is not satisfied with the object of his joy4 ,now peace implies these two things1 namely1 that we be not disturbed by external things1 and that our desires rest altogether in one object4 ,wherefore after charity and joy1 peace is given the third place4 ,in evil things the mind has a good disposition1 in respect of two things4 ,first1 by not being disturbed whenever evil threatens3 which pertains to patience2 secondly1 by not being disturbed1 whenever good things are delayed2 which belongs to long suffering1 since to lack good is a kind of evil 7,ethic4 v1 #c74 ,man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him1 viz4 his neighbor1 first1 as to the will to do good2 and to this belongs goodness4 ,secondly1 as to the execution of well-doing2 and to this belongs benignity1 for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame 7bonus ignis7 of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor4 ,thirdly1 as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him4 ,to this belongs meekness1 which curbs anger4 ,fourthly1 in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger1 but also through fraud or deceit4 ,to this pertains faith1 if we take it as denoting fidelity4 ,but if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in ,god1 then man is directed thereby to that which is above him1 so that he subject his intellect and1 consequently1 all that is his1 to ,god4 ,man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him1 as regards external action1 by modesty1 whereby we observe the mode in all our words and deeds3 as regards internal desires1 by continency and chastity3 whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires1 continency also from lawful desires3 or because the continent man is subject to concupiscence1 but is not led away2 whereas the chaste man is neither subject to1 nor led away from them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sanctification is effected by all the virtues1 by which also sins are taken away4 ,consequently fruit is mentioned there in the singular1 on account of its being generically one1 though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the hundredfold1 sixtyfold1 and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts1 but as various degrees of perfection1 even in the same virtue4 ,thus continency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit2 the continency of widowhood1 by the sixtyfold2 and virginal continency1 by the hundredfold fruit4 ,there are1 moreover1 other ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue3 and they speak of three degrees1 because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its beginning1 its middle1 and its end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in4 ,and as to faith1 if we consider it as the foundation1 it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful1 in as much as it contains certainty3 hence a gloss expounds thus3 ,faith1 which is certainly about the unseen4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,augustine says on ,gal4 #e3bb1 #bc1 the ,apostle had no intention of teaching us how many 7either works of the flesh1 or fruits of the ,spirit7 there are2 but to show how the former should be avoided1 and the latter sought after4 ,hence either more or fewer fruits might have been mentioned4 ,nevertheless1 all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness1 in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways4 ,wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing to good1 are reduced to charity1 joy and peace4 ,the reason why he mentions these rather than others1 is that these imply either enjoyment of good things1 or relief from evils1 which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,fruits of the ,holy ,ghost ,are ,contrary to the ,works of the ,flesh8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the fruits of the ,holy ,ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh1 which the ,apostle enumerates 7,gal4 #e3ai1 seqq474 ,because contraries are in the same genus4 ,but the works of the flesh are not called fruits4 ,therefore the fruits of the ,spirit are not contrary to them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one thing has a contrary4 ,now the ,apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the ,spirit4 ,therefore the fruits of the ,spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 among the fruits of the ,spirit1 the first place is given to charity1 joy1 and peace3 to which1 fornication1 uncleanness1 and immodesty1 which are the first of the works of the flesh1 are not opposed4 ,therefore the fruits of the ,spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3ag7 that the flesh lusteth against the spirit1 and the spirit against the flesh4 ,i answer that1 ,the works of the flesh and the fruits of the ,spirit may be taken in two ways4 ,first1 in general3 and in this way the fruits of the ,holy ,ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh4 ,because the ,holy ,ghost moves the human mind to that which is in accord with reason1 or rather to that which surpasses reason3 whereas the fleshly1 viz4 the sensitive1 appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him4 ,wherefore1 since upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order1 so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the ,spirit4 ,secondly1 both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly1 each according to its specific nature4 ,and in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each3 because1 as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #d71 the ,apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works1 whether spiritual or carnal4 ,however1 by a kind of adaptation1 ,augustine1 commenting on ,gal4 #e3bb1 #bc1 contrasts the fruits with the carnal works1 each to each4 ,thus to fornication1 which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock1 we may contrast charity1 whereby the soul is wedded to ,god3 wherein also is true chastity4 ,by uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication3 and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed4 ,idolatry1 by reason of which war was waged against the ,gospel of ,god1 is opposed to peace4 ,against witchcrafts1 enmities1 contentions1 emulations1 wraths and quarrels1 there is longsuffering1 which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell2 while kindness helps us to cure those evils2 and goodness1 to forgive them4 ,in contrast to heresy there is faith2 to envy1 mildness2 to drunkenness and revellings1 contingency4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that which proceeds from a tree against the tree's nature1 is not called its fruit1 but rather its corruption4 ,and since works of virtue are connatural to reason1 while works of vice are contrary to nature1 therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits1 but not so works of vice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good happens in one way1 evil in all manner of ways1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 so that to one virtue many vices are contrary4 ,consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit4 ,the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is clear from what has been said4 ,,evil ,,habits1 i4e4 ,,vices ,,and ,,sins 7,,qq4 #ga-hi7 ,,question #ga ,,of ,,vice ,,and ,,sin ,,considered ,,in ,,themselves 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we have in the next place to consider vice and sin3 about which six points have to be considered3 7#a7 ,vice and sin considered in themselves2 7#b7 their distinction2 7#c7 their comparison with one another2 7#d7 the subject of sin2 7#e7 the cause of sin2 7#f7 the effect of sin4 ,under the first head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether vice is contrary to virtue8 7#b7 ,whether vice is contrary to nature8 7#c7 ,which is worse1 a vice or a vicious act8 7#d7 ,whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue8 7#e7 ,whether every sin includes action8 7#f7 ,of the definition of sin proposed by ,augustine 7,contra ,faust4 xxii73 ,sin is a word1 deed1 or desire against the eternal law4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,vice ,is ,contrary to ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue4 ,for one thing has one contrary1 as proved in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #ag4 ,now sin and malice are contrary to virtue4 ,therefore vice is not contrary to it3 since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 virtue denotes a certain perfection of power4 ,but vice does not denote anything relative to power4 ,therefore vice is not contrary to virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,cicero 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv7 says that virtue is the soul's health4 ,now sickness or disease1 rather than vice1 is opposed to health4 ,therefore vice is not contrary to virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,perfect4 ,justit4 ii7 that vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil4 ,but virtue is a quality which makes its subject good1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ee1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,therefore vice is contrary to virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,two things may be considered in virtue--the essence of virtue1 and that to which virtue is ordained4 ,in the essence of virtue we may consider something directly1 and we may consider something consequently4 ,virtue implies directly a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature3 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag7 that virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best2 and by perfect ,i mean that which is disposed according to its nature4 ,that which virtue implies consequently is that it is a kind of goodness3 because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature4 ,that to which virtue is directed is a good act1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c74 ,accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue4 ,one of these is sin1 which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained3 since1 properly speaking1 sin denotes an inordinate act2 even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act3 in respect of that which virtue implies consequently1 viz4 that it is a kind of goodness1 the contrary of virtue is malice3 while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly1 its contrary is vice3 because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature3 hence ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii73 ,whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be called a vice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these three things are contrary to virtue1 but not in the same respect3 for sin is opposed to virtue1 according as the latter is productive of a good work2 malice1 according as virtue is a kind of goodness2 while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,virtue implies not only perfection of power1 the principle of action2 but also the due disposition of its subject4 ,the reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act3 so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work4 ,it is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,cicero says 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv71 disease and sickness are vicious qualities1 for in speaking of the body he calls it disease when the whole body is infected1 for instance1 with fever or the like2 he calls it sickness when the disease is attended with weakness2 and vice when the parts of the body are not well compacted together4 ,and although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness1 for instance1 when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations2 yet1 in the soul1 as he says1 these two things are indistinguishable1 except in thought4 ,for whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly1 through some inordinate affection1 he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties3 since a tree is known by its fruit1 i4e4 man by his works1 according to ,matt4 #ab3cc4 ,but vice of the soul1 as ,cicero says 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv71 is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life3 and this is to be found even without disease and sickness1 e4g4 when a man sins from weakness or passion4 ,consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease2 even as virtue extends to more things than health2 for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue 7,phys4 vii1 text4 #ag74 ,consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue1 more fittingly than sickness or disease4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,vice ,is ,contrary to ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that vice is not contrary to nature4 ,because vice is contrary to virtue1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now virtue is in us1 not by nature but by infusion or habituation1 as stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,therefore vice is not contrary to nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature3 thus a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement 7,ethic4 ii1 #a74 ,but some men become habituated to vice4 ,therefore vice is not contrary to nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anything contrary to a nature1 is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature4 ,now vice is found in the greater number of men2 for it is written 7,matt4 #g3ac73 ,broad is the way that leadeth to destruction1 and many there are who go in thereat4 ,therefore vice is not contrary to nature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 sin is compared to vice1 as act to habit1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now sin is defined as a word1 deed1 or desire1 contrary to the ,law of ,god1 as ,augustine shows 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg74 ,but the ,law of ,god is above nature4 ,therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the ,law1 rather than to nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ac73 ,every vice1 simply because it is a vice1 is contrary to nature4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 vice is contrary to virtue4 ,now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature1 and for this reason is that thing vituperated1 which word is derived from vice according to ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ad74 ,but it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species4 ,now man derives his species from his rational soul3 and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is1 properly speaking1 contrary to the nature of man1 as man2 while whatever is in accord with reason1 is in accord with the nature of man1 as man4 ,now man's good is to be in accord with reason1 and his evil is to be against reason1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore human virtue1 which makes a man good1 and his work good1 is in accord with man's nature1 for as much as it accords with his reason3 while vice is contrary to man's nature1 in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being1 yet they incline us to that which accords with reason1 i4e4 with the order of reason4 ,for ,cicero says 7,de ,inv4 ,rhet4 ii7 that virtue is a habit in accord with reason1 like a second nature3 and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature1 and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature1 in so far as being against nature is contrary to being from nature3 and not in so far as being against nature is contrary to being in accord with nature1 in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature1 in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is a twofold nature in man1 rational nature1 and the sensitive nature4 ,and since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason1 hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature1 than who follow the order of reason3 because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion4 ,now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,whatever is irregular in a work of art1 is unnatural to the art which produced that work4 ,now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason1 as art to a work of art4 ,therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason1 and that they are contrary to the eternal law4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #f7 that every nature1 as such1 is from ,god2 and is a vicious nature1 in so far as it fails from the ,divine art whereby it was made4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,vice ,is ,worse ,than a ,vicious ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that vice1 i4e4 a bad habit1 is worse than a sin1 i4e4 a bad act4 ,for1 as the more lasting a good is1 the better it is1 so the longer an evil lasts1 the worse it is4 ,now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts1 that pass forthwith4 ,therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 several evils are more to be shunned than one4 ,but a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts4 ,therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a cause is more potent than its effect4 ,but a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness4 ,therefore a habit is more potent than its act1 both in goodness and in badness4 ,on the contrary1 ,a man is justly punished for a vicious act2 but not for a vicious habit1 so long as no act ensues4 ,therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit4 ,i answer that1 ,a habit stands midway between power and act4 ,now it is evident that both in good and in evil1 act precedes power1 as stated in ,metaph4 ix1 #ai4 ,for it is better to do well than to be able to do well1 and in like manner1 it is more blameworthy to do evil1 than to be able to do evil3 whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness1 habit stands midway between power and act1 so that1 to wit1 even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness1 so does it stand below the corresponding act4 ,this is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad1 save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act3 wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act3 so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness1 since the cause of a thing being such1 is yet more so4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply1 and below it in some respect4 ,now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both2 while it is deemed above it in a certain respect1 if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both4 ,now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit1 that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness4 ,whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act1 is accidental to them1 and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action1 and whose action consists in a transient movement4 ,consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness1 but habit excels in a certain respect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a habit is several acts1 not simply1 but in a certain respect1 i4e4 virtually4 ,wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes act simply1 both in goodness and in badness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,habit causes act by way of efficient causality3 but act causes habit1 by way of final causality1 in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil4 ,consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,sin ,is ,compatible with ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a vicious act1 i4e4 sin1 is incompatible with virtue4 ,for contraries cannot be together in the same subject4 ,now sin is1 in some way1 contrary to virtue1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore sin is incompatible with virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is worse than vice1 i4e4 evil act than evil habit4 ,but vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue3 neither1 therefore1 can sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin occurs in natural things1 even as in voluntary matters 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #hb74 ,now sin never happens in natural things1 except through some corruption of the natural power2 thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed1 as stated in ,phys4 ii4 ,therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters1 except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul3 so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #b1 #c7 that virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes4 ,now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #c73 and1 consequently1 one sinful act does not corrupt virtue4 ,therefore they can be together in the same subject4 ,i answer that1 ,sin is compared to virtue1 as evil act to good habit4 ,now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing4 ,for the form of a natural thing produces1 of necessity1 an operation befitting itself2 wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form3 thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling1 and lightness with downward movement 7except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover73 whereas the habit that resides in the soul1 does not1 of necessity1 produce its operation1 but is used by man when he wills4 ,consequently man1 while possessing a habit1 may either fail to use the habit1 or produce a contrary act2 and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin4 ,and this sinful act1 so long as there is but one1 cannot corrupt virtue1 if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit3 since1 just as habit is not engendered by one act1 so neither is it destroyed by one act as stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,but if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues1 then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act4 ,for every mortal sin is contrary to charity1 which is the root of all the infused virtues1 as virtues2 and consequently1 charity being banished by one act of mortal sin1 it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled as virtues4 ,and ,i say this on account of faith and hope1 whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin1 so that they are no longer virtues4 ,on the other hand1 since venial sin is neither contrary to charity1 nor banishes it1 as a consequence1 neither does it expel the other virtues4 ,as to the acquired virtues1 they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin4 ,accordingly1 mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues1 but is consistent with acquired virtue3 while venial sin is compatible with virtues1 whether infused or acquired4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sin is contrary to virtue1 not by reason of itself1 but by reason of its act4 ,hence sin is incompatible with the act1 but not with the habit1 of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,vice is directly contrary to virtue1 even as sin to virtuous act3 and so vice excludes virtue1 just as sin excludes acts of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the natural powers act of necessity1 and hence so long as the power is unimpaired1 no sin can be found in the act4 ,on the other hand1 the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity2 hence the comparison fails4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,every ,sin ,includes an ,action8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every sin includes an action4 ,for as merit is compared with virtue1 even so is sin compared with vice4 ,now there can be no merit without an action4 ,neither1 therefore1 can there be sin without action4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah7 99,cf4 ,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv43 ,so true is it that every sin is voluntary1 that1 unless it be voluntary1 it is no sin at all4 ,now nothing can be voluntary1 save through an act of the will4 ,therefore every sin implies an act4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if sin could be without act1 it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought4 ,now he who never does something that he ought to do1 ceases continually doing what he ought4 ,therefore it would follow that he sins continually2 and this is untrue4 ,therefore there is no sin without an act4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,james #d3ag73 ,to him 4 4 4 who knoweth to do good1 and doth it not1 to him it is a sin4 ,now not to do does not imply an act4 ,therefore sin can be without act4 ,i answer that1 ,the reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission1 about which there have been various opinions4 ,for some say that in every sin of omission there is some act1 either interior or exterior--interior1 as when a man wills not to go to church1 when he is bound to go--exterior1 as when a man1 at the very hour that he is bound to go to church 7or even before71 occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going4 ,this seems1 in a way1 to amount to the same as the first1 for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other1 wills1 consequently1 to go without this other3 unless1 perchance1 it does not occur to him1 that what he wishes to do1 will hinder him from that which he is bound to do1 in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence4 ,on the other hand1 others say1 that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act3 for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin4 ,now each of these opinions has some truth in it4 ,for if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists1 the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act1 as when a man wills not to go to church3 while sometimes it will be without any act at all1 whether interior or exterior1 as when a man1 at the time that he is bound to go to church1 does not think of going or not going to church4 ,if1 however1 in the sin of omission1 we consider also the causes1 or occasions of the omission1 then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act4 ,for there is no sin of omission1 unless we omit what we can do or not do3 and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do1 must needs be due to some cause or occasion1 either united with the omission or preceding it4 ,now if this cause be not in man's power1 the omission will not be sinful1 as when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness3 but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will1 the omission is sinful2 and such cause1 in so far as it is voluntary1 must needs always include some act1 at least the interior act of the will3 which act sometimes bears directly on the omission1 as when a man wills not to go to church1 because it is too much trouble2 and in this case this act1 of its very nature1 belongs to the omission1 because the volition of any sin whatever1 pertains1 of itself1 to that sin1 since voluntariness is essential to sin4 ,sometimes1 however1 the act of the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he ought1 whether this something else be united with the omission1 as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church--or1 precede the omission1 as when a man wills to sit up late at night1 the result being that he does not go to church in the morning4 ,in this case the act1 interior or exterior1 is accidental to the omission1 since the omission follows outside the intention1 and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #di1 #ej74 ,wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with1 or preceding the omission1 but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission4 ,now in judging about things1 we must be guided by that which is proper to them1 and not by that which is accidental3 and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act2 else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,more things are required for good than for evil1 since good results from a whole and entire cause1 whereas evil results from each single defect1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not1 or by his not doing what he ought2 while there can be no merit1 unless a man do willingly what he ought to do3 wherefore there can be no merit without act1 whereas there can be sin without act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the term voluntary is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear1 but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #e4 ,hence even not to will may be called voluntary1 in so far as man has it in his power to will1 and not to will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always1 but not for always4 ,hence1 by omitting to act1 a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ga1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,sin ,is ,fittingly ,defined ,as a ,word1 ,deed1 or ,desire ,contrary to the ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying3 ,sin is a word1 deed1 or desire1 contrary to the eternal law4 ,because word1 deed1 and desire imply an act2 whereas not every sin implies an act1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore this definition does not include every sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,duab4 ,anim4 xii73 ,sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids4 ,now will is comprised under desire1 in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite4 ,therefore it was enough to say3 ,sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law1 nor was there need to add word or deed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end3 because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f2 ,q4 #bj1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c73 wherefore ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i7 defines sin in reference to the end1 by saying that sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things1 and seek after temporal things3 and again he says 7,qq4 lxxxii1 qu4 #cj7 that all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy1 and in enjoying what we should use4 ,now the definition in question contains no mention of aversion from our due end3 therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a thing is said to be forbidden1 because it is contrary to the law4 ,now not all sins are evil through being forbidden1 but some are forbidden because they are evil4 ,therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of ,god4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a sin denotes a bad human act1 as was explained above 7,a4 #a74 ,now man's evil is to be against reason1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law4 ,on the contrary1 the authority of ,augustine suffices 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg74 ,i answer that1 ,as was shown above 7,a4 #a71 sin is nothing else than a bad human act4 ,now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a71 whether it be voluntary1 as being elicited by the will1 e4g4 to will or to choose1 or as being commanded by the will1 e4g4 the exterior actions of speech or operation4 ,again1 a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure3 and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule1 from which if that thing depart1 it is incommensurate4 ,now there are two rules of the human will3 one is proximate and homogeneous1 viz4 the human reason2 the other is the first rule1 viz4 the eternal law1 which is ,god's reason1 so to speak4 ,accordingly ,augustine 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg7 includes two things in the definition of sin2 one1 pertaining to the substance of a human act1 and which is the matter1 so to speak1 of sin1 when he says word1 deed1 or desire2 the other1 pertaining to the nature of evil1 and which is the form1 as it were1 of sin1 when he says1 contrary to the eternal law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus3 e4g4 in ,divine things1 begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus relation1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,trin4 v1 #f1 #g73 and so word and deed denote equally what is said and what is not said1 what is done and what is not done4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the first cause of sin is in the will1 which commands all voluntary acts1 in which alone is sin to be found3 and hence it is that ,augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone4 ,but since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin1 through being evil of themselves1 as stated1 it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end1 and in consequence1 makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end3 hence when he says1 contrary to the eternal law1 he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of inordinateness4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden1 this must be understood of prohibition by positive law4 ,if1 however1 the prohibition be referred to the natural law1 which is contained primarily in the eternal law1 but secondarily in the natural code of the human reason1 then every sin is evil through being prohibited3 since it is contrary to natural law1 precisely because it is inordinate4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against ,god2 and the moral philosopher1 as something contrary to reason4 ,hence ,augustine defines sin with reference to its being contrary to the eternal law1 more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason2 the more so1 as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason1 e4g4 in matters of faith4 ,,question #gb ,,of ,,the ,,distinction ,,of ,,sins 7,in ,nine ,articles7 ,we must now consider the distinction of sins or vices3 under which head there are nine points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects8 7#b7 ,of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins2 7#c7 ,whether sins differ in reference to their causes8 7#d7 ,whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against8 7#e7 ,whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment8 7#f7 ,whether they differ in regard to omission and commission8 7#g7 ,whether they differ according to their various stages8 7#h7 ,whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency8 7#i7 ,whether they differ according to their various circumstances8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,sins ,differ in ,species ,according to ,their ,objects8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sins do not differ in species1 according to their objects4 ,for acts are said to be good or evil1 in relation1 chiefly1 to their end1 as shown above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f74 ,since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a71 it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 evil1 being a privation1 differs specifically according to the different species of opposites4 ,now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts4 ,therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if sins differed specifically according to their objects1 it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects3 and yet such sins are to be found4 ,for pride is about things spiritual and material as ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxiv1 #ah72 and avarice is about different kinds of things4 ,therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects4 ,on the contrary1 ,sin is a word1 deed1 or desire against ,god's law4 ,now words1 deeds1 and desires differ in species according to their various objects3 since acts differ by their objects1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore sins1 also differ in species according to their objects4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f71 two things concur in the nature of sin1 viz4 the voluntary act1 and its inordinateness1 which consists in departing from ,god's law4 ,of these two1 one is referred essentially to the sinner1 who intends such and such an act in such and such matter2 while the other1 viz4 the inordinateness of the act1 is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner1 for no one acts intending evil1 as ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental3 because what is accidental is outside the specific nature4 ,consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin4 ,now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects1 as was proved above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the aspect of good is found chiefly in the end3 and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin4 ,consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order3 hence sins differ specifically according to the objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites1 although1 even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues1 it would come to the same3 since virtues differ specifically according to their objects1 as stated above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in various things1 differing in species or genus1 nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object1 from which aspect sin receives its species4 ,it is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things2 and avarice seeks abundance of things adapted to human use4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,spiritual ,sins ,are ,fittingly ,distinguished from ,carnal ,sins8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3ai73 ,the works of the flesh are manifest1 which are fornication1 uncleanness1 immodesty1 luxury1 idolatry1 witchcrafts1 etc4 from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh4 ,now carnal sins are called works of the flesh4 ,therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whosoever sins1 walks according to the flesh1 as stated in ,rom4 #h3ac3 ,if you live according to the flesh1 you shall die4 ,but if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh1 you shall live4 ,now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin4 ,therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the higher part of the soul1 which is the mind or reason1 is called the spirit1 according to ,eph4 #d3bc3 ,be renewed in the spirit of your mind1 where spirit stands for reason1 according to a gloss4 ,now every sin1 which is committed in accordance with the flesh1 flows from the reason by its consent2 since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual1 and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if some sins are carnal specifically1 this1 seemingly1 should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body4 ,but1 according to the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #f3ah71 every sin that a man doth1 is without the body3 but he that committeth fornication1 sinneth against his own body4 ,therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin1 whereas the ,apostle 7,eph4 #e3c7 reckons covetousness with the carnal sins4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag7 says that of the seven capital sins five are spiritual1 and two carnal4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 sins take their species from their objects4 ,now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good1 for which man has an inordinate desire1 and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure4 ,now1 as explained above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #c71 pleasure is twofold4 ,one belongs to the soul1 and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire2 this can also be called spiritual pleasure1 e4g4 when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like4 ,the other pleasure is bodily or natural1 and is realized in bodily touch1 and this can also be called carnal pleasure4 ,accordingly1 those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure1 are called spiritual sins2 while those which consist in carnal pleasure1 are called carnal sins1 e4g4 gluttony1 which consists in the pleasures of the table2 and lust1 which consists in sexual pleasures4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #g3a73 ,let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as a gloss says on the same passage1 these vices are called works of the flesh1 not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure2 but flesh here denotes man1 who is said to live according to the flesh1 when he lives according to himself1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #b1 #c74 ,the reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act1 viz4 the act of reason3 but the end of these sins1 from which they are named1 is carnal pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the gloss says1 in the sin of fornication the soul is the body's slave in a special sense1 because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else3 whereas the pleasure of gluttony1 although carnal1 does not so utterly absorb the reason4 ,it may also be said that in this sin1 an injury is done to the body also1 for it is defiled inordinately3 wherefore by this sin alone is man said specifically to sin against his body4 ,while covetousness1 which is reckoned among the carnal sins1 stands here for adultery1 which is the unjust appropriation of another's wife4 ,again1 it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily1 and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins3 but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body1 but to the spirit1 wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag7 that it is a spiritual sin4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sins ,differ ,specifically in ,reference to ,their ,causes8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes4 ,for a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being4 ,now sins derive their being from their causes4 ,therefore they take their species from them also4 ,therefore they differ specifically in reference to their causes4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species4 ,now the object in a sin is like its material cause4 ,since1 therefore1 sins differ specifically according to their objects1 it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine1 commenting on ,ps4 #gi3ag1 ,things set on fire and dug down1 says that every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility1 or to love enkindling us to undue ardor4 ,for it is written 7#a ,john #b3af7 that all that is in the world1 is the concupiscence of the flesh1 or ,vulg43 'and' the concupiscence of the eyes1 or ,vulg43 'and' the pride of life4 ,now a thing is said to be in the world on account of sin1 in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world1 as ,augustine observes 7,tract4 ii in ,joan474 ,gregory1 too 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag71 distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices4 ,now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins4 ,therefore1 seemingly1 sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes4 ,on the contrary1 ,if this were the case all sins would belong to one species1 since they are due to one cause4 ,for it is written 7,ecclus4 #aj3ae7 that pride is the beginning of all sin1 and 7#a ,tim4 #f3aj7 that the desire of money is the root of all evils4 ,now it is evident that there are various species of sins4 ,therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes4 ,i answer that1 ,since there are four kinds of causes1 they are attributed to various things in various ways4 ,because the formal and the material cause regard properly the substance of a thing2 and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form1 both in species and in genus4 ,the agent and the end regard directly movement and operation3 wherefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes2 in different ways1 however1 because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts2 so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects1 which are the ends or terms of those acts1 but also from their active principles3 thus heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold4 ,on the other hand1 the active principles in voluntary acts1 such as the acts of sins1 are not determined1 of necessity1 to one act1 and consequently from one active or motive principle1 diverse species of sins can proceed3 thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft1 or murder1 or to neglect the flock committed to his care2 and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor4 ,hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes1 but only in respect of diversity in the final cause1 which is the end and object of the will4 ,for it has been shown above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f7 that human acts take their species from the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the active principles in voluntary acts1 not being determined to one act1 do not suffice for the production of human acts1 unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,metaph4 ix1 text4 #ae1 #af71 and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,objects1 in relation to external acts1 have the character of matter about which2 but1 in relation to the interior act of the will1 they have the character of end2 and it is owing to this that they give the act its species4 ,nevertheless1 even considered as the matter about which1 they have the character of term1 from which movement takes its species 7,phys4 v1 text4 #d2 ,ethic4 x1 #d72 yet even terms of movement specify movements1 in so far as term has the character of end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these distinctions of sins are given1 not as distinct species of sins1 but to show their various causes4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,sin ,is ,fittingly ,divided into ,sin ,against ,god1 ,against ,oneself1 and ,against ,one's ,neighbor8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against ,god1 against one's neighbor1 and against oneself4 ,for that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin4 ,but it is common to all sins to be against ,god3 for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is against ,god's law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore sin against ,god should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every division should consist of things in opposition to one another4 ,but these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another3 for whoever sins against his neighbor1 sins against himself and against ,god4 ,therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 specification is not taken from things external4 ,but ,god and our neighbor are external to us4 ,therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them3 and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore 7,de ,summo ,bono71 in giving the division of sins1 says that man is said to sin against himself1 against ,god1 and against his neighbor4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,,aa4 #a1 #f71 sin is an inordinate act4 ,now there should be a threefold order in man3 one in relation to the rule of reason1 in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason3 another order is in relation to the rule of the ,divine ,law1 whereby man should be directed in all things3 and if man were by nature a solitary animal1 this twofold order would suffice4 ,but since man is naturally a civic and social animal1 as is proved in ,polit4 i1 #b1 hence a third order is necessary1 whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell4 ,of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it4 ,for whatever things are comprised under the order of reason1 are comprised under the order of ,god ,himself4 ,yet some things are comprised under the order of ,god1 which surpass the human reason1 such as matters of faith1 and things due to ,god alone4 ,hence he that sins in such matters1 for instance1 by heresy1 sacrilege1 or blasphemy1 is said to sin against ,god4 ,in like manner1 the first order includes the third and surpasses it1 because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor1 we need to be directed according to the order of reason4 ,yet in some things we are directed according to reason1 in relation to ourselves only1 and not in reference to our neighbor2 and when man sins in these matters1 he is said to sin against himself1 as is seen in the glutton1 the lustful1 and the prodigal4 ,but when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor1 he is said to sin against his neighbor1 as appears in the thief and murderer4 ,now the things whereby man is directed to ,god1 his neighbor1 and himself are diverse4 ,wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects1 according to which the species of sins are diversified3 and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins3 because the virtues also1 to which sins are opposed1 differ specifically in respect of these three4 ,for it is evident from what has been said 7,q4 #fb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c7 that by the theological virtues man is directed to ,god2 by temperance and fortitude1 to himself2 and by justice to his neighbor4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to sin against ,god is common to all sins1 in so far as the order to ,god includes every human order2 but in so far as order to ,god surpasses the other two orders1 sin against ,god is a special kind of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when several things1 of which one includes another1 are distinct from one another1 this distinction is understood to refer1 not to the part contained in another1 but to that in which one goes beyond another4 ,this may be seen in the division of numbers and figures3 for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby1 but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby3 and the same applies to the numbers three and four4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although ,god and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself1 they are not external to the act of sin1 but are related to it as to its object4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,division of ,sins ,according to ,their ,debt of ,punishment ,diversifies ,their ,species8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species2 for instance1 when sin is divided into mortal and venial4 ,for things which are infinitely apart1 cannot belong to the same species1 nor even to the same genus4 ,but venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart1 since temporal punishment is due to venial sin1 and eternal punishment to mortal sin2 and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault1 according to ,deut4 #be3b3 ,according to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be4 ,therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus1 nor can they be said to belong to the same species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some sins are mortal in virtue of their species 99,ex genere1 genus in this case denoting the species1 as murder and adultery2 and some are venial in virtue of their species1 as in an idle word1 and excessive laughter4 ,therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward1 so does sin stand in relation to punishment4 ,but the reward is the end of the virtuous act4 ,therefore punishment is the end of sin4 ,now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment4 ,on the contrary1 ,those things that constitute a species are prior to the species1 e4g4 specific differences4 ,but punishment follows sin as the effect thereof4 ,therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment4 ,i answer that1 ,in things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference3 the first causes the diversity of species1 and is not to be found save in different species1 e4g4 rational and irrational1 animate1 and inanimate3 the other difference is consequent to specific diversity2 and though1 in some cases1 it may follow from the diversity of species1 yet1 in others1 it may be found within the same species2 thus white and black are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan1 and yet this difference is found within the one species of man4 ,we must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin1 or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment1 cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity4 ,for what is accidental never constitutes a species2 and what is outside the agent's intention is accidental 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #ej74 ,now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner1 wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner4 ,nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle1 viz4 the justice of the judge1 who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin4 ,therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment1 may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins1 but cannot constitute it4 ,now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin4 ,for inordinateness is twofold1 one that destroys the principle of order1 and another which1 without destroying the principle of order1 implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle3 thus1 in an animal's body1 the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed2 this is the inordinateness of death2 while1 on the other hand1 saving the vital principle1 there may be disorder in the bodily humors2 and then there is sickness4 ,now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end1 which stands in the same relation to matters of action1 as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation 7,ethic4 vii1 #h74 ,therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end1 viz4 ,god1 to ,whom it is united by charity1 there is mortal sin2 but when it is disordered without turning away from ,god1 there is venial sin4 ,for even as in the body1 the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life1 is irreparable according to nature1 while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved1 so it is in matters concerning the soul4 ,because1 in speculative matters1 it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles1 whereas one who errs1 but retains the principles1 can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles4 ,likewise in practical matters1 he who1 by sinning1 turns away from his last end1 if we consider the nature of his sin1 falls irreparably1 and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment3 whereas when a man sins without turning away from ,god1 by the very nature of his sin1 his disorder can be repaired1 because the principle of the order is not destroyed2 wherefore he is said to sin venially1 because1 to wit1 he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they turn away from1 not as regards what they turn to1 viz4 the object which specifies them4 ,hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins2 for instance1 in the species adultery the first movement is a venial sin2 while an idle word1 which is1 generally speaking1 venial1 may even be a mortal sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species1 and another venial by reason of its species1 it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins1 not that it is the cause thereof4 ,and this difference may be found even in things of the same species1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtuously2 whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner1 but1 on the contrary1 is against his will4 ,hence the comparison fails4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,sins of ,commission and ,omission ,differ ,specifically8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically4 ,for offense and sin are condivided with one another 7,eph4 #b3a71 where it is written3 ,when you were dead in your offenses and sins1 which words a gloss explains1 saying3 ',offenses1' by omitting to do what was commanded1 and 'sins1' by doing what was forbidden4 ,whence it is evident that offenses here denotes sins of omission2 while sin denotes sins of commission4 ,therefore they differ specifically1 since they are contrasted with one another as different species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is essential to sin to be against ,god's law1 for this is part of its definition1 as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f74 ,now in ,god's law1 the affirmative precepts1 against which is the sin of omission1 are different from the negative precepts1 against which is the sin of omission4 ,therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation4 ,now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species1 since negation has no species2 for there is neither species nor difference of non-being1 as the ,philosopher states 7,phys4 iv1 text4 #fg74 ,therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species4 ,on the contrary1 ,omission and commission are found in the same species of sin4 ,for the covetous man both takes what belongs to others1 which is a sin of commission2 and gives not of his own to whom he should give1 which is a sin of omission4 ,therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically4 ,i answer that1 ,there is a twofold difference in sins2 a material difference and a formal difference3 the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act2 while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end1 which is also their proper object4 ,hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference1 which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin1 because they are directed to the one same end3 thus strangling1 stoning1 and stabbing come under the one species of murder1 although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species4 ,accordingly1 if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission1 they differ specifically1 using species in a broad sense1 in so far as negation and privation may have a species4 ,but if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission1 they do not differ specifically1 because they are directed to the same end1 and proceed from the same motive4 ,for the covetous man1 in order to hoard money1 both robs1 and omits to give what he ought1 and in like manner1 the glutton1 to satiate his appetite1 both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts4 ,the same applies to other sins3 for in things1 negation is always founded on affirmation1 which1 in a manner1 is its cause4 ,hence in the physical order it comes under the same head1 that fire gives forth heat1 and that it does not give forth cold4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this division in respect of commission and omission1 is not according to different formal species1 but only according to material species1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in ,god's law1 the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts1 was that men might be gradually led to virtue1 first by abstaining from evil1 being induced to this by the negative precepts1 and afterwards by doing good1 to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts4 ,wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues1 but to different degrees of virtue2 and consequently they are not1 of necessity1 opposed to sins of different species4 ,moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away1 because in this respect it is a negation or privation1 but by that to which it turns1 in so far as sin is an act4 ,consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the ,law4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection considers the material diversity of sins4 ,it must be observed1 however1 that although1 properly speaking1 negation is not in a species1 yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,sins ,are ,fittingly ,divided into ,sins of ,thought1 ,word1 and ,deed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought1 word1 and deed4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 describes three stages of sin1 of which the first is when the carnal sense offers a bait1 which is the sin of thought2 the second stage is reached when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought2 and the third stage1 when consent is given to the deed4 ,now these three belong to the sin of thought4 ,therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory 7,moral4 iv1 #be7 reckons four degrees of sin2 the first of which is a fault hidden in the heart2 the second1 when it is done openly2 the third1 when it is formed into a habit2 and the fourth1 when man goes so far as to presume on ,god's mercy or to give himself up to despair3 where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word1 and two other degrees of sin are added4 ,therefore the first division was unfitting4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought4 ,therefore these sins do not differ specifically4 ,therefore they should not be condivided with one another4 ,on the contrary1 ,jerome in commenting on ,ezech4 #dc3bc1 says3 ,the human race is subject to three kinds of sin1 for when we sin1 it is either by thought1 or word1 or deed4 ,i answer that1 ,things differ specifically in two ways3 first1 when each has the complete species2 thus a horse and an ox differ specifically3 secondly1 when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement3 thus the building is the complete generation of a house1 while the laying of the foundations1 and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 x1 #d72 and the same can apply to the generation of animals4 ,accordingly sins are divided into these three1 viz4 sins of thought1 word1 and deed1 not as into various complete species3 for the consummation of sin is in the deed1 wherefore sins of deed have the complete species2 but the first beginning of sin is its foundation1 as it were1 in the sin of thought2 the second degree is the sin of word1 in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought2 while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed4 ,consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin4 ,nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin1 since they proceed from the same motive4 ,for the angry man1 through desire of vengeance1 is at first disturbed in thought1 then he breaks out into words of abuse1 and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds2 and the same applies to lust and to any other sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all sins of thought have the common note of secrecy1 in respect of which they form one degree1 which is1 however1 divided into three stages1 viz4 of cogitation1 pleasure1 and consent4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sins of words and deed are both done openly1 and for this reason ,gregory 7,moral4 iv1 #be7 reckons them under one head3 whereas ,jerome 7in commenting on ,ezech4 #dc3bc7 distinguishes between them1 because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally2 while in sins of deed1 it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended1 and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel4 ,habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin1 even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it1 but when each is found by itself3 even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement1 when the movement is continuous1 but only when there is a break in the movement4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,excess and ,deficiency ,diversify the ,species of ,sins8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins4 ,for excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less4 ,now more and less do not diversify a species4 ,therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as sin1 in matters of action1 is due to straying from the rectitude of reason1 so falsehood1 in speculative matters1 is due to straying from the truth of the reality4 ,now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality4 ,therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one species cannot be made out of two1 as ,porphyry declares 99,isagog42 cf4 ,arist4 ,metaph4 i4 ,now excess and deficiency are united in one sin2 for some are at once illiberal and wasteful--illiberality being a sin of deficiency1 and prodigality1 by excess4 ,therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins4 ,on the contrary1 ,contraries differ specifically1 for contrariety is a difference of form1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #ac1 #ad4 ,now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another1 as illiberality to wastefulness4 ,therefore they differ specifically4 ,i answer that1 ,while there are two things in sin1 viz4 the act itself and its inordinateness1 in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the ,divine law1 the species of sin is gathered1 not from its inordinateness1 which is outside the sinner's intention1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 but one the contrary1 from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention is directed4 ,consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin1 there will be a different species of sin4 ,now it is evident that the motive for sinning1 in sins by excess1 is not the same as the motive for sinning1 in sins of deficiency2 in fact1 they are contrary to one another1 just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures1 while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same4 ,therefore these sins not only differ specifically1 but are contrary to one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although more and less do not cause diversity of species1 yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference1 in so far as they are the result of diversity of form2 thus we may say that fire is lighter than air4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #a7 that those who held that there are no different species of friendship1 by reason of its admitting of degree1 were led by insufficient proof4 ,in this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different1 in so far as they result from different motives4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason2 and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason4 ,on the other hand1 sometimes he who utters a falsehood1 intends to hide the truth1 wherefore in this respect1 it matters not whether he tells more or less4 ,if1 however1 departure from the truth be not outside the intention1 it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less2 and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood1 as is evident of the boaster1 who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame1 and the cheat1 who tells less than the truth1 in order to escape from paying his debts4 ,this also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects3 for instance one may be illiberal 99,cf4 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #aai1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a in taking what one ought not3 and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject1 in different respects4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gb1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,sins ,differ ,specifically in ,respect of ,different ,circumstances8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances4 ,for1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 evil results from each single defect4 ,now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances4 ,therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sins are human acts4 ,but human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #aj74 ,therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 diverse species are assigned to gluttony1 according to the words contained in the following verse3 ,hastily1 sumptuously1 too much1 greedily1 daintily4 ,now these pertain to various circumstances1 for hastily means sooner than is right2 too much1 more than is right1 and so on with the others4 ,therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #g2 iv1 #a7 that every vice sins by doing more than one ought1 and when one ought not2 and in like manner as to the other circumstances4 ,therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #h71 wherever there is a special motive for sinning1 there is a different species of sin1 because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin4 ,now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted1 there is but one motive3 thus the illiberal man1 for the same motive1 takes when he ought not1 where he ought not1 and more than he ought1 and so on with the circumstances1 since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money3 and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins1 but belongs to one and the same species4 ,sometimes1 however1 the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives3 for instance that a man eat hastily1 may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food1 on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors2 and that he desire too much food1 may be due to a naturally strong digestion2 that he desire choice meats1 is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food4 ,hence in such matters1 the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evil1 as such1 is a privation1 and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived1 even as other privations4 ,but sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 but from turning to the object of the act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another1 save when there is another motive4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the various species of gluttony there are various motives1 as stated4 ,,question #gc ,,of ,,the ,,comparison ,,of ,,one ,,sin ,,with ,,another 7,in ,ten ,articles7 ,we must now consider the comparison of one sin with another3 under which head there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether all sins and vices are connected with one another8 7#b7 ,whether all are equal8 7#c7 ,whether the gravity of sin depends on its object8 7#d7 ,whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed8 7#e7 ,whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins8 7#f7 ,whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes8 7#g7 ,whether it depends on their circumstances8 7#h7 ,whether it depends on how much harm ensues8 7#i7 ,whether on the position of the person sinned against8 7#aj7 ,whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,all ,sins ,are ,connected with ,one ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all sins are connected4 ,for it is written 7,james #b3aj73 ,whosoever shall keep the whole ,law1 but offend in one point1 is become guilty of all4 ,now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of ,law1 is the same as to commit all sins1 because1 as ,ambrose says 7,de ,parad4 viii71 sin is a transgression of the ,divine law1 and disobedience of the heavenly commandments4 ,therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 each sin banishes its opposite virtue4 ,now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all1 as was shown above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore whoever commits one sin1 is deprived of all the virtues4 ,therefore whoever commits one sin1 is guilty of all sins4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all virtues are connected1 because they have a principle in common1 as stated above 7,q4 #fe1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now as the virtues have a common principle1 so have sins1 because1 as the love of ,god1 which builds the city of ,god1 is the beginning and root of all the virtues1 so self-love1 which builds the city of ,babylon1 is the root of all sins1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bh74 ,therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one1 has them all4 ,on the contrary1 ,some vices are contrary to one another1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ii1 #h74 ,but contraries cannot be together in the same subject4 ,therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another4 ,i answer that1 ,the intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason1 is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason4 ,for the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason1 wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end1 so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done1 viz4 prudence1 as stated above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,but the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason2 rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species4 ,now these goods1 to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason1 are of various kinds1 having no mutual connection2 in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another4 ,since1 therefore1 vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn1 it is evident that1 in respect of that which completes a sin's species1 sins are not connected with one another4 ,for sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one1 as is the case with virtues1 which are connected1 but rather in forsaking the one for the many4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,james is speaking of sin1 not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #a71 but as regards that from which sin turns away1 in as much as man1 by sinning1 departs from a commandment of the law4 ,now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same1 as he also says in the same passage1 so that the same ,god is despised in every sin2 and in this sense he says that whoever offends in one point1 is become guilty of all1 for as much as1 by committing one sin1 he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of ,god1 which is the origin of all sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #d71 the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin2 because venial sin does not destroy virtue2 while mortal sin destroys infused virtue1 by turning man away from ,god4 ,yet one act1 even of mortal sin1 does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue2 though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit1 the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed1 the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence1 since when man acts against any virtue whatever1 he acts against prudence1 without which no moral virtue is possible1 as stated above 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #a74 ,consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue1 which they have in so far as they partake of prudence1 yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts1 which inclinations1 however1 are not virtues4 ,nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins--first1 because several vices are opposed to one virtue1 so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them1 without the others being present2 secondly1 because sin is directly opposed to virtue1 as regards the virtue's inclination to act1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore1 as long as any virtuous inclinations remain1 it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the love of ,god is unitive1 in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one2 so that the virtues1 which flow from the love of ,god1 are connected together4 ,but self-love disunites man's affections among different things1 in so far as man loves himself1 by desiring for himself temporal goods1 which are various and of many kinds3 hence vices and sins1 which arise from self-love1 are not connected together4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,all ,sins ,are ,equal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all sins are equal4 ,because sin is to do what is unlawful4 ,now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things4 ,therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way4 ,therefore one sin is not graver than another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason1 which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things4 ,therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line4 ,but passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way1 even if one go a long way from it or stay near it1 since privations do not admit of more or less4 ,therefore all sins are equal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sins are opposed to virtues4 ,but all virtues are equal1 as ,cicero states 7,paradox4 iii74 ,therefore all sins are equal4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said to ,pilate 7,john #ai3aa73 ,he that hath delivered me to thee1 hath the greater sin1 and yet it is evident that ,pilate was guilty of some sin4 ,therefore one sin is greater than another4 ,i answer that1 ,the opinion of the ,stoics1 which ,cicero adopts in the book on ,paradoxes 7,paradox4 iii71 was that all sins are equal3 from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics1 who not only hold all sins to be equal1 but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal4 ,so far as can be gathered from the words of ,cicero the ,stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only1 in so far1 to wit1 as it is a departure from reason2 wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less1 they held that all sins are equal4 ,yet1 if we consider the matter carefully1 we shall see that there are two kinds of privation4 ,for there is a simple and pure privation1 which consists1 so to speak1 in being corrupted2 thus death is privation of life1 and darkness is privation of light4 ,such like privations do not admit of more or less1 because nothing remains of the opposite habit2 hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death1 or on the third or fourth days1 than after a year1 when his corpse is already dissolved2 and1 in like manner1 a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades1 than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light4 ,there is1 however1 another privation which is not simple1 but retains something of the opposite habit2 it consists in becoming corrupted rather than in being corrupted1 like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors1 yet so that something remains of that commensuration1 else the animal would cease to live3 and the same applies to deformity and the like4 ,such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit4 ,for it matters much in sickness or deformity1 whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or members4 ,the same applies to vices and sins3 because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether2 else evil1 if total1 destroys itself1 as stated in ,ethic4 iv1 #e4 ,for the substance of the act1 or the affection of the agent could not remain1 unless something remained of the order of reason4 ,therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason3 and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to commit sin is unlawful on account of some inordinateness therein3 wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful1 and consequently graver sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject3 yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species2 and again1 one man is more virtuous than another1 in the same species of virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #ff1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,moreover1 even if virtues were equal1 it would not follow that vices are equal1 since virtues are connected1 and vices or sins are not4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,gravity of ,sins ,varies ,according to ,their ,objects8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects4 ,because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality3 whereas the object is the matter of the sin4 ,therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice4 ,now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns1 and which is some appetible good1 but rather from that which it turns away from4 ,therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sins that have different objects are of different kinds4 ,but things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another1 as is proved in ,phys4 vii1 text4 #cj1 seqq4 ,therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects4 ,on the contrary1 ,sins take their species from their objects1 as was shown above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #a74 ,but some sins are graver than others in respect of their species1 as murder is graver than theft4 ,therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects4 ,i answer that1 ,as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #e71 the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another3 for just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humors1 in keeping with an animal's nature1 so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason4 ,now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors1 the graver is the sickness3 thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart1 which is the principle of life1 or from some neighboring part1 is more dangerous4 ,wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver1 as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason4 ,now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end3 wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts1 the graver the sin4 ,now the object of an act is its end1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b72 and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects4 ,thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end1 while man is further directed to ,god as his end4 ,wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man1 e4g4 murder1 is graver than a sin which is about external things1 e4g4 theft2 and graver still is a sin committed directly against ,god1 e4g4 unbelief1 blasphemy1 and the like3 and in each of these grades of sin1 one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or lower principle4 ,and forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects1 the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost1 as resulting from the species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned1 yet it has the character of an end1 in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on it1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,now the form of a moral act depends on the end1 as was shown above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good1 it follows that he turns away from the immutable ,good1 which aversion completes the nature of evil4 ,hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the objects of human acts are related to one another1 wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind1 in so far as they are directed to the last end4 ,therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,gravity of ,sins ,depends on the ,excellence of the ,virtues to ,which ,they ,are ,opposed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed1 so that1 to wit1 the graver sin is opposed to the greater virtue4 ,for1 according to ,prov4 #ae3e1 ,in abundant justice there is the greatest strength4 ,now1 as ,our ,lord says 7,matt4 #e3bj1 seqq47 abundant justice restrains anger1 which is a less grievous sin than murder1 which less abundant justice restrains4 ,therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #c that virtue is about the difficult and the good3 whence it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult4 ,but it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult1 than in what is less difficult4 ,therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ac74 ,now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope4 ,therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 #h3aj7 that the worst is opposed to the best4 ,now in morals the best is the greatest virtue2 and the worst is the most grievous sin4 ,therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,a sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways3 first1 principally and directly2 that sin1 to wit1 which is about the same object3 because contraries are about the same thing4 ,in this way1 the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue3 because1 just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object1 so also does the greatness of a virtue1 since both sin and virtue take their species from the object1 as shown above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue1 as being furthest removed from it in the same genus4 ,secondly1 the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin4 ,for the greater a virtue is1 the further it removes man from the contrary sin1 so that it withdraws man not only from that sin1 but also from whatever leads to it4 ,and thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is1 the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins3 even as the more perfect health is1 the more does it ward off even minor ailments4 ,and in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue1 on the part of the latter's effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin2 for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil4 ,for in each case there is a certain superiority1 in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil1 through not being overcome by the difficulty4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,charity is not any kind of love1 but the love of ,god3 hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly1 but the hatred of ,god1 which is the most grievous of all sins4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,carnal ,sins ,are of ,less ,guilt ,than ,spiritual ,sins8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins4 ,because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft3 for it is written 7,prov4 #f3cj1 #cb73 ,the fault is not so great when a man has stolen 4 4 4 but he that is an adulterer1 for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul4 ,now theft belongs to covetousness1 which is a spiritual sin2 while adultery pertains to lust1 which is a carnal sin4 ,therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says in his commentary on ,leviticus 99,the quotation is from ,de ,civ4 ,dei ii1 #d and iv1 #ca4 that the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry4 ,but he rejoices more in the greater sin4 ,therefore1 since lust is a carnal sin1 it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher proves 7,ethic4 vii1 #f7 that it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger4 ,but anger is a spiritual sin1 according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag72 while lust pertains to carnal sins4 ,therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxiii1 #aa7 that carnal sins are of less guilt1 but of more shame than spiritual sins4 ,i answer that1 ,spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins3 yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin2 but that1 considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal1 spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins1 other things being equal4 ,three reasons may be assigned for this4 ,the first is on the part of the subject3 because spiritual sins belong to the spirit1 to which it is proper to turn to ,god1 and to turn away from ,him2 whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite1 to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body2 so that carnal sin1 as such1 denotes more a turning to something1 and for that reason1 implies a closer cleaving2 whereas spiritual sin denotes more a turning from something1 whence the notion of guilt arises2 and for this reason it involves greater guilt4 ,a second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed3 because carnal sin1 as such1 is against the sinner's own body1 which he ought to love less1 in the order of charity1 than ,god and his neighbor1 against whom he commits spiritual sins1 and consequently spiritual sins1 as such1 are of greater guilt4 ,a third reason may be taken from the motive1 since the stronger the impulse to sin1 the less grievous the sin1 as we shall state further on 7,a4 #f74 ,now carnal sins have a stronger impulse1 viz4 our innate concupiscence of the flesh4 ,therefore spiritual sins1 as such1 are of greater guilt4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust1 but also to the sin of injustice1 and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness1 as a gloss observes on ,eph4 #e3e4 ,no fornicator1 or unclean1 or covetous person1 etc42 so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft1 as a man loves his wife more than his chattels4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust1 because it is of the greatest adhesion1 and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it4 ,for the desire of pleasure is insatiable1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iii1 #ab74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher himself says 7,ethic4 vii1 #f71 the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger1 is that lust partakes less of reason2 and in the same sense he says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj7 that sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach1 because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational animals3 hence1 by these sins man is1 so to speak1 brutalized2 for which same reason ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag7 that they are more shameful4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,gravity of a ,sin ,depends on ,its ,cause8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause4 ,because the greater a sin's cause1 the more forcibly it moves to sin1 and so the more difficult is it to resist4 ,but sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist2 for it denotes weakness in the sinner1 if he cannot easily resist sin2 and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous4 ,therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 concupiscence is a general cause of sin2 wherefore a gloss on ,rom4 #g3g1 ,for ,i had not known concupiscence1 says3 ,the law is good1 since by forbidding concupiscence1 it forbids all evils4 ,now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome1 the less grievous his sin4 ,therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act1 so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin4 ,now the greater the defect in the reason1 the less grievous the sin3 so much so that he who lacks the use of reason1 is altogether excused from sin1 and he who sins through ignorance1 sins less grievously4 ,therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,if the cause be increased1 the effect is increased4 ,therefore the greater the cause of sin1 the more grievous the sin4 ,i answer that1 ,in the genus of sin1 as in every other genus1 two causes may be observed4 ,the first is the direct and proper cause of sin1 and is the will to sin3 for it is compared to the sinful act1 as a tree to its fruit1 as a gloss observes on ,matt4 #g3ah1 ,a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit3 and the greater this cause is1 the more grievous will the sin be1 since the greater the will to sin1 the more grievously does man sin4 ,the other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote1 as it were1 being those whereby the will is inclined to sin4 ,among these causes we must make a distinction2 for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will3 such is the end1 which is the proper object of the will2 and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous1 because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end4 ,other causes incline the will to sin1 against the nature and order of the will1 whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason4 ,wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason 7e4g4 ignorance71 or which weaken the free movement of the will1 7e4g4 weakness1 violence1 fear1 or the like71 diminish the gravity of sin1 even as they diminish its voluntariness2 and so much so1 that if the act be altogether involuntary1 it is no longer sinful4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers the extrinsic moving cause1 which diminishes voluntariness4 ,the increase of such a cause diminishes the sin1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will1 then1 where there is greater concupiscence1 there is a greater sin4 ,but if by concupiscence we understand a passion1 which is a movement of the concupiscible power1 then a greater concupiscence1 forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will1 diminishes the sin1 because the man who sins1 being stimulated by a greater concupiscence1 falls through a more grievous temptation1 wherefore he is less to be blamed4 ,on the other hand1 if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason1 and the movement of the will1 then the greater concupiscence1 the graver the sin3 because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary1 and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin1 as stated4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #g ,whether a ,circumstance ,aggravates a ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin4 ,because sin takes its gravity from its species4 ,now a circumstance does not specify a sin1 for it is an accident thereof4 ,therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a circumstance is either evil or not3 if it is evil1 it causes1 of itself1 a species of evil2 and if it is not evil1 it cannot make a thing worse4 ,therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away 7from ,god74 ,but circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns4 ,therefore they do not add to the sin's malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin3 for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance1 deserves to be forgiven 7,ethic4 iii1 #a74 ,now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin4 ,therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b71 it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it4 ,now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance3 because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action4 ,wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances4 ,this happens in three ways4 ,first1 in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another3 thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife3 but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another1 the sin is drawn to another kind of sin1 viz4 injustice1 in so far as he usurps another's property2 and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication4 ,secondly1 a circumstance aggravates a sin1 not by drawing it into another genus1 but only by multiplying the ratio of sin3 thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not1 and to whom he ought not to give1 he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not1 and for that very reason his sin is more grievous2 even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body4 ,hence ,cicero says 7,paradox4 iii7 that in taking his father's life a man commits many sins2 for he outrages one who begot him1 who fed him1 who educated him1 to whom he owes his lands1 his house1 his position in the republic4 ,thirdly1 a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance3 thus1 taking another's property constitutes the sin of theft2 but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's property1 the sin will be more grievous2 although in itself1 to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some circumstances do specify a moral act1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #aj74 ,nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species1 may aggravate a sin2 because1 even as the goodness of a thing is weighed1 not only in reference to its species1 but also in reference to an accident1 so the malice of an act is measured1 not only according to the species of that act1 but also according to a circumstance4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a circumstance may aggravate a sin either way4 ,for if it is evil1 it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species2 because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species1 as stated above4 ,and if it be not evil1 it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reason should direct the action not only as regards the object1 but also as regards every circumstance4 ,therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance2 for instance1 by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not2 and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil4 ,this turning aside from the rule of reason results from man's turning away from ,god1 to ,whom man ought to be united by right reason4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,sin ,is ,aggravated by ,reason of ,its ,causing ,more ,harm8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm4 ,because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act4 ,but the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice1 as stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor4 ,because no one wishes to harm himself3 and no one can harm ,god1 according to ,job #ce3f1 #h3 ,if thy iniquities be multiplied1 what shalt thou do against ,him8 4 4 4 ,thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee4 ,if1 therefore1 sins were aggravated through causing more harm1 it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against ,god or oneself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace1 than by taking away his natural life2 because the life of grace is better than the life of nature1 so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace4 ,now1 speaking absolutely1 a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin4 ,if therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm1 it would follow that fornication1 absolutely speaking1 is a more grievous sin than murder1 which is evidently untrue4 ,therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ad73 ,since vice is contrary to nature1 a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature4 ,now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm4 ,therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm4 ,i answer that1 ,harm may bear a threefold relation to sin4 ,because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended1 as when a man does something with a mind to harm another1 e4g4 a murderer or a thief4 ,in this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly1 because then the harm is the direct object of the sin4 ,sometimes the harm is foreseen1 but not intended2 for instance1 when a man takes a short cut through a field1 the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops1 although his intention is not to do this harm1 but to commit fornication4 ,in this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin2 indirectly1 however1 in so far1 to wit1 as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin1 that a man does not forbear from doing1 to himself or to another1 a harm which he would not wish simply4 ,sometimes1 however1 the harm is neither foreseen nor intended3 and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally1 it does not aggravate the sin directly2 but1 on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue1 a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the harm follow directly from the sinful act1 although it be neither foreseen nor intended1 it aggravates the sin directly1 because whatever is directly consequent to a sin1 belongs1 in a manner1 to the very species of that sin3 for instance1 if a man is a notorious fornicator1 the result is that many are scandalized2 and although such was not his intention1 nor was it perhaps foreseen by him1 yet it aggravates his sin directly4 ,but this does not seem to apply to penal harm1 which the sinner himself incurs4 ,such like harm1 if accidentally connected with the sinful act1 and if neither foreseen nor intended1 does not aggravate a sin1 nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin3 for instance1 if a man in running to slay1 slips and hurts his foot4 ,if1 on the other hand1 this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act1 although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended1 then greater harm does not make greater sin1 but1 on the contrary1 a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm4 ,thus1 an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell1 would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft3 but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this1 as it would be in the case of a believer1 who1 seemingly1 sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment1 that he may satisfy his desire to sin2 but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as we have already stated 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #e71 in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions1 the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the harm done aggravates a sin1 it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous3 in fact1 it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin4 ,wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin1 in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate4 ,hence it does not follow1 supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor1 that such sins are the most grievous1 since a much greater inordinateness is to be found in sins which man commits against ,god1 and in some which he commits against himself4 ,moreover we might say that although no man can do ,god any harm in ,his substance1 yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning ,him1 e4g4 by destroying faith1 by outraging holy things1 which are most grievous sins4 ,again1 a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself1 as in the case of suicide1 though this be referred finally to some apparent good1 for example1 delivery from some anxiety4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument does not prove1 for two reasons3 first1 because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors2 whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but pleasure2 secondly1 because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death2 whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another's spiritual death1 because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #i ,whether a ,sin ,is ,aggravated by ,reason of the ,condition of the ,person ,against ,whom ,it ,is ,committed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed4 ,for if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man4 ,but this does not aggravate a sin3 because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him1 than others1 who1 through being scandalized1 are also hurt inwardly4 ,therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if the condition of the person aggravated the sin1 this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin1 because1 as ,cicero says 7,paradox4 iii73 ,the man who kills his slave sins once3 he that takes his father's life sins many times4 ,but the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin1 because every man is most akin to himself2 and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another1 e4g4 to kill one's own1 than another's horse1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 v1 #aa74 ,therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge1 according to ,wis4 #f3g3 ,the mighty shall be mightily tormented1 and ,luke #ab3dg3 ,the servant who knew the will of his lord 4 4 4 and did it not 4 4 4 shall be beaten with many stripes4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 on the part of the person sinned against1 the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowledge4 ,but1 apparently1 it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man1 since there is no respect of persons with ,god 7,col4 #c3be71 according to ,whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured4 ,therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,holy ,writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of ,god4 ,thus it is written 7#c ,kings #ai3ad73 ,they have destroyed ,thy altars1 they have slain ,thy prophets with the sword4 ,moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him1 according to ,micah #g3f3 the son dishonoreth the father1 and the daughter riseth up against her mother4 ,furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned3 thus it is written 7,job #cd3ah73 ,who saith to the king3 ',thou art an apostate'2 who calleth rulers ungodly4 ,therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin4 ,i answer that1 ,the person sinned against is1 in a manner1 the object of the sin4 ,now it has been stated above 7,a4 #c7 that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object2 so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave1 as its object is a more principal end4 ,but the principal ends of human acts are ,god1 man himself1 and his neighbor3 for whatever we do1 it is on account of one of these that we do it2 although one of them is subordinate to the other4 ,therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin1 in respect of the person sinned against1 may be considered on the part of these three4 ,first1 on the part of ,god1 to ,whom man is the more closely united1 as he is more virtuous or more sacred to ,god3 so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to ,god according to ,zech4 #b3h3 ,he that toucheth you1 toucheth the apple of ,my eye4 ,wherefore a sin is the more grievous1 according as it is committed against a person more closely united to ,god by reason of personal sanctity1 or official station4 ,on the part of man himself1 it is evident that he sins all the more grievously1 according as the person against whom he sins1 is more united to him1 either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond2 because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other1 and1 for this very reason1 sins all the more grievously1 according to ,ecclus4 #ad3e3 ,he that is evil to himself1 to whom will he be good8 ,on the part of his neighbor1 a man sins the more grievously1 according as his sin affects more persons3 so that a sin committed against a public personage1 e4g4 a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people1 is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person2 hence it is expressly prohibited 7,ex4 #bb3bh73 ,the prince of thy people thou shalt not curse4 ,in like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence1 is all the more grave1 on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person1 so far as he is concerned1 disturbs him internally and externally2 but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness1 which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will1 for instance his possessions1 is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another1 because he does it of his own will2 but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will1 such as natural and spiritual goods1 it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself3 for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another4 ,since1 however1 things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will1 the argument fails to prove1 in respect of injuries done to such like things1 that it is less grievous to sin in their regard1 unless indeed our neighbor be willing1 or give his approval4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is no respect for persons if ,god punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank2 for this is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #aj ,whether the ,excellence of the ,person ,sinning ,aggravates the ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin4 ,for man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to ,god1 according to ,ecclus4 #be3ac3 ,how great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge6 but there is none above him that feareth the ,lord4 ,now the more a man cleaves to ,god1 the less is a sin imputed to him3 for it is written 7#b ,paral4 #cj3 #ah1 #ai73 ,the ,lord ,who is good will show mercy to all them1 who with their whole heart seek the ,lord the ,god of their fathers2 and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified4 ,therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no respect of persons with ,god 7,rom4 #b3aa74 ,therefore ,he does not punish one man more than another1 for one and the same sin4 ,therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one should reap disadvantage from good4 ,but he would1 if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness4 ,therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,de ,summo ,bono ii1 #ah73 ,a sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent person4 ,i answer that1 ,sin is twofold4 ,there is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature3 and such like sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous1 because he is less negligent in checking those sins1 which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether4 ,but there are other sins which proceed from deliberation3 and these sins are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent4 ,four reasons may be assigned for this4 ,first1 because a more excellent person1 e4g4 one who excels in knowledge and virtue1 can more easily resist sin2 hence ,our ,lord said 7,luke #ab3dg7 that the servant who knew the will of his lord 4 4 4 and did it not 4 4 4 shall be beaten with many stripes4 ,secondly1 on account of ingratitude1 because every good in which a man excels1 is a gift of ,god1 to ,whom man is ungrateful when he sins3 and in this respect any excellence1 even in temporal goods1 aggravates a sin1 according to ,wis4 #f3g3 ,the mighty shall be mightily tormented4 ,thirdly1 on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning3 for instance1 if a prince were to violate justice1 whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice1 or if a priest were to be a fornicator1 whereas he has taken the vow of chastity4 ,fourthly1 on account of the example or scandal2 because1 as ,gregory says 7,pastor4 i1 #b73 ,sin becomes much more scandalous1 when the sinner is honored for his position3 and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more indignation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely1 because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage1 not from the good which he has1 but from his abuse thereof4 ,,question #gd ,,of ,,the ,,subject ,,of ,,sin 7,in ,ten ,articles7 ,we must now consider the subject of vice or sin3 under which head there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the will can be the subject of sin8 7#b7 ,whether the will alone is the subject of sin8 7#c7 ,whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin8 7#d7 ,whether it can be the subject of mortal sin8 7#e7 ,whether the reason can be the subject of sin8 7#f7 ,whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason8 7#g7 ,whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason8 7#h7 ,whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin8 7#i7 ,whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin8 7#aj7 ,whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,will ,is a ,subject of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil is outside the will and the intention4 ,but sin has the character of evil4 ,therefore sin cannot be in the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good4 ,now from the fact that will wishes the good1 it does not sin3 and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good1 points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will4 ,therefore sin is nowise in the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin3 because the efficient and the material cause do not coincide 7,phys4 #b1 text4 #gj74 ,now the will is the efficient cause of sin3 because the first cause of sinning is the will1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,duabus ,anim4 x1 #aj1 #aa74 ,therefore it is not the subject of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #i7 that it is by the will that we sin1 and live righteously4 ,i answer that1 ,sin is an act1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,,aa4 #a1 #f74 ,now some acts pass into external matter1 e4g4 to cut and to burn3 and such acts have for their matter and subject1 the thing into which the action passes3 thus the ,philosopher states 7,phys4 iii1 text4 #ah7 that movement is the act of the thing moved1 caused by a mover4 ,on the other hand1 there are acts which do not pass into external matter1 but remain in the agent1 e4g4 to desire and to know3 and such are all moral acts1 whether virtuous or sinful4 ,consequently the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act4 ,now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #f71 it follows that the will1 which is the principle of voluntary acts1 both of good acts1 and of evil acts or sins1 is the principle of sins4 ,therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evil is said to be outside the will1 because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil4 ,but since some evil is an apparent good1 the will sometimes desires an evil1 and in this sense is in the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will1 there would be no sin1 either in the will1 or in the apprehensive power1 as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible4 ,it remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will1 this defect also is deemed a sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter1 and which do not move themselves1 but move other things2 the contrary of which is to be observed in the will2 hence the argument does not prove4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,will ,alone ,is the ,subject of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,duabus ,anim4 x1 #aj7 that no one sins except by the will4 ,now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin4 ,therefore the will alone is the subject of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is an evil contrary to reason4 ,now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone4 ,therefore the will alone is the subject of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every sin is a voluntary act1 because1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah7 99,cf4 ,de ,vera ,relig4 xiv41 so true is it that every sin is voluntary1 that unless it be voluntary1 it is no sin at all4 ,now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary1 except in so far as those powers are moved by the will2 nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin1 because then even the external members of the body1 which are moved by the will1 would be a subject of sin2 which is clearly untrue4 ,therefore the will alone is the subject of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,sin is contrary to virtue3 and contraries are about one same thing4 ,but the other powers of the soul1 besides the will1 are the subject of virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #ef74 ,therefore the will is not the only subject of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as was shown above 7,a4 #a71 whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin4 ,now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will1 but also those which are commanded by the will1 as we stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d7 in treating of voluntariness4 ,therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin1 but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts1 or restrained from their acts1 by the will2 and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits1 because act and habit belong to the same subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we do not sin except by the will as first mover2 but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects2 but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils1 by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue1 vice1 and sin1 in so far as they partake of will and reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action3 wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves them1 as a slave who is moved but moves no other4 ,on the other hand1 the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents1 because they both act and are acted upon1 as is made clear in ,polit4i1 #c4 ,moreover1 the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter1 as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder4 ,consequently there is no comparison4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,sin in the ,sensuality8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality4 ,for sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions4 ,now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals4 ,therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no man sins in what he cannot avoid1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah74 ,but man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate1 since the sensuality ever remains corrupt1 so long as we abide in this mortal life2 wherefore it is signified by the serpent1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab1 #ac74 ,therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin4 ,now that alone do we seem to do ourselves1 which we do with the deliberation of reason1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #h74 ,therefore the movement of the sensuality1 which is without the deliberation of reason1 is not imputed to a man as a sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #g3ai73 ,the good which ,i will ,i do not2 but the evil which ,i will not1 that ,i do3 which words ,augustine explains 7,contra ,julian4 iii1 #bf2 ,de ,verb4 ,apost4 xii1 #b1 #c71 as referring to the evil of concupiscence1 which is clearly a movement of the sensuality4 ,therefore there can be sin in the sensuality4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate1 wherein consists the nature of sin4 ,now it is evident that the act of the sensuality1 or sensitive appetite1 is naturally inclined to be moved by the will4 ,wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals1 nevertheless1 in us1 they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason2 thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d74 ,in the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason2 and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action1 and1 consequently1 the subject of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the fomes1 which is never completely destroyed in this life1 since1 though the stain of original sin passes1 its effect remains4 ,however1 this corruption of the fomes does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements1 if he be presentient of them1 for instance by turning his thoughts to other things4 ,yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else1 an inordinate movement may arise about this also3 thus when a man1 in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence1 turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures1 to the considerations of science1 sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise4 ,consequently1 a man cannot avoid all such movements1 on account of the aforesaid corruption3 but it is enough1 for the conditions of a voluntary sin1 that he be able to avoid each single one4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason1 since the principal part of man does nothing therein3 wherefore such is not perfectly a human act2 and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin1 but is something imperfect of that kind4 ,therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason1 is a venial sin1 which is something imperfect in the genus of sin4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,mortal ,sin ,can ,be in the ,sensuality8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality4 ,because an act is discerned by its object4 ,now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality1 e4g4 about carnal pleasures4 ,therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin1 so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 mortal sin is opposed to virtue4 ,but virtue can be in the sensuality2 for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj74 ,therefore1 since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject1 sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin4 ,now disposition and habit are in the same subject4 ,since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality1 as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #c71 mortal sin can be there also4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #bc73 ,the inordinate movement of concupiscence1 which is the sin of the sensuality1 can even be in those who are in a state of grace1 in whom1 however1 mortal sin is not to be found4 ,therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin4 ,i answer that1 ,just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body's life causes the body's death1 so too a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life1 viz4 the last end1 causes spiritual death1 which is mortal sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e74 ,now it belongs to the reason alone1 and not to the sensuality1 to order anything to the end3 and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the end4 ,wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality1 but only in the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin3 yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due1 not to its being an act of the sensuality1 but to its being an act of reason1 to whom the ordering to the end belongs4 ,consequently mortal sin is imputed1 not to the sensuality1 but to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality1 but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will1 whose function it is to choose3 for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice3 wherefore the act of moral virtue1 which perfects the appetitive power1 is always accompanied by an act of prudence1 which perfects the rational power2 and the same applies to mortal sin1 as stated 7ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes3 for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject2 thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science3 sometimes it is in the same subject1 but is not the same thing2 thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire3 sometimes it is neither the same thing1 nor in the same subject1 as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other1 e4g4 goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect4 ,in this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality1 may be a disposition to mortal sin1 which is in the reason4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,sin ,can ,be in the ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin cannot be in the reason4 ,for the sin of any power is a defect thereof4 ,but the fault of the reason is not a sin1 on the contrary1 it excuses sin3 for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance4 ,therefore sin cannot be in the reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the primary object of sin is the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now reason precedes the will1 since it directs it4 ,therefore sin cannot be in the reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there can be no sin except about things which are under our control4 ,now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control3 since by nature some are mentally deficient1 and some shrewd-minded4 ,therefore no sin is in the reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason4 ,i answer that1 ,the sin of any power is an act of that power1 as we have clearly shown 7,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,now reason has a twofold act3 one is its proper act in respect of its proper object1 and this is the act of knowing the truth2 the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers4 ,now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason4 ,first1 in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth1 which error is imputed to the reason as a sin1 when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know3 secondly1 when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers1 or deliberately fails to check them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object1 and with regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know3 for then this defect of reason is not a sin1 and excuses from sin1 as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen4 ,if1 however1 the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know1 he is not altogether excused from sin1 and the defect is imputed to him as a sin4 ,the defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers1 is always imputed to reason as a sin1 because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a71 when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason1 the will moves and precedes the reason1 in one way1 and the reason moves and precedes the will in another3 so that both the movement of the will can be called rational1 and the act of the reason1 voluntary4 ,accordingly sin is found in the reason1 either through being a voluntary defect of the reason1 or through the reason being the principle of the will's act4 ,the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is evident from what has been said 7ad #a74 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,sin of ,morose ,delectation ,is in the ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason4 ,for delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power1 as stated above 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #a74 ,but the appetitive power is distinct from the reason1 which is an apprehensive power4 ,therefore morose delectation is not in the reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object shows to which power an act belongs1 since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object4 ,now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods1 and not about the goods of the reason4 ,therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a thing is said to be morose 99,from the ,latin mora--delay through taking a length of time4 ,but length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power4 ,therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 that if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure1 ,i deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit4 ,now the woman denotes the lower reason1 as he himself explains 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab74 ,therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated 7,a4 #e71 sin may be in the reason1 not only in respect of reason's proper act1 but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions4 ,now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts1 but also internal passions4 ,consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions1 sin is said to be in the reason1 as also when it fails in directing external actions4 ,now it fails1 in two ways1 in directing internal passions3 first1 when it commands unlawful passions2 for instance1 when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger1 or of lust3 secondly1 when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion2 for instance1 when a man1 having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate1 continues1 notwithstanding1 to dwell 7immoratur7 upon it1 and fails to drive it away4 ,and in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle2 but it is in the reason as its first mover1 in accordance with what has been stated above 7,a4 #a71 viz4 that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object2 but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason3 and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time1 but because the reason in deliberating dwells 7immoratur7 thereon1 and fails to drive it away1 deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab74 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,sin of ,consent to the ,act ,is in the ,higher ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason4 ,for consent is an act of the appetitive power1 as stated above 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #a73 whereas the reason is an apprehensive power4 ,therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g74 99,rationes aeternae1 cf4 ,i1 ,q4 #ae1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 where as in similar passages ratio has been rendered by the ,english type1 because ,st4 ,thomas was speaking of the ,divine idea as the archetype of the creature4 ,hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct1 and is identified with the eternal law1 7cf4 ,a4 #h1 ,obj4 #a2 ,a4 #i74 ,but sometimes consent is given to an act1 without consulting the eternal law3 since man does not always think about ,divine things1 whenever he consents to an act4 ,therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law1 so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions4 ,but consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed1 belongs to the lower reason1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #b74 ,therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as the higher reason excels the lower1 so does the reason excel the imagination4 ,now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination1 without any deliberation of his reason1 as when1 without premeditation1 he moves his hand1 or foot4 ,therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act1 independently of the higher reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab73 ,if the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses1 so far approves of any sin1 as to point1 if possible1 to its consummation by deed1 we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband4 ,i answer that1 ,consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given4 ,for just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters1 so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action4 ,now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment1 the final sentence belongs to the supreme court1 even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles2 since1 so long as there remains a yet higher principle1 the question can yet be submitted to it3 wherefore the judgment is still in suspense1 the final sentence not being as yet pronounced4 ,but it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason1 which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally2 and further still1 from the rule of the ,divine law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d74 ,consequently1 since the rule of the ,divine law is the higher rule1 it follows that the ultimate sentence1 whereby the judgment is finally pronounced1 belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types4 ,now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points1 the final judgment deals with that which comes last2 and1 in human acts1 the action itself comes last1 and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto4 ,therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason1 while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason1 which delivers judgment in a lower court3 although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation1 since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court1 is subject also to the judgment of the higher court1 but not conversely4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,consent is an act of the appetitive power1 not absolutely1 but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging1 as stated above 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #c74 ,because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment4 ,hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the higher reason is said to consent1 from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the ,divine law1 whether or not it advert to the eternal law4 ,for if it thinks of ,god's law1 it holds it in actual contempt3 and if not1 it neglects it by a kind of omission4 ,therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason3 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab71 the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin1 unless by its consent1 whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action1 or of restraining them from action1 it become the servant or slave of the evil deed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the higher reason1 by considering the eternal law1 can direct or restrain the internal delectation1 even as it can direct or restrain the external action3 nevertheless1 before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason1 while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles1 sometimes approves of this delectation3 and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason4 ,if1 however1 after considering the eternal law1 man persists in giving the same consent1 such consent will then belong to the higher reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate3 wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate4 ,but the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate1 and so requires time1 during which the higher reason can also deliberate2 consequently1 if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act1 this will deservedly be imputed to it4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,consent to ,delectation ,is a ,mortal ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin1 for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason1 which does not consider the eternal types1 i4e4 the eternal law1 and consequently does not turn away from them4 ,now every mortal sin consists in turning away from the ,divine law1 as is evident from ,augustine's definition of mortal sin1 which was quoted above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 consent to a thing is not evil1 unless the thing to which consent is given be evil4 ,now the cause of anything being such is yet more so1 or at any rate not less4 ,consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent4 ,but delectation without deed is not a mortal sin1 but only a venial sin4 ,therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 delectations differ in goodness and malice1 according to the difference of the deeds1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 x1 #c1 #e74 ,now the inward thought is one thing1 and the outward deed1 e4g4 fornication1 is another4 ,therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought1 differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication1 as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed2 and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand4 ,but the inward thought is not a mortal sin1 nor is the consent to that thought3 and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin1 not by reason of the delectation1 since this is found also in the marriage act1 but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself4 ,now he that consents to the delectation does not1 for this reason1 consent to the inordinateness of the act4 ,therefore he seems not to sin mortally4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication4 ,now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder4 ,much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 the ,lord's prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins1 as ,augustine asserts 7,enchiridion lxxviii74 ,now ,augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the ,lord's ,prayer3 for he says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 that this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed3 wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also1 and we should strike our breasts and say3 ',forgive us our trespasses4' ,therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine adds after a few words3 ,man will be altogether lost unless1 through the grace of the ,mediator1 he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought1 since without the will to do them1 he desires nevertheless to enjoy them4 ,but no man is lost except through mortal sin4 ,therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin4 ,i answer that1 ,there have been various opinions on this point1 for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin1 but only a venial sin1 while others have held it to be a mortal sin1 and this opinion is more common and more probable4 ,for we must take note that since every delectation results from some action1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #d1 and again1 that since every delectation may be compared to two things1 viz4 to the operation from which it results1 and to the object in which a person takes delight4 ,now it happens that an action1 just as a thing1 is an object of delectation1 because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end1 in which the person who delights in it1 rests4 ,sometimes the action itself1 which results in delectation1 is the object of delectation1 in so far as the appetitive power1 to which it belongs to take delight in anything1 is brought to bear on the action itself as a good3 for instance1 when a man thinks and delights in his thought1 in so far as his thought pleases him2 while at other times the delight consequent to an action1 e4g4 a thought1 has for its object another action1 as being the object of his thought2 and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite1 not indeed to the thought1 but to the action thought of4 ,accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication1 may delight in either of two things3 first1 in the thought itself1 secondly1 in the fornication thought of4 ,now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought2 and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin2 sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin1 as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose2 and sometimes it is no sin at all1 as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it2 for instance1 he may wish to preach or dispute about it4 ,consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus1 but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all3 wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought4 ,in this sense the first opinion is true4 ,but that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of1 is due to his desire being inclined to this act4 ,wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation1 amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication3 for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite4 ,now it is a mortal sin1 if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin4 ,wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin1 is itself a mortal sin1 as the second opinion maintains4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason1 but also in the higher reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types1 for1 though it is not intent on them1 as regulating according to them1 which is proper to the higher reason1 yet1 it is intent on them1 as being regulated according to them3 and by turning from them in this sense1 it may sin mortally2 since even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins1 in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according to the eternal types4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,consent to a sin that is venial in its genus1 is itself a venial sin1 and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication1 is a venial sin4 ,but delectation in the act itself of fornication is1 in its genus1 a mortal sin3 and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given1 is accidental1 viz4 on account of the incompleteness of the act3 which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given1 so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the delectation which has an external act for its object1 cannot be without complacency in the external act as such1 even though there be no decision to fulfil it1 on account of the prohibition of some higher authority3 wherefore the act is inordinate1 and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the consent to delectation1 resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of1 is a mortal sin also3 but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the ,lord's ,prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin1 but also from mortal sin4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,venial ,sin in the ,higher ,reason ,as ,directing the ,lower ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers1 i4e4 as consenting to a sinful act4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g7 that the higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law4 ,but mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law4 ,therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life1 as the heart is of the body's life4 ,but the diseases of the heart are deadly4 ,therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt4 ,but it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin1 deliberately1 without contempt4 ,since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal law1 it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin1 on account of the contempt of the ,divine law4 ,on the contrary1 ,consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,but consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin4 ,therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g71 the higher reason is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law2 it contemplates it by considering its truth2 it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it3 and to this pertains the fact that by deliberating through the eternal types1 it consents to an act or dissents from it4 ,now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to which it consents1 is not contrary to the eternal law1 in the same way as mortal sin is1 because it does not imply aversion from the last end1 but is beside that law1 as an act of venial sin is4 ,therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin1 it does not turn away from the eternal law3 wherefore it sins1 not mortally1 but venially4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,disease of the heart is twofold3 one which is in the very substance of the heart1 and affects its natural consistency1 and such a disease is always mortal3 the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the heart1 and such a disease is not always mortal4 ,in like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the eternal law1 is destroyed2 but when the disorder leaves this untouched1 the sin is not mortal but venial4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the ,divine law1 but only when the sin is contrary to the ,divine law4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,venial ,sin ,can ,be in the ,higher ,reason ,as ,such8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such1 i4e4 as considering the eternal law4 ,for the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object4 ,now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law1 in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin4 ,therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since the reason is a deliberative power1 there can be no act of reason without deliberation4 ,now every inordinate movement in things concerning ,god1 if it be deliberate1 is a mortal sin4 ,therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares1 is a venial sin4 ,now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin1 through the reason1 in deliberating1 having recourse to some higher good1 by acting against which1 man sins more grievously2 just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act1 considers that it is contrary to the law of ,god1 it sins more grievously in consenting1 than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue4 ,but the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object4 ,therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin1 neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin2 which is clearly false4 ,therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such4 ,on the contrary1 ,a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin4 ,but it belongs to the higher reason as such4 ,therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such4 ,i answer that1 ,the higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason4 ,for it does not regard the objects of the lower powers1 except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them1 and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation4 ,now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus1 is itself a mortal sin2 and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally1 if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins4 ,with regard to its own object it has a twofold act1 viz4 simple intuition1 and deliberation1 in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object4 ,but in respect of simple intuition1 it can have an inordinate movement about ,divine things1 as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief4 ,and although unbelief1 in its genus1 is a mortal sin1 yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin1 because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of ,god4 ,now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect1 before the eternal law1 i4e4 the law of ,god1 is consulted1 or can be consulted1 on the matter2 as1 for instance1 when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally1 and rejects it1 as soon as he had thus apprehended it1 before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the ,divine law4 ,if1 however1 the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation1 it is a mortal sin4 ,therefore1 in sudden movements1 the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object1 even if it be a mortal sin in its genus2 or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent2 but in things pertaining to the lower powers1 it always sins mortally1 in things which are mortal sins in their genus1 but not in those which are venial sins in their genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a sin which is against the eternal law1 though it be mortal in its genus1 may nevertheless be venial1 on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in matters of action1 the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds1 belongs to the reason1 as well as the act of deliberation3 even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions3 consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations1 of which one is higher than the other2 thus the existence of ,god may be considered1 either as possible to be known by the human reason1 or as delivered to us by ,divine revelation1 which is a higher consideration4 ,and therefore1 although the object of the higher reason is1 in its nature1 something sublime1 yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration3 and in this way1 that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin1 becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration1 as was explained above4 ,,question #ge ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,sin1 ,,in ,,general 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the causes of sin3 7#a7 in general2 7#b7 in particular4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether sin has a cause8 7#b7 ,whether it has an internal cause8 7#c7 ,whether it has an external cause8 7#d7 ,whether one sin is the cause of another8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,sin ,has a ,cause8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin has no cause4 ,for sin has the nature of evil1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f74 ,but evil has no cause1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore sin has no cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a cause is that from which something follows of necessity4 ,now that which is of necessity1 seems to be no sin1 for every sin is voluntary4 ,therefore sin has no cause4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if sin has a cause1 this cause is either good or evil4 ,it is not a good1 because good produces nothing but good1 for a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit 7,matt4 #g3ah74 ,likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin1 because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin1 and the evil of guilt is the same as sin4 ,therefore sin has no cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is done has a cause1 for1 according to ,job #e3f1 nothing upon earth is done without a cause4 ,but sin is something done2 since it a word1 deed1 or desire contrary to the law of ,god4 ,therefore sin has a cause4 ,i answer that1 ,a sin is an inordinate act4 ,accordingly1 so far as it is an act1 it can have a direct cause1 even as any other act2 but1 so far as it is inordinate1 it has a cause1 in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause4 ,now two causes may be assigned to a negation3 in the first place1 absence of the cause of affirmation2 i4e4 the negation of the cause itself1 is the cause of the negation in itself2 since the result of removing the cause is the removal of the effect3 thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness4 ,in the second place1 the cause of an affirmation1 of which a negation is a sequel1 is the accidental cause of the resulting negation3 thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency1 consequently causes a privation of cold4 ,the first of these suffices to cause a simple negation4 ,but1 since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation1 but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have1 such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause4 ,for that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing1 is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause4 ,and accordingly we are wont to say that evil1 which consists in a certain privation1 has a deficient cause1 or an accidental efficient cause4 ,now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause4 ,since then sin1 on the part of its inordinateness1 has an accidental efficient cause1 and on the part of the act1 a direct efficient cause1 it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act4 ,accordingly then1 the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the ,divine law1 and intent on some mutable good1 causes the act of sin directly1 and the inordinateness of the act1 indirectly1 and beside the intention3 for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sin signifies not only the privation of good1 which privation is its inordinateness1 but also the act which is the subject of that privation1 which has the nature of evil3 and how this evil has a cause1 has been explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if this definition is to be verified in all cases1 it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded4 ,for it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else1 and that the effect does not follow of necessity1 on account of some supervening impediment3 else it would follow that all things happen of necessity1 as is proved in ,metaph4 vi1 text4 #e4 ,accordingly1 though sin has a cause1 it does not follow that this is a necessary cause1 since its effect can be impeded4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above1 the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the ,divine law1 is the cause of sin4 ,now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the ,divine law1 has not in itself the nature of evil1 whether of punishment or of guilt1 before it is applied to the act4 ,wherefore accordingly1 evil is not the cause of the first sin1 but some good lacking some other good4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,sin ,has an ,internal ,cause8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin has no internal cause4 ,for that which is within a thing is always in it4 ,if therefore sin had an internal cause1 man would always be sinning1 since given the cause1 the effect follows4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing is not its own cause4 ,but the internal movements of a man are sins4 ,therefore they are not the cause of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary4 ,now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin1 for sin is contrary to nature1 as ,damascene states 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #c2 iv1 #ba72 while that which is voluntary1 if it be inordinate1 is already a sin4 ,therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,duabus ,anim4 x1 #aj1 #aa2 ,retract4 i1 #i7 that the will is the cause of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act4 ,now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts1 one remote1 the other proximate4 ,the proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will1 in respect of which man has a free-will2 while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part1 and also the sensitive appetite4 ,for just as it is due to the judgment of reason1 that the will is moved to something in accord with reason1 so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something2 which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason1 as we shall explain further on 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #a74 ,accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned2 one proximate1 on the part of the reason and will2 and the other remote1 on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite4 ,but since we have said above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c7 that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive1 yet lacking the due motive1 viz4 the rule of reason or the ,divine law1 this motive which is an apparent good1 appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite2 while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason1 whose nature it is to consider this rule2 and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will1 so that the act of the will1 given the conditions we have just mentioned1 is already a sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that which is within a thing as its natural power1 is always in it3 but that which is within it1 as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power1 is not always in it4 ,now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin1 but is made actual by the preceding movements1 both of the sensitive part1 in the first place1 and afterwards1 of the reason4 ,for it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses1 and because the appetite is inclined1 that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule1 so that the will produces the act of sin4 ,since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual1 neither is man always actually sinning4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin1 for this consists principally in the act of the will2 but some precede and some follow the sin itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which causes sin1 as a power produces its act1 is natural2 and again1 the movement of the sensitive part1 from which sin follows1 is natural sometimes1 as1 for instance1 when anyone sins through appetite for food4 ,yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails1 which man1 in accord with his nature1 ought to observe4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sin ,has an ,external ,cause8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin has no external cause4 ,for sin is a voluntary act4 ,now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us1 so that they have no external cause4 ,therefore sin has no external cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as nature is an internal principle1 so is the will4 ,now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause2 for instance1 the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle4 ,therefore in the moral order1 sin can arise from no other than an internal cause4 ,therefore it has no external cause4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the cause is multiplied1 the effect is multiplied4 ,now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are1 the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin4 ,therefore nothing external is a cause of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,num4 #ba3af73 ,are not these they1 that deceived the children of ,israel by the counsel of ,balaam1 and made you transgress against the ,lord by the sin of ,phogor8 ,therefore something external can be a cause of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 the internal cause of sin is both the will1 as completing the sinful act1 and the reason1 as lacking the due rule1 and the appetite1 as inclining to sin4 ,accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways1 either by moving the will itself immediately1 or by moving the reason1 or by moving the sensitive appetite4 ,now1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #d71 none can move the will inwardly save ,god alone1 who cannot be a cause of sin1 as we shall prove further on 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin1 except by moving the reason1 as a man or devil by enticing to sin2 or by moving the sensitive appetite1 as certain external sensibles move it4 ,yet neither does external enticement move the reason1 of necessity1 in matters of action1 nor do things proposed externally1 of necessity move the sensitive appetite1 except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way2 and even the sensitive appetite does not1 of necessity1 move the reason and will4 ,therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin1 but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof3 and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily1 it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause2 for nothing external is a cause of sin1 except through the medium of the internal cause1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied1 the sinful acts are multiplied1 because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency4 ,nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened1 since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,one ,sin ,is a ,cause of ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another4 ,for there are four kinds of cause1 none of which will fit in with one sin causing another4 ,because the end has the character of good2 which is inconsistent with sin1 which has the character of evil4 ,in like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause1 since evil is not an efficient cause1 but is weak and powerless1 as ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,the material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies1 which are composed of matter and form4 ,therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing1 as stated in ,meteor4 iv1 #b 99,cf4 ,de ,anima ii44 ,but sin is essentially something imperfect4 ,therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if one sin is the cause of a second sin1 in the same way1 yet another sin will be the cause of the first1 and thus we go on indefinitely1 which is absurd4 ,therefore one sin is not the cause of another4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says on ,ezechiel 7,hom4 xi73 ,a sin that is not quickly blotted out by repentance1 is both a sin and a cause of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin1 it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another1 in the same way as one human act is the cause of another4 ,hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes4 ,first1 after the manner of an efficient or moving cause1 both directly and indirectly4 ,indirectly1 as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement3 for when man1 by one sinful act1 loses grace1 or charity1 or shame1 or anything else that withdraws him from sin1 he thereby falls into another sin1 so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second4 ,directly1 as when1 by one sinful act1 man is disposed to commit more readily another like act3 because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts4 ,secondly1 after the manner of a material cause1 one sin is the cause of another1 by preparing its matter3 thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife1 which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together4 ,thirdly1 after the manner of a final cause1 one sin causes another1 in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end2 as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition1 or fornication for the purpose of theft4 ,and since the end gives the form to moral matters1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f71 it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another3 because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft1 the former is material while the latter is formal4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sin1 in so far as it is inordinate1 has the character of evil2 but1 in so far as it is an act1 it has some good1 at least apparent1 for its end3 so that1 as an act1 but not as being inordinate1 it can be the cause1 both final and efficient1 of another sin4 ,a sin has matter1 not of which but about which it is3 and it has its form from its end4 ,consequently one sin can be the cause of another1 in respect of the four kinds of cause1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness4 ,nevertheless1 as an act it can have natural perfection3 and thus it can be the cause of another sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not every cause of one sin is another sin2 so there is no need to go on indefinitely3 for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin4 ,,question #gf ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,sin1 ,,in ,,particular 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the causes of sin1 in particular1 and 7#a7 ,the internal causes of sin2 7#b7 its external causes2 and 7#c7 sins which are the causes of other sins4 ,in view of what has been said above 7,a4 #b71 the first consideration will be threefold3 so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance1 which is the cause of sin on the part of reason2 secondly1 of weakness or passion1 which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite2 thirdly1 of malice1 which is the cause of sin on the part of the will4 ,under the first head1 there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ignorance is a cause of sin8 7#b7 ,whether ignorance is a sin8 7#c7 ,whether it excuses from sin altogether8 7#d7 ,whether it diminishes sin8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,ignorance ,can ,be a ,cause of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin3 because a non-being is not the cause of anything4 ,now ignorance is a non-being1 since it is a privation of knowledge4 ,therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a turning to something1 as was stated above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #a74 ,now ignorance seems to savor of turning away from something4 ,therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every sin is seated in the will4 ,now the will does not turn to that which is not known1 because its object is the good apprehended4 ,therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 et ,grat4 lxvii7 that some sin through ignorance4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 viii1 #bg7 a moving cause is twofold1 direct and indirect4 ,a direct cause is one that moves by its own power1 as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things4 ,an indirect cause1 is either one that removes an impediment1 or the removal itself of an impediment3 and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act2 because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin1 in so far as it directs human acts4 ,now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge1 universal and particular3 because in conferring about what is to be done1 it employs a syllogism1 the conclusion of which is an act of judgment1 or of choice1 or an operation4 ,now actions are about singulars3 wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition4 ,but a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition1 except through the medium of a particular proposition3 thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide1 by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father1 and that this man is his father4 ,hence ignorance about either of these two propositions1 viz4 of the universal principle which is a rule of reason1 or of the particular circumstance1 could cause an act of parricide4 ,hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin1 but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act4 ,consequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide1 even though he recognized his father1 his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin1 but is concomitant with the sin3 wherefore such a man sins1 not through ignorance but in ignorance1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 iii1 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything3 but it can be an accidental cause1 as being the removal of an impediment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as knowledge1 which is removed by ignorance1 regards sin as turning towards something1 so too1 ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin1 as removing its impediment4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown3 but if something be known in one respect1 and unknown in another1 the will can will it4 ,it is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin3 for instance1 when a man knows that what he is killing is a man1 but not that it is his own father2 or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable1 but not that it is a sin4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,ignorance ,is a ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ignorance is not a sin4 ,for sin is a word1 deed or desire contrary to ,god's law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #e74 ,now ignorance does not denote an act1 either internal or external4 ,therefore ignorance is not a sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge4 ,now privation of grace is not a sin1 but a punishment resulting from sin4 ,therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if ignorance is a sin1 this can only be in so far as it is voluntary4 ,but if ignorance is a sin1 through being voluntary1 it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will1 rather than in the ignorance4 ,therefore the ignorance will not be a sin1 but rather a result of sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every sin is taken away by repentance1 nor does any sin1 except only original sin1 pass as to guilt1 yet remain in act4 ,now ignorance is not removed by repentance1 but remains in act1 all its guilt being removed by repentance4 ,therefore ignorance is not a sin1 unless perchance it be original sin4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if ignorance be a sin1 then a man will be sinning1 as long as he remains in ignorance4 ,but ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant4 ,therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning1 which is clearly false1 else ignorance would be a most grievous sin4 ,therefore ignorance is not a sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,nothing but sin deserves punishment4 ,but ignorance deserves punishment1 according to #a ,cor4 #ad3ch3 ,if any man know not1 he shall not be known4 ,therefore ignorance is a sin4 ,i answer that1 ,ignorance differs from nescience1 in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge2 wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything1 can be said to be nescient about it3 in which sense ,dionysius puts nescience in the angels 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74 ,on the other hand1 ignorance denotes privation of knowledge1 i4e4 lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know4 ,some of these we are under an obligation to know1 those1 to wit1 without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly4 ,wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith1 and the universal principles of right1 and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state4 ,meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know1 yet he is not bound to know them1 such as the geometrical theorems1 and contingent particulars1 except in some individual case4 ,now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do1 commits a sin of omission4 ,wherefore through negligence1 ignorance of what one is bound to know1 is a sin2 whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man1 if he fails to know what he is unable to know4 ,consequently ignorance of such like things is called invincible1 because it cannot be overcome by study4 ,for this reason such like ignorance1 not being voluntary1 since it is not in our power to be rid of it1 is not a sin3 wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin4 ,on the other hand1 vincible ignorance is a sin1 if it be about matters one is bound to know2 but not1 if it be about things one is not bound to know4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a71 when we say that sin is a word1 deed or desire1 we include the opposite negations1 by reason of which omissions have the character of sin2 so that negligence1 in as much as ignorance is a sin1 is comprised in the above definition of sin2 in so far as one omits to say what one ought1 or to do what one ought1 or to desire what one ought1 in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although privation of grace is not a sin in itself1 yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace1 it may have the character of sin1 even as ignorance2 nevertheless even here there is a difference1 since man can acquire knowledge by his acts1 whereas grace is not acquired by acts1 but by ,god's favor4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as in a sin of transgression1 the sin consists not only in the act of the will1 but also in the act willed1 which is commanded by the will2 so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin1 but also the omission1 in so far as it is in some way voluntary2 and accordingly1 the neglect to know1 or even lack of consideration is a sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although when the guilt has passed away through repentance1 the ignorance remains1 according as it is a privation of knowledge1 nevertheless the negligence does not remain1 by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,just as in other sins of omission1 man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding1 so is it with the sin of ignorance4 ,for the ignorant man sins actually indeed1 not continually1 but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,ignorance ,excuses from ,sin ,altogether8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether4 ,for as ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #i71 every sin is voluntary4 ,now ignorance causes involuntariness1 as stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is done beside the intention1 is done accidentally4 ,now the intention cannot be about what is unknown4 ,therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts4 ,but what is accidental does not give the species4 ,therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts1 should be deemed sinful or virtuous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man is the subject of virtue and sin1 inasmuch as he is partaker of reason4 ,now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason4 ,therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah7 that some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved4 ,now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins4 ,therefore some things done through ignorance are sins4 ,therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin4 ,i answer that1 ,ignorance1 by its very nature1 renders the act which it causes involuntary4 ,now it has already been stated 7,,aa4 #a1 #b7 that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented2 so that this act1 if knowledge were to hand1 would be contrary to the will1 which is the meaning of the word involuntary4 ,if1 however1 the knowledge1 which is removed by ignorance1 would not have prevented the act1 on account of the inclination of the will thereto1 the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling1 but not willing1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #a3 and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act1 as already stated1 since it does not make the act to be involuntary1 does not excuse from sin4 ,the same applies to any ignorance that does not cause1 but follows or accompanies the sinful act4 ,on the other hand1 ignorance which is the cause of the act1 since it makes it to be involuntary1 of its very nature excuses from sin1 because voluntariness is essential to sin4 ,but it may fail to excuse altogether from sin1 and this for two reasons4 ,first1 on the part of the thing itself which is not known4 ,for ignorance excuses from sin1 in so far as something is not known to be a sin4 ,now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin1 the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning1 whether it belong to the substance of the sin1 or not2 and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful2 for instance1 if a man strike someone1 knowing that it is a man 7which suffices for it to be sinful7 and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father1 7which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin72 or1 suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back1 and that if he had known this1 he would not have struck him 7which does not affect the sinfulness of the act74 ,wherefore1 though this man sins through ignorance1 yet he is not altogether excused1 because1 not withstanding1 he has knowledge of the sin4 ,secondly1 this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself1 because1 to wit1 this ignorance is voluntary1 either directly1 as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely2 or indirectly1 as when a man1 through stress of work or other occupations1 neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin4 ,for such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful1 provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know4 ,consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin4 ,if1 however1 the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary1 either through being invincible1 or through being of matters one is not bound to know1 then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every ignorance causes involuntariness1 as stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h74 ,hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,so far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person1 the intention of sin remains in him3 so that1 in this respect1 his sin is not accidental4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely1 it excuses from sin altogether1 as is the case with madmen and imbeciles3 but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin2 and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,ignorance ,diminishes a ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin4 ,for that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin4 ,now ignorance is common to all sins1 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 that every evil man is ignorant4 ,therefore ignorance does not diminish sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one sin added to another makes a greater sin4 ,but ignorance is itself a sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it does not diminish a sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin4 ,now ignorance aggravates sin2 for ,ambrose commenting on ,rom4 #b3d1 ,knowest thou not that the benignity of ,god leadeth thee to penance8 says3 ,thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not4 ,therefore ignorance does not diminish sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin1 this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether4 ,now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin1 but increases it3 for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e7 that the punishment is doubled for a drunken man4 ,therefore ignorance does not diminish sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven1 diminishes sin4 ,now such is ignorance1 as is clear from #a ,tim4 #a3ac3 ,i obtained 4 4 4 mercy 4 4 4 because ,i did it ignorantly4 ,therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin4 ,i answer that1 ,since every sin is voluntary1 ignorance can diminish sin1 in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness2 and if it does not render it less voluntary1 it nowise alleviates the sin4 ,now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether 7through making it altogether involuntary7 does not diminish a sin1 but does away with it altogether4 ,on the other hand1 ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed1 but is concomitant with it1 neither diminishes nor increases the sin4 ,therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance1 but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed1 and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether4 ,now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary1 as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely1 and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful1 since it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance1 for the sake of freedom in sinning4 ,sometimes1 however1 the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed1 is not directly voluntary1 but indirectly or accidentally1 as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies1 the result being that he is ignorant1 or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine1 the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet1 and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin4 ,for when a thing is not known to be a sin1 the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly1 but only accidentally2 wherefore1 in that case there is less contempt1 and therefore less sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ignorance whereby every evil man is ignorant1 is not the cause of sin being committed1 but something resulting from that cause1 viz4 of the passion or habit inclining to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one sin added to another makes more sins1 but it does not always make a sin greater1 since1 perchance1 the two sins do not coincide1 but are separate4 ,it may happen1 if the first diminishes the second1 that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have2 thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober1 than if committed by a man when drunk1 although in the latter case there are two sins3 because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the words of ,ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance2 or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude1 the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received2 or again1 they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief1 which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the drunken man deserves a double punishment for the two sins which he commits1 viz4 drunkenness1 and the sin which results from his drunkenness3 and yet drunkenness1 on account of the ignorance connected therewith1 diminishes the resulting sin1 and more1 perhaps1 than the gravity of the drunkenness implies1 as stated above 7ad #b74 ,it might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named ,pittacus1 who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone2 having an eye1 not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim1 but to expediency1 since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,polit4 ii74 ,,question #gg ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,sin1 ,,on ,,the ,,part ,,of ,,the ,,sensitive ,,appetite 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of sin1 on the part of the sensitive appetite1 as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin3 and under this head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will8 7#b7 ,whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge8 7#c7 ,whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness8 7#d7 ,whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin8 7#e7 ,of three causes mentioned in #a ,john #b3af3 ,concupiscence of the eyes1 ,concupiscence of the flesh1 and ,pride of life4 7#f7 ,whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it8 7#g7 ,whether passion excuses from sin altogether8 7#h7 ,whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,will ,is ,moved by a ,passion of the ,sensitive ,appetite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite4 ,for no passive power is moved except by its object4 ,now the will is a power both passive and active1 inasmuch as it is mover and moved1 as the ,philosopher says of the appetitive power in general 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ed74 ,since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite1 but good defined by the reason1 it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the higher mover is not moved by the lower2 thus the soul is not moved by the body4 ,now the will1 which is the rational appetite1 is compared to the sensitive appetite1 as a higher mover to a lower3 for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #eg7 that the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite1 even as1 in the heavenly bodies1 one sphere moves another4 ,therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material4 ,now the will is an immaterial power1 because it does not use a corporeal organ1 since it is in the reason1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #db3 whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force1 since it is seated in an organ of the body4 ,therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,dan4 #ac3ef73 ,lust hath perverted thy heart4 ,i answer that1 ,a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly2 but it can do so indirectly1 and this in two ways4 ,first1 by a kind of distraction3 because1 since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul1 it follows of necessity that1 when one power is intent in its act1 another power becomes remiss1 or is even altogether impeded1 in its act1 both because all energy is weakened through being divided1 so that1 on the contrary1 through being centered on one thing1 it is less able to be directed to several2 and because1 in the operations of the soul1 a certain attention is requisite1 and if this be closely fixed on one thing1 less attention is given to another4 ,in this way1 by a kind of distraction1 when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever1 the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must1 of necessity1 become remiss or altogether impeded4 ,secondly1 this may happen on the part of the will's object1 which is good apprehended by reason4 ,because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power1 as appears in those who are out of their mind4 ,now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite1 even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue3 for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion1 do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion1 the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite1 and consequently the will's movement follows it also1 since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will1 yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the higher mover is not directly moved by the lower2 but1 in a manner1 it can be moved by it indirectly1 as stated4 ,the ,third ,objection is solved in like manner4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,reason ,can ,be ,overcome by a ,passion1 ,against ,its ,knowledge8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion1 against its knowledge4 ,for the stronger is not overcome by the weaker4 ,now knowledge1 on account of its certitude1 is the strongest thing in us4 ,therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion1 which is weak and soon passes away4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good4 ,now when a passion draws the will to that which is really good1 it does not influence the reason against its knowledge2 and when it draws it to that which is good apparently1 but not really1 it draws it to that which appears good to the reason4 ,but what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason4 ,therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general1 to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter--on the contrary1 if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed1 they are opposed by contradiction1 e4g4 ,every man1 and ,not every man4 ,now if two opinions contradict one another1 they are contrary to one another1 as stated in ,peri ,herm4 ii4 ,if therefore anyone1 while knowing something in general1 were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case1 he would have two contrary opinions at the same time1 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whoever knows the universal1 knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal3 thus who knows that every mule is sterile1 knows that this particular animal is sterile1 provided he knows it to be a mule1 as is clear from ,poster4 i1 text4 #b4 ,now he who knows something in general1 e4g4 that no fornication is lawful1 knows this general proposition to contain1 for example1 the particular proposition1 ,this is an act of fornication4 ,therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,peri ,herm4 i71 words express the thoughts of the mind4 ,now it often happens that man1 while in a state of passion1 confesses that what he has chosen is an evil1 even in that particular case4 ,therefore he has knowledge1 even in particular4 ,therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge2 because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3bc73 ,i see another law in my members1 fighting against the law of my mind1 and captivating me in the law of sin4 ,now the law that is in the members is concupiscence1 of which he had been speaking previously4 ,since then concupiscence is a passion1 it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 vii1 #b71 the opinion of ,socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion2 wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge1 and every sin a kind of ignorance4 ,in this he was somewhat right1 because1 since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good1 it is never moved to an evil1 unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason2 so that the will would never tend to evil1 unless there were ignorance or error in the reason4 ,hence it is written 7,prov4 #ad3bb73 ,they err that work evil4 ,experience1 however1 shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have1 and this is confirmed by ,divine authority1 according to the words of ,luke #ab3dg3 ,the servant who knew that the will of his lord 4 4 4 and did not 4 4 4 shall be beaten with many stripes1 and of ,james #d3ag3 ,to him 4 4 4 who knoweth to do good1 and doth it not1 to him it is a sin4 ,consequently he was not altogether right1 and it is necessary1 with the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #c7 to make a distinction4 ,because1 since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge1 viz4 universal and particular1 a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed1 as stated above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a74 ,it may happen1 then1 that a man has some knowledge in general1 e4g4 that no fornication is lawful1 and yet he does not know in particular that this act1 which is fornication1 must not be done2 and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason4 ,again1 it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually3 so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular1 and yet not to consider his knowledge actually3 and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider4 ,now1 that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually1 may happen through mere lack of attention3 for instance1 a man who knows geometry1 may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions1 which he is ready to consider at any moment4 ,sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually1 on account of some hindrance supervening1 e4g4 some external occupation1 or some bodily infirmity2 and1 in this way1 a man who is in a state of passion1 fails to consider in particular what he knows in general1 in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it4 ,now it hinders him in three ways4 ,first1 by way of distraction1 as explained above 7,a4 #a74 ,secondly1 by way of opposition1 because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general4 ,thirdly1 by way of bodily transmutation1 the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely2 even as sleep or drunkenness1 on account of some change wrought on the body1 fetters the use of reason4 ,that this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes1 when the passions are very intense1 man loses the use of reason altogether3 for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger4 ,it is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular1 against the knowledge which it has in general4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,universal knowledge1 which is most certain1 does not hold the foremost place in action1 but rather particular knowledge1 since actions are about singulars3 wherefore it is not astonishing that1 in matters of action1 passion acts counter to universal knowledge1 if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that something appears good in particular to the reason1 whereas it is not good1 is due to a passion3 and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition1 and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition1 or vice versa3 but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition1 and actually a false opinion about a particular negative3 because an act is directly opposed1 not to a habit1 but to an act4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,he that has knowledge in a universal1 is hindered1 on account of a passion1 from reasoning about that universal1 so as to draw the conclusion3 but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion1 and draws his conclusion accordingly4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #c7 that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions1 two particular and two universal1 of which one is of the son1 e4g4 ,no fornication is lawful1 and the other1 of passion1 e4g4 ,pleasure is to be pursued4 ,hence passion fetters the reason1 and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition2 so that while the passion lasts1 the reason argues and concludes under the second4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification1 of which1 however1 he is incompetent to judge1 his drunkenness hindering him2 so that a man who is in a state of passion1 may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so1 yet his inner thought is that he must do it1 as stated in ,ethic4 vii1 #c4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,sin ,committed ,through ,passion1 ,should ,be ,called a ,sin of ,weakness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness4 ,for a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness4 ,therefore a sin committed through passion1 should not be called a sin of weakness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him4 ,now this is the flesh2 whence it is written 7,ps4 #gg3ci73 ,he remembered that they are flesh4 ,therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects1 rather than those which are due to a passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will4 ,now it is subject to man's will1 whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him1 according to ,gen4 #d3g3 ,thy appetite shall be under thee 99,vulg43 ',the lust thereof shall be under thee4'1 and thou shalt have dominion over it4 ,therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness4 ,on the contrary1 ,cicero 7,de ,quaest4 ,tusc4 iv7 calls the passions diseases of the soul4 ,now weakness is another name for disease4 ,therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness4 ,i answer that1 ,the cause of sin is on the part of the soul1 in which1 chiefly1 sin resides4 ,now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body4 ,accordingly1 man's body is said to be weak1 when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action1 through some disorder of the body's parts1 so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power4 ,hence a member is said to be weak1 when it cannot do the work of a healthy member1 the eye1 for instance1 when it cannot see clearly1 as the ,philosopher states 7,de ,hist4 ,animal4 x1 #a74 ,therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts4 ,now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order1 when they fail to comply with the order of nature1 so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate1 when they are not subject to the order of reason1 for the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts4 ,accordingly1 when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason1 the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man1 it is said to be a sin of weakness4 ,hence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #h7 compares the incontinent man to an epileptic1 whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature1 the greater the weakness1 so likewise1 the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason1 the greater the weakness of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sin consists chiefly in an act of the will1 which is not hindered by weakness of the body3 for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action1 and yet be hindered by a passion1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,hence when we speak of sins of weakness1 we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body4 ,and yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh1 in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do1 and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us2 and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained 7,a4 #a74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,self-love ,is the ,source of ,every ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin4 ,for that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin4 ,now love of self is a good and right thing in itself3 wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself 7,lev4 #ai3ah74 ,therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3h73 ,sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence2 on which words a gloss says that the law is good1 since by forbidding concupiscence1 it forbids all evils1 the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin4 ,now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine in commenting on ,ps4 #gi3ag1 ,things set on fire and dug down1 says that every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility4 ,therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 as man sins at times through inordinate love of self1 so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor4 ,therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bh7 that self-love1 amounting to contempt of ,god1 builds up the city of ,babylon4 ,now every sin makes man a citizen of ,babylon4 ,therefore self-love is the cause of every sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #a71 the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good2 in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good4 ,now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately1 is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately2 for to wish anyone some good is to love him4 ,therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,well ordered self-love1 whereby man desires a fitting good for himself1 is right and natural2 but it is inordinate self-love1 leading to contempt of ,god1 that ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bh7 reckons to be the cause of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,concupiscence1 whereby a man desires good for himself1 is reduced to self-love as to its cause1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man is said to love both the good he desires for himself1 and himself to whom he desires it4 ,love1 in so far as it is directed to the object of desire 7e4g4 a man is said to love wine or money7 admits1 as its cause1 fear which pertains to avoidance of evil3 for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good1 or from inordinate avoidance of some evil4 ,but each of these is reduced to self-love1 since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things1 or avoids evil things4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a friend is like another self 7,ethic4 ix73 wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend1 seems to be committed through self-love4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,concupiscence of the ,flesh1 ,concupiscence of the ,eyes1 and ,pride of ,life ,are ,fittingly ,described ,as ,causes of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that concupiscence of the flesh1 concupiscence of the eyes1 and pride of life are unfittingly described as causes of sin4 ,because1 according to the ,apostle 7#a ,tim4 #f3aj71 covetousness 99,douay3 ',the desire of money' is the root of all evils4 ,now pride of life is not included in covetousness4 ,therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes1 according to ,dan4 #ac3ef3 ,beauty hath deceived thee4 ,therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 concupiscence is desire for pleasure1 as stated above 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b74 ,now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight1 but also by the other senses4 ,therefore concupiscence of the hearing and of the other senses should also have been mentioned4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as man is induced to sin1 through inordinate desire of good things1 so is he also1 through inordinate avoidance of evil things1 as stated above 7,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,but nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil4 ,therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,john #b3af73 ,all that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh1 or ,vulg43 'and' pride of life4 ,now a thing is said to be in the world by reason of sin3 wherefore it is written 7#a ,john #e3ai73 ,the whole world is seated in wickedness4 ,therefore these three are causes of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d71 inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin4 ,now self-love includes inordinate desire of good3 for a man desires good for the one he loves4 ,hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin4 ,now good is1 in two ways1 the object of the sensitive appetite1 wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin3 first1 absolutely1 according as it is the object of the concupiscible part2 secondly1 under the aspect of difficulty1 according as it is the object of the irascible part1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,again1 concupiscence is twofold1 as stated above 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #c74 ,one is natural1 and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body1 whether as regards the preservation of the individual1 such as food1 drink1 and the like1 or as regards the preservation of the species1 such as sexual matters3 and the inordinate appetite of such things is called concupiscence of the flesh4 ,the other is spiritual concupiscence1 and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses1 but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination1 or some similar mode of perception2 such are money1 apparel1 and the like2 and this spiritual concupiscence is called concupiscence of the eyes1 whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself1 of which the eyes are the organ1 so as to denote curiosity according to ,augustine's exposition 7,confess4 x72 or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes1 so as to denote covetousness1 according to the explanation of others4 ,the inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the pride of life2 for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #b2 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #afb1 ,a4 #a74 ,it is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three3 since all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two1 and all the irascible passions to the third1 which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,pride of life is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good4 ,how covetousness1 as a special vice1 which goes by the name of avarice1 is the root of all sins1 shall be explained further on 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,concupiscence of the eyes does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes1 but only for such things as afford1 not carnal pleasure in respect of touch1 but in respect of the eyes1 i4e4 of any apprehensive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses1 and covers a larger ground1 as stated in ,metaph4 i3 and so its name is transferred to all the other senses1 and even to the inner apprehensions1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 serm4 xxxiii74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ci1 ,a4 #b72 and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good1 as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,sin ,is ,alleviated on ,account of a ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion4 ,for increase of cause adds to the effect3 thus if a hot thing causes something to melt1 a hotter will do so yet more4 ,now passion is a cause of sin1 as stated 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore the more intense the passion1 the greater the sin4 ,therefore passion does not diminish sin1 but increases it4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a good passion stands in the same relation to merit1 as an evil passion does to sin4 ,now a good passion increases merit3 for a man seems to merit the more1 according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man4 ,therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a man seems to sin the more grievously1 according as he sins with a more intense will4 ,but the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act4 ,therefore passion aggravates a sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,the passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh4 ,but the greater the temptation that overcomes a man1 the less grievous his sin1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,civ4 ,dei iv1 #ab74 ,i answer that1 ,sin consists essentially in an act of the free will1 which is a faculty of the will and reason2 while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite4 ,now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will1 antecedently and consequently3 antecedently1 according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #c72 and consequently1 in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower1 since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely1 without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite4 ,accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act1 it must needs diminish the sin3 because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary1 and under our control4 ,now a thing is said to be under our control1 through the reason and will3 and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord1 and not through the impulse of a passion1 the more is it voluntary and under our control4 ,in this respect passion diminishes sin1 in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness4 ,on the other hand1 a consequent passion does not diminish a sin1 but increases it2 or rather it is a sign of its gravity1 in so far1 to wit1 as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act2 and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins1 the greater the sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns4 ,but the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns1 which results accidentally from his turning to something else--accidentally1 i4e4 beside his intention4 ,now an effect is increased by the increase1 not of its accidental cause1 but of its direct cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit2 but if it precede1 so that a man is moved to do well1 rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason1 such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense1 yet it is not so much the will's own movement1 as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,passion ,excuses from ,sin ,altogether8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether4 ,for whatever causes an act to be involuntary1 excuses from sin altogether4 ,but concupiscence of the flesh1 which is a passion1 makes an act to be involuntary1 according to ,gal4 #e3ag3 ,the flesh lusteth against the spirit 4 4 4 so that you do not the things that you would4 ,therefore passion excuses from sin altogether4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter1 as stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #c74 ,but ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether1 as stated above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore passion excuses from sin altogether4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body4 ,but bodily disease excuses from sin altogether1 as in the case of mad people4 ,much more1 therefore1 does passion1 which is a disease of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle 7,rom4 #g3e7 speaks of the passions as passions of sins1 for no other reason than that they cause sin3 which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether4 ,therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether4 ,i answer that1 ,an act which1 in its genus1 is evil1 cannot be excused from sin altogether1 unless it be rendered altogether involuntary4 ,consequently1 if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary1 it entirely excuses from sin2 otherwise1 it does not excuse entirely4 ,in this matter two points apparently should be observed3 first1 that a thing may be voluntary either in itself1 as when the will tends towards it directly2 or in its cause1 when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect2 as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk1 for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk4 ,secondly1 we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary directly or indirectly2 directly1 if the will tends towards it2 indirectly1 if the will could have prevented it1 but did not4 ,accordingly therefore we must make a distinction3 because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether1 as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger2 and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning1 the act is reckoned a sin1 because it is voluntary in its cause1 as we have stated with regard to drunkenness4 ,if1 however1 the cause be not voluntary but natural1 for instance1 if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason1 his act is rendered wholly involuntary1 and he is entirely excused from sin4 ,sometimes1 however1 the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether2 and then reason can drive the passion away1 by turning to other thoughts1 or it can prevent it from having its full effect2 since the members are not put to work1 except by the consent of reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #i73 wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words1 ,so that you do not the things that you would are not to be referred to outward deeds1 but to the inner movement of concupiscence2 for a man would wish never to desire evil1 in which sense we are to understand the words of ,rom4 #g3ai3 ,the evil which ,i will not1 that ,i do4 ,or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion1 as is the case with the incontinent1 who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the particular ignorance which excuses altogether1 is ignorance of a circumstance1 which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions4 ,but passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case1 by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act1 which passion the reason is able to drive away1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,bodily disease is involuntary3 there would be a comparison1 however1 if it were voluntary1 as we have stated about drunkenness1 which is a kind of bodily disease4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #h ,whether a ,sin ,committed ,through ,passion ,can ,be ,mortal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal4 ,because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin4 ,now sin committed from weakness is venial1 since it has in itself a motive for pardon 7venia74 ,since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weakness1 it seems that it cannot be mortal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the cause is more powerful than its effect4 ,but passion cannot be a mortal sin1 for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality1 as stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 passion is a hindrance to reason1 as explained above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now it belongs to the reason to turn to ,god1 or to turn away from ,him1 which is the essence of a mortal sin4 ,therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3e7 that the passions of the sins 4 4 4 work ,vulg43 'did work' in our members to bring forth fruit unto death4 ,now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death4 ,therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal4 ,i answer that1 ,mortal sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e71 consists in turning away from our last end which is ,god1 which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason1 whose function it is also to direct towards the end4 ,therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin1 only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue1 which is the case in sudden movements4 ,now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act1 or to a deliberate consent1 this does not happen suddenly3 and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here1 since it can drive the passion away1 or at least prevent it from having its effect1 as stated above3 wherefore if it does not come to the rescue1 there is a mortal sin2 and it is thus1 as we see1 that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a sin may be venial in three ways4 ,first1 through its cause1 i4e4 through having cause to be forgiven1 which cause lessens the sin2 thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial4 ,secondly1 through its issue2 thus every sin1 through repentance1 becomes venial1 i4e4 receives pardon 7veniam74 ,thirdly1 by its genus1 e4g4 an idle word4 ,this is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin3 whereas the objection regards the first kind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something4 ,but that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion1 which follows accidentally from the adherence1 as stated above 7,a4 #f1 ad #a73 hence the argument does not prove4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether3 consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will1 so as to turn away from ,god1 or turn to ,him4 ,if1 however1 the use of reason be taken away altogether1 the sin is no longer either mortal or venial4 ,,question #gh ,,of ,,that ,,cause ,,of ,,sin ,,which ,,is ,,malice 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will1 viz4 malice3 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice1 i4e4 purposely8 7#b7 ,whether everyone that sins through habit1 sins through certain malice8 7#c7 ,whether every one that sins through certain malice1 sins through habit8 7#d7 ,whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice1 than through passion8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,anyone ,sins ,through ,certain ,malice8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no one sins purposely1 or through certain malice4 ,because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice4 ,now every evil man is ignorant1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #a72 and it is written 7,prov4 #ad3bb73 ,they err that work evil4 ,therefore no one sins through certain malice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that no one works intending evil4 ,now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil 99,alluding to the derivation of malitia 7malice7 from malum 7evil7 in sinning1 because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental4 ,therefore no one sins through malice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 malice itself is a sin4 ,if therefore malice is a cause of sin1 it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely1 which is absurd4 ,therefore no one sins through malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,job #cd3bg73 ,who as it were on purpose have revolted from ,god ,vulg43 ',him'1 and would not understand all ,his ways4 ,now to revolt from ,god is to sin4 ,therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice4 ,i answer that1 ,man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good2 and so if his appetite incline away to evil1 this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man3 for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things4 ,now the principles of human acts are the intellect1 and the appetite1 both rational 7i4e4 the will7 and sensitive4 ,therefore even as sin occurs in human acts1 sometimes through a defect of the intellect1 as when anyone sins through ignorance1 and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite1 as when anyone sins through passion1 so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will4 ,now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good4 ,again1 the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard1 in order to obtain a good that one loves more3 as when a man1 even knowingly1 suffers the loss of a limb1 that he may save his life which he loves more4 ,accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good1 e4g4 riches or pleasure1 more than the order of reason or ,divine law1 or ,divine charity1 or some such thing1 it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good1 so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good4 ,now evil is merely the privation of some good2 and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil1 which is evil simply1 whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good1 in order to possess a temporal good3 wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose1 because he chooses evil knowingly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil1 and then man is said to sin through ignorance3 sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment1 as when he sins through passion3 and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good1 but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil3 it is thus that a man is ignorant1 when he sins through certain malice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake2 but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil1 or obtaining another good1 as stated above3 and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake1 without suffering loss of the other good2 even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending ,god2 but with the two set before him to choose from1 he prefers sinning and thereby incurring ,god's anger1 to being deprived of the pleasure4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the malice through which anyone sins1 may be taken to denote habitual malice1 in the sense in which the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 calls an evil habit by the name of malice1 just as a good habit is called virtue3 and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit4 ,it may also denote actual malice1 whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil 7and thus anyone is said to sin through malice1 in so far as he sins through making a choice of evil71 or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault1 as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy4 ,nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause3 for the interior act is the cause of the exterior act1 and one sin is the cause of another2 not indefinitely1 however1 since we can trace it back to some previous sin1 which is not caused by any previous sin1 as was explained above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,everyone ,that ,sins ,through ,habit1 ,sins ,through ,certain ,malice8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not every one who sins through habit1 sins through certain malice4 ,because sin committed through certain malice1 seems to be most grievous4 ,now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit1 as when he utters an idle word4 ,therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed 7,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b74 ,but the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice4 ,therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 when a man commits a sin through certain malice1 he is glad after having done it1 according to ,prov4 #b3ad3 ,who are glad when they have done evil1 and rejoice in most wicked things3 and this1 because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire1 and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit4 ,but those who sin through habit1 are sorrowful after committing a sin3 because bad men1 i4e4 those who have a vicious habit1 are full of remorse 7,ethic4 ix1 #d74 ,therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,a sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil4 ,now we make choice of those things to which we are inclined by habit1 as stated in ,ethic4 vi1 #b with regard to virtuous habits4 ,therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed through certain malice4 ,i answer that1 ,there is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit1 and a sin committed by habit3 for it is not necessary to use a habit1 since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit4 ,hence habit is defined as being something we use when we will1 as stated above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #a74 ,and thus1 even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act1 because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether1 something of which remains unimpaired1 the result being that a sinner does some works which are generically good2 so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit1 acts1 not from that habit1 but through the uprising of a passion1 or again through ignorance4 ,but whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice3 because to anyone that has a habit1 whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit1 has the aspect of something lovable1 since it thereby becomes1 in a way1 connatural to him1 according as custom and habit are a second nature4 ,now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit1 is something that excludes a spiritual good3 the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil1 that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit3 and this is to sin through certain malice4 ,wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit1 sins through certain malice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,venial sin does not exclude spiritual good1 consisting in the grace of ,god or charity4 ,wherefore it is an evil1 not simply1 but in a relative sense3 and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed3 but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect4 ,such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit1 as long as he uses the habit4 ,but since he is able not to use the habit1 and to think of something else1 by means of his reason1 which is not altogether corrupted1 it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit4 ,and so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him1 but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,one ,who ,sins ,through ,certain ,malice1 ,sins ,through ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that whoever sins through certain malice1 sins through habit4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #i7 that an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it1 i4e4 through choice1 unless it be done through habit4 ,now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore no one sins through certain malice1 unless he has the habit of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,origen says 7,peri ,archon iii7 that a man is not suddenly ruined and lost1 but must needs fall away little by little4 ,but the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice4 ,therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice1 not from the outset1 but from inveterate custom1 which may engender a habit4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whenever a man sins through certain malice1 his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses4 ,but by the nature of that power man is inclined1 not to evil but to good4 ,therefore if he chooses evil1 this must be due to something supervening1 which is passion or habit4 ,now when a man sins through passion1 he sins not through certain malice1 but through weakness1 as stated 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice1 he sins through habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,the good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good1 as the bad habit to the choice of something evil4 ,but it happens sometimes that a man1 without having the habit of a virtue1 chooses that which is good according to that virtue4 ,therefore sometimes also a man1 without having the habit of a vice1 may choose evil1 which is to sin through certain malice4 ,i answer that1 ,the will is related differently to good and to evil4 ,because from the very nature of the power1 it is inclined to the rational good1 as its proper object2 wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature4 ,hence1 if a will be inclined1 by its choice1 to some evil1 this must be occasioned by something else4 ,sometimes1 in fact1 this is occasioned through some defect in the reason1 as when anyone sins through ignorance2 and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite1 as when anyone sins through passion4 ,yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice2 for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice1 when his will is moved to evil of its own accord4 ,this may happen in two ways4 ,first1 through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil1 so that1 in respect of that disposition1 some evil is1 as it were1 suitable and similar to him2 and to this thing1 by reason of its suitableness1 the will tends1 as to something good1 because everything tends1 of its own accord1 to that which is suitable to it4 ,moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom1 or a sickly condition on the part of the body1 as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins1 by reason of some natural corruption in himself4 ,secondly1 the will1 of its own accord1 may tend to an evil1 through the removal of some obstacle3 for instance1 if a man be prevented from sinning1 not through sin being in itself displeasing to him1 but through hope of eternal life1 or fear of hell1 if hope give place to despair1 or fear to presumption1 he will end in sinning through certain malice1 being freed from the bridle1 as it were4 ,it is evident1 therefore1 that sin committed through certain malice1 always presupposes some inordinateness in man1 which1 however1 is not always a habit3 so that it does not follow of necessity1 if a man sins through certain malice1 that he sins through habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to do an action as an unjust man does1 may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice1 but also to do them with pleasure1 and without any notable resistance on the part of reason1 and this occurs only in one who has a habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice1 and that something is presupposed2 but this something is not always a habit1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which inclines the will to evil1 is not always a habit or a passion1 but at times is something else4 ,moreover1 there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil3 because evil is never without some good of nature1 whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,it ,is ,more ,grievous to ,sin ,through ,certain ,malice ,than ,through ,passion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion4 ,because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part4 ,now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice1 than in one who sins through passion2 since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance1 which according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #h7 is ignorance of principle1 for he has a false estimation of the end1 which is the principle in matters of action4 ,therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice1 than for one who sins through passion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more a man is impelled to sin1 the less grievous his sin1 as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion4 ,now he that sins through certain malice1 is impelled by habit1 the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion4 ,therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil4 ,now he that sins through passion1 also chooses evil4 ,therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,a sin that is committed on purpose1 for this very reason deserves heavier punishment1 according to ,job #cd3bf3 ,he hath struck them as being wicked1 in open sight1 who1 as it were1 on purpose1 have revolted from ,him4 ,now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault4 ,therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose1 i4e4 through certain malice4 ,i answer that1 ,a sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion1 for three reasons4 ,first1 because1 as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will1 it follows that1 other things being equal1 a sin is all the more grievous1 according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will4 ,now when a sin is committed through malice1 the movement of sin belongs more to the will1 which is then moved to evil of its own accord1 than when a sin is committed through passion1 when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic1 as it were4 ,wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice1 and so much the more1 as the malice is greater2 whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion1 and so much the more1 as the passion is stronger4 ,secondly1 because the passion which incites the will to sin1 soon passes away1 so that man repents of his sin1 and soon returns to his good intentions2 whereas the habit1 through which a man sins1 is a permanent quality1 so that he who sins through malice1 abides longer in his sin4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #h7 compares the intemperate man1 who sins through malice1 to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease1 while he compares the incontinent man1 who sins through passion1 to one who suffers intermittently4 ,thirdly1 because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself1 which is the principle in matters of action2 and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion1 whose purpose tends to a good end1 although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion1 for the time being4 ,now the worst of all defects is defect of principle4 ,therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,ignorance of choice1 to which the objection refers1 neither excuses nor diminishes a sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the impulse due to passion1 is1 as it were1 due to a defect which is outside the will3 whereas1 by a habit1 the will is inclined from within4 ,hence the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is one thing to sin while choosing1 and another to sin through choosing4 ,for he that sins through passion1 sins while choosing1 but not through choosing1 because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin2 for he is induced through the passion1 to choose what he would not choose1 were it not for the passion4 ,on the other hand1 he that sins through certain malice1 chooses evil of his own accord1 in the way already explained 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 so that his choosing1 of which he has full control1 is the principle of his sin3 and for this reason he is said to sin through choosing4 ,,question #gi ,,of ,,the ,,external ,,causes ,,of ,,sin 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the external causes of sin1 and 7#a7 on the part of ,god2 7#b7 on the part of the devil2 7#c7 on the part of man4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is a cause of sin8 7#b7 ,whether the act of sin is from ,god8 7#c7 ,whether ,god is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart8 7#d7 ,whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god ,is a ,cause of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god is a cause of sin4 ,for the ,apostle says of certain ones 7,rom4 #a3bh73 ,god delivered them up to a reprobate sense1 to do those things which are not right ,douay3 'convenient'1 and a gloss comments on this by saying that ,god works in men's hearts1 by inclining their wills to whatever ,he wills1 whether to good or to evil4 ,now sin consists in doing what is not right1 and in having a will inclined to evil4 ,therefore ,god is to man a cause of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,wis4 #ad3aa73 ,the creatures of ,god are turned to an abomination2 and a temptation to the souls of men4 ,but a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin4 ,since therefore creatures were made by ,god alone1 as was established in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a71 it seems that ,god is a cause of sin1 by provoking man to sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect4 ,now ,god is the cause of the free-will1 which itself is the cause of sin4 ,therefore ,god is the cause of sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every evil is opposed to good4 ,but it is not contrary to ,god's goodness that ,he should cause the evil of punishment2 since of this evil it is written 7,isa4 #de3g7 that ,god creates evil1 and 7,amos #c3f73 ,shall there be evil in the city which ,god ,vulg43 'the ,lord' hath not done8 ,therefore it is not incompatible with ,god's goodness that ,he should cause the evil of fault4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #aa3be73 ,thou 4 4 4 hatest none of the things which ,thou hast made4 ,now ,god hates sin1 according to ,wis4 #ad3i3 ,to ,god the wicked and his wickedness are hateful4 ,therefore ,god is not a cause of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,man is1 in two ways1 a cause either of his own or of another's sin4 ,first1 directly1 namely by inclining his or another's will to sin2 secondly1 indirectly1 namely by not preventing someone from sinning4 ,hence 7,ezech4 #c3ah7 it is said to the watchman3 ,if thou say not to the wicked3 ',thou shalt surely die' 99,vulg43 ,if1 when ,i say to the wicked1 ',thou shalt surely die1' thou declare it not to him4 4 4 4 ,i will require his blood at thy hand4 ,now ,god cannot be directly the cause of sin1 either in ,himself or in another1 since every sin is a departure from the order which is to ,god as the end3 whereas ,god inclines and turns all things to ,himself as to their last end1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 i73 so that it is impossible that ,he should be either to ,himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to ,himself4 ,therefore ,he cannot be directly the cause of sin4 ,in like manner neither can ,he cause sin indirectly4 ,for it happens that ,god does not give some the assistance1 whereby they may avoid sin1 which assistance were ,he to give1 they would not sin4 ,but ,he does all this according to the order of ,his wisdom and justice1 since ,he ,himself is ,wisdom and ,justice3 so that if someone sin it is not imputable to ,him as though ,he were the cause of that sin2 even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship1 through not steering the ship1 unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer4 ,it is therefore evident that ,god is nowise a cause of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as to the words of the ,apostle1 the solution is clear from the text4 ,for if ,god delivered some up to a reprobate sense1 it follows that they already had a reprobate sense1 so as to do what was not right4 ,accordingly ,he is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense1 in so far as ,he does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense1 even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him4 ,the saying of ,augustine 7,de ,grat4 et ,lib4 ,arb4 xxi1 whence the gloss quoted is taken7 to the effect that ,god inclines men's wills to good and evil1 is to be understood as meaning that ,he inclines the will directly to good2 and to evil1 in so far as ,he does not hinder it1 as stated above4 ,and yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when it is said the creatures of ,god are turned 'to' an abomination1 and a temptation to the souls of men1 the preposition to does not denote causality but sequel 99,this is made clear by the ,douay ,version3 the ,latin factae sunt in abominationem admits of the translation were made to be an abomination1 which might imply causality42 for ,god did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man2 this was the result of man's folly1 wherefore the text goes on to say1 and a snare to the feet of the unwise1 who1 to wit1 in their folly1 use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the effect which proceeds from the middle cause1 according as it is subordinate to the first cause1 is reduced to that first cause2 but if it proceed from the middle cause1 according as it goes outside the order of the first cause1 it is not reduced to that first cause3 thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's orders1 it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof4 ,in like manner sin1 which the free-will commits against the commandment of ,god1 is not attributed to ,god as being its cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished1 who is thereby deprived of some good or other3 but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to ,god2 and so it is directly opposed to the ,divine goodness2 consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,act of ,sin ,is from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the act of sin is not from ,god4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,perfect4 ,justit4 ii7 that the act of sin is not a thing4 ,now whatever is from ,god is a thing4 ,therefore the act of sin is not from ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man is not said to be the cause of sin1 except because he is the cause of the sinful act3 for no one works1 intending evil1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now ,god is not a cause of sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore ,god is not the cause of the act of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some actions are evil and sinful in their species1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #b1 #h74 ,now whatever is the cause of a thing1 causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species4 ,if therefore ,god caused the act of sin1 ,he would be the cause of sin1 which is false1 as was proved above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore ,god is not the cause of the act of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,the act of sin is a movement of the free-will4 ,now the will of ,god is the cause of every movement1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d1 #i74 ,therefore ,god's will is the cause of the act of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,the act of sin is both a being and an act2 and in both respects it is from ,god4 ,because every being1 whatever the mode of its being1 must be derived from the ,first ,being1 as ,dionysius declares 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,again every action is caused by something existing in act1 since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act2 and every being in act is reduced to the ,first ,act1 viz4 ,god1 as to its cause1 ,who is act by ,his ,essence4 ,therefore ,god is the cause of every action1 in so far as it is an action4 ,but sin denotes a being and an action with a defect3 and this defect is from the created cause1 viz4 the free-will1 as falling away from the order of the ,first ,agent1 viz4 ,god4 ,consequently this defect is not reduced to ,god as its cause1 but to the free-will3 even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause1 but not to the motive power1 which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping4 ,accordingly ,god is the cause of the act of sin3 and yet ,he is not the cause of sin1 because ,he does not cause the act to have a defect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in this passage ,augustine calls by the name of thing1 that which is a thing simply1 viz4 substance2 for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not only the act1 but also the defect1 is reduced to man as its cause1 which defect consists in man not being subject to ,whom he ought to be1 although he does not intend this principally4 ,wherefore man is the cause of the sin3 while ,god is the cause of the act1 in such a way1 that nowise is ,he the cause of the defect accompanying the act1 so that ,he is not the cause of the sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #a71 acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself1 wherein consists the nature of evil1 but from some object1 to which that privation is united3 and so this defect which consists in not being from ,god1 belongs to the species of the act consequently1 and not as a specific difference4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,is the ,cause of ,spiritual ,blindness and ,hardness of ,heart8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart4 ,for ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #c7 that ,god is not the cause of that which makes man worse4 ,now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart4 ,therefore ,god is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,fulgentius says 7,de ,dupl4 ,praedest4 i1 #ai73 ,god does not punish what ,he causes4 ,now ,god punishes the hardened heart1 according to ,ecclus4 #c3bg3 ,a hard heart shall fear evil at the last4 ,therefore ,god is not the cause of hardness of heart4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same effect is not put down to contrary causes4 ,but the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man1 according to ,wis4 #b3ba3 ,for their own malice blinded them1 and again1 according to #b ,cor4 #d3d3 ,the god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers3 which causes seem to be opposed to ,god4 ,therefore ,god is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,isa4 #f3aj73 ,blind the heart of this people1 and make their ears heavy1 and ,rom4 #i3ah3 ,he hath mercy on whom ,he will1 and whom ,he will ,he hardeneth4 ,i answer that1 ,spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things4 ,one is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil1 and turning away from the ,divine light2 and as regards this1 ,god is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart1 just as ,he is not the cause of sin4 ,the other thing is the withdrawal of grace1 the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by ,god to see aright1 and man's heart is not softened to live aright2 and as regards this ,god is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart4 ,now we must consider that ,god is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls1 according to ,john #a3i3 ,that was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world1 even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies1 though not in the same way2 for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature1 whereas ,god works freely1 through the order of ,his wisdom4 ,now although the sun1 so far as it is concerned1 enlightens all bodies1 yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body1 it leaves it in darkness1 as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed1 although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened1 since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house2 and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters4 ,on the other hand1 ,god1 of ,his own accord1 withholds ,his grace from those in whom ,he finds an obstacle3 so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace2 but ,god1 ,who1 of ,his own accord1 withholds ,his grace4 ,in this way1 ,god is the cause of spiritual blindness1 deafness of ear1 and hardness of heart4 ,these differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace1 which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom1 and softens the affections by the fire of charity4 ,and since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect1 viz4 sight and hearing1 of which the former assists discovery1 and the latter1 teaching1 hence it is that spiritual blindness corresponds to sight1 heaviness of the ears to hearing1 and hardness of heart to the affections4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,blindness and hardheartedness1 as regards the withholding of grace1 are punishments1 and therefore1 in this respect1 they make man no worse4 ,it is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them1 even as other punishments4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness1 just as sin is the cause of punishment3 and in this way too1 the devil is said to blind1 in so far as he induces man to sin4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,blindness and ,hardness of ,heart ,are ,directed to the ,salvation of ,those ,who ,are ,blinded and ,hardened8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened4 ,for ,augustine says 7,enchiridion xi7 that as ,god is supremely good1 ,he would nowise allow evil to be done1 unless ,he could draw some good from every evil4 ,much more1 therefore1 does ,he direct to some good1 the evil of which ,he ,himself is the cause4 ,now ,god is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,wis4 #a3ac7 that ,god hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly 99,vulg43 ',god made not death1 neither hath ,he pleasure in the destruction of the living4'4 ,now ,he would seem to take pleasure in their destruction1 if ,he did not turn their blindness to their profit3 just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid1 if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him4 ,therefore ,god turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god is not a respecter of persons 7,acts #aj3cd74 ,now ,he directs the blinding of some1 to their salvation1 as in the case of some of the ,jews1 who were blinded so as not to believe in ,christ1 and1 through not believing1 to slay ,him1 and afterwards were seized with compunction1 and converted1 as related by ,augustine 7,de ,quaest4 ,evang4 iii74 ,therefore ,god turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded4 ,obj4 #d3 ,on the other hand1 according to ,rom4 #c3h1 evil should not be done1 that good may ensue4 ,now blindness is an evil4 ,therefore ,god does not blind some for the sake of their welfare4 ,i answer that1 ,blindness is a kind of preamble to sin4 ,now sin has a twofold relation--to one thing directly1 viz4 to the sinner's damnation--to another1 by reason of ,god's mercy or providence1 viz4 that the sinner may be healed1 in so far as ,god permits some to fall into sin1 that by acknowledging their sin1 they may be humbled and converted1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,nat4 et ,grat4 xxii74 ,therefore blindness1 of its very nature1 is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded2 for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation4 ,but1 through ,god's mercy1 temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded4 ,this mercy1 however1 is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded1 but only to the predestinated1 to whom all things work together unto good 7,rom4 #h3bh74 ,therefore as regards some1 blindness is directed to their healing2 but as regards others1 to their damnation2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,quaest4 ,evang4 iii74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every evil that ,god does1 or permits to be done1 is directed to some good2 yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is1 but sometimes to the good of others1 or of the whole universe3 thus ,he directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs1 and the punishment of the lost to the glory of ,his justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god does not take pleasure in the loss of man1 as regards the loss itself1 but by reason of ,his justice1 or of the good that ensues from the loss4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that ,god directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare1 is due to ,his mercy2 but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to ,his justice3 and that ,he vouchsafes ,his mercy to some1 and not to all1 does not make ,god a respecter of persons1 as explained in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #e1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,evil of fault must not be done1 that good may ensue2 but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good4 ,,question #hj ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,sin1 ,,as ,,regards ,,the ,,devil 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of sin1 as regards the devil2 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the devil is directly the cause of sin8 7#b7 ,whether the devil induces us to sin1 by persuading us inwardly8 7#c7 ,whether he can make us sin of necessity8 7#d7 ,whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hj1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,devil ,is ,directly the ,cause of ,man's ,sinning8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man's sinning4 ,for sin consists directly in an act of the appetite4 ,now ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #ab7 that the devil inspires his friends with evil desires2 and ,bede1 commenting on ,acts #e3c1 says that the devil draws the mind to evil desires2 and ,isidore says 7,de ,summo ,bono ii1 #da2 iii1 #e7 that the devil fills men's hearts with secret lusts4 ,therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,jerome says 7,contra ,jovin4 ii1 #b7 that as ,god is the perfecter of good1 so is the devil the perfecter of evil4 ,but ,god is directly the cause of our good4 ,therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says in a chapter of the ,eudemean ,ethics 7vii1 #ah73 ,there must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel4 ,now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things4 ,therefore1 as ,god moves man to take good counsel1 and so is the cause of good1 so the devil moves him to take evil counsel1 and consequently is directly the cause of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine proves 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #aa7 that nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his desire4 ,now man does not become a slave to his desires1 except through sin4 ,therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil1 but man's own will alone4 ,i answer that1 ,sin is an action3 so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin1 in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action2 and this can only happen by moving that action's proper principle to act4 ,now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will1 since every sin is voluntary4 ,consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin1 except that which can move the will to act4 ,now the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d1 #f71 can be moved by two things3 first by its object1 inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite3 secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will1 and this is no other than the will itself1 or ,god1 as was shown above 7,q4 #i1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d1 #f74 ,now ,god cannot be the cause of sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore it follows that in this respect1 a man's will alone is directly the cause of his sin4 ,as regards the object1 a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways4 ,first1 the object itself which is proposed to the will3 thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat4 ,secondly1 he that proposes or offers this object4 ,thirdly1 he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good1 because he also1 in a fashion1 offers the will its proper object1 which is a real or apparent good of reason4 ,accordingly1 in the first way the sensible things1 which approach from without1 move a man's will to sin4 ,in the second and third ways1 either the devil or a man may incite to sin1 either by offering an object of appetite to the senses1 or by persuading the reason4 ,but in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin1 because the will is not1 of necessity1 moved by any object except the last end1 as stated above 7,q4 #aj1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,consequently neither the thing offered from without1 nor he that proposes it1 nor he that persuades1 is the sufficient cause of sin4 ,therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin1 neither directly nor sufficiently1 but only by persuasion1 or by proposing the object of appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all these1 and other like authorities1 if we meet with them1 are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin1 either by suggesting to him1 or by offering him objects of appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins1 even as ,god is in a certain way the cause of our good actions1 but does not extend to the mode of causation3 for ,god causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly1 whereas the devil cannot move us in this way4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god is the universal principle of all inward movements of man2 but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel1 is directly due to the human will1 and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,devil ,can ,induce ,man to ,sin1 by ,internal ,instigations8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin1 by internal instigations4 ,because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions4 ,now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle1 not even those of the vegetal soul1 which are the lowest of vital functions4 ,therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature4 ,now it belongs to ,god alone to do anything beside the order of nature1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements1 except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine4 ,now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these1 because1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaa1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 ad #b71 the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect1 nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species1 since imaginary forms1 being more spiritual1 are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter1 which1 nevertheless1 the devil is unable to produce1 as is clear from what we have said in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aaa1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 ad #b74 ,therefore the devil cannot through man's internal movements induce him to sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,in that case1 the devil would never tempt man1 unless he appeared visibly2 which is evidently false4 ,i answer that1 ,the interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive2 and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will4 ,as regards the will1 we have already stated 7,a4 #a2 ,i1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a7 what is the devil's relation thereto4 ,now the intellect1 of its very nature1 is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth1 which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard2 rather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin1 which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite4 ,consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite1 by moving either of which he can induce man to sin4 ,for his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination2 and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other4 ,the reason of this is1 that as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #c71 the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature3 so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below1 except he be restrained by the ,divine power4 ,now the representation of forms to the imagination is due1 sometimes1 to local movement3 for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,somno et ,vigil47 99,de ,insomn4 iii1 iv4 that when an animal sleeps1 the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle1 and the movements descend with it1 viz4 the impressions left by the action of sensible objects1 which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species1 and continue to move the apprehensive principle1 so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time4 ,hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons1 whether man sleep or wake3 and so it happens that man's imagination is brought into play4 ,in like manner1 the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits3 wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also4 ,and through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite1 the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained1 before the apprehensive principle1 since1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,de ,somno et ,virgil43 ,de ,insomn4 iii1 iv71 lovers are moved1 by even a slight likeness1 to an apprehension of the beloved4 ,it also happens1 through the rousing of a passion1 that what is put before the imagination1 is judged1 as being something to be pursued1 because1 to him who is held by a passion1 whatever the passion inclines him to1 seems good4 ,in this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle1 yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them1 even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul1 that food may be more easily digested4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature1 nor is it due to a command alone1 but according to local movement1 as explained above4 ,consequently the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is clear1 because these forms are received originally from the senses4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q1 #hj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,devil ,can ,induce ,man to ,sin of ,necessity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity4 ,because the greater can compel the lesser4 ,now it is said of the devil 7,job #da3bd7 that there is no power on earth that can compare with him4 ,therefore he can compel man to sin1 while he dwells on the earth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses1 or are represented to the imagination3 because all our knowledge arises from the senses1 and we cannot understand without a phantasm 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #cj4 #ci74 ,now the devil can move man's imagination1 as stated above 7,a4 #b72 and also the external senses1 for ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #ab7 that this evil1 of which1 to wit1 the devil is the cause1 extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses1 it adapts itself to shapes1 blends with colors1 mingles with sounds1 seasons every flavor4 ,therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #d7 that there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit4 ,now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh1 even as other passions1 in the way explained above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,pet4 #e3h73 ,your adversary the devil1 as a roaring lion1 goeth about seeking whom he may devour4 ,now it would be useless to admonish thus1 if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil4 ,therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity4 ,further1 it is likewise written 7,jam4 #d3g73 ,be subject 4 4 4 to ,god1 but resist the devil1 and he will fly from you1 which would be said neither rightly nor truly1 if the devil were able to compel us1 in any way whatever1 to sin2 for then neither would it be possible to resist him1 nor would he fly from those who do4 ,therefore he does not compel to sin4 ,i answer that1 ,the devil1 by his own power1 unless he be restrained by ,god1 can compel anyone to do an act which1 in its genus1 is a sin2 but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning4 ,this is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin1 except by his reason2 the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether1 by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite2 as is the case with one who is possessed4 ,but then1 the reason being thus fettered1 whatever man may do1 it is not imputed to him as a sin4 ,if1 however1 the reason is not altogether fettered1 then1 in so far as it is free1 it can resist sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #g74 ,it is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every power that is greater than man1 can move man's will2 ,god alone can do this1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will1 of necessity1 so long as man has the use of reason2 nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the lusting of the flesh against the spirit1 when the reason actually resists it1 is not a sin1 but is matter for the exercise of virtue4 ,that reason does not resist1 is not in the devil's power2 wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all the ,sins of ,men ,are ,due to the ,devil's ,suggestion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the crowd of demons are the cause of all evils1 both to themselves and to others4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever sins mortally1 becomes the slave of the devil1 according to ,john #h3cd3 ,whosoever committeth sin is the slave ,douay3 'servant' of sin4 ,now by whom a man is overcome1 of the same also he is the slave 7#b ,pet4 #b3ai74 ,therefore whoever commits a sin1 has been overcome by the devil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 iv1 #aj7 the sin of the devil is irreparable1 because he sinned at no other's suggestion4 ,therefore1 if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other1 their sin would be irremediable3 which is clearly false4 ,therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogm4 lxxxii73 ,not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil2 sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will4 ,i answer that1 the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins1 in so far as he induced the first man to sin1 by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected1 that we are all prone to sin3 even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable4 ,he is not1 however1 the direct cause of all the sins of men1 as though each were the result of his suggestion4 ,origen proves this 7,peri ,archon iii1 #b7 from the fact that even if the devil were no more1 men would still have the desire for food1 sexual pleasures and the like2 which desire might be inordinate1 unless it were subordinate to reason1 a matter that is subject to the free-will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils1 as regards their original cause1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him1 but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously3 it is thus that one who sins of his own accord1 becomes the slave of the devil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the devil's sin was irremediable1 not only because he sinned without another's suggestion2 but also because he was not already prone to sin1 on account of any previous sin2 which can be said of no sin of man4 ,,question #ha ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,sin1 ,,on ,,the ,,part ,,of ,,man 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of sin1 on the part of man4 ,now1 while man1 like the devil1 is the cause of another's sin1 by outward suggestion1 he has a certain special manner of causing sin1 by way of origin4 ,wherefore we must speak about original sin1 the consideration of which will be three-fold3 7#a7 ,of its transmission2 7#b7 of its essence2 7#c7 of its subject4 ,under the first head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether man's first sin is transmitted1 by way of origin to his descendants8 7#b7 ,whether all the other sins of our first parent1 or of any other parents1 are transmitted to their descendants1 by way of origin8 7#c7 ,whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of ,adam by way of seminal generation8 7#d7 ,whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body8 7#e7 ,whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman1 and not the man1 had sinned8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,first ,sin of ,our ,first ,parent ,is ,contracted by ,his ,descendants1 by ,way of ,origin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others1 by way of origin4 ,for it is written 7,ezech4 #ah3bj73 ,the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father4 ,but he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him4 ,therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an accident is not transmitted by way of origin1 unless its subject be also transmitted1 since accidents do not pass from one subject to another4 ,now the rational soul which is the subject of sin1 is not transmitted by way of origin1 as was shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is transmitted by way of human origin1 is caused by the semen4 ,but the semen cannot cause sin1 because it lacks the rational part of the soul1 which alone can be a cause of sin4 ,therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 that which is more perfect in nature1 is more powerful in action4 ,now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it1 else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin1 so long as it is united to the body4 ,much less1 therefore1 can the semen infect the soul4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e73 ,no one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature1 but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness4 ,now those are said to be naturally ugly1 who are so from their origin4 ,therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3ab73 ,by one man sin entered into this world1 and by sin death4 ,nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion1 since it is written 7,wis4 #b3bd73 ,by the envy of the devil1 death came into this world4 ,it follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the ,catholic ,faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants1 by way of origin4 ,for this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth1 to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness4 ,the contrary is part of the ,pelagian heresy1 as is clear from ,augustine in many of his books 99,for instance1 ,retract4 i1 #i2 ,de ,pecc4 ,merit4 et ,remiss4 ix2 ,contra ,julian4 iii1 #a2 ,de ,dono ,persev4 xi1 xii4 ,in endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants1 various writers have gone about it in various ways4 ,for some1 considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul1 maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen1 so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls4 ,others1 rejecting this as erroneous1 endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be transmitted to the children1 even though the soul be not transmitted1 from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child--thus a leper may beget a leper1 or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son1 on account of some seminal corruption1 although this corruption is not leprosy or gout4 ,now since the body is proportionate to the soul1 and since the soul's defects redound into the body1 and vice versa1 in like manner1 say they1 a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child1 through the transmission of the semen1 albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt4 ,but all these explanations are insufficient4 ,because1 granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child1 and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence1 on account of a defect in the bodily habit1 as in the case of idiots begetting idiots2 nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt1 which is essentially something voluntary4 ,wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted1 from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will1 it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment2 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e71 no one reproaches a man born blind2 one rather takes pity on him4 ,therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of ,adam may be considered as one man1 inasmuch as they have one common nature1 which they receive from their first parents2 even as in civil matters1 all who are members of one community are reputed as one body1 and the whole community as one man4 ,indeed ,porphyry says 7,praedic41 ,de ,specie7 that by sharing the same species1 many men are one man4 ,accordingly the multitude of men born of ,adam1 are as so many members of one body4 ,now the action of one member of the body1 of the hand for instance1 is voluntary not by the will of that hand1 but by the will of the soul1 the first mover of the members4 ,wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand1 considered by itself as apart from the body1 but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle4 ,in this way1 then1 the disorder which is in this man born of ,adam1 is voluntary1 not by his will1 but by the will of his first parent1 who1 by the movement of generation1 moves all who originate from him1 even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions4 ,hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called original1 just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called actual4 ,and just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body1 is not the sin of that member1 except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man1 for which reason it is called a human sin2 so original sin is not the sin of this person1 except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent1 for which reason it is called the sin of nature1 according to ,eph4 #b3c3 ,we 4 4 4 were by nature children of wrath4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father1 because he is not punished for his father's sin1 unless he share in his guilt4 ,it is thus in the case before us3 because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son1 even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the soul is not transmitted1 because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul1 nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul3 so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child1 and with that nature1 the stain which infects it3 for he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt1 through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the guilt is not actually in the semen1 yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the semen is the principle of generation1 which is an act proper to nature1 by helping it to propagate itself4 ,hence the soul is more infected by the semen1 than by the flesh which is already perfect1 and already affixed to a certain person4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin1 if we consider the man born1 in himself4 ,but it we consider him as referred to a principle1 then he may be reproached for it3 thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace1 on account of a crime committed by one of his forbears4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,also ,other ,sins of the ,first ,parent or of ,nearer ,ancestors ,are ,transmitted to ,their ,descendants8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that also other sins1 whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors1 are transmitted to their descendants4 ,for punishment is never due unless for fault4 ,now some are punished by the judgment of ,god for the sin of their immediate parents1 according to ,ex4 #bj3e3 ,i am 4 4 4 ,god 4 4 4 jealous1 visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children1 unto the third and fourth generation4 ,furthermore1 according to human law1 the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited4 ,therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a man can better transmit to another1 that which he has of himself1 than that which he has received from another3 thus fire heats better than hot water does4 ,now a man transmits to his children1 by the way1 of origin1 the sin which he has from ,adam4 ,much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature1 which he corrupted4 ,but we were likewise in our nearer ancestors1 as in principles of our nature1 which however it be corrupt1 can be corrupted yet more by sin1 according to ,apoc4 #bb3aa3 ,he that is filthy1 let him be filthier still4 ,therefore children contract1 by the way of origin1 the sins of their nearer ancestors1 even as they contract the sin of their first parent4 ,on the contrary1 ,good is more self-diffusive than evil4 ,but the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants4 ,much less therefore are their sins4 ,i answer that1 ,augustine puts this question in the ,enchiridion xlvi1 xlvii1 and leaves it unsolved4 ,yet if we look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors1 or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmitted by way of origin4 ,the reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual4 ,consequently those things that pertain directly to the individual1 such as personal actions and matters affecting them1 are not transmitted by parents to their children3 for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies4 ,on the other hand1 those things that concern the nature of the species1 are transmitted by parents to their children1 unless there be a defect of nature3 thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes1 unless nature fails4 ,and if nature be strong1 even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition1 are transmitted to the children1 e4g4 fleetness of body1 acuteness of intellect1 and so forth2 but nowise those that are purely personal1 as stated above4 ,now just as something may belong to the person as such1 and also something through the gift of grace1 so may something belong to the nature as such1 viz4 whatever is caused by the principles of nature1 and something too through the gift of grace4 ,in this way original justice1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #a71 was a gift of grace1 conferred by ,god on all human nature in our first parent4 ,this gift the first man lost by his first sin4 ,wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity1 so also was its disorder4 ,other actual sins1 however1 whether of the first parent or of others1 do not corrupt the nature as nature1 but only as the nature of that person1 i4e4 in respect of the proneness to sin3 and consequently other sins are not transmitted4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,augustine in his letter to ,avitus 99,ep4 ad ,auxilium ccl41 children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on account of their parents1 unless they share in their guilt1 either in their origin1 or by imitation1 because every soul is ,god's immediate property1 as stated in ,ezech4 #ah3d4 ,sometimes1 however1 by ,divine or human judgment1 children receive bodily punishment on their parents' account1 inasmuch as the child1 as to its body1 is part of its father4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself1 provided it be transmissible4 ,but the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible1 because they are purely personal1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature2 whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the person4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,sin of the ,first ,parent ,is ,transmitted1 by the ,way of ,origin1 to ,all ,men8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted1 by the way of origin1 to all men4 ,because death is a punishment consequent upon original sin4 ,but not all those1 who are born of the seed of ,adam1 will die3 since those who will be still living at the coming of our ,lord1 will never die1 as1 seemingly1 may be gathered from #a ,thess4 #d3ad3 ,we who are alive 4 4 4 unto the coming of the ,lord1 shall not prevent them who have slept4 ,therefore they do not contract original sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no one gives another what he has not himself4 ,now a man who has been baptized has not original sin4 ,therefore he does not transmit it to his children4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the gift of ,christ is greater than the sin of ,adam1 as the ,apostle declares 7,rom4 #e3ae1 seqq74 ,but the gift of ,christ is not transmitted to all men3 neither1 therefore1 is the sin of ,adam4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3ab73 ,death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the ,catholic ,faith we must firmly believe that1 ,christ alone excepted1 all men descended from ,adam contract original sin from him2 else all would not need redemption 99,cf4 ,translator's note inserted before ,,iii1 ,q4 #bg which is through ,christ2 and this is erroneous4 ,the reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated 7,a4 #a71 viz4 that original sin1 in virtue of the sin of our first parent1 is transmitted to his posterity1 just as1 from the soul's will1 actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body1 through their being moved by the will4 ,now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved by the will4 ,therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by ,adam by the movement of generation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our ,lord1 will die1 and rise again shortly1 as we shall state more fully in the ,third ,part 7,suppl41 ,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #a74 ,if1 however1 it be true1 as others hold1 that they will never die1 7an opinion which ,jerome mentions among others in a letter to ,minerius1 on the ,resurrection of the ,body--,ep4 cxix71 then we must say in reply to the objection1 that although they are not to die1 the debt of death is none the less in them1 and that the punishment of death will be remitted by ,god1 since ,he can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,original sin is taken away by ,baptism as to the guilt1 in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind4 ,nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the fomes1 which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself1 in respect of which1 and not of the mind1 man exercises his power of generation4 ,consequently those who are baptized transmit original sin3 since they do not beget as being renewed in ,baptism1 but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as ,adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born of ,adam corporally1 so is the grace of ,christ transmitted to all that are begotten of ,him spiritually1 by faith and ,baptism3 and this1 not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent1 but also unto the removal of actual sins1 and the obtaining of glory4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,original ,sin ,would ,be ,contracted by a ,person ,formed ,miraculously from ,human ,flesh8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh4 ,for a gloss on ,gen4 #d3a says that ,adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins1 because they were not severed from him in the place of life1 before he sinned1 but in the place of exile after he had sinned4 ,but if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner1 his flesh would be severed in the place of exile4 ,therefore it would contract original sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh4 ,but man's flesh is entirely corrupted4 ,therefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin1 from whatever part of the flesh it was formed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 original sin comes upon all from our first parent1 in so far as we were all in him when he sinned4 ,but those who might be formed out of human flesh1 would have been in ,adam4 ,therefore they would contract original sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,they would not have been in ,adam according to seminal virtue1 which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin1 as ,augustine states 7,gen4 ad lit4 x1 #ah1 seqq474 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #c71 original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity1 inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation1 even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin4 ,now there is no movement to generation except by the active power of generation3 so that those alone contract original sin1 who are descended from ,adam through the active power of generation originally derived from ,adam1 i4e4 who are descended from him through seminal power2 for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation4 ,but if anyone were to be formed by ,god out of human flesh1 it is evident that the active power would not be derived from ,adam4 ,consequently he would not contract original sin3 even as a hand would have no part in a human sin1 if it were moved1 not by the man's will1 but by some external power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin4 ,consequently it is not on account of the place of exile1 but on account of the sin1 that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the flesh does not corrupt the soul1 except in so far as it is the active principle in generation1 as we have stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if a man were to be formed from human flesh1 he would have been in ,adam1 by way of bodily substance 99,the expression is ,st4 ,augustine's 7,gen4 ad lit4 x74 ,cf4 ,summa ,theologica1 ,,iii1 ,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #f1 ,reply to ,first ,objection41 but not according to seminal virtue1 as stated above4 ,therefore he would not contract original sin4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,if ,eve1 and ,not ,adam1 ,had ,sinned1 ,their ,children ,would ,have ,contracted ,original ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that if ,eve1 and not ,adam1 had sinned1 their children would have contracted original sin4 ,because we contract original sin from our parents1 in so far as we were once in them1 according to the word of the ,apostle 7,rom4 #e3ab73 ,in whom all have sinned4 ,now a man pre-exists in his mother as well as in his father4 ,therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother's sin as well as from his father's4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if ,eve1 and not ,adam1 had sinned1 their children would have been born liable to suffering and death1 since it is the mother that provides the matter in generation as the ,philosopher states 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ii1 #a1 #d71 when death and liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter4 ,now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin4 ,therefore if ,eve1 and not ,adam1 had sinned1 their children would contract original sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #c7 that the ,holy ,ghost came upon the ,virgin1 7of whom ,christ was to be born without original sin7 purifying her4 ,but this purification would not have been necessary1 if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother4 ,therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother3 so that if ,eve had sinned1 her children would have contracted original sin1 even if ,adam had not sinned4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3ab73 ,by one man sin entered into this world4 ,now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children1 he should have said that it entered by two1 since both of them sinned1 or rather that it entered by a woman1 since she sinned first4 ,therefore original sin is transmitted to the children1 not by the mother1 but by the father4 ,i answer that1 ,the solution of this question is made clear by what has been said4 ,for it has been stated 7,a4 #a7 that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children3 wherefore it has been said 7,a4 #d7 that if anyone were begotten materially only1 of human flesh1 they would not contract original sin4 ,now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers1 the active principle of generation is from the father1 while the mother provides the matter4 ,therefore original sin is contracted1 not from the mother1 but from the father3 so that1 accordingly1 if ,eve1 and not ,adam1 had sinned1 their children would not contract original sin3 whereas1 if ,adam1 and not ,eve1 had sinned1 they would contract it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle1 and in its mother1 as in its material and passive principle4 ,consequently the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some hold that if ,eve1 and not ,adam1 had sinned1 their children would be immune from the sin1 but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother1 not as punishments1 but as actual defects4 ,this1 however1 seems unreasonable4 ,because1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ig1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 ad #d71 immortality and impassibility1 in the original state1 were a result1 not of the condition of matter1 but of original justice1 whereby the body was subjected to the soul1 so long as the soul remained subject to ,god4 ,now privation of original justice is original sin4 ,if1 therefore1 supposing ,adam had not sinned1 original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of ,eve's sin2 it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice3 and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this prevenient purification in the ,blessed ,virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin1 but because it behooved the ,mother of ,god to shine with the greatest purity 99,cf4 ,anselm1 ,de ,concep4 ,virg4 xviii44 ,for nothing is worthy to receive ,god unless it be pure1 according to ,ps4 #ib3e3 ,holiness becometh ,thy ,house1 ,o ,lord4 ,,question #hb ,,of ,,original ,,sin1 ,,as ,,to ,,its ,,essence 7,question #hb7 ,we must now consider original sin as to its essence1 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether original sin is a habit8 7#b7 ,whether there is but one original sin in each man8 7#c7 ,whether original sin is concupiscence8 7#d7 ,whether original sin is equally in all8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,original ,sin ,is a ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin is not a habit4 ,for original sin is the absence of original justice1 as ,anselm states 7,de ,concep4 ,virg4 ii1 iii1 xxvi71 so that original sin is a privation4 ,but privation is opposed to habit4 ,therefore original sin is not a habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin1 in so far as it is more voluntary4 ,now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault1 else it would follow that a man while asleep1 would be guilty of sin4 ,therefore no original habit has the nature of a fault4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in wickedness act always precedes habit1 because evil habits are not infused1 but acquired4 ,now original sin is not preceded by an act4 ,therefore original sin is not a habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says in his book on the ,baptism of infants 7,de ,pecc4 ,merit4 et ,remiss4 i1 #ci7 that on account of original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act4 ,now aptitude denotes some kind of habit4 ,therefore original sin is a habit4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #a71 habit is twofold4 ,the first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act3 thus science and virtue are called habits4 ,in this way original sin is not a habit4 ,the second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature1 whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to something1 chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature1 as in the case of sickness or health4 ,in this sense original sin is a habit4 ,for it is an inordinate disposition1 arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice1 even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body1 by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health4 ,hence it is that original sin is called the languor of nature 99,cf4 ,augustine1 ,in ,ps4 #aah1 serm4 iii4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as bodily sickness is partly a privation1 in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health1 and partly something positive1 viz4 the very humors that are inordinately disposed1 so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice1 and besides this1 the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul4 ,consequently it is not a pure privation1 but a corrupt habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,actual sin is an inordinateness of an act3 whereas original sin1 being the sin of nature1 is an inordinate disposition of nature1 and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a74 ,now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit1 whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not3 and for this reason original sin can be a habit1 whereas actual sin cannot4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act3 but original sin is not this kind of habit4 ,nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin1 not directly1 but indirectly1 viz4 by the removal of the obstacle1 i4e4 original justice1 which hindered inordinate movements3 just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness4 ,nor is it necessary to say that original sin is a habit infused1 or a habit acquired 7except by the act of our first parent1 but not by our own act73 but it is a habit inborn due to our corrupt origin4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,several ,original ,sins in ,one ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are many original sins in one man4 ,for it is written 7,ps4 #a3g73 ,behold ,i was conceived in iniquities1 and in sins did my mother conceive me4 ,but the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin4 ,therefore there are several original sins in man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries3 since the inclination of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing4 ,now original sin1 even in one man1 inclines to various and contrary sins4 ,therefore original sin is not one habit2 but several4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 original sin infects every part of the soul4 ,now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin1 as shown above 7,q4 #gd74 ,since then one sin cannot be in different subjects1 it seems that original sin is not one but several4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,john #a3bi73 ,behold the ,lamb of ,god1 behold ,him ,who taketh away the sin of the world3 and the reason for the employment of the singular is that the sin of the world is original sin1 as a gloss expounds this passage4 ,i answer that1 ,in one man there is one original sin4 ,two reasons may be assigned for this4 ,the first is on the part of the cause of original sin4 ,for it has been stated 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b71 that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity4 ,wherefore in one man original sin is one in number2 and in all men1 it is one in proportion1 i4e4 in relation to its first principle4 ,the second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin4 ,because in every inordinate disposition1 unity of species depends on the cause1 while the unity of number is derived from the subject4 ,for example1 take bodily sickness3 various species of sickness proceed from different causes1 e4g4 from excessive heat or cold1 or from a lesion in the lung or liver2 while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number4 ,now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin1 is one only1 viz4 the privation of original justice1 removing the subjection of man's mind to ,god4 ,consequently original sin is specifically one1 and1 in one man1 can be only one in number2 while1 in different men1 it is one in species and in proportion1 but is numerically many4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the employment of the plural--in sins--may be explained by the custom of the ,divine ,scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the singular1 e4g4 ,they are dead that sought the life of the child2 or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin1 as in a principle so that it is virtually many2 or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first parent1 viz4 pride1 disobedience1 gluttony1 and so forth2 or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,of itself and directly1 i4e4 by its own form1 one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries4 ,but there is no reason why it should not do so1 indirectly and accidentally1 i4e4 by the removal of an obstacle3 thus1 when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed1 the elements have contrary local tendencies4 ,in like manner1 when the harmony of original justice is destroyed1 the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,original sin infects the different parts of the soul1 in so far as they are the parts of one whole2 even as original justice held all the soul's parts together in one4 ,consequently there is but one original sin3 just as there is but one fever in one man1 although the various parts of the body are affected4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,original ,sin ,is ,concupiscence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin is not concupiscence4 ,for every sin is contrary to nature1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d1 #cj74 ,but concupiscence is in accordance with nature1 since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power4 ,therefore concupiscence is not original sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 through original sin the passions of sins are in us1 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #g3e74 ,now there are several other passions besides concupiscence1 as stated above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by original sin1 all the parts of the soul are disordered1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #c74 ,but the intellect is the highest of the soul's parts1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 x1 #g74 ,therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #ae73 ,concupiscence is the guilt of original sin4 ,i answer that1 ,everything takes its species from its form3 and it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that the species of original sin is taken from its cause4 ,consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered in respect of the cause of original sin4 ,but contraries have contrary causes4 ,therefore the cause of original sin must be considered with respect to the cause of original justice1 which is opposed to it4 ,now the whole order of original justice consists in man's will being subject to ,god3 which subjection1 first and chiefly1 was in the will1 whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a71 so that the will being turned away from ,god1 all the other powers of the soul become inordinate4 ,accordingly the privation of original justice1 whereby the will was made subject to ,god1 is the formal element in original sin2 while every other disorder of the soul's powers1 is a kind of material element in respect of original sin4 ,now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good2 which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence4 ,hence original sin is concupiscence1 materially1 but privation of original justice1 formally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since1 in man1 the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason1 the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man1 as it is in accord with the order of reason2 while1 in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason1 it is1 for a man1 contrary to reason4 ,such is the concupiscence of original sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a71 all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions1 as holding the principal place3 and of these1 concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving1 and is felt most1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence1 as being the chief passion1 and as including all the others1 in a fashion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as1 in good things1 the intellect and reason stand first1 so conversely in evil things1 the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence1 for it clouds and draws the reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #gg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2,q4 #hj1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance1 although ignorance is comprised among the material defects of original sin4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,original ,sin ,is ,equally in ,all8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin is not equally in all4 ,because original sin is inordinate concupiscence1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence4 ,therefore original sin is not equally in all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul1 just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body4 ,but sickness is subject to degrees4 ,therefore original sin is subject to degrees4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,nup4 et ,concep4 i1 #bc7 that lust transmits original sin to the child4 ,but the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another4 ,therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another4 ,on the contrary1 ,original sin is the sin of nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a74 ,but nature is equally in all4 ,therefore original sin is too4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two things in original sin3 one is the privation of original justice2 the other is the relation of this privation to the sin of our first parent1 from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin4 ,as to the first1 original sin has no degrees1 since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely2 and privations that remove something entirely1 such as death and darkness1 cannot be more or less1 as stated above 7,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #b74 ,in like manner1 neither is this possible1 as to the second3 since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin1 from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt2 for relations cannot be more or less4 ,consequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,through the bond of original justice being broken1 which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order1 each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement1 and the more impetuously1 as it is stronger4 ,now it happens that some of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another1 on account of the different bodily temperaments4 ,consequently if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence1 this is not due to original sin1 because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all1 and the lower parts of the soul are1 in all1 left to themselves equally2 but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sickness of the body1 even sickness of the same species1 has not an equal cause in all2 for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the bile1 the corruption may be greater or less1 and nearer to1 or further from a vital principle4 ,but the cause of original sin is equal to all1 so that there is no comparison4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is not the actual lust that transmits original sin3 for1 supposing ,god were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation1 he would still transmit original sin2 we must understand this to be habitual lust1 whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice4 ,this lust is equally in all4 ,,question #hc ,,of ,,the ,,subject ,,of ,,original ,,sin 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the subject of original sin1 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul8 7#b7 ,if it be the soul1 whether this be through its essence1 or through its powers8 7#c7 ,whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin8 7#d7 ,whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected1 viz4 the generative power1 the concupiscible part1 and the sense of touch8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,original ,sin ,is ,more in the ,flesh ,than in the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul4 ,because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin4 ,now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh3 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3bc73 ,i see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind4 ,therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing is more in its cause than in its effect3 thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water4 ,now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen4 ,therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we contract original sin from our first parent1 in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue4 ,now our souls were not in him thus1 but only our flesh4 ,therefore original sin is not in the soul1 but in the flesh4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the rational soul created by ,god is infused into the body4 ,if therefore the soul were infected with original sin1 it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion3 and thus ,god would be the cause of sin1 since ,he is the author of the soul's creation and fusion4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel1 knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid4 ,but the rational soul is more precious than any liquid4 ,if therefore the soul1 by being united with the body1 could be corrupted with the infection of original sin1 ,god1 ,who is wisdom itself1 would never infuse the soul into such a body4 ,and yet ,he does2 wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh4 ,therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh4 ,on the contrary1 ,the same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue4 ,but the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue3 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3ah73 ,i know that there dwelleth not in me1 that is to say1 in my flesh1 that which is good4 ,therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin1 but only the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,one thing can be in another in two ways4 ,first1 as in its cause1 either principal1 or instrumental2 secondly1 as in its subject4 ,accordingly the original sin of all men was in ,adam indeed1 as in its principal cause1 according to the words of the ,apostle 7,rom4 #e3ab73 ,in whom all have sinned3 whereas it is in the bodily semen1 as in its instrumental cause1 since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child4 ,but original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject1 but only in the soul4 ,the reason for this is that1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a71 original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation1 in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts4 ,now in this transmission it is to be observed1 that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin1 to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt1 either as its subject or as its instrument1 has the character of sin4 ,thus from the will consenting to gluttony1 concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty1 and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth1 which1 in so far as they are moved by the will to sin1 are the instruments of sin4 ,but that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members1 which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will1 does not bear the character of guilt4 ,accordingly1 since the soul can be the subject of guilt1 while the flesh1 of itself1 cannot be the subject of guilt2 whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin1 has the character of guilt1 while whatever accrues to the flesh1 has the character1 not of guilt but of punishment3 so that1 therefore1 the soul is the subject of original sin1 and not the flesh4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #bg7 99,cf4 ,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #ff1 the ,apostle is speaking1 in that passage1 of man already redeemed1 who is delivered from guilt1 but is still liable to punishment1 by reason of which sin is stated to dwell in the flesh4 ,consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject1 not of guilt1 but of punishment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause4 ,now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect2 but only in the principal cause3 and1 in this way1 original sin was in ,adam more fully1 since in him it had the nature of actual sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the soul of any individual man was in ,adam1 in respect of his seminal power1 not indeed as in its effective principle1 but as in a dispositive principle3 because the bodily semen1 which is transmitted from ,adam1 does not of its own power produce the rational soul1 but disposes the matter for it4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the corruption of original sin is nowise caused by ,god1 but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation4 ,and so1 since creation implies a relation in the soul to ,god alone1 it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created4 ,on the other hand1 infusion implies relation both to ,god infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused4 ,and so1 with regard to ,god infusing1 it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being infused2 but only with regard to the body into which it is infused4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the common good takes precedence of private good4 ,wherefore ,god1 according to ,his wisdom1 does not overlook the general order of things 7which is that such a soul be infused into such a body71 lest this soul contract a singular corruption3 all the more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #c74 ,and it is better for the soul to be thus1 according to its nature1 than not to be at all1 especially since it can avoid damnation1 by means of grace4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,original ,sin ,is in the ,essence of the ,soul ,rather ,than in the ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers4 ,for the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin1 in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will4 ,now the soul is moved by the will1 not as to its essence but only as to the powers4 ,therefore original sin is in the soul1 not according to its essence1 but only according to the powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 original sin is opposed to original justice4 ,now original justice was in a power of the soul1 because power is the subject of virtue4 ,therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul1 rather than in its essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh1 so is it derived by the powers from the essence4 ,but original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh4 ,therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 original sin is said to be concupiscence1 as stated 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #c74 ,but concupiscence is in the powers of the soul4 ,therefore original sin is also4 ,on the contrary1 ,original sin is called the sin of nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the soul is the form and nature of the body1 in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence4 ,i answer that1 ,the subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains3 thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure1 which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object1 it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin4 ,now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin4 ,consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin1 is the primary subject of original sin4 ,now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation1 according as it is the form of the body3 and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence1 as was proved in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore the soul1 in respect of its essence1 is the primary subject of original sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul's powers and not to its essence1 so the motion of the will of the first generator1 through the channel of generation1 reaches first of all to the essence of the soul1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul1 because it was ,god's gift to human nature1 to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers4 ,for the powers seem to regard the person1 in as much as they are the principles of personal acts4 ,hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins1 which are the sins of the person4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the body is related to the soul as matter to form1 which though it comes second in order of generation1 nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature4 ,but the essence of the soul is related to the powers1 as a subject to its proper accidents1 which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection4 ,consequently the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,concupiscence1 in relation to original sin1 holds the position of matter and effect1 as stated above 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #c74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,original ,sin ,infects the ,will ,before the ,other ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers4 ,for every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused4 ,now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power4 ,therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen4 ,but the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is1 as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers1 which use a bodily organ4 ,therefore original sin is in them more than in the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect precedes the will1 for the object of the will is only the good understood4 ,if therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul1 it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect1 as preceding the others4 ,on the contrary1 ,original justice has a prior relation to the will1 because it is rectitude of the will1 as ,anselm states 7,de ,concep4 ,virg4 iii74 ,therefore original sin1 which is opposed to it1 also has a prior relation to the will4 ,i answer that1 ,two things must be considered in the infection of original sin4 ,first1 its inherence to its subject2 and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,in the second place we must consider its inclination to act2 and in this way it regards the powers of the soul4 ,it must therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin1 and this is the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore original sin regards first of all the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,original sin1 in man1 is not caused by the generative power of the child1 but by the act of the parental generative power4 ,consequently1 it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,original sin spreads in two ways2 from the flesh to the soul1 and from the essence of the soul to the powers4 ,the former follows the order of generation1 the latter follows the order of perfection4 ,therefore1 although the other1 viz4 the sensitive powers1 are more akin to the flesh1 yet1 since the will1 being the higher power1 is more akin to the essence of the soul1 the infection of original sin reaches it first4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellect precedes the will1 in one way1 by proposing its object to it4 ,in another way1 the will precedes the intellect1 in the order of motion to act1 which motion pertains to sin4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,aforesaid ,powers ,are ,more ,infected ,than the ,others8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others4 ,for the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin4 ,now this is the rational part1 and chiefly the will4 ,therefore that power is most infected by original sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no power of the soul is infected by guilt1 except in so far as it can obey reason4 ,now the generative power cannot obey reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #ac4 ,therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason1 in so far as it shows us how a number of things differ 7,metaph4 i74 ,but the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason4 ,therefore the sight is more infected than touch4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #af1 seqq41 #bd7 that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation1 which are not subject to reason4 ,now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes1 wherein there is the delectation of touch1 which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence4 ,therefore the infection of original sin regards these three chiefly1 viz4 the generative power1 the concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch4 ,i answer that1 ,those corruptions especially are said to be infectious1 which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to another3 hence contagious diseases1 such as leprosy and murrain and the like1 are said to be infectious4 ,now the corruption of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the powers which concur in this act1 are chiefly said to be infected4 ,now this act serves the generative power1 in as much as it is directed to generation2 and it includes delectation of the touch1 which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty4 ,consequently1 while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin1 these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,original sin1 in so far as it inclines to actual sins1 belongs chiefly to the will1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring1 it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately1 and to the will1 remotely4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner4 ,but the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor1 but through his natural origin1 which is effected by the generative power4 ,hence it is this power that is infected by original sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition1 in so far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight4 ,but the delectation is completed in the touch4 ,wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight4 ,,question #hd ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,sin1 ,,in ,,respect ,,of ,,one ,,sin ,,being ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,another 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of sin1 in so far as one sin can be the cause of another4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether covetousness is the root of all sins8 7#b7 ,whether pride is the beginning of every sin8 7#c7 ,whether other special sins should be called capital vices1 besides pride and covetousness8 7#d7 ,how many capital vices there are1 and which are they8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,covetousness ,is the ,root of ,all ,sins8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins4 ,for covetousness1 which is immoderate desire for riches1 is opposed to the virtue of liberality4 ,but liberality is not the root of all virtues4 ,therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end4 ,now riches1 the desire for which is called covetousness1 are not desired except as being useful for some end1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #e4 ,therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins1 but proceeds from some deeper root4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it often happens that avarice1 which is another name for covetousness1 arises from other sins2 as when a man desires money through ambition1 or in order to sate his gluttony4 ,therefore it is not the root of all sins4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #f3aj73 ,the desire of money is the root of all evil4 ,i answer that1 ,according to some1 covetousness may be understood in different ways4 ,first1 as denoting inordinate desire for riches3 and thus it is a special sin4 ,secondly1 as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good3 and thus it is a genus comprising all sins1 because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #b74 ,thirdly1 as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately3 and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins1 comparing it to the root of a tree1 which draws its sustenance from earth1 just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things4 ,now1 though all this is true1 it does not seem to explain the mind of the ,apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins4 ,for in that passage he clearly speaks against those who1 because they will become rich1 fall into temptation1 and into the snare of the devil 4 4 4 for covetousness is the root of all evils4 ,hence it is evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches4 ,accordingly1 we must say that covetousness1 as denoting a special sin1 is called the root of all sins1 in likeness to the root of a tree1 in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree4 ,for we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever1 and of sating his desire for any sin whatever1 since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods1 according to ,eccles4 #aj3ai3 ,all things obey money3 so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue and sin do not arise from the same source4 ,for sin arises from the desire of mutable good2 and consequently the desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods1 is called the root of all sins4 ,but virtue arises from the desire for the immutable ,god2 and consequently charity1 which is the love of ,god1 is called the root of the virtues1 according to ,eph4 #c3ag3 ,rooted and founded in charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the desire of money is said to be the root of sins1 not as though riches were sought for their own sake1 as being the last end2 but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end4 ,and since a universal good is more desirable than a particular good1 they move the appetite more than any individual goods1 which along with many others can be procured by means of money4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens1 but what happens most frequently1 for the reason that the nature of corruptible things can be hindered1 so as not always to act in the same way2 so also in moral matters1 we consider what happens in the majority of cases1 not what happens invariably1 for the reason that the will does not act of necessity4 ,so when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils1 we do not assert that no other evil can be its root1 but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom1 for the reason given4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,pride ,is the ,beginning of ,every ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin4 ,for the root is a beginning of a tree1 so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin4 ,now covetousness is the root of every sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore it is also the beginning of every sin1 and not pride4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #aj3ad73 ,the beginning of the pride of man is apostasy ,douay3 'to fall off' from ,god4 ,but apostasy from ,god is a sin4 ,therefore another sin is the beginning of pride1 so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins4 ,now this is inordinate self-love1 which1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv71 builds up the city of ,babylon4 ,therefore self-love and not pride1 is the beginning of every sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #aj3ae73 ,pride is the beginning of all sin4 ,i answer that1 ,some say pride is to be taken in three ways4 ,first1 as denoting inordinate desire to excel2 and thus it is a special sin4 ,secondly1 as denoting actual contempt of ,god1 to the effect of not being subject to ,his commandment2 and thus1 they say1 it is a generic sin4 ,thirdly1 as denoting an inclination to this contempt1 owing to the corruption of nature2 and in this sense they say that it is the beginning of every sin1 and that it differs from covetousness1 because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is1 as it were1 nourished and fostered1 for which reason covetousness is called the root2 whereas pride regards sin as turning away from ,god1 to ,whose commandment man refuses to be subject1 for which reason it is called the beginning1 because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from ,god4 ,now though all this is true1 nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said 7,ecclus4 #aj3ae73 ,pride is the beginning of all sin4 ,for it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel1 as is clear from what follows 7verse #ag73 ,god hath overturned the thrones of proud princes2 indeed this is the point of nearly the whole chapter4 ,we must therefore say that pride1 even as denoting a special sin1 is the beginning of every sin4 ,for we must take note that1 in voluntary actions1 such as sins1 there is a twofold order1 of intention1 and of execution4 ,in the former order1 the principle is the end1 as we have stated many times before 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #g1 ad #b2 ,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b74 ,now man's end in acquiring all temporal goods is that1 through their means1 he may have some perfection and excellence4 ,therefore1 from this point of view1 pride1 which is the desire to excel1 is said to be the beginning of every sin4 ,on the other hand1 in the order of execution1 the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin1 has the character of a root1 and such are riches2 so that1 from this point of view1 covetousness is said to be the root of all evils1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,apostasy from ,god is stated to be the beginning of pride1 in so far as it denotes a turning away from ,god1 because from the fact that man wishes not to be subject to ,god1 it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things4 ,wherefore1 in the passage quoted1 apostasy from ,god does not denote the special sin1 but rather that general condition of every sin1 consisting in its turning away from ,god4 ,it may also be said that apostasy from ,god is said to be the beginning of pride1 because it is the first species of pride4 ,for it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior1 and especially to ,god2 the result being that a man is unduly lifted up1 in respect of the other species of pride4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in desiring to excel1 man loves himself1 for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself4 ,consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,other ,special ,sins1 ,besides ,pride and ,avarice1 ,should ,be ,called ,capital8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no other special sins1 besides pride and avarice1 should be called capital4 ,because the head seems to be to an animal1 what the root is to a plant1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 text4 #ch3 for the roots are like a mouth4 ,if therefore covetousness is called the root of all evils1 it seems that it alone1 and no other sin1 should be called a capital vice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members1 in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head4 ,but sin implies privation of order4 ,therefore sin has not the character of head3 so that no sins should be called capital4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment4 ,but every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus4 ,therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag7 enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital4 ,i answer that1 ,the word capital is derived from caput 7a head74 ,now the head1 properly speaking1 is that part of an animal's body1 which is the principle and director of the whole animal4 ,hence1 metaphorically speaking1 every principle is called a head1 and even men who direct and govern others are called heads4 ,accordingly a capital vice is so called1 in the first place1 from head taken in the proper sense1 and thus the name capital is given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted4 ,it is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins1 but in another sense1 in which the term capital is derived from head1 taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others4 ,in this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise1 chiefly by being their final cause1 which origin is formal1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #f74 ,wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others1 but is also their director and1 in a way1 their leader3 because the art or habit1 to which the end belongs1 is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means4 ,hence ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag7 compares these capital vices to the leaders of an army4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the term capital is taken from caput and applied to something connected with1 or partaking of the head1 as having some property thereof1 but not as being the head taken literally4 ,and therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin1 as covetousness which is called the root1 and pride which is called the beginning1 but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from ,god1 for in this respect it is an evil1 and evil1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,natura ,boni iv71 is the privation of mode1 species and order4 ,but in so far as sin implies a turning to something1 it regards some good3 wherefore1 in this respect1 there can be order in sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves1 in which sense we are not taking it here4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,seven ,capital ,vices ,are ,suitably ,reckoned8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices1 viz4 vainglory1 envy1 anger1 sloth1 covetousness1 gluttony1 lust4 ,for sins are opposed to virtues4 ,but there are four principal virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore there are only four principal or capital vices4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the passions of the soul are causes of sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gg74 ,but there are four principal passions of the soul2 two of which1 viz4 hope and fear1 are not mentioned among the above sins1 whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong1 since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust1 and sadness to sloth and envy4 ,therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anger is not a principal passion4 ,therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin1 so is pride the beginning of sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,but avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices4 ,therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these3 as1 for instance1 when one sins through ignorance1 or when one commits a sin with a good intention1 e4g4 steals in order to give an alms4 ,therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of ,gregory who enumerates them in this way 7,moral4 xxxi1 #ag74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 the capital vices are those which give rise to others1 especially by way of final cause4 ,now this kind of origin may take place in two ways4 ,first1 on account of the condition of the sinner1 who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end1 the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins4 ,but this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art1 because man's particular dispositions are infinite in number4 ,secondly1 on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another3 and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another1 so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art4 ,accordingly therefore1 those vices are called capital1 whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite2 and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated4 ,now a thing moves the appetite in two ways4 ,first1 directly and of its very nature3 thus good moves the appetite to seek it1 while evil1 for the same reason1 moves the appetite to avoid it4 ,secondly1 indirectly and on account of something else1 as it were3 thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good1 or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil4 ,again1 man's good is threefold4 ,for1 in the first place1 there is a certain good of the soul1 which derives its aspect of appetibility1 merely through being apprehended1 viz4 the excellence of honor and praise1 and this good is sought inordinately by vainglory4 ,secondly1 there is the good of the body1 and this regards either the preservation of the individual1 e4g4 meat and drink1 which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony1 or the preservation of the species1 e4g4 sexual intercourse1 which good is sought inordinately by lust4 ,thirdly1 there is external good1 viz4 riches1 to which covetousness is referred4 ,these same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils4 ,or again1 good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness1 which all men seek naturally4 ,now in the first place happiness implies perfection1 since happiness is a perfect good1 to which belongs excellence or renown1 which is desired by pride or vainglory4 ,secondly1 it implies satiety1 which covetousness seeks in riches that give promise thereof4 ,thirdly1 it implies pleasure1 without which happiness is impossible1 as stated in ,ethic4 i1 #g2 x1 #f1 #g1 #h and this gluttony and lust pursue4 ,on the other hand1 avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways4 ,for this happens either in respect of one's own good1 and thus we have sloth1 which is sadness about one's spiritual good1 on account of the attendant bodily labor3 or else it happens in respect of another's good1 and this1 if it be without recrimination1 belongs to envy1 which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence1 while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance1 it is anger4 ,again1 these same vices seek the contrary evils4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue and vice do not originate in the same way3 since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason1 or to the immutable good1 which is ,god1 whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good4 ,wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fear and hope are irascible passions4 ,now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part2 and these are all1 in a way1 directed to pleasure or sorrow4 ,hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins1 as being the most important of the passions1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although anger is not a principal passion1 yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices1 because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite1 in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good1 i4e4 of the right to vengeance4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,pride is said to be the beginning of every sin1 in the order of the end1 as stated above 7,a4 #b73 and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal4 ,wherefore pride1 like a universal vice1 is not counted along with the others1 but is reckoned as the queen of them all1 as ,gregory states 7,moral4 xxxi1 #bg74 ,but covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,these vices are called capital because others1 most frequently1 arise from them3 so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes4 ,nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance1 can be reduced to sloth1 to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor2 for the ignorance that can cause sin1 is due to negligence1 as stated above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #b74 ,that a man commit a sin with a good intention1 seems to point to ignorance1 in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it4 ,,question #he ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,sin1 ,,and1 ,,first1 ,,of ,,the ,,corruption ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,of ,,nature 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the effects of sin2 and 7#a7 the corruption of the good of nature2 7#b7 the stain on the soul2 7#c7 the debt of punishment4 ,under the first head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the good of nature is diminished by sin8 7#b7 ,whether it can be taken away altogether8 7#c7 ,of the four wounds1 mentioned by ,bede1 with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin4 7#d7 ,whether privation of mode1 species and order is an effect of sin8 7#e7 ,whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin8 7#f7 ,whether they are1 in any way1 natural to man8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,sin ,diminishes the ,good of ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature4 ,for man's sin is no worse than the devil's4 ,but natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 when that which follows is changed1 that which precedes remains unchanged1 since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed4 ,but nature exists before the voluntary action4 ,therefore1 when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act1 nature is not changed on that account1 so that the good of nature be diminished4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin is an action1 while diminution is a passion4 ,now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting1 although it is possible for it to act on one thing1 and to be passive as regards another4 ,therefore he who sins1 does not1 by his sin1 diminish the good of his nature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 no accident acts on its subject3 because that which is patient is a potential being1 while that which is subjected to an accident1 is already an actual being as regards that accident4 ,but sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject4 ,therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature1 since to diminish is to act4 ,on the contrary1 ,a certain man going down from ,jerusalem to ,jericho 7,luke #aj3cj71 i4e4 to the corruption of sin1 was stripped of his gifts1 and wounded in his nature1 as ,bede 99,the quotation is from the ,glossa ,ordinaria of ,strabo expounds the passage4 ,therefore sin diminishes the good of nature4 ,i answer that1 ,the good of human nature is threefold4 ,first1 there are the principles of which nature is constituted1 and the properties that flow from them1 such as the powers of the soul1 and so forth4 ,secondly1 since man has from nature an inclination to virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a71 this inclination to virtue is a good of nature4 ,thirdly1 the gift of original justice1 conferred on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man1 may be called a good of nature4 ,accordingly1 the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin4 ,the third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent4 ,but the second good of nature1 viz4 the natural inclination to virtue1 is diminished by sin4 ,because human acts produce an inclination to like acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #a74 ,now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries1 its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished4 ,wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue1 from the very fact that a man sins1 there results a diminution of that good of nature1 which is the inclination to virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature1 which consists in being1 living and understanding1 as anyone may see who reads the context4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although nature precedes the voluntary action1 it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action4 ,wherefore nature is not changed in itself1 through a change in the voluntary action3 it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a voluntary action proceeds from various powers1 active and passive4 ,the result is that through voluntary actions something is caused or taken away in the man who acts1 as we have stated when treating of the production of habits 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,an accident does not act effectively on its subject1 but it acts on it formally1 in the same sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white4 ,in this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature2 but only in so far as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature1 through being an inordinateness of action4 ,but as regards the inordinateness of the agent1 we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul1 there is an active1 and a passive element3 thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite1 and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will1 as stated above 7,q4 #gg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,the result of this is the inordinateness1 not as though an accident acted on its own subject1 but in so far as the object acts on the power1 and one power acts on another and puts it out of order4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,entire ,good of ,human ,nature ,can ,be ,destroyed by ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin4 ,for the good of human nature is finite1 since human nature itself is finite4 ,now any finite thing is entirely taken away1 if the subtraction be continuous4 ,since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin1 it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in a thing of one nature1 the whole and the parts are uniform1 as is evidently the case with air1 water1 flesh and all bodies with similar parts4 ,but the good of nature is wholly uniform4 ,since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin1 it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good of nature1 that is weakened by sin1 is aptitude for virtue4 ,now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of sin3 thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight4 ,therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion xiv7 that evil does not exist except in some good4 ,but the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace1 because they are contrary to it4 ,therefore it must be in the good of nature1 and consequently it does not destroy it entirely4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the good of nature1 that is diminished by sin1 is the natural inclination to virtue1 which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being2 for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason1 which is to act virtuously4 ,now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being1 for then he would no longer be capable of sin4 ,wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely4 ,since1 however1 this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin1 some1 in order to illustrate this1 have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely1 without being entirely destroyed4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 i1 text4 #cg7 that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity1 it will at last be entirely destroyed1 for instance if from any finite length ,i continue to subtract the length of a span4 ,if1 however1 the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion1 and not in the same quantity1 it may go on indefinitely1 as1 for instance1 if a quantity be halved1 and one half be diminished by half1 it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely1 provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before4 ,but this does not apply to the question at issue1 since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin1 but perhaps more1 if it be a more grievous sin4 ,we must1 therefore1 explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two others3 for it is based on the rational nature as on its root1 and tends to the good of virtue1 as to its term and end4 ,consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways3 first1 on the part of its root1 secondly1 on the part of its term4 ,in the first way1 it is not diminished by sin1 because sin does not diminish nature1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but it is diminished in the second way1 in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term4 ,now if it were diminished in the first way1 it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed4 ,since1 however1 it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is placed against its attaining its term1 it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely1 because obstacles can be placed indefinitely1 inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin3 and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely1 because the root of this inclination always remains4 ,an example of this may be seen in a transparent body1 which has an inclination to receive light1 from the very fact that it is transparent2 yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds1 although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction4 ,but here the diminution is made by raising obstacles1 and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform3 nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term1 in respect of which diversity of relation1 it is diminished on the one hand1 and not on the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains1 else they would have no remorse of conscience4 ,that it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by ,divine justice4 ,thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature1 inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight3 yet this aptitude is not reduced to act1 for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it1 by forming the organ requisite for sight4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,weakness1 ,ignorance1 ,malice and ,concupiscence ,are ,suitably ,reckoned ,as the ,wounds of ,nature ,consequent ,upon ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that weakness1 ignorance1 malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin4 ,for one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing4 ,but these are reckoned to be causes of sin1 as appears from what has been said above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #gg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #e2 ,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 malice is the name of a sin4 ,therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 concupiscence is something natural1 since it is an act of the concupiscible power4 ,but that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature4 ,therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it has been stated 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c7 that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion4 ,but concupiscence is a passion4 ,therefore it should not be condivided with weakness4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,nat4 et ,grat4 lxvii1 #fg7 reckons two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner1 viz4 ignorance and difficulty1 from which arise error and vexation1 which four do not coincide with the four in question4 ,therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete4 ,on the contrary1 ,the authority of ,bede suffices 99,reference not known4 ,i answer that1 ,as a result of original justice1 the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul1 while reason itself was perfected by ,god1 and was subject to ,him4 ,now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent1 as already stated 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b72 so that all the powers of the soul are left1 as it were1 destitute of their proper order1 whereby they are naturally directed to virtue2 which destitution is called a wounding of nature4 ,again1 there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #fa1 ,a4 #b71 viz4 the reason1 where prudence resides1 the will1 where justice is1 the irascible1 the subject of fortitude1 and the concupiscible1 the subject of temperance4 ,therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true1 there is the wound of ignorance2 in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good1 there is the wound of malice2 in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous1 there is the wound of weakness2 and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable1 moderated by reason1 there is the wound of concupiscence4 ,accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin4 ,but since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin1 as was explained above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 these four wounds are also the result of other sins1 in so far as1 through sin1 the reason is obscured1 especially in practical matters1 the will hardened to evil1 good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another3 because the soul1 through sinning once1 is more easily inclined to sin again4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,malice is not to be taken here as a sin1 but as a certain proneness of the will to evil1 according to the words of ,gen4 #h3ba3 ,man's senses are prone to evil from his youth 99,vulgate3 ',the imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth4'4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a71 concupiscence is natural to man1 in so far as it is subject to reason3 whereas1 in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason1 it is unnatural to man4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,speaking in a general way1 every passion can be called a weakness1 in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the reason4 ,bede1 however1 took weakness in the strict sense1 as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the difficulty which is mentioned in this book of ,augustine1 includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers1 viz4 malice1 weakness and concupiscence1 for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good4 ,error and vexation are consequent wounds1 since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,privation of ,mode1 ,species and ,order ,is the ,effect of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that privation of mode1 species and order is not the effect of sin4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,natura ,boni iii7 that where these three abound1 the good is great2 where they are less1 there is less good2 where they are not1 there is no good at all4 ,but sin does not destroy the good of nature4 ,therefore it does not destroy mode1 species and order4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is its own cause4 ,but sin itself is the privation of mode1 species and order1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,natura ,boni iv74 ,therefore privation of mode1 species and order is not the effect of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 different effects result from different sins4 ,now since mode1 species and order are diverse1 their corresponding privations must be diverse also1 and1 consequently1 must be the result of different sins4 ,therefore privation of mode1 species and order is not the effect of each sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body1 according to ,ps4 #f3c1 ,have mercy on me1 ,o ,lord1 for ,i am weak4 ,now weakness deprives the body of mode1 species and order4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated in the ,first ,part1 ,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e1 mode1 species and order are consequent upon every created good1 as such1 and also upon every being4 ,because every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its species4 ,again1 any kind of form1 whether substantial or accidental1 of anything whatever1 is according to some measure1 wherefore it is stated in ,metaph4 viii1 that the forms of things are like numbers1 so that a form has a certain mode corresponding to its measure4 ,lastly owing to its form1 each thing has a relation of order to something else4 ,accordingly there are different grades of mode1 species and order1 corresponding to the different degrees of good4 ,for there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature1 which good has its mode1 species and order1 and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin4 ,there is again the good of the natural inclination1 which also has its mode1 species and order2 and this is diminished by sin1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 but is not entirely destroyed4 ,again1 there is the good of virtue and grace3 this too has its mode1 species and order1 and is entirely taken away by sin4 ,lastly1 there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself1 which also has its mode1 species and order1 the privation of which is essentially sin4 ,hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode1 species and order1 and how it destroys or diminishes mode1 species and order4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the first two ,objections4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mode1 species and order follow one from the other1 as explained above3 and so they are destroyed or diminished together4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,death and ,other ,bodily ,defects ,are the ,result of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin4 ,because equal causes have equal effects4 ,now these defects are not equal in all1 but abound in some more than in others1 whereas original sin1 from which especially these defects seem to result1 is equal in all1 as stated above 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if the cause is removed1 the effect is removed4 ,but these defects are not removed1 when all sin is removed by ,baptism or ,penance4 ,therefore they are not the effect of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has4 ,but actual sin does not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some defect4 ,much less1 therefore1 does original sin4 ,therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3ab71 ,by one man sin entered into this world1 and by sin death4 ,i answer that1 ,one thing causes another in two ways3 first1 by reason of itself2 secondly1 accidentally4 ,by reason of itself1 one thing is the cause of another1 if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form1 the result being that the effect is directly intended by the cause4 ,consequently1 as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner1 it is evident that sin is not1 of itself1 the cause of these defects4 ,accidentally1 one thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle3 thus it is stated in ,phys4 viii1 text4 #cb1 that by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon4 ,in this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in human nature1 in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away1 whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason1 without any disorder whatever1 but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul1 without any defect1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore1 original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent2 just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers1 as stated above 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #c71 so also it became subject to corruption1 by reason of disorder in the body4 ,now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment1 even as the withdrawal of grace has4 ,consequently1 death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin4 ,and although the defects are not intended by the sinner1 nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of ,god ,who inflicts them as punishments4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,causes that produce their effects of themselves1 if equal1 produce equal effects3 for if such causes be increased or diminished1 the effect is increased or diminished4 ,but equal causes of an obstacle being removed1 do not point to equal effects4 ,for supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns1 it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will be equal2 but that one will move with greater velocity1 which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature1 to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed4 ,accordingly1 when original justice is removed1 the nature of the human body is left to itself1 so that according to diverse natural temperaments1 some men's bodies are subject to more defects1 some to fewer1 although original sin is equal in all4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects1 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #h3aa73 ,he 4 4 4 shall quicken 4 4 4 your mortal bodies1 because of ,his ,spirit that dwelleth in you3 but each is done according to the order of ,divine wisdom1 at a fitting time4 ,because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to ,christ's sufferings1 before attaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory1 which was begun in ,him1 and by ,him acquired for us4 ,hence it behooves that our bodies should remain1 for a time1 subject to suffering1 in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory1 in conformity with ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,two things may be considered in actual sin1 the substance of the act1 and the aspect of fault4 ,as regards the substance of the act1 actual sin can cause a bodily defect3 thus some sicken and die through eating too much4 ,but as regards the fault1 it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul1 but not that we may ward off defects of the body1 as original justice did4 ,wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects1 as original sin does4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,death and ,other ,defects ,are ,natural to ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man4 ,for the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically 7,metaph4 x1 text4 #bf74 ,but man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible4 ,therefore man is naturally corruptible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible1 as having within itself the cause of corruption4 ,but such is the human body4 ,therefore it is naturally corruptible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a hot thing naturally consumes moisture4 ,now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements4 ,since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 text4 #ej1 it seems that death and such like defects are natural to man4 ,on the contrary1 7#a7 ,god made in man whatever is natural to him4 ,now ,god made not death 7,wis4 #a3ac74 ,therefore death is not natural to man4 7#b7 ,further1 that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil3 since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it4 ,but death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore they are not natural to man4 7#c7 ,further1 matter is proportionate to form1 and everything to its end4 ,now man's end is everlasting happiness1 as stated above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #e1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d73 and the form of the human body is the rational soul1 as was proved in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible4 ,i answer that1 ,we may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways2 first1 in respect of its universal nature1 secondly1 as regards its particular nature4 ,a thing's particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation4 ,and in respect of this nature1 every corruption and defect is contrary to nature1 as stated in ,de ,coelo ii1 text4 #cg1 since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it belongs4 ,on the other hand1 the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature1 for instance in some heavenly body2 or again belonging to some superior substance1 in which sense ,god is said by some to be the ,nature ,who makes nature4 ,this force intends the good and the preservation of the universe1 for which alternate generation and corruption in things are requisite3 and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural1 not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection1 but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent4 ,and although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can1 yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity1 except the rational soul2 for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter1 as other forms are2 indeed it has an immaterial operation of its own1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b74 ,consequently as regards his form1 incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things4 ,but since that very form has a matter composed of contraries1 from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole4 ,in this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself1 but not as regards the nature of his form4 ,the first three objections argue on the side of the matter2 while the other three argue on the side of the form4 ,wherefore in order to solve them1 we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul1 in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end1 which is everlasting happiness3 whereas the human body1 which is corruptible1 considered in respect of its nature1 is1 in a way1 adapted to its form1 and1 in another way1 it is not4 ,for we may note a twofold condition in any matter1 one which the agent chooses1 and another which is not chosen by the agent1 and is a natural condition of matter4 ,thus1 a smith in order to make a knife1 chooses a matter both hard and flexible1 which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting1 and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife3 but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust1 results from the natural disposition of iron1 nor does the workman choose this in the iron1 indeed he would do without it if he could3 wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's intention1 nor to the purpose of his art4 ,in like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament1 in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers4 ,whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter1 and is not chosen by nature3 indeed nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could4 ,but ,god1 to ,whom every nature is subject1 in forming man supplied the defect of nature1 and by the gift of original justice1 gave the body a certain incorruptibility1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #a74 ,it is in this sense that it is said that ,god made not death1 and that death is the punishment of sin4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,,question #hf ,,of ,,the ,,stain ,,of ,,sin 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we must now consider the stain of sin2 under which head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul8 7#b7 ,whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,sin ,causes a ,stain on the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul4 ,for a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature3 hence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies1 as ,augustine says 7,contra ,quinque ,haereses v74 ,now the human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things1 to which it turns by sinning4 ,therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is chiefly in the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now the will is in the reason1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #db4 ,but the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever2 rather indeed is it perfected thereby4 ,therefore neither is the will stained by sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if sin causes a stain1 this stain is either something positive1 or a pure privation4 ,if it be something positive1 it can only be either a disposition or a habit3 for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act4 ,but it is neither disposition nor habit3 for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit2 for instance1 in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality1 is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice4 ,therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul4 ,again1 neither is it a pure privation4 ,because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace3 and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins4 ,therefore the stain is not the effect of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,it was said to ,solomon 7,ecclus4 #dg3bb73 ,thou hast stained thy glory3 and it is written 7,eph4 #e3bg73 ,that ,he might present it to ,himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle3 and in each case it is question of the stain of sin4 ,therefore a stain is the effect of sin4 ,i answer that1 ,a stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things1 when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body1 e4g4 a garment1 gold or silver1 or the like4 ,accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner4 ,now man's soul has a twofold comeliness2 one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason1 whereby he is directed in his actions2 the other1 from the refulgence of the ,divine light1 viz4 of wisdom and grace1 whereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions4 ,now1 when the soul cleaves to things by love1 there is a kind of contact in the soul3 and when man sins1 he cleaves to certain things1 against the light of reason and of the ,divine law1 as shown above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f74 ,wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact1 is metaphorically called a stain on the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the soul is not defiled by inferior things1 by their own power1 as though they acted on the soul3 on the contrary1 the soul1 by its own action1 defiles itself1 through cleaving to them inordinately1 against the light of reason and of the ,divine law4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect1 according to the mode of the intellect1 so that the intellect is not defiled1 but perfected1 by them4 ,on the other hand1 the act of the will consists in a movement towards things themselves1 so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved4 ,thus it is that the soul is stained1 when it cleaves inordinately1 according to ,osee #i3aj3 ,they 4 4 4 became abominable as those things were which they loved4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the stain is neither something positive in the soul1 nor does it denote a pure privation3 it denotes a privation of the soul's brightness in relation to its cause1 which is sin2 wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains4 ,it is like a shadow1 which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body1 and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,stain ,remains in the ,soul ,after the ,act of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin4 ,for after an action1 nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition4 ,but the stain is not a habit or disposition1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #c74 ,therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,but the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by4 ,therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every effect depends on its cause4 ,now the cause of the stain is the act of sin4 ,therefore when the act of sin is no longer there1 neither is the stain in the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jos4 #bb3ag73 ,is it a small thing to you that you sinned with ,beelphegor1 and the stain of that crime remaineth in you ,vulg43 'us' to this day8 ,i answer that1 ,the stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past4 ,the reason for this is that the stain1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul1 on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the ,divine law4 ,and therefore so long as man remains out of this light1 the stain of sin remains in him3 but as soon as1 moved by grace1 he returns to the ,divine light and to the light of reason1 the stain is removed4 ,for although the act of sin ceases1 whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the ,divine law1 man does not at once return to the state in which he was before1 and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement4 ,thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement1 he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases1 but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin1 except the disposition or habit2 but there does remain something privative1 viz4 the privation of union with the ,divine light4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,after the interposed body has passed by1 the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating body1 and so the shadow passes at once4 ,but when the sin is past1 the soul does not remain in the same relation to ,god3 and so there is no comparison4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the act of sin parts man from ,god1 which parting causes the defect of brightness1 just as local movement causes local parting4 ,wherefore1 just as when movement ceases1 local distance is not removed1 so neither1 when the act of sin ceases1 is the stain removed4 ,,question #hg ,,of ,,the ,,debt ,,of ,,punishment 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider the debt of punishment4 ,we shall consider 7#a7 the debt itself2 7#b7 mortal and venial sin1 which differ in respect of the punishment due to them4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin8 7#b7 ,whether one sin can be the punishment of another8 7#c7 ,whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment8 7#d7 ,whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity8 7#e7 ,whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment8 7#f7 ,whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin8 7#g7 ,whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin8 7#h7 ,whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,debt of ,punishment ,is an ,effect of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin4 ,for that which is accidentally related to a thing1 does not seem to be its proper effect4 ,now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin1 for it is beside the intention of the sinner4 ,therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 evil is not the cause of good4 ,but punishment is good1 since it is just1 and is from ,god4 ,therefore it is not an effect of sin1 which is evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 i7 that every inordinate affection is its own punishment4 ,but punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment1 because then it would go on indefinitely4 ,therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #b3i73 ,tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil4 ,but to work evil is to sin4 ,therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words tribulation and anguish4 ,i answer that1 ,it has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another1 it suffers some detriment therefrom4 ,for we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes1 the other acts with greater energy1 for which reason hot water freezes more rapidly1 as stated in ,meteor4 i1 #ab4 ,wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against him4 ,now it is evident that all things contained in an order1 are1 in a manner1 one1 in relation to the principle of that order4 ,consequently1 whatever rises up against an order1 is put down by that order or by the principle thereof4 ,and because sin is an inordinate act1 it is evident that whoever sins1 commits an offense against an order3 wherefore he is put down1 in consequence1 by that same order1 which repression is punishment4 ,accordingly1 man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject4 ,in the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his own reason2 secondly1 it is subjected to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters1 as a member either of the state or of the household2 thirdly1 it is subjected to the universal order of the ,divine government4 ,now each of these orders is disturbed by sin1 for the sinner acts against his reason1 and against human and ,divine law4 ,wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment2 one1 inflicted by himself1 viz4 remorse of conscience2 another1 inflicted by man2 and a third1 inflicted by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,punishment follows sin1 inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate4 ,wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner's act1 being beside his intention1 so also is the debt of punishment4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a just punishment may be inflicted either by ,god or by man3 wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin1 not directly but dispositively4 ,sin1 however1 makes man deserving of punishment1 and that is an evil3 for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that punishment is not an evil1 but to deserve punishment is4 ,consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this punishment of the inordinate affection is due to sin as overturning the order of reason4 ,nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment1 through disturbing the order of the ,divine or human law4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,sin ,can ,be the ,punishment of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin4 ,for the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,ethic4 x1 #i74 ,now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue1 but leads him in the opposite direction4 ,therefore sin is not the punishment of sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just punishments are from ,god1 as ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #hb74 ,but sin is not from ,god1 and is an injustice4 ,therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the nature of punishment is to be something against the will4 ,but sin is something from the will1 as shown above 7,q4 #gd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory speaks 7,hom4 xi in ,ezech47 that some sins are punishments of others4 ,i answer that1 ,we may speak of sin in two ways3 first1 in its essence1 as such2 secondly1 as to that which is accidental thereto4 ,sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another4 ,because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will1 for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt4 ,whereas punishment is essentially something against the will1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #e74 ,consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin4 ,on the other hand1 sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways4 ,first1 when one sin is the cause of another1 by removing an impediment thereto4 ,for passions1 temptations of the devil1 and the like are causes of sin1 but are impeded by the help of ,divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin4 ,wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment1 and is from ,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #c71 the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally4 ,it is in this sense that the ,apostle speaks 7,rom4 #a3bd7 when he says3 ,wherefore ,god gave them up to the desires of their heart1 i4e4 to their passions2 because1 to wit1 when men are deprived of the help of ,divine grace1 they are overcome by their passions4 ,in this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin4 ,secondly1 by reason of the substance of the act1 which is such as to cause pain1 whether it be an interior act1 as is clearly the case with anger or envy1 or an exterior act1 as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act1 according to ,wis4 #e3g3 ,we wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity4 ,thirdly1 on the part of the effect1 so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect4 ,in the last two ways1 a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin1 but also with regard to itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even when ,god punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin1 this is directed to the good of virtue4 ,sometimes indeed it is for the good of those who are punished1 when1 to wit1 men arise from sin1 more humble and more cautious4 ,but it is always for the amendment of others1 who seeing some men fall from sin to sin1 are the more fearful of sinning4 ,with regard to the other two ways1 it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment1 since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning1 is of a nature to withdraw man from sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection considers sin essentially as such3 and the same answer applies to the ,third ,objection4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,sin ,incurs a ,debt of ,eternal ,punishment8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment4 ,for a just punishment is equal to the fault1 since justice is equality3 wherefore it is written 7,isa4 #bg3h73 ,in measure against measure1 when it shall be cast off1 thou shalt judge it4 ,now sin is temporal4 ,therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 punishments are a kind of medicine 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,but no medicine should be infinite1 because it is directed to an end1 and what is directed to an end1 is not infinite1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4 i1 #f74 ,therefore no punishment should be infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake4 ,but ,god hath not pleasure in the destruction of men ,vulg43 'of the living'4 ,therefore ,he will not inflict eternal punishment on man4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 nothing accidental is infinite4 ,but punishment is accidental1 for it is not natural to the one who is punished4 ,therefore it cannot be of infinite duration4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #be3df73 ,these shall go into everlasting punishment2 and 7,mk4 #c3bi73 ,he that shall blaspheme against the ,holy ,ghost1 shall never have forgiveness1 but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order4 ,but the effect remains so long as the cause remains4 ,wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also4 ,now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable1 sometimes irreparable3 because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable1 whereas if the principle be saved1 defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle4 ,for instance1 if the principle of sight be destroyed1 sight cannot be restored except by ,divine power2 whereas1 if the principle of sight be preserved1 while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight1 these can be remedied by nature or by art4 ,now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order4 ,consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man's will is subject to ,god1 the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself1 irreparable1 although it is possible to repair it by the power of ,god4 ,now the principle of this order is the last end1 to which man adheres by charity4 ,therefore whatever sins turn man away from ,god1 so as to destroy charity1 considered in themselves1 incur a debt of eternal punishment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity1 both in ,divine and in human judgments4 ,in no judgment1 however1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi1 #aa7 is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration4 ,for the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment3 in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life--sometimes even by death2 wherein account is not taken of the time occupied in killing1 but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living1 so that this punishment1 in its own way1 represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by ,god4 ,now according to ,gregory 7,dial4 iv1 #dd7 it is just that he who has sinned against ,god in his own eternity should be punished in ,god's eternity4 ,a man is said to have sinned in his own eternity1 not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life1 but also because1 from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin1 he has the will to sin1 everlastingly4 ,wherefore ,gregory says 7,dial4 iv1 #dd7 that the wicked would wish to live without end1 that they might abide in their sins for ever4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws1 is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished1 but sometimes only for others3 thus when a thief is hanged1 this is not for his own amendment1 but for the sake of others1 that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment1 according to ,prov4 #ai3be3 ,the wicked man being scourged1 the fool shall be wiser4 ,accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by ,god on the reprobate1 are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments1 according to ,ps4 #ei3f3 ,thou hast given a warning to them that fear ,thee1 that they may flee from before the bow1 that ,thy beloved may be delivered4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god does not delight in punishments for their own sake2 but ,he does delight in the order of ,his justice1 which requires them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although punishment is related indirectly to nature1 nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order1 and to ,god's justice4 ,wherefore1 so long as the disturbance lasts1 the punishment endures4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,sin ,incurs a ,debt of ,punishment ,infinite in ,quantity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity4 ,for it is written 7,jer4 #aj3bd73 ,correct me1 ,o ,lord1 but yet with judgment3 and not in ,thy fury1 lest ,thou bring me to nothing4 ,now ,god's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of ,divine justice3 and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment1 even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power4 ,therefore according to ,god's vengeance1 sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault1 according to ,deut4 #be3b3 ,according to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be4 ,now a sin which is committed against ,god1 is infinite3 because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against 7thus it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual71 and ,god's greatness is infinite4 ,therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a thing may be infinite in two ways1 in duration1 and in quantity4 ,now the punishment is infinite in duration4 ,therefore it is infinite in quantity also4 ,on the contrary1 ,if this were the case1 the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal2 because one infinite is not greater than another4 ,i answer that1 ,punishment is proportionate to sin4 ,now sin comprises two things4 ,first1 there is the turning away from the immutable good1 which is infinite1 wherefore1 in this respect1 sin is infinite4 ,secondly1 there is the inordinate turning to mutable good4 ,in this respect sin is finite1 both because the mutable good itself is finite1 and because the movement of turning towards it is finite1 since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite4 ,accordingly1 in so far as sin consists in turning away from something1 its corresponding punishment is the pain of loss1 which also is infinite1 because it is the loss of the infinite good1 i4e4 ,god4 ,but in so far as sin turns inordinately to something1 its corresponding punishment is the pain of sense1 which is also finite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it would be inconsistent with ,divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely1 because this would be incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that ,divine justice requires1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,the expression to be brought to nothing is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods1 according to #a ,cor4 #ac3b3 ,if ,i 4 4 4 have not charity1 ,i am nothing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers sin as turning away from something1 for it is thus that man sins against ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault1 not indeed as regards the act1 but on the part of the stain1 for as long as this remains1 the debt of punishment remains4 ,but punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity4 ,and a fault which is irreparable1 is such that1 of itself1 it lasts for ever2 wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment4 ,but it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to2 wherefore1 in this respect1 it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,every ,sin ,incurs a ,debt of ,eternal ,punishment8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment4 ,because punishment1 as stated above 7,a4 #d71 is proportionate to the fault4 ,now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment3 whereas no sin1 apparently1 differs infinitely from another1 since every sin is a human act1 which cannot be infinite4 ,since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment1 as stated above 7,a4 #d71 it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 original sin is the least of all sins1 wherefore ,augustine says 7,enchiridion xciii7 that the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone4 ,but original sin incurs everlasting punishment1 since children who have died in original sin through not being baptized1 will never see the kingdom of ,god1 as shown by our ,lord's words 7,john #c3c73 ,unless a man be born again1 he cannot see the kingdom of ,god4 ,much more1 therefore1 will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin2 for ,divine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin4 ,now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul1 because in hell there is no remission of sins4 ,therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment4 ,therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,dial4 iv1 #ci71 that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life4 ,therefore all sins are not punished eternally4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c71 a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment1 in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of ,divine justice1 through being contrary to the very principle of that order1 viz4 the last end4 ,now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed1 but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end1 but only in respect of things referable to the end1 in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end3 as1 for instance1 when a man is too fond of some temporal thing1 yet would not offend ,god for its sake1 by breaking one of ,his commandments4 ,consequently such sins do not incur everlasting1 but only temporal punishment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good1 which constitutes the substance of the sinful act2 but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something4 ,because some sins consist in turning away from the last end1 and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end3 and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are referred to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,original sin incurs everlasting punishment1 not on account of its gravity1 but by reason of the condition of the subject1 viz4 a human being deprived of grace1 without which there is no remission of sin4 ,the same answer applies to the ,third ,objection about venial sin4 ,because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin1 but to its irremissibility1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,debt of ,punishment ,remains ,after ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin4 ,for if the cause be removed the effect is removed4 ,but sin is the cause of the debt of punishment4 ,therefore1 when the sin is removed1 the debt of punishment ceases also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is removed by man returning to virtue4 ,now a virtuous man deserves1 not punishment1 but reward4 ,therefore1 when sin is removed1 the debt of punishment no longer remains4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,punishments are a kind of medicine 7,ethic4 ii1 #c74 ,but a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease4 ,therefore1 when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#b ,kings xii4 #ac1 #ad73 ,david said to ,nathan3 ,i have sinned against the ,lord4 ,and ,nathan said to ,david3 ,the ,lord also hath taken away thy sin2 thou shalt not die4 ,nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the ,lord to blaspheme 4 4 4 the child that is born to thee shall die4 ,therefore a man is punished by ,god even after his sin is forgiven3 and so the debt of punishment remains1 when the sin has been removed4 ,i answer that1 ,two things may be considered in sin3 the guilty act1 and the consequent stain4 ,now it is evident that in all actual sins1 when the act of sin has ceased1 the guilt remains2 because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment1 in so far as he transgresses the order of ,divine justice1 to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation1 which restores him to the equality of justice2 so that1 according to the order of ,divine justice1 he who has been too indulgent to his will1 by transgressing ,god's commandments1 suffers1 either willingly or unwillingly1 something contrary to what he would wish4 ,this restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men4 ,consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment4 ,but if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain1 it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul1 without the soul being united to ,god1 since it was through being separated from ,him that it suffered the loss of its brightness1 in which the stain consists1 as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #a74 ,now man is united to ,god by his will4 ,wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man1 unless his will accept the order of ,divine justice1 that is to say1 unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin1 or bear patiently the punishment which ,god inflicts on him2 and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction4 ,now when punishment is satisfactory1 it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment3 for the nature of punishment is to be against the will2 and although satisfactory punishment1 absolutely speaking1 is against the will1 nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose1 it is voluntary4 ,consequently it is voluntary simply1 but involuntary in a certain respect1 as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #f74 ,we must1 therefore1 say that1 when the stain of sin has been removed1 there may remain a debt of punishment1 not indeed of punishment simply1 but of satisfactory punishment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as after the act of sin has ceased1 the stain remains1 as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #b71 so the debt of punishment also can remain4 ,but when the stain has been removed1 the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply1 but he may deserve it as satisfactory3 because his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against ,god or man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when the stain is removed1 the wound of sin is healed as regards the will4 ,but punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed1 since they were so disordered by the sin committed1 so that1 to wit1 the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it4 ,moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice1 and to remove the scandal given to others1 so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment1 as may be seen in the example of ,david quoted above4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,every ,punishment ,is ,inflicted for a ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin4 ,for it is written 7,john #i3c1 #b7 about the man born blind3 ,neither hath this man sinned1 nor his parents 4 4 4 that he should be born blind4 ,in like manner we see that many children1 those also who have been baptized1 suffer grievous punishments1 fevers1 for instance1 diabolical possession1 and so forth1 and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized4 ,moreover before they are baptized1 there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things4 ,therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head4 ,now each of these is frequently observed in human affairs1 for it is written about the wicked 7,ps4 #gb3e73 ,they are not in the labor of men3 neither shall they be scourged like other men2 and 7,job #ba3g73 ,why then do the wicked live1 are they advanced1 and strengthened with riches 78799,the words in brackets show the readings of the ,vulgate2 and 7,hab4 #a3ac73 ,why lookest ,thou upon the contemptuous ,vulg43 'them that do unjust things'1 and holdest ,thy peace1 when the wicked man oppresseth ,vulg43 'devoureth'1 the man that is more just than himself8 ,therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written of ,christ 7#a ,pet4 #b3bb7 that ,he did no sin1 nor was guile found in ,his mouth4 ,and yet it is said 7#a ,pet4 #b3ba7 that ,he suffered for us4 ,therefore punishment is not always inflicted by ,god for sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,job #d3g1 seqq473 ,who ever perished innocent8 ,or when were the just destroyed8 ,on the contrary1 ,i have seen those who work iniquity 4 4 4 perishing by the blast of ,god2 and ,augustine writes 7,retract4 i7 that all punishment is just1 and is inflicted for a sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as already stated 7,a4 #f71 punishment can be considered in two ways--simply1 and as being satisfactory4 ,a satisfactory punishment is1 in a way1 voluntary4 ,and since those who differ as to the debt of punishment1 may be one in will by the union of love1 it happens that one who has not sinned1 bears willingly the punishment for another3 thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves4 ,if1 however1 we speak of punishment simply1 in respect of its being something penal1 it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished4 ,sometimes this is a relation to actual sin1 as when a man is punished by ,god or man for a sin committed by him4 ,sometimes it is a relation to original sin3 and this1 either principally or consequently--principally1 the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself1 and deprived of original justice3 and consequently1 all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature4 ,nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal1 and yet is not so simply4 ,because punishment is a species of evil1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #e74 ,now evil is privation of good4 ,and since man's good is manifold1 viz4 good of the soul1 good of the body1 and external goods1 it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good1 that he may profit in a greater good1 as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health1 or loss of both of these1 for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of ,god4 ,in such cases the loss is an evil to man1 not simply but relatively2 wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply1 but of medicinal punishment1 because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients1 that he may restore them to health4 ,and since such like are not punishments properly speaking1 they are not referred to sin as their cause1 except in a restricted sense3 because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines1 is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin4 ,for there was no need1 in the state of innocence1 for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue2 so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue1 is reduced to original sin as its cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,such like defects of those who are born with them1 or which children suffer from1 are the effects and the punishments of original sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #e72 and they remain even after baptism1 for the cause stated above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #e1 ad #b73 and that they are not equally in all1 is due to the diversity of nature1 which is left to itself1 as stated above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #e1 ad #a74 ,nevertheless1 they are directed by ,divine providence1 to the salvation of men1 either of those who suffer1 or of others who are admonished by their means--and also to the glory of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man1 but they are of small account3 whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods4 ,consequently it belongs to ,divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous1 and to award them as much temporal goods or evils1 as suffices for virtue3 for1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 viii71 ,divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man1 by material gifts4 ,the very fact that others receive temporal goods1 is detrimental to their spiritual good2 wherefore the psalm quoted concludes 7verse #f73 ,therefore pride hath held them fast4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,christ bore a satisfactory punishment1 not for ,his1 but for our sins4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,anyone ,is ,punished for ,another's ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one may be punished for another's sin4 ,for it is written 7,ex4 #bj3e73 ,i am 4 4 4 ,god 4 4 4 jealous1 visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children1 unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate ,me2 and 7,matt4 #bc3ce73 ,that upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 human justice springs from ,divine justice4 ,now1 according to human justice1 children are sometimes punished for their parents1 as in the case of high treason4 ,therefore also according to ,divine justice1 one is punished for another's sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it be replied that the son is punished1 not for the father's sin1 but for his own1 inasmuch as he imitates his father's wickedness2 this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders1 who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that children are punished1 not for their own sins1 but for those of their parents4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ezech4 #ah3bj73 ,the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father4 ,i answer that1 ,if we speak of that satisfactory punishment1 which one takes upon oneself voluntarily1 one may bear another's punishment1 in so far as they are1 in some way1 one1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,if1 however1 we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin1 inasmuch as it is penal1 then each one is punished for his own sin only1 because the sinful act is something personal4 ,but if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal1 in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's sin4 ,for it has been stated 7,a4 #g7 that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself1 are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul4 ,wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin1 either by ,god or by man2 e4g4 on children for their parents1 or on servants for their masters1 inasmuch as they are their property so to speak2 in such a way1 however1 that1 if the children or the servants take part in the sin1 this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for4 ,but if they do not take part in the sin1 it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne1 while1 in regard to the one who is punished1 it is merely medicinal 7except accidentally1 if he consent to the other's sin71 since it is intended for the good of his soul1 if he bears it patiently4 ,with regard to spiritual punishments1 these are not merely medicinal1 because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good4 ,consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,avit47 99,ep4 ad ,auxilium1 ccl41 such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another's sin1 because1 as regards the soul1 the son is not the father's property4 ,hence the ,lord assigns the reason for this by saying 7,ezech4 #ah3d73 ,all souls are ,mine4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,both the passages quoted should1 seemingly1 be referred to temporal or bodily punishments1 in so far as children are the property of their parents1 and posterity1 of their forefathers4 ,else1 if they be referred to spiritual punishments1 they must be understood in reference to the imitation of sin1 wherefore in ,exodus these words are added1 ,of them that hate ,me1 and in the chapter quoted from ,matthew 7verse #cb7 we read3 ,fill ye up then the measure of your fathers4 ,the sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children1 because the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents' crimes1 both by becoming accustomed to them1 and by imitating their parents' example1 conforming to their authority as it were4 ,moreover they deserve heavier punishment if1 seeing the punishment of their parents1 they fail to mend their ways4 ,the text adds1 to the third and fourth generation1 because men are wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation1 so that both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to imitate them1 and the parents can see their children's punishments so as to grieve for them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another's sin are bodily and temporal4 ,they are also remedies or medicines against future sins1 in order that either they who are punished1 or others may be restrained from similar faults4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those who are near of kin are said to be punished1 rather than outsiders1 for the sins of others1 both because the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned1 as stated above1 in so far as the child is the father's property1 and because the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own household are more moving4 ,consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents1 he is more eager to imitate them1 and if he is not deterred by their punishments1 he would seem to be the more obstinate1 and1 therefore1 to deserve more severe punishment4 ,,question #hh ,,of ,,venial ,,and ,,mortal ,,sin 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,in the next place1 since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment1 we must consider them4 ,first1 we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin2 secondly1 we shall consider venial sin in itself4 ,under the first head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin8 7#b7 ,whether they differ generically8 7#c7 ,whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin8 7#d7 ,whether a venial sin can become mortal8 7#e7 ,whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance8 7#f7 ,whether a mortal sin can become venial8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,venial ,sin ,is ,fittingly ,condivided with ,mortal ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin4 ,for ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bg73 ,sin is a word1 deed or desire contrary to the eternal law4 ,but the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal4 ,consequently every sin is mortal4 ,therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aj3ca73 ,whether you eat or drink1 or whatever else you do2 do all to the glory of ,god4 ,now whoever sins breaks this commandment1 because sin is not done for ,god's glory4 ,consequently1 since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin1 it seems that whoever sins1 sins mortally4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever cleaves to a thing by love1 cleaves either as enjoying it1 or as using it1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #c1 #d74 ,but no person1 in sinning1 cleaves to a mutable good as using it3 because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness1 which1 properly speaking1 is to use1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #c1 #d74 ,therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good4 ,now to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness1 as ,augustine again says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cj74 ,therefore1 since perverseness 99,the ,latin 'pervertere' means to overthrow1 to destroy1 hence 'perversion' of ,god's law is a mortal sin4 denotes a mortal sin1 it seems that whoever sins1 sins mortally4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whoever approaches one term1 from that very fact turns away from the opposite4 ,now whoever sins1 approaches a mutable good1 and1 consequently turns away from the immutable good1 so that he sins mortally4 ,therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,tract4 xli in ,joan471 that a crime is one that merits damnation1 and a venial sin1 one that does not4 ,but a crime denotes a mortal sin4 ,therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin4 ,i answer that1 ,certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed1 if taken in their proper sense1 whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically3 thus to smile is not opposed to being dry2 but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought4 ,in like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body1 it does not imply opposition to venial1 nor belong to the same genus4 ,but if mortal be taken metaphorically1 as applied to sin1 it is opposed to that which is venial4 ,for sin1 being a sickness of the soul1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #i1 ad #b71 is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease1 which is said to be mortal1 through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e74 ,now the principle of the spiritual life1 which is a life in accord with virtue1 is the order to the last end1 as stated above 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #c73 and if this order be corrupted1 it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle1 but by the power of ,god alone1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #c71 because disorders in things referred to the end1 are repaired through the end1 even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles4 ,hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle1 as neither can an error about principles4 ,wherefore such sins are called mortal1 as being irreparable4 ,on the other hand1 sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end1 the order to the end itself being preserved1 are reparable4 ,these sins are called venial3 because a sin receives its acquittal 7veniam7 when the debt of punishment is taken away1 and this ceases when the sin ceases1 as explained above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #f74 ,accordingly1 mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable3 and ,i say this with reference to the intrinsic principle1 but not to the ,divine power1 which can repair all diseases1 whether of the body or of the soul4 ,therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature3 but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts1 of which it is predicated1 of the one first1 and of the other afterwards4 ,consequently the perfect notion of sin1 which ,augustine gives1 applies to mortal sin4 ,on the other hand1 venial sin is called a sin1 in reference to an imperfect notion of sin1 and in relation to mortal sin3 even as an accident is called a being1 in relation to substance1 in reference to the imperfect notion of being4 ,for it is not against the law1 since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids1 nor omits what the law prescribes to be done2 but he acts beside the law1 through not observing the mode of reason1 which the law intends4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this precept of the ,apostle is affirmative1 and so it does not bind for all times4 ,consequently everyone who does not actually refer all his actions to the glory of ,god1 does not therefore act against this precept4 ,in order1 therefore1 to avoid mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to ,god's glory1 it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to ,god habitually4 ,now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to ,god's glory1 and not habitual reference3 because it does not exclude charity1 which refers man to ,god habitually4 ,therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially1 sins mortally4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he that sins venially1 cleaves to temporal good1 not as enjoying it1 because he does not fix his end in it1 but as using it1 by referring it to ,god1 not actually but habitually4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good1 unless one's end is fixed therein3 because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,mortal and ,venial ,sin ,differ ,generically8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically1 so that some sins be generically mortal1 and some generically venial4 ,because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #b74 ,now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter3 since man can love any mutable good1 either less than ,god1 which may be a venial sin1 or more than ,god1 which is a mortal sin4 ,therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #c71 a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable1 venial when it can be repaired4 ,now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice1 which1 according to some1 is irremissible3 whereas reparability belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance1 which are remissible4 ,therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance4 ,but1 in this respect1 sins differ not in genus but in cause1 as stated above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #h1 ad #a74 ,therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it was stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c2 ,a4 #aj7 that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins4 ,but sudden movements occur in every kind of sin4 ,therefore no sins are generically venial4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine1 in a sermon on ,purgatory 7,de ,sanctis1 serm4 xli71 enumerates certain generic venial sins1 and certain generic mortal sins4 ,i answer that1 ,venial sin is so called from venia 7pardon74 ,consequently a sin may be called venial1 first of all1 because it has been pardoned3 thus ,ambrose says that penance makes every sin venial3 and this is called venial from the result4 ,secondly1 a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally1 to prevent its being pardoned3 partially1 as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt1 e4g4 a sin committed through weakness or ignorance3 and this is called venial from the cause3 totally1 through not destroying the order to the last end1 wherefore it deserves temporal1 but not everlasting punishment4 ,it is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now4 ,for as regards the first two1 it is evident that they have no determinate genus3 whereas venial sin1 taken in the third sense1 can have a determinate genus1 so that one sin may be venial generically1 and another generically mortal1 according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object4 ,for1 when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity1 whereby man is directed to his last end1 the sin is mortal by reason of its object4 ,consequently it is a mortal sin generically1 whether it be contrary to the love of ,god1 e4g4 blasphemy1 perjury1 and the like1 or against the love of one's neighbor1 e4g4 murder1 adultery1 and such like3 wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus4 ,sometimes1 however1 the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness1 but which is not contrary to the love of ,god and one's neighbor1 e4g4 an idle word1 excessive laughter1 and so forth3 and such sins are venial by reason of their genus4 ,nevertheless1 since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice1 not only from their objects1 but also from some disposition of the agent1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f71 it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object1 becomes mortal on the part of the agent1 either because he fixes his last end therein1 or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus2 for example1 if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery4 ,in like manner it may happen1 on the part of the agent1 that a sin generically mortal because venial1 by reason of the act being imperfect1 i4e4 not deliberated by reason1 which is the proper principle of an evil act1 as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity1 proves that he prefers it to the love of ,god1 and consequently1 that he loves it more than he loves ,god4 ,hence it belongs to the genus of some sins1 which are of themselves contrary to charity1 that something is loved more than ,god2 so that they are mortal by reason of their genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,venial ,sin ,is a ,disposition to ,mortal ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin4 ,for one contrary does not dispose to another4 ,but venial and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an act disposes to something of like species1 wherefore it is stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #a1 #b1 that from like acts like dispositions and habits are engendered4 ,but mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin1 it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin4 ,now every good work disposes to mortal sin2 wherefore ,augustine says in his ,rule 7,ep4 ccxi7 that pride lies in wait for good works that it may destroy them4 ,therefore even good works would be venial sins1 which is absurd4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ai3a73 ,he that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little4 ,now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things4 ,therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin4 ,i answer that1 ,a disposition is a kind of cause2 wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause1 so is there a twofold manner of disposition4 ,for there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect1 as a hot thing heats3 and there is a cause which moves indirectly1 by removing an obstacle1 as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it4 ,accordingly an act of sin disposes to something in two ways4 ,first1 directly1 and thus it disposes to an act of like species4 ,in this way1 a sin generically venial does not1 primarily and of its nature1 dispose to a sin generically mortal1 for they differ in species4 ,nevertheless1 in this same way1 a venial sin can dispose1 by way of consequence1 to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent3 because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin1 that the lust of sinning increases1 and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin3 since the end for one who has a habit1 as such1 is to work according to that habit2 and the consequence will be that1 by sinning often venially1 he becomes disposed to a mortal sin4 ,secondly1 a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto4 ,in this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal4 ,because he that commits a sin generically venial1 turns aside from some particular order2 and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters1 is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end1 by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another1 as though they were species of one genus1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a71 but as an accident is condivided with substance4 ,wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form1 so can a venial sin dispose to mortal4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,venial sin is not like mortal sin in species2 but it is in genus1 inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order1 albeit in different ways1 as stated 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a good work is not1 of itself1 a disposition to mortal sin2 but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally2 whereas a venial sin1 of its very nature1 disposes to mortal sin1 as stated4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,venial ,sin ,can ,become ,mortal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin4 ,for ,augustine in explaining the words of ,john #c3cf3 ,he that believeth not the ,son1 shall not see life1 says 7,tract4 xii in ,joan473 ,the slightest1 i4e4 venial1 sins kill if we make little of them4 ,now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul4 ,therefore a venial sin can become mortal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason1 is a venial sin1 but after consent1 is a mortal sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #h1 ad #b74 ,therefore a venial sin can become mortal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but a curable disease may become incurable4 ,therefore a venial sin may become mortal4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a disposition may become a habit4 ,now venial sin is a disposition to mortal1 as stated 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore a venial sin can become mortal4 ,i answer that1 ,the fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways4 ,first1 so that the same identical act be at first a venial1 and then a mortal sin4 ,this is impossible3 because a sin1 like any moral act1 consists chiefly in an act of the will3 so that an act is not one morally1 if the will be changed1 although the act be continuous physically4 ,if1 however1 the will be not changed1 it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal4 ,secondly1 this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial1 becomes mortal4 ,this is possible1 in so far as one may fix one's end in that venial sin1 or direct it to some mortal sin as end1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,thirdly1 this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin4 ,if this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin1 it is false1 because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin4 ,this is evident as regards the duration of the punishment1 since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment1 while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #e74 ,it is also evident as regards the pain of loss1 because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing ,god1 to which no other punishment is comparable1 as ,chrysostom states 7,hom4 xxiv in ,matth474 ,it is also evident as regards the pain of sense1 as to the remorse of conscience2 although as to the pain of fire1 the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another4 ,if1 however1 this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively1 it is true1 as was shown above 7,a4 #c7 with regard to the two different manners of disposition1 whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin2 but the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,disease of the body is not an act1 but an abiding disposition2 wherefore1 while remaining the same disease1 it may undergo change4 ,on the other hand1 venial sin is a transient act1 which cannot be taken up again3 so that in this respect the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a disposition that becomes a habit1 is like an imperfect thing in the same species2 thus imperfect science1 by being perfected1 becomes a habit4 ,on the other hand1 venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically1 even as an accident which disposes to a substantial form1 into which it is never changed4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #e ,whether a ,circumstance ,can ,make a ,venial ,sin to ,be ,mortal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal4 ,for ,augustine says in a sermon on ,purgatory 7,de ,sanctis1 serm4 xli7 that if anger continue for a long time1 or if drunkenness be frequent1 they become mortal sins4 ,but anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically1 else they would always be mortal sins4 ,therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,master says 7,sentent4 ii1 ,d1 #bd7 that delectation1 if morose 99,see ,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #f1 is a mortal sin1 but that if it be not morose1 it is a venial sin4 ,now moroseness is a circumstance4 ,therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin1 both of which are generically evil4 ,but a circumstance makes a good act to be evil1 as when a man gives an alms for vainglory4 ,much more1 therefore1 can it make a venial sin to be mortal4 ,on the contrary1 ,since a circumstance is an accident1 its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself1 derived from the act's genus1 because the subject always excels its accident4 ,if1 therefore1 an act be venial by reason of its genus1 it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident3 since1 in a way1 mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin1 as is evident from what has been said 7,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e1 ad #a2 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #e1 ad #a74 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d2 ,,aa4 #aj1 #aa71 when we were treating of circumstances1 a circumstance1 as such1 is an accident of the moral act3 and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act1 and then it loses its nature of circumstance1 and constitutes the species of the moral act4 ,this happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus2 thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife1 the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity2 but if this other be another man's wife1 there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another2 and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery4 ,it is1 however1 impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal1 unless it adds the deformity of another species4 ,for it has been stated above 7,a4 #a7 that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end1 whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end4 ,consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal1 so long as it remains a circumstance1 but only when it transfers the sin to another species1 and becomes1 as it were1 the specific difference of the moral act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species1 nor is frequency or custom1 except perhaps by something accidental supervening4 ,for an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged1 unless by chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species1 e4g4 disobedience1 contempt1 or the like4 ,we must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor1 if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically1 such as murder or robbery1 that anger will be a mortal sin generically3 and if it be a venial sin1 this will be due to the imperfection of the act1 in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality3 whereas1 if it last a long time1 it returns to its generic nature1 through the consent of reason4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the hurt to which the angry movement tends1 is a sin generically venial1 for instance1 if a man be angry with someone1 so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little1 the anger will not be mortal sin1 however long it last1 unless perhaps accidentally2 for instance1 if it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind4 ,with regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus2 for1 that a man1 without necessity1 and through the mere lust of wine1 make himself unable to use his reason1 whereby he is directed to ,god and avoids committing many sins1 is expressly contrary to virtue4 ,that it be a venial sin1 is due some sort of ignorance or weakness1 as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine1 or of his own unfitness1 so that he has no thought of getting drunk1 for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin1 but only the excessive drink4 ,if1 however1 he gets drunk frequently1 this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse1 for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine3 wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically4 ,in such matters1 if the delectation be not morose1 there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act1 as we have said with regard to anger 7ad #a73 because anger is said to be lasting1 and delectation to be morose1 on account of the approval of the deliberating reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a circumstance does not make a good act to be evil1 unless it constitute the species of a sin1 as we have stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d74 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #f ,whether a ,mortal ,sin ,can ,become ,venial8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a mortal sin can become venial4 ,because venial sin is equally distant from mortal1 as mortal sin is from venial4 ,but a venial sin can become mortal1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,therefore also a mortal sin can become venial4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this1 that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than ,god1 while he who sins venially loves the creature less than ,god4 ,now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal1 loves a creature less than ,god2 for instance1 if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin1 and contrary to the love of ,god1 commits the sin of fornication1 yet so as to be ready1 for the love of ,god1 to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of ,god4 ,therefore his will be a venial sin2 and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as stated above 7,a4 #e1 ,obj4 #c71 good is more distant from evil1 than venial from mortal sin4 ,but an act which is evil in itself1 can become good2 thus to kill a man may be an act of justice1 as when a judge condemns a thief to death4 ,much more therefore can a mortal sin become venial4 ,on the contrary1 ,an eternal thing can never become temporal4 ,but mortal sin deserves eternal punishment1 whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment4 ,therefore a mortal sin can never become venial4 ,i answer that1 ,venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,now the imperfect can become perfect1 by some sort of addition3 and1 consequently1 a venial sin can become mortal1 by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin1 as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication4 ,on the other hand1 the perfect cannot become imperfect1 by addition2 and so a mortal sin cannot become venial1 by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin1 for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word2 rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity4 ,nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal1 can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act1 because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act1 since it is not a deliberate1 but a sudden act1 as is evident from what we have said above 7,a4 #b74 ,this happens by a kind of subtraction1 namely1 of deliberate reason4 ,and since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason1 the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect1 even as a boy differs from a man4 ,but the boy becomes a man and not vice versa4 ,hence the argument does not prove4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether1 as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile1 then he that commits fornication in a state of such ignorance1 commits no sin either mortal or venial4 ,but if the ignorance be not invincible1 then the ignorance itself is a sin1 and contains within itself the lack of the love of ,god1 in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,contra ,mendacium vii71 those things which are evil in themselves1 cannot be well done for any good end4 ,now murder is the slaying of the innocent1 and this can nowise be well done4 ,but1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #d1 #e71 the judge who sentences a thief to death1 or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal1 are not murderers4 ,,question #hi ,,of ,,venial ,,sin ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider venial sin in itself1 and under this head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul8 7#b7 ,of the different kinds of venial sin1 as denoted by wood1 hay1 stubble 7#a ,cor4 #c3ab72 7#c7 ,whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence8 7#d7 ,whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially8 7#e7 ,whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins8 7#f7 ,whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,venial ,sin ,causes a ,stain on the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,poenit47 99,hom4 #ej1 inter4 ,l41 #b1 that if venial sins be multiplied1 they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse4 ,but the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty4 ,therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 mortal sin causes a stain in the soul1 on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections4 ,but1 in venial sin1 there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections4 ,therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing1 through love thereof as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #a74 ,but1 in venial sin1 the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love4 therefore1 venial sin brings a stain on the soul4 ,on the contrary1 it is written1 7,eph4 #e3bg73 ,that ,he might present it to ,himself a glorious church1 not having spot or wrinkle1 on which the gloss says3 i4e41 some grievous sin4 ,therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul4 ,i answer that as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #a71 a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something1 as may be seen in corporeal matters1 from which the term has been transferred to the soul1 by way of similitude4 ,now1 just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness1 one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors1 the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening1 so too1 in the soul1 there is a twofold comeliness1 one habitual and1 so to speak1 intrinsic1 the other actual like an outward flash of light4 ,now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness1 but not to habitual comeliness1 because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues1 as we shall show further on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #aj2 ,q4 #acc1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b71 but only hinders their acts4 ,on the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained1 wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness4 ,therefore1 properly speaking1 venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul4 ,if1 however1 we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain1 this is in a restricted sense1 in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively3 because otherwise they would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue1 but not in venial sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end1 so that the shedding of the light of grace1 which accrues to those who1 by charity1 cleave to ,god as their last end1 is entirely cut off4 ,on the contrary1 in venial sin1 man does not cleave to a creature as his last end3 hence there is no comparison4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,venial ,sins ,are ,suitably ,designated ,as ,wood1 ,hay1 and ,stubble8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as wood1 hay1 and stubble4 ,because wood1 hay1 and stubble are said 7#a ,cor4 #c3ab7 to be built on a spiritual foundation4 ,now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation1 even as false opinions are outside the pale of science4 ,therefore1 venial sins are not suitably designated as wood1 hay1 and stubble4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he who builds wood1 hay1 and stubble1 shall be saved yet so as by fire 7#a ,cor4 #c3ae74 ,but sometimes the man who commits a venial sin1 will not be saved1 even by fire1 e4g4 when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached4 ,therefore1 venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood1 hay1 and stubble4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #c3ab7 those who build gold1 silver1 precious stones1 i4e4 love of ,god and our neighbor1 and good works1 are others from those who build wood1 hay1 and stubble4 ,but those even who love ,god and their neighbor1 and do good works1 commit venial sins3 for it is written 7#a ,john #a3h73 ,if we say that we have no sin1 we deceive ourselves4 ,therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins4 ,therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #c3ae7 that the man who builds up wood1 hay and stubble1 shall be saved yet so as by fire1 so that he will suffer punishment1 but not everlasting4 ,now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore these three signify venial sins4 ,i answer that1 ,some have understood the foundation to be dead faith1 upon which some build good works1 signified by gold1 silver1 and precious stones1 while others build mortal sins1 which according to them are designated by wood1 hay and stubble4 ,but ,augustine disapproves of this explanation 7,de ,fide et ,oper4 xv71 because1 as the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3ba71 he who does the works of the flesh1 shall not obtain the kingdom of ,god1 which signifies to be saved2 whereas the ,apostle says that he who builds wood1 hay1 and stubble shall be saved yet so as by fire4 ,consequently wood1 hay1 stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins4 ,others say that wood1 hay1 stubble designate good works1 which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice1 but are mixed with venial sins3 as1 when a man is charged with the care of a family1 which is a good thing1 excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life1 under ,god however1 so that1 to wit1 for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to ,god4 ,but neither does this seem to be reasonable4 ,for it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of ,god1 and one's neighbor1 wherefore they are designated by gold1 silver1 and precious stones1 and consequently not by wood1 hay1 and stubble4 ,we must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things1 are designated by wood1 hay1 and stubble4 ,for just as these are stored in a house1 without belonging to the substance of the house1 and can be burnt1 while the house is saved1 so also venial sins are multiplied in a man1 while the spiritual edifice remains1 and for them1 man suffers fire1 either of temporal trials in this life1 or of purgatory after this life1 and yet he is saved for ever4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation1 as though they were laid directly upon it1 but because they are laid beside it2 in the same sense as it is written 7,ps4 #acf3a73 ,upon the waters of ,babylon1 i4e4 beside the waters3 because venial sins do not destroy the edifice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not said that everyone who builds wood1 hay and stubble1 shall be saved as by fire1 but only those who build upon the foundation4 ,and this foundation is not dead faith1 as some have esteemed1 but faith quickened by charity1 according to ,eph4 #c3ag3 ,rooted and founded in charity4 ,accordingly1 he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins1 has indeed wood1 hay1 and stubble1 but not built upon the spiritual edifice2 and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things1 sin venially sometimes1 yet they commit but slight venial sins1 and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity3 wherefore they do not build up venial sins1 because these do not remain long in them4 ,but the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly things remain longer1 because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,coelo i1 text4 #b71 all things are comprised under three1 the beginning1 the middle1 the end4 ,accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three1 viz4 to wood1 which remains longer in the fire2 stubble1 which is burnt up at once2 and hay1 which is between these two3 because venial sins are removed by fire1 quickly or slowly1 according as man is more or less attached to them4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,man ,could ,commit a ,venial ,sin in the ,state of ,innocence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence4 ,because on #a ,tim4 #b3ad1 ,adam was not seduced1 a gloss says3 ,having had no experience of ,god's severity1 it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin4 ,but he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial sin4 ,therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #e73 ,we must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man1 unless first of all there had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked4 ,now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat1 which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin1 could be nothing more than a venial sin4 ,in like manner1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #e7 that man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment1 when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit4 ,again there seems to have been a certain movement of unbelief in ,eve1 since she doubted what the ,lord had said1 as appears from her saying 7,gen4 #c3c73 ,lest perhaps we die4 ,now these apparently were venial sins4 ,therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state1 than venial sin is4 ,now man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state4 ,therefore he could also sin venially4 ,on the contrary1 ,every sin deserves some punishment4 ,but nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj74 ,therefore he could not commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity4 ,but venial sin does not change man's state4 ,therefore he could not sin venially4 ,i answer that1 ,it is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence4 ,this1 however1 is not to be understood as though on account of the perfection of his state1 the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him1 if he had committed it4 ,because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin1 but it does not transfer it to another species1 unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience1 or vow or the like1 which does not apply to the question in point4 ,consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state4 ,we must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially1 because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself1 before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally4 ,the reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us1 either through the imperfection of the act1 as in the case of sudden movements1 in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end1 the due order of the end being safeguarded4 ,now each of these happens on account of some defect of order1 by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher4 ,because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason3 and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due1 in us1 to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good1 as stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #aj72 and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end1 the due order of the end being safeguarded1 is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end1 which holds the highest place1 being the beginning1 as it were1 in matters concerning the appetite1 as stated above 7,q4 #aj1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 ad #c2 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e74 ,now1 in the state of innocence1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #a71 there was an unerring stability of order1 so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher1 so long as man remained subject to ,god1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ac74 ,hence there can be no inordinateness in man1 unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to ,god1 which constitutes a mortal sin4 ,from this it is evident that1 in the state of innocence1 man could not commit a venial sin1 before committing a mortal sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the passage quoted1 venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now2 but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this vainglory which preceded man's downfall1 was his first mortal sin1 for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin4 ,this vainglory was followed1 in the man1 by the desire to make and experiment1 and in the woman1 by doubt1 for she gave way to vainglory1 merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept1 as though she refused to be held in check by the precept4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state3 this a venial sin cannot do4 ,and because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever1 the result is that the first man could not sin venially1 before committing a mortal sin4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,good or a ,wicked ,angel ,can ,sin ,venially8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially4 ,because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called the mind1 according to ,gregory1 who says 7,hom4 xxix in ,evang47 that man understands in common with the angels4 ,but man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul4 ,therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,he that can do more can do less4 ,but an angel could love a created good more than ,god1 and he did1 by sinning mortally4 ,therefore he could also love a creature less than ,god inordinately1 by sinning venially4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically1 by provoking men to laughter1 and other like frivolities4 ,now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above 7,a4 #c71 unless there is a special prohibition1 which is not the case in point4 ,therefore an angel can sin venially4 ,on the contrary1 ,the perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state4 ,but man could not sin venially in the primitive state1 and much less1 therefore1 can an angel4 ,i answer that1 ,an angel's intellect1 as stated above in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #h71 is not discursive1 i4e4 it does not proceed from principles to conclusions1 so as to understand both separately1 as we do4 ,consequently1 whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion1 it must1 of necessity1 consider it in its principles4 ,now in matters of appetite1 as we have often stated 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #gb1 ,a4 #e71 ends are like principles1 while the means are like conclusions4 ,wherefore1 an angel's mind is not directed to the means1 except as they stand under the order to the end4 ,consequently1 from their very nature1 they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means1 unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end1 and this is a mortal sin4 ,now good angels are not moved to the means1 except in subordination to the due end which is ,god3 wherefore all their acts are acts of charity1 so that no venial sin can be in them4 ,on the other hand1 wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride4 ,therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will4 ,this does not apply to the appetite for the natural good1 which appetite we have stated to be in them 7,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #b1 ad #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect1 but he differs in his mode of understanding1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angel could not love a creature less than ,god1 without1 at the same time1 either referring it to ,god1 as the last end1 or to some inordinate end1 for the reason given above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the demons incite man to all such things which seem venial1 that he may become used to them1 so as to lead him on to mortal sin4 ,consequently in all such things they sin mortally1 on account of the end they have in view4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,first ,movements of the ,sensuality in ,unbelievers ,are ,mortal ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3a7 that there is 4 4 4 no condemnation to them that are in ,christ ,jesus1 who walk not according to the flesh3 and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality1 as appears from the context 7,rom4 #g74 ,therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh1 i4e4 by consenting to concupiscence1 is because they are in ,christ ,jesus4 ,but unbelievers are not in ,christ ,jesus4 ,therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation4 ,therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further ,anselm says 7,de ,gratia et ,lib4 ,arb4 vii73 ,those who are not in ,christ1 when they feel the sting of the flesh1 follow the road of damnation1 even if they walk not according to the flesh4 ,but damnation is not due save to mortal sin4 ,therefore1 since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence1 it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,anselm says 7,de ,gratia et ,lib4 ,arb4 vii73 ,man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence4 ,now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of ,baptism1 which the unbeliever has not4 ,therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever1 even without his consent1 is a mortal sin1 because he acts against his duty4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated in ,acts #aj3cd that ,god is not a respecter of persons4 ,therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation1 what ,he does not impute to another4 ,but he does not impute first movements to believers1 unto condemnation4 ,neither therefore does ,he impute them to unbelievers4 ,i answer that1 ,it is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins1 when they do not consent to them4 ,this is evident for two reasons4 ,first1 because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #d74 ,now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers4 ,therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers1 to be mortal sins4 ,secondly1 from the state of the sinner4 ,because excellence of the person never diminishes sin1 but1 on the contrary1 increases it1 as stated above 7,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #aj74 ,therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever1 but much more so4 ,for the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness1 on account of their ignorance1 according to #a ,tim4 #a3ac3 ,i obtained the mercy of ,god1 because ,i did it ignorantly in my unbelief3 whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace1 according to ,heb4 #aj3bi3 ,how much more1 do you think1 he deserveth worse punishments 4 4 4 who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean1 by which he was sanctified8 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin1 which condemnation is remitted by the grace of ,jesus ,christ1 although the fomes of concupiscence remain4 ,wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin1 as it is in unbelievers4 ,in this way also is to be understood the saying of ,anselm1 wherefore the ,reply to the ,second ,objection is evident4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice4 ,wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains1 not to actual but to original sin4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,venial ,sin ,can ,be in ,anyone with ,original ,sin ,alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone4 ,for disposition precedes habit4 ,now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin1 as stated above 7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore in an unbeliever1 in whom original sin is not remitted1 venial sin exists before mortal sin3 and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin1 and without mortal sins4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 venial sin has less in common1 and less connection with mortal sin1 than one mortal sin has with another4 ,but an unbeliever in the state of original sin1 can commit one mortal sin without committing another4 ,therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin3 and when the child comes to that time1 it can stay a short time at least1 without committing a mortal sin1 because this happens in the worst criminals4 ,now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time1 however short it may be4 ,therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo1 where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #f73 whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin4 ,therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone1 and without mortal sin4 ,the reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion1 the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin1 wherefore1 much more does it excuse him from venial sin1 if he does anything which is such generically4 ,but when he begins to have the use of reason1 he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin4 ,now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then1 is to deliberate about himself4 ,and if he then direct himself to the due end1 he will1 by means of grace1 receive the remission of original sin3 whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end1 as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age1 he will sin mortally1 through not doing that which is in his power to do4 ,accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal1 until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary1 but as a contingent disposition1 just as work sometimes disposes to fever1 but not as heat disposes to the form of fire4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone1 not on account of its want of connection or likeness1 but on account of the lack of use of reason1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time1 but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission1 unless it turns to ,god as soon as possible4 ,for the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion1 is to think of himself1 and to direct other things to himself as to their end1 since the end is the first thing in the intention4 ,therefore this is the time when man is bound by ,god's affirmative precept1 which the ,lord expressed by saying 7,zech4 #a3c73 ,turn ye to ,me 4 4 4 and ,i will turn to you4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,law 7,,qq4 #ij-ajh7 ,,question #ij ,,of ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,law 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts4 ,now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil1 of whose temptations we have spoken in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #aad74 ,but the extrinsic principle moving to good is ,god1 ,who both instructs us by means of ,his ,law1 and assists us by ,his ,grace3 wherefore in the first place we must speak of law2 in the second place1 of grace4 ,concerning law1 we must consider3 7#a7 ,law itself in general2 7#b7 its parts4 ,concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration3 7#a7 ,its essence2 7#b7 ,the different kinds of law2 7#c7 ,the effects of law4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether law is something pertaining to reason8 7#b7 ,concerning the end of law2 7#c7 ,its cause2 7#d7 ,the promulgation of law4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,law ,is ,something ,pertaining to ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3bc73 ,i see another law in my members1 etc4 ,but nothing pertaining to reason is in the members2 since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ4 ,therefore law is not something pertaining to reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the reason there is nothing else but power1 habit1 and act4 ,but law is not the power itself of reason4 ,in like manner1 neither is it a habit of reason3 because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above 7,q4 #eg74 ,nor again is it an act of reason3 because then law would cease1 when the act of reason ceases1 for instance1 while we are asleep4 ,therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright4 ,but it belongs properly to the will to move to act1 as is evident from what has been said above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore law pertains1 not to the reason1 but to the will2 according to the words of the ,jurist 7,lib4 i1 ff41 ,de ,const4 ,prin4 leg4 i73 ,whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign1 has force of law4 ,on the contrary1 ,it belongs to the law to command and to forbid4 ,but it belongs to reason to command1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore law is something pertaining to reason4 ,i answer that1 ,law is a rule and measure of acts1 whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting3 for lex 7law7 is derived from ligare 7to bind71 because it binds one to act4 ,now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason1 which is the first principle of human acts1 as is evident from what has been stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c72 since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end1 which is the first principle in all matters of action1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 ii74 ,now that which is the principle in any genus1 is the rule and measure of that genus3 for instance1 unity in the genus of numbers1 and the first movement in the genus of movements4 ,consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since law is a kind of rule and measure1 it may be in something in two ways4 ,first1 as in that which measures and rules3 and since this is proper to reason1 it follows that1 in this way1 law is in the reason alone4 ,secondly1 as in that which is measured and ruled4 ,in this way1 law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law3 so that any inclination arising from a law1 may be called a law1 not essentially but by participation as it were4 ,and thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called the law of the members4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as1 in external action1 we may consider the work and the work done1 for instance the work of building and the house built2 so in the acts of reason1 we may consider the act itself of reason1 i4e4 to understand and to reason1 and something produced by this act4 ,with regard to the speculative reason1 this is first of all the definition2 secondly1 the proposition2 thirdly1 the syllogism or argument4 ,and since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done1 as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a7 and since as the ,philosopher teaches 7,ethic4 vii1 #c72 hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations1 as1 in the speculative intellect1 the proposition holds in regard to conclusions4 ,such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law4 ,and these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration1 while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reason has its power of moving from the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #a73 for it is due to the fact that one wills the end1 that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end4 ,but in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law1 it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason4 ,and in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law2 otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,law ,is ,always ,something ,directed to the ,common ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end4 ,for it belongs to law to command and to forbid4 ,but commands are directed to certain individual goods4 ,therefore the end of the law is not always the common good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the law directs man in his actions4 ,but human actions are concerned with particular matters4 ,therefore the law is directed to some particular good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #c73 ,if the law is based on reason1 whatever is based on reason will be a law4 ,but reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good1 but also of that which is directed to private good4 ,therefore the law is not only directed to the good of all1 but also to the private good of an individual4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #ba7 that laws are enacted for no private profit1 but for the common benefit of the citizens4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts1 because it is their rule and measure4 ,now as reason is a principle of human acts1 so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest3 wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred4 ,now the first principle in practical matters1 which are the object of the practical reason1 is the last end3 and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness1 as stated above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness4 ,moreover1 since every part is ordained to the whole1 as imperfect to perfect2 and since one man is a part of the perfect community1 the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher1 in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic3 for he says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that we call those legal matters just1 which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic3 since the state is a perfect community1 as he says in ,polit4 i1 #a4 ,now in every genus1 that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others1 and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing3 thus fire1 which is chief among hot things1 is the cause of heat in mixed bodies1 and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire4 ,consequently1 since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good1 any other precept in regard to some individual work1 must needs be devoid of the nature of a law1 save in so far as it regards the common good4 ,therefore every law is ordained to the common good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law4 ,now the order to the common good1 at which the law aims1 is applicable to particular ends4 ,and in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,actions are indeed concerned with particular matters3 but those particular matters are referable to the common good1 not as to a common genus or species1 but as to a common final cause1 according as the common good is said to be the common end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles1 so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason1 unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good3 and whatever stands to reason in this sense1 has the nature of a law4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,reason of ,any ,man ,is ,competent to ,make ,laws8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #b3ad7 that when the ,gentiles1 who have not the law1 do by nature those things that are of the law 4 4 4 they are a law to themselves4 ,now he says this of all in general4 ,therefore anyone can make a law for himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #a71 the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue4 ,but every man can lead another to virtue4 ,therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as the sovereign of a state governs the state1 so every father of a family governs his household4 ,but the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state4 ,therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #aj73 ,a law is an ordinance of the people1 whereby something is sanctioned by the ,elders together with the ,commonalty4 ,i answer that1 ,a law1 properly speaking1 regards first and foremost the order to the common good4 ,now to order anything to the common good1 belongs either to the whole people1 or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people4 ,and therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people3 since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #a71 a law is in a person not only as in one that rules1 but also by participation as in one that is ruled4 ,in the latter way each one is a law to himself1 in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him4 ,hence the same text goes on3 ,who show the work of the law written in their hearts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously3 for he can only advise1 and if his advice be not taken1 it has no coercive power1 such as the law should have1 in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #i74 ,but this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage1 to whom it belongs to inflict penalties1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c2 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as one man is a part of the household1 so a household is a part of the state3 and the state is a perfect community1 according to ,polit4 i1 #a4 ,and therefore1 as the good of one man is not the last end1 but is ordained to the common good2 so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state1 which is a perfect community4 ,consequently he that governs a family1 can indeed make certain commands or ordinances1 but not such as to have properly the force of law4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,promulgation ,is ,essential to a ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law4 ,for the natural law above all has the character of law4 ,but the natural law needs no promulgation4 ,therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something4 ,but the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated1 but also others4 ,therefore promulgation is not essential to a law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the binding force of a law extends even to the future1 since laws are binding in matters of the future1 as the jurists say 7,cod4 #a1 tit4 ,de lege et constit4 leg4 vii74 ,but promulgation concerns those who are present4 ,therefore it is not essential to a law4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is laid down in the ,decretals1 dist4 #d1 that laws are established when they are promulgated4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure4 ,now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it4 ,wherefore1 in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law1 it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it4 ,such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation4 ,wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force4 ,thus from the four preceding articles1 the definition of law may be gathered2 and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good1 made by him who has care of the community1 and promulgated4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the natural law is promulgated by the very fact that ,god instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who are not present when a law is promulgated1 are bound to observe the law1 in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others1 after it has been promulgated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the promulgation that takes place now1 extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters1 by which means it is continually promulgated4 ,hence ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #c2 ii1 #aj7 that lex 7law7 is derived from legere 7to read7 because it is written4 ,,question #ia ,,of ,,the ,,various ,,kinds ,,of ,,law 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the various kinds of law3 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is an eternal law8 7#b7 ,whether there is a natural law8 7#c7 ,whether there is a human law8 7#d7 ,whether there is a ,divine law8 7#e7 ,whether there is one ,divine law1 or several8 7#f7 ,whether there is a law of sin8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is an ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no eternal law4 ,because every law is imposed on someone4 ,but there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed3 since ,god alone was from eternity4 ,therefore no law is eternal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 promulgation is essential to law4 ,but promulgation could not be from eternity3 because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity4 ,therefore no law can be eternal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a law implies order to an end4 ,but nothing ordained to an end is eternal3 for the last end alone is eternal4 ,therefore no law is eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f73 ,that ,law which is the ,supreme ,reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community4 ,now it is evident1 granted that the world is ruled by ,divine ,providence1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #bb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 that the whole community of the universe is governed by ,divine ,reason4 ,wherefore the very ,idea of the government of things in ,god the ,ruler of the universe1 has the nature of a law4 ,and since the ,divine ,reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal1 according to ,prov4 #h3bc1 therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those things that are not in themselves1 exist with ,god1 inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by ,him1 according to ,rom4 #d3ag3 ,who calls those things that are not1 as those that are4 ,accordingly the eternal concept of the ,divine law bears the character of an eternal law1 in so far as it is ordained by ,god to the government of things foreknown by ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing2 and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated3 because both the ,divine ,word and the writing of the ,book of ,life are eternal4 ,but the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the law implies order to the end actively1 in so far as it directs certain things to the end2 but not passively--that is to say1 the law itself is not ordained to the end--except accidentally1 in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him1 and to which end his law must needs be ordained4 ,but the end of the ,divine government is ,god ,himself1 and ,his law is not distinct from ,himself4 ,wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,is in ,us a ,natural ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no natural law in us4 ,because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law3 for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i7 that the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly4 ,but nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries4 ,therefore no law is natural to man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 by the law man is directed1 in his acts1 to the end1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature1 as is the case in irrational creatures1 which act for an end solely by their natural appetite2 whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will4 ,therefore no law is natural to man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more a man is free1 the less is he under the law4 ,but man is freer than all the animals1 on account of his free-will1 with which he is endowed above all other animals4 ,since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law1 neither is man subject to a natural law4 ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on ,rom4 #b3ad3 ,when the ,gentiles1 who have not the law1 do by nature those things that are of the law1 comments as follows3 ,although they have no written law1 yet they have the natural law1 whereby each one knows1 and is conscious of1 what is good and what is evil4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a71 law1 being a rule and measure1 can be in a person in two ways3 in one way1 as in him that rules and measures2 in another way1 as in that which is ruled and measured1 since a thing is ruled and measured1 in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure4 ,wherefore1 since all things subject to ,divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law1 as was stated above 7,a4 #a72 it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law1 in so far as1 namely1 from its being imprinted on them1 they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends4 ,now among all others1 the rational creature is subject to ,divine providence in the most excellent way1 in so far as it partakes of a share of providence1 by being provident both for itself and for others4 ,wherefore it has a share of the ,eternal ,reason1 whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end3 and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law4 ,hence the ,psalmist after saying 7,ps4 #d3f73 ,offer up the sacrifice of justice1 as though someone asked what the works of justice are1 adds3 ,many say1 ,who showeth us good things8 in answer to which question he says3 ,the light of ,thy countenance1 ,o ,lord1 is signed upon us3 thus implying that the light of natural reason1 whereby we discern what is good and what is evil1 which is the function of the natural law1 is nothing else than an imprint on us of the ,divine light4 ,it is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument would hold1 if the natural law were something different from the eternal law3 whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #a73 for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally1 and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end4 ,accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even irrational animals partake in their own way of the ,eternal ,reason1 just as the rational creature does4 ,but because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner1 therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law1 since a law is something pertaining to reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a74 ,irrational creatures1 however1 do not partake thereof in a rational manner1 wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them1 except by way of similitude4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is a ,human ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is not a human law4 ,for the natural law is a participation of the eternal law1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,now through the eternal law all things are most orderly1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f74 ,therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs4 ,consequently there is no need for a human law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a law bears the character of a measure1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a74 ,but human reason is not a measure of things1 but vice versa1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #e4 ,therefore no law can emanate from human reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a measure should be most certain1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #c4 ,but the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain1 according to ,wis4 #i3ad3 ,the thoughts of mortal men are fearful1 and our counsels uncertain4 ,therefore no law can emanate from human reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f7 distinguishes two kinds of law1 the one eternal1 the other temporal1 which he calls human4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b71 a law is a dictate of the practical reason4 ,now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason3 for each proceeds from principles to conclusions1 as stated above 7ibid474 ,accordingly we conclude that just as1 in the speculative reason1 from naturally known indemonstrable principles1 we draw the conclusions of the various sciences1 the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature1 but acquired by the efforts of reason1 so too it is from the precepts of the natural law1 as from general and indemonstrable principles1 that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters4 ,these particular determinations1 devised by human reason1 are called human laws1 provided the other essential conditions of law be observed1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d74 ,wherefore ,tully says in his ,rhetoric 7,de ,invent4 ,rhet4 ii7 that justice has its source in nature2 thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility2 afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom1 were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the ,divine ,reason1 but according to its own mode1 and imperfectly4 ,consequently1 as on the part of the speculative reason1 by a natural participation of ,divine ,wisdom1 there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles1 but not proper knowledge of each single truth1 such as that contained in the ,divine ,wisdom2 so too1 on the part of the practical reason1 man has a natural participation of the eternal law1 according to certain general principles1 but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases1 which are1 however1 contained in the eternal law4 ,hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,human reason is not1 of itself1 the rule of things3 but the principles impressed on it by nature1 are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct1 whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure1 although it is not the measure of things that are from nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the practical reason is concerned with practical matters1 which are singular and contingent3 but not with necessary things1 with which the speculative reason is concerned4 ,wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences4 ,nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain1 but according as it is possible in its own particular genus4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,was ,any ,need for a ,divine ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there was no need for a ,divine law4 ,because1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law4 ,but the eternal law is a ,divine law1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore there was no need for a ,divine law in addition to the natural law1 and human laws derived therefrom4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #ae3ad7 that ,god left man in the hand of his own counsel4 ,now counsel is an act of reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore man was left to the direction of his reason4 ,but a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a ,divine law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures4 ,but irrational creatures have no ,divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them4 ,much less1 therefore1 should the rational creature have a ,divine law in addition to the natural law4 ,on the contrary1 ,david prayed ,god to set ,his law before him1 saying 7,ps4 #aah3cc73 ,set before me for a law the way of ,thy justifications1 ,o ,lord4 ,i answer that1 ,besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a ,divine law4 ,and this for four reasons4 ,first1 because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end4 ,and indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty1 there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason1 besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it4 ,but since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is improportionate to man's natural faculty1 as stated above 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e71 therefore it was necessary that1 besides the natural and the human law1 man should be directed to his end by a law given by ,god4 ,secondly1 because1 on account of the uncertainty of human judgment1 especially on contingent and particular matters1 different people form different judgments on human acts2 whence also different and contrary laws result4 ,in order1 therefore1 that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid1 it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by ,god1 for it is certain that such a law cannot err4 ,thirdly1 because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge4 ,but man is not competent to judge of interior movements1 that are hidden1 but only of exterior acts which appear3 and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts4 ,consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts2 and it was necessary for this purpose that a ,divine law should supervene4 ,fourthly1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #e1 #f71 human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds3 since while aiming at doing away with all evils1 it would do away with many good things1 and would hinder the advance of the common good1 which is necessary for human intercourse4 ,in order1 therefore1 that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished1 it was necessary for the ,divine law to supervene1 whereby all sins are forbidden4 ,and these four causes are touched upon in ,ps4 #aah3h1 where it is said3 ,the law of the ,lord is unspotted1 i4e4 allowing no foulness of sin2 converting souls1 because it directs not only exterior1 but also interior acts2 the testimony of the ,lord is faithful1 because of the certainty of what is true and right2 giving wisdom to little ones1 by directing man to an end supernatural and ,divine4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature4 ,but to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way4 ,hence the additional law given by ,god1 whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,counsel is a kind of inquiry3 hence it must proceed from some principles4 ,nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature1 which are the precepts of the natural law1 for the reasons given above3 but there is need for certain additional principles1 namely1 the precepts of the ,divine law4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers3 consequently the comparison fails4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,is but ,one ,divine ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is but one ,divine law4 ,because1 where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law4 ,now the whole of mankind is compared to ,god as to one king1 according to ,ps4 #df3h3 ,god is the ,king of all the earth4 ,therefore there is but one ,divine law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law4 ,but ,god intends one and the same thing for all men2 since according to #a ,tim4 #b3d3 ,he will have all men to be saved1 and to come to the knowledge of the truth4 ,therefore there is but one ,divine law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law1 which is one1 than the natural law1 according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge4 ,therefore much more is the ,divine law but one4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3ab73 ,the priesthood being translated1 it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law4 ,but the priesthood is twofold1 as stated in the same passage1 viz4 the levitical priesthood1 and the priesthood of ,christ4 ,therefore the ,divine law is twofold1 namely the ,old ,law and the ,new ,law4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #c71 distinction is the cause of number4 ,now things may be distinguished in two ways4 ,first1 as those things that are altogether specifically different1 e4g4 a horse and an ox4 ,secondly1 as perfect and imperfect in the same species1 e4g4 a boy and a man3 and in this way the ,divine law is divided into ,old and ,new4 ,hence the ,apostle 7,gal4 #c3bd1 #be7 compares the state of man under the ,old ,law to that of a child under a pedagogue2 but the state under the ,new ,law1 to that of a full grown man1 who is no longer under a pedagogue4 ,now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law1 as stated above4 ,for1 in the first place1 it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,this good may be twofold4 ,it may be a sensible and earthly good2 and to this1 man was directly ordained by the ,old ,law3 wherefore1 at the very outset of the law1 the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the ,chananaeans 7,ex4 #c3h1 #ag74 ,again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good3 and to this1 man is ordained by the ,new ,law4 ,wherefore1 at the very beginning of ,his preaching1 ,christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven1 saying 7,matt4 #d3ag73 ,do penance1 for the kingdom of heaven is at hand4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 iv7 that promises of temporal goods are contained in the ,old ,testament1 for which reason it is called old2 but the promise of eternal life belongs to the ,new ,testament4 ,secondly1 it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness 7,a4 #d73 wherein also the ,new ,law surpasses the ,old ,law1 since it directs our internal acts1 according to ,matt4 #e3bj3 ,unless your justice abound more than that of the ,scribes and ,pharisees1 you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven4 ,hence the saying that the ,old ,law restrains the hand1 but the ,new ,law controls the mind 7 ,sentent4 iii1 ,d1 xl74 ,thirdly1 it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments4 ,this the ,old ,law did by the fear of punishment3 but the ,new ,law1 by love1 which is poured into our hearts by the grace of ,christ1 bestowed in the ,new ,law1 but foreshadowed in the ,old4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,contra ,adimant4 ,manich4 discip4 xvii7 that there is little difference 99,the 'little difference' refers to the ,latin words 'timor' and 'amor'--'fear' and 'love4' between the ,law and the ,gospel--fear and love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults1 so also the one ,king1 ,god1 in ,his one kingdom1 gave one law to men1 while they were yet imperfect1 and another more perfect law1 when1 by the preceding law1 they had been led to a greater capacity for ,divine things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through ,christ1 according to ,acts #d3ab3 ,there is no other name 4 4 4 given to men1 whereby we must be saved4 ,consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of ,christ4 ,but before ,his coming it was necessary to give to the people1 of whom ,christ was to be born1 a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation1 in order to prepare them to receive ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts1 common to both the perfect and the imperfect3 wherefore it is one and the same for all4 ,but the ,divine law directs man also in certain particular matters1 to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation4 ,hence the necessity for the ,divine law to be twofold1 as already explained4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,there ,is a ,law in the ,fomes of ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no law of the fomes of sin4 ,for ,isidore says 7,etym4 v7 that the law is based on reason4 ,but the fomes of sin is not based on reason1 but deviates from it4 ,therefore the fomes has not the nature of a law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every law is binding1 so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors4 ,but man is not called a transgressor1 from not following the instigations of the fomes2 but rather from his following them4 ,therefore the fomes has not the nature of a law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the law is ordained to the common good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the fomes inclines us1 not to the common1 but to our own private good4 ,therefore the fomes has not the nature of sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3bc73 ,i see another law in my members1 fighting against the law of my mind4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a71 the law1 as to its essence1 resides in him that rules and measures2 but1 by way of participation1 in that which is ruled and measured2 so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law1 is called a law by participation1 as stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver4 ,first1 in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something2 sometimes indeed different subjects to different acts2 in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law4 ,secondly1 indirectly2 thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity1 the latter passes into another order1 so as to be under another law1 as it were3 thus if a soldier be turned out of the army1 he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation4 ,accordingly under the ,divine ,lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations1 so that what is1 as it were1 a law for one1 is against the law for another3 thus ,i might say that fierceness is1 in a way1 the law of a dog1 but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal4 ,and so the law of man1 which1 by the ,divine ordinance1 is allotted to him1 according to his proper natural condition1 is that he should act in accordance with reason3 and this law was so effective in the primitive state1 that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares4 ,but when man turned his back on ,god1 he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses3 in fact this happens to each one individually1 the more he deviates from the path of reason1 so that1 after a fashion1 he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality1 according to ,ps4 #dh3ba3 ,man1 when he was in honor1 did not understand3 he hath been compared to senseless beasts1 and made like to them4 ,so1 then1 this very inclination of sensuality which is called the fomes1 in other animals has simply the nature of a law 7yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things71 by reason of a direct inclination4 ,but in man1 it has not the nature of law in this way1 rather is it a deviation from the law of reason4 ,but since1 by the just sentence of ,god1 man is destitute of original justice1 and his reason bereft of its vigor1 this impulse of sensuality1 whereby he is led1 in so far as it is a penalty following from the ,divine law depriving man of his proper dignity1 has the nature of a law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers the fomes in itself1 as an incentive to evil4 ,it is not thus that it has the nature of a law1 as stated above1 but according as it results from the justice of the ,divine law3 it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure3 for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors4 ,but the fomes is not a law in this respect1 but by a kind of participation1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers the fomes as to its proper inclination1 and not as to its origin4 ,and yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals1 thus it is ordained to the common good1 namely1 to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual4 ,and this is in man also1 in so far as sensuality is subject to reason4 ,but it is called fomes in so far as it strays from the order of reason4 ,,question #ib ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,law 7,in ,two articles7 ,we must now consider the effects of law2 under which head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether an effect of law is to make men good8 7#b7 ,whether the effects of law are to command1 to forbid1 to permit1 and to punish1 as the ,jurist states8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #a ,whether an ,effect of ,law ,is to ,make ,men ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good4 ,for men are good through virtue1 since virtue1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #f is that which makes its subject good4 ,but virtue is in man from ,god alone1 because ,he it is ,who works it in us without us1 as we stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #d7 in giving the definition of virtue4 ,therefore the law does not make men good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,law does not profit a man unless he obeys it4 ,but the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good4 ,therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law4 ,therefore the law does not make men good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,law is ordained to the common good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,but some behave well in things regarding the community1 who behave ill in things regarding themselves4 ,therefore it is not the business of the law to make men good4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 some laws are tyrannical1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #f74 ,but a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects1 but considers only his own profit4 ,therefore law does not make men good4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #a7 that the intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens4 ,i answer that1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b2 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed4 ,now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated3 thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason2 and accordingly the virtue of every subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i74 ,but every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it4 ,consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue3 and since virtue is that which makes its subject good1 it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given1 good1 either simply or in some particular respect4 ,for if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good1 which is the common good regulated according to ,divine justice1 it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply4 ,if1 however1 the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good1 but useful or pleasurable to himself1 or in opposition to ,divine justice2 then the law does not make men good simply1 but in respect to that particular government4 ,in this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves3 thus a man is called a good robber1 because he works in a way that is adapted to his end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue is twofold1 as explained above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #b71 viz4 acquired and infused4 ,now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both1 but in different ways2 for it causes the acquired virtue2 while it disposes to infused virtue1 and preserves and fosters it when it already exists4 ,and since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts2 as far as human acts conduce to virtue1 so far does law make men good4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says in the second book of the ,politics 7,ethic4 ii7 that lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law1 but sometimes it is through fear of punishment1 and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason1 which is a beginning of virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole2 hence ,augustine says 7,confess4 iii7 that unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole4 ,since then every man is a part of the state1 it is impossible that a man be good1 unless he be well proportionate to the common good3 nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it4 ,consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish1 unless the citizens be virtuous1 at least those whose business it is to govern4 ,but it is enough for the good of the community1 that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 ii1 #b7 that the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man1 but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a tyrannical law1 through not being according to reason1 is not a law1 absolutely speaking1 but rather a perversion of law2 and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law1 it aims at the citizens' being good4 ,for all it has in the nature of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects1 and aims at being obeyed by them1 which is to make them good1 not simply1 but with respect to that particular government4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,acts of ,law ,are ,suitably ,assigned8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in command1 prohibition1 permission1 and punishment4 ,for every law is a general precept1 as the ,jurist states4 ,but command and precept are the same4 ,therefore the other three are superfluous4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but counsel aims at a higher good than a command does4 ,therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds1 so does reward4 ,therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law1 so also is to reward4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but he that obeys the law1 merely through fear of being punished1 is not good3 because although a good deed may be done through servile fear1 i4e4 fear of punishment1 it is not done well1 as ,augustine says 7,contra duas ,epist4 ,pelag4 ii74 ,therefore punishment is not a proper effect of law4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #ai73 ,every law either permits something1 as3 ',a brave man may demand his reward'3 or forbids something1 as3 ,no man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage3 or punishes1 as3 ,let him that commits a murder be put to death4 ,i answer that1 ,just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something1 so is a law a dictate of reason1 commanding something4 ,now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another4 ,wherefore just as1 in demonstrative sciences1 the reason leads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion1 so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law4 ,now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts1 in which the law directs1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #d74 ,again there are three kinds of human acts3 for1 as stated above 7,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #h71 some acts are good generically1 viz4 acts of virtue2 and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command1 for the law commands all acts of virtue 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,some acts are evil generically1 viz4 acts of vice1 and in respect of these the law forbids4 ,some acts are generically indifferent1 and in respect of these the law permits2 and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent4 ,and it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience3 in which respect punishment is an effect of law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as to cease from evil is a kind of good1 so a prohibition is a kind of precept3 and accordingly1 taking precept in a wide sense1 every law is a kind of precept4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to advise is not a proper act of law1 but may be within the competency even of a private person1 who cannot make a law4 ,wherefore too the ,apostle1 after giving a certain counsel 7#a ,cor4 #g3ab7 says3 ,i speak1 not the ,lord4 ,consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to reward may also pertain to anyone3 but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law1 by whose authority the pain is inflicted4 ,wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law1 but only to punish4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,from becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good1 through fear of punishment1 one is sometimes led on to do so likewise1 with delight and of one's own accord4 ,accordingly1 law1 even by punishing1 leads men on to being good4 ,,question #ic ,,of ,,the ,,eternal ,,law 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider each law by itself2 and 7#a7 ,the eternal law2 7#b7 ,the natural law2 7#c7 ,the human law2 7#d7 ,the old law2 7#e7 ,the new law1 which is the law of the ,gospel4 ,of the sixth law which is the law of the fomes1 suffice what we have said when treating of original sin4 ,concerning the first there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is the eternal law8 7#b7 ,whether it is known to all8 7#c7 ,whether every law is derived from it8 7#d7 ,whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law8 7#e7 ,whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law8 7#f7 ,whether all human things are subject to it8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,eternal ,law ,is a ,sovereign ,type 99,ratio ,existing in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in ,god4 ,for there is only one eternal law4 ,but there are many types of things in the ,divine mind2 for ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #df7 that ,god made each thing according to its type4 ,therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the ,divine mind4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #d74 ,but ,word is a ,personal name in ,god1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #a73 whereas type refers to the ,essence4 ,therefore the eternal law is not the same as a ,divine type4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxx73 ,we see a law above our minds1 which is called truth4 ,but the law which is above our minds is the eternal law4 ,therefore truth is the eternal law4 ,but the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type4 ,therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f7 that the eternal law is the sovereign type1 to which we must always conform4 ,i answer that1 ,just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art1 so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government4 ,and just as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art1 so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subjects1 bears the character of a law1 provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above 7,q4 #ij74 ,now ,god1 by ,his wisdom1 is the ,creator of all things in relation to which ,he stands as the artificer to the products of his art1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #h74 ,moreover ,he governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature1 as was also stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #e74 ,wherefore as the type of the ,divine ,wisdom1 inasmuch as by ,it all things are created1 has the character of art1 exemplar or idea2 so the type of ,divine ,wisdom1 as moving all things to their due end1 bears the character of law4 ,accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of ,divine ,wisdom1 as directing all actions and movements4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing2 and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality1 according to their different relations to things1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #b74 ,but law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,and things1 which are in themselves different1 may be considered as one1 according as they are ordained to one common thing4 ,wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,with regard to any sort of word1 two points may be considered3 viz4 the word itself1 and that which is expressed by the word4 ,for the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man1 and expresses that which is signified by the human word4 ,the same applies to the human mental word1 which is nothing else than something conceived by the mind1 by which man expresses his thoughts mentally4 ,so then in ,god the ,word conceived by the intellect of the ,father is the name of a ,person3 but all things that are in the ,father's knowledge1 whether they refer to the ,essence or to the ,persons1 or to the works of ,god1 are expressed by this ,word1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ad74 ,and among other things expressed by this ,word1 the eternal law itself is expressed thereby4 ,nor does it follow that the eternal law is a ,personal name in ,god3 yet it is appropriated to the ,son1 on account of the kinship between type and word4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the types of the ,divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things1 as the types of the human intellect4 ,for the human intellect is measured by things1 so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself1 but by reason of its being consonant with things1 since an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality4 ,but the ,divine intellect is the measure of things3 since each thing has so far truth in it1 as it represents the ,divine intellect1 as was stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a74 ,consequently the ,divine intellect is true in itself2 and its type is truth itself4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,eternal ,law ,is ,known to ,all8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the eternal law is not known to all4 ,because1 as the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #b3aa71 the things that are of ,god no man knoweth1 but the ,spirit of ,god4 ,but the eternal law is a type existing in the ,divine mind4 ,therefore it is unknown to all save ,god alone4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f7 the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly4 ,but all do not know how all things are most orderly4 ,therefore all do not know the eternal law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxi7 that the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man4 ,but according to ,ethic4 i1 any man can judge well of what he knows4 ,therefore the eternal law is not known to us4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f7 that knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may be known in two ways3 first1 in itself2 secondly1 in its effect1 wherein some likeness of that thing is found3 thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance1 may know it by its rays4 ,so then no one can know the eternal law1 as it is in itself1 except the blessed who see ,god in ,his ,essence4 ,but every rational creature knows it in its reflection1 greater or less4 ,for every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law1 which is the unchangeable truth1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxi74 ,now all men know the truth to a certain extent1 at least as to the common principles of the natural law3 and as to the others1 they partake of the knowledge of truth1 some more1 some less2 and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we cannot know the things that are of ,god1 as they are in themselves2 but they are made known to us in their effects1 according to ,rom4 #a3bj3 ,the invisible things of ,god 4 4 4 are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity1 in the way explained above1 yet none can comprehend it3 for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects4 ,therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid1 knows also the whole order of things1 whereby they are most orderly4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to judge a thing may be understood in two ways4 ,first1 as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object1 according to ,job #ab3aa3 ,doth not the ear discern words1 and the palate of him that eateth1 the taste8 ,it is to this kind of judgment that the ,philosopher alludes when he says that anyone can judge well of what he knows1 by judging1 namely1 whether what is put forward is true4 ,in another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment1 as to whether he should be such and such or not4 ,and thus none can judge of the eternal law4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,every ,law ,is ,derived from the ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law4 ,for there is a law of the fomes1 as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #f71 which is not derived from that ,divine law which is the eternal law1 since thereunto pertains the prudence of the flesh1 of which the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3g71 that it cannot be subject to the law of ,god4 ,therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law1 because1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #b71 the eternal law is that1 according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly4 ,but some laws are unjust1 according to ,isa4 #aj3a3 ,woe to them that make wicked laws4 ,therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #e7 that the law which is framed for ruling the people1 rightly permits many things which are punished by ,divine providence4 ,but the type of ,divine providence is the eternal law1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law4 ,on the contrary1 ,divine ,wisdom says 7,prov4 #h3ae73 ,by ,me kings reign1 and lawgivers decree just things4 ,but the type of ,divine ,wisdom is the eternal law1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end4 ,now wherever there are movers ordained to one another1 the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover2 since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first4 ,wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern1 so that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief2 thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to his inferior administrators3 and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen1 who work with their hands4 ,since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the ,chief ,governor1 all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law4 ,but these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law4 ,therefore all laws1 in so far as they partake of right reason1 are derived from the eternal law4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f7 that in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful1 but what man has drawn from the eternal law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the fomes has the nature of law in man1 in so far as it is a punishment resulting from ,divine justice2 and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law4 ,but in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin1 it is contrary to the ,divine law1 and has not the nature of law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason2 and it is clear that1 in this respect1 it is derived from the eternal law4 ,but in so far as it deviates from reason1 it is called an unjust law1 and has the nature1 not of law but of violence4 ,nevertheless even an unjust law1 in so far as it retains some appearance of law1 though being framed by one who is in power1 is derived from the eternal law2 since all power is from the ,lord ,god1 according to ,rom4 #ac3a4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,human law is said to permit certain things1 not as approving them1 but as being unable to direct them4 ,and many things are directed by the ,divine law1 which human law is unable to direct1 because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause4 ,hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct1 comes under the ordination of the eternal law4 ,it would be different1 were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns4 ,consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law1 but that it is not on a perfect equality with it4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,necessary and ,eternal ,things ,are ,subject to the ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law4 ,for whatever is reasonable is subject to reason4 ,but the ,divine will is reasonable1 for it is just4 ,therefore it is subject to 7the ,divine7 reason4 ,but the eternal law is the ,divine reason4 ,therefore ,god's will is subject to the eternal law4 ,but ,god's will is eternal4 ,therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is subject to the ,king1 is subject to the ,king's law4 ,now the ,son1 according to #a ,cor4 #ae3bh1 #bd1 shall be subject 4 4 4 to ,god and the ,father 4 4 4 when ,he shall have delivered up the ,kingdom to ,him4 ,therefore the ,son1 ,who is eternal1 is subject to the eternal law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the eternal law is ,divine providence as a type4 ,but many necessary things are subject to ,divine providence3 for instance1 the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies4 ,therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law4 ,on the contrary1 ,things that are necessary cannot be otherwise1 and consequently need no restraining4 ,but laws are imposed on men1 in order to restrain them from evil1 as explained above 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the eternal law is the type of the ,divine government4 ,consequently whatever is subject to the ,divine government1 is subject to the eternal law3 while if anything is not subject to the ,divine government1 neither is it subject to the eternal law4 ,the application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us4 ,for those things are subject to human government1 which can be done by man2 but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government2 for instance1 that he should have a soul1 hands1 or feet4 ,accordingly all that is in things created by ,god1 whether it be contingent or necessary1 is subject to the eternal law3 while things pertaining to the ,divine ,nature or ,essence are not subject to the eternal law1 but are the eternal law itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we may speak of ,god's will in two ways4 ,first1 as to the will itself3 and thus1 since ,god's will is ,his very ,essence1 it is subject neither to the ,divine government1 nor to the eternal law1 but is the same thing as the eternal law4 ,secondly1 we may speak of ,god's will1 as to the things themselves that ,god wills about creatures2 which things are subject to the eternal law1 in so far as they are planned by ,divine ,wisdom4 ,in reference to these things ,god's will is said to be reasonable 7rationalis73 though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type 7ratio74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god the ,son was not made by ,god1 but was naturally born of ,god4 ,consequently ,he is not subject to ,divine providence or to the eternal law3 but rather is ,himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation1 as ,augustine explains 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxi74 ,but ,he is said to be subject to the ,father by reason of ,his human nature1 in respect of which also the ,father is said to be greater than ,he4 ,the third objection we grant1 because it deals with those necessary things that are created4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #f71 some necessary things have a cause of their necessity3 and thus they derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise4 ,and this is in itself a most effective restraint2 for whatever is restrained1 is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,natural ,contingents ,are ,subject to the ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law4 ,because promulgation is essential to law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #d74 ,but a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures1 to whom it is possible to make an announcement4 ,therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law2 and consequently natural contingents are not4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason1 as stated in ,ethic4 i4 ,but the eternal law is the supreme type1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way1 but are altogether void of reason1 it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the eternal law is most efficient4 ,but in natural contingents defects occur4 ,therefore they are not subject to the eternal law4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #h3bi73 ,when ,he compassed the sea with its bounds1 and set a law to the waters1 that they should not pass their limits4 ,i answer that1 ,we must speak otherwise of the law of man1 than of the eternal law which is the law of ,god4 ,for the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man4 ,the reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone3 wherefore1 properly speaking1 none imposes a law on his own actions4 ,now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man1 is done by the act of man himself moving those things1 for these irrational creatures do not move themselves1 but are moved by others1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #b74 ,consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings1 however much they may be subject to him4 ,but he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him1 in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind1 he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action4 ,now just as man1 by such pronouncement1 impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him1 so ,god imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions4 ,and so1 in this way1 ,god is said to command the whole of nature1 according to ,ps4 #adh3f3 ,he hath made a decree1 and it shall not pass away4 ,and thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law4 ,consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law1 through being moved by ,divine providence2 but not1 as rational creatures are1 through understanding the ,divine commandment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the impression of an inward active principle is to natural things1 what the promulgation of law is to men3 because law1 by being promulgated1 imprints on man a directive principle of human actions1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason3 whereas they do partake of the ,divine ,reason by obeying it2 because the power of ,divine ,reason extends over more things than human reason does4 ,and as the members of the human body are moved at the command of reason1 and yet do not partake of reason1 since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason2 so too irrational creatures are moved by ,god1 without1 on that account1 being rational4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes1 they are not outside the order of universal causes1 especially of the ,first ,cause1 i4e4 ,god1 from ,whose providence nothing can escape1 as stated in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,and since the eternal law is the type of ,divine providence1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal law4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,all ,human ,affairs ,are ,subject to the ,eternal ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3ah73 ,if you are led by the spirit you are not under the law4 ,but the righteous who are the sons of ,god by adoption1 are led by the spirit of ,god1 according to ,rom4 #h3ad3 ,whosoever are led by the spirit of ,god1 they are the sons of ,god4 ,therefore not all men are under the eternal law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3g73 ,the prudence ,vulg43 'wisdom' of the flesh is an enemy to ,god3 for it is not subject to the law of ,god4 ,but many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates4 ,therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f7 that the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery1 the good1 a life of blessedness4 ,but those who are already blessed1 and those who are already lost1 are not in the state of merit4 ,therefore they are not under the eternal law4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ab73 ,nothing evades the laws of the most high ,creator and ,governor1 for by ,him the peace of the universe is administered4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law1 as explained above 7,a4 #e73 first1 by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge2 secondly1 by way of action and passion1 i4e4 by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle3 and in this second way1 irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,but since the rational nature1 together with that which it has in common with all creatures1 has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational1 consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways2 because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law2 for we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue 7,ethic4 ii1 #a74 ,both ways1 however1 are imperfect1 and to a certain extent destroyed1 in the wicked2 because in them the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits1 and1 moreover1 the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits of sin4 ,but in the good both ways are found more perfect3 because in them1 besides the natural knowledge of good1 there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom2 and again1 besides the natural inclination to good1 there is the added motive of grace and virtue4 ,accordingly1 the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law1 as always acting according to it3 whereas the wicked are subject to the eternal law1 imperfectly as to their actions1 indeed1 since both their knowledge of good1 and their inclination thereto1 are imperfect2 but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion1 in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them1 according as they fail to act in harmony with that law4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #ae73 ,i esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law2 and 7,de ,catech4 ,rud4 xviii73 ,out of the just misery of the souls which deserted ,him1 ,god knew how to furnish the inferior parts of ,his creation with most suitable laws4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying of the ,apostle may be understood in two ways4 ,first1 so that a man is said to be under the law1 through being pinned down thereby1 against his will1 as by a load4 ,hence1 on the same passage a gloss says that he is under the law1 who refrains from evil deeds1 through fear of punishment threatened by the law1 and not from love of virtue4 ,in this way the spiritual man is not under the law1 because he fulfils the law willingly1 through charity which is poured into his heart by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,secondly1 it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man1 who is led by the ,holy ,ghost1 are the works of the ,holy ,ghost rather than his own4 ,therefore1 since the ,holy ,ghost is not under the law1 as neither is the ,son1 as stated above 7,a4 #d1 ad #b72 it follows that such works1 in so far as they are of the ,holy ,ghost1 are not under the law4 ,the ,apostle witnesses to this when he says 7#b ,cor4 #c3ag73 ,where the ,spirit of the ,lord is1 there is liberty4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of ,god as regards action2 since it inclines to actions contrary to the ,divine law3 yet it is subject to the law of ,god1 as regards passion2 since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of ,divine justice4 ,nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature3 and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law4 ,for we have seen above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #b7 that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause3 thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither4 ,we therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve happiness1 others unhappiness1 so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state1 others in an unhappy state4 ,accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law4 ,,question #id ,,of ,,the ,,natural ,,law 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the natural law2 concerning which there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is the natural law8 7#b7 ,what are the precepts of the natural law8 7#c7 ,whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law8 7#d7 ,whether the natural law is the same in all8 7#e7 ,whether it is changeable8 7#f7 ,whether it can be abolished from the heart of man8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,natural ,law ,is a ,habit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the natural law is a habit4 ,because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #e71 there are three things in the soul3 power1 habit1 and passion4 ,but the natural law is not one of the soul's powers3 nor is it one of the passions2 as we may see by going through them one by one4 ,therefore the natural law is a habit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,basil 99,damascene1 ,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1 #bb says that the conscience or synderesis is the law of our mind2 which can only apply to the natural law4 ,but the synderesis is a habit1 as was shown in the ,first ,part 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #ab74 ,therefore the natural law is a habit4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the natural law abides in man always1 as will be shown further on 7,a4 #f74 ,but man's reason1 which the law regards1 does not always think about the natural law4 ,therefore the natural law is not an act1 but a habit4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,bono ,conjug4 xxi7 that a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary4 ,but such is not the natural law3 since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it4 ,therefore the natural law is not a habit4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may be called a habit in two ways4 ,first1 properly and essentially3 and thus the natural law is not a habit4 ,for it has been stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b7 that the natural law is something appointed by reason1 just as a proposition is a work of reason4 ,now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it3 for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar4 ,since then a habit is that by which we act1 a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially4 ,secondly1 the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit3 thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith4 ,and accordingly1 since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually1 while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually1 in this way the natural law may be called a habit4 ,thus1 in speculative matters1 the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles1 but are the principles the habit of which we possess4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue2 and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action1 he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts1 viz4 powers1 habits and passions4 ,but there are other things in the soul besides these three3 there are acts2 thus to will is in the one that wills2 again1 things known are in the knower2 moreover its own natural properties are in the soul1 such as immortality and the like4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,synderesis is said to be the law of our mind1 because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law1 which are the first principles of human actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument proves that the natural law is held habitually2 and this is granted4 ,to the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually1 on account of some impediment3 thus1 on account of sleep1 a man is unable to use the habit of science4 ,in like manner1 through the deficiency of his age1 a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles1 or the natural law1 which is in him habitually4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,natural ,law ,contains ,several ,precepts1 or ,only ,one8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the natural law contains1 not several precepts1 but one only4 ,for law is a kind of precept1 as stated above 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #b74 ,if therefore there were many precepts of the natural law1 it would follow that there are also many natural laws4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the natural law is consequent to human nature4 ,but human nature1 as a whole1 is one2 though1 as to its parts1 it is manifold4 ,therefore1 either there is but one precept of the law of nature1 on account of the unity of nature as a whole2 or there are many1 by reason of the number of parts of human nature4 ,the result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 law is something pertaining to reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #a74 ,now reason is but one in man4 ,therefore there is only one precept of the natural law4 ,on the contrary1 ,the precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters1 as the first principles to matters of demonstration4 ,but there are several first indemonstrable principles4 ,therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #c71 the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason1 what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason2 because both are self-evident principles4 ,now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways3 first1 in itself2 secondly1 in relation to us4 ,any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself1 if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject3 although1 to one who knows not the definition of the subject1 it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident4 ,for instance1 this proposition1 ,man is a rational being1 is1 in its very nature1 self-evident1 since who says man1 says a rational being3 and yet to one who knows not what a man is1 this proposition is not self-evident4 ,hence it is that1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom471 certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all2 and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all1 as1 ,every whole is greater than its part1 and1 ,things equal to one and the same are equal to one another4 ,but some propositions are self-evident only to the wise1 who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions3 thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body1 it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place3 but this is not evident to the unlearned1 for they cannot grasp it4 ,now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally4 ,for that which1 before aught else1 falls under apprehension1 is being1 the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends4 ,wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time1 which is based on the notion of being and not-being3 and on this principle all others are based1 as is stated in ,metaph4 iv1 text4 #i4 ,now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply1 so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason1 which is directed to action3 since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good4 ,consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good1 viz4 that good is that which all things seek after4 ,hence this is the first precept of law1 that good is to be done and pursued1 and evil is to be avoided4 ,all other precepts of the natural law are based upon this3 so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good 7or evil7 belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided4 ,since1 however1 good has the nature of an end1 and evil1 the nature of a contrary1 hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination1 are naturally apprehended by reason as being good1 and consequently as objects of pursuit1 and their contraries as evil1 and objects of avoidance4 ,wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations1 is the order of the precepts of the natural law4 ,because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances3 inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being1 according to its nature3 and by reason of this inclination1 whatever is a means of preserving human life1 and of warding off its obstacles1 belongs to the natural law4 ,secondly1 there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially1 according to that nature which he has in common with other animals3 and in virtue of this inclination1 those things are said to belong to the natural law1 which nature has taught to all animals 99,pandect4 ,just4 ,i1 tit4 i1 such as sexual intercourse1 education of offspring and so forth4 ,thirdly1 there is in man an inclination to good1 according to the nature of his reason1 which nature is proper to him3 thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about ,god1 and to live in society3 and in this respect1 whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law2 for instance1 to shun ignorance1 to avoid offending those among whom one has to live1 and other such things regarding the above inclination4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law1 inasmuch as they flow from one first precept4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature1 e4g4 of the concupiscible and irascible parts1 in so far as they are ruled by reason1 belong to the natural law1 and are reduced to one first precept1 as stated above3 so that the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves1 but are based on one common foundation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although reason is one in itself1 yet it directs all things regarding man2 so that whatever can be ruled by reason1 is contained under the law of reason4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,all ,acts of ,virtue ,are ,prescribed by the ,natural ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law4 ,because1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b7 it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good4 ,but some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual1 as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance4 ,therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sin is opposed to some virtuous act4 ,if therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law1 it seems to follow that all sins are against nature3 whereas this applies to certain special sins4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those things which are according to nature are common to all4 ,but acts of virtue are not common to all3 since a thing is virtuous in one1 and vicious in another4 ,therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #d7 that virtues are natural4 ,therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law4 ,i answer that1 ,we may speak of virtuous acts in two ways3 first1 under the aspect of virtuous2 secondly1 as such and such acts considered in their proper species4 ,if then we speak of acts of virtue1 considered as virtuous1 thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law4 ,for it has been stated 7,a4 #b7 that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature4 ,now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form3 thus fire is inclined to give heat4 ,wherefore1 since the rational soul is the proper form of man1 there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason3 and this is to act according to virtue4 ,consequently1 considered thus1 all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law3 since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously4 ,but if we speak of virtuous acts1 considered in themselves1 i4e4 in their proper species1 thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law3 for many things are done virtuously1 to which nature does not incline at first2 but which1 through the inquiry of reason1 have been found by men to be conducive to well-living4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food1 drink and sexual matters1 which are indeed ordained to the natural common good1 just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man--and in this sense all sins1 as being against reason1 are also against nature1 as ,damascene states 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #cj73 or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals2 and in this sense1 certain special sins are said to be against nature2 thus contrary to sexual intercourse1 which is natural to all animals1 is unisexual lust1 which has received the special name of the unnatural crime4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument considers acts in themselves4 ,for it is owing to the various conditions of men1 that certain acts are virtuous for some1 as being proportionate and becoming to them1 while they are vicious for others1 as being out of proportion to them4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,natural ,law ,is the ,same in ,all ,men8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the natural law is not the same in all4 ,for it is stated in the ,decretals 7,dist4 i7 that the natural law is that which is contained in the ,law and the ,gospel4 ,but this is not common to all men2 because1 as it is written 7,rom4 #aj3af71 all do not obey the gospel4 ,therefore the natural law is not the same in all men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,things which are according to the law are said to be just1 as stated in ,ethic4 v4 ,but it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men4 ,therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature4 ,now different men are naturally inclined to different things2 some to the desire of pleasures1 others to the desire of honors1 and other men to other things4 ,therefore there is not one natural law for all4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #d73 ,the natural law is common to all nations4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 to the natural law belong those things to which a man is inclined naturally3 and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason4 ,now the process of reason is from the common to the proper1 as stated in ,phys4 i4 ,the speculative reason1 however1 is differently situated in this matter1 from the practical reason4 ,for1 since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things1 which cannot be otherwise than they are1 its proper conclusions1 like the universal principles1 contain the truth without fail4 ,the practical reason1 on the other hand1 is busied with contingent matters1 about which human actions are concerned3 and consequently1 although there is necessity in the general principles1 the more we descend to matters of detail1 the more frequently we encounter defects4 ,accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men1 both as to principles and as to conclusions3 although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions1 but only as regards the principles which are called common notions4 ,but in matters of action1 truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all1 as to matters of detail1 but only as to the general principles3 and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail1 it is not equally known to all4 ,it is therefore evident that1 as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason1 truth or rectitude is the same for all1 and is equally known by all4 ,as to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason1 the truth is the same for all1 but is not equally known to all3 thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles1 although it is not known to all4 ,but as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason1 neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all1 nor1 where it is the same1 is it equally known by all4 ,thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason3 and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion1 that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner4 ,now this is true for the majority of cases3 but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious1 and therefore unreasonable1 to restore goods held in trust2 for instance1 if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country4 ,and this principle will be found to fail the more1 according as we descend further into detail1 e4g4 if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee1 or in such and such a way2 because the greater the number of conditions added1 the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail1 so that it be not right to restore or not to restore4 ,consequently we must say that the natural law1 as to general principles1 is the same for all1 both as to rectitude and as to knowledge4 ,but as to certain matters of detail1 which are conclusions1 as it were1 of those general principles1 it is the same for all in the majority of cases1 both as to rectitude and as to knowledge2 and yet in some few cases it may fail1 both as to rectitude1 by reason of certain obstacles 7just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle71 and as to knowledge1 since in some the reason is perverted by passion1 or evil habit1 or an evil disposition of nature2 thus formerly1 theft1 although it is expressly contrary to the natural law1 was not considered wrong among the ,germans1 as ,julius ,caesar relates 7,de ,bello ,gall4 vi74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the ,law and the ,gospel belongs to the natural law1 since they contain many things that are above nature2 but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them4 ,wherefore ,gratian1 after saying that the natural law is what is contained in the ,law and the ,gospel1 adds at once1 by way of example1 by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the saying of the ,philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just1 not as general principles1 but as conclusions drawn from them1 having rectitude in the majority of cases1 but failing in a few4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as1 in man1 reason rules and commands the other powers1 so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason4 ,wherefore it is universally right for all men1 that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,natural ,law ,can ,be ,changed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the natural law can be changed4 ,because on ,ecclus4 #ag3i1 ,he gave them instructions1 and the law of life1 the gloss says3 ,he wished the law of the letter to be written1 in order to correct the law of nature4 ,but that which is corrected is changed4 ,therefore the natural law can be changed4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the slaying of the innocent1 adultery1 and theft are against the natural law4 ,but we find these things changed by ,god3 as when ,god commanded ,abraham to slay his innocent son 7,gen4 #bb3b72 and when he ordered the ,jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the ,egyptians 7,ex4 #ab3ce72 and when ,he commanded ,osee to take to himself a wife of fornications 7,osee #a3b74 ,therefore the natural law can be changed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 #e3d7 that the possession of all things in common1 and universal freedom1 are matters of natural law4 ,but these things are seen to be changed by human laws4 ,therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in the ,decretals 7,dist4 v73 ,the natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature4 ,it does not vary according to time1 but remains unchangeable4 ,i answer that1 ,a change in the natural law may be understood in two ways4 ,first1 by way of addition4 ,in this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed3 since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law1 both by the ,divine law and by human laws4 ,secondly1 a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction1 so that what previously was according to the natural law1 ceases to be so4 ,in this sense1 the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles3 but in its secondary principles1 which1 as we have said 7,a4 #d71 are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles1 the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases4 ,but it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence1 through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law1 either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law2 or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men1 as to certain matters1 so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil2 which perversion stood in need of correction4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all men alike1 both guilty and innocent1 die the death of nature3 which death of nature is inflicted by the power of ,god on account of original sin1 according to #a ,kings #b3f3 ,the ,lord killeth and maketh alive4 ,consequently1 by the command of ,god1 death can be inflicted on any man1 guilty or innocent1 without any injustice whatever4 ,in like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife2 who is allotted to him by the law emanating from ,god4 ,consequently intercourse with any woman1 by the command of ,god1 is neither adultery nor fornication4 ,the same applies to theft1 which is the taking of another's property4 ,for whatever is taken by the command of ,god1 to ,whom all things belong1 is not taken against the will of its owner1 whereas it is in this that theft consists4 ,nor is it only in human things1 that whatever is commanded by ,god is right2 but also in natural things1 whatever is done by ,god1 is1 in some way1 natural1 as stated in the ,first ,part1 ,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways4 ,first1 because nature inclines thereto3 e4g4 that one should not do harm to another4 ,secondly1 because nature did not bring in the contrary3 thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law1 because nature did not give him clothes1 but art invented them4 ,in this sense1 the possession of all things in common and universal freedom are said to be of the natural law1 because1 to wit1 the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature1 but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life4 ,accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect1 except by addition4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,law of ,nature ,can ,be ,abolished from the ,heart of ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man4 ,because on ,rom4 #b3ad1 ,when the ,gentiles who have not the law1 etc4 a gloss says that the law of righteousness1 which sin had blotted out1 is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace4 ,but the law of righteousness is the law of nature4 ,therefore the law of nature can be blotted out4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature4 ,but the law of grace is blotted out by sin4 ,much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted out4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that which is established by law is made just4 ,but many things are enacted by men1 which are contrary to the law of nature4 ,therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 ii73 ,thy law is written in the hearts of men1 which iniquity itself effaces not4 ,but the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural law4 ,therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #d1 #e71 there belong to the natural law1 first1 certain most general precepts1 that are known to all2 and secondly1 certain secondary and more detailed precepts1 which are1 as it were1 conclusions following closely from first principles4 ,as to those general principles1 the natural law1 in the abstract1 can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts4 ,but it is blotted out in the case of a particular action1 in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice1 on account of concupiscence or some other passion1 as stated above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #b74 ,but as to the other1 i4e4 the secondary precepts1 the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart1 either by evil persuasions1 just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions2 or by vicious customs and corrupt habits1 as among some men1 theft1 and even unnatural vices1 as the ,apostle states 7,rom4 i71 were not esteemed sinful4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases1 not universally1 except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law1 in the way stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although grace is more efficacious than nature1 yet nature is more essential to man1 and therefore more enduring4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law1 against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust4 ,,question #ie ,,of ,,human ,,law 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider human law2 and 7#a7 this law considered in itself2 7#b7 its power2 7#c7 its mutability4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,its utility4 7#b7 ,its origin4 7#c7 ,its quality4 7#d7 ,its division4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,it ,was ,useful for ,laws to ,be ,framed by ,men8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men4 ,because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby1 as stated above 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #a74 ,but men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions1 than against their will1 by means of laws4 ,therefore there was no need to frame laws4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #d71 men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice4 ,but animate justice is better than inanimate justice1 which contained in laws4 ,therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges1 than to frame laws in addition4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every law is framed for the direction of human actions1 as is evident from what has been stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but since human actions are about singulars1 which are infinite in number1 matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man1 who looks into each one of them4 ,therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men1 than by the framing of laws4 ,therefore there was no need of human laws4 ,on the contrary1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #bj73 ,laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check1 that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness1 and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm4 ,but these things are most necessary to mankind4 ,therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #id1 ,a4 #c71 man has a natural aptitude for virtue2 but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training4 ,thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities1 for instance1 in food and clothing4 ,certain beginnings of these he has from nature1 viz4 his reason and his hands2 but he has not the full complement1 as other animals have1 to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food4 ,now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training3 since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures1 to which above all man is inclined1 and especially the young1 who are more capable of being trained4 ,consequently a man needs to receive this training from another1 whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue4 ,and as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue1 by their good natural disposition1 or by custom1 or rather by the gift of ,god1 paternal training suffices1 which is by admonitions4 ,but since some are found to be depraved1 and prone to vice1 and not easily amenable to words1 it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear1 in order that1 at least1 they might desist from evil-doing1 and leave others in peace1 and that they themselves1 by being habituated in this way1 might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear1 and thus become virtuous4 ,now this kind of training1 which compels through fear of punishment1 is the discipline of laws4 ,therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue1 it was necessary for laws to be framed3 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b71 as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue1 so is he the lowest of all1 if he be severed from law and righteousness2 because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions1 which other animals are unable to do4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion3 but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,rhet4 i1 #a71 it is better that all things be regulated by law1 than left to be decided by judges3 and this for three reasons4 ,first1 because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws1 than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case4 ,secondly1 because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make2 whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises3 and it is easier for man to see what is right1 by taking many instances into consideration1 than by considering one solitary fact4 ,thirdly1 because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events2 whereas those who sit in judgment judge of things present1 towards which they are affected by love1 hatred1 or some kind of cupidity2 wherefore their judgment is perverted4 ,since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man1 and since it can be deflected1 therefore it was necessary1 whenever possible1 for the law to determine how to judge1 and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law have necessarily to be committed to judges1 as the ,philosopher says in the same passage3 for instance1 concerning something that has happened or not happened1 and the like4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,every ,human ,law ,is ,derived from the ,natural ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #g7 that the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference4 ,but those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference4 ,therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 positive law is contrasted with natural law1 as stated by ,isidore 7,etym4 v1 #d7 and the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #g74 ,but those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law1 as stated above 7,q4 #id1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the law of nature is the same for all2 since the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #g7 that the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere4 ,if therefore human laws were derived from the natural law1 it would follow that they too are the same for all3 which is clearly false4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law4 ,but it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers1 as the jurist says 99,pandect4 ,justin4 lib4 i1 ff1 tit4 iii1 v2 ,de ,leg4 et ,senat44 ,therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law4 ,on the contrary1 ,tully says 7,rhet4 ii73 ,things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom1 were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #e7 that which is not just seems to be no law at all3 wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice4 ,now in human affairs a thing is said to be just1 from being right1 according to the rule of reason4 ,but the first rule of reason is the law of nature1 as is clear from what has been stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law1 as it is derived from the law of nature4 ,but if in any point it deflects from the law of nature1 it is no longer a law but a perversion of law4 ,but it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways3 first1 as a conclusion from premises1 secondly1 by way of determination of certain generalities4 ,the first way is like to that by which1 in sciences1 demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles3 while the second mode is likened to that whereby1 in the arts1 general forms are particularized as to details3 thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape4 ,some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law1 by way of conclusions2 e4g4 that one must not kill may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man3 while some are derived therefrom by way of determination2 e4g4 the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished2 but that he be punished in this or that way1 is a determination of the law of nature4 ,accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law4 ,but those things which are derived in the first way1 are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively1 but have some force from the natural law also4 ,but those things which are derived in the second way1 have no other force than that of human law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law1 by way of conclusions4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs3 and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,these words of the ,jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law3 on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles2 in so far1 to wit1 as they see at once what is the best thing to decide4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #aa7 that in such matters1 we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience1 age and prudence1 as to their demonstrations4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,isidore's ,description of the ,quality of ,positive ,law ,is ,appropriate8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate1 when he says 7,etym4 v1 #ba73 ,law shall be virtuous1 just1 possible to nature1 according to the custom of the country1 suitable to place and time1 necessary1 useful2 clearly expressed1 lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding2 framed for no private benefit1 but for the common good4 ,because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions1 saying that law is anything founded on reason1 provided that it foster religion1 be helpful to discipline1 and further the common weal4 ,therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,justice is included in honesty1 as ,tully says 7,de ,offic4 vii74 ,therefore after saying honest it was superfluous to add just4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 written law is condivided with custom1 according to ,isidore 7,etym4 ii1 #aj74 ,therefore it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is according to the custom of the country4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a thing may be necessary in two ways4 ,it may be necessary simply1 because it cannot be otherwise3 and that which is necessary in this way1 is not subject to human judgment1 wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind4 ,again a thing may be necessary for an end3 and this necessity is the same as usefulness4 ,therefore it is superfluous to say both necessary and useful4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of ,isidore4 ,i answer that1 ,whenever a thing is for an end1 its form must be determined proportionately to that end2 as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting 7,phys4 ii1 text4 #hh74 ,again1 everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and measure4 ,now both these conditions are verified of human law3 since it is both something ordained to an end2 and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure4 ,and this higher measure is twofold1 viz4 the ,divine law and the natural law1 as explained above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ic1 ,a4 #c74 ,now the end of human law is to be useful to man1 as the ,jurist states 99,pandect4 ,justin4 lib4 xxv1 ff41 tit4 iii2 ,de ,leg4 et ,senat44 ,wherefore ,isidore in determining the nature of law1 lays down1 at first1 three conditions2 viz4 that it foster religion1 inasmuch as it is proportionate to the ,divine law2 that it be helpful to discipline1 inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law2 and that it further the common weal1 inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind4 ,all the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three4 ,for it is called virtuous because it fosters religion4 ,and when he goes on to say that it should be just1 possible to nature1 according to the customs of the country1 adapted to place and time1 he implies that it should be helpful to discipline4 ,for human discipline depends first on the order of reason1 to which he refers by saying just3 secondly1 it depends on the ability of the agent2 because discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability1 taking also into account the ability of nature 7for the same burdens should not be laid on children as adults72 and should be according to human customs2 since man cannot live alone in society1 paying no heed to others3 thirdly1 it depends on certain circumstances1 in respect of which he says1 adapted to place and time4 ,the remaining words1 necessary1 useful1 etc4 mean that law should further the common weal3 so that necessity refers to the removal of evils2 usefulness to the attainment of good2 clearness of expression1 to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself4 ,and since1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b71 law is ordained to the common good1 this is expressed in the last part of the description4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,isidore's ,division of ,human ,laws ,is ,appropriate8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law 7,etym4 v1 #d1 seqq474 ,for under this law he includes the law of nations1 so called1 because1 as he says1 nearly all nations use it4 ,but as he says1 natural law is that which is common to all nations4 ,therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law1 but rather under natural law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those laws which have the same force1 seem to differ not formally but only materially4 ,but statutes1 decrees of the commonalty1 senatorial decrees1 and the like which he mentions 7,etym4 v1 #i71 all have the same force4 ,therefore they do not differ1 except materially4 ,but art takes no notice of such a distinction3 since it may go on to infinity4 ,therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as1 in the state1 there are princes1 priests and soldiers1 so are there other human offices4 ,therefore it seems that1 as this division includes military law1 and public law1 referring to priests and magistrates2 so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 those things that are accidental should be passed over4 ,but it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man4 ,therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers1 so that one be called the ,cornelian law1 another the ,falcidian law1 etc4 ,on the contrary1 ,the authority of ,isidore 7,obj4 #a7 suffices4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing4 ,thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal3 and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational2 but not in the point of its being white or black1 which are entirely beside the notion of animal4 ,now1 in the notion of human law1 many things are contained1 in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself4 ,for in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law1 to be derived from the law of nature1 as explained above 7,a4 #b74 ,in this respect positive law is divided into the law of nations and civil law1 according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,because1 to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature1 as conclusions from premises1 e4g4 just buyings and sellings1 and the like1 without which men cannot live together1 which is a point of the law of nature1 since man is by nature a social animal1 as is proved in ,polit4 i1 #b4 ,but those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination1 belong to the civil law1 according as each state decides on what is best for itself4 ,secondly1 it belongs to the notion of human law1 to be ordained to the common good of the state4 ,in this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good3 e4g4 priests1 by praying to ,god for the people2 princes1 by governing the people2 soldiers1 by fighting for the safety of the people4 ,wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men4 ,thirdly1 it belongs to the notion of human law1 to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state1 as shown above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #c74 ,in this respect1 there are various human laws according to the various forms of government4 ,of these1 according to the ,philosopher 7,polit4 iii1 #aj7 one is monarchy1 i4e4 when the state is governed by one2 and then we have ,royal ,ordinances4 ,another form is aristocracy1 i4e4 government by the best men or men of highest rank2 and then we have the ,authoritative legal opinions 7,responsa ,prudentum7 and ,decrees of the ,senate 7,senatus consulta74 ,another form is oligarchy1 i4e4 government by a few rich and powerful men2 and then we have ,praetorian1 also called ,honorary1 law4 ,another form of government is that of the people1 which is called democracy1 and there we have ,decrees of the commonalty 7,plebiscita74 ,there is also tyrannical government1 which is altogether corrupt1 which1 therefore1 has no corresponding law4 ,finally1 there is a form of government made up of all these1 and which is the best3 and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the ,lords and ,commons1 as stated by ,isidore 7,etym4 v1 #d1 seqq474 ,fourthly1 it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions4 ,in this respect1 according to the various matters of which the law treats1 there are various kinds of laws1 which are sometimes named after their authors3 thus we have the ,lex ,julia about adultery1 the ,lex ,cornelia concerning assassins1 and so on1 differentiated in this way1 not on account of the authors1 but on account of the matters to which they refer4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the law of nations is indeed1 in some way1 natural to man1 in so far as he is a reasonable being1 because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises4 ,wherefore men easily agreed thereto4 ,nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law1 especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals4 ,the ,replies to the other ,objections are evident from what has been said4 ,,question #if ,,of ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,human ,,law 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the power of human law4 ,under this head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether human law should be framed for the community8 7#b7 ,whether human law should repress all vices8 7#c7 ,whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue8 7#d7 ,whether it binds man in conscience8 7#e7 ,whether all men are subject to human law8 7#f7 ,whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,human ,law ,should ,be ,framed for the ,community ,rather ,than for the ,individual8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human law should be framed not for the community1 but rather for the individual4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #g7 that the legal just 4 4 4 includes all particular acts of legislation 4 4 4 and all those matters which are the subject of decrees1 which are also individual matters1 since decrees are framed about individual actions4 ,therefore law is framed not only for the community1 but also for the individual4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 law is the director of human acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but human acts are about individual matters4 ,therefore human laws should be framed1 not for the community1 but rather for the individual4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 law is a rule and measure of human acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but a measure should be most certain1 as stated in ,metaph4 x4 ,since therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases1 it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual cases4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,jurist says 7,pandect4 ,justin4 lib4 i1 tit4 iii1 art4 ii2 ,de legibus1 etc47 that laws should be made to suit the majority of instances2 and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case4 ,i answer that1 ,whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end4 ,now the end of law is the common good2 because1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #ba7 that law should be framed1 not for any private benefit1 but for the common good of all the citizens4 ,hence human laws should be proportionate to the common good4 ,now the common good comprises many things4 ,wherefore law should take account of many things1 as to persons1 as to matters1 and as to times4 ,because the community of the state is composed of many persons2 and its good is procured by many actions2 nor is it established to endure for only a short time1 but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ii1 #ba2 xxii1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #g7 divides the legal just1 i4e4 positive law1 into three parts4 ,for some things are laid down simply in a general way3 and these are the general laws4 ,of these he says that the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference1 but which1 when enacted1 is so no longer3 as the fixing of the ransom of a captive4 ,some things affect the community in one respect1 and individuals in another4 ,these are called privileges1 i4e4 private laws1 as it were1 because they regard private persons1 although their power extends to many matters2 and in regard to these1 he adds1 and further1 all particular acts of legislation4 ,other matters are legal1 not through being laws1 but through being applications of general laws to particular cases3 such are decrees which have the force of law2 and in regard to these1 he adds all matters subject to decrees4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a principle of direction should be applicable to many2 wherefore 7,metaph4 x1 text4 #d7 the ,philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus1 are measured by one1 which is the principle in that genus4 ,for if there were as many rules or measures as there are things measured or ruled1 they would cease to be of use1 since their use consists in being applicable to many things4 ,hence law would be of no use1 if it did not extend further than to one single act4 ,because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions2 whereas law is a general precept1 as stated above 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #b1 ,obj4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things 7,ethic4 i1 #c74 ,consequently in contingent matters1 such as natural and human things1 it is enough for a thing to be certain1 as being true in the greater number of instances1 though at times and less frequently it fail4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,it ,belongs to the ,human ,law to ,repress ,all ,vices8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices4 ,for ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #bj7 that laws were made in order that1 in fear thereof1 man's audacity might be held in check4 ,but it would not be held in check sufficiently1 unless all evils were repressed by law4 ,therefore human laws should repress all evils4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous4 ,but a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice4 ,therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human law is derived from the natural law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #b74 ,but all vices are contrary to the law of nature4 ,therefore human law should repress all vices4 ,on the contrary1 ,we read in ,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #e3 ,it seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits these things1 and that ,divine providence punishes them4 ,but ,divine providence punishes nothing but vices4 ,therefore human law rightly allows some vices1 by not repressing them4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts4 ,now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #c1 #d1 since different things are measured by different measures4 ,wherefore laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition1 for1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #ba71 law should be possible both according to nature1 and according to the customs of the country4 ,now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition3 since the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit1 as is possible to one who has4 ,thus the same is not possible to a child as to a full-grown man3 for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults1 since many things are permitted to children1 which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame4 ,in like manner many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue1 which would be intolerable in a virtuous man4 ,now human law is framed for a number of human beings1 the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue4 ,wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices1 from which the virtuous abstain1 but only the more grievous vices1 from which it is possible for the majority to abstain2 and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others1 without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained3 thus human law prohibits murder1 theft and such like4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others4 ,consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor is injured3 and these sins are forbidden by human law1 as stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue1 not suddenly1 but gradually4 ,wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous1 viz4 that they should abstain from all evil4 ,otherwise these imperfect ones1 being unable to bear such precepts1 would break out into yet greater evils3 thus it is written 7,ps4 #cj3cc73 ,he that violently bloweth his nose1 bringeth out blood2 and 7,matt4 #i3ag7 that if new wine1 i4e4 precepts of a perfect life1 is put into old bottles1 i4e4 into imperfect men1 the bottles break1 and the wine runneth out1 i4e4 the precepts are despised1 and those men1 from contempt1 break into evils worse still4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law3 while human law falls short of the eternal law4 ,now ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #e73 ,the law which is framed for the government of states1 allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished by ,divine providence4 ,nor1 if this law does not attempt to do everything1 is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does4 ,wherefore1 too1 human law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natural law4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,human ,law ,prescribes ,acts of ,all the ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues4 ,for vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue4 ,but human law does not prohibit all vices1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue4 ,but virtue is the end of law2 so that whatever is from a virtue1 cannot come under a precept of law4 ,therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 law is ordained to the common good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,but some acts of virtue are ordained1 not to the common good1 but to private good4 ,therefore the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that the law prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man 4 4 4 and the acts of the temperate man 4 4 4 and the acts of the meek man3 and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices1 prescribing the former1 forbidding the latter4 ,i answer that1 ,the species of virtues are distinguished by their objects1 as explained above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #b74 ,now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual1 or to the common good of the multitude3 thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state1 or for upholding the rights of a friend1 and in like manner with the other virtues4 ,but law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b7 is ordained to the common good4 ,wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law4 ,nevertheless human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue3 but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common good--either immediately1 as when certain things are done directly for the common good--or mediately1 as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good order1 whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,human law does not forbid all vicious acts1 by the obligation of a precept1 as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue4 ,but it forbids certain acts of each vice1 just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways4 ,first1 from the fact that a man does something virtuous2 thus the act of justice is to do what is right1 and an act of fortitude is to do brave things3 and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue4 ,secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it4 ,such an act always proceeds from virtue3 and it does not come under a precept of law1 but is the end at which every lawgiver aims4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good1 as stated above1 either mediately or immediately4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,human ,law ,binds a ,man in ,conscience8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience4 ,for an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher power4 ,but the power of man1 which frames human law1 is beneath the ,divine power4 ,therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a ,divine court1 such as is the court of conscience4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of ,god4 ,but sometimes ,god's commandments are made void by human laws1 according to ,matt4 #ae3f3 ,you have made void the commandment of ,god for your tradition4 ,therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man1 according to ,isa4 #aj3a et seqq43 ,woe to them that make wicked laws1 and when they write1 write injustice2 to oppress the poor in judgment1 and do violence to the cause of the humble of ,my people4 ,but it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence4 ,therefore human laws do not bind man in conscience4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,pet4 #b3ai73 ,this is thankworthy1 if for conscience 4 4 4 a man endure sorrows1 suffering wrongfully4 ,i answer that1 ,laws framed by man are either just or unjust4 ,if they be just1 they have the power of binding in conscience1 from the eternal law whence they are derived1 according to ,prov4 #h3ae3 ,by ,me kings reign1 and lawgivers decree just things4 ,now laws are said to be just1 both from the end1 when1 to wit1 they are ordained to the common good--and from their author1 that is to say1 when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver--and from their form1 when1 to wit1 burdens are laid on the subjects1 according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good4 ,for1 since one man is a part of the community1 each man in all that he is and has1 belongs to the community2 just as a part1 in all that it is1 belongs to the whole2 wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part1 in order to save the whole3 so that on this account1 such laws as these1 which impose proportionate burdens1 are just and binding in conscience1 and are legal laws4 ,on the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways3 first1 by being contrary to human good1 through being opposed to the things mentioned above--either in respect of the end1 as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws1 conducive1 not to the common good1 but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory--or in respect of the author1 as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him--or in respect of the form1 as when burdens are imposed unequally on the community1 although with a view to the common good4 ,the like are acts of violence rather than laws2 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #e71 a law that is not just1 seems to be no law at all4 ,wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience1 except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance1 for which cause a man should even yield his right1 according to ,matt4 #e3dj1 #da3 ,if a man 4 4 4 take away thy coat1 let go thy cloak also unto him2 and whosoever will force thee one mile1 go with him other two4 ,secondly1 laws may be unjust through being opposed to the ,divine good3 such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry1 or to anything else contrary to the ,divine law3 and laws of this kind must nowise be observed1 because1 as stated in ,acts #e3bi1 we ought to obey ,god rather than man4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3a1 #b71 all human power is from ,god 4 4 4 therefore he that resisteth the power1 in matters that are within its scope1 resisteth the ordinance of ,god2 so that he becomes guilty according to his conscience4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of ,god1 which is beyond the scope of 7human7 power4 ,wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects4 ,the power that man holds from ,god does not extend to this3 wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law1 provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,all ,are ,subject to the ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all are subject to the law4 ,for those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made4 ,but the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #a3i73 ,the law is not made for the just man4 ,therefore the just are not subject to the law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,pope ,urban says 99,decretals4 caus4 xix1 qu4 #b3 ,he that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by the public law4 ,now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the ,holy ,ghost1 for they are the sons of ,god1 of whom it is said 7,rom4 #h3ad73 ,whosoever are led by the ,spirit of ,god1 they are the sons of ,god4 ,therefore not all men are subject to human law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the jurist says 99,pandect4 ,justin4 i1 ff41 tit4 #c1 ,de ,leg4 et ,senat4 that the sovereign is exempt from the laws4 ,but he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby4 ,therefore not all are subject to the law4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3a73 ,let every soul be subject to the higher powers4 ,but subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed by that power4 ,therefore all men should be subject to human law4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 the notion of law contains two things3 first1 that it is a rule of human acts2 secondly1 that it has coercive power4 ,wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways4 ,first1 as the regulated is subject to the regulator3 and1 in this way1 whoever is subject to a power1 is subject to the law framed by that power4 ,but it may happen in two ways that one is not subject to a power4 ,in one way1 by being altogether free from its authority3 hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom1 since they are not subject to his authority4 ,in another way1 by being under a yet higher law2 thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command1 but not in those matters in which the subject receives his orders from the emperor3 for in these matters1 he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority1 since he is directed by that of a higher4 ,in this way1 one who is simply subject to a law1 may not be subject thereto in certain matters1 in respect of which he is ruled by a higher law4 ,secondly1 a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer4 ,in this way the virtuous and righteous are not subject to the law1 but only the wicked4 ,because coercion and violence are contrary to the will3 but the will of the good is in harmony with the law1 whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it4 ,wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the law1 but only the wicked4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is true of subjection by way of coercion3 for1 in this way1 the law is not made for the just men3 because they are a law to themselves1 since they show the work of the law written in their hearts1 as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #b3ad1 #ae74 ,consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the law of the ,holy ,ghost is above all law framed by man3 and therefore spiritual men1 in so far as they are led by the law of the ,holy ,ghost1 are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law1 is due to the leading of the ,holy ,ghost1 according to #a ,pet4 #b3ac3 ,be ye subject 4 4 4 to every human creature for ,god's sake4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sovereign is said to be exempt from the law1 as to its coercive power2 since1 properly speaking1 no man is coerced by himself1 and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign4 ,thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law1 because none is competent to pass sentence on him1 if he acts against the law4 ,wherefore on ,ps4 #ej3f3 ,to ,thee only have ,i sinned1 a gloss says that there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king4 ,but as to the directive force of law1 the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will1 according to the statement 7,extra1 ,de ,constit4 cap4 ,cum omnes7 that whatever law a man makes for another1 he should keep himself4 ,and a wise authority 99,dionysius ,cato1 ,dist4 de ,moribus says3 ',obey the law that thou makest thyself4' ,moreover the ,lord reproaches those who say and do not2 and who bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders1 but with a finger of their own they will not move them 7,matt4 #bc3c1 #d74 ,hence1 in the judgment of ,god1 the sovereign is not exempt from the law1 as to its directive force2 but he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint4 ,again the sovereign is above the law1 in so far as1 when it is expedient1 he can change the law1 and dispense in it according to time and place4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,he ,who ,is ,under a ,law ,may ,act ,beside the ,letter of the ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #ca73 ,although men judge about temporal laws when they make them1 yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them1 but according to them4 ,but if anyone disregard the letter of the law1 saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver1 he seems to pass judgment on the law4 ,therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to disregard the letter of the law1 in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law4 ,but those who are subject to the law cannot make the law4 ,therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver1 but should always act according to the letter of the law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words4 ,but those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise3 for ,wisdom says 7,prov4 #h3ae73 ,by ,me kings reign1 and lawgivers decree just things4 ,therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iv73 ,the meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it3 because things are not subject to speech1 but speech to things4 ,therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver1 rather than of his very words4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #d71 every law is directed to the common weal of men1 and derives the force and nature of law accordingly4 ,hence the jurist says 99,pandect4 ,justin4 lib4 i1 ff41 tit4 #c1 ,de ,leg4 et ,senat43 ,by no reason of law1 or favor of equity1 is it allowable for us to interpret harshly1 and render burdensome1 those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man4 ,now it happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances1 and yet1 in some cases1 is very hurtful4 ,since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case1 he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently1 by directing his attention to the common good4 ,wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general welfare1 it should not be observed4 ,for instance1 suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed1 this is good for public welfare as a general rule3 but1 it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens1 who are defenders of the city1 it would be a great loss to the city1 if the gates were not opened to them3 and so in that case the gates ought to be opened1 contrary to the letter of the law1 in order to maintain the common weal1 which the lawgiver had in view4 ,nevertheless it must be noted1 that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant remedy1 it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state3 those alone can do this who are in authority1 and who1 on account of such like cases1 have the power to dispense from the laws4 ,if1 however1 the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority1 the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation1 since necessity knows no law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,he who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law1 does not judge the law2 but of a particular case in which he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,he who follows the intention of the lawgiver1 does not interpret the law simply2 but in a case in which it is evident1 by reason of the manifest harm1 that the lawgiver intended otherwise4 ,for if it be a matter of doubt1 he must either act according to the letter of the law1 or consult those in power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case2 wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view4 ,and even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration1 he ought not to mention them all1 in order to avoid confusion3 but should frame the law according to that which is of most common occurrence4 ,,question #ig ,,of ,,change ,,in ,,laws 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider change in laws3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether human law is changeable8 7#b7 ,whether it should be always changed1 whenever anything better occurs8 7#c7 ,whether it is abolished by custom1 and whether custom obtains the force of law8 7#d7 ,whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,human ,law ,should ,be ,changed in ,any ,way8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all4 ,because human law is derived from the natural law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the natural law endures unchangeably4 ,therefore human law should also remain without any change4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #e71 a measure should be absolutely stable4 ,but human law is the measure of human acts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore it should remain without change4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is of the essence of law to be just and right1 as stated above 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #b74 ,but that which is right once is right always4 ,therefore that which is law once1 should be always law4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f73 ,a temporal law1 however just1 may be justly changed in course of time4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #c71 human law is a dictate of reason1 whereby human acts are directed4 ,thus there may be two causes for the just change of human law3 one on the part of reason2 the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law4 ,the cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect4 ,hence1 in speculative sciences1 we see that the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect1 and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them4 ,so also in practical matters3 for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community1 not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration1 set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways2 and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal4 ,on the part of man1 whose acts are regulated by law1 the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man1 to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition4 ,an example is proposed by ,augustine 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #f73 ,if the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility1 and are most careful guardians of the common weal1 it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth4 ,but if1 as time goes on1 the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes1 and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals2 then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people1 and the choice devolves to a few good men4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the natural law is a participation of the eternal law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #b71 and therefore endures without change1 owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the ,divine ,reason1 the ,author of nature4 ,but the reason of man is changeable and imperfect3 wherefore his law is subject to change4 ,moreover the natural law contains certain universal precepts1 which are everlasting3 whereas human law contains certain particular precepts1 according to various emergencies4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a measure should be as enduring as possible4 ,but nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change4 ,and therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in corporal things1 right is predicated absolutely3 and therefore1 as far as itself is concerned1 always remains right4 ,but right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal1 to which one and the same thing is not always adapted1 as stated above3 wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,human ,law ,should ,always ,be ,changed1 ,whenever ,something ,better ,occurs8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human law should be changed1 whenever something better occurs4 ,because human laws are devised by human reason1 like other arts4 ,but in the other arts1 the tenets of former times give place to others1 if something better occurs4 ,therefore the same should apply to human laws4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 by taking note of the past we can provide for the future4 ,now unless human laws had been changed when it was found possible to improve them1 considerable inconvenience would have ensued2 because the laws of old were crude in many points4 ,therefore it seems that laws should be changed1 whenever anything better occurs to be enacted4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human laws are enacted about single acts of man4 ,but we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters1 except by experience1 which requires time1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii4 ,therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur for legislation4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated in the ,decretals 7,dist4 xii1 #e73 ,it is absurd1 and a detestable shame1 that we should suffer those traditions to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 human law is rightly changed1 in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal4 ,but1 to a certain extent1 the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good3 because custom avails much for the observance of laws1 seeing that what is done contrary to general custom1 even in slight matters1 is looked upon as grave4 ,consequently1 when a law is changed1 the binding power of the law is diminished1 in so far as custom is abolished4 ,wherefore human law should never be changed1 unless1 in some way or other1 the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect4 ,such compensation may arise either from some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment2 or from the extreme urgency of the case1 due to the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust1 or its observance extremely harmful4 ,wherefore the ,jurist says 99,pandect4 ,justin4 lib4 i1 ff41 tit4 #d1 ,de ,constit4 ,princip4 that in establishing new laws1 there should be evidence of the benefit to be derived1 before departing from a law which has long been considered just4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,rules of art derive their force from reason alone3 and therefore whenever something better occurs1 the rule followed hitherto should be changed4 ,but laws derive very great force from custom1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4 ii1 #e73 consequently they should not be quickly changed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument proves that laws ought to be changed3 not in view of any improvement1 but for the sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency1 as stated above4 ,this answer applies also to the ,third ,objection4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,custom ,can ,obtain ,force of ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law1 nor abolish a law4 ,because human law is derived from the natural law and from the ,divine law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ic1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #b74 ,but human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the ,divine law4 ,therefore neither can it change human law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 many evils cannot make one good4 ,but he who first acted against the law1 did evil4 ,therefore by multiplying such acts1 nothing good is the result4 ,now a law is something good2 since it is a rule of human acts4 ,therefore law is not abolished by custom1 so that the mere custom should obtain force of law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community2 wherefore private individuals cannot make laws4 ,but custom grows by the acts of private individuals4 ,therefore custom cannot obtain force of law1 so as to abolish the law4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,casulan4 xxxvi73 ,the customs of ,god's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered as laws4 ,and those who throw contempt on the customs of the ,church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,all law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver2 the ,divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of ,god2 the human law from the will of man1 regulated by reason4 ,now just as human reason and will1 in practical matters1 may be made manifest by speech1 so may they be made known by deeds3 since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution4 ,but it is evident that by human speech1 law can be both changed and expounded1 in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason4 ,wherefore by actions also1 especially if they be repeated1 so as to make a custom1 law can be changed and expounded2 and also something can be established which obtains force of law1 in so far as by repeated external actions1 the inward movement of the will1 and concepts of reason are most effectually declared2 for when a thing is done again and again1 it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason4 ,accordingly1 custom has the force of a law1 abolishes law1 and is the interpreter of law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the natural and ,divine laws proceed from the ,divine will1 as stated above4 ,wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the will of man1 but only by ,divine authority4 ,hence it is that no custom can prevail over the ,divine or natural laws3 for ,isidore says 7,synon4 ii1 #af73 ,let custom yield to authority3 evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f71 human laws fail in some cases3 wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law2 namely1 in a case where the law fails2 yet the act will not be evil4 ,and when such cases are multiplied1 by reason of some change in man1 then custom shows that the law is no longer useful3 just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary4 ,if1 however1 the same reason remains1 for which the law was useful hitherto1 then it is not the custom that prevails against the law1 but the law that overcomes the custom3 unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless1 be that it is not possible according to the custom of the country 99,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #c1 which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law4 ,for it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions4 ,for if they are free1 and able to make their own laws1 the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance1 that does the authority of the sovereign1 who has not the power to frame laws1 except as representing the people4 ,wherefore although each individual cannot make laws1 yet the whole people can4 ,if however the people have not the free power to make their own laws1 or to abolish a law made by a higher authority2 nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of law1 in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people3 because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,rulers of the ,people ,can ,dispense from ,human ,laws8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws4 ,for the law is established for the common weal1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #ba74 ,but the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual3 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #b71 the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man4 ,therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those who are placed over others are commanded as follows 7,deut4 #a3ag73 ,you shall hear the little as well as the great2 neither shall you respect any man's person1 because it is the judgment of ,god4 ,but to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all1 seems to be respect of persons4 ,therefore the rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations1 since this is against a precept of the ,divine law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 human law1 in order to be just1 should accord with the natural and ,divine laws3 else it would not foster religion1 nor be helpful to discipline1 which is requisite to the nature of law1 as laid down by ,isidore 7,etym4 v1 #c74 ,but no man can dispense from the ,divine and natural laws4 ,neither1 therefore1 can he dispense from the human law4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #i3ag73 ,a dispensation is committed to me4 ,i answer that1 ,dispensation1 properly speaking1 denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods3 thus the head of a household is called a dispenser1 because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure4 ,accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense1 from the very fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each individual4 ,now it happens at times that a precept1 which is conducive to the common weal as a general rule1 is not good for a particular individual1 or in some particular case1 either because it would hinder some greater good1 or because it would be the occasion of some evil1 as explained above 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f74 ,but it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual1 except perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency1 as stated above 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f74 ,consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority1 so that1 when the law fails in its application to persons or circumstances1 he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed4 ,if however he grant this permission without any such reason1 and of his mere will1 he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser3 unfaithful1 if he has not the common good in view2 imprudent1 if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations4 ,hence ,our ,lord says 7,luke #ab3db73 ,who1 thinkest thou1 is the faithful and wise dispenser ,douay3 steward1 whom his lord setteth over his family8 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when a person is dispensed from observing the general law1 this should not be done to the prejudice of1 but with the intention of benefiting1 the common good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal4 ,wherefore when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment1 it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,natural law1 so far as it contains general precepts1 which never fail1 does not allow of dispensations4 ,in other precepts1 however1 which are as conclusions of the general precepts1 man sometimes grants a dispensation3 for instance1 that a loan should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country1 or something similar4 ,but to the ,divine law each man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject4 ,wherefore just as none can dispense from public human law1 except the man from whom the law derives its authority1 or his delegate2 so1 in the precepts of the ,divine law1 which are from ,god1 none can dispense but ,god1 or the man to whom ,he may give special power for that purpose4 ,,question #ih ,,of ,,the ,,old ,,law 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,in due sequence we must now consider the ,old ,law2 and 7#a7 ,the ,law itself2 7#b7 ,its precepts4 ,under the first head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ,old ,law was good8 7#b7 ,whether it was from ,god8 7#c7 ,whether it came from ,him through the angels8 7#d7 ,whether it was given to all8 7#e7 ,whether it was binding on all8 7#f7 ,whether it was given at a suitable time8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,old ,law ,was ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law was not good4 ,for it is written 7,ezech4 #bj3be73 ,i gave them statutes that were not good1 and judgments in which they shall not live4 ,but a law is not said to be good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains4 ,therefore the ,old ,law was not good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #c74 ,but the ,old ,law was not salutary2 rather was it deadly and hurtful4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3h1 seqq473 ,without the law sin was dead4 ,and ,i lived some time without the law4 ,but when the commandment came sin revived2 and ,i died4 ,again he says 7,rom4 #e3bj73 ,law entered in that sin might abound4 ,therefore the ,old ,law was not good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it1 both according to nature1 and according to human custom4 ,but such the ,old ,law was not3 since ,peter said 7,acts #ae3aj73 ,why tempt you 7,god7 to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples1 which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear8 ,therefore it seems that the ,old ,law was not good4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3ab73 ,wherefore the law indeed is holy1 and the commandment holy1 and just1 and good4 ,i answer that1 ,without any doubt1 the ,old ,law was good4 ,for just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right reason1 so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason4 ,now the ,old ,law was in accordance with reason4 ,because it repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason1 as evidenced by the commandment1 ,thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods 7,ex4 #bj3ag74 ,moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin2 and these too are contrary to reason4 ,consequently it is evident that it was a good law4 ,the ,apostle argues in the same way 7,rom4 #g73 ,i am delighted1 says he 7verse #bb71 with the law of ,god1 according to the inward man3 and again 7verse #af73 ,i consent to the law1 that is good4 ,but it must be noted that the good has various degrees1 as ,dionysius states 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 for there is a perfect good1 and an imperfect good4 ,in things ordained to an end1 there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end3 while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end1 but is not sufficient for the realization thereof4 ,thus a medicine is perfectly good1 if it gives health to a man2 but it is imperfect1 if it helps to cure him1 without being able to bring him back to health4 ,again it must be observed that the end of human law is different from the end of ,divine law4 ,for the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state1 which end law effects by directing external actions1 as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state4 ,on the other hand1 the end of the ,divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness2 which end is hindered by any sin1 not only of external1 but also of internal action4 ,consequently that which suffices for the perfection of human law1 viz4 the prohibition and punishment of sin1 does not suffice for the perfection of the ,divine law3 but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness4 ,now this cannot be done save by the grace of the ,holy ,ghost1 whereby charity which fulfilleth the law 4 4 4 is spread abroad in our hearts 7,rom4 #e3e73 since the grace of ,god is life everlasting 7,rom4 #f3bc74 ,but the ,old ,law could not confer this grace1 for this was reserved to ,christ2 because1 as it is written 7,john #a3ag71 the law was given by ,moses1 grace and truth came by ,jesus ,christ4 ,consequently the ,old ,law was good indeed1 but imperfect1 according to ,heb4 #g3ai3 ,the law brought nothing to perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts2 which are said not to be good1 because they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins1 although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner4 ,hence it is said pointedly1 and judgments in which they shall not live2 i4e4 whereby they are unable to obtain life2 and so the text goes on3 ,and ,i polluted them1 i4e4 showed them to be polluted1 in their own gifts1 when they offered all that opened the womb1 for their offenses4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the law is said to have been deadly1 as being not the cause1 but the occasion of death1 on account of its imperfection3 in so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed1 and to avoid what it forbade4 ,hence this occasion was not given to men1 but taken by them4 ,wherefore the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3aa73 ,sin1 taking occasion by the commandment1 seduced me1 and by it killed me4 ,in the same sense when it is said that the law entered in that sin might abound1 the conjunction that must be taken as consecutive and not final3 in so far as men1 taking occasion from the law1 sinned all the more1 both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it1 and because concupiscence increased1 since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace1 which the law did not confer3 for it is written 7,rom4 #i3af73 ,it is not him that willeth1 nor of him that runneth1 viz4 that he wills and runs in the commandments of ,god1 but of ,god that showeth mercy4 ,wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #aah3cb73 ,i have run the way of ,thy commandments1 when ,thou didst enlarge my heart1 i4e4 by giving me grace and charity4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,old ,law ,was from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law was not from ,god4 ,for it is written 7,deut4 #cb3d73 ,the works of ,god are perfect4 ,but the ,law was imperfect1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the ,old ,law was not from ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,eccles4 #c3ad73 ,i have learned that all the works which ,god hath made continue for ever4 ,but the ,old ,law does not continue for ever3 since the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3ah73 ,there is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment1 because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof4 ,therefore the ,old ,law was not from ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a wise lawgiver should remove1 not only evil1 but also the occasions of evil4 ,but the ,old ,law was an occasion of sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to ,god1 to ,whom none is like among the lawgivers 7,job #cf3bb74 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is written 7#a ,tim4 #b3d7 that ,god will have all men to be saved4 ,but the ,old ,law did not suffice to save man1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to ,god4 ,therefore the ,old ,law was not from ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #ae3f7 while speaking to the ,jews1 to whom the ,law was given3 ,you have made void the commandment of ,god for your tradition4 ,and shortly before 7verse #d7 ,he had said3 ,honor thy father and mother1 which is contained expressly in the ,old ,law 7,ex4 #bj3ab2 ,deut4 #e3af74 ,therefore the ,old ,law was from ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,old ,law was given by the good ,god1 ,who is the ,father of ,our ,lord ,jesus ,christ4 ,for the ,old ,law ordained men to ,christ in two ways4 ,first by bearing witness to ,christ2 wherefore ,he ,himself says 7,luke #bd3dd73 ,all things must needs be fulfilled1 which are written in the law 4 4 4 and in the prophets1 and in the psalms1 concerning ,me3 and 7,john #e3df73 ,if you did believe ,moses1 you would perhaps believe ,me also2 for he wrote of ,me4 ,secondly1 as a kind of disposition1 since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship1 it enclosed 7concludebat7 them in the worship of one ,god1 by ,whom the human race was to be saved through ,christ4 ,wherefore the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #c3bc73 ,before the faith came1 we were kept under the law shut up 7conclusi71 unto that faith which was to be revealed4 ,now it is evident that the same thing it is1 which gives a disposition to the end1 and which brings to the end2 and when ,i say the same1 ,i mean that it does so either by itself or through its subjects4 ,for the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to ,christ1 ,who was to cast him out1 according to ,matt4 #ab3bf3 ,if ,satan cast out ,satan1 his kingdom is divided ,vulg43 'he is divided against himself'4 ,therefore the ,old ,law was given by the same ,god1 from ,whom came salvation to man1 through the grace of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply1 and yet perfect in respect of time3 thus a boy is said to be perfect1 not simply1 but with regard to the condition of time4 ,so1 too1 precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison with the condition of those to whom they are given1 although they are not perfect simply4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #c3bd73 ,the law was our pedagogue in ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those works of ,god endure for ever which ,god so made that they would endure for ever2 and these are ,his perfect works4 ,but the ,old ,law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace2 not as though it were evil1 but as being weak and useless for this time2 because1 as the ,apostle goes on to say1 the law brought nothing to perfection3 hence he says 7,gal4 #c3be73 ,after the faith is come1 we are no longer under a pedagogue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #d71 ,god sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin1 that they may thereby be humbled4 ,so also did ,he wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill1 so that1 while presuming on their own powers1 they might find themselves to be sinners1 and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although the ,old ,law did not suffice to save man1 yet another help from ,god besides the ,law was available for man1 viz4 faith in the ,mediator1 by which the fathers of old were justified even as we were4 ,accordingly ,god did not fail man by giving him insufficient aids to salvation4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,old ,law ,was ,given ,through the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the ,old ,law was not given through the angels1 but immediately by ,god4 ,for an angel means a messenger2 so that the word angel denotes ministry1 not lordship1 according to ,ps4 #ajb3bj1 #ba3 ,bless the ,lord1 all ye ,his ,angels 4 4 4 you ministers of ,his4 ,but the ,old ,law is related to have been given by the ,lord3 for it is written 7,ex4 #bj3a73 ,and the ,lord spoke 4 4 4 these words1 and further on3 ,i am the ,lord ,thy ,god4 ,moreover the same expression is often repeated in ,exodus1 and the later books of the ,law4 ,therefore the ,law was given by ,god immediately4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,john #a3ag1 the ,law was given by ,moses4 ,but ,moses received it from ,god immediately3 for it is written 7,ex4 #cc3aa73 ,the ,lord spoke to ,moses face to face1 as a man is wont to speak to his friend4 ,therefore the ,old ,law was given by ,god immediately4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #c74 ,but ,god alone is ,sovereign as regards the salvation of souls3 while the angels are the ministering spirits1 as stated in ,heb4 #a3ad4 ,therefore it was not meet for the ,law to be given through the angels1 since it is ordained to the salvation of souls4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle said 7,gal4 #c3ai7 that the ,law was given ,vulg43 'ordained' by angels in the hand of a ,mediator4 ,and ,stephen said 7,acts #g3ec73 7,who7 have received the ,law by the disposition of angels4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,law was given by ,god through the angels4 ,and besides the general reason given by ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv71 viz4 that the gifts of ,god should be brought to men by means of the angels1 there is a special reason why the ,old ,law should have been given through them4 ,for it has been stated 7,,aa4 #a1 #b7 that the ,old ,law was imperfect1 and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race1 which was to come through ,christ4 ,now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts1 he that holds the highest place1 himself exercises the principal and perfect acts2 while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his subordinates3 thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together1 but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist him under his direction4 ,consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the ,new ,testament should be given by the incarnate ,god immediately2 but that the ,old ,law should be given to men by the ministers of ,god1 i4e4 by the angels4 ,it is thus that the ,apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the ,hebrews 7#a3b7 proves the excellence of the ,new ,law over the ,old2 because in the ,new ,testament ,god 4 4 4 hath spoken to us by ,his ,son1 whereas in the ,old ,testament the word was spoken by angels 7,heb4 #b3b74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,gregory says at the beginning of his ,morals 7,praef4 chap4 i71 the angel who is described to have appeared to ,moses1 is sometimes mentioned as an angel1 sometimes as the ,lord3 an angel1 in truth1 in respect of that which was subservient to the external delivery2 and the ,lord1 because ,he was the ,director within1 ,who supported the effectual power of speaking4 ,hence also it is that the angel spoke as personating the ,lord4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bg71 it is stated in ,exodus that the ,lord spoke to ,moses face to face2 and shortly afterwards we read1 ',show me ,thy glory4' ,therefore ,he perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not4 ,hence he did not see the very ,essence of ,god2 and consequently he was not taught by ,him immediately4 ,accordingly when ,scripture states that ,he spoke to him face to face1 this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people1 who thought that ,moses was speaking with ,god mouth to mouth1 when ,god spoke and appeared to him1 by means of a subordinate creature1 i4e4 an angel and a cloud4 ,again we may say that this vision face to face means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation1 inferior to the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority2 but sometimes after making a law1 he promulgates it through others4 ,thus ,god made the ,law by ,his own authority1 but ,he promulgated it through the angels4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q1 #ih1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,old ,law ,should ,have ,been ,given to the ,jews ,alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law should not have been given to the ,jews alone4 ,for the ,old ,law disposed men for the salvation which was to come through ,christ1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,but that salvation was to come not to the ,jews alone but to all nations1 according to ,isa4 #di3f3 ,it is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of ,jacob1 and to convert the dregs of ,israel4 ,behold ,i have given thee to be the light of the ,gentiles1 that thou mayest be ,my salvation1 even to the farthest part of the earth4 ,therefore the ,old ,law should have been given to all nations1 and not to one people only4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,acts #aj3cd1 #ce1 ,god is not a respecter of persons3 but in every nation1 he that feareth ,him1 and worketh justice1 is acceptable to ,him4 ,therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the law was given through the angels1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,but ,god always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to the ,jews alone1 but to all nations3 for it is written 7,ecclus4 #ag3ad73 ,over every nation ,he set a ruler4 ,also on all nations ,he bestows temporal goods1 which are of less account with ,god than spiritual goods4 ,therefore ,he should have given the ,law also to all peoples4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #c3a1 #b73 ,what advantage then hath the ,jew8 4 4 4 ,much every way4 ,first indeed1 because the words of ,god were committed to them3 and 7,ps4 #adg3i73 ,he hath not done in like manner to every nation3 and ,his judgments ,he hath not made manifest unto them4 ,i answer that1 ,it might be assigned as a reason for the ,law being given to the ,jews rather than to other peoples1 that the ,jewish people alone remained faithful to the worship of one ,god1 while the others turned away to idolatry2 wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the ,law1 lest a holy thing should be given to dogs4 ,but this reason does not seem fitting3 because that people turned to idolatry1 even after the ,law had been made1 which was more grievous1 as is clear from ,ex4 #cb and from ,amos #e3be1 #bf3 ,did you offer victims and sacrifices to ,me in the desert for forty years1 ,o house of ,israel8 ,but you carried a tabernacle for your ,moloch1 and the image of your idols1 the star of your god1 which you made to yourselves4 ,moreover it is stated expressly 7,deut4 #i3f73 ,know therefore that the ,lord thy ,god giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices1 for thou art a very stiff-necked people3 but the real reason is given in the preceding verse3 ,that the ,lord might accomplish ,his word1 which ,he promised by oath to thy fathers ,abraham1 ,isaac1 and ,jacob4 ,what this promise was is shown by the ,apostle1 who says 7,gal4 #c3af7 that to ,abraham were the promises made and to his seed4 ,he saith not1 ',and to his seeds1' as of many3 but as of one1 ',and to thy seed1' which is ,christ4 ,and so ,god vouchsafed both the ,law and other special boons to that people1 on account of the promised made to their fathers that ,christ should be born of them4 ,for it was fitting that the people1 of whom ,christ was to be born1 should be signalized by a special sanctification1 according to the words of ,lev4 #ai3b3 ,be ye holy1 because ,i 4 4 4 am holy4 ,nor again was it on account of the merit of ,abraham himself that this promise was made to him1 viz4 that ,christ should be born of his seed3 but of gratuitous election and vocation4 ,hence it is written 7,isa4 #da3b73 ,who hath raised up the just one form the east1 hath called him to follow him8 ,it is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise1 and that the people sprung from them received the law2 according to ,deut4 #d3cf1 #cg3 ,ye did ,vulg43 ',thou didst' hear ,his words out of the midst of the fire1 because ,he loved thy fathers1 and chose their seed after them4 ,and if again it asked why ,he chose this people1 and not another1 that ,christ might be born thereof2 a fitting answer is given by ,augustine 7,tract4 super ,joan4 xxvi73 ,why ,he draweth one and draweth not another1 seek not thou to judge1 if thou wish not to err4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the salvation1 which was to come through ,christ1 was prepared for all nations1 yet it was necessary that ,christ should be born of one people1 which1 for this reason1 was privileged above other peoples2 according to ,rom4 #i3d3 ,to whom1 namely the ,jews1 belongeth the adoption as of children 7of ,god7 4 4 4 and the testament1 and the giving of the ,law 4 4 4 whose are the fathers1 and of whom is ,christ according to the flesh4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due2 but it has no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously4 ,because he who1 out of generosity1 gives of his own to one and not to another1 is not a respecter of persons3 but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common1 and were not to distribute them according to personal merits1 he would be a respecter of persons4 ,now ,god bestows the benefits of salvation on the human race gratuitously3 wherefore ,he is not a respecter of persons1 if ,he gives them to some rather than to others4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,praedest4 ,sanct4 viii73 ,all whom ,god teaches1 he teaches out of pity2 but whom ,he teaches not1 out of justice ,he teaches not3 for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin3 but not the benefits of nature4 ,among the latter are the ministries of the angels1 which the very order of various natures demands1 viz4 that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings3 and also bodily aids1 which ,god vouchsafes not only to men1 but also to beasts1 according to ,ps4 #ce3g3 ,men and beasts ,thou wilt preserve1 ,o ,lord4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,all ,men ,were ,bound to ,observe the ,old ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all men were bound to observe the ,old ,law4 ,because whoever is subject to the king1 must needs be subject to his law4 ,but the ,old ,law was given by ,god1 ,who is ,king of all the earth 7,ps4 #df3h74 ,therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the ,law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,jews could not be saved without observing the ,old ,law3 for it is written 7,deut4 #bg3bf73 ,cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law1 and fulfilleth them not in work4 ,if therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the ,old ,law1 the ,jews would be in a worse plight than other men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,gentiles were admitted to the ,jewish ritual and to the observances of the ,law3 for it is written 7,ex4 #ab3dh73 ,if any stranger be willing to dwell among you1 and to keep the ,phase of the ,lord1 all his males shall first be circumcised1 and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner2 and he shall be as he that is born in the land4 ,but it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to ,divine ordinance1 if they could have been saved without the observance of the ,law4 ,therefore none could be saved without observing the ,law4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 ix7 that many of the ,gentiles were brought back to ,god by the angels4 ,but it is clear that the ,gentiles did not observe the ,law4 ,therefore some could be saved without observing the ,law4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,old ,law showed forth the precepts of the natural law1 and added certain precepts of its own4 ,accordingly1 as to those precepts of the natural law contained in the ,old ,law1 all were bound to observe the ,old ,law2 not because they belonged to the ,old ,law1 but because they belonged to the natural law4 ,but as to those precepts which were added by the ,old ,law1 they were not binding on any save the ,jewish people alone4 ,the reason of this is because the ,old ,law1 as stated above 7,a4 #d71 was given to the ,jewish people1 that it might receive a prerogative of holiness1 in reverence for ,christ ,who was to be born of that people4 ,now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones1 are binding on them alone3 thus clerics who are set aside for the service of ,god are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound2 likewise religious are bound by their profession to certain works of perfection1 to which people living in the world are not bound4 ,in like manner this people was bound to certain special observances1 to which other peoples were not bound4 ,wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #ah3ac73 ,thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the ,lord thy ,god3 and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession1 as appears from ,deut4 #bf3c3 ,i profess this day before the ,lord thy ,god1 etc4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,whoever are subject to a king1 are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general4 ,but if he orders certain things to be observed by the servants of his household1 others are not bound thereto4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the more a man is united to ,god1 the better his state becomes3 wherefore the more the ,jewish people were bound to the worship of ,god1 the greater their excellence over other peoples4 ,hence it is written 7,deut4 #d3h73 ,what other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments1 and all the law8 ,in like manner1 from this point of view1 the state of clerics is better than that of the laity1 and the state of religious than that of folk living in the world4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the ,law than under the mere natural law3 and for this reason they were admitted to them4 ,so too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy1 and secular persons to those of the religious1 although they can be saved without this4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,old ,law ,was ,suitably ,given at the ,time of ,moses8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law was not suitably given at the time of ,moses4 ,because the ,old ,law disposed man for the salvation which was to come through ,christ1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,but man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned4 ,therefore the ,law should have been given immediately after sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,old ,law was given for the sanctification of those from whom ,christ was to be born4 ,now the promise concerning the seed1 which is ,christ 7,gal4 #c3af7 was first made to ,abraham1 as related in ,gen4 #ab3g4 ,therefore the ,law should have been given at once at the time of ,abraham4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as ,christ was born of those alone who descended from ,noe through ,abraham1 to whom the promise was made2 so was ,he born of no other of the descendants of ,abraham but ,david1 to whom the promise was renewed1 according to #b ,kings #bc3a3 ,the man to whom it was appointed concerning the ,christ of the ,god of ,jacob 4 4 4 said4 ,therefore the ,old ,law should have been given after ,david1 just as it was given after ,abraham4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #c3ai7 that the ,law was set because of transgressions1 until the seed should come1 to whom ,he made the promise1 being ordained by angels in the hand of a ,mediator3 ordained1 i4e4 given in orderly fashion1 as the gloss explains4 ,therefore it was fitting that the ,old ,law should be given in this order of time4 ,i answer that1 ,it was most fitting for the ,law to be given at the time of ,moses4 ,the reason for this may be taken from two things in respect of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men4 ,because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud1 whom the law restrains and tames3 and it is imposed on good men1 who1 through being instructed by the law1 are helped to fulfil what they desire to do4 ,hence it was fitting that the ,law should be given at such a time as would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride4 ,for man was proud of two things1 viz4 of knowledge and of power4 ,he was proud of his knowledge1 as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation3 and accordingly1 in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter1 man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written law3 and man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient1 since about the time of ,abraham man had fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices4 ,wherefore1 after those times1 it was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance3 because by the ,law is the knowledge of sin 7,rom4 #c3bj74 ,but1 after man had been instructed by the ,law1 his pride was convinced of his weakness1 through his being unable to fulfil what he knew4 ,hence1 as the ,apostle concludes 7,rom4 #h3c1 #d71 what the ,law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh1 ,god sent ,vulg43 'sending' ,his own ,son 4 4 4 that the justification of the ,law might be fulfilled in us4 ,with regard to good men1 the ,law was given to them as a help2 which was most needed by the people1 at the time when the natural law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin3 for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner1 so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection2 wherefore it was becoming that the ,old ,law should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it was not fitting for the ,old ,law to be given at once after the sin of the first man3 both because man was so confident in his own reason1 that he did not acknowledge his need of the ,old ,law2 because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual sinning4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a law should not be given save to the people1 since it is a general precept1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c72 wherefore at the time of ,abraham ,god gave men certain familiar1 and1 as it were1 household precepts3 but when ,abraham's descendants had multiplied1 so as to form a people1 and when they had been freed from slavery1 it was fitting that they should be given a law2 for slaves are not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the law to be directed1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #b1 #d1 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the ,law had to be given to the people1 not only those1 of whom ,christ was born1 received the ,law1 but the whole people1 who were marked with the seal of circumcision1 which was the sign of the promise made to ,abraham1 and in which he believed1 according to ,rom4 #d3aa3 hence even before ,david1 the ,law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together4 ,,question #ii ,,of ,,the ,,precepts ,,of ,,the ,,old ,,law 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the precepts of the ,old ,law2 and 7#a7 how they are distinguished from one another2 7#b7 each kind of precept4 ,under the first head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ,old ,law contains several precepts or only one8 7#b7 ,whether the ,old ,law contains any moral precepts8 7#c7 ,whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts8 7#d7 ,whether besides these it contains judicial precepts8 7#e7 ,whether it contains any others besides these8 7#f7 ,how the ,old ,law induced men to keep its precepts4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,old ,law ,contains ,only ,one ,precept8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law contains but one precept4 ,because a law is nothing else than a precept1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,now there is but one ,old ,law4 ,therefore it contains but one precept4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3i73 ,if there be any other commandment1 it is comprised in this word3 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself4 ,but this is only one commandment4 ,therefore the ,old ,law contained but one commandment4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7,matt4 #g3ab73 ,all things 4 4 4 whatsoever you would that men should do to you1 do you also to them4 ,for this is the ,law and the prophets4 ,but the whole of the ,old ,law is comprised in the ,law and the prophets4 ,therefore the whole of the ,old ,law contains but one commandment4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #b3ae73 ,making void the ,law of commandments contained in decrees3 where he is referring to the ,old ,law1 as the gloss comments1 on the passage4 ,therefore the ,old ,law comprises many commandments4 ,i answer that1 ,since a precept of law is binding1 it is about something which must be done3 and1 that a thing must be done1 arises from the necessity of some end4 ,hence it is evident that a precept implies1 in its very idea1 relation to an end1 in so far as a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end4 ,now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end2 and1 accordingly1 precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one end4 ,consequently we must say that all the precepts of the ,old ,law are one in respect of their relation to one end3 and yet they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,old ,law is said to be one as being ordained to one end3 yet it comprises various precepts1 according to the diversity of the things which it directs to the end4 ,thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end1 because it aims at the building of a house3 and yet it contains various rules1 according to the variety of acts ordained thereto4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #a3e71 the end of the commandment is charity2 since every law aims at establishing friendship1 either between man and man1 or between man and ,god4 ,wherefore the whole ,law is comprised in this one commandment1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself1 as expressing the end of all commandments3 because love of one's neighbor includes love of ,god1 when we love our neighbor for ,god's sake4 ,hence the ,apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of ,god and of one's neighbor1 and of which ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #bb3dj73 ,on these two commandments dependeth the whole ,law and the prophets4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated in ,ethic4 ix1 #h1 friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself1 in so far as man looks on another as on himself4 ,hence when it is said1 ,all things whatsoever you would that men should do to you1 do you also to them1 this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words1 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself3 so that it is an explanation of this commandment4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,old ,law ,contains ,moral ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law contains no moral precepts4 ,for the ,old ,law is distinct from the law of nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e2 ,q4 #ih1 ,a4 #e74 ,but the moral precepts belong to the law of nature4 ,therefore they do not belong to the ,old ,law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,divine ,law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him3 as is evident in regard to things that are of faith1 which are above reason4 ,but man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts4 ,therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the ,old ,law1 which is a ,divine law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,old ,law is said to be the letter that killeth 7#b ,cor4 #c3f74 ,but the moral precepts do not kill1 but quicken1 according to ,ps4 #aah3ic3 ,thy justifications ,i will never forget1 for by them ,thou hast given me life4 ,therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the ,old ,law4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ag3i73 ,moreover1 ,he gave them discipline ,douay3 'instructions' and the law of life for an inheritance4 ,now discipline belongs to morals2 for this gloss on ,heb4 #ab3aa3 ,now all chastisement 7disciplina71 etc41 says3 ,discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties4 ,therefore the ,law which was given by ,god comprised moral precepts4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,old ,law contained some moral precepts2 as is evident from ,ex4 #bj3ac1 #ae3 ,thou shalt not kill1 ,thou shalt not steal4 ,this was reasonable3 because1 just as the principal intention of human law is to create friendship between man and man2 so the chief intention of the ,divine law is to establish man in friendship with ,god4 ,now since likeness is the reason of love1 according to ,ecclus4 #ac3ai3 ,every beast loveth its like2 there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to ,god1 ,who is supremely good1 unless man become good3 wherefore it is written 7,lev4 #ai3b2 #aa3de73 ,you shall be holy1 for ,i am holy4 ,but the goodness of man is virtue1 which makes its possessor good 7,ethic4 ii1 #f74 ,therefore it was necessary for the ,old ,law to include precepts about acts of virtue3 and these are the moral precepts of the ,law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,old ,law is distinct from the natural law1 not as being altogether different from it1 but as something added thereto4 ,for just as grace presupposes nature1 so must the ,divine law presuppose the natural law4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it was fitting that the ,divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient1 but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded4 ,now human reason could not go astray in the abstract1 as to the universal principles of the natural law2 but through being habituated to sin1 it became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail4 ,but with regard to the other moral precepts1 which are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law1 the reason of many men went astray1 to the extend of judging to be lawful1 things that are evil in themselves4 ,hence there was need for the authority of the ,divine law to rescue man from both these defects4 ,thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach1 such as the ,trinity of the ,godhead2 but also those to which right reason can attain1 such as the ,unity of the ,godhead2 in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine proves 7,de ,spiritu et ,litera xiv71 even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death1 as to the moral precepts2 in so far as1 to wit1 it prescribes what is good1 without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,old ,law ,comprises ,ceremonial1 ,besides ,moral1 ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law does not comprise ceremonial1 besides moral1 precepts4 ,for every law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing human actions4 ,now human actions are called moral1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore it seems that the ,old ,law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the ,divine worship4 ,but ,divine worship is the act of a virtue1 viz4 religion1 which1 as ,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ii7 offers worship and ceremony to the ,godhead4 ,since1 then1 the moral precepts are about acts of virtue1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively4 ,but1 as ,augustine observes 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #c1 #d71 of all signs employed by men words hold the first place4 ,therefore there is no need for the ,law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #d3ac1 #ad73 ,ten words 4 4 4 ,he wrote in two tables of stone2 and ,he commanded me at that time that ,i should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do4 ,but the ten commandments of the ,law are moral precepts4 ,therefore besides the moral precepts there are others which are ceremonial4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 the ,divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to ,god2 while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another4 ,hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to ,divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind3 and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating to ,divine matters1 according as it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals2 as may be seen in the rites of the ,gentiles4 ,on the other hand the ,divine law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to ,god1 which order was the chief aim of that law4 ,now man is directed to ,god not only by the interior acts of the mind1 which are faith1 hope1 and love1 but also by certain external works1 whereby man makes profession of his subjection to ,god3 and it is these works that are said to belong to the ,divine worship4 ,this worship is called ceremony1--the munia1 i4e4 gifts1 of ,ceres 7who was the goddess of fruits71 as some say3 because1 at first1 offerings were made to ,god from the fruits3 or because1 as ,valerius ,maximus states 99,fact4 et ,dict4 ,memor4 i1 #a1 the word ceremony was introduced among the ,latins1 to signify the ,divine worship1 being derived from a town near ,rome called ,caere3 since1 when ,rome was taken by the ,gauls1 the sacred chattels of the ,romans were taken thither and most carefully preserved4 ,accordingly those precepts of the ,law which refer to the ,divine worship are specially called ceremonial4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,human acts extend also to the ,divine worship3 and therefore the ,old ,law given to man contains precepts about these matters also4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #c71 the precepts of the natural law are general1 and require to be determined3 and they are determined both by human law and by ,divine law4 ,and just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be1 not of natural1 but of positive law2 so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law1 effected by the ,divine law1 are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law4 ,wherefore to worship ,god1 since it is an act of virtue1 belongs to a moral precept2 but the determination of this precept1 namely that ,he is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices1 and such and such offerings1 belongs to the ceremonial precepts4 ,consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i71 the things of ,god cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes4 ,now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words1 but also offered to the senses4 ,wherefore the things of ,god are set forth in the ,scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words1 as in the case of metaphorical expressions2 but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes1 which pertains to the ceremonial precepts4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #d ,whether1 ,besides the ,moral and ,ceremonial ,precepts1 ,there ,are ,also ,judicial ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the ,old ,law4 ,for ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 vi1 #b7 that in the ,old ,law there are precepts concerning the life we have to lead1 and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed4 ,now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts2 and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial4 ,therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the ,law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a gloss on ,ps4 #aah3ajb1 ,i have not declined from ,thy judgments1 says1 i4e4 from the rule of life ,thou hast set for me4 ,but a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts4 ,therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 judgment seems to be an act of justice1 according to ,ps4 #ic3ae3 ,until justice be turned into judgment4 ,but acts of justice1 like the acts of other virtues1 belong to the moral precepts4 ,therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts1 and consequently should not be held as distinct from them4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #f3a73 ,these are the precepts and ceremonies1 and judgments3 where precepts stands for moral precepts antonomastically4 ,therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 it belongs to the ,divine law to direct men to one another and to ,god4 ,now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law1 to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred3 yet each of them has to be determined by ,divine or human law1 because naturally known principles are universal1 both in speculative and in practical matters4 ,accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about ,divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts1 so the determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts4 ,we must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the ,old ,law2 viz4 moral precepts1 which are dictated by the natural law2 ceremonial precepts1 which are determinations of the ,divine worship2 and judicial precepts1 which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men4 ,wherefore the ,apostle 7,rom4 #g3ab7 after saying that the ,law is holy1 adds that the commandment is just1 and holy1 and good3 just1 in respect of the judicial precepts2 holy1 with regard to the ceremonial precepts 7since the word sanctus--holy--is applied to that which is consecrated to ,god72 and good1 i4e4 conducive to virtue1 as to the moral precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life3 and consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by ,augustine1 viz4 under the precepts of the life we have to lead4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,judgment denotes execution of justice1 by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way4 ,hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts1 in that they are derived from reason2 and something in common with the ceremonial precepts1 in that they are determinations of general precepts4 ,this explains why sometimes judgments comprise both judicial and moral precepts1 as in ,deut4 #e3a3 ,hear1 ,o ,israel1 the ceremonies and judgments2 and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts1 as in ,lev4 #ah3d3 ,you shall do ,my judgments1 and shall observe ,my precepts1 where precepts denotes moral precepts1 while judgments refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the act of justice1 in general1 belongs to the moral precepts2 but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,old ,law ,contains ,any ,others ,besides the ,moral1 ,judicial1 and ,ceremonial ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law contains others besides the moral1 judicial1 and ceremonial precepts4 ,because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice1 which is between man and man2 while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion1 whereby ,god is worshipped4 ,now besides these there are many other virtues1 viz4 temperance1 fortitude1 liberality1 and several others1 as stated above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore besides the aforesaid precepts1 the ,old ,law should comprise others4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,deut4 #aa3a73 ,love the ,lord thy ,god1 and observe ,his precepts and ceremonies1 ,his judgments and commandments4 ,now precepts concern moral matters1 as stated above 7,a4 #d74 ,therefore besides the moral1 judicial and ceremonial precepts1 the ,law contains others which are called commandments4 99,the commandments 7mandata7 spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the ,commandments 7praecepta7 in the ordinary acceptance of the word4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7,deut4 #f3ag73 ,keep the precepts of the ,lord thy ,god1 and the testimonies and ceremonies which ,i have ,vulg43 ',he hath' commanded thee4 ,therefore in addition to the above1 the ,law comprises testimonies4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is written 7,ps4 #aah3ic73 ,thy justifications 7i4e4 ,thy ,law1 according to a gloss7 ,i will never forget4 ,therefore in the ,old ,law there are not only moral1 ceremonial and judicial precepts1 but also others1 called justifications4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #f3a73 ,these are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the ,lord your ,god commanded 4 4 4 you4 ,and these words are placed at the beginning of the ,law4 ,therefore all the precepts of the ,law are included under them4 ,i answer that1 ,some things are included in the ,law by way of precept2 other things1 as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts4 ,now the precepts refer to things which have to be done3 and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations1 viz4 the authority of the lawgiver1 and the benefit derived from the fulfilment1 which benefit consists in the attainment of some good1 useful1 pleasurable or virtuous1 or in the avoidance of some contrary evil4 ,hence it was necessary that in the ,old ,law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of ,god the lawgiver3 e4g4 ,deut4 #f3d3 ,hear1 ,o ,israel1 the ,lord our ,god is one ,lord2 and ,gen4 #a3a3 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth3 and these are called testimonies4 ,again it was necessary that in the ,law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the ,law1 and punishments for those who transgress2 as it may be seen in ,deut4 #bh3 ,if thou wilt hear the voice of the ,lord thy ,god 4 4 4 ,he will make thee higher than all the nations1 etc43 and these are called justifications1 according as ,god punishes or rewards certain ones justly4 ,the things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty4 ,now a duty is twofold3 one according to the rule of reason2 the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty3 thus the ,philosopher distinguishes a twofold just--moral and legal 7,ethic4 v1 #g74 ,moral duty is twofold3 because reason dictates that something must be done1 either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed2 or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue4 ,and in this sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition1 as ,thou shalt not kill1 ,thou shalt not steal3 and these are properly called precepts4 ,other things are prescribed or forbidden1 not as an absolute duty1 but as something better to be done4 ,these may be called commandments2 because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion3 an example whereof is seen in ,ex4 #bb3bf3 ,if thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge1 thou shalt give it him again before sunset2 and in other like cases4 ,wherefore ,jerome 7,praefat4 in ,comment4 super ,marc47 says that justice is in the precepts1 charity in the commandments4 ,duty as fixed by the ,law1 belongs to the judicial precepts1 as regards human affairs2 to the ceremonial precepts1 as regards ,divine matters4 ,nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called testimonies1 in so far as they testify to the ,divine justice4 ,again all the precepts of the ,law may be styled justifications1 as being executions of legal justice4 ,furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts1 so that those things be called precepts which ,god ,himself prescribed2 and those things commandments which ,he enjoined 7mandavit7 through others1 as the very word seems to denote4 ,from this it is clear that all the precepts of the ,law are either moral1 ceremonial1 or judicial2 and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept1 but are directed to the observance of the precepts1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,justice alone1 of all the virtues1 implies the notion of duty4 ,consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice3 of which virtue religion is a part1 as ,tully says 7,de ,invent4 ii74 ,wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts4 ,the ,replies to the other ,objections are clear from what has been said4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,old ,law ,should ,have ,induced ,men to the ,observance of ,its ,precepts1 by ,means of ,temporal ,promises and ,threats8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts1 by means of temporal promises and threats4 ,for the purpose of the ,divine law is to subject man to ,god by fear and love3 hence it is written 7,deut4 #aj3ab73 ,and now1 ,israel1 what doth the ,lord thy ,god require of thee1 but that thou fear the ,lord thy ,god1 and walk in ,his ways1 and love ,him8 ,but the desire for temporal goods leads man away from ,god3 for ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #cf71 that covetousness is the bane of charity4 ,therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver3 and this makes a law worthy of rejection1 as the ,philosopher declares 7,polit4 ii1 #f74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,divine law is more excellent than human law4 ,now1 in sciences1 we notice that the loftier the science1 the higher the means of persuasion that it employs4 ,therefore1 since human law employs temporal threats and promises1 as means of persuading man1 the ,divine law should have used1 not these1 but more lofty means4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked4 ,but as stated in ,eccles4 #i3b1 all temporal things equally happen to the just and to the wicked1 to the good and the evil1 to the clean and to the unclean1 to him that offereth victims1 and to him that despiseth sacrifices4 ,therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the ,divine law4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,isa4 #a3ai1 #bj73 ,if you be willing1 and will hearken to ,me1 you shall eat the good things of the land4 ,but if you will not1 and will provoke ,me to wrath3 the sword shall devour you4 ,i answer that1 ,as in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments1 so too in every law1 men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards4 ,now it is to be observed that1 in speculative sciences1 the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil3 wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered becomingly1 so that the instruction is based on principles more generally known4 ,and thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts1 needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection2 just as children are induced to do something1 by means of little childish gifts4 ,now it has been said above 7,q4 #ih1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c7 that the ,old ,law disposed men to 7the coming of7 ,christ1 as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect1 wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from ,christ's coming3 and for this reason1 that people is compared to a child that is still under a pedagogue 7,gal4 #c3bd74 ,but the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual1 as is clear from the words of the ,apostle 7,phil4 #c3ac1 #ae73 ,forgetting the things that are behind1 ,i stretch ,vulg43 'and stretching' forth myself to those that are before 4 4 4 ,let us therefore1 as many as are perfect1 be thus minded4 ,those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods1 albeit in subordination to ,god3 whereas the perverse place their end in temporalities4 ,it was therefore fitting that the ,old ,law should conduct men to ,god by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities1 is the bane of charity4 ,but the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to ,god is a road leading the imperfect to the love of ,god1 according to ,ps4 #dh3ai3 ,he will praise ,thee1 when ,thou shalt do well to him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men3 whereas the ,divine law persuades men by means of rewards or punishments to be received from ,god4 ,in this respect it employs higher means4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as any one can see1 who reads carefully the story of the ,old ,testament1 the common weal of the people prospered under the ,law as long as they obeyed it2 and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the ,law they were overtaken by many calamities4 ,but certain individuals1 although they observed the justice of the ,law1 met with misfortunes--either because they had already become spiritual 7so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal things1 and that their virtue might be tried7--or because1 while outwardly fulfilling the works of the ,law1 their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods1 and far removed from ,god1 according to ,isa4 #bi3ac 7,matt4 #ae3h73 ,this people honoreth ,me with their lips2 but their hearts is far from ,me4 ,,question #ajj ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,precepts ,,of ,,the ,,old ,,law 7,in ,twelve ,articles7 ,we must now consider each kind of precept of the ,old ,law3 and 7#a7 the moral precepts1 7#b7 the ceremonial precepts1 7#c7 the judicial precepts4 ,under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether all the moral precepts of the ,old ,law belong to the law of nature8 7#b7 ,whether the moral precepts of the ,old ,law are about the acts of all the virtues8 7#c7 ,whether all the moral precepts of the ,old ,law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue8 7#d7 ,how the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another8 7#e7 ,their number2 7#f7 ,their order2 7#g7 ,the manner in which they were given2 7#h7 ,whether they are dispensable8 7#i7 ,whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the ,law8 7#aj7 ,whether the mode of charity comes under the precept8 7#aa7 ,the distinction of other moral precepts2 7#ab7 ,whether the moral precepts of the ,old ,law justified man8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,all the ,moral ,precepts of the ,old ,law ,belong to the ,law of ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature4 ,for it is written 7,ecclus4 #ag3i73 ,moreover ,he gave them instructions1 and the law of life for an inheritance4 ,but instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature2 since the law of nature is not learnt1 but instilled by natural instinct4 ,therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,divine law is more perfect than human law4 ,but human law adds certain things concerning good morals1 to those that belong to the law of nature3 as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men1 while these moral institutions are various for various people4 ,much more reason therefore was there why the ,divine law should add to the law of nature1 ordinances pertaining to good morals4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters1 so does faith3 hence it is written 7,gal4 #e3f7 that faith worketh by charity4 ,but faith is not included in the law of nature2 since that which is of faith is above nature4 ,therefore not all the moral precepts of the ,divine law belong to the law of nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #b3ad7 that the ,gentiles1 who have not the ,law1 do by nature those things that are of the ,law3 which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals4 ,therefore all the moral precepts of the ,law belong to the law of nature4 ,i answer that1 ,the moral precepts1 distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts1 are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals4 ,now since human morals depend on their relation to reason1 which is the proper principle of human acts1 those morals are called good which accord with reason1 and those are called bad which are discordant from reason4 ,and as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles1 so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally1 as stated above 7,q4 #id1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d73 from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters4 ,for some matters connected with human actions are so evident1 that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles3 while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances1 which all are not competent to do carefully1 but only those who are wise3 just as it is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences1 but only for those who are versed in philosophy3 and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by ,divine instruction2 such as the articles of faith4 ,it is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals2 and since good morals are those which are in accord with reason2 and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way from natural reason2 it follows1 of necessity1 that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature2 but not all in the same way4 ,for there are certain things which the natural reason of every man1 of its own accord and at once1 judges to be done or not to be done3 e4g4 ,honor thy father and thy mother1 and ,thou shalt not kill1 ,thou shalt not steal3 and these belong to the law of nature absolutely4 ,and there are certain things which1 after a more careful consideration1 wise men deem obligatory4 ,such belong to the law of nature1 yet so that they need to be inculcated1 the wiser teaching the less wise3 e4g4 ,rise up before the hoary head1 and honor the person of the aged man1 and the like4 ,and there are some things1 to judge of which1 human reason needs ,divine instruction1 whereby we are taught about the things of ,god3 e4g4 ,thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing1 nor the likeness of anything2 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain4 ,this suffices for the ,replies to the ,objections4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,moral ,precepts of the ,law ,are ,about ,all the ,acts of ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the moral precepts of the ,law are not about all the acts of virtue4 ,for observance of the precepts of the ,old ,law is called justification1 according to ,ps4 #aah3h3 ,i will keep ,thy justifications4 ,but justification is the execution of justice4 ,therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty4 ,but the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of the other virtues1 for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due4 ,therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues1 but only about the acts of justice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every law is made for the common good1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #ba74 ,but of all the virtues justice alone regards the common good1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,paradiso viii7 that a sin is a transgression of the ,divine law1 and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven4 ,but there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue4 ,therefore it belongs to ,divine law to direct all the acts of virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,since the precepts of the ,law are ordained to the common good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b71 the precepts of the ,law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community3 hence the ,philosopher 7,polit4 iv1 #a7 teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state which is ruled by the people1 or by a few powerful men in the state4 ,now human law is ordained for one kind of community1 and the ,divine law for another kind4 ,because human law is ordained for the civil community1 implying mutual duties of man and his fellows3 and men are ordained to one another by outward acts1 whereby men live in communion with one another4 ,this life in common of man with man pertains to justice1 whose proper function consists in directing the human community4 ,wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice2 and if it commands acts of other virtues1 this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice1 as the ,philosopher explains 7,ethic4 v1 #a74 ,but the community for which the ,divine law is ordained1 is that of men in relation to ,god1 either in this life or in the life to come4 ,and therefore the ,divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their relations to ,god4 ,now man is united to ,god by his reason or mind1 in which is ,god's image4 ,wherefore the ,divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered4 ,but this is effected by the acts of all the virtues3 since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves3 while the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions4 ,it is therefore evident that the ,divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues3 yet so that certain matters1 without which the order of virtue1 which is the order of reason1 cannot even exist1 come under an obligation of precept2 while other matters1 which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue1 come under an admonition of counsel4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the fulfilment of the commandments of the ,law1 even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues1 has the character of justification1 inasmuch as it is just that man should obey ,god3 or again1 inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another3 but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to reason4 ,it is in relation to this latter duty that the ,philosopher speaks 7,ethic4 v1 #aa7 of a kind of metaphorical justice4 ,the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,all the ,moral ,precepts of the ,old ,law ,are ,reducible to the ,ten ,precepts of the ,decalogue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all the moral precepts of the ,old ,law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue4 ,for the first and principal precepts of the ,law are1 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god1 and ,thou shalt love thy neighbor1 as stated in ,matt4 #bb3cg1 #ci4 ,but these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue4 ,therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts1 but rather vice versa4 ,but among the precepts of the decalogue1 one is ceremonial1 viz4 ,remember that thou keep holy the ,sabbath-day4 ,therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue4 ,but among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of justice2 as may be seen by going through them all4 ,therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts4 ,on the contrary1 ,the gloss on ,matt4 #e3aa3 ,blessed are ye when they shall revile you1 etc4 says that ,moses1 after propounding the ten precepts1 set them out in detail4 ,therefore all the precepts of the ,law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue4 ,i answer that1 ,the precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the ,law1 in the fact that ,god ,himself is said to have given the precepts of the decalogue2 whereas ,he gave the other precepts to the people through ,moses4 ,wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from ,god4 ,such are those which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general principles3 and those also which become known to man immediately through divinely infused faith4 ,consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue3 viz4 first general principles1 for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident2 as1 for instance1 that one should do evil to no man1 and other similar principles3 and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason2 since the people receive these principles from ,god1 through being taught by wise men4 ,nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue2 yet in different ways4 ,for the first general principles are contained in them1 as principles in their proximate conclusions2 while those which are known through wise men are contained1 conversely1 as conclusions in their principles4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law1 and are self-evident to human reason1 either through nature or through faith4 ,wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these1 as conclusions to general principles4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the precept of the ,sabbath observance is moral in one respect1 in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of ,god1 according to ,ps4 #de3aa3 ,be still and see that ,i am ,god4 ,in this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue3 but not as to the fixing of the time1 in which respect it is a ceremonial precept4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice4 ,hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice4 ,wherefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts of the decalogue1 which are the primary elements of the ,law4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,precepts of the ,decalogue ,are ,suitably ,distinguished from ,one ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another4 ,for worship is a virtue distinct from faith4 ,now the precepts are about acts of virtue4 ,but that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue1 ,thou shalt not have strange gods before ,me1 belongs to faith3 and that which is added1 ,thou shalt not make 4 4 4 any graven thing1 etc4 belongs to worship4 ,therefore these are not one precept1 as ,augustine asserts 7,qq4 in ,exod4 qu4 lxxi71 but two4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the affirmative precepts in the ,law are distinct from the negative precepts2 e4g4 ,honor thy father and thy mother1 and1 ,thou shalt not kill4 ,but this1 ,i am the ,lord thy ,god1 is affirmative3 and that which follows1 ,thou shalt not have strange gods before ,me1 is negative4 ,therefore these are two precepts1 and do not1 as ,augustine says 7,qq4 in ,exod4 qu4 lxxi71 make one4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #g3g73 ,i had not known concupiscence1 if the ,law did not say3 ',thou shalt not covet4' ,hence it seems that this precept1 ,thou shalt not covet1 is one precept2 and1 therefore1 should not be divided into two4 ,on the contrary1 stands the authority of ,augustine who1 in commenting on ,exodus 7,qq4 in ,exod4 qu4 lxxi7 distinguishes three precepts as referring to ,god1 and seven as referring to our neighbor4 ,i answer that1 ,the precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities4 ,for ,hesychius commenting on ,lev4 #bf3bf1 ,ten women shall bake your bread in one oven1 says that the precept of the ,sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts1 because its observance1 in the letter1 is not binding for all time4 ,but he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to ,god1 the first being1 ,i am the ,lord thy ,god2 the second1 ,thou shalt not have strange gods before ,me1 7thus also ,jerome distinguishes these two precepts1 in his commentary on ,osee #aj3aj1 ,on thy ,vulg43 their two iniquities72 the third precept according to him is1 ,thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing2 and the fourth1 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain4 ,he states that there are six precepts pertaining to our neighbor2 the first1 ,honor thy father and thy mother2 the second1 ,thou shalt not kill2 the third1 ,thou shalt not commit adultery2 the fourth1 ,thou shalt not steal2 the fifth1 ,thou shalt not bear false witness2 the sixth1 ,thou shalt not covet4 ,but1 in the first place1 it seems unbecoming for the precept of the ,sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue1 if it nowise belonged to the decalogue4 ,secondly1 because1 since it is written 7,matt4 #f3bd71 ,no man can serve two masters1 the two statements1 ,i am the ,lord thy ,god1 and1 ,thou shalt not have strange gods before ,me seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept4 ,hence ,origen 7,hom4 viii in ,exod47 who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to ,god1 unites these two under one precept2 and reckons in the second place1 ,thou shalt not make 4 4 4 any graven thing2 as third1 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain2 and as fourth1 ,remember that thou keep holy the ,sabbath-day4 ,the other six he reckons in the same way as ,hesychius4 ,since1 however1 the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as gods--for ,god commanded an image of the ,seraphim ,vulg43 ,cherubim to be made and placed in the tabernacle1 as related in ,ex4 #be3ah--;,augustine more fittingly unites these two1 ,thou shalt not have strange gods before ,me1 and1 ,thou shalt not make 4 4 4 any graven thing1 into one precept4 ,likewise to covet another's wife1 for the purpose of carnal knowledge1 belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh2 whereas1 to covet other things1 which are desired for the purpose of possession1 belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes2 wherefore ,augustine reckons as distinct precepts1 that which forbids the coveting of another's goods1 and that which prohibits the coveting of another's wife4 ,thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to ,god1 and seven as referring to our neighbor4 ,and this is better4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,worship is merely a declaration of faith3 wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those about faith4 ,nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith1 because the precept about faith is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue1 as is also the precept of charity4 ,for just as the first general principles of the natural law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason1 and need no promulgation2 so also to believe in ,god is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith3 for he that cometh to ,god1 must believe that ,he is 7,heb4 #aa3f74 ,hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of faith4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative1 when one is not comprised in the other3 thus that man should honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man2 nor does the latter include the former4 ,but when an affirmative precept is included in a negative1 or vice versa1 we do not find that two distinct precepts are given3 thus there is not one precept saying that ,thou shalt not steal1 and another binding one to keep another's property intact1 or to give it back to its owner4 ,in the same way there are not different precepts about believing in ,god1 and about not believing in strange gods4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all covetousness has one common ratio3 and therefore the ,apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it were one4 ,but because there are various special kinds of covetousness1 therefore ,augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against coveting3 for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #e74 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,precepts of the ,decalogue ,are ,suitably ,set ,forth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth4 ,because sin1 as stated by ,ambrose 7,de ,paradiso viii71 is a transgression of the ,divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven4 ,but sins are distinguished according as man sins against ,god1 or his neighbor1 or himself4 ,since1 then1 the decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations to himself1 but only such as direct him in his relations to ,god and himself1 it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as the ,sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of ,god1 so also did the observance of other solemnities1 and the offering of sacrifices4 ,but the decalogue contains a precept about the ,sabbath-day observance4 ,therefore it should contain others also1 pertaining to the other solemnities1 and to the sacrificial rite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as sins against ,god include the sin of perjury1 so also do they include blasphemy1 or other ways of lying against the teaching of ,god4 ,but there is a precept forbidding perjury1 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain4 ,therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as man has a natural affection for his parents1 so has he also for his children4 ,moreover the commandment of charity extends to all our neighbors4 ,now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity1 according to #a ,tim4 #a3e3 ,the end of the commandment is charity4 ,therefore as there is a precept referring to parents1 so should there have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbors4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 in every kind of sin1 it is possible to sin in thought or in deed4 ,but in some kinds of sin1 namely in theft and adultery1 the prohibition of sins of deed1 when it is said1 ,thou shalt not commit adultery1 ,thou shalt not steal1 is distinct from the prohibition of the sin of thought1 when it is said1 ,thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods1 and1 ,thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife4 ,therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false witness4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible faculty1 so does it arise through disorder of the irascible part4 ,but some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence1 when it is said1 ,thou shalt not covet4 ,therefore the decalogue should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty4 ,therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #d3ac73 ,he shewed you ,his covenant1 which ,he commanded you to do1 and the ten words that ,he wrote in two tablets of stone4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community1 so the precepts of the ,divine law direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of men under ,god4 ,now in order that any man may dwell aright in a community1 two things are required3 the first is that he behave well to the head of the community2 the other is that he behave well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community4 ,it is therefore necessary that the ,divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering man in his relations to ,god2 and in the second place1 other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his neighbors and live with him under ,god4 ,now man owes three things to the head of the community3 first1 fidelity2 secondly1 reverence2 thirdly1 service4 ,fidelity to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another3 and this is the sense of the first commandment1 in the words ,thou shalt not have strange gods4 ,reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him3 and this is conveyed by the second commandment1 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain4 ,service is due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him3 and to this belongs the third commandment of the sanctification of the ,sabbath in memory of the creation of all things4 ,to his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general4 ,in particular1 as to those to whom he is indebted1 by paying his debts3 and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one's parents4 ,in general1 as to all men1 by doing harm to none1 either by deed1 or by word1 or by thought4 ,by deed1 harm is done to one's neighbor--sometimes in his person1 i4e4 as to his personal existence2 and this is forbidden by the words1 ,thou shalt not kill3 sometimes in a person united to him1 as to the propagation of offspring2 and this is prohibited by the words1 ,thou shalt not commit adultery3 sometimes in his possessions1 which are directed to both the aforesaid2 and with this regard to this it is said1 ,thou shalt not steal4 ,harm done by word is forbidden when it is said1 ,thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor3 harm done by thought is forbidden in the words1 ,thou shalt not covet4 ,the three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards ,god may also be differentiated in this same way4 ,for the first refers to deeds2 wherefore it is said1 ,thou shalt not make 4 4 4 a graven thing3 the second1 to words2 wherefore it is said1 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain3 the third1 to thoughts2 because the sanctification of the ,sabbath1 as the subject of a moral precept1 requires repose of the heart in ,god4 ,or1 according to ,augustine 7,in ,ps4 #cb3 ,conc4 #a71 by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the ,first ,principle2 by the second1 the ,divine truth2 by the third1 ,his goodness whereby we are sanctified1 and wherein we rest as in our last end4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection may be answered in two ways4 ,first1 because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity4 ,now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving ,god and his neighbor1 because in this respect the natural law had become obscured on account of sin3 but not about the duty of loving oneself1 because in this respect the natural law retained its vigor3 or again1 because love of oneself is contained in the love of ,god and of one's neighbor3 since true self-love consists in directing oneself to ,god4 ,and for this reason the decalogue includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to ,god4 ,secondly1 it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from ,god immediately2 wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #aj3d73 ,he wrote in the tables1 according as ,he had written before1 the ten words1 which the ,lord spoke to you4 ,hence the precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once4 ,now a precept implies the notion of duty4 ,but it is easy for a man1 especially for a believer1 to understand that1 of necessity1 he owes certain duties to ,god and to his neighbor4 ,but that1 in matters which regard himself and not another1 man has1 of necessity1 certain duties to himself1 is not so evident3 for1 at the first glance1 it seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself4 ,and therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself1 reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters2 and1 consequently1 they are not contained in the decalogue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all the solemnities of the ,old ,law were instituted in celebration of some ,divine favor1 either in memory of past favors1 or in sign of some favor to come3 in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose4 ,now of all the ,divine favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the ,creation1 which was called to mind by the sanctification of the ,sabbath2 wherefore the reason for this precept is given in ,ex4 #bj3aa3 ,in six days the ,lord made heaven and earth1 etc4 ,and of all future blessings1 the chief and final was the repose of the mind in ,god1 either1 in the present life1 by grace1 or1 in the future life1 by glory2 which repose was also foreshadowed in the ,sabbath-day observance3 wherefore it is written 7,isa4 #eh3ac73 ,if thou turn away thy foot from the ,sabbath1 from doing thy own will in ,my holy day1 and call the ,sabbath delightful1 and the holy of the ,lord glorious4 ,because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men1 especially by the faithful4 ,but other solemnities were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory1 such as the celebration of the ,passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery from ,egypt1 and as a sign of the future ,passion of ,christ1 which though temporal and transitory1 brought us to the repose of the spiritual ,sabbath4 ,consequently1 the ,sabbath alone1 and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices1 is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #f3af71 men swear by one greater than themselves2 and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy4 ,hence1 since oaths are common to all1 inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue4 ,according to one interpretation1 however1 the words1 ,thou shalt not take the name of the ,lord thy ,god in vain1 are a prohibition of false doctrine1 for one gloss expounds them thus3 ,thou shalt not say that ,christ is a creature4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,that a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason3 and therefore the precepts that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men4 ,but it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for another1 unless he happen to be indebted to someone4 ,now a son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by denying it3 since the father is the principle of generation and being1 and also of upbringing and teaching4 ,wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone except to one's parents4 ,on the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for any favors received1 but rather the reverse is the case4 ,again1 a child is a part of his father2 and parents love their children as being a part of themselves1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 viii1 #ab74 ,hence1 just as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself1 so1 for the same reason1 it includes no precept about loving one's children4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth1 in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good1 are of themselves1 objects of appetite3 and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire4 ,but murder and falsehood are1 of themselves1 objects of repulsion 7since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth73 and are desired only for the sake of something else4 ,consequently with regard to sins of murder and false witness1 it was necessary to proscribe1 not sins of thought1 but only sins of deed4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a71 all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part4 ,hence1 as the precepts of the decalogue are1 as it were1 the first elements of the ,law1 there was no need for mention of the irascible passions1 but only of the concupiscible passions4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,ten ,precepts of the ,decalogue ,are ,set in ,proper ,order8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order4 ,because love of one's neighbor is seemingly previous to love of ,god1 since our neighbor is better known to us than ,god is2 according to #a ,john #d3bj3 ,he that loveth not his brother1 whom he seeth1 how can he love ,god1 ,whom he seeth not8 ,but the first three precepts belong to the love of ,god1 while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor4 ,therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts1 and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts4 ,but according to ,boethius in his commentary on the ,categories 99,lib4 iv1 cap4 ,de ,oppos41 vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown4 ,therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor1 the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the precepts of the ,law are about men's actions4 ,but actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed4 ,therefore the precepts about not coveting1 which regard our thoughts1 are unsuitably placed last in order4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3a73 ,the things that are of ,god1 are well ordered ,vulg43 ',those that are1 are ordained of ,god'4 ,but the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by ,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore they are arranged in becoming order4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #c1 #e1 ad #a71 the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once4 ,now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason1 as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason4 ,moreover1 it is clear1 since the order of reason begins with the end1 that1 for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end1 is supremely contrary to reason4 ,now the end of human life and society is ,god4 ,consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue1 first of all1 to direct man to ,god2 since the contrary to this is most grievous4 ,thus also1 in an army1 which is ordained to the commander as to its end1 it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander1 and the opposite of this is most grievous2 and secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers4 ,now among those things whereby we are ordained to ,god1 the first is that man should be subjected to ,him faithfully1 by having nothing in common with ,his enemies4 ,the second is that he should show ,him reverence3 the third that he should offer ,him service4 ,thus1 in an army1 it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe1 than to be insolent to his commander3 and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him4 ,as to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor1 it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason1 and a more grievous sin1 if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted4 ,consequently1 among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor1 the first place is given to that one which regards his parents4 ,among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin4 ,for it is more grave and more repugnant to reason1 to sin by deed than by word2 and by word than by thought4 ,and among sins of deed1 murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery1 which imperils the life of the unborn child2 and adultery is more grave than theft1 which regards external goods4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although our neighbor is better known than ,god by the way of the senses1 nevertheless the love of ,god is the reason for the love of our neighbor1 as shall be declared later on 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bf1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence the precepts ordaining man to ,god demanded precedence of the others4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as ,god is the universal principle of being in respect of all things1 so is a father a principle of being in respect of his son4 ,therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding ,god4 ,this argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed3 although even then it is not altogether cogent4 ,for although in the order of execution1 vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown1 according to ,ps4 #cc3ae3 ,turn away from evil1 and do good1 and ,isa4 #a3af1 #ag3 ,cease to do perversely2 learn to do well2 yet1 in the order of knowledge1 virtue precedes vice1 because the crooked line is known by the straight 7,de ,anima i73 and by the law is the knowledge of sin 7,rom4 #c3bj74 ,wherefore the affirmative precept demanded the first place4 ,however1 this is not the reason for the order1 but that which is given above4 ,because in the precepts regarding ,god1 which belongs to the first table1 an affirmative precept is placed last1 since its transgression implies a less grievous sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution1 yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of reason4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,precepts of the ,decalogue ,are ,suitably ,formulated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated4 ,because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of virtue1 while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice4 ,but in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another4 ,therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue1 there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept4 ,therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in some matters1 and negative precepts in others4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isidore says 7,etym4 ii1 #aj7 that every law is based on reason4 ,but all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the ,divine law4 ,therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept1 and not only in the first and third4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by ,god4 ,but the ,divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts4 ,therefore the promise should have been included in each precept1 and not only in the second and fourth4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,old ,law is called the law of fear1 in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts1 by means of the threat of punishments4 ,but all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the ,old ,law4 ,therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each1 and not only in the first and second4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 all the commandments of ,god should be retained in the memory3 for it is written 7,prov4 #c3c73 ,write them in the tables of thy heart4 ,therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the third commandment only4 ,consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #aa3ba7 that ,god made all things1 in measure1 number and weight4 ,much more therefore did ,he observe a suitable manner in formulating ,his ,law4 ,i answer that1 ,the highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the ,divine law3 wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #d3f73 ,this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations4 ,now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order4 ,therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the ,law are suitably set forth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite3 but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the affirmation of the other4 ,for it follows that if a thing is white1 it is not black3 but it does not follow that if it is not black1 it is white3 because negation extends further than affirmation4 ,and hence too1 that one ought not to do harm to another1 which pertains to the negative precepts1 extends to more persons1 as a primary dictate of reason1 than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness4 ,nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness1 if he has not yet repaid the debt4 ,now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay1 viz4 ,god and man's father1 as stated in ,ethic4 viii1 #ad4 ,therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts2 one about the honor due to parents1 the other about the celebration of the ,sabbath in memory of the ,divine favor4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest2 hence there was no need to add the reason4 ,but some of the precepts include ceremonial matter1 or a determination of a general moral precept2 thus the first precept includes the determination1 ,thou shalt not make a graven thing2 and in the third precept the ,sabbath-day is fixed4 ,consequently there was need to state the reason in each case4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,generally speaking1 men direct their actions to some point of utility4 ,consequently in those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no useful result1 or that some utility might be hindered1 it was necessary to add a promise of reward4 ,and since parents are already on the way to depart from us1 no benefit is expected from them3 wherefore a promise of reward is added to the precept about honoring one's parents4 ,the same applies to the precept forbidding idolatry3 since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by entering into a compact with the demons4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #i4 ,wherefore a threat of punishment is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone4 ,now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general custom of the nations4 ,likewise men are prone to perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths4 ,hence it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the commandment about the ,sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing4 ,wherefore special mention of the memory is made therein4 ,or again1 the commandment about the ,sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law1 wherefore this precept needed a special admonition4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,precepts of the ,decalogue ,are ,dispensable8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable4 ,for the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural law4 ,but the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable1 like human nature1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #g74 ,now the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation1 as stated above 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore a dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man stands in the same relation to human law as ,god does to ,divine law4 ,but man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by man4 ,therefore1 since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by ,god1 it seems that ,god can dispense with them4 ,now our superiors are ,god's viceregents on earth2 for the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #b3aj73 ,for what ,i have pardoned1 if ,i have pardoned anything1 for your sakes have ,i done it in the person of ,christ4 ,therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder4 ,but it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept3 for instance1 when according to the prescription of human law1 such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain4 ,therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the observance of the ,sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue4 ,but a dispensation was granted in this precept2 for it is written 7#a ,macc4 #b3d73 ,and they determined in that day1 saying3 ,whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the ,sabbath-day1 we will fight against him4 ,therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable4 ,on the contrary1 are the words of ,isa4 #bd3e1 where some are reproved for that they have changed the ordinance1 they have broken the everlasting covenant2 which1 seemingly1 apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue4 ,therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #d71 precepts admit of dispensation1 when there occurs a particular case in which1 if the letter of the law be observed1 the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated4 ,now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good2 secondly1 to the order of justice and virtue1 whereby the common good is preserved and attained4 ,if therefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good1 or the very order of justice and virtue1 such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver1 and therefore are indispensable4 ,for instance1 if in some community a law were enacted1 such as this--that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth1 or betray the state to its enemies1 or that no man should do anything unjust or evil1 such precepts would not admit of dispensation4 ,but if other precepts were enacted1 subordinate to the above1 and determining certain special modes of procedure1 these latter precepts would admit of dispensation1 in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver4 ,for instance if1 for the safeguarding of the commonwealth1 it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege1 some might be dispensed from this on account of some greater utility4 ,now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver1 who is ,god4 ,for the precepts of the first table1 which direct us to ,god1 contain the very order to the common and final good1 which is ,god2 while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men1 that nothing undue be done to anyone1 and that each one be given his due2 for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue4 ,consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice3 for it is a never-failing principle that justice should be preserved4 ,but he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice1 which fail to apply in certain cases4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,apostle says 7#b ,tim4 #b3ac71 ,god continueth faithful1 ,he cannot deny ,himself4 ,but ,he would deny ,himself if ,he were to do away with the very order of ,his own justice1 since ,he is justice itself4 ,wherefore ,god cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to ,god1 or not to be subject to ,his justice1 even in those matters in which men are directed to one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue1 in so far as it bears the character of something undue3 for in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice4 ,human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly4 ,but it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain3 hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue2 and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept1 as ,augustine observes 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 i1 #d74 ,in like manner when a man's property is taken from him1 if it be due that he should lose it1 this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue4 ,consequently when the children of ,israel1 by ,god's command1 took away the spoils of the ,egyptians1 this was not theft2 since it was due to them by the sentence of ,god4 ,likewise when ,abraham consented to slay his son1 he did not consent to murder1 because his son was due to be slain by the command of ,god1 ,who is ,lord of life and death3 for ,he it is ,who inflicts the punishment of death on all men1 both godly and ungodly1 on account of the sin of our first parent1 and if a man be the executor of that sentence by ,divine authority1 he will be no murderer any more than ,god would be4 ,again ,osee1 by taking unto himself a wife of fornications1 or an adulterous woman1 was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication3 because he took unto himself one who was his by command of ,god1 ,who is the ,author of the institution of marriage4 ,accordingly1 therefore1 the precepts of the decalogue1 as to the essence of justice which they contain1 are unchangeable3 but as to any determination by application to individual actions--for instance1 that this or that be murder1 theft or adultery1 or not--in this point they admit of change2 sometimes by ,divine authority alone1 namely1 in such matters as are exclusively of ,divine institution1 as marriage and the like2 sometimes also by human authority1 namely in such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction3 for in this respect men stand in the place of ,god3 and yet not in all respects4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation4 ,for a man is not taken to break the ,sabbath1 if he does something necessary for human welfare2 as ,our ,lord proves 7,matt4 #ab3c1 seqq474 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #i ,whether the ,mode of ,virtue ,falls ,under the ,precept of the ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law4 ,for the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done justly1 that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely1 and in like manner as to the other virtues4 ,but it is commanded 7,deut4 #bf3bj7 that thou shalt follow justly after that which is just4 ,therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept4 ,but the intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii3 and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously4 ,therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure4 ,but this falls under a precept of the ,divine law1 for it is written 7,ps4 #ii3b73 ,serve ye the ,lord with gladness2 and 7#b ,cor4 #i3g73 ,not with sadness or necessity3 for ,god loveth a cheerful giver2 whereupon the gloss says3 ,whatever ye do1 do gladly2 and then you will do it well2 whereas if you do it sorrowfully1 it is done in thee1 not by thee4 ,therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law4 ,on the contrary1 ,no man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue1 as the ,philosopher explains 7,ethic4 ii1 #d2 v1 #h74 ,now whoever transgresses a precept of the law1 deserves to be punished4 ,hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue1 would deserve to be punished1 whatever he does4 ,but this is contrary to the intention of the law1 which aims at leading man to virtue1 by habituating him to good works4 ,therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 a precept of law has compulsory power4 ,hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear1 falls directly under the precept of the law4 ,now the law compels through fear of punishment1 as stated in ,ethic4 x1 #i1 because that properly falls under the precept of the law1 for which the penalty of the law is inflicted4 ,but ,divine law and human law are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties2 since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the lawgiver2 for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given4 ,now man1 the framer of human law1 is competent to judge only of outward acts2 because man seeth those things that appear1 according to #a ,kings #af3g3 while ,god alone1 the framer of the ,divine law1 is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills1 according to ,ps4 #g3aj3 ,the searcher of hearts and reins is ,god4 ,accordingly1 therefore1 we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by ,divine law2 in some respect it is regarded by the ,divine1 but not by the human law2 and in another way1 it is regarded neither by the human nor by the ,divine law4 ,now the mode of virtue consists in three things1 as the ,philosopher states in ,ethic4 ii4 ,the first is that man should act knowingly3 and this is subject to the judgment of both ,divine and human law2 because what a man does in ignorance1 he does accidentally4 ,hence according to both human and ,divine law1 certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable4 ,the second point is that a man should act deliberately1 i4e4 from choice1 choosing that particular action for its own sake2 wherein a twofold internal movement is implied1 of volition and of intention1 about which we have spoken above 7,,qq4 #h1 #ab73 and concerning these two1 ,divine law alone1 and not human law1 is competent to judge4 ,for human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay1 and slays not3 whereas the ,divine law does1 according to ,matt4 #e3bb3 ,whosoever is angry with his brother1 shall be in danger of the judgment4 ,the third point is that he should act from a firm and immovable principle3 which firmness belongs properly to a habit1 and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit4 ,in this respect1 the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of ,divine or of human law1 since neither by man nor by ,god is he punished as breaking the law1 who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the mode of doing acts of justice1 which falls under the precept1 is that they be done in accordance with right2 but not that they be done from the habit of justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intention of the lawgiver is twofold4 ,his aim1 in the first place1 is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law3 and this is virtue4 ,secondly1 his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept3 and this is something leading or disposing to virtue1 viz4 an act of virtue4 ,for the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same3 just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that works of virtue should be done without sadness1 falls under the precept of the ,divine law2 for whoever works with sadness works unwillingly4 ,but to work with pleasure1 i4e4 joyfully or cheerfully1 in one respect falls under the precept1 viz4 in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of ,god and one's neighbor 7which love falls under the precept71 and love causes pleasure3 and in another respect does not fall under the precept1 in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit2 for pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit1 as stated in ,ethic4 ii1 #c4 ,for an act may give pleasure either on account of its end1 or through its proceeding from a becoming habit4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #aj ,whether the ,mode of ,charity ,falls ,under the ,precept of the ,divine ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the ,divine law4 ,for it is written 7,matt4 #ai3ag73 ,if thou wilt enter into life1 keep the commandments3 whence it seems to follow that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into life4 ,but good works do not suffice for entrance into life1 except they be done from charity3 for it is written 7#a ,cor4 #ac3c73 ,if ,i should distribute all my goods to feed the poor1 and if ,i should deliver my body to be burned1 and have not charity1 it profiteth me nothing4 ,therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing all things for ,god4 ,but this falls under the precept2 for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aj3ca73 ,do all to the glory of ,god4 ,therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept1 it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without having charity4 ,now what can be done without charity can be done without grace1 which is always united to charity4 ,therefore one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace4 ,but this is the error of ,pelagius1 as ,augustine declares 7,de ,haeres4 lxxxviii74 ,therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment4 ,on the contrary1 ,whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally4 ,if therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept1 it follows that whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally4 ,but whoever has not charity1 acts otherwise than from charity4 ,therefore it follows that whoever has not charity1 sins mortally in whatever he does1 however good this may be in itself3 which is absurd4 ,i answer that1 ,opinions have been contrary on this question4 ,for some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept2 and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept3 because he can dispose himself to receive charity from ,god4 ,nor 7say they7 does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind3 because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity1 and is binding not for all time1 but only for such time as one is in a state of charity4 ,on the other hand1 some have said that the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept4 ,both these opinions are true up to a certain point4 ,because the act of charity can be considered in two ways4 ,first1 as an act by itself3 and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it1 viz4 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god1 and ,thou shalt love thy neighbor4 ,in this sense1 the first opinion is true4 ,because it is not impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity2 since man can dispose himself to possess charity1 and when he possesses it1 he can use it4 ,secondly1 the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues1 i4e4 inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity1 which is the end of the commandment1 as stated in #a ,tim4 i1 #e3 for it has been said above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d7 that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end4 ,in this sense the second opinion is true in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept1 that is to say that this commandment1 ,honor thy father1 does not mean that a man must honor his father from charity1 but merely that he must honor him4 ,wherefore he that honors his father1 yet has not charity1 does not break this precept3 although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity1 for which reason he deserves to be punished4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord did not say1 ,if thou wilt enter into life1 keep one commandment2 but keep all the commandments3 among which is included the commandment concerning the love of ,god and our neighbor4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the precept of charity contains the injunction that ,god should be loved from our whole heart1 which means that all things would be referred to ,god4 ,consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity1 unless he also refer all things to ,god4 ,wherefore he that honors his father and mother1 is bound to honor them from charity1 not in virtue of the precept1 ,honor thy father and mother1 but in virtue of the precept1 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with thy whole heart4 ,and since these are two affirmative precepts1 not binding for all times1 they can be binding1 each one at a different time3 so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother1 without at the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law1 unless he fulfil the precept of charity1 which is impossible without charity4 ,consequently it is not possible1 as ,pelagius maintained1 for man to fulfil the law without grace4 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #aa ,whether ,it ,is ,right to ,distinguish ,other ,moral ,precepts of the ,law ,besides the ,decalogue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue4 ,because1 as ,our ,lord declared 7,matt4 #bb3dj71 on these two commandments of charity dependeth the whole law and the prophets4 ,but these two commandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue4 ,therefore there is no need for other moral precepts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,but the determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts3 and the general moral precepts are contained in the decalogue1 or are even presupposed to the decalogue1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore1 as the ,law contains1 besides the decalogue1 moral precepts pertaining to religion1 liberality1 mercy1 and chastity2 so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues1 for instance1 fortitude1 sobriety1 and so forth4 ,and yet such is not the case4 ,it is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the ,law besides those of the decalogue4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ah3h73 ,the law of the ,lord is unspotted1 converting souls4 ,but man is preserved from the stain of sin1 and his soul is converted to ,god by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue4 ,therefore it was right for the ,law to include other moral precepts4 ,i answer that1 ,as is evident from what has been stated 7,q4 #ii1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their institution alone3 since before they were instituted1 it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way4 ,but the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason1 even if they were never included in the ,law4 ,now of these there are three grades3 for some are most certain1 and so evident as to need no promulgation2 such as the commandments of the love of ,god and our neighbor1 and others like these1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 which are1 as it were1 the ends of the commandments2 wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them4 ,some precepts are more detailed1 the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp2 and yet they need to be promulgated1 because human judgment1 in a few instances1 happens to be led astray concerning them3 these are the precepts of the decalogue4 ,again1 there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone1 but only the wise2 these are moral precepts added to the decalogue1 and given to the people by ,god through ,moses and ,aaron4 ,but since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident1 these other moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue1 as so many corollaries4 ,thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods3 and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship of idols3 thus it is written 7,deut4 #ah3aj1 #aa73 ,neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter1 making them to pass through the fire3 4 4 4 neither let there by any wizard nor charmer1 nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits1 or fortune-tellers1 or that seeketh the truth from the dead4 ,the second commandment forbids perjury4 ,to this is added the prohibition of blasphemy 7,lev4 #bd3ae1 seqq7 and the prohibition of false doctrine 7,deut4 #ac74 ,to the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts4 ,to the fourth commandment prescribing the honor due to parents1 is added the precept about honoring the aged1 according to ,lev4 #ai3cb3 ,rise up before the hoary head1 and honor the person of the aged man2 and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters1 or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors4 ,to the fifth commandment1 which forbids murder1 is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor1 according to ,lev4 #ai3af3 ,thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor3 likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother 7,lev4 #ai3ag73 ,thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart4 ,to the sixth commandment which forbids adultery1 is added the prohibition about whoredom1 according to ,deut4 #bc3ag3 ,there shall be no whore among the daughters of ,israel1 nor whoremonger among the sons of ,israel2 and the prohibition against unnatural sins1 according to ,lev4 #bh3bb1 #bc3 ,thou shalt not lie with mankind 4 4 4 thou shalt not copulate with any beast4 ,to the seventh commandment which prohibits theft1 is added the precept forbidding usury1 according to ,deut4 #bc3ai3 ,thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury2 and the prohibition against fraud1 according to ,deut4 #be3ac3 ,thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag2 and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny4 ,to the eighth commandment1 forbidding false testimony1 is added the prohibition against false judgment1 according to ,ex4 #bc3b3 ,neither shalt thou yield in judgment1 to the opinion of the most part1 to stray from the truth2 and the prohibition against lying 7,ex4 #bc3g73 ,thou shalt fly lying1 and the prohibition against detraction1 according to ,lev4 #ai3af3 ,thou shalt not be a detractor1 nor a whisperer among the people4 ,to the other two commandments no further precepts are added1 because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil desires4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of ,god and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them2 but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue1 not by reason of a natural instinct1 as in the case of the superadded moral precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the precepts of a law are ordained for the common good1 as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b74 ,and since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good1 as also does the virtue of chastity1 in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species2 hence precepts bearing directly on these virtues are given1 both in the decalogue and in addition thereto4 ,as to the act of fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in the war1 which is undertaken for the common good3 as is clear from ,deut4 #bj3c1 where the priest is commanded 7to speak thus73 ,be not afraid1 do not give back4 ,in like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition1 since it is contrary to the good of the household2 hence it is said 7,deut4 #ba3bj7 in the person of parents3 ,he slighteth hearing our admonitions1 he giveth himself to revelling1 and to debauchery and banquetings4 ,,twelfth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #ab ,whether the ,moral ,precepts of the ,old ,law ,justified ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the moral precepts of the ,old ,law justified man4 ,because the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #b3ac73 ,for not the hearers of the ,law are justified before ,god1 but the doers of the ,law shall be justified4 ,but the doers of the ,law are those who fulfil the precepts of the ,law4 ,therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the ,law was a cause of justification4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,lev4 #ah3e73 ,keep ,my laws and ,my judgments1 which if a man do1 he shall live in them4 ,but the spiritual life of man is through justice4 ,therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the ,law was a cause of justification4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,divine law is more efficacious than human law4 ,but human law justifies man2 since there is a kind of justice consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law4 ,therefore the precepts of the ,law justified man4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #c3f73 ,the letter killeth3 which1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xiv71 refers even to the moral precepts4 ,therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice4 ,i answer that1 ,just as healthy is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health1 and secondarily of that which is a sign or a safeguard of health2 so justification means first and properly the causing of justice2 while secondarily and improperly1 as it were1 it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto4 ,if justice be taken in the last two ways1 it is evident that it was conferred by the precepts of the ,law2 in so far1 to wit1 as they disposed men to the justifying grace of ,christ1 which they also signified1 because as ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bd71 even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed ,christ4 ,but if we speak of justification properly so called1 then we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act3 so that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways4 ,first1 according as man is made just1 by becoming possessed of the habit of justice3 secondly1 according as he does works of justice1 so that in this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of justice4 ,now justice1 like the other virtues1 may denote either the acquired or the infused virtue1 as is clear from what has been stated 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #d74 ,the acquired virtue is caused by works2 but the infused virtue is caused by ,god ,himself through ,his grace4 ,the latter is true justice1 of which we are speaking now1 and in this respect of which a man is said to be just before ,god1 according to ,rom4 #d3b3 ,if ,abraham were justified by works1 he hath whereof to glory1 but not before ,god4 ,hence this justice could not be caused by moral precepts1 which are about human actions3 wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice4 ,if1 on the other hand1 by justification we understand the execution of justice1 thus all the precepts of the ,law justified man1 but in various ways4 ,because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself1 in so far as they aimed at offering worship to ,god2 whereas taken individually they contained that which is just1 not in itself1 but by being a determination of the ,divine law4 ,hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them4 ,on the other hand the moral and judicial precepts1 either in general or also in particular1 contained that which is just in itself3 but the moral precepts contained that which is just in itself according to that general justice which is every virtue according to ,ethic4 v1 #a3 whereas the judicial precepts belonged to special justice1 which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life1 between one man and another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle takes justification for the execution of justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the man who fulfilled the precepts of the ,law is said to live in them1 because he did not incur the penalty of death1 which the ,law inflicted on its transgressors3 in this sense the ,apostle quotes this passage 7,gal4 #c3ab74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice3 it is not about this that we are inquiring now1 but only about that justice which is before ,god4 ,,question #aja ,,of ,,the ,,ceremonial ,,precepts ,,in ,,themselves 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the ceremonial precepts3 and first we must consider them in themselves2 secondly1 their cause2 thirdly1 their duration4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,the nature of the ceremonial precepts2 7#b7 ,whether they are figurative8 7#c7 ,whether there should have been many of them8 7#d7 ,of their various kinds4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,nature of the ,ceremonial ,precepts ,consists in ,their ,pertaining to the ,worship of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of ,god4 ,because1 in the ,old ,law1 the ,jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food 7,lev4 #aa72 and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes1 e4g4 7,lev4 #ai3ai73 ,thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts2 and again 7,num4 #ae3ch73 ,to make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments4 ,but these are not moral precepts2 since they do not remain in the ,new ,law4 ,nor are they judicial precepts2 since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man4 ,therefore they are ceremonial precepts4 ,yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of ,god4 ,therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to ,divine worship4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities2 as though they were so called from the cerei 7candles7 which are lit up on those occasions4 ,but many other things besides solemnities pertain to the worship of ,god4 ,therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the ,divine worship4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns1 i4e4 rules1 of salvation3 because the ,greek chaire is the same as the ,latin salve4 ,but all the precepts of the ,law are rules of salvation1 and not only those that pertain to the worship of ,god4 ,therefore not only those precepts which pertain to ,divine worship are called ceremonial4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,rabbi ,moses says 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii7 that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason4 ,but there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of ,god2 such as the observance of the ,sabbath1 the feasts of the ,passover and of the ,tabernacles1 and many other things1 the reason for which is set down in the ,law4 ,therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4 #ah3ai1 #bj73 ,be thou to the people in those things that pertain to ,god 4 4 4 and 4 4 4 shew the people the ceremonies and the manner of worshipping4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d71 the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to ,god1 just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor4 ,now man is directed to ,god by the worship due to ,him4 ,wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial1 which pertain to the ,divine worship4 ,the reason for their being so called was given above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #c71 when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like1 which seem to be directed to ,god immediately1 but also those things whereby ,his worshippers are duly prepared to worship ,him3 thus too in other matters1 whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science whose object is the end4 ,accordingly those precepts of the ,law which regard the clothing and food of ,god's worshippers1 and other such matters1 pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers1 with the view of fitting them for the ,divine worship3 just as those who administer to a king make use of certain special observances4 ,consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable3 especially as the ,law does not contain many instances of the lighting of candles in solemnities2 since1 even the lamps of the ,candlestick were furnished with oil of olives1 as stated in ,lev4 #bd3b4 ,nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the ,divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals3 so that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point1 since the word ceremony is not ,greek but ,latin4 ,we may say1 however1 that1 since man's salvation is from ,god1 those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation1 which direct man to ,god3 and accordingly those which refer to ,divine worship are called ceremonial precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of probability3 not that they are called ceremonial precisely because there is no evident reason for them2 this is a kind of consequence4 ,for1 since the precepts referring to the ,divine worship must needs be figurative1 as we shall state further on 7,a4 #b71 the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,ceremonial ,precepts ,are ,figurative8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative4 ,for it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as to be easily understood1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 iv1 #d1 #aj7 and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law3 because precepts of law are proposed to the populace2 for which reason a law should be manifest1 as ,isidore declares 7,etym4 v1 #ba74 ,if therefore the precepts of the ,law were given as figures of something1 it seems unbecoming that ,moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signified4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is done for the worship of ,god1 should be entirely free from unfittingness4 ,but the performance of actions in representation of others1 seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama3 because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent the actions of others4 ,therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of ,god4 ,but the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the ,divine worship1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore they should not be figurative4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion iii1 iv7 that ,god is worshipped chiefly by faith1 hope1 and charity4 ,but the precepts of faith1 hope1 and charity are not figurative4 ,therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,our ,lord said 7,john #d3bd73 ,god is a spirit1 and they that adore ,him1 must adore ,him in spirit and in truth4 ,but a figure is not the very truth3 in fact one is condivided with the other4 ,therefore the ceremonial precepts1 which refer to the ,divine worship1 should not be figurative4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,col4 #b3af1 #ag73 ,let no man 4 4 4 judge you in meat or in drink1 or in respect of a festival day1 or of the new moon1 or of the sabbaths1 which are a shadow of things to come4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ii1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of ,god4 ,now the ,divine worship is twofold3 internal1 and external4 ,for since man is composed of soul and body1 each of these should be applied to the worship of ,god2 the soul by an interior worship2 the body by an outward worship3 hence it is written 7,ps4 #hc3c73 ,my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living ,god4 ,and as the body is ordained to ,god through the soul1 so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship4 ,now interior worship consists in the soul being united to ,god by the intellect and affections4 ,wherefore according to the various ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships ,god are rightly united to ,god1 his external actions are applied in various ways to the ,divine worship4 ,for in the state of future bliss1 the human intellect will gaze on the ,divine ,truth in ,itself4 ,wherefore the external worship will not consist in anything figurative1 but solely in the praise of ,god1 proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection1 according to ,isa4 #ea3c3 ,joy and gladness shall be found therein1 thanksgiving and the voice of praise4 ,but in the present state of life1 we are unable to gaze on the ,divine ,truth in ,itself1 and we need the ray of ,divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures1 as ,dionysius states 7,coel4 ,hier4 i72 in various ways1 however1 according to the various states of human knowledge4 ,for under the ,old ,law1 neither was the ,divine ,truth manifest in ,itself1 nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out1 as the ,apostle declares 7,heb4 #i3h74 ,hence the external worship of the ,old ,law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly country1 but also of ,christ1 ,who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation4 ,but under the ,new ,law this way is already revealed3 and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future1 but to be brought to our minds as something past or present3 and the truth of the glory to come1 which is not yet revealed1 alone needs to be foreshadowed4 ,this is what the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aa3a73 ,the ,law has ,vulg43 'having' a shadow of the good things to come1 not the very image of the things3 for a shadow is less than an image2 so that the image belongs to the ,new ,law1 but the shadow to the ,old4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the things of ,god are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity3 else he would be in danger of downfall1 were he to despise what he cannot grasp4 ,hence it was more beneficial that the ,divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people under a veil of figures1 that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth1 so does it fail to grasp ,divine things perfectly1 on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain3 and therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible figures4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine is speaking there of internal worship2 to which1 however1 external worship should be ordained1 as stated above4 ,the same answer applies to the ,fourth ,objection3 because men were taught by ,him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of ,god4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,should ,have ,been ,many ,ceremonial ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts4 ,for those things which conduce to an end should be proportionate to that end4 ,but the ceremonial precepts1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 are ordained to the worship of ,god1 and to the foreshadowing of ,christ4 ,now there is but one ,god1 of ,whom are all things 4 4 4 and one ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 by ,whom are all things 7#a ,cor4 #h3f74 ,therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression1 according to the words of ,peter 7,acts #ae3aj73 ,why tempt you ,god1 to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples1 which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear8 ,now the transgression of the ,divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation4 ,since1 therefore1 every law should conduce to man's salvation1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #c71 it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of ,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,but the ,law should have lessened this bodily worship3 since it directed men to ,christ1 ,who taught them to worship ,god in spirit and in truth1 as stated in ,john #d3bc4 ,therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts4 ,on the contrary1 7,osee #h3ab73 ,i shall write to them ,vulg43 'him' ,my manifold laws2 and 7,job #aa3f73 ,that ,he might show thee the secrets of ,his wisdom1 and that ,his ,law is manifold4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #a71 every law is given to a people4 ,now a people contains two kinds of men3 some1 prone to evil1 who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #a72 some1 inclined to good1 either from nature or from custom1 or rather from grace2 and the like have to be taught and improved by means of the precepts of the law4 ,accordingly1 with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the ,old ,law should contain many ceremonial precepts4 ,for in that people there were many prone to idolatry2 wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of ,god4 ,and since men served idols in many ways1 it was necessary on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one3 and again1 to lay many obligations on such like men1 in order that being burdened1 as it were1 by their duties to the ,divine worship1 they might have no time for the service of idols4 ,as to those who were inclined to good1 it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts2 both because thus their mind turned to ,god in many ways1 and more continually2 and because the mystery of ,christ1 which was foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts1 brought many boons to the world1 and afforded men many considerations1 which needed to be signified by various ceremonies4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto1 then one such thing suffices for one end3 thus one remedy1 if it be efficacious1 suffices sometimes to restore men to health1 and then the remedy needs not to be repeated4 ,but when that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect1 it needs to be multiplied3 thus many remedies are given to a sick man1 when one is not enough to heal him4 ,now the ceremonies of the ,old ,law were weak and imperfect1 both for representing the mystery of ,christ1 on account of its surpassing excellence2 and for subjugating men's minds to ,god4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3ah1 #ai73 ,there is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof1 for the law brought nothing to perfection4 ,consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions1 that the greater may be avoided4 ,and therefore1 in order to avoid the sin of idolatry1 and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the ,jews1 were they to fulfil all the precepts of the ,law1 the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent ,god from giving them many ceremonial precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,old ,law lessened bodily worship in many ways4 ,thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person4 ,many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship2 as ,rabbi ,moses1 the ,egyptian testifies 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii74 ,nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of ,god so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,ceremonies of the ,old ,law ,are ,suitably ,divided into ,sacrifices1 ,sacred ,things1 ,sacraments1 and ,observances8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ceremonies of the ,old ,law are unsuitably divided into sacrifices1 sacred things1 sacraments1 and observances4 ,for the ceremonies of the ,old ,law foreshadowed ,christ4 ,but this was done only by the sacrifices1 which foreshadowed the sacrifice in which ,christ delivered ,himself an oblation and a sacrifice to ,god 7,eph4 #e3b74 ,therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,old ,law was ordained to the ,new4 ,but in the ,new ,law the sacrifice is the ,sacrament of the ,altar4 ,therefore in the ,old ,law there should be no distinction between sacrifices and sacraments4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a sacred thing is something dedicated to ,god3 in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated4 ,but all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of ,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore all ceremonies were sacred things4 ,therefore sacred things should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 observances are so called from having to be observed4 ,but all the precepts of the ,law had to be observed3 for it is written 7,deut4 #h3aa73 ,observe ,douay3 ',take heed' and beware lest at any time thou forget the ,lord thy ,god1 and neglect ,his commandments and judgments and ceremonies4 ,therefore the observances should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial3 since they were a shadow of things to come 7,col4 #b3af1 #ag73 and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts1 as appears from the words of the ,apostle 7,heb4 #i3i73 and yet these do not seem to be inclined in any of those mentioned above4 ,therefore the above division of ceremonies is unsuitable4 ,on the contrary1 ,in the ,old ,law each of the above is called a ceremony4 ,for the sacrifices are called ceremonies 7,num4 #ae3bd73 ,they shall offer a calf 4 4 4 and the sacrifices and libations thereof1 as the ceremonies require4 ,of the sacrament of ,order it is written 7,lev4 #g3ce73 ,this is the anointing of ,aaron and his sons in the ceremonies4 ,of sacred things also it is written 7,ex4 #ch3ba73 ,these are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony 4 4 4 in the ceremonies of the ,levites4 ,and again of the observances it is written 7#c ,kings #i3f73 ,if you 4 4 4 shall turn away from following ,me1 and will not observe ,douay3 'keep' ,my 4 4 4 ceremonies which ,i have set before you4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the ,divine worship4 ,now in this worship we may consider the worship itself1 the worshippers1 and the instruments of worship4 ,the worship consists specially in sacrifices1 which are offered up in honor of ,god4 ,the instruments of worship refer to the sacred things1 such as the tabernacle1 the vessels and so forth4 ,with regard to the worshippers two points may be considered4 ,the first point is their preparation for ,divine worship1 which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the ministers2 and to this the sacraments refer4 ,the second point is their particular mode of life1 whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship ,god3 and to this pertain the observances1 for instance1 in matters of food1 clothing1 and so forth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men3 and all this pertained to the worship of ,god4 ,wherefore just as their sacrifices signified ,christ the victim1 so too their sacraments and sacred things foreshadowed the sacraments and sacred things of the ,new ,law2 while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the ,new ,law3 all of which things pertain to ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the sacrifice of the ,new ,law1 viz4 the ,eucharist1 contains ,christ ,himself1 the ,author of our ,sanctification3 for ,he sanctified the people by ,his own blood 7,heb4 #ac3ab74 ,hence this ,sacrifice is also a sacrament4 ,but the sacrifices of the ,old ,law did not contain ,christ1 but foreshadowed ,him2 hence they are not called sacraments4 ,in order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of the ,old ,law1 which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come4 ,nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things4 ,but certain things were sacred1 through being dedicated to the ,divine worship1 and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments3 wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped ,god1 retained the common designation of observances1 in so far as they fell short of the above4 ,for they were not called sacred things1 because they had no immediate connection with the worship of ,god1 such as the tabernacle and its vessels had4 ,but by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony1 in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place1 so were they offered at fixed times3 for which reason the solemn festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things4 ,the oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices2 hence the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #e3a73 ,every high-priest taken from among men1 is ordained for men in things that appertain to ,god1 that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices4 ,,question #ajb ,,of ,,the ,,causes ,,of ,,the ,,ceremonial ,,precepts 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts3 under which head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts8 7#b7 ,whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative8 7#c7 ,the causes of the sacrifices2 7#d7 ,the causes of the sacrifices2 7#e7 ,the causes of the sacred things2 7#f7 ,the causes of the observances4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,was ,any ,cause for the ,ceremonial ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts4 ,because on ,eph4 #b3ae1 ,making void the law of the commandments1 the gloss says1 7i4e47 making void the ,old ,law as to the carnal observances1 by substituting decrees1 i4e4 evangelical precepts1 which are based on reason4 ,but if the observances of the ,old ,law were based on reason1 it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the ,new ,law4 ,therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the ,old ,law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,old ,law succeeded the law of nature4 ,but in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that man's obedience might be tested2 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #f1 #ac71 concerning the prohibition about the tree of life4 ,therefore in the ,old ,law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience1 having no reason in themselves4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason4 ,if therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts1 they would not differ from the moral precepts4 ,it seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts3 for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ah3i73 ,the commandment of the ,lord is lightsome1 enlightening the eyes4 ,but the ceremonial precepts are commandments of ,god4 ,therefore they are lightsome3 and yet they would not be so1 if they had no reasonable cause4 ,therefore the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause4 ,i answer that1 ,since1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 i1 #b71 it is the function of a wise man to do everything in order1 those things which proceed from the ,divine wisdom must needs be well ordered1 as the ,apostle states 7,rom4 #ac3a74 ,now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered4 ,first1 that they be ordained to their due end1 which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action3 since those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end1 or which are not done seriously but for fun1 are said to be inordinate4 ,secondly1 that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end4 ,from this it follows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the end3 thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting1 which is its end1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #i4 ,now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts1 like all the other precepts of the ,law1 were institutions of ,divine wisdom3 hence it is written 7,deut4 #d3f73 ,this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations4 ,consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts were ordained to a certain end1 wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it may be said there was no reason for the observances of the ,old ,law1 in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing done3 for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen4 ,but there could be a reason for them in relation to something else3 namely1 in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby4 ,on the other hand1 the decrees of the ,new ,law1 which refer chiefly to faith and the love of ,god1 are reasonable from the very nature of the act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil3 and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else1 in as much as it signified something4 ,and so also the ceremonial precepts of the ,old ,law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes3 as for instance1 ,thou shalt not kill1 ,thou shalt not steal4 ,but the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else1 as stated above4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,ceremonial ,precepts ,have a ,literal ,cause or ,merely a ,figurative ,cause8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal1 but merely a figurative cause4 ,for among the ceremonial precepts1 the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb4 ,but neither of these had any but a figurative cause3 because each was given as a sign4 ,for it is written 7,gen4 #ag3aa73 ,you shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin1 that it may be a sign of the covenant between ,me and you3 and of the celebration of the ,passover it is written 7,ex4 #ac3i73 ,it shall be as a sign in thy hand1 and as a memorial before thy eyes4 ,therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a figurative reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an effect is proportionate to its cause4 ,but all the ceremonial precepts are figurative1 as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore they have no other than a figurative cause4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing1 considered in itself1 be done in a particular way or not1 it seems that it has not a literal cause4 ,now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts1 which appear to be a matter of indifference1 as to whether they be done in one way or in another3 for instance1 the number of animals to be offered1 and other such particular circumstances4 ,therefore there is no literal cause for the precepts of the ,old ,law4 ,on the contrary1 ,just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed ,christ1 so did the stories of the ,old ,testament3 for it is written 7#a ,cor4 #aj3aa7 that all 7these things7 happened to them in figure4 ,now in the stories of the ,old ,testament1 besides the mystical or figurative1 there is the literal sense4 ,therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal1 besides their figurative causes4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end4 ,now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold3 for they were ordained to the ,divine worship1 for that particular time1 and to the foreshadowing of ,christ2 just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come1 as ,jerome says on ,osee #a3c4 ,accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the ,old ,law can be taken in two ways4 ,first1 in respect of the ,divine worship which was to be observed for that particular time3 and these reasons are literal3 whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry2 or recall certain ,divine benefits2 or remind men of the ,divine excellence2 or point out the disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped ,god4 ,secondly1 their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being ordained to foreshadow ,christ3 and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical3 whether they be taken from ,christ ,himself and the ,church1 which pertains to the allegorical sense2 or to the morals of the ,christian people1 which pertains to the moral sense2 or to the state of future glory1 in as much as we are brought thereto by ,christ1 which refers to the anagogical sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,just as the use of metaphorical expressions in ,scripture belongs to the literal sense1 because the words are employed in order to convey that particular meaning2 so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain ,divine benefits1 on account of which they were instituted1 and of others similar which belonged to that time1 does not go beyond the order of literal causes4 ,consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration of the ,passover was its signification of the delivery from ,egypt1 or that circumcision was a sign of ,god's covenant with ,abraham1 we assign the literal cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come1 and not for the purpose of worshipping ,god then and there4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as we have stated when speaking of human laws 7,q4 #if1 ,,aa4 #a1 #f71 there is a reason for them in the abstract1 but not in regard to particular conditions1 which depend on the judgment of those who frame them2 so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the ,old ,law have no literal cause1 but only a figurative cause2 whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,suitable ,cause ,can ,be ,assigned for the ,ceremonies ,which ,pertained to ,sacrifices8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices4 ,for those things which were offered in sacrifice1 are those which are necessary for sustaining human life3 such as certain animals and certain loaves4 ,but ,god needs no such sustenance2 according to ,ps4 #di3ac3 ,shall ,i eat the flesh of bullocks8 ,or shall ,i drink the blood of goats8 ,therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to ,god1 viz4 oxen1 sheep and goats2 of birds1 generally the turtledove and the dove2 but specially1 in the cleansing of a leper1 an offering was made of sparrows4 ,now many other animals are more noble than these4 ,since therefore whatever is best should be offered to ,god1 it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have been offered to ,him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as man has received from ,god the dominion over birds and beasts1 so also has he received dominion over fishes4 ,consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up4 ,since then the young of the dove are commanded to be offered1 so also should the young of the turtledove4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,god is the ,author of life1 not only of men1 but also of animals1 as is clear from ,gen4 #a3bj1 seqq4 ,now death is opposed to life4 ,therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered to ,god1 especially as the ,apostle admonishes us 7,rom4 #ab3a71 to present our bodies a living sacrifice1 holy1 pleasing unto ,god4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to ,god1 it seems that it mattered not how they were slain4 ,therefore it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined1 especially as regards birds 7,lev4 #a3ae1 seqq474 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death4 ,if therefore slain animals were offered to ,god1 it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal1 e4g4 a lame1 or a blind1 or otherwise defective animal4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 those who offer victims to ,god should partake thereof1 according to the words of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #aj3ah73 ,are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar8 ,it was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims1 namely1 the blood1 the fat1 the breastbone and the right shoulder4 ,objection #i3 ,further1 just as holocausts were offered up in honor of ,god1 so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings4 ,but no female animals was offered up to ,god as a holocaust1 although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds4 ,therefore it was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings1 and that nevertheless birds should not be offered up in peace-offerings4 ,objection #aj3 ,further1 all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind4 ,therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them1 so that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day1 while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other peace-offerings1 as laid down in ,lev4 #g3ae1 seqq4 ,objection #aa3 ,further1 all sins agree in turning us from ,god4 ,therefore1 in order to reconcile us to ,god1 one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all sins4 ,objection #ab3 ,further1 all animals that were offered up in sacrifice1 were offered up in one way1 viz4 slain4 ,therefore it does not seem to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways2 for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn1 sometimes of flour1 sometimes of bread1 this being baked sometimes in an oven1 sometimes in a pan1 sometimes on a gridiron4 ,objection #ac3 ,further1 whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from ,god4 ,it was therefore unbecoming that besides animals1 nothing but bread1 wine1 oil1 incense1 and salt should be offered to ,god4 ,objection #ad3 ,further1 bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart1 whereby man offers his soul to ,god4 ,but in the inward sacrifice1 the sweetness1 which is denoted by honey1 surpasses the pungency which salt represents2 for it is written 7,ecclus4 #bd3bg73 ,my spirit is sweet above honey4 ,therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey1 and of leaven which makes bread savory1 should be forbidden in a sacrifice2 while the use was prescribed1 of salt which is pungent1 and of incense which has a bitter taste4 ,consequently it seems that things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,lev4 #a3ac73 ,the priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar1 for a holocaust1 and most sweet savor to the ,lord4 ,now according to ,wis4 #g3bh1 ,god loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom3 whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to ,god is wisely done4 ,therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done1 as having reasonable causes4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had a twofold cause1 viz4 a literal cause1 according as they were intended for ,divine worship2 and a figurative or mystical cause1 according as they were intended to foreshadow ,christ3 and on either hand the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause4 ,for1 according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship1 the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two ways4 ,first1 in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to ,god1 to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated4 ,now in order to direct his mind to ,god aright1 man must recognize that whatever he has is from ,god as from its first principle1 and direct it to ,god as its last end4 ,this was denoted in the offerings and sacrifices1 by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of ,god1 as though in recognition of his having received them from ,god1 according to the saying of ,david 7#a ,paral4 xxix1 #ad73 ,all things are ,thine3 and we have given ,thee what we received of ,thy hand4 ,wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that ,god is the first principle of the creation of all things1 and their last end1 to which all things must be directed4 ,and since1 for the human mind to be directed to ,god aright1 it must recognize no first author of things other than ,god1 nor place its end in any other2 for this reason it was forbidden in the ,law to offer sacrifice to any other but ,god1 according to ,ex4 #bb3bj3 ,he that sacrificeth to gods1 shall be put to death1 save only to the ,lord4 ,wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies of the sacrifices1 from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols4 ,hence too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the ,jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry1 by worshipping the molten calf3 as though those sacrifices were instituted1 that the people1 being ready to offer sacrifices1 might offer those sacrifices to ,god rather than to idols4 ,thus it is written 7,jer4 #g3bb73 ,i spake not to your fathers and ,i commanded them not1 in the day that ,i brought them out of the land of ,egypt1 concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices4 ,now of all the gifts which ,god vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin1 the chief is that ,he gave ,his ,son2 wherefore it is written 7,john #c3af73 ,god so loved the world1 as to give ,his only-begotten ,son2 that whosoever believeth in ,him1 may not perish1 but may have life everlasting4 ,consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby ,christ ,himself delivered ,himself 4 4 4 to ,god for an odor of sweetness 7,eph4 #e3b74 ,and for this reason all the other sacrifices of the ,old ,law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice--the imperfect forecasting the perfect4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aj3aa7 that the priest of the ,old ,law often offered the same sacrifices1 which can never take away sins3 but ,christ offered one sacrifice for sins1 for ever4 ,and since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents1 therefore the reasons of the figurative sacrifices of the ,old ,law should be taken from the true sacrifice of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to ,him on account of the things themselves that were offered1 as though ,he stood in need of them3 wherefore it is written 7,isa4 #a3aa73 ,i desire not holocausts of rams1 and fat of fatlings1 and blood of calves and lambs and buckgoats4 ,but1 as stated above1 ,he wished them to be offered to ,him1 in order to prevent idolatry2 in order to signify the right ordering of man's mind to ,god2 and in order to represent the mystery of the ,redemption of man by ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in all the respects mentioned above 7ad #a71 there was a suitable reason for these animals1 rather than others1 being offered in sacrifice to ,god4 ,first1 in order to prevent idolatry4 ,because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods1 or made use of them in their sorceries3 while the ,egyptians 7among whom the people had been dwelling7 considered it abominable to slay these animals1 wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their gods4 ,hence it is written 7,ex4 #h3bf73 ,we shall sacrifice the abominations of the ,egyptians to the ,lord our ,god4 ,for they worshipped the sheep2 they reverenced the ram 7because demons appeared under the form thereof72 while they employed oxen for agriculture1 which was reckoned by them as something sacred4 ,secondly1 this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's mind to ,god3 and in two ways4 ,first1 because it is chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained3 and moreover they are most clean1 and partake of a most clean food3 whereas other animals are either wild1 and not deputed to ordinary use among men3 or1 if they be tame1 they have unclean food1 as pigs and geese3 and nothing but what is clean should be offered to ,god4 ,these birds especially were offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise4 ,secondly1 because the sacrificing of these animals represented purity of heart4 ,because as the gloss says on ,lev4 #a1 ,we offer a calf1 when we overcome the pride of the flesh2 a lamb1 when we restrain our unreasonable motions2 a goat1 when we conquer wantonness2 a turtledove1 when we keep chaste2 unleavened bread1 when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity4 ,and it is evident that the dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart4 ,thirdly1 it was fitting that these animals should be offered1 that they might foreshadow ,christ4 ,because1 as the gloss observes1 ,christ is offered in the calf1 to denote the strength of the cross2 in the lamb1 to signify ,his innocence2 in the ram1 to foreshadow ,his headship2 and in the goat1 to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' 99,an allusion to ,col4 #b3aa 7,textus ,receptus74 ,the turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures2 or else the turtledove signified chastity2 while the dove was a figure of charity4 ,the wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water of ,baptism4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,fish through living in water are further removed from man than other animals1 which1 like man1 live in the air4 ,again1 fish die as soon as they are taken out of water2 hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young2 while with doves the case is the reverse4 ,wherefore1 as ,rabbi ,moses observes 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii71 turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered1 because nothing should be offered to ,god but what is best4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain1 because it is by being killed that they become useful to man1 forasmuch as ,god gave them to man for food4 ,wherefore also they were burnt with fire3 because it is by being cooked that they are made fit for human consumption4 ,moreover the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins3 and also that man deserved death on account of his sins2 as though those animals were slain in man's stead1 in order to betoken the expiation of sins4 ,again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the ,law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing1 whereby idolaters sacrificed animals to idols4 ,or again1 as ,rabbi ,moses says 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii71 the ,law chose that manner of slaying which was least painful to the slain animal4 ,this excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers1 and any mangling of the animals slain4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,it is because unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt among men1 that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to ,god3 and for this reason too they were forbidden 7,deut4 #bc3ah7 to offer the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of 4 4 4 ,god4 ,for the same reason they did not offer animals before the seventh day1 because such were abortive as it were1 the flesh being not yet firm on account of its exceeding softness4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,there were three kinds of sacrifices4 ,there was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire3 this was called a holocaust1 i4e4 all burnt4 ,for this kind of sacrifice was offered to ,god specially to show reverence to ,his majesty1 and love of ,his goodness3 and typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels4 ,wherefore the whole was burnt up3 so that as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft1 so it might denote that the whole man1 and whatever belongs to him1 are subject to the authority of ,god1 and should be offered to ,him4 ,another sacrifice was the sin-offering1 which was offered to ,god on account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin3 and this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying for sins4 ,it was divided into two parts3 for one part was burnt2 while the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by ,god through the ministry of ,his priests4 ,when1 however1 this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people1 or specially for the sin of the priest1 the whole victim was burnt up4 ,for it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was offered for their own sins1 to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them4 ,moreover1 this would not be satisfaction for sin3 for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered1 it would seem to be the same as if it had not been offered4 ,the third kind of sacrifice was called the peace-offering1 which was offered to ,god1 either in thanksgiving1 or for the welfare and prosperity of the offerers1 in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be received3 and this typifies the state of those who are proficient in the observance of the commandments4 ,these sacrifices were divided into three parts3 for one part was burnt in honor of ,god2 another part was allotted to the use of the priests2 and the third part to the use of the offerers2 in order to signify that man's salvation is from ,god1 by the direction of ,god's ministers1 and through the cooperation of those who are saved4 ,but it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers3 the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar1 in honor of ,god1 while the fat was burnt upon the altar 7,lev4 #i3i1 #aj74 ,the reason for this was1 first1 in order to prevent idolatry3 because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat of the victims1 according to ,deut4 #cb3ch3 ,of whose victims they eat the fat1 and drank the wine of their drink-offerings4 ,secondly1 in order to form them to a right way of living4 ,for they were forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood2 wherefore it is written 7,gen4 #i3d1 #e73 ,flesh with blood you shall not eat3 for ,i will require the blood of your lives3 and they were forbidden to eat the fat1 in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness2 hence it is written 7,ezech4 #cd3c73 ,you have killed that which was fat4 ,thirdly1 on account of the reverence due to ,god3 because blood is most necessary for life1 for which reason life is said to be in the blood 7,lev4 #ag3aa1 #ad73 while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment4 ,wherefore1 in order to show that to ,god we owe both life and a sufficiency of all good things1 the blood was poured out1 and the fat burnt up in ,his honor4 ,fourthly1 in order to foreshadow the shedding of ,christ's blood1 and the abundance of ,his charity1 whereby ,he offered ,himself to ,god for us4 ,in the peace-offerings1 the breast-bone and the right shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest1 in order to prevent a certain kind of divination which is known as spatulamantia1 so called because it was customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade 7spatula71 and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice2 wherefore these things were taken away from the offerers4 ,this is also denoted the priest's need of wisdom in the heart1 to instruct the people--this was signified by the breast-bone1 which covers the heart2 and his need of fortitude1 in order to bear with human frailty--and this was signified by the right shoulder4 ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice1 therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust3 because the female is an imperfect animal4 ,the offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers1 who were unable to offer bigger animals4 ,and since peace-victims were offered freely1 and no one was bound to offer them against his will1 hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims1 but among the holocausts and victims for sin1 which man was obliged to offer at times4 ,moreover these birds1 on account of their lofty flight1 were befitting the perfection of the holocausts3 and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is doleful4 ,reply ,obj4 #aj3 ,the holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices3 because all was burnt in honor of ,god1 and nothing of it was eaten4 ,the second place in holiness1 belongs to the sacrifice for sins1 which was eaten in the court only1 and on the very day of the sacrifice 7,lev4 #g3f1 #ae74 ,the third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving1 which were eaten on the same day1 but anywhere in ,jerusalem4 ,fourth in order were the ex-voto peace-offerings1 the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow4 ,the reason for this order is that man is bound to ,god1 chiefly on account of ,his majesty2 secondly1 on account of the sins he has committed2 thirdly1 because of the benefits he has already received from ,him2 fourthly1 by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #aa3 ,sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner1 as stated above 7,q4 #gc1 ,a4 #aj73 wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest1 or of a prince1 or of some other private individual4 ,but1 as ,rabbi ,moses says 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii71 we must take note that the more grievous the sin1 the lower the species of animals offered for it4 ,wherefore the goat1 which is a very base animal1 was offered for idolatry2 while a calf was offered for a priest's ignorance1 and a ram for the negligence of a prince4 ,reply ,obj4 #ab3 ,in the matter of sacrifices the ,law had in view the poverty of the offerers2 so that those who could not have a four-footed animal at their disposal1 might at least offer a bird2 and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread2 and that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn4 ,the figurative cause is that the bread signifies ,christ ,who is the living bread 7,john #f3da1 #ea74 ,he was indeed an ear of corn1 as it were1 during the state of the law of nature1 in the faith of the patriarchs2 ,he was like flour in the doctrine of the ,law of the prophets2 and ,he was like perfect bread after ,he had taken human nature2 baked in the fire1 i4e4 formed by the ,holy ,ghost in the oven of the virginal womb2 baked again in a pan by the toils which ,he suffered in the world2 and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron4 ,reply ,obj4 #ac3 ,the products of the soil are useful to man1 either as food1 and of these bread was offered2 or as drink1 and of these wine was offered2 or as seasoning1 and of these oil and salt were offered2 or as healing1 and of these they offered incense1 which both smells sweetly and binds easily together4 ,now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of ,christ2 and the wine1 ,his blood1 whereby we were redeemed2 oil betokens the grace of ,christ2 salt1 ,his knowledge2 incense1 ,his prayer4 ,reply ,obj4 #ad3 ,honey was not offered in the sacrifices to ,god1 both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols2 and in order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice to ,god4 ,leaven was not offered1 to denote the exclusion of corruption4 ,perhaps too1 it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols4 ,salt1 however1 was offered1 because it wards off the corruption of putrefaction3 for sacrifices offered to ,god should be incorrupt4 ,moreover1 salt signifies the discretion of wisdom1 or again1 mortification of the flesh4 ,incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart1 which is necessary in the offerer2 and again1 to signify the odor of a good name3 for incense is composed of matter1 both rich and fragrant4 ,and since the sacrifice of jealousy did not proceed from devotion1 but rather from suspicion1 therefore incense was not offered therein 7,num4 #e3ae74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,sufficient ,reason ,can ,be ,assigned for the ,ceremonies ,pertaining to ,holy ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the ,old ,law that pertain to holy things4 ,for ,paul said 7,acts #ag3bd73 ,god ,who made the world and all things therein2 ,he being ,lord of heaven and earth1 dwelleth not in temples made by hands4 ,it was therefore unfitting that in the ,old ,law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the state of the ,old ,law was not changed except by ,christ4 ,but the tabernacle denoted the state of the ,old ,law4 ,therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,divine ,law1 more than any other indeed1 should lead man to the worship of ,god4 ,but an increase of divine worship requires multiplication of altars and temples2 as is evident in regard to the ,new ,law4 ,therefore it seems that also under the ,old ,law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple1 but many4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of ,god4 ,but in ,god we should worship above all ,his unity and simplicity4 ,therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the power of the ,first ,mover1 i4e4 ,god1 appears first of all in the east1 for it is in that quarter that the first movement begins4 ,but the tabernacle was set up for the worship of ,god4 ,therefore it should have been built so as to point to the east rather than the west4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 the ,lord commanded 7,ex4 #bj3d7 that they should not make 4 4 4 a graven thing1 nor the likeness of anything4 ,it was therefore unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple4 ,in like manner1 the ark1 the propitiatory1 the candlestick1 the table1 the two altars1 seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 the ,lord commanded 7,ex4 #bj3bd73 ,you shall make an altar of earth unto ,me3 and again 7,ex4 #bj3bf73 ,thou shalt not go up by steps unto ,my altar4 ,it was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass2 and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps4 ,for it is written 7,ex4 #bg3a1 #b73 ,thou shalt make also an altar of setim wood1 which shall be five cubits long1 and as many broad 4 4 4 and three cubits high 4 4 4 and thou shalt cover it with brass3 and 7,ex4 #cj3a1 #c73 ,thou shalt make 4 4 4 an altar to burn incense1 of setim wood 4 4 4 and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 in ,god's works nothing should be superfluous2 for not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found4 ,but one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house4 ,therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings1 viz4 curtains1 curtains of goats' hair1 rams' skins dyed red1 and violet-colored skins 7,ex4 #bf74 ,objection #i3 ,further1 exterior consecration signifies interior holiness1 the subject of which is the soul4 ,it was therefore unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated1 since they were inanimate things4 ,objection #aj3 ,further1 it is written 7,ps4 #cc3b73 ,i will bless the ,lord at all times1 ,his praise shall always be in my mouth4 ,but the solemn festivals were instituted for the praise of ,god4 ,therefore it was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals2 so that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #h3d7 that those who offer gifts according to the law 4 4 4 serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things4 ,as it was answered to ,moses1 when he was to finish the tabernacle3 ,see1 says ,he1 that thou make all things according to the pattern which was shown thee on the mount4 ,but that is most reasonable1 which presents a likeness to heavenly things4 ,therefore the ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause4 ,i answer that1 ,the chief purpose of the whole external worship is that man may give worship to ,god4 ,now man's tendency is to reverence less those things which are common1 and indistinct from other things2 whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from others in some point of excellence4 ,hence too it is customary among men for kings and princes1 who ought to be reverenced by their subjects1 to be clothed in more precious garments1 and to possess vaster and more beautiful abodes4 ,and for this reason it behooved special times1 a special abode1 special vessels1 and special ministers to be appointed for the divine worship1 so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for ,god4 ,in like manner the state of the ,old ,law1 as observed above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #b71 was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of ,christ4 ,now that which foreshadows something should be determinate1 so that it may present some likeness thereto4 ,consequently1 certain special points had to be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the divine worship regards two things3 namely1 ,god ,who is worshipped2 and men1 who worship ,him4 ,accordingly ,god1 ,who is worshipped1 is confined to no bodily place3 wherefore there was no need1 on ,his part1 for a tabernacle or temple to be set up4 ,but men1 who worship ,him1 are corporeal beings3 and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of ,god1 for two reasons4 ,first1 that through coming together with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of ,god1 they might approach thither with greater reverence4 ,secondly1 that certain things relating to the excellence of ,christ's ,divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement of various details in such temple or tabernacle4 ,to this ,solomon refers 7#c ,kings #h3bg7 when he says3 ,if heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain ,thee1 how much less this house which ,i have built for ,thee8 ,and further on 7#c ,kings #h3bi1 #bj7 he adds3 ,that ,thy eyes may be open upon this house 4 4 4 of which ,thou hast said3 ,my name shall be there2 4 4 4 that ,thou mayest hearken to the supplication of ,thy servant and of ,thy people ,israel4 ,from this it is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up1 not in order to contain ,god1 as abiding therein locally1 but that ,god might be made known there by means of things done and said there2 and that those who prayed there might1 through reverence for the place1 pray more devoutly1 so as to be heard more readily4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,before the coming of ,christ1 the state of the ,old ,law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the ,law1 which was effected in ,christ alone3 but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the ,law4 ,because1 at first1 the people were in the desert1 having no fixed abode3 afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations2 and lastly1 at the time of ,david and ,solomon1 the state of that people was one of great peace4 ,and then for the first time the temple was built in the place which ,abraham1 instructed by ,god1 had chosen for the purpose of sacrifice4 ,for it is written 7,gen4 #bb3b7 that the ,lord commanded ,abraham to offer his son for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which ,i will show thee3 and it is related further on 7,gen4 #bb3ad7 that he calleth the name of that place1 ,the ,lord seeth1 as though1 according to the ,divine prevision1 that place were chosen for the worship of ,god4 ,hence it is written 7,deut4 #ab3e1 #f73 ,you shall come to the place which the ,lord your ,god shall choose 4 4 4 and you shall offer 4 4 4 your holocausts and victims4 ,now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time2 for three reasons assigned by ,rabbi ,moses4 ,first1 lest the ,gentiles might seize hold of that place4 ,secondly1 lest the ,gentiles might destroy it4 ,the third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot1 and strifes and quarrels be the result4 ,hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels4 ,until that time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship1 no place being as yet fixed for the worship of ,god4 ,this is the literal reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple4 ,the figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state4 ,for the tabernacle1 which was changeable1 signifies the state of the present changeable life3 whereas the temple1 which was fixed and stable1 signifies the state of future life which is altogether unchangeable4 ,for this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw1 to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state4 ,or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the ,old ,law2 while the temple built by ,solomon betokens the state of the ,new ,law4 ,hence the ,jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle2 whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the ,gentiles1 viz4 the ,tyrians and ,sidonians4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative4 ,the literal reason was the exclusion of idolatry4 ,for the ,gentiles put up various temples to various gods3 and so1 to strengthen in the minds of men their belief in the unity of the ,godhead1 ,god wished sacrifices to be offered to ,him in one place only4 ,another reason was in order to show that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself3 and so they restrained from offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere4 ,but the worship of the ,new ,law1 in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained1 is of itself acceptable to ,god2 and consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the ,new ,law4 ,as to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of ,god1 consisting in the teaching of the ,law and the ,prophets1 there were1 even under the ,old ,law1 various places1 called synagogues1 appointed for the people to gather together for the praise of ,god2 just as now there are places called churches in which the ,christian people gather together for the divine worship4 ,thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue3 since the very sacrifice of the ,church is spiritual2 wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching4 ,the figurative reason may be that hereby is signified the unity of the ,church1 whether militant or triumphant4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of ,god1 or the unity of the ,church1 so also the division of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to ,god1 and from which we arise to the worship of ,god4 ,now the tabernacle was divided into two parts3 one was called the ,holy of ,holies1 and was placed to the west2 the other was called the ,holy ,place 99,or ',sanctuary'4 ,the ,douay version uses both expressions1 which was situated to the east4 ,moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle4 ,accordingly there are two reasons for this distinction4 ,one is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of ,god4 ,because the different parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle4 ,for that part which was called the ,holy of ,holies signified the higher world1 which is that of spiritual substances3 while that part which is called the ,holy ,place signified the corporeal world4 ,hence the ,holy ,place was separated from the ,holy of ,holies by a veil1 which was of four different colors 7denoting the four elements71 viz4 of linen1 signifying earth1 because linen1 i4e4 flax1 grows out of the earth2 purple1 signifying water1 because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea2 violet1 signifying air1 because it has the color of the air2 and scarlet twice dyed1 signifying fire3 and this because matter composed of the four elements is a veil between us and incorporeal substances4 ,hence the high-priest alone1 and that once a year1 entered into the inner tabernacle1 i4e4 the ,holy of ,holies3 whereby we are taught that man's final perfection consists in his entering into that 7higher7 world3 whereas into the outward tabernacle1 i4e4 the ,holy ,place1 the priests entered every day3 whereas the people were only admitted to the court2 because the people were able to perceived material things1 the inner nature of which only wise men by dint of study are able to discover4 ,but with regard to the figurative reason1 the outward tabernacle1 which was called the ,holy ,place1 betokened the state of the ,old ,law1 as the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #i3f1 seqq473 because into that tabernacle the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices4 ,but the inner tabernacle1 which was called the ,holy of ,holies1 signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the ,new ,law to come4 ,to the latter state ,christ brought us2 and this was signified by the high-priest entering alone1 once a year1 into the ,holy of ,holies4 ,the veil betokened the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old4 ,this veil was adorned with four colors3 viz4 that of linen1 to designate purity of the flesh2 purple1 to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for ,god2 scarlet twice dyed1 signifying the twofold love of ,god and our neighbor2 and violet1 in token of heavenly contemplation4 ,with regard to the state of the ,old ,law the people and the priests were situated differently from one another4 ,for the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices which were offered in the court3 whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices1 because their faith in the mysteries of ,christ was more explicit4 ,hence they entered into the outer tabernacle4 ,this outer tabernacle was divided from the court by a veil2 because some matters relating to the mystery of ,christ were hidden from the people1 while they were known to the priests3 though they were not fully revealed to them1 as they were subsequently in the ,new ,testament 7cf4 ,eph4 #c3e74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,worship towards the west was introduced in the ,law to the exclusion of idolatry3 because all the ,gentiles1 in reverence to the sun1 worshipped towards the east2 hence it is written 7,ezech4 #h3af7 that certain men had their backs towards the temple of the ,lord1 and their faces to the east1 and they adored towards the rising of the sun4 ,accordingly1 in order to prevent this1 the tabernacle had the ,holy of ,holies to westward1 that they might adore toward the west4 ,a figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the death of ,christ1 which is signified by the west1 according to ,ps4 #fg3e3 ,who ascendeth unto the west2 the ,lord is ,his name4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle4 ,the literal reason is in connection with the divine worship4 ,and because1 as already observed 7ad #d71 the inner tabernacle1 called the ,holy of ,holies1 signified the higher world of spiritual substances1 hence that tabernacle contained three things1 viz4 the ark of the testament in which was a golden pot that had manna1 and the rod of ,aaron that had blossomed1 and the tables 7,heb4 #i3d7 on which were written the ten commandments of the ,law4 ,now the ark stood between two cherubim that looked one towards the other3 and over the ark was a table1 called the propitiatory1 raised above the wings of the cherubim1 as though it were held up by them2 and appearing1 to the imagination1 to be the very seat of ,god4 ,for this reason it was called the propitiatory1 as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers of the high-priest4 ,and so it was held up1 so to speak1 by the cherubim1 in obedience1 as it were1 to ,god3 while the ark of the testament was like the foot-stool to ,him that sat on the propitiatory4 ,these three things denote three things in that higher world3 namely1 ,god ,who is above all1 and incomprehensible to any creature4 ,hence no likeness of ,him was set up2 to denote ,his invisibility4 ,but there was something to represent his seat2 since1 to wit1 the creature1 which is beneath ,god1 as the seat under the sitter1 is comprehensible4 ,again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels4 ,these are signified by the two cherubim1 looking one towards the other1 to show that they are at peace with one another1 according to ,job #be3b3 ,who maketh peace in 4 4 4 high places4 ,for this reason1 too1 there was more than one cherub1 to betoken the multitude of heavenly spirits1 and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to worship but one ,god4 ,moreover there are1 enclosed as it were in that spiritual world1 the intelligible types of whatsoever takes place in this world1 just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects1 and in the craftsman the types of the works of his craft4 ,this was betokened by the ark1 which represented1 by means of the three things it contained1 the three things of greatest import in human affairs4 ,these are wisdom1 signified by the tables of the testament2 the power of governing1 betokened by the rod of ,aaron2 and life1 betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance4 ,or else these three things signified the three ,divine attributes1 viz4 wisdom1 in the tables2 power1 in the rod2 goodness1 in the manna--both by reason of its sweetness1 and because it was through the goodness of ,god that it was granted to man1 wherefore it was preserved as a memorial of the ,divine mercy4 ,again1 these three things were represented in ,isaias' vision4 ,for he saw the ,lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated2 and the seraphim standing by2 and that the house was filled with the glory of the ,lord2 wherefrom the seraphim cried out3 ,all the earth is full of ,his glory 7,isa4 #f3a1 #c74 ,and so the images of the seraphim were set up1 not to be worshipped1 for this was forbidden by the first commandment2 but as a sign of their function1 as stated above4 ,the outer tabernacle1 which denotes this present world1 also contained three things1 viz4 the altar of incense1 which was directly opposite the ark2 the table of proposition1 with the twelve loaves of proposition on it1 which stood on the northern side2 and the candlestick1 which was placed towards the south4 ,these three things seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the ark2 and they represented the same things as the latter1 but more clearly3 because1 in order that wise men1 denoted by the priests entering the temple1 might grasp the meaning of these types1 it was necessary to express them more manifestly than they are in the ,divine or angelic mind4 ,accordingly the candlestick betokened1 as a sensible sign thereof1 the wisdom which was expressed on the tables 7of the ,law7 in intelligible words4 ,the altar of incense signified the office of the priest1 whose duty it was to bring the people to ,god3 and this was signified also by the rod3 because on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt1 signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to ,god3 for it is written 7,apoc4 #h3c7 that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the justifications of the saints 7cf4 ,apoc4 #ai3h74 ,moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted1 in the ark1 by the rod1 and1 in the outer tabernacle1 by the altar of incense3 because the priest is the mediator between ,god and the people1 governing the people by ,divine power1 denoted by the rod2 and offering to ,god the fruit of ,his government1 i4e4 the holiness of the people1 on the altar of incense1 so to speak4 ,the table signified the sustenance of life1 just as the manna did3 but the former1 a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment2 the latter1 a sweeter and more delicate4 ,again1 the candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side1 while the table was placed to the north3 because the south is the right-hand side of the world1 while the north is the left-hand side1 as stated in ,de ,coelo et ,mundo ii2 and wisdom1 like other spiritual goods1 belongs to the right hand1 while temporal nourishment belongs on the left1 according to ,prov4 #c3af3 ,in her left hand 7are7 riches and glory4 ,and the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom2 because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed4 ,another literal signification may be assigned4 ,for the ark contained the tables of the ,law1 in order to prevent forgetfulness of the ,law1 wherefore it is written 7,ex4 #bd3ab73 ,i will give thee two tables of stone1 and the ,law1 and the commandments which ,i have written3 that thou mayest teach them to the children of ,israel4 ,the rod of ,aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood of ,aaron2 wherefore it is written 7,num4 #ag3aj73 ,carry back the rod of ,aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony1 that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious children of ,israel4 ,the manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by ,god on the children of ,israel in the desert2 wherefore it is written 7,ex4 #af3cb73 ,fill a gomor of it1 and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter1 that they may know the bread wherewith ,i fed you in the wilderness4 ,the candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple1 for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well lighted4 ,now the candlestick had seven branches1 as ,josephus observes 7,antiquit4 iii1 #g1 #h71 to signify the seven planets1 wherewith the whole world is illuminated4 ,hence the candlestick was placed towards the south2 because for us the course of the planets is from that quarter4 ,the altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet-smelling smoke2 both through respect for the tabernacle1 and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the slaying of animals4 ,for men despise evil-smelling things as being vile1 whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated4 ,the table was placed there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple3 wherefore1 as stated in ,matt4 #ab3d1 it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on the table in memory of the twelve tribes4 ,and the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory1 in order to exclude an idolatrous rite3 for the ,gentiles1 on the feasts of the moon1 set up a table in front of the idol of the moon1 wherefore it is written 7,jer4 #g3ah73 ,the women knead the dough1 to make cakes to the queen of heaven4 ,in the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts1 on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were offered to ,god3 and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to ,god by the hands of the priest could be present in the court4 ,but the priests alone1 whose function it was to offer the people to ,god1 could approach the inner altar1 whereon the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to ,god4 ,and this altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the court1 to the exclusion of idolatrous worship3 for the ,gentiles placed altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols4 ,the figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the relation of the tabernacle to ,christ1 who was foreshadowed therein4 ,now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the ,law1 various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken ,christ4 ,for ,he was foreshadowed by the propitiatory1 since ,he is a propitiation for our sins 7#a ,john #b3b74 ,this propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim1 since of ,him it is written 7,heb4 #a3f73 ,let all the angels of ,god adore ,him4 ,he is also signified by the ark3 because just as the ark was made of setim-wood1 so was ,christ's body composed of most pure members4 ,more over it was gilded3 for ,christ was full of wisdom and charity1 which are betokened by gold4 ,and in the ark was a golden pot1 i4e4 ,his holy soul1 having manna1 i4e4 all the fulness of the ,godhead 7,col4 #b3i74 ,also there was a rod in the ark1 i4e4 ,his priestly power3 for ,he was made a 4 4 4 priest for ever 7,heb4 #f3bj74 ,and therein were the tables of the ,testament1 to denote that ,christ ,himself is a lawgiver4 ,again1 ,christ was signified by the candlestick1 for ,he said ,himself 7,john #h3ab73 ,i am the ,light of the world2 while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,he is also betokened in the table1 because ,he is our spiritual food1 according to ,john #f3da1 #ea3 ,i am the living bread3 and the twelve loaves signified the twelve apostles1 or their teaching4 ,or again1 the candlestick and table may signify the ,church's teaching1 and faith1 which also enlightens and refreshes4 ,again1 ,christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense4 ,because all works of virtue must be offered to us to ,god through ,him2 both those whereby we afflict the body1 which are offered1 as it were1 on the altar of holocausts2 and those which1 with greater perfection of mind1 are offered to ,god in ,christ1 by the spiritual desires of the perfect1 on the altar of incense1 as it were1 according to ,heb4 #ac3ae3 ,by ,him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the ,lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts1 in honor of ,god1 and for the upkeep of the ministers who served the tabernacle4 ,now concerning the construction of the altar the ,lord issued a twofold precept4 ,one was at the beginning of the ,law 7,ex4 #bj3bd1 seqq47 when the ,lord commanded them to make an altar of earth1 or at least not of hewn stones2 and again1 not to make the altar high1 so as to make it necessary to go up to it by steps4 ,this was in detestation of idolatrous worship3 for the ,gentiles made their altars ornate and high1 thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things4 ,for this reason1 too1 the ,lord commanded 7,deut4 #af3ba73 ,thou shalt plant no grove1 nor any tree near the altar of the ,lord thy ,god3 since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees1 on account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them4 ,there was also a figurative reason for these precepts4 ,because we must confess that in ,christ1 ,who is our altar1 there is the true nature of flesh1 as regards ,his humanity--and this is to make an altar of earth2 and again1 in regard to ,his ,godhead1 we must confess ,his equality with the ,father--and this is not to go up to the altar by steps4 ,moreover we should not couple the doctrine of ,christ to that of the ,gentiles1 which provokes men to lewdness4 ,but when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of ,god1 there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry4 ,wherefore the ,lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass1 and to be conspicuous to all the people2 and the altar of incense1 which was visible to none but the priests4 ,nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry4 ,since1 however1 the reason for the precept1 ,thou shalt not go up by steps unto ,my altar 7,ex4 #bj3bf7 is stated to have been lest thy nakedness be discovered1 it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry1 for in the feasts of ,priapus the ,gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people4 ,but later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency3 so that without any danger the altar could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood1 not fixed but movable4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,the body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end1 and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors1 viz4 twisted linen1 violet1 purple1 and scarlet twice dyed4 ,these curtains1 however1 covered the sides only of the tabernacle2 and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins2 and over this there was another covering of rams' skins dyed red2 and over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair1 which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle1 but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside4 ,the literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle1 that it might be an object of respect4 ,taken singly1 according to some1 the curtains denoted the starry heaven1 which is adorned with various stars2 the curtain 7of goats' skin7 signified the waters which are above the firmament2 the skins dyed red denoted the empyrean heaven1 where the angels are2 the violet skins1 the heaven of the ,blessed ,trinity4 ,the figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of ,christ1 who compose the ,church4 ,the boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors3 because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the four virtues3 for the twisted linen1 as the gloss observes1 signifies the flesh refulgent with purity2 violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things2 purple denotes the flesh subject to passions2 the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of ,god and our neighbor4 ,the coverings of the building designate prelates and doctors1 who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life1 signified by the violet colored skins3 and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom1 denoted by the skins dyed red2 and austere of life and patient in adversity1 betokened by the curtains of goats' hair1 which were exposed to wind and rain1 as the gloss observes4 ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,the literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence1 being deputed1 as it were1 to the divine worship by this consecration4 ,the figurative reason is that this sanctification signified the sanctification of the living tabernacle1 i4e4 the faithful of whom the ,church of ,christ is composed4 ,reply ,obj4 #aj3 ,under the ,old ,law there were seven temporal solemnities1 and one continual solemnity1 as may be gathered from ,num4 #bh1 #bi4 ,there was a continual feast1 since the lamb was sacrificed every day1 morning and evening3 and this continual feast of an abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of ,divine bliss4 ,of the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every week4 ,this was the solemnity of the ,sabbath1 celebrated in memory of the work of the creation of the universe4 ,another solemnity1 viz4 the ,new ,moon1 was repeated every month1 and was observed in memory of the work of the ,divine government4 ,for the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon2 wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon3 and not at the full moon1 to avoid the worship of idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time4 ,and these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human race2 and hence they were repeated more frequently4 ,the other five feasts were celebrated once a year3 and they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially on that people4 ,for there was the feast of the ,passover in the first month to commemorate the blessing of being delivered out of ,egypt4 ,the feast of ,pentecost was celebrated fifty days later1 to recall the blessing of the giving of the ,law4 ,the other three feasts were kept in the seventh month1 nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them1 just as the seventh day4 ,for on the first of the seventh month was the feast of ,trumpets1 in memory of the delivery of ,isaac1 when ,abraham found the ram caught by its horns1 which they represented by the horns which they blew4 ,the feast of ,trumpets was a kind of invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day4 ,this was the feast of ,expiation1 in memory of the blessing whereby1 at the prayer of ,moses1 ,god forgave the people's sin of worshipping the calf4 ,after this was the feast of ,scenopegia or of ,tents1 which was kept for seven days1 to commemorate the blessing of being protected and led by ,god through the desert1 where they lived in tents4 ,hence during this feast they had to take the fruits of the fairest tree1 i4e4 the citron1 and the trees of dense foliage 99,douay and ,a4 ,v4 and ,r4 ,v4 read3 ',boughs of thick trees'1 i4e4 the myrtle1 which is fragrant1 and the branches of palm-trees1 and willows of the brook1 which retain their greenness a long time2 and these are to be found in the ,land of promise2 to signify that ,god had brought them through the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights4 ,on the eighth day another feast was observed1 of ,assembly and ,congregation1 on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship3 and it signified the uniting of the people and the peace granted to them in the ,land of promise4 ,the figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of ,christ1 ,who is the ,lamb of ,god1 according to ,heb4 #ac3h3 ,jesus ,christ yesterday and today1 and the same for ever4 ,the ,sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by ,christ1 as stated in ,heb4 #d4 ,the ,neomenia1 which is the beginning of the new moon1 signified the enlightening of the primitive ,church by ,christ's preaching and miracles4 ,the feast of ,pentecost signified the ,descent of the ,holy ,ghost on the apostles4 ,the feast of ,trumpets signified the preaching of the apostles4 ,the feast of ,expiation signified the cleansing of the ,christian people from sins3 and the feast of ,tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in this world1 wherein they walk by advancing in virtue4 ,the feast of ,assembly or ,congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven3 wherefore this feast is described as most holy 7,lev4 #bc3cf74 ,these three feasts followed immediately on one another1 because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue1 until they come to see ,god1 as stated in ,ps4 #hc3h4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,any ,suitable ,cause for the ,sacraments of the ,old ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the ,old ,law4 ,because those things that are done for the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters3 since it is written 7,deut4 #ab3ca73 ,thou shalt not do in like manner to the ,lord thy ,god3 for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the ,lord abhorreth4 ,now worshippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of blood3 for it is related 7#c ,kings #ah3bh7 that they cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets1 till they were all covered with blood4 ,for this reason the ,lord commanded 7,deut4 #ad3a73 ,you shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead4 ,therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed by the ,law 7,lev4 #ab3c74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those things which are done for the worship of ,god should be marked with decorum and gravity2 according to ,ps4 #cd3ah3 ,i will praise ,thee in a grave ,douay3 'strong' people4 ,but it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste4 ,therefore it was unfittingly commanded 7,ex4 #ab3aa7 that they should eat the ,paschal lamb in haste4 ,other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed1 which seem altogether unreasonable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the sacraments of the ,old ,law were figures of the sacraments of the ,new ,law4 ,now the ,paschal lamb signified the sacrament of the ,eucharist1 according to #a ,cor4 #e3g3 ,christ our ,pasch is sacrificed4 ,therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the ,old ,law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the ,new ,law1 such as ,confirmation1 ,extreme ,unction1 and ,matrimony1 and so forth4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure4 ,but as far as ,god is concerned1 no bodily thing is reputed impure1 because all bodies are ,god's creatures2 and every creature of ,god is good1 and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving 7#a ,tim4 #d3d74 ,it was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse1 or any similar corporeal infection4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #cd3d73 ,what can be made clean by the unclean8 ,but the ashes of the red heifer 99,cf4 ,heb4 #i3ac which was burnt1 were unclean1 since they made a man unclean3 for it is stated 7,num4 #ai3g1 seqq47 that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean until the evening2 likewise he that burnt her2 and he that gathered up her ashes4 ,therefore it was unfittingly prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another3 nor can man be cleansed from sin by means of something unclean4 ,it was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the sins of the children of ,israel on one of the buck-goats1 that it might carry them away into the wilderness3 while they were rendered unclean by the other1 which they used for the purpose of purification1 by burning it together with the calf outside the camp2 so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water 7,lev4 #af74 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again4 ,it was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a man cleansed from leprosy1 or to a house2 as laid down in ,lev4 #ad4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair4 ,therefore it seems unreasonable that the ,lord ordered 7,ex4 #cj3ah1 seqq47 the making of a brazen laver with its foot1 that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple2 and that ,he commanded 7,num4 #h3g7 the ,levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification1 and to shave all the hairs of their flesh4 ,objection #i3 ,further1 that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less4 ,therefore it was unfitting that1 in the ,law1 the higher and lower priests1 as stated in ,lev4 #h 99,cf4 ,ex4 #bi1 and the ,levites1 according to ,num4 #h1 should be consecrated with any bodily anointing1 bodily sacrifices1 and bodily oblations4 ,objection #aj3 ,further1 as stated in #a ,kings #af3g1 ,man seeth those things that appear1 but the ,lord beholdeth the heart4 ,but those things that appear outwardly in man are the dispositions of his body and his clothes4 ,therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the higher and lower priests1 as related in ,ex4 #bh 99,cf4 ,lev4 #h3g1 seqq44 ,it seems1 moreover1 unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from the priesthood on account of defects in the body1 as stated in ,lev4 #ba3ag1 seqq43 ,whosoever of thy seed throughout their families1 hath a blemish1 he shall not offer bread to his ,god 4 4 4 if he be blind1 if he be lame1 etc4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that the sacraments of the ,old ,law were unreasonable4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,lev4 #bj3h73 ,i am the ,lord that sanctify you4 ,but nothing unreasonable is done by ,god1 for it is written 7,ps4 #ajc3bd73 ,thou hast made all things in wisdom4 ,therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the ,old ,law1 which were ordained to the sanctification of man4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #d71 the sacraments are1 properly speaking1 things applied to the worshippers of ,god for their consecration so as1 in some way1 to depute them to the worship of ,god4 ,now the worship of ,god belonged in a general way to the whole people2 but in a special way1 it belonged to the priests and ,levites1 who were the ministers of divine worship4 ,consequently1 in these sacraments of the ,old ,law1 certain things concerned the whole people in general2 while others belonged to the ministers4 ,in regard to both1 three things were necessary4 ,the first was to be established in the state of worshipping ,god3 and this institution was brought about--for all in general1 by circumcision1 without which no one was admitted to any of the legal observances--and for the priests1 by their consecration4 ,the second thing required was the use of those things that pertain to divine worship4 ,and thus1 as to the people1 there was the partaking of the paschal banquet1 to which no uncircumcised man was admitted1 as is clear from ,ex4 #ab3dc1 seqq43 and1 as to the priests1 the offering of the victims1 and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things that were allotted to the use of the priests4 ,the third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship1 viz4 of uncleannesses4 ,and then1 as to the people1 certain purifications were instituted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses2 and also expiations from sins2 while1 as to the priests and ,levites1 the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted4 ,and all these things had reasonable causes1 both literal1 in so far as they were ordained to the worship of ,god for the time being1 and figurative1 in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow ,christ3 as we shall see by taking them one by one4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one ,god4 ,and because ,abraham was the first to sever himself from the infidels1 by going out from his house and kindred1 for this reason he was the first to receive circumcision4 ,this reason is set forth by the ,apostle 7,rom4 #d3i1 seqq47 thus3 ,he received the sign of circumcision1 a seal of the justice of the faith which he had1 being uncircumcised2 because1 to wit1 we are told that unto ,abraham faith was reputed to justice1 for the reason that against hope he believed in hope1 i4e4 against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace1 that he might be made the father of many nations1 when he was an old man1 and his wife an old and barren woman4 ,and in order that this declaration1 and imitation of ,abraham's faith1 might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the ,jews1 they received in their flesh such a sign as they could not forget1 wherefore it is written 7,gen4 #ag3ac73 ,my covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant4 ,this was done on the eighth day1 because until then a child is very tender1 and so might be seriously injured2 and is considered as something not yet consolidated3 wherefore neither are animals offered before the eighth day4 ,and it was not delayed after that time1 lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision on account of the pain3 and also lest the parents1 whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older1 should withdraw their children from circumcision4 ,a second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member4 ,a third motive may have been to revile the worship of ,venus and ,priapus1 which gave honor to that part of the body4 ,the ,lord's prohibition extended only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols3 and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking4 ,the figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption1 which was to be brought about by ,christ1 and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age1 which is the age of those who rise from the dead4 ,and since all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us through our carnal origin1 from the sin of our first parent1 therefore circumcision was applied to the generative member4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,col4 #b3aa73 ,you are circumcised in ,christ with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh1 but in the circumcision of ,our ,lord ,jesus ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the literal reason of the paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of being led by ,god out of ,egypt4 ,hence by celebrating this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people which ,god had taken to ,himself out of ,egypt4 ,for when they were delivered from ,egypt1 they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the transoms of their house doors1 as though declaring that they were averse to the rites of the ,egyptians who worshipped the ram4 ,wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts1 from the danger of extermination which threatened the ,egyptians4 ,now two things are to be observed in their departure from ,egypt3 namely1 their haste in going1 for the ,egyptians pressed them to go forth speedily1 as related in ,ex4 #ab3cc2 and there was danger that anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the ,egyptians4 ,their haste was shown in two ways4 ,first by what they ate4 ,for they were commanded to eat unleavened bread1 as a sign that it could not be leavened1 the ,egyptians pressing them to depart2 and to eat roast meat1 for this took less time to prepare2 and that they should not break a bone thereof1 because in their haste there was no time to break bones4 ,secondly1 as to the manner of eating4 ,for it is written3 ,you shall gird your reins1 and you shall have shoes on your feet1 holding staves in your hands1 and you shall eat in haste3 which clearly designates men at the point of starting on a journey4 ,to this also is to be referred the command3 ,in one house shall it be eaten1 neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house3 because1 to wit1 on account of their haste1 they could not send any gifts of it4 ,the stress they suffered while in ,egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces4 ,the figurative reason is evident1 because the sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of ,christ according to #a ,cor4 #e3g3 ,christ our pasch is sacrificed4 ,the blood of the lamb1 which ensured deliverance from the destroyer1 by being sprinkled on the ransoms1 signified faith in ,christ's ,passion1 in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful1 by which same ,passion we are delivered from sin and death1 according to #a ,pet4 #a3ah3 ,you were 4 4 4 redeemed 4 4 4 with the precious blood 4 4 4 of a lamb unspotted4 ,the partaking of its flesh signified the eating of ,christ's body in the ,sacrament2 and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify ,christ's ,passion or charity4 ,and it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of ,christ's body1 according to #a ,cor4 #e3h3 ,let us feast 4 4 4 with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth4 ,the wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins1 which is required of those who receive the body of ,christ4 ,their loins were girt in sign of chastity3 and the shoes of their feet are the examples of our dead ancestors4 ,the staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority3 and it was commanded that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house1 i4e4 in a catholic church1 and not in the conventicles of heretics4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some of the sacraments of the ,new ,law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the ,old ,law4 ,for ,baptism1 which is the sacrament of ,faith1 corresponds to circumcision4 ,hence it is written 7,col4 #b3aa1 #ab73 ,you are circumcised 4 4 4 in the circumcision of ,our ,lord ,jesus ,christ3 buried with ,him in ,baptism4 ,in the ,new ,law the sacrament of the ,eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb4 ,the sacrament of ,penance in the ,new ,law corresponds to all the purifications of the ,old ,law4 ,the sacrament of ,orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the priests4 ,to the sacrament of ,confirmation1 which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace1 there would be no corresponding sacrament of the ,old ,law1 because the time of fulness had not yet come1 since the ,law brought no man ,vulg43 'nothing' to perfection 7,heb4 #g3ai74 ,the same applies to the sacrament of ,extreme ,unction1 which is an immediate preparation for entrance into glory1 to which the way was not yet opened out in the ,old ,law1 since the price had not yet been paid4 ,matrimony did indeed exist under the ,old ,law1 as a function of nature1 but not as the sacrament of the union of ,christ with the ,church1 for that union was not as yet brought about4 ,hence under the ,old ,law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce1 which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as already stated1 the purifications of the ,old ,law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship3 which worship is twofold2 viz4 spiritual1 consisting in devotion of the mind to ,god2 and corporal1 consisting in sacrifices1 oblations1 and so forth4 ,now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins1 whereby men were said to be polluted1 for instance1 by idolatry1 murder1 adultery1 or incest4 ,from such pollutions men were purified by certain sacrifices1 offered either for the whole community in general1 or also for the sins of individuals2 not that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin2 but that they signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected by ,christ1 and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the ,redeemer1 while taking part in the figurative sacrifices4 ,the impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily uncleannesses2 which were considered in the first place as existing in man1 and consequently in other animals also1 and in man's clothes1 dwelling-place1 and vessels4 ,in man himself uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things4 ,anything proceeding from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption1 or exposed thereto3 and consequently since death is a kind of corruption1 the human corpse was considered unclean4 ,in like manner1 since leprosy arises from corruption of the humors1 which break out externally and infect other persons1 therefore were lepers also considered unclean2 and1 again1 women suffering from a flow of blood1 whether from weakness1 or from nature 7either at the monthly course or at the time of conception72 and1 for the same reason1 men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed1 whether due to weakness1 to nocturnal pollution1 or to sexual intercourse4 ,because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some unclean infection4 ,again1 man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever4 ,now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these uncleannesses4 ,the literal reason was taken from the reverence due to those things that belong to the divine worship3 both because men are not wont1 when unclean1 to touch precious things3 and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them4 ,for since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses1 the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things belonging to the worship of ,god1 so that when they did approach1 they did so with greater reverence and humility4 ,moreover1 in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping ,god through fear of coming in contact with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases4 ,in others1 again1 the reason was to avoid idolatrous worship3 because in their sacrificial rites the ,gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed4 ,all these bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water1 or1 in the case of those which were more grievous1 by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question4 ,the figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures of various sins4 ,for the uncleanness of any corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin1 which is the death of the soul4 ,the uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical doctrine3 both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is1 and because no doctrine is so false as not to have some truth mingled with error1 just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are infected4 ,the uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness of idolatry1 on account of the blood which is offered up4 ,the uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies the uncleanness of empty words1 for the seed is the word of ,god4 ,the uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin4 ,the uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure4 ,speaking generally1 the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another's sin1 according to #b ,cor4 #f3ag3 ,go out from among them1 and be ye separate 4 4 4 and touch not the unclean thing4 ,moreover1 this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects2 for whatever was touched in any way by an unclean man1 became itself unclean4 ,wherein the ,law attenuated the superstition of the ,gentiles1 who held that uncleanness was contracted not only by touch1 but also by speech or looks1 as ,rabbi ,moses states 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii7 of a woman in her periods4 ,the mystical sense of this was that to ,god the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike 7,wis4 #ad3i74 ,there was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in themselves1 such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in clothes4 ,for just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh2 so1 too1 through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness1 there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is built1 or in clothes4 ,hence the ,law called this corruption by the name of leprosy1 whereby a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean3 both because all corruption savored of uncleanness1 as stated above1 and because the ,gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption4 ,hence the ,law prescribed such houses1 where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature1 to be destroyed2 and such garments to be burnt1 in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry4 ,there was also an uncleanness of vessels1 of which it is written 7,num4 #ai3ae73 ,the vessel that hath no cover1 and binding over it1 shall be unclean4 ,the cause of this uncleanness was that anything unclean might easily drop into such vessels1 so as to render them unclean4 ,moreover1 this command aimed at the prevention of idolatry4 ,for idolaters believed that if mice1 lizards1 or the like1 which they used to sacrifice to the idols1 fell into the vessels or into the water1 these became more pleasing to the gods4 ,even now some women let down uncovered vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call ,janae4 ,the figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics2 the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind2 the leprosy of a woolen garment denoted the wickedness of flatterers2 leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul2 leprosy on the woof denoted sins of the flesh1 for as the warp is in the woof1 so is the soul in the body4 ,the vessel that has neither cover nor binding1 betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity1 and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as stated above 7ad #d71 there was a twofold uncleanness in the ,law2 one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body2 and this was the graver uncleanness2 the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing1 and this was less grave1 and was more easily expiated4 ,because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins1 since all corruption is due to sin1 and signifies sin3 whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling of a certain water1 of which water we read in ,num4 #ai4 ,for there ,god commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf4 ,and a cow is mentioned rather than a calf1 because it was thus that the ,lord was wont to designate the synagogue1 according to ,osee #d3af3 ,israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer3 and this was1 perhaps1 because they worshipped heifers after the custom of ,egypt1 according to ,osee #aj3e3 7,they7 have worshipped the kine of ,bethaven4 ,and in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp2 in fact1 whenever sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins1 it was all burnt outside the camp4 ,moreover1 in order to show that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins1 the priest dipped his finger in her blood1 and sprinkled it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times2 for the number seven signified universality4 ,further1 the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of idolatry1 in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out1 but was collected together1 and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols4 ,likewise it was burnt by fire1 either because ,god appeared to ,moses in a fire1 and the ,law was given from the midst of fire2 or to denote that idolatry1 together with all that was connected therewith1 was to be extirpated altogether2 just as the cow was burnt with her skin and her flesh1 her blood and dung being delivered to the flames4 ,to this burning were added cedar-wood1 and hyssop1 and scarlet twice dyed1 to signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction1 and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color1 and hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried2 so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people1 and for their good behavior and devotion4 ,hence it is said of the ashes of the cow3 ,that they may be reserved for the multitude of the children of ,israel4 ,or1 according to ,josephus 7,antiq4 iii1 #h1 #i1 #aj71 the four elements are indicated here3 for cedar-wood was added to the fire1 to signify the earth1 on account of its earthiness2 hyssop1 to signify the air1 on account of its smell2 scarlet twice dyed1 to signify water1 for the same reason as purple1 on account of the dyes which are taken out of the water3 thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the ,creator of the four elements4 ,and since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry1 both he that burned her1 and he that gathered up the ashes1 and he that sprinkled the water in which the ashes were placed1 were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin1 in order to show that whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean4 ,from this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing of their clothes2 nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of uncleanness1 because otherwise the process would have been unending1 since he that sprinkled the water became unclean1 so that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean2 and if another were to sprinkle him1 that one would have become unclean1 and in like manner1 whoever might sprinkle him1 and so on indefinitely4 ,the figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified ,christ in respect of his assumed weakness1 denoted by the female sex2 while the color of the cow designated the blood of ,his ,passion4 ,and the red cow was of full age1 because all ,christ's works are perfect1 in which there was no blemish2 and which had not carried the yoke1 because ,christ was innocent1 nor did ,he carry the yoke of sin4 ,it was commanded to be taken to ,moses1 because they blamed ,him for transgressing the law of ,moses by breaking the ,sabbath4 ,and it was commanded to be delivered to ,eleazar the priest1 because ,christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain4 ,it was immolated without the camp1 because ,christ suffered outside the gate 7,heb4 #ac3ab74 ,and the priest dipped his finger in her blood1 because the mystery of ,christ's ,passion should be considered and imitated4 ,it was sprinkled over against 4 4 4 the tabernacle1 which denotes the synagogue1 to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving ,jews1 or the purification of believers2 and this seven times1 in token either of the seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised4 ,again1 all things that pertain to the ,incarnation of ,christ should be burnt with fire1 i4e4 they should be understood spiritually2 for the skin and flesh signified ,christ's outward works2 the blood denoted the subtle inward force which quickened ,his external deeds2 the dung betokened ,his weariness1 ,his thirst1 and all such like things pertaining to ,his weakness4 ,three things were added1 viz4 cedar-wood1 which denotes the height of hope or contemplation2 hyssop1 in token of humility or faith2 scarlet twice dyed1 which denotes twofold charity2 for it is by these three that we should cling to ,christ suffering4 ,the ashes of this burning were gathered by a man that is clean1 because the relics of the ,passion came into the possession of the ,gentiles1 who were not guilty of ,christ's death4 ,the ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation1 because ,baptism receives from ,christ's ,passion the power of washing away sins4 ,the priest who immolated and burned the cow1 and he who burned1 and he who gathered together the ashes1 were unclean1 as also he that sprinkled the water3 either because the ,jews became unclean through putting ,christ to death1 whereby our sins are expiated2 and this1 until the evening1 i4e4 until the end of the world1 when the remnants of ,israel will be converted2 or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses1 as ,gregory says 7,pastor4 ii1 #e72 and this until the evening1 i4e4 until the end of this life4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as stated above 7ad #e71 an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings4 ,now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals3 but since some were neglectful about expiating such sins and uncleannesses2 or1 through ignorance1 failed to offer this expiation2 it was laid down that once a year1 on the tenth day of the seventh month1 a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the whole people4 ,and because1 as the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3bh71 the ,law maketh men priests1 who have infirmity1 it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins1 in memory of ,aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf2 and besides1 to offer a ram for a holocaust1 which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram1 who is the head of the flock1 was to be ordained to the glory of ,god4 ,then he offered two he-goats for the people3 one of which was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude4 ,for the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal2 and from its skin clothes are made having a pungent odor2 to signify the stench1 uncleanness and the sting of sin4 ,after this he-goat had been immolated1 its blood was taken1 together with the blood of the calf1 into the ,holy of ,holies1 and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it2 to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of ,israel4 ,but the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt1 to denote the destruction of sins4 ,they were not1 however1 burnt on the altar3 since none but holocausts were burnt thereon2 but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without the camp1 in detestation of sin3 for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin1 or for the multitude of sins4 ,the other goat was let loose into the wilderness3 not indeed to offer it to the demons1 whom the ,gentiles worshipped in desert places1 because it was unlawful to offer aught to them2 but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which had been offered up4 ,hence the priest put his hand on its head1 while confessing the sins of the children of ,israel3 as though that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness1 where it would be devoured by wild beasts1 because it bore the punishment of the people's sins4 ,and it was said to bear the sins of the people1 either because the forgiveness of the people's sins was signified by its being let loose1 or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened4 ,the figurative reason of these things was that ,christ was foreshadowed both by the calf1 on account of ,his power2 and by the ram1 because ,he is the ,head of the faithful2 and by the he-goat1 on account of the likeness of sinful flesh 7,rom4 #h3c74 ,moreover1 ,christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people3 since both those of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by ,his ,passion4 ,the blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into the ,holies by the priest1 because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of ,christ's ,passion4 ,their bodies were burnt without the camp1 because ,christ suffered without the gate1 as the ,apostle declares 7,heb4 #ac3ab74 ,the scape-goat may denote either ,christ's ,godhead ,which went away into solitude when the ,man ,christ suffered1 not by going to another place1 but by restraining ,his power3 or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to cast away from ourselves1 while we offer up to ,our ,lord acts of virtue4 ,with regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices1 the reason is the same as that which we assigned 7ad #e7 to the sacrifice of the red heifer4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity1 but declared him to be cleansed4 ,this is shown by the words of ,lev4 #ad3c1 seqq41 where it was said that the priest1 when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed1 shall command him that is to be purified3 consequently1 the leper was already healed3 but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest restored him to the society of men and to the worship of ,god4 ,it happened sometimes1 however1 that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite1 when the priest erred in his judgment4 ,now this purification of a leper was twofold3 for1 in the first place1 he was declared to be clean2 and1 secondly1 he was restored1 as clean1 to the society of men and to the worship of ,god1 to wit1 after seven days4 ,at the first purification the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for himself two living sparrows 4 4 4 cedar-wood1 and scarlet1 and hyssop1 in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread1 so that the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory3 while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow which was immolated 4 4 4 over living waters4 ,these things he offered as an antidote to the four defects of leprosy3 for cedar-wood1 which is not subject to putrefaction1 was offered against the putrefaction2 hyssop1 which is a sweet-smelling herb1 was offered up against the stench2 a living sparrow was offered up against numbness2 and scarlet1 which has a vivid color1 was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy4 ,the living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain1 because the leper was restored to his former liberty4 ,on the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship1 and was restored to the society of men2 but only after having shaved all the hair of his body1 and washed his clothes1 because leprosy rots the hair1 infects the clothes1 and gives them an evil smell4 ,afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin1 since leprosy was frequently a result of sin3 and some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed1 and on the thumb of his right hand1 and the great toe of his right foot2 because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt4 ,in this rite1 moreover1 three liquids were employed3 viz4 blood1 against the corruption of the blood2 oil1 to denote the healing of the disease2 and living waters1 to wash away the filth4 ,the figurative reason was that the ,divine and human natures in ,christ were denoted by the two sparrows1 one of which1 in likeness of ,his human nature1 was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters1 because the waters of ,baptism are sanctified by ,christ's ,passion4 ,the other sparrow1 in token of ,his impassible ,godhead1 remained living1 because the ,godhead cannot die3 hence it flew away1 for the ,godhead could not be encompassed by the ,passion4 ,now this living sparrow1 together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal1 and hyssop1 i4e4 faith1 hope and charity1 as stated above 7ad #e71 was put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling1 because we are baptized in the faith of the ,god-,man4 ,by the waters of ,baptism or of his tears man washes his clothes1 i4e4 his works1 and all his hair1 i4e4 his thoughts4 ,the tip of the right ear of the man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil1 in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words2 and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy4 ,other matters pertaining to this purification1 or to that also of any other uncleannesses1 call for no special remark1 beyond what applies to other sacrifices1 whether for sins or for trespasses4 ,reply ,obj4 #h and #i3 ,just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship1 so were the ministers by some special purification or consecration3 wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other men1 as being specially deputed1 rather than others1 to the ministry of the divine worship4 ,and all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution1 was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity1 power and dignity4 ,hence three things were done in the institution of ministers3 for first1 they were purified2 secondly1 they were adorned 99',ornabantur4' ,some editions have 'ordinabantur'--'were ordained'3 the former reading is a reference to ,lev4 #h3g-i and consecrated2 thirdly1 they were employed in the ministry4 ,all in general used to be purified by washing in water1 and by certain sacrifices2 but the ,levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies1 as stated in ,lev4 #h 7cf4 ,num4 #h74 ,with regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was performed as follows4 ,first1 when they had been washed1 they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity4 ,in particular1 the high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of unction3 to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others1 just as oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body2 according to ,ps4 #acb3b3 ,like the precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard1 the beard of ,aaron4 ,but the ,levites received no other consecration besides being offered to the ,lord by the children of ,israel through the hands of the high-priest1 who prayed for them4 ,the lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only1 which were to be employed in the sacrifices4 ,the tip of their right ear and the thumb of their right hand1 and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal1 to denote that they should be obedient to ,god's law in offering the sacrifices 7this is denoted by touching their right ear72 and that they should be careful and ready in performing the sacrifices 7this is signified by the moistening of the right foot and hand74 ,they themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed1 in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in ,egypt4 ,at their consecration the following sacrifices were offered3 a calf1 for sin1 in memory of ,aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf2 a ram1 for a holocaust1 in memory of the sacrifice of ,abraham1 whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate2 again1 a ram of consecration1 which was a peace-offering1 in memory of the delivery from ,egypt through the blood of the lamb2 and a basket of bread1 in memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people4 ,in reference to their being destined to the ministry1 the fat of the ram1 one roll of bread1 and the right shoulder were placed on their hands1 to show that they received the power of offering these things to the ,lord3 while the ,levites were initiated to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant1 as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary4 ,the figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of ,christ1 should be first of all purified by the waters of ,baptism1 and by the waters of tears1 in their faith in ,christ's ,passion1 which is a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification4 ,they have also to shave all the hair of their body1 i4e4 all evil thoughts4 ,they should1 moreover1 be decked with virtues1 and be consecrated with the oil of the ,holy ,ghost1 and with the sprinkling of ,christ's blood4 ,and thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry4 ,reply ,obj4 #aj3 ,as already stated 7,a4 #d71 the purpose of the ,law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship3 and this in two ways2 first1 by excluding from the worship of ,god whatever might be an object of contempt2 secondly1 by introducing into the divine worship all that seemed to savor of reverence4 ,and1 indeed1 if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels1 and in the animals to be sacrificed1 much more was it to be observed in the very ministers4 ,wherefore1 in order to obviate contempt for the ministers1 it was prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect3 since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others4 ,for the same reason it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of ,god was not to be made in a broadcast manner from any family1 but according to their descent from one particular stock1 thus giving them distinction and nobility4 ,in order that they might be revered1 special ornate vestments were appointed for their use1 and a special form of consecration4 ,this indeed is the general reason of ornate garments4 ,but the high-priest in particular had eight vestments4 ,first1 he had a linen tunic4 ,secondly1 he had a purple tunic2 round the bottom of which were placed little bells and pomegranates of violet1 and purple1 and scarlet twice dyed4 ,thirdly1 he had the ephod1 which covered his shoulders and his breast down to the girdle2 and it was made of gold1 and violet and purple1 and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen3 and on his shoulders he bore two onyx stones1 on which were graven the names of the children of ,israel4 ,fourthly1 he had the rational1 made of the same material2 it was square in shape1 and was worn on the breast1 and was fastened to the ephod4 ,on this rational there were twelve precious stones set in four rows1 on which also were graven the names of the children of ,israel1 in token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people1 since he bore their names on his shoulders2 and that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare1 since he wore them on his breast1 bearing them in his heart1 so to speak4 ,and the ,lord commanded the ,doctrine and ,truth to be put in the rational3 for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were written on it4 ,the ,jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the various things which were about to happen to the children of ,israel3 and this they call the ,truth and ,doctrine4 ,fifthly1 he wore a belt or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above4 ,sixthly1 there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen4 ,seventhly1 there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead2 on it was inscribed the ,lord's name4 ,eighthly1 there were the linen breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness1 when they went up to the sanctuary or altar4 ,of these eight vestments the lesser priests had four1 viz4 the linen tunic and breeches1 the belt and the tiara4 ,according to some1 the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe2 as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the ,creator of the world1 wherefore it is written 7,wis4 #ah3bd73 ,in the robe of ,aaron was the whole world described4 ,for the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax grows4 ,the surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth4 ,the violet tunic denoted the air by its color3 its little bells betoken the thunder2 the pomegranates1 the lightning4 ,the ephod1 by its many colors1 signified the starry heaven2 the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres1 or the sun and moon4 ,the twelve precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac3 and they are said to have been placed on the rational because in heaven are the types 7rationes7 of earthly things1 according to ,job #ch3cc3 ,dost thou know the order of heaven1 and canst thou set down the reason 7rationem7 thereof on the earth8 ,the turban or tiara signified the empyrean3 the golden plate was a token of ,god1 the governor of the universe4 ,the figurative reason is evident4 ,because bodily stains or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune1 signify the various vices and sins from which they should be free4 ,thus it is forbidden that he should be blind1 i4e4 he ought not to be ignorant3 he must not be lame1 i4e4 vacillating and uncertain of purpose3 that he must have a little1 or a great1 or a crooked nose1 i4e4 that he should not1 from lack of discretion1 exceed in one direction or in another1 or even exercise some base occupation3 for the nose signifies discretion1 because it discerns odors4 ,it is forbidden that he should have a broken foot or hand1 i4e4 he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue4 ,he is rejected1 too1 if he have a swelling either in front or behind ,vulg43 'if he be crook-backed'3 by which is signified too much love of earthly things3 if he be blear-eyed1 i4e4 if his mind is darkened by carnal affections3 for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of matter4 ,he is also rejected if he had a pearl in his eye1 i4e4 if he presumes in his own estimation that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness4 ,again1 he is rejected if he have a continued scab1 i4e4 lustfulness of the flesh3 also1 if he have a dry scurf1 which covers the body without giving pain1 and is a blemish on the comeliness of the members2 which denotes avarice4 ,lastly1 he is rejected if he have a rupture or hernia2 through baseness rending his heart1 though it appear not in his deeds4 ,the vestments denote the virtues of ,god's ministers4 ,now there are four things that are necessary to all ,his ministers1 viz4 chastity denoted by the breeches2 a pure life1 signified by the linen tunic2 the moderation of discretion1 betokened by the girdle2 and rectitude of purpose1 denoted by the mitre covering the head4 ,but the high-priests needed four other things in addition to these4 ,first1 a continual recollection of ,god in their thoughts2 and this was signified by the golden plate worn over the forehead1 with the name of ,god engraved thereon4 ,secondly1 they had to bear with the shortcomings of the people3 this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders4 ,thirdly1 they had to carry the people in their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity1 in token of which they wore the rational4 ,fourthly1 they had to lead a godly life by performing works of perfection2 and this was signified by the violet tunic4 ,hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the violet tunic1 which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly mode of life4 ,in addition to these were the pomegranates1 signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals3 because his doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,there ,was ,any ,reasonable ,cause for the ,ceremonial ,observances8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances4 ,because1 as the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #d3d71 every creature of ,god is good1 and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving4 ,it was therefore unfitting that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods1 as being unclean according to ,lev4 #aa 99,cf4 ,deut4 #ad4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as animals are given to man for food1 so also are herbs3 wherefore it is written 7,gen4 #i3c73 ,as the green herbs have ,i delivered all flesh to you4 ,but the ,law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being unclean1 although some are most harmful1 for instance1 those that are poisonous4 ,therefore it seems that neither should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the matter from which a thing is generated be unclean1 it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is unclean4 ,but flesh is generated from blood4 ,since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean1 it seems that in like manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean2 nor the fat which is engendered from blood4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #aj3bh2 cf4 ,luke #ab3d71 that those should not be feared that kill the body1 since after death they have no more that they can do3 which would not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body4 ,much less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how its flesh be cooked4 ,consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said1 ,ex4 #bc3ai3 ,thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 all that is first brought forth of man and beast1 as being most perfect1 is commanded to be offered to the ,lord 7,ex4 #ac74 ,therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in ,lev4 #ai3bc3 when you shall be come into the land1 and shall have planted in it fruit trees1 you shall take away the uncircumcision 99',praeputia1' which ,douay version renders 'first fruits' of them1 i4e4 the first crops1 and they shall be unclean to you1 neither shall you eat of them4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 clothing is something extraneous to man's body4 ,therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to the ,jews3 for instance 7,lev4 #ai3ai73 ,thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts3 and 7,deut4 #bb3e73 ,a woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel1 neither shall a man use woman's apparel3 and further on 7,deut4 #bb3aa73 ,thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of woolen and linen together4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 to be mindful of ,god's commandments concerns not the body but the heart4 ,therefore it is unsuitably prescribed 7,deut4 #f3h1 seqq47 that they should bind the commandments of ,god as a sign on their hands2 and that they should write them in the entry2 and 7,num4 #ae3ch1 seqq47 that they should make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments1 putting in them ribands of blue 4 4 4 they may remember 4 4 4 the commandments of the ,lord4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #i3i7 that ,god does not take care for oxen1 and1 therefore1 neither of other irrational animals4 ,therefore without reason is it commanded 7,deut4 #bb3f73 ,if thou find1 as thou walkest by the way1 a bird's nest in a tree 4 4 4 thou shalt not take the dam with her young2 and 7,deut4 #be3d73 ,thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn2 and 7,lev4 #ai3ai73 ,thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind4 ,objection #i3 ,further1 no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants4 ,much less therefore should any distinction have been made about the cultivation of plants4 ,therefore it was unfittingly prescribed 7,lev4 #ai3ai73 ,thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds2 and 7,deut4 #bb3i1 seqq473 ,thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds2 and3 ,thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together4 ,objection #aj3 ,further1 it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all subject to the power of man4 ,therefore it was unfitting to debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made1 or anything they found in the houses of idols1 as expressed in the commandment of the ,law 7,deut4 #g3be1 seqq474 ,it also seems an absurd commandment set forth in ,deut4 #bc3ac1 that they should dig round about and 4 4 4 cover with earth that which they were eased of4 ,objection #aa3 ,further1 piety is required especially in priests4 ,but it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends3 wherefore ,tobias is commended for so doing 7,tob4 #a3bj1 seqq474 ,in like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman1 because she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy4 ,therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests 7,lev4 #ba74 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #ah3ad73 ,but thou art otherwise instructed by the ,lord thy ,god3 from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted by ,god to be a special prerogative of that people4 ,therefore they are not without reason or cause4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,jewish people1 as stated above 7,a4 #e71 were specially chosen for the worship of ,god1 and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose4 ,and just as other things that are applied to the divine worship1 need to be marked in some particular way so that they be worthy of the worship of ,god2 so too in that people's1 and especially the priests'1 mode of life1 there needed to be certain special things befitting the divine worship1 whether spiritual or corporal4 ,now the worship prescribed by the ,law foreshadowed the mystery of ,christ3 so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to ,christ1 according to #a ,cor4 #aj3aa3 ,all these things happened to them in figures4 ,consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways1 first according to their fittingness to the worship of ,god2 secondly1 according as they foreshadow something touching the ,christian mode of life4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #e1 ad #d1 #e71 the ,law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness2 one1 that of sin1 whereby the soul was defiled2 and another consisting in some kind of corruption1 whereby the body was in some way infected4 ,speaking then of the first-mentioned uncleanness1 no kind of food is unclean1 or can defile a man1 by reason of its nature2 wherefore we read 7,matt4 #ae3aa73 ,not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man2 but what cometh out of the mouth1 this defileth a man3 which words are explained 7,matt4 #ae3ag7 as referring to sins4 ,yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally2 in so far as man partakes of them against obedience or a vow1 or from excessive concupiscence2 or through their being an incentive to lust1 for which reason some refrain from wine and flesh-meat4 ,if1 however1 we speak of bodily uncleanness1 consisting in some kind of corruption1 the flesh of certain animals is unclean1 either because like the pig they feed on unclean things2 or because their life is among unclean surroundings3 thus certain animals1 like moles and mice and such like1 live underground1 whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell2 or because their flesh1 through being too moist or too dry1 engenders corrupt humors in the human body4 ,hence they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals1 i4e4 animals having an uncloven hoof1 on account of their earthiness2 and in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet1 because such are very fierce and their flesh is very dry1 such as the flesh of lions and the like4 ,for the same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry1 and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity4 ,in like manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture2 such as eels and the like4 ,they were1 however1 allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof1 because in such animals the humors are well absorbed1 and their nature well balanced3 for neither are they too moist1 as is indicated by the hoof2 nor are they too earthy1 which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof4 ,of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds1 of which the fins and scales are an indication1 because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered4 ,of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer kinds1 such as hens1 partridges1 and the like4 ,another reason was detestation of idolatry3 because the ,gentiles1 and especially the ,egyptians1 among whom they had grown up1 offered up these forbidden animals to their idols1 or employed them for the purpose of sorcery3 whereas they did not eat those animals which the ,jews were allowed to eat1 but worshipped them as gods1 or abstained1 for some other motive1 from eating them1 as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,the third reason was to prevent excessive care about food3 wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily and promptly4 ,with regard to blood and fat1 they were forbidden to partake of those of any animals whatever without exception4 ,blood was forbidden1 both in order to avoid cruelty1 that they might abhor the shedding of human blood1 as stated above 7,a4 #c1 ad #h72 and in order to shun idolatrous rites whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it for a banquet in honor of the idols1 to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable4 ,hence the ,lord commanded the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth 7,lev4 #ag3ac74 ,for the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled3 because the blood of these animals would not be separated from the body3 or because this form of death is very painful to the victim2 and the ,lord wished to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals1 so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men1 through being used to be kind to beasts4 ,they were forbidden to eat the fat3 both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods2 and because it used to be burnt in honor of ,god2 and1 again1 because blood and fat are not nutritious1 which is the cause assigned by ,rabbi ,moses 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii74 ,the reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in ,gen4 #cb3cb1 where it is stated that the children of ,israel 4 4 4 eat not the sinew 4 4 4 because he touched the sinew of ,jacob's thigh and it shrank4 ,the figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins1 in token of which those animals were prohibited4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,contra ,faustum iv1 #g73 ,if the swine and lamb be called in question1 both are clean by nature1 because all ,god's creatures are good3 yet the lamb is clean1 and the pig is unclean in a certain signification4 ,thus if you speak of a foolish1 and of a wise man1 each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of the sound1 letters and syllables of which it is composed3 but in signification1 the one is clean1 the other unclean4 ,the animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof1 is clean in signification4 ,because division of the hoof is a figure of the two ,testaments3 or of the ,father and ,son3 or of the two natures in ,christ3 of the distinction of good and evil4 ,while chewing the cud signifies meditation on the ,scriptures and a sound understanding thereof2 and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean4 ,in like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification4 ,because fins signify the heavenly or contemplative life2 while scales signify a life of trials1 each of which is required for spiritual cleanness4 ,of birds certain kinds were forbidden4 ,in the eagle which flies at a great height1 pride is forbidden3 in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men1 cruelty of powerful men is prohibited4 ,the osprey1 which feeds on very small birds1 signifies those who oppress the poor4 ,the kite1 which is full of cunning1 denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings4 ,the vulture1 which follows an army1 expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain1 signifies those who like others to die or to fight among themselves that they may gain thereby4 ,birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts2 or those who lack kindly feelings1 for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark4 ,the ostrich which1 though a bird1 cannot fly1 and is always on the ground1 signifies those who fight for ,god's cause1 and at the same time are taken up with worldly business4 ,the owl1 which sees clearly at night1 but cannot see in the daytime1 denotes those who are clever in temporal affairs1 but dull in spiritual matters4 ,the gull1 which both flies in the air and swims in the water1 signifies those who are partial both to ,circumcision and to ,baptism3 or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation1 yet dwell in the waters of sensual delights4 ,the hawk1 which helps men to seize the prey1 is a figure of those who assist the strong to prey on the poor4 ,the screech-owl1 which seeks its food by night but hides by day1 signifies the lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness4 ,the cormorant1 so constituted that it can stay a long time under water1 denotes the glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure4 ,the ibis is an ,african bird with a long beak1 and feeds on snakes2 and perhaps it is the same as the stork3 it signifies the envious man1 who refreshes himself with the ills of others1 as with snakes4 ,the swan is bright in color1 and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water3 it may denote those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue4 ,the bittern is a bird of the ,east3 it has a long beak1 and its jaws are furnished with follicules1 wherein it stores its food at first1 after a time proceeding to digest it3 it is a figure of the miser1 who is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life4 ,the coot 99,douay3 porphyrion4 ,st4 ,thomas' description tallies with the coot or moorhen3 though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another4 has this peculiarity apart from other birds1 that it has a webbed foot for swimming1 and a cloven foot for walking3 for it swims like a duck in the water1 and walks like a partridge on land3 it drinks only when it bites1 since it dips all its food in water3 it is a figure of a man who will not take advice1 and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own will4 ,the heron 99,vulg43 herodionem1 commonly called a falcon1 signifies those whose feet are swift to shed blood 7,ps4 #ac3c74 ,the plover 99,here1 again1 the ,douay translators transcribed from the ,vulgate3 charadrion2 charadrius is the generic name for all plovers41 which is a garrulous bird1 signifies the gossip4 ,the hoopoe1 which builds its nest on dung1 feeds on foetid ordure1 and whose song is like a groan1 denotes worldly grief which works death in those who are unclean4 ,the bat1 which flies near the ground1 signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge1 seek none but earthly things4 ,of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs1 so that they can leap3 whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth3 because those who abuse the doctrine of the four ,evangelists1 so that they are not lifted up thereby1 are reputed unclean4 ,by the prohibition of blood1 fat and nerves1 we are to understand the forbidding of cruelty1 lust1 and bravery in committing sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge3 but the eating of flesh seems to have been introduced after the deluge2 for it is written 7,gen4 #i3c73 ,even as the green herbs have ,i delivered 4 4 4 all flesh to you4 ,the reason for this was that the eating of the products of the soil savors rather of a simple life2 whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and over-careful living4 ,for the soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord2 and such like products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very little effort3 whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal4 ,consequently ,god being wishful to bring ,his people back to a more simple way of living1 forbade them to eat many kinds of animals1 but not those things that are produced by the soil4 ,another reason may be that animals were offered to idols1 while the products of the soil were not4 ,the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is clear from what has been said 7ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked1 yet it would seem to savor of heartlessness if the dam's milk1 which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring1 were served up on the same dish4 ,it might also be said that the ,gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner1 for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet3 hence 7,ex4 #bc7 after the solemnities to be celebrated under the ,law had been foretold1 it is added3 ,thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam4 ,the figurative reason for this prohibition is this3 the kid1 signifying ,christ1 on account of the likeness of sinful flesh 7,rom4 #h3c71 was not to be seethed1 i4e4 slain1 by the ,jews1 in the milk of its dam1 i4e4 during ,his infancy4 ,or else it signifies that the kid1 i4e4 the sinner1 should not be boiled in the milk of its dam1 i4e4 should not be cajoled by flattery4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the ,gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits1 which they held to bring them good luck3 or they burnt them for the purpose of secrecy4 ,consequently 7the ,israelites7 were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean3 for in that country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time2 those trees1 to wit1 that are cultivated either from seed1 or from a graft1 or from a cutting3 but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown3 since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit3 and the ,law considered what happened most frequently4 ,the fruits1 however1 of the fourth year1 as being the firstlings of clean fruits1 were offered to ,god3 and from the fifth year onward they were eaten4 ,the figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the three states of the ,law 7the first lasting from ,abraham to ,david1 the second1 until they were carried away to ,babylon1 the third until the time of ,christ71 the ,fruit of the ,law1 i4e4 ,christ1 was to be offered to ,god4 ,or again1 that we must mistrust our first efforts1 on account of their imperfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,it is said of a man in ,ecclus4 #ai3bg1 that the attire of the body 4 4 4 shows what he is4 ,hence the ,lord wished ,his people to be distinguished from other nations1 not only by the sign of the circumcision1 which was in the flesh1 but also by a certain difference of attire4 ,wherefore they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together1 and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel1 or vice versa1 for two reasons4 ,first1 to avoid idolatrous worship4 ,because the ,gentiles1 in their religious rites1 used garments of this sort1 made of various materials4 ,moreover in the worship of ,mars1 women put on men's armor2 while1 conversely1 in the worship of ,venus men donned women's attire4 ,the second reason was to preserve them from lust3 because the employment of various materials in the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes1 while the use of male attire by a woman1 or vice versa1 has an incentive to evil desires1 and offers an occasion of lust4 ,the figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence1 denoted by wool1 with the duplicity of malice1 betokened by linen4 ,it also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach1 or perform other duties of men3 or that man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,as ,jerome says on ,matt4 #bc3f1 the ,lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments1 so that the ,israelites might be distinguished from other nations4 ,hence1 in this way1 they professed to be ,jews3 and consequently the very sight of this sign reminded them of their law4 ,when we read3 ,thou shalt bind them on thy hand1 and they shall be ever before thy eyes ,vulg43 'they shall be and shall move between thy eyes'1 the ,pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words1 and wrote the decalogue of ,moses on a parchment1 and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath1 so that it moved in front of their eyes3 whereas the intention of the ,lord in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands1 i4e4 in their works2 and that they should be before their eyes1 i4e4 in their thoughts4 ,the violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intention which should accompany our every deed4 ,it may1 however1 be said that1 because they were a carnal-minded and stiff-necked people1 it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the ,law4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,affection in man is twofold3 it may be an affection of reason1 or it may be an affection of passion4 ,if a man's affection be one of reason1 it matters not how man behaves to animals1 because ,god has subjected all things to man's power1 according to ,ps4 #h3h3 ,thou hast subjected all things under his feet3 and it is in this sense that the ,apostle says that ,god has no care for oxen2 because ,god does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals4 ,but if man's affection be one of passion1 then it is moved also in regard to other animals3 for since the passion of pity is caused by the afflictions of others2 and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain1 it is possible for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals4 ,now it is evident that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals1 he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men3 wherefore it is written 7,prov4 #aa3aj73 ,the just regardeth the lives of his beasts3 but the bowels of the wicked are cruel4 ,consequently the ,lord1 in order to inculcate pity to the ,jewish people1 who were prone to cruelty1 wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals1 and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals4 ,hence ,he prohibited them to boil a kid in the milk of its dam2 and to muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn2 and to slay the dam with her young4 ,it may1 nevertheless1 be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry4 ,for the ,egyptians held it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn4 ,moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother bird with her young during incubation1 and to employ them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up children3 also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young4 ,as to the mingling of animals of divers species1 the literal reason may have been threefold4 ,the first was to show detestation for the idolatry of the ,egyptians1 who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets1 which produce various effects1 and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions4 ,the second reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins4 ,the third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence4 ,because animals of different species do not easily breed1 unless this be brought about by man2 and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things4 ,wherefore in the ,jewish traditions we find it prescribed as stated by ,rabbi ,moses that men shall turn away their eyes from such sights4 ,the figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn1 i4e4 from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine1 as the ,apostle states 7#a ,cor4 #i3d1 seqq474 ,again1 we should not take the dam with her young3 because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses1 i4e4 the offspring1 and set aside the observance of the letter1 i4e4 the mother1 for instance1 in all the ceremonies of the ,law4 ,it is also forbidden that a beast of burden1 i4e4 any of the common people1 should be allowed to engender1 i4e4 to have any connection1 with animals of another kind1 i4e4 with ,gentiles or ,jews4 ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,all these minglings were forbidden in agriculture2 literally1 in detestation of idolatry4 ,for the ,egyptians in worshipping the stars employed various combinations of seeds1 animals and garments1 in order to represent the various connections of the stars4 ,or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice4 ,they have1 however1 a figurative reason4 ,for the prohibition3 ,thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds1 is to be understood1 in the spiritual sense1 of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the ,church1 which is a spiritual vineyard4 ,likewise the field1 i4e4 the ,church1 must not be sown with different seeds1 i4e4 with ,catholic and heretical doctrines4 ,neither is it allowed to plough with an ox and an ass together2 thus a fool should not accompany a wise man in preaching1 for one would hinder the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #aj3 99,the ,reply to the ,tenth ,objection is lacking in the codices4 ,the solution given here is found in some editions1 and was supplied by ,nicolai4 ,silver and gold were reasonably forbidden 7,deut4 #g7 not as though they were not subject to the power of man1 but because1 like the idols themselves1 all materials out of which idols were made1 were anathematized as hateful in ,god's sight4 ,this is clear from the same chapter1 where we read further on 7,deut4 #g3bf73 ,neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house1 lest thou become an anathema like it4 ,another reason was lest1 by taking silver and gold1 they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the ,jews were inclined4 ,the other precept 7,deut4 #bc7 about covering up excretions1 was just and becoming1 both for the sake of bodily cleanliness2 and in order to keep the air wholesome2 and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which stood in the midst of the camp1 wherein the ,lord was said to dwell2 as is clearly set forth in the same passage1 where after expressing the command1 the reason thereof is at once added1 to wit3 ,for the ,lord thy ,god walketh in the midst of thy camp1 to deliver thee1 and to give up thy enemies to thee1 and let thy camp be holy 7i4e4 clean71 and let no uncleanness appear therein4 ,the figurative reason for this precept1 according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi71 is that sins which are the fetid excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance1 that we may become acceptable to ,god1 according to ,ps4 #ca3a3 ,blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven1 and whose sins are covered4 ,or else according to a gloss1 that we should recognize the unhappy condition of human nature1 and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination4 ,reply ,obj4 #aa3 ,sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use1 in their rites1 of the bones and flesh of dead men4 ,wherefore1 in order to extirpate the customs of idolatrous worship1 the ,lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree1 who at fixed times served in the temple1 should not incur an uncleanness at the death of anyone except of those who were closely related to them1 viz4 their father or mother1 and others thus near of kin to them4 ,but the high-priest had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary2 wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead1 however nearly related to him4 ,they were also forbidden to marry a harlot or one that has been put away1 or any other than a virgin3 both on account of the reverence due to the priesthood1 the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage3 and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother's shame3 which was most of all to be avoided when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to son4 ,again1 they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard1 and not to make incisions in their flesh1 in order to exclude the rites of idolatry4 ,for the priests of the ,gentiles shaved both head and beard1 wherefore it is written 7,bar #f3cj73 ,priests sit in their temples having their garments rent1 and their heads and beards shaven4 ,moreover1 in worshipping their idols they cut themselves with knives and lancets 7#c ,kings #ah3bh74 ,for this reason the priests of the ,old ,law were commanded to do the contrary4 ,the spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely free from dead works1 i4e4 sins4 ,and they should not shave their heads1 i4e4 set wisdom aside2 nor should they shave their beards1 i4e4 set aside the perfection of wisdom2 nor rend their garments or cut their flesh1 i4e4 they should not incur the sin of schism4 ,,question #ajc ,,of ,,the ,,duration ,,of ,,the ,,ceremonial ,,precepts 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the ,law8 7#b7 ,whether at the time of the ,law the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had any power of justification8 7#c7 ,whether they ceased at the coming of ,christ8 7#d7 ,whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of ,christ8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,ceremonies of the ,law ,were in ,existence ,before the ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ceremonies of the ,law were in existence before the ,law4 ,for sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies of the ,old ,law1 as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #d74 ,but sacrifices and holocausts preceded the ,law3 for it is written 7,gen4 #d3c1 #d7 that ,cain offered1 of the fruits of the earth1 gifts to the ,lord1 and that ,abel offered of the firstlings of his flock1 and of their fat4 ,noe also offered holocausts to the ,lord 7,gen4 #ah3bj71 and ,abraham did in like manner 7,gen4 #bb3ac74 ,therefore the ceremonies of the ,old ,law preceded the ,law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things4 ,but these preceded the ,law4 ,for we read 7,gen4 #ac3ah7 that ,abraham 4 4 4 built 4 4 4 an altar the ,lord2 and 7,gen4 #bh3ah7 that ,jacob 4 4 4 took the stone 4 4 4 and set it up for a title1 pouring oil upon the top of it4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the ,law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision4 ,but circumcision preceded the ,law1 as appears from ,gen4 #ag4 ,in like manner the priesthood preceded the ,law2 for it is written 7,gen4 #ad3ah7 that ,melchisedech 4 4 4 was the priest of the most high ,god4 ,therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the ,law4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajj1 #b1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a74 ,but this distinction preceded the ,law2 for it is written 7,gen4 #g3b1 #c73 ,of all clean beasts take seven and seven 4 4 4 but of the beasts that are unclean1 two and two4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the ,law4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #f3a73 ,these are the precepts and ceremonies 4 4 4 which the ,lord your ,god commanded that ,i should teach you4 ,but they would not have needed to be taught about these things1 if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies did not precede the ,law4 ,i answer that1 ,as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #b71 the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose2 the worship of ,god1 and the foreshadowing of ,christ4 ,now whoever worships ,god must needs worship ,him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship4 ,but the fixing of the divine worship belongs to the ceremonies2 just as the determining of our relations with our neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d74 ,consequently1 as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts1 not indeed established by ,divine authority1 but ordained by human reason2 so also there were some ceremonies fixed1 not by the authority of any law1 but according to the will and devotion of those that worship ,god4 ,since1 however1 even before the ,law some of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy1 it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct1 like a private law1 prompted them to worship ,god in a certain definite way1 which would be both in keeping with the interior worship1 and a suitable token of ,christ's mysteries1 which were foreshadowed also by other things that they did1 according to #a ,cor4 #aj3aa3 ,all 4 4 4 things happened to them in figure4 ,therefore there were some ceremonies before the ,law1 but they were not legal ceremonies1 because they were not as yet established by legislation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the patriarchs offered up these oblations1 sacrifices and holocausts previously to the ,law1 out of a certain devotion of their own will1 according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of ,god those things which they had received from ,him1 and thus to testify that they worshipped ,god ,who is the beginning and end of all4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,they also established certain sacred things1 because they thought that the honor due to ,god demanded that certain places should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sacrament of circumcision was established by command of ,god before the ,law4 ,hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the ,law as though it were an institution of the ,law1 but only as an observance included in the ,law4 ,hence ,our ,lord said 7,john #g3bj7 that circumcision was not of ,moses1 but of his fathers4 ,again1 among those who worshipped ,god1 the priesthood was in existence before the ,law by human appointment1 for the ,law allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the ,law1 not with regard to eating them1 since it is written 7,gen4 #i3c73 ,everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you3 but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used only certain animals for that purpose4 ,if1 however1 they did make any distinction in regard to eating2 it was not that it was considered illegal to eat such animals1 since this was not forbidden by any law1 but from dislike or custom3 thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries1 while people partake of them in others4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #b ,whether1 at the ,time of the ,law1 the ,ceremonies of the ,old ,law ,had ,any ,power of ,justification8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had the power of justification at the time of the ,law4 ,because expiation from sin and consecration pertains to justification4 ,but it is written 7,ex4 #ci3ba7 that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil2 and 7,lev4 #af3af7 that1 by sprinkling the blood of the calf1 the priest expiated the sanctuary from the uncleanness of the children of ,israel1 and from their transgressions and 4 4 4 their sins4 ,therefore the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had the power of justification4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that by which man pleases ,god pertains to justification1 according to ,ps4 #aj3h3 ,the ,lord is just and hath loved justice4 ,but some pleased ,god by means of ceremonies1 according to ,lev4 #aj3ai3 ,how could ,i 4 4 4 please the ,lord in the ceremonies1 having a sorrowful heart8 ,therefore the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had the power of justification4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body1 according to ,ps4 #ah3h3 ,the ,law of the ,lord is unspotted1 converting souls4 ,but the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the ,old ,law1 as stated in ,lev4 #ad4 ,much more therefore could the ceremonies of the ,old ,law cleanse the soul by justifying it4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #b7 99,the first words of the quotation are from #c3ba3 ,st4 ,thomas probably quoting from memory1 substituted them for #b3ba1 which runs thus3 ',if justice be by the ,law1 then ,christ died in vain4'3 ,if there had been a law given which could justify ,vulg43 'give life'1 ,christ died in vain1 i4e4 without cause4 ,but this is inadmissible4 ,therefore the ceremonies of the ,old ,law did not confer justice4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d71 a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the ,old ,law4 ,one was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin4 ,the other was corporal1 which rendered a man unfit for divine worship2 thus a leper1 or anyone that touched carrion1 was said to be unclean3 and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity4 ,from this uncleanness1 then1 the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had the power to cleanse3 because they were ordered by the ,law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were contracted in consequence of the prescription of the ,law4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #i3ac7 that the blood of goats and of oxen1 and the ashes of a heifer1 being sprinkled1 sanctify such as are defiled1 to the cleansing of the flesh4 ,and just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies1 affected the flesh rather than the soul1 so also the ceremonies themselves are called by the ,apostle shortly before 7,heb4 #i3aj7 justices of the flesh3 justices of the flesh1 says he1 being laid on them until the time of correction4 ,on the other hand1 they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul1 i4e4 from the uncleanness of sin4 ,the reason of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin1 except through ,christ1 ,who taketh away the sins ,vulg43 'sin' of the world 7,john #a3bi74 ,and since the mystery of ,christ's ,incarnation and ,passion had not yet really taken place1 those ceremonies of the ,old ,law could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from ,christ already incarnate and crucified1 such as the sacraments of the ,new ,law contain4 ,consequently they could not cleanse from sin3 thus the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aj3d7 that it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away2 and for this reason he calls them 7,gal4 #d3i7 weak and needy elements3 weak indeed1 because they cannot take away sin2 but this weakness results from their being needy1 i4e4 from the fact that they do not contain grace within themselves4 ,however1 it was possible at the time of the ,law1 for the minds of the faithful1 to be united by faith to ,christ incarnate and crucified2 so that they were justified by faith in ,christ3 of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession1 inasmuch as they foreshadowed ,christ4 ,hence in the ,old ,law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins1 not as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away1 but because they were professions of faith which cleansed from sin4 ,in fact1 the ,law itself implies this in the terms employed3 for it is written 7,lev4 #d3bf2 #e3af7 that in offering the sacrifice for sin the priest shall pray for him 4 4 4 and it shall be forgiven him1 as though the sin were forgiven1 not in virtue of the sacrifices1 but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them4 ,it must be observed1 however1 that the very fact that the ceremonies of the ,old ,law washed away uncleanness of the body1 was a figure of that expiation from sins which was effected by ,christ4 ,it is therefore evident that under the state of the ,old ,law the ceremonies had no power of justification4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that sanctification of priests and their sons1 and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them1 by sprinkling them with blood1 had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship1 and to remove impediments from them1 to the cleansing of the flesh1 as the ,apostle states 7,heb4 #i3ac7 in token of that sanctification whereby ,jesus sanctified the people by ,his own blood 7,heb4 #ac3ab74 ,moreover1 the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses1 not to the forgiveness of sin4 ,hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the priests pleased ,god in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion1 and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed2 not by reason of the things considered in themselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper1 were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the defilement of leprosy4 ,this is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed3 hence it is written 7,lev4 #ad3c1 #d7 that the priest1 going out of the camp1 when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed1 shall command him that is to be purified to offer1 etc42 whence it is evident that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy1 not before1 but after cleansing4 ,but these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity4 ,they do say1 however1 that if a priest were to err in his judgment1 the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of ,god1 but not in virtue of the sacrifice4 ,thus also it was by miracle that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted1 when she had drunk the water on which the priest had heaped curses1 as stated in ,num4 #e3ai-bg4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,ceremonies of the ,old ,law ,ceased at the ,coming of ,christ8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ceremonies of the ,old ,law did not cease at the coming of ,christ4 ,for it is written 7,bar4 #d3a73 ,this is the book of the commandments of ,god1 and the law that is for ever4 ,but the legal ceremonies were part of the ,law4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the ,law4 ,but the ,gospel commands the leper1 who has been cleansed1 to make this offering 7,matt4 #h3d74 ,therefore the ceremonies of the ,old ,law did not cease at ,christ's coming4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as long as the cause remains1 the effect remains4 ,but the ceremonies of the ,old ,law had certain reasonable causes1 inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of ,god1 besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of ,christ4 ,therefore the ceremonies of the ,old ,law should not have ceased4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 circumcision was instituted as a sign of ,abraham's faith3 the observance of the sabbath1 to recall the blessing of creation3 and other solemnities1 in memory of other ,divine favors1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #d1 ad #aj2 ,a4 #e1 ad #a74 ,but ,abraham's faith is ever to be imitated even by us3 and the blessing of creation and other ,divine favors should never be forgotten4 ,therefore at least circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,col4 #b3af1 #ag73 ,let no man 4 4 4 judge you in meat or in drink1 or in respect of a festival day1 or of the new moon1 or of the sabbaths1 which are a shadow of things to come3 and 7,heb4 #h3ac73 ,in saying a new 7testament71 he hath made the former old3 and that which decayeth and groweth old1 is near its end4 ,i answer that1 ,all the ceremonial precepts of the ,old ,law were ordained to the worship of ,god as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship1 which consists in faith1 hope and charity4 ,consequently exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship1 in which a threefold state may be distinguished4 ,one state was in respect of faith and hope1 both in heavenly goods1 and in the means of obtaining them--in both of these considered as things to come4 ,such was the state of faith and hope in the ,old ,law4 ,another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come2 but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods1 as in things present or past4 ,such is the state of the ,new ,law4 ,the third state is that in which both are possessed as present2 wherein nothing is believed in as lacking1 nothing hoped for as being yet to come4 ,such is the state of the ,blessed4 ,in this state of the ,blessed1 then1 nothing in regard to worship of ,god will be figurative2 there will be naught but thanksgiving and voice of praise 7,isa4 #ea3c74 ,hence it is written concerning the city of the ,blessed 7,apoc4 #ba3bb73 ,i saw no temple therein3 for the ,lord ,god ,almighty is the temple thereof1 and the ,lamb4 ,proportionately1 therefore1 the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third states1 had need to cease at the advent of the second state2 and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that particular time1 wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future1 but the ,divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,old ,law is said to be for ever simply and absolutely1 as regards its moral precepts2 but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in ,christ's ,passion3 hence ,our ,lord said then3 ,it is consummated 7,john #ai3cj74 ,consequently the prescriptions of the ,law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled4 ,as a sign of this1 we read that at the ,passion of ,christ the veil of the temple was rent 7,matt4 #bg3ea74 ,hence1 before ,christ's ,passion1 while ,christ was preaching and working miracles1 the ,law and the ,gospel were concurrent1 since the mystery of ,christ had already begun1 but was not as yet consummated4 ,and for this reason ,our ,lord1 before ,his ,passion1 commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the literal reasons already given 7,q4 #ajb7 for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship1 which was founded on faith in that which was to come4 ,hence1 at the advent of ,him ,who was to come1 both that worship ceased1 and all the reasons referring thereto4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the faith of ,abraham was commended in that he believed in ,god's promise concerning his seed to come1 in which all nations were to blessed4 ,wherefore1 as long as this seed was yet to come1 it was necessary to make profession of ,abraham's faith by means of circumcision4 ,but now that it is consummated1 the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign1 viz4 ,baptism1 which1 in this respect1 took the place of circumcision1 according to the saying of the ,apostle 7,col4 #b3aa1 #ab73 ,you are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand1 in despoiling of the body of the flesh1 but in the circumcision of ,christ1 buried with ,him in ,baptism4 ,as to the sabbath1 which was a sign recalling the first creation1 its place is taken by the ,lord's ,day1 which recalls the beginning of the new creature in the ,resurrection of ,christ4 ,in like manner other solemnities of the ,old ,law are supplanted by new solemnities3 because the blessings vouchsafed to that people1 foreshadowed the favors granted us by ,christ4 ,hence the feast of the ,passover gave place to the feast of ,christ's ,passion and ,resurrection3 the feast of ,pentecost when the ,old ,law was given1 to the feast of ,pentecost on which was given the ,law of the living spirit3 the feast of the ,new ,moon1 to ,lady ,day1 when appeared the first rays of the sun1 i4e4 ,christ1 by the fulness of grace3 the feast of ,trumpets1 to the feasts of the ,apostles3 the feast of ,expiation1 to the feasts of ,martyrs and ,confessors3 the feast of ,tabernacles1 to the feast of the ,church ,dedication3 the feast of the ,assembly and ,collection1 to feast of the ,angels1 or else to the feast of ,all ,hallows4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,since ,christ's ,passion the ,legal ,ceremonies ,can ,be ,observed ,without ,committing ,mortal ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that since ,christ's ,passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin4 ,for we must not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the ,holy ,ghost3 since by ,his fulness they were endued with power from on high 7,luke #bd3di74 ,but the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the ,holy ,ghost3 for it is stated 7,acts #af3c7 that ,paul circumcised ,timothy3 and 7,acts #ba3bf7 that ,paul1 at the advice of ,james1 took the men1 and 4 4 4 being purified with them1 entered into the temple1 giving notice of the accomplishment of the days of purification1 until an oblation should be offered for every one of them4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since the ,passion of ,christ without mortal sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of ,gentiles4 ,but the first ,pastor of the ,church complied with this observance2 for it is stated 7,gal4 #b3ab7 that1 when certain men had come to ,antioch1 ,peter withdrew and separated himself from the ,gentiles4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since ,christ's ,passion without committing mortal sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin4 ,but it was commanded by apostolic decree that the ,gentiles should observe certain ceremonies of the ,law3 for it is written 7,acts #ae3bh1 #bi73 ,it hath seemed good to the ,holy ,ghost and to us1 to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things3 that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols1 and from blood1 and from things strangled1 and from fornication4 ,therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since ,christ's ,passion without committing mortal sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3b73 ,if you be circumcised1 ,christ shall profit you nothing4 ,but nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving ,christ's fruit4 ,therefore since ,christ's ,passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised1 or to observe the other legal ceremonies4 ,i answer that1 ,all ceremonies are professions of faith1 in which the interior worship of ,god consists4 ,now man can make profession of his inward faith1 by deeds as well as by words3 and in either profession1 if he make a false declaration1 he sins mortally4 ,now1 though our faith in ,christ is the same as that of the fathers of old2 yet1 since they came before ,christ1 whereas we come after ,him1 the same faith is expressed in different words1 by us and by them4 ,for by them was it said3 ,behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son1 where the verbs are in the future tense3 whereas we express the same by means of verbs in the past tense1 and say that she conceived and bore4 ,in like manner the ceremonies of the ,old ,law betokened ,christ as having yet to be born and to suffer3 whereas our sacraments signify ,him as already born and having suffered4 ,consequently1 just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone1 in making a profession of faith1 to say that ,christ is yet to be born1 which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully2 so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity4 ,such is the teaching of ,augustine 7,contra ,faust4 xix1 #af71 who says3 ,it is no longer promised that ,he shall be born1 shall suffer and rise again1 truths of which their sacraments were a kind of image3 but it is declared that ,he is already born1 has suffered and risen again2 of which our sacraments1 in which ,christians share1 are the actual representation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,on this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between ,jerome and ,augustine4 ,for ,jerome 7,super ,galat4 ii1 #aa1 seqq47 distinguished two periods of time4 ,one was the time previous to ,christ's ,passion1 during which the legal ceremonies were neither dead1 since they were obligatory1 and did expiate in their own fashion2 nor deadly1 because it was not sinful to observe them4 ,but immediately after ,christ's ,passion they began to be not only dead1 so as no longer to be either effectual or binding2 but also deadly1 so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin4 ,hence he maintained that after the ,passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest2 but only by a kind of pious pretense1 lest1 to wit1 they should scandalize the ,jews and hinder their conversion4 ,this pretense1 however1 is to be understood1 not as though they did not in reality perform those actions1 but in the sense that they performed them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the ,law3 thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health's sake1 not with the intention of observing legal circumcision4 ,but since it seems unbecoming that the apostles1 in order to avoid scandal1 should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and doctrine1 and that they should have made use of pretense1 in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful2 therefore ,augustine 7,epist4 lxxxii7 more fittingly distinguished three periods of time4 ,one was the time that preceded the ,passion of ,christ1 during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead3 another period was after the publication of the ,gospel1 during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly4 ,the third is a middle period1 viz4 from the ,passion of ,christ until the publication of the ,gospel1 during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed1 because they had neither effect nor binding force2 but were not deadly1 because it was lawful for the ,jewish converts to ,christianity to observe them1 provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation1 as though faith in ,christ could not justify without the legal observances4 ,on the other hand1 there was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to ,christianity should observe them4 ,hence ,paul circumcised ,timothy1 who was born of a ,jewish mother2 but was unwilling to circumcise ,titus1 who was of heathen nationality4 ,the reason why the ,holy ,ghost did not wish the converted ,jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies1 while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom1 was in order to show that there is a difference between these rites4 ,for heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful1 and as prohibited by ,god for all time2 whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through ,christ's ,passion1 being instituted by ,god as a figure of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to ,jerome1 ,peter withdrew himself from the ,gentiles by pretense1 in order to avoid giving scandal to the ,jews1 of whom he was the ,apostle4 ,hence he did not sin at all in acting thus4 ,on the other hand1 ,paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him1 in order to avoid scandalizing the ,gentiles1 whose ,apostle he was4 ,but ,augustine disapproves of this solution3 because in the canonical ,scripture 7viz4 ,gal4 #b3aa71 wherein we must not hold anything to be false1 ,paul says that ,peter was to be blamed4 ,consequently it is true that ,peter was at fault3 and ,paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense4 ,peter1 however1 did not sin1 by observing the legal ceremonial for the time being2 because this was lawful for him who was a converted ,jew4 ,but he did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the ,jews1 the result being that he gave scandal to the ,gentiles4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally1 but spiritually3 namely1 that the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder2 the prohibition of things strangled1 that of violence and rapine2 the prohibition of things offered to idols1 that of idolatry2 while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself3 which opinion they gathered from certain glosses1 which expound these prohibitions in a mystical sense4 ,since1 however1 murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the ,gentiles1 there would have been no need to give this special commandment to those who were converted to ,christ from heathendom4 ,hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally1 not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies1 but in order to prevent gluttony4 ,thus ,jerome says on ,ezech4 #dd3ca 7,the priest shall not eat of anything that is dead73 ,he condemns those priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts4 ,but since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony1 there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden more than the others4 ,we must therefore follow the third opinion1 and hold that these foods were forbidden literally1 not with the purpose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies1 but in order to further the union of ,gentiles and ,jews living side by side4 ,because blood and things strangled were loathsome to the ,jews by ancient custom2 while the ,jews might have suspected the ,gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols4 ,hence these things were prohibited for the time being1 during which the ,gentiles and ,jews were to become united together4 ,but as time went on1 with the lapse of the cause1 the effect lapsed also1 when the truth of the ,gospel teaching was divulged1 wherein ,our ,lord taught that not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man 7,matt4 #ae3aa72 and that nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving 7#a ,tim4 #d3d74 ,with regard to fornication a special prohibition was made1 because the ,gentiles did not hold it to be sinful4 ,,question #ajd ,,of ,,the ,,judicial ,,precepts 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the judicial precepts3 and first of all we shall consider them in general2 in the second place we shall consider their reasons4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is meant by the judicial precepts8 7#b7 ,whether they are figurative8 7#c7 ,their duration2 7#d7 ,their division4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,judicial ,precepts ,were ,those ,which ,directed ,man in ,relation to ,his ,neighbor8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor4 ,for judicial precepts take their name from judgment4 ,but there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor1 which are not subordinate to judgment4 ,therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d74 ,but there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor3 as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table4 ,therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the ceremonial precepts relate to ,god1 so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor1 as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #a74 ,but among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself1 such as observances in matter of food and apparel1 of which we have already spoken 7,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a1 #f74 ,therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is reckoned 7,ezech4 #ah3h7 among other works of a good and just man1 that he hath executed true judgment between man and man4 ,but judicial precepts are so called from judgment4 ,therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man4 ,i answer that1 ,as is evident from what we have stated above 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d71 in every law1 some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself1 because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided4 ,these are called moral precepts3 since human morals are based on reason4 ,at the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force1 not from the very dictate of reason 7because1 considered in themselves1 they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue72 but from some institution1 ,divine or human3 and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts4 ,when therefore the moral precepts are fixed by ,divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to ,god1 they are called ceremonial precepts3 but when they refer to man's relations to other men1 they are called judicial precepts4 ,hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts3 viz4 first1 that they refer to man's relations to other men2 secondly1 that they derive their binding force not from reason alone1 but in virtue of their institution4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs1 and in whom the judicial power is vested4 ,now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters1 but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man1 and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof4 ,consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law2 but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another1 which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor1 and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in those precepts which direct us to ,god1 some are moral precepts1 which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith2 such as that ,god is to be loved and worshipped4 ,there are also ceremonial precepts1 which have no binding force except in virtue of their ,divine institution4 ,now ,god is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to ,him1 but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to ,him and worship ,him4 ,because men are ordained to ,god as to their end2 wherefore it concerns ,god and1 consequently1 is a matter of ceremonial precept1 that man should show some fitness for the divine worship4 ,on the other hand1 man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end1 so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor1 for such is the relationship of a slave to his master1 since a slave is his master's in all that he is1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b74 ,hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself2 all such precepts are moral3 because the reason1 which is the principle in moral matters1 holds the same position1 in man1 with regard to things that concern him1 as a prince or judge holds in the state4 ,nevertheless we must take note that1 since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to ,god1 there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor1 than whereby he is directed to ,god4 ,for the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the ,law4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,judicial ,precepts ,were ,figurative8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative4 ,because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else4 ,therefore1 if the judicial precepts are figurative1 there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 just as certain judicial precepts were given to the ,jewish people1 so also were some given to other heathen peoples4 ,but the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative1 but stated what had to be done4 ,therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the ,old ,law figures of anything4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures1 because the things of ,god are above our reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,but things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason4 ,therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative4 ,on the contrary1 ,the judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense 7,ex4 #ba74 ,i answer that1 ,a precept may be figurative in two ways4 ,first1 primarily and in itself3 because1 to wit1 it is instituted principally that it may be the figure of something4 ,in this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative2 since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of ,god and the mystery of ,christ4 ,but some precepts are figurative1 not primarily and in themselves1 but consequently4 ,in this way the judicial precepts of the ,old ,law are figurative4 ,for they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative1 but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity4 ,nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently3 since1 to wit1 the entire state of that people1 who were directed by these precepts1 was figurative1 according to #a ,cor4 #aj3aa3 ,all 4 4 4 things happened to them in figure4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts1 as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,jewish people were chosen by ,god that ,christ might be born of them4 ,consequently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative1 as ,augustine states 7,contra ,faust4 xxii1 #bd74 ,for this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations4 ,thus1 too1 the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense3 but not the wars and deeds of the ,assyrians or ,romans1 although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor1 considered in itself1 was subject to reason4 ,but in so far as it was referred to the worship of ,god1 it was above reason3 and in this respect it was figurative4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,judicial ,precepts of the ,old ,law ,bind for ,ever8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the judicial precepts of the ,old ,law bind for ever4 ,because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice3 since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice4 ,now justice is perpetual and immortal 7,wis4 #a3ae74 ,therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions4 ,but the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever4 ,therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the ,divine ,law4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3ah7 that there is a setting aside of the former commandment1 because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof4 ,now this is true of the ceremonial precept1 which could ,vulg43 'can' not1 as to the conscience1 make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks1 and divers washings and justices of the flesh1 as the ,apostle declares 7,heb4 #i3i1 #aj74 ,on the other hand1 the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted1 viz4 to establish justice and equity among men4 ,therefore the judicial precepts of the ,old ,law are not set aside1 but still retain their efficacy4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3ab7 that the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the ,law4 ,but the priesthood was transferred from ,aaron to ,christ4 ,therefore the entire ,law was also transferred4 ,therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force4 ,i answer that1 ,the judicial precepts did not bind for ever1 but were annulled by the coming of ,christ3 yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts4 ,for the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only dead1 but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of ,christ1 especially since the promulgation of the ,gospel4 ,on the other hand1 the judicial precepts are dead indeed1 because they have no binding force3 but they are not deadly4 ,for if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom1 he would not sin3 unless perchance they were observed1 or ordered to be observed1 as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the ,old ,law3 for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus4 ,the reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above 7,a4 #b74 ,for it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves1 as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of ,christ to come4 ,on the other hand1 the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures1 but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to ,christ4 ,consequently1 when the state of that people changed with the coming of ,christ1 the judicial precepts lost their binding force3 for the ,law was a pedagogue1 leading men to ,christ1 as stated in ,gal4 #c3bd4 ,since1 however1 these judicial precepts are instituted1 not for the purpose of being figures1 but for the performance of certain deeds1 the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith4 ,but the intention of observing them1 as though one were bound by the ,law1 is prejudicial to the truth of faith3 because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts1 and that ,christ has not yet come4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual4 ,but the determination of those things that are just1 according to human or ,divine institution1 must needs be different1 according to the different states of mankind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever1 so long as the state of government remains the same4 ,but if the state or nation pass to another form of government1 the laws must needs be changed4 ,for democracy1 which is government by the people1 demands different laws from those of oligarchy1 which is government by the rich1 as the ,philosopher shows 7,polit4 iv1 #a74 ,consequently when the state of that people changed1 the judicial precepts had to be changed also4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity1 in keeping with the demands of that state4 ,but after the coming of ,christ1 there had to be a change in the state of that people1 so that in ,christ there was no distinction between ,gentile and ,jew1 as there had been before4 ,for this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,it ,is ,possible to ,assign a ,distinct ,division of the ,judicial ,precepts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts4 ,because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another4 ,but those things which need to be directed1 as pertaining to the relationship between man and man1 and which are made use of by men1 are not subject to division1 since they are infinite in number4 ,therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters4 ,but moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division1 except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue4 ,therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts1 the ,law alludes to this division1 by describing some as sacrifices1 others as observances4 ,but the ,law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts4 ,therefore it seems that they have no distinct division4 ,on the contrary1 ,wherever there is order there must needs be division4 ,but the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts1 since thereby that people was ordained4 ,therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division4 ,i answer that1 ,since law is the art1 as it were1 of directing or ordering the life of man1 as in every art there is a distinct division in the rules of art1 so1 in every law1 there must be a distinct division of precepts3 else the law would be rendered useless by confusion4 ,we must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the ,old ,law1 whereby men were directed in their relations to one another1 are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is directed4 ,now in every people a fourfold order is to be found3 one1 of the people's sovereign to his subjects2 a second of the subjects among themselves2 a third1 of the citizens to foreigners2 a fourth1 of members of the same household1 such as the order of the father to his son2 of the wife to her husband2 of the master to his servant3 and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the ,old ,law4 ,for certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office1 and about the respect due to him3 this is one part of the judicial precepts4 ,again1 certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens3 for instance1 about buying and selling1 judgments and penalties3 this is the second part of the judicial precepts4 ,again1 certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners3 for instance1 about wars waged against their foes1 and about the way to receive travelers and strangers3 this is the third part of the judicial precepts4 ,lastly1 certain precepts are given relating to home life3 for instance1 about servants1 wives and children3 this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number3 yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads1 according to the different relations in which one man stands to another1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #c73 and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them4 ,but the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force1 derived1 not from natural reason1 but from their institution alone4 ,hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the ,law4 ,,question #aje ,,of ,,the ,,reason ,,for ,,the ,,judicial ,,precepts 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers2 7#b7 ,concerning the fellowship of one man with another2 7#c7 ,concerning matters relating to foreigners2 7#d7 ,concerning things relating to domestic matters4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,old ,law ,enjoined ,fitting ,precepts ,concerning ,rulers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers4 ,because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #d71 the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler4 ,but the ,law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler2 and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers3 firstly 7,ex4 #ah3ba73 ,provide out of all the people wise ,vulg43 'able' men1 etc42 again 7,num4 #aa3af73 ,gather unto ,me seventy men of the ancients of ,israel2 and again 7,deut4 #a3ac73 ,let ,me have from among you wise and understanding men1 etc4 ,therefore the ,law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,the best gives of the best1 as ,plato states 7,tim4 ii74 ,now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled by a king3 because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the ,divine government1 whereby ,god rules the world from the beginning4 ,therefore the ,law should have set a king over the people1 and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter1 as indeed they were allowed 7,deut4 #ag3ad1 #ae73 ,when thou 4 4 4 shalt say3 ,i will set a king over me 4 4 4 thou shalt set him1 etc4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,matt4 #ab3be3 ,every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate3 a saying which was verified in the ,jewish people1 whose destruction was brought about by the division of the kingdom4 ,but the ,law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being of the people4 ,therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings3 nor should this have been introduced even by ,divine authority2 as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet ,ahias the ,silonite 7#c ,kings #aa3bi1 seqq474 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning ,god1 as stated in ,heb4 #e3a2 so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs4 ,but certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and ,levites of the ,law3 such as the tithes and first-fruits1 and many like things4 ,therefore in like manner certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people3 the more that they were forbidden to accept presents1 as is clearly stated in ,ex4 #bc3h3 ,you shall not ,vulg43 ',neither shalt thou' take bribes1 which even blind the wise1 and pervert the words of the just4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 as a kingdom is the best form of government1 so is tyranny the most corrupt4 ,but when the ,lord appointed the king1 ,he established a tyrannical law2 for it is written 7#a ,kings #h3aa73 ,this will be the right of the king1 that shall reign over you3 ,he will take your sons1 etc4 ,therefore the ,law made unfitting provision with regard to the institution of rulers4 ,on the contrary1 ,the people of ,israel is commended for the beauty of its order 7,num4 #bd3e73 ,how beautiful are thy tabernacles1 ,o ,jacob1 and thy tents4 ,but the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right establishment of its rulers4 ,therefore the ,law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers4 ,i answer that1 ,two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation4 ,one is that all should take some share in the government3 for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people1 commends itself to all1 and is most enduring1 as stated in ,polit4 ii1 #f4 ,the other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government1 or the different ways in which the constitutions are established4 ,for whereas these differ in kind1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4 iii1 #e71 nevertheless the first place is held by the kingdom1 where the power of government is vested in one2 and aristocracy1 which signifies government by the best1 where the power of government is vested in a few4 ,accordingly1 the best form of government is in a state or kingdom1 where one is given the power to preside over all2 while under him are others having governing powers3 and yet a government of this kind is shared by all1 both because all are eligible to govern1 and because the rules are chosen by all4 ,for this is the best form of polity1 being partly kingdom1 since there is one at the head of all2 partly aristocracy1 in so far as a number of persons are set in authority2 partly democracy1 i4e4 government by the people1 in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people1 and the people have the right to choose their rulers4 ,such was the form of government established by the ,divine ,law4 ,for ,moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all2 so that there was a kind of kingdom4 ,moreover1 seventy-two men were chosen1 who were elders in virtue3 for it is written 7,deut4 #a3ae73 ,i took out of your tribes wise and honorable1 and appointed them rulers3 so that there was an element of aristocracy4 ,but it was a democratical government in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the people2 for it is written 7,ex4 #ah3ba73 ,provide out of all the people wise ,vulg43 'able' men1 etc42 and1 again1 in so far as they were chosen by the people2 wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #a3ac73 ,let me have from among you wise ,vulg43 'able' men1 etc4 ,consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the ,law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this people was governed under the special care of ,god3 wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #g3f73 ,the ,lord thy ,god hath chosen thee to be ,his peculiar people3 and this is why the ,lord reserved to ,himself the institution of the chief ruler4 ,for this too did ,moses pray 7,num4 #bg3af73 ,may the ,lord the ,god of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man1 that may be over this multitude4 ,thus by ,god's orders ,josue was set at the head in place of ,moses2 and we read about each of the judges who succeeded ,josue that ,god raised 4 4 4 up a saviour for the people1 and that the spirit of the ,lord was in them 7,judges #c3i1 #aj1 #ae74 ,hence the ,lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people2 but reserved this to ,himself1 as appears from ,deut4 #ag3ae3 ,thou shalt set him whom the ,lord thy ,god shall choose4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a kingdom is the best form of government of the people1 so long as it is not corrupt4 ,but since the power granted to a king is so great1 it easily degenerates into tyranny1 unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man3 for it is only the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,ethic4 iv1 #c74 ,now perfect virtue is to be found in few3 and especially were the ,jews inclined to cruelty and avarice1 which vices above all turn men into tyrants4 ,hence from the very first the ,lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power1 but gave them judges and governors to rule them4 ,but afterwards when the people asked ,him to do so1 being indignant with them1 so to speak1 ,he granted them a king1 as is clear from ,his words to ,samuel 7#a ,kings #h3g73 ,they have not rejected thee1 but ,me1 that ,i should not reign over them4 ,nevertheless1 as regards the appointment of a king1 ,he did establish the manner of election from the very beginning 7,deut4 #ag3ad1 seqq473 and then ,he determined two points3 first1 that in choosing a king they should wait for the ,lord's decision2 and that they should not make a man of another nation king1 because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they are set over1 and consequently to have no care for their welfare3 secondly1 ,he prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave1 in regard to himself2 namely1 that he should not accumulate chariots and horses1 nor wives1 nor immense wealth3 because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice4 ,he also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards ,god3 namely1 that they should continually read and ponder on ,god's ,law1 and should ever fear and obey ,god4 ,moreover1 ,he decided how they should behave towards their subjects3 namely1 that they should not proudly despise them1 or ill-treat them1 and that they should not depart from the paths of justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the division of the kingdom1 and a number of kings1 was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions1 specially against the just rule of ,david1 than a benefit conferred on them for their profit4 ,hence it is written 7,osee #ac3aa73 ,i will give thee a king in ,my wrath2 and 7,osee #h3d73 ,they have reigned1 but not by ,me3 they have been princes1 and ,i knew not4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son3 and this1 in order that it might be held in greater respect1 if not any man from the people could become a priest3 since honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship4 ,hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits1 and1 again1 as to oblations and sacrifices1 that they might be afforded a means of livelihood4 ,on the other hand1 the rulers1 as stated above1 were chosen from the whole people2 wherefore they had their own possessions1 from which to derive a living3 and so much the more1 since the ,lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make too much show of magnificence3 both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny1 arising from such things1 and because1 if the rulers were not very rich1 and if their office involved much work and anxiety1 it would not tempt the ambition of the common people2 and would not become an occasion of sedition4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,that right was not given to the king by ,divine institution3 rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right1 by framing unjust laws1 and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects4 ,this is clear from the context that follows3 ,and you shall be his slaves ,douay3 'servants'3 which is significative of tyranny1 since a tyrant rules is subjects as though they were his slaves4 ,hence ,samuel spoke these words to deter them from asking for a king2 since the narrative continues3 ,but the people would not hear the voice of ,samuel4 ,it may happen1 however1 that even a good king1 without being a tyrant1 may take away the sons1 and make them tribunes and centurions2 and may take many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,judicial ,precepts ,were ,suitably ,framed ,as to the ,relations of ,one ,man with ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another4 ,because men cannot live together in peace1 if one man takes what belongs to another4 ,but this seems to have been approved by the ,law3 since it is written 7,deut4 #bc3bd73 ,going into thy neighbor's vineyard1 thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest4 ,therefore the ,old ,law did not make suitable provisions for man's peace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 ii1 #f74 ,but this was introduced by the ,old ,law2 for it is written 7,num4 #bg3h73 ,when a man dieth without a son1 his inheritance shall pass to his daughter4 ,therefore the ,law made unsuitable provision for the welfare of the people4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying and selling1 as stated in ,polit4 i4 ,but the ,old ,law took away the force of sales2 since it prescribes that in the #ejth year of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor 7,lev4 #be3bh74 ,therefore in this matter the ,law gave the people an unfitting command4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 man's needs require that men should be ready to lend3 which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the pledges3 hence it is written 7,ecclus4 #bi3aj73 ,many have refused to lend1 not out of wickedness1 but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause4 ,and yet this was encouraged by the ,law4 ,first1 because it prescribed 7,deut4 #ae3b73 ,he to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother1 cannot demand it again1 because it is the year of remission of the ,lord2 and 7,ex4 #bb3ae7 it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present1 the borrower is not bound to make restitution4 ,secondly1 because the security acquired through the pledge is lost3 for it is written 7,deut4 #bd3aj73 ,when thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee1 thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge2 and again 7,deut4 #bd3ab1 #ac73 ,the pledge shall not lodge with thee that night1 but thou shalt restore it to him presently4 ,therefore the ,law made insufficient provision in the matter of loans4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary3 wherefore great caution should be observed in such matters3 hence it is stated in #b ,mac4 #c3ae that the priests 4 4 4 called upon ,him from heaven1 ,who made the law concerning things given to be kept1 that ,he would preserve them safe1 for them that had deposited them4 ,but the precepts of the ,old ,law observed little caution in regard to deposits3 since it is prescribed 7,ex4 #bb3aj1 #aa7 that when goods deposited are lost1 the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary4 ,therefore the ,law made unsuitable provision in this matter4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 just as a workman offers his work for hire1 so do men let houses and so forth4 ,but there is no need for the tenant to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house4 ,therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescription 7,lev4 #ai3ac7 that the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 since there is often pressing need for a judge1 it should be easy to gain access to one4 ,it was therefore unfitting that the ,law 7,deut4 #ag3h1 #i7 should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 it is possible that not only two1 but three or more1 should agree to tell a lie4 ,therefore it is unreasonably stated 7,deut4 #ai3ae7 that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand4 ,objection #i3 ,further1 punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault3 for which reason also it is written 7,deut4 #be3b73 ,according to the measure of the sin1 shall the measure also of the stripes be4 ,yet the ,law fixed unequal punishments for certain faults3 for it is written 7,ex4 #bb3a7 that the thief shall restore five oxen for one ox1 and four sheep for one sheep4 ,moreover1 certain slight offenses are severely punished3 thus 7,num4 #ae3cb1 seqq47 a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day3 and 7,deut4 #ba3ah1 seqq47 the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions1 viz4 because he gave himself to revelling 4 4 4 and banquetings4 ,therefore the ,law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner4 ,objection #aj3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi1 #aa71 ,tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment1 indemnity1 prison1 stripes1 retaliation1 public disgrace1 exile1 death1 slavery4 ,now some of these were prescribed by the ,law4 ,indemnity1 as when a thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold4 ,prison1 as when 7,num4 #ae3cd7 a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned4 ,stripes2 thus 7,deut4 #be3b71 if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes2 they shall lay him down1 and shall cause him to be beaten before them4 ,public disgrace was brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother1 for she took off his shoe from his foot1 and did spit in his face 7,deut4 #be3i74 ,it prescribed the death penalty1 as is clear from 7,lev4 #bj3i73 ,he that curseth his father1 or mother1 dying let him die4 ,the ,law also recognized the lex talionis1 by prescribing 7,ex4 #ba3bd73 ,eye for eye1 tooth for tooth4 ,therefore it seems unreasonable that the ,law should not have inflicted the two other punishments1 viz4 exile and slavery4 ,objection #aa3 ,further1 no punishment is due except for a fault4 ,but dumb animals cannot commit a fault4 ,therefore the ,law is unreasonable in punishing them 7,ex4 #ba3bi73 ,if the ox 4 4 4 shall kill a man or a woman1 it shall be stoned3 and 7,lev4 #bj3af73 ,the woman that shall lie under any beast1 shall be killed together with the same4 ,therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one man with another were unsuitably regulated by the ,law4 ,objection #ab3 ,further1 the ,lord commanded 7,ex4 #ba3ab7 a murderer to be punished with death4 ,but the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of a man4 ,hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal4 ,therefore it is unfittingly prescribed 7,deut4 #ba3a1 #d7 that when there shall be found 4 4 4 the corpse of a man slain1 and it is not known who is guilty of the murder 4 4 4 the ancients of the nearest city shall take a heifer of the herd1 that hath not drawn in the yoke1 nor ploughed the ground1 and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley1 that never was ploughed1 nor sown2 and there they shall strike off the head of the heifer4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is recalled as a special blessing 7,ps4 #adg3bj7 that ,he hath not done in like manner to every nation2 and ,his judgments ,he hath not made manifest to them4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ii1 #ba71 quoting ,tully1 a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and by community of welfare4 ,consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws4 ,now the relations of one man with another are twofold3 some are effected under the guidance of those in authority3 others are effected by the will of private individuals4 ,and since whatever is subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to his will1 hence it is that the decision of matters between one man and another1 and the punishment of evildoers1 depend on the direction of those in authority1 to whom men are subject4 ,on the other hand1 the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess3 and consequently their dealings with one another1 as regards such things1 depend on their own will1 for instance in buying1 selling1 giving1 and so forth4 ,now the ,law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another4 ,for it established judges1 as is clearly indicated in ,deut4 #af3ah3 ,thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its ,vulg43 'thy' gates 4 4 4 that they may judge the people with just judgment4 ,it is also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments1 according to ,deut4 #a3af1 #ag3 ,judge that which is just1 whether he be one of your own country or a stranger3 there shall be no difference of persons4 ,it also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment1 by forbidding judges to accept bribes 7,ex4 #bc3h2 ,deut4 #af3ai74 ,it prescribed the number of witnesses1 viz4 two or three3 and it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes1 as we shall state farther on 7ad #aj74 ,but with regard to possessions1 it is a very good thing1 says the ,philosopher 7,polit4 ii1 #b7 that the things possessed should be distinct1 and the use thereof should be partly common1 and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors4 ,these three points were provided for by the ,law4 ,because1 in the first place1 the possessions themselves were divided among individuals3 for it is written 7,num4 #cc3ec1 #ed73 ,i have given you the land for a possession3 and you shall divide it among you by lot4 ,and since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of possessions1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,polit4 ii1 #f72 therefore the ,law provided a threefold remedy against the irregularity of possessions4 ,the first was that they should be divided equally1 wherefore it is written 7,num4 #cc3ed73 ,to the more you shall give a larger part1 and to the fewer1 a lesser4 ,a second remedy was that possessions could not be alienated for ever1 but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner1 so as to avoid confusion of possessions 7cf4 ad #c74 ,the third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion1 and provided that the dead should be succeeded by their next of kin3 in the first place1 the son2 secondly1 the daughter2 thirdly1 the brother2 fourthly1 the father's brother2 fifthly1 any other next of kin4 ,furthermore1 in order to preserve the distinction of property1 the ,law enacted that heiresses should marry within their own tribe1 as recorded in ,num4 #cf3f4 ,secondly1 the ,law commanded that1 in some respects1 the use of things should belong to all in common4 ,firstly1 as regards the care of them2 for it was prescribed 7,deut4 #bb3a-d73 ,thou shalt not pass by1 if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray2 but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother1 and in like manner as to other things4 ,secondly1 as regards fruits4 ,for all alike were allowed on entering a friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit1 but not to take any away4 ,and1 specially1 with respect to the poor1 it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves1 and the bunches of grapes and fruit1 should be left behind for them 7,lev4 #ai3i2 ,deut4 #bd3ai74 ,moreover1 whatever grew in the seventh year was common property1 as stated in ,ex4 #bc3aa and ,lev4 #be3d4 ,thirdly1 the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner4 ,there was a purely gratuitous transfer3 thus it is written 7,deut4 #ad3bh1 #bi73 ,the third day thou shalt separate another tithe 4 4 4 and the ,levite 4 4 4 and the stranger1 and the fatherless1 and the widow 4 4 4 shall come and shall eat and be filled4 ,and there was a transfer for a consideration1 for instance1 by selling and buying1 by letting out and hiring1 by loan and also by deposit1 concerning all of which we find that the ,law made ample provision4 ,consequently it is clear that the ,old ,law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of one man with another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3h71 he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the ,law3 because1 to wit1 all the precepts of the ,law1 chiefly those concerning our neighbor1 seem to aim at the end that men should love one another4 ,now it is an effect of love that men give their own goods to others3 because1 as stated in #a ,john #c3ag3 ,he that 4 4 4 shall see his brother in need1 and shall shut up his bowels from him3 how doth the charity of ,god abide in him8 ,hence the purpose of the ,law was to accustom men to give of their own to others readily3 thus the ,apostle 7#a ,tim4 #f3ah7 commands the rich to give easily and to communicate to others4 ,now a man does not give easily to others if he will not suffer another man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him4 ,and so the ,law laid down that it should be lawful for a man1 on entering his neighbor's vineyard1 to eat of the fruit there3 but not to carry any away1 lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm1 and cause a disturbance of the peace3 for among well-behaved people1 the taking of a little does not disturb the peace2 in fact1 it rather strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue3 failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father1 who would have been sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers4 ,nevertheless the ,law observed due caution in the matter1 by providing that those women who succeeded to their father's estate1 should marry within their own tribe1 in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions1 as stated in ,num4 #cf3g1 #h4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 ii1 #d71 the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation4 ,consequently1 as he himself observes1 it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states1 that anyone should sell his possessions1 except to avoid a manifest loss4 ,for if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately1 they might happen to come into the hands of a few3 so that it might become necessary for a state or country to become void of inhabitants4 ,hence the ,old ,law1 in order to remove this danger1 ordered things in such a way that while provision was made for men's needs1 by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period1 at the same time the said danger was removed1 by prescribing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed4 ,the reason for this law was to prevent confusion of possessions1 and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes4 ,but as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates1 therefore the ,law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity1 like movable goods4 ,because the number of houses in a town was not fixed1 whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates1 which could not be exceeded1 while the number of houses in a town could be increased4 ,on the other hand1 houses situated not in a town1 but in a village that hath no walls1 could not be sold in perpetuity3 because such houses are built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions2 wherefore the ,law rightly made the same prescription in regard to both 7,lev4 #be74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as stated above 7ad #a71 the purpose of the ,law was to accustom men to its precepts1 so as to be ready to come to one another's assistance3 because this is a very great incentive to friendship4 ,the ,law granted these facilities for helping others in the matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations1 but also of mutual transfers3 because the latter kind of succor is more frequent and benefits the greater number3 and it granted facilities for this purpose in many ways4 ,first of all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend1 and that they should not be less inclined to do so as the year of remission drew nigh1 as stated in ,deut4 #ae3g1 seqq4 ,secondly1 by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan1 either by exacting usury1 or by accepting necessities of life in security2 and by prescribing that when this had been done they should be restored at once4 ,for it is written 7,deut4 #bc3ai73 ,thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury3 and 7,deut4 #bd3f73 ,thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge2 for he hath pledged his life to thee3 and 7,ex4 #bb3bf73 ,if thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge1 thou shalt give it him again before sunset4 ,thirdly1 by forbidding them to be importunate in exacting payment4 ,hence it is written 7,ex4 #bb3be73 ,if thou lend money to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee1 thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner4 ,for this reason1 too1 it is enacted 7,deut4 #bd3aj1 #aa73 ,when thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee1 thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge1 but thou shalt stand without1 and he shall bring out to thee what he hath3 both because a man's house is his surest refuge1 wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house2 and because the ,law does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security1 but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least4 ,fourthly1 the ,law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years4 ,for it was probable that those who could conveniently pay their debts1 would do so before the seventh year1 and would not defraud the lender without cause4 ,but if they were altogether insolvent1 there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them1 as there was for renewing the loan on account of their need4 ,as regards animals granted in loan1 the ,law enacted that if1 through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent1 they perished or deteriorated in his absence1 he was bound to make restitution4 ,but if they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper care of them1 he was not bound to make restitution1 especially if they were hired for a consideration3 because they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the lender1 so that if the animal had been saved through being lent1 the lender would have gained something by the loan which would no longer have been gratuitous4 ,and especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration3 because then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals2 wherefore he had no right to any profit1 by receiving indemnity for the animal1 unless the person who had charge of it were negligent4 ,in the case1 however1 of animals not hired for a consideration1 equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to whom they are transferred1 whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor4 ,hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit4 ,because the latter might be lost in two ways4 ,first1 unavoidably3 i4e4 either through a natural cause1 for instance if an animal held in deposit were to die or depreciate in value2 or through an extrinsic cause1 for instance1 if it were taken by an enemy1 or devoured by a beast 7in which case1 however1 a man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus slain73 whereas in the other cases mentioned above1 he was not bound to make restitution2 but only to take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion4 ,secondly1 the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause1 for instance by theft3 and then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his neglect4 ,but1 as stated above 7ad #d71 he who held an animal on loan1 was bound to restitution1 even if he were absent when it depreciated or died3 because he was held responsible for less negligence than a depositary1 who was only held responsible in case of theft4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,workmen who offer their labor for hire1 are poor men who toil for their daily bread3 and therefore the ,law commanded wisely that they should be paid at once1 lest they should lack food4 ,but they who offer other commodities for hire1 are wont to be rich3 nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood3 and consequently the comparison does not hold4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the purpose for which judges are appointed among men1 is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice4 ,now a matter may be doubtful in two ways4 ,first1 among simple-minded people3 and in order to remove doubts of this kind1 it was prescribed 7,deut4 #af3ah7 that judges and magistrates should be appointed in each tribe1 to judge the people with just judgment4 ,secondly1 a matter may be doubtful even among experts3 and therefore1 in order to remove doubts of this kind1 the ,law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen by ,god1 where there would be both the high-priest1 who would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship2 and the chief judge of the people1 who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men3 just as even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation4 ,hence it is written 7,deut4 #ag3h1 #i73 ,if thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment 4 4 4 and thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary2 arise and go up to the place1 which the ,lord thy ,god shall choose2 and thou shalt come to the priests of the ,levitical race1 and to the judge that shall be at that time4 ,but such like doubtful matters did not often occur for judgment3 wherefore the people were not burdened on this account4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,in the business affairs of men1 there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof1 and we must be content with a certain conjectural probability1 such as that which an orator employs to persuade4 ,consequently1 although it is quite possible for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood1 yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing3 wherefore their testimony is taken as being true1 especially if they do not waver in giving it1 or are not otherwise suspect4 ,moreover1 in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth1 the ,law commanded that they should be most carefully examined1 and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished1 as stated in ,deut4 #ai3af1 seqq4 ,there was1 however1 a reason for fixing on this particular number1 in token of the unerring truth of the ,divine ,persons1 ,who are sometimes mentioned as two1 because the ,holy ,ghost is the bond of the other two ,persons2 and sometimes as three3 as ,augustine observes on ,john #h3ag3 ,in your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true4 ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,a severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault1 but also for other reasons4 ,first1 on account of the greatness of the sin1 because a greater sin1 other things being equal1 deserves a greater punishment4 ,secondly1 on account of a habitual sin1 since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments4 ,thirdly1 on account of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin3 for men are not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished4 ,fourthly1 on account of the facility of committing a sin and of concealing it3 for such like sins1 when discovered1 should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing them4 ,again1 with regard to the greatness of a sin1 four degrees may be observed1 even in respect of one single deed4 ,the first is when a sin is committed unwillingly2 because then1 if the sin be altogether involuntary1 man is altogether excused from punishment2 for it is written 7,deut4 #bb3be1 seqq47 that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death1 because she cried1 and there was no man to help her4 ,but if a man sinned in any way voluntarily1 and yet through weakness1 as for instance when a man sins from passion1 the sin is diminished3 and the punishment1 according to true judgment1 should be diminished also2 unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from committing such sins1 as stated above4 ,the second degree is when a man sins through ignorance3 and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent1 on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge3 yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices4 ,hence it is written 7,lev4 #d3b73 ,the soul that sinneth through ignorance1 etc4 ,this is1 however1 to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact2 and not to ignorance of the ,divine precept1 which all were bound to know4 ,the third degree was when a man sinned from pride1 i4e4 through deliberate choice or malice3 and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin 99,cf4 ,deut4 #be3b4 ,the fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy3 and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the commandment of the ,law 99,cf4 ,num4 #ae3cj1 #ca4 ,accordingly we must say that1 in appointing the punishment for theft1 the ,law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently 7,ex4 #bb3a-i73 wherefore1 as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief1 the thief restored only twice their value4 ,but sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief1 because they graze in the fields3 wherefore it happened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields4 ,consequently the ,law inflicted a heavier penalty1 by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one4 ,as to cattle1 they were yet more difficult to safeguard1 because they are kept in the fields1 and do not graze in flocks as sheep do2 wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted in their regard1 so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox4 ,and this ,i say1 unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in the thief's possession3 because in that case he had to restore only twice the number1 as in the case of other thefts3 for there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal1 since he kept it alive4 ,again1 we might say1 according to a gloss1 that a cow is useful in five ways3 it may be used for sacrifice1 for ploughing1 for food1 for milk1 and its hide is employed for various purposes3 and therefore for one cow five had to be restored4 ,but the sheep was useful in four ways3 for sacrifice1 for meat1 for milk1 and for its wool4 ,the unruly son was slain1 not because he ate and drank3 but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion1 which was always punished by death1 as stated above4 ,as to the man who gathered sticks on the sabbath1 he was stoned as a breaker of the ,law1 which commanded the sabbath to be observed1 to testify the belief in the newness of the world1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajj1 ,a4 #e73 wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever4 ,reply ,obj4 #aj3 ,the ,old ,law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes1 viz4 for those which are committed against ,god1 and for murder1 for stealing a man1 irreverence towards one's parents1 adultery and incest4 ,in the case of thief of other things it inflicted punishment by indemnification3 while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation2 and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness4 ,in other faults of less degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace4 ,the punishment of slavery was prescribed by the ,law in two cases4 ,first1 in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of the privilege granted by the ,law1 whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission3 wherefore he was punished by remaining a slave for ever4 ,secondly1 in the case of a thief1 who had not wherewith to make restitution1 as stated in ,ex4 #bb3c4 ,the punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the ,law3 because ,god was worshipped by that people alone1 whereas all other nations were given to idolatry3 wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely1 he would be in danger of falling into idolatry4 ,for this reason it is related 7#a ,kings #bf3ai7 that ,david said to ,saul3 ,they are cursed in the sight of the ,lord1 who have cast me out this day1 that ,i should not dwell in the inheritance of the ,lord1 saying3 ,go1 serve strange gods4 ,there was1 however1 a restricted sort of exile3 for it is written in ,deut4 #ai3d 99,cf4 ,num4 #ce3be that he that striketh ,vulg43 'killeth' his neighbor ignorantly1 and is proved to have had no hatred against him1 shall flee to one of the cities of refuge and abide there until the death of the high-priest4 ,for then it became lawful for him to return home1 because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot their private quarrels1 so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer4 ,reply ,obj4 #aa3 ,dumb animals were ordered to be slain1 not on account of any fault of theirs2 but as a punishment to their owners1 who had not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses4 ,hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone yesterday or the day before 7in which case steps might have been taken to avoid the danger7 than if it had taken to butting suddenly4--,or again1 the animal was slain in detestation of the sin2 and lest men should be horrified at the sight thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #ab3 ,the literal reason for this commandment1 as ,rabbi ,moses declares 7,doct4 ,perplex4 iii71 was because the slayer was frequently from the nearest city3 wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder4 ,this was brought about in three ways4 ,in the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads4 ,secondly1 the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his beast1 and if the murder was previously discovered1 the beast was not slain4 ,thirdly1 the place1 where the heifer was slain1 remained uncultivated4 ,wherefore1 in order to avoid this twofold loss1 the men of the city would readily make known the murderer1 if they knew who he was3 and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter4 ,or again1 this was done in order to frighten people1 in detestation of murder4 ,because the slaying of a heifer1 which is a useful animal and full of strength1 especially before it has been put under the yoke1 signified that whoever committed murder1 however useful and strong he might be1 was to forfeit his life2 and that1 by a cruel death1 which was implied by the striking off of its head2 and that the murderer1 as vile and abject1 was to be cut off from the fellowship of men1 which was betokened by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place4 ,mystically1 the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of ,christ2 which had not drawn a yoke1 since it had done no sin2 nor did it plough the ground1 i4e4 it never knew the stain of revolt4 ,the fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified the despised death of ,christ1 whereby all sins are washed away1 and the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,judicial ,precepts ,regarding ,foreigners ,were ,framed in a ,suitable ,manner8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed4 ,for ,peter said 7,acts #aj3cd1 #ce73 ,in very deed ,i perceive that ,god is not a respecter of persons1 but in every nation1 he that feareth ,him and worketh justice is acceptable to ,him4 ,but those who are acceptable to ,god should not be excluded from the ,church of ,god4 ,therefore it is unsuitably commanded 7,deut4 #bc3c7 that the ,ammonite and the ,moabite1 even after the tenth generation1 shall not enter into the church of the ,lord for ever3 whereas1 on the other hand1 it is prescribed 7,deut4 #bc3g7 to be observed with regard to certain other nations3 ,thou shalt not abhor the ,edomite1 because he is thy brother2 nor the ,egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power4 ,but it is not in man's power to be an eunuch1 or born of a prostitute4 ,therefore it is unsuitably commanded 7,deut4 #bc3a1 #b7 that an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the ,lord4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,old ,law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested3 for it is written 7,ex4 #bb3ba73 ,thou shalt not molest a stranger1 nor afflict him2 for yourselves also were strangers in the land of ,egypt3 and 7,ex4 #bc3i73 ,thou shalt not molest a stranger1 for you know the hearts of strangers1 for you also were strangers in the land of ,egypt4 ,but it is an affliction to be burdened with usury4 ,therefore the ,law unsuitably permitted them 7,deut4 #bc3ai1 #bj7 to lend money to the stranger for usury4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 men are much more akin to us than trees4 ,but we should show greater care and love for those things that are nearest to us1 according to ,ecclus4 #ac3ai3 ,every beast loveth its like3 so also every man him that is nearest to himself4 ,therefore the ,lord unsuitably commanded 7,deut4 #bj3ac-ai7 that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain1 but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual4 ,but the common good is sought in a war which men fight against their enemies4 ,therefore it is unsuitably commanded 7,deut4 #bj3e-g7 that certain men should be sent home1 for instance a man that had built a new house1 or who had planted a vineyard1 or who had married a wife4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 no man should profit by his own fault4 ,but it is a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted3 since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude4 ,therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle 7,deut4 #bj3h74 ,on the contrary1 ,divine ,wisdom declares 7,prov4 #h3h73 ,all my words are just1 there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them4 ,i answer that1 ,man's relations with foreigners are twofold3 peaceful1 and hostile3 and in directing both kinds of relation the ,law contained suitable precepts4 ,for the ,jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners4 ,first1 when foreigners passed through their land as travelers4 ,secondly1 when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers4 ,and in both these respects the ,law made kind provision in its precepts3 for it is written 7,ex4 #bb3ba73 ,thou shalt not molest a stranger 7advenam72 and again 7,ex4 #bb3i73 ,thou shalt not molest a stranger 7peregrino74 ,thirdly1 when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship4 ,with regard to these a certain order was observed4 ,for they were not at once admitted to citizenship3 just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations1 as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #a74 ,the reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst1 many dangers might occur1 since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt something hurtful to the people4 ,hence it was that the ,law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations with the ,jews 7viz41 the ,egyptians among whom they were born and educated1 and the ,idumeans1 the children of ,esau1 ,jacob's brother71 that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation2 whereas others 7with whom their relations had been hostile1 such as the ,ammonites and ,moabites7 were never to be admitted to citizenship2 while the ,amalekites1 who were yet more hostile to them1 and had no fellowship of kindred with them1 were to be held as foes in perpetuity3 for it is written 7,ex4 #ag3af73 ,the war of the ,lord shall be against ,amalec from generation to generation4 ,in like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners1 the ,law contained suitable precepts4 ,for1 in the first place1 it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause3 thus it is commanded 7,deut4 #bj3aj7 that when they advanced to besiege a city1 they should at first make an offer of peace4 ,secondly1 it enjoined that when once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it1 putting their trust in ,god4 ,and in order that they might be the more heedful of this command1 it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising them ,god's aid4 ,thirdly1 it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight1 and that certain men1 who might be in the way1 should be sent home4 ,fourthly1 it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of victory1 by sparing women and children1 and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of ,god and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul3 for it is written 7,ex4 #ab3dh73 ,if any stranger be willing to dwell among you1 and to keep the ,phase of the ,lord2 all his males shall first be circumcised1 and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner1 and he shall be as that which is born in the land4 ,but in temporal matters concerning the public life of the people1 admission was not granted to everyone at once1 for the reason given above3 but to some1 i4e4 the ,egyptians and ,idumeans1 in the third generation2 while others were excluded in perpetuity1 in detestation of their past offense1 i4e4 the peoples of ,moab1 ,ammon1 and ,amalec4 ,for just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him1 in order that others seeing this may be deterred and refrain from sinning2 so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime1 that others may refrain from similar crimes4 ,nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of virtue3 thus it is related 7,judith #ad3f7 that ,achior1 the captain of the children of ,ammon1 was joined to the people of ,israel1 with all the succession of his kindred4 ,the same applies to ,ruth the ,moabite who was a virtuous woman 7,ruth #c3aa73 although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women1 who are not competent to be citizens absolutely speaking4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 iii1 #c71 a man is said to be a citizen in two ways3 first1 simply2 secondly1 in a restricted sense4 ,a man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship1 for instance1 the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly4 ,on the other hand1 any man may be called citizen1 only in a restricted sense1 if he dwells within the state1 even common people or children or old men1 who are not fit to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common weal4 ,for this reason bastards1 by reason of their base origin1 were excluded from the ecclesia1 i4e4 from the popular assembly1 down to the tenth generation4 ,the same applies to eunuchs1 who were not competent to receive the honor due to a father1 especially among the ,jews1 where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation3 for even among the heathens1 those who had many children were marked with special honor1 as the ,philosopher remarks 7,polit4 ii1 #f74 ,nevertheless1 in matters pertaining to the grace of ,god1 eunuchs were not discriminated from others1 as neither were strangers1 as already stated3 for it is written 7,isa4 #ef3c73 ,let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the ,lord speak1 saying3 ,the ,lord will divide and separate me from ,his people4 ,and let not the eunuch say3 ,behold ,i am a dry tree4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it was not the intention of the ,law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers1 but only to tolerate it on account of the proneness of the ,jews to avarice2 and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a profit4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities4 ,for some of them were far distant1 and were not among those which had been promised to them4 ,when they had taken these cities1 they killed all the men who had fought against ,god's people2 whereas the women and children were spared4 ,but in the neighboring cities which had been promised to them1 all were ordered to be slain1 on account of their former crimes1 to punish which ,god sent the ,israelites as executor of ,divine justice3 for it is written 7,deut4 #i3e7 because they have done wickedly1 they are destroyed at thy coming in4 ,the fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched1 for the use of the people themselves1 to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the builder of a new house1 the planter of a vineyard1 the newly married husband1 were excluded from fighting1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired1 or is on the point of having1 and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things4 ,wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this affection they would fear death all the more1 and be so much the less brave in battle4 ,secondly1 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #e71 it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp4 ,and so lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them2 and also lest the people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune3 these men were taken away from the danger of death by being removed from the battle4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the timid were sent back home1 not that they might be the gainers thereby2 but lest the people might be the losers by their presence1 since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,old ,law ,set ,forth ,suitable ,precepts ,about the ,members of the ,household8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,old ,law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household4 ,for a slave is in every respect his master's property1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4 i1 #b74 ,but that which is a man's property should be his always4 ,therefore it was unfitting for the ,law to command 7,ex4 #ba3b7 that slaves should go out free in the seventh year4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a slave is his master's property1 just as an animal1 e4g4 an ass or an ox4 ,but it is commanded 7,deut4 #bb3a-c7 with regard to animals1 that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray4 ,therefore it was unsuitably commanded 7,deut4 #bc3ae73 ,thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,divine ,law should encourage mercy more even than the human law4 ,but according to human laws those who ill-treat their servants and maidservants are severely punished3 and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death4 ,therefore it is unfittingly commanded 7,ex4 #ba3bj1 #ba7 that he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod1 and they die under his hands 4 4 4 if the party remain alive a day 4 4 4 he shall not be subject to the punishment1 because it is his money4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son 7,polit4 i1 #c74 ,but the dominion of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant4 ,therefore it was unfitting for the ,law to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid 7,ex4 #ba3g74 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a father has power over his son4 ,but he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses4 ,therefore it is unfittingly commanded 7,deut4 #ba3ah1 seqq47 that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 the ,lord forbade them 7,deut4 #g3c1 seqq47 to make marriages with strange nations2 and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted 7#a ,esdras #aj74 ,therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations 7,deut4 #ba3aj1 seqq474 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 the ,lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity1 according to ,lev4 #ah4 ,therefore it was unsuitably commanded 7,deut4 #be3e7 that if any man died without issue1 his brother should marry his wife4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife1 so should there be the staunchest fidelity4 ,but this is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered4 ,therefore it was unfitting for the ,lord to allow 7,deut4 #bd3a-d7 a man to put his wife away1 by writing a bill of divorce2 and besides1 that he could not take her again to wife4 ,objection #i3 ,further1 just as a wife can be faithless to her husband1 so can a slave be to his master1 and a son to his father4 ,but the ,law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master1 or by a son to his father4 ,therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the ,law to prescribe the sacrifice of jealousy in order to investigate a wife's adultery 7,num4 #e3ab1 seqq474 ,consequently it seems that the ,law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ah3aj73 ,the judgments of the ,lord are true1 justified in themselves4 ,i answer that1 ,the mutual relations of the members of a household regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life1 as the ,philosopher states 7,polit4 i1 #a74 ,now the preservation of man's life may be considered from two points of view4 ,first1 from the point of view of the individual1 i4e4 in so far as man preserves his individuality3 and for the purpose of the preservation of life1 considered from this standpoint1 man has at his service external goods1 by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life3 in the handling of which he has need of servants4 ,secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of the species1 by means of generation1 for which purpose man needs a wife1 that she may bear him children4 ,accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of a threefold combination3 viz4 those of master and servant1 those of husband and wife1 and those of father and son3 and in respect of all these relationships the ,old ,law contained fitting precepts4 ,thus1 with regard to servants1 it commanded them to be treated with moderation--both as to their work1 lest1 to wit1 they should be burdened with excessive labor1 wherefore the ,lord commanded 7,deut4 #e3ad7 that on the ,sabbath day thy manservant and thy maidservant should rest even as thyself--and also as to the infliction of punishment1 for it ordered those who maimed their servants1 to set them free 7,ex4 #ba3bf1 #bg74 ,similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone 7,ex4 #ba3g1 seqq474 ,moreover1 with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people1 the ,law prescribed that they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them1 even their clothes 7,ex4 #ba3b1 seqq473 and furthermore it was commanded 7,deut4 #ae3ac7 that they should be given provision for the journey4 ,with regard to wives the ,law made certain prescriptions as to those who were to be taken in marriage3 for instance1 that they should marry a wife from their own tribe 7,num4 #cf3f73 and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes4 ,also that a man should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without issue1 as prescribed in ,deut4 #be3e1 #f3 and this in order that he who could not have successors according to carnal origin1 might at least have them by a kind of adoption1 and that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten4 ,it also forbade them to marry certain women2 to wit1 women of strange nations1 through fear of their losing their faith2 and those of their near kindred1 on account of the natural respect due to them4 ,furthermore it prescribed in what way wives were to be treated after marriage4 ,to wit1 that they should not be slandered without grave reason3 wherefore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime 7,deut4 #bb3ac1 seqq474 ,also that a man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son 7,deut4 #ba3ae1 seqq474 ,again1 that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her1 but rather that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away 7,deut4 #bd3a74 ,furthermore1 in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset1 it was prescribed that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man1 so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife4 ,with regard to children1 the ,law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith3 hence it is written 7,ex4 #ab3bf1 seqq473 ,when your children shall say to you3 ,what is the meaning of this service8 ,you shall say to them3 ,it is the victim of the passage of the ,lord4 ,moreover1 they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct3 wherefore it is written 7,deut4 #ba3bj7 that the parents had to say3 ,he slighteth hearing our admonitions1 he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the children of ,israel had been delivered by the ,lord from slavery1 and for this reason were bound to the service of ,god1 ,he did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity4 ,hence it is written 7,lev4 #be3ci1 seqq473 ,if thy brother1 constrained by poverty1 sell himself to thee1 thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants3 but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner 4 4 4 for they are ,my servants1 and ,i brought them out of the land of ,egypt3 let them not be sold as bondmen3 and consequently1 since they were slaves1 not absolutely but in a restricted sense1 after a lapse of time they were set free4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill1 or to help him in committing some sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,with regard to the ill-treatment of servants1 the ,law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not3 since if it were certain1 the ,law fixed a penalty3 for maiming1 the penalty was forfeiture of the servant1 who was ordered to be given his liberty3 while for slaying1 the punishment was that of a murderer1 when the slave died under the blow of his master4 ,if1 however1 the hurt was not certain1 but only probable1 the ,law did not impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant3 for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck1 but after some days3 for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received4 ,for when a man struck a free man1 yet so that he did not die at once1 but walked abroad again upon his staff1 he that struck him was quit of murder1 even though afterwards he died4 ,nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault4 ,but this was not the case if a man killed his own servant3 because whatever the servant had1 even his very person1 was the property of his master4 ,hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being because it is his money4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as stated above 7ad #a71 no ,jew could own a ,jew as a slave absolutely3 but only in a restricted sense1 as a hireling for a fixed time4 ,and in this way the ,law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter4 ,this is shown by the very words of the ,law1 where we read3 ,if any man sell his daughter to be a servant1 she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go out4 ,moreover1 in this way a man might sell not only his son1 but even himself1 rather as a hireling than as a slave1 according to ,lev4 #be3ci1 #dj3 ,if thy brother1 constrained by poverty1 sell himself to thee1 thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants3 but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #i71 the paternal authority has the power only of admonition2 but not that of coercion1 whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled4 ,hence in this case the ,lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by the rulers of the city4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the ,lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of the danger of seduction1 lest they should be led astray into idolatry4 ,and specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them1 because it was more probable that they would adopt their religious practices4 ,when1 however1 the woman was willing to renounce idolatry1 and become an adherent of the ,law1 it was lawful to take her in marriage3 as was the case with ,ruth whom ,booz married4 ,wherefore she said to her mother-in-law 7,ruth #a3af73 ,thy people shall be my people1 and thy ,god my ,god4 ,accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she first shaved her hair1 and pared her nails1 and put off the raiment wherein she was taken1 and mourned for her father and mother1 in token that she renounced idolatry for ever4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,as ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 xlviii super ,matth471 because death was an unmitigated evil for the ,jews1 who did everything with a view to the present life1 it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother3 thus affording a certain mitigation to his death4 ,it was not1 however1 ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should marry the wife of the deceased1 because the offspring of this union would not be looked upon as that of the deceased3 and moreover1 a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the household of the deceased1 as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his relationship4 ,hence it is evident that in marrying the wife of his dead brother1 he took his dead brother's place4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,the ,law permitted a wife to be divorced1 not as though it were just absolutely speaking1 but on account of the ,jews' hardness of heart1 as ,our ,lord declared 7,matt4 #ai3h74 ,of this1 however1 we must speak more fully in the treatise on ,matrimony 7,supp41 ,q4 #fg74 ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,wives break their conjugal faith by adultery1 both easily1 for motives of pleasure1 and hiddenly1 since the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness 7,job #bd3ae74 ,but this does not apply to a son in respect of his father1 or to a servant in respect of his master3 because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure1 but rather of malice3 nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of an adulterous woman4 ,,question #ajf ,,of ,,the ,,law ,,of ,,the ,,gospel1 ,,called ,,the ,,new ,,law1 ,,considered ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,in proper sequence we have to consider now the ,law of the ,gospel which is called the ,new ,law3 and in the first place we must consider it in itself2 secondly1 in comparison with the ,old ,law2 thirdly1 we shall treat of those things that are contained in the ,new ,law4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what kind of law is it8 i4e4 ,is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart8 7#b7 ,of its efficacy1 i4e4 does it justify8 7#c7 ,of its beginning3 should it have been given at the beginning of the world8 7#d7 ,of its end3 i4e4 whether it will last until the end1 or will another law take its place8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,new ,law ,is a ,written ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law is a written law4 ,for the ,new ,law is just the same as the ,gospel4 ,but the ,gospel is set forth in writing1 according to ,john #bj3ca3 ,but these are written that you may believe4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is a written law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law1 according to ,rom4 #b3ad1 #ae3 7,the ,gentiles7 do by nature those things that are of the law 4 4 4 who have ,vulg43 'show' the work of the law written in their hearts4 ,if therefore the law of the ,gospel were instilled in our hearts1 it would not be distinct from the law of nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the law of the ,gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the ,new ,testament4 ,but the law that is instilled in the heart is common to those who are in the ,new ,testament and to those who are in the ,old ,testament3 for it is written 7,wis4 #g3bg7 that ,divine ,wisdom through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls1 she maketh the friends of ,god and prophets4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not instilled in our hearts4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,new ,law is the law of the ,new ,testament4 ,but the law of the ,new ,testament is instilled in our hearts4 ,for the ,apostle1 quoting the authority of ,jeremiah #ca3ca1 #cc3 ,behold the days shall come1 saith the ,lord2 and ,i will perfect unto the house of ,israel1 and unto the house of ,judah1 a new testament1 says1 explaining what this statement is 7,heb4 #h3h1 #aj73 ,for this is the testament which ,i will make to the house of ,israel 4 4 4 by giving ,vulg43 ',i will give' ,my laws into their mind1 and in their heart will ,i write them4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is instilled in our hearts4 ,i answer that1 ,each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it1 as the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 ix1 #h74 ,now that which is preponderant in the law of the ,new ,testament1 and whereon all its efficacy is based1 is the grace of the ,holy ,ghost1 which is given through faith in ,christ4 ,consequently the ,new ,law is chiefly the grace itself of the ,holy ,ghost1 which is given to those who believe in ,christ4 ,this is manifestly stated by the ,apostle who says 7,rom4 #c3bg73 ,where is 4 4 4 thy boasting8 ,it is excluded4 ,by what law8 ,of works8 ,no1 but by the law of faith3 for he calls the grace itself of faith a law4 ,and still more clearly it is written 7,rom4 #h3b73 ,the law of the spirit of life1 in ,christ ,jesus1 hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xxiv7 that as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone1 so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful3 and elsewhere1 in the same book 7xxi73 ,what else are the ,divine laws written by ,god ,himself on our hearts1 but the very presence of ,his ,holy ,spirit8 ,nevertheless the ,new ,law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the ,holy ,ghost1 and pertaining to the use of that grace3 such things are of secondary importance1 so to speak1 in the ,new ,law2 and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them1 both by word and writing1 both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do4 ,consequently we must say that the ,new ,law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts1 but that secondarily it is a written law4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the ,holy ,ghost1 either by disposing us thereto1 or by directing us to the use thereof4 ,thus with regard to the intellect1 the ,gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of ,christ's ,godhead or humanity1 which dispose us by means of faith through which we receive the grace of the ,holy ,ghost3 and with regard to the affections1 it contains matters touching the contempt of the world1 whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the ,holy ,ghost3 for the world1 i4e4 worldly men1 cannot receive the ,holy ,ghost 7,john #ad3ag74 ,as to the use of spiritual grace1 this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the ,new ,testament exhort men in divers ways4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man4 ,first1 through being part of his nature1 and thus the natural law is instilled into man4 ,secondly1 a thing is instilled into man by being1 as it were1 added on to his nature by a gift of grace4 ,in this way the ,new ,law is instilled into man1 not only by indicating to him what he should do1 but also by helping him to accomplish it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no man ever had the grace of the ,holy ,ghost except through faith in ,christ either explicit or implicit3 and by faith in ,christ man belongs to the ,new ,testament4 ,consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the ,new ,testament4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,new ,law ,justifies8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law does not justify4 ,for no man is justified unless he obeys ,god's law1 according to ,heb4 #e3i3 ,he1 i4e4 ,christ1 became to all that obey ,him the cause of eternal salvation4 ,but the ,gospel does not always cause men to believe in it3 for it is written 7,rom4 #aj3af73 ,all do not obey the ,gospel4 ,therefore the ,new ,law does not justify4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle proves in his epistle to the ,romans that the ,old ,law did not justify1 because transgression increased at its advent3 for it is stated 7,rom4 #d3ae73 ,the ,law worketh wrath3 for where there is no law1 neither is there transgression4 ,but much more did the ,new ,law increase transgression3 since he who sins after the giving of the ,new ,law deserves greater punishment1 according to ,heb4 #aj3bh1 #bi3 ,a man making void the ,law of ,moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses4 ,how much more1 do you think1 he deserveth worse punishments1 who hath trodden underfoot the ,son of ,god1 etc48 ,therefore the ,new ,law1 like the ,old ,law1 does not justify4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 justification is an effect proper to ,god1 according to ,rom4 #h3cc3 ,god that justifieth4 ,but the ,old ,law was from ,god just as the ,new ,law4 ,therefore the ,new ,law does not justify any more than the ,old ,law4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #a3af73 ,i am not ashamed of the ,gospel3 for it is the power of ,god unto salvation to everyone that believeth4 ,but there is no salvation but to those who are justified4 ,therefore the ,law of the ,gospel justifies4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 there is a twofold element in the ,law of the ,gospel4 ,there is the chief element1 viz4 the grace of the ,holy ,ghost bestowed inwardly4 ,and as to this1 the ,new ,law justifies4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xvii73 ,there1 i4e4 in the ,old ,testament1 the ,law was set forth in an outward fashion1 that the ungodly might be afraid2 here1 i4e4 in the ,new ,testament1 it is given in an inward manner1 that they may be justified4 ,the other element of the ,evangelical ,law is secondary3 namely1 the teachings of faith1 and those commandments which direct human affections and human actions4 ,and as to this1 the ,new ,law does not justify4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #c3f7 ,the letter killeth1 but the spirit quickeneth3 and ,augustine explains this 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xiv1 xvii7 by saying that the letter denotes any writing external to man1 even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the ,gospel4 ,wherefore the letter1 even of the ,gospel would kill1 unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument holds true of the ,new ,law1 not as to its principal1 but as to its secondary element3 i4e4 as to the dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the grace of the ,new ,testament helps man to avoid sin1 yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin3 for this belongs to the state of glory4 ,hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the ,new ,testament1 he deserves greater punishment1 as being ungrateful for greater benefits1 and as not using the help given to him4 ,and this is why the ,new ,law is not said to work wrath3 because as far as it is concerned it gives man sufficient help to avoid sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same ,god gave both the ,new and the ,old ,law1 but in different ways4 ,for ,he gave the ,old ,law written on tables of stone3 whereas ,he gave the ,new ,law written in the fleshly tables of the heart1 as the ,apostle expresses it 7#b ,cor4 #c3c74 ,wherefore1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xviii71 the ,apostle calls this letter which is written outside man1 a ministration of death and a ministration of condemnation3 whereas he calls the other letter1 i4e4 the ,law of the ,new ,testament1 the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice3 because through the gift of the ,spirit we work justice1 and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,new ,law ,should ,have ,been ,given from the ,beginning of the ,world8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law should have been given from the beginning of the world4 ,for there is no respect of persons with ,god 7,rom4 #b3aa74 ,but all men have sinned and do need the glory of ,god 7,rom4 #c3bc74 ,therefore the ,law of the ,gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world1 in order that it might bring succor to all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as men dwell in various places1 so do they live in various times4 ,but ,god1 ,who will have all men to be saved 7#a ,tim4 #b3d71 commanded the ,gospel to be preached in all places1 as may be seen in the last chapters of ,matthew and ,mark4 ,therefore the ,law of the ,gospel should have been at hand for all times1 so as to be given from the beginning of the world4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man needs to save his soul1 which is for all eternity1 more than to save his body1 which is a temporal matter4 ,but ,god provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body1 by subjecting to his power whatever was created for the sake of man 7,gen4 #a3bf-bi74 ,therefore the ,new ,law also1 which is very necessary for the health of the soul1 should have been given to man from the beginning of the world4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ae3df73 ,that was not first which is spiritual1 but that which is natural4 ,but the ,new ,law is highly spiritual4 ,therefore it was not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world4 ,i answer that1 ,three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for the ,new ,law to be given from the beginning of the world4 ,the first is because the ,new ,law1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 consists chiefly in the grace of the ,holy ,ghost3 which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin1 which is an obstacle to grace1 had been cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by ,christ3 wherefore it is written 7,john #g3ci73 ,as yet the ,spirit was not given1 because ,jesus was not yet glorified4 ,this reason the ,apostle states clearly 7,rom4 #h3b1 seqq47 where1 after speaking of the ,law of the ,spirit of life1 he adds3 ,god sending ,his own ,son1 in the likeness of sinful flesh1 of sin99 hath condemned sin in the flesh1 that the justification of the ,law might be fulfilled in us4 99,st4 ,thomas1 quoting perhaps from memory1 omits the et 7and71 after sinful flesh4 ,the text quoted should read thus3 in the likeness of sinful flesh1 and a sin offering 7peri hamartias71 hath1 etc4 ,a second reason may be taken from the perfection of the ,new ,law4 ,because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset1 but through an orderly succession of time2 thus one is at first a boy1 and then a man4 ,and this reason is stated by the ,apostle 7,gal4 #c3bd1 #be73 ,the ,law was our pedagogue in ,christ that we might be justified by faith4 ,but after the faith is come1 we are no longer under a pedagogue4 ,the third reason is found in the fact that the ,new ,law is the law of grace3 wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left to himself under the state of the ,old ,law1 so that through falling into sin1 he might realize his weakness1 and acknowledge his need of grace4 ,this reason is set down by the ,apostle 7,rom4 #e3bj73 ,the ,law entered in1 that sin might abound3 and when sin abounded grace did more abound4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace3 and so from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld1 and to whom it is given1 it is mercifully given1 as ,augustine states 7,de ,perfect4 ,justit4 iv7 99,cf4 ,ep4 ccvii2 ,de ,pecc4 ,mer4 et ,rem4 ii1 #ai4 ,consequently it does not follow that there is respect of persons with ,god1 from the fact that ,he did not offer the ,law of grace to all from the beginning of the world1 which ,law was to be published in due course of time1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the state of mankind does not vary according to diversity of place1 but according to succession of time4 ,hence the ,new ,law avails for all places1 but not for all times3 although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the ,new ,testament1 as stated above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature1 which sin does not destroy3 whereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace1 which is forfeit through sin4 ,consequently the comparison will not hold4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,new ,law ,will ,last ,till the ,end of the ,world8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law will not last until the end of the world4 ,because1 as the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3aj71 when that which is perfect is come1 that which is in part shall be done away4 ,but the ,new ,law is in part1 since the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3i73 ,we know in part and we prophesy in part4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is to be done away1 and will be succeeded by a more perfect state4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,our ,lord 7,john #af3ac7 promised ,his disciples the knowledge of all truth when the ,holy ,ghost1 the ,comforter1 should come4 ,but the ,church knows not yet all truth in the state of the ,new ,testament4 ,therefore we must look forward to another state1 wherein all truth will be revealed by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 just as the ,father is distinct from the ,son and the ,son from the ,father1 so is the ,holy ,ghost distinct from the ,father and the ,son4 ,but there was a state corresponding with the ,person of the ,father1 viz4 the state of the ,old ,law1 wherein men were intent on begetting children3 and likewise there is a state corresponding to the ,person of the ,son3 viz4 the state of the ,new ,law1 wherein the clergy who are intent on wisdom 7which is appropriated to the ,son7 hold a prominent place4 ,therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the ,holy ,ghost1 wherein spiritual men will hold the first place4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #bd3ad73 ,this ,gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world 4 4 4 and then shall the consummation come4 ,but the ,gospel of ,christ is already preached throughout the whole world3 and yet the consummation has not yet come4 ,therefore the ,gospel of ,christ is not the ,gospel of the kingdom1 but another ,gospel1 that of the ,holy ,ghost1 is to come yet1 like unto another ,law4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #bd3cd73 ,i say to you that this generation shall not pass till all 7these7 things be done3 which passage ,chrysostom 7,hom4 lxxvii7 explains as referring to the generation of those that believe in ,christ4 ,therefore the state of those who believe in ,christ will last until the consummation of the world4 ,i answer that1 ,the state of the world may change in two ways4 ,in one way1 according to a change of law3 and thus no other state will succeed this state of the ,new ,law4 ,because the state of the ,new ,law succeeded the state of the ,old ,law1 as a more perfect law a less perfect one4 ,now no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the ,new ,law3 since nothing can approach nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to the last end4 ,but the ,new ,law does this3 wherefore the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aj3ai-bb73 ,having therefore1 brethren1 a confidence in the entering into the ,holies by the blood of ,christ1 a new 4 4 4 way which ,he hath dedicated for us 4 4 4 let us draw near4 ,therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of the ,new ,law1 since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is4 ,in another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly4 ,and thus the state of the ,old ,law underwent frequent changes1 since at times the laws were very well kept1 and at other times were altogether unheeded4 ,thus1 too1 the state of the ,new ,law is subject to change with regard to various places1 times1 and persons1 according as the grace of the ,holy ,ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly4 ,nevertheless we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the ,holy ,ghost more perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto1 especially the apostles who received the firstfruits of the ,spirit1 i4e4 sooner and more abundantly than others1 as a gloss expounds on ,rom4 #h3bc4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 v71 there is a threefold state of mankind2 the first was under the ,old ,law2 the second is that of the ,new ,law2 the third will take place not in this life1 but in heaven4 ,but as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the state of the ,gospel2 so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state1 with the advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed in that very passage 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ab73 ,we see now through a glass in a dark manner2 but then face to face4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xix1 #ca71 ,montanus and ,priscilla pretended that ,our ,lord's promise to give the ,holy ,ghost was fulfilled1 not in the apostles1 but in themselves4 ,in like manner the ,manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in ,manes whom they held to be the ,paraclete4 ,hence none of the above received the ,acts of the ,apostles1 where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles3 just as ,our ,lord promised them a second time 7,acts #a3e73 ,you shall be baptized with the ,holy ,ghost1 not many days hence3 which we read as having been fulfilled in ,acts #b4 ,however1 these foolish notions are refuted by the statement 7,john #g3ci7 that as yet the ,spirit was not given1 because ,jesus was not yet glorified2 from which we gather that the ,holy ,ghost was given as soon as ,christ was glorified in ,his ,resurrection and ,ascension4 ,moreover1 this puts out of court the senseless idea that the ,holy ,ghost is to be expected to come at some other time4 ,now the ,holy ,ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation2 those things1 to wit1 that we are bound to believe and to do4 ,but ,he did not teach them about all future events3 for this did not regard them according to ,acts #a3g3 ,it is not for you to know the times or moments which the ,father hath put in ,his own power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,old ,law corresponded not only to the ,father1 but also to the ,son3 because ,christ was foreshadowed in the ,old ,law4 ,hence ,our ,lord said 7,john #e3df73 ,if you did believe ,moses1 you would perhaps believe me also2 for he wrote of ,me4 ,in like manner the ,new ,law corresponds not only to ,christ1 but also to the ,holy ,ghost2 according to ,rom4 #h3b3 ,the ,law of the ,spirit of life in ,christ ,jesus1 etc4 ,hence we are not to look forward to another law corresponding to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since ,christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the ,gospel3 ,the kingdom of heaven is at hand 7,matt4 #d3ag71 it is most absurd to say that the ,gospel of ,christ is not the ,gospel of the kingdom4 ,but the preaching of the ,gospel of ,christ may be understood in two ways4 ,first1 as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of ,christ3 and thus the ,gospel was preached throughout the world even at the time of the apostles1 as ,chrysostom states 7,hom4 lxxv in ,matth474 ,and in this sense the words that follow--and then shall the consummation come1 refer to the destruction of ,jerusalem1 of which ,he was speaking literally4 ,secondly1 the preaching of the ,gospel may be understood as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect1 so that1 to wit1 the ,church would be founded in every nation4 ,and in these sense1 as ,augustine writes to ,hesychius 7,epist4 cxcix71 the ,gospel is not preached to the whole world yet1 but1 when it is1 the consummation of the world will come4 ,,question #ajg ,,of ,,the ,,new ,,law ,,as ,,compared ,,with ,,the ,,old 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the ,new ,law as compared with the ,old3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ,new ,law is distinct from the ,old ,law8 7#b7 ,whether the ,new ,law fulfils the ,old8 7#c7 ,whether the ,new ,law is contained in the ,old8 7#d7 ,which is the more burdensome1 the ,new or the ,old ,law8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,new ,law ,is ,distinct from the ,old ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law is not distinct from the ,old4 ,because both these laws were given to those who believe in ,god3 since without faith it is impossible to please ,god1 according to ,heb4 #aa3f4 ,but the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same1 as the gloss says on ,matt4 #ba3i4 ,therefore the law is the same also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,adamant4 ,manich4 discip4 xvii7 that there is little difference between the ,law and ,gospel 99,the 'little difference' refers to the ,latin words 'timor' and 'amor'--fear and love4 ,but the ,new and ,old ,laws cannot be differentiated in respect of these two things3 since even the ,old ,law comprised precepts of charity3 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor 7,lev4 #ai3ah71 and3 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god 7,deut4 #f3e74 ,in like manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which ,augustine assigns 7,contra ,faust4 iv1 #b71 viz4 that the ,old ,testament contained temporal promises1 whereas the ,new ,testament contains spiritual and eternal promises3 since even the ,new ,testament contains temporal promises1 according to ,mk4 #aj3cj3 ,he shall receive a hundred times as much 4 4 4 in this time1 houses and brethren1 etc43 while in the ,old ,testament they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal1 according to ,heb4 #aa3af3 ,but now they desire a better1 that is to say1 a heavenly country1 which is said of the patriarchs4 ,therefore it seems that the ,new ,law is not distinct from the ,old4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the ,old ,law a law of works1 and the ,new ,law a law of faith 7,rom4 #c3bg74 ,but the ,old ,law was also a law of faith1 according to ,heb4 #aa3ci3 ,all were ,vulg43 ',all these being' approved by the testimony of faith1 which he says of the fathers of the ,old ,testament4 ,in like manner the ,new ,law is a law of works3 since it is written 7,matt4 #e3dd73 ,do good to them that hate you2 and 7,luke #bb3ai73 ,do this for a commemoration of ,me4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not distinct from the ,old4 ,on the contrary1 the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #g3ab73 ,the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the ,law4 ,but the priesthood of the ,new ,testament is distinct from that of the ,old1 as the ,apostle shows in the same place4 ,therefore the ,law is also distinct4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ia1 ,a4 #d71 every law ordains human conduct to some end4 ,now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways1 considered from the point of view of the end4 ,first1 through being ordained to different ends3 and this difference will be specific1 especially if such ends are proximate4 ,secondly1 by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end4 ,thus it is clear that movements differ in species through being directed to different terms3 while according as one part of a movement is nearer to the term than another part1 the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is assessed4 ,accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways4 ,first1 through being altogether diverse1 from the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends3 thus a state-law ordained to democratic government1 would differ specifically from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy4 ,secondly1 two laws may be distinguished from one another1 through one of them being more closely connected with the end1 and the other more remotely3 thus in one and the same state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age1 who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good2 and another law regulating the education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on4 ,we must therefore say that1 according to the first way1 the ,new ,law is not distinct from the ,old ,law3 because they both have the same end1 namely1 man's subjection to ,god2 and there is but one ,god of the ,new and of the ,old ,testament1 according to ,rom4 #c3cj3 ,it is one ,god that justifieth circumcision by faith1 and uncircumcision through faith4 ,according to the second way1 the ,new ,law is distinct from the ,old ,law3 because the ,old ,law is like a pedagogue of children1 as the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #c3bd71 whereas the ,new ,law is the law of perfection1 since it is the law of charity1 of which the ,apostle says 7,col4 #c3ad7 that it is the bond of perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the unity of faith under both ,testaments witnesses to the unity of end3 for it has been stated above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #b7 that the object of the theological virtues1 among which is faith1 is the last end4 ,yet faith had a different state in the ,old and in the ,new ,law3 since what they believed as future1 we believe as fact4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all the differences assigned between the ,old and ,new ,laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection4 ,for the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue4 ,now the imperfect1 who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit1 are directed in one way to perform virtuous acts1 while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in another way4 ,for those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits1 are directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause3 for instance1 by the threat of punishment1 or the promise of some extrinsic rewards1 such as honor1 riches1 or the like4 ,hence the ,old ,law1 which was given to men who were imperfect1 that is1 who had not yet received spiritual grace1 was called the law of fear1 inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties2 and is spoken of as containing temporal promises4 ,on the other hand1 those who are possessed of virtue1 are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue1 not on account of some extrinsic punishment or reward4 ,hence the ,new ,law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts1 is called the ,law of love3 and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises1 which are objects of the virtues1 chiefly of charity4 ,accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects1 not as to something foreign but as to something of their own4 ,for this reason1 too1 the ,old ,law is described as restraining the hand1 not the will 99,peter ,lombard1 ,sent4 iii1 ,d1 #dj2 since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished1 his will does not shrink simply from sin1 as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness3 and hence the ,new ,law1 which is the ,law of love1 is said to restrain the will4 ,nevertheless there were some in the state of the ,old ,testament who1 having charity and the grace of the ,holy ,ghost1 looked chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises3 and in this respect they belonged to the ,new ,law4 ,in like manner in the ,new ,testament there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the ,new ,law2 and these it was necessary1 even under the ,new ,testament1 to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises4 ,but although the ,old ,law contained precepts of charity1 nevertheless it did not confer the ,holy ,ghost by ,whom charity 4 4 4 is spread abroad in our hearts 7,rom4 #e3e74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the ,new ,law is called the law of faith1 in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace which is given inwardly to believers1 and for this reason is called the grace of faith4 ,nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain deeds1 moral and sacramental3 but the ,new ,law does not consist chiefly in these latter things1 as did the ,old ,law4 ,as to those under the ,old ,testament who through faith were acceptable to ,god1 in this respect they belonged to the ,new ,testament3 for they were not justified except through faith in ,christ1 ,who is the ,author of the ,new ,testament4 ,hence of ,moses the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aa3bf7 that he esteemed the reproach of ,christ greater riches than the treasure of the ,egyptians4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,new ,law ,fulfils the ,old8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law does not fulfil the ,old4 ,because to fulfil and to void are contrary4 ,but the ,new ,law voids or excludes the observances of the ,old ,law3 for the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #e3b73 ,if you be circumcised1 ,christ shall profit you nothing4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not a fulfilment of the ,old4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one contrary is not the fulfilment of another4 ,but ,our ,lord propounded in the ,new ,law precepts that were contrary to precepts of the ,old ,law4 ,for we read 7,matt4 #e3bg-cb73 ,you have heard that it was said to them of old3 4 4 4 ',whosoever shall put away his wife1 let him give her a bill of divorce4 ,but ,i say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife 4 4 4 maketh her to commit adultery4' ,furthermore1 the same evidently applies to the prohibition against swearing1 against retaliation1 and against hating one's enemies4 ,in like manner ,our ,lord seems to have done away with the precepts of the ,old ,law relating to the different kinds of foods 7,matt4 #ae3aa73 ,not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man3 but what cometh out of the mouth1 this defileth a man4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not a fulfilment of the ,old4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law4 ,but ,christ in certain cases acted against the ,law4 ,for ,he touched the leper 7,matt4 #h3c71 which was contrary to the ,law4 ,likewise ,he seems to have frequently broken the sabbath2 since the ,jews used to say of ,him 7,john #i3af73 ,this man is not of ,god1 who keepeth not the sabbath4 ,therefore ,christ did not fulfil the ,law3 and so the ,new ,law given by ,christ is not a fulfilment of the ,old4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,old ,law contained precepts1 moral1 ceremonial1 and judicial1 as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d74 ,but ,our ,lord 7,matt4 #e7 fulfilled the ,law in some respects1 but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts4 ,therefore it seems that the ,new ,law is not a complete fulfilment of the ,old4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #e3ag73 ,i am not come to destroy1 but to fulfil3 and went on to say 7,matt4 #e3ah73 ,one jot or one tittle shall not pass of the ,law till all be fulfilled4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the ,new ,law is compared to the ,old as the perfect to the imperfect4 ,now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the imperfect4 ,and accordingly the ,new ,law fulfils the ,old by supplying that which was lacking in the ,old ,law4 ,now two things in the ,old ,law offer themselves to our consideration3 viz41 the end1 and the precepts contained in the ,law4 ,now the end of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous1 as was stated above 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #a73 and consequently the end of the ,old ,law was the justification of men4 ,the ,law1 however1 could not accomplish this3 but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions1 and promised it in words4 ,and in this respect1 the ,new ,law fulfils the ,old by justifying men through the power of ,christ's ,passion4 ,this is what the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3c1 #d73 ,what the ,law could not do 4 4 4 ,god sending ,his own ,son in the likeness of sinful flesh 4 4 4 hath condemned sin in the flesh1 that the justification of the ,law might be fulfilled in us4 ,and in this respect1 the ,new ,law gives what the ,old ,law promised1 according to #b ,cor4 #a3bj3 ,whatever are the promises of ,god1 in ,him1 i4e4 in ,christ1 they are ',yea'4 99,the ,douay version reads thus3 ,all the promises of ,god are in ,him1 ',it is'4 ,again1 in this respect1 it also fulfils what the ,old ,law foreshadowed4 ,hence it is written 7,col4 #b3ag7 concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were a shadow of things to come1 but the body is of ,christ2 in other words1 the reality is found in ,christ4 ,wherefore the ,new ,law is called the law of reality2 whereas the ,old ,law is called the law of shadow or of figure4 ,now ,christ fulfilled the precepts of the ,old ,law both in ,his works and in ,his doctrine4 ,in ,his works1 because ,he was willing to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances1 which were binding for the time being2 according to ,gal4 #d3d3 ,made under the ,law4 ,in ,his doctrine ,he fulfilled the precepts of the ,law in three ways4 ,first1 by explaining the true sense of the ,law4 ,this is clear in the case of murder and adultery1 the prohibition of which the ,scribes and ,pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act3 wherefore ,our ,lord fulfilled the ,law by showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins4 ,secondly1 ,our ,lord fulfilled the precepts of the ,law by prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes of the ,old ,law4 ,thus the ,old ,law forbade perjury3 and this is more safely avoided1 by abstaining altogether from swearing1 save in cases of urgency4 ,thirdly1 ,our ,lord fulfilled the precepts of the ,law1 by adding some counsels of perfection3 this is clearly seen in ,matt4 #ai3ba1 where ,our ,lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the ,old ,law3 ,one thing is wanting to thee3 ,if thou wilt be perfect1 go1 sell whatsoever thou hast1 etc4 99,st4 ,thomas combines ,matt4 #ai3ba with ,mk4 #aj3ba4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,new ,law does not void observance of the ,old ,law except in the point of ceremonial precepts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajc1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,now the latter were figurative of something to come4 ,wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed1 it follows that they are no longer to be observed3 for if they were to be observed1 this would mean that something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled4 ,thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift4 ,in this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xix1 #bf71 those precepts of ,our ,lord are not contrary to the precepts of the ,old ,law4 ,for what ,our ,lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife1 is not contrary to what the ,law prescribed4 ,for the ,law did not say3 ',let him that wills1 put his wife away'3 the contrary of which would be not to put her away4 ,on the contrary1 the ,law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife1 since it prescribed a delay1 so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill4 ,hence ,our ,lord1 in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away1 allowed no exception save in the case of fornication4 ,the same applies to the prohibition about swearing1 as stated above4 ,the same is also clear with respect to the prohibition of retaliation4 ,for the ,law fixed a limit to revenge1 by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably3 whereas ,our ,lord deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether4 ,with regard to the hatred of one's enemies1 ,he dispelled the false interpretation of the ,pharisees1 by admonishing us to hate1 not the person1 but his sin4 ,as to discriminating between various foods1 which was a ceremonial matter1 ,our ,lord did not forbid this to be observed3 but ,he showed that no foods are naturally unclean1 but only in token of something else1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #f1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it was forbidden by the ,law to touch a leper2 because by doing so1 man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity1 as also by touching the dead1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d74 ,but ,our ,lord1 ,who healed the leper1 could not contract an uncleanness4 ,by those things which ,he did on the sabbath1 ,he did not break the sabbath in reality1 as the ,master ,himself shows in the ,gospel3 both because ,he worked miracles by ,his ,divine power1 which is ever active among things2 and because ,his works were concerned with the salvation of man1 while the ,pharisees were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the sabbath2 and again because on account of urgency ,he excused ,his disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the sabbath4 ,but ,he did seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the ,pharisees1 who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath2 which was contrary to the intention of the ,law4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the reason why the ceremonial precepts of the ,law are not mentioned in ,matt4 #e is because1 as stated above 7ad #a71 their observance was abolished by their fulfilment4 ,but of the judicial precepts ,he mentioned that of retaliation3 so that what ,he said about it should refer to all the others4 ,with regard to this precept1 ,he taught that the intention of the ,law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice1 and not as a punishment out of revengeful spite1 which ,he forbade1 admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults2 and this remains still in the ,new ,law4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,new ,law ,is ,contained in the ,old8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law is not contained in the ,old4 ,because the ,new ,law consists chiefly in faith3 wherefore it is called the law of faith 7,rom4 #c3bg74 ,but many points of faith are set forth in the ,new ,law1 which are not contained in the ,old4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not contained in the ,old4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a gloss says on ,matt4 #e3ai1 ,he that shall break one of these least commandments1 that the lesser commandments are those of the ,law1 and the greater commandments1 those contained in the ,gospel4 ,now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not contained in the ,old4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 who holds the container holds the contents4 ,if1 therefore1 the ,new ,law is contained in the ,old1 it follows that whoever had the ,old ,law had the ,new3 so that it was superfluous to give men a ,new ,law when once they had the ,old4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is not contained in the ,old4 ,on the contrary1 ,as expressed in ,ezech4 #a3af1 there was a wheel in the midst of a wheel1 i4e4 the ,new ,testament within the ,old1 according to ,gregory's exposition4 ,i answer that1 ,one thing may be contained in another in two ways4 ,first1 actually2 as a located thing is in a place4 ,secondly1 virtually2 as an effect in its cause1 or as the complement in that which is incomplete2 thus a genus contains its species1 and a seed contains the whole tree1 virtually4 ,it is in this way that the ,new ,law is contained in the ,old3 for it has been stated 7,a4 #a7 that the ,new ,law is compared to the ,old as perfect to imperfect4 ,hence ,chrysostom1 expounding ,mk4 #d3bh1 ,the earth of itself bringeth forth fruit1 first the blade1 then the ear1 afterwards the full corn in the ear1 expresses himself as follows3 ,he brought forth first the blade1 i4e4 the ,law of ,nature2 then the ear1 i4e4 the ,law of ,moses2 lastly1 the full corn1 i4e4 the ,law of the ,gospel4 ,hence then the ,new ,law is in the ,old as the corn in the ear4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,whatsoever is set down in the ,new ,testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith1 is contained in the ,old ,testament as a matter of belief1 but implicitly1 under a figure4 ,and accordingly1 even as to those things which we are bound to believe1 the ,new ,law is contained in the ,old4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the precepts of the ,new ,law are said to be greater than those of the ,old ,law1 in the point of their being set forth explicitly4 ,but as to the substance itself of the precepts of the ,new ,testament1 they are all contained in the ,old4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xix1 #bc1 #bh7 that nearly all ,our ,lord's admonitions or precepts1 where ,he expressed ,himself by saying3 ',but ,i say unto you1' are to be found also in those ancient books4 ,yet1 since they thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body1 ,our ,lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder4 ,and it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of the ,new ,law are said to be greater than those of the ,old4 ,nothing1 however1 prevents the greater from being contained in the lesser virtually2 just as a tree is contained in the seed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,what is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly4 ,hence after the publishing of the ,old ,law1 a ,new ,law also had to be given4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,new ,law ,is ,more ,burdensome ,than the ,old8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law is more burdensome than the ,old4 ,for ,chrysostom 7,opus ,imp4 in ,matth41 ,hom4 x 99,the work of an unknown author7 say3 ,the commandments given to ,moses are easy to obey3 ,thou shalt not kill2 ,thou shalt not commit adultery3 but the commandments of ,christ are difficult to accomplish1 for instance3 ,thou shalt not give way to anger1 or to lust4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is more burdensome than the ,old4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations4 ,but in the ,old ,testament observance of the ,law was followed by temporal prosperity1 as may be gathered from ,deut4 #bh3a-ad2 whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the ,new ,law1 as stated in #b ,cor4 #f3d-aj3 ,let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of ,god1 in much patience1 in tribulation1 in necessities1 in distresses1 etc4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is more burdensome than the ,old4 ,obj4 #c3 ,the more one has to do1 the more difficult it is4 ,but the ,new ,law is something added to the ,old4 ,for the ,old ,law forbade perjury1 while the ,new ,law proscribed even swearing3 the ,old ,law forbade a man to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce1 while the ,new ,law forbade divorce altogether2 as is clearly stated in ,matt4 #e3ca1 seqq41 according to ,augustine's expounding4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is more burdensome than the ,old4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #aa3bh73 ,come to ,me1 all you that labor and are burdened3 which words are expounded by ,hilary thus3 ,he calls to ,himself all those that labor under the difficulty of observing the ,law1 and are burdened with the sins of this world4 ,and further on ,he says of the yoke of the ,gospel3 ,for ,my yoke is sweet and ,my burden light4 ,therefore the ,new ,law is a lighter burden than the ,old4 ,i answer that1 ,a twofold difficulty may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the ,law are concerned4 ,one is on the part of the outward works1 which of themselves are1 in a way1 difficult and burdensome4 ,and in this respect the ,old ,law is a much heavier burden than the ,new3 since the ,old ,law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the ,new ,law1 which1 in the teaching of ,christ and the apostles1 added very few precepts to those of the natural law2 although afterwards some were added1 through being instituted by the holy ,fathers4 ,even in these ,augustine says that moderation should be observed1 lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful4 ,for he says in reply to the queries of ,januarius 7,ep4 lv7 that1 whereas ,god in ,his mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments1 certain persons make it a slave's burden2 so much so that the state of the ,jews who were subject to the sacraments of the ,law1 and not to the presumptuous devices of man1 was more tolerable4 ,the other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts3 for instance1 that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and pleasure4 ,it is this difficulty that virtue solves3 because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue3 but through virtue it becomes easy for him4 ,in this respect the precepts of the ,new ,law are more burdensome than those of the ,old2 because the ,new ,law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul1 which were not expressly forbidden in the ,old ,law in all cases1 although they were forbidden in some1 without1 however1 any punishment being attached to the prohibition4 ,now this is very difficult to a man without virtue3 thus even the ,philosopher states 7,ethic4 v1 #i7 that it is easy to do what a righteous man does2 but that to do it in the same way1 viz4 with pleasure and promptitude1 is difficult to a man who is not righteous4 ,accordingly we read also 7#a ,john #e3c7 that ,his commandments are not heavy3 which words ,augustine expounds by saying that they are not heavy to the man that loveth2 whereas they are a burden to him that loveth not4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the ,new ,law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the tribulations suffered by those who observe the ,new ,law are not imposed by the ,law itself4 ,moreover they are easily borne1 on account of the love in which the same ,law consists3 since1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 lxx71 love makes light and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the object of these additions to the precepts of the ,old ,law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed1 as ,augustine states 99,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #ag1 #ba2 xix1 #bc1 #bf4 ,accordingly this does not prove that the ,new ,law is more burdensome1 but rather that it is a lighter burden4 ,,question #ajh ,,of ,,those ,,things ,,that ,,are ,,contained ,,in ,,the ,,new ,,law 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider those things that are contained in the ,new ,law3 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ,new ,law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works8 7#b7 ,whether the ,new ,law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts8 7#c7 ,whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently8 7#d7 ,whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,new ,law ,ought to ,prescribe or ,prohibit ,any ,external ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts4 ,for the ,new ,law is the ,gospel of the kingdom1 according to ,matt4 #bd3ad3 ,this ,gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world4 ,but the kingdom of ,god consists not in exterior1 but only in interior acts1 according to ,luke #ag3ba3 ,the kingdom of ,god is within you2 and ,rom4 #ad3ag3 ,the kingdom of ,god is not meat and drink2 but justice and peace and joy in the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore the ,new ,law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,new ,law is the law of the ,spirit 7,rom4 #h3b74 ,but where the ,spirit of the ,lord is1 there is liberty 7#b ,cor4 #c3ag74 ,now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts4 ,therefore the ,new ,law does not prescribe or forbid any external acts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all external acts are understood as referable to the hand1 just as interior acts belong to the mind4 ,but this is assigned as the difference between the ,new and ,old ,laws that the ,old ,law restrains the hand1 whereas the ,new ,law curbs the will 99,peter ,lombard1 ,sent4 iii1 ,d1 #dj4 ,therefore the ,new ,law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior deeds1 but only about interior acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,through the ,new ,law1 men are made children of light3 wherefore it is written 7,john #ab3cf73 ,believe in the light that you may be the children of light4 ,now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness1 according to ,eph4 #e3h3 ,you were heretofore darkness1 but now light in the ,lord4 ,walk 4 4 4 as children of the light4 ,therefore the ,new ,law had to forbid certain external acts and prescribe others4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the ,new ,law consists chiefly in the grace of the ,holy ,ghost1 which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love4 ,now men become receivers of this grace through ,god's ,son made man1 ,whose humanity grace filled first1 and thence flowed forth to us4 ,hence it is written 7,john #a3ad73 ,the ,word was made flesh1 and afterwards3 full of grace and truth2 and further on3 ,of ,his fulness we all have received1 and grace for grace4 ,hence it is added that grace and truth came by ,jesus ,christ4 ,consequently it was becoming that the grace which flows from the incarnate ,word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects2 and that from this inward grace1 whereby the flesh is subjected to the ,spirit1 certain external works should ensue4 ,accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace4 ,in the first place1 as leading in some way to grace4 ,such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the ,new ,law1 e4g4 ,baptism1 the ,eucharist1 and the like4 ,in the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace3 and herein we must observe a difference4 ,for there are some which are necessarily in keeping with1 or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through love4 ,such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the ,new ,law2 thus confession of faith is prescribed1 and denial of faith is forbidden2 for it is written 7,matt4 #aj3cb1 #cc7 7,every one7 that shall confess ,me before men1 ,i will also confess him before ,my ,father 4 4 4 ,but he that shall deny ,me before men1 ,i will also deny him before ,my ,father4 ,on the other hand1 there are works which are not necessarily opposed to1 or in keeping with faith that worketh through love4 ,such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the ,new ,law1 by virtue of its primitive institution2 but have been left by the ,lawgiver1 i4e4 ,christ1 to the discretion of each individual4 ,and so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid2 and to each superior1 to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must do or avoid4 ,wherefore also in this respect the ,gospel is called the law of liberty 99,cf4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 since the ,old ,law decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the kingdom of ,god consists chiefly in internal acts3 but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts belong also to the kingdom of ,god4 ,thus if the kingdom of ,god is internal righteousness1 peace1 and spiritual joy1 all external acts that are incompatible with righteousness1 peace1 and spiritual joy1 are in opposition to the kingdom of ,god2 and consequently should be forbidden in the ,gospel of the kingdom4 ,on the other hand1 those things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid1 for instance1 to eat of this or that food1 are not part of the kingdom of ,god2 wherefore the ,apostle says before the words quoted3 ,the kingdom of ,god is not meat and drink4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 i1 #b71 what is free is cause of itself4 ,therefore he acts freely1 who acts of his own accord4 ,now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature3 since a habit inclines one as a second nature4 ,if1 however1 a habit be in opposition to nature1 man would not act according to his nature1 but according to some corruption affecting that nature4 ,since then the grace of the ,holy ,ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright1 it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace1 and shun what is opposed to it4 ,accordingly the ,new ,law is called the law of liberty in two respects4 ,first1 because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things1 except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation1 and come under the prescription or prohibition of the law4 ,secondly1 because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions1 inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace4 ,it is for these two reasons that the ,new ,law is called the law of perfect liberty 7,james #a3be74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,new ,law1 by restraining the mind from inordinate movements1 must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts1 which ensue from inward movements4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,new ,law ,made ,sufficient ,ordinations ,about ,external ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law made insufficient ordinations about external acts4 ,because faith that worketh through charity seems chiefly to belong to the ,new ,law1 according to ,gal4 #e3f3 ,in ,christ ,jesus neither circumcision availeth anything1 nor uncircumcision3 but faith that worketh through charity4 ,but the ,new ,law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the ,old ,law2 for instance1 belief in the ,trinity4 ,therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds1 which were not fixed in the ,old ,law4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the ,old ,law not only were sacraments instituted1 but also certain sacred things1 as stated above 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #d74 ,but in the ,new ,law1 although certain sacraments are instituted by ,our ,lord2 for instance1 pertaining either to the sanctification of a temple or of the vessels1 or to the celebration of some particular feast4 ,therefore the ,new ,law made insufficient ordinations about external matters4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the ,old ,law1 just as there were certain observances pertaining to ,god's ministers1 so also were there certain observances pertaining to the people3 as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the ,old ,law 7,q4 #aja1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ajb1 ,a4 #f74 ,now in the ,new ,law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of ,god2 as may be gathered from ,matt4 #aj3i3 ,do not possess gold1 nor silver1 nor money in your purses1 nor other things which are mentioned here and ,luke #i1 #aj4 ,therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the ,new ,law4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in the ,old ,law1 besides moral and ceremonial precepts1 there were certain judicial precepts4 ,but in the ,new ,law there are no judicial precepts4 ,therefore the ,new ,law made insufficient ordinations about external works4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,matt4 #g3bd73 ,every one 4 4 4 that heareth these ,my words1 and doth them1 shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock4 ,but a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building4 ,therefore ,christ's words contain all things necessary for man's salvation4 ,i answer that1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the ,new ,law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace4 ,and since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace1 but through ,christ alone1 hence ,christ of ,himself instituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace3 viz4 ,baptism1 ,eucharist1 ,orders of the ministers of the ,new ,law1 by the institution of the apostles and seventy-two disciples1 ,penance1 and indissoluble ,matrimony4 ,he promised ,confirmation through the sending of the ,holy ,ghost3 and we read that by ,his institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil 7,mk4 #f3ac74 ,these are the sacraments of the ,new ,law4 ,the right use of grace is by means of works of charity4 ,these1 in so far as they are essential to virtue1 pertain to the moral precepts1 which also formed part of the ,old ,law4 ,hence1 in this respect1 the ,new ,law had nothing to add as regards external action4 ,the determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship1 belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the ,law2 and1 in relation to our neighbor1 to the judicial precepts1 as stated above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #d74 ,and therefore1 since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the ,law consists1 they do not come under a precept of the ,new ,law1 but are left to the decision of man2 some relating to inferiors--as when a precept is given to an individual2 others1 relating to superiors1 temporal or spiritual1 referring1 namely1 to the common good4 ,accordingly the ,new ,law had no other external works to determine1 by prescribing or forbidding1 except the sacraments1 and those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue1 for instance1 that one must not kill1 or steal1 and so forth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,matters of faith are above human reason1 and so we cannot attain to them except through grace4 ,consequently1 when grace came to be bestowed more abundantly1 the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith4 ,on the other hand1 it is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue1 for it is the rule of human action1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #b74 ,wherefore in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the ,law1 which proceed from the dictate of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the sacraments of the ,new ,law grace is bestowed1 which cannot be received except through ,christ3 consequently they had to be instituted by ,him4 ,but in the sacred things no grace is given3 for instance1 in the consecration of a temple1 an altar or the like1 or1 again1 in the celebration of feasts4 ,wherefore ,our ,lord left the institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful1 since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,our ,lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances1 but as moral statutes3 and they can be understood in two ways4 ,first1 following ,augustine 7,de ,consensu ,evang4 #cj71 as being not commands but permissions4 ,for ,he permitted them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick1 and so on1 since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom they preached3 wherefore ,he goes on to say3 ,for the laborer is worthy of his hire4 ,nor is it a sin1 but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him1 without accepting supplies from those to whom he preaches2 as ,paul did 7#a ,cor4 #i3d1 seqq474 ,secondly1 according to the explanation of other holy men1 they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time during which they were sent to preach in ,judea before ,christ's ,passion4 ,for the disciples1 being yet as little children under ,christ's care1 needed to receive some special commands from ,christ1 such as all subjects receive from their superiors3 and especially so1 since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of temporalities1 so as to become fitted for the preaching of the ,gospel throughout the whole world4 ,nor must we wonder if ,he established certain fixed modes of life1 as long as the state of the ,old ,law endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect liberty of the ,spirit4 ,these statutes ,he abolished shortly before ,his ,passion1 as though the disciples had by their means become sufficiently practiced4 ,hence ,he said 7,luke #bb3ce1 #cf7 ,when ,i sent you without purse and scrip and shoes1 did you want anything8 ,but they said3 ,nothing4 ,then said ,he unto them3 ,but now1 he that hath a purse1 let him take it1 and likewise a scrip4 ,because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand1 when they would be left entirely to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,judicial precepts also1 are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination1 but only in regard to the common notion of justice4 ,consequently ,our ,lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge of others4 ,but as regards the judicial precepts of the ,old ,law1 some of them ,he explained1 because they were misunderstood by the ,pharisees1 as we shall state later on 7,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,new ,law ,directed ,man ,sufficiently ,as ,regards ,interior ,actions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,new ,law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions4 ,for there are ten commandments of the decalogue directing man to ,god and his neighbor4 ,but ,our ,lord partly fulfilled only three of them3 as regards1 namely1 the prohibition of murder1 of adultery1 and of perjury4 ,therefore it seems that1 by omitting to fulfil the other precepts1 ,he directed man insufficiently4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as regards the judicial precepts1 ,our ,lord ordained nothing in the ,gospel1 except in the matter of divorcing a wife1 of punishment by retaliation1 and of persecuting one's enemies4 ,but there are many other judicial precepts of the ,old ,law1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #aje74 ,therefore1 in this respect1 ,he directed human life insufficiently4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the ,old ,law1 besides moral and judicial1 there were ceremonial precepts about which ,our ,lord made no ordination4 ,therefore it seems that ,he ordained insufficiently4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed1 man should do no good deed for any temporal end whatever4 ,but there are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man3 and there are many other good works besides fasting1 alms-deeds1 and prayer4 ,therefore ,our ,lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works1 and of no other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory of human favor4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man1 and this solicitude even other animals share with man3 wherefore it is written 7,prov4 #f3f1 #h73 ,go to the ant1 ,o sluggard1 and consider her ways 4 4 4 she provideth her meat for herself in the summer1 and gathereth her food in the harvest4 ,but every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command1 forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature4 ,therefore it seems that ,our ,lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition4 ,now judgment is an act of justice1 according to ,ps4 #ah3ae3 ,until justice be turned into judgment4 ,therefore it seems that ,our ,lord unbecomingly forbade judgment3 and consequently that the ,new ,law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #a73 ,we should take note that1 when ,he said3 ',he that heareth these ,my words1' ,he indicates clearly that this sermon of the ,lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a ,christian's life is formed4 ,i answer that1 ,as is evident from ,augustine's words just quoted1 the sermon1 which ,our ,lord delivered on the mountain1 contains the whole process of forming the life of a ,christian4 ,therein man's interior movements are ordered4 ,because after declaring that his end is ,beatitude2 and after commending the authority of the apostles1 through whom the teaching of the ,gospel was to be promulgated1 ,he orders man's interior movements1 first in regard to man himself1 secondly in regard to his neighbor4 ,this he does in regard to man himself1 in two ways1 corresponding to man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective action1 viz4 volition of what has to be done1 and intention of the end4 ,wherefore1 in the first place1 ,he directs man's will in respect of the various precepts of the ,law3 by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works that are evil in themselves1 but also from internal acts1 and from the occasions of evil deeds4 ,in the second place ,he directs man's intention1 by teaching that in our good works1 we should seek neither human praise1 nor worldly riches1 which is to lay up treasures on earth4 ,afterwards ,he directs man's interior movement in respect of his neighbor1 by forbidding us1 on the one hand1 to judge him rashly1 unjustly1 or presumptuously2 and1 on the other1 to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy4 ,lastly1 ,he teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the ,gospel2 viz4 by imploring the help of ,god2 by striving to enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue2 and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences4 ,moreover1 ,he declares that we must observe ,his commandments1 and that it is not enough to make profession of faith1 or to work miracles1 or merely to hear ,his words4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the ,scribes and ,pharisees did not rightly understand3 and this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue4 ,for they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only1 and not the internal desire4 ,and they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false witness1 because the movement of anger tending to murder1 and the movement of desire tending to adultery1 seem to be in us from nature somewhat1 but not the desire of stealing or bearing false witness4 ,they held a false opinion about perjury1 for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin2 but that oaths were of themselves to be desired and to be taken frequently1 since they seem to proceed from reverence to ,god4 ,hence ,our ,lord shows that an oath is not desirable as a good thing2 and that it is better to speak without oaths1 unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,scribes and ,pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways4 ,first1 because they considered certain matters contained in the ,law of ,moses by way of permission1 to be right in themselves3 namely1 divorce of a wife1 and the taking of usury from strangers4 ,wherefore ,our ,lord forbade a man to divorce his wife 7,matt4 #e3cb72 and to receive usury 7,luke #f3ce71 when ,he said3 ,lend1 hoping for nothing thereby4 ,in another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the ,old ,law commanded to be done for justice's sake1 should be done out of desire for revenge1 or out of lust for temporal goods1 or out of hatred of one's enemies2 and this in respect of three precepts4 ,for they thought that desire for revenge was lawful1 on account of the precept concerning punishment by retaliation3 whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded1 not that man might seek revenge4 ,wherefore1 in order to do away with this1 ,our ,lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary4 ,they thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of what had been purloined1 together with something added thereto1 as stated above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #b1 ad #i72 whereas the ,law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice1 not to encourage covetousness4 ,wherefore ,our ,lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity1 and that we should be ready to give yet more if necessary4 ,they thought that the movement of hatred was lawful1 on account of the commandments of the ,law about the slaying of one's enemies3 whereas the ,law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice1 as stated above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #c1 ad #d71 not to satisfy hatred4 ,wherefore ,our ,lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies1 and to be ready to do good to them if necessary4 ,for these precepts are to be taken as binding the mind to be prepared to fulfil them1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte i1 #ai74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the ,new ,law1 because they are of themselves essential to virtue3 whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the ,law3 this was left to man to decide in one way or another4 ,hence ,our ,lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts4 ,on the other hand1 the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of the reality2 wherefore in regard to these precepts ,he commanded nothing on this occasion when ,he was giving the general points of ,his doctrine4 ,elsewhere1 however1 ,he makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the ,law1 was to be changed into spiritual worship3 as is evident from ,john #d3ba1 #bc1 where ,he says3 ,the hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain1 nor in ,jerusalem adore the ,father 4 4 4 but 4 4 4 the true adorers shall adore the ,father in spirit and in truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all worldly goods may be reduced to three--honors1 riches1 and pleasures2 according to #a ,john #b3af3 ,all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh1 which refers to pleasures of the flesh1 and the concupiscence of the eyes1 which refers to riches1 and the pride of life1 which refers to ambition for renown and honor4 ,now the ,law did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures2 on the contrary1 it forbade them4 ,but it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches2 for it is written in reference to the former 7,deut4 #bh3a73 ,if thou wilt hear the voice of the ,lord thy ,god 4 4 4 ,he will make thee higher than all the nations2 and in reference to the latter1 we read a little further on 7,deut4 #bh3aa73 ,he will make thee abound with all goods4 ,but the ,jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises1 as to think that we ought to serve ,god1 with these things as the end in view4 ,wherefore ,our ,lord set this aside by teaching1 first of all1 that works of virtue should not be done for human glory4 ,and ,he mentions three works1 to which all others may be reduced3 since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires1 comes under the head of fasting2 and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor1 comes under the head of alms-deeds2 and whatever a man does for the worship of ,god1 comes under the head of prayer4 ,and ,he mentions these three specifically1 as they hold the principal place1 and are most often used by men in order to gain glory4 ,in the second place ,he taught us that we must not place our end in riches1 when ,he said3 ,lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth 7,matt4 #f3ai74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,our ,lord forbade1 not necessary1 but inordinate solicitude4 ,now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters4 ,first1 we must not place our end in them1 nor serve ,god for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment4 ,wherefore ,he says3 ,lay not up for yourselves1 etc4 ,secondly1 we must not be so anxious about temporal things1 as to despair of ,god's help3 wherefore ,our ,lord says 7,matt4 #f3cb73 ,your ,father knoweth that you have need of all these things4 ,thirdly1 we must not add presumption to our solicitude2 in other words1 we must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without ,god's help3 such solicitude ,our ,lord sets aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature 7,matt4 #f3bg74 ,we must not anticipate the time for anxiety2 namely1 by being solicitous now1 for the needs1 not of the present1 but of a future time3 wherefore ,he says 7,matt4 #f3cd73 ,be not 4 4 4 solicitous for tomorrow4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,our ,lord did not forbid the judgment of justice1 without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy4 ,but he forbade inordinate judgment1 as stated above4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,certain ,definite ,counsels ,are ,fittingly ,proposed in the ,new ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the ,new ,law4 ,for counsels are given about that which is expedient for an end1 as we stated above1 when treating of counsel 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the same things are not expedient for all4 ,therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 counsels regard a greater good4 ,but there are no definite degrees to the greater good4 ,therefore definite counsels should not be given4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 counsels pertain to the life of perfection4 ,but obedience pertains to the life of perfection4 ,therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the ,gospel4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments1 as1 for instance1 ,love your enemies 7,matt4 #e3dd71 and those precepts which ,our ,lord gave ,his apostles 7,matt4 #aj74 ,therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the ,new ,law3 both because they are not all mentioned2 and because they are not distinguished from the commandments4 ,on the contrary1 ,the counsels of a wise friend are of great use1 according to ,prov4 7#bg3i73 ,ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart3 and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul4 ,but ,christ is our wisest and greatest friend4 ,therefore ,his counsels are supremely useful and becoming4 ,i answer that1 ,the difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation1 whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given4 ,consequently in the ,new ,law1 which is the law of liberty1 counsels are added to the commandments1 and not in the ,old ,law1 which is the law of bondage4 ,we must therefore understand the commandments of the ,new ,law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss1 to which end the ,new ,law brings us forthwith3 but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious4 ,now man is placed between the things of this world1 and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists3 so that the more he cleaves to the one1 the more he withdraws from the other1 and conversely4 ,wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world1 so as to make them his end1 and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does1 falls away altogether from spiritual goods4 ,hence this disorder is removed by the commandments4 ,nevertheless1 for man to gain the end aforesaid1 he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether3 since he can1 while using the things of this world1 attain to eternal happiness1 provided he does not place his end in them3 but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving up the goods of this world entirely3 wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose4 ,now the goods of this world which come into use in human life1 consist in three things3 viz4 in external wealth pertaining to the concupiscence of the eyes2 carnal pleasures pertaining to the concupiscence of the flesh2 and honors1 which pertain to the pride of life1 according to #a ,john #b3af3 and it is in renouncing these altogether1 as far as possible1 that the evangelical counsels consist4 ,moreover1 every form of the religious life that professes the state of perfection is based on these three3 since riches are renounced by poverty2 carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity2 and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience4 ,now if a man observe these absolutely1 this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand4 ,but if a man observe any one of them in a particular case1 this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense1 namely1 as applying to that particular case4 ,for instance1 when anyone gives an alms to a poor man1 not being bound so to do1 he follows the counsels in that particular case4 ,in like manner1 when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to prayer1 he follows the counsel for that particular time4 ,and again1 when a man follows not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully1 he follows the counsel in that particular case3 for instance1 if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to1 or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged4 ,in this way1 too1 all particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the aforesaid counsels1 considered in themselves1 are expedient to all2 but owing to some people being ill-disposed1 it happens that some of them are inexpedient1 because their disposition is not inclined to such things4 ,hence ,our ,lord1 in proposing the evangelical counsels1 always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels4 ,for in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty 7,matt4 #ai3ba71 ,he begins with the words3 ,if thou wilt be perfect1 and then ,he adds3 ,go1 sell all ,vulg43 'what' thou hast4 ,in like manner when ,he gave the counsel of perpetual chastity1 saying 7,matt4 #ai3ab73 ,there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven1 ,he adds straightway3 ,he that can take1 let him take it4 ,and again1 the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #g3ce71 after giving the counsel of virginity1 says3 ,and this ,i speak for your profit2 not to cast a snare upon you4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual2 but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good in general are fixed3 and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by ,our ,lord in the words3 ,and let him follow ,me4 ,for we follow ,him not only by imitating ,his works1 but also by obeying ,his commandments1 according to ,john #aj3bg3 ,my sheep hear ,my voice 4 4 4 and they follow ,me4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those things which ,our ,lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies1 and other similar sayings 7,matt4 #e2 ,luke #f71 may be referred to the preparation of the mind1 and then they are necessary for salvation2 for instance1 that man be prepared to do good to his enemies1 and other similar actions1 when there is need4 ,hence these things are placed among the precepts4 ,but that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need1 is to be referred to the particular counsels1 as stated above4 ,as to those matters which are set down in ,matt4 #aj and ,luke #i and #aj1 they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time1 or concessions1 as stated above 7,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,hence they are not set down among the counsels4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,grace 7,,qq4 #aji-aad7 ,,question #aji ,,of ,,the ,,necessity ,,of ,,grace 7,in ,ten ,articles7 ,we must now consider the exterior principle of human acts1 i4e4 ,god1 in so far as1 through grace1 we are helped by ,him to do right3 and1 first1 we must consider the grace of ,god2 secondly1 its cause2 thirdly1 its effects4 ,the first point of consideration will be threefold3 for we shall consider 7#a7 ,the necessity of grace2 7#b7 grace itself1 as to its essence2 7#c7 its division4 ,under the first head there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether without grace man can know anything8 7#b7 ,whether without ,god's grace man can do or wish any good8 7#c7 ,whether without grace man can love ,god above all things8 7#d7 ,whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the ,law8 7#e7 ,whether without grace he can merit eternal life8 7#f7 ,whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace8 7#g7 ,whether without grace he can rise from sin8 7#h7 ,whether without grace man can avoid sin8 7#i7 ,whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further ,divine help8 7#aj7 ,whether he can of himself persevere in good8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,without ,grace ,man ,can ,know ,any ,truth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that without grace man can know no truth4 ,for1 on #a ,cor4 #ab3c3 ,no man can say1 the ,lord ,jesus1 but by the ,holy ,ghost1 a gloss says3 ,every truth1 by whomsoever spoken is from the ,holy ,ghost4 ,now the ,holy ,ghost dwells in us by grace4 ,therefore we cannot know truth without grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,solil4 i1 #f7 that the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen4 ,now ,god ,himself is ,he ,who sheds the light4 ,and reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye4 ,and the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul4 ,now the bodily senses1 however pure1 cannot see any visible object1 without the sun's light4 ,therefore the human mind1 however perfect1 cannot1 by reasoning1 know any truth without ,divine light3 and this pertains to the aid of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the human mind can only understand truth by thinking1 as is clear from ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #g74 ,but the ,apostle says 7#b ,cor4 #c3e73 ,not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves1 as of ourselves2 but our sufficiency is from ,god4 ,therefore man cannot1 of himself1 know truth without the help of grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #d73 ,i do not approve having said in the prayer1 ,o ,god1 ,who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth2 for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths4 ,now man is cleansed from sin by grace1 according to ,ps4 #ej3ab3 ,create a clean heart in me1 ,o ,god1 and renew a right spirit within my bowels4 ,therefore without grace man of himself can know truth4 ,i answer that1 ,to know truth is a use or act of intellectual light1 since1 according to the ,apostle 7,eph4 #e3ac73 ,all that is made manifest is light4 ,now every use implies movement1 taking movement broadly1 so as to call thinking and willing movements1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,now in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action1 but there is also required the motion of the first mover4 ,now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heavenly body4 ,hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat1 it would not bring about alteration1 except by the motion of the heavenly body4 ,but it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover1 so all movements1 both corporeal and spiritual1 are reduced to the simple ,first ,mover1 ,who is ,god4 ,and hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be1 it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by ,god2 but this motion is according to the plan of ,his providence1 and not by necessity of nature1 as the motion of the heavenly body4 ,now not only is every motion from ,god as from the ,first ,mover1 but all formal perfection is from ,him as from the ,first ,act4 ,and thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon ,god in two ways3 first1 inasmuch as it is from ,him that it has the form whereby it acts2 secondly1 inasmuch as it is moved by ,him to act4 ,now every form bestowed on created things by ,god has power for a determined act1 which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment2 and beyond which it is powerless1 except by a superadded form1 as water can only heat when heated by the fire4 ,and thus the human understanding has a form1 viz4 intelligible light1 which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things1 viz4 those we can come to know through the senses4 ,higher intelligible things the human intellect cannot know1 unless it be perfected by a stronger light1 viz4 the light of faith or prophecy which is called the light of grace1 inasmuch as it is added to nature4 ,hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs ,divine help1 that the intellect may be moved by ,god to its act4 ,but he does not need a new light added to his natural light1 in order to know the truth in all things1 but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge4 ,and yet at times ,god miraculously instructs some by ,his grace in things that can be known by natural reason1 even as ,he sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the ,holy ,ghost as bestowing the natural light1 and moving us to understand and speak the truth1 but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace1 or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature4 ,for this only takes place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken1 and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith1 of which the ,apostle speaks4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the material sun sheds its light outside us2 but the intelligible ,sun1 ,who is ,god1 shines within us4 ,hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is ,god's enlightenment1 whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge2 and for this there is required no further knowledge1 but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we always need ,god's help for every thought1 inasmuch as ,he moves the understanding to act2 for actually to understand anything is to think1 as is clear from ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #g74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,man ,can ,wish or ,do ,any ,good ,without ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man can wish and do good without grace4 ,for that is in man's power1 whereof he is master4 ,now man is master of his acts1 and especially of his willing1 as stated above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #f74 ,hence man1 of himself1 can wish and do good without the help of grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man has more power over what is according to his nature than over what is beyond his nature4 ,now sin is against his nature1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #cj72 whereas deeds of virtue are according to his nature1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the understanding's good is truth1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b74 ,now the intellect can of itself know truth1 even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself4 ,therefore1 much more can man1 of himself1 do and wish good4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #i3af73 ,it is not of him that willeth1 namely1 to will1 nor of him that runneth1 namely to run1 but of ,god that showeth mercy4 ,and ,augustine says 7,de ,corrept4 et ,gratia ii7 that without grace men do nothing good when they either think or wish or love or act4 ,i answer that1 ,man's nature may be looked at in two ways3 first1 in its integrity1 as it was in our first parent before sin2 secondly1 as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent4 ,now in both states human nature needs the help of ,god as ,first ,mover1 to do or wish any good whatsoever1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but in the state of integrity1 as regards the sufficiency of the operative power1 man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature1 such as the good of acquired virtue2 but not surpassing good1 as the good of infused virtue4 ,but in the state of corrupt nature1 man falls short of what he could do by his nature1 so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers4 ,yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin1 so as to be shorn of every natural good1 even in the state of corrupted nature it can1 by virtue of its natural endowments1 work some particular good1 as to build dwellings1 plant vineyards1 and the like2 yet it cannot do all the good natural to it1 so as to fall short in nothing2 just as a sick man can of himself make some movements1 yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health1 unless by the help of medicine he be cured4 ,and thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason1 viz4 in order to do and wish supernatural good2 but for two reasons1 in the state of corrupt nature1 viz4 in order to be healed1 and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue1 which are meritorious4 ,beyond this1 in both states man needs the ,divine help1 that he may be moved to act well4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man is master of his acts and of his willing or not willing1 because of his deliberate reason1 which can be bent to one side or another4 ,and although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating1 yet this can only be by a previous deliberation2 and since it cannot go on to infinity1 we must come at length to this1 that man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle1 which is above the human mind1 to wit by ,god1 as the ,philosopher proves in the chapter ,on ,good ,fortune 7,ethic4 ,eudem4 vii74 ,hence the mind of man still unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not need to be moved by ,god2 and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin1 whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature4 ,now as every created thing has its being from another1 and1 considered in itself1 is nothing1 so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature4 ,for it can of itself fail in good1 even as of itself it can fall into non-existence1 unless it is upheld by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man cannot even know truth without ,divine help1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,and yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good1 than in regard to the knowledge of truth4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #c ,whether by ,his ,own ,natural ,powers and ,without ,grace ,man ,can ,love ,god ,above ,all ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that without grace man cannot love ,god above all things by his own natural powers4 ,for to love ,god above all things is the proper and principal act of charity4 ,now man cannot of himself possess charity1 since the charity of ,god is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost ,who is given to us1 as is said ,rom4 #e3e4 ,therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love ,god above all things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no nature can rise above itself4 ,but to love ,god above all things is to tend above oneself4 ,therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love ,god above itself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to ,god1 ,who is the ,highest ,good1 is due the best love1 which is that ,he be loved above all things4 ,now without grace man is not capable of giving ,god the best love1 which is ,his due2 otherwise it would be useless to add grace4 ,hence man1 without grace and with his natural powers alone1 cannot love ,god above all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,as some maintain1 man was first made with only natural endowments2 and in this state it is manifest that he loved ,god to some extent4 ,but he did not love ,god equally with himself1 or less than himself1 otherwise he would have sinned4 ,therefore he loved ,god above himself4 ,therefore man1 by his natural powers alone1 can love ,god more than himself and above all things4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,i1 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e71 where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth1 man in a state of perfect nature1 could by his natural power1 do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift1 though not without the help of ,god moving him4 ,now to love ,god above all things is natural to man and to every nature1 not only rational but irrational1 and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature4 ,and the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit 7to be sought and loved7 since all things act according as they are naturally fit as stated in ,phys4 ii1 #h4 ,now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole2 hence everything1 by its natural appetite and love1 loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe1 which is ,god4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that ,god leads everything to love of ,himself4 ,hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of ,god as to its end2 and thus he loved ,god more than himself and above all things4 ,but in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will1 which1 unless it is cured by ,god's grace1 follows its private good1 on account of the corruption of nature4 ,and hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments1 in order to love ,god above all things naturally1 although he needed ,god's help to move him to it2 but in the state of corrupt nature man needs1 even for this1 the help of grace to heal his nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,charity loves ,god above all things in a higher way than nature does4 ,for nature loves ,god above all things inasmuch as ,he is the beginning and the end of natural good2 whereas charity loves ,him1 as ,he is the object of beatitude1 and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with ,god4 ,moreover charity adds to natural love of ,god a certain quickness and joy1 in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when it is said that nature cannot rise above itself1 we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself1 for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself1 as is shown in our natural knowledge of ,god4 ,but we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength4 ,now to love ,god above all things is not such an act2 for it is natural to every creature1 as was said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,love is said to be best1 both with respect to degree of love1 and with regard to the motive of loving1 and the mode of love4 ,and thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves ,god as the giver of beatitude1 as was said above4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,man ,without ,grace and by ,his ,own ,natural ,powers ,can ,fulfil the ,commandments of the ,law8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man without grace1 and by his own natural powers1 can fulfil the commandments of the ,law4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #b3ad7 that the ,gentiles who have not the law1 do by nature those things that are of the ,law4 ,now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace4 ,hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the ,law without grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,jerome says 7,expos4 ,cathol4 ,fide 99,symboli ,explanatio ad ,damasum1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,jerome3 now ascribed to ,pelagius7 that they are anathema who say ,god has laid impossibilities upon man4 ,now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him4 ,therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 of all the commandments of the ,law1 the greatest is this1 ,thou shalt love the ,lord thy ,god with thy whole heart 7,matt4 #bg3cg74 ,now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving ,god above all things1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the ,law without grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,haeres4 lxxxviii7 that it is part of the ,pelagian heresy that they believe that without grace man can fulfil all the ,divine commandments4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the ,law4 ,the first regards the substance of the works1 as when a man does works of justice1 fortitude1 and of other virtues4 ,and in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the ,law2 otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state1 since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the ,divine commandments4 ,but in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the ,divine commandments without healing grace4 ,secondly1 the commandments of the law can be fulfilled1 not merely as regards the substance of the act1 but also as regards the mode of acting1 i4e4 their being done out of charity4 ,and in this way1 neither in the state of perfect nature1 nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace4 ,hence1 ,augustine 7,de ,corrept4 et ,grat4 ii7 having stated that without grace men can do no good whatever1 adds3 ,not only do they know by its light what to do1 but by its help they do lovingly what they know4 ,beyond this1 in both states they need the help of ,god's motion in order to fulfil the commandments1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xxvii71 do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the ,law2 for the ,spirit of grace works this1 in order to restore in us the image of ,god1 after which we were naturally made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what we can do with the ,divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us2 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #c73 ,what we can do through our friends1 we can do1 in some sense1 by ourselves4 ,hence ,jerome 99,symboli ,explanatio ad ,damasum1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,jerome3 now ascribed to ,pelagius concedes that our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still require ,god's help4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man cannot1 with his purely natural endowments1 fulfil the precept of the love of ,god1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,man ,can ,merit ,everlasting ,life ,without ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace4 ,for ,our ,lord says 7,matt4 #ai3ag73 ,if thou wilt enter into life1 keep the commandments2 from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests with man's will4 ,but what rests with our will1 we can do of ourselves4 ,hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life of himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by ,god on men1 according to ,matt4 #e3ab3 ,your reward is very great in heaven4 ,but wage or reward is meted by ,god to everyone according to his works1 according to ,ps4 #fa3ab3 ,thou wilt render to every man according to his works4 ,hence1 since man is master of his works1 it seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everlasting life is the last end of human life4 ,now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end4 ,much more1 therefore1 may man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments1 without grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #f3bc73 ,the grace of ,god is life everlasting4 ,and as a gloss says1 this is said that we may understand that ,god1 of ,his own mercy1 leads us to everlasting life4 ,i answer that1 ,acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end4 ,but no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle2 and hence we see in natural things1 that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force1 but only such as is proportionate to its power4 ,now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #e74 ,hence man1 by his natural endowments1 cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life2 and for this a higher force is needed1 viz4 the force of grace4 ,and thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life2 yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man1 as to toil in the fields1 to drink1 to eat1 or to have friends1 and the like1 as ,augustine says in his third ,reply to the ,pelagians 99,hypognosticon iii1 among the spurious works of ,st4 ,augustine4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man1 by his will1 does works meritorious of everlasting life2 but as ,augustine says1 in the same book1 for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the gloss upon ,rom4 #f3bc1 ,the grace of ,god is life everlasting1 says1 ,it is certain that everlasting life is meted to good works2 but the works to which it is meted1 belong to ,god's grace4 ,and it has been said 7,a4 #d71 that to fulfil the commandments of the ,law1 in their due way1 whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious1 requires grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection has to do with the natural end of man4 ,now human nature1 since it is nobler1 can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end1 which lower natures can nowise reach2 even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,de ,coelo ii1 #ab74 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #f ,whether a ,man1 by ,himself and ,without the ,external ,aid of ,grace1 ,can ,prepare ,himself for ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man1 by himself and without the external help of grace1 can prepare himself for grace4 ,for nothing impossible is laid upon man1 as stated above 7,a4 #d1 ad #a74 ,but it is written 7,zech4 #a3c73 ,turn ye to ,me 4 4 4 and ,i will turn to you4 ,now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to ,god4 ,therefore it seems that man of himself1 and without the external help of grace1 can prepare himself for grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do1 since if man does what is in him to do1 ,god will not deny him grace1 for it is written 7,matt4 #g3aa7 that ,god gives ,his good ,spirit to them that ask ,him4 ,but what is in our power is in us to do4 ,therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace1 with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace2 and thus to infinity1 which is impossible4 ,hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first1 viz4 that man1 of himself and without grace1 can prepare himself for grace4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is written 7,prov4 #af3a7 that it is the part of man to prepare the soul4 ,now an action is said to be part of a man1 when he can do it by himself4 ,hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,john #f3dd73 ,no man can come to ,me except the ,father1 ,who hath sent ,me1 draw him4 ,but if man could prepare himself1 he would not need to be drawn by another4 ,hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace4 ,i answer that1 ,the preparation of the human will for good is twofold3 the first1 whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy ,god2 and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace1 which is the principle of meritorious works1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,there is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself4 ,now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift1 it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul1 otherwise we should go on to infinity4 ,but we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of ,god1 ,who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish4 ,for in these two ways do we need the ,divine assistance1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,now that we need the help of ,god to move us1 is manifest4 ,for since every agent acts for an end1 every cause must direct is effect to its end1 and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers1 man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover1 and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers2 as the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army--and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer4 ,and thus since ,god is the ,first ,mover1 simply1 it is by ,his motion that everything seeks to be likened to ,god in its own way4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that ,god turns all to ,himself4 ,but ,he directs righteous men to ,himself as to a special end1 which they seek1 and to which they wish to cling1 according to ,ps4 #gb3bh1 it is good for ,me to adhere to my ,god4 ,and that they are turned to ,god can only spring from ,god's having turned them4 ,now to prepare oneself for grace is1 as it were1 to be turned to ,god2 just as1 whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun1 prepares himself to receive the sun's light1 by turning his eyes towards the sun4 ,hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of ,god moving him inwardly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man's turning to ,god is by free-will2 and thus man is bidden to turn himself to ,god4 ,but free-will can only be turned to ,god1 when ,god turns it1 according to ,jer4 #ca3ah3 ,convert me and ,i shall be converted1 for ,thou art the ,lord1 my ,god2 and ,lam4 #e3ba3 ,convert us1 ,o ,lord1 to ,thee1 and we shall be converted4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man can do nothing unless moved by ,god1 according to ,john #ae3e3 ,without ,me1 you can do nothing4 ,hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do1 this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection regards habitual grace1 for which some preparation is required1 since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject4 ,but in order that man should be moved by ,god1 no further motion is presupposed since ,god is the ,first ,mover4 ,hence we need not go to infinity4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it is the part of man to prepare his soul1 since he does this by his free-will4 ,and yet he does not do this without the help of ,god moving him1 and drawing him to ,himself1 as was said above4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,man ,can ,rise from ,sin ,without the ,help of ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace4 ,for what is presupposed to grace1 takes place without grace4 ,but to rise from sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace2 since it is written 7,eph4 #e3ad73 ,arise from the dead and ,christ shall enlighten thee4 ,therefore man can rise from sin without grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,now1 man1 by force of his nature1 can rise from illness to health1 without the external help of medicine1 since there still remains in him the principle of life1 from which the natural operation proceeds4 ,hence it seems that1 with equal reason1 man may be restored by himself1 and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature1 as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness1 and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement4 ,now a sin is an act against nature1 as is clear from ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #cj74 ,hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,gal4 #b3ba2 ,cf4 ,gal4 #c3ba73 ,for if there had been a law given which could give life--then ,christ died in vain1 i4e4 to no purpose4 ,hence with equal reason1 if man has a nature1 whereby he can he justified1 ,christ died in vain1 i4e4 to no purpose4 ,but this cannot fittingly be said4 ,therefore by himself he cannot be justified1 i4e4 he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice4 ,i answer that1 ,man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace4 ,for since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #f71 to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin2 but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning4 ,now man incurs a triple loss by sinning1 as was clearly shown above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #a71 viz4 stain1 corruption of natural good1 and debt of punishment4 ,he incurs a stain1 inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin4 ,natural good is corrupted1 inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not being subject to ,god's2 and this order being overthrown1 the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered4 ,lastly1 there is the debt of punishment1 inasmuch as by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation4 ,now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by ,god4 ,for since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of ,divine light1 this lustre cannot be brought back1 except ,god sheds ,his light anew3 hence a habitual gift is necessary1 and this is the light of grace4 ,likewise1 the order of nature can only be restored1 i4e4 man's will can only be subject to ,god when ,god draws man's will to ,himself1 as stated above 7,a4 #f74 ,so1 too1 the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by ,god alone1 against ,whom the offense was committed and ,who is man's ,judge4 ,and thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace1 both as regards a habitual gift1 and as regards the internal motion of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free-will1 as this act is required in order that man should rise from sin4 ,hence when it is said1 ,arise1 and ,christ shall enlighten thee1 we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the enlightenment of grace2 but that when man by his free-will1 moved by ,god1 strives to rise from sin1 he receives the light of justifying grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace4 ,this principle is grace which is taken away by sin4 ,hence man cannot be restored by himself2 but he requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew1 as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when nature is perfect1 it can be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate condition2 but without exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure4 ,and thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin1 remains no longer perfect1 but corrupted1 as stated above 7,q4 #he72 nor can it be restored1 by itself1 to its connatural good1 much less to the supernatural good of justice4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,man ,without ,grace ,can ,avoid ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that without grace man can avoid sin4 ,because no one sins in what he cannot avoid1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,duab4 ,anim4 x1 xi2 ,de ,libero ,arbit4 iii1 #ah74 ,hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin1 it would seem that in sinning he does not sin1 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 men are corrected that they may not sin4 ,if therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin1 correction would seem to be given to no purpose2 which is absurd4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7,ecclus4 #ae3ah73 ,before man is life and death1 good and evil2 that which he shall choose shall be given him4 ,but by sinning no one ceases to be a man4 ,hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil2 and thus man can avoid sin without grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,perfect ,just4 xxi73 ,whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer ',lead us not into temptation' 7and they deny it who maintain that the help of ,god's grace is not necessary to man for salvation1 but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will7 ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing1 and to be anathematized by the tongues of all4 ,i answer that1 ,we may speak of man in two ways3 first1 in the state of perfect nature2 secondly1 in the state of corrupted nature4 ,now in the state of perfect nature1 man1 without habitual grace1 could avoid sinning either mortally or venially2 since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature--and in the state of perfect nature man could avoid this4 ,nevertheless he could not have done it without ,god's help to uphold him in good1 since if this had been withdrawn1 even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness4 ,but in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin4 ,and in the present life this healing is wrought in the mind--the carnal appetite being not yet restored4 ,hence the ,apostle 7,rom4 #g3be7 says in the person of one who is restored3 ,i myself1 with the mind1 serve the law of ,god1 but with the flesh1 the law of sin4 ,and in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin1 which takes its stand in his reason1 as stated above 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #e72 but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality4 ,for man can1 indeed1 repress each of its movements 7and hence they are sinful and voluntary71 but not all1 because whilst he is resisting one1 another may arise1 and also because the reason is not always alert to avoid these movements1 as was said above 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,so1 too1 before man's reason1 wherein is mortal sin1 is restored by justifying grace1 he can avoid each mortal sin1 and for a time1 since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning4 ,but it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,super ,ezech4 ,hom4 xi7 that a sin not at once taken away by repentance1 by its weight drags us down to other sins3 and this because1 as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason1 so should the reason be subject to ,god1 and should place in ,him the end of its will4 ,now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated1 even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated4 ,and thus1 even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason1 so likewise1 since man's reason is not entirely subject to ,god1 the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason4 ,for when man's heart is not so fixed on ,god as to be unwilling to be parted from ,him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil1 many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from ,god and breaks ,his commandments1 and thus sins mortally3 especially since1 when surprised1 a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii72 although with premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit4 ,but because a man cannot always have this premeditation1 it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from ,god1 unless1 by grace1 he is quickly brought back to the due order4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man can avoid each but not every act of sin1 except by grace1 as stated above4 ,nevertheless1 since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace1 the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,correction is useful in order that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate2 if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise1 in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing1 ,god by hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,corr4 et ,gratia vi74 ,correction is therefore necessary1 from the fact that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin2 yet it is not sufficient without ,god's help4 ,hence it is written 7,eccles4 #g3ad73 ,consider the works of ,god that no man can correct whom ,he hath despised4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,hypognosticon iii 99,among the spurious works of ,st4 ,augustine71 this saying is to be understood of man in the state of perfect nature1 when as yet he was not a slave of sin4 ,hence he was able to sin and not to sin4 ,now1 too1 whatever a man wills1 is given to him2 but his willing good1 he has by ,god's assistance4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,one ,who ,has ,already ,obtained ,grace1 ,can1 of ,himself and ,without ,further ,help of ,grace1 ,do ,good and ,avoid ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that whoever has already obtained grace1 can by himself and without further help of grace1 do good and avoid sin4 ,for a thing is useless or imperfect1 if it does not fulfil what it was given for4 ,now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin4 ,hence if with grace man cannot do this1 it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 by grace the ,holy ,spirit dwells in us1 according to #a ,cor4 #c3af3 ,know you not that you are the temple of ,god1 and that the ,spirit of ,god dwelleth in you8 ,now since the ,spirit of ,god is omnipotent1 ,he is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin4 ,hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things without any further assistance of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin1 with equal reason1 will he need yet another grace1 even though he has obtained this first help of grace4 ,therefore we must go on to infinity2 which is impossible4 ,hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free from sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,natura et ,gratia xxvi7 that as the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light1 so1 neither can a man1 even if he is most righteous1 live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice4 ,but justification is by grace1 according to ,rom4 #c3bd3 ,being justified freely by ,his grace4 ,hence even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #e71 in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of ,god--first1 a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed1 and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritorious of everlasting life1 which exceed the capability of nature4 ,secondly1 man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by ,god to act4 ,now with regard to the first kind of help1 man does not need a further help of grace1 e4g4 a further infused habit4 ,yet he needs the help of grace in another way1 i4e4 in order to be moved by ,god to act righteously1 and this for two reasons3 first1 for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act1 unless by virtue of the ,divine motion4 ,secondly1 for this special reason--the condition of the state of human nature4 ,for although healed by grace as to the mind1 yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh1 whereby it serves the law of sin1 ,rom4 #g3be4 ,in the intellect1 too1 there remains the darkness of ignorance1 whereby1 as is written 7,rom4 #h3bf73 ,we know not what we should pray for as we ought2 since on account of the various turns of circumstances1 and because we do not know ourselves perfectly1 we cannot fully know what is for our good1 according to ,wis4 #i3ad3 ,for the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain4 ,hence we must be guided and guarded by ,god1 ,who knows and can do all things4 ,for which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of ,god1 to say3 ,lead us not into temptation1 and ,thy ,will be done on earth as it is in heaven1 and whatever else is contained in the ,lord's ,prayer pertaining to this4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the ,divine help2 for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from ,him4 ,hence if after having received grace man still needs the ,divine help1 it cannot be concluded that grace is given to no purpose1 or that it is imperfect1 since man will need the ,divine help even in the state of glory1 when grace shall be fully perfected4 ,but here grace is to some extent imperfect1 inasmuch as it does not completely heal man1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the operation of the ,holy ,ghost1 which moves and protects1 is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us2 but beyond this effect ,he1 together with the ,father and the ,son1 moves and protects us4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,man ,possessed of ,grace ,needs the ,help of ,grace in ,order to ,persevere8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to persevere4 ,for perseverance is something less than virtue1 even as continence is1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vii1 #g1 #i74 ,now since man is justified by grace1 he needs no further help of grace in order to have the virtues4 ,much less1 therefore1 does he need the help of grace to have perseverance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all the virtues are infused at once4 ,but perseverance is put down as a virtue4 ,hence it seems that1 together with grace1 perseverance is given to the other infused virtues4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3bj7 more was restored to man by ,christ's gift1 than he had lost by ,adam's sin4 ,but ,adam received what enabled him to persevere2 and thus man does not need grace in order to persevere4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,persev4 ii73 ,why is perseverance besought of ,god1 if it is not bestowed by ,god8 ,for is it not a mocking request to seek what we know ,he does not give1 and what is in our power without ,his giving it8 ,now perseverance is besought by even those who are hallowed by grace2 and this is seen1 when we say ,hallowed be ,thy name1 which ,augustine confirms by the words of ,cyprian 7,de ,correp4 et ,grat4 xii74 ,hence man1 even when possessed of grace1 needs perseverance to be given to him by ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,perseverance is taken in three ways4 ,first1 to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly1 lest he be moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous4 ,and thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii1 #g74 ,secondly1 perseverance may be called a habit1 whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the end4 ,and in both these ways perseverance is infused together with grace1 even as continence and the other virtues are4 ,thirdly1 perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life4 ,and in order to have this perseverance man does not1 indeed1 need another habitual grace1 but he needs the ,divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions1 as appears from the preceding article4 ,and hence after anyone has been justified by grace1 he still needs to beseech ,god for the aforesaid gift of perseverance1 that he may be kept from evil till the end of his life4 ,for to many grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection regards the first mode of perseverance1 as the second objection regards the second4 ,hence the solution of the second objection is clear4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,natura et ,gratia xliii7 99,cf4 ,de ,correp4 et ,grat4 xii3 in the original state man received a gift whereby he could persevere1 but to persevere was not given him4 ,but now1 by the grace of ,christ1 many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere1 and the further gift of persevering1 and thus ,christ's gift is greater than ,adam's fault4 ,nevertheless it was easier for man to persevere1 with the gift of grace in the state of innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit1 than it is now4 ,for the restoration by ,christ's grace1 although it is already begun in the mind1 is not yet completed in the flesh1 as it will be in heaven1 where man will not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin4 ,,question #aaj ,,of ,,the ,,grace ,,of ,,god ,,as ,,regards ,,its ,,essence 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must now consider the grace of ,god as regards its essence2 and under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether grace implies something in the soul8 7#b7 ,whether grace is a quality8 7#c7 ,whether grace differs from infused virtue8 7#d7 ,of the subject of grace4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,grace ,implies ,anything in the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace does not imply anything in the soul4 ,for man is said to have the grace of ,god even as the grace of man4 ,hence it is written 7,gen4 #ci3ba7 that the ,lord gave to ,joseph grace ,douay3 'favor' in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison4 ,now when we say that a man has the favor of another1 nothing is implied in him who has the favor of the other1 but an acceptance is implied in him whose favor he has4 ,hence when we say that a man has the grace of ,god1 nothing is implied in his soul2 but we merely signify the ,divine acceptance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the soul quickens the body so does ,god quicken the soul2 hence it is written 7,deut4 #cj3bj73 ,he is thy life4 ,now the soul quickens the body immediately4 ,therefore nothing can come as a medium between ,god and the soul4 ,hence grace implies nothing created in the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 on ,rom4 #a3g1 ,grace to you and peace1 the gloss says3 ,grace1 i4e4 the remission of sins4 ,now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul1 but only in ,god1 ,who does not impute the sin1 according to ,ps4 #ca3b3 ,blessed is the man to whom the ,lord hath not imputed sin4 ,hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,light implies something in what is enlightened4 ,but grace is a light of the soul2 hence ,augustine says 7,de ,natura et ,gratia xxii73 ,the light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law1 and those who have been thus deserted become blind4 ,therefore grace implies something in the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the common manner of speech1 grace is usually taken in three ways4 ,first1 for anyone's love1 as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king1 i4e4 the king looks on him with favor4 ,secondly1 it is taken for any gift freely bestowed1 as we are accustomed to say3 ,i do you this act of grace4 ,thirdly1 it is taken for the recompense of a gift given gratis1 inasmuch as we are said to be grateful for benefits4 ,of these three the second depends on the first1 since one bestows something on another gratis from the love wherewith he receives him into his good graces4 ,and from the second proceeds the third1 since from benefits bestowed gratis arises gratitude4 ,now as regards the last two1 it is clear that grace implies something in him who receives grace3 first1 the gift given gratis2 secondly1 the acknowledgment of the gift4 ,but as regards the first1 a difference must be noted between the grace of ,god and the grace of man2 for since the creature's good springs from the ,divine will1 some good in the creature flows from ,god's love1 whereby ,he wishes the good of the creature4 ,on the other hand1 the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things2 and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing1 but pre-supposes it either in part or wholly4 ,therefore it is clear that every love of ,god is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature1 but not co-eternal with the eternal love4 ,and according to this difference of good the love of ,god to the creature is looked at differently4 ,for one is common1 whereby ,he loves all things that are 7,wis4 #aa3be71 and thereby gives things their natural being4 ,but the second is a special love1 whereby ,he draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the ,divine good2 and according to this love ,he is said to love anyone simply1 since it is by this love that ,god simply wishes the eternal good1 which is ,himself1 for the creature4 ,accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of ,god1 there is signified something bestowed on man by ,god4 ,nevertheless the grace of ,god sometimes signifies ,god's eternal love1 as we say the grace of predestination1 inasmuch as ,god gratuitously and not from merits predestines or elects some2 for it is written 7,eph4 #a3e73 ,he hath predestinated us into the adoption of children 4 4 4 unto the praise of the glory of ,his grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even when a man is said to be in another's good graces1 it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other2 even as anyone is said to have ,god's grace--with this difference1 that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love1 but whatever is pleasing to ,god in a man is caused by the ,divine love1 as was said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause2 but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of a formal cause4 ,now there is no medium between form and matter1 since the form1 of itself1 informs the matter or subject2 whereas the agent informs the subject1 not by its substance1 but by the form1 which it causes in the matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #be73 ,when ,i said that grace was for the remission of sins1 and peace for our reconciliation with ,god1 you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general peace1 but that the special name of grace signifies the remission of sins4 ,not only grace1 therefore1 but many other of ,god's gifts pertain to grace4 ,and hence the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us1 as will appear later 7,q4 #aac1 ,a4 #b74 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,grace ,is a ,quality of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul4 ,for no quality acts on its subject1 since the action of a quality is not without the action of its subject1 and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself4 ,but grace acts upon the soul1 by justifying it4 ,therefore grace is not a quality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,furthermore1 substance is nobler than quality4 ,but grace is nobler than the nature of the soul1 since we can do many things by grace1 to which nature is not equal1 as stated above 7,q4 #aji1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,therefore grace is not a quality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,furthermore1 no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject4 ,but grace remains2 since it is not corrupted1 for thus it would be reduced to nothing1 since it was created from nothing2 hence it is called a new creature7,gal4 #f3ae74 ,on the contrary1 on ,ps4 #ajc3ae3 ,that he may make the face cheerful with oil2 the gloss says3 ,grace is a certain beauty of soul1 which wins the ,divine love4 ,but beauty of soul is a quality1 even as beauty of body4 ,therefore grace is a quality4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 there is understood to be an effect of ,god's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have ,god's grace4 ,now it was stated 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #a7 that man is aided by ,god's gratuitous will in two ways3 first1 inasmuch as man's soul is moved by ,god to know or will or do something1 and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality1 but a movement of the soul2 for motion is the act of the mover in the moved4 ,secondly1 man is helped by ,god's gratuitous will1 inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by ,god into the soul2 and for this reason1 that it is not fitting that ,god should provide less for those ,he loves1 that they may acquire supernatural good1 than for creatures1 whom ,he loves that they may acquire natural good4 ,now ,he so provides for natural creatures1 that not merely does ,he move them to their natural acts1 but ,he bestows upon them certain forms and powers1 which are the principles of acts1 in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements1 and thus the movements whereby they are moved by ,god become natural and easy to creatures1 according to ,wis4 #h3a3 she 4 4 4 ordereth all things sweetly4 ,much more therefore does ,he infuse into such as ,he moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good1 certain forms or supernatural qualities1 whereby they may be moved by ,him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good2 and thus the gift of grace is a quality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,grace1 as a quality1 is said to act upon the soul1 not after the manner of an efficient cause1 but after the manner of a formal cause1 as whiteness makes a thing white1 and justice1 just4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature1 even as matter and form are called substance4 ,and because grace is above human nature1 it cannot be a substance or a substantial form1 but is an accidental form of the soul4 ,now what is substantially in ,god1 becomes accidental in the soul participating the ,divine goodness1 as is clear in the case of knowledge4 ,and thus because the soul participates in the ,divine goodness imperfectly1 the participation of the ,divine goodness1 which is grace1 has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself4 ,nevertheless1 inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the ,divine goodness1 it is nobler than the nature of the soul1 though not in its mode of being4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,boethius 99,pseudo-,bede1 ,sent4 ,phil4 ex ,artist4 says1 the being of an accident is to inhere4 ,hence no accident is called being as if it had being1 but because by it something is2 hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being 7,metaph4 vii1 text4 #b74 ,and because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is1 properly speaking1 no accident comes into being or is corrupted1 but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident4 ,and thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it1 i4e4 are given a new being out of nothing1 i4e4 not from merits1 according to ,eph4 #b3aj1 created in ,jesus ,christ in good works4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,grace ,is the ,same ,as ,virtue8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is the same as virtue4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,spir4 et ,lit4 xiv7 that operating grace is faith that worketh by charity4 ,but faith that worketh by charity is a virtue4 ,therefore grace is a virtue4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what fits the definition1 fits the defined4 ,but the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace1 since it makes its subject good1 and his work good1 and it is a good quality of the mind1 whereby we live righteously1 etc4 ,therefore grace is virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 grace is a quality4 ,now it is clearly not in the fourth species of quality2 viz4 form which is the abiding figure of things1 since it does not belong to bodies4 ,nor is it in the third1 since it is not a passion nor a passion-like quality1 which is in the sensitive part of the soul1 as is proved in ,physic4 viii2 and grace is principally in the mind4 ,nor is it in the second species1 which is natural power or impotence2 since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil1 as does natural power4 ,therefore it must be in the first species which is habit or disposition4 ,now habits of the mind are virtues2 since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner1 as stated above 7,q4 #eg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore grace is the same as virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,if grace is a virtue1 it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues4 ,but grace is neither faith nor hope1 for these can be without sanctifying grace4 ,nor is it charity1 since grace foreruns charity1 as ,augustine says in his book on the ,predestination of the ,saints 7,de ,dono ,persev4 xvi74 ,therefore grace is not virtue4 ,i answer that1 ,some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence1 and differed only logically--in the sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to ,god1 or is given gratuitously--and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly4 ,and the ,master seems to have thought this 7,sent4 ii1 ,d #bg74 ,but if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue1 this cannot hold1 since1 as the ,philosopher says 7,physic4 vii1 text4 #ag71 virtue is disposition of what is perfect--and ,i call perfect what is disposed according to its nature4 ,now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature1 from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature4 ,but it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above 7,q4 #ee1 seqq47 are dispositions1 whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man2 whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end1 and consequently in relation to some higher nature1 i4e4 in relation to a participation of the ,divine ,nature1 according to #b ,pet4 #a3d3 ,he hath given us most great and most precious promises2 that by these you may be made partakers of the ,divine ,nature4 ,and it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of ,god4 ,and thus1 even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues1 which are ordained to this natural light1 so also the light of grace which is a participation of the ,divine ,nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light1 hence the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3h73 ,for you were heretofore darkness1 but now light in the ,lord4 ,walk then as children of the light4 ,for as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk1 in accordance with the natural light of reason1 so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine calls faith that worketh by charity grace1 since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated4 ,now good is not attributed to grace in this manner1 but as to the root of goodness in man1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,grace is reduced to the first species of quality2 and yet it is not the same as virtue1 but is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues1 as their principle and root4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,grace ,is in the ,essence of the ,soul ,as in a ,subject1 or in ,one of the ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul1 as in a subject1 but in one of the powers4 ,for ,augustine says 7,hypognosticon iii 99,among the spurious works of ,st4 ,augustine7 that grace is related to the will or to the free will as a rider to his horse4 ,now the will or the free will is a power1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #hc1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence grace is in a power of the soul1 as in a subject4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,man's merit springs from grace as ,augustine says 7,de ,gratia et ,lib4 ,arbit4 vi74 ,now merit consists in acts1 which proceed from a power4 ,hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace1 the soul1 inasmuch as it has an essence1 must be capable of grace4 ,but this is false2 since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace4 ,therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the essence of the soul is prior to its powers4 ,now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior4 ,hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul1 although we suppose no part or power of the soul--viz4 neither the will1 nor the intellect1 nor anything else2 which is impossible4 ,on the contrary1 ,by grace we are born again sons of ,god4 ,but generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers4 ,therefore grace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers4 ,i answer that1 ,this question depends on the preceding4 ,for if grace is the same as virtue1 it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject2 since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #a74 ,but if grace differs from virtue1 it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace1 since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it remains that grace1 as it is prior to virtue1 has a subject prior to the powers of the soul1 so that it is in the essence of the soul4 ,for as man in his intellective powers participates in the ,divine knowledge through the virtue of faith1 and in his power of will participates in the ,divine love through the virtue of charity1 so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the ,divine ,nature1 after the manner of a likeness1 through a certain regeneration or re-creation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as from the essence of the soul flows its powers1 which are the principles of deeds1 so likewise the virtues1 whereby the powers are moved to act1 flow into the powers of the soul from grace4 ,and thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved1 which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse--but not as an accident to a subject4 ,and thereby is made clear the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,for grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues1 as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the soul is the subject of grace1 as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature4 ,but the soul is not classed in a species by any of its powers1 since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species4 ,hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls1 viz4 of dumb animals1 and of plants4 ,consequently it does not follow that1 if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace1 every soul may be the subject of grace2 since it belongs to the essence of the soul1 inasmuch as it is of such a species4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species1 the soul cannot be without them4 ,yet1 granted that it was without them1 the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species1 not that it would actually have these powers1 but on account of the essence of such a species1 from which these powers naturally flow4 ,,question #aaa ,,of ,,the ,,division ,,of ,,grace 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider the division of grace2 under which head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace8 7#b7 ,of the division into operating and cooperating grace2 7#c7 ,of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace2 7#d7 ,of the division of gratuitous grace2 7#e7 ,of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace4 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,grace ,is ,fittingly ,divided into ,sanctifying ,grace and ,gratuitous ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace4 ,for grace is a gift of ,god1 as is clear from what has been already stated 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a74 ,but man is not therefore pleasing to ,god because something is given him by ,god1 but rather on the contrary2 since something is freely given by ,god1 because man is pleasing to ,him4 ,hence there is no sanctifying grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is not given on account of preceding merits is given gratis4 ,now even natural good is given to man without preceding merit1 since nature is presupposed to merit4 ,therefore nature itself is given gratuitously by ,god4 ,but nature is condivided with grace4 ,therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace1 since it is found outside the genus of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 members of a division are mutually opposed4 ,but even sanctifying grace1 whereby we are justified1 is given to us gratuitously1 according to ,rom4 #c3bd3 ,being justified freely 7gratis7 by ,his grace4 ,hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle attributes both to grace1 viz4 to sanctify and to be gratuitously given4 ,for with regard to the first he says 7,eph4 #a3f73 ,he hath graced us in ,his beloved son4 ,and with regard to the second 7,rom4 #b3f73 ,and if by grace1 it is not now by works1 otherwise grace is no more grace4 ,therefore grace can be distinguished by its having one only or both4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ac3a71 those things that are of ,god are well ordered ,vulg43 'those that are1 are ordained by ,god4 ,now the order of things consists in this1 that things are led to ,god by other things1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv74 ,and hence since grace is ordained to lead men to ,god1 this takes place in a certain order1 so that some are led to ,god by others4 ,and thus there is a twofold grace3 one whereby man himself is united to ,god1 and this is called sanctifying grace2 the other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to ,god1 and this gift is called gratuitous grace1 since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature1 and beyond the merit of the person4 ,but whereas it is bestowed on a man1 not to justify him1 but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another1 it is not called sanctifying grace4 ,and it is of this that the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ab3g73 ,and the manifestation of the ,spirit is given to every man unto utility1 i4e4 of others4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,grace is said to make pleasing1 not efficiently but formally1 i4e4 because thereby a man is justified1 and is made worthy to be called pleasing to ,god1 according to ,col4 #a3ba3 ,he hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,grace1 inasmuch as it is gratuitously given1 excludes the notion of debt4 ,now debt may be taken in two ways3 first1 as arising from merit2 and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works1 according to ,rom4 #d3d3 ,now to him that worketh1 the reward is not reckoned according to grace1 but according to debt4 ,the second debt regards the condition of nature4 ,thus we say it is due to a man to have reason1 and whatever else belongs to human nature4 ,yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that ,god is under an obligation to ,his creature1 but rather that the creature ought to be subject to ,god1 that the ,divine ordination may be fulfilled in it1 which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties1 and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further4 ,and hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second4 ,but supernatural gifts are due in neither sense4 ,hence they especially merit the name of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace1 since it makes man pleasing to ,god4 ,and hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name1 as happens in many other cases2 and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,grace ,is ,fittingly ,divided into ,operating and ,cooperating ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace4 ,for grace is an accident1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b74 ,now no accident can act upon its subject4 ,therefore no grace can be called operating4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings about justification4 ,but not only grace works this4 ,for ,augustine says1 on ,john #ad3ab1 the works that ,i do he also shall do1 says 7,serm4 clxix73 ,he ,who created thee without thyself1 will not justify thee without thyself4 ,therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent1 and not to the principal agent4 ,but grace works in us more than free-will1 according to ,rom4 #i3af3 ,it is not of him that willeth1 nor of him that runneth1 but of ,god that sheweth mercy4 ,therefore no grace ought to be called cooperating4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 division ought to rest on opposition4 ,but to operate and to cooperate are not opposed2 for one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate4 ,therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,gratia et ,lib4 ,arbit4 xvii73 ,god by cooperating with us1 perfects what ,he began by operating in us1 since ,he who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing1 begins by operating that they may will4 ,but the operations of ,god whereby ,he moves us to good pertain to grace4 ,therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b7 grace may be taken in two ways2 first1 as a ,divine help1 whereby ,god moves us to will and to act2 secondly1 as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us4 ,now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating4 ,for the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover4 ,hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move1 but in which ,god is the sole mover1 the operation is attributed to ,god1 and it is with reference to this that we speak of operating grace4 ,but in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved1 the operation is not only attributed to ,god1 but also to the soul2 and it is with reference to this that we speak of cooperating grace4 ,now there is a double act in us4 ,first1 there is the interior act of the will1 and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved1 and ,god is the mover2 and especially when the will1 which hitherto willed evil1 begins to will good4 ,and hence1 inasmuch as ,god moves the human mind to this act1 we speak of operating grace4 ,but there is another1 exterior act2 and since it is commanded by the will1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #i7 the operation of this act is attributed to the will4 ,and because ,god assists us in this act1 both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act1 and by granting outwardly the capability of operating1 it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace4 ,hence after the aforesaid words ,augustine subjoins3 ,he operates that we may will2 and when we will1 ,he cooperates that we may perfect4 ,and thus if grace is taken for ,god's gratuitous motion whereby ,he moves us to meritorious good1 it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace4 ,but if grace is taken for the habitual gift1 then again there is a double effect of grace1 even as of every other form2 the first of which is being1 and the second1 operation2 thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot1 and to give heat outwardly4 ,and thus habitual grace1 inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul1 or makes it pleasing to ,god1 is called operating grace2 but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works1 which spring from the free-will1 it is called cooperating grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality1 it does not act upon the soul efficiently1 but formally1 as whiteness makes a surface white4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god does not justify us without ourselves1 because whilst we are being justified we consent to ,god's justification 7justitiae7 by a movement of our free-will4 ,nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace1 but the effect2 hence the whole operation pertains to grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent1 but when it helps to the end intended4 ,now man is helped by ,god to will the good1 through the means of operating grace4 ,and hence1 the end being already intended1 grace cooperates with us4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,operating and cooperating grace are the same grace2 but are distinguished by their different effects1 as is plain from what has been said4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,grace ,is ,fittingly ,divided into ,prevenient and ,subsequent ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent4 ,for grace is an effect of the ,divine love4 ,but ,god's love is never subsequent1 but always prevenient1 according to #a ,john #d3aj3 ,not as though we had loved ,god1 but because ,he hath first loved us4 ,therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is but one sanctifying grace in man1 since it is sufficient1 according to #b ,cor4 #ab3i3 ,my grace is sufficient for thee4 ,but the same thing cannot be before and after4 ,therefore grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 grace is known by its effects4 ,now there are an infinite number of effects--one preceding another4 ,hence if with regard to these1 grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent1 it would seem that there are infinite species of grace4 ,now no art takes note of the infinite in number4 ,hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent4 ,on the contrary1 ,god's grace is the outcome of ,his mercy4 ,now both are said in ,ps4 #eh3aa3 ,his mercy shall prevent me1 and again1 ,ps4 #bb3f3 ,thy mercy will follow me4 ,therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent4 ,i answer that1 ,as grace is divided into operating and cooperating1 with regard to its diverse effects1 so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent1 howsoever we consider grace4 ,now there are five effects of grace in us3 of these1 the first is1 to heal the soul2 the second1 to desire good2 the third1 to carry into effect the good proposed2 the fourth1 to persevere in good2 the fifth1 to reach glory4 ,and hence grace1 inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us1 is called prevenient with respect to the second1 and inasmuch as it causes the second1 it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect4 ,and as one effect is posterior to this effect1 and prior to that1 so may grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect viewed relatively to divers others4 ,and this is what ,augustine says 7,de ,natura et ,gratia xxxi73 ,it is prevenient1 inasmuch as it heals1 and subsequent1 inasmuch as1 being healed1 we are strengthened2 it is prevenient1 inasmuch as we are called1 and subsequent1 inasmuch as we are glorified4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god's love signifies something eternal2 and hence can never be called anything but prevenient4 ,but grace signifies a temporal effect1 which can precede and follow another2 and thus grace may be both prevenient and subsequent4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence1 but only in its effects1 as was already said of operating and cooperating grace4 ,for subsequent grace1 inasmuch as it pertains to glory1 is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified4 ,for even as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven1 so must the same be said of the light of grace1 since the notion of neither implies imperfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the effects of grace may be infinite in number1 even as human acts are infinite1 nevertheless all are reduced to some of a determinate species1 and moreover all coincide in this--that one precedes another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,gratuitous ,grace ,is ,rightly ,divided by the ,apostle8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided by the ,apostle4 ,for every gift vouchsafed to us by ,god1 may be called a gratuitous grace4 ,now there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on us by ,god as regards both the good of the soul and the good of the body--and yet they do not make us pleasing to ,god4 ,hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace4 ,but faith pertains to sanctifying grace1 since we are justified by it1 according to ,rom4 #e3a3 ,being justified therefore by faith4 ,hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces1 especially since the other virtues are not so placed1 as hope and charity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the operation of healing1 and speaking divers tongues are miracles4 ,again1 the interpretation of speeches pertains either to wisdom or to knowledge1 according to ,dan4 #a3ag3 ,and to these children ,god gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom4 ,hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and kinds of tongues against the working of miracles2 and the interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 so also are understanding1 counsel1 piety1 fortitude1 and fear1 as stated above 7,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the gratuitous gifts4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ab3h1 #i1 #aj73 ,to one indeed by the ,spirit is given the word of wisdom2 and to another the word of knowledge1 according to the same ,spirit2 to another1 the working of miracles2 to another1 prophecy2 to another1 the discerning of spirits2 to another divers kinds of tongues2 to another interpretation of speeches4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,a4 #a71 gratuitous grace is ordained to this1 viz4 that a man may help another to be led to ,god4 ,now no man can help in this by moving interiorly 7for this belongs to ,god alone71 but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading4 ,hence gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct another in ,divine things which are above reason4 ,now for this three things are required3 first1 a man must possess the fullness of knowledge of ,divine things1 so as to be capable of teaching others4 ,secondly1 he must be able to confirm or prove what he says1 otherwise his words would have no weight4 ,thirdly1 he must be capable of fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows4 ,now as regards the first1 three things are necessary1 as may be seen in human teaching4 ,for whoever would teach another in any science must first be certain of the principles of the science1 and with regard to this there is faith1 which is certitude of invisible things1 the principles of ,catholic doctrine4 ,secondly1 it behooves the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science1 and hence we have the word of wisdom1 which is the knowledge of ,divine things4 ,thirdly1 he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects1 whereby at times he needs to manifest causes2 and thus we have the word of knowledge1 which is the knowledge of human things1 since the invisible things of ,him 4 4 4 are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made 7,rom4 #a3bj74 ,now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon arguments2 but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what is proper to the ,divine power1 and this in two ways3 first1 when the teacher of sacred doctrine does what ,god alone can do1 in miraculous deeds1 whether with respect to bodily health--and thus there is the grace of healing1 or merely for the purpose of manifesting the ,divine power2 for instance1 that the sun should stand still or darken1 or that the sea should be divided--and thus there is the working of miracles4 ,secondly1 when he can manifest what ,god alone can know1 and these are either future contingents--and thus there is prophecy1 or also the secrets of hearts--and thus there is the discerning of spirits4 ,but the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a person can be understood1 and thus there is kinds of tongues2 or it can regard the sense of what is said1 and thus there is the interpretation of speeches4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 not all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces1 but only those that surpass the power of nature--e4g4 that a fisherman should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like2 and such as these are here set down as gratuitous graces4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces1 not as a virtue justifying man in himself1 but as implying a super-eminent certitude of faith1 whereby a man is fitted for instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith4 ,with regard to hope and charity1 they belong to the appetitive power1 according as man is ordained thereby to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the grace of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one to the faith1 since a man is all the more ready to believe when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith4 ,so1 too1 to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special efficacy in bestowing faith4 ,hence they are set down as special gratuitous graces4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 i4e4 inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily movable by the ,holy ,ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge2 for thus they are gifts of the ,holy ,ghost1 as stated above 7,q4 #fh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d74 ,but they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces1 inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of ,divine things1 but may instruct others and overpower adversaries4 ,hence it is significant that it is the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous graces1 since1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #a71 ,it is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting life1 and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be defended against the ungodly4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,gratuitous ,grace ,is ,nobler ,than ,sanctifying ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace4 ,for the people's good is better than the individual good1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #b74 ,now sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone1 whereas gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole ,church1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #d74 ,hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is a greater power that is able to act upon another1 than that which is confined to itself1 even as greater is the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies1 than of that which can only shine but cannot illuminate2 and hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 v1 #a7 that justice is the most excellent of the virtues1 since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others4 ,but by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself2 whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others4 ,hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is proper to the best is nobler than what is common to all2 thus to reason1 which is proper to man1 is nobler than to feel1 which is common to all animals4 ,now sanctifying grace is common to all members of the ,church1 but gratuitous grace is the proper gift of the more exalted members of the ,church4 ,hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #ab3ca71 having enumerated the gratuitous graces1 adds3 ,and ,i shew unto you yet a more excellent way2 and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity1 which pertains to sanctifying grace4 ,hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous grace4 ,i answer that1 ,the higher the good to which a virtue is ordained1 the more excellent is the virtue4 ,now the end is always greater than the means4 ,but sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end1 whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is preparatory to the end2 i4e4 by prophecy and miracles and so forth1 men are induced to unite themselves to their last end4 ,and hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 xii1 text4 #eb71 a multitude1 as an army1 has a double good2 the first is in the multitude itself1 viz4 the order of the army2 the second is separate from the multitude1 viz4 the good of the leader--and this is better good1 since the other is ordained to it4 ,now gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the ,church1 which is ecclesiastical order1 whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common good1 which is ,god4 ,hence sanctifying grace is the nobler4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if gratuitous grace could cause a man to have sanctifying grace1 it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the nobler2 even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of an object that is lit up4 ,but by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause another to have union with ,god1 which he himself has by sanctifying grace2 but he causes certain dispositions towards it4 ,hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent1 even as in fire1 the heat1 which manifests its species whereby it produces heat in other things1 is not more noble than its substantial form4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,feeling is ordained to reason1 as to an end2 and thus1 to reason is nobler4 ,but here it is the contrary2 for what is proper is ordained to what is common as to an end4 ,hence there is no comparison4 ,,question #aab ,,of ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,grace 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we must now consider the cause of grace2 and under this head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god alone is the efficient cause of grace8 7#b7 ,whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient1 by an act of free-will8 7#c7 ,whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity8 7#d7 ,whether grace is equal in all8 7#e7 ,whether anyone may know that he has grace8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god ,alone ,is the ,cause of ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god alone is not the cause of grace4 ,for it is written 7,john #a3ag73 ,grace and truth came by ,jesus ,christ4 ,now1 by the name of ,jesus ,christ is understood not merely the ,divine ,nature assuming1 but the created nature assumed4 ,therefore a creature may be the cause of grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is this difference between the sacraments of the ,new ,law and those of the ,old1 that the sacraments of the ,new ,law cause grace1 whereas the sacraments of the ,old ,law merely signify it4 ,now the sacraments of the ,new ,law are certain visible elements4 ,therefore ,god is not the only cause of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 iii1 iv1 vii1 viii71 ,angels cleanse1 enlighten1 and perfect both lesser angels and men4 ,now the rational creature is cleansed1 enlightened1 and perfected by grace4 ,therefore ,god is not the only cause of grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #hc3ab73 ,the ,lord will give grace and glory4 ,i answer that1 ,nothing can act beyond its species1 since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect4 ,now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature1 since it is nothing short of a partaking of the ,divine ,nature1 which exceeds every other nature4 ,and thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace4 ,for it is as necessary that ,god alone should deify1 bestowing a partaking of the ,divine ,nature by a participated likeness1 as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,christ's humanity is an organ of ,his ,godhead1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #ai74 ,now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power1 but in virtue of the principal agent4 ,hence ,christ's humanity does not cause grace by its own power1 but by virtue of the ,divine ,nature joined to it1 whereby the actions of ,christ's humanity are saving actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as in the person of ,christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace1 the ,divine power being the principal agent1 so likewise in the sacraments of the ,new ,law1 which are derived from ,christ1 grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments1 and principally by the power of the ,holy ,ghost working in the sacraments1 according to ,john #c3e3 ,unless a man be born again of water and the ,holy ,ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,angels cleanse1 enlighten1 and perfect angels or men1 by instruction1 and not by justifying them through grace4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 that this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of ,divine knowledge4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,any ,preparation and ,disposition for ,grace ,is ,required on ,man's ,part8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man's part1 since1 as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #d3d71 ,to him that worketh1 the reward is not reckoned according to grace1 but according to debt4 ,now a man's preparation by free-will can only be through some operation4 ,hence it would do away with the notion of grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever is going on sinning1 is not preparing himself to have grace4 ,but to some who are going on sinning grace is given1 as is clear in the case of ,paul1 who received grace whilst he was breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the ,lord 7,act #i3a74 ,hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter1 since it does not even require matter1 as appears in creation1 to which grace is compared1 which is called a new creature 7,gal4 #f3ae74 ,but only ,god1 ,who has infinite power1 causes grace1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,hence no preparation is required on man's part to obtain grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,amos #d3ab73 ,be prepared to meet thy ,god1 ,o ,israel1 and 7#a ,kings #g3c73 ,prepare your hearts unto the ,lord4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #b71 grace is taken in two ways3 first1 as a habitual gift of ,god4 ,secondly1 as a help from ,god1 ,who moves the soul to good4 ,now taking grace in the first sense1 a certain preparation of grace is required for it1 since a form can only be in disposed matter4 ,but if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from ,god to move us to good1 no preparation is required on man's part1 that1 as it were1 anticipates the ,divine help1 but rather1 every preparation in man must be by the help of ,god moving the soul to good4 ,and thus even the good movement of the free-will1 whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace1 is an act of the free-will moved by ,god4 ,and thus man is said to prepare himself1 according to ,prov4 #af3a3 ,it is the part of man to prepare the soul2 yet it is principally from ,god1 ,who moves the free-will4 ,hence it is said that man's will is prepared by ,god1 and that man's steps are guided by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace2 and this operation is meritorious1 not indeed of grace1 which is already possessed--but of glory which is not yet possessed4 ,but there is another imperfect preparation1 which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace1 and yet it is from ,god's motion4 ,but it does not suffice for merit1 since man is not yet justified by grace1 and merit can only arise from grace1 as will be seen further on 7,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless ,god prevent and move him to good1 it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously1 or step by step4 ,for it is written 7,ecclus4 #aa3bc73 ,it is easy in the eyes of ,god on a sudden to make the poor man rich4 ,now it sometimes happens that ,god moves a man to good1 but not perfect good1 and this preparation precedes grace4 ,but ,he sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good1 and man receives grace suddenly1 according to ,john #f3de3 ,every one that hath heard of the ,father1 and hath learned1 cometh to ,me4 ,and thus it happened to ,paul1 since1 suddenly when he was in the midst of sin1 his heart was perfectly moved by ,god to hear1 to learn1 to come2 and hence he received grace suddenly4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter1 brought about by the action of something else2 and yet1 looking to the condition of the thing caused1 it must cause1 in the thing caused1 both the matter and the due disposition for the form4 ,so likewise1 when ,god infuses grace into a soul1 no preparation is required which ,he ,himself does not bring about4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,grace ,is ,necessarily ,given to ,whoever ,prepares ,himself for ,it1 or to ,whoever ,does ,what ,he ,can8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace1 or to whoever does what he can1 because1 on ,rom4 #e3a1 ,being justified 4 4 4 by faith1 let us have peace1 etc4 the gloss says3 ,god welcomes whoever flies to ,him1 otherwise there would be injustice with ,him4 ,but it is impossible for injustice to be with ,god4 ,therefore it is impossible for ,god not to welcome whoever flies to ,him4 ,hence he receives grace of necessity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,anselm says 7,de ,casu ,diaboli4 iii7 that the reason why ,god does not bestow grace on the devil1 is that he did not wish1 nor was he prepared1 to receive it4 ,but if the cause be removed1 the effect must needs be removed also4 ,therefore1 if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 good is diffusive of itself1 as appears from ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,now the good of grace is better than the good of nature4 ,hence1 since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter1 much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,man is compared to ,god as clay to the potter1 according to ,jer4 #ah3f3 ,as clay is in the hand of the potter1 so are you in ,my hand4 ,but however much the clay is prepared1 it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter4 ,hence1 however much a man prepares himself1 he does not necessarily receive grace from ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 man's preparation for grace is from ,god1 as ,mover1 and from the free-will1 as moved4 ,hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways3 first1 as it is from free-will1 and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace1 since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power4 ,but it may be considered1 secondly1 as it is from ,god the ,mover1 and thus it has a necessity--not indeed of coercion1 but of infallibility--as regards what it is ordained to by ,god1 since ,god's intention cannot fail1 according to the saying of ,augustine in his book on the ,predestination of the ,saints 7,de ,dono ,persev4 xiv7 that by ,god's good gifts whoever is liberated1 is most certainly liberated4 ,hence if ,god intends1 while moving1 that the one whose heart ,he moves should attain to grace1 he will infallibly attain to it1 according to ,john #f3de3 ,every one that hath heard of the ,father1 and hath learned1 cometh to ,me4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this gloss is speaking of such as fly to ,god by a meritorious act of their free-will1 already informed with grace2 for if they did not receive grace1 it would be against the justice which ,he ,himself established4 ,or if it refers to the movement of free-will before grace1 it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to ,god is by a ,divine motion1 which ought not1 in justice1 to fail4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the first cause of the defect of grace is on our part2 but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on ,god's according to ,osee #ac3i3 ,destruction is thy own1 ,o ,israel2 thy help is only in ,me4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even in natural things1 the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter1 except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,grace ,is ,greater in ,one ,than in ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another4 ,for grace is caused in us by the ,divine love1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a74 ,now it is written 7,wis4 #f3h73 ,he made the little and the great and ,he hath equally care of all4 ,therefore all obtain grace from ,him equally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is the greatest possible1 cannot be more or less4 ,but grace is the greatest possible1 since it joins us with our last end4 ,therefore there is no greater or less in it4 ,hence it is not greater in one than in another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 grace is the soul's life1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,but there is no greater or less in life4 ,hence1 neither is there in grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eph4 #d3g73 ,but to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of ,christ4 ,now what is given in measure1 is not given to all equally4 ,hence all have not an equal grace4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #eb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #ef1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 habits can have a double magnitude3 one1 as regards the end or object1 as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good2 the other on the part of the subject1 which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it4 ,now as regards the first magnitude1 sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less1 since1 of its nature1 grace joins man to the ,highest ,good1 which is ,god4 ,but as regards the subject1 grace can receive more or less1 inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another4 ,and a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace2 since he who is better prepared for grace1 receives more grace4 ,yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity1 since man prepares himself1 only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by ,god4 ,hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of ,god1 ,who dispenses ,his gifts of grace variously1 in order that the beauty and perfection of the ,church may result from these various degrees2 even as ,he instituted the various conditions of things1 that the universe might be perfect4 ,hence after the ,apostle had said 7,eph4 #d3g73 ,to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of ,christ1 having enumerated the various graces1 he adds 7,eph4 #d3ab73 ,for the perfecting of the saints 4 4 4 for the edifying of the body of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,divine care may be looked at in two ways3 first1 as regards the ,divine act1 which is simple and uniform2 and thus ,his care looks equally to all1 since by one simple act ,he administers great things and little4 ,but1 secondly1 it may be considered in those things which come to be considered by the ,divine care2 and thus1 inequality is found1 inasmuch as ,god by ,his care provides greater gifts to some1 and lesser gifts for others4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace2 since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good1 but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good4 ,for there may be diversity of intensity and remissness1 both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,natural life pertains to man's substance1 and hence cannot be more or less2 but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally1 and hence man may possess it more or less4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,man ,can ,know ,that ,he ,has ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man can know that he has grace4 ,for grace by its physical reality is in the soul4 ,now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality1 as appears from ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ca74 ,hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as knowledge is a gift of ,god1 so is grace4 ,but whoever receives knowledge from ,god1 knows that he has knowledge1 according to ,wis4 #g3ag3 ,the ,lord hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are4 ,hence1 with equal reason1 whoever receives grace from ,god1 knows that he has grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 light is more knowable than darkness1 since1 according to the ,apostle 7,eph4 #e3ac71 all that is made manifest is light4 ,now sin1 which is spiritual darkness1 may be known with certainty by one that is in sin4 ,much more1 therefore1 may grace1 which is spiritual light1 be known4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #b3ab73 ,now we have received not the ,spirit of this world1 but the ,spirit that is of ,god2 that we may know the things that are given us from ,god4 ,now grace is ,god's first gift4 ,hence1 the man who receives grace by the ,holy ,spirit1 by the same ,holy ,spirit knows the grace given to him4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it was said by the ,lord to ,abraham 7,gen4 #bb3ab73 ,now ,i know that thou fearest ,god1 i4e4 ,i have made thee know4 ,now ,he is speaking there of chaste fear1 which is not apart from grace4 ,hence a man may know that he has grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eccles4 #i3a73 ,man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred4 ,now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of ,god's love4 ,therefore no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace4 ,i answer that1 ,there are three ways of knowing a thing3 first1 by revelation1 and thus anyone may know that he has grace1 for ,god by a special privilege reveals this at times to some1 in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life1 and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy1 and may bear the evils of this present life1 as when it was said to ,paul 7#b ,cor4 #ab3i73 ,my grace is sufficient for thee4 ,secondly1 a man may1 of himself1 know something1 and with certainty2 and in this way no one can know that he has grace4 ,for certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle4 ,thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions4 ,now no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle4 ,but the principle of grace and its object is ,god1 ,who by reason of ,his very excellence is unknown to us1 according to ,job #cf3bf3 ,behold ,god is great1 exceeding our knowledge4 ,and hence ,his presence in us and ,his absence cannot be known with certainty1 according to ,job #i3aa3 ,if ,he come to me1 ,i shall not see ,him2 if ,he depart ,i shall not understand4 ,and hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace1 according to #a ,cor4 #d3c1 #d3 ,but neither do ,i judge my own self 4 4 4 but ,he that judgeth me is the ,lord4 ,thirdly1 things are known conjecturally by signs2 and thus anyone may know he has grace1 when he is conscious of delighting in ,god1 and of despising worldly things1 and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin4 ,and thus it is written 7,apoc4 #b3ag73 ,to him that overcometh ,i will give the hidden manna 4 4 4 which no man knoweth1 but he that receiveth it1 because whoever receives it knows1 by experiencing a certain sweetness1 which he who does not receive it1 does not experience4 ,yet this knowledge is imperfect2 hence the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #d3d73 ,i am not conscious to myself of anything1 yet am ,i not hereby justified1 since1 according to ,ps4 #ah3ac3 ,who can understand sins8 ,from my secret ones cleanse me1 ,o ,lord1 and from those of others spare ,thy servant4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those things which are in the soul by their physical reality1 are known through experimental knowledge2 in so far as through acts man has experience of their inward principles3 thus when we wish1 we perceive that we have a will2 and when we exercise the functions of life1 we observe that there is life in us4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge2 and again1 it is an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith1 and this1 because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect1 wherein these gifts exist4 ,hence1 whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them4 ,but it is otherwise with grace and charity and such like1 which perfect the appetitive faculty4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sin has for its principal object commutable good1 which is known to us4 ,but the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness of its light1 according to #a ,tim4 #f3af3 ,who 4 4 4 inhabiteth light inaccessible4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the ,apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory1 which have been given to us in hope1 and these we know most certainly by faith1 although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them4 ,or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged knowledge1 which comes of revelation4 ,hence he adds 7#a ,cor4 #b3aj73 ,but to us ,god hath revealed them by ,his ,spirit4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,what was said to ,abraham may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant4 ,for in the deed that ,abraham had just wrought1 he could know experimentally that he had the fear of ,god4 ,or it may refer to a revelation4 ,,question #aac ,,of ,,the ,,effects ,,of ,,grace 7,in ,ten ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the effect of grace2 7#a7 the justification of the ungodly1 which is the effect of operating grace2 and 7#b7 merit1 which is the effect of cooperating grace4 ,under the first head there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is the justification of the ungodly8 7#b7 ,whether grace is required for it8 7#c7 ,whether any movement of the free-will is required8 7#d7 ,whether a movement of faith is required8 7#e7 ,whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required8 7#f7 ,whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing8 7#g7 ,whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden8 7#h7 ,of the natural order of the things concurring to justification2 7#i7 ,whether the justification of the ungodly is ,god's greatest work8 7#aj7 ,whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,justification of the ,ungodly ,is the ,remission of ,sins8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not the remission of sins4 ,for sin is opposed not only to justice1 but to all the other virtues1 as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #a74 ,now justification signifies a certain movement towards justice4 ,therefore not even remission of sin is justification1 since movement is from one contrary to the other4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything ought to be named from what is predominant in it1 according to ,de ,anima ii1 text4 #di4 ,now the remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith1 according to ,acts #ae3i3 ,purifying their hearts by faith2 and by charity1 according to ,prov4 #aj3ab3 ,charity covereth all sins4 ,therefore the remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the remission of sins seems to be the same as being called1 for whoever is called is afar off1 and we are afar off from ,god by sin4 ,but one is called before being justified according to ,rom4 #h3cj3 ,and whom ,he called1 them ,he also justified4 ,therefore justification is not the remission of sins4 ,on the contrary1 ,on ,rom4 #h3cj1 ,whom ,he called1 them ,he also justified1 the gloss says i4e4 by the remission of sins4 ,therefore the remission of sins is justification4 ,i answer that1 ,justification taken passively implies a movement towards justice1 as heating implies a movement towards heat4 ,but since justice1 by its nature1 implies a certain rectitude of order1 it may be taken in two ways3 first1 inasmuch as it implies a right order in man's act1 and thus justice is placed amongst the virtues--either as particular justice1 which directs a man's acts by regulating them in relation to his fellowman--or as legal justice1 which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to the common good of society1 as appears from ,ethic4 v1 #a4 ,secondly1 justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man1 in so far as what is highest in man is subject to ,god1 and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior1 i4e4 to the reason2 and this disposition the ,philosopher calls justice metaphorically speaking 7,ethic4 v1 #aa74 ,now this justice may be in man in two ways3 first1 by simple generation1 which is from privation to form2 and thus justification may belong even to such as are not in sin1 when they receive this justice from ,god1 as ,adam is said to have received original justice4 ,secondly1 this justice may be brought about in man by a movement from one contrary to the other1 and thus justification implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of justice4 ,and it is thus we are now speaking of the justification of the ungodly1 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #d3e73 ,but to him that worketh not1 yet believeth in ,him that justifieth the ungodly1 etc4 ,and because movement is named after its term whereto rather than from its term whence1 the transmutation whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodliness to the state of justice1 borrows its name from its term whereto1 and is called justification of the ungodly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every sin1 inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind not subject to ,god1 may be called injustice1 as being contrary to the aforesaid justice1 according to #a ,john #c3d3 ,whosoever committeth sin1 committeth also iniquity2 and sin is iniquity4 ,and thus the removal of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faith and charity imply a special directing of the human mind to ,god by the intellect and will2 whereas justice implies a general rectitude of order4 ,hence this transmutation is named after justice rather than after charity or faith4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,being called refers to ,god's help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin1 and this motion of ,god is not the remission of sins1 but its cause4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,infusion of ,grace ,is ,required for the ,remission of ,guilt1 i4e41 for the ,justification of the ,ungodly8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that for the remission of guilt1 which is the justification of the ungodly1 no infusion of grace is required4 ,for anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other1 if the contraries are not immediate4 ,now the state of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries2 for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt4 ,hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the remission of guilt consists in the ,divine imputation1 according to ,ps4 #ca3b3 ,blessed is the man to whom the ,lord hath not imputed sin4 ,now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one can be subject to two contraries at once4 ,now some sins are contraries1 as wastefulness and miserliness4 ,hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness1 yet it may happen that he has been subject to it hitherto4 ,hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness4 ,and thus a sin is remitted without grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #c3bd73 ,justified freely by ,his grace4 ,i answer that1 by sinning a man offends ,god as stated above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #e74 ,now an offense is remitted to anyone1 only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended4 ,hence sin is remitted to us1 when ,god is at peace with us1 and this peace consists in the love whereby ,god loves us4 ,now ,god's love1 considered on the part of the ,divine act1 is eternal and unchangeable2 whereas1 as regards the effect it imprints on us1 it is sometimes interrupted1 inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it4 ,now the effect of the ,divine love in us1 which is taken away by sin1 is grace1 whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life1 from which sin shuts him out4 ,hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt1 without the infusion of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,more is required for an offender to pardon an offense1 than for one who has committed no offense1 not to be hated4 ,for it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another4 ,but if the other offends him1 then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring from a special goodwill4 ,now ,god's goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace2 and hence although a man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt1 yet that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,god's love consists not merely in the act of the ,divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a71 so likewise1 when ,god does not impute sin to a man1 there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed2 for it proceeds from the ,divine love1 that sin is not imputed to a man by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,nup4 et ,concup4 i1 #bf71 if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin1 it would be enough if ,scripture warned us thus3 ',my son1 hast thou sinned8 do so no more8' ,now this is not enough1 but it is added3 ',but for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee4' ,for the act of sin passes1 but the guilt remains1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #f74 ,hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice1 he ceases to have the act of the former sin1 but he does not cease to have the guilt1 hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once4 ,for sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from ,god1 wherein sin has its guilt4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #c ,whether for the ,justification of the ,ungodly ,is ,required a ,movement of the ,free-will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,for we see that by the sacrament of ,baptism1 infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will3 hence ,augustine says 7,confess4 iv7 that when one of his friends was taken with a fever1 he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat1 and when he was despaired of1 he was baptized without his knowing1 and was regenerated2 which is effected by sanctifying grace4 ,now ,god does not confine ,his power to the sacraments4 ,hence ,he can justify a man without the sacraments1 and without any movement of the free-will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a man has not the use of reason when asleep1 and without it there can be no movement of the free-will4 ,but ,solomon received from ,god the gift of wisdom when asleep1 as related in #c ,kings #c and #b ,paral #a4 ,hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by ,god on man without the movement of his free-will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into being1 for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #ab7 that so ought man to turn to ,god as he is ever made just by ,him4 ,now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will4 ,hence it can be infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,john #f3de73 ,every one that hath heard of the ,father1 and hath learned1 cometh to ,me4 ,now to learn cannot be without a movement of the free-will1 since the learner assents to the teacher4 ,hence1 no one comes to the ,father by justifying grace without a movement of the free-will4 ,i answer that1 ,the justification of the ungodly is brought about by ,god moving man to justice4 ,for ,he it is that justifieth the ungodly according to ,rom4 #d3e4 ,now ,god moves everything in its own manner1 just as we see that in natural things1 what is heavy and what is light are moved differently1 on account of their diverse natures4 ,hence ,he moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature4 ,but it is man's proper nature to have free-will4 ,hence in him who has the use of reason1 ,god's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will2 but ,he so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time ,he moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace1 in such as are capable of being moved thus4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will2 hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that ,god moves them to justice4 ,now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament2 because as original sin1 from which they are justified1 does not come to them from their own will1 but by carnal generation1 so also is grace given them by ,christ through spiritual regeneration4 ,and the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their free-will4 ,but in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sickness or sleep1 he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of ,baptism1 or of any other sacrament1 unless he intended to make use of this sacrament1 and this can only be by the use of his free-will4 ,and it was in this way that he of whom ,augustine speaks was regenerated1 because both previously and afterwards he assented to the ,baptism4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep2 but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by ,god4 ,hence it is said in his person 7,wis4 #g3g73 ,i wished1 and understanding was given unto me4 ,or it may be said that his sleep was not natural1 but was the sleep of prophecy1 according to ,num4 #ab3f3 ,if there be among you a prophet of the ,lord1 ,i will appear to him in a vision1 or ,i will speak to him in a dream4 ,in such cases the use of free-will remains4 ,and yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold4 ,for the gift of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good1 which is the object of the will2 and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will which is a movement of free-will4 ,but wisdom perfects the intellect which precedes the will2 hence without any complete movement of the free-will1 the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom1 even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep1 according to ,job #cc3ae1 #af3 ,when deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds1 then ,he openeth the ears of men1 and teaching1 instructeth them in what they are to learn4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul1 and hence a proper movement of the human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner4 ,but the conservation of grace is without transmutation3 no movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the ,divine influx4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #d ,whether a ,movement of ,faith ,is ,required for the ,justification of the ,ungodly8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,for as a man is justified by faith1 so also by other things1 viz4 by fear1 of which it is written 7,ecclus4 #a3bg73 ,the fear of the ,lord driveth out sin1 for he that is without fear cannot be justified2 and again by charity1 according to ,luke #g3dg3 ,many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much2 and again by humility1 according to ,james #d3f3 ,god resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble2 and again by mercy1 according to ,prov4 #ae3bg3 ,by mercy and faith sins are purged away4 ,hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly1 than the movements of the aforesaid virtues4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows ,god by faith4 ,but a man may know ,god in other ways1 viz4 by natural knowledge1 and by the gift of wisdom4 ,hence no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there are several articles of faith4 ,therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly1 it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified4 ,but this seems inconvenient1 since such thought would require a long delay of time4 ,hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #e3a73 ,being justified therefore by faith1 let us have peace with ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #c7 a movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly1 inasmuch as man's mind is moved by ,god4 ,now ,god moves man's soul by turning it to ,himself according to ,ps4 #hd3g 7,septuagint73 ,thou wilt turn us1 ,o ,god1 and bring us to life4 ,hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required1 by which it is turned to ,god4 ,now the first turning to ,god is by faith1 according to ,heb4 #aa3f3 ,he that cometh to ,god must believe that ,he is4 ,hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity2 hence in the justification of the ungodly1 a movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith4 ,now free-will is moved to ,god by being subject to ,him2 hence an act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur4 ,for it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues1 when one commands and another is commanded1 inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various ends4 ,but the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it1 and thus it follows justification2 or by way of preparation1 inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy2 and thus it can either precede justification1 or concur with the other virtues towards justification1 inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by natural knowledge a man is not turned to ,god1 according as ,he is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification4 ,hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification4 ,but the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith1 as stated above 7,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #d3e71 to him that 4 4 4 believeth in ,him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice1 according to the purpose of the grace of ,god4 ,hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that ,god justifies man through the mystery of ,christ4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #e ,whether for the ,justification of the ,ungodly ,there ,is ,required a ,movement of the ,free-will ,towards ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no movement of the free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,for charity alone suffices to take away sin1 according to ,prov4 #aj3ab3 ,charity covereth all sins4 ,now the object of charity is not sin4 ,therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards sin is required4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever is tending onward1 ought not to look back1 according to ,phil4 #c3ac1 #ad3 ,forgetting the things that are behind1 and stretching forth myself to those that are before1 ,i press towards the mark1 to the prize of the supernal vocation4 ,but whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him4 ,hence he ought to forget them1 and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not remitted without another1 for it is irreverent to expect half a pardon from ,god 99,cap41 ,sunt4 plures3 ,dist4 iii1 ,de ,poenit44 ,hence1 in the justification of the ungodly1 if man's free-will must move against sin1 he ought to think of all his sins4 ,but this is unseemly1 both because a great space of time would be required for such thought1 and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten4 ,hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is required4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ca3e73 ,i will confess against myself my injustice to the ,lord2 and ,thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by ,god from the state of sin to the state of justice4 ,hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will1 as a body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement4 ,now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term whence and nears the term whereto4 ,hence the human mind whilst it is being justified1 must1 by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice4 ,now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice1 in an act of free-will1 means detestation and desire4 ,for ,augustine says on the words the hireling fleeth1 etc4 7,john #aj3ab73 ,our emotions are the movements of our soul2 joy is the soul's outpouring2 fear is the soul's flight2 your soul goes forward when you seek2 your soul flees1 when you are afraid4 ,hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of the free-will--one1 whereby it tends to ,god's justice2 the other whereby it hates sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to avoid the other2 and hence1 as it belongs to charity to love ,god1 so likewise1 to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a man ought not to return to those things that are behind1 by loving them2 but1 for that matter1 he ought to forget them1 lest he be drawn to them4 ,yet he ought to recall them to mind1 in order to detest them2 for this is to fly from them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed1 and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed1 in which are included such sins as have been forgotten4 ,for a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember1 if they were present to his memory2 and this movement cooperates in his justification4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,remission of ,sins ,ought to ,be ,reckoned ,amongst the ,things ,required for ,justification8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification4 ,for the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing2 thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul4 ,but the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same2 as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same4 ,but a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself2 for unity is opposed to multitude4 ,therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the remission of sin follows as effect from cause1 from the free-will's movement towards ,god and sin2 since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven4 ,but an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause2 since things thus enumerated together1 and1 as it were1 condivided1 are by nature simultaneous4 ,hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the ungodly4 ,on the contrary1 ,in reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end1 which is the chief part of everything4 ,now the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly2 for it is written 7,isa4 #bg3i73 ,this is all the fruit1 that the sin thereof should be taken away4 ,hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification4 ,i answer that1 ,there are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly1 viz4 the infusion of grace1 the movement of the free-will towards ,god by faith1 the movement of the free-will towards sin1 and the remission of sins4 ,the reason for this is that1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by ,god from a state of sin to a state of justice4 ,now in the movement whereby one thing is moved by another1 three things are required3 first1 the motion of the mover2 secondly1 the movement of the moved2 thirdly1 the consummation of the movement1 or the attainment of the end4 ,on the part of the ,divine motion1 there is the infusion of grace2 on the part of the free-will which is moved1 there are two movements--of departure from the term whence1 and of approach to the term whereto2 but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins2 for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins1 even as every movement has its species from its term4 ,nevertheless1 many other things are required in order to reach the term1 as stated above 7,a4 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways3 first1 with respect to the substance of the act1 and thus they are the same2 for by the same act ,god bestows grace and remits sin4 ,secondly1 they may be considered on the part of the objects2 and thus they differ by the difference between guilt1 which is taken away1 and grace1 which is infused2 just as in natural things generation and corruption differ1 although the generation of one thing is the corruption of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species1 in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous2 but it is division of the things required for the completion of anything2 and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows1 since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,justification of the ,ungodly ,takes ,place in an ,instant or ,successively8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant1 but successively1 since1 as already stated 7,a4 #c71 for the justification of the ungodly1 there is required a movement of free-will4 ,now the act of the free-will is choice1 which requires the deliberation of counsel1 as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence1 since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process1 and this implies succession1 the justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the free-will's movement is not without actual consideration4 ,but it is impossible to understand many things actually and at once1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence1 since for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things1 viz4 towards ,god and towards sin1 it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an instant4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a form that may be greater or less1 e4g4 blackness or whiteness1 is received successively by its subject4 ,now grace may be greater or less1 as stated above 7,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence it is not received suddenly by its subject4 ,therefore1 seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly1 it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the free-will's movement1 which cooperates in justification1 is meritorious2 and hence it must proceed from grace1 without which there is no merit1 as we shall state further on 7,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #b74 ,now a thing receives its form before operating by this form4 ,hence grace is first infused1 and then the free-will is moved towards ,god and to detest sin4 ,hence justification is not all at once4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if grace is infused into the soul1 there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul2 so1 too1 if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin4 ,but it cannot be the same instant1 otherwise opposites would be in the same simultaneously4 ,hence they must be two successive instants2 between which there must be time1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vi1 #a74 ,therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once1 but successively4 ,on the contrary1 ,the justification of the ungodly is caused by the justifying grace of the ,holy ,spirit4 ,now the ,holy ,spirit comes to men's minds suddenly1 according to ,acts #b3b3 ,and suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming1 upon which the gloss says that the grace of the ,holy ,ghost knows no tardy efforts4 ,hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive1 but instantaneous4 ,i answer that1 ,the entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace4 ,for it is by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted4 ,now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without succession4 ,and the reason of this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject1 it is either because that subject is not disposed1 or because the agent needs time to dispose the subject4 ,hence we see that immediately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration1 the substantial form accrues to the matter2 thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light1 it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous4 ,now it was stated 7,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #b7 that ,god1 in order to infuse grace into the soul1 needs no disposition1 save what ,he ,himself has made4 ,and sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace ,he makes suddenly1 sometimes gradually and successively1 as stated above 7,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,for the reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the power of the agent2 and hence we see that the stronger the agent1 the more speedily is the matter disposed4 ,therefore1 since the ,divine power is infinite1 it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form2 and much more man's free-will1 whose movement is by nature instantaneous4 ,therefore the justification of the ungodly by ,god takes place in an instant4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the movement of the free-will1 which concurs in the justification of the ungodly1 is a consent to detest sin1 and to draw near to ,god2 and this consent takes place suddenly4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 it happens that deliberation precedes1 yet this is not of the substance of justification1 but a way of justification2 as local movement is a way of illumination1 and alteration to generation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #e71 there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at once1 in so far as they are somehow one2 thus we understand the subject and predicate together1 inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation4 ,and in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other4 ,now the free-will's movement towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards ,god1 since a man detests sin1 as contrary to ,god1 to ,whom he wishes to cling4 ,hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and turns to ,god1 even as a body approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less2 for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air1 which can be illumined more or less4 ,but the reason is to be sought on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the same instant the form is acquired1 the thing begins to operate with the form2 as fire1 the instant it is generated moves upwards1 and if its movement was instantaneous1 it would be terminated in the same instant4 ,now to will and not to will--the movements of the free-will--are not successive1 but instantaneous4 ,hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those that are above time4 ,for in those that are in time1 there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject2 but there is the last time1 and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject2 and this for the reason1 that in time we are not to consider one instant1 since neither do instants succeed each other immediately in time1 nor points in a line1 as is proved in ,physic4 vi1 #a4 ,but time is terminated by an instant4 ,hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form1 it is under the opposite form2 but in the last instant of this time1 which is the first instant of the subsequent time1 it has the form which is the term of the movement4 ,but in those that are above time1 it is otherwise4 ,for if there be any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them 7as in the angels71 such succession is not measured by continuous time1 but by discrete time1 even as the things measured are not continuous1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #ec1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,in these1 therefore1 there is a last instant in which the preceding is1 and a first instant in which the subsequent is4 ,nor must there be time in between1 since there is no continuity of time1 which this would necessitate4 ,now the human mind1 which is justified1 is1 in itself1 above time1 but is subject to time accidentally1 inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time1 with respect to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,we must1 therefore1 decide from this about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements1 i4e4 we must say that there is no last instant that sin inheres1 but a last time2 whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres2 and in all the time previous sin inhered4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,infusion of ,grace ,is ,naturally the ,first of the ,things ,required for the ,justification of the ,ungodly8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly4 ,for we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good1 according to ,ps4 #cc3ae3 ,turn away from evil1 and do good4 ,now the remission of sins regards the turning away from evil1 and the infusion of grace regards the turning to good4 ,hence the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes4 ,now the free-will's movement is a disposition for the reception of grace4 ,therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin hinders the soul from tending freely to ,god4 ,now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes place4 ,hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,the cause is naturally prior to its effect4 ,now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the ungodly1 as stated above 7,a4 #g74 ,therefore it is naturally prior to it4 ,i answer that1 ,the aforesaid four things required for the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time1 since the justification of the ungodly is not successive1 as stated above 7,a4 #g72 but in the order of nature1 one is prior to another2 and in their natural order the first is the infusion of grace2 the second1 the free-will's movement towards ,god2 the third1 the free-will's movement towards sin2 the fourth1 the remission of sin4 ,the reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally first2 the disposition of the matter1 or the movement of the moved1 is second2 the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests1 is last4 ,now the motion of ,god the ,mover is the infusion of grace1 as stated above 7,a4 #f72 the movement or disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement2 and the term or end of the movement is the remission of sin1 as stated above 7,a4 #f74 ,hence in their natural order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace2 the second is the free-will's movement towards ,god2 the third is the free-will's movement towards sin1 for he who is being justified detests sin because it is against ,god1 and thus the free-will's movement towards ,god naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin1 since it is its cause and reason2 the fourth and last is the remission of sin1 to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be looked at in two ways3 first1 on the part of the thing moved1 and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term1 since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement4 ,but on the part of the agent it is the other way about1 since the agent1 by the form pre-existing in it1 acts for the removal of the opposite form2 as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness1 and hence on the part of the sun1 illumination is prior to the removal of darkness2 but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated1 to be freed from darkness is1 in the order of nature1 prior to being illuminated1 although both are simultaneous in time4 ,and since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard ,god ,who justifies1 hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin4 ,but if we look at what is on the part of the man justified1 it is the other way about1 since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace4 ,or it may be said that the term whence of justification is sin2 and the term whereto is justice2 and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form1 in the order of nature2 yet it follows the action of the agent1 whereby the subject is disposed4 ,and hence the free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature1 and follows the infusion of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #i71 in movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical end is the very first1 but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end4 ,and as the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul1 in the order of nature it moves towards ,god as to its end1 before removing the impediment of sin4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #i ,whether the ,justification of the ,ungodly ,is ,god's ,greatest ,work8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not ,god's greatest work4 ,for it is by the justification of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer4 ,now by glorification we receive heavenly grace1 which is greater4 ,hence the glorification of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the particular good of one man4 ,but the good of the universe is greater than the good of one man1 as is plain from ,ethic4 i1 #b4 ,hence the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to make something from nothing1 where there is nought to cooperate with the agent1 is greater than to make something with the cooperation of the recipient4 ,now in the work of creation something is made from nothing1 and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent2 but in the justification of the ungodly ,god makes something from something1 i4e4 a just man from a sinner1 and there is a cooperation on man's part1 since there is a movement of the free-will1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,hence the justification of the ungodly is not ,god's greatest work4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #add3i73 ,his tender mercies are over all ,his works1 and in a collect 99,tenth ,sunday after ,pentecost we say3 ,o ,god1 ,who dost show forth ,thine all-mightiness most by pardoning and having mercy1 and ,augustine1 expounding the words1 greater than these shall he do 7,john #ad3ab7 says that for a just man to be made from a sinner1 is greater than to create heaven and earth4 ,i answer that1 ,a work may be called great in two ways3 first1 on the part of the mode of action1 and thus the work of creation is the greatest work1 wherein something is made from nothing2 secondly1 a work may be called great on account of what is made1 and thus the justification of the ungodly1 which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the ,godhead1 is greater than the creation of heaven and earth1 which terminates at the good of mutable nature4 ,hence1 ,augustine1 after saying that for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth1 adds1 for heaven and earth shall pass away1 but the justification of the ungodly shall endure4 ,again1 we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways3 first1 in an absolute quantity1 and thus the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly2 and in this respect the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the ungodly4 ,secondly1 a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quantity1 and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just1 for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly1 who are worthy of punishment1 more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just1 who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory4 ,hence ,augustine says3 ,let him that can1 judge whether it is greater to create the angels just1 than to justify the ungodly4 ,certainly1 if they both betoken equal power1 one betokens greater mercy4 ,and thus the reply to the first objection is clear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one1 if we consider both in the same genus4 ,but the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection rests on the manner of acting1 in which way creation is ,god's greatest work4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #aj ,whether the ,justification of the ,ungodly ,is a ,miraculous ,work8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work4 ,for miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous4 ,now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works1 as is clear from the quotation from ,augustine 7,a4 #i74 ,hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things4 ,but when ,god works in natural things against their inclination of their nature1 it is a miraculous work1 as when ,he gave sight to the blind or raised the dead4 ,now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil4 ,hence1 since ,god in justifying a man moves him to good1 it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as wisdom is a gift of ,god1 so also is justice4 ,now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from ,god without study4 ,therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,miraculous works are beyond natural power4 ,now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,praed4 ,sanct4 v7 that to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature2 but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful4 ,therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous4 ,i answer that1 ,in miraculous works it is usual to find three things3 the first is on the part of the active power1 because they can only be performed by ,divine power2 and they are simply wondrous1 since their cause is hidden1 as stated above 7,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #g74 ,and thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world1 and1 generally speaking1 every work that can be done by ,god alone1 is miraculous4 ,secondly1 in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter1 as in the resurrection of the dead1 life is above the natural power of such a body4 ,and thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous1 because the soul is naturally capable of grace2 since from its having been made to the likeness of ,god1 it is fit to receive ,god by grace1 as ,augustine says1 in the above quotation4 ,thirdly1 in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect1 as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art1 receives perfect health2 and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not4 ,for the common and wonted course of justification is that ,god moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to ,god1 first by an imperfect conversion1 that it may afterwards become perfect2 because charity begun merits increase1 and when increased merits perfection1 as ,augustine says 7,in ,epist4 ,joan4 ,tract4 v74 ,yet ,god sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once1 as took place in the conversion of ,paul1 which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration4 ,hence the conversion of ,paul is commemorated in the ,church as miraculous4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,certain miraculous works1 although they are less than the justification of the ungodly1 as regards the good caused1 are beyond the wonted order of such effects1 and thus have more of the nature of a miracle4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not a miraculous work1 whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination1 otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated1 or for a stone to be thrown upwards2 but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause1 which naturally does this4 ,now no other cause save ,god can justify the ungodly1 even as nothing save fire can heat water4 ,hence the justification of the ungodly by ,god is not miraculous in this respect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from ,god by his own talent and study4 ,hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside this order4 ,but a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action1 but by ,god's4 ,hence there is no parity4 ,,question #aad ,,of ,,merit 7,in ,ten ,articles7 ,we must now consider merit1 which is the effect of cooperating grace2 and under this head there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether a man can merit anything from ,god8 7#b7 ,whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life8 7#c7 ,whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly8 7#d7 ,whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit8 7#e7 ,whether a man may merit the first grace for himself8 7#f7 ,whether he may merit it for someone else8 7#g7 ,whether anyone can merit restoration after sin8 7#h7 ,whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity8 7#i7 ,whether he can merit final perseverance8 7#aj7 ,whether temporal goods fall under merit8 ,,first ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,man ,may ,merit ,anything from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man can merit nothing from ,god4 ,for no one1 it would seem1 merits by giving another his due4 ,but by all the good we do1 we cannot make sufficient return to ,god1 since yet more is ,his due1 as also the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #ad74 ,hence it is written 7,luke #ag3aj73 ,when you have done all these things that are commanded you1 say3 ,we are unprofitable servants2 we have done that which we ought to do4 ,therefore a man can merit nothing from ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it would seem that a man merits nothing from ,god1 by what profits himself only1 and profits ,god nothing4 ,now by acting well1 a man profits himself or another man1 but not ,god1 for it is written 7,job #ce3g73 ,if thou do justly1 what shalt thou give ,him1 or what shall ,he receive of thy hand4 ,hence a man can merit nothing from ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor2 for a man's wage is a debt due to him4 ,now ,god is no one's debtor2 hence it is written 7,rom4 #aa3ce73 ,who hath first given to ,him1 and recompense shall be made to him8 ,hence no one can merit anything from ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 #ca3af73 ,there is a reward for thy work4 ,now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit4 ,hence it would seem that a man may merit from ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,merit and reward refer to the same1 for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil1 as a price for it4 ,hence1 as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another1 so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil4 ,now justice is a kind of equality1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #c71 and hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal2 but where there is no absolute equality between them1 neither is there absolute justice1 but there may be a certain manner of justice1 as when we speak of a father's or a master's right 7,ethic4 v1 #f71 as the ,philosopher says4 ,and hence where there is justice simply1 there is the character of merit and reward simply4 ,but where there is no simple right1 but only relative1 there is no character of merit simply1 but only relatively1 in so far as the character of justice is found there1 since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord4 ,now it is clear that between ,god and man there is the greatest inequality3 for they are infinitely apart1 and all man's good is from ,god4 ,hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and ,god1 but only of a certain proportion1 inasmuch as both operate after their own manner4 ,now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from ,god4 ,hence man's merit with ,god only exists on the presupposition of the ,divine ordination1 so that man obtains from ,god1 as a reward of his operation1 what ,god gave him the power of operation for1 even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by ,god2 differently1 indeed1 since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will1 hence its action has the character of merit1 which is not so in other creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man merits1 inasmuch as he does what he ought1 by his free-will2 otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god seeks from our goods not profit1 but glory1 i4e4 the manifestation of ,his goodness2 even as ,he seeks it also in ,his own works4 ,now nothing accrues to ,him1 but only to ourselves1 by our worship of ,him4 ,hence we merit from ,god1 not that by our works anything accrues to ,him1 but inasmuch as we work for ,his glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since our action has the character of merit1 only on the presupposition of the ,divine ordination1 it does not follow that ,god is made our debtor simply1 but ,his own1 inasmuch as it is right that ,his will should be carried out4 ,,second ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,anyone ,without ,grace ,can ,merit ,eternal ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal life4 ,for man merits from ,god what he is divinely ordained to1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,now man by his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end2 hence1 too1 he naturally wishes to be blessed4 ,hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude which is eternal life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the less a work is due1 the more meritorious it is4 ,now1 less due is that work which is done by one who has received fewer benefits4 ,hence1 since he who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts from ,god1 than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as nature1 it would seem that his works are more meritorious with ,god4 ,and thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent1 much more may he who has no grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human mercy and liberality4 ,now a man may merit from another1 even though he has not hitherto had his grace4 ,much more1 therefore1 would it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #f3bc73 ,the grace of ,god1 life everlasting4 ,i answer that1 ,man without grace may be looked at in two states1 as was said above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b73 the first1 a state of perfect nature1 in which ,adam was before his sin2 the second1 a state of corrupt nature1 in which we are before being restored by grace4 ,therefore1 if we speak of man in the first state1 there is only one reason why man cannot merit eternal life without grace1 by his purely natural endowments1 viz4 because man's merit depends on the ,divine pre-ordination4 ,now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are the principles of its act2 for it is a law of ,divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its powers4 ,now everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature2 since it exceeds its knowledge and desire1 according to #a ,cor4 #b3i3 ,eye hath not seen1 nor ear heard1 neither hath it entered into the heart of man4 ,and hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life1 unless there is added a supernatural gift1 which we call grace4 ,but if we speak of man as existing in sin1 a second reason is added to this1 viz4 the impediment of sin4 ,for since sin is an offense against ,god1 excluding us from eternal life1 as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #ga1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #aac1 ,a4 #b71 no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he be reconciled to ,god1 through his sin being forgiven1 which is brought about by grace4 ,for the sinner deserves not life1 but death1 according to ,rom4 #f3bc3 ,the wages of sin is death4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life1 not by its own strength1 but by the help of grace2 and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace1 since the more perfect the principle1 the more perfect the action4 ,but the objection would hold good1 if we supposed the operations equal in both cases4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,with regard to the first reason adduced1 the case is different in ,god and in man4 ,for a man receives all his power of well-doing from ,god1 and not from man4 ,hence a man can merit nothing from ,god except by ,his gift1 which the ,apostle expresses aptly saying 7,rom4 #aa3ce73 ,who hath first given to ,him1 and recompense shall be made to him8 ,but man may merit from man1 before he has received anything from him1 by what he has received from ,god4 ,but as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin1 the case is similar with man and ,god1 since one man cannot merit from another whom he has offended1 unless he makes satisfaction to him and is reconciled4 ,,third ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #c ,whether a ,man in ,grace ,can ,merit ,eternal ,life ,condignly8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly1 for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3ah73 ,the sufferings of this time are not worthy 7condignae7 to be compared with the glory to come1 that shall be revealed in us4 ,but of all meritorious works1 the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious4 ,therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 on ,rom4 #f3bc1 ,the grace of ,god1 life everlasting1 a gloss says3 ,he might have truly said3 ',the wages of justice1 life everlasting'2 but ,he preferred to say ',the grace of ,god1 life everlasting1' that we may know that ,god leads us to life everlasting of ,his own mercy and not by our merits4 ,now when anyone merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy1 but from merit4 ,hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting condignly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 merit that equals the reward1 would seem to be condign4 ,now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life1 which surpasses our knowledge and our desire1 and moreover1 surpasses the charity or love of the wayfarer1 even as it exceeds nature4 ,therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly4 ,on the contrary1 ,what is granted in accordance with a fair judgment1 would seem a condign reward4 ,but life everlasting is granted by ,god1 in accordance with the judgment of justice1 according to #b ,tim4 #d3h3 ,as to the rest1 there is laid up for me a crown of justice1 which the ,lord1 the just judge1 will render to me in that day4 ,therefore man merits everlasting life condignly4 ,i answer that1 ,man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways3 first1 as it proceeds from free-will2 secondly1 as it proceeds from the grace of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,if it is considered as regards the substance of the work1 and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will1 there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality4 ,but there is congruity1 on account of an equality of proportion3 for it would seem congruous that1 if a man does what he can1 ,god should reward him according to the excellence of his power4 ,if1 however1 we speak of a meritorious work1 inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the ,holy ,ghost moving us to life everlasting1 it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly4 ,for thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the ,holy ,ghost moving us to life everlasting according to ,john #d3ad3 ,shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting4 ,and the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace1 whereby a man1 being made a partaker of the ,divine ,nature1 is adopted as a son of ,god1 to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption1 according to ,rom4 #h3ag3 ,if sons1 heirs also4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life1 viz4 ,god's mercy4 ,but our merit is a subsequent cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the grace of the ,holy ,ghost which we have at present1 although unequal to glory in act1 is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree1 wherein the whole tree is virtually4 ,so likewise by grace of the ,holy ,ghost dwells in man2 and ,he is a sufficient cause of life everlasting2 hence1 #b ,cor4 #a3bb1 ,he is called the pledge of our inheritance4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,grace ,is the ,principle of ,merit ,through ,charity ,rather ,than the ,other ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues4 ,for wages are due to work1 according to ,matt4 #bj3h3 ,call the laborers and pay them their hire4 ,now every virtue is a principle of some operation1 since virtue is an operative habit1 as stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence every virtue is equally a principle of merit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #c3h73 ,every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor4 ,now charity lessens rather than increases the labor1 because as ,augustine says 7,de ,verbis ,dom41 ,serm4 lxx71 love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing4 ,hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious4 ,but the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious1 as appears in the martyrs1 who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even till death4 ,hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord said 7,john #ad3ba73 ,he that loveth ,me1 shall be loved of ,my ,father2 and ,i will love him and will manifest ,myself to him4 ,now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of ,god1 according to ,john #ag3c3 ,this is eternal life3 that they may know ,thee1 the only true and living ,god4 ,hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly with charity4 ,i answer that1 ,as we may gather from what has been stated above 7,a4 #a71 human acts have the nature of merit from two causes3 first and chiefly from the ,divine ordination1 inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained4 ,secondly1 on the part of free-will1 inasmuch as man1 more than other creatures1 has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself4 ,and in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity4 ,for we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of ,god4 ,now the human mind's movement to the fruition of the ,divine good is the proper act of charity1 whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end1 since all the other virtues are commanded by charity4 ,hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity1 and secondly1 to the other virtues1 inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity4 ,so1 likewise1 is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly4 ,hence1 even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness1 merit is chiefly attributed to charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,charity1 inasmuch as it has the last end for object1 moves the other virtues to act4 ,for the habit to which the end pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain1 as was said above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways3 first1 from the greatness of the work1 and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit2 and thus charity does not lessen the toil--rather1 it makes us undertake the greatest toils1 for it does great things1 if it exists1 as ,gregory says 7,hom4 in ,evang4 xxx74 ,secondly1 from the defect of the operator2 for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us1 and this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the act of faith is not meritorious unless faith 4 4 4 worketh by charity 7,gal4 #e3f74 ,so1 too1 the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity1 according to #a ,cor4 #ac3c3 ,if ,i should deliver my body to be burned1 and have not charity1 it profiteth me nothing4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #e ,whether a ,man ,may ,merit for ,himself the ,first ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,ep4 clxxxvi71 faith merits justification4 ,now a man is justified by the first grace4 ,therefore a man may merit the first grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god gives grace only to the worthy4 ,now1 no one is said to be worthy of some good1 unless he has merited it condignly4 ,therefore we may merit the first grace condignly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 with men we may merit a gift already received4 ,thus if a man receives a horse from his master1 he merits it by a good use of it in his master's service4 ,now ,god is much more bountiful than man4 ,much more1 therefore1 may a man1 by subsequent works1 merit the first grace already received from ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,the nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works1 according to ,rom4 #d3d3 ,now to him that worketh1 the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt4 ,now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt1 as the reward of his works4 ,hence a man may not merit the first grace4 ,i answer that1 ,the gift of grace may be considered in two ways3 first in the nature of a gratuitous gift1 and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace1 since as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #aa3f71 if by grace1 it is not now by works4 ,secondly1 it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given1 and thus1 also1 it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace1 both because it exceeds the proportion of nature1 and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace1 viz4 sin4 ,but when anyone has grace1 the grace already possessed cannot come under merit1 since reward is the term of the work1 but grace is the principle of all our good works1 as stated above 7,q4 #aji74 ,but of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace1 it would not be the first grace4 ,hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #bc71 he was deceived on this point for a time1 believing the beginning of faith to be from us1 and its consummation to be granted us by ,god2 and this he here retracts4 ,and seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification4 ,but if we suppose1 as indeed it is a truth of faith1 that the beginning of faith is in us from ,god1 the first act must flow from grace2 and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace4 ,therefore man is justified by faith1 not as though man1 by believing1 were to merit justification1 but that1 he believes1 whilst he is being justified2 inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly1 as stated above 7,q4 #aac1 ,a4 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god gives grace to none but to the worthy1 not that they were previously worthy1 but that by ,his grace ,he makes them worthy1 ,who alone can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed 7,job #ad3d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle2 but not from any gift of man4 ,consequently1 there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #f ,whether a ,man ,can ,merit the ,first ,grace for ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another4 ,because on ,matt4 #i3b3 ,jesus seeing their faith1 etc4 a gloss says3 ,how much is our personal faith worth with ,god1 ,who set such a price on another's faith1 as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly6 ,now inward healing is brought about by grace4 ,hence a man can merit the first grace for another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the prayers of the just are not void1 but efficacious1 according to ,james #e3af3 ,the continued prayer of a just man availeth much4 ,now he had previously said3 ,pray one for another1 that you may be saved4 ,hence1 since man's salvation can only be brought about by grace1 it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7,luke #af3i73 ,make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity1 that when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting dwellings4 ,now it is through grace alone that anyone is received into everlasting dwellings1 for by it alone does anyone merit everlasting life as stated above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #e74 ,hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 #ae3a73 ,if ,moses and ,samuel shall stand before ,me1 ,my soul is not towards this people--yet they had great merit with ,god4 ,hence it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another4 ,i answer that1 ,as shown above 7,,aa4 #a1 #c1 #d71 our works are meritorious from two causes3 first1 by virtue of the ,divine motion2 and thus we merit condignly2 secondly1 according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do them willingly1 and thus they have congruous merit1 since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of his power ,god should by ,his super-excellent power work still higher things4 ,and therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for another his first grace1 save ,christ alone2 since each one of us is moved by ,god to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace2 hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion4 ,but ,christ's soul is moved by ,god through grace1 not only so as to reach the glory of life everlasting1 but so as to lead others to it1 inasmuch as ,he is the ,head of the ,church1 and the ,author of human salvation1 according to ,heb4 #b3aj3 ,who hath brought many children into glory to perfect the ,author of their salvation4 ,but one may merit the first grace for another congruously2 because a man in grace fulfils ,god's will1 and it is congruous and in harmony with friendship that ,god should fulfil man's desire for the salvation of another1 although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation the just man desires4 ,and it is in this sense that the passage from ,jeremias speaks4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a man's faith avails for another's salvation by congruous and not by condign merit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the impetration of prayer rests on mercy1 whereas condign merit rests on justice2 hence a man may impetrate many things from the ,divine mercy in prayer1 which he does not merit in justice1 according to ,dan4 #i3ah3 ,for it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before ,thy face1 but for the multitude of ,thy tender mercies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the poor who receive alms are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings1 either by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer1 or by meriting congruously by other good works1 or materially speaking1 inasmuch as by these good works of mercy1 exercised towards the poor1 we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #g ,whether a ,man ,may ,merit ,restoration ,after a ,fall8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after a fall4 ,for what a man may justly ask of ,god1 he may justly merit4 ,now nothing may more justly be besought of ,god than to be restored after a fall1 as ,augustine says 99,cf4 ,ennar4 i super ,ps4 lxx41 according to ,ps4 #gj3i3 ,when my strength shall fail1 do not ,thou forsake me4 ,hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a man's works benefit himself more than another4 ,now a man may1 to some extent1 merit for another his restoration after a fall1 even as his first grace4 ,much more1 therefore1 may he merit for himself restoration after a fall4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting by the good works he does1 as was shown above 7,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #e74 ,now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace4 ,hence it would seem that he merits for himself restoration4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ezech4 #ah3bd73 ,if the just man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity 4 4 4 all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered4 ,therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise again4 ,hence no one can merit for himself restoration after a fall4 ,i answer that1 ,no one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall1 either condignly or congruously4 ,he cannot merit for himself condignly1 since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of ,divine grace1 and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin2 hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from ,god1 whereby he is restored1 do not fall under merit--the motion of the preceding grace not extending to them4 ,again1 congruous merit1 whereby one merits the first grace for another1 is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited4 ,much more1 therefore1 is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits1 and in him for whom it is merited2 for both these are in the same person4 ,and therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just1 and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just1 because it tends to justice2 and not that it depends on justice by way of merit1 but only on mercy4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,anyone may congruously merit for another his first grace1 because there is no impediment 7at least1 on the part of him who merits71 such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some have said that no one absolutely merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace1 but only conditionally1 i4e4 if he perseveres4 ,but it is unreasonable to say this1 for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more1 but less meritorious than preceding acts1 on account of the prostration of illness4 ,hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely2 but by subsequent sin1 there arises an impediment to the preceding merit1 so that it does not obtain its effect2 just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening impediment4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #h ,whether a ,man ,may ,merit the ,increase of ,grace or ,charity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity4 ,for when anyone receives the reward he merited no other reward is due to him2 thus it was said of some 7,matt4 #f3b73 ,they have received their reward4 ,hence1 if anyone were to merit the increase of charity or grace1 it would follow that1 when his grace has been increased1 he could not expect any further reward1 which is unfitting4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing acts beyond its species4 ,but the principle of merit is grace or charity1 as was shown above 7,,aa4 #b1 #d74 ,therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what falls under merit a man merits by every act flowing from grace or charity1 as by every such act a man merits life everlasting4 ,if1 therefore1 the increase of grace or charity falls under merit1 it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man would merit an increase of charity4 ,but what a man merits1 he infallibly receives from ,god1 unless hindered by subsequent sin2 for it is written 7#b ,tim4 #a3ab73 ,i know ,whom ,i have believed1 and ,i am certain that ,he is able to keep that which ,i have committed unto ,him4 ,hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every meritorious act2 and this would seem impossible since at times meritorious acts are not very fervent1 and would not suffice for the increase of charity4 ,therefore the increase of charity does not come under merit4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7super ,ep4 ,joan42 cf4 ,ep4 clxxxvi7 that charity merits increase1 and being increased merits to be perfected4 ,hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #f1 #g71 whatever the motion of grace reaches to1 falls under condign merit4 ,now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last term of the movement1 but to the whole progress of the movement4 ,but the term of the movement of grace is eternal life2 and progress in this movement is by the increase of charity or grace according to ,prov4 #d3ah3 ,but the path of the just as a shining light1 goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day1 which is the day of glory4 ,and thus the increase of grace falls under condign merit4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reward is the term of merit4 ,but there is a double term of movement1 viz4 the last1 and the intermediate1 which is both beginning and term2 and this term is the reward of increase4 ,now the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their end in it2 hence such as these receive no other reward4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the increase of grace is not above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace1 although it is above its quantity1 even as a tree is not above the virtuality of the seed1 although above its quantity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,by every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace1 equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life4 ,but just as eternal life is not given at once1 but in its own time1 so neither is grace increased at once1 but in its own time1 viz4 when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #i ,whether a ,man ,may ,merit ,perseverance8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that anyone may merit perseverance4 ,for what a man obtains by asking1 can come under the merit of anyone that is in grace4 ,now men obtain perseverance by asking it of ,god2 otherwise it would be useless to ask it of ,god in the petitions of the ,lord's ,prayer1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,dono ,persev4 ii74 ,therefore perseverance may come under the merit of whoever has grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin4 ,but not to be able to sin comes under merit1 for we merit eternal life1 of which impeccability is an essential part4 ,much more1 therefore1 may we merit not to sin1 i4e4 to persevere4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 increase of grace is greater than perseverance in the grace we already possess4 ,but a man may merit an increase of grace1 as was stated above 7,a4 #h74 ,much more1 therefore1 may he merit perseverance in the grace he has already4 ,on the contrary1 ,what we merit1 we obtain from ,god1 unless it is hindered by sin4 ,now many have meritorious works1 who do not obtain perseverance2 nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the impediment of sin1 since sin itself is opposed to perseverance2 and thus if anyone were to merit perseverance1 ,god would not permit him to fall into sin4 ,hence perseverance does not come under merit4 ,i answer that1 ,since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good and evil1 there are two ways of obtaining from ,god perseverance in good3 first1 inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate grace1 which will be in glory2 secondly1 on the part of the ,divine motion1 which inclines man to good unto the end4 ,now as explained above 7,,aa4 #f1 #g1 #h71 that which is related as a term to the free-will's movement directed to ,god the mover1 falls under human merit2 and not what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle4 ,hence it is clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid movement falls under merit2 but perseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under merit1 since it depends solely on the ,divine motion1 which is the principle of all merit4 ,now ,god freely bestows the good of perseverance1 on whomsoever ,he bestows it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we impetrate in prayer things that we do not merit1 since ,god hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins1 which they do not merit1 as appears from ,augustine 99,tract4 xliv in ,joan4 on ,john #aa3ca1 ,now we know that ,god doth not hear sinners1 otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say3 ,o ,god1 be merciful to me a sinner1 ,luke #ah3ac4 ,so too may we impetrate of ,god in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others1 although it does not fall under merit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the perseverance which is in heaven is compared as term to the free-will's movement2 not so1 the perseverance of the wayfarer1 for the reason given in the body of the article4 ,in the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the increase of grace1 as was explained above4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,temporal ,goods ,fall ,under ,merit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that temporal goods fall under merit4 ,for what is promised to some as a reward of justice1 falls under merit4 ,now1 temporal goods were promised in the ,old ,law as the reward of justice1 as appears from ,deut4 #bh4 ,hence it seems that temporal goods fall under merit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that would seem to fall under merit1 which ,god bestows on anyone for a service done4 ,but ,god sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for services done for ,him4 ,for it is written 7,ex4 #a3ba73 ,and because the midwives feared ,god1 ,he built them houses2 on which a gloss of ,gregory 7,moral4 xviii1 #d7 says that life everlasting might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill1 but on account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward4 ,and it is written 7,ezech4 #bi3ah73 ,the ,king of ,babylon hath made his army to undergo hard service against ,tyre 4 4 4 and there hath been no reward given him1 and further on3 ,and it shall be wages for his army 4 4 4 ,i have given him the land of ,egypt because he hath labored for me4 ,therefore temporal goods fall under merit4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as good is to merit so is evil to demerit4 ,but on account of the demerit of sin some are punished by ,god with temporal punishments1 as appears from the ,sodomites1 ,gen4 #ai4 ,hence temporal goods fall under merit4 ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1 ,what falls under merit does not come upon all alike4 ,but temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike2 according to ,eccles4 #i3b3 ,all things equally happen to the just and the wicked1 to the good and to the evil1 to the clean and to the unclean1 to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth sacrifices4 ,therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit4 ,i answer that1 ,what falls under merit is the reward or wage1 which is a kind of good4 ,now man's good is twofold3 the first1 simply2 the second1 relatively4 ,now man's good simply is his last end 7according to ,ps4 #gb3bg3 ,but it is good for men to adhere to my ,god7 and consequently what is ordained and leads to this end2 and these fall simply under merit4 ,but the relative1 not the simple1 good of man is what is good to him now1 or what is a good to him relatively2 and this does not fall under merit simply1 but relatively4 ,hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are useful for virtuous works1 whereby we are led to heaven1 they fall directly and simply under merit1 even as increase of grace1 and everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first grace4 ,for ,god gives men1 both just and wicked1 enough temporal goods to enable them to attain to everlasting life2 and thus these temporal goods are simply good4 ,hence it is written 7,ps4 #cc3aj73 ,for there is no want to them that fear ,him1 and again1 ,ps4 #cf3be3 ,i have not seen the just forsaken1 etc4 ,but if these temporal goods are considered in themselves1 they are not man's good simply1 but relatively1 and thus they do not fall under merit simply1 but relatively1 inasmuch as men are moved by ,god to do temporal works1 in which with ,god's help they reach their purpose4 ,and thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice in relation to the ,divine motion1 as stated above 7,,aa4 #c1 #f71 so have temporal goods1 considered in themselves1 the nature of reward1 with respect to the ,divine motion1 whereby men's wills are moved to undertake these works1 even though1 sometimes1 men have not a right intention in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 iv1 #b71 in these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come4 ,for the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life2 and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these rewards are said to have been divinely brought about in relation to the ,divine motion1 and not in relation to the malice of their wills1 especially as regards the ,king of ,babylon1 since he did not besiege ,tyre as if wishing to serve ,god1 but rather in order to usurp dominion4 ,so1 too1 although the midwives had a good will with regard to saving the children1 yet their will was not right1 inasmuch as they framed falsehoods4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the wicked1 inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life everlasting4 ,but to the just who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but medicines as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #h74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all things happen equally to the good and the wicked1 as regards the substance of temporal good or evil2 but not as regards the end1 since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them4 ,and now enough has been said regarding morals in general4