supplementation by ,david ,mc,clamrock ,,st4 ,,thomas ,,aquinas ,,summa ,,theologica ,,part ,i 7,prima ,pars7 ,translated by ,fathers of the ,english ,dominican ,province ,,benziger ,,brothers ,,new ,,york ,,dedication ,to the ,blessed ,virgin ,mary ,immaculate ,seat of ,wisdom ,,note ,,to ,,this ,,electronic ,,edition ,the text of this electronic edition was originally produced by ,sandra ,k4 ,perry1 ,perrysburg1 ,ohio1 and made available through the ,christian ,classics ,ethereal ,library http3_/_/www4ccel4org4 ,i have eliminated unnecessary formatting in the text1 corrected some errors in transcription1 and added the dedication1 tables of contents1 ,prologue1 and the numbers of the questions and articles1 as they appeared in the printed translation published by ,benziger ,brothers4 ,each article is now designated by part1 question number1 and article number in brackets1 like this3 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,supreme ,good1 ,god1 ,is the ,cause of ,evil8 ,in a few places1 where obvious errors appeared in the ,benziger ,brothers edition1 ,i have corrected them by reference to a ,latin text of the ,summa4 ,these corrections are indicated by ,english text in brackets4 ,for example1 in ,part ,i1 ,question #de1 ,article #b1 the first sentence in the ,benziger ,brothers edition begins3 ,not only is it impossible that anything should be created by ,god4444 ,by reference to the ,latin1 non solum non est impossibile a ,deo aliquid creari 7emphasis added71 this has been corrected to ,not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by ,god4444 ,this electronic edition also differs from the ,benziger ,brothers edition in the following details 7as well as the obvious lack of the original page numbers and headers73 99 ,the repetitive expression ,we proceed thus to the next ,article does not appear directly below the title of each article4 99 ,italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end1 like this4 ,quotations and other quotable matter1 however1 are ordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this edition1 in accordance with common ,english usage1 even where they were set in italics with no quotation marks in the ,benziger ,brothers edition4 ,titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear in the text with no parentheses1 but not when the books are cited in parentheses4 99 ,bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated by colons1 like this3 ,dan4 #g3aj--not like this3 ,dan4 vii4 #aj4 ,small roman numerals have been retained where they appear in citations to books other than the ,bible4 99 ,any matter that appeared in a footnote in the ,benziger ,brothers edition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the footnote mark appeared4 99 ,greek words are presented in ,roman transliteration4 99 ,paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines4 99 ,numbered topics1 set forth at the beginning of each question and at certain other places1 are ordinarily presented on a separate line for each topic4 99 ,titles of questions are in all caps4 ,anything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to the content of the ,benziger ,brothers edition may be regarded as a defect in this edition and attributed to me 7,david ,mc,clamrock74 ,,contents ,,prologue ,,first ,,part 7,,qq4 #a-aai7 ,question #a4 ,the ,nature and ,extent of ,sacred ,doctrine #b4 ,the ,existence of ,god #c4 ,on the ,simplicity of ,god #d4 ,the ,perfection of ,god #e4 ,of ,goodness in ,general #f4 ,the ,goodness of ,god #g4 ,the ,infinity of ,god #h4 ,the ,existence of ,god in ,things #i4 ,the ,immutability of ,god #aj4 ,the ,eternity of ,god #aa4 ,the ,unity of ,god #ab4 ,how ,god ,is ,known by ,us #ac4 ,the ,names of ,god #ad4 ,of ,god's ,knowledge #ae4 ,of ,ideas #af4 ,of ,truth #ag4 ,concerning ,falsity #ah4 ,the ,life of ,god #ai4 ,the ,will of ,god #bj4 ,god's ,love #ba4 ,the ,justice and ,mercy of ,god #bb4 ,the ,providence of ,god #bc4 ,of ,predestination #bd4 ,the ,book of ,life #be4 ,the ,power of ,god #bf4 ,of the ,divine ,beatitude ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,trinity #bg4 ,the ,procession of the ,divine ,persons #bh4 ,the ,divine ,relations #bi4 ,the ,divine ,persons #cj4 ,the ,plurality of ,persons in ,god #ca4 ,of ,what ,belongs to the ,unity or ,plurality in ,god #cb4 ,the ,knowledge of the ,divine ,persons #cc4 ,of the ,person of the ,father #cd4 ,of the ,person of the ,son #ce4 ,of the ,image #cf4 ,of the ,person of the ,holy ,ghost #cg4 ,of the ,name of the ,holy ,ghost--,love #ch4 ,of the ,name of the ,holy ,ghost1 as ,gift #ci4 ,of the ,persons in ,relation to the ,essence #dj4 ,of the ,persons as ,compared to the ,relations or ,properties #da4 ,of the ,persons in ,reference to the ,notional ,acts #db4 ,of ,equality and ,likeness ,among the ,divine ,persons #dc4 ,the ,mission of the ,divine ,persons ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,creation #dd4 ,the ,procession of ,creatures from ,god1 and of the ,first ,cause of ,all ,things #de4 ,the ,mode of ,emanation of ,things from the ,first ,principle #df4 ,of the ,beginning of the ,duration of ,creatures #dg4 ,of the ,distinction of ,things in ,general #dh4 ,the ,distinction of ,things in ,particular #di4 ,the ,cause of ,evil ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,angels #ej4 ,of the ,substance of the ,angels ,absolutely ,considered #ea4 ,of the ,angels in ,comparison with ,bodies #eb4 ,of the ,angels in ,relation to ,place #ec4 ,of the ,local ,movement of the ,angels #ed4 ,of the ,knowledge of the ,angels #ee4 ,of the ,medium of the ,angelic ,knowledge #ef4 ,of the ,angels' ,knowledge of ,immaterial ,things #eg4 ,of the ,angels' ,knowledge of ,material ,things #eh4 ,of the ,mode of the ,angelic ,knowledge #ei4 ,the ,will of the ,angels #fj4 ,of the ,love or ,dilection of the ,angels #fa4 ,of the ,production of the ,angels in the ,order of ,natural ,being #fb4 ,of the ,perfection of the ,angels in the ,order of ,grace and of ,glory #fc4 ,the ,malice of the ,angels with ,regard to ,sin #fd4 ,the ,punishment of the ,demons ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,the ,,six ,,days #fe4 ,the ,work of ,creation of ,corporeal ,creatures #ff4 ,on the ,order of ,creation ,towards ,distinction #fg4 ,on the ,work of ,distinction in ,itself #fh4 ,on the ,work of the ,second ,day #fi4 ,on the ,work of the ,third ,day #gj4 ,on the ,work of ,adornment1 as ,regards the ,fourth ,day #ga4 ,on the ,work of the ,fifth ,day #gb4 ,on the ,work of the ,sixth ,day #gc4 ,on the ,things ,that ,belong to the ,seventh ,day #gd4 ,on ,all the ,seven ,days in ,common ,,treatise ,,on ,,man #ge4 ,of ,man ,who ,is ,composed of a ,spiritual and a ,corporeal ,substance3 and in the ,first ,place1 ,concerning ,what ,belongs to the ,essence of the ,soul #gf4 ,of the ,union of ,body and ,soul #gg4 ,of ,those ,things ,which ,belong to the ,powers of the ,soul in ,general #gh4 ,of the ,specific ,powers of the ,soul #gi4 ,of the ,intellectual ,powers #hj4 ,of the ,appetitive ,powers in ,general #ha4 ,of the ,power of ,sensuality #hb4 ,of the ,will #hc4 ,of ,free-,will #hd4 ,how the ,soul ,while ,united to the ,body ,understands ,corporeal ,things ,beneath ,it #he4 ,of the ,mode and ,order of ,understanding #hf4 ,what ,our ,intellect ,knows in ,material ,things #hg4 ,how the ,intellectual ,soul ,knows ,itself and ,all ,within ,itself #hh4 ,how the ,human ,soul ,knows ,what ,is ,above ,itself #hi4 ,of the ,knowledge of the ,separated ,soul #ij4 ,of the ,first ,production of ,man's ,soul #ia4 ,the ,production of the ,first ,man's ,body #ib4 ,the ,production of the ,woman #ic4 ,the ,end or ,term of the ,production of ,man #id4 ,of the ,state and ,condition of the ,first ,man as ,regards ,his ,intellect #ie4 ,of ,things ,pertaining to the ,first ,man's ,will--,namely1 ,grace and ,righteousness #if4 ,of the ,mastership ,belonging to ,man in the ,state of ,innocence #ig4 ,of the ,preservation of the ,individual in the ,primitive ,state #ih4 ,of the ,preservation of the ,species #ii4 ,of the ,condition of the ,offspring ,as to the ,body #ajj4 ,of the ,condition of the ,offspring ,as ,regards ,righteousness #aja4 ,of the ,condition of the ,offspring ,as ,regards ,knowledge #ajb4 ,of ,man's ,abode1 ,which ,is ,paradise ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,divine ,,government #ajc4 ,of the ,government of ,things in ,general #ajd4 ,the ,special ,effects of the ,divine ,government #aje4 ,of the ,change of ,creatures by ,god #ajf4 ,how ,one ,creature ,moves ,another #ajg4 ,the ,speech of the ,angels #ajh4 ,of the ,angelic ,degrees of ,hierarchies and ,orders #aji4 ,the ,ordering of the ,bad ,angels #aaj4 ,how ,angels ,act on ,bodies #aaa4 ,the ,action of the ,angels on ,man #aab4 ,the ,mission of the ,angels #aac4 ,of the ,guardianship of the ,good ,angels #aad4 ,of the ,assaults of the ,demons #aae4 ,of the ,action of the ,corporeal ,creature #aaf4 ,on ,fate #aag4 ,of ,things ,pertaining to the ,action of ,man #aah4 ,of the ,production of ,man from ,man ,as to the ,soul #aai4 ,of the ,propagation of ,man ,as to the ,body ,,prologue ,because the ,master of ,catholic ,truth ought not only to teach the proficient1 but also to instruct beginners 7according to the ,apostle3 ,as ,unto ,little ,ones in ,christ1 ,i ,gave ,you ,milk to ,drink1 ,not ,meat-- #a ,cor4 iii4 #a1 #b7--we purpose in this book to treat of whatever belongs to the ,christian ,religion1 in such a way as may tend to the instruction of beginners4 ,we have considered that students in this ,science have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written by other authors1 partly on account of the multiplication of useless questions1 articles1 and arguments2 partly also because those things that are needful for them to know are not taught according to the order of the subject-matter1 but according as the plan of the book might require1 or the occasion of the argument offer2 partly1 too1 because frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the minds of the readers4 ,endeavoring to avoid these and other like faults1 we shall try1 by ,god's help1 to set forth whatever is included in this ,sacred ,science as briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow4 ,,summa ,,theologica ,,first ,,part ,i1 ,prima ,pars ,,question #a ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,extent ,,of ,,sacred ,,doctrine 7in ,ten ,articles7 ,to place our purpose within proper limits1 we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine4 ,concerning this there are ten points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether it is necessary8 7#b7 ,whether it is a science8 7#c7 ,whether it is one or many8 7#d7 ,whether it is speculative or practical8 7#e7 ,how it is compared with other sciences8 7#f7 ,whether it is the same as wisdom8 7#g7 ,whether ,god is its subject-matter8 7#h7 ,whether it is a matter of argument8 7#i7 ,whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes8 7#aj7 ,whether the ,sacred ,scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #a ,whether1 besides ,philosophy1 any ,further ,doctrine ,is ,required8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that1 besides philosophical science1 we have no need of any further knowledge4 ,for man should not seek to know what is above reason3 ,seek not the things that are too high for thee 7,ecclus4 #c3bb74 ,but whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science4 ,therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 knowledge can be concerned only with being1 for nothing can be known1 save what is true2 and all that is1 is true4 ,but everything that is1 is treated of in philosophical science--even ,god ,himself2 so that there is a part of philosophy called theology1 or the divine science1 as ,aristotle has proved 7,metaph4 vi74 ,therefore1 besides philosophical science1 there is no need of any further knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#b ,tim4 #c3af73 ,all ,scripture inspired of ,god is profitable to teach1 to reprove1 to correct1 to instruct in justice4 ,now ,scripture1 inspired of ,god1 is no part of philosophical science1 which has been built up by human reason4 ,therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science1 there should be other knowledge1 i4e4 inspired of ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,it was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by ,god besides philosophical science built up by human reason4 ,firstly1 indeed1 because man is directed to ,god1 as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason3 ,the eye hath not seen1 ,o ,god1 besides ,thee1 what things ,thou hast prepared for them that wait for ,thee 7,isa4 #ff3d74 ,but the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end4 ,hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation4 ,even as regards those truths about ,god which human reason could have discovered1 it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation2 because the truth about ,god such as reason could discover1 would only be known by a few1 and that after a long time1 and with the admixture of many errors4 ,whereas man's whole salvation1 which is in ,god1 depends upon the knowledge of this truth4 ,therefore1 in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely1 it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation4 ,it was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason1 there should be a sacred science learned through revelation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although those things which are beyond man's knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason1 nevertheless1 once they are revealed by ,god1 they must be accepted by faith4 ,hence the sacred text continues1 ,for many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man 7,ecclus4 #c3be74 ,and in this1 the sacred science consists4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained4 ,for the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion3 that the earth1 for instance1 is round3 the astronomer by means of mathematics 7i4e4 abstracting from matter71 but the physicist by means of matter itself4 ,hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science1 so far as they can be known by natural reason1 may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation4 ,hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,sacred ,doctrine ,is a ,science8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that sacred doctrine is not a science4 ,for every science proceeds from self-evident principles4 ,but sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident1 since their truth is not admitted by all3 ,for all men have not faith 7#b ,thess4 #c3b74 ,therefore sacred doctrine is not a science4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no science deals with individual facts4 ,but this sacred science treats of individual facts1 such as the deeds of ,abraham1 ,isaac and ,jacob and such like4 ,therefore sacred doctrine is not a science4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #a7 to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten1 nourished1 protected and strengthened4 ,but this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine4 ,therefore sacred doctrine is a science4 ,i answer that1 ,sacred doctrine is a science4 ,we must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences4 ,there are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence1 such as arithmetic and geometry and the like4 ,there are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science3 thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry1 and music from principles established by arithmetic4 ,so it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science1 namely1 the science of ,god and the blessed4 ,hence1 just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician1 so sacred science is established on principles revealed by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident1 or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science2 and such1 as we have said1 are the principles of sacred doctrine4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine1 not because it is concerned with them principally1 but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives 7as in moral sciences7 and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation1 on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based1 has come down to us4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,sacred ,doctrine ,is ,one ,science8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that sacred doctrine is not one science2 for according to the ,philosopher 7,poster4 i7 that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects4 ,but the creator and the creature1 both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine1 cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects4 ,therefore sacred doctrine is not one science4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in sacred doctrine we treat of angels1 corporeal creatures and human morality4 ,but these belong to separate philosophical sciences4 ,therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science4 ,on the contrary1 ,holy ,scripture speaks of it as one science3 ,wisdom gave him the knowledge scientiam of holy things 7,wis4 #aj3aj74 ,i answer that1 ,sacred doctrine is one science4 ,the unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object1 not indeed1 in its material aspect1 but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object4 ,for example1 man1 ass1 stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored2 and color is the formal object of sight4 ,therefore1 because ,sacred ,scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed1 whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science2 and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sacred doctrine does not treat of ,god and creatures equally1 but of ,god primarily1 and of creatures only so far as they are referable to ,god as their beginning or end4 ,hence the unity of this science is not impaired4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well2 because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality1 as the object of the common sense is whatever affects the senses1 including1 therefore1 whatever is visible or audible4 ,hence the common sense1 although one faculty1 extends to all the objects of the five senses4 ,similarly1 objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation4 ,so that in this way1 sacred doctrine bears1 as it were1 the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple1 yet extends to everything4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,sacred ,doctrine ,is a ,practical ,science8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science2 for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 ii74 ,but sacred doctrine is ordained to action3 ,be ye doers of the word1 and not hearers only 7,james #a3bb74 ,therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sacred doctrine is divided into the ,old and the ,new ,law4 ,but law implies a moral science which is a practical science4 ,therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science4 ,on the contrary1 ,every practical science is concerned with human operations2 as moral science is concerned with human acts1 and architecture with buildings4 ,but sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with ,god1 whose handiwork is especially man4 ,therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science4 ,i answer that1 ,sacred doctrine1 being one1 extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect1 namely1 so far as they can be known through divine revelation4 ,hence1 although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical1 nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both2 as ,god1 by one and the same science1 knows both ,himself and ,his works4 ,still1 it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts2 though it does treat even of these latter1 inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of ,god in which consists eternal bliss4 ,this is a sufficient answer to the ,objections4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,sacred ,doctrine ,is ,nobler than ,other ,sciences8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences2 for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes4 ,but other sciences1 the principles of which cannot be doubted1 seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine2 for its principles--namely1 articles of faith--can be doubted4 ,therefore other sciences seem to be nobler4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher2 as music depends on arithmetic4 ,but sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences2 for ,jerome observes1 in his ,epistle to ,magnus1 that the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers1 that thou knowest not what more to admire in them1 their profane erudition or their scriptural learning4 ,therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences4 ,on the contrary1 ,other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one3 ,wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower 7,prov4 #i3c74 ,i answer that1 ,since this science is partly speculative and partly practical1 it transcends all others speculative and practical4 ,now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another1 either by reason of its greater certitude1 or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter4 ,in both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences2 in point of greater certitude1 because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason1 which can err2 whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge1 which cannot be misled3 in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason2 while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason's grasp4 ,of the practical sciences1 that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose1 as political science is nobler than military science2 for the good of the army is directed to the good of the ,state4 ,but the purpose of this science1 in so far as it is practical1 is eternal bliss2 to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed4 ,hence it is clear that from every standpoint1 it is nobler than other sciences4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence1 which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature2 as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun 7,metaph4 ii1 lect4 i74 ,hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths1 but to the weakness of human intelligence2 yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things1 as is said in de ,animalibus xi4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences1 not as though it stood in need of them1 but only in order to make its teaching clearer4 ,for it accepts its principles not from other sciences1 but immediately from ,god1 by revelation4 ,therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher1 but makes use of them as of the lesser1 and as handmaidens3 even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials1 as political of military science4 ,that it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency1 but to the defect of our intelligence1 which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason 7from which proceed the other sciences7 to that which is above reason1 such as are the teachings of this science4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,this ,doctrine ,is the ,same as ,wisdom8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom4 ,for no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom2 seeing that the wise man directs1 and is not directed 7,metaph4 i74 ,but this doctrine borrows its principles4 ,therefore this science is not wisdom4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences4 ,hence it is called the chief of sciences1 as is clear in ,ethic4 vi4 ,but this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences4 ,therefore it is not the same as wisdom4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 this doctrine is acquired by study1 whereas wisdom is acquired by ,god's inspiration2 so that it is numbered among the gifts of the ,holy ,spirit 7,isa4 #aa3b74 ,therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,deut4 #d3f73 ,this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations4 ,i answer that1 ,this doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom2 not merely in any one order1 but absolutely4 ,for since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge1 and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle1 he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order3 thus in the order of building1 he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect1 in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones3 ,as a wise architect1 ,i have laid the foundation 7#a ,cor4 #c3aj74 ,again1 in the order of all human life1 the prudent man is called wise1 inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end3 ,wisdom is prudence to a man 7,prov4 #aj3 #bc74 ,therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe1 namely ,god1 is most of all called wise4 ,hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ad74 ,but sacred doctrine essentially treats of ,god viewed as the highest cause--not only so far as ,he can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew ,him--,that which is known of ,god is manifest in them 7,rom4 #a3ai7--;but also as far as ,he is known to ,himself alone and revealed to others4 ,hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge1 but from the divine knowledge1 through which1 as through the highest wisdom1 all our knowledge is set in order4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved1 or are proved by natural reason through some other science4 ,but the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation and not through natural reason4 ,therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences1 but only to judge of them4 ,whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false3 ,destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of ,god 7#b ,cor4 #aj3d1 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since judgment appertains to wisdom1 the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom4 ,a man may judge in one way by inclination1 as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it4 ,hence it is the virtuous man1 as we read1 who is the measure and rule of human acts4 ,in another way1 by knowledge1 just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts1 though he had not the virtue4 ,the first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the ,holy ,ghost3 ,the spiritual man judgeth all things 7#a ,cor4 #b3ae74 ,and ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii73 ,hierotheus is taught not by mere learning1 but by experience of divine things4 ,the second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study1 though its principles are obtained by revelation4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,god ,is the ,object of ,this ,science8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not the object of this science4 ,for in every science1 the nature of its object is presupposed4 ,but this science cannot presuppose the essence of ,god1 for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 iv73 ,it is impossible to define the essence of ,god4 ,therefore ,god is not the object of this science4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science4 ,but in ,holy ,writ we reach conclusions not only concerning ,god1 but concerning many other things1 such as creatures and human morality4 ,therefore ,god is not the object of this science4 ,on the contrary1 ,the object of the science is that of which it principally treats4 ,but in this science1 the treatment is mainly about ,god2 for it is called theology1 as treating of ,god4 ,therefore ,god is the object of this science4 ,i answer that1 ,god is the object of this science4 ,the relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object4 ,now properly speaking1 the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit1 as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored4 ,hence colored things are the proper objects of sight4 ,but in sacred science1 all things are treated of under the aspect of ,god3 either because they are ,god ,himself or because they refer to ,god as their beginning and end4 ,hence it follows that ,god is in very truth the object of this science4 ,this is clear also from the principles of this science1 namely1 the articles of faith1 for faith is about ,god4 ,the object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same1 since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles4 ,some1 however1 looking to what is treated of in this science1 and not to the aspect under which it is treated1 have asserted the object of this science to be something other than ,god--that is1 either things and signs2 or the works of salvation2 or the whole ,christ1 as the head and members4 ,of all these things1 in truth1 we treat in this science1 but so far as they have reference to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although we cannot know in what consists the essence of ,god1 nevertheless in this science we make use of ,his effects1 either of nature or of grace1 in place of a definition1 in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning ,god2 even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect1 by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under ,god1 not as parts or species or accidents but as in some way related to ,him4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,sacred ,doctrine is a ,matter of ,argument8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument4 ,for ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide #a73 ,put arguments aside where faith is sought4 ,but in this doctrine1 faith especially is sought3 ,but these things are written that you may believe 7,john #bj3ca74 ,therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if it is a matter of argument1 the argument is either from authority or from reason4 ,if it is from authority1 it seems unbefitting its dignity1 for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof4 ,but if it is from reason1 this is unbefitting its end1 because1 according to ,gregory 7,hom4 #bf71 faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience4 ,therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,scripture says that a bishop should embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine1 that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers 7,titus #a3i74 ,i answer that1 ,as other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles1 but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences3 so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles1 which are the articles of faith1 but from them it goes on to prove something else2 as the ,apostle from the resurrection of ,christ argues in proof of the general resurrection 7#a ,cor4 #ae74 ,however1 it is to be borne in mind1 in regard to the philosophical sciences1 that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them1 but leave this to a higher science2 whereas the highest of them1 viz4 metaphysics1 can dispute with one who denies its principles1 if only the opponent will make some concession2 but if he concede nothing1 it can have no dispute with him1 though it can answer his objections4 ,hence ,sacred ,scripture1 since it has no science above itself1 can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation2 thus we can argue with heretics from texts in ,holy ,writ1 and against those who deny one article of faith1 we can argue from another4 ,if our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation1 there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning1 but only of answering his objections--if he has any--against faith4 ,since faith rests upon infallible truth1 and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated1 it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations1 but are difficulties that can be answered4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith1 nevertheless1 this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority1 inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation3 thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made4 ,nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine1 for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest1 yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest4 ,but sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason1 not1 indeed1 to prove faith 7for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end71 but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine4 ,since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it1 natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity4 ,hence the ,apostle says3 ,bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of ,christ 7#b ,cor4 #aj3e74 ,hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason1 as ,paul quotes a saying of ,aratus3 ,as some also of your own poets said3 ,for we are also ,his offspring 7,acts #ag3bh74 ,nevertheless1 sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments2 but properly uses the authority of the canonical ,scriptures as an incontrovertible proof1 and the authority of the doctors of the ,church as one that may properly be used1 yet merely as probable4 ,for our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books1 and not on the revelations 7if any such there are7 made to other doctors4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,epis4 ad ,hieron4 xix1 #a73 ,only those books of ,scripture which are called canonical have ,i learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them4 ,but other authors ,i so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true1 merely on account of their having so thought and written1 whatever may have been their holiness and learning4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,holy ,scripture ,should ,use ,metaphors8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,holy ,scripture should not use metaphors4 ,for that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science1 which holds the highest place of all4 ,but to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry1 the least of all the sciences4 ,therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear4 ,hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it3 ,they that explain me shall have life everlasting 7,ecclus4 #bd3ca74 ,but by such similitudes truth is obscured4 ,therefore1 to put forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the higher creatures are1 the nearer they approach to the divine likeness4 ,if therefore any creature be taken to represent ,god1 this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures1 and not from the lower2 yet this is often found in ,scriptures4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,osee #ab3aj73 ,i have multiplied visions1 and ,i have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets4 ,but to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors4 ,therefore this sacred science may use metaphors4 ,i answer that1 ,it is befitting ,holy ,writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things4 ,for ,god provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature4 ,now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects1 because all our knowledge originates from sense4 ,hence in ,holy ,writ1 spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things4 ,this is what ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i73 ,we cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils4 ,it is also befitting ,holy ,writ1 which is proposed to all without distinction of persons--,to the wise and to the unwise ,i am a debtor 7,rom4 #a3ad7--that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things1 in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation1 for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations4 ,but sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i72 and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made1 to rest in the metaphors1 but raises them to the knowledge of truths2 and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters4 ,hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of ,scripture1 in other parts are taught more openly4 ,the very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious1 according to the words ,give not that which is holy to dogs 7,matt4 #g3f74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,dionysius says1 7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies1 and this for three reasons4 ,firstly1 because thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error4 ,for then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths1 which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies1 especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies4 ,secondly1 because this is more befitting the knowledge of ,god that we have in this life4 ,for what ,he is not is clearer to us than what ,he is4 ,therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from ,god form within us a truer estimate that ,god is above whatsoever we may say or think of ,him4 ,thirdly1 because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #a1 ,art4 #aj ,whether in ,holy ,scripture a ,word may have ,several ,senses8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that in ,holy ,writ a word cannot have several senses1 historical or literal1 allegorical1 tropological or moral1 and anagogical4 ,for many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument4 ,hence no argument1 but only fallacies1 can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions4 ,but ,holy ,writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy4 ,therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de util4 cred4 iii7 that the ,old ,testament has a fourfold division as to history1 etiology1 analogy and allegory4 ,now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection4 ,therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of ,holy ,writ according to the four different senses mentioned above4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 besides these senses1 there is the parabolical1 which is not one of these four4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xx1 #a73 ,holy ,writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science1 because in one and the same sentence1 while it describes a fact1 it reveals a mystery4 ,i answer that1 ,the author of ,holy ,writ is ,god1 in whose power it is to signify ,his meaning1 not by words only 7as man also can do71 but also by things themselves4 ,so1 whereas in every other science things are signified by words1 this science has the property1 that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification4 ,therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense1 the historical or literal4 ,that signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense1 which is based on the literal1 and presupposes it4 ,now this spiritual sense has a threefold division4 ,for as the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aj3a7 the ,old ,law is a figure of the ,new ,law1 and ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 the ,new ,law itself is a figure of future glory4 ,again1 in the ,new ,law1 whatever our ,head has done is a type of what we ought to do4 ,therefore1 so far as the things of the ,old ,law signify the things of the ,new ,law1 there is the allegorical sense2 so far as the things done in ,christ1 or so far as the things which signify ,christ1 are types of what we ought to do1 there is the moral sense4 ,but so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory1 there is the anagogical sense4 ,since the literal sense is that which the author intends1 and since the author of ,holy ,writ is ,god1 ,who by one act comprehends all things by ,his intellect1 it is not unfitting1 as ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii71 if1 even according to the literal sense1 one word in ,holy ,writ should have several senses4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity1 seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things1 but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things4 ,thus in ,holy ,writ no confusion results1 for all the senses are founded on one--the literal--from which alone can any argument be drawn1 and not from those intended in allegory1 as ,augustine says 7,epis4 #dh74 ,nevertheless1 nothing of ,holy ,scripture perishes on account of this1 since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the ,scripture in its literal sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these three--history1 etiology1 analogy--are grouped under the literal sense4 ,for it is called history1 as ,augustine expounds 7,epis4 #dh71 whenever anything is simply related2 it is called etiology when its cause is assigned1 as when ,our ,lord gave the reason why ,moses allowed the putting away of wives--namely1 on account of the hardness of men's hearts2 it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of ,scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another4 ,of these four1 allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses4 ,thus ,hugh of ,st4 ,victor 7,sacram4 iv1 #d ,prolog47 includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense1 laying down three senses only--the historical1 the allegorical1 and the tropological4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the parabolical sense is contained in the literal1 for by words things are signified properly and figuratively4 ,nor is the figure itself1 but that which is figured1 the literal sense4 ,when ,scripture speaks of ,god's arm1 the literal sense is not that ,god has such a member1 but only what is signified by this member1 namely operative power4 ,hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of ,holy ,writ4 ,,question #b ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,god 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of ,god1 not only as ,he is in ,himself1 but also as ,he is the beginning of things and their last end1 and especially of rational creatures1 as is clear from what has been already said1 therefore1 in our endeavor to expound this science1 we shall treat3 7#a7 ,of ,god2 7#b7 ,of the rational creature's advance towards ,god2 7#c7 ,of ,christ1 ,who as man1 is our way to ,god4 ,in treating of ,god there will be a threefold division1 for we shall consider3 7#a7 ,whatever concerns the ,divine ,essence2 7#b7 ,whatever concerns the distinctions of ,persons2 7#c7 ,whatever concerns the procession of creatures from ,him4 ,concerning the ,divine ,essence1 we must consider3 7#a7 ,whether ,god exists8 7#b7 ,the manner of ,his existence1 or1 rather1 what is not the manner of ,his existence2 7#c7 ,whatever concerns ,his operations--namely1 ,his knowledge1 will1 power4 ,concerning the first1 there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the proposition ,god exists is self-evident8 7#b7 ,whether it is demonstrable8 7#c7 ,whether ,god exists8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,existence of ,god ,is ,self-,evident8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the existence of ,god is self-evident4 ,now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us1 as we can see in regard to first principles4 ,but as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #a1c71 the knowledge of ,god is naturally implanted in all4 ,therefore the existence of ,god is self-evident4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known1 which the ,philosopher 7#a ,poster4 iii7 says is true of the first principles of demonstration4 ,thus1 when the nature of a whole and of a part is known1 it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part4 ,but as soon as the signification of the word ,god is understood1 it is at once seen that ,god exists4 ,for by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived4 ,but that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally4 ,therefore1 since as soon as the word ,god is understood it exists mentally1 it also follows that it exists actually4 ,therefore the proposition ,god exists is self-evident4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the existence of truth is self-evident4 ,for whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist3 and1 if truth does not exist1 then the proposition ,truth does not exist is true3 and if there is anything true1 there must be truth4 ,but ,god is truth itself3 ,i am the way1 the truth1 and the life 7,john #ad3f7 ,therefore ,god exists is self-evident4 ,on the contrary1 ,no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident2 as the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 iv1 lect4 vi7 states concerning the first principles of demonstration4 ,but the opposite of the proposition ,god is can be mentally admitted3 ,the fool said in his heart1 ,there is no ,god 7,ps4 #eb3a74 ,therefore1 that ,god exists is not self-evident4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing can be self-evident in either of two ways3 on the one hand1 self-evident in itself1 though not to us2 on the other1 self-evident in itself1 and to us4 ,a proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject1 as ,man is an animal1 for animal is contained in the essence of man4 ,if1 therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all1 the proposition will be self-evident to all2 as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration1 the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of1 such as being and non-being1 whole and part1 and such like4 ,if1 however1 there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown1 the proposition will be self-evident in itself1 but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition4 ,therefore1 it happens1 as ,boethius says 7,hebdom41 the title of which is3 ,whether all that is1 is good71 that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned1 as that incorporeal substances are not in space4 ,therefore ,i say that this proposition1 ,god exists1 of itself is self-evident1 for the predicate is the same as the subject1 because ,god is ,his own existence as will be hereafter shown 7,q4 #c1 ,art4 #d74 ,now because we do not know the essence of ,god1 the proposition is not self-evident to us2 but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us1 though less known in their nature--namely1 by effects4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to know that ,god exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature1 inasmuch as ,god is man's beatitude4 ,for man naturally desires happiness1 and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him4 ,this1 however1 is not to know absolutely that ,god exists2 just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that ,peter is approaching1 even though it is ,peter who is approaching2 for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness1 consists in riches1 and others in pleasures1 and others in something else4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,perhaps not everyone who hears this word ,god understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought1 seeing that some have believed ,god to be a body4 ,yet1 granted that everyone understands that by this word ,god is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought1 nevertheless1 it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually1 but only that it exists mentally4 ,nor can it be argued that it actually exists1 unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought2 and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that ,god does not exist4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a ,primal ,truth is not self-evident to us4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,it ,can ,be ,demonstrated ,that ,god ,exists8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the existence of ,god cannot be demonstrated4 ,for it is an article of faith that ,god exists4 ,but what is of faith cannot be demonstrated1 because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge2 whereas faith is of the unseen 7,heb4 #aa3a74 ,therefore it cannot be demonstrated that ,god exists4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the essence is the middle term of demonstration4 ,but we cannot know in what ,god's essence consists1 but solely in what it does not consist2 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #d74 ,therefore we cannot demonstrate that ,god exists4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the existence of ,god were demonstrated1 this could only be from ,his effects4 ,but ,his effects are not proportionate to ,him1 since ,he is infinite and ,his effects are finite2 and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion4 ,therefore1 since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it1 it seems that the existence of ,god cannot be demonstrated4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says3 ,the invisible things of ,him are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made 7,rom4 #a3bj74 ,but this would not be unless the existence of ,god could be demonstrated through the things that are made2 for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists4 ,i answer that1 ,demonstration can be made in two ways3 ,one is through the cause1 and is called a priori1 and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely4 ,the other is through the effect1 and is called a demonstration a posteriori2 this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us4 ,when an effect is better known to us than its cause1 from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause4 ,and from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated1 so long as its effects are better known to us2 because since every effect depends upon its cause1 if the effect exists1 the cause must pre-exist4 ,hence the existence of ,god1 in so far as it is not self-evident to us1 can be demonstrated from those of ,his effects which are known to us4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the existence of ,god and other like truths about ,god1 which can be known by natural reason1 are not articles of faith1 but are preambles to the articles2 for faith presupposes natural knowledge1 even as grace presupposes nature1 and perfection supposes something that can be perfected4 ,nevertheless1 there is nothing to prevent a man1 who cannot grasp a proof1 accepting1 as a matter of faith1 something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect1 this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence4 ,this is especially the case in regard to ,god1 because1 in order to prove the existence of anything1 it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word1 and not its essence1 for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence4 ,now the names given to ,god are derived from ,his effects2 consequently1 in demonstrating the existence of ,god from ,his effects1 we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,from effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained4 ,yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated1 and so we can demonstrate the existence of ,god from ,his effects2 though from them we cannot perfectly know ,god as ,he is in ,his essence4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #b1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,exists8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not exist2 because if one of two contraries be infinite1 the other would be altogether destroyed4 ,but the word ,god means that ,he is infinite goodness4 ,if1 therefore1 ,god existed1 there would be no evil discoverable2 but there is evil in the world4 ,therefore ,god does not exist4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many4 ,but it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles1 supposing ,god did not exist4 ,for all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature2 and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason1 or will4 ,therefore there is no need to suppose ,god's existence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in the person of ,god3 ,i am ,who am4 7,ex4 #c3ad7 ,i answer that1 ,the existence of ,god can be proved in five ways4 ,the first and more manifest way is the argument from motion4 ,it is certain1 and evident to our senses1 that in the world some things are in motion4 ,now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another1 for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion2 whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act4 ,for motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality4 ,but nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality1 except by something in a state of actuality4 ,thus that which is actually hot1 as fire1 makes wood1 which is potentially hot1 to be actually hot1 and thereby moves and changes it4 ,now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect1 but only in different respects4 ,for what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot2 but it is simultaneously potentially cold4 ,it is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved1 i4e4 that it should move itself4 ,therefore1 whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another4 ,if that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion1 then this also must needs be put in motion by another1 and that by another again4 ,but this cannot go on to infinity1 because then there would be no first mover1 and1 consequently1 no other mover2 seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover2 as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand4 ,therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover1 put in motion by no other2 and this everyone understands to be ,god4 ,the second way is from the nature of the efficient cause4 ,in the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes4 ,there is no case known 7neither is it1 indeed1 possible7 in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself2 for so it would be prior to itself1 which is impossible4 ,now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity1 because in all efficient causes following in order1 the first is the cause of the intermediate cause1 and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause1 whether the intermediate cause be several1 or only one4 ,now to take away the cause is to take away the effect4 ,therefore1 if there be no first cause among efficient causes1 there will be no ultimate1 nor any intermediate cause4 ,but if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity1 there will be no first efficient cause1 neither will there be an ultimate effect1 nor any intermediate efficient causes2 all of which is plainly false4 ,therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause1 to which everyone gives the name of ,god4 ,the third way is taken from possibility and necessity1 and runs thus4 ,we find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be1 since they are found to be generated1 and to corrupt1 and consequently1 they are possible to be and not to be4 ,but it is impossible for these always to exist1 for that which is possible not to be at some time is not4 ,therefore1 if everything is possible not to be1 then at one time there could have been nothing in existence4 ,now if this were true1 even now there would be nothing in existence1 because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing4 ,therefore1 if at one time nothing was in existence1 it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist2 and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd4 ,therefore1 not all beings are merely possible1 but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary4 ,but every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another1 or not4 ,now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another1 as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes4 ,therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity1 and not receiving it from another1 but rather causing in others their necessity4 ,this all men speak of as ,god4 ,the fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things4 ,among beings there are some more and some less good1 true1 noble and the like4 ,but more and less are predicated of different things1 according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum1 as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest2 so that there is something which is truest1 something best1 something noblest and1 consequently1 something which is uttermost being2 for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being1 as it is written in ,metaph4 ii4 ,now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus2 as fire1 which is the maximum heat1 is the cause of all hot things4 ,therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being1 goodness1 and every other perfection2 and this we call ,god4 ,the fifth way is taken from the governance of the world4 ,we see that things which lack intelligence1 such as natural bodies1 act for an end1 and this is evident from their acting always1 or nearly always1 in the same way1 so as to obtain the best result4 ,hence it is plain that not fortuitously1 but designedly1 do they achieve their end4 ,now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end1 unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence2 as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer4 ,therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end2 and this being we call ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,enchiridion xi73 ,since ,god is the highest good1 ,he would not allow any evil to exist in ,his works1 unless ,his omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil4 ,this is part of the infinite goodness of ,god1 that ,he should allow evil to exist1 and out of it produce good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent1 whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to ,god1 as to its first cause4 ,so also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will1 since these can change or fail2 for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle1 as was shown in the body of the ,article4 ,,question #c ,,of ,,the ,,simplicity ,,of ,,god 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,when the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence1 in order that we may know its essence4 ,now1 because we cannot know what ,god is1 but rather what ,he is not1 we have no means for considering how ,god is1 but rather how ,he is not4 ,therefore1 we must consider3 7#a7 ,how ,he is not2 7#b7 ,how ,he is known by us2 7#c7 ,how ,he is named4 ,now it can be shown how ,god is not1 by denying ,him whatever is opposed to the idea of ,him1 viz4 composition1 motion1 and the like4 ,therefore 7#a7 we must discuss ,his simplicity1 whereby we deny composition in ,him2 and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else1 we shall discuss 7#b7 ,his perfection2 7#c7 ,his infinity2 7#d7 ,his immutability2 7#e7 ,his unity4 ,concerning ,his simplicity1 there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is a body8 7#b7 ,whether ,he is composed of matter and form8 7#c7 ,whether in ,him there is composition of quiddity1 essence or nature1 and subject8 7#d7 ,whether ,he is composed of essence and existence8 7#e7 ,whether ,he is composed of genus and difference8 7#f7 ,whether ,he is composed of subject and accident8 7#g7 ,whether ,he is in any way composite1 or wholly simple8 7#h7 ,whether ,he enters into composition with other things8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god ,is a ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is a body4 ,for a body is that which has the three dimensions4 ,but ,holy ,scripture attributes the three dimensions to ,god1 for it is written3 ,he is higher than ,heaven1 and what wilt thou do8 ,he is deeper than ,hell1 and how wilt thou know8 ,the measure of ,him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea 7,job #aa3h1 #i74 ,therefore ,god is a body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything that has figure is a body1 since figure is a quality of quantity4 ,but ,god seems to have figure1 for it is written3 ,let us make man to our image and likeness 7,gen4 #a3bf74 ,now a figure is called an image1 according to the text3 ,who being the brightness of ,his glory and the figure1 i4e4 the image1 of ,his substance 7,heb4 #a3c74 ,therefore ,god is a body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever has corporeal parts is a body4 ,now ,scripture attributes corporeal parts to ,god4 ,hast thou an arm like ,god8 7,job #dj3d72 and ,the eyes of the ,lord are upon the just 7,ps4 #cc3af72 and ,the right hand of the ,lord hath wrought strength 7,ps4 #aag3af74 ,therefore ,god is a body4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 posture belongs only to bodies4 ,but something which supposes posture is said of ,god in the ,scriptures3 ,i saw the ,lord sitting 7,isa4 #f3a71 and ,he standeth up to judge 7,isa4 #c3ac74 ,therefore ,god is a body4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term wherefrom or whereto4 ,but in the ,scriptures ,god is spoken of as a local term whereto1 according to the words1 ,come ye to ,him and be enlightened 7,ps4 #cc3f71 and as a term wherefrom3 ,all they that depart from ,thee shall be written in the earth 7,jer4 #ag3ac74 ,therefore ,god is a body4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written in the ,gospel of ,st4 ,john 7,john #d3bd73 ,god is a spirit4 ,i answer that1 ,it is absolutely true that ,god is not a body2 and this can be shown in three ways4 ,first1 because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion1 as is evident from induction4 ,now it has been already proved 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c71 that ,god is the ,first ,mover1 and is ,himself unmoved4 ,therefore it is clear that ,god is not a body4 ,secondly1 because the first being must of necessity be in act1 and in no way in potentiality4 ,for although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality1 the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality2 nevertheless1 absolutely speaking1 actuality is prior to potentiality2 for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality4 ,now it has been already proved that ,god is the ,first ,being4 ,it is therefore impossible that in ,god there should be any potentiality4 ,but every body is in potentiality because the continuous1 as such1 is divisible to infinity2 it is therefore impossible that ,god should be a body4 ,thirdly1 because ,god is the most noble of beings4 ,now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings2 for a body must be either animate or inanimate2 and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body4 ,but an animate body is not animate precisely as body2 otherwise all bodies would be animate4 ,therefore its animation depends upon some other thing1 as our body depends for its animation on the soul4 ,hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body4 ,therefore it is impossible that ,god should be a body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #a1 ,a4 #i71 ,holy ,writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things4 ,hence1 when it attributes to ,god the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity1 it implies ,his virtual quantity2 thus1 by depth1 it signifies ,his power of knowing hidden things2 by height1 the transcendence of ,his excelling power2 by length1 the duration of ,his existence2 by breadth1 ,his act of love for all4 ,or1 as says ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 ix71 by the depth of ,god is meant the incomprehensibility of ,his essence2 by length1 the procession of ,his all-pervading power2 by breadth1 ,his overspreading all things1 inasmuch as all things lie under ,his protection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,man is said to be after the image of ,god1 not as regards his body1 but as regards that whereby he excels other animals4 ,hence1 when it is said1 ,let us make man to our image and likeness1 it is added1 ,and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea 7,gen4 #a3bf74 ,now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence2 hence it is according to his intelligence and reason1 which are incorporeal1 that man is said to be according to the image of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,corporeal parts are attributed to ,god in ,scripture on account of ,his actions1 and this is owing to a certain parallel4 ,for instance the act of the eye is to see2 hence the eye attributed to ,god signifies ,his power of seeing intellectually1 not sensibly2 and so on with the other parts4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,whatever pertains to posture1 also1 is only attributed to ,god by some sort of parallel4 ,he is spoken of as sitting1 on account of ,his unchangeableness and dominion2 and as standing1 on account of ,his power of overcoming whatever withstands ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,we draw near to ,god by no corporeal steps1 since ,he is everywhere1 but by the affections of our soul1 and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from ,him2 thus1 to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,is ,composed of ,matter and ,form8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is composed of matter and form4 ,for whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form2 since the soul is the form of the body4 ,but ,scripture attributes a soul to ,god2 for it is mentioned in ,hebrews 7,heb4 #aj3ch71 where ,god says3 ,but ,my just man liveth by faith2 but if he withdraw himself1 he shall not please ,my soul4 ,therefore ,god is composed of matter and form4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 anger1 joy and the like are passions of the composite4 ,but these are attributed to ,god in ,scripture3 ,the ,lord was exceeding angry with ,his people 7,ps4 #aje3dj74 ,therefore ,god is composed of matter and form4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 matter is the principle of individualization4 ,but ,god seems to be individual1 for ,he cannot be predicated of many4 ,therefore ,he is composed of matter and form4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is composed of matter and form is a body2 for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter4 ,but ,god is not a body as proved in the preceding ,article2 therefore ,he is not composed of matter and form4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible that matter should exist in ,god4 ,first1 because matter is in potentiality4 ,but we have shown 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c7 that ,god is pure act1 without any potentiality4 ,hence it is impossible that ,god should be composed of matter and form4 ,secondly1 because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form2 therefore its goodness is participated1 inasmuch as matter participates the form4 ,now the first good and the best--viz4 ,god--is not a participated good1 because the essential good is prior to the participated good4 ,hence it is impossible that ,god should be composed of matter and form4 ,thirdly1 because every agent acts by its form2 hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent4 ,therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form4 ,now ,god is the first agent1 since ,he is the first efficient cause4 ,he is therefore of ,his essence a form2 and not composed of matter and form4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a soul is attributed to ,god because ,his acts resemble the acts of a soul2 for1 that we will anything1 is due to our soul4 ,hence what is pleasing to ,his will is said to be pleasing to ,his soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,anger and the like are attributed to ,god on account of a similitude of effect4 ,thus1 because to punish is properly the act of an angry man1 ,god's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as ,his anger4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter1 which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject2 although form of itself1 unless something else prevents it1 can be received by many4 ,but that form which cannot be received in matter1 but is self-subsisting1 is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject2 and such a form is ,god4 ,hence it does not follow that matter exists in ,god4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god is the ,same as ,his ,essence or ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not the same as ,his essence or nature4 ,for nothing can be in itself4 ,but the substance or nature of ,god--i4e4 the ,godhead--is said to be in ,god4 ,therefore it seems that ,god is not the same as ,his essence or nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the effect is assimilated to its cause2 for every agent produces its like4 ,but in created things the suppositum is not identical with its nature2 for a man is not the same as his humanity4 ,therefore ,god is not the same as ,his ,godhead4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said of ,god that ,he is life itself1 and not only that ,he is a living thing3 ,i am the way1 the truth1 and the life 7,john #ad3f74 ,now the relation between ,godhead and ,god is the same as the relation between life and a living thing4 ,therefore ,god is ,his very ,godhead4 ,i answer that1 ,god is the same as ,his essence or nature4 ,to understand this1 it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form1 the nature or essence must differ from the suppositum1 because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species2 as1 humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man1 for it is by this that man is man1 and it is this that humanity signifies1 that1 namely1 whereby man is man4 ,now individual matter1 with all the individualizing accidents1 is not included in the definition of the species4 ,for this particular flesh1 these bones1 this blackness or whiteness1 etc41 are not included in the definition of a man4 ,therefore this flesh1 these bones1 and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter1 are not included in humanity2 and yet they are included in the thing which is man4 ,hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity4 ,consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical2 but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man1 because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter4 ,on the other hand1 in things not composed of matter and form1 in which individualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say1 to this matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting supposita4 ,therefore suppositum and nature in them are identified4 ,since ,god then is not composed of matter and form1 ,he must be ,his own ,godhead1 ,his own ,life1 and whatever else is thus predicated of ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge4 ,therefore in speaking of ,god1 we use concrete nouns to signify ,his subsistence1 because with us only those things subsist which are composite2 and we use abstract nouns to signify ,his simplicity4 ,in saying therefore that ,godhead1 or life1 or the like are in ,god1 we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands1 but not that there is any composition in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the effects of ,god do not imitate ,him perfectly1 but only as far as they are able2 and the imitation is here defective1 precisely because what is simple and one1 can only be represented by divers things2 consequently1 composition is accidental to them1 and therefore1 in them suppositum is not the same as nature4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,essence and ,existence ,are the ,same in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that essence and existence are not the same in ,god4 ,for if it be so1 then the divine being has nothing added to it4 ,now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things4 ,therefore it follows that ,god is being in general which can be predicated of everything4 ,but this is false3 ,for men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood 7,wis4 #ad3ba74 ,therefore ,god's existence is not ,his essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we can know whether ,god exists as said above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #b72 but we cannot know what ,he is4 ,therefore ,god's existence is not the same as ,his essence--that is1 as ,his quiddity or nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,trin4 vii73 ,in ,god existence is not an accidental quality1 but subsisting truth4 ,therefore what subsists in ,god is ,his existence4 ,i answer that1 ,god is not only ,his own essence1 as shown in the preceding article1 but also ,his own existence4 ,this may be shown in several ways4 ,first1 whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence 7like a property that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent principles of the species71 or by some exterior agent--as heat is caused in water by fire4 ,therefore1 if the existence of a thing differs from its essence1 this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles4 ,now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles1 for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence1 if its existence is caused4 ,therefore that thing1 whose existence differs from its essence1 must have its existence caused by another4 ,but this cannot be true of ,god2 because we call ,god the first efficient cause4 ,therefore it is impossible that in ,god ,his existence should differ from ,his essence4 ,secondly1 existence is that which makes every form or nature actual2 for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual1 only because they are spoken of as existing4 ,therefore existence must be compared to essence1 if the latter is a distinct reality1 as actuality to potentiality4 ,therefore1 since in ,god there is no potentiality1 as shown above 7,a4 #a71 it follows that in ,him essence does not differ from existence4 ,therefore ,his essence is ,his existence4 ,thirdly1 because1 just as that which has fire1 but is not itself fire1 is on fire by participation2 so that which has existence but is not existence1 is a being by participation4 ,but ,god is ,his own essence1 as shown above 7,a4 #c72 if1 therefore1 ,he is not ,his own existence ,he will be not essential1 but participated being4 ,he will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd4 ,therefore ,god is ,his own existence1 and not merely ,his own essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds4 ,either its essence precludes any addition2 thus1 for example1 it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason4 ,or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it1 inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it2 thus the genus animal is without reason1 because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason2 but neither is it to lack reason4 ,and so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense2 whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to be can mean either of two things4 ,it may mean the act of essence1 or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject4 ,taking to be in the first sense1 we cannot understand ,god's existence nor ,his essence2 but only in the second sense4 ,we know that this proposition which we form about ,god when we say ,god is1 is true2 and this we know from ,his effects 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #b74 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,god ,is ,contained in a ,genus8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is contained in a genus4 ,for a substance is a being that subsists of itself4 ,but this is especially true of ,god4 ,therefore ,god is in a genus of substance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus2 as length is measured by length and numbers by number4 ,but ,god is the measure of all substances1 as the ,commentator shows 7,metaph4 x74 ,therefore ,god is in the genus of substance4 ,on the contrary1 ,in the mind1 genus is prior to what it contains4 ,but nothing is prior to ,god either really or mentally4 ,therefore ,god is not in any genus4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing can be in a genus in two ways2 either absolutely and properly1 as a species contained under a genus2 or as being reducible to it1 as principles and privations4 ,for example1 a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity1 as its principles2 while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit4 ,but in neither way is ,god in a genus4 ,that ,he cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways4 ,first1 because a species is constituted of genus and difference4 ,now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived1 is always related to that from which the genus is derived1 as actuality is related to potentiality4 ,for animal is derived from sensitive nature1 by concretion as it were1 for that is animal1 which has a sensitive nature4 ,rational being1 on the other hand1 is derived from intellectual nature1 because that is rational1 which has an intellectual nature1 and intelligence is compared to sense1 as actuality is to potentiality4 ,the same argument holds good in other things4 ,hence since in ,god actuality is not added to potentiality1 it is impossible that ,he should be in any genus as a species4 ,secondly1 since the existence of ,god is ,his essence1 if ,god were in any genus1 ,he would be the genus being1 because1 since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing4 ,but the ,philosopher has shown 7,metaph4 iii7 that being cannot be a genus1 for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence4 ,now no difference can exist distinct from being2 for non-being cannot be a difference4 ,it follows then that ,god is not in a genus4 ,thirdly1 because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential1 but they differ in their existence4 ,for the existence of man and of horse is not the same2 as also of this man and that man3 thus in every member of a genus1 existence and quiddity--i4e4 essence--must differ4 ,but in ,god they do not differ1 as shown in the preceding article4 ,therefore it is plain that ,god is not in a genus as if ,he were a species4 ,from this it is also plain that ,he has no genus nor difference1 nor can there be any definition of ,him2 nor1 save through ,his effects1 a demonstration of ,him3 for a definition is from genus and difference2 and the mean of a demonstration is a definition4 ,that ,god is not in a genus1 as reducible to it as its principle1 is clear from this1 that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus2 as1 a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone2 and unity1 of discontinuous quantity4 ,but ,god is the principle of all being4 ,therefore ,he is not contained in any genus as its principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the word substance signifies not only what exists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus1 as shown in the body of the article2 but1 it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way--namely1 of existing of itself2 this existence1 however1 is not its essence4 ,thus it is clear that ,god is not in the genus of substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured4 ,now1 ,god is not a measure proportionate to anything4 ,still1 ,he is called the measure of all things1 in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles ,him4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #f ,whether in ,god ,there ,are ,any ,accidents8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there are accidents in ,god4 ,for substance cannot be an accident1 as ,aristotle says 7,phys4 i74 ,therefore that which is an accident in one1 cannot1 in another1 be a substance4 ,thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire1 because it is an accident in other things4 ,but wisdom1 virtue1 and the like1 which are accidents in us1 are attributes of ,god4 ,therefore in ,god there are accidents4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in every genus there is a first principle4 ,but there are many genera of accidents4 ,if1 therefore1 the primal members of these genera are not in ,god1 there will be many primal beings other than ,god--which is absurd4 ,on the contrary1 ,every accident is in a subject4 ,but ,god cannot be a subject1 for no simple form can be a subject1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,trin474 ,therefore in ,god there cannot be any accident4 ,i answer that1 ,from all we have said1 it is clear there can be no accident in ,god4 ,first1 because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality2 for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents4 ,but there can be no potentiality in ,god1 as was shown 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,secondly1 because ,god is ,his own existence2 and as ,boethius says 7,hebdom471 although every essence may have something superadded to it1 this cannot apply to absolute being3 thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it1 as whiteness1 nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat4 ,thirdly1 because what is essential is prior to what is accidental4 ,whence as ,god is absolute primal being1 there can be in ,him nothing accidental4 ,neither can ,he have any essential accidents 7as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man71 because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject4 ,now there can be nothing caused in ,god1 since ,he is the first cause4 ,hence it follows that there is no accident in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,virtue and wisdom are not predicated of ,god and of us univocally4 ,hence it does not follow that there are accidents in ,god as there are in us4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since substance is prior to its accidents1 the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior2 although ,god is not first as if contained in the genus of substance2 yet ,he is first in respect to all being1 outside of every genus4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,god ,is ,altogether ,simple8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not altogether simple4 ,for whatever is from ,god must imitate ,him4 ,thus from the first being are all beings2 and from the first good is all good4 ,but in the things which ,god has made1 nothing is altogether simple4 ,therefore neither is ,god altogether simple4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is best must be attributed to ,god4 ,but with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple2 thus1 chemical compounds are better than simple elements1 and animals than the parts that compose them4 ,therefore it cannot be said that ,god is altogether simple4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #f1g73 ,god is truly and absolutely simple4 ,i answer that1 ,the absolute simplicity of ,god may be shown in many ways4 ,first1 from the previous articles of this question4 ,for there is neither composition of quantitative parts in ,god1 since ,he is not a body2 nor composition of matter and form2 nor does ,his nature differ from ,his suppositum2 nor ,his essence from ,his existence2 neither is there in ,him composition of genus and difference1 nor of subject and accident4 ,therefore1 it is clear that ,god is nowise composite1 but is altogether simple4 ,secondly1 because every composite is posterior to its component parts1 and is dependent on them2 but ,god is the first being1 as shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,thirdly1 because every composite has a cause1 for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite4 ,but ,god is uncaused1 as shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c71 since ,he is the first efficient cause4 ,fourthly1 because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality2 but this does not apply to ,god2 for either one of the parts actuates another1 or at least all the parts are potential to the whole4 ,fifthly1 because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts4 ,and this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts2 for no part of a man is a man1 nor any of the parts of the foot1 a foot4 ,but in wholes made up of similar parts1 although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part 7as a part of the air is air1 and a part of water1 water71 nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts2 for instance1 if the whole volume of water is two cubits1 no part of it can be two cubits4 ,thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself4 ,but1 even if this could be said of whatever has a form1 viz4 that it has something which is not it itself1 as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white2 nevertheless in the form itself1 there is nothing besides itself4 ,and so1 since ,god is absolute form1 or rather absolute being1 ,he can be in no way composite4 ,hilary implies this argument1 when he says 7,de ,trin4 vii73 ,god1 ,who is strength1 is not made up of things that are weak2 nor is ,he ,who is light1 composed of things that are dim4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,whatever is from ,god imitates ,him1 as caused things imitate the first cause4 ,but it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite2 because at least its existence differs from its essence1 as will be shown hereafter1 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,with us composite things are better than simple things1 because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing1 but in many things4 ,but the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing 7,,qq4 #d1 ,a4 #a1 and #f1 ,a4 #b74 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #c1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,god ,enters into the ,composition of ,other ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god enters into the composition of other things1 for ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv73 ,the being of all things is that which is above being--the ,godhead4 ,but the being of all things enters into the composition of everything4 ,therefore ,god enters into the composition of other things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god is a form2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom4 ,serm4 xxxviii7 that1 the word of ,god1 which is ,god1 is an uncreated form4 ,but a form is part of a compound4 ,therefore ,god is part of some compound4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever things exist1 in no way differing from each other1 are the same4 ,but ,god and primary matter exist1 and in no way differ from each other4 ,therefore they are absolutely the same4 ,but primary matter enters into the composition things4 ,therefore also does ,god4 ,proof of the minor--whatever things differ1 they differ by some differences1 and therefore must be composite4 ,but ,god and primary matter are altogether simple4 ,therefore they nowise differ from each other4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii73 ,there can be no touching ,him1 i4e4 ,god1 nor any other union with ,him by mingling part with part4 ,further1 the first cause rules all things without commingling with them1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,causis74 ,i answer that1 ,on this point there have been three errors4 ,some have affirmed that ,god is the world-soul1 as is clear from ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei vii1 #f74 ,this is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that ,god is the soul of the highest heaven4 ,again1 others have said that ,god is the formal principle of all things2 and this was the theory of the ,almaricians4 ,the third error is that of ,david of ,dinant1 who most absurdly taught that ,god was primary matter4 ,now all these contain manifest untruth2 since it is not possible for ,god to enter into the composition of anything1 either as a formal or a material principle4 ,first1 because ,god is the first efficient cause4 ,now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused1 but only specifically3 for man begets man4 ,but primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause2 for the former is merely potential1 while the latter is actual4 ,secondly1 because1 since ,god is the first efficient cause1 to act belongs to ,him primarily and essentially4 ,but that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially1 but rather the composite so acts2 for the hand does not act1 but the man by his hand2 and1 fire warms by its heat4 ,hence ,god cannot be part of a compound4 ,thirdly1 because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter1 nor form1 though they are the primal parts of every compound4 ,for matter is merely potential2 and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality1 as is clear from the foregoing 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a73 while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form2 and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential1 so likewise is that which is participated2 as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such4 ,now it has been proved that ,god is absolutely primal being 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,godhead is called the being of all things1 as their efficient and exemplar cause1 but not as being their essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,word is an exemplar form2 but not a form that is part of a compound4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,simple things do not differ by added differences--for this is the property of compounds4 ,thus man and horse differ by their differences1 rational and irrational2 which differences1 however1 do not differ from each other by other differences4 ,hence1 to be quite accurate1 it is better to say that they are1 not different1 but diverse4 ,hence1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 x71 things which are diverse are absolutely distinct1 but things which are different differ by something4 ,therefore1 strictly speaking1 primary matter and ,god do not differ1 but are by their very being1 diverse4 ,hence it does not follow they are the same4 ,,question #d ,,the ,,perfection ,,of ,,god 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,having considered the divine simplicity1 we treat next of ,god's perfection4 ,now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good1 we shall speak first of the divine perfection2 secondly of the divine goodness4 ,concerning the first there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is perfect8 7#b7 ,whether ,god is perfect universally1 as having in ,himself the perfections of all things8 7#c7 ,whether creatures can be said to be like ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god is ,perfect8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that perfection does not belong to ,god4 ,for we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made4 ,but it does not befit ,god to be made4 ,therefore ,he is not perfect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god is the first beginning of things4 ,but the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect1 as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life4 ,therefore ,god is imperfect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d71 ,god's essence is existence4 ,but existence seems most imperfect1 since it is most universal and receptive of all modification4 ,therefore ,god is imperfect4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,be you perfect as also your heavenly ,father is perfect 7,matt4 #e3dh74 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher relates 7,metaph4 xii71 some ancient philosophers1 namely1 the ,pythagoreans and ,leucippus1 did not predicate best and most perfect of the first principle4 ,the reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle2 and a material principle is most imperfect4 ,for since matter as such is merely potential1 the first material principle must be simply potential1 and thus most imperfect4 ,now ,god is the first principle1 not material1 but in the order of efficient cause1 which must be most perfect4 ,for just as matter1 as such1 is merely potential1 an agent1 as such1 is in the state of actuality4 ,hence1 the first active principle must needs be most actual1 and therefore most perfect2 for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality1 because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,gregory says 7,moral4 v1 #bf1bi73 ,though our lips can only stammer1 we yet chant the high things of ,god4 ,for that which is not made is improperly called perfect4 ,nevertheless because created things are then called perfect1 when from potentiality they are brought into actuality1 this word perfect signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality1 whether this be by way of perfection or not4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the material principle which with us is found to be imperfect1 cannot be absolutely primal2 but must be preceded by something perfect4 ,for seed1 though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed1 has previous to it1 the animal or plant from which is came4 ,because1 previous to that which is potential1 must be that which is actual2 since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,existence is the most perfect of all things1 for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual2 for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists4 ,hence existence is that which actuates all things1 even their forms4 ,therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received2 but rather as the received to the receiver4 ,when therefore ,i speak of the existence of man1 or horse1 or anything else1 existence is considered a formal principle1 and as something received2 and not as that which exists4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,perfections of ,all ,things ,are in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the perfections of all things are not in ,god4 ,for ,god is simple1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g72 whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse4 ,therefore the perfections of all things are not in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 opposites cannot coexist4 ,now the perfections of things are opposed to each other1 for each thing is perfected by its specific difference4 ,but the differences by which genera are divided1 and species constituted1 are opposed to each other4 ,therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject1 it seems that the perfections of all things are not in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists2 and an intelligent thing than what merely lives4 ,therefore life is more perfect than existence2 and knowledge than life4 ,but the essence of ,god is existence itself4 ,therefore ,he has not the perfections of life1 and knowledge1 and other similar perfections4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v7 that ,god in ,his one existence prepossesses all things4 ,i answer that1 ,all created perfections are in ,god4 ,hence ,he is spoken of as universally perfect1 because ,he lacks not 7says the ,commentator1 ,metaph4 v7 any excellence which may be found in any genus4 ,this may be seen from two considerations4 ,first1 because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause3 either in the same formality1 if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces man2 or in a more eminent degree1 if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power4 ,now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause3 and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way1 since matter as such is imperfect1 and an agent as such is perfect2 still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect1 but in a more perfect way4 ,since therefore ,god is the first effective cause of things1 the perfections of all things must pre-exist in ,god in a more eminent way4 ,dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of ,god 7,div4 ,nom4 v73 ,it is not that ,he is this and not that1 but that ,he is all1 as the cause of all4 ,secondly1 from what has been already proved1 ,god is existence itself1 of itself subsistent 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,consequently1 ,he must contain within ,himself the whole perfection of being4 ,for it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat1 this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection2 but if this heat were self-subsisting1 nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it4 ,since therefore ,god is subsisting being itself1 nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to ,him4 ,now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being2 for things are perfect1 precisely so far as they have being after some fashion4 ,it follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to ,god4 ,this line of argument1 too1 is implied by ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 v71 when he says that1 ,god exists not in any single mode1 but embraces all being within ,himself1 absolutely1 without limitation1 uniformly2 and afterwards he adds that1 ,he is the very existence to subsisting things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even as the sun 7as ,dionysius remarks1 7,div4 ,nom4 v771 while remaining one and shining uniformly1 contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things1 and many and diverse qualities2 a fortiori should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things2 and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other1 pre-exist in ,god as one1 without injury to ,his simplicity4 ,this suffices for the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v7 that1 although existence is more perfect than life1 and life than wisdom1 if they are considered as distinguished in idea2 nevertheless1 a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists1 because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live4 ,although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom1 because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence2 nevertheless ,god's existence includes in itself life and wisdom1 because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to ,him who is subsisting being itself4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,creature ,can ,be ,like ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that no creature can be like ,god4 ,for it is written 7,ps4 #he3h73 ,there is none among the gods like unto ,thee1 ,o ,lord4 ,but of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by participation gods4 ,therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 likeness implies comparison4 ,but there can be no comparison between things in a different genus4 ,therefore neither can there be any likeness4 ,thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness4 ,but no creature is in the same genus as ,god3 since ,god is no genus1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore no creature is like ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we speak of those things as like which agree in form4 ,but nothing can agree with ,god in form2 for1 save in ,god alone1 essence and existence differ4 ,therefore no creature can be like to ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 among like things there is mutual likeness2 for like is like to like4 ,if therefore any creature is like ,god1 ,god will be like some creature1 which is against what is said by ,isaias3 ,to whom have you likened ,god8 7,isa4 #dj3ah74 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,let us make man to our image and likeness 7,gen4 #a3bf71 and3 ,when ,he shall appear we shall be like to ,him 7#a ,john #c3b74 ,i answer that1 ,since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form1 it varies according to the many modes of communication in form4 ,some things are said to be like1 which communicate in the same form according to the same formality1 and according to the same mode2 and these are said to be not merely like1 but equal in their likeness2 as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness2 and this is the most perfect likeness4 ,in another way1 we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality1 though not according to the same measure1 but according to more or less1 as something less white is said to be like another thing more white2 and this is imperfect likeness4 ,in a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form1 but not according to the same formality2 as we see in non-univocal agents4 ,for since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent1 and everything acts according to the manner of its form1 the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent4 ,if therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect1 there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made1 according to the same formality of the species2 as man reproduces man4 ,if1 however1 the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species1 there will be a likeness1 but not according to the formality of the same species2 as things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun1 not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness1 but in its generic likeness4 ,therefore if there is an agent not contained in any genus1 its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent1 not1 that is1 so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic formality1 but only according to some sort of analogy2 as existence is common to all4 ,in this way all created things1 so far as they are beings1 are like ,god as the first and universal principle of all being4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ix71 when ,holy ,writ declares that nothing is like ,god1 it does not mean to deny all likeness to ,him4 ,for1 the same things can be like and unlike to ,god3 like1 according as they imitate ,him1 as far as ,he1 ,who is not perfectly imitable1 can be imitated2 unlike according as they fall short of their cause1 not merely in intensity and remission1 as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white2 but because they are not in agreement1 specifically or generically4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different genus1 but as transcending every genus1 and as the principle of all genera4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,likeness of creatures to ,god is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species1 but solely according to analogy1 inasmuch as ,god is essential being1 whereas other things are beings by participation4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like ,god1 it must nowise be admitted that ,god is like creatures2 because1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ix73 ,a mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order1 but not between a cause and that which is caused4 ,for1 we say that a statue is like a man1 but not conversely2 so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like ,god2 but not that ,god is like a creature4 ,,question #e ,,of ,,goodness ,,in ,,general 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we next consider goodness3 ,first1 goodness in general4 ,secondly1 the goodness of ,god4 ,under the first head there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether goodness and being are the same really8 7#b7 ,granted that they differ only in idea1 which is prior in thought8 7#c7 ,granted that being is prior1 whether every being is good8 7#d7 ,to what cause should goodness be reduced8 7#e7 ,whether goodness consists in mode1 species1 and order8 7#f7 ,whether goodness is divided into the virtuous1 the useful1 and the pleasant8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,goodness ,differs ,really from ,being8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that goodness differs really from being4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom473 ,i perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing3 that they are is another4 ,therefore goodness and being really differ4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing can be its own form4 ,but that is called good which has the form of being1 according to the commentary on ,de ,causis4 ,therefore goodness differs really from being4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 goodness can be more or less4 ,but being cannot be more or less4 ,therefore goodness differs really from being4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #db7 that1 inasmuch as we exist we are good4 ,i answer that1 ,goodness and being are really the same1 and differ only in idea2 which is clear from the following argument4 ,the essence of goodness consists in this1 that it is in some way desirable4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i73 ,goodness is what all desire4 ,now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect2 for all desire their own perfection4 ,but everything is perfect so far as it is actual4 ,therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists2 for it is existence that makes all things actual1 as is clear from the foregoing 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really4 ,but goodness presents the aspect of desirableness1 which being does not present4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although goodness and being are the same really1 nevertheless since they differ in thought1 they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way4 ,since being properly signifies that something actually is1 and actuality properly correlates to potentiality2 a thing is1 in consequence1 said simply to have being1 accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality2 and this is precisely each thing's substantial being4 ,hence by its substantial being1 everything is said to have being simply2 but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively4 ,thus to be white implies relative being1 for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being2 because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being4 ,but goodness signifies perfection which is desirable2 and consequently of ultimate perfection4 ,hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good2 but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have 7although1 in so far as it is at all actual1 it has some perfection71 is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply1 but only relatively4 ,in this way1 therefore1 viewed in its primal 7i4e4 substantial7 being a thing is said to be simply1 and to be good relatively 7i4e4 in so far as it has being7 but viewed in its complete actuality1 a thing is said to be relatively1 and to be good simply4 ,hence the saying of ,boethius 7,de ,hebdom471 ,i perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing2 that they are is another1 is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply1 and having being simply4 ,because1 regarded in its primal actuality1 a thing simply exists2 and regarded in its complete actuality1 it is good simply--in such sort that even in its primal actuality1 it is in some sort good1 and even in its complete actuality1 it in some sort has being4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,again1 goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality1 for example1 as to knowledge or virtue4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,goodness ,is ,prior in ,idea to ,being8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that goodness is prior in idea to being4 ,for names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names4 ,but ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iii7 assigned the first place1 amongst the other names of ,god1 to ,his goodness rather than to ,his being4 ,therefore in idea goodness is prior to being4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is the more extensive is prior in idea4 ,but goodness is more extensive than being1 because1 as ,dionysius notes 7,div4 ,nom4 v71 goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing2 whereas existence extends to existing things alone4 ,therefore goodness is in idea prior to being4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is the more universal is prior in idea4 ,but goodness seems to be more universal than being1 since goodness has the aspect of desirable2 whereas to some non-existence is desirable2 for it is said of ,judas3 ,it were better for him1 if that man had not been born 7,matt4 #bf3bd74 ,therefore in idea goodness is prior to being4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 not only is existence desirable1 but life1 knowledge1 and many other things besides4 ,thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible1 and goodness a universal appetible4 ,therefore1 absolutely1 goodness is prior in idea to being4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said by ,aristotle 7,de ,causis7 that the first of created things is being4 ,i answer that1 ,in idea being is prior to goodness4 ,for the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it4 ,therefore1 that is prior in idea1 which is first conceived by the intellect4 ,now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being2 because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality4 ,hence1 being is the proper object of the intellect1 and is primarily intelligible2 as sound is that which is primarily audible4 ,therefore in idea being is prior to goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius discusses the ,divine ,names 7,div4 ,nom4 i1 iii7 as implying some causal relation in ,god2 for we name ,god1 as he says1 from creatures1 as a cause from its effects4 ,but goodness1 since it has the aspect of desirable1 implies the idea of a final cause1 the causality of which is first among causes1 since an agent does not act except for some end2 and by an agent matter is moved to its form4 ,hence the end is called the cause of causes4 ,thus goodness1 as a cause1 is prior to being1 as is the end to the form4 ,therefore among the names signifying the divine causality1 goodness precedes being4 ,again1 according to the ,platonists1 who1 through not distinguishing primary matter from privation1 said that matter was non-being1 goodness is more extensively participated than being2 for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it1 for all seek their like2 but it does not participate in being1 since it is presumed to be non-being4 ,therefore ,dionysius says that goodness extends to non-existence 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same solution is applied to this objection4 ,or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things1 not so far as it can be predicated of them1 but so far as it can cause them--if1 indeed1 by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist1 but those which are potential1 and not actual4 ,for goodness has the aspect of the end1 in which not only actual things find their completion1 but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual1 but merely potential4 ,now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only1 either inherent or exemplar2 and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,non-being is desirable1 not of itself1 but only relatively--i4e4 inasmuch as the removal of an evil1 which can only be removed by non-being1 is desirable4 ,now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable1 except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being4 ,therefore being is desirable of itself2 and non-being only relatively1 inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived2 thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,life1 wisdom1 and the like1 are desirable only so far as they are actual4 ,hence1 in each one of them some sort of being is desired4 ,and thus nothing can be desired except being2 and consequently nothing is good except being4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,every ,being ,is ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that not every being is good4 ,for goodness is something superadded to being1 as is clear from ,a4 #a4 ,but whatever is added to being limits it2 as substance1 quantity1 quality1 etc4 ,therefore goodness limits being4 ,therefore not every being is good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no evil is good3 ,woe to you that call evil good and good evil 7,isa4 #e3bj74 ,but some things are called evil4 ,therefore not every being is good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 goodness implies desirability4 ,now primary matter does not imply desirability1 but rather that which desires4 ,therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness4 ,therefore not every being is good4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher notes 7,metaph4 iii7 that in mathematics goodness does not exist4 ,but mathematics are entities2 otherwise there would be no science of mathematics4 ,therefore not every being is good4 ,on the contrary1 ,every being that is not ,god is ,god's creature4 ,now every creature of ,god is good 7#a ,tim4 #d3d73 and ,god is the greatest good4 ,therefore every being is good4 ,i answer that1 ,every being1 as being1 is good4 ,for all being1 as being1 has actuality and is in some way perfect2 since every act implies some sort of perfection2 and perfection implies desirability and goodness1 as is clear from ,a4 #a4 ,hence it follows that every being as such is good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,substance1 quantity1 quality1 and everything included in them1 limit being by applying it to some essence or nature4 ,now in this sense1 goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection1 which is also proper to being1 whatever kind of nature it may be4 ,hence goodness does not limit being4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,no being can be spoken of as evil1 formally as being1 but only so far as it lacks being4 ,thus a man is said to be evil1 because he lacks some virtue2 and an eye is said to be evil1 because it lacks the power to see well4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as primary matter has only potential being1 so it is only potentially good4 ,although1 according to the ,platonists1 primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it1 nevertheless1 it does participate to a certain extent in goodness1 viz4 by its relation to1 or aptitude for1 goodness4 ,consequently1 to be desirable is not its property1 but to desire4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,mathematical entities do not subsist as realities2 because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted2 but they have only logical existence1 inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter2 thus they cannot have the aspect of an end1 which itself has the aspect of moving another4 ,nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness2 since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness1 as was said in the preceding article4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,goodness ,has the ,aspect of a ,final ,cause8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause1 but rather of the other causes4 ,for1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 ,goodness is praised as beauty4 ,but beauty has the aspect of a formal cause4 ,therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 goodness is self-diffusive2 for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that goodness is that whereby all things subsist1 and are4 ,but to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause4 ,therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #ca7 that we exist because ,god is good4 ,but we owe our existence to ,god as the efficient cause4 ,therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii7 that that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things1 for the sake of which something is4 ,therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause4 ,i answer that1 ,since goodness is that which all things desire1 and since this has the aspect of an end1 it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end4 ,nevertheless1 the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause1 and also of a formal cause4 ,for we see that what is first in causing1 is last in the thing caused4 ,fire1 e4g4 heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire2 though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form4 ,now in causing1 goodness and the end come first1 both of which move the agent to act2 secondly1 the action of the agent moving to the form2 thirdly1 comes the form4 ,hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place1 so that there should be first1 the form whereby it is a being2 secondly1 we consider in it its effective power1 whereby it is perfect in being1 for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like1 as the ,philosopher says 7,meteor4 iv72 thirdly1 there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally2 for they are based upon the same thing1 namely1 the form2 and consequently goodness is praised as beauty4 ,but they differ logically1 for goodness properly relates to the appetite 7goodness being what all things desire72 and therefore it has the aspect of an end 7the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing74 ,on the other hand1 beauty relates to the cognitive faculty2 for beautiful things are those which please when seen4 ,hence beauty consists in due proportion2 for the senses delight in things duly proportioned1 as in what is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason1 just as is every cognitive faculty4 ,now since knowledge is by assimilation1 and similarity relates to form1 beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,he who has a will is said to be good1 so far as he has a good will2 because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have4 ,hence a man is said to be good1 not by his good understanding2 but by his good will4 ,now the will relates to the end as to its proper object4 ,thus the saying1 we exist because ,god is good has reference to the final cause4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,essence of ,goodness ,consists in ,mode1 ,species and ,order8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode1 species and order4 ,for goodness and being differ logically4 ,but mode1 species and order seem to belong to the nature of being1 for it is written3 ,thou hast ordered all things in measure1 and number1 and weight 7,wis4 #aa3ba74 ,and to these three can be reduced species1 mode and order1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #c73 ,measure fixes the mode of everything1 number gives it its species1 and weight gives it rest and stability4 ,therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode1 species and order4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 mode1 species and order are themselves good4 ,therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode1 species and order1 then every mode must have its own mode1 species and order4 ,the same would be the case with species and order in endless succession4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 evil is the privation of mode1 species and order4 ,but evil is not the total absence of goodness4 ,therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode1 species and order4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil4 ,yet we can speak of an evil mode1 species and order4 ,therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode1 species and order4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 mode1 species and order are caused by weight1 number and measure1 as appears from the quotation from ,augustine4 ,but not every good thing has weight1 number and measure2 for ,ambrose says 7,hexam4 i1 #i73 ,it is of the nature of light not to have been created in number1 weight and measure4 ,therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode1 species and order4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni4 iii73 ,these three--mode1 species and order--as common good things1 are in everything ,god has made2 thus1 where these three abound the things are very good2 where they are less1 the things are less good2 where they do not exist at all1 there can be nothing good4 ,but this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them4 ,therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode1 species and order4 ,i answer that1 ,everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect2 for in that way only is it desirable 7as shown above1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection4 ,but since everything is what it is by its form 7and since the form presupposes certain things1 and from the form certain things necessarily follow71 in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form1 together with all that precedes and follows upon that form4 ,now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles1 whether material or efficient1 and this is signified by the mode3 hence it is said that the measure marks the mode4 ,but the form itself is signified by the species2 for everything is placed in its species by its form4 ,hence the number is said to give the species1 for definitions signifying species are like numbers1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 x72 for as a unit added to1 or taken from a number1 changes its species1 so a difference added to1 or taken from a definition1 changes its species4 ,further1 upon the form follows an inclination to the end1 or to an action1 or something of the sort2 for everything1 in so far as it is in act1 acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form2 and this belongs to weight and order4 ,hence the essence of goodness1 so far as it consists in perfection1 consists also in mode1 species and order4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these three only follow upon being1 so far as it is perfect1 and according to this perfection is it good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,mode1 species and order are said to be good1 and to be beings1 not as though they themselves were subsistences1 but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good4 ,hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good3 for they are spoken of as good1 not as though formally constituted so by something else1 but as formally constituting others good3 thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else2 but because1 by it1 something else has accidental being1 as an object that is white4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every being is due to some form4 ,hence1 according to every being of a thing is its mode1 species1 order4 ,thus1 a man has a mode1 species and order as he is white1 virtuous1 learned and so on2 according to everything predicated of him4 ,but evil deprives a thing of some sort of being1 as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight2 yet it does not destroy every mode1 species and order1 but only such as follow upon the being of sight4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni4 xxiii71 ,every mode1 as mode1 is good 7and the same can be said of species and order74 ,but an evil mode1 species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be1 or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong4 ,therefore they are called evil1 because they are out of place and incongruous4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the nature of light is spoken of as being without number1 weight and measure1 not absolutely1 but in comparison with corporeal things1 because the power of light extends to all corporeal things2 inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change1 i4e4 the heavens4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #e1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,goodness ,is ,rightly ,divided into the ,virtuous991 the ,useful and the ,pleasant8 99,bonum honestum is the virtuous good considered as fitting4 ,cf4 ,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #ada1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ade4 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous1 the useful and the pleasant4 ,for goodness is divided by the ten predicaments1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i74 ,but the virtuous1 the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament4 ,therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every division is made by opposites4 ,but these three do not seem to be opposites2 for the virtuous is pleasing1 and no wickedness is useful2 whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites1 for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed2 and ,tully speaks of this 7,de ,offic4 ii74 ,therefore this division is incorrect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 where one thing is on account of another1 there is only one thing4 ,but the useful is not goodness1 except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous4 ,therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose makes use of this division of goodness 7,de ,offic4 i1 #i7 ,i answer that1 ,this division properly concerns human goodness4 ,but if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view1 we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such4 ,for everything is good so far as it is desirable1 and is a term of the movement of the appetite2 the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body4 ,now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely2 and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end1 where the movement ceases2 so a thing is called a term of movement1 so far as it terminates any part of that movement4 ,now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways1 either as the thing itself towards which it tends1 e4g4 a place or form2 or a state of rest in that thing4 ,thus1 in the movement of the appetite1 the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively1 as a means by which something tends towards another1 is called the useful2 but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite1 as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends1 is called the virtuous2 for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake2 but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired1 is called the pleasant4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,goodness1 so far as it is identical with being1 is divided by the ten predicaments4 ,but this division belongs to it according to its proper formality4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this division is not by opposite things2 but by opposite aspects4 ,now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant1 being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue4 ,whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves1 but are desired only as helpful to something further1 as the taking of bitter medicine2 while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all2 but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority4 ,hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous2 then of the pleasant2 and lastly of the useful4 ,,question #f ,,the ,,goodness ,,of ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider the goodness of ,god2 under which head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether goodness belongs to ,god8 7#b7 ,whether ,god is the supreme good8 7#c7 ,whether ,he alone is essentially good8 7#d7 ,whether all things are good by the divine goodness8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god is good8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that to be good does not belong to ,god4 ,for goodness consists in mode1 species and order4 ,but these do not seem to belong to ,god2 since ,god is immense and is not ordered to anything else4 ,therefore to be good does not belong to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the good is what all things desire4 ,but all things do not desire ,god1 because all things do not know ,him2 and nothing is desired unless it is known4 ,therefore to be good does not belong to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,lam4 #c3be73 ,the ,lord is good to them that hope in ,him1 to the soul that seeketh ,him4 ,i answer that1 ,to be good belongs pre-eminently to ,god4 ,for a thing is good according to its desirableness4 ,now everything seeks after its own perfection2 and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent1 since every agent makes its like2 and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good4 ,for the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness4 ,therefore1 since ,god is the first effective cause of all things1 it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to ,him2 and hence ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 attributes good to ,god as to the first efficient cause1 saying that1 ,god is called good as by ,whom all things subsist4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to have mode1 species and order belongs to the essence of caused good2 but good is in ,god as in its cause1 and hence it belongs to ,him to impose mode1 species and order on others2 wherefore these three things are in ,god as in their cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all things1 by desiring their own perfection1 desire ,god ,himself1 inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being2 as appears from what is said above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c74 ,and so of those things which desire ,god1 some know ,him as ,he is ,himself1 and this is proper to the rational creature2 others know some participation of ,his goodness1 and this belongs also to sensible knowledge2 others have a natural desire without knowledge1 as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,is the ,supreme ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not the supreme good4 ,for the supreme good adds something to good2 otherwise it would belong to every good4 ,but everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing3 therefore the supreme good is a compound4 ,but ,god is supremely simple2 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore ,god is not the supreme good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,good is what all desire1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #a74 ,now what all desire is nothing but ,god1 ,who is the end of all things3 therefore there is no other good but ,god4 ,this appears also from what is said 7,luke #ah3ai73 ,none is good but ,god alone4 ,but we use the word supreme in comparison with others1 as e4g4 supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats4 ,therefore ,god cannot be called the supreme good4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 supreme implies comparison4 ,but things not in the same genus are not comparable2 as1 sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line4 ,therefore1 since ,god is not in the same genus as other good things1 as appears above 7,,qq4 #c1 ,a4 #e2 #d1 ,a4 #c7 it seems that ,god cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ii7 that1 the ,trinity of the divine persons is the supreme good1 discerned by purified minds4 ,i answer that1 ,god is the supreme good simply1 and not only as existing in any genus or order of things4 ,for good is attributed to ,god1 as was said in the preceding article1 inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from ,him as from the first cause4 ,they do not1 however1 flow from ,him as from a univocal agent1 as shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b72 but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus4 ,now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly2 but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently1 as1 heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire4 ,therefore as good is in ,god as in the first1 but not the univocal1 cause of all things1 it must be in ,him in a most excellent way2 and therefore ,he is called the supreme good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing1 but only a relation4 ,now a relation of ,god to creatures1 is not a reality in ,god1 but in the creature2 for it is in ,god in our idea only3 as1 what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge1 not that it depends on knowledge1 but because knowledge depends on it4 ,thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good1 but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when we say that good is what all desire1 it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all2 but that whatever is desired has the nature of good4 ,and when it is said1 ,none is good but ,god alone1 this is to be understood of essential goodness1 as will be explained in the next article4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera4 ,now we say that ,god is not in the same genus with other good things2 not that ,he is any other genus1 but that ,he is outside genus1 and is the principle of every genus2 and thus ,he is compared to others by excess1 and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies4 ,,third ,,article ,i4 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #c ,whether to ,be ,essentially ,good ,belongs to ,god ,alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that to be essentially good does not belong to ,god alone4 ,for as one is convertible with being1 so is good2 as we said above 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #a74 ,but every being is one essentially1 as appears from the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 iv72 therefore every being is good essentially4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if good is what all things desire1 since being itself is desired by all1 then the being of each thing is its good4 ,but everything is a being essentially2 therefore every being is good essentially4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything is good by its own goodness4 ,therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially1 it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence4 ,therefore its goodness1 since it is a being1 must be good2 and if it is good by some other goodness1 the same question applies to that goodness also2 therefore we must either proceed to infinity1 or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness4 ,therefore the first supposition holds good4 ,therefore everything is good essentially4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom471 that all things but ,god are good by participation4 ,therefore they are not good essentially4 ,i answer that1 ,god alone is good essentially4 ,for everything is called good according to its perfection4 ,now perfection of a thing is threefold3 first1 according to the constitution of its own being2 secondly1 in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation2 thirdly1 perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end4 ,thus1 for instance1 the first perfection of fire consists in its existence1 which it has through its own substantial form2 its secondary perfection consists in heat1 lightness and dryness1 and the like2 its third perfection is to rest in its own place4 ,this triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence2 it belongs to ,god only1 in ,whom alone essence is existence2 in ,whom there are no accidents2 since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to ,him essentially2 as1 to be powerful1 wise and the like1 as appears from what is stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #f72 and ,he is not directed to anything else as to an end1 but is ,himself the last end of all things4 ,hence it is manifest that ,god alone has every kind of perfection by ,his own essence2 therefore ,he ,himself alone is good essentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one does not include the idea of perfection1 but only of indivision1 which belongs to everything according to its own essence4 ,now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially1 but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually2 and therefore everything must be one essentially1 but not good essentially1 as was shown above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although everything is good in that it has being1 yet the essence of a creature is not very being2 and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the goodness of a creature is not its very essence1 but something superadded2 it is either its existence1 or some added perfection1 or the order to its end4 ,still1 the goodness itself thus added is good1 just as it is being4 ,but for this reason is it called being because by it something has being1 not because it itself has being through something else3 hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good1 and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #f1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all ,things ,are ,good by the ,divine ,goodness8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that all things are good by the divine goodness4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 viii71 ,this and that are good2 take away this and that1 and see good itself if thou canst2 and so thou shalt see ,god1 good not by any other good1 but the good of every good4 ,but everything is good by its own good2 therefore everything is good by that very good which is ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom471 all things are called good1 accordingly as they are directed to ,god1 and this is by reason of the divine goodness2 therefore all things are good by the divine goodness4 ,on the contrary1 ,all things are good1 inasmuch as they have being4 ,but they are not called beings through the divine being1 but through their own being2 therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness1 but by their own goodness4 ,i answer that1 ,as regards relative things1 we must admit extrinsic denomination2 as1 a thing is denominated placed from place1 and measured from measure4 ,but as regards absolute things opinions differ4 ,plato held the existence of separate ideas 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #d7 of all things1 and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas2 for instance1 that ,socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man4 ,now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse1 so likewise he laid down separate ideas of being and of one1 and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness2 and by participation of these1 everything was called being or one2 and what was thus absolute being and absolute one1 he said was the supreme good4 ,and because good is convertible with being1 as one is also2 he called ,god the absolute good1 from whom all things are called good by way of participation4 ,although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves--as ,aristotle argues in many ways--still1 it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good1 which we call ,god1 as appears from what is shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c71 and ,aristotle agrees with this4 ,hence from the first being1 essentially such1 and good1 everything can be called good and a being1 inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective2 as appears from the above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c74 ,everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness1 as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness4 ,nevertheless1 everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it1 which is formally its own goodness1 whereby it is denominated good4 ,and so of all things there is one goodness1 and yet many goodnesses4 ,this is a sufficient ,reply to the ,objections4 ,,question #g ,,the ,,infinity ,,of ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity1 and ,god's existence in things3 for ,god is everywhere1 and in all things1 inasmuch as ,he is boundless and infinite4 ,concerning the first1 there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is infinite8 7#b7 ,whether anything besides ,him is infinite in essence8 7#c7 ,whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude8 7#d7 ,whether an infinite multitude can exist8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god ,is ,infinite8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not infinite4 ,for everything infinite is imperfect1 as the ,philosopher says2 because it has parts and matter1 as is said in ,phys4 iii4 ,but ,god is most perfect2 therefore ,he is not infinite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 i71 finite and infinite belong to quantity4 ,but there is no quantity in ,god1 for ,he is not a body1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore it does not belong to ,him to be infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere1 is finite according to place4 ,therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing1 is finite according to substance4 ,but ,god is this1 and not another2 for ,he is not a stone or wood4 ,therefore ,god is not infinite in substance4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #d7 that ,god is infinite and eternal1 and boundless4 ,i answer that1 ,all the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle1 as is said 7,phys4 iii71 and with reason2 for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle4 ,but because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle1 as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity2 forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle2 consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things4 ,we must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite4 ,now matter is in a way made finite by form1 and the form by matter4 ,matter indeed is made finite by form1 inasmuch as matter1 before it receives its form1 is in potentiality to many forms2 but on receiving a form1 it is terminated by that one4 ,again1 form is made finite by matter1 inasmuch as form1 considered in itself1 is common to many2 but when received in matter1 the form is determined to this one particular thing4 ,now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite2 therefore infinite as attributed to matter1 has the nature of something imperfect2 for it is as it were formless matter4 ,on the other hand1 form is not made perfect by matter1 but rather is contracted by matter2 and hence the infinite1 regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter1 has the nature of something perfect4 ,now being is the most formal of all things1 as appears from what is shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #c74 ,since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything1 but ,he is ,his own subsistent being as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d71 it is clear that ,god ,himself is infinite and perfect4 ,from this appears the ,reply to the ,first ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,quantity is terminated by its form1 which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated1 is a kind of quantitative form4 ,hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter2 such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to ,god2 as was said above1 in this article4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the fact that the being of ,god is self-subsisting1 not received in any other1 and is thus called infinite1 shows ,him to be distinguished from all other beings1 and all others to be apart from ,him4 ,even so1 were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness1 the very fact that it did not exist in anything else1 would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,anything but ,god ,can ,be ,essentially ,infinite8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that something else besides ,god can be essentially infinite4 ,for the power of anything is proportioned to its essence4 ,now if the essence of ,god is infinite1 ,his power must also be infinite4 ,therefore ,he can produce an infinite effect1 since the extent of a power is known by its effect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever has infinite power1 has an infinite essence4 ,now the created intellect has an infinite power2 for it apprehends the universal1 which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things4 ,therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 primary matter is something other than ,god1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #h74 ,but primary matter is infinite4 ,therefore something besides ,god can be infinite4 ,on the contrary1 ,the infinite cannot have a beginning1 as said in ,phys4 iii4 ,but everything outside ,god is from ,god as from its first principle4 ,therefore besides ,god nothing can be infinite4 ,i answer that1 ,things other than ,god can be relatively infinite1 but not absolutely infinite4 ,for with regard to infinite as applied to matter1 it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form2 and thus its matter is determined by form4 ,but because matter1 considered as existing under some substantial form1 remains in potentiality to many accidental forms1 which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite2 as1 for example1 wood is finite according to its own form1 but still it is relatively infinite1 inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes4 ,but if we speak of the infinite in reference to form1 it is manifest that those things1 the forms of which are in matter1 are absolutely finite1 and in no way infinite4 ,if1 however1 any created forms are not received into matter1 but are self-subsisting1 as some think is the case with angels1 these will be relatively infinite1 inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated1 nor contracted by any matter4 ,but because a created form thus subsisting has being1 and yet is not its own being1 it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature4 ,hence it cannot be absolutely infinite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence2 because subsisting being is not a created being2 hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite4 ,therefore1 as ,god1 although ,he has infinite power1 cannot make a thing to be not made 7for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time71 so likewise ,he cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things1 is because the intellect is a form not in matter1 but either wholly separated from matter1 as is the angelic substance1 or at least an intellectual power1 which is not the act of any organ1 in the intellectual soul joined to a body4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,primary matter does not exist by itself in nature1 since it is not actually being1 but potentially only2 hence it is something concreated rather than created4 ,nevertheless1 primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite1 but relatively1 because its potentiality extends only to natural forms4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,actually ,infinite ,magnitude ,can ,exist8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude4 ,for in mathematics there is no error1 since there is no lie in things abstract1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii74 ,but mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude2 thus1 the geometrician in his demonstrations says1 ,let this line be infinite4 ,therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is not against the nature of anything1 can agree with it4 ,now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude2 but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity4 ,therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 magnitude is infinitely divisible1 for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible1 as is clear from ,phys4 iii4 ,but contraries are concerned about one and the same thing4 ,since therefore addition is opposed to division1 and increase opposed to diminution1 it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity4 ,therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes1 as is said in ,phys4 iv4 ,but it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite1 since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end4 ,therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite4 ,on the contrary1 ,every body has a surface4 ,but every body which has a surface is finite2 because surface is the term of a finite body4 ,therefore all bodies are finite4 ,the same applies both to surface and to a line4 ,therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude4 ,i answer that1 ,it is one thing to be infinite in essence1 and another to be infinite in magnitude4 ,for granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude1 as fire or air1 yet this could not be infinite in essence1 because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form1 and confined to individuality by matter4 ,and so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence1 it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude4 ,we must therefore observe that a body1 which is a complete magnitude1 can be considered in two ways2 mathematically1 in respect to its quantity only2 and naturally1 as regards its matter and form4 ,now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite4 ,for every natural body has some determined substantial form4 ,since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form1 it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form2 and among these accidents is quantity4 ,so every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity4 ,hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite4 ,the same appears from movement2 because every natural body has some natural movement2 whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement2 neither direct1 because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place2 and this could not happen to an infinite body1 for it would occupy every place1 and thus every place would be indifferently its own place4 ,neither could it move circularly2 forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part1 and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body3 for if two lines be drawn from the centre1 the farther they extend from the centre1 the farther they are from each other2 therefore1 if a body were infinite1 the lines would be infinitely distant from each other2 and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other4 ,the same applies to a mathematical body4 ,for if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing1 we must imagine it under some form1 because nothing is actual except by its form2 hence1 since the form of quantity as such is figure1 such a body must have some figure1 and so would be finite2 for figure is confined by a term or boundary4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite1 but takes some actually finite line1 from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary2 which line he calls infinite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general1 still it is against the nature of any species of it2 thus1 for instance1 it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude1 whether circular or triangular1 and so on4 ,now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus2 hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude1 since no species of magnitude is infinite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the infinite in quantity1 as was shown above1 belongs to matter4 ,now by division of the whole we approach to matter1 forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter2 but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form4 ,therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude1 but only in division4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,movement and time are whole1 not actually but successively2 hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality4 ,but magnitude is an actual whole2 therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter1 and does not agree with the totality of magnitude2 yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement3 for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #g1 ,art4 #d ,whether an ,infinite ,multitude ,can ,exist8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible4 ,for it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual4 ,but number can be multiplied to infinity4 ,therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual4 ,but the species of figures are infinite4 ,therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other4 ,but supposing a multitude of things to exist1 there can still be many others not opposed to them4 ,therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them1 and so on to infinitude2 therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written1 ,thou hast ordered all things in measure1 and number1 and weight 7,wis4 #aa3ba74 ,i answer that1 ,a twofold opinion exists on this subject4 ,some1 as ,avicenna and ,algazel1 said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely2 but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible4 ,a multitude is said to be infinite absolutely1 when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist4 ,now this is impossible2 because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence2 and hence its generation could never come to be1 because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium4 ,a multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary1 but accidental4 ,this can be shown1 for example1 in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude2 namely1 art in the soul1 the movement of the hand1 and a hammer2 and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied1 the carpentering work would never be finished1 forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes4 ,but the multitude of hammers1 inasmuch as one may be broken and another used1 is an accidental multitude2 for it happens by accident that many hammers are used1 and it matters little whether one or two1 or many are used1 or an infinite number1 if the work is carried on for an infinite time4 ,in this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude4 ,this1 however1 is impossible2 since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude4 ,now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers4 ,but no species of number is infinite2 for every number is multitude measured by one4 ,hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude1 either absolute or accidental4 ,likewise multitude in nature is created2 and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the ,creator2 for no agent acts aimlessly4 ,hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number4 ,therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist1 even accidentally4 ,but a potentially infinite multitude is possible2 because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude2 since the more a thing is divided1 the greater number of things result4 ,hence1 as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous1 because we thus approach matter1 as was shown in the preceding article1 by the same rule1 the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being2 for instance1 a day is reduced to act successively1 and not all at once4 ,likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively1 and not all at once2 because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number4 ,now there are various species of figures1 such as trilateral1 quadrilateral and so on2 and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act1 so neither is the multitude of figures4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others1 still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude4 ,hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist4 ,,question #h ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,god ,,in ,,things 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere1 and in all things1 we now consider whether this belongs to ,god2 and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is in all things8 7#b7 ,whether ,god is everywhere8 7#c7 ,whether ,god is everywhere by essence1 power1 and presence8 7#d7 ,whether to be everywhere belongs to ,god alone8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god ,is in ,all ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not in all things4 ,for what is above all things is not in all things4 ,but ,god is above all1 according to the ,psalm 7,ps4 #aab3d71 ,the ,lord is high above all nations1 etc4 ,therefore ,god is not in all things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is in anything is thereby contained4 ,now ,god is not contained by things1 but rather does ,he contain them4 ,therefore ,god is not in things but things are rather in ,him4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 #bj71 that in ,him things are1 rather than ,he is in any place4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more powerful an agent is1 the more extended is its action4 ,but ,god is the most powerful of all agents4 ,therefore ,his action can extend to things which are far removed from ,him2 nor is it necessary that ,he should be in all things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the demons are beings4 ,but ,god is not in the demons2 for there is no fellowship between light and darkness 7#b ,cor4 #f3ad74 ,therefore ,god is not in all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,a thing is wherever it operates4 ,but ,god operates in all things1 according to ,isa4 #bf3ab1 ,lord 4 4 4 ,thou hast wrought all our works in ,vulg43 'for' us4 ,therefore ,god is in all things4 ,i answer that1 ,god is in all things2 not1 indeed1 as part of their essence1 nor as an accident1 but as an agent is present to that upon which it works4 ,for an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power2 hence it is proved in ,phys4 vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together4 ,now since ,god is very being by ,his own essence1 created being must be ,his proper effect2 as to ignite is the proper effect of fire4 ,now ,god causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be1 but as long as they are preserved in being2 as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated4 ,therefore as long as a thing has being1 ,god must be present to it1 according to its mode of being4 ,but being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing1 as was shown above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it must be that ,god is in all things1 and innermostly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is above all things by the excellence of ,his nature2 nevertheless1 ,he is in all things as the cause of the being of all things2 as was shown above in this article4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them1 nevertheless1 spiritual things contain those things in which they are2 as the soul contains the body4 ,hence also ,god is in things containing them2 nevertheless1 by a certain similitude to corporeal things1 it is said that all things are in ,god2 inasmuch as they are contained by ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no action of an agent1 however powerful it may be1 acts at a distance1 except through a medium4 ,but it belongs to the great power of ,god that ,he acts immediately in all things4 ,hence nothing is distant from ,him1 as if it could be without ,god in itself4 ,but things are said to be distant from ,god by the unlikeness to ,him in nature or grace2 as also ,he is above all by the excellence of ,his own nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the demons there is their nature which is from ,god1 and also the deformity of sin which is not from ,him2 therefore1 it is not to be absolutely conceded that ,god is in the demons1 except with the addition1 inasmuch as they are beings4 ,but in things not deformed in their nature1 we must say absolutely that ,god is4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,is ,everywhere8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not everywhere4 ,for to be everywhere means to be in every place4 ,but to be in every place does not belong to ,god1 to ,whom it does not belong to be in place at all2 for incorporeal things1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom471 are not in a place4 ,therefore ,god is not everywhere4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence4 ,but one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times2 therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place4 ,now the divine being is not successive but permanent4 ,therefore ,god is not in many places2 and thus ,he is not everywhere4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere4 ,but if ,god is in any one place ,he is all there2 for ,he has no parts4 ,no part of ,him then is elsewhere2 and therefore ,god is not everywhere4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written1 ,i fill heaven and earth4 7,jer4 #bc3bd74 ,i answer that1 ,since place is a thing1 to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense2 either by way of other things--i4e4 as one thing is said to be in another no matter how2 and thus the accidents of a place are in place2 or by a way proper to place2 and thus things placed are in a place4 ,now in both these senses1 in some way ,god is in every place2 and this is to be everywhere4 ,first1 as ,he is in all things giving them being1 power and operation2 so ,he is in every place as giving it existence and locative power4 ,again1 things placed are in place1 inasmuch as they fill place2 and ,god fills every place2 not1 indeed1 like a body1 for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body2 whereas by ,god being in a place1 others are not thereby excluded from it2 indeed1 by the very fact that ,he gives being to the things that fill every place1 ,he ,himself fills every place4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity1 as bodies are but by contact of power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the indivisible is twofold4 ,one is the term of the continuous2 as a point in permanent things1 and as a moment in succession2 and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things1 forasmuch as it has a determinate site1 cannot be in many parts of place1 or in many places2 likewise the indivisible of action or movement1 forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action1 cannot be in many parts of time4 ,another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous2 and in this way incorporeal substances1 like ,god1 angel and soul1 are called indivisible4 ,such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous1 as a part of it1 but as touching it by its power2 hence1 according as its power can extend itself to one or to many1 to a small thing1 or to a great one1 in this way it is in one or in many places1 and in a small or large place4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a whole is so called with reference to its parts4 ,now part is twofold3 viz4 a part of the essence1 as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite1 while genus and difference are called parts of species4 ,there is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided4 ,what therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity1 cannot be outside of that place1 because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place2 and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place4 ,but totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place4 ,hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing1 not to be at all outside of it4 ,this appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity2 as an example1 whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence2 because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface4 ,but if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally1 then it is not whole in every part of the surface4 ,on the other hand1 incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally1 except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence4 ,hence1 as the soul is whole in every part of the body1 so is ,god whole in all things and in each one4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,is ,everywhere by ,essence1 ,presence and ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the mode of ,god's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence1 presence and power4 ,for what is by essence in anything1 is in it essentially4 ,but ,god is not essentially in things2 for ,he does not belong to the essence of anything4 ,therefore it ought not to be said that ,god is in things by essence1 presence and power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to be present in anything means not to be absent from it4 ,now this is the meaning of ,god being in things by ,his essence1 that ,he is not absent from anything4 ,therefore the presence of ,god in all things by essence and presence means the same thing4 ,therefore it is superfluous to say that ,god is present in things by ,his essence1 presence and power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as ,god by ,his power is the principle of all things1 so ,he is the same likewise by ,his knowledge and will4 ,but it is not said that ,he is in things by knowledge and will4 ,therefore neither is ,he present by ,his power4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing1 so many other perfections are likewise added4 ,therefore if ,god is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace1 it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of ,god's existence in things4 ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on the ,canticle of ,canticles 7#e7 says that1 ,god by a common mode is in all things by ,his presence1 power and substance2 still ,he is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace4 99,the quotation is from ,st4 ,gregory1 7,hom4 viii in ,ezech474 ,i answer that1 ,god is said to be in a thing in two ways2 in one way after the manner of an efficient cause2 and thus ,he is in all things created by ,him2 in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator2 and this is proper to the operations of the soul1 according as the thing known is in the one who knows2 and the thing desired in the one desiring4 ,in this second way ,god is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves ,him actually or habitually4 ,and because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace1 as will be shown later 7,q4 #ab74 ,he is said to be thus in the saints by grace4 ,but how ,he is in other things created by ,him1 may be considered from human affairs4 ,a king1 for example1 is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power1 although he is not everywhere present4 ,again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection2 as things in a house are said to be present to anyone1 who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house4 ,lastly1 a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be4 ,now there were some 7the ,manichees7 who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power2 but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle4 ,therefore against these it is necessary to say that ,god is in all things by ,his power4 ,but others1 though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power1 still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies1 and in the person of these it is said1 ,he walketh about the poles of the heavens2 and ,he doth not consider our things 99,vulg43 ',he doth not consider 4 4 4 and ,he walketh1' etc4 7,job #bb3ad74 ,against these it is necessary to say that ,god is in all things by ,his presence4 ,further1 others said that1 although all things are subject to ,god's providence1 still all things are not immediately created by ,god2 but that ,he immediately created the first creatures1 and these created the others4 ,against these it is necessary to say that ,he is in all things by ,his essence4 ,therefore1 ,god is in all things by ,his power1 inasmuch as all things are subject to ,his power2 ,he is by ,his presence in all things1 as all things are bare and open to ,his eyes2 ,he is in all things by ,his essence1 inasmuch as ,he is present to all as the cause of their being4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is said to be in all things by essence1 not indeed by the essence of the things themselves1 as if ,he were of their essence2 but by ,his own essence2 because ,his substance is present to all things as the cause of their being4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a thing can be said to be present to another1 when in its sight1 though the thing may be distant in substance1 as was shown in this article2 and therefore two modes of presence are necessary2 viz4 by essence and by presence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows1 and the thing willed in the one who wills4 ,hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in ,god than ,god in things4 ,but power is the principle of acting on another2 hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing2 thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,no other perfection1 except grace1 added to substance1 renders ,god present in anything as the object known and loved2 therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of ,god's existence in things4 ,there is1 however1 another special mode of ,god's existence in man by union1 which will be treated of in its own place 7,part ,,iii74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #h1 ,art4 #d ,whether to ,be ,everywhere ,belongs to ,god ,alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that to be everywhere does not belong to ,god alone4 ,for the universal1 according to the ,philosopher 7,poster4 i71 is everywhere1 and always2 primary matter also1 since it is in all bodies1 is everywhere4 ,but neither of these is ,god1 as appears from what is said above 7,q4 #c74 ,therefore to be everywhere does not belong to ,god alone4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 number is in things numbered4 ,but the whole universe is constituted in number1 as appears from the ,book of ,wisdom 7,wis4 #aa3ba74 ,therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe1 and is thus everywhere4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the universe is a kind of whole perfect body 7,coel4 et ,mund4 i74 ,but the whole universe is everywhere1 because there is no place outside it4 ,therefore to be everywhere does not belong to ,god alone4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if any body were infinite1 no place would exist outside of it1 and so it would be everywhere4 ,therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to ,god alone4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the soul1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #f71 is whole in the whole body1 and whole in every one of its parts4 ,therefore if there was only one animal in the world1 its soul would be everywhere2 and thus to be everywhere does not belong to ,god alone4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,ep4 #acg71 ,the soul feels where it sees1 and lives where it feels1 and is where it lives4 ,but the soul sees as it were everywhere3 for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight4 ,therefore the soul is everywhere4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,spir4 ,sanct4 i1 #g73 ,who dares to call the ,holy ,ghost a creature1 ,who in all things1 and everywhere1 and always is1 which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone8 ,i answer that1 ,to be everywhere primarily and absolutely1 is proper to ,god4 ,now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere2 for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places1 it would not be primarily everywhere1 forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily2 thus if a man has white teeth1 whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth4 ,but a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally1 that is1 merely on some supposition2 as a grain of millet would be everywhere1 supposing that no other body existed4 ,it belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when1 on any supposition1 it must be everywhere2 and this properly belongs to ,god alone4 ,for whatever number of places be supposed1 even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist1 it would be necessary that ,god should be in all of them2 for nothing can exist except by ,him4 ,therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to ,god and is proper to ,him3 because whatever number of places be supposed to exist1 ,god must be in all of them1 not as to a part of ,him1 but as to ,his very self4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the universal1 and also primary matter are indeed everywhere2 but not according to the same mode of existence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,number1 since it is an accident1 does not1 of itself1 exist in place1 but accidentally2 neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered2 hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the whole body of the universe is everywhere1 but not primarily2 forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place1 but according to its parts2 nor again is it everywhere absolutely1 because1 supposing that other places existed besides itself1 it would not be in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,if an infinite body existed1 it would be everywhere2 but according to its parts4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,were there one animal only1 its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed1 but only accidentally4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,when it is said that the soul sees anywhere1 this can be taken in two senses4 ,in one sense the adverb anywhere determines the act of seeing on the part of the object2 and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens1 it sees in the heavens2 and in the same way it feels in the heavens2 but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens1 because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object4 ,in another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer1 as proceeding from the seer2 and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees1 there it is1 and there it lives according to this mode of speaking2 and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere4 ,,question #i ,,the ,,immutability ,,of ,,god 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we next consider ,god's immutability1 and ,his eternity following on ,his immutability4 ,on the immutability of ,god there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is altogether immutable8 7#b7 ,whether to be immutable belongs to ,god alone8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god is altogether immutable8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not altogether immutable4 ,for whatever moves itself is in some way mutable4 ,but1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit1 viii1 #bj71 ,the ,creator ,spirit moves ,himself neither by time1 nor by place4 ,therefore ,god is in some way mutable4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is said of ,wisdom1 that it is more mobile than all things active ,vulg4 'mobilior' 7,wis4 #g3bd74 ,but ,god is wisdom itself2 therefore ,god is movable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to approach and to recede signify movement4 ,but these are said of ,god in ,scripture1 ,draw nigh to ,god and ,he will draw nigh to you 7,james #d3h74 ,therefore ,god is mutable4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written1 ,i am the ,lord1 and ,i change not 7,malachi #c3f74 ,i answer that1 ,from what precedes1 it is shown that ,god is altogether immutable4 ,first1 because it was shown above that there is some first being1 whom we call ,god2 and that this first being must be pure act1 without the admixture of any potentiality1 for the reason that1 absolutely1 potentiality is posterior to act4 ,now everything which is in any way changed1 is in some way in potentiality4 ,hence it is evident that it is impossible for ,god to be in any way changeable4 ,secondly1 because everything which is moved1 remains as it was in part1 and passes away in part2 as what is moved from whiteness to blackness1 remains the same as to substance2 thus in everything which is moved1 there is some kind of composition to be found4 ,but it has been shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g7 that in ,god there is no composition1 for ,he is altogether simple4 ,hence it is manifest that ,god cannot be moved4 ,thirdly1 because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement1 and attains to what it had not attained previously4 ,but since ,god is infinite1 comprehending in ,himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being1 ,he cannot acquire anything new1 nor extend ,himself to anything whereto ,he was not extended previously4 ,hence movement in no way belongs to ,him4 ,so1 some of the ancients1 constrained1 as it were1 by the truth1 decided that the first principle was immovable4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine there speaks in a similar way to ,plato1 who said that the first mover moves ,himself2 calling every operation a movement1 even as the acts of understanding1 and willing1 and loving1 are called movements4 ,therefore because ,god understands and loves ,himself1 in that respect they said that ,god moves ,himself1 not1 however1 as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality1 as we now speak of change and movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude1 according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things2 for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation1 as from the first effective and formal principle2 as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist4 ,and so in the same way1 inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things1 which participate more fully of its likeness1 to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree1 there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things2 as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth1 inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth4 ,in this way ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 expounds the matter1 that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the ,father of light4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these things are said of ,god in ,scripture metaphorically4 ,for as the sun is said to enter a house1 or to go out1 according as its rays reach the house1 so ,god is said to approach to us1 or to recede from us1 when we receive the influx of ,his goodness1 or decline from ,him4 ,,second ,,article ,i4 ,q4 #i1 ,art4 #b ,whether to ,be ,immutable ,belongs to ,god ,alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that to be immutable does not belong to ,god alone4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 ii7 that matter is in everything which is moved4 ,but1 according to some1 certain created substances1 as angels and souls1 have not matter4 ,therefore to be immutable does not belong to ,god alone4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything in motion moves to some end4 ,what therefore has already attained its ultimate end1 is not in motion4 ,but some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end2 as all the blessed in heaven4 ,therefore some creatures are immovable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything which is mutable is variable4 ,but forms are invariable2 for it is said 7,sex ,princip4 i7 that form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable4 ,therefore it does not belong to ,god alone to be immutable4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni4 i71 ,god alone is immutable2 and whatever things ,he has made1 being from nothing1 are mutable4 ,i answer that1 ,god alone is altogether immutable2 whereas every creature is in some way mutable4 ,be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways3 by a power in itself2 and by a power possessed by another4 ,for all creatures before they existed1 were possible1 not by any created power1 since no creature is eternal1 but by the divine power alone1 inasmuch as ,god could produce them into existence4 ,thus1 as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of ,god1 so likewise it depends on ,his will that things should be preserved2 for ,he does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence2 hence if ,he took away ,his action from them1 all things would be reduced to nothing1 as appears from ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #ab74 ,therefore as it was in the ,creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves1 so likewise it is in the ,creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing4 ,in this way therefore1 by the power of another--namely1 of ,god--they are mutable1 inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by ,him1 and are by ,him reducible from existence to non-existence4 ,if1 however1 a thing is called mutable by a power in itself1 thus also in some manner every creature is mutable4 ,for every creature has a twofold power1 active and passive2 and ,i call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being1 or in attaining to its end4 ,now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being1 in that way all creatures are not mutable1 but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-being4 ,hence1 in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being1 inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form1 and also as regards their accidental being1 supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident2 as1 for example1 this subject man can exist with not-whiteness and can therefore be changed from white to not-white4 ,but supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject1 then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject4 ,hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident2 as1 for example1 snow cannot be made black4 ,now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form1 because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter2 therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being1 but only as to locality1 because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place4 ,on the other hand incorporeal substances1 being subsistent forms which1 although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act1 are not consistent with the privation of this act2 forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form1 and nothing corrupts except it lose its form4 ,hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence2 and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence4 ,wherefore ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation1 as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances4 ,still1 there remains in them a twofold mutability3 one as regards their potentiality to their end2 and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ii1 #c1d72 the other as regards place1 inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be said of ,god1 who by ,his infinity fills all places1 as was shown above 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #b74 ,thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible2 or as regards locality only1 as in the case of the celestial bodies2 or as regards the order to their end1 and the application of their powers to divers objects1 as in the case with the angels2 and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the ,creator1 in ,whose power is their existence and non-existence4 ,hence since ,god is in none of these ways mutable1 it belongs to ,him alone to be altogether immutable4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being2 for philosophers treated of such movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good angels1 besides their natural endowment of immutability of being1 have also immutability of election by divine power2 nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,forms are called invariable1 forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation2 but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable4 ,hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are2 for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being1 but because through them something has being4 ,,question #aj ,,the ,,eternity ,,of ,,god 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the eternity of ,god1 concerning which arise six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is eternity8 7#b7 ,whether ,god is eternal8 7#c7 ,whether to be eternal belongs to ,god alone8 7#d7 ,whether eternity differs from time8 7#e7 ,the difference of aeviternity and of time4 7#f7 ,whether there is only one aeviternity1 as there is one time1 and one eternity8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,this ,is a ,good ,definition of ,eternity1 ,the ,simultaneously- ,whole and ,perfect ,possession of ,interminable ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the definition of eternity given by ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 v7 is not a good one3 ,eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life4 ,for the word interminable is a negative one4 ,but negation only belongs to what is defective1 and this does not belong to eternity4 ,therefore in the definition of eternity the word interminable ought not to be found4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 eternity signifies a certain kind of duration4 ,but duration regards existence rather than life4 ,therefore the word life ought not to come into the definition of eternity2 but rather the word existence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a whole is what has parts4 ,but this is alien to eternity which is simple4 ,therefore it is improperly said to be whole4 ,obj4 #d3 ,many days cannot occur together1 nor can many times exist all at once4 ,but in eternity1 days and times are in the plural1 for it is said1 ,his going forth is from the beginning1 from the days of eternity 7,micah #e3b72 and also it is said1 ,according to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity 7,rom4 #af3be74 ,therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the whole and the perfect are the same thing4 ,supposing1 therefore1 that it is whole1 it is superfluously described as perfect4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 duration does not imply possession4 ,but eternity is a kind of duration4 ,therefore eternity is not possession4 ,i answer that1 ,as we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things1 so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time1 which is nothing but the numbering of movement by before and after4 ,for since succession occurs in every movement1 and one part comes after another1 the fact that we reckon before and after in movement1 makes us apprehend time1 which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement4 ,now in a thing bereft of movement1 which is always the same1 there is no before or after4 ,as therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement2 so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement1 consists the idea of eternity4 ,further1 those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time1 because in everything which is moved there is a beginning1 and there is an end4 ,but as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession1 so it has no beginning1 and no end4 ,thus eternity is known from two sources3 first1 because what is eternal is interminable--that is1 has no beginning nor end 7that is1 no term either way72 secondly1 because eternity has no succession1 being simultaneously whole4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,simple things are usually defined by way of negation2 as a point is that which has no parts4 ,yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence1 but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things1 cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what is truly eternal1 is not only being1 but also living2 and life extends to operation1 which is not true of being4 ,now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being2 hence time is the numbering of movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,eternity is called whole1 not because it has parts1 but because it is wanting in nothing4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,god1 although incorporeal1 is named in ,scripture metaphorically by corporeal names1 so eternity though simultaneously whole1 is called by names implying time and succession4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,two things are to be considered in time3 time itself1 which is successive2 and the now of time1 which is imperfect4 ,hence the expression simultaneously-whole is used to remove the idea of time1 and the word perfect is used to exclude the now of time4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,whatever is possessed1 is held firmly and quietly2 therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity1 we use the word possession4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god is ,eternal8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not eternal4 ,for nothing made can be predicated of ,god2 for ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 iv7 that1 ,the now that flows away makes time1 the now that stands still makes eternity2 and ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 #bh7 that ,god is the author of eternity4 ,therefore ,god is not eternal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is before eternity1 and after eternity1 is not measured by eternity4 ,but1 as ,aristotle says 7,de ,causis71 ,god is before eternity and ,he is after eternity3 for it is written that the ,lord shall reign for eternity1 and beyond 99,douay3 'for ever and ever' 7,ex4 #ae3ah74 ,therefore to be eternal does not belong to ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 eternity is a kind of measure4 ,but to be measured belongs not to ,god4 ,therefore it does not belong to ,him to be eternal4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in eternity1 there is no present1 past or future1 since it is simultaneously whole2 as was said in the preceding article4 ,but words denoting present1 past and future time are applied to ,god in ,scripture4 ,therefore ,god is not eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,athanasius says in his ,creed3 ,the ,father is eternal1 the ,son is eternal1 the ,holy ,ghost is eternal4 ,i answer that1 ,the idea of eternity follows immutability1 as the idea of time follows movement1 as appears from the preceding article4 ,hence1 as ,god is supremely immutable1 it supremely belongs to ,him to be eternal4 ,nor is ,he eternal only2 but ,he is ,his own eternity2 whereas1 no other being is its own duration1 as no other is its own being4 ,now ,god is ,his own uniform being2 and hence as ,he is ,his own essence1 so ,he is ,his own eternity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the now that stands still1 is said to make eternity according to our apprehension4 ,as the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the now1 so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the now standing still4 ,when ,augustine says that ,god is the author of eternity1 this is to be understood of participated eternity4 ,for ,god communicates ,his eternity to some in the same way as ,he communicates ,his immutability4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from this appears the answer to the ,second ,objection4 ,for ,god is said to be before eternity1 according as it is shared by immaterial substances4 ,hence1 also1 in the same book1 it is said that intelligence is equal to eternity4 ,in the words of ,exodus1 ,the ,lord shall reign for eternity1 and beyond1 eternity stands for age1 as another rendering has it4 ,thus it is said that the ,lord will reign beyond eternity1 inasmuch as ,he endures beyond every age1 i4e4 beyond every kind of duration4 ,for age is nothing more than the period of each thing1 as is said in the book ,de ,coelo i4 ,or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever1 as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers1 then ,god would still reign beyond1 inasmuch as ,his reign is simultaneously whole4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,eternity is nothing else but ,god ,himself4 ,hence ,god is not called eternal1 as if ,he were in any way measured2 but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,words denoting different times are applied to ,god1 because ,his eternity includes all times2 not as if ,he ,himself were altered through present1 past and future4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #c ,whether to ,be ,eternal ,belongs to ,god ,alone8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that it does not belong to ,god alone to be eternal4 ,for it is written that those who instruct many to justice1 shall be as stars unto perpetual eternities 99,douay3 'for all eternity' 7,dan4 #ab3c74 ,now if ,god alone were eternal1 there could not be many eternities4 ,therefore ,god alone is not the only eternal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written ,depart1 ye cursed into eternal ,douay3 'everlasting' fire 7,matt4 #be3da74 ,therefore ,god is not the only eternal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every necessary thing is eternal4 ,but there are many necessary things2 as1 for instance1 all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions4 ,therefore ,god is not the only eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,jerome says 7,ep4 ad ,damasum1 xv7 that ,god is the only one who has no beginning4 ,now whatever has a beginning1 is not eternal4 ,therefore ,god is the only one eternal4 ,i answer that1 ,eternity truly and properly so called is in ,god alone1 because eternity follows on immutability2 as appears from the first article4 ,but ,god alone is altogether immutable1 as was shown above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,accordingly1 however1 as some receive immutability from ,him1 they share in ,his eternity4 ,thus some receive immutability from ,god in the way of never ceasing to exist2 in that sense it is said of the earth1 it standeth for ever 7,eccl4 #a3d74 ,again1 some things are called eternal in ,scripture because of the length of their duration1 although they are in nature corruptible2 thus 7,ps4 #ge3e7 the hills are called eternal and we read of the fruits of the eternal hills4 7,deut4 #cc3ae74 ,some again1 share more fully than others in the nature of eternity1 inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation2 like the angels1 and the blessed1 who enjoy the ,word1 because as regards that vision of the ,word1 no changing thoughts exist in the ,saints1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv74 ,hence those who see ,god are said to have eternal life2 according to that text1 ,this is eternal life1 that they may know ,thee the only true ,god1 etc4 7,john #ag3c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there are said to be many eternities1 accordingly as many share in eternity1 by the contemplation of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fire of hell is called eternal1 only because it never ends4 ,still1 there is change in the pains of the lost1 according to the words ,to extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters 7,job #bd3ai74 ,hence in hell true eternity does not exist1 but rather time2 according to the text of the ,psalm ,their time will be for ever 7,ps4 #hj3af74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,necessary means a certain mode of truth2 and truth1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 vi71 is in the mind4 ,therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal1 because they are in the eternal mind1 which is the divine intellect alone2 hence it does not follow that anything beside ,god is eternal4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i4 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,eternity ,differs from ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that eternity does not differ from time4 ,for two measures of duration cannot exist together1 unless one is part of the other2 for instance two days or two hours cannot be together2 nevertheless1 we may say that a day or an hour are together1 considering hour as part of a day4 ,but eternity and time occur together1 each of which imports a certain measure of duration4 ,since therefore eternity is not a part of time1 forasmuch as eternity exceeds time1 and includes it1 it seems that time is a part of eternity1 and is not a different thing from eternity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iv71 the now of time remains the same in the whole of time4 ,but the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time4 ,therefore eternity is the now of time4 ,but the now of time is not substantially different from time4 ,therefore eternity is not substantially different from time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement1 as said in ,phys4 iv1 it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being4 ,but eternity is the measure of the first being--that is1 of the divine being4 ,therefore eternity is the measure of every being4 ,but the being of things corruptible is measured by time4 ,time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity4 ,on the contrary1 ,eternity is simultaneously whole4 ,but time has a before and an after4 ,therefore time and eternity are not the same thing4 ,i answer that1 ,it is manifest that time and eternity are not the same4 ,some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end2 whereas time has a beginning and an end4 ,this1 however1 makes a merely accidental1 and not an absolute difference because1 granted that time always was and always will be1 according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever1 there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 v71 arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole2 which cannot be applied to time3 for eternity is the measure of a permanent being2 while time is a measure of movement4 ,supposing1 however1 that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured1 and not as regards the measures1 then there is some reason for it1 inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time4 ,hence1 if the movement of the heavens lasted always1 time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration1 since the infinite is not measurable2 but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time4 ,another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves1 if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities2 because1 granted also that time always goes on1 yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end1 by considering its parts3 thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year2 which cannot be applied to eternity4 ,still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences1 that eternity is simultaneously whole1 but that time is not so4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure2 but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the now of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time1 but it differs in aspect2 for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement1 its now corresponds to what is movable2 and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time1 but differs in aspect a being here and there2 and such alteration is movement4 ,likewise the flow of the now as alternating in aspect is time4 ,but eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect2 and hence eternity is not the same as the now of time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as eternity is the proper measure of permanent being1 so time is the proper measure of movement2 and hence1 according as any being recedes from permanence of being1 and is subject to change1 it recedes from eternity1 and is subject to time4 ,therefore the being of things corruptible1 because it is changeable1 is not measured by eternity1 but by time2 for time measures not only things actually changed1 but also things changeable2 hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose1 which belongs to whatever is naturally movable1 but is not actually in motion4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #e ,the ,difference of ,aeviternity and ,time ,objection #a3 ,it seems that aeviternity is the same as time4 ,for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #bj1 #bb1 #bc71 that ,god moves the spiritual through time4 ,but aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances4 ,therefore time is the same as aeviternity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is essential to time to have before and after2 but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole1 as was shown above in the first article4 ,now aeviternity is not eternity2 for it is written 7,ecclus4 #a3a7 that eternal ,wisdom is before age4 ,therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has before and after2 and thus it is the same as time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if there is no before and after in aeviternity1 it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being1 having been1 or going to be4 ,since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been1 it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future2 which is false1 since ,god can reduce them to nothing4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration1 if aeviternity is simultaneously whole1 it follows that some creature is actually infinite2 which is impossible4 ,therefore aeviternity does not differ from time4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii7 ,who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity4 ,i answer that1 ,aeviternity differs from time1 and from eternity1 as the mean between them both4 ,this difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end1 aeviternity1 a beginning but no end1 and time both beginning and end4 ,this difference1 however1 is but an accidental one1 as was shown above1 in the preceding article2 because even if aeviternal things had always been1 and would always be1 as some think1 and even if they might sometimes fail to be1 which is possible to ,god to allow2 even granted this1 aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity1 and from time4 ,others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no before and after2 but that time has both1 together with innovation and veteration2 and that aeviternity has before and after without innovation and veteration4 ,this theory1 however1 involves a contradiction2 which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself4 ,for since before and after of duration cannot exist together1 if aeviternity has before and after1 it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity1 the after part of aeviternity must newly appear2 and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself1 as it does in time4 ,and if they be referred to the things measured1 even then an incongruity would follow4 ,for a thing which exists in time grows old with time1 because it has a changeable existence1 and from the changeableness of a thing measured1 there follows before and after in the measure1 as is clear from ,physic4 iv4 ,therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate1 nor subject to innovation1 comes from its changelessness2 and consequently its measure does not contain before and after4 ,we say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being1 in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being1 it recedes from eternity4 ,now some things recede from permanence of being1 so that their being is subject to change1 or consists in change2 and these things are measured by time1 as are all movements1 and also the being of all things corruptible4 ,but others recede less from permanence of being1 forasmuch as their being neither consists in change1 nor is the subject of change2 nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially4 ,this appears in the heavenly bodies1 the substantial being of which is unchangeable2 and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place4 ,the same applies to the angels1 who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice2 moreover they have changeableness of intelligence1 of affections and of places in their own degree4 ,therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time4 ,but the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable1 nor is it annexed to change4 ,in this way time has before and after2 aeviternity in itself has no before and after1 which can1 however1 be annexed to it2 while eternity has neither before nor after1 nor is it compatible with such at all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time4 ,hence also ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #bj1 #bb1 #bc7 that to be moved through time1 is to be moved by affections4 ,but as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity2 whereas as regards the vision of glory1 they have a share of eternity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,aeviternity is simultaneously whole2 yet it is not eternity1 because before and after are compatible with it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the very being of an angel considered absolutely1 there is no difference of past and future1 but only as regards accidental change4 ,now to say that an angel was1 or is1 or will be1 is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect1 which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time4 ,but when we say that an angel is1 or was1 we suppose something1 which being supposed1 its opposite is not subject to the divine power4 ,whereas when we say he will be1 we do not as yet suppose anything4 ,hence1 since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power1 ,god can make the existence of an angel not future2 but ,he cannot cause him not to be while he is1 or not to have been1 after he has been4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the duration of aeviternity is infinite1 forasmuch as it is not finished by time4 ,hence1 there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite1 inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i4 ,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,one ,aeviternity8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there is not only one aeviternity2 for it is written in the apocryphal books of ,esdras3 ,majesty and power of ages are with ,thee1 ,o ,lord4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 different genera have different measures4 ,but some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus1 as the heavenly bodies2 and others are spiritual substances1 as are the angels4 ,therefore there is not only one aeviternity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since aeviternity is a term of duration1 where there is one aeviternity1 there is also one duration4 ,but not all aeviternal things have one duration1 for some begin to exist after others2 as appears in the case especially of human souls4 ,therefore there is not only one aeviternity4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration2 for there appears to be one time for all temporal things2 since the first movement1 measured by time1 is in some way the cause of all movement4 ,but aeviternal things do not depend on each other1 for one angel is not the cause of another angel4 ,therefore there is not only one aeviternity4 ,on the contrary1 ,aeviternity is a more simple thing than time1 and is nearer to eternity4 ,but time is one only4 ,therefore much more is aeviternity one only4 ,i answer that1 ,a twofold opinion exists on this subject4 ,some say there is only one aeviternity2 others that there are many aeviternities4 ,which of these is true1 may be considered from the cause why time is one2 for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things4 ,now some say that there is only one time for temporal things1 forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered2 as time is a number1 according to the ,philosopher 7,physic4 iv74 ,this1 however1 is not a sufficient reason2 because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered1 but existing in the thing numbered2 otherwise it would not be continuous2 for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number1 but by reason of the thing numbered4 ,now number as it exists in the thing numbered1 is not the same for all2 but it is different for different things4 ,hence1 others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time4 ,thus all durations are one in that view1 in the light of their principle1 but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle4 ,on the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one2 as it is the first subject of movement1 the measure of which is time4 ,neither of these reasons1 however1 is sufficient2 forasmuch as things which are one in principle1 or in subject1 especially if distant1 are not one absolutely1 but accidentally4 ,therefore the true reason why time is one1 is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which1 since it is most simple1 all other movements are measured4 ,therefore time is referred to that movement1 not only as a measure is to the thing measured1 but also as accident is to subject2 and thus receives unity from it4 ,whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured4 ,hence it is not multiplied by their multitude1 because by one separate measure many things can be measured4 ,this being established1 we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances4 ,some said that all proceeded from ,god in a certain equality1 as ,origen said 7,peri ,archon4 i72 or at least many of them1 as some others thought4 ,others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from ,god in a certain degree and order2 and ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 x7 seems to have thought so1 when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first1 the middle and the last2 even in one order of angels4 ,now according to the first opinion1 it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree4 ,but according to the second opinion1 it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only2 because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus1 it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing1 which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first4 ,wherefore because the second opinion is truer1 as will be shown later 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b72 we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,aeviternity is sometimes taken for age1 that is1 a space of a thing's duration2 and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature1 still they agree in having a changeless being1 and are thus measured by aeviternity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all temporal things did not begin together2 nevertheless there is one time for all of them1 by reason of the first measured by time2 and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first1 though all did not begin together4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,for things to be measured by one1 it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all1 but that it be more simple than the rest4 ,,question #aa ,,the ,,unity ,,of ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after the foregoing1 we consider the divine unity2 concerning which there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether one adds anything to being8 7#b7 ,whether one and many are opposed to each other8 7#c7 ,whether ,god is one8 7#d7 ,whether ,he is in the highest degree one8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,one ,adds ,anything to ,being8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that one adds something to being4 ,for everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being1 which penetrates all genera4 ,but one is a determinate genus1 for it is the principle of number1 which is a species of quantity4 ,therefore one adds something to being4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what divides a thing common to all1 is an addition to it4 ,but being is divided by one and by many4 ,therefore one is an addition to being4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if one is not an addition to being1 one and being must have the same meaning4 ,but it would be nugatory to call being by the name of being2 therefore it would be equally so to call being one4 ,now this is false4 ,therefore one is an addition to being4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 #e1 ult473 ,nothing which exists is not in some way one1 which would be false if one were an addition to being1 in the sense of limiting it4 ,therefore one is not an addition to being4 ,i answer that1 ,one does not add any reality to being2 but is only a negation of division2 for one means undivided being4 ,this is the very reason why one is the same as being4 ,now every being is either simple or compound4 ,but what is simple is undivided1 both actually and potentially4 ,whereas what is compound1 has not being whilst its parts are divided1 but after they make up and compose it4 ,hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision2 and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some1 thinking that the one convertible with being is the same as the one which is the principle of number1 were divided into contrary opinions4 ,pythagoras and ,plato1 seeing that the one convertible with being did not add any reality to being1 but signified the substance of being as undivided1 thought that the same applied to the one which is the principle of number4 ,and because number is composed of unities1 they thought that numbers were the substances of all things4 ,avicenna1 however1 on the contrary1 considering that one which is the principle of number1 added a reality to the substance of being 7otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity71 thought that the one convertible with being added a reality to the substance of beings2 as white to man4 ,this1 however1 is manifestly false1 inasmuch as each thing is one by its substance4 ,for if a thing were one by anything else but by its substance1 since this again would be one1 supposing it were again one by another thing1 we should be driven on to infinity4 ,hence we must adhere to the former statement2 therefore we must say that the one which is convertible with being1 does not add a reality to being2 but that the one which is the principle of number1 does add a reality to being1 belonging to the genus of quantity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided1 from being another way undivided2 as what is divided in number1 may be undivided in species2 thus it may be that a thing is in one way one1 and in another way many4 ,still1 if it is absolutely undivided1 either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence1 though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence1 as what is one in subject may have many accidents2 or because it is undivided actually1 and divided potentially1 as what is one in the whole1 and is many in parts2 in such a case a thing will be one absolutely and many accidentally4 ,on the other hand1 if it be undivided accidentally1 and divided absolutely1 as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause1 it will be many absolutely and one accidentally2 as what are many in number and one in species or one in principle4 ,hence in that way1 being is divided by one and by many2 as it were by one absolutely and by many accidentally4 ,for multitude itself would not be contained under being1 unless it were in some way contained under one4 ,thus ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom41 cap4 ult47 that there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one4 ,but what are many in their parts1 are one in their whole2 and what are many in accidents1 are one in subject2 and what are many in number1 are one in species2 and what are many in species1 are one in genus2 and what are many in processions1 are one in principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it does not follow that it is nugatory to say being is one2 forasmuch as one adds an idea to being4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,one and ,many ,are ,opposed to ,each ,other8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that one and many are not mutually opposed4 ,for no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite4 ,but every multitude is in a certain way one1 as appears from the preceding article4 ,therefore one is not opposed to multitude4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite4 ,but multitude is constituted by one4 ,therefore it is not opposed to multitude4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one is opposed to one4 ,but the idea of few is opposed to many4 ,therefore one is not opposed to many4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if one is opposed to multitude1 it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided2 and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit4 ,but this appears to be incongruous2 because it would follow that one comes after multitude1 and is defined by it2 whereas1 on the contrary1 multitude is defined by one4 ,hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition2 which is inadmissible4 ,therefore one and many are not opposed4 ,on the contrary1 ,things which are opposed in idea1 are themselves opposed to each other4 ,but the idea of one consists in indivisibility2 and the idea of multitude contains division4 ,therefore one and many are opposed to each other4 ,i answer that1 ,one is opposed to many1 but in various ways4 ,the one which is the principle of number is opposed to multitude which is number1 as the measure is to the thing measured4 ,for one implies the idea of a primary measure2 and number is multitude measured by one1 as is clear from ,metaph4 x4 ,but the one which is convertible with being is opposed to multitude by way of privation2 as the undivided is to the thing divided4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,no privation entirely takes away the being of a thing1 inasmuch as privation means negation in the subject1 according to the ,philosopher 7,categor4 viii74 ,nevertheless every privation takes away some being2 and so in being1 by reason of its universality1 the privation of being has its foundation in being2 which is not the case in privations of special forms1 as of sight1 or of whiteness and the like4 ,and what applies to being applies also to one and to good1 which are convertible with being1 for the privation of good is founded in some good2 likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing4 ,hence it happens that multitude is some one thing2 and evil is some good thing1 and non-being is some kind of being4 ,nevertheless1 opposite is not predicated of opposite2 forasmuch as one is absolute1 and the other is relative2 for what is relative being 7as a potentiality7 is non-being absolutely1 i4e4 actually2 or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being4 ,in the same way1 what is relatively good is absolutely bad1 or vice versa2 likewise what is absolutely one is relatively many1 and vice versa4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a whole is twofold4 ,in one sense it is homogeneous1 composed of like parts2 in another sense it is heterogeneous1 composed of dissimilar parts4 ,now in every homogeneous whole1 the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole2 as1 for instance1 every part of water is water2 and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts4 ,in every heterogeneous whole1 however1 every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole2 as1 for instance1 no part of a house is a house1 nor is any part of a man a man4 ,now multitude is such a kind of a whole4 ,therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude1 the latter is composed of unities1 as a house is composed of not houses2 not1 indeed1 as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided1 in which way they are opposed to multitude2 but so far as they have being1 as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings1 not by the fact that they are not houses4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,many is taken in two ways3 absolutely1 and in that sense it is opposed to one2 in another way as importing some kind of excess1 in which sense it is opposed to few2 hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,one is opposed to many privatively1 inasmuch as the idea of many involves division4 ,hence division must be prior to unity1 not absolutely in itself1 but according to our way of apprehension4 ,for we apprehend simple things by compound things2 and hence we define a point to be1 what has no part1 or the beginning of a line4 ,multitude also1 in idea1 follows on one2 because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part4 ,hence one is placed in the definition of multitude2 but multitude is not placed in the definition of one4 ,but division comes to be understood from the very negation of being3 so what first comes to mind is being2 secondly1 that this being is not that being1 and thus we apprehend division as a consequence2 thirdly1 comes the notion of one2 fourthly1 the notion of multitude4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,is ,one8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not one4 ,for it is written ,for there be many gods and many lords 7#a ,cor4 #h3e74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,one1 as the principle of number1 cannot be predicated of ,god1 since quantity is not predicated of ,god2 likewise1 neither can one which is convertible with being be predicated of ,god1 because it imports privation1 and every privation is an imperfection1 which cannot apply to ,god4 ,therefore ,god is not one4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written ,hear1 ,o ,israel1 the ,lord our ,god is one ,lord 7,deut4 #f3d74 ,i answer that1 ,it can be shown from these three sources that ,god is one4 ,first from ,his simplicity4 ,for it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is this particular thing is because it cannot be communicated to many3 since that whereby ,socrates is a man1 can be communicated to many2 whereas1 what makes him this particular man1 is only communicable to one4 ,therefore1 if ,socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man1 as there cannot be many ,socrates1 so there could not in that way be many men4 ,now this belongs to ,god alone2 for ,god ,himself is ,his own nature1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore1 in the very same way ,god is ,god1 and ,he is this ,god4 ,impossible is it therefore that many ,gods should exist4 ,secondly1 this is proved from the infinity of ,his perfection4 ,for it was shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b7 that ,god comprehends in ,himself the whole perfection of being4 ,if then many gods existed1 they would necessarily differ from each other4 ,something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another4 ,and if this were a privation1 one of them would not be absolutely perfect2 but if a perfection1 one of them would be without it4 ,so it is impossible for many gods to exist4 ,hence also the ancient philosophers1 constrained as it were by truth1 when they asserted an infinite principle1 asserted likewise that there was only one such principle4 ,thirdly1 this is shown from the unity of the world4 ,for all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others4 ,but things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order1 unless they are ordered thereto by one4 ,for many are reduced into one order by one better than by many3 because one is the per se cause of one1 and many are only the accidental cause of one1 inasmuch as they are in some way one4 ,since therefore what is first is most perfect1 and is so per se and not accidentally1 it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one4 ,and this one is ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities1 thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods1 and also the separate parts of the world4 ,hence the ,apostle adds3 ,our ,god is one1 etc4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one which is the principle of number is not predicated of ,god1 but only of material things4 ,for one the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematics1 which are material in being1 and abstracted from matter only in idea4 ,but one which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being4 ,and although in ,god there is no privation1 still1 according to the mode of our apprehension1 ,he is known to us by way only of privation and remotion4 ,thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of ,god2 for instance1 that ,he is incorporeal and infinite2 and in the same way it is said of ,god that ,he is one4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aa1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,god ,is ,supremely ,one8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not supremely one4 ,for one is so called from the privation of division4 ,but privation cannot be greater or less4 ,therefore ,god is not more one than other things which are called one4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible2 such as a point and unity4 ,but a thing is said to be more one according as it is indivisible4 ,therefore ,god is not more one than unity is one and a point is one4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is essentially good is supremely good4 ,therefore what is essentially one is supremely one4 ,but every being is essentially one1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iv74 ,therefore every being is supremely one2 and therefore ,god is not one more than any other being is one4 ,on the contrary1 ,bernard says 7,de ,consid4 v73 ,among all things called one1 the unity of the ,divine ,trinity holds the first place4 ,i answer that1 ,since one is an undivided being1 if anything is supremely one it must be supremely being1 and supremely undivided4 ,now both of these belong to ,god4 ,for ,he is supremely being1 inasmuch as ,his being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined2 since ,he is being itself1 subsistent1 absolutely undetermined4 ,but ,he is supremely undivided inasmuch as ,he is divided neither actually nor potentially1 by any mode of division2 since ,he is altogether simple1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g74 ,hence it is manifest that ,god is one in the supreme degree4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less1 still according as its opposite is subject to more or less1 privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less4 ,therefore according as a thing is more divided1 or is divisible1 either less or not at all1 in the degree it is called more1 or less1 or supremely1 one4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a point and unity which is the principle of number1 are not supremely being1 inasmuch as they have being only in some subject4 ,hence neither of them can be supremely one4 ,for as a subject cannot be supremely one1 because of the difference within it of accident and subject1 so neither can an accident4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although every being is one by its substance1 still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity2 for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple4 ,,question #ab ,,how ,,god ,,is ,,known ,,by ,,us 7,in ,thirteen ,articles7 ,as hitherto we have considered ,god as ,he is in ,himself1 we now go on to consider in what manner ,he is in the knowledge of creatures2 concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether any created intellect can see the essence of ,god8 7#b7 ,whether the essence of ,god is seen by the intellect through any created image8 7#c7 ,whether the essence of ,god can be seen by the corporeal eye8 7#d7 ,whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of ,god8 7#e7 ,whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of ,god8 7#f7 ,whether of those who see ,god1 one sees ,him more perfectly than another8 7#g7 ,whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of ,god8 7#h7 ,whether the created intellect seeing the essence of ,god1 knows all things in it8 7#i7 ,whether what is there known is known by any similitudes8 7#aj7 ,whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in ,god8 7#aa7 ,whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of ,god8 7#ab7 ,whether by natural reason we can know ,god in this life8 7#ac7 ,whether there is in this life any knowledge of ,god through grace above the knowledge of natural reason8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,any ,created ,intellect ,can ,see the ,essence of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that no created intellect can see the essence of ,god4 ,for ,chrysostom 7,hom4 xiv4 in ,joan47 commenting on ,john #a3ah1 ,no man hath seen ,god at any time1 says3 ,not prophets only1 but neither angels nor archangels have seen ,god4 ,for how can a creature see what is increatable8 ,dionysius also says 7,div4 ,nom4 i71 speaking of ,god3 ,neither is there sense1 nor image1 nor opinion1 nor reason1 nor knowledge of ,him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything infinite1 as such1 is unknown4 ,but ,god is infinite1 as was shown above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore in ,himself ,he is unknown4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the created intellect knows only existing things4 ,for what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being4 ,now ,god is not something existing2 but ,he is rather super-existence1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore ,god is not intelligible2 but above all intellect4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 there must be some proportion between the knower and the known1 since the known is the perfection of the knower4 ,but no proportion exists between the created intellect and ,god2 for there is an infinite distance between them4 ,therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,we shall see ,him as ,he is 7#a ,john #b3b74 ,i answer that1 ,since everything is knowable according as it is actual1 ,god1 ,who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality1 is in ,himself supremely knowable4 ,but what is supremely knowable in itself1 may not be knowable to a particular intellect1 on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect2 as1 for example1 the sun1 which is supremely visible1 cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light4 ,therefore some who considered this1 held that no created intellect can see the essence of ,god4 ,this opinion1 however1 is not tenable4 ,for as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function1 which is the operation of his intellect2 if we suppose that the created intellect could never see ,god1 it would either never attain to beatitude1 or its beatitude would consist in something else beside ,god2 which is opposed to faith4 ,for the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being2 since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle4 ,further the same opinion is also against reason4 ,for there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees2 and thence arises wonder in men4 ,but if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things1 the natural desire would remain void4 ,hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension4 ,hence ,dionysius premises immediately before the words cited1 ,he is universally to all incomprehensible1 etc4 ,chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says3 ,he says this of the most certain vision of the ,father1 which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the ,father has of the ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the infinity of matter not made perfect by form1 is unknown in itself1 because all knowledge comes by the form2 whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter1 is in itself supremely known4 ,god is ,infinite in this way1 and not in the first way3 as appears from what was said above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god is not said to be not existing as if ,he did not exist at all1 but because ,he exists above all that exists2 inasmuch as ,he is ,his own existence4 ,hence it does not follow that ,he cannot be known at all1 but that ,he exceeds every kind of knowledge2 which means that ,he is not comprehended4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,proportion is twofold4 ,in one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another1 according as double1 treble and equal are species of proportion4 ,in another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion4 ,and in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to ,god1 inasmuch as it is related to ,him as the effect of its cause1 and as potentiality to its act2 and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know ,god4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,essence of ,god ,is ,seen by the ,created ,intellect ,through an ,image8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the essence of ,god is seen through an image by the created intellect4 ,for it is written3 ,we know that when ,he shall appear1 we shall be like to ,him1 and ,vulg43 'because' we shall see ,him as ,he is 7#a ,john #c3b74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v73 ,when we know ,god1 some likeness of ,god is made in us4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect in act is the actual intelligible2 as sense in act is the actual sensible4 ,but this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object1 and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood4 ,therefore1 if ,god is seen by the created intellect in act1 it must be that ,he is seen by some similitude4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv7 that when the ,apostle says1 ,we see through a glass and in an enigma 99,douay3 'in a dark manner'1 by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him1 which are accommodated to the vision of ,god4 ,but to see the essence of ,god is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision1 but is1 on the contrary1 of an opposite kind4 ,therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude4 ,i answer that1 ,two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision--viz4 power of sight1 and union of the thing seen with the sight4 ,for vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer4 ,now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer1 but only by its likeness2 as the similitude of a stone is in the eye1 whereby the vision is made actual2 whereas the substance of the stone is not there4 ,but if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing1 it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees1 from that one same thing4 ,now it is manifest both that ,god is the author of the intellectual power1 and that ,he can be seen by the intellect4 ,and since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of ,god1 it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of ,him who is the first intellect4 ,hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light1 as it were1 derived from the first light1 whether this be understood of the natural power1 or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory4 ,therefore1 in order to see ,god1 there must be some similitude of ,god on the part of the visual faculty1 whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing ,god4 ,but on the part of the object seen1 which must necessarily be united to the seer1 the essence of ,god cannot be seen by any created similitude4 ,first1 because as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i71 by the similitudes of the inferior order of things1 the superior can in no way be known2 as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known4 ,much less therefore can the essence of ,god be seen by any created likeness whatever4 ,secondly1 because the essence of ,god is ,his own very existence1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d71 which cannot be said of any created form2 and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of ,god to the seer4 ,thirdly1 because the divine essence is uncircumscribed1 and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect4 ,now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness2 for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom1 or of power1 or of being itself1 or of some like thing4 ,hence to say that ,god is seen by some similitude1 is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all2 which is false4 ,therefore it must be said that to see the essence of ,god1 there is required some similitude in the visual faculty1 namely1 the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see ,god1 which is spoken of in the ,psalm 7#ce3aj71 ,in ,thy light we shall see light4 ,the essence of ,god1 however1 cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine speaks of the knowledge of ,god here on earth4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the divine essence is existence itself4 ,hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity1 whereby the intellect itself is informed1 and made in act2 so the divine essence is united to the created intellect1 as the object actually understood1 making the intellect in act by and of itself4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,essence of ,god ,can ,be ,seen with the ,bodily ,eye8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the essence of ,god can be seen by the corporeal eye4 ,for it is written 7,job #ai3bf73 ,in my flesh ,i shall see 4 4 4 ,god1 and 7,job #db3e71 ,with the hearing of the ear ,i have heard ,thee1 but now my eye seeth ,thee4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxix1 #bi73 ,those eyes 7namely the glorified7 will therefore have a greater power of sight1 not so much to see more keenly1 as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles 7for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures1 they can see only corporeal things7 but to see even incorporeal things4 ,now whoever can see incorporeal things1 can be raised up to see ,god4 ,therefore the glorified eye can see ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination4 ,for it is written3 ,i saw the ,lord sitting upon a throne1 etc4 7,isa4 #f3a74 ,but an imaginary vision originates from sense2 for the imagination is moved by sense to act4 ,therefore ,god can be seen by a vision of sense4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vid4 ,deum1 ,ep4 cxlvii73 ,no one has ever seen ,god either in this life1 as ,he is1 nor in the angelic life1 as visible things are seen by corporeal vision4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for ,god to be seen by the sense of sight1 or by any other sense1 or faculty of the sensitive power4 ,for every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ1 as will be shown later 7,q4 #gh74 ,now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it4 ,hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things4 ,for ,god is incorporeal1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence ,he cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination1 but only by the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words1 ,in my flesh ,i shall see ,god my ,saviour1 do not mean that ,god will be seen with the eye of the flesh1 but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see ,god4 ,likewise the words1 ,now my eye seeth ,thee1 are to be understood of the mind's eye1 as the ,apostle says3 ,may ,he give unto you the spirit of wisdom 4 4 4 in the knowledge of ,him1 that the eyes of your heart may be enlightened 7,eph4 #a3ag1 #ah74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine speaks as one inquiring1 and conditionally4 ,this appears from what he says previously3 ,therefore they will have an altogether different power 7viz4 the glorified eyes71 if they shall see that incorporeal nature2 and afterwards he explains this1 saying3 ,it is very credible1 that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth1 as to see most clearly ,god everywhere present1 governing all corporeal things1 not as we now see the invisible things of ,god as understood by what is made2 but as when we see men among whom we live1 living and exercising the functions of human life1 we do not believe they live1 but see it4 ,hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see ,god1 as now our eyes see the life of another4 ,but life is not seen with the corporeal eye1 as a thing in itself visible1 but as the indirect object of the sense2 which indeed is not known by sense1 but at once1 together with sense1 by some other cognitive power4 ,but that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of1 and through1 corporeal things1 happens from two causes--viz4 from the perspicuity of the intellect1 and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the essence of ,god is not seen in a vision of the imagination2 but the imagination receives some form representing ,god according to some mode of similitude2 as in the divine ,scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,any ,created ,intellect by ,its ,natural ,powers ,can ,see the ,divine ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that a created intellect can see the ,divine essence by its own natural power4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,an angel is a pure mirror1 most clear1 receiving1 if it is right to say so1 the whole beauty of ,god4 ,but if a reflection is seen1 the original thing is seen4 ,therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself1 it seems that by his own natural power he understands the ,divine essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is supremely visible1 is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight4 ,but the angelic intellect has no such defect4 ,therefore1 since ,god is supremely intelligible in ,himself1 it seems that in like manner ,he is supremely so to an angel4 ,therefore1 if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power1 much more can he understand ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance1 which is above its nature4 ,therefore if to see the essence of ,god is above the nature of every created intellect1 it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of ,god at all4 ,but this is false1 as appears from what is said above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the ,divine essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,the grace of ,god is life everlasting 7,rom4 #f3bc74 ,but life everlasting consists in the vision of the ,divine essence1 according to the words3 ,this is eternal life1 that they may know ,thee the only true ,god1 etc4 7,john #ag3c74 ,therefore to see the essence of ,god is possible to the created intellect by grace1 and not by nature4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of ,god by its own natural power4 ,for knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower4 ,but the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower4 ,hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature4 ,if therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower1 it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower4 ,now the mode of being of things is manifold4 ,for some things have being only in this one individual matter2 as all bodies4 ,but others are subsisting natures1 not residing in matter at all1 which1 however1 are not their own existence1 but receive it2 and these are the incorporeal beings1 called angels4 ,but to ,god alone does it belong to be ,his own subsistent being4 ,therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally1 forasmuch as our soul1 whereby we know1 is the form of certain matter4 ,now our soul possesses two cognitive powers2 one is the act of a corporeal organ1 which naturally knows things existing in individual matter2 hence sense knows only the singular4 ,but there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul1 called the intellect2 and this is not the act of any corporeal organ4 ,wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter2 not as they are in such individual matter1 but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect2 hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal2 and this is beyond the power of the sense4 ,now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter2 but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life1 united as it is to the body4 ,it follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone2 and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect2 for no creature is its own existence1 forasmuch as its existence is participated4 ,therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of ,god1 unless ,god by ,his grace unites ,himself to the created intellect1 as an object made intelligible to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this mode of knowing ,god is natural to an angel--namely1 to know ,him by ,his own likeness refulgent in the angel himself4 ,but to know ,god by any created similitude is not to know the essence of ,god1 as was shown above 7,a4 #b74 ,hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of ,god by his own power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angelic intellect is not defective1 if defect be taken to mean privation1 as if it were without anything which it ought to have4 ,but if the defect be taken negatively1 in that sense every creature is defective1 when compared with ,god2 forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sense of sight1 as being altogether material1 cannot be raised up to immateriality4 ,but our intellect1 or the angelic intellect1 inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature1 can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace4 ,the proof is1 that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely2 for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature2 whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely4 ,now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter1 still it resolves the composite into both of these elements2 and it considers the form separately by itself4 ,likewise1 also1 the intellect of an angel1 although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature1 still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect2 since it knows that the thing itself is one thing1 and its existence is another4 ,since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form1 and the concrete being abstractedly1 by way of a kind of resolution of parts2 it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance1 and separate subsisting existence4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,created ,intellect ,needs ,any ,created ,light in ,order to ,see the ,essence of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of ,god4 ,for what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen4 ,therefore the same applies to intelligible things4 ,now ,god is intelligible light4 ,therefore ,he is not seen by means of any created light4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if ,god is seen through a medium1 ,he is not seen in ,his essence4 ,but if seen by any created light1 ,he is seen through a medium4 ,therefore ,he is not seen in ,his essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is created can be natural to some creature4 ,therefore if the essence of ,god is seen through any created light1 such a light can be made natural to some other creature2 and thus1 that creature would not need any other light to see ,god2 which is impossible4 ,therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,in ,thy light we shall see light 7,ps4 #ce3aj74 ,i answer that1 ,everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature1 must be prepared by some disposition above its nature2 as1 for example1 if air is to receive the form of fire1 it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form4 ,but when any created intellect sees the essence of ,god1 the essence of ,god itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect4 ,hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height4 ,now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of ,god1 as was shown in the preceding article1 it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace4 ,now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect1 as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination4 ,and this is the light spoken of in the ,apocalypse 7,apoc4 #ba3bc73 ,the glory of ,god hath enlightened it--viz4 the society of the blessed who see ,god4 ,by this light the blessed are made deiform--i4e4 like to ,god1 according to the saying3 ,when ,he shall appear we shall be like to ,him1 and ,vulg43 'because' we shall see ,him as ,he is 7#a ,john #b3b74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the created light is necessary to see the essence of ,god1 not in order to make the essence of ,god intelligible1 which is of itself intelligible1 but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act4 ,even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight1 inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent1 and susceptible of color4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this light is required to see the divine essence1 not as a similitude in which ,god is seen1 but as a perfection of the intellect1 strengthening it to see ,god4 ,therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which ,god is seen1 but as one by which ,he is seen2 and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form4 ,hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature2 which is impossible4 ,but by this light the rational creature is made deiform1 as is said in this article4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i4 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #f ,whether of ,those ,who ,see the ,essence of ,god1 ,one ,sees ,more ,perfectly ,than ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that of those who see the essence of ,god1 one does not see more perfectly than another4 ,for it is written 7#a ,john #c3b73 ,we shall see ,him as ,he is4 ,but ,he is only in one way4 ,therefore ,he will be seen by all in one way only2 and therefore ,he will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xxxii73 ,one person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another4 ,but all who see the essence of ,god1 understand the ,divine essence1 for ,god is seen by the intellect and not by sense1 as was shown above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore of those who see the divine essence1 one does not see more clearly than another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,that anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways3 either on the part of the visible object1 or on the part of the visual power of the seer4 ,on the part of the object1 it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer1 that is1 according to the greater perfection of the similitude2 but this does not apply to the present question1 for ,god is present to the intellect seeing ,him not by way of similitude1 but by ,his essence4 ,it follows then that if one sees ,him more perfectly than another1 this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power2 thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher1 will see ,him the more clearly2 and this is incongruous2 since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude4 ,on the contrary1 ,eternal life consists in the vision of ,god1 according to ,john #ag3c3 ,this is eternal life1 that they may know ,thee the only true ,god1 etc4 ,therefore if all saw the essence of ,god equally in eternal life1 all would be equal2 the contrary to which is declared by the ,apostle3 ,star differs from star in glory 7#a ,cor4 #ae3da74 ,i answer that1 ,of those who see the essence of ,god1 one sees ,him more perfectly than another4 ,this1 indeed1 does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of ,god than another1 since that vision will not spring from any similitude2 but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see ,god than another4 ,the faculty of seeing ,god1 however1 does not belong to the created intellect naturally1 but is given to it by the light of glory1 which establishes the intellect in a kind of deiformity1 as appears from what is said above1 in the preceding article4 ,hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see ,god the more perfectly2 and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity2 because where there is the greater charity1 there is the more desire2 and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired4 ,hence he who possesses the more charity1 will see ,god the more perfectly1 and will be the more beatified4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the words1 ,we shall see ,him as ,he is1 the conjunction as determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen1 so that the meaning is1 we shall see ,him to be as ,he is1 because we shall see ,his existence1 which is ,his essence4 ,but it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing2 as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing ,god will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of ,god's existence4 ,thus appears the answer to the ,second ,objection4 ,for when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another1 this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood1 for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is1 does not truly understand it1 but not if referred to the mode of understanding1 for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen1 for the same object will be presented to all--viz4 the essence of ,god2 nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes2 but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect1 not1 indeed1 the natural faculty1 but the glorified faculty4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,those ,who ,see the ,essence of ,god ,comprehend ,him8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that those who see the divine essence1 comprehend ,god4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,phil4 #c3ab73 ,but ,i follow after1 if ,i may by any means comprehend ,douay3 'apprehend'4 ,but the ,apostle did not follow in vain2 for he said 7#a ,cor4 #i3bf73 ,i 4 4 4 so run1 not as at an uncertainty4 ,therefore he comprehended2 and in the same way1 others also1 whom he invites to do the same1 saying3 ,so run that you may comprehend4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vid4 ,deum1 ,ep4 cxlvii73 ,that is comprehended which is so seen as a whole1 that nothing of it is hidden from the seer4 ,but if ,god is seen in ,his essence1 ,he is seen whole1 and nothing of ,him is hidden from the seer1 since ,god is simple4 ,therefore whoever sees ,his essence1 comprehends ,him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if we say that ,he is seen as a whole1 but not wholly1 it may be contrarily urged that wholly refers either to the mode of the seer1 or to the mode of the thing seen4 ,but he who sees the essence of ,god1 sees ,him wholly1 if the mode of the thing seen is considered2 forasmuch as he sees ,him as ,he is2 also1 likewise1 he sees ,him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant1 forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the ,divine essence4 ,therefore all who see the essence of ,god see ,him wholly2 therefore they comprehend ,him4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,o most mighty1 great1 and powerful1 the ,lord of hosts is ,thy ,name4 ,great in counsel1 and incomprehensible in thought 7,jer4 #cb3ah1ai74 ,therefore ,he cannot be comprehended4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend ,god2 yet for the mind to attain to ,god in some degree is great beatitude1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,dom41 ,serm4 xxxviii74 ,in proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known2 and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known4 ,thus1 if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof1 it is not comprehended2 as1 for instance1 if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles1 he comprehends that truth2 whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it1 he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself1 because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable4 ,but no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the ,divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable4 ,which thus appears--,everything is knowable according to its actuality4 ,but ,god1 whose being is infinite1 as was shown above 7,q4 #g71 is infinitely knowable4 ,now no created intellect can know ,god infinitely4 ,for the created intellect knows the ,divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory4 ,since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite1 it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know ,god in an infinite degree4 ,hence it is impossible that it should comprehend ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,comprehension is twofold3 in one sense it is taken strictly and properly1 according as something is included in the one comprehending2 and thus in no way is ,god comprehended either by intellect1 or in any other way2 forasmuch as ,he is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being2 so that no finite being can contain ,him infinitely1 in the degree of ,his own infinity4 ,in this sense we now take comprehension4 ,but in another sense comprehension is taken more largely as opposed to non-attainment2 for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him4 ,and in this sense ,god is comprehended by the blessed1 according to the words1 ,i held him1 and ,i will not let him go 7,cant4 #c3d72 in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the ,apostle concerning comprehension4 ,and in this way comprehension is one of the three prerogatives of the soul1 responding to hope1 as vision responds to faith1 and fruition responds to charity4 ,for even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed1 forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off1 or they are not in our power of attainment4 ,neither1 again1 do we always enjoy what we possess2 either because we find no pleasure in them1 or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire1 so as to satisfy and quell it4 ,but the blessed possess these three things in ,god2 because they see ,him1 and in seeing ,him1 possess ,him as present1 having the power to see ,him always2 and possessing ,him1 they enjoy ,him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is called incomprehensible not because anything of ,him is not seen2 but because ,he is not seen as perfectly as ,he is capable of being seen2 thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only1 it does not follow that any part of it is unknown1 either the subject1 or the predicate1 or the composition2 but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known4 ,hence ,augustine1 in his definition of comprehension1 says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer1 or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced2 for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the word wholly denotes a mode of the object2 not that the whole object does not come under knowledge1 but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows4 ,therefore he who sees ,god's essence1 sees in ,him that ,he exists infinitely1 and is infinitely knowable2 nevertheless1 this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely2 thus1 for instance1 a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable1 although he himself does not know it as demonstrated4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,those ,who ,see the ,essence of ,god ,see ,all in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that those who see the essence of ,god see all things in ,god4 ,for ,gregory says 7,dialog4 iv73 ,what do they not see1 who see ,him ,who sees all things8 ,but ,god sees all things4 ,therefore those who see ,god see all things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever sees a mirror1 sees what is reflected in the mirror4 ,but all actual or possible things shine forth in ,god as in a mirror2 for ,he knows all things in ,himself4 ,therefore whoever sees ,god1 sees all actual things in ,him1 and also all possible things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever understands the greater1 can understand the least1 as is said in ,de ,anima iii4 ,but all that ,god does1 or can do1 are less than ,his essence4 ,therefore whoever understands ,god1 can understand all that ,god does1 or can do4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the rational creature naturally desires to know all things4 ,therefore if in seeing ,god it does not know all things1 its natural desire will not rest satisfied2 thus1 in seeing ,god it will not be fully happy2 which is incongruous4 ,therefore he who sees ,god knows all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,the angels see the essence of ,god2 and yet do not know all things4 ,for as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels4 ,also they are ignorant of future contingent things1 and of secret thoughts2 for this knowledge belongs to ,god alone4 ,therefore whosoever sees the essence of ,god1 does not know all things4 ,i answer that1 ,the created intellect1 in seeing the divine essence1 does not see in it all that ,god does or can do4 ,for it is manifest that things are seen in ,god as they are in ,him4 ,but all other things are in ,god as effects are in the power of their cause4 ,therefore all things are seen in ,god as an effect is seen in its cause4 ,now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen1 the more of its effects can be seen in it4 ,for whoever has a lofty understanding1 as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions2 but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect1 for he needs things to be explained to him separately4 ,and so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself1 if it comprehends the cause wholly4 ,now no created intellect can comprehend ,god wholly1 as shown above 7,a4 #g74 ,therefore no created intellect in seeing ,god can know all that ,god does or can do1 for this would be to comprehend ,his power2 but of what ,god does or can do any intellect can know the more1 the more perfectly it sees ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient1 namely1 ,god1 who in ,himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all things2 but it does not follow that whoever sees ,god knows all things1 for he does not perfectly comprehend ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror1 unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although it is more to see ,god than to see all things else1 still it is a greater thing to see ,him so that all things are known in ,him1 than to see ,him in such a way that not all things1 but the fewer or the more1 are known in ,him4 ,for it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in ,god according as ,he is seen more or less perfectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect1 namely1 the species and the genera of things and their types1 and these everyone who sees the ,divine essence will see in ,god4 ,but to know other singulars1 their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things2 neither1 again1 does it desire to know things that exist not as yet1 but which ,god can call into being4 ,yet if ,god alone were seen1 ,who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth1 ,he would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired1 and the seer would be completely beatified4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,confess4 v73 ,unhappy the man who knoweth all these 7i4e4 all creatures7 and knoweth not ,thee6 but happy whoso knoweth ,thee although he know not these4 ,and whoso knoweth both ,thee and them is not the happier for them1 but for ,thee alone4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,what ,is ,seen in ,god by ,those ,who ,see the ,divine ,essence1 ,is ,seen ,through ,any ,similitude8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that what is seen in ,god by those who see the ,divine essence1 is seen by means of some similitude4 ,for every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known4 ,for thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible1 and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible1 inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object1 as the eye by the similitude of color4 ,therefore if the intellect of one who sees the ,divine essence understands any creatures in ,god1 it must be informed by their similitudes4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what we have seen1 we keep in memory4 ,but ,paul1 seeing the essence of ,god whilst in ecstasy1 when he had ceased to see the ,divine essence1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #bh1cd71 remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture2 hence he said3 ,i have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter 7#b ,cor4 #ab3d74 ,therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered1 remained in his mind2 and in the same way1 when he actually saw the essence of ,god1 he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it4 ,on the contrary1 ,a mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness4 ,but all things are seen in ,god as in an intelligible mirror4 ,therefore if ,god ,himself is not seen by any similitude but by ,his own essence1 neither are the things seen in ,him seen by any similitudes or ideas4 ,i answer that1 ,those who see the divine essence see what they see in ,god not by any likeness1 but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect4 ,for each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows4 ,now this takes place in two ways4 ,for as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other1 the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways4 ,in one way it is assimilated by the object itself1 when it is directly informed by a similitude1 and then the object is known in itself4 ,in another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object2 and in this way1 the knowledge is not of the thing in itself1 but of the thing in its likeness4 ,for the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image4 ,hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows1 is to know them in themselves or in their own nature2 whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in ,god1 is to see them in ,god4 ,now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge4 ,hence1 according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of ,god1 they are seen in ,god ,himself not by any other similitudes but by the ,divine essence alone present to the intellect2 by which also ,god ,himself is seen4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the created intellect of one who sees ,god is assimilated to what is seen in ,god1 inasmuch as it is united to the ,divine essence1 in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived2 thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain2 and the intellect1 from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference1 forms the idea of species2 in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image4 ,thus ,paul1 or any other person who sees ,god1 by the very vision of the divine essence1 can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence1 which remained in ,paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of ,god4 ,still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived1 is not the same as that whereby things are seen in ,god4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,those ,who ,see the ,essence of ,god ,see ,all ,they ,see in ,it at the ,same ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that those who see the essence of ,god do not see all they see in ,him at one and the same time4 ,for according to the ,philosopher 7,topic4 ii73 ,it may happen that many things are known1 but only one is understood4 ,but what is seen in ,god1 is understood2 for ,god is seen by the intellect4 ,therefore those who see ,god do not see all in ,him at the same time4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #bb1 #bc71 ,god moves the spiritual creature according to time--i4e4 by intelligence and affection4 ,but the spiritual creature is the angel who sees ,god4 ,therefore those who see ,god understand and are affected successively2 for time means succession4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xvi73 ,our thoughts will not be unstable1 going to and fro from one thing to another2 but we shall see all we know at one glance4 ,i answer that1 ,what is seen in the ,word is seen not successively1 but at the same time4 ,in proof whereof1 we ourselves cannot know many things all at once1 forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas4 ,but our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time1 so as to understand by them2 as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously4 ,hence1 when many things can be understood by one idea1 they are understood at the same time2 as the parts of a whole are understood successively1 and not all at the same time1 if each one is understood by its own idea2 whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole1 they are understood simultaneously4 ,now it was shown above that things seen in ,god1 are not seen singly by their own similitude2 but all are seen by the one essence of ,god4 ,hence they are seen simultaneously1 and not successively4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we understand one thing only when we understand by one idea2 but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously1 as in the idea of a man we understand animal and rational2 and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as regards their natural knowledge1 whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them1 the angels do not know all things simultaneously1 and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time2 but as regards what they see in ,god1 they see all at the same time4 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #aa ,whether ,anyone in ,this ,life ,can ,see the ,essence of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that one can in this life see the ,divine essence4 ,for ,jacob said3 ,i have seen ,god face to face 7,gen4 #cb3cj74 ,but to see ,him face to face is to see ,his essence1 as appears from the words3 ,we see now in a glass and in a dark manner1 but then face to face 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ab74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,lord said to ,moses3 ,i speak to him mouth to mouth1 and plainly1 and not by riddles and figures doth he see the ,lord 7,num4 #ab3h72 but this is to see ,god in ,his essence4 ,therefore it is possible to see the essence of ,god in this life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that wherein we know all other things1 and whereby we judge of other things1 is known in itself to us4 ,but even now we know all things in ,god2 for ,augustine says 7,confess4 viii73 ,if we both see that what you say is true1 and we both see that what ,i say is true2 where1 ,i ask1 do we see this8 neither ,i in thee1 nor thou in me2 but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds4 ,he also says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxx7 that1 ,we judge of all things according to the divine truth2 and 7,de ,trin4 xii7 that1 it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas2 which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable4 ,therefore even in this life we see ,god ,himself4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bd1 #be71 those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision4 ,but intellectual vision is of intelligible things1 not by similitudes1 but by their very essences1 as he also says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xiii1 #bd1 #be74 ,therefore since ,god is in our soul by ,his essence1 it follows that ,he is seen by us in ,his essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written1 ,man shall not see ,me1 and live 7,ex4 #cb3bj71 and a gloss upon this says1 ,in this mortal life ,god can be seen by certain images1 but not by the likeness itself of ,his own nature4 ,i answer that1 ,god cannot be seen in ,his essence by a mere human being1 except he be separated from this mortal life4 ,the reason is because1 as was said above 7,a4 #d71 the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower4 ,but our soul1 as long as we live in this life1 has its being in corporeal matter2 hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter1 or what can be known by such a form4 ,now it is evident that the ,divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things4 ,for it was shown above 7,,aa4 #b1 #i7 that the knowledge of ,god by means of any created similitude is not the vision of ,his essence4 ,hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of ,god4 ,this can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things1 the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things4 ,hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly4 ,it is not possible1 therefore1 that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects1 i4e4 to the divine essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv7 a man is said in the ,scriptures to see ,god in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination1 according to some similitude representing in part the divinity4 ,so when ,jacob says1 ,i have seen ,god face to face1 this does not mean the ,divine essence1 but some figure representing ,god4 ,and this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy1 so that ,god seems to speak1 though in an imaginary vision2 as will later be explained 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #agd7 in treating of the degrees of prophecy4 ,we may also say that ,jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation1 above the ordinary state4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,god works miracles in corporeal things1 so also ,he does supernatural wonders above the common order1 raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense1 even up to the vision of ,his own essence2 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bf1 #bg1 #bh7 of ,moses1 the teacher of the ,jews2 and of ,paul1 the teacher of the ,gentiles4 ,this will be treated more fully in the question of rapture 7,,ii-,,ii1 ,q4 #age74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all things are said to be seen in ,god and all things are judged in ,him1 because by the participation of ,his light1 we know and judge all things2 for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light2 as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun1 i4e41 by the sun's light4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 i1 #h71 ,the lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun1 namely ,god4 ,as therefore in order to see a sensible object1 it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun1 so in like manner to see any intelligible object1 it is not necessary to see the essence of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence1 as intelligible things are in the intellect4 ,and thus ,god is in the souls of the blessed2 not thus is ,he in our soul1 but by presence1 essence and power4 ,,twelfth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #ab ,whether ,god ,can ,be ,known in ,this ,life by ,natural ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that by natural reason we cannot know ,god in this life4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 v7 that reason does not grasp simple form4 ,but ,god is a supremely simple form1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore natural reason cannot attain to know ,him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination4 ,but we cannot have an imagination of ,god1 ,who is incorporeal4 ,therefore we cannot know ,god by natural knowledge4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil1 inasmuch as they have a common nature4 ,but the knowledge of ,god belongs only to the good2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i73 ,the weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith4 ,therefore ,god cannot be known by natural reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #a3ai71 ,that which is known of ,god1 namely1 what can be known of ,god by natural reason1 is manifest in them4 ,i answer that1 ,our natural knowledge begins from sense4 ,hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things4 ,but our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of ,god2 because the sensible effects of ,god do not equal the power of ,god as their cause4 ,hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of ,god cannot be known2 nor therefore can ,his essence be seen4 ,but because they are ,his effects and depend on their cause1 we can be led from them so far as to know of ,god whether ,he exists1 and to know of ,him what must necessarily belong to ,him1 as the first cause of all things1 exceeding all things caused by ,him4 ,hence we know that ,his relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all2 also that creatures differ from ,him1 inasmuch as ,he is not in any way part of what is caused by ,him2 and that creatures are not removed from ,him by reason of any defect on ,his part1 but because ,he superexceeds them all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason cannot reach up to simple form1 so as to know what it is2 but it can know whether it is4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is known by natural knowledge through the images of ,his effects4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the knowledge of ,god's essence is by grace1 it belongs only to the good2 but the knowledge of ,him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad2 and hence ,augustine says 7,retract4 i71 retracting what he had said before3 ,i do not approve what ,i said in prayer1 ',god who willest that only the pure should know truth4' ,for it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths1 i4e4 by natural reason4 ,,thirteenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ab1 ,art4 #ac ,whether by ,grace a ,higher ,knowledge of ,god ,can ,be ,obtained ,than by ,natural ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that by grace a higher knowledge of ,god is not obtained than by natural reason4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,de ,mystica ,theol4 i7 that whoever is the more united to ,god in this life1 is united to ,him as to one entirely unknown4 ,he says the same of ,moses1 who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace4 ,but to be united to ,god while ignoring of ,him what ,he is1 comes about also by natural reason4 ,therefore ,god is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination2 and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 that it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils4 ,therefore we cannot know ,god more fully by grace than by natural reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 our intellect adheres to ,god by grace of faith4 ,but faith does not seem to be knowledge2 for ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxvi in ,ev47 that things not seen are the objects of faith1 and not of knowledge4 ,therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of ,god by grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says that ,god hath revealed to us ,his spirit1 what none of the princes of this world knew 7#a ,cor4 #b3aj71 namely1 the philosophers1 as the gloss expounds4 ,i answer that1 ,we have a more perfect knowledge of ,god by grace than by natural reason4 ,which is proved thus4 ,the knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things3 images derived from the sensible objects2 and the natural intelligible light1 enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions4 ,now in both of these1 human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace4 ,for the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light2 and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed1 so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects1 as appears in prophetic visions2 while sometimes sensible things1 or even voices1 are divinely formed to express some divine meaning2 as in the ,baptism1 the ,holy ,ghost was seen in the shape of a dove1 and the voice of the ,father was heard1 ,this is ,my beloved ,son 7,matt4 #c3ag74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of ,god what ,he is1 and thus are united to ,him as to one unknown2 still we know ,him more fully according as many and more excellent of ,his effects are demonstrated to us1 and according as we attribute to ,him some things known by divine revelation1 to which natural reason cannot reach1 as1 for instance1 that ,god is ,three and ,one4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the images either received from sense in the natural order1 or divinely formed in the imagination1 we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge1 the stronger the intelligible light is in man2 and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,faith is a kind of knowledge1 inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object4 ,but this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer1 but from the vision of ,him who is believed4 ,thus as far as faith falls short of vision1 it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science1 for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles4 ,,question #ac ,,the ,,names ,,of ,,god 7,in ,twelve ,articles7 ,after the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge1 we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names4 ,for everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it4 ,under this head1 there are twelve points for inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god can be named by us8 7#b7 ,whether any names applied to ,god are predicated of ,him substantially8 7#c7 ,whether any names applied to ,god are said of ,him literally1 or are all to be taken metaphorically8 7#d7 ,whether any names applied to ,god are synonymous8 7#e7 ,whether some names are applied to ,god and to creatures univocally or equivocally8 7#f7 ,whether1 supposing they are applied analogically1 they are applied first to ,god or to creatures8 7#g7 ,whether any names are applicable to ,god from time8 7#h7 ,whether this name ,god is a name of nature1 or of the operation8 7#i7 ,whether this name ,god is a communicable name8 7#aj7 ,whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying ,god1 by nature1 by participation1 and by opinion8 7#aa7 ,whether this name1 ,who is1 is the supremely appropriate name of ,god8 7#ab7 ,whether affirmative propositions can be formed about ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,name ,can ,be ,given to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that no name can be given to ,god4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i7 that1 ,of ,him there is neither name1 nor can one be found of ,him2 and it is written3 ,what is ,his name1 and what is the name of ,his ,son1 if thou knowest8 7,prov4 #cj3d74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every name is either abstract or concrete4 ,but concrete names do not belong to ,god1 since ,he is simple1 nor do abstract names belong to ,him1 forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing4 ,therefore no name can be said of ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nouns are taken to signify substance with quality2 verbs and participles signify substance with time2 pronouns the same with demonstration or relation4 ,but none of these can be applied to ,god1 for ,he has no quality1 nor accident1 nor time2 moreover1 ,he cannot be felt1 so as to be pointed out2 nor can ,he be described by relation1 inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns1 participles1 or demonstrative pronouns4 ,therefore ,god cannot in any way be named by us4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4 #ae3c73 ,the ,lord is a man of war1 ,almighty is ,his name4 ,i answer that1 ,since according to the ,philosopher 7,peri ,herm4 i71 words are signs of ideas1 and ideas the similitude of things1 it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception4 ,it follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it4 ,now it was shown above 7,q4 #ab1 ,,aa4 #aa1 #ab7 that in this life we cannot see the essence of ,god2 but we know ,god from creatures as their principle1 and also by way of excellence and remotion4 ,in this way therefore ,he can be named by us from creatures1 yet not so that the name which signifies ,him expresses the divine essence in itself4 ,thus the name man expresses the essence of man in himself1 since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence2 for the idea expressed by the name is the definition4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the reason why ,god has no name1 or is said to be above being named1 is because ,his essence is above all that we understand about ,god1 and signify in word4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,because we know and name ,god from creatures1 the names we attribute to ,god signify what belongs to material creatures1 of which the knowledge is natural to us4 ,and because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound2 whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing1 but rather is that whereby a thing is2 hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things2 whereas names given to signify simple forms1 signify a thing not as subsisting1 but as that whereby a thing is2 as1 for instance1 whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white4 ,and as ,god is simple1 and subsisting1 we attribute to ,him abstract names to signify ,his simplicity1 and concrete names to signify ,his substance and perfection1 although both these kinds of names fail to express ,his mode of being1 forasmuch as our intellect does not know ,him in this life as ,he is4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to signify substance with quality is to signify the suppositum with a nature or determined form in which it subsists4 ,hence1 as some things are said of ,god in a concrete sense1 to signify ,his subsistence and perfection1 so likewise nouns are applied to ,god signifying substance with quality4 ,further1 verbs and participles which signify time1 are applied to ,him because ,his eternity includes all time4 ,for as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things1 so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things1 because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things4 ,but demonstrative pronouns are applied to ,god as describing what is understood1 not what is sensed4 ,for we can only describe ,him as far as we understand ,him4 ,thus1 according as nouns1 participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to ,god1 so far can ,he be signified by relative pronouns4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,any ,name ,can ,be ,applied to ,god ,substantially8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that no name can be applied to ,god substantially4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #i73 ,everything said of ,god signifies not ,his substance1 but rather shows forth what ,he is not2 or expresses some relation1 or something following from ,his nature or operation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i73 ,you will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of ,god4 ,thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising ,god are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves4 ,but what expresses the procession of anything1 does not signify its essence4 ,therefore the names applied to ,god are not said of ,him substantially4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a thing is named by us according as we understand it4 ,but ,god is not understood by us in this life in ,his substance4 ,therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi73 ,the being of ,god is the being strong1 or the being wise1 or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby ,his substance is signified4 ,therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance4 ,i answer that1 ,negative names applied to ,god1 or signifying ,his relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify ,his substance1 but rather express the distance of the creature from ,him1 or ,his relation to something else1 or rather1 the relation of creatures to ,himself4 ,but as regards absolute and affirmative names of ,god1 as good1 wise1 and the like1 various and many opinions have been given4 ,for some have said that all such names1 although they are applied to ,god affirmatively1 nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from ,god1 rather than to express anything that exists positively in ,him4 ,hence they assert that when we say that ,god lives1 we mean that ,god is not like an inanimate thing2 and the same in like manner applies to other names2 and this was taught by ,rabbi ,moses4 ,others say that these names applied to ,god signify ,his relationship towards creatures3 thus in the words1 ,god is good1 we mean1 ,god is the cause of goodness in things2 and the same rule applies to other names4 ,both of these opinions1 however1 seem to be untrue for three reasons4 ,first because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to ,god4 ,for ,he is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as ,he is the cause of good things2 therefore if the words ,god is good1 signified no more than1 ,god is the cause of good things1 it might in like manner be said that ,god is a body1 inasmuch as ,he is the cause of bodies4 ,so also to say that ,he is a body implies that ,he is not a mere potentiality1 as is primary matter4 ,secondly1 because it would follow that all names applied to ,god would be said of ,him by way of being taken in a secondary sense1 as healthy is secondarily said of medicine1 forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy4 ,thirdly1 because this is against the intention of those who speak of ,god4 ,for in saying that ,god lives1 they assuredly mean more than to say the ,he is the cause of our life1 or that ,he differs from inanimate bodies4 ,therefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz4 that these names signify the divine substance1 and are predicated substantially of ,god1 although they fall short of a full representation of ,him4 ,which is proved thus4 ,for these names express ,god1 so far as our intellects know ,him4 ,now since our intellect knows ,god from creatures1 it knows ,him as far as creatures represent ,him4 ,now it is shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b7 that ,god prepossesses in ,himself all the perfections of creatures1 being ,himself simply and universally perfect4 ,hence every creature represents ,him1 and is like ,him so far as it possesses some perfection2 yet it represents ,him not as something of the same species or genus1 but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short1 although they derive some kind of likeness thereto1 even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun4 ,this was explained above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c71 in treating of the divine perfection4 ,therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance1 but in an imperfect manner1 even as creatures represent it imperfectly4 ,so when we say1 ,god is good1 the meaning is not1 ,god is the cause of goodness1 or ,god is not evil2 but the meaning is1 ,whatever good we attribute to creatures1 pre-exists in ,god1 and in a more excellent and higher way4 ,hence it does not follow that ,god is good1 because ,he causes goodness2 but rather1 on the contrary1 ,he causes goodness in things because ,he is good2 according to what ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cb71 ,because ,he is good1 we are4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,damascene says that these names do not signify what ,god is1 forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what ,he is2 but each one signifies ,him in an imperfect manner1 even as creatures represent ,him imperfectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the significance of names1 that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify1 as for instance1 this name stone lapis is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot loedit pedem1 but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot1 but rather to signify a certain kind of body2 otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone 99,this refers to the ,latin etymology of the word lapis1 which has no place in ,english4 ,so we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions2 for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections1 creatures are the representations of ,god1 although in an imperfect manner2 so likewise our intellect knows and names ,god according to each kind of procession2 but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves1 as if when we say ,god lives1 the sense were1 life proceeds from ,him2 but to signify the principle itself of things1 in so far as life pre-exists in ,him1 although it pre-exists in ,him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we cannot know the essence of ,god in this life1 as ,he really is in ,himself2 but we know ,him accordingly as ,he is represented in the perfections of creatures2 and thus the names imposed by us signify ,him in that manner only4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,name ,can ,be ,applied to ,god in ,its ,literal ,sense8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that no name is applied literally to ,god4 ,for all names which we apply to ,god are taken from creatures2 as was explained above 7,a4 #a74 ,but the names of creatures are applied to ,god metaphorically1 as when we say1 ,god is a stone1 or a lion1 or the like4 ,therefore names are applied to ,god in a metaphorical sense4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it4 ,but all such names as good1 wise1 and the like are more truly withheld from ,god than given to ,him2 as appears from ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 ii74 ,therefore none of these names belong to ,god in their literal sense4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 corporeal names are applied to ,god in a metaphorical sense only2 since ,he is incorporeal4 ,but all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition2 for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions4 ,therefore all these names are applied to ,god in a metaphorical sense4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide ii71 ,some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity1 and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty1 but others there are which are applied to ,god metaphorically by way of similitude4 ,therefore not all names are applied to ,god in a metaphorical sense1 but there are some which are said of ,him in their literal sense4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the preceding article1 our knowledge of ,god is derived from the perfections which flow from ,him to creatures1 which perfections are in ,god in a more eminent way than in creatures4 ,now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures1 and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names4 ,therefore as to the names applied to ,god--viz4 the perfections which they signify1 such as goodness1 life and the like1 and their mode of signification4 ,as regards what is signified by these names1 they belong properly to ,god1 and more properly than they belong to creatures1 and are applied primarily to ,him4 ,but as regards their mode of signification1 they do not properly and strictly apply to ,god2 for their mode of signification applies to creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there are some names which signify these perfections flowing from ,god to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as stone signifies a material being1 and names of this kind can be applied to ,god only in a metaphorical sense4 ,other names1 however1 express these perfections absolutely1 without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words being1 good1 living1 and the like1 and such names can be literally applied to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,such names as these1 as ,dionysius shows1 are denied of ,god for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to ,him in the ordinary sense of its signification1 but in a more eminent way4 ,hence ,dionysius says also that ,god is above all substance and all life4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these names which are applied to ,god literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified1 but as regards their mode of signification2 whereas those which are applied to ,god metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,names ,applied to ,god ,are ,synonymous8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that these names applied to ,god are synonymous names4 ,for synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same4 ,but these names applied to ,god mean entirely the same thing in ,god2 for the goodness of ,god is ,his essence1 and likewise it is ,his wisdom4 ,therefore these names are entirely synonymous4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality1 but differ in idea1 it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion4 ,therefore if these ideas are many1 and the thing is one1 it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a thing which is one in reality and in idea1 is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea4 ,but ,god is supremely one4 ,therefore it seems that ,he is not one in reality and many in idea2 and thus the names applied to ,god do not signify different ideas2 and thus they are synonymous4 ,on the contrary1 ,all synonyms united with each other are redundant1 as when we say1 vesture clothing4 ,therefore if all names applied to ,god are synonymous1 we cannot properly say good ,god or the like1 and yet it is written1 ,o most mighty1 great and powerful1 the ,lord of hosts is ,thy name 7,jer4 #cb3ah74 ,i answer that1 ,these names spoken of ,god are not synonymous4 ,this would be easy to understand1 if we said that these names are used to remove1 or to express the relation of cause to creatures2 for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of ,god1 or as regards diverse effects connoted4 ,but even according to what was said above 7,a4 #b71 that these names signify the divine substance1 although in an imperfect manner1 it is also clear from what has been said 7,,aa4 #a1 #b7 that they have diverse meanings4 ,for the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name4 ,but our intellect1 since it knows ,god from creatures1 in order to understand ,god1 forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from ,god to creatures1 which perfections pre-exist in ,god unitedly and simply1 whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied4 ,as therefore1 to the different perfections of creatures1 there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner1 so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect1 there corresponds one altogether simple principle1 according to these conceptions1 imperfectly understood4 ,therefore although the names applied to ,god signify one thing1 still because they signify that under many and different aspects1 they are not synonymous4 ,thus appears the solution of the ,first ,objection1 since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect2 for words which signify different aspects of one thing1 do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing2 because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception1 as was said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the many aspects of these names are not empty and vain1 for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the perfect unity of ,god requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in ,him simply and unitedly4 ,thus it comes about that ,he is one in reality1 and yet multiple in idea1 because our intellect apprehends ,him in a manifold manner1 as things represent ,him4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,what ,is ,said of ,god and of ,creatures ,is ,univocally ,predicated of ,them8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the things attributed to ,god and creatures are univocal4 ,for every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal1 as many are reduced to one2 for if the name dog be said equivocally of the barking dog1 and of the dogfish1 it must be said of some univocally--viz4 of all barking dogs2 otherwise we proceed to infinitude4 ,now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition1 as man generates man2 and there are some agents which are equivocal1 as the sun which causes heat1 although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense4 ,therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced1 is an univocal agent3 and thus what is said of ,god and creatures1 is predicated univocally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no similitude among equivocal things4 ,therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to ,god1 according to the word of ,genesis 7,gen4 #a3bf71 ,let us make man to our image and likeness1 it seems that something can be said of ,god and creatures univocally4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 measure is homogeneous with the thing measured4 ,but ,god is the first measure of all beings4 ,therefore ,god is homogeneous with creatures2 and thus a word may be applied univocally to ,god and to creatures4 ,on the contrary1 whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense1 is predicated equivocally4 ,but no name belongs to ,god in the same sense that it belongs to creatures2 for instance1 wisdom in creatures is a quality1 but not in ,god4 ,now a different genus changes an essence1 since the genus is part of the definition2 and the same applies to other things4 ,therefore whatever is said of ,god and of creatures is predicated equivocally4 ,further1 ,god is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other4 ,but the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible1 as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus4 ,therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of ,god and creatures2 and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them4 ,i answer that1 ,univocal predication is impossible between ,god and creatures4 ,the reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause1 receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree1 but in a measure that falls short1 so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply1 and in the same manner2 as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things4 ,in the same way1 as said in the preceding article1 all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied1 pre-exist in ,god unitedly4 ,thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature1 it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections2 as1 for instance1 by the term wise applied to man1 we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence1 and distinct from his power and existence1 and from all similar things2 whereas when we apply to it ,god1 we do not mean to signify anything distinct from ,his essence1 or power1 or existence4 ,thus also this term wise applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified2 whereas this is not the case when it is applied to ,god2 but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended1 and as exceeding the signification of the name4 ,hence it is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same way to ,god and to man4 ,the same rule applies to other terms4 ,hence no name is predicated univocally of ,god and of creatures4 ,neither1 on the other hand1 are names applied to ,god and creatures in a purely equivocal sense1 as some have said4 ,because if that were so1 it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about ,god at all2 for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation4 ,such a view is against the philosophers1 who proved many things about ,god1 and also against what the ,apostle says3 ,the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made 7,rom4 #a3bj74 ,therefore it must be said that these names are said of ,god and creatures in an analogous sense1 i4e4 according to proportion4 ,now names are thus used in two ways3 either according as many things are proportionate to one1 thus for example healthy predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body1 of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause3 or according as one thing is proportionate to another1 thus healthy is said of medicine and animal1 since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body4 ,and in this way some things are said of ,god and creatures analogically1 and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense4 ,for we can name ,god only from creatures 7,a4 #a74 ,thus whatever is said of ,god and creatures1 is said according to the relation of a creature to ,god as its principle and cause1 wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently4 ,now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation4 ,for in analogies the idea is not1 as it is in univocals1 one and the same1 yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals2 but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing2 thus healthy applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health1 and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal1 still in actions1 the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent4 ,for the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species1 as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men2 whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species 7otherwise it would be the cause of itself1 since it is contained in the species71 but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation4 ,therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent2 and the universal cause comes before the particular cause4 ,but this universal agent1 whilst it is not univocal1 nevertheless is not altogether equivocal1 otherwise it could not produce its own likeness1 but rather it is to be called an analogical agent1 as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication1 which is being4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the likeness of the creature to ,god is imperfect1 for it does not represent one and the same generic thing 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god is not the measure proportioned to things measured2 hence it is not necessary that ,god and creatures should be in the same genus4 ,the arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of ,god and creatures2 yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,names ,predicated of ,god ,are ,predicated ,primarily of ,creatures8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of ,god4 ,for we name anything accordingly as we know it1 since names1 as the ,philosopher says1 are signs of ideas4 ,but we know creatures before we know ,god4 ,therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i73 ,we name ,god from creatures4 ,but names transferred from creatures to ,god1 are said primarily of creatures rather than of ,god1 as lion1 stone1 and the like4 ,therefore all names applied to ,god and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all names equally applied to ,god and creatures1 are applied to ,god as the cause of all creatures1 as ,dionysius says 7,de ,mystica ,theol474 ,but what is applied to anything through its cause1 is applied to it secondarily1 for healthy is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine1 which is the cause of health4 ,therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written1 ,i bow my knees to the ,father1 of our ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 of ,whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named 7,eph4 #c3ad1ae72 and the same applies to the other names applied to ,god and creatures4 ,therefore these names are applied primarily to ,god rather than to creatures4 ,i answer that1 ,in names predicated of many in an analogical sense1 all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing2 and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all4 ,and since that expressed by the name is the definition1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iv71 such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things1 and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first4 ,thus1 for instance1 healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine1 which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal2 and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine1 which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health4 ,thus all names applied metaphorically to ,god1 are applied to creatures primarily rather than to ,god1 because when said of ,god they mean only similitudes to such creatures4 ,for as smiling applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness1 so the name of lion applied to ,god means only that ,god manifests strength in ,his works1 as a lion in his4 ,thus it is clear that applied to ,god the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures4 ,but to other names not applied to ,god in a metaphorical sense1 the same rule would apply if they were spoken of ,god as the cause only1 as some have supposed4 ,for when it is said1 ,god is good1 it would then only mean ,god is the cause of the creature's goodness2 thus the term good applied to ,god would included in its meaning the creature's goodness4 ,hence good would apply primarily to creatures rather than to ,god4 ,but as was shown above 7,a4 #b71 these names are applied to ,god not as the cause only1 but also essentially4 ,for the words1 ,god is good1 or wise1 signify not only that ,he is the cause of wisdom or goodness1 but that these exist in ,him in a more excellent way4 ,hence as regards what the name signifies1 these names are applied primarily to ,god rather than to creatures1 because these perfections flow from ,god to creatures2 but as regards the imposition of the names1 they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first4 ,hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures1 as said above 7,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection refers to the imposition of the name4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names1 as said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection would be valid if these names were applied to ,god only as cause1 and not also essentially1 for instance as healthy is applied to medicine4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,names ,which ,imply ,relation to ,creatures ,are ,predicated of ,god ,temporally8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of ,god temporally4 ,for all such names signify the divine substance1 as is universally held4 ,hence also ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide i7 that this name ,lord is the name of power1 which is the divine substance2 and ,creator signifies the action of ,god1 which is ,his essence4 ,now the divine substance is not temporal1 but eternal4 ,therefore these names are not applied to ,god temporally1 but eternally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that to which something applies temporally can be described as made2 for what is white temporally is made white4 ,but to make does not apply to ,god4 ,therefore nothing can be predicated of ,god temporally4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if any names are applied to ,god temporally as implying relation to creatures1 the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures4 ,but some names are spoken of ,god implying relation of ,god to creatures from eternity2 for from eternity ,he knew and loved the creature1 according to the word3 ,i have loved thee with an everlasting love 7,jer4 #ca3c74 ,therefore also other names implying relation to creatures1 as ,lord and ,creator1 are applied to ,god from eternity4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 names of this kind signify relation4 ,therefore that relation must be something in ,god1 or in the creature only4 ,but it cannot be that it is something in the creature only1 for in that case ,god would be called ,lord from the opposite relation which is in creatures2 and nothing is named from its opposite4 ,therefore the relation must be something in ,god also4 ,but nothing temporal can be in ,god1 for ,he is above time4 ,therefore these names are not applied to ,god temporally4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 a thing is called relative from relation2 for instance lord from lordship1 as white from whiteness4 ,therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in ,god1 but only in idea1 it follows that ,god is not really ,lord1 which is plainly false4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature1 one can exist without the other2 as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it1 as the ,philosopher says 7,praedic4 v74 ,but relative things which are said of ,god and creatures are not simultaneous in nature4 ,therefore a relation can be predicated of ,god to the creature even without the existence of the creature2 and thus these names ,lord and ,creator are predicated of ,god from eternity1 and not temporally4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v7 that this relative appellation ,lord is applied to ,god temporally4 ,i answer that1 ,the names which import relation to creatures are applied to ,god temporally1 and not from eternity4 ,to see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality1 but only an idea4 ,but this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude4 ,nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes1 it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical4 ,sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only1 as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason2 as when we say a thing the same as itself4 ,for reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two2 thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself4 ,and the same applies to relations between being and non-being formed by reason1 apprehending non-being as an extreme4 ,the same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason1 as genus and species1 and the like4 ,now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes1 as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both2 as is clear of all relations1 consequent upon quantity2 as great and small1 double and half1 and the like2 for quantity exists in both extremes3 and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion1 as motive power and the movable thing1 father and son1 and the like4 ,again1 sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality1 while in the other extreme it is an idea only2 and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order2 as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things2 which1 inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature1 are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence4 ,therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists1 because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things2 whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order1 and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense1 but only in idea1 inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v7 that they are called relative1 not forasmuch as they are related to other things1 but as others are related to them4 ,likewise for instance1 on the right is not applied to a column1 unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side2 which relation is not really in the column1 but in the animal4 ,since therefore ,god is outside the whole order of creation1 and all creatures are ordered to ,him1 and not conversely1 it is manifest that creatures are really related to ,god ,himself2 whereas in ,god there is no real relation to creatures1 but a relation only in idea1 inasmuch as creatures are referred to ,him4 ,thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of ,god temporally1 not by reason of any change in ,him1 but by reason of the change of the creature2 as a column is on the right of an animal1 without change in itself1 but by change in the animal4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves1 as master and servant1 father1 and son1 and the like1 and these relatives are called predicamental secundum esse4 ,but others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes1 as the mover and the thing moved1 the head and the thing that has a head1 and the like3 and these relatives are called transcendental secundum dici4 ,thus1 there is the same two-fold difference in divine names4 ,for some signify the habitude itself to the creature1 as ,lord1 and these do not signify the divine substance directly1 but indirectly1 in so far as they presuppose the divine substance2 as dominion presupposes power1 which is the divine substance4 ,others signify the divine essence directly1 and consequently the corresponding habitudes1 as ,saviour1 ,creator1 and suchlike2 and these signify the action of ,god1 which is ,his essence4 ,yet both names are said of ,god temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently1 but not as signifying the essence1 either directly or indirectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as relations applied to ,god temporally are only in ,god in our idea1 so1 to become or to be made are applied to ,god only in idea1 with no change in ,him1 as for instance when we say1 ,lord1 ,thou art become ,douay3 'hast been' our refuge 7,ps4 #hi3a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator1 therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will1 are applied to ,god from eternity2 whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to ,god temporally1 as ,saviour1 ,creator1 and the like4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,relations signified by these names which are applied to ,god temporally1 are in ,god only in idea2 but the opposite relations in creatures are real4 ,nor is it incongruous that ,god should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing1 yet so that the opposite relations in ,god should also be understood by us at the same time2 in the sense that ,god is spoken of relatively to the creature1 inasmuch as the creature is related to ,him3 thus the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v7 that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,since ,god is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to ,him3 and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature1 it follows that ,god is ,lord not in idea only1 but in reality2 for ,he is called ,lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,to know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise1 it is not necessary to consider the order of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves4 ,for if one in its idea includes another1 and vice versa1 then they are simultaneous by nature3 as double and half1 father and son1 and the like4 ,but if one in its idea includes another1 and not vice versa1 they are not simultaneous by nature4 ,this applies to science and its object2 for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality1 and the science as a habit1 or as an act4 ,hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science1 but if the same object is considered in act1 then it is simultaneous with science in act2 for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known4 ,thus1 though ,god is prior to the creature1 still because the signification of ,lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa1 these two relative terms1 ,lord and servant1 are simultaneous by nature4 ,hence1 ,god was not ,lord until ,he had a creature subject to ,himself4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,this ,name ,god ,is a ,name of the ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that this name1 ,god1 is not a name of the nature4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 #a7 that ,god 7,theos7 is so called from theein which means to take care of1 and to cherish all things2 or from aithein that is1 to burn1 for our ,god is a fire consuming all malice2 or from theasthai1 which means to consider all things4 ,but all these names belong to operation4 ,therefore this name ,god signifies ,his operation and not ,his nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing is named by us as we know it4 ,but the divine nature is unknown to us4 ,therefore this name ,god does not signify the divine nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide i7 that ,god is a name of the nature4 ,i answer that1 ,whence a name is imposed1 and what the name signifies are not always the same thing4 ,for as we know substance from its properties and operations1 so we name substance sometimes for its operation1 or its property2 e4g4 we name the substance of a stone from its act1 as for instance that it hurts the foot loedit pedem2 but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action1 but the stone's substance4 ,the things1 on the other hand1 known to us in themselves1 such as heat1 cold1 whiteness and the like1 are not named from other things4 ,hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same4 ,because therefore ,god is not known to us in ,his nature1 but is made known to us from ,his operations or effects1 we name ,him from these1 as said in ,a4 #a2 hence this name ,god is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning4 ,for this name is imposed from ,his universal providence over all things2 since all who speak of ,god intend to name ,god as exercising providence over all2 hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii71 ,the ,deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness4 ,but taken from this operation1 this name ,god is imposed to signify the divine nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all that ,damascene says refers to providence2 which is the source of the signification of the name ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects4 ,hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property1 this name stone signifies the nature of the stone itself2 for it signifies the definition of stone1 by which we know what it is1 for the idea which the name signifies is the definition1 as is said in ,metaph4 iv4 ,now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself1 so as to know what it is2 but only by way of eminence1 and by way of causality1 and of negation as stated above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #ab74 ,thus the name ,god signifies the divine nature1 for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things1 the principle of all things and removed from all things2 for those who name ,god intend to signify all this4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,this ,name ,god ,is ,communicable8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that this name ,god is communicable4 ,for whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself4 ,but this name ,god signifies the divine nature1 which is communicable to others1 according to the words1 ,he hath given us great ,vulg43 'most great' and precious promises1 that by these we ,vulg43 'ye' may be made partakers of the divine nature 7#b ,pet4 #a3d74 ,therefore this name ,god can be communicated to others4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 only proper names are not communicable4 ,now this name ,god is not a proper1 but an appellative noun2 which appears from the fact that it has a plural1 according to the text1 ,i have said1 ,you are gods 7,ps4 #ha3f74 ,therefore this name ,god is communicable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 this name ,god comes from operation1 as explained4 ,but other names given to ,god from ,his operations or effects are communicable2 as good1 wise1 and the like4 ,therefore this name ,god is communicable4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,they gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones 7,wis4 #ad3ba71 in reference to the divine name4 ,therefore this name ,god is incommunicable4 ,i answer that1 ,a name is communicable in two ways3 properly1 and by similitude4 ,it is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many2 by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name4 ,for instance this name lion is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as lion2 by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion1 as for instance by courage1 or strength1 and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically4 ,to know1 however1 what names are properly communicable1 we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject1 by which it is individualized1 is common to many either in reality1 or in idea2 as human nature is common to many in reality1 and in idea2 whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality1 but only in idea2 for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects2 and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular4 ,hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species4 ,so1 given the idea of a species1 it can be understood as existing in many4 ,but the singular1 from the fact that it is singular1 is divided off from all others4 ,hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea2 for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be2 nor can it be conceived in idea4 ,hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many1 but only by way of similitude2 as for instance a person can be called ,achilles metaphorically1 forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of ,achilles1 such as strength4 ,on the other hand1 forms which are individualized not by any suppositum1 but by and of themselves1 as being subsisting forms1 if understood as they are in themselves1 could not be communicable either in reality or in idea2 but only perhaps by way of similitude1 as was said of individuals4 ,forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are1 we understand them as compound things having forms in matter2 therefore1 as was said in the first article1 we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some suppositum4 ,hence1 so far as concerns images1 the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures4 ,since1 then1 this name ,god is given to signify the divine nature as stated above 7,a4 #h71 and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #c71 it follows that this name ,god is incommunicable in reality1 but communicable in opinion2 just in the same way as this name sun would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns4 ,therefore1 it is written3 ,you served them who by nature are not gods1 7,gal4 #d3h71 and a gloss adds1 ,gods not in nature1 but in human opinion4 ,nevertheless this name ,god is communicable1 not in its whole signification1 but in some part of it by way of similitude2 so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness1 according to the text1 ,i have said1 ,you are gods 7,ps4 #ha3f74 ,but if any name were given to signify ,god not as to ,his nature but as to ,his suppositum1 accordingly as ,he is considered as this something1 that name would be absolutely incommunicable2 as1 for instance1 perhaps the ,tetragrammaton among the ,hebrew2 and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this name ,god is an appellative name1 and not a proper name1 for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor2 although ,god ,himself in reality is neither universal nor particular4 ,for names do not follow upon the mode of being in things1 but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind4 ,and yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing1 as was said above concerning the name sun4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these names good1 wise1 and the like1 are imposed from the perfections proceeding from ,god to creatures2 but they do not signify the divine nature1 but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely2 and therefore they are in truth communicable to many4 ,but this name ,god is given to ,god from ,his own proper operation1 which we experience continually1 to signify the divine nature4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,this ,name ,god ,is ,applied to ,god ,univocally by ,nature1 by ,participation1 and ,according to ,opinion8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that this name ,god is applied to ,god univocally by nature1 by participation1 and according to opinion4 ,for where a diverse signification exists1 there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation2 for equivocation prevents contradiction4 ,but a ,catholic who says3 ,an idol is not ,god1 contradicts a pagan who says3 ,an idol is ,god4 ,therefore ,god in both senses is spoken of univocally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as an idol is ,god in opinion1 and not in truth1 so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion1 and not in truth4 ,but this name beatitude is applied univocally to this supposed happiness1 and also to true happiness4 ,therefore also this name ,god is applied univocally to the true ,god1 and to ,god also in opinion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 names are called univocal because they contain one idea4 ,now when a ,catholic says3 ,there is one ,god1 he understands by the name ,god an omnipotent being1 and one venerated above all2 while the heathen understands the same when he says3 ,an idol is ,god4 ,therefore this name ,god is applied univocally to both4 ,on the contrary1 ,the idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in ,peri ,herm4 i4 ,but the word animal applied to a true animal1 and to a picture of one1 is equivocal4 ,therefore this name ,god applied to the true ,god and to ,god in opinion is applied equivocally4 ,further1 ,no one can signify what he does not know4 ,but the heathen does not know the divine nature4 ,so when he says an idol is ,god1 he does not signify the true ,deity4 ,on the other hand1 a ,catholic signifies the true ,deity when he says that there is one ,god4 ,therefore this name ,god is not applied univocally1 but equivocally to the true ,god1 and to ,god according to opinion4 ,i answer that1 ,this name ,god in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally1 but analogically4 ,this is apparent from this reason3 ,univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing1 but equivocal terms absolutely different2 whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses2 as1 for instance1 being which is applied to substance is placed in the definition of being as applied to accident2 and healthy applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine4 ,for urine is the sign of health in the animal1 and medicine is the cause of health4 ,the same applies to the question at issue4 ,for this name ,god1 as signifying the true ,god1 includes the idea of ,god when it is used to denote ,god in opinion1 or participation4 ,for when we name anyone god by participation1 we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true ,god4 ,likewise1 when we call an idol god1 by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is ,god2 thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings1 but that one of them is comprised in the other significations4 ,hence it is manifestly said analogically4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name1 but on the signification3 for this name man1 of whomsoever it is predicated1 whether truly or falsely1 is predicated in one sense4 ,but it would be multiplied if by the name man we meant to signify different things2 for instance1 if one meant to signify by this name man what man really is1 and another meant to signify by the same name a stone1 or something else4 ,hence it is evident that a ,catholic saying that an idol is not ,god contradicts the pagan asserting that it is ,god2 because each of them uses this name ,god to signify the true ,god4 ,for when the pagan says an idol is ,god1 he does not use this name as meaning ,god in opinion1 for he would then speak the truth1 as also ,catholics sometimes use the name in that sense1 as in the ,psalm1 ,all the gods of the ,gentiles are demons 7,ps4 #ie3e74 ,the same remark applies to the ,second and ,third ,objections4 ,for these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name1 and not from its various significations4 ,reply ,obj4 #d ,on the contrary1 par4 #a3 ,the term animal applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal2 for the ,philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense1 including analogous names2 because also being1 which is predicated analogically1 is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments4 ,reply ,obj4 #e ,on the contrary1 par4 #b 3 ,neither a ,catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of ,god as it is in itself2 but each one knows it according to some idea of causality1 or excellence1 or remotion 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #ab74 ,so a pagan can take this name ,god in the same way when he says an idol is ,god1 as the ,catholic does in saying an idol is not ,god4 ,but if anyone should be quite ignorant of ,god altogether1 he could not even name ,him1 unless1 perhaps1 as we use names the meaning of which we know not4 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #aa ,whether ,this ,name1 ,,he ,,who ,,is1 ,is the ,most ,proper ,name of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that this name ,,he ,,who ,,is is not the most proper name of ,god4 ,for this name ,god is an incommunicable name4 ,but this name ,,he ,,who ,,is1 is not an incommunicable name4 ,therefore this name ,,he ,,who ,,is is not the most proper name of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iii7 that the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of ,god4 ,but it especially belongs to ,god to be the universal principle of all things4 ,therefore this name good is supremely proper to ,god1 and not this name ,,he ,,who ,,is4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures1 for ,god is known to us only through creatures4 ,but this name ,,he ,,who ,,is imports no relation to creatures4 ,therefore this name ,,he ,,who ,,is is not the most applicable to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written that when ,moses asked1 ,if they should say to me1 ,what is ,his name8 what shall ,i say to them8 ,the ,lord answered him1 ,thus shalt thou say to them1 ,,he ,,who ,,is hath sent me to you 7,ex4 #c3ac1 #ad74 ,therefore this name ,,he ,,who ,,is most properly belongs to ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,this name ,,he ,,who ,,is is most properly applied to ,god1 for three reasons3 ,first1 because of its signification4 ,for it does not signify form1 but simply existence itself4 ,hence since the existence of ,god is ,his essence itself1 which can be said of no other 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d71 it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates ,god1 for everything is denominated by its form4 ,secondly1 on account of its universality4 ,for all other names are either less universal1 or1 if convertible with it1 add something above it at least in idea2 hence in a certain way they inform and determine it4 ,now our intellect cannot know the essence of ,god itself in this life1 as it is in itself1 but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about ,god1 it falls short of the mode of what ,god is in ,himself4 ,therefore the less determinate the names are1 and the more universal and absolute they are1 the more properly they are applied to ,god4 ,hence ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i7 that1 ,,he ,,who ,,is1 is the principal of all names applied to ,god2 for comprehending all in itself1 it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance4 ,now by any other name some mode of substance is determined1 whereas this name ,,he ,,who ,,is1 determines no mode of being1 but is indeterminate to all2 and therefore it denominates the infinite ocean of substance4 ,thirdly1 from its consignification1 for it signifies present existence2 and this above all properly applies to ,god1 whose existence knows not past or future1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this name ,,he ,,who ,,is is the name of ,god more properly than this name ,god1 as regards its source1 namely1 existence2 and as regards the mode of signification and consignification1 as said above4 ,but as regards the object intended by the name1 this name ,god is more proper1 as it is imposed to signify the divine nature2 and still more proper is the ,tetragrammaton1 imposed to signify the substance of ,god itself1 incommunicable and1 if one may so speak1 singular4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this name good is the principal name of ,god in so far as ,he is a cause1 but not absolutely2 for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures1 but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from ,god to creatures4 ,among these the first is existence1 from which comes this name1 ,,he ,,who ,,is4 ,,twelfth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ac1 ,art4 #ab ,whether ,affirmative ,propositions ,can ,be ,formed ,about ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about ,god4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 ii7 that negations about ,god are true2 but affirmations are vague4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 ii7 that a simple form cannot be a subject4 ,but ,god is the most absolutely simple form1 as shown 7,q4 #c73 therefore ,he cannot be a subject4 ,but everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject4 ,therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is4 ,but ,god has existence without any composition as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound1 it follows that a true affirmative proposition about ,god cannot be made4 ,on the contrary1 ,what is of faith cannot be false4 ,but some affirmative propositions are of faith2 as that ,god is ,three and ,one2 and that ,he is omnipotent4 ,therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,true affirmative propositions can be formed about ,god4 ,to prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality1 and different things in idea4 ,and this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate1 and in those which have an essential predicate4 ,for it is manifest that man and white are the same in subject1 and different in idea2 for the idea of man is one thing1 and that of whiteness is another4 ,the same applies when ,i say1 man is an animal2 since the same thing which is man is truly animal2 for in the same suppositum there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal1 and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man2 hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to suppositum1 but different as to idea4 ,but in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself1 the same rule in some way applies1 inasmuch as the intellect draws to the suppositum what it places in the subject2 and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the suppositum2 according to the saying that predicates are to be taken formally1 and subjects materially4 ,to this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject1 while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself4 ,god1 however1 as considered in ,himself1 is altogether one and simple1 yet our intellect knows ,him by different conceptions because it cannot see ,him as ,he is in ,himself4 ,nevertheless1 although it understands ,him under different conceptions1 it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions4 ,therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea2 and the intellect represents the unity by composition4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius says that the affirmations about ,god are vague or1 according to another translation1 incongruous1 inasmuch as no name can be applied to ,god according to its mode of signification4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms1 as they really are in themselves2 but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent4 ,therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject1 and attributes something else to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this proposition1 ,the intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is1 is false1 can be taken in two senses1 accordingly as this adverb otherwise determines the word understanding on the part of the thing understood1 or on the part of the one who understands4 ,taken as referring to the thing understood1 the proposition is true1 and the meaning is3 ,any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is1 is false4 ,but this does not hold in the present case2 because our intellect1 when forming a proposition about ,god1 does not affirm that ,he is composite1 but that ,he is simple4 ,but taken as referring to the one who understands1 the proposition is false4 ,for the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence4 ,since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner2 not that it understands them to be immaterial things2 but its manner of understanding is immaterial4 ,likewise1 when it understands simple things above itself1 it understands them according to its own mode1 which is in a composite manner2 yet not so as to understand them to be composite things4 ,and thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning ,god4 ,,question #ad ,,of ,,god',s ,,knowledge 7,in ,sixteen ,articles7 ,having considered what belongs to the divine substance1 we have now to treat of ,god's operation4 ,and since one kind of operation is immanent1 and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect1 we treat first of knowledge and of will 7for understanding abides in the intelligent agent1 and will is in the one who wills72 and afterwards of the power of ,god1 the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect4 ,now because to understand is a kind of life1 after treating of the divine knowledge1 we consider the divine life4 ,and as knowledge concerns truth1 we consider truth and falsehood4 ,further1 as everything known is in the knower1 and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of ,god are called ideas1 to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas4 ,concerning knowledge1 there are sixteen points for inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is knowledge in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether ,god understands ,himself8 7#c7 ,whether ,he comprehends ,himself8 7#d7 ,whether ,his understanding is ,his substance8 7#e7 ,whether ,he understands other things besides ,himself8 7#f7 ,whether ,he has a proper knowledge of them8 7#g7 ,whether the knowledge of ,god is discursive8 7#h7 ,whether the knowledge of ,god is the cause of things8 7#i7 ,whether ,god has knowledge of non-existing things8 7#aj7 ,whether ,he has knowledge of evil8 7#aa7 ,whether ,he has knowledge of individual things8 7#ab7 ,whether ,he knows the infinite8 7#ac7 ,whether ,he knows future contingent things8 7#ad7 ,whether ,he knows enunciable things8 7#ae7 ,whether the knowledge of ,god is variable8 7#af7 ,whether ,god has speculative or practical knowledge of things8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,knowledge 99,scientia in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that in ,god there is not knowledge4 ,for knowledge is a habit2 and habit does not belong to ,god1 since it is the mean between potentiality and act4 ,therefore knowledge is not in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since science is about conclusions1 it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles4 ,but nothing is caused in ,god2 therefore science is not in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all knowledge is universal1 or particular4 ,but in ,god there is no universal or particular 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore in ,god there is not knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says1 ,o the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of ,god 7,rom4 #aa3cc74 ,i answer that1 ,in ,god there exists the most perfect knowledge4 ,to prove this1 we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form2 whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing2 for the idea of the thing known is in the knower4 ,hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited2 whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension2 therefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii7 that the soul is in a sense all things4 ,now the contraction of the form comes from the matter4 ,hence1 as we have said above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a7 forms according as they are the more immaterial1 approach more nearly to a kind of infinity4 ,therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive2 and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge4 ,hence it is said in ,de ,anima ii that plants do not know1 because they are wholly material4 ,but sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter1 and the intellect is still further cognitive1 because it is more separated from matter and unmixed1 as said in ,de ,anima iii4 ,since therefore ,god is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a71 it follows that ,he occupies the highest place in knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,because perfections flowing from ,god to creatures exist in a higher state in ,god ,himself 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b71 whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to ,god1 it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures4 ,hence knowledge is not a quality of ,god1 nor a habit2 but substance and pure act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in ,god simply and unitedly 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #d74 ,now man has different kinds of knowledge1 according to the different objects of ,his knowledge4 ,he has intelligence as regards the knowledge of principles2 he has science as regards knowledge of conclusions2 he has wisdom1 according as he knows the highest cause2 he has counsel or prudence1 according as he knows what is to be done4 ,but ,god knows all these by one simple act of knowledge1 as will be shown 7,a4 #g74 ,hence the simple knowledge of ,god can be named by all these names2 in such a way1 however1 that there must be removed from each of them1 so far as they enter into divine predication1 everything that savors of imperfection2 and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them4 ,hence it is said1 ,with ,him is wisdom and strength1 ,he hath counsel and understanding 7,job #ab3ac74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows2 for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower4 ,now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures1 divine knowledge does not exist in ,god after the mode of created knowledge1 so as to be universal or particular1 or habitual1 or potential1 or existing according to any such mode4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,understands ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not understand ,himself4 ,for it is said by the ,philosopher 7,de ,causis71 ,every knower who knows his own essence1 returns completely to his own essence4 ,but ,god does not go out from ,his own essence1 nor is ,he moved at all2 thus ,he cannot return to ,his own essence4 ,therefore ,he does not know ,his own essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to understand is a kind of passion and movement1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii72 and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known2 and the thing known is the perfection of the knower4 ,but nothing is moved1 or suffers1 or is made perfect by itself1 nor1 as ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iii71 is a thing its own likeness4 ,therefore ,god does not understand ,himself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we are like to ,god chiefly in our intellect1 because we are the image of ,god in our mind1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 vi74 ,but our intellect understands itself1 only as it understands other things1 as is said in ,de ,anima iii4 ,therefore ,god understands ,himself only so far perchance as ,he understands other things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,the things that are of ,god no man knoweth1 but the ,spirit of ,god 7#a ,cor4 #b3aa74 ,i answer that1 ,god understands ,himself through ,himself4 ,in proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect1 the object of the operation1 which is taken as the term1 exists outside the operator2 nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator1 the object signified as the term of operation1 resides in the operator2 and accordingly as it is in the operator1 the operation is actual4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii7 that the sensible in act is sense in act1 and the intelligible in act is intellect in act4 ,for the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species4 ,and because of this only1 it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object1 since both are in potentiality4 ,since therefore ,god has nothing in ,him of potentiality1 but is pure act1 ,his intellect and its object are altogether the same2 so that ,he neither is without the intelligible species1 as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially2 nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect1 as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually2 but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself1 and thus ,god understands ,himself through ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself4 ,inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence1 it is in a certain way diffused in it2 and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself4 ,therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting1 but are the acts of organs1 do not know themselves1 as in the case of each of the senses2 whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting1 know themselves2 hence it is said in ,de ,causis that1 whoever knows his essence returns to it4 ,now it supremely belongs to ,god to be self-subsisting4 ,hence according to this mode of speaking1 ,he supremely returns to ,his own essence1 and knows ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,movement and passion are taken equivocally1 according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii4 ,for to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another1 but it is an act1 existing in the agent itself1 of something perfect4 ,likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object1 i4e4 is assimilated to it1 this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality2 because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species1 which is the likeness of the thing understood1 and makes it to be perfected thereby1 as potentiality is perfected by act4 ,on the other hand1 the divine intellect1 which is no way in potentiality1 is not perfected by the intelligible object1 nor is it assimilated thereto1 but is its own perfection1 and its own intelligible object4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,existence in nature does not belong to primary matter1 which is a potentiality1 unless it is reduced to act by a form4 ,now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things2 for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects1 just as primary matter is to natural things4 ,hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something2 and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species1 as it understands other things3 for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding1 and by this act knows the intellectual faculty4 ,but ,god is a pure act in the order of existence1 as also in the order of intelligible objects2 therefore ,he understands ,himself through ,himself4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,comprehends ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not comprehend ,himself4 ,for ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 xv71 that whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself4 ,but ,god is in all ways infinite4 ,therefore ,he does not comprehend ,himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,if it is said that ,god is infinite to us1 and finite to ,himself1 it can be urged to the contrary1 that everything in ,god is truer than it is in us4 ,if therefore ,god is finite to ,himself1 but infinite to us1 then ,god is more truly finite than infinite2 which is against what was laid down above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore ,god does not comprehend ,himself4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 xv71 that ,everything that understands itself1 comprehends itself4 ,but ,god understands ,himself4 ,therefore ,he comprehends ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,god perfectly comprehends ,himself1 as can be thus proved4 ,a thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained1 and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable2 as1 for instance1 a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration1 not1 however1 when it is known by some probable reason4 ,now it is manifest that ,god knows ,himself as perfectly as ,he is perfectly knowable4 ,for everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality2 since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality1 but in so far as it is in actuality1 as said in ,metaph4 ix4 ,now the power of ,god in knowing is as great as ,his actuality in existing2 because it is from the fact that ,he is in act and free from all matter and potentiality1 that ,god is cognitive1 as shown above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,whence it is manifest that ,he knows ,himself as much as ,he is knowable2 and for that reason ,he perfectly comprehends ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the strict meaning of comprehension signifies that one thing holds and includes another2 and in this sense everything comprehended is finite1 as also is everything included in another4 ,but ,god is not said to be comprehended by ,himself in this sense1 as if ,his intellect were a faculty apart from ,himself1 and as if it held and included ,himself2 for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation4 ,but as ,god is said to be in ,himself1 forasmuch as ,he is not contained by anything outside of ,himself2 so ,he is said to be comprehended by ,himself1 forasmuch as nothing in ,himself is hidden from ,himself4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,vid4 ,deum4 ep4 cxii71 ,the whole is comprehended when seen1 if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when it is said1 ,god is finite to ,himself1 this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion1 because ,he has the same relation in not exceeding ,his intellect1 as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect4 ,but ,god is not to be called finite to ,himself in this sense1 as if ,he understood ,himself to be something finite4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,act of ,god's ,intellect ,is ,his ,substance8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the act of ,god's intellect is not ,his substance4 ,for to understand is an operation4 ,but an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator4 ,therefore the act of ,god's intellect is not ,his substance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to understand one's act of understanding1 is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood1 but secondary and accessory4 ,if therefore ,god be his own act of understanding1 ,his act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding3 and thus ,god's act of understanding will not be something great4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every act of understanding means understanding something4 ,when therefore ,god understands ,himself1 if ,he ,himself is not distinct from this act of understanding1 ,he understands that ,he understands ,himself2 and so on to infinity4 ,therefore the act of ,god's intellect is not ,his substance4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii71 ,in ,god to be is the same as to be wise4 ,but to be wise is the same thing as to understand4 ,therefore in ,god to be is the same thing as to understand4 ,but ,god's existence is ,his substance1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore the act of ,god's intellect is ,his substance4 ,i answer that1 ,it must be said that the act of ,god's intellect is ,his substance4 ,for if ,his act of understanding were other than ,his substance1 then something else1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 xii71 would be the act and perfection of the divine substance1 to which the divine substance would be related1 as potentiality is to act1 which is altogether impossible2 because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding4 ,let us now consider how this is4 ,as was laid down above 7,a4 #b71 to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic2 for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection2 as existence is the perfection of the one existing3 just as existence follows on the form1 so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species4 ,now in ,god there is no form which is something other than ,his existence1 as shown above 7,q4 #c74 ,hence as ,his essence itself is also ,his intelligible species1 it necessarily follows that ,his act of understanding must be ,his essence and ,his existence4 ,thus it follows from all the foregoing that in ,god1 intellect1 and the object understood1 and the intelligible species1 and ,his act of understanding are entirely one and the same4 ,hence when ,god is said to be understanding1 no kind of multiplicity is attached to ,his substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator1 but remaining in him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood1 something not great is understood2 as when we understand our act of understanding2 and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent4 ,thus appears the ,reply to the ,third ,objection4 ,for the act of divine understanding subsists in itself1 and belongs to its very self and is not another's2 hence it need not proceed to infinity4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,god ,knows ,things ,other ,than ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not know things besides ,himself4 ,for all other things but ,god are outside of ,god4 ,but ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xlvi7 that ,god does not behold anything out of ,himself4 ,therefore ,he does not know things other than ,himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands4 ,if therefore ,god understands other things besides ,himself1 something else will be the perfection of ,god1 and will be nobler than ,he2 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object1 as is every other act from its own object4 ,hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler1 the nobler the object understood4 ,but ,god is ,his own intellectual act4 ,if therefore ,god understands anything other than ,himself1 then ,god ,himself is specified by something else than ,himself2 which cannot be4 ,therefore ,he does not understand things other than ,himself4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,all things are naked and open to ,his eyes 7,heb4 #d3ac74 ,i answer that1 ,god necessarily knows things other than ,himself4 ,for it is manifest that ,he perfectly understands ,himself2 otherwise ,his existence would not be perfect1 since ,his existence is ,his act of understanding4 ,now if anything is perfectly known1 it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known4 ,but the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends4 ,since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things1 as is clear from the aforesaid 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c71 ,god must necessarily know things other than ,himself4 ,and this appears still more plainly if we add that the very existence of the first effective cause--viz4 ,god--is ,his own act of understanding4 ,hence whatever effects pre-exist in ,god1 as in the first cause1 must be in ,his act of understanding1 and all things must be in ,him according to an intelligible mode3 for everything which is in another1 is in it according to the mode of that in which it is4 ,now in order to know how ,god knows things other than ,himself1 we must consider that a thing is known in two ways3 in itself1 and in another4 ,a thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object2 as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man4 ,a thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it2 as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole2 or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror1 or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another4 ,so we say that ,god sees ,himself in ,himself1 because ,he sees ,himself through ,his essence2 and ,he sees other things not in themselves1 but in ,himself2 inasmuch as ,his essence contains the similitude of things other than ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the passage of ,augustine in which it is said that ,god sees nothing outside ,himself is not to be taken in such a way1 as if ,god saw nothing outside ,himself1 but in the sense that what is outside ,himself ,he does not see except in ,himself1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance1 but by its image1 according to which it is in the intellect1 as its form and perfection1 as is said in ,de ,anima iii4 ,for a stone is not in the soul1 but its image4 ,now those things which are other than ,god are understood by ,god1 inasmuch as the essence of ,god contains their images as above explained2 hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another1 but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood4 ,for the intellectual act is specified by its object1 inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation3 since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation2 as heating by heat4 ,hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act4 ,and this is the image of the principal thing understood1 which in ,god is nothing but ,his own essence in which all images of things are comprehended4 ,hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act1 or rather ,god ,himself1 is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,god ,knows ,things ,other ,than ,himself by ,proper ,knowledge8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not know things other than ,himself by proper knowledge4 ,for1 as was shown 7,a4 #e71 ,god knows things other than ,himself1 according as they are in ,himself4 ,but other things are in ,him as in their common and universal cause1 and are known by ,god as in their first and universal cause4 ,this is to know them by general1 and not by proper knowledge4 ,therefore ,god knows things besides ,himself by general1 and not by proper knowledge4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the created essence is as distant from the divine essence1 as the divine essence is distant from the created essence4 ,but the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence1 as said above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence4 ,thus as ,god knows only by ,his essence1 it follows that ,he does not know what the creature is in its essence1 so as to know what it is1 which is to have proper knowledge of it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio i4e41 concept4 ,but as ,god knows all things by ,his essence1 it seems that ,he does not know each thing by its proper ratio2 for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things4 ,therefore ,god has not a proper knowledge of things1 but a general knowledge2 for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them4 ,on the contrary1 ,to have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general1 but as they are distinct from each other4 ,now ,god knows things in that manner4 ,hence it is written that ,he reaches even to the division of the soul and the spirit1 of the joints also and the marrow1 and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart2 neither is there any creature invisible in ,his sight 7,heb4 #d3ab1ac74 ,i answer that1 ,some have erred on this point1 saying that ,god knows things other than ,himself only in general1 that is1 only as beings4 ,for as fire1 if it knew itself as the principle of heat1 would know the nature of heat1 and all things else in so far as they are hot2 so ,god1 through knowing ,himself as the principle of being1 knows the nature of being1 and all other things in so far as they are beings4 ,but this cannot be4 ,for to know a thing in general and not in particular1 is to have an imperfect knowledge4 ,hence our intellect1 when it is reduced from potentiality to act1 acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things1 before it knows them in particular2 as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect1 as is clear from ,phys4 i4 ,if therefore the knowledge of ,god regarding things other than ,himself is only universal and not special1 it would follow that ,his understanding would not be absolutely perfect2 therefore neither would ,his being be perfect2 and this is against what was said above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #a74 ,we must therefore hold that ,god knows things other than ,himself with a proper knowledge2 not only in so far as being is common to them1 but in so far as one is distinguished from the other4 ,in proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that ,god knows many things by one1 bring forward some examples1 as1 for instance1 that if the centre knew itself1 it would know all lines that proceed from the centre2 or if light knew itself1 it would know all colors4 ,now these examples although they are similar in part1 namely1 as regards universal causality1 nevertheless they fail in this respect1 that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle1 not as regards that which is the principle of distinction1 but only as regards that in which they communicate4 ,for the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only1 but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it2 and likewise1 the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position4 ,hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge1 but only in a general way4 ,in ,god1 however1 it is otherwise4 ,for it was shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b7 that whatever perfection exists in any creature1 wholly pre-exists and is contained in ,god in an excelling manner4 ,now not only what is common to creatures--viz4 being--belongs to their perfection1 but also what makes them distinguished from each other2 as living and understanding1 and the like1 whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living1 and the intelligent from the non-intelligent4 ,likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species1 is a perfection2 and thus all things pre-exist in ,god1 not only as regards what is common to all1 but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another4 ,and therefore as ,god contains all perfections in ,himself1 the essence of ,god is compared to all other essences of things1 not as the common to the proper1 as unity is to numbers1 or as the centre 7of a circle7 to the 7radiating7 lines2 but as perfect acts to imperfect2 as if ,i were to compare man to animal2 or six1 a perfect number1 to the imperfect numbers contained under it4 ,now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general1 but also by proper knowledge2 thus1 for example1 whoever knows a man1 knows an animal by proper knowledge2 and whoever knows the number six1 knows the number three also by proper knowledge4 ,as therefore the essence of ,god contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being1 and far more1 ,god can know in ,himself all of them with proper knowledge4 ,for the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection4 ,now ,god could not be said to know ,himself perfectly unless ,he knew all the ways in which ,his own perfection can be shared by others4 ,neither could ,he know the very nature of being perfectly1 unless ,he knew all modes of being4 ,hence it is manifest that ,god knows all things with proper knowledge1 in their distinction from each other4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,so to know a thing as it is in the knower1 may be understood in two ways4 ,in one way this adverb so imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known2 and in that sense it is false4 ,for the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower2 since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye2 but by the image of the stone which is in the eye1 the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye4 ,and if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the 7mode of7 existence it has in the knower1 the knower nevertheless knows it according to its 7mode of7 existence outside the knower2 thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect1 inasmuch as it knows that it understands2 while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature4 ,if however the adverb 'so' be understood to import the mode 7of knowledge7 on the part of the knower1 in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower2 for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower1 the more perfect is the mode of knowledge4 ,we must say therefore that ,god not only knows that all things are in ,himself2 but by the fact that they are in ,him1 ,he knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly1 the more perfectly each one is in ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the created essence is compared to the essence of ,god as the imperfect to the perfect act4 ,therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence1 but rather the converse4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things4 ,but the divine essence excels all creatures4 ,hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in1 and imitate it4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,knowledge of ,god ,is ,discursive8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the knowledge of ,god is discursive4 ,for the knowledge of ,god is not habitual knowledge1 but actual knowledge4 ,now the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 ii73 ,the habit of knowledge may regard many things at once2 but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time4 ,therefore as ,god knows many things1 ,himself and others1 as shown above 7,,aa4 #b1 #e71 it seems that ,he does not understand all at once1 but discourses from one to another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause4 ,but ,god knows things through ,himself2 as an effect 7is known7 through its cause4 ,therefore ,his knowledge is discursive4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god knows each creature more perfectly than we know it4 ,but we know the effects in their created causes2 and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused4 ,therefore it seems that the same applies to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv71 ,god does not see all things in their particularity or separately1 as if ,he saw alternately here and there2 but ,he sees all things together at once4 ,i answer that1 ,in the divine knowledge there is no discursion2 the proof of which is as follows4 ,in our knowledge there is a twofold discursion3 one is according to succession only1 as when we have actually understood anything1 we turn ourselves to understand something else2 while the other mode of discursion is according to causality1 as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions4 ,the first kind of discursion cannot belong to ,god4 ,for many things1 which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself1 we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing2 if1 for instance1 we understand the parts in the whole1 or see different things in a mirror4 ,now ,god sees all things in one 7thing71 which is ,himself4 ,therefore ,god sees all things together1 and not successively4 ,likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to ,god4 ,first1 because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode2 for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once2 secondly1 because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown4 ,hence it is manifest that when the first is known1 the second is still unknown2 and thus the second is known not in the first1 but from the first4 ,now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first1 by resolving the effects into their causes2 and then the discursion ceases4 ,hence as ,god sees ,his effects in ,himself as their cause1 ,his knowledge is not discursive4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although there is only one act of understanding in itself1 nevertheless many things may be understood in one 7medium71 as shown above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god does not know by their cause1 known1 as it were previously1 effects unknown2 but ,he knows the effects in the cause2 and hence ,his knowledge is not discursive1 as was shown above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves1 much better than we can2 but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in ,him by the knowledge of the created causes1 as is the case with us2 and hence ,his knowledge is not discursive4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,knowledge of ,god ,is the ,cause of ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the knowledge of ,god is not the cause of things4 ,for ,origen says1 on ,rom4 #h3cj1 ,whom ,he called1 them ,he also justified1 etc43 ,a thing will happen not because ,god knows it as future2 but because it is future1 it is on that account known by ,god1 before it exists4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 given the cause1 the effect follows4 ,but the knowledge of ,god is eternal4 ,therefore if the knowledge of ,god is the cause of things created1 it seems that creatures are eternal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,the thing known is prior to knowledge1 and is its measure1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 x74 ,but what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause4 ,therefore the knowledge of ,god is not the cause of things4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv71 ,not because they are1 does ,god know all creatures spiritual and temporal1 but because ,he knows them1 therefore they are4 ,i answer that1 ,the knowledge of ,god is the cause of things4 ,for the knowledge of ,god is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art4 ,now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect4 ,hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action2 as heat is the principle of heating4 ,nevertheless1 we must observe that a natural form1 being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence1 denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect2 and likewise1 the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect1 which inclination is through the will4 ,for since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things 7inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites71 it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 ix74 ,now it is manifest that ,god causes things by ,his intellect1 since ,his being is ,his act of understanding2 and hence ,his knowledge must be the cause of things1 in so far as ,his will is joined to it4 ,hence the knowledge of ,god as the cause of things is usually called the knowledge of approbation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it1 as is said above4 ,but when he says the reason why ,god foreknows some things is because they are future1 this must be understood according to the cause of consequence1 and not according to the cause of essence4 ,for if things are in the future1 it follows that ,god knows them2 but not that the futurity of things is the cause why ,god knows them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the knowledge of ,god is the cause of things according as things are in ,his knowledge4 ,now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of ,god2 hence although the knowledge of ,god is eternal1 it does not follow that creatures are eternal4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,natural things are midway between the knowledge of ,god and our knowledge3 for we receive knowledge from natural things1 of which ,god is the cause by ,his knowledge4 ,hence1 as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge1 and are its measure1 so1 the knowledge of ,god is prior to natural things1 and is the measure of them2 as1 for instance1 a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it1 and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,god ,has ,knowledge of ,things ,that ,are ,not8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god has not knowledge of things that are not4 ,for the knowledge of ,god is of true things4 ,but truth and being are convertible terms4 ,therefore the knowledge of ,god is not of things that are not4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known4 ,but those things that are not cannot have any likeness to ,god1 ,who is very being4 ,therefore what is not1 cannot be known by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the knowledge of ,god is the cause of what is known by ,him4 ,but it is not the cause of things that are not1 because a thing that is not1 has no cause4 ,therefore ,god has no knowledge of things that are not4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says3 ,who 4 4 4 calleth those things that are not as those that are 7,rom4 #d3ag74 ,i answer that1 ,god knows all things whatsoever that in any way are4 ,now it is possible that things that are not absolutely1 should be in a certain sense4 ,for things absolutely are which are actual2 whereas things which are not actual1 are in the power either of ,god ,himself or of a creature1 whether in active power1 or passive2 whether in power of thought or of imagination1 or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever4 ,whatever therefore can be made1 or thought1 or said by the creature1 as also whatever ,he ,himself can do1 all are known to ,god1 although they are not actual4 ,and in so far it can be said that ,he has knowledge even of things that are not4 ,now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual4 ,for though some of them may not be in act now1 still they were1 or they will be2 and ,god is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision3 for since ,god's act of understanding1 which is ,his being1 is measured by eternity2 and since eternity is without succession1 comprehending all time1 the present glance of ,god extends over all time1 and to all things which exist in any time1 as to objects present to ,him4 ,but there are other things in ,god's power1 or the creature's1 which nevertheless are not1 nor will be1 nor were2 and as regards these ,he is said to have knowledge1 not of vision1 but of simple intelligence4 ,this is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality2 for it is true that they are in potentiality2 and as such they are known by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since ,god is very being everything is1 in so far as it participates in the likeness of ,god2 as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat4 ,so1 things in potentiality are known by ,god1 although they are not in act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the knowledge of ,god1 joined to ,his will is the cause of things4 ,hence it is not necessary that what ever ,god knows1 is1 or was1 or will be2 but only is this necessary as regards what ,he wills to be1 or permits to be4 ,further1 it is in the knowledge of ,god not that they be1 but that they be possible4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,god ,knows ,evil ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not know evil things4 ,for the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii7 says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation4 ,but evil is the privation of good1 as ,augustine says 7,confess4 iii1 #g74 ,therefore1 as the intellect of ,god is never in potentiality1 but is always in act1 as is clear from the foregoing 7,a4 #b71 it seems that ,god does not know evil things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known1 or is caused by it4 ,but the knowledge of ,god is not the cause of evil1 nor is it caused by evil4 ,therefore ,god does not know evil things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything known is known either by its likeness1 or by its opposite4 ,but whatever ,god knows1 ,he knows through ,his essence1 as is clear from the foregoing 7,a4 #e74 ,now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil1 nor is evil contrary to it2 for to the divine essence there is no contrary1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii74 ,therefore ,god does not know evil things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 what is known through another and not through itself1 is imperfectly known4 ,but evil is not known by ,god2 for the thing known must be in the knower4 ,therefore if evil is known through another1 namely1 through good1 it would be known by ,him imperfectly2 which cannot be1 for the knowledge of ,god is not imperfect4 ,therefore ,god does not know evil things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #ae3aa71 ,hell and destruction are before ,god ,vulg3 'the ,lord'4 ,i answer that1 ,whoever knows a thing perfectly1 must know all that can be accidental to it4 ,now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental4 ,hence ,god would not know good things perfectly1 unless ,he also knew evil things4 ,now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is2 hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good1 by the fact that ,god knows good things1 ,he knows evil things also2 as by light is known darkness4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii73 ,god through ,himself receives the vision of darkness1 not otherwise seeing darkness except through light4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the saying of the ,philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality1 does not know privation by privation existing in it2 and this agrees with what he said previously1 that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division4 ,this is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually1 but only potentially2 for were they actually in our intellect1 they would not be known by privation4 ,it is thus that simple things are known by separate substances4 ,god therefore knows evil1 not by privation existing in ,himself1 but by the opposite good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the knowledge of ,god is not the cause of evil2 but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although evil is not opposed to the divine essence1 which is not corruptible by evil2 it is opposed to the effects of ,god1 which ,he knows by ,his essence2 and knowing them1 ,he knows the opposite evils4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,to know a thing by something else only1 belongs to imperfect knowledge1 if that thing is of itself knowable2 but evil is not of itself knowable1 forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good2 therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good4 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #aa ,whether ,god ,knows ,singular ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not know singular things4 ,for the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect4 ,now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things2 but as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii71 reason has to do with universals1 sense with singular things4 ,therefore ,god does not know singular things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in us those faculties alone know the singular1 which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions4 ,but in ,god things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality4 ,therefore ,god does not know singular things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness4 ,but the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular1 does not seem to be in ,god2 for the principle of singularity is matter1 which1 since it is in potentiality only1 is altogether unlike ,god1 ,who is pure act4 ,therefore ,god cannot know singular things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #af3b71 ,all the ways of a man are open to ,his eyes4 ,i answer that1 ,god knows singular things4 ,for all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in ,god in a higher way1 as is clear from the foregoing 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b74 ,now to know singular things is part of our perfection4 ,hence ,god must know singular things4 ,even the ,philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to ,god2 and thus against ,empedocles he argues 7,de ,anima i and ,metaph4 iii7 that ,god would be most ignorant if ,he did not know discord4 ,now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings1 exist simply and unitedly in ,god2 hence1 although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial1 and by another we know singular and material things1 nevertheless ,god knows both by ,his simple intellect4 ,now some1 wishing to show how this can be1 said that ,god knows singular things by universal causes4 ,for nothing exists in any singular thing1 that does not arise from some universal cause4 ,they give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens1 and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come4 ,this1 however1 is not enough2 for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which1 however they may be joined together1 are not individualized except by individual matter4 ,hence he who knows ,socrates because he is white1 or because he is the son of ,sophroniscus1 or because of something of that kind1 would not know him in so far as he is this particular man4 ,hence according to the aforesaid mode1 ,god would not know singular things in their singularity4 ,on the other hand1 others have said that ,god knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects4 ,but this will not hold2 forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing2 hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular1 for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things4 ,therefore it must be said otherwise1 that1 since ,god is the cause of things by ,his knowledge1 as stated above 7,a4 #h71 ,his knowledge extends as far as ,his causality extends4 ,hence as the active power of ,god extends not only to forms1 which are the source of universality1 but also to matter1 as we shall prove further on 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b71 the knowledge of ,god must extend to singular things1 which are individualized by matter4 ,for since ,he knows things other than ,himself by ,his essence1 as being the likeness of things1 or as their active principle1 ,his essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by ,him1 not only in the universal1 but also in the singular4 ,the same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer1 if it were productive of the whole thing1 and not only of the form4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles2 hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles2 and on that account our intellect does not know the singular4 ,but the intelligible species in the divine intellect1 which is the essence of ,god1 is immaterial not by abstraction1 but of itself1 being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things1 whether principles of the species or principles of the individual2 hence by it ,god knows not only universal1 but also singular things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense1 yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to ,god1 yet1 even in so far as it has being in this wise1 it retains a certain likeness to the divine being4 ,,twelfth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #ab ,whether ,god ,can ,know ,infinite ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god cannot know infinite things4 ,for the infinite1 as such1 is unknown2 since the infinite is that which1 to those who measure it1 leaves always something more to be measured1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iii74 ,moreover1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii7 that whatever is comprehended by knowledge1 is bounded by the comprehension of the knower4 ,now infinite things have no boundary4 ,therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in ,god's knowledge1 against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable1 and the finite that it is traversable1 as said in ,phys4 iii4 ,but the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite1 as is proved in ,phys4 vi4 ,therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite1 nor even by the infinite2 and so the infinite cannot be finite in ,god's knowledge1 which is infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the knowledge of ,god is the measure of what is known4 ,but it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured4 ,therefore infinite things cannot be known by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii71 ,although we cannot number the infinite1 nevertheless it can be comprehended by ,him whose knowledge has no bounds4 ,i answer that1 ,since ,god knows not only things actual but also things possible to ,himself or to created things1 as shown above 7,a4 #i71 and as these must be infinite1 it must be held that ,he knows infinite things4 ,although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are1 or will be1 or were1 is not of infinite things1 as some say1 for we do not say that the world is eternal1 nor that generation and movement will go on for ever1 so that individuals be infinitely multiplied2 yet1 if we consider more attentively1 we must hold that ,god knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision4 ,for ,god knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts1 which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever4 ,the reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge4 ,for the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing1 and can give the knowledge of only one individual4 ,but the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature1 which is participable by infinite particulars2 hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men2 not however as distinguished from each other1 but as communicating in the nature of the species2 and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles1 but as to the principles of the species4 ,on the other hand1 the divine essence1 whereby the divine intellect understands1 is a sufficing likeness of all things that are1 or can be1 not only as regards the universal principles1 but also as regards the principles proper to each one1 as shown above4 ,hence it follows that the knowledge of ,god extends to infinite things1 even as distinct from each other4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the idea of the infinite pertains to quantity1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 i74 ,but the idea of quantity implies the order of parts4 ,therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part2 and in this way the infinite cannot be known2 for whatever quantity of parts be taken1 there will always remain something else outside4 ,but ,god does not know the infinite or infinite things1 as if ,he enumerated part after part2 since ,he knows all things simultaneously1 and not successively1 as said above 7,a4 #g74 ,hence there is nothing to prevent ,him from knowing infinite things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,transition imports a certain succession of parts2 and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite1 nor by the infinite4 ,but equality suffices for comprehension1 because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender4 ,hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite4 ,and so1 what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of ,god as comprehended2 but not as if it were traversable4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the knowledge of ,god is the measure of things1 not quantitatively1 for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure2 but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things4 ,for everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of ,god1 as the thing made by art agrees with the art4 ,granted1 however1 an actually infinite number of things1 for instance1 an infinitude of men1 or an infinitude in continuous quantity1 as an infinitude of air1 as some of the ancients held2 yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being1 because their being would be limited to some determinate nature4 ,hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of ,god4 ,,thirteenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #ac ,whether the ,knowledge of ,god ,is of ,future ,contingent ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the knowledge of ,god is not of future contingent things4 ,for from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect4 ,but the knowledge of ,god is the cause of things known1 as said above 7,a4 #h74 ,since therefore that knowledge is necessary1 what ,he knows must also be necessary4 ,therefore the knowledge of ,god is not of contingent things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent4 ,for the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion3 and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow1 as is proved in ,poster4 i4 ,but this is a true conditional proposition1 ,if ,god knew that this thing will be1 it will be1 for the knowledge of ,god is only of true things4 ,now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary1 because it is eternal1 and because it is signified as past4 ,therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary4 ,therefore whatever ,god knows1 is necessary2 and so the knowledge of ,god is not of contingent things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything known by ,god must necessarily be1 because even what we ourselves know1 must necessarily be2 and1 of course1 the knowledge of ,god is much more certain than ours4 ,but no future contingent things must necessarily be4 ,therefore no contingent future thing is known by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #cb3ae71 ,he ,who hath made the hearts of every one of them2 ,who understandeth all their works1 i4e4 of men4 ,now the works of men are contingent1 being subject to free will4 ,therefore ,god knows future contingent things4 ,i answer that1 ,since as was shown above 7,a4 #i71 ,god knows all things2 not only things actual but also things possible to ,him and creature2 and since some of these are future contingent to us1 it follows that ,god knows future contingent things4 ,in evidence of this1 we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways2 first1 in itself1 in so far as it is now in act3 and in this sense it is not considered as future1 but as present2 neither is it considered as contingent 7as having reference7 to one of two terms1 but as determined to one2 and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge1 for instance to the sense of sight1 as when ,i see that ,socrates is sitting down4 ,in another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause2 and in this way it is considered as future1 and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one2 forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things3 and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge4 ,hence1 whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only1 has merely a conjectural knowledge of it4 ,now ,god knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes1 but also as each one of them is actually in itself4 ,and although contingent things become actual successively1 nevertheless ,god knows contingent things not successively1 as they are in their own being1 as we do but simultaneously4 ,the reason is because ,his knowledge is measured by eternity1 as is also ,his being2 and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time1 as said above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence all things that are in time are present to ,god from eternity1 not only because ,he has the types of things present within ,him1 as some say2 but because ,his glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality4 ,hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by ,god1 inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality2 yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the supreme cause is necessary1 the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause2 just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause1 although the movement of the sun which is the first cause1 is necessary4 ,so likewise things known by ,god are contingent on account of their proximate causes1 while the knowledge of ,god1 which is the first cause1 is necessary4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some say that this antecedent1 ,god knew this contingent to be future1 is not necessary1 but contingent2 because1 although it is past1 still it imports relation to the future4 ,this however does not remove necessity from it2 for whatever has had relation to the future1 must have had it1 although the future sometimes does not follow4 ,on the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent1 because it is a compound of necessary and contingent2 as this saying is contingent1 ,socrates is a white man4 ,but this also is to no purpose2 for when we say1 ,god knew this contingent to be future1 contingent is used here only as the matter of the word1 and not as the chief part of the proposition4 ,hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition1 or to its being true or false4 ,for it may be just as true that ,i said a man is an ass1 as that ,i said ,socrates runs1 or ,god is3 and the same applies to necessary and contingent4 ,hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary4 ,nor does it follow1 as some say1 that the consequent is absolutely necessary1 because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent1 which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause4 ,but this is to no purpose4 ,for the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause1 and the consequent a contingent effect2 as1 for example1 if ,i said1 if the sun moves1 the grass will grow4 ,therefore we must reply otherwise2 that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul1 the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself1 but as it is in the soul3 for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul4 ,for example1 when ,i say1 ,what the soul understands is immaterial1 this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect1 not as it is in itself4 ,likewise if ,i say1 ,if ,god knew anything1 it will be1 the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge1 i4e4 as it is in its presentiality4 ,and thus it is necessary1 as also is the antecedent3 ,for everything that is1 while it is1 must be necessarily be1 as the ,philosopher says in ,peri ,herm4 i4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things reduced to act in time1 as known by us successively in time1 but by ,god 7are known7 in eternity1 which is above time4 ,whence to us they cannot be certain1 forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such2 but 7they are certain7 to ,god alone1 whose understanding is in eternity above time4 ,just as he who goes along the road1 does not see those who come after him2 whereas he who sees the whole road from a height1 sees at once all travelling by the way4 ,hence what is known by us must be necessary1 even as it is in itself2 for what is future contingent in itself1 cannot be known by us4 ,whereas what is known by ,god must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge1 as already stated1 but not absolutely as considered in their own causes4 ,hence also this proposition1 ,everything known by ,god must necessarily be1 is usually distinguished2 for this may refer to the thing1 or to the saying4 ,if it refers to the thing1 it is divided and false2 for the sense is1 ,everything which ,god knows is necessary4 ,if understood of the saying1 it is composite and true2 for the sense is1 ,this proposition1 'that which is known by ,god is' is necessary4 ,now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject2 thus if ,i said1 ,it is possible for a white thing to be black1 it is false as applied to the saying1 and true as applied to the thing3 for a thing which is white1 can become black2 whereas this saying1 a white thing is black can never be true4 ,but in forms that are inseparable from the subject1 this distinction does not hold1 for instance1 if ,i said1 ,a black crow can be white2 for in both senses it is false4 ,now to be known by ,god is inseparable from the thing2 for what is known by ,god cannot be known4 ,this objection1 however1 would hold if these words that which is known implied any disposition inherent to the subject2 but since they import an act of the knower1 something can be attributed to the thing known1 in itself 7even if it always be known71 which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge2 thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself1 which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known4 ,,fourteenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #ad ,whether ,god ,knows ,enunciable ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not know enunciable things4 ,for to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides4 ,but in the divine intellect1 there is no composition4 ,therefore ,god does not know enunciable things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness4 ,but in ,god there is no likeness of enunciable things1 since ,he is altogether simple4 ,therefore ,god does not know enunciable things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,the ,lord knoweth the thoughts of men 7,ps4 #ic3aa74 ,but enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men4 ,therefore ,god knows enunciable things4 ,i answer that1 ,since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations1 and since ,god knows whatever is in ,his own power or in that of creatures1 as said above 7,a4 #i71 it follows of necessity that ,god knows all enunciations that can be formed4 ,now just as ,he knows material things immaterially1 and composite things simply1 so likewise ,he knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things1 as if in ,his intellect there were composition or division of enunciations2 for ,he knows each thing by simple intelligence1 by understanding the essence of each thing2 as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is1 were to understand all that can be predicated of man4 ,this1 however1 does not happen in our intellect1 which discourses from one thing to another1 forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another4 ,hence when we understand what man is1 we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him1 but we understand them one by one1 according to a certain succession4 ,on this account the things we understand as separated1 we must reduce to one by way of composition or division1 by forming an enunciation4 ,now the species of the divine intellect1 which is ,god's essence1 suffices to represent all things4 ,hence by understanding ,his essence1 ,god knows the essences of all things1 and also whatever can be accidental to them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection would avail if ,god knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing2 and thus ,god by ,his existence1 which is ,his essence1 is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation4 ,,fifteenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #ae ,whether the ,knowledge of ,god ,is ,variable8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the knowledge of ,god is variable4 ,for knowledge is related to what is knowable4 ,but whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to ,god from time1 and varies according to the variation of creatures4 ,therefore the knowledge of ,god is variable according to the variation of creatures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever ,god can make1 ,he can know4 ,but ,god can make more than ,he does4 ,therefore ,he can know more than ,he knows4 ,thus ,his knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god knew that ,christ would be born4 ,but ,he does not know now that ,christ will be born2 because ,christ is not to be born in the future4 ,therefore ,god does not know everything ,he once knew2 and thus the knowledge of ,god is variable4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said1 that in ,god there is no change nor shadow of alteration 7,james #a3ag74 ,i answer that1 ,since the knowledge of ,god is ,his substance1 as is clear from the foregoing 7,a4 #d71 just as ,his substance is altogether immutable1 as shown above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a71 so ,his knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,lord1 ,creator and the like1 import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves4 ,but the knowledge of ,god imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in ,god2 because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands4 ,now created things are in ,god in an invariable manner2 while they exist variably in themselves4 ,we may also say that ,lord1 ,creator and the like1 import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves1 as they are in themselves2 and thus these relations are attributed to ,god variously1 according to the variation of creatures4 ,but knowledge and love1 and the like1 import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in ,god2 and therefore these are predicated of ,god in an invariable manner4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god knows also what ,he can make1 and does not make4 ,hence from the fact that ,he can make more than ,he makes1 it does not follow that ,he can know more than ,he knows1 unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision1 according to which ,he is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time4 ,but from the fact that ,he knows some things might be which are not1 or that some things might not be which are1 it does not follow that ,his knowledge is variable1 but rather that ,he knows the variability of things4 ,if1 however1 anything existed which ,god did not previously know1 and afterwards knew1 then ,his knowledge would be variable4 ,but this could not be2 for whatever is1 or can be in any period of time1 is known by ,god in ,his eternity4 ,therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time1 it follows that it is known by ,god from eternity4 ,therefore it cannot be granted that ,god can know more than ,he knows2 because such a proposition implies that first of all ,he did not know1 and then afterwards knew4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ancient ,nominalists said that it was the same thing to say ,christ is born and will be born and was born2 because the same thing is signified by these three--viz4 the nativity of ,christ4 ,therefore it follows1 they said1 that whatever ,god knew1 ,he knows2 because now ,he knows that ,christ is born1 which means the same thing as that ,christ will be born4 ,this opinion1 however1 is false2 both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations2 and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true2 which is contrary to what the ,philosopher lays down 7,categor4 iii7 when he says that this sentence1 ,socrates sits1 is true when he is sitting1 and false when he rises up4 ,therefore1 it must be conceded that this proposition is not true1 ,whatever ,god knew ,he knows1 if referred to enunciable propositions4 ,but because of this1 it does not follow that the knowledge of ,god is variable4 ,for as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that ,god knows one and the same thing sometime to be1 and sometime not to be1 so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that ,god knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true1 and sometime false4 ,the knowledge of ,god1 however1 would be variable if ,he knew enunciable things by way of enunciation1 by composition and division1 as occurs in our intellect4 ,hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity1 for example1 if when either as regards truth and falsity1 for example1 if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it2 or as regards diverse opinions1 as if we first thought that anyone was sitting1 and afterwards thought that he was not sitting2 neither of which can be in ,god4 ,,sixteenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ad1 ,art4 #af ,whether ,god ,has a ,speculative ,knowledge of ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god has not a speculative knowledge of things4 ,for the knowledge of ,god is the cause of things1 as shown above 7,a4 #h74 ,but speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known4 ,therefore the knowledge of ,god is not speculative4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things2 which does not belong to the divine knowledge4 ,therefore the knowledge of ,god is not speculative4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to ,god4 ,but speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge1 as the ,philosopher says in the beginning of ,metaphysics4 ,therefore ,god has a speculative knowledge of things4 ,i answer that1 ,some knowledge is speculative only2 some is practical only2 and some is partly speculative and partly practical4 ,in proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways3 first1 on the part of the things known1 which are not operable by the knower2 such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine things4 ,secondly1 as regards the manner of knowing--as1 for instance1 if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing1 and considering what belongs to it in general3 for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner1 and not as practically operable2 for operable means the application of form to matter1 and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles4 ,thirdly1 as regards the end2 for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii74 ,for the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation2 whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth4 ,hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made1 not ordering this to the end of operation1 but only to know 7how to do it71 this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end1 although it concerns an operable thing4 ,therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known1 is merely speculative4 ,but that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical3 and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical4 ,in accordance with this1 therefore1 it must be said that ,god has of ,himself a speculative knowledge only2 for ,he ,himself is not operable4 ,but of all other things ,he has both speculative and practical knowledge4 ,he has speculative knowledge as regards the mode2 for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing1 ,god knows all this much more perfectly4 ,now of things which ,he can make1 but does not make at any time1 ,he has not a practical knowledge1 according as knowledge is called practical from the end4 ,but ,he has a practical knowledge of what ,he makes in some period of time4 ,and1 as regards evil things1 although they are not operable by ,him1 yet they fall under ,his practical knowledge1 like good things1 inasmuch as ,he permits1 or impedes1 or directs them2 as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician1 inasmuch as he cures them by his art4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the knowledge of ,god is the cause1 not indeed of ,himself1 but of other things4 ,he is actually the cause of some1 that is1 of things that come to be in some period of time2 and ,he is virtually the cause of others1 that is1 of things which ,he can make1 and which nevertheless are never made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge1 but only accidentally in so far as it is human4 ,in answer to what is objected on the contrary1 we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable4 ,therefore1 since the knowledge of ,god is in every way perfect1 ,he must know what is operable by ,him1 formally as such1 and not only in so far as they are speculative4 ,nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of ,his speculative knowledge1 forasmuch as ,he sees all things other than ,himself in ,himself1 and ,he knows ,himself speculatively2 and so in the speculative knowledge of ,himself1 he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things4 ,,question #ae ,,of ,,ideas 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,after considering the knowledge of ,god1 it remains to consider ideas4 ,and about this there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there are ideas8 7#b7 ,whether they are many1 or one only8 7#c7 ,whether there are ideas of all things known by ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,are ,ideas8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there are no ideas4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii71 that ,god does not know things by ideas4 ,but ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them4 ,therefore there are no ideas4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god knows all things in ,himself1 as has been already said 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #e74 ,but ,he does not know ,himself through an idea2 neither therefore other things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action4 ,but the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things4 ,it is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xlvi71 ,such is the power inherent in ideas1 that no one can be wise unless they are understood4 ,i answer that1 ,it is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind4 ,for the ,greek word ,idea is in ,latin ,forma4 ,hence by ideas are understood the forms of things1 existing apart from the things themselves4 ,now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends3 either to be the type of that of which it is called the form1 or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing1 inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them4 ,in either case we must suppose ideas1 as is clear for the following reason3 ,in all things not generated by chance1 the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever4 ,but an agent does not act on account of the form1 except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent1 as may happen in two ways4 ,for in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being1 as in those that act by their nature2 as a man generates a man1 or fire generates fire4 ,whereas in other agents 7the form of the thing to be made pre-exists7 according to intelligible being1 as in those that act by the intellect2 and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder4 ,and this may be called the idea of the house1 since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind4 ,as then the world was not made by chance1 but by ,god acting by ,his intellect1 as will appear later 7,q4 #df1 ,a4 #a71 there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made4 ,and in this the notion of an idea consists4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god does not understand things according to an idea existing outside ,himself4 ,thus ,aristotle 7,metaph4 ix7 rejects the opinion of ,plato1 who held that ideas existed of themselves1 and not in the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although ,god knows ,himself and all else by ,his own essence1 yet ,his essence is the operative principle of all things1 except of ,himself4 ,it has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things2 though not with respect to ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god is the similitude of all things according to ,his essence2 therefore an idea in ,god is identical with ,his essence4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,ideas ,are ,many8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ideas are not many4 ,for an idea in ,god is ,his essence4 ,but ,god's essence is one only4 ,therefore there is only one idea4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating1 so are art and wisdom4 ,but in ,god there are not several arts or wisdoms4 ,therefore in ,him there is no plurality of ideas4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures1 it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal4 ,if1 then1 ideas are many1 but creatures temporal1 then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 these relations are either real in creatures only1 or in ,god also4 ,if in creatures only1 since creatures are not from eternity1 the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity1 if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations4 ,but if they are real in ,god1 it follows that there is a real plurality in ,god other than the plurality of ,persons3 and this is against the teaching of ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #aj71 who says1 in ,god all things are one1 except ingenerability1 generation1 and procession4 ,ideas therefore are not many4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xlvi71 ,ideas are certain principal forms1 or permanent and immutable types of things1 they themselves not being formed4 ,thus they are eternal1 and existing always in the same manner1 as being contained in the divine intelligence4 ,whilst1 however1 they themselves neither come into being nor decay1 yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay1 and all that actually does so4 ,i answer that1 ,it must necessarily be held that ideas are many4 ,in proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent1 as the order of an army 7is the proper intention7 of the general4 ,now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe1 as the ,philosopher clearly teaches in ,metaph4 xii4 ,therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by ,god1 and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents1 as has been supposed by those who have taught that ,god created only the first creature1 and that this creature created the second creature1 and so on1 until this great multitude of beings was produced4 ,according to this opinion ,god would have the idea of the first created thing alone2 whereas1 if the order itself of the universe was created by ,him immediately1 and intended by ,him1 ,he must have the idea of the order of the universe4 ,now there cannot be an idea of any whole1 unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made2 just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts4 ,so1 then1 it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xlvi71 that each thing was created by ,god according to the idea proper to it1 from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many4 ,now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of ,god1 if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood1 and not as the image whereby he understands1 which is a form that makes the intellect in act4 ,for the form of the house in the mind of the builder1 is something understood by him1 to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter4 ,now1 it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things2 though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were ,his understanding to be formed by a plurality of images4 ,hence many ideas exist in the divine mind1 as things understood by it2 as can be proved thus4 ,inasmuch as ,he knows ,his own essence perfectly1 ,he knows it according to every mode in which it can be known4 ,now it can be known not only as it is in itself1 but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness4 ,but every creature has its own proper species1 according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence4 ,so far1 therefore1 as ,god knows ,his essence as capable of such imitation by any creature1 ,he knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature2 and in like manner as regards other creatures4 ,so it is clear that ,god understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence1 but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing4 ,hence ideas are said to be many1 inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by wisdom and art we signify that by which ,god understands2 but an idea1 that which ,god understands4 ,for ,god by one understands many things1 and that not only according to what they are in themselves1 but also according as they are understood1 and this is to understand the several types of things4 ,in the same way1 an architect is said to understand a house1 when he understands the form of the house in matter4 ,but if he understands the form of a house1 as devised by himself1 from the fact that he understands that he understands it1 he thereby understands the type or idea of the house4 ,now not only does ,god understand many things by ,his essence1 but ,he also understands that ,he understands many things by ,his essence4 ,and this means that ,he understands the several types of things2 or that many ideas are in ,his intellect as understood by ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,such relations1 whereby ideas are multiplied1 are caused not by the things themselves1 but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things1 but in ,god4 ,yet they are not real relations1 such as those whereby the ,persons are distinguished1 but relations understood by ,god4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ae1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,are ,ideas of ,all ,things ,that ,god ,knows8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there are not ideas in ,god of all things that ,he knows4 ,for the idea of evil is not in ,god2 since it would follow that evil was in ,him4 ,but evil things are known by ,god4 ,therefore there are not ideas of all things that ,god knows4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god knows things that neither are1 nor will be1 nor have been1 as has been said above 7,a4 #i74 ,but of such things there are no ideas1 since1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v73 ,acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things4 ,therefore there are not in ,god ideas of all things known by ,him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god knows primary matter1 of which there can be no idea1 since it has no form4 ,hence the same conclusion4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is certain that ,god knows not only species1 but also genera1 singulars1 and accidents4 ,but there are not ideas of these1 according to ,plato's teaching1 who first taught ideas1 as ,augustine says 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xlvi74 ,therefore there are not ideas in ,god of all things known by ,him4 ,on the contrary1 ,ideas are types existing in the divine mind1 as is clear from ,augustine 7,octog4 ,tri4 ,quaest4 qu4 xlvi74 ,but ,god has the proper types of all things that ,he knows2 and therefore ,he has ideas of all things known by ,him4 ,i answer that1 ,as ideas1 according to ,plato1 are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation1 an idea has this twofold office1 as it exists in the mind of ,god4 ,so far as the idea is the principle of the making of things1 it may be called an exemplar1 and belongs to practical knowledge4 ,but so far as it is a principle of knowledge1 it is properly called a type1 and may belong to speculative knowledge also4 ,as an exemplar1 therefore1 it has respect to everything made by ,god in any period of time2 whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by ,god1 even though they never come to be in time2 and to all things that ,he knows according to their proper type1 in so far as they are known by ,him in a speculative manner4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evil is known by ,god not through its own type1 but through the type of good4 ,evil1 therefore1 has no idea in ,god1 neither in so far as an idea is an exemplar nor as a type4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god has no practical knowledge1 except virtually1 of things which neither are1 nor will be1 nor have been4 ,hence1 with respect to these there is no idea in ,god in so far as idea signifies an exemplar but only in so far as it denotes a type4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created2 and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter4 ,since1 however1 we hold matter to be created by ,god1 though not apart from form1 matter has its idea in ,god2 but not apart from the idea of the composite2 for matter in itself can neither exist1 nor be known4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species1 in so far as idea denotes an exemplar2 for genus cannot exist except in some species4 ,the same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject2 for these come into being along with their subject4 ,but accidents which supervene to the subject1 have their special idea4 ,for an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it2 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed1 such as painting1 or any other such thing1 are produced through some other form4 ,now individual things1 according to ,plato1 have no other idea than that of species2 both because particular things are individualized by matter1 which1 as some say1 he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea2 and because the intention of nature regards the species1 and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved4 ,however1 divine providence extends not merely to species2 but to individuals as will be shown later 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c74 ,,question #af ,,of ,,truth 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,since knowledge is of things that are true1 after the consideration of the knowledge of ,god1 we must inquire concerning truth4 ,about this there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether truth resides in the thing1 or only in the intellect8 7#b7 ,whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing8 7#c7 ,on the comparison of the true to being4 7#d7 ,on the comparison of the true to the good4 7#e7 ,whether ,god is truth8 7#f7 ,whether all things are true by one truth1 or by many8 7#g7 ,on the eternity of truth4 7#h7 ,on the unchangeableness of truth4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,truth ,resides ,only in the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect1 but rather in things4 ,for ,augustine 7,soliloq4 ii1 #e7 condemns this definition of truth1 ,that is true which is seen2 since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones1 as they are not seen4 ,he also condemns the following1 ,that is true which is as it appears to the knower1 who is willing and able to know1 for hence it would follow that nothing would be true1 unless someone could know it4 ,therefore he defines truth thus3 ,that is true which is4 ,it seems1 then1 that truth resides in things1 and not in the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is true1 is true by reason of truth4 ,if1 then1 truth is only in the intellect1 nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood4 ,but this is the error of the ancient philosophers1 who said that whatever seems to be true is so4 ,consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that1 on account of which a thing is so1 is itself more so1 as is evident from the ,philosopher 7,poster4 i74 ,but it is from the fact that a thing is or is not1 that our thought or word is true or false1 as the ,philosopher teaches 7,praedicam4 iii74 ,therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vi71 ,the true and the false reside not in things1 but in the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,as the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends1 so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends4 ,now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect1 or any knowledge whatsoever1 that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower1 whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired4 ,thus the term of the appetite1 namely good1 is in the object desirable1 and the term of the intellect1 namely true1 is in the intellect itself4 ,now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite1 in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good2 so1 since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood1 the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood1 so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect4 ,now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally4 ,it is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence2 but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable2 even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect1 but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend4 ,now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally1 but by what is in it essentially4 ,hence1 everything is said to be true absolutely1 in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends2 and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as being related to our intellect4 ,for a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind2 and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect4 ,in the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind4 ,for a stone is called true1 which possesses the nature proper to a stone1 according to the preconception in the divine intellect4 ,thus1 then1 truth resides primarily in the intellect1 and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle4 ,consequently there are various definitions of truth4 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxvi71 ,truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is2 and ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 v7 that ,truth makes being clear and evident and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect4 ,as to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect1 we have ,augustine's definition 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxvi71 ,truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle3 also ,anselm's definition 7,de ,verit4 xii71 ,truth is rightness1 perceptible by the mind alone2 for that is right which is in accordance with the principle2 also ,avicenna's definition 7,metaph4 viii1 #f71 ,the truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it4 ,the definition that ,truth is the equation of thought and thing is applicable to it under either aspect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking about the truth of things1 and excludes from the notion of this truth1 relation to our intellect2 for what is accidental is excluded from every definition4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect1 but were produced by chance4 ,but as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect1 they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect4 ,from this1 conclusions result that are inadmissible1 and which the ,philosopher refutes 7,metaph4 iv74 ,such1 however1 do not follow1 if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing1 yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily1 any more than that health should be primarily in medicine1 rather than in the animal3 for the virtue of medicine1 and not its health1 is the cause of health1 for here the agent is not univocal4 ,in the same way1 the being of the thing1 not its truth1 is the cause of truth in the intellect4 ,hence the ,philosopher says that a thought or a word is true from the fact that a thing is1 not because a thing is true4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,truth ,resides ,only in the ,intellect ,composing and ,dividing8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii7 that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects1 so is the intellect as regards what a thing is4 ,now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is4 ,therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isaac says in his book ,on ,definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing4 ,now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things1 so also with regard to simple things2 and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is4 ,therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing4 ,on the contrary1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vi7 that with regard to simple things and what a thing is1 truth is found neither in the intellect nor in things4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated before1 truth resides1 in its primary aspect1 in the intellect4 ,now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature1 the intellect1 in so far as it is knowing1 must be true1 so far as it has the likeness of the thing known1 this being its form1 as knowing4 ,for this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing2 and hence to know this conformity is to know truth4 ,but in no way can sense know this4 ,for although sight has the likeness of a visible thing1 yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it4 ,but the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing2 yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing what a thing is4 ,when1 however1 it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing1 then first it knows and expresses truth4 ,this it does by composing and dividing3 for in every proposition it either applies to1 or removes from the thing signified by the subject1 some form signified by the predicate3 and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing1 as is also the intellect1 when it knows what a thing is2 but it does not thereby know or affirm truth4 ,this is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words4 ,truth therefore may be in the senses1 or in the intellect knowing what a thing is1 as in anything that is true2 yet not as the thing known in the knower1 which is implied by the word truth2 for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known4 ,therefore1 properly speaking1 truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing2 and not in the senses2 nor in the intellect knowing what a thing is4 ,and thus the ,objections given are solved4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,true and ,being ,are ,convertible ,terms8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the true and being are not convertible terms4 ,for the true resides properly in the intellect1 as stated 7,a4 #a72 but being is properly in things4 ,therefore they are not convertible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being4 ,but the true extends to being and not-being2 for it is true that what is1 is2 and that what is not1 is not4 ,therefore the true and being are not convertible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible4 ,but the true appears to be prior to being2 for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true4 ,therefore it seems they are not convertible4 ,on the contrary1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 ii7 that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth4 ,i answer that1 ,as good has the nature of what is desirable1 so truth is related to knowledge4 ,now everything1 in as far as it has being1 so far is it knowable4 ,wherefore it is said in ,de ,anima iii that the soul is in some manner all things1 through the senses and the intellect4 ,and therefore1 as good is convertible with being1 so is the true4 ,but as good adds to being the notion of desirable1 so the true adds relation to the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the true resides in things and in the intellect1 as said before 7,a4 #a74 ,but the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance2 while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being1 as the manifestation with the manifested2 for this belongs to the nature of truth1 as has been said already 7,a4 #a74 ,it may1 however1 be said that being also is in things and in the intellect1 as is the true2 although truth is primarily in the intellect1 while being is primarily in things2 and this is so because truth and being differ in idea4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known2 yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable4 ,hence the true is based on being1 inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being1 apprehended1 that is1 by reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true1 this can be understood in two ways4 ,in the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended1 unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being2 and this is true4 ,in the other way1 so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also2 and this is false4 ,but the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also2 since being is included in the idea of the true4 ,the case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being4 ,for being cannot be understood1 unless being is intelligible4 ,yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood4 ,similarly1 being when understood is true1 yet the true is not understood by understanding being4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,good ,is ,logically ,prior to the ,true8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that good is logically prior to the true4 ,for what is more universal is logically prior1 as is evident from ,phys4 i4 ,but the good is more universal than the true1 since the true is a kind of good1 namely1 of the intellect4 ,therefore the good is logically prior to the true4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 good is in things1 but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above 7,a4 #b74 ,but that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect4 ,therefore good is logically prior to the true4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 truth is a species of virtue1 as is clear from ,ethic4 iv4 ,but virtue is included under good2 since1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arbit4 ii1 #ai71 it is a good quality of the mind4 ,therefore the good is prior to the true4 ,on the contrary1 ,what is in more things is prior logically4 ,but the true is in some things wherein good is not1 as1 for instance1 in mathematics4 ,therefore the true is prior to good4 ,i answer that1 ,although the good and the true are convertible with being1 as to suppositum1 yet they differ logically4 ,and in this manner the true1 speaking absolutely1 is prior to good1 as appears from two reasons4 ,first1 because the true is more closely related to being than is good4 ,for the true regards being itself simply and immediately2 while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect2 for thus it is desirable4 ,secondly1 it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite4 ,hence1 since the true regards knowledge1 but the good regards the appetite1 the true must be prior in idea to the good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will and the intellect mutually include one another3 for the intellect understands the will1 and the will wills the intellect to understand4 ,so then1 among things directed to the object of the will1 are comprised also those that belong to the intellect2 and conversely4 ,whence in the order of things desirable1 good stands as the universal1 and the true as the particular2 whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse is the case4 ,from the fact1 then1 that the true is a kind of good1 it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable2 but not that it is prior absolutely4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect4 ,now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself2 secondly1 it apprehends that it understands being2 and thirdly1 it apprehends that it desires being4 ,hence the idea of being is first1 that of truth second1 and the idea of good third1 though good is in things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the virtue which is called truth is not truth in general1 but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is4 ,but truth as applied to life is used in a particular sense1 inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect1 as it has been said that truth exists in other things 7,a4 #a74 ,whereas the truth of justice is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor1 as ordained by law4 ,hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,god ,is ,truth8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not truth4 ,for truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing4 ,but in ,god there is not composition and division4 ,therefore in ,him there is not truth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 truth1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxvi7 is a likeness to the principle4 ,but in ,god there is no likeness to a principle4 ,therefore in ,god there is not truth4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is said of ,god1 is said of ,him as of the first cause of all things2 thus the being of ,god is the cause of all being2 and ,his goodness the cause of all good4 ,if therefore there is truth in ,god1 all truth will be from ,him4 ,but it is true that someone sins4 ,therefore this will be from ,god2 which is evidently false4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord says1 ,i am the ,way1 the ,truth1 and the ,life 7,john #ad3f74 ,i answer that1 ,as said above 7,a4 #a71 truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is2 and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect4 ,this is to the greatest degree found in ,god4 ,for ,his being is not only conformed to ,his intellect1 but it is the very act of ,his intellect2 and ,his act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect1 and ,he ,himself is ,his own existence and act of understanding4 ,whence it follows not only that truth is in ,him1 but that ,he is truth itself1 and the sovereign and first truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division1 yet in ,his simple act of intelligence ,he judges of all things and knows all things complex2 and thus there is truth in ,his intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle1 that is to say1 to the things from which it receives knowledge4 ,the truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle1 namely1 the divine intellect4 ,now this cannot be said1 properly speaking1 of divine truth2 unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the ,son1 ,who has a principle4 ,but if we speak of divine truth in its essence1 we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative1 as when one says3 the ,father is of ,himself1 because ,he is not from another4 ,similarly1 the divine truth can be called a likeness to the principle1 inasmuch as ,his existence is not dissimilar to ,his intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not-being and privation have no truth of themselves1 but only in the apprehension of the intellect4 ,now all apprehension of the intellect is from ,god4 ,hence all the truth that exists in the statement--that a person commits fornication is true--is entirely from ,god4 ,but to argue1 ,therefore that this person fornicates is from ,god1 is a fallacy of ,accident4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,one ,truth1 ,according to ,which ,all ,things ,are ,true8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there is only one truth1 according to which all things are true4 ,for according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #a71 nothing is greater than the mind of man1 except ,god4 ,now truth is greater than the mind of man2 otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth3 whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth1 and not according to its own measure4 ,therefore ,god alone is truth4 ,therefore there is no other truth but ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,anselm says 7,de ,verit4 xiv71 that1 as is the relation of time to temporal things1 so is that of truth to true things4 ,but there is only one time for all temporal things4 ,therefore there is only one truth1 by which all things are true4 ,on the contrary1 it is written 7,ps4 #aa3b71 ,truths are decayed from among the children of men4 ,i answer that1 ,in one sense truth1 whereby all things are true1 is one1 and in another sense it is not4 ,in proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally1 it is found in each of them according to its proper nature2 as animal is found in each species of animal4 ,but when anything is predicated of many things analogically1 it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature1 and from this one the rest are denominated4 ,so healthiness is predicated of animal1 of urine1 and of medicine1 not that health is only in the animal2 but from the health of the animal1 medicine is called healthy1 in so far as it is the cause of health1 and urine is called healthy1 in so far as it indicates health4 ,and although health is neither in medicine nor in urine1 yet in either there is something whereby the one causes1 and the other indicates health4 ,now we have said 7,a4 #a7 that truth resides primarily in the intellect2 and secondarily in things1 according as they are related to the divine intellect4 ,if therefore we speak of truth1 as it exists in the intellect1 according to its proper nature1 then are there many truths in many created intellects2 and even in one and the same intellect1 according to the number of things known4 ,whence a gloss on ,ps4 #aa3b1 ,truths are decayed from among the children of men1 says3 ,as from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror1 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth4 ,but if we speak of truth as it is in things1 then all things are true by one primary truth2 to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity4 ,and thus1 although the essences or forms of things are many1 yet the truth of the divine intellect is one1 in conformity to which all things are said to be true4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth1 but according to the primary truth1 inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul1 as in a mirror1 by reason of the first principles of the understanding4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that the primary truth is greater than the soul4 ,and yet1 even created truth1 which resides in our intellect1 is greater than the soul1 not simply1 but in a certain degree1 in so far as it is its perfection2 even as science may be said to be greater than the soul4 ,yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul1 except ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the saying of ,anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,created ,truth ,is ,eternal8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that created truth is eternal4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arbit4 ii1 #h7 ,nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle1 and that two added to three make five4 ,but the truth of these is a created truth4 ,therefore created truth is eternal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which is always1 is eternal4 ,but universals are always and everywhere2 therefore they are eternal4 ,so therefore is truth1 which is the most universal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future4 ,but as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth1 so is that of a proposition regarding the future4 ,therefore some created truth is eternal4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 all that is without beginning and end is eternal4 ,but the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end2 for if their truth had a beginning1 since it was not before1 it was true that truth was not1 and true1 of course1 by reason of truth2 so that truth was before it began to be4 ,similarly1 if it be asserted that truth has an end1 it follows that it is after it has ceased to be1 for it will still be true that truth is not4 ,therefore truth is eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,god alone is eternal1 as laid down before 7,q4 #aj1 ,art4 #c74 ,i answer that1 ,the truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect4 ,for an enunciation resides in the intellect1 and in speech4 ,now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself3 but according as it is in speech1 it is called enunciable truth1 according as it signifies some truth of the intellect1 not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation1 as though in a subject4 ,thus urine is called healthy1 not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates4 ,in like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect4 ,hence1 if no intellect were eternal1 no truth would be eternal4 ,now because only the divine intellect is eternal1 in it alone truth has eternity4 ,nor does it follow from this that anything else but ,god is eternal2 since the truth of the divine intellect is ,god ,himself1 as shown already 7,a4 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the nature of a circle1 and the fact that two and three make five1 have eternity in the mind of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that something is always and everywhere1 can be understood in two ways4 ,in one way1 as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places1 as it belongs to ,god to be everywhere and always4 ,in the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time1 as primary matter is said to be one1 not because it has one form1 but by the absence of all distinguishing form4 ,in this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always1 in so far as universals are independent of place and time4 ,it does not1 however1 follow from this that they are eternal1 except in an intellect1 if one exists that is eternal4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which now is1 was future1 before it 7actually7 was2 because it was in its cause that it would be4 ,hence1 if the cause were removed1 that thing's coming to be was not future4 ,but the first cause is alone eternal4 ,hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be1 except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause2 and ,god alone is such a cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,because our intellect is not eternal1 neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us1 eternal1 but it had a beginning in time4 ,now before such truth existed1 it was not true to say that such a truth did exist1 except by reason of the divine intellect1 wherein alone truth is eternal4 ,but it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist3 and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect2 and not by reason of any truth in the things4 ,for this is truth concerning not-being2 and not-being has not truth of itself1 but only so far as our intellect apprehends it4 ,hence it is true to say that truth did not exist1 in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #af1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,truth ,is ,immutable8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that truth is immutable4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arbit4 ii1 #ab71 that ,truth and mind do not rank as equals1 otherwise truth would be mutable1 as the mind is4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what remains after every change is immutable2 as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible1 since it remains after all generation and corruption4 ,but truth remains after all change2 for after every change it is true to say that a thing is1 or is not4 ,therefore truth is immutable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the truth of an enunciation changes1 it changes mostly with the changing of the thing4 ,but it does not thus change4 ,for truth1 according to ,anselm 7,de ,verit4 viii71 is a certain rightness in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it4 ,but this proposition that ,socrates sits1 receives from the divine mind the signification that ,socrates does sit2 and it has the same signification even though he does not sit4 ,therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 where there is the same cause1 there is the same effect4 ,but the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions1 ,socrates sits1 will sit1 sat4 ,therefore the truth of each is the same4 ,but one or other of these must be the true one4 ,therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable2 and for the same reason that of any other4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #aa3b71 ,truths are decayed from among the children of men4 ,i answer that1 ,truth1 properly speaking1 resides only in the intellect1 as said before 7,a4 #a72 but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect4 ,hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect1 the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood4 ,now this conformity may vary in two ways1 even as any other likeness1 through change in one of the two extremes4 ,hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect1 from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed1 and in another way1 when the thing is changed1 but not the opinion2 and in either way there can be a change from true to false4 ,if1 then1 there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions1 and the knowledge of which nothing can escape1 in this is immutable truth4 ,now such is the divine intellect1 as is clear from what has been said before 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ae74 ,hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable4 ,but the truth of our intellect is mutable2 not because it is itself the subject of change1 but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity1 for thus forms may be called mutable4 ,whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true1 and this is altogether immutable4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of divine truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the true and being are convertible terms4 ,hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself1 but accidentally1 in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated1 as is said in ,phys4 i1 so does truth change1 not so as that no truth remains1 but because that truth does not remain which was before4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a proposition not only has truth1 as other things are said to have it1 in so far1 that is1 as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them2 but it is said to have truth in a special way1 in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect1 which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing4 ,when this disappears1 the truth of an opinion changes1 and consequently the truth of the proposition4 ,so therefore this proposition1 ,socrates sits1 is true1 as long as he is sitting1 both with the truth of the thing1 in so far as the expression is significative1 and with the truth of signification1 in so far as it signifies a true opinion4 ,when ,socrates rises1 the first truth remains1 but the second is changed4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the sitting of ,socrates1 which is the cause of the truth of the proposition1 ,socrates sits1 has not the same meaning when ,socrates sits1 after he sits1 and before he sits4 ,hence the truth which results1 varies1 and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present1 past1 or future4 ,thus it does not follow1 though one of the three propositions is true1 that the same truth remains invariable4 ,,question #ag ,,concerning ,,falsity 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider falsity4 ,about this four points of inquiry arise3 7#a7 ,whether falsity exists in things8 7#b7 ,whether it exists in the sense8 7#c7 ,whether it exists in the intellect8 7#d7 ,concerning the opposition of the true and the false4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,falsity ,exists in ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it appears that falsity does not exist in things4 ,for ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 ii1 #h71 ,if the true is that which is1 it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere2 whatever reason may appear to the contrary4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 false is derived from fallere 7to deceive74 ,but things do not deceive2 for1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #cc71 they show nothing but their own species4 ,therefore the false is not found in things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect1 as stated above 7,q4 #af74 ,but everything1 in so far as it exists1 imitates ,god4 ,therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity2 and thus nothing is false4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #cd73 ,every body is a true body and a false unity3 for it imitates unity without being unity4 ,but everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it4 ,therefore in all things falsity exists4 ,i answer that1 ,since true and false are opposed1 and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing1 we must needs seek falsity1 where primarily we find truth2 that is to say1 in the intellect4 ,now1 in things1 neither truth nor falsity exists1 except in relation to the intellect4 ,and since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it per se1 but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally2 a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends1 and to which it is compared per se but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect1 to which it is compared accidentally4 ,now natural things depend on the divine intellect1 as artificial things on the human4 ,wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves1 in so far as they fall short of the form of the art2 whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work1 if it falls short of the proper operation of his art4 ,in things that depend on ,god1 falseness cannot be found1 in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect2 since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect1 unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only1 who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained2 wherein consists the evil of sin4 ,thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the ,scriptures1 according to the words of the text1 ,why do you love vanity1 and seek after lying8 7,ps4 #d3c73 as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the truth of life as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect4 ,thus it is said1 ,he that doth truth1 cometh to the light 7,john #c3ba74 ,but in relation to our intellect1 natural things which are compared thereto accidentally1 can be called false2 not simply1 but relatively2 and that in two ways4 ,in one way according to the thing signified1 and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false4 ,in this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it2 as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 #cd74 ,so1 too1 ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 ii1 #aj73 ,the true tragedian is a false ,hector3 even as1 on the contrary1 anything can be called true1 in regard to that which is becoming to it4 ,in another way a thing can be called false1 by way of cause--and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion4 ,and whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances1 since our knowledge takes its rise from sense1 which principally and naturally deals with external accidents1 therefore those external accidents1 which resemble things other than themselves1 are said to be false with respect to those things2 thus gall is falsely honey2 and tin1 false gold4 ,regarding this1 ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 ii1 #f73 ,we call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true3 and the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 #cd73 ,things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not1 or what they are not4 ,in this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words1 and not because he can invent them2 for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false1 as stated in ,metaph4 v1 #cd4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is2 and false in respect to what it is not4 ,hence1 ,the true tragedian is a false ,hector1 as stated in ,soliloq4 ii1 #f4 ,as1 therefore1 in things that are is found a certain non-being1 so in things that are is found a degree of falseness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,things do not deceive by their own nature1 but by accident4 ,for they give occasion to falsity1 by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,things are said to be false1 not as compared with the divine intellect1 in which case they would be false simply1 but as compared with our intellect2 and thus they are false only relatively4 ,to the argument which is urged on the contrary1 likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion4 ,hence a thing is not always said to be false1 because it resembles another thing2 but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion1 not in any one case1 but in the majority of instances4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,is ,falsity in the ,senses8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that falsity is not in the senses4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #cc73 ,if all the bodily senses report as they are affected1 ,i do not know what more we can require from them4 ,thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses2 and therefore that falsity is not in them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iv1 #bd7 that falsity is not proper to the senses1 but to the imagination4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in non-complex things there is neither true nor false1 but in complex things only4 ,but affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses4 ,therefore in the senses there is no falsity4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 ii1 #f71 ,it appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes4 ,i answer that1 ,falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them4 ,now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth1 but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly1 as said above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #b71 and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are1 and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are4 ,the knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses2 and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways4 ,in the first way1 primarily and of its own nature1 as in sight there is the likeness of colors1 and of other sensible objects proper to it4 ,secondly1 of its own nature1 though not primarily2 as in sight there is the likeness of shape1 size1 and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense4 ,thirdly1 neither primarily nor of its own nature1 but accidentally1 as in sight1 there is the likeness of a man1 not as man1 but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man4 ,sense1 then1 has no false knowledge about its proper objects1 except accidentally and rarely1 and then1 because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly2 just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent4 ,hence1 for instance1 it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person4 ,but as to common objects of sense1 and accidental objects1 even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment1 because it is referred to them not directly1 but accidentally1 or as a consequence of being directed to other things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the affection of sense is its sensation itself4 ,hence1 from the fact that sense reports as it is affected1 it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation4 ,since1 however1 sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object1 it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object2 and thus we are deceived by sense about the object1 but not about the fact of sensation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,falsity is said not to be proper to sense1 since sense is not deceived as to its proper object4 ,hence in another translation it is said more plainly1 ,sense1 about its proper object1 is never false4 ,falsity is attributed to the imagination1 as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence4 ,hence1 when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself1 falsity results from such an apprehension2 and for this reason the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 #cd7 that shadows1 pictures1 and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument proves that the false is not in the sense1 as in that which knows the true and the false4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,falsity ,is in the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that falsity is not in the intellect4 ,for ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 #cb71 ,everyone who is deceived1 understands not that in which he is deceived4 ,but falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein4 ,therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #ea7 that the intellect is always right4 ,therefore there is no falsity in the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in ,de ,anima iii1 #ba1 #bb that where there is composition of objects understood1 there is truth and falsehood4 ,but such composition is in the intellect4 ,therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,just as a thing has being by its proper form1 so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known4 ,hence1 as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form1 but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities1 even as a man may fail to possess two feet1 but not fail to be a man2 so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed2 but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form1 or accidental thereto4 ,for it has been said 7,a4 #b7 that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible1 but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object2 or about accidental objects of sense4 ,now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object1 so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing4 ,hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing1 as neither the sense about its proper object4 ,but in affirming and denying1 the intellect may be deceived1 by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence1 something which is not consequent upon it1 or is opposed to it4 ,for the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things1 as sense is as to judging of common1 or accidental1 sensible objects4 ,there is1 however1 this difference1 as before mentioned regarding truth 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #b71 that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the intellect is false1 but because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge1 as it is conscious of truth2 whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,but because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect1 falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing1 in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it4 ,this can take place in two ways4 ,in one way1 by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another2 as that of a circle to a man4 ,wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another4 ,in another way1 by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive4 ,for thus the definition is not only false of the thing1 but false in itself4 ,a definition such as a reasonable four-footed animal would be of this kind1 and the intellect false in making it2 for such a statement as some reasonable animals are four-footed is false in itself4 ,for this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences2 but it is either true1 or it understands nothing at all4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect1 we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence1 and judge of it thereby2 as takes place in demonstrations1 in which there is no falsity4 ,in this sense ,augustine's words must be understood1 that he who is deceived1 understands not that wherein he is deceived2 and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellect is always right as regards first principles2 since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is4 ,for self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood1 from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ag1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,true and ,false ,are ,contraries8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that true and false are not contraries4 ,for true and false are opposed1 as that which is to that which is not2 for truth1 as ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 ii1 #e71 is that which is4 ,but that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries4 ,therefore true and false are not contrary things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one of two contraries is not in the other4 ,but falsity is in truth1 because1 as ,augustine says1 7,soliloq4 ii1 #aj71 ,a tragedian would not be a false ,hector1 if he were not a true tragedian4 ,therefore true and false are not contraries4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in ,god there is no contrariety1 for nothing is contrary to the ,divine ,substance1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #b74 ,but falsity is opposed to ,god1 for an idol is called in ,scripture a lie1 ,they have laid hold on lying 7,jer4 #h3e71 that is to say1 an idol1 as a gloss says4 ,therefore false and true are not contraries4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,peri ,herm4 ii71 that a false opinion is contrary to a true one4 ,i answer that1 ,true and false are opposed as contraries1 and not1 as some have said1 as affirmation and negation4 ,in proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject1 and can therefore be said of being as of not-being1 for instance not-seeing or not-sitting4 ,but privation asserts nothing1 whereas it determines its subject1 for it is negation in a subject1 as stated in ,metaph4 iv1 #d3 v4 #bg2 for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see4 ,contraries1 however1 both assert something and determine the subject1 for blackness is a species of color4 ,falsity asserts something1 for a thing is false1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iv1 #bg71 inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not1 or not to be what it really is4 ,for as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing1 so falsity implies the contrary4 ,hence it is clear that true and false are contraries4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,what is in things is the truth of the thing2 but what is apprehended1 is the truth of the intellect1 wherein truth primarily resides4 ,hence the false is that which is not as apprehended4 ,to apprehend being1 and not-being1 implies contrariety2 for1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,peri ,herm4 ii71 the contrary of this statement ,god is good1 is1 ,god is not good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it1 just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it1 but in that which is its proper subject4 ,this happens in either1 because true and good are universals1 and convertible with being4 ,hence1 as every privation is founded in a subject1 that is a being1 so every evil is founded in some good1 and every falsity in some truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,because contraries1 and opposites by way of privation1 are by nature about one and the same thing1 therefore there is nothing contrary to ,god1 considered in ,himself1 either with respect to ,his goodness or ,his truth1 for in ,his intellect there can be nothing false4 ,but in our apprehension of ,him contraries exist1 for the false opinion concerning ,him is contrary to the true4 ,so idols are called lies1 opposed to the divine truth1 inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity4 ,,question #ah ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,since to understand belongs to living beings1 after considering the divine knowledge and intellect1 we must consider the divine life4 ,about this1 four points of inquiry arise3 7#a7 ,to whom does it belong to live8 7#b7 ,what is life8 7#c7 ,whether life is properly attributed to ,god8 7#d7 ,whether all things in ,god are life8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #a ,whether to ,live ,belongs to ,all ,natural ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that to live belongs to all natural things4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 viii1 #a7 that ,movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature4 ,but all natural things participate in movement4 ,therefore all natural things partake of life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 plants are said to live1 inasmuch as they have in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay4 ,but local movement is naturally more perfect than1 and prior to1 movement of growth and decay1 as the ,philosopher shows 7,phys4 viii1 #ef1 #eg74 ,since then1 all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement1 it seems that all natural bodies live4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect4 ,yet life is attributed to them1 for we speak of living waters4 ,much more1 therefore1 have other natural bodies life4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vi1 #a7 that ,the last echo of life is heard in the plants1 whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree4 ,but inanimate bodies are inferior to plants4 ,therefore they have not life4 ,i answer that1 ,we can gather to what things life belongs1 and to what it does not1 from such things as manifestly possess life4 ,now life manifestly belongs to animals1 for it said in ,de ,vegetab4 i 99,de ,plantis i1 #a that in animals life is manifest4 ,we must1 therefore1 distinguish living from lifeless things1 by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live3 and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last4 ,we say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself3 and as long as such movement appears in it1 so long as it is considered to be alive4 ,when it no longer has any movement of itself1 but is only moved by another power1 then its life is said to fail1 and the animal to be dead4 ,whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement1 whether it be movement properly so called1 as the act of an imperfect being1 i4e4 of a thing in potentiality1 is called movement2 or movement in a more general sense1 as when said of the act of a perfect thing1 as understanding and feeling are called movement4 ,accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind3 whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so1 cannot be called living1 unless by a similitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of the ,philosopher may be understood either of the first movement1 namely1 that of the celestial bodies1 or of the movement in its general sense4 ,in either way is movement called the life1 as it were1 of natural bodies1 speaking by a similitude1 and not attributing it to them as their property4 ,the movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart1 whereby life is preserved1 is in animals4 ,similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life4 ,hence1 if the whole corporeal universe were one animal1 so that its movement came from an intrinsic moving force1 as some in fact have held1 in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to bodies1 whether heavy or light1 movement does not belong1 except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions1 and are out of their proper place2 for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them1 then they are at rest4 ,plants and other living things move with vital movement1 in accordance with the disposition of their nature1 but not by approaching thereto1 or by receding from it1 for in so far as they recede from such movement1 so far do they recede from their natural disposition4 ,heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force1 either generating them and giving them form1 or removing obstacles from their way4 ,they do not therefore move themselves1 as do living bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,waters are called living that have a continuous current3 for standing waters1 that are not connected with a continually flowing source1 are called dead1 as in cisterns and ponds4 ,this is merely a similitude1 inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive4 ,yet this is not life in them in its real sense1 since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them4 ,the same is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,life ,is an ,operation8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that life is an operation4 ,for nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus4 ,but life is divided by certain operations1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #ac71 who distinguishes four kinds of life1 namely1 nourishment1 sensation1 local movement and understanding4 ,therefore life is an operation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the active life is said to be different from the contemplative4 ,but the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations4 ,therefore life is an operation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to know ,god is an operation4 ,but this is life1 as is clear from the words of ,john #ah3c1 ,now this is eternal life1 that they may know ,thee1 the only true ,god4 ,therefore life is an operation4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #cg71 ,in living things1 to live is to be4 ,i answer that1 ,as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #ag1 ,a4 #c71 our intellect1 which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object1 gains knowledge from sense1 of which the proper objects are external accidents4 ,hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things4 ,and because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it1 as is clear from what has already been said 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a71 so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences4 ,hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself1 the signification of which is their principal object2 but sometimes1 and less strictly1 to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed4 ,and so we see that the word body is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions3 and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves2 in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity4 ,the same must be said of life4 ,the name is given from a certain external appearance1 namely1 self-movement1 yet not precisely to signify this1 but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation1 belong naturally4 ,to live1 accordingly1 is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature2 and life signifies this1 though in the abstract1 just as the word running denotes to run in the abstract4 ,hence living is not an accidental but an essential predicate4 ,sometimes1 however1 life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken1 and thus the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #i7 that to live is principally to sense or to understand4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher here takes to live to mean an operation of life4 ,or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like1 are sometimes taken for the operations1 sometimes for the existence itself of the operator4 ,for he says 7,ethic4 ix1 #i7 that to live is to sense or to understand--in other words1 to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding4 ,thus1 then1 he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned4 ,for in this lower world there are four kinds of living things4 ,it is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment1 and1 as a consequence1 of growing and generating4 ,others are able1 in addition1 to sense1 as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement4 ,others have the further power of moving from place to place1 as perfect animals1 such as quadrupeds1 and birds1 and so on4 ,others1 as man1 have the still higher faculty of understanding4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator1 and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself4 ,it happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers1 but something over and above these1 such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations1 so that the operations become sources of pleasure4 ,thus1 as by a similitude1 any kind of work in which a man takes delight1 so that his bent is towards it1 his time spent in it1 and his whole life ordered with a view to it1 is said to be the life of that man4 ,hence some are said to lead a life of self-indulgence1 others a life of virtue4 ,in this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active1 and thus to know ,god is said to be life eternal4 ,wherefore the ,reply to the ,third ,objection is clear4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,life ,is ,properly ,attributed to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that life is not properly attributed to ,god4 ,for things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves1 as previously stated 7,a4 #b74 ,but movement does not belong to ,god4 ,neither therefore does life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life4 ,hence it is said by the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #d7 that the soul is the cause and principle of the living body4 ,but ,god has no principle4 ,therefore life cannot be attributed to ,him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul4 ,but this exists only in corporeal things4 ,therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #hc3c73 ,my heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,life is in the highest degree properly in ,god4 ,in proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another1 the more perfectly this power is found in anything1 the more perfect is the life of that thing4 ,in things that move and are moved1 a threefold order is found4 ,in the first place1 the end moves the agent3 and the principal agent is that which acts through its form1 and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form1 but of the principal agent1 and does no more than execute the action4 ,accordingly there are things that move themselves1 not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them1 but only in respect of the executing of the movement2 the form by which they act1 and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature4 ,of this kind are plants1 which move themselves according to their inherent nature1 with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay4 ,other things have self-movement in a higher degree1 that is1 not only with regard to executing the movement1 but even as regards to the form1 the principle of movement1 which form they acquire of themselves4 ,of this kind are animals1 in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form2 but one received through sense4 ,hence the more perfect is their sense1 the more perfect is their power of self-movement4 ,such as have only the sense of touch1 as shellfish1 move only with the motion of expansion and contraction2 and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants4 ,whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection1 so as to recognize not only connection and touch1 but also objects apart from themselves1 can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement4 ,yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement1 nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation1 or movement2 for this has been implanted in them by nature2 and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense4 ,hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these4 ,this can only be done by reason and intellect2 whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end1 and duly coordinate them4 ,hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings2 for their power of self-movement is more perfect4 ,this is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers2 and these by their command move the organs of movement4 ,thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship1 i4e4 the art of navigation1 rules the art of ship-designing2 and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship4 ,but although our intellect moves itself to some things1 yet others are supplied by nature1 as are first principles1 which it cannot doubt2 and the last end1 which it cannot but will4 ,hence1 although with respect to some things it moves itself1 yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another4 ,wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature1 and which1 in what it naturally possesses1 is not determined by another1 must have life in the most perfect degree4 ,such is ,god2 and hence in ,him principally is life4 ,from this the ,philosopher concludes 7,metaph4 xii1 #ea71 after showing ,god to be intelligent1 that ,god has life most perfect and eternal1 since ,his intellect is most perfect and always in act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated in ,metaph4 ix1 #af1 action is twofold4 ,actions of one kind pass out to external matter1 as to heat or to cut2 whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent1 as to understand1 to sense and to will4 ,the difference between them is this1 that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves1 but of the thing moved2 whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent4 ,hence1 because movement is an act of the thing in movement1 the latter action1 in so far as it is the act of the operator1 is called its movement1 by this similitude1 that as movement is an act of the thing moved1 so an act of this kind is the act of the agent1 although movement is an act of the imperfect1 that is1 of what is in potentiality2 while this kind of act is an act of the perfect1 that is to say1 of what is in act as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #bh4 ,in the sense1 therefore1 in which understanding is movement1 that which understands itself is said to move itself4 ,it is in this sense that ,plato also taught that ,god moves ,himself2 not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,god is ,his own very existence and understanding1 so is ,he ,his own life2 and therefore ,he so lives that ,he has no principle of life4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature1 that needs generation to preserve the species1 and nourishment to preserve the individual4 ,for this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul3 but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ah1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all ,things ,are ,life in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that not all things are life in ,god4 ,for it is said 7,acts #ag3bh71 ,in ,him we live1 and move1 and be4 ,but not all things in ,god are movement4 ,therefore not all things are life in ,him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all things are in ,god as their first model4 ,but things modelled ought to conform to the model4 ,since1 then1 not all things have life in themselves1 it seems that not all things are life in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #bi71 a living substance is better than a substance that does not live4 ,if1 therefore1 things which in themselves have not life1 are life in ,god1 it seems that things exist more truly in ,god than themselves4 ,but this appears to be false2 since in themselves they exist actually1 but in ,god potentially4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 just as good things and things made in time are known by ,god1 so are bad things1 and things that ,god can make1 but that never will be made4 ,if1 therefore1 all things are life in ,god1 inasmuch as known by ,him1 it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in ,god1 as known by ,him1 and this appears inadmissible4 ,on the contrary1 7,john #a3c1 #d71 it is said1 ,what was made1 in ,him was life4 ,but all things were made1 except ,god4 ,therefore all things are life in ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,in ,god to live is to understand1 as before stated 7,a4 #c74 ,in ,god intellect1 the thing understood1 and the act of understanding1 are one and the same4 ,hence whatever is in ,god as understood is the very living or life of ,god4 ,now1 wherefore1 since all things that have been made by ,god are in ,him as things understood1 it follows that all things in ,him are the divine life itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,creatures are said to be in ,god in a twofold sense4 ,in one way1 so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power2 even as we say that things that are in our power are in us4 ,and creatures are thus said to be in ,god1 even as they exist in their own natures4 ,in this sense we must understand the words of the ,apostle when he says1 ,in ,him we live1 move1 and be2 since our being1 living1 and moving are themselves caused by ,god4 ,in another sense things are said to be in ,god1 as in ,him who knows them1 in which sense they are in ,god through their proper ideas1 which in ,god are not distinct from the divine essence4 ,hence things as they are in ,god are the divine essence4 ,and since the divine essence is life and not movement1 it follows that things existing in ,god in this manner are not movement1 but life4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the thing modelled must be like the model according to the form1 not the mode of being4 ,for sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled4 ,thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being2 but in the house that exists outside his mind1 material and sensible being4 ,hence the ideas of things1 though not existing in themselves1 are life in the divine mind1 as having a divine existence in that mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if form only1 and not matter1 belonged to natural things1 then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind1 by the ideas of them1 than in themselves4 ,for which reason1 in fact1 ,plato held that the separate man was the true man2 and that man as he exists in matter1 is man only by participation4 ,but since matter enters into the being of natural things1 we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves1 because in that mind they have an uncreated being1 but in themselves a created being3 whereas this particular being1 a man1 or horse1 for example1 has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind1 because it belongs to human nature to be material1 which1 as existing in the divine mind1 it is not4 ,even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in matter2 yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind2 since the former is actual1 the latter only potential4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although bad things are in ,god's knowledge1 as being comprised under that knowledge1 yet they are not in ,god as created by ,him1 or preserved by ,him1 or as having their type in ,him4 ,they are known by ,god through the types of good things4 ,hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in ,god4 ,those things that are not in time may be called life in ,god in so far as life means understanding only1 and inasmuch as they are understood by ,god2 but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation4 ,,question #ai ,,the ,,will ,,of ,,god 7,in ,twelve ,articles7 ,after considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge1 we consider what belongs to the divine will4 ,the first consideration is about the divine will itself2 the second about what belongs strictly to ,his will2 the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to ,his will4 ,about ,his will itself there are twelve points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is will in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether ,god wills things apart from ,himself8 7#c7 ,whether whatever ,god wills1 ,he wills necessarily8 7#d7 ,whether the will of ,god is the cause of things8 7#e7 ,whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will8 7#f7 ,whether the divine will is always fulfilled8 7#g7 ,whether the will of ,god is mutable8 7#h7 ,whether the will of ,god imposes necessity on the things willed8 7#i7 ,whether there is in ,god the will of evil8 7#aj7 ,whether ,god has free will8 7#aa7 ,whether the will of expression is distinguished in ,god8 7#ab7 ,whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,will in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there is not will in ,god4 ,for the object of will is the end and the good4 ,but we cannot assign to ,god any end4 ,therefore there is not will in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 will is a kind of appetite4 ,but appetite1 as it is directed to things not possessed1 implies imperfection1 which cannot be imputed to ,god4 ,therefore there is not will in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #ed71 the will moves1 and is moved4 ,but ,god is the first cause of movement1 and ,himself is unmoved1 as proved in ,phys4 viii1 #di4 ,therefore there is not will in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #ab3b73 ,that you may prove what is the will of ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,there is will in ,god1 as there is intellect3 since will follows upon intellect4 ,for as natural things have actual existence by their form1 so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form4 ,now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form1 that when it has it not1 it tends towards it2 and when it has it1 it is at rest therein4 ,it is the same with every natural perfection1 which is a natural good4 ,this aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite4 ,whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form2 so as to rest therein when possessed1 and when not possessed to seek to possess it1 both of which pertain to the will4 ,hence in every intellectual being there is will1 just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite4 ,and so there must be will in ,god1 since there is intellect in ,him4 ,and as ,his intellect is ,his own existence1 so is ,his will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although nothing apart from ,god is ,his end1 yet ,he ,himself is the end with respect to all things made by ,him4 ,and this by ,his essence1 for by ,his essence ,he is good1 as shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #c73 for the end has the aspect of good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,will in us belongs to the appetitive part1 which1 although named from appetite1 has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess2 but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess4 ,in this respect will is said to be in ,god1 as having always good which is its object1 since1 as already said1 it is not distinct from ,his essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a will of which the principal object is a good outside itself1 must be moved by another2 but the object of the divine will is ,his goodness1 which is ,his essence4 ,hence1 since the will of ,god is ,his essence1 it is not moved by another than itself1 but by itself alone1 in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement4 ,this is what ,plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,wills ,things ,apart from ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not will things apart from ,himself4 ,for the divine will is the divine existence4 ,but ,god is not other than ,himself4 ,therefore ,he does not will things other than ,himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the willed moves the willer1 as the appetible the appetite1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #ed4 ,if1 therefore1 ,god wills anything apart from ,himself1 ,his will must be moved by another2 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if what is willed suffices the willer1 he seeks nothing beyond it4 ,but ,his own goodness suffices ,god1 and completely satisfies ,his will4 ,therefore ,god does not will anything apart from ,himself4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects4 ,if1 therefore1 ,god wills ,himself and things apart from ,himself1 it follows that the act of ,his will is manifold1 and consequently ,his existence1 which is ,his will4 ,but this is impossible4 ,therefore ,god does not will things apart from ,himself4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,thess4 #d3c73 ,this is the will of ,god1 your sanctification4 ,i answer that1 ,god wills not only ,himself1 but other things apart from ,himself4 ,this is clear from the comparison which we made above 7,a4 #a74 ,for natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good1 to acquire it if not possessed1 and1 if possessed1 to rest therein2 but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others1 so far as possible4 ,hence we see that every agent1 in so far as it is perfect and in act1 produces its like4 ,it pertains1 therefore1 to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed2 and especially does this pertain to the divine will1 from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness4 ,hence1 if natural things1 in so far as they are perfect1 communicate their good to others1 much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible4 ,thus1 then1 ,he wills both ,himself to be1 and other things to be2 but ,himself as the end1 and other things as ordained to that end2 inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the divine will is ,god's own existence essentially1 yet they differ in aspect1 according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them1 as is clear from what has already been said 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #d74 ,for when we say that ,god exists1 no relation to any other object is implied1 as we do imply when we say that ,god wills4 ,therefore1 although ,he is not anything apart from ,himself1 yet ,he does will things apart from ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in things willed for the sake of the end1 the whole reason for our being moved is the end1 and this it is that moves the will1 as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end4 ,he who wills to take a bitter draught1 in doing so wills nothing else than health2 and this alone moves his will4 ,it is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant1 which anyone may will to do1 not only for the sake of health1 but also for its own sake4 ,hence1 although ,god wills things apart from ,himself only for the sake of the end1 which is ,his own goodness1 it does not follow that anything else moves ,his will1 except ,his goodness4 ,so1 as ,he understands things apart from ,himself by understanding ,his own essence1 so ,he wills things apart from ,himself by willing ,his own goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,from the fact that ,his own goodness suffices the divine will1 it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself1 but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness4 ,thus1 too1 the divine intellect1 though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence1 yet in that essence knows other things4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as the divine intellect is one1 as seeing the many only in the one1 in the same way the divine will is one and simple1 as willing the many only through the one1 that is1 through its own goodness4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,whatever ,god ,wills ,he ,wills ,necessarily8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that whatever ,god wills ,he wills necessarily4 ,for everything eternal is necessary4 ,but whatever ,god wills1 ,he wills from eternity1 for otherwise ,his will would be mutable4 ,therefore whatever ,he wills1 ,he wills necessarily4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god wills things apart from ,himself1 inasmuch as ,he wills ,his own goodness4 ,now ,god wills ,his own goodness necessarily4 ,therefore ,he wills things apart from ,himself necessarily4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever belongs to the nature of ,god is necessary1 for ,god is of ,himself necessary being1 and the principle of all necessity1 as above shown 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,but it belongs to ,his nature to will whatever ,he wills2 since in ,god there can be nothing over and above ,his nature as stated in ,metaph4 v1 #f4 ,therefore whatever ,he wills1 ,he wills necessarily4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 being that is not necessary1 and being that is possible not to be1 are one and the same thing4 ,if1 therefore1 ,god does not necessarily will a thing that ,he wills1 it is possible for ,him not to will it1 and therefore possible for ,him to will what ,he does not will4 ,and so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things1 and imperfect1 since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things1 no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power1 as the ,commentator 99,averroes says in ,phys4 ii4 ,if1 then1 the ,will of ,god is indifferent with regard to anything1 it follows that ,his determination to act comes from another2 and thus ,he has some cause prior to ,himself4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 whatever ,god knows1 ,he knows necessarily4 ,but as the divine knowledge is ,his essence1 so is the divine will4 ,therefore whatever ,god wills1 ,he wills necessarily4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #a3aa73 ,who worketh all things according to the counsel of ,his will4 ,now1 what we work according to the counsel of the will1 we do not will necessarily4 ,therefore ,god does not will necessarily whatever ,he wills4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary1 namely1 absolutely1 and by supposition4 ,we judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms1 as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject3 thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal4 ,it is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate2 thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even4 ,in this way it is not necessary that ,socrates sits3 wherefore it is not necessary absolutely1 though it may be so by supposition2 for1 granted that he is sitting1 he must necessarily sit1 as long as he is sitting4 ,accordingly as to things willed by ,god1 we must observe that ,he wills something of absolute necessity3 but this is not true of all that ,he wills4 ,for the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness1 since that is its proper object4 ,hence ,god wills ,his own goodness necessarily1 even as we will our own happiness necessarily1 and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object1 for instance the sight to color1 since it tends to it by its own nature4 ,but ,god wills things apart from ,himself in so far as they are ordered to ,his own goodness as their end4 ,now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it1 unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them2 as1 we will to take food to preserve life1 or to take ship in order to cross the sea4 ,but we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable1 such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot1 for we can make the journey without one4 ,the same applies to other means4 ,hence1 since the goodness of ,god is perfect1 and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to ,him from them1 it follows that ,his willing things apart from ,himself is not absolutely necessary4 ,yet it can be necessary by supposition1 for supposing that ,he wills a thing1 then ,he is unable not to will it1 as ,his will cannot change4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from the fact that ,god wills from eternity whatever ,he wills1 it does not follow that ,he wills it necessarily2 except by supposition4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although ,god necessarily wills ,his own goodness1 ,he does not necessarily will things willed on account of ,his goodness2 for it can exist without other things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is not natural to ,god to will any of those other things that ,he does not will necessarily2 and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to ,his nature1 but voluntary4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect2 owing to a deficiency in the effect1 and not in the cause4 ,even so1 the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth1 owing to a defect not in the solar power1 but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause4 ,in the same way1 that ,god does not necessarily will some of the things that ,he wills1 does not result from defect in the divine will1 but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed1 namely1 that the perfect goodness of ,god can be without it2 and such defect accompanies all created good4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power4 ,the divine will1 which by its nature is necessary1 determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as the divine essence is necessary of itself1 so is the divine will and the divine knowledge2 but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known2 not the divine will to the thing willed4 ,the reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower2 but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves4 ,since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in ,god2 but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves1 in so far as they exist in themselves2 it follows that ,god knows necessarily whatever ,he wills1 but does not will necessarily whatever ,he wills4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,will of ,god ,is the ,cause of ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the will of ,god is not the cause of things4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #a73 ,as our sun1 not by reason nor by pre-election1 but by its very being1 enlightens all things that can participate in its light1 so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists4 ,but every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election4 ,therefore ,god does not act by will2 and so ,his will is not the cause of things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,the first in any order is that which is essentially so1 thus in the order of burning things1 that comes first which is fire by its essence4 ,but ,god is the first agent4 ,therefore ,he acts by ,his essence2 and that is ,his nature4 ,he acts then by nature1 and not by will4 ,therefore the divine will is not the cause of things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,whatever is the cause of anything1 through being such a thing1 is the cause by nature1 and not by will4 ,for fire is the cause of heat1 as being itself hot2 whereas an architect is the cause of a house1 because he wills to build it4 ,now ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cb71 ,because ,god is good1 we exist4 ,therefore ,god is the cause of things by ,his nature1 and not by ,his will4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,of one thing there is one cause4 ,but the cause of created things is the knowledge of ,god1 as said before 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore the will of ,god cannot be considered the cause of things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,wis4 #aa3bf71 ,how could anything endure1 if ,thou wouldst not8 ,i answer that1 ,we must hold that the will of ,god is the cause of things2 and that ,he acts by the will1 and not1 as some have supposed1 by a necessity of ,his nature4 ,this can be shown in three ways3 ,first1 from the order itself of active causes4 ,since both intellect and nature act for an end1 as proved in ,phys4 ii1 #di1 the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect2 as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer4 ,hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature4 ,hence1 since ,god is first in the order of agents1 ,he must act by intellect and will4 ,this is shown1 secondly1 from the character of a natural agent1 of which the property is to produce one and the same effect2 for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented4 ,this is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent2 and hence as long as it has that nature1 its acts will be in accordance with that nature2 for every natural agent has a determinate being4 ,since1 then1 the ,divine ,being is undetermined1 and contains in ,himself the full perfection of being1 it cannot be that ,he acts by a necessity of ,his nature1 unless ,he were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being3 and that this is impossible has been already shown 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #b74 ,he does not1 therefore1 act by a necessity of ,his nature1 but determined effects proceed from ,his own infinite perfection according to the determination of ,his will and intellect4 ,thirdly1 it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause4 ,for effects proceed from the agent that causes them1 in so far as they pre-exist in the agent2 since every agent produces its like4 ,now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause4 ,wherefore since the ,divine ,being is ,his own intellect1 effects pre-exist in ,him after the mode of intellect1 and therefore proceed from ,him after the same mode4 ,consequently1 they proceed from ,him after the mode of will1 for ,his inclination to put in act what ,his intellect has conceived appertains to the will4 ,therefore the will of ,god is the cause of things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from ,god absolutely2 but only in a certain sense1 in so far1 that is1 as ,he communicates ,his goodness not merely to certain things1 but to all2 and as election implies a certain distinction4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,because the essence of ,god is ,his intellect and will1 from the fact of ,his acting by ,his essence1 it follows that ,he acts after the mode of intellect and will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,good is the object of the will4 ,the words1 therefore1 ,because ,god is good1 we exist1 are true inasmuch as ,his goodness is the reason of ,his willing all other things1 as said before 7,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it1 whereby the form of the work is conceived1 and will as commanding it1 since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect1 except by the will4 ,hence1 the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation4 ,but the power is cause1 as executing the effect1 since it denotes the immediate principle of operation4 ,but in ,god all these things are one4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,any ,cause ,can ,be ,assigned to the ,divine ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will4 ,for ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 #df73 ,who would venture to say that ,god made all things irrationally8 ,but to a voluntary agent1 what is the reason of operating1 is the cause of willing4 ,therefore the will of ,god has some cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in things made by one who wills to make them1 and whose will is influenced by no cause1 there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills4 ,but the will of ,god is the cause of all things1 as has been already shown 7,a4 #d74 ,if1 then1 there is no cause of ,his will1 we cannot seek in any natural things any cause1 except the divine will alone4 ,thus all science would be in vain1 since science seeks to assign causes to effects4 ,this seems inadmissible1 and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is done by the willer1 on account of no cause1 depends simply on his will4 ,if1 therefore1 the will of ,god has no cause1 it follows that all things made depend simply on ,his will1 and have no other cause4 ,but this also is not admissible4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,qq4 lxxxiii1 #bh73 ,every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected4 ,but nothing is greater than the will of ,god4 ,we must not then seek for a cause of it4 ,i answer that1 ,in no wise has the will of ,god a cause4 ,in proof of which we must consider that1 since the will follows from the intellect1 there is cause of the will in the person who wills1 in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding1 in the person that understands4 ,the case with the understanding is this3 that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other1 the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known4 ,if the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself1 apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance1 in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses1 since a thing cannot be its own cause2 and yet1 it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion4 ,it is the same with the will1 with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end1 as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding4 ,hence1 if anyone in one act wills an end1 and in another act the means to that end1 his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means4 ,this cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means2 for a thing cannot be its own cause4 ,yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end4 ,now as ,god by one act understands all things in ,his essence1 so by one act ,he wills all things in ,his goodness4 ,hence1 as in ,god to understand the cause is not the cause of ,his understanding the effect1 for ,he understands the effect in the cause1 so1 in ,him1 to will an end is not the cause of ,his willing the means1 yet ,he wills the ordering of the means to the end4 ,therefore1 ,he wills this to be as means to that2 but does not will this on account of that4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will of ,god is reasonable1 not because anything is to ,god a cause of willing1 but in so far as ,he wills one thing to be on account of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since ,god wills effects to proceed from definite causes1 for the preservation of order in the universe1 it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will4 ,it would1 however1 be unreasonable to do so1 if such were considered as primary1 and not as dependent on the will of ,god4 ,in this sense ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #b73 ,philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes1 being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others1 the will of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since ,god wills effects to come from causes1 all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of ,god1 but on something else besides3 but the first effect depends on the divine will alone4 ,thus1 for example1 we may say that ,god willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work1 and intellect1 that he might be man2 and willed him to be man that he might enjoy ,him1 or for the completion of the universe4 ,but this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends4 ,hence such things depend on the simple will of ,god2 but the others on the order of other causes4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,will of ,god ,is ,always ,fulfilled8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the will of ,god is not always fulfilled4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #b3d73 ,god will have all men to be saved1 and to come to the knowledge of the truth4 ,but this does not happen4 ,therefore the will of ,god is not always fulfilled4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as is the relation of knowledge to truth1 so is that of the will to good4 ,now ,god knows all truth4 ,therefore ,he wills all good4 ,but not all good actually exists2 for much more good might exist4 ,therefore the will of ,god is not always fulfilled4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since the will of ,god is the first cause1 it does not exclude intermediate causes4 ,but the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause2 as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb4 ,therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes4 ,the will of ,god1 therefore1 is not always fulfilled4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #aac3aa73 ,god hath done all things1 whatsoever ,he would4 ,i answer that1 ,the will of ,god must needs always be fulfilled4 ,in proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form1 the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes4 ,the rule in forms is this3 that although a thing may fall short of any particular form1 it cannot fall short of the universal form4 ,for though a thing may fail to be1 for example1 a man or a living being1 yet it cannot fail to be a being4 ,hence the same must happen in active causes4 ,something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause1 but not outside the order of the universal cause2 under which all particular causes are included3 and if any particular cause fails of its effect1 this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause1 which is included in the order of the universal cause4 ,therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause4 ,even in corporeal things this is clearly seen4 ,for it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects2 yet whatever effect does result1 in corporeal things1 from this hindrance of a corporeal cause1 must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven4 ,since1 then1 the will of ,god is the universal cause of all things1 it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect4 ,hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order1 returns into it in another order2 as does the sinner1 who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him1 yet falls back into the order of that will1 when by its justice he is punished4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words of the ,apostle1 ,god will have all men to be saved1 etc4 can be understood in three ways4 ,first1 by a restricted application1 in which case they would mean1 as ,augustine says 7,de praed4 sanct4 i1 #h3 ,enchiridion #ajc71 ,god wills all men to be saved that are saved1 not because there is no man whom ,he does not wish saved1 but because there is no man saved whose salvation ,he does not will4 ,secondly1 they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals1 not to every individual of each class2 in which case they mean that ,god wills some men of every class and condition to be saved1 males and females1 ,jews and ,gentiles1 great and small1 but not all of every condition4 ,thirdly1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bi71 they are understood of the antecedent will of ,god2 not of the consequent will4 ,this distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself1 in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent1 but to the things willed4 ,to understand this we must consider that everything1 in so far as it is good1 is willed by ,god4 ,a thing taken in its primary sense1 and absolutely considered1 may be good or evil1 and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account1 by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary4 ,thus that a man should live is good2 and that a man should be killed is evil1 absolutely considered4 ,but if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society1 to kill him is a good2 that he live is an evil4 ,hence it may be said of a just judge1 that antecedently he wills all men to live2 but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged4 ,in the same way ,god antecedently wills all men to be saved1 but consequently wills some to be damned1 as ,his justice exacts4 ,nor do we will simply1 what we will antecedently1 but rather we will it in a qualified manner2 for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves1 and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications4 ,hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered2 and this is what is meant by willing consequently4 ,thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer1 but in a qualified manner he would will him to live1 to wit1 inasmuch as he is a man4 ,such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will4 ,thus it is clear that whatever ,god simply wills takes place2 although what ,he wills antecedently may not take place4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower2 while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves4 ,but all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in ,god1 though it does not all exist in created things4 ,therefore ,god knows all truth2 but does not will all good1 except in so far as ,he wills ,himself1 in ,whom all good virtually exists4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause1 when it is not the universal first cause1 including within itself all causes2 for then the effect could in no way escape its order4 ,and thus it is with the will of ,god1 as said above4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,will of ,god ,is ,changeable8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the will of ,god is changeable4 ,for the ,lord says 7,gen4 #f3g73 ,it repenteth ,me that ,i have made man4 ,but whoever repents of what he has done1 has a changeable will4 ,therefore ,god has a changeable will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is said in the person of the ,lord3 ,i will speak against a nation and against a kingdom1 to root out1 and to pull down1 and to destroy it2 but if that nation shall repent of its evil1 ,i also will repent of the evil that ,i have thought to do to them 7,jer4 #ah3g1 #h74 ,therefore ,god has a changeable will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever ,god does1 ,he does voluntarily4 ,but ,god does not always do the same thing1 for at one time ,he ordered the law to be observed1 and at another time forbade it4 ,therefore ,he has a changeable will4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,god does not will of necessity what ,he wills1 as said before 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore ,he can both will and not will the same thing4 ,but whatever can incline to either of two opposites1 is changeable substantially2 and that which can exist in a place or not in that place1 is changeable locally4 ,therefore ,god is changeable as regards ,his will4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said3 ,god is not as a man1 that ,he should lie1 nor as the son of man1 that ,he should be changed 7,num4 #bc3ai74 ,i answer that1 ,the will of ,god is entirely unchangeable4 ,on this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing2 to will that certain things should be changed is another4 ,it is possible to will a thing to be done now1 and its contrary afterwards2 and yet for the will to remain permanently the same3 whereas the will would be changed1 if one should begin to will what before he had not willed2 or cease to will what he had willed before4 ,this cannot happen1 unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer4 ,for since the will regards good1 a man may in two ways begin to will a thing4 ,in one way when that thing begins to be good for him1 and this does not take place without a change in him4 ,thus when the cold weather begins1 it becomes good to sit by the fire2 though it was not so before4 ,in another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him1 though he did not know it before2 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us4 ,now it has already been shown that both the substance of ,god and ,his knowledge are entirely unchangeable 7,,qq4 #i1 ,a4 #a2 #ad1 ,a4 #ae74 ,therefore ,his will must be entirely unchangeable4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of the ,lord are to be understood metaphorically1 and according to the likeness of our nature4 ,for when we repent1 we destroy what we have made2 although we may even do so without change of will2 as1 when a man wills to make a thing1 at the same time intending to destroy it later4 ,therefore ,god is said to have repented1 by way of comparison with our mode of acting1 in so far as by the deluge ,he destroyed from the face of the earth man whom ,he had made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will of ,god1 as it is the first and universal cause1 does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects4 ,since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause1 there are many things in the divine power1 knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes4 ,thus in the case of the raising of ,lazarus1 one who looked only on inferior causes might have said3 ,lazarus will not rise again1 but looking at the divine first cause might have said3 ,lazarus will rise again4 ,and ,god wills both3 that is1 that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen2 but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen2 or ,he may will conversely4 ,we may say1 then1 that ,god sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes1 as of nature1 or merit1 which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause4 ,thus ,he foretold to ,ezechias3 ,take order with thy house1 for thou shalt die1 and not live 7,isa4 #ch3a74 ,yet this did not take place1 since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will1 which is unchangeable4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,moral4 xvi1 #e73 ,the sentence of ,god changes1 but not ,his counsel--that is to say1 the counsel of ,his will4 ,when therefore ,he says1 ,i also will repent1 ,his words must be understood metaphorically4 ,for men seem to repent1 when they do not fulfill what they have threatened4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it does not follow from this argument that ,god has a will that changes1 but that ,he sometimes wills that things should change4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although ,god's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity1 yet it is necessary by supposition1 on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will1 as has been said above 7,a4 #c74 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,will of ,god ,imposes ,necessity on the ,things ,willed8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the will of ,god imposes necessity on the things willed4 ,for ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ajc73 ,no one is saved1 except whom ,god has willed to be saved4 ,he must therefore be asked to will it2 for if ,he wills it1 it must necessarily be4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every cause that cannot be hindered1 produces its effect necessarily1 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #hd7 ,nature always works in the same way1 if there is nothing to hinder it4 ,but the will of ,god cannot be hindered4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #i3ai73 ,who resisteth ,his will8 ,therefore the will of ,god imposes necessity on the things willed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely2 it is thus necessary that animals should die1 being compounded of contrary elements4 ,now things created by ,god are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause1 whereby they have necessity4 ,for the conditional statement is true that if ,god wills a thing1 it comes to pass2 and every true conditional statement is necessary4 ,it follows therefore that all that ,god wills is necessary absolutely4 ,on the contrary1 ,all good things that exist ,god wills to be4 ,if therefore ,his will imposes necessity on things willed1 it follows that all good happens of necessity2 and thus there is an end of free will1 counsel1 and all other such things4 ,i answer that1 ,the divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all4 ,the reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes1 holding that what ,god produces by necessary causes is necessary2 and what ,he produces by contingent causes contingent4 ,this does not seem to be a sufficient explanation1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause1 from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause1 as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant4 ,but no defect of a secondary cause can hinder ,god's will from producing its effect4 ,secondly1 because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes1 this must be independent of the divine intention and will2 which is inadmissible4 ,it is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will4 ,for when a cause is efficacious to act1 the effect follows upon the cause1 not only as to the thing done1 but also as to its manner of being done or of being4 ,thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points1 that belong to its manner of being4 ,since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious1 it follows not only that things are done1 which ,god wills to be done1 but also that they are done in the way that ,he wills4 ,now ,god wills some things to be done necessarily1 some contingently1 to the right ordering of things1 for the building up of the universe4 ,therefore to some effects ,he has attached necessary causes1 that cannot fail2 but to others defectible and contingent causes1 from which arise contingent effects4 ,hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by ,god happen contingently1 but because ,god prepared contingent causes for them1 it being ,his will that they should happen contingently4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by the words of ,augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by ,god that is not absolute1 but conditional4 ,for the conditional statement that if ,god wills a thing it must necessarily be1 is necessarily true4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the very fact that nothing resists the divine will1 it follows that not only those things happen that ,god wills to happen1 but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to ,his will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents4 ,hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that ,god wills them to have1 either absolute or conditional4 ,not all things1 therefore1 are absolute necessities4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,god ,wills ,evils8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god wills evils4 ,for every good that exists1 ,god wills4 ,but it is a good that evil should exist4 ,for ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ie73 ,although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good1 yet it is good that not only good things should exist1 but also evil things4 ,therefore ,god wills evil things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #bc73 ,evil would conduce to the perfection of everything1 i4e4 the universe4 ,and ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #aj1 #aa73 ,out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe1 wherein even that which is called evil1 properly ordered and disposed1 commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil4 ,but ,god wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe1 for this is what ,god desires above all things in ,his creatures4 ,therefore ,god wills evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 that evil should exist1 and should not exist1 are contradictory opposites4 ,but ,god does not will that evil should not exist2 otherwise1 since various evils do exist1 ,god's will would not always be fulfilled4 ,therefore ,god wills that evil should exist4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,qq4 #hc1c73 ,no wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse4 ,now ,god surpasses all men in wisdom4 ,much less therefore is ,god the cause of man becoming worse2 and when ,he is said to be the cause of a thing1 ,he is said to will it4 ,therefore it is not by ,god's will that man becomes worse4 ,now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse4 ,therefore ,god wills not evil things4 ,i answer that1 ,since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility1 as said before 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #a71 and since evil is opposed to good1 it is impossible that any evil1 as such1 should be sought for by the appetite1 either natural1 or animal1 or by the intellectual appetite which is the will4 ,nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally1 so far as it accompanies a good1 as appears in each of the appetites4 ,for a natural agent intends not privation or corruption1 but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form1 and the generation of one thing1 which implies the corruption of another4 ,also when a lion kills a stag1 his object is food1 to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means4 ,similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object1 and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment4 ,now the evil that accompanies one good1 is the privation of another good4 ,never therefore would evil be sought after1 not even accidentally1 unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation4 ,now ,god wills no good more than ,he wills ,his own goodness2 yet ,he wills one good more than another4 ,hence ,he in no way wills the evil of sin1 which is the privation of right order towards the divine good4 ,the evil of natural defect1 or of punishment1 ,he does will1 by willing the good to which such evils are attached4 ,thus in willing justice ,he wills punishment2 and in willing the preservation of the natural order1 ,he wills some things to be naturally corrupted4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some have said that although ,god does not will evil1 yet ,he wills that evil should be or be done1 because1 although evil is not a good1 yet it is good that evil should be or be done4 ,this they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end2 and this order they thought was expressed in the words that evil should be or be done4 ,this1 however1 is not correct2 since evil is not of itself ordered to good1 but accidentally4 ,for it is beside the intention of the sinner1 that any good should follow from his sin2 as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions4 ,it cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done1 since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally1 but by that which belongs to it essentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe1 except accidentally1 as said above 7ad #a74 ,therefore ,dionysius in saying that evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe1 draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the statements that evil exists1 and that evil exists not1 are opposed as contradictories2 yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be1 are not so opposed2 since either is affirmative4 ,god therefore neither wills evil to be done1 nor wills it not to be done1 but wills to permit evil to be done2 and this is a good4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,god ,has ,free-,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god has not free-will4 ,for ,jerome says1 in a homily on the prodigal son 99,ep4 #adf1 ad ,damas42 ,god alone is ,he who is not liable to sin1 nor can be liable3 all others1 as having free-will1 can be inclined to either side4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 free-will is the faculty of the reason and will1 by which good and evil are chosen4 ,but ,god does not will evil1 as has been said 7,a4 #i74 ,therefore there is not free-will in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide ii1 #c73 ,the ,holy ,spirit divideth unto each one as ,he will1 namely1 according to the free choice of the will1 not in obedience to necessity4 ,i answer that1 ,we have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity1 nor by natural instinct4 ,for our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will1 but to natural instinct4 ,hence other animals1 that are moved to act by natural instinct1 are not said to be moved by free-will4 ,since then ,god necessarily wills ,his own goodness1 but other things not necessarily1 as shown above 7,a4 #c71 ,he has free will with respect to what ,he does not necessarily will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,jerome seems to deny free-will to ,god not simply1 but only as regards the inclination to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness1 by which ,god wills all things1 as above shown1 it is manifestly impossible for ,him to will the evil of sin2 yet ,he can make choice of one of two opposites1 inasmuch as ,he can will a thing to be1 or not to be4 ,in the same way we ourselves1 without sin1 can will to sit down1 and not will to sit down4 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #aa ,whether the ,will of ,expression ,is to ,be ,distinguished in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in ,god4 ,for as the will of ,god is the cause of things1 so is ,his wisdom4 ,but no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom4 ,therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself1 is false4 ,if therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will1 they are false4 ,but if they do agree1 they are superfluous4 ,no expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will4 ,on the contrary1 ,the will of ,god is one1 since it is the very essence of ,god4 ,yet sometimes it is spoken of as many1 as in the words of ,ps4 #aaj3b3 ,great are the works of the ,lord1 sought out according to all ,his wills4 ,therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will4 ,i answer that1 ,some things are said of ,god in their strict sense2 others by metaphor1 as appears from what has been said before 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #c74 ,when certain human passions are predicated of the ,godhead metaphorically1 this is done because of a likeness in the effect4 ,hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion1 is signified metaphorically in ,god under the name of that passion4 ,thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish1 so that punishment becomes an expression of anger4 ,therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger1 when anger is attributed to ,god4 ,in the same way1 what is usually with us an expression of will1 is sometimes metaphorically called will in ,god2 just as when anyone lays down a precept1 it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed4 ,hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of ,god1 as in the words3 ,thy will be done on earth1 as it is in heaven 7,matt4 #f3aj74 ,there is1 however1 this difference between will and anger1 that anger is never attributed to ,god properly1 since in its primary meaning it includes passion2 whereas will is attributed to ,him properly4 ,therefore in ,god there are distinguished will in its proper sense1 and will as attributed to ,him by metaphor4 ,will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure2 and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression1 inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done1 unless through the will4 ,for we do not put into act what we know1 unless we will to do so4 ,accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge1 but to will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,expressions of will are called divine wills1 not as being signs that ,god wills anything2 but because what in us is the usual expression of our will1 is called the divine will in ,god4 ,thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in ,god2 but it is called anger in ,him1 from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves4 ,,twelfth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ai1 ,art4 #ab ,whether ,five ,expressions of ,will ,are ,rightly ,assigned to the ,divine ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that five expressions of will--namely1 prohibition1 precept1 counsel1 operation1 and permission--are not rightly assigned to the divine will4 ,for the same things that ,god bids us do by ,his precept or counsel1 these ,he sometimes operates in us1 and the same things that ,he prohibits1 these ,he sometimes permits4 ,they ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god works nothing unless ,he wills it1 as the ,scripture says 7,wis4 #aa3bf74 ,but the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure4 ,therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common1 since ,god works in them all1 and permits some action in them all4 ,but precept1 counsel1 and prohibition belong to rational creatures only4 ,therefore they do not come rightly under one division1 not being of one order4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 evil happens in more ways than good1 since good happens in one way1 but evil in all kinds of ways1 as declared by the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ii1 #f71 and ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #bb74 ,it is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil--namely1 prohibition--and two--namely1 counsel and precept--in the case of good4 ,i answer that1 ,by these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something4 ,a man may show that he wills something1 either by himself or by means of another4 ,he may show it by himself1 by doing something either directly1 or indirectly and accidentally4 ,he shows it directly when he works in his own person2 in that way the expression of his will is his own working4 ,he shows it indirectly1 by not hindering the doing of a thing2 for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover4 ,in this respect the expression is called permission4 ,he declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work1 either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept1 and by prohibiting its contrary2 or by persuasion1 which is a part of counsel4 ,since in these ways the will of man makes itself known1 the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will1 as the expression of that will4 ,that precept1 counsel1 and prohibition are called the will of ,god is clear from the words of ,matt4 #f3aj3 ,thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven4 ,that permission and operation are called the will of ,god is clear from ,augustine 7,enchiridion #ie71 who says3 ,nothing is done1 unless the ,almighty wills it to be done1 either by permitting it1 or by actually doing it4 ,or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time1 permission being with respect to evil1 operation with regard to good4 ,whilst as to future time1 prohibition is in respect to evil1 precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways2 thus we find many words that mean the same thing4 ,hence there is no reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept1 operation1 and counsel2 or of prohibition or permission4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,god may by metaphor be said to will what by ,his will1 properly speaking1 ,he wills not2 so ,he may by metaphor be said to will what ,he does1 properly speaking1 will4 ,hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure1 and of the will of expression4 ,but operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure2 while precept and counsel are not2 both because the former regards the present1 and the two latter the future2 and because the former is of itself the effect of the will2 the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,rational creatures are masters of their own acts2 and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts1 inasmuch as ,god ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves4 ,other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation2 therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all evil of sin1 though happening in many ways1 agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will4 ,hence with regard to evil1 only one expression is assigned1 that of prohibition4 ,on the other hand1 good stands in various relations to the divine goodness1 since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness1 and these are the subject of precept2 and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly1 and these are the subject of counsel4 ,or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good2 but also with the avoiding of lesser evils4 ,,question #bj ,,god',s ,,love 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of ,god4 ,in the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul1 as joy1 love1 and the like2 and the habits of the moral virtues1 as justice1 fortitude and the like4 ,hence we shall first consider the love of ,god1 and secondly ,his justice and mercy4 ,about the first there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether love exists in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether ,he loves all things8 7#c7 ,whether ,he loves one thing more than another8 7#d7 ,whether ,he loves more the better things8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,love ,exists in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that love does not exist in ,god4 ,for in ,god there are no passions4 ,now love is a passion4 ,therefore love is not in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love1 anger1 sorrow and the like1 are mutually divided against one another4 ,but sorrow and anger are not attributed to ,god1 unless by metaphor4 ,therefore neither is love attributed to ,him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,love is a uniting and binding force4 ,but this cannot take place in ,god1 since ,he is simple4 ,therefore love does not exist in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,god is love 7,john #d3af74 ,i answer that1 ,we must needs assert that in ,god there is love3 because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty4 ,for since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil1 as to their proper objects3 and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite1 whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly1 as opposed to good2 it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil2 thus1 for instance1 joy is prior to sorrow1 love to hate3 because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another4 ,again1 the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so4 ,hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth2 and in the second place to particular and special truths4 ,now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition1 as joy and delight regard good present and possessed2 whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed4 ,love1 however1 regards good universally1 whether possessed or not4 ,hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite2 for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love1 as their root and origin4 ,for nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything1 except as a good that is loved3 nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love4 ,similarly1 it is clear that sorrow1 and other things like to it1 must be referred to love as to their first principle4 ,hence1 in whomsoever there is will and appetite1 there must also be love3 since if the first is wanting1 all that follows is also wanting4 ,now it has been shown that will is in ,god 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #a71 and hence we must attribute love to ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive3 and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #eh1 #ge1 so in ourselves the intellectual appetite1 or the will as it is called1 moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite4 ,hence1 in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies4 ,some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite1 and this change affects especially the heart1 which1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de part4 animal4 iii1 #d71 is the first principle of movement in animals4 ,therefore acts of the sensitive appetite1 inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change1 are called passions2 whereas acts of the will are not so called4 ,love1 therefore1 and joy and delight are passions2 in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite1 they are not passions4 ,it is in this latter sense that they are in ,god4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vii73 ,god rejoices by an operation that is one and simple1 and for the same reason ,he loves without passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element--namely1 the bodily change--and a certain formal element1 which is on the part of the appetite4 ,thus in anger1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #ae1 #fc1 #fd71 the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart2 but the formal1 the appetite for revenge4 ,again1 as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied1 as in desire1 which is of the good we have not1 and in sorrow1 which is about the evil we have4 ,this applies also to anger1 which supposes sorrow4 ,certain other passions1 however1 as love and joy1 imply no imperfection4 ,since therefore none of these can be attributed to ,god on their material side1 as has been said 7ad #a72 neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to ,him2 except metaphorically1 and from likeness of effects1 as already show 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #aa74 ,whereas1 those that do not imply imperfection1 such as love and joy1 can be properly predicated of ,god1 though without attributing passion to ,him1 as said before 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #aa74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an act of love always tends towards two things2 to the good that one wills1 and to the person for whom one wills it3 since to love a person is to wish that person good4 ,hence1 inasmuch as we love ourselves1 we wish ourselves good2 and1 so far as possible1 union with that good4 ,so love is called the unitive force1 even in ,god1 yet without implying composition2 for the good that ,he wills for ,himself1 is no other than ,himself1 ,who is good by ,his essence1 as above shown 7,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,and by the fact that anyone loves another1 he wills good to that other4 ,thus he puts the other1 as it were1 in the place of himself2 and regards the good done to him as done to himself4 ,so far love is a binding force1 since it aggregates another to ourselves1 and refers his good to our own4 ,and then again the divine love is a binding force1 inasmuch as ,god wills good to others2 yet it implies no composition in ,god4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,loves ,all ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not love all things4 ,for according to ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #a71 love places the lover outside himself1 and causes him to pass1 as it were1 into the object of his love4 ,but it is not admissible to say that ,god is placed outside of ,himself1 and passes into other things4 ,therefore it is inadmissible to say that ,god loves things other than ,himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the love of ,god is eternal4 ,but things apart from ,god are not from eternity2 except in ,god4 ,therefore ,god does not love anything1 except as it exists in ,himself4 ,but as existing in ,him1 it is no other than ,himself4 ,therefore ,god does not love things other than ,himself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love is twofold--the love1 namely1 of desire1 and the love of friendship4 ,now ,god does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire1 since ,he needs no creature outside ,himself4 ,nor with the love of friendship2 since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures1 as the ,philosopher shows 7,ethic4 viii1 #b74 ,therefore ,god does not love all things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is written 7,ps4 #e3g73 ,thou hatest all the workers of iniquity4 ,now nothing is at the same time hated and loved4 ,therefore ,god does not love all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,wis4 #aa3be73 ,thou lovest all things that are1 and hatest none of the things which ,thou hast made4 ,i answer that1 ,god loves all existing things4 ,for all existing things1 in so far as they exist1 are good1 since the existence of a thing is itself a good2 and likewise1 whatever perfection it possesses4 ,now it has been shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d7 that ,god's will is the cause of all things4 ,it must needs be1 therefore1 that a thing has existence1 or any kind of good1 only inasmuch as it is willed by ,god4 ,to every existing thing1 then1 ,god wills some good4 ,hence1 since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing1 it is manifest that ,god loves everything that exists4 ,yet not as we love4 ,because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things1 but is moved by it as by its object1 our love1 whereby we will good to anything1 is not the cause of its goodness2 but conversely its goodness1 whether real or imaginary1 calls forth our love1 by which we will that it should preserve the good it has1 and receive besides the good it has not1 and to this end we direct our actions3 whereas the love of ,god infuses and creates goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a lover is placed outside himself1 and made to pass into the object of his love1 inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved2 and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #a73 ,on behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this1 that ,he ,himself1 the cause of all things1 by ,his abounding love and goodness1 is placed outside ,himself by ,his providence for all existing things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although creatures have not existed from eternity1 except in ,god1 yet because they have been in ,him from eternity1 ,god has known them eternally in their proper natures2 and for that reason has loved them1 even as we1 by the images of things within us1 know things existing in themselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures1 who are capable of returning love1 and communicating one with another in the various works of life1 and who may fare well or ill1 according to the changes of fortune and happiness2 even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised4 ,but irrational creatures cannot attain to loving ,god1 nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that ,he lives4 ,strictly speaking1 therefore1 ,god does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship2 but as it were with the love of desire1 in so far as ,he orders them to rational creatures1 and even to ,himself4 ,yet this is not because ,he stands in need of them2 but only on account of ,his goodness1 and of the services they render to us4 ,for we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect1 while it is hated under another4 ,god loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures2 for they have existence and have it from ,him4 ,in so far as they are sinners1 they have not existence at all1 but fall short of it2 and this in them is not from ,god4 ,hence under this aspect1 they are hated by ,him4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,loves ,all ,things ,equally8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god loves all things equally4 ,for it is said3 ,he hath equally care of all 7,wis4 #f3h74 ,but ,god's providence over things comes from the love wherewith ,he loves them4 ,therefore ,he loves all things equally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the love of ,god is ,his essence4 ,but ,god's essence does not admit of degree2 neither therefore does ,his love4 ,he does not therefore love some things more than others4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as ,god's love extends to created things1 so do ,his knowledge and will extend4 ,but ,god is not said to know some things more than others2 nor will one thing more than another4 ,neither therefore does ,he love some things more than others4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,tract4 in ,joan4 cx73 ,god loves all things that ,he has made1 and amongst them rational creatures more1 and of these especially those who are members of ,his only-begotten ,son ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,since to love a thing is to will it good1 in a twofold way anything may be loved more1 or less4 ,in one way on the part of the act of the will itself1 which is more or less intense4 ,in this way ,god does not love some things more than others1 because ,he loves all things by an act of the will that is one1 simple1 and always the same4 ,in another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved4 ,in this way we are said to love that one more than another1 for whom we will a greater good1 though our will is not more intense4 ,in this way we must needs say that ,god loves some things more than others4 ,for since ,god's love is the cause of goodness in things1 as has been said 7,a4 #b71 no one thing would be better than another1 if ,god did not will greater good for one than for another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is said to have equally care of all1 not because by ,his care ,he deals out equal good to all1 but because ,he administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will1 which is the divine essence4 ,but the good that ,god wills for ,his creatures1 is not the divine essence4 ,therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to understand and to will denote the act alone1 and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which ,god may be said to know or will more or less1 as has been said with respect to ,god's love4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,god ,always ,loves ,more the ,better ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god does not always love more the better things4 ,for it is manifest that ,christ is better than the whole human race1 being ,god and man4 ,but ,god loved the human race more than ,he loved ,christ2 for it is said3 ,he spared not ,his own ,son1 but delivered ,him up for us all 7,rom4 #h3cb74 ,therefore ,god does not always love more the better things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an angel is better than a man4 ,hence it is said of man3 ,thou hast made him a little less than the angels 7,ps4 #h3f74 ,but ,god loved men more than ,he loved the angels1 for it is said3 ,nowhere doth ,he take hold of the angels1 but of the seed of ,abraham ,he taketh hold 7,heb4 #b3af74 ,therefore ,god does not always love more the better things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,peter was better than ,john1 since he loved ,christ more4 ,hence the ,lord1 knowing this to be true1 asked ,peter1 saying3 ,simon1 son of ,john1 lovest thou ,me more than these8 ,yet ,christ loved ,john more than ,he loved ,peter4 ,for as ,augustine says1 commenting on the words1 ,simon1 son of ,john1 lovest thou ,me83 ,by this very mark is ,john distinguished from the other disciples1 not that ,he loved him only1 but that ,he loved him more than the rest4 ,therefore ,god does not always love more the better things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the innocent man is better than the repentant1 since repentance is1 as ,jerome says 7,cap4 #c in ,isa471 a second plank after shipwreck4 ,but ,god loves the penitent more than the innocent2 since ,he rejoices over him the more4 ,for it is said3 ,i say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance1 more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance 7,luke #ae3g74 ,therefore ,god does not always love more the better things4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner4 ,now ,god loves more the predestined sinner1 since ,he wills for him a greater good1 life eternal4 ,therefore ,god does not always love more the better things4 ,on the contrary1 ,everything loves what is like it1 as appears from 7,ecclus4 #ac3ai73 ,every beast loveth its like4 ,now the better a thing is1 the more like is it to ,god4 ,therefore the better things are more loved by ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,it must needs be1 according to what has been said before1 that ,god loves more the better things4 ,for it has been shown 7,,aa4 #b1 #c71 that ,god's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than ,his willing for that thing a greater good3 because ,god's will is the cause of goodness in things2 and the reason why some things are better than others1 is that ,god wills for them a greater good4 ,hence it follows that ,he loves more the better things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god loves ,christ not only more than ,he loves the whole human race1 but more than ,he loves the entire created universe3 because ,he willed for ,him the greater good in giving ,him a name that is above all names1 in so far as ,he was true ,god4 ,nor did anything of ,his excellence diminish when ,god delivered ,him up to death for the salvation of the human race2 rather did ,he become thereby a glorious conqueror3 ,the government was placed upon ,his shoulder1 according to ,isa4 #i3f4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god loves the human nature assumed by the ,word of ,god in the person of ,christ more than ,he loves all the angels2 for that nature is better1 especially on the ground of the union with the ,godhead4 ,but speaking of human nature in general1 and comparing it with the angelic1 the two are found equal1 in the order of grace and of glory3 since according to ,rev #ba3ag1 the measure of a man and of an angel is the same4 ,yet so that1 in this respect1 some angels are found nobler than some men1 and some men nobler than some angels4 ,but as to natural condition an angel is better than a man4 ,god therefore did not assume human nature because ,he loved man1 absolutely speaking1 more2 but because the needs of man were greater2 just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant1 that he does not give to his own son in sound health4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this doubt concerning ,peter and ,john has been solved in various ways4 ,augustine interprets it mystically1 and says that the active life1 signified by ,peter1 loves ,god more than the contemplative signified by ,john1 because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life1 and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them1 and depart to ,god4 ,god1 he says1 loves more the contemplative life1 since ,he preserves it longer4 ,for it does not end1 as the active life does1 with the life of the body4 ,some say that ,peter loved ,christ more in ,his members1 and therefore was loved more by ,christ also1 for which reason ,he gave him the care of the ,church2 but that ,john loved ,christ more in ,himself1 and so was loved more by ,him2 on which account ,christ commended ,his mother to his care4 ,others say that it is uncertain which of them loved ,christ more with the love of charity1 and uncertain also which of them ,god loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life4 ,peter is said to have loved more1 in regard to a certain promptness and fervor2 but ,john to have been more loved1 with respect to certain marks of familiarity which ,christ showed to him rather than to others1 on account of his youth and purity4 ,while others say that ,christ loved ,peter more1 from his more excellent gift of charity2 but ,john more1 from his gifts of intellect4 ,hence1 absolutely speaking1 ,peter was the better and more beloved2 but1 in a certain sense1 ,john was the better1 and was loved the more4 ,however1 it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters2 since the ,lord and no other is the weigher of spirits 7,prov4 #af3b74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded4 ,for whether innocent or penitent1 those are the better and better loved who have most grace4 ,other things being equal1 innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved4 ,god is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent1 because often penitents rise from sin more cautious1 humble1 and fervent4 ,hence ,gregory commenting on these words 7,hom4 #cd in ,ev47 says that1 ,in battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy1 more than him who has never fled1 but has never done a brave deed4 ,or it may be answered that gifts of grace1 equal in themselves1 are more as conferred on the penitent1 who deserved punishment1 than as conferred on the innocent1 to whom no punishment was due2 just as a hundred pounds marcoe are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,since ,god's will is the cause of goodness in things1 the goodness of one who is loved by ,god is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness4 ,according therefore to the time1 when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good1 the sinner is better2 although according to some other time he is the worse2 because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad4 ,,question #ba ,,the ,,justice ,,and ,,mercy ,,of ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after considering the divine love1 we must treat of ,god's justice and mercy4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is justice in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether ,his justice can be called truth8 7#c7 ,whether there is mercy in ,god8 7#d7 ,whether in every work of ,god there are justice and mercy8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,justice in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there is not justice in ,god4 ,for justice is divided against temperance4 ,but temperance does not exist in ,god3 neither therefore does justice4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice4 ,but1 as the ,apostle says3 ,god worketh all things according to the counsel of ,his will 7,eph4 #a3aa74 ,therefore justice cannot be attributed to ,him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the act of justice is to pay what is due4 ,but ,god is no man's debtor4 ,therefore justice does not belong to ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whatever is in ,god1 is ,his essence4 ,but justice cannot belong to this4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom473 ,good regards the essence2 justice the act4 ,therefore justice does not belong to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #aj3h73 ,the ,lord is just1 and hath loved justice4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two kinds of justice4 ,the one consists in mutual giving and receiving1 as in buying and selling1 and other kinds of intercourse and exchange4 ,this the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 v1 #d7 calls commutative justice1 that directs exchange and intercourse of business4 ,this does not belong to ,god1 since1 as the ,apostle says3 ,who hath first given to ,him1 and recompense shall be made him8 7,rom4 #aa3ce74 ,the other consists in distribution1 and is called distributive justice2 whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves4 ,as then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler1 so the order of the universe1 which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will1 shows forth the justice of ,god4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 viii1 #d73 ,we must needs see that ,god is truly just1 in seeing how ,he gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each2 and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions1 as temperance with concupiscence1 fortitude with fear and daring1 meekness with anger4 ,such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to ,god2 since1 as stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #a71 in ,god there are no passions2 nor a sensitive appetite1 which is1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #aj71 the subject of those virtues4 ,on the other hand1 certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending2 such as justice1 liberality1 and magnificence2 and these reside not in the sensitive faculty1 but in the will4 ,hence1 there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to ,god2 although not in civil matters1 but in such acts as are not unbecoming to ,him4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 x1 #h71 it would be absurd to praise ,god for ,his political virtues4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will1 it is impossible for ,god to will anything but what ,his wisdom approves4 ,this is1 as it were1 ,his law of justice1 in accordance with which ,his will is right and just4 ,hence1 what ,he does according to ,his will ,he does justly3 as we do justly what we do according to law4 ,but whereas law comes to us from some higher power1 ,god is a law unto ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to each one is due what is his own4 ,now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own4 ,thus the master owns the servant1 and not conversely1 for that is free which is its own cause4 ,in the word debt1 therefore1 is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed4 ,now a twofold order has to be considered in things3 the one1 whereby one created thing is directed to another1 as the parts of the whole1 accident to substance1 and all things whatsoever to their end2 the other1 whereby all created things are ordered to ,god4 ,thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways1 as due either to ,god1 or to creatures1 and in either way ,god pays what is due4 ,it is due to ,god that there should be fulfilled in creatures what ,his will and wisdom require1 and what manifests ,his goodness4 ,in this respect1 ,god's justice regards what befits ,him2 inasmuch as ,he renders to ,himself what is due to ,himself4 ,it is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it2 thus it is due to man to have hands1 and that other animals should serve him4 ,thus also ,god exercises justice1 when ,he gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition4 ,this debt however is derived from the former2 since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom4 ,and although ,god in this way pays each thing its due1 yet ,he ,himself is not the debtor1 since ,he is not directed to other things1 but rather other things to ,him4 ,justice1 therefore1 in ,god is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of ,his goodness2 sometimes as the reward of merit4 ,anselm touches on either view where he says 7,prosolog4 #aj73 ,when ,thou dost punish the wicked1 it is just1 since it agrees with their deserts2 and when ,thou dost spare the wicked1 it is also just2 since it befits ,thy goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although justice regards act1 this does not prevent its being the essence of ,god2 since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action4 ,but good does not always regard act2 since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act1 but also as regards perfection in its essence4 ,for this reason it is said 7,de ,hebdom47 that the good is related to the just1 as the general to the special4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,justice of ,god ,is ,truth8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the justice of ,god is not truth4 ,for justice resides in the will2 since1 as ,anselm says 7,dial4 ,verit4 #ac71 it is a rectitude of the will1 whereas truth resides in the intellect1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vi2 ,ethic4 vi1 #b1f74 ,therefore justice does not appertain to truth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iv1 #g71 truth is a virtue distinct from justice4 ,truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice4 ,on the contrary1 it is said 7,ps4 #hd3aa73 ,mercy and truth have met each other3 where truth stands for justice4 ,i answer that1 ,truth consists in the equation of mind and thing1 as said above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the mind1 that is the cause of the thing1 is related to it as its rule and measure2 whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things4 ,when therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind1 truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing1 as happens in ourselves4 ,for according as a thing is1 or is not1 our thoughts or our words about it are true or false4 ,but when the mind is the rule or measure of things1 truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind2 just as the work of an artist is said to be true1 when it is in accordance with his art4 ,now as works of art are related to art1 so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord4 ,therefore ,god's justice1 which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of ,his wisdom1 which is the law of ,his justice1 is suitably called truth4 ,thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,justice1 as to the law that governs1 resides in the reason or intellect2 but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law1 it resides in the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the truth of which the ,philosopher is speaking in this passage1 is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is4 ,thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified2 and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule3 as has been said regarding the truth of justice4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,mercy ,can ,be ,attributed to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that mercy cannot be attributed to ,god4 ,for mercy is a kind of sorrow1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ad74 ,but there is no sorrow in ,god2 and therefore there is no mercy in ,him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 mercy is a relaxation of justice4 ,but ,god cannot remit what appertains to ,his justice4 ,for it is said 7#b ,tim4 #b3ac73 ,if we believe not1 ,he continueth faithful3 ,he cannot deny ,himself4 ,but ,he would deny ,himself1 as a gloss says1 if ,he should deny ,his words4 ,therefore mercy is not becoming to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 it is said 7,ps4 #aaj3d73 ,he is a merciful and gracious ,lord4 ,i answer that1 ,mercy is especially to be attributed to ,god1 as seen in its effect1 but not as an affection of passion4 ,in proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful misericors1 as being1 so to speak1 sorrowful at heart miserum cor2 being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own4 ,hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other1 as if it were his2 and this is the effect of mercy4 ,to sorrow1 therefore1 over the misery of others belongs not to ,god2 but it does most properly belong to ,him to dispel that misery1 whatever be the defect we call by that name4 ,now defects are not removed1 except by the perfection of some kind of goodness2 and the primary source of goodness is ,god1 as shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d74 ,it must1 however1 be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness1 but also to ,his justice1 liberality1 and mercy2 yet under different aspects4 ,the communicating of perfections1 absolutely considered1 appertains to goodness1 as shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d72 in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion1 the bestowal of them belongs to justice1 as has been already said 7,a4 #a72 in so far as ,god does not bestow them for ,his own use1 but only on account of ,his goodness1 it belongs to liberality2 in so far as perfections given to things by ,god expel defects1 it belongs to mercy4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is based on mercy1 regarded as an affection of passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god acts mercifully1 not indeed by going against ,his justice1 but by doing something more than justice2 thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money1 though owing him only one hundred1 does nothing against justice1 but acts liberally or mercifully4 ,the case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him1 for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift4 ,hence the ,apostle calls remission a forgiving3 ,forgive one another1 as ,christ has forgiven you 7,eph4 #d3cb74 ,hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice1 but in a sense is the fulness thereof4 ,and thus it is said3 ,mercy exalteth itself above judgement 7,james #b3ac74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ba1 ,art4 #d ,whether in ,every ,work of ,god ,there ,are ,mercy and ,justice8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that not in every work of ,god are mercy and justice4 ,for some works of ,god are attributed to mercy1 as the justification of the ungodly2 and others to justice1 as the damnation of the wicked4 ,hence it is said3 ,judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy 7,james #b3ac74 ,therefore not in every work of ,god do mercy and justice appear4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle attributes the conversion of the ,jews to justice and truth1 but that of the ,gentiles to mercy 7,rom4 #ae74 ,therefore not in every work of ,god are justice and mercy4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 many just persons are afflicted in this world2 which is unjust4 ,therefore not in every work of ,god are justice and mercy4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is the part of justice to pay what is due1 but of mercy to relieve misery4 ,thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works3 whereas creation presupposes nothing4 ,therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #bd3aj73 ,all the ways of the ,lord are mercy and truth4 ,i answer that1 ,mercy and truth are necessarily found in all ,god's works1 if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect4 ,not every defect1 however1 can properly be called a misery2 but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy2 for misery is opposed to happiness4 ,for this necessity there is a reason1 because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to ,god1 or to some creature1 neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of ,god3 because ,god can do nothing that is not in accord with ,his wisdom and goodness2 and it is in this sense1 as we have said1 that anything is due to ,god4 ,likewise1 whatever is done by ,him in created things1 is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice4 ,thus justice must exist in all ,god's works4 ,now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy2 and is founded thereupon4 ,for nothing is due to creatures1 except for something pre-existing in them1 or foreknown4 ,again1 if this is due to a creature1 it must be due on account of something that precedes4 ,and since we cannot go on to infinity1 we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will--which is the ultimate end4 ,we may say1 for instance1 that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul2 and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man2 and his being man is on account of the divine goodness4 ,so in every work of ,god1 viewed at its primary source1 there appears mercy4 ,in all that follows1 the power of mercy remains1 and works indeed with even greater force2 as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes4 ,for this reason does ,god out of abundance of ,his goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts3 since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers2 because between creatures and ,god's goodness there can be no proportion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,certain works are attributed to justice1 and certain others to mercy1 because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy4 ,even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen1 which1 though it does not totally remit1 yet somewhat alleviates1 in punishing short of what is deserved4 ,in the justification of the ungodly1 justice is seen1 when ,god remits sins on account of love1 though ,he ,himself has mercifully infused that love4 ,so we read of ,magdalen3 ,many sins are forgiven her1 because she hath loved much 7,luke #g3dg74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the ,jews and of the ,gentiles4 ,but an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the ,jews which is not seen in the conversion of the ,gentiles2 inasmuch as the ,jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world1 since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them1 and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to ,god4 ,as to this ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxvi1 #i73 ,the evils that press on us in this world force us to go to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although creation presupposes nothing in the universe2 yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of ,god4 ,in this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation2 by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness4 ,and the idea of mercy1 also1 is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence4 ,,question #bb ,,the ,,providence ,,of ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,having considered all that relates to the will absolutely1 we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will1 namely providence1 in respect to all created things2 predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation4 ,for in the science of morals1 after the moral virtues themselves1 comes the consideration of prudence1 to which providence would seem to belong4 ,concerning ,god's providence there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether providence is suitably assigned to ,god8 7#b7 ,whether everything comes under divine providence8 7#c7 ,whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things8 7#d7 ,whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,providence ,can ,suitably ,be ,attributed to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that providence is not becoming to ,god4 ,for providence1 according to ,tully 7,de ,invent4 ii71 is a part of prudence4 ,but prudence1 since1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #e1 #i1 #ah71 it gives good counsel1 cannot belong to ,god1 ,who never has any doubt for which ,he should take counsel4 ,therefore providence cannot belong to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is in ,god1 is eternal4 ,but providence is not anything eternal1 for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bi74 ,therefore there is no providence in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there is nothing composite in ,god4 ,but providence seems to be something composite1 because it includes both the intellect and the will4 ,therefore providence is not in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,wis4 #ad3c73 ,but ,thou1 ,father1 governest all things by providence 99,vulg4 ,but ',thy providence1 ,o ,father1 governeth it4'4 ,i answer that1 ,it is necessary to attribute providence to ,god4 ,for all the good that is in created things has been created by ,god1 as was shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d74 ,in created things good is found not only as regards their substance1 but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end1 which1 as was said above1 is the divine goodness 7,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #d74 ,this good of order existing in things created1 is itself created by ,god4 ,since1 however1 ,god is the cause of things by ,his intellect1 and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in ,him1 as is clear from what has gone before 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d71 it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind3 and the type of things ordered towards an end is1 properly speaking1 providence4 ,for it is the chief part of prudence1 to which two other parts are directed--namely1 remembrance of the past1 and understanding of the present2 inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present1 we gather how to provide for the future4 ,now it belongs to prudence1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #ab71 to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself--as for instance1 a man is said to be prudent1 who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him1 in a family1 city or kingdom2 in which sense it is said 7,matt4 #bd3de71 a faithful and wise servant1 whom his lord hath appointed over his family4 ,in this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to ,god4 ,for in ,god ,himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end1 since ,he is the last end4 ,this type of order in things towards an end is therefore in ,god called providence4 ,whence ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv1 #f7 that ,providence is the divine type itself1 seated in the ,supreme ,ruler2 which disposeth all things3 which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end1 or to the type of the order of parts in the whole4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #i1 #aj71 ,prudence is what1 strictly speaking1 commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged 99,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #f4 ,whence1 though to take counsel may not be fitting to ,god1 from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful1 nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end1 the right reason of which ,he possesses1 does belong to ,god1 according to ,ps4 #adh3f3 ,he hath made a decree1 and it shall not pass away4 ,in this manner both prudence and providence belong to ,god4 ,although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in ,god2 not because of any inquiry necessitated1 but from the certitude of the knowledge1 to which those who take counsel come by inquiry4 ,whence it is said3 ,who worketh all things according to the counsel of ,his will 7,eph4 #a3aa74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,two things pertain to the care of providence--namely1 the reason of order1 which is called providence and disposition2 and the execution of order1 which is termed government4 ,of these1 the first is eternal1 and the second is temporal4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,providence resides in the intellect2 but presupposes the act of willing the end4 ,nobody gives a precept about things done for an end2 unless he will that end4 ,hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues1 by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good1 as the ,philosopher says4 ,even if ,providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally1 this would not affect the divine simplicity1 since in ,god both the will and intellect are one and the same thing1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ai74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,everything ,is ,subject to the ,providence of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that everything is not subject to divine providence4 ,for nothing foreseen can happen by chance4 ,if then everything was foreseen by ,god1 nothing would happen by chance4 ,and thus hazard and luck would disappear2 which is against common opinion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a wise provider excludes any defect or evil1 as far as he can1 from those over whom he has a care4 ,but we see many evils existing4 ,either1 then1 ,god cannot hinder these1 and thus is not omnipotent2 or else ,he does not have care for everything4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence4 ,hence1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi1 #e1 #i1 #aj1 #aa73 ,prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice4 ,since1 then1 many things happen from necessity1 everything cannot be subject to providence4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor4 ,but men are left to themselves by ,god in accordance with the words3 ,god made man from the beginning1 and left him in the hand of his own counsel 7,ecclus4 #ae3ad74 ,and particularly in reference to the wicked3 ,i let them go according to the desires of their heart 7,ps4 #hj3ac74 ,everything1 therefore1 cannot be subject to divine providence4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #i3i73 ,god doth not care for oxen 99,vulg4 ',doth ,god take care for oxen8'3 and we may say the same of other irrational creatures4 ,thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said of ,divine ,wisdom3 ,she reacheth from end to end mightily1 and ordereth all things sweetly 7,wis4 #h3a74 ,i answer that1 ,certain persons totally denied the existence of providence1 as ,democritus and the ,epicureans1 maintaining that the world was made by chance4 ,others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves1 but only according to their species2 for in this respect they are incorruptible4 ,they are represented as saying 7,job #bb3ad73 ,the clouds are ,his covert2 and ,he doth not consider our things2 and ,he walketh about the poles of heaven4 ,rabbi ,moses1 however1 excluded men from the generality of things corruptible1 on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess1 but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others4 ,we must say1 however1 that all things are subject to divine providence1 not only in general1 but even in their own individual selves4 ,this is made evident thus4 ,for since every agent acts for an end1 the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends4 ,whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end1 because the effect comes from a cause other than1 and outside the intention of the agent4 ,but the causality of ,god1 ,who is the first agent1 extends to all being1 not only as to constituent principles of species1 but also as to the individualizing principles2 not only of things incorruptible1 but also of things corruptible4 ,hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by ,god towards some end2 as the ,apostle says3 ,those things that are of ,god are well ordered 99,vulg4 ',those powers that are1 are ordained of ,god'3 ',quae autem sunt1 a ,deo ordinatae sunt4' ,st4 ,thomas often quotes this passage1 and invariably reads3 ',quae a ,deo sunt1 ordinata sunt4' 7,rom4 #ac3a74 ,since1 therefore1 as the providence of ,god is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end1 as we have said2 it necessarily follows that all things1 inasmuch as they participate in existence1 must likewise be subject to divine providence4 ,it has also been shown 7,q4 #ad1 ,,aa4 #f1 #aa7 that ,god knows all things1 both universal and particular4 ,and since ,his knowledge may be compared to the things themselves1 as the knowledge of art to the objects of art1 all things must of necessity come under ,his ordering2 as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is a difference between universal and particular causes4 ,a thing can escape the order of a particular cause2 but not the order of a universal cause4 ,for nothing escapes the order of a particular cause1 except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause2 as1 for instance1 wood may be prevented from burning1 by the action of water4 ,since then1 all particular causes are included under the universal cause1 it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause4 ,so far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause1 it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause2 but if we regard the universal cause1 outside whose range no effect can happen1 it is said to be foreseen4 ,thus1 for instance1 the meeting of two servants1 although to them it appears a chance circumstance1 has been fully foreseen by their master1 who has purposely sent them to meet at the one place1 in such a way that the one knows not about the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing1 and one whose providence is universal1 because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can2 whereas1 one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain1 lest the good of the whole should be hindered4 ,hence1 corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature2 yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature2 inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another1 or even to the universal good3 for the corruption of one is the generation of another1 and through this it is that a species is kept in existence4 ,since ,god1 then1 provides universally for all being1 it belongs to ,his providence to permit certain defects in particular effects1 that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered1 for if all evil were prevented1 much good would be absent from the universe4 ,a lion would cease to live1 if there were no slaying of animals2 and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution4 ,thus ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #b73 ,almighty ,god would in no wise permit evil to exist in ,his works1 unless ,he were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil4 ,it would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied1 that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things--e4g4 casual and evil things--as removed from the care of divine providence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man is not the author of nature2 but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use4 ,hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity2 but divine providence extends thus far1 since ,god is the author of nature4 ,apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence1 attributing it rather to the necessity of matter1 as ,democritus1 and others of the ancients4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when it is said that ,god left man to himself1 this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence2 but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect2 as in the case of natural things1 which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end2 and do not act of themselves1 as if they directed themselves towards an end1 like rational creatures1 through the possession of free will1 by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice4 ,hence it is significantly said3 ,in the hand of his own counsel4 ,but since the very act of free will is traced to ,god as to a cause1 it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence4 ,for human providence is included under the providence of ,god1 as a particular under a universal cause4 ,god1 however1 extends ,his providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked2 inasmuch as ,he prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation4 ,for to them that love ,god1 all things work together unto good 7,rom4 #h3bh74 ,but from the fact that ,he does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin1 ,he is said to abandon them3 not that ,he altogether withdraws ,his providence from them2 otherwise they would return to nothing1 if they were not preserved in existence by ,his providence4 ,this was the reason that had weight with ,tully1 who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,since a rational creature has1 through its free will1 control over its actions1 as was said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #aj71 it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner1 so that something is imputed to it as a fault1 or as a merit2 and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward4 ,in this way1 the ,apostle withdraws oxen from the care of ,god3 not1 however1 that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence2 as was the opinion of the ,rabbi ,moses4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,has ,immediate ,providence ,over ,everything8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god has not immediate providence over all things4 ,for whatever is contained in the notion of dignity1 must be attributed to ,god4 ,but it belongs to the dignity of a king1 that he should have ministers2 through whose mediation he provides for his subjects4 ,therefore much less has ,god ,himself immediate providence over all things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to providence to order all things to an end4 ,now the end of everything is its perfection and its good4 ,but it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good2 wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence4 ,if therefore ,god were to have immediate providence over all things1 all secondary causes would be withdrawn4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ag7 that1 ,it is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them1 for example1 vile things3 and the ,philosopher says the same 7,metaph4 xii1 #ea74 ,but whatever is better must be assigned to ,god4 ,therefore ,he has not immediate providence over bad and vile things4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,job #cd3ac73 ,what other hath ,he appointed over the earth8 or whom hath ,he set over the world which ,he made8 ,on which passage ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxiv1 #bj73 ,himself ,he ruleth the world which ,he ,himself hath made4 ,i answer that1 ,two things belong to providence--namely1 the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end2 and the execution of this order1 which is called government4 ,as regards the first of these1 ,god has immediate providence over everything1 because ,he has in ,his intellect the types of everything1 even the smallest2 and whatsoever causes ,he assigns to certain effects1 ,he gives them the power to produce those effects4 ,whence it must be that ,he has beforehand the type of those effects in ,his mind4 ,as to the second1 there are certain intermediaries of ,god's providence2 for ,he governs things inferior by superior1 not on account of any defect in ,his power1 but by reason of the abundance of ,his goodness2 so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures4 ,thus ,plato's opinion1 as narrated by ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,de ,provid4 viii1 #c71 is exploded4 ,he taught a threefold providence4 ,first1 one which belongs to the supreme ,deity1 ,who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things1 and thus over the whole world as regards genus1 species1 and universal causes4 ,the second providence1 which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted1 he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens2 that is1 certain separate substances1 which move corporeal things in a circular direction4 ,the third providence1 over human affairs1 he assigned to demons1 whom the ,platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods1 as ,augustine tells us 7,de ,civ4 ,dei1 #a1 #b3 viii1 #ad74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence4 ,but the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself4 ,for every operative science is the more perfect1 the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes2 which are the executors of ,his order1 as was said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,,aa4 #e1 #h74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is better for us not to know low and vile things1 because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher2 for we cannot understand many things simultaneously2 because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil4 ,this does not hold with ,god1 ,who sees everything simultaneously at one glance1 and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,providence ,imposes ,any ,necessity on ,things ,foreseen8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen4 ,for every effect that has a per se cause1 either present or past1 which it necessarily follows1 happens from necessity2 as the ,philosopher proves 7,metaph4 vi1 #g74 ,but the providence of ,god1 since it is eternal1 pre-exists2 and the effect flows from it of necessity1 for divine providence cannot be frustrated4 ,therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every provider makes his work as stable as he can1 lest it should fail4 ,but ,god is most powerful4 ,therefore ,he assigns the stability of necessity to things provided4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv1 #f73 ,fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes4 ,it seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says that 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #bc7 to corrupt nature is not the work of providence4 ,but it is in the nature of some things to be contingent4 ,divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency4 ,i answer that1 ,divine providence imposes necessity upon some things2 not upon all1 as some formerly believed4 ,for to providence it belongs to order things towards an end4 ,now after the divine goodness1 which is an extrinsic end to all things1 the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe2 which would not be1 were not all grades of being found in things4 ,whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being4 ,and thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes1 so that they happen of necessity2 for others contingent causes1 that they may happen by contingency1 according to the nature of their proximate causes4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow2 but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency4 ,therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity2 and that happens from contingency1 which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain1 so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen1 whether from necessity or from contingency4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that indissolubility and unchangeableness of which ,boethius speaks1 pertain to the certainty of providence1 which fails not to produce its effect1 and that in the way foreseen2 but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects4 ,we must remember that properly speaking necessary and contingent are consequent upon being1 as such4 ,hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of ,god1 who provides universally for all being2 not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things4 ,,question #bc ,,of ,,predestination 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,after consideration of divine providence1 we must treat of predestination and the book of life4 ,concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether predestination is suitably attributed to ,god8 7#b7 ,what is predestination1 and whether it places anything in the predestined8 7#c7 ,whether to ,god belongs the reprobation of some men8 7#d7 ,on the comparison of predestination to election2 whether1 that is to say1 the predestined are chosen8 7#e7 ,whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination1 or reprobation1 or election8 7#f7 of the certainty of predestination2 whether the predestined will infallibly be saved8 7#g7 ,whether the number of the predestined is certain8 7#h7 ,whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,men ,are ,predestined by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that men are not predestined by ,god1 for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #cj73 ,it must be borne in mind that ,god foreknows but does not predetermine everything1 since ,he foreknows all that is in us1 but does not predetermine it all4 ,but human merit and demerit are in us1 forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will4 ,all that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by ,god2 and thus man's predestination is done away4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence1 as was said above 7,q4 #bb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but other creatures are not said to be predestined by ,god4 ,therefore neither are men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angels are capable of beatitude1 as well as men4 ,but predestination is not suitable to angels1 since in them there never was any unhappiness 7miseria72 for predestination1 as ,augustine says 7,de praedest4 sanct4 #ag71 is the purpose to take pity miserendi 99,see ,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c4 ,therefore men are not predestined4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the benefits ,god confers upon men are revealed by the ,holy ,ghost to holy men according to the saying of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #b3ab73 ,now we have received not the spirit of this world1 but the ,spirit that is of ,god3 that we may know the things that are given us from ,god4 ,therefore if man were predestined by ,god1 since predestination is a benefit from ,god1 his predestination would be made known to each predestined2 which is clearly false4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #h3cj73 ,whom ,he predestined1 them ,he also called4 ,i answer that1 ,it is fitting that ,god should predestine men4 ,for all things are subject to ,his providence1 as was shown above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end1 as was also said 7,q4 #bb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,the end towards which created things are directed by ,god is twofold2 one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature2 and this end is life eternal1 that consists in seeing ,god which is above the nature of every creature1 as shown above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d74 ,the other end1 however1 is proportionate to created nature1 to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature4 ,now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature1 it must be directed thereto by another2 thus1 an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark4 ,hence1 properly speaking1 a rational creature1 capable of eternal life1 is led towards it1 directed1 as it were1 by ,god4 ,the reason of that direction pre-exists in ,god2 as in ,him is the type of the order of all things towards an end1 which we proved above to be providence4 ,now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done1 is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done4 ,hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination4 ,for to destine1 is to direct or send4 ,thus it is clear that predestination1 as regards its objects1 is a part of providence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity1 after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end4 ,this is clear from his adding3 ,he does not will malice1 nor does ,he compel virtue4 ,whence predestination is not excluded by ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature4 ,whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined2 although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,predestination applies to angels1 just as it does to men1 although they have never been unhappy4 ,for movement does not take its species from the term wherefrom but from the term whereto4 ,because it matters nothing1 in respect of the notion of making white1 whether he who is made white was before black1 yellow or red4 ,likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not4 ,although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy2 as was shown previously 7,q4 #ba1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some1 it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone2 because1 if so1 those who were not predestined would despair2 and security would beget negligence in the predestined4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,predestination ,places ,anything in the ,predestined8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that predestination does place something in the predestined4 ,for every action of itself causes passion4 ,if therefore predestination is action in ,god1 predestination must be passion in the predestined4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,origen says on the text1 ,he who was predestined1 etc4 7,rom4 #a3d73 ,predestination is of one who is not2 destination1 of one who is4 ,and ,augustine says 7,de ,praed4 ,sanct473 ,what is predestination but the destination of one who is8 ,therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists2 and it thus places something in the predestined4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 preparation is something in the thing prepared4 ,but predestination is the preparation of ,god's benefits1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,praed4 ,sanct4 ii1 #ad74 ,therefore predestination is something in the predestined4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity4 ,but grace1 which is something temporal1 is found in the definition of predestination4 ,for predestination is the preparation of grace in the present2 and of glory in the future4 ,therefore predestination is not anything eternal4 ,so it must needs be that it is in the predestined1 and not in ,god2 for whatever is in ,him is eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,praed4 ,sanct4 ii1 #ad7 that predestination is the foreknowledge of ,god's benefits4 ,but foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown1 but in the person who foreknows them4 ,therefore1 predestination is in the one who predestines1 and not in the predestined4 ,i answer that1 ,predestination is not anything in the predestined2 but only in the person who predestines4 ,we have said above that predestination is a part of providence4 ,now providence is not anything in the things provided for2 but is a type in the mind of the provider1 as was proved above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #a74 ,but the execution of providence which is called government1 is in a passive way in the thing governed1 and in an active way in the governor4 ,whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation1 existing in the divine mind4 ,the execution1 however1 of this order is in a passive way in the predestined1 but actively in ,god4 ,the execution of predestination is the calling and magnification2 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #h3cj73 ,whom ,he predestined1 them ,he also called and whom ,he called1 them ,he also magnified ,vulg4 'justified'4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion--for example1 the actions of warming and cutting2 but not so actions remaining in the agent1 as understanding and willing1 as said above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ah1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a74 ,predestination is an action of this latter class4 ,wherefore1 it does not put anything in the predestined4 ,but its execution1 which passes out to external things1 has an effect in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end2 thus1 destination can only be said of someone actually existing4 ,it is taken1 however1 in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind2 and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind4 ,in this latter way it is said that ,eleazar determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life 7#b ,macc4 #f3bj74 ,thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist4 ,predestination1 however1 by reason of the antecedent nature it implies1 can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist2 in whatsoever way destination is accepted4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,preparation is twofold3 of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared2 and of the agent to action1 and this is in the agent4 ,such a preparation is predestination1 and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act1 accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done4 ,thus1 ,god from all eternity prepared by predestination1 conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,grace does not come into the definition of predestination1 as something belonging to its essence1 but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace1 as of cause to effect1 and of act to its object4 ,whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,reprobates ,any ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god reprobates no man4 ,for nobody reprobates what he loves4 ,but ,god loves every man1 according to 7,wis4 #aa3be73 ,thou lovest all things that are1 and ,thou hatest none of the things ,thou hast made4 ,therefore ,god reprobates no man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if ,god reprobates any man1 it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined4 ,but predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined4 ,therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate4 ,but this false4 ,for it is said 7,osee #ac3i73 ,destruction is thy own1 ,o ,israel2 ,thy help is only in ,me4 ,god does not1 then1 reprobate any man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid4 ,but if ,god reprobates anyone1 that one must perish4 ,for it is said 7,eccles4 #g3ad73 ,consider the works of ,god1 that no man can correct whom ,he hath despised4 ,therefore it could not be imputed to any man1 were he to perish4 ,but this is false4 ,therefore ,god does not reprobate anyone4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,malachi #a3b1c73 ,i have loved ,jacob1 but have hated ,esau4 ,i answer that1 ,god does reprobate some4 ,for it was said above 7,a4 #a7 that predestination is a part of providence4 ,to providence1 however1 it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence1 as was said above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,thus1 as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of ,god1 it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end2 this is called reprobation4 ,thus1 as predestination is a part of providence1 in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation1 so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end4 ,hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge1 but also something more1 as does providence1 as was said above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore1 as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory2 so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin1 and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god loves all men and all creatures1 inasmuch as ,he wishes them all some good2 but ,he does not wish every good to them all4 ,so far1 therefore1 as ,he does not wish this particular good--namely1 eternal life--,he is said to hate or reprobated them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reprobation differs in its causality from predestination4 ,this latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined--namely1 glory--and of what is received in this life--namely1 grace4 ,reprobation1 however1 is not the cause of what is in the present--namely1 sin2 but it is the cause of abandonment by ,god4 ,it is the cause1 however1 of what is assigned in the future--namely1 eternal punishment4 ,but guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace4 ,in this way1 the word of the prophet is true--namely1 ,destruction is thy own1 ,o ,israel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,reprobation by ,god does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated4 ,hence1 when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace1 this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility3 but only conditional impossibility3 as was said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c71 that the predestined must necessarily be saved2 yet a conditional necessity1 which does not do away with the liberty of choice4 ,whence1 although anyone reprobated by ,god cannot acquire grace1 nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will4 ,hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,predestined ,are ,chosen by ,god8 99,eligantur4 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the predestined are not chosen by ,god4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #a7 that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection1 so does ,god ,his goodness4 ,but the goodness of ,god is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory4 ,therefore ,god without any selection communicates ,his grace and glory2 and this belongs to predestination4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 election is of things that exist4 ,but predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist4 ,therefore1 some are predestined without election4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 election implies some discrimination4 ,now ,god wills all men to be saved 7#a ,tim4 #b3d74 ,therefore1 predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation1 is without election4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,eph4 #a3d73 ,he chose us in ,him before the foundation of the world4 ,i answer that1 ,predestination presupposes election in the order of reason2 and election presupposes love4 ,the reason of this is that predestination1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 is a part of providence4 ,now providence1 as also prudence1 is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end2 as was proved above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,but nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists4 ,whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes1 in the order of reason1 that ,god wills their salvation2 and to this belong both election and love3--love1 inasmuch as ,he wills them this particular good of eternal salvation2 since to love is to wish well to anyone1 as stated above 7,q4 #bj1 ,,aa4 #b 1#c73--;election1 inasmuch as ,he wills this good to some in preference to others2 since ,he reprobates some1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,election and love1 however1 are differently ordered in ,god1 and in ourselves3 because in us the will in loving does not cause good1 but we are incited to love by the good which already exists2 and therefore we choose someone to love1 and so election in us precedes love4 ,in ,god1 however1 it is the reverse4 ,for ,his will1 by which in loving ,he wishes good to someone1 is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others4 ,thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason1 and election precedes predestination4 ,whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered1 ,god communicates ,his goodness without election2 inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in ,his goodness1 as we said above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d74 ,but if we consider the communication of this or that particular good1 ,he does not allot it without election2 since ,he gives certain goods to some men1 which ,he does not give to others4 ,thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen1 the choice must needs be of those things which already exist1 as happens in our choice4 ,in ,god it is otherwise2 as was said above 7,q4 #bj1 ,a4 #b74 ,thus1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,verb4 ,ap4 ,serm4 #aa73 ,those are chosen by ,god1 who do not exist2 yet ,he does not err in ,his choice4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god wills all men to be saved by ,his antecedent will1 which is to will not simply but relatively2 and not by ,his consequent will1 which is to will simply4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,foreknowledge of ,merits ,is the ,cause of ,predestination8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3bi73 ,whom ,he foreknew1 ,he also predestined4 ,again a gloss of ,ambrose on ,rom4 #i3ae3 ,i will have mercy upon whom ,i will have mercy says3 ,i will give mercy to him who1 ,i foresee1 will turn to ,me with his whole heart4 ,therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,divine predestination includes the divine will1 which by no means can be irrational2 since predestination is the purpose to have mercy1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,praed4 ,sanct4 ii1 #ag74 ,but there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits4 ,therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,there is no injustice in ,god 7,rom4 #i3ad74 ,now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals4 ,but all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin2 and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions4 ,therefore ,god does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating1 unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,titus #c3e73 ,not by works of justice which we have done1 but according to ,his mercy ,he saved us4 ,but as ,he saved us1 so ,he predestined that we should be saved4 ,therefore1 foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination4 ,i answer that1 ,since predestination includes will1 as was said above 7,a4 #d71 the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of ,god4 ,now it was shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #e71 that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing2 but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed2 inasmuch as ,god wills one thing on account of something else4 ,wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator4 ,but this is the question1 whether1 as regards the effect1 predestination has any cause2 or what comes to the same thing1 whether ,god pre-ordained that ,he would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits4 ,accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life4 ,this was the opinion of ,origen1 who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning1 and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body4 ,the ,apostle1 however1 rebuts this opinion where he says 7,rom4 #i3aa1ab73 ,for when they were not yet born1 nor had done any good or evil 4 4 4 not of works1 but of ,him that calleth1 it was said of her3 ,the elder shall serve the younger4 ,others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination4 ,for the ,pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us2 and the consummation from ,god3 so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one1 and not to another1 because the one made a beginning by preparing1 whereas the other did not4 ,but against this we have the saying of the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #c3e71 that we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves4 ,now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking4 ,wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination4 ,and so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination2 giving us to understand that ,god gives grace to a person1 and pre-ordains that ,he will give it1 because ,he knows beforehand that ,he will make good use of that grace1 as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it4 ,but these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace1 and that which flows from free will1 as if the same thing cannot come from both4 ,it is1 however1 manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination2 and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination1 since it is contained in the notion of predestination4 ,therefore1 if anything else in us be the reason of predestination1 it will outside the effect of predestination4 ,now there is no distinction between what flows from free will1 and what is of predestination2 as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause4 ,for the providence of ,god produces effects through the operation of secondary causes1 as was above shown 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore1 that which flows from free-will is also of predestination4 ,we must say1 therefore1 that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light--in one way1 in particular2 and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another2 a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect1 as its final cause2 and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause1 which is reduced to the disposition of the matter4 ,thus we might say that ,god pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit1 and that ,he pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory4 ,in another way1 the effect of predestination may be considered in general4 ,thus1 it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us2 because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation1 is all included under the effect of predestination2 even the preparation for grace4 ,for neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help1 according to the prophet ,jeremias 7,lam4 #e3ba73 convert us1 ,o ,lord1 to ,thee1 and we shall be converted4 ,yet predestination has in this way1 in regard to its effect1 the goodness of ,god for its reason2 towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end2 and from which it proceeds1 as from its first moving principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the use of grace foreknown by ,god is not the cause of conferring grace1 except after the manner of a final cause2 as was explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,predestination has its foundation in the goodness of ,god as regards its effects in general4 ,considered in its particular effects1 however1 one effect is the reason of another2 as already stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason for the predestination of some1 and reprobation of others1 must be sought for in the goodness of ,god4 ,thus ,he is said to have made all things through ,his goodness1 so that the divine goodness might be represented in things4 ,now it is necessary that ,god's goodness1 which in itself is one and undivided1 should be manifested in many ways in ,his creation2 because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of ,god4 ,thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being2 some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe4 ,that this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things1 ,god allows some evils1 lest many good things should never happen1 as was said above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,let us then consider the whole of the human race1 as we consider the whole universe4 ,god wills to manifest ,his goodness in men2 in respect to those whom ,he predestines1 by means of ,his mercy1 as sparing them2 and in respect of others1 whom he reprobates1 by means of ,his justice1 in punishing them4 ,this is the reason why ,god elects some and rejects others4 ,to this the ,apostle refers1 saying 7,rom4 #i3bb1 #bc73 ,what if ,god1 willing to show ,his wrath that is1 the vengeance of ,his justice1 and to make ,his power known1 endured that is1 permitted with much patience vessels of wrath1 fitted for destruction2 that ,he might show the riches of ,his glory on the vessels of mercy1 which ,he hath prepared unto glory and 7#b ,tim4 #b3bj73 ,but in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver2 but also of wood and of earth2 and some1 indeed1 unto honor1 but some unto dishonor4 ,yet why ,he chooses some for glory1 and reprobates others1 has no reason1 except the divine will4 ,whence ,augustine says 7,tract4 xxvi4 in ,joan473 ,why ,he draws one1 and another ,he draws not1 seek not to judge1 if thou dost not wish to err4 ,thus too1 in the things of nature1 a reason can be assigned1 since primary matter is altogether uniform1 why one part of it was fashioned by ,god from the beginning under the form of fire1 another under the form of earth1 that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature4 ,yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form1 and that under another1 depends upon the simple will of ,god2 as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall1 and that in another2 although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place1 and some in that place4 ,neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in ,god1 if ,he prepares unequal lots for not unequal things4 ,this would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice1 if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt1 and not gratuitously4 ,in things which are given gratuitously1 a person can give more or less1 just as he pleases 7provided he deprives nobody of his due71 without any infringement of justice4 ,this is what the master of the house said3 ,take what is thine1 and go thy way4 ,is it not lawful for me to do what ,i will8 7,matt4 #bj3ad1ae74 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,predestination ,is ,certain8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that predestination is not certain4 ,because on the words ,hold fast that which thou hast1 that no one take thy crown1 7,rev #c3aa71 ,augustine says 7,de ,corr4 et ,grat4 #ae73 ,another will not receive1 unless this one were to lose it4 ,hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost4 ,therefore predestination cannot be certain4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 granted what is possible1 nothing impossible follows4 ,but it is possible that one predestined--e4g4 ,peter--may sin and then be killed4 ,but if this were so1 it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted4 ,this then1 is not impossible4 ,therefore predestination is not certain4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever ,god could do in the past1 ,he can do now4 ,but ,he could have not predestined whom ,he hath predestined4 ,therefore now ,he is able not to predestine him4 ,therefore predestination is not certain4 ,on the contrary1 ,a gloss on ,rom4 #h3bi3 ,whom ,he foreknew1 ,he also predestinated1 says3 ,predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of ,god1 by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed4 ,i answer that1 ,predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect2 yet it does not impose any necessity1 so that1 namely1 its effect should take place from necessity4 ,for it was said above 7,a4 #a71 that predestination is a part of providence4 ,but not all things subject to providence are necessary2 some things happening from contingency1 according to the nature of the proximate causes1 which divine providence has ordained for such effects4 ,yet the order of providence is infallible1 as was shown above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #d74 ,so also the order of predestination is certain2 yet free-will is not destroyed2 whence the effect of predestination has its contingency4 ,moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d7 must also be taken into consideration2 since they do not destroy contingency in things1 although they themselves are most certain and infallible4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways2 first1 by ,god's predestination1 and thus no one loses his crown3 secondly1 by the merit of grace2 for what we merit1 in a certain way is ours2 and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin4 ,another person receives that crown thus lost1 inasmuch as he takes the former's place4 ,for ,god does not permit some to fall1 without raising others2 according to ,job #cd3bd3 ,he shall break in pieces many and innumerable1 and make others to stand in their stead4 ,thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels2 and the ,gentiles in that of the ,jews4 ,he who is substituted for another in the state of grace1 also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done1 in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin2 yet it is not possible1 supposed1 as in fact it is supposed4 that he is predestinated4 ,whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since predestination includes the divine will as stated above 7,a4 #d73 and the fact that ,god wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that ,he so wills1 on account of the immutability of the divine will1 but is not necessary absolutely2 so the same must be said of predestination4 ,wherefore one ought not to say that ,god is able not to predestinate one whom ,he has predestinated1 taking it in a composite sense1 thought1 absolutely speaking1 ,god can predestinate or not4 ,but in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,number of the ,predestined ,is ,certain8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the number of the predestined is not certain4 ,for a number to which an addition can be made is not certain4 ,but there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems2 for it is written 7,deut4 #a3aa73 ,the ,lord ,god adds to this number many thousands1 and a gloss adds1 fixed by ,god1 who knows those who belong to ,him4 ,therefore the number of the predestined is not certain4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no reason can be assigned why ,god pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another4 ,but nothing is arranged by ,god without a reason4 ,therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by ,god cannot be certain4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the operations of ,god are more perfect than those of nature4 ,but in the works of nature1 good is found in the majority of things2 defect and evil in the minority4 ,if1 then1 the number of the saved were fixed by ,god at a certain figure1 there would be more saved than lost4 ,yet the contrary follows from ,matt4 #g3ac1ad3 ,for wide is the gate1 and broad the way that leadeth to destruction1 and many there are who go in thereat4 ,how narrow is the gate1 and strait is the way that leadeth to life2 and few there are who find it6 ,therefore the number of those pre-ordained by ,god to be saved is not certain4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,corr4 et ,grat4 #ac73 ,the number of the predestined is certain1 and can neither be increased nor diminished4 ,i answer that1 ,the number of the predestined is certain4 ,some have said that it was formally1 but not materially certain2 as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved2 not however these or those individuals4 ,but this destroys the certainty of predestination2 of which we spoke above 7,a4 #f74 ,therefore we must say that to ,god the number of the predestined is certain1 not only formally1 but also materially4 ,it must1 however1 be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to ,god1 not by reason of ,his knowledge1 because1 that is to say1 ,he knows how many will be saved 7for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to ,god72 but by reason of ,his deliberate choice and determination4 ,for the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite1 as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite 7,q4 #g1 ,,aa4 #b 1#c74 ,now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts1 which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole4 ,for of those things which are required not principally1 but only on account of something else1 he does not select any definite number per se2 but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing4 ,for instance1 a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house1 and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house2 and definite measurements of the walls and roof2 he does not1 however1 select a definite number of stones1 but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall4 ,so also must we consider concerning ,god in regard to the whole universe1 which is ,his effect4 ,for ,he pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe1 and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe--that is to say1 which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity2 how many spheres1 how many stars1 how many elements1 and how many species4 ,individuals1 however1 which undergo corruption1 are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe1 but in a secondary way1 inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them4 ,whence1 although ,god knows the total number of individuals1 the number of oxen1 flies and such like1 is not pre-ordained by ,god per se2 but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species4 ,now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe1 being as such incorruptible2 more especially those who attain to eternal happiness1 since they more immediately reach the ultimate end4 ,whence the number of the predestined is certain to ,god2 not only by way of knowledge1 but also by way of a principal pre-ordination4 ,it is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate1 who would seem to be pre-ordained by ,god for the good of the elect1 in whose regard all things work together unto good 7,rom4 #h3bh74 ,concerning the number of all the predestined1 some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell2 some1 so many as there were angels left2 others1 as many as the number of angels created by ,god4 ,it is1 however1 better to say that1 to ,god alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness 99,from the 'secret' prayer of the missal1 'pro vivis et defunctis4' ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of ,deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by ,god beforehand in respect to present righteousness4 ,for their number is increased and diminished1 but not the number of the predestined4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole4 ,thus in ,god the reason why ,he has made so many stars1 or so many species of things1 or predestined so many1 is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority2 and is wanting in the minority4 ,the good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority1 and is wanting in the majority4 ,thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life2 and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish2 but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest4 ,since their eternal happiness1 consisting in the vision of ,god1 exceeds the common state of nature1 and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin1 those who are saved are in the minority4 ,in this especially1 however1 appears the mercy of ,god1 that ,he has chosen some for that salvation1 from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bc1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,predestination ,can ,be ,furthered by the ,prayers of the ,saints8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints4 ,for nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal2 and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal4 ,but predestination is eternal4 ,therefore1 since the prayers of the saints are temporal1 they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined4 ,predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge1 so there is no need of help except through defective power4 ,but neither of these things can be said of ,god when ,he predestines4 ,whence it is said3 ,who hath helped the ,spirit of the ,lord8 99,vulg43 ',who hath known the mind of the ,lord8' ,or who hath been ,his counsellor8 7,rom4 #aa3cd74 ,therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a thing can be helped1 it can also be hindered4 ,but predestination cannot be hindered by anything4 ,therefore it cannot be furthered by anything4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said that ,isaac besought the ,lord for his wife because she was barren2 and ,he heard him and made ,rebecca to conceive 7,gen4 #be3ba74 ,but from that conception ,jacob was born1 and he was predestined4 ,now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born4 ,therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints4 ,i answer that1 ,concerning this question1 there were different errors4 ,some1 regarding the certainty of divine predestination1 said that prayers were superfluous1 as also anything else done to attain salvation2 because whether these things were done or not1 the predestined would attain1 and the reprobate would not attain1 eternal salvation4 ,but against this opinion are all the warnings of ,holy ,scripture1 exhorting us to prayer and other good works4 ,others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer4 ,this is stated to have the opinion of the ,egyptians1 who thought that the divine ordination1 which they called fate1 could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers4 ,against this also is the authority of ,scripture4 ,for it is said3 ,but the triumpher in ,israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance 7#a ,kings #ae3bi72 and that the gifts and the calling of ,god are without repentance 7,rom4 #aa3bi74 ,wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered--namely1 the divine ordination2 and its effect4 ,as regards the former1 in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints4 ,for it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by ,god4 ,as regards the latter1 predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints1 and by other good works2 because providence1 of which predestination is a part1 does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects1 that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence4 ,so1 as natural effects are provided by ,god in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects1 without which those effects would not happen2 so the salvation of a person is predestined by ,god in such a way1 that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination2 whether it be one's own prayers or those of another2 or other good works1 and such like1 without which one would not attain to salvation4 ,whence1 the predestined must strive after good works and prayer2 because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled4 ,for this reason it is said3 ,labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election 7#b ,pet4 #a3aj74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints1 as regards the preordination4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one is said to be helped by another in two ways2 in one way1 inasmuch as he receives power from him3 and to be helped thus belongs to the weak2 but this cannot be said of ,god1 and thus we are to understand1 ,who hath helped the ,spirit of the ,lord8 ,in another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work1 as a master through a servant4 ,in this way ,god is helped by us2 inasmuch as we execute ,his orders1 according to #a ,cor4 #c3i3 ,we are ,god's co-adjutors4 ,nor is this on account of any defect in the power of ,god1 but because ,he employs intermediary causes1 in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe2 and also that ,he may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause1 as has been said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #f71 indeed1 they execute that order4 ,and therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures1 but it cannot be impeded by them4 ,,question #bd ,,the ,,book ,,of ,,life 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we now consider the book of life2 concerning which there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is the book of life8 7#b7 ,of what life is it the book8 7#c7 ,whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,book of ,life ,is the ,same ,as ,predestination8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the book of life is not the same thing as predestination4 ,for it is said1 ,all things are the book of life 7,ecclus4 #d3cb7--;i4e4 the ,old and ,new ,testament according to a gloss4 ,this1 however1 is not predestination4 ,therefore the book of life is not predestination4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xx1 #ad7 that the book of life is a certain divine energy1 by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory4 ,but divine energy belongs seemingly1 not to predestination1 but rather to divine power4 ,therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 reprobation is opposed to predestination4 ,so1 if the book of life were the same as predestination1 there should also be a book of death1 as there is a book of life4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in a gloss upon ,ps4 #fh3bi1 ,let them be blotted out of the book of the living1 ,this book is the knowledge of ,god1 by which ,he hath predestined to life those whom ,he foreknew4 ,i answer that1 ,the book of life is in ,god taken in a metaphorical sense1 according to a comparison with human affairs4 ,for it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book2 as1 for instance1 soldiers1 or counsellors1 who formerly were called conscript fathers4 ,now it is clear from the preceding 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #d7 that all the predestined are chosen by ,god to possess eternal life4 ,this conscription1 therefore1 of the predestined is called the book of life4 ,a thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory1 according to ,prov4 #c3c3 ,forget not ,my ,law1 and let thy heart keep ,my commandments1 and further on1 ,write them in the tables of thy heart4 ,for things are written down in material books to help the memory4 ,whence1 the knowledge of ,god1 by which ,he firmly remembers that ,he has predestined some to eternal life1 is called the book of life4 ,for as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done1 so the knowledge of ,god is a sign in ,him of those who are to be brought to eternal life1 according to #b ,tim4 #aa3ai3 ,the sure foundation of ,god standeth firm1 having this seal2 the ,lord knoweth who are ,his4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the book of life may be understood in two senses4 ,in one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life2 thus we now speak of the book of life4 ,in another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life2 and this also is twofold1 either as of things to be done2 and thus the ,old and ,new ,testament are called a book of life2 or of things already done1 and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory1 is spoken of as the book of life4 ,thus that also may be called the book of war1 whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service2 or treats of the art of warfare1 or relates the deeds of soldiers4 ,hence the solution of the ,second ,objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is the custom to inscribe1 not those who are rejected1 but those who are chosen4 ,whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation2 as the book of life to predestination4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing4 ,for this latter implies the knowledge of predestination2 as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,book of ,life ,regards ,only the ,life of ,glory of the ,predestined8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined4 ,for the book of life is the knowledge of life4 ,but ,god1 through ,his own life1 knows all other life4 ,therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life2 and not only in regard to the life of the predestined4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the life of glory comes from ,god1 so also does the life of nature4 ,therefore1 if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life2 so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory2 as it is clear from what is said3 ,have not ,i chosen you twelve1 and one of you is a devil8 7,john #f3ga74 ,but the book of life is the inscription of the divine election1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore it applies also to the life of grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,the book of life is the knowledge of predestination1 as stated above 7ibid474 ,but predestination does not regard the life of grace1 except so far as it is directed to glory2 for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory4 ,the book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory4 ,i answer that1 ,the book of life1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life4 ,now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature2 and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end4 ,for a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor1 but to fight2 since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed4 ,but the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature1 as said above 7,q4 #bc1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore1 strictly speaking1 the book of life regards the life of glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the divine life1 even considered as a life of glory1 is natural to ,god2 whence in ,his regard there is no election1 and in consequence no book of life3 for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense1 or any of those things that are consequent on nature4 ,from this we gather the ,reply to the ,second ,objection4 ,for there is no election1 nor a book of life1 as regards the life of nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the life of grace has the aspect1 not of an end1 but of something directed towards an end4 ,hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace1 except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory4 ,for this reason those who1 possessing grace1 fail to obtain glory1 are not said to be chosen simply1 but relatively4 ,likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply1 but relatively2 that is to say1 that it is in the ordination and knowledge of ,god that they are to have some relation to eternal life1 according to their participation in grace4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,anyone ,may ,be ,blotted ,out of the ,book of ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xx1 #ae73 ,god's foreknowledge1 which cannot be deceived1 is the book of life4 ,but nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of ,god1 nor from predestination4 ,therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing4 ,but the book of life is something eternal and immutable4 ,therefore whatsoever is written therein1 is there not in a temporary way1 but immovably1 and indelibly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 blotting out is the contrary to inscription4 ,but nobody can be written a second time in the book of life4 ,neither therefore can he be blotted out4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said1 ,let them be blotted out from the book of the living 7,ps4 #fh3bi74 ,i answer that1 ,some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact1 but only in the opinion of men4 ,for it is customary in the ,scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known4 ,thus some are said to be written in the book of life1 inasmuch as men think they are written therein1 on account of the present righteousness they see in them2 but when it becomes evident1 either in this world or in the next1 that they have fallen from that state of righteousness1 they are then said to be blotted out4 ,and thus a gloss explains the passage3 ,let them be blotted out of the book of the living4 ,but because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just1 according to the text1 ,he that shall overcome1 shall thus be clothed in white garments1 and ,i will not blot his name out of the book of life 7,apoc4 #c3e7 7and what is promised to holy men1 is not merely something in the opinion of men71 it can therefore be said that to be blotted out1 and not blotted out1 of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man1 but to the reality of the fact4 ,for the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life1 to which one is directed from two sources2 namely1 from predestination1 which direction never fails1 and from grace2 for whoever has grace1 by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life4 ,this direction fails sometimes2 because some are directed by possessing grace1 to obtain eternal life1 yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin4 ,therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply1 because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality2 such are never blotted out from the book of life4 ,those1 however1 who are ordained to eternal life1 not through divine predestination1 but through grace1 are said to be written in the book of life not simply1 but relatively1 for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself1 but in its cause only4 ,yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life1 this blotting out must not be referred to ,god1 as if ,god foreknew a thing1 and afterwards knew it not2 but to the thing known1 namely1 because ,god knows one is first ordained to eternal life1 and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards ,god's foreknowledge1 as if in ,god there were any change2 but as regards things foreknown1 which can change4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although things are immutably in ,god1 yet in themselves they are subject to change4 ,to this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew2 either in the opinion of men1 or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace2 which also is included in the knowledge of ,god1 although not anew4 ,,question #be ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,god 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,after considering the divine foreknowledge and will1 and other things pertaining thereto1 it remains for us to consider the power of ,god4 ,about this are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is power in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether ,his power is infinite8 7#c7 ,whether ,he is almighty8 7#d7 ,whether ,he could make the past not to have been8 7#e7 ,whether ,he could do what ,he does not1 or not do what ,he does8 7#f7 ,whether what ,he makes ,he could make better8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,power in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that power is not in ,god4 ,for as primary matter is to power1 so ,god1 who is the first agent1 is to act4 ,but primary matter1 considered in itself1 is devoid of all act4 ,therefore1 the first agent--namely1 ,god--is devoid of power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 vi1 #ai71 better than every power is its act4 ,for form is better than matter2 and action than active power1 since it is its end4 ,but nothing is better than what is in ,god2 because whatsoever is in ,god1 is ,god1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore1 there is no power in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,power is the principle of operation4 ,but the divine power is ,god's essence1 since there is nothing accidental in ,god3 and of the essence of ,god there is no principle4 ,therefore there is no power in ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it was shown above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d7 that ,god's knowledge and will are the cause of things4 ,but the cause and principle of a thing are identical4 ,we ought not1 therefore1 to assign power to ,god2 but only knowledge and will4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said3 ,thou art mighty1 ,o ,lord1 and ,thy truth is round about ,thee 7,ps4 #hh3i74 ,i answer that1 ,power is twofold--namely1 passive1 which exists not at all in ,god2 and active1 which we must assign to ,him in the highest degree4 ,for it is manifest that everything1 according as it is in act and is perfect1 is the active principle of something3 whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect4 ,now it was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #d1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 that ,god is pure act1 simply and in all ways perfect1 nor in ,him does any imperfection find place4 ,whence it most fittingly belongs to ,him to be an active principle1 and in no way whatsoever to be passive4 ,on the other hand1 the notion of active principle is consistent with active power4 ,for active power is the principle of acting upon something else2 whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 #ag74 ,it remains1 therefore1 that in ,god there is active power in the highest degree4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,active power is not contrary to act1 but is founded upon it1 for everything acts according as it is actual3 but passive power is contrary to act2 for a thing is passive according as it is potential4 ,whence this potentiality is not in ,god1 but only active power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whenever act is distinct from power1 act must be nobler than power4 ,but ,god's action is not distinct from ,his power1 for both are ,his divine essence2 neither is ,his existence distinct from ,his essence4 ,hence it does not follow that there should be anything in ,god nobler than ,his power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in creatures1 power is the principle not only of action1 but likewise of effect4 ,thus in ,god the idea of power is retained1 inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect2 not1 however1 as it is a principle of action1 for this is the divine essence itself2 except1 perchance1 after our manner of understanding1 inasmuch as the divine essence1 which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things1 can be understood either under the notion of action1 or under that of power2 as also it is understood under the notion of suppositum possessing nature1 and under that of nature4 ,accordingly the notion of power is retained in ,god in so far as it is the principle of an effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,power is predicated of ,god not as something really distinct from ,his knowledge and will1 but as differing from them logically2 inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands1 and what knowledge directs1 which three things in ,god are identified4 ,or we may say1 that the knowledge or will of ,god1 according as it is the effective principle1 has the notion of power contained in it4 ,hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of ,god precedes the consideration of ,his power1 as the cause precedes the operation and effect4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,power of ,god ,is ,infinite8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the power of ,god is not infinite4 ,for everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iii1 #f74 ,but the power of ,god is far from imperfect4 ,therefore it is not infinite4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every power is made known by its effect2 otherwise it would be ineffectual4 ,if1 then1 the power of ,god were infinite1 it could produce an infinite effect1 but this is impossible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #gi7 that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite1 it would cause instantaneous movement4 ,god1 however1 does not cause instantaneous movement1 but moves the spiritual creature in time1 and the corporeal creature in place and time1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 #bj1 #bb1 #bc74 ,therefore1 ,his power is not infinite4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 viii71 that ,god's power is immeasurable4 ,he is the living mighty one4 ,now everything that is immeasurable is infinite4 ,therefore the power of ,god is infinite4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 active power exists in ,god according to the measure in which ,he is actual4 ,now ,his existence is infinite1 inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it1 as is clear from what has been said1 when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a74 ,wherefore1 it is necessary that the active power in ,god should be infinite4 ,for in every agent is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act4 ,for instance1 the hotter a thing is1 the greater the power has it to give heat2 and it would have infinite power to give heat1 were its own heat infinite4 ,whence1 since the divine essence1 through which ,god acts1 is infinite1 as was shown above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a7 it follows that ,his power likewise is infinite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form2 and such infinity belongs to quantity4 ,but the divine essence is otherwise1 as was shown above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a72 and consequently so also ,his power4 ,it does not follow1 therefore1 that it is imperfect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect4 ,the generative power of man1 for example1 is not able to do more than beget man4 ,but the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect3 as1 for example1 the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction4 ,now it is clear that ,god is not a univocal agent4 ,for nothing agrees with ,him either in species or in genus1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #d1 ,a4 #c74 ,whence it follows that ,his effect is always less than ,his power4 ,it is not necessary1 therefore1 that the infinite power of ,god should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect4 ,yet even if it were to produce no effect1 the power of ,god would not be ineffectual2 because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain4 ,but the power of ,god is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end2 rather1 it is the end of the effect produced by it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher 7,phys4 viii1 #gi7 proves that if a body had infinite power1 it would cause a non-temporal movement4 ,and he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite1 because it can move in an infinite time4 ,it remains1 therefore1 according to his reckoning1 that the infinite power of a body1 if such existed1 would move without time2 not1 however1 the power of an incorporeal mover4 ,the reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent2 wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion4 ,since then the greater the power of a moving body1 the more quickly does it move2 the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite1 it would move beyond comparison faster1 and this is to move without time4 ,an incorporeal mover1 however1 is not a univocal agent2 whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion1 so as to move without time2 and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,is ,omnipotent8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not omnipotent4 ,for movement and passiveness belong to everything4 ,but this is impossible with ,god1 for ,he is immovable1 as was said above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore ,he is not omnipotent4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sin is an act of some kind4 ,but ,god cannot sin1 nor deny ,himself as it is said in #b ,tim4 #b3ac4 ,therefore ,he is not omnipotent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is said of ,god that ,he manifests ,his omnipotence especially by sparing and having mercy 99,collect1 #ajth ,sunday after ,pentecost4 ,therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy4 ,there are things much greater1 however1 than sparing and having mercy2 for example1 to create another world1 and the like4 ,therefore ,god is not omnipotent4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 upon the text1 ,god hath made foolish the wisdom of this world 7#a ,cor4 #a3bj71 a gloss says3 ,god hath made the wisdom of this world foolish 99,vulg43 ',hath not ,god'1 etc4 by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible4 ,whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes1 as the wisdom of this world judges them2 but in reference to the divine power4 ,if ,god1 then1 were omnipotent1 all things would be possible2 nothing1 therefore impossible4 ,but if we take away the impossible1 then we destroy also the necessary2 for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist4 ,therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if ,god were omnipotent4 ,but this is an impossibility4 ,therefore ,god is not omnipotent4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said3 ,no word shall be impossible with ,god 7,luke #a3cg74 ,i answer that1 ,all confess that ,god is omnipotent2 but it seems difficult to explain in what ,his omnipotence precisely consists3 for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that ,god can do all things4 ,if1 however1 we consider the matter aright1 since power is said in reference to possible things1 this phrase1 ,god can do all things1 is rightly understood to mean that ,god can do all things that are possible2 and for this reason ,he is said to be omnipotent4 ,now according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v1 #ag71 a thing is said to be possible in two ways4 ,first in relation to some power1 thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man4 ,secondly absolutely1 on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other4 ,now ,god cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature2 for the divine power extends farther than that4 ,if1 however1 we were to say that ,god is omnipotent because ,he can do all things that are possible to ,his power1 there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of ,his power4 ,for this would be saying nothing else but that ,god is omnipotent1 because ,he can do all that ,he is able to do4 ,it remains therefore1 that ,god is called omnipotent because ,he can do all things that are possible absolutely2 which is the second way of saying a thing is possible4 ,for a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely1 according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another1 possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject1 as that ,socrates sits2 and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject1 as1 for instance1 that a man is a donkey4 ,it must1 however1 be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself1 to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded2 for instance1 the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed4 ,the divine existence1 however1 upon which the nature of power in ,god is founded1 is infinite1 and is not limited to any genus of being2 but possesses within itself the perfection of all being4 ,whence1 whatsoever has or can have the nature of being1 is numbered among the absolutely possible things1 in respect of which ,god is called omnipotent4 ,now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being4 ,therefore1 that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing1 within the scope of the divine omnipotence4 ,for such cannot come under the divine omnipotence1 not because of any defect in the power of ,god1 but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing4 ,therefore1 everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms1 is numbered amongst those possible things1 in respect of which ,god is called omnipotent3 whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence1 because it cannot have the aspect of possibility4 ,hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done1 than that ,god cannot do them4 ,nor is this contrary to the word of the angel1 saying3 ,no word shall be impossible with ,god4 ,for whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word1 because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is said to be omnipotent in respect to ,his active power1 not to passive power1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a74 ,whence the fact that ,he is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to ,his omnipotence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to sin is to fall short of a perfect action2 hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action1 which is repugnant to omnipotence4 ,therefore it is that ,god cannot sin1 because of ,his omnipotence4 ,nevertheless1 the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 iv1 #c7 that ,god can deliberately do what is evil4 ,but this must be understood either on a condition1 the antecedent of which is impossible--as1 for instance1 if we were to say that ,god can do evil things if ,he will4 ,for there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true1 though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible3 as if one were to say3 ,if man is a donkey1 he has four feet4 ,or he may be understood to mean that ,god can do some things which now seem to be evil3 which1 however1 if ,he did them1 would then be good4 ,or he is1 perhaps1 speaking after the common manner of the heathen1 who thought that men became gods1 like ,jupiter or ,mercury4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy1 because in this is it made manifest that ,god has supreme power1 that ,he freely forgives sins4 ,for it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will4 ,or1 because by sparing and having mercy upon men1 ,he leads them on to the participation of an infinite good2 which is the ultimate effect of the divine power4 ,or because1 as was said above 7,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #d71 the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works4 ,for nothing is due to anyone1 except on account of something already given him gratuitously by ,god4 ,in this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest1 because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes1 or to inferior causes1 but in reference to itself4 ,but the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause4 ,hence those things which it belongs to ,god alone to do immediately--as1 for example1 to create1 to justify1 and the like--are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause4 ,those things1 however1 which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes4 ,for it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish1 because what is impossible to nature1 it judges to be impossible to ,god4 ,so it is clear that the omnipotence of ,god does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,god ,can ,make the ,past ,not to ,have ,been8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god can make the past not to have been4 ,for what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally4 ,but ,god can do what is impossible in itself1 as to give sight to the blind1 or to raise the dead4 ,therefore1 and much more can ,he do what is only impossible accidentally4 ,now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally3 thus for ,socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible1 from the fact that his running is a thing of the past4 ,therefore ,god can make the past not to have been4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what ,god could do1 ,he can do now1 since ,his power is not lessened4 ,but ,god could have effected1 before ,socrates ran1 that he should not run4 ,therefore1 when he has run1 ,god could effect that he did not run4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity4 ,but ,god can supply charity that is lost2 therefore also lost virginity4 ,therefore ,he can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt4 ,on the contrary1 ,jerome says 7,ep4 #bb ad ,eustoch473 ,although ,god can do all things1 ,he cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 ,he cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #b71 there does not fall under the scope of ,god's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction4 ,now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction4 ,for as it implies a contradiction to say that ,socrates is sitting1 and is not sitting1 so does it to say that he sat1 and did not sit4 ,but to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past4 ,to say that he did not sit1 is to say that it did not happen4 ,whence1 that the past should not have been1 does not come under the scope of divine power4 ,this is what ,augustine means when he says 7,contra ,faust4 xxix1 #e73 ,whosoever says1 ,if ,god is almighty1 let ,him make what is done as if it were not done1 does not see that this is to say3 ,if ,god is almighty let ,him effect that what is true1 by the very fact that it is true1 be false3 and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b73 ,of this one thing alone is ,god deprived--namely1 to make undone the things that have been done4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been1 if one considers the past thing itself1 as1 for instance1 the running of ,socrates2 nevertheless1 if the past thing is considered as past1 that it should not have been is impossible1 not only in itself1 but absolutely since it implies a contradiction4 ,thus1 it is more impossible than the raising of the dead2 in which there is nothing contradictory1 because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power1 that is to say1 some natural power2 for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,god1 in accordance with the perfection of the divine power1 can do all things1 and yet some things are not subject to ,his power1 because they fall short of being possible2 so1 also1 if we regard the immutability of the divine power1 whatever ,god could do1 ,he can do now4 ,some things1 however1 at one time were in the nature of possibility1 whilst they were yet to be done1 which now fall short of the nature of possibility1 when they have been done4 ,so is ,god said not to be able to do them1 because they themselves cannot be done4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen2 but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her2 as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,god ,can ,do ,what ,he ,does ,not8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god cannot do other than what ,he does4 ,for ,god cannot do what ,he has not foreknown and pre-ordained that ,he would do4 ,but ,he neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that ,he would do anything except what ,he does4 ,therefore ,he cannot do except what ,he does4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done4 ,but ,god is not bound to do what ,he does not2 nor is it right that ,he should do what ,he does not4 ,therefore ,he cannot do except what ,he does4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation4 ,but it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are4 ,therefore ,god cannot do except what ,he does4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said3 ,thinkest thou that ,i cannot ask ,my ,father1 and ,he will give ,me presently more than twelve legions of angels8 7,matt4 #bf3ec74 ,but ,he neither asked for them1 nor did ,his ,father show them to refute the ,jews4 ,therefore ,god can do what ,he does not4 ,i answer that1 ,in this matter certain persons erred in two ways4 ,some laid it down that ,god acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place--as1 for instance1 from the seed of man1 a man must come1 and from that of an olive1 an olive2 so from the divine operation there could not result other things1 nor another order of things1 than that which now is4 ,but we showed above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c7 that ,god does not act from natural necessity1 but that ,his will is the cause of all things2 nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things4 ,whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by ,god from any necessity1 so that other things could not happen4 ,others1 however1 said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which ,god does nothing4 ,but since the power of ,god1 which is ,his essence1 is nothing else but ,his wisdom1 it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom2 for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power4 ,yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom1 in which order the notion of ,his justice consists1 as said above 7,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #b71 is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things4 ,now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end4 ,so1 when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end1 the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order4 ,but the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created4 ,whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen4 ,wherefore we must simply say that ,god can do other things than those ,he has done4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in ourselves1 in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect1 and again intellect from wisdom1 and will from justice1 there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect4 ,but in ,god1 power and essence1 will and intellect1 wisdom and justice1 are one and the same4 ,whence1 there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in ,his just will or in ,his wise intellect4 ,nevertheless1 because ,his will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things1 except upon supposition1 as was said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c71 neither are the wisdom and justice of ,god restricted to this present order1 as was shown above2 so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which ,he does not will1 and which is not included in the order which ,he has place in things4 ,again1 because power is considered as executing1 the will as commanding1 and the intellect and wisdom as directing2 what is attributed to ,his power considered in itself1 ,god is said to be able to do in accordance with ,his absolute power4 ,of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being1 as was said above 7,a4 #c74 ,what is1 however1 attributed to the divine power1 according as it carries into execution the command of a just will1 ,god is said to be able to do by ,his ordinary power4 ,in this manner1 we must say that ,god can do other things by ,his absolute power than those ,he has foreknown and pre-ordained ,he would do4 ,but it could not happen that ,he should do anything which ,he had not foreknown1 and had not pre-ordained that ,he would do1 because ,his actual doing is subject to ,his foreknowledge and pre-ordination1 though ,his power1 which is ,his nature1 is not so4 ,for ,god does things because ,he wills so to do2 yet the power to do them does not come from ,his will1 but from ,his nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is bound to nobody but ,himself4 ,hence1 when it is said that ,god can only do what ,he ought1 nothing else is meant by this than that ,god can do nothing but what is befitting to ,himself1 and just4 ,but these words befitting and just may be understood in two ways3 one1 in direct connection with the verb is2 and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things2 and would concern ,his power4 ,then what is said in the objection is false2 for the sense is that ,god can do nothing except what is now fitting and just4 ,if1 however1 they be joined directly with the verb can 7which has the effect of extending the meaning71 and then secondly with is1 the present will be signified1 but in a confused and general way4 ,the sentence would then be true in this sense3 ,god cannot do anything except that which1 if ,he did it1 would be suitable and just4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although this order of things be restricted to what now exists1 the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted4 ,whence1 although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are1 yet ,god can do other things and impose upon them another order4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #be1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,god ,can ,do ,better ,than ,what ,he ,does8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god cannot do better than ,he does4 ,for whatever ,god does1 ,he does in a most powerful and wise way4 ,but a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done4 ,therefore ,god cannot do anything better than ,he does4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine thus argues 7,contra ,maximin4 iii1 #h73 ,if ,god could1 but would not1 beget a ,son ,his equal1 ,he would have been envious4 ,for the same reason1 if ,god could have made better things than ,he has done1 but was not willing so to do1 ,he would have been envious4 ,but envy is far removed from ,god4 ,therefore ,god makes everything of the best4 ,he cannot therefore make anything better than ,he does4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered2 because nothing is better than the best4 ,but as ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #aj71 each thing that ,god has made is good1 and1 taken all together they are very good2 because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe4 ,therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,christ as man is full of grace and truth1 and has the ,spirit without measure2 and so ,he cannot be better4 ,again created happiness is described as the highest good1 and thus cannot be better4 ,and the ,blessed ,virgin ,mary is raised above all the choirs of angels1 and so cannot be better than she is4 ,god cannot therefore make all things better than ,he has made them4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,eph4 #c3bj73 ,god is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand4 ,i answer that1 ,the goodness of anything is twofold2 one1 which is of the essence of it--thus1 for instance1 to be rational pertains to the essence of man4 ,as regards this good1 ,god cannot make a thing better than it is itself2 although ,he can make another thing better than it2 even as ,he cannot make the number four greater than it is2 because if it were greater it would no longer be four1 but another number4 ,for the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers 7,metaph4 viii1 #aj74 ,another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence2 thus1 the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise4 ,as regards this kind of goodness1 ,god can make better the things ,he has made4 ,absolutely speaking1 however1 ,god can make something else better than each thing made by ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when it is said that ,god can make a thing better than ,he makes it1 if better is taken substantively1 this proposition is true4 ,for ,he can always make something else better than each individual thing3 and ,he can make the same thing in one way better than it is1 and in another way not2 as was explained above4 ,if1 however1 better is taken as an adverb1 implying the manner of the making2 thus ,god cannot make anything better than ,he makes it1 because ,he cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness4 ,but if it implies the manner of the thing done1 ,he can make something better2 because ,he can give to things made by ,him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents1 although not as regards the substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father1 when he comes to maturity4 ,but it is not of the nature of anything created1 that it should be better than it was made by ,god4 ,hence the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the universe1 the present creation being supposed1 cannot be better1 on account of the most beautiful order given to things by ,god2 in which the good of the universe consists4 ,for if any one thing were bettered1 the proportion of order would be destroyed2 as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be1 the melody of the harp would be destroyed4 ,yet ,god could make other things1 or add something to the present creation2 and then there would be another and a better universe4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the humanity of ,christ1 from the fact that it is united to the ,godhead2 and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of ,god2 and the ,blessed ,virgin from the fact that she is the mother of ,god2 have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good1 which is ,god4 ,and on this account there cannot be anything better than these2 just as there cannot be anything better than ,god4 ,,question #bf ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,beatitude 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence1 we come to treat of the divine beatitude4 ,concerning this1 there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether beatitude belongs to ,god8 7#b7 ,in regard to what is ,god called blessed2 does this regard ,his act of intellect8 7#c7 ,whether ,he is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed8 7#d7 ,whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,beatitude ,belongs to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that beatitude does not belong to ,god4 ,for beatitude according to ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 iv7 is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things4 ,but the aggregation of goods has no place in ,god2 nor has composition4 ,therefore beatitude does not belong to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue1 according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 i1 #i74 ,but reward does not apply to ,god2 as neither does merit4 ,therefore neither does beatitude4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says3 ,which in ,his times ,he shall show1 who is the ,blessed and only ,almighty1 the ,king of ,kings and ,lord of ,lords4 7#a ,tim4 #f3ae74 ,i answer that1 ,beatitude belongs to ,god in a very special manner4 ,for nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature2 which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses1 to which it is competent that good or ill may befall1 and which can control its own actions4 ,all of these things belong in a most excellent manner to ,god1 namely1 to be perfect1 and to possess intelligence4 ,whence beatitude belongs to ,god in the highest degree4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,aggregation of good is in ,god1 after the manner not of composition1 but of simplicity2 for those things which in creatures is manifold1 pre-exist in ,god1 as was said above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #d71 in simplicity and unity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue1 so far as anyone attains to beatitude2 even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being1 so far as it passes from potentiality to act4 ,as1 then1 ,god has being1 though not begotten2 so ,he has beatitude1 although not acquired by merit4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,is ,called ,blessed in ,respect of ,his ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is not called blessed in respect to ,his intellect4 ,for beatitude is the highest good4 ,but good is said to be in ,god in regard to ,his essence1 because good has reference to being which is according to essence1 according to ,boethius 7,de ,hebdom474 ,therefore beatitude also is said to be in ,god in regard to ,his essence1 and not to ,his intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,beatitude implies the notion of end4 ,now the end is the object of the will1 as also is the good4 ,therefore beatitude is said to be in ,god with reference to ,his will1 and not with reference to ,his intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxxii1 #g73 ,he is in glory1 ,who whilst ,he rejoices in ,himself1 needs not further praise4 ,to be in glory1 however1 is the same as to be blessed4 ,therefore1 since we enjoy ,god in respect to our intellect1 because vision is the whole of the reward1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxii71 it would seem that beatitude is said to be in ,god in respect of ,his intellect4 it would seem that beatitude is said to be in ,god in respect of ,his intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,beatitude1 as stated above 7,a4 #a71 is the perfect good of an intellectual nature4 ,thus it is that1 as everything desires the perfection of its nature1 intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy4 ,now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation1 by which in some sense it grasps everything4 ,whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding4 ,now in ,god1 to be and to understand are one and the same thing2 differing only in the manner of our understanding them4 ,beatitude must therefore be assigned to ,god in respect of ,his intellect2 as also to the blessed1 who are called blessed beati by reason of the assimilation to ,his beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument proves that beatitude belongs to ,god2 not that beatitude pertains essentially to ,him under the aspect of ,his essence2 but rather under the aspect of ,his intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since beatitude is a good1 it is the object of the will2 now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power4 ,whence in our manner of understanding1 divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it4 ,this cannot be other than the act of the intellect2 and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,is the ,beatitude of ,each of the ,blessed8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that ,god is the beatitude of each of the blessed4 ,for ,god is the supreme good1 as was said above 7,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d74 ,but it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods1 as also is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore1 since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good1 it seems that beatitude is nothing else but ,god ,himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 beatitude is the last end of the rational nature4 ,but to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to ,god4 ,therefore the beatitude of every blessed is ,god alone4 ,on the contrary1 ,the beatitude of one is greater than that of another1 according to #a ,cor4 #ae3da3 ,star differeth from star in glory4 ,but nothing is greater than ,god4 ,therefore beatitude is something different from ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,the beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect4 ,in this we may consider two things1 namely1 the object of the act1 which is the thing understood2 and the act itself which is to understand4 ,if1 then1 beatitude be considered on the side of the object1 ,god is the only beatitude2 for everyone is blessed from this sole fact1 that he understands ,god1 in accordance with the saying of ,augustine 7,confess4 v1 #d73 ,blessed is he who knoweth ,thee1 though he know nought else4 ,but as regards the act of understanding1 beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures2 but in ,god1 even in this way1 it is an uncreated thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,beatitude1 as regards its object1 is the supreme good absolutely1 but as regards its act1 in beatified creatures it is their supreme good1 not absolutely1 but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,end is twofold1 namely1 objective and subjective1 as the ,philosopher says 7,greater ,ethics i1 #c71 namely1 the thing itself and its use4 ,thus to a miser the end is money1 and its acquisition4 ,accordingly ,god is indeed the last end of a rational creature1 as the thing itself2 but created beatitude is the end1 as the use1 or rather fruition1 of the thing4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bf1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all ,other ,beatitude ,is ,included in the ,beatitude of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes4 ,for there are some false beatitudes4 ,but nothing false can be in ,god4 ,therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a certain beatitude1 according to some1 consists in things corporeal2 as in pleasure1 riches1 and such like4 ,now none of these have to do with ,god1 since ,he is incorporeal4 ,therefore ,his beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes4 ,on the contrary1 ,beatitude is a certain perfection4 ,but the divine perfection embraces all other perfection1 as was shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes4 ,i answer that1 ,whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude1 whether true or false1 pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude4 ,as to contemplative happiness1 ,god possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of ,himself and of all things else2 and as to that which is active1 ,he has the governance of the whole universe4 ,as to earthly happiness1 which consists in delight1 riches1 power1 dignity1 and fame1 according to ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 iii1 #aj71 ,he possesses joy in ,himself and all things else for ,his delight2 instead of riches ,he has that complete self-sufficiency1 which is promised by riches2 in place of power1 ,he has omnipotence2 for dignities1 the government of all things2 and in place of fame1 ,he possesses the admiration of all creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude2 and thus it is not in ,god4 ,but whatever semblance it has1 howsoever slight1 of beatitude1 the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner1 is also in ,god1 but in a spiritual manner4 ,we have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,most ,,holy ,,trinity 7,,qq4 #bg-dc7 ,,question #bg ,,the ,,procession ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,persons 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence1 it remains to treat of what belongs to the ,trinity of the persons in ,god4 ,and because the divine ,persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin1 the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly1 the question of origin or procession2 secondly1 the relations of origin2 thirdly1 the persons4 ,concerning procession there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is procession in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether any procession in ,god can be called generation8 7#c7 ,whether there can be any other procession in ,god besides generation8 7#d7 ,whether that other procession can be called generation8 7#e7 ,whether there are more than two processions in ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,procession in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there cannot be any procession in ,god4 ,for procession signifies outward movement4 ,but in ,god there is nothing mobile1 nor anything extraneous4 ,therefore neither is there procession in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds4 ,but in ,god there is no diversity2 but supreme simplicity4 ,therefore in ,god there is no procession4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle4 ,but ,god is the first principle1 as shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore in ,god there is no procession4 ,on the contrary1 ,our ,lord says1 ,from ,god ,i proceeded 7,john #h3db74 ,i answer that1 ,divine ,scripture uses1 in relation to ,god1 names which signify procession4 ,this procession has been differently understood4 ,some have understood it in the sense of an effect1 proceeding from its cause2 so ,arius took it1 saying that the ,son proceeds from the ,father as ,his primary creature1 and that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father and the ,son as the creature of both4 ,in this sense neither the ,son nor the ,holy ,ghost would be true ,god3 and this is contrary to what is said of the ,son1 ,that 4 4 4 we may be in ,his true ,son4 ,this is true ,god 7#a ,john #e3bj74 ,of the ,holy ,ghost it is also said1 ,know you not that your members are the temple of the ,holy ,ghost8 7#a ,cor4 #f3ai74 ,now1 to have a temple is ,god's prerogative4 ,others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect1 as moving it1 or impressing its own likeness on it2 in which sense it was understood by ,sabellius1 who said that ,god the ,father is called ,son in assuming flesh from the ,virgin1 and that the ,father also is called ,holy ,ghost in sanctifying the rational creature1 and moving it to life4 ,the words of the ,lord contradict such a meaning1 when ,he speaks of ,himself1 ,the ,son cannot of ,himself do anything 7,john #e3ai72 while many other passages show the same1 whereby we know that the ,father is not the ,son4 ,careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act2 hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in ,god ,himself2 whereas1 since procession always supposes action1 and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter1 so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent4 ,this applies most conspicuously to the intellect1 the action of which remains in the intelligent agent4 ,for whenever we understand1 by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us1 which is a conception of the object understood1 a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object4 ,this conception is signified by the spoken word2 and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice4 ,as ,god is above all things1 we should understand what is said of ,god1 not according to the mode of the lowest creatures1 namely bodies1 but from the similitude of the highest creatures1 the intellectual substances2 while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects4 ,procession1 therefore1 is not to be understood from what it is in bodies1 either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect1 as1 for instance1 like heat from the agent to the thing made hot4 ,rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation1 for example1 of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker1 yet remains in him4 ,in that sense the ,catholic ,faith understands procession as existing in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion1 or of an action tending to external matter1 or to an exterior effect2 which kind of procession does not exist in ,god1 as we have explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds1 whereas1 whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct2 indeed1 the more perfectly it proceeds1 the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds4 ,for it is clear that the more a thing is understood1 the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent2 since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood4 ,thus1 as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of ,god 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b71 the divine ,word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence ,he proceeds1 without any kind of diversity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to proceed from a principle1 so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle1 is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle2 whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle4 ,for when we call the builder the principle of the house1 in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art2 and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house4 ,god1 ,who is the first principle of all things1 may be compared to things created as the architect is to things designed4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,any ,procession in ,god ,can ,be ,called ,generation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no procession in ,god can be called generation4 ,for generation is change from non-existence to existence1 and is opposed to corruption2 while matter is the subject of both4 ,nothing of all this belongs to ,god4 ,therefore generation cannot exist in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 procession exists in ,god1 according to an intelligible mode1 as above explained 7,a4 #a74 ,but such a process is not called generation in us2 therefore neither is it to be so called in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 anything that is generated derives existence from its generator4 ,therefore such existence is a derived existence4 ,but no derived existence can be a self-subsistence4 ,therefore1 since the divine existence is self-subsisting 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d71 it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence4 ,therefore there is no generation in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #b3g73 ,this day have ,i begotten ,thee4 ,i answer that1 ,the procession of the ,word in ,god is called generation4 ,in proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning3 one common to everything subject to generation and corruption2 in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence4 ,in another sense it is proper and belongs to living things2 in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle2 and this is properly called birth4 ,not everything of that kind1 however1 is called begotten2 but1 strictly speaking1 only what proceeds by way of similitude4 ,hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship1 but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude4 ,nor will any likeness suffice2 for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship1 although it has a generic similitude2 for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature2 as a man proceeds from a man1 and a horse from a horse4 ,so in living things1 which proceed from potential to actual life1 such as men and animals1 generation includes both these kinds of generation4 ,but if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act1 procession 7if found in such a being7 excludes entirely the first kind of generation2 whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things4 ,so in this manner the procession of the ,word in ,god is generation2 for ,he proceeds by way of intelligible action1 which is a vital operation3--from a conjoined principle 7as above described73--by way of similitude1 inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived3--and exists in the same nature1 because in ,god the act of understanding and ,his existence are the same1 as shown above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence the procession of the ,word in ,god is called generation2 and the ,word ,himself proceeding is called the ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense1 importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act2 in which sense it is not found in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect2 hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds2 so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it4 ,but the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #d74 ,the ,word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature2 and so is properly called begotten1 and ,son4 ,hence ,scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine ,wisdom1 namely1 conception and birth2 as is declared in the person of the divine ,wisdom1 ,the depths were not as yet1 and ,i was already conceived2 before the hills1 ,i was brought forth4 7,prov4 #h3bd74 ,in our way of understanding we use the word conception in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood1 although there be no identity of nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not everything derived from another has existence in another subject2 otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from ,god1 since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance4 ,so1 then1 what is generated in ,god receives its existence from the generator1 not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject 7which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence72 but when we speak of ,his existence as received1 we mean that ,he ,who proceeds receives divine existence from another2 not1 however1 as if ,he were other from the divine nature4 ,for in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the ,word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the ,word1 with whatever belongs to ,his perfection 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,any ,other ,procession ,exists in ,god ,besides ,that of the ,word8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no other procession exists in ,god besides the generation of the ,word4 ,because1 for whatever reason we admit another procession1 we should be led to admit yet another1 and so on to infinitude2 which cannot be4 ,therefore we must stop at the first1 and hold that there exists only one procession in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication2 because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms4 ,but procession in ,god is only by way of communication of the divine nature4 ,therefore1 as there is only one divine nature 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #d71 it follows that only one procession exists in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the ,word existed in ,god1 it could only be the procession of love1 which is by the operation of the will4 ,but such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect1 inasmuch as the will in ,god is the same as ,his intellect 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore in ,god there is no other procession but the procession of the ,word4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father 7,john #ae3bf72 and ,he is distinct from the ,son1 according to the words1 ,i will ask ,my ,father1 and ,he will give you another ,paraclete 7,john #ad3af74 ,therefore in ,god another procession exists besides the procession of the ,word4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two processions in ,god2 the procession of the ,word1 and another4 ,in evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in ,god1 only according to an action which does not tend to anything external1 but remains in the agent itself4 ,such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect1 and of the will4 ,the procession of the ,word is by way of an intelligible operation4 ,the operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession1 that of love1 whereby the object loved is in the lover2 as1 by the conception of the word1 the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent4 ,hence1 besides the procession of the ,word in ,god1 there exists in ,him another procession called the procession of love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions2 for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all that exists in ,god1 is ,god 7,q4 #c1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d72 whereas the same does not apply to others4 ,therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward1 and this does not apply to other natures4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,though will and intellect are not diverse in ,god1 nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order4 ,for the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the ,word2 since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect4 ,so as there exists a certain order of the ,word to the principle whence ,he proceeds1 although in ,god the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same2 so1 although in ,god the will and the intellect are the same1 still1 inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect1 there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the ,word in ,god4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,procession of ,love in ,god ,is ,generation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the procession of love in ,god is generation4 ,for what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born4 ,but what proceeds in ,god by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature2 otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature1 and would be an external procession4 ,therefore what proceeds in ,god by way of love1 proceeds as generated and born4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as similitude is of the nature of the word1 so does it belong to love4 ,hence it is said1 that every beast loves its like 7,ecclus4 #ac3ai74 ,therefore if the ,word is begotten and born by way of likeness1 it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is not in any species is not in the genus4 ,so if there is a procession of love in ,god1 there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession4 ,but no other name is applicable but generation4 ,therefore the procession of love in ,god is generation4 ,on the contrary1 ,were this true1 it would follow that the ,holy ,ghost ,who proceeds as love1 would proceed as begotten2 which is against the statement of ,athanasius3 ,the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,father and the ,son1 not made1 nor begotten1 but proceeding4 ,i answer that1 ,the procession of love in ,god ought not to be called generation4 ,in evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect1 that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect2 whereas the will is made actual1 not by any similitude of the object willed within it1 but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed4 ,thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude1 and is called generation1 because every generator begets its own like2 whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude1 but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object4 ,so what proceeds in ,god by way of love1 does not proceed as begotten1 or as son1 but proceeds rather as spirit2 which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse1 accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all that exists in ,god is one with the divine nature4 ,hence the proper notion of this or that procession1 by which one procession is distinguished from another1 cannot be on the part of this unity3 but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another2 which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect4 ,hence1 each procession in ,god takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect2 the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is2 and so it is that the ,person proceeding as love receives the divine nature1 but is not said to be born4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love4 ,it belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood1 as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator2 but it belongs to love1 not as though love itself were a likeness1 but because likeness is the principle of loving4 ,thus it does not follow that love is begotten1 but that the one begotten is the principle of love4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we can name ,god only from creatures 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a74 ,as in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature1 procession in ,god has no proper or special name1 except that of generation4 ,hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name2 but it can be called spiration1 as it is the procession of the ,spirit4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,are ,more ,than ,two ,processions in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are more than two processions in ,god4 ,as knowledge and will are attributed to ,god1 so is power4 ,therefore1 if two processions exist in ,god1 of intellect and will1 it seems that there must also be a third procession of power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession1 since goodness is diffusive of itself4 ,therefore there must be a procession of goodness in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in ,god there is greater power of fecundity than in us4 ,but in us there is not only one procession of the word1 but there are many3 for in us from one word proceeds another2 and also from one love proceeds another4 ,therefore in ,god there are more than two processions4 ,on the contrary1 ,in ,god there are not more than two who proceed--the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore there are in ,him but two processions4 ,i answer that1 ,the divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent4 ,in a nature which is intellectual1 and in the divine nature these actions are two1 the acts of intelligence and of will4 ,the act of sensation1 which also appears to be an operation within the agent1 takes place outside the intellectual nature1 nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions2 for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense4 ,it follows that no other procession is possible in ,god but the procession of the ,word1 and of ,love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another4 ,hence it is that external action points to power4 ,thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person2 but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom471 goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation1 unless considered as the object of the will4 ,thus1 as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions2 no other processions can be understood in ,god according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the ,word and of love1 according as ,god understands and loves ,his own essence1 truth and goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as above explained 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #e71 ,god understands all things by one simple act2 and by one act also ,he wills all things4 ,hence there cannot exist in ,him a procession of ,word from ,word1 nor of ,love from ,love3 for there is in ,him only one perfect ,word1 and one perfect ,love2 thereby being manifested ,his perfect fecundity4 ,,question #bh ,,the ,,divine ,,relations 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,the divine relations are next to be considered1 in four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there are real relations in ,god8 7#b7 ,whether those relations are the divine essence itself1 or are extrinsic to it8 7#c7 ,whether in ,god there can be several relations distinct from each other8 7#d7 ,the number of these relations4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,are ,real ,relations in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are no real relations in ,god4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 iv71 ,all possible predicaments used as regards the ,godhead refer to the substance2 for nothing can be predicated relatively4 ,but whatever really exists in ,god can be predicated of ,him4 ,therefore no real relation exists in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 iv7 that1 ,relation in the ,trinity of the ,father to the ,son1 and of both to the ,holy ,ghost1 is the relation of the same to the same4 ,but a relation of this kind is only a logical one2 for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms4 ,therefore the divine relations are not real relations1 but are formed only by the mind4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle4 ,but to say that ,god is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation1 but only a logical one4 ,therefore paternity in ,god is not a real relation2 while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word4 ,but the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations4 ,therefore paternity and filiation in ,god1 consequent upon generation1 are only logical relations4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,father is denominated only from paternity2 and the ,son only from filiation4 ,therefore1 if no real paternity or filiation existed in ,god1 it would follow that ,god is not really ,father or ,son1 but only in our manner of understanding2 and this is the ,sabellian heresy4 ,i answer that1 relations exist in ,god really2 in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality4 ,this is not found in any other genus2 forasmuch as other genera1 as quantity and quality1 in their strict and proper meaning1 signify something inherent in a subject4 ,but relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another4 ,such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things1 as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other1 and have a mutual inclination2 and such relations are necessarily real relations2 as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre2 and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things4 ,sometimes1 however1 this regard to another1 signified by relation1 is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another1 and this is a logical relation only2 as1 for instance1 when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus4 ,but when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature1 then both the one proceeding and the source of procession1 agree in the same order2 and then they have real relations to each other4 ,therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature1 as above explained 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d71 these relations1 according to the divine processions1 are necessarily real relations4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,relationship is not predicated of ,god according to its proper and formal meaning1 that is to say1 in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent1 but only as denoting regard to another4 ,nevertheless ,boethius did not wish to exclude relation in ,god2 but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of ,him as regards the mode of inherence in ,himself in the strict meaning of relation2 but rather by way of relation to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the relation signified by the term the same is a logical relation only1 if in regard to absolutely the same thing2 because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself1 according to some two aspects thereof4 ,the case is otherwise1 however1 when things are called the same1 not numerically1 but generically or specifically4 ,thus ,boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity1 not in every respect1 but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations1 as neither is it by relation of identity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the creature proceeds from ,god in diversity of nature1 ,god is outside the order of the whole creation1 nor does any relation to the creature arise from ,his nature2 for ,he does not produce the creature by necessity of ,his nature1 but by ,his intellect and will1 as is above explained 7,q4 #ad1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore there is no real relation in ,god to the creature2 whereas in creatures there is a real relation to ,god2 because creatures are contained under the divine order1 and their very nature entails dependence on ,god4 ,on the other hand1 the divine processions are in one and the same nature4 ,hence no parallel exists4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only1 inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind4 ,those relations1 however1 which follow the operation of the intellect1 and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds1 are not logical relations only1 but are real relations2 inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things1 and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly2 as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally4 ,thus paternity and filiation are real relations in ,god4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,relation in ,god ,is the ,same ,as ,his ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v7 that not all that is said of ,god is said of ,his substance1 for we say some things relatively1 as ,father in respect of the ,son3 but such things do not refer to the substance4 ,therefore the relation is not the divine essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii7 that1 every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed1 as master is a man1 and slave is a man4 ,therefore1 if relations exist in ,god1 there must be something else besides relation in ,god4 ,this can only be ,his essence4 ,therefore essence differs from relation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the essence of relation is the being referred to another1 as the ,philosopher says 7,praedic4 v74 ,so if relation is the divine essence1 it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else2 whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence1 which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore relation is not the divine essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,everything which is not the divine essence is a creature4 ,but relation really belongs to ,god2 and if it is not the divine essence1 it is a creature2 and it cannot claim the adoration of latria2 contrary to what is sung in the ,preface3 ,let us adore the distinction of the ,persons1 and the equality of their ,majesty4 ,i answer that1 ,it is reported that ,gilbert de la ,porree erred on this point1 but revoked his error later at the council of ,rheims4 ,for he said that the divine relations are assistant1 or externally affixed4 ,to perceive the error here expressed1 we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark4 ,one is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident2 which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject1 for the essence of an accident is to inhere4 ,the other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera4 ,in the genera1 apart from that of relation1 as in quantity and quality1 even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject2 for quantity is called the measure of substance1 and quality is the disposition of substance4 ,but the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is1 but from its respect to something outside4 ,so if we consider even in creatures1 relations formally as such1 in that aspect they are said to be assistant1 and not intrinsically affixed1 for1 in this way1 they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else2 whereas1 if relation is considered as an accident1 it inheres in a subject1 and has an accidental existence in it4 ,gilbert de la ,porree considered relation in the former mode only4 ,now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures1 when considered as transferred to ,god1 has a substantial existence2 for there is no accident in ,god2 since all in ,him is ,his essence4 ,so1 in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures1 relation really existing in ,god has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom4 ,but in so far as relation implies respect to something else1 no respect to the essence is signified1 but rather to its opposite term4 ,thus it is manifest that relation really existing in ,god is really the same as ,his essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility2 as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence4 ,thus it is clear that in ,god relation and essence do not differ from each other1 but are one and the same4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of ,augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in ,god is not in its very being the same as the divine essence2 but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance1 as existing in ,him to ,whom it is applied2 but as a relation4 ,so there are said to be two predicaments only in ,god1 since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken1 both in their generic and in their specific nature2 but nothing that exists in ,god can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken1 except the relation of identity2 and this by reason of ,god's supreme simplicity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another1 but also something absolute1 so the same applies to ,god1 yet not in the same way4 ,what is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation1 is something else besides that relation2 whereas in ,god there is no distinction1 but both are one and the same2 and this is not perfectly expressed by the word relation1 as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term4 ,for it was above explained 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #b71 in treating of the divine names1 that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name4 ,hence it does not follow that there exists in ,god anything besides relation in reality2 but only in the various names imposed by us4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names1 it would follow that it is imperfect1 being thus related to something else2 as in the same way1 if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word wisdom1 it would not in that case be a subsistence4 ,but as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name1 it does not follow1 if a relative term or any other name applied to ,god signify something imperfect1 that the divine essence is in any way imperfect2 for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,relations in ,god ,are ,really ,distinguished from ,each ,other8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other4 ,for things which are identified with the same1 are identified with each other4 ,but every relation in ,god is really the same as the divine essence4 ,therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence1 so likewise are goodness and power4 ,but this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power4 ,therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in ,god there is no real distinction but that of origin4 ,but one relation does not seem to arise from another4 ,therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,trin47 that in ,god the substance contains the unity2 and relation multiplies the trinity4 ,therefore1 if the relations were not really distinguished from each other1 there would be no real trinity in ,god1 but only an ideal trinity1 which is the error of ,sabellius4 ,i answer that1 ,the attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it4 ,so when man is attributed to anyone1 a rational nature is likewise attributed to him4 ,the idea of relation1 however1 necessarily means regard of one to another1 according as one is relatively opposed to another4 ,so as in ,god there is a real relation 7,a4 #a71 there must also be a real opposition4 ,the very nature of relative opposition includes distinction4 ,hence1 there must be real distinction in ,god1 not1 indeed1 according to that which is absolute--namely1 essence1 wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is relative4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iii71 this argument holds1 that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other1 if the identity be real and logical2 as1 for instance1 a tunic and a garment2 but not if they differ logically4 ,hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion1 and likewise passion2 still it does not follow that action and passion are the same2 because action implies reference as of something from which there is motion in the thing moved2 whereas passion implies reference as of something which is from another4 ,likewise1 although paternity1 just as filiation1 is really the same as the divine essence2 nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects4 ,hence they are distinguished from each other4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures2 and hence there is no parallel argument4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although relations1 properly speaking1 do not arise or proceed from each other1 nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bh1 ,art4 #c ,whether in ,god ,there ,are ,only ,four ,real ,relations--,paternity1 ,filiation1 ,spiration1 and ,procession8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in ,god there are not only four real relations--paternity1 filiation1 spiration and procession4 ,for it must be observed that in ,god there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood2 and of the one willing to the object willed2 which are real relations not comprised under those above specified4 ,therefore there are not only four real relations in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 real relations in ,god are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the ,word4 ,but intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied1 as ,avicenna says4 ,therefore in ,god there exists an infinite series of real relations4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ideas in ,god are eternal 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #a72 and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things1 as above stated4 ,therefore in ,god there are many more eternal relations4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 equality1 and likeness1 and identity are relations3 and they are in ,god from eternity4 ,therefore several more relations are eternal in ,god than the above named4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in ,god than those above named4 ,for1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iii text #bd71 ,it is the same way from ,athens to ,thebes1 as from ,thebes to ,athens4 ,by the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the ,father to the ,son1 that of paternity1 and from the ,son to the ,father1 that of filiation2 and thus there are not four relations in ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v71 every relation is based either on quantity1 as double and half2 or on action and passion1 as the doer and the deed1 the father and the son1 the master and the servant1 and the like4 ,now as there is no quantity in ,god1 for ,he is great without quantity1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #a7 it follows that a real relation in ,god can be based only on action4 ,such relations are not based on the actions of ,god according to any extrinsic procession1 forasmuch as the relations of ,god to creatures are not real in ,him 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #g74 ,hence1 it follows that real relations in ,god can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal1 and not external1 processions in ,god4 ,these processions are two only1 as above explained 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #e71 one derived from the action of the intellect1 the procession of the ,word2 and the other from the action of the will1 the procession of love4 ,in respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise2 one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle2 the other is the relation of the principle ,himself4 ,the procession of the ,word is called generation in the proper sense of the term1 whereby it is applied to living things4 ,now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity2 and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation4 ,but the procession of ,love has no proper name of its own 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d72 and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own4 ,the relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration2 and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession3 although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves1 and not to the relations4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object1 and the will and its object1 there can be a real relation1 both of science to its object1 and of the willer to the object willed4 ,in ,god1 however1 the intellect and its object are one and the same2 because by understanding ,himself1 ,god understands all other things2 and the same applies to ,his will and the object that ,he wills4 ,hence it follows that in ,god these kinds of relations are not real2 as neither is the relation of a thing to itself4 ,nevertheless1 the relation to the word is a real relation2 because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action2 and not as a thing understood4 ,for when we understand a stone2 that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood1 is called the word4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied1 because a man understands a stone by one act1 and by another act understands that he understands the stone1 and again by another1 understands that he understands this2 thus the acts of understanding are infinitely multiplied1 and consequently also the relations understood4 ,this does not apply to ,god1 inasmuch as ,he understands all things by one act alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,ideal relations exist as understood by ,god4 ,hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in ,god2 but that ,god knows these many relations4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,equality and similitude in ,god are not real relations2 but are only logical relations 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #c1 ad #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the way from one term to another and conversely is the same2 nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same4 ,hence1 we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father2 but we could conclude this of something absolute1 if there were such between them4 ,,question #bi ,,the ,,divine ,,persons 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations1 we must now approach the subject of the persons4 ,first1 we shall consider the persons absolutely1 and then comparatively as regards each other4 ,we must consider the persons absolutely first in common2 and then singly4 ,the general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points3 7#a7 ,the signification of this word person2 7#b7 the number of the persons2 7#c7 what is involved in the number of persons1 or is opposed thereto2 as diversity1 and similitude1 and the like2 and 7#d7 what belongs to our knowledge of the persons4 ,four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point3 7#a7 ,the definition of person4 7#b7 ,the comparison of person to essence1 subsistence1 and hypostasis4 7#c7 ,whether the name of person is becoming to ,god8 7#d7 ,what does it signify in ,him8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #a ,the ,definition of ,person ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the definition of person given by ,boethius 7,de ,duab4 ,nat47 is insufficient--that is1 a person is an individual substance of a rational nature4 ,for nothing singular can be subject to definition4 ,but person signifies something singular4 ,therefore person is improperly defined4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 substance as placed above in the definition of person1 is either first substance1 or second substance4 ,if it is the former1 the word individual is superfluous1 because first substance is individual substance2 if it stands for second substance1 the word individual is false1 for there is contradiction of terms2 since second substances are the genera or species4 ,therefore this definition is incorrect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing4 ,for to define a man as a species of animal would not be a correct definition2 since man is the name of a thing1 and species is a name of an intention4 ,therefore1 since person is the name of a thing 7for it signifies a substance of a rational nature71 the word individual which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,nature is the principle of motion and rest1 in those things in which it is essentially1 and not accidentally1 as ,aristotle says 7,phys4 ii74 ,but person exists in things immovable1 as in ,god1 and in the angels4 ,therefore the word nature ought not to enter into the definition of person1 but the word should rather be essence4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature2 but it is not a person4 ,therefore person is not properly defined as above4 ,i answer that1 ,although the universal and particular exist in every genus1 nevertheless1 in a certain special way1 the individual belongs to the genus of substance4 ,for substance is individualized by itself2 whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject1 which is the substance2 since this particular whiteness is called this1 because it exists in this particular subject4 ,and so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own2 for they are called hypostases1 or first substances4 ,further still1 in a more special and perfect way1 the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions2 and which are not only made to act1 like others2 but which can act of themselves2 for actions belong to singulars4 ,therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances2 and this name is person4 ,thus the term individual substance is placed in the definition of person1 as signifying the singular in the genus of substance2 and the term rational nature is added1 as signifying the singular in rational substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although this or that singular may not be definable1 yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined2 and so the ,philosopher 7,de ,praedic41 cap4 ,de substantia7 gives a definition of first substance2 and in this way ,boethius defines person4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the opinion of some1 the term substance in the definition of person stands for first substance1 which is the hypostasis2 nor is the term individual superfluously added1 forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded4 ,for we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis1 nor that the hand is since it is only a part4 ,but where individual is added1 the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person2 for the human nature in ,christ is not a person1 since it is assumed by a greater--that is1 by the ,word of ,god4 ,it is1 however1 better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense1 as divided into first and second1 and when individual is added1 it is restricted to first substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,substantial differences being unknown to us1 or at least unnamed by us1 it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial2 as1 for example1 we may say that fire is a simple1 hot1 and dry body3 for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms1 and make them known4 ,likewise1 terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed4 ,and so the term individual is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v1 #e71 the word nature was first used to signify the generation of living things1 which is called nativity4 ,and because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle1 this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement4 ,in this sense he defines nature 7,phys4 ii1 #c74 ,and since this kind of principle is either formal or material1 both matter and form are commonly called nature4 ,and as the essence of anything is completed by the form2 so the essence of anything1 signified by the definition1 is commonly called nature4 ,and here nature is taken in that sense4 ,hence ,boethius says 7,de ,duab4 ,nat47 that1 nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing1 for the specific difference completes the definition1 and is derived from the special form of a thing4 ,so in the definition of person1 which means the singular in a determined genus1 it is more correct to use the term nature than essence1 because the latter is taken from being1 which is most common4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the soul is a part of the human species2 and so1 although it may exist in a separate state1 yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility1 it cannot be called an individual substance1 which is the hypostasis or first substance1 as neither can the hand nor any other part of man2 thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,person ,is the ,same ,as ,hypostasis1 ,subsistence1 and ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that person is the same as hypostasis1 subsistence1 and essence4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,duab4 ,nat47 that the ,greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis4 ,but this with us signifies person4 ,therefore person is altogether the same as hypostasis4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as we say there are three persons in ,god1 so we say there are three subsistences in ,god2 which implies that person and subsistence have the same meaning4 ,therefore person and subsistence mean the same4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,com4 ,praed47 that the ,greek ousia1 which means essence1 signifies a being composed of matter and form4 ,now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called hypostasis and person4 ,therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning4 ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,duab4 ,nat47 that genera and species only subsist2 whereas individuals are not only subsistent1 but also substand4 ,but subsistences are so called from subsisting1 as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding4 ,therefore1 since genera and species are not hypostases or persons1 these are not the same as subsistences4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,com4 ,praed47 that matter is called hypostasis1 and form is called ousiosis--that is1 subsistence4 ,but neither form nor matter can be called person4 ,therefore person differs from the others4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v71 substance is twofold4 ,in one sense it means the quiddity of a thing1 signified by its definition1 and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing2 in which sense substance is called by the ,greeks ousia1 what we may call essence4 ,in another sense substance means a subject or suppositum1 which subsists in the genus of substance4 ,to this1 taken in a general sense1 can be applied a name expressive of an intention2 and thus it is called suppositum4 ,it is also called by three names signifying a reality--that is1 a thing of nature1 subsistence1 and hypostasis1 according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named4 ,for1 as it exists in itself and not in another1 it is called subsistence2 as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves1 and not in another4 ,as it underlies some common nature1 it is called a thing of nature2 as1 for instance1 this particular man is a human natural thing4 ,as it underlies the accidents1 it is called hypostasis1 or substance4 ,what these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances1 this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,among the ,greeks the term hypostasis1 taken in the strict interpretation of the word1 signifies any individual of the genus substance2 but in the usual way of speaking1 it means the individual of the rational nature1 by reason of the excellence of that nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as we say three persons plurally in ,god1 and three subsistences1 so the ,greeks say three hypostases4 ,but because the word substance1 which1 properly speaking1 corresponds in meaning to hypostasis1 is used among us in an equivocal sense1 since it sometimes means essence1 and sometimes means hypostasis1 in order to avoid any occasion of error1 it was thought preferable to use subsistence for hypostasis1 rather than substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,strictly speaking1 the essence is what is expressed by the definition4 ,now1 the definition comprises the principles of the species1 but not the individual principles4 ,hence in things composed of matter and form1 the essence signifies not only the form1 nor only the matter1 but what is composed of matter and the common form1 as the principles of the species4 ,but what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person4 ,for soul1 flesh1 and bone belong to the nature of man2 whereas this soul1 this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man4 ,therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence2 nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form1 as we said above when treating of divine simplicity 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,boethius says that genera and species subsist1 inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist1 from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance1 but not because the species and genera themselves subsist2 except in the opinion of ,plato1 who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things4 ,to substand1 however1 belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents1 which are outside the essence of genera and species4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter4 ,hence ,boethius says 7,de ,trin473 ,a simple form cannot be a subject4 ,its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form1 which does not supervene to the things subsisting1 but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual4 ,on this account1 therefore1 he ascribes hypostasis to matter1 and ousiosis1 or subsistence1 to the form1 because the matter is the principle of substanding1 and form is the principle of subsisting4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,word ,person ,should ,be ,said of ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the name person should not be said of ,god4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom473 ,no one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden ,divinity1 beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles4 ,but the name person is not expressed to us in the ,old or ,new ,testament4 ,therefore person is not to be applied to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,duab4 ,nat473 ,the word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies4 ,for person comes from sounding through personando1 since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask4 ,these persons or masks the ,greeks called prosopa1 as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes4 ,this1 however1 can apply to ,god only in a metaphorical sense4 ,therefore the word person is only applied to ,god metaphorically4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every person is a hypostasis4 ,but the word hypostasis does not apply to ,god1 since1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,duab4 ,nat471 it signifies what is the subject of accidents1 which do not exist in ,god4 ,jerome also says 7,ep4 ad ,damas47 that1 in this word hypostasis1 poison lurks in honey4 ,therefore the word person should not be said of ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if a definition is denied of anything1 the thing defined is also denied of it4 ,but the definition of person1 as given above1 does not apply to ,god4 ,both because reason implies a discursive knowledge1 which does not apply to ,god1 as we proved above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ab72 and thus ,god cannot be said to have a rational nature4 ,and also because ,god cannot be called an individual substance1 since the principle of individuation is matter2 while ,god is immaterial3 nor is ,he the subject of accidents1 so as to be called a substance4 ,therefore the word person ought not to be attributed to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,in the ,creed of ,athanasius we say3 ,one is the person of the ,father1 another of the ,son1 another of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,i answer that1 ,person signifies what is most perfect in all nature--that is1 a subsistent individual of a rational nature4 ,hence1 since everything that is perfect must be attributed to ,god1 forasmuch as ,his essence contains every perfection1 this name person is fittingly applied to ,god2 not1 however1 as it is applied to creatures1 but in a more excellent way2 as other names also1 which1 while giving them to creatures1 we attribute to ,god2 as we showed above when treating of the names of ,god 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the word person is not found applied to ,god in ,scripture1 either in the ,old or ,new ,testament1 nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of ,god in many places of ,scripture2 as that ,he is the supreme self-subsisting being1 and the most perfectly intelligent being4 ,if we could speak of ,god only in the very terms themselves of ,scripture1 it would follow that no one could speak about ,god in any but the original language of the ,old or ,new ,testament4 ,the urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about ,god4 ,nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned2 since it is by no means profane1 for it does not lead us astray from the sense of ,scripture4 ,the ,apostle warns us to avoid profane novelties of words 7#a ,tim4 #f3bj74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although this name person may not belong to ,god as regards the origin of the term1 nevertheless it excellently belongs to ,god in its objective meaning4 ,for as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies1 the name person was given to signify those who held high dignity4 ,hence1 those who held high rank in the ,church came to be called persons4 ,thence by some the definition of person is given as hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity4 ,and because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity1 therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a person4 ,now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity2 and thus the name person pre-eminently belongs to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the word hypostasis does not apply to ,god as regards its source of origin1 since ,he does not underlie accidents2 but it applies to ,him in its objective sense1 for it is imposed to signify the subsistence4 ,jerome said that poison lurks in this word1 forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the ,latins1 the heretics used this term to deceive the simple1 to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases1 inasmuch as the word substance1 which corresponds to hypostasis in ,greek1 is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it may be said that ,god has a rational nature1 if reason be taken to mean1 not discursive thought1 but in a general sense1 an intelligent nature4 ,but ,god cannot be called an individual in the sense that ,his individuality comes from matter2 but only in the sense which implies incommunicability4 ,substance can be applied to ,god in the sense of signifying self-subsistence4 ,there are some1 however1 who say that the definition of ,boethius1 quoted above 7,a4 #a71 is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in ,god4 ,therefore ,richard of ,st4 ,victor amends this definition by adding that ,person in ,god is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #bi1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,this ,word ,person ,signifies ,relation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this word person1 as applied to ,god1 does not signify relation1 but substance4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #f73 ,when we speak of the person of the ,father1 we mean nothing else but the substance of the ,father1 for person is said in regard to ,himself1 and not in regard to the ,son4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the interrogation ,what8 refers to essence4 ,but1 as ,augustine says3 ,when we say there are three who bear witness in heaven1 the ,father1 the ,word1 and the ,holy ,ghost1 and it is asked1 ,three what8 the answer is1 ,three persons4 ,therefore person signifies essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 iv71 the meaning of a word is its definition4 ,but the definition of person is this3 ,the individual substance of the rational nature1 as above stated4 ,therefore person signifies substance4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 person in men and angels does not signify relation1 but something absolute4 ,therefore1 if in ,god it signified relation1 it would bear an equivocal meaning in ,god1 in man1 and in angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,trin47 that every word that refers to the persons signifies relation4 ,but no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word person itself4 ,therefore this word person signifies relation4 ,i answer that1 ,a difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word person in ,god1 from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the ,three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence2 nor does it in itself refer to another1 as do the words which express relation4 ,hence some have thought that this word person of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence2 as this name ,god and this word ,wise2 but that to meet heretical attack1 it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense1 and especially in the plural1 or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective2 as when we say1 ,three persons1 or1 one is the person of the ,father1 another of the ,son1 etc4 ,used1 however1 in the singular1 it may be either absolute or relative4 ,but this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation2 for1 if this word person1 by force of its own signification1 expresses the divine essence only1 it follows that forasmuch as we speak of three persons1 so far from the heretics being silenced1 they had still more reason to argue4 ,seeing this1 others maintained that this word person in ,god signifies both the essence and the relation4 ,some of these said that it signifies directly the essence1 and relation indirectly1 forasmuch as person means as it were by itself one per se una2 and unity belongs to the essence4 ,and what is by itself implies relation indirectly2 for the ,father is understood to exist by ,himself1 as relatively distinct from the ,son4 ,others1 however1 said1 on the contrary1 that it signifies relation directly2 and essence indirectly2 forasmuch as in the definition of person the term nature is mentioned indirectly2 and these come nearer to the truth4 ,to determine the question1 we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term1 which is not included in the more common term2 as rational is included in the meaning of man1 and not in the meaning of animal4 ,so that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal1 and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man4 ,also1 it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word person in general2 and another to ask the meaning of person as applied to ,god4 ,for person in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure4 ,the individual in itself is undivided1 but is distinct from others4 ,therefore person in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature3 thus in human nature it signifies this flesh1 these bones1 and this soul1 which are the individuating principles of a man1 and which1 though not belonging to person in general1 nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person4 ,now distinction in ,god is only by relation of origin1 as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c71 while relation in ,god is not as an accident in a subject1 but is the divine essence itself2 and so it is subsistent1 for the divine essence subsists4 ,therefore1 as the ,godhead is ,god so the divine paternity is ,god the ,father1 ,who is a divine person4 ,therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting4 ,and this is to signify relation by way of substance1 and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature1 although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself4 ,thus it is true to say that the name person signifies relation directly1 and the essence indirectly2 not1 however1 the relation as such1 but as expressed by way of a hypostasis4 ,so likewise it signifies directly the essence1 and indirectly the relation1 inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis3 while in ,god the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation3 and thus relation1 as such1 enters into the notion of the person indirectly4 ,thus we can say that this signification of the word person was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics4 ,hence1 this word person was used just as any other absolute term4 ,but afterwards it was applied to express relation1 as it lent itself to that signification1 so that this word person means relation not only by use and custom1 according to the first opinion1 but also by force of its own proper signification4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this word person is said in respect to itself1 not to another2 forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such1 but by way of a substance--which is a hypostasis4 ,in that sense ,augustine says that it signifies the essence1 inasmuch as in ,god essence is the same as the hypostasis1 because in ,god what ,he is1 and whereby ,he is are the same4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the term what refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition1 as when we ask2 ,what is man8 and we answer3 ,a mortal rational animal4 ,sometimes it refers to the suppositum1 as when we ask1 ,what swims in the sea8 and answer1 ,a fish4 ,so to those who ask1 ,three what8 we answer1 ,three persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in ,god the individual--i4e4 distinct and incommunicable substance--includes the idea of relation1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common4 ,although a horse and an ass have their own proper definitions1 nevertheless they agree univocally in animal1 because the common definition of animal applies to both4 ,so it does not follow that1 although relation is contained in the signification of divine person1 but not in that of an angelic or of a human person1 the word person is used in an equivocal sense4 ,though neither is it applied univocally1 since nothing can be said univocally of ,god and creatures 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #e74 ,,question #cj ,,the ,,plurality ,,of ,,persons ,,in ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we are now led to consider the plurality of the persons3 about which there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there are several persons in ,god8 7#b7 ,how many are they8 7#c7 ,what the numeral terms signify in ,god8 7#d7 ,the community of the term person4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,are ,several ,persons in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not several persons in ,god4 ,for person is the individual substance of a rational nature4 ,if then there are several persons in ,god1 there must be several substances2 which appears to be heretical4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons1 either in ,god1 or in ourselves4 ,much less therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations4 ,but in ,god there is no plurality but of relations 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore there cannot be several persons in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,boethius says of ,god 7,de ,trin4 i71 that this is truly one which has no number4 ,but plurality implies number4 ,therefore there are not several persons in ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 where number is1 there is whole and part4 ,thus1 if in ,god there exist a number of persons1 there must be whole and part in ,god2 which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity4 ,on the contrary1 ,athanasius says3 ,one is the person of the ,father1 another of the ,son1 another of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore the ,father1 and the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost are several persons4 ,i answer that1 ,it follows from what precedes that there are several persons in ,god4 ,for it was shown above 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #d7 that this word person signifies in ,god a relation as subsisting in the divine nature4 ,it was also established 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #a7 that there are several real relations in ,god2 and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the divine nature2 which means that there are several persons in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the definition of person includes substance1 not as meaning the essence1 but the suppositum which is made clear by the addition of the term individual4 ,to signify the substance thus understood1 the ,greeks use the name hypostasis4 ,so1 as we say1 ,three persons1 they say ,three hypostases4 ,we are not1 however1 accustomed to say ,three substances1 lest we be understood to mean three essences or natures1 by reason of the equivocal signification of the term4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the absolute properties in ,god1 such as goodness and wisdom1 are not mutually opposed2 and hence1 neither are they really distinguished from each other4 ,therefore1 although they subsist1 nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities--that is1 several persons4 ,but the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist1 although they are really distinguished from each other1 as whiteness and sweetness2 on the other hand1 the relative properties in ,god subsist1 and are really distinguished from each other 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence the plurality of persons in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the supreme unity and simplicity of ,god exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things1 but not plurality of relations4 ,because relations are predicated relatively1 and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated1 as ,boethius teaches in the same book4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,number is twofold1 simple or absolute1 as two and three and four2 and number as existing in things numbered1 as two men and two horses4 ,so1 if number in ,god is taken absolutely or abstractedly1 there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in ,him1 and thus number in ,him is only in our way of understanding2 forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect4 ,but if number be taken as it is in the things numbered1 in that sense as existing in creatures1 one is part of two1 and two of three1 as one man is part of two men1 and two of three2 but this does not apply to ,god1 because the ,father is of the same magnitude as the whole ,trinity1 as we shall show further on 7,q4 #db1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,more ,than ,three ,persons in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are more than three persons in ,god4 ,for the plurality of persons in ,god arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but there are four relations in ,god as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d71 paternity1 filiation1 common spiration1 and procession4 ,therefore there are four persons in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,the nature of ,god does not differ from ,his will more than from ,his intellect4 ,but in ,god1 one person proceeds from the will1 as love2 and another proceeds from ,his nature1 as ,son4 ,therefore another proceeds from ,his intellect1 as ,word1 besides the one ,who proceeds from ,his nature1 as ,son2 thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more perfect a creature is1 the more interior operations it has2 as a man has understanding and will beyond other animals4 ,but ,god infinitely excels every creature4 ,therefore in ,god not only is there a person proceeding from the will1 and another from the intellect1 but also in an infinite number of ways4 ,therefore there are an infinite number of persons in ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is from the infinite goodness of the ,father that ,he communicates ,himself infinitely in the production of a divine person4 ,but also in the ,holy ,ghost is infinite goodness4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost produces a divine person2 and that person another2 and so to infinity4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 everything within a determinate number is measured1 for number is a measure4 ,but the divine persons are immense1 as we say in the ,creed of ,athanasius3 ,the ,father is immense1 the ,son is immense1 the ,holy ,ghost is immense4 ,therefore the persons are not contained within the number three4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said3 ,there are three who bear witness in heaven1 the ,father1 the ,word1 and the ,holy ,ghost 7#a ,john #e3g74 ,to those who ask1 ,three what8 we answer1 with ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #d71 ,three persons4 ,therefore there are but three persons in ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,as was explained above1 there can be only three persons in ,god4 ,for it was shown above that the several persons are the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other4 ,but a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative opposition4 ,therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two persons3 and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong to the same person4 ,since then paternity and filiation are opposite relations1 they belong necessarily to two persons4 ,therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the ,father2 and the subsisting filiation is the person of the ,son4 ,the other two relations are not opposed to each other2 therefore these two cannot belong to one person3 hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons2 or one must belong to one person1 and the other to the other4 ,now1 procession cannot belong to the ,father and the ,son1 or to either of them2 for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect1 which in ,god is generation1 wherefrom paternity and filiation are derived1 would issue from the procession of love1 whence spiration and procession are derived1 if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from the person spirating2 and this is against what was laid down above 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,we must consequently admit that spiration belongs to the person of the ,father1 and to the person of the ,son1 forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation2 and consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of the ,holy ,ghost1 who proceeds by way of love1 as above explained4 ,therefore only three persons exist in ,god1 the ,father1 the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although there are four relations in ,god1 one of them1 spiration1 is not separated from the person of the ,father and of the ,son1 but belongs to both2 thus1 although it is a relation1 it is not called a property1 because it does not belong to only one person2 nor is it a personal relation--i4e4 constituting a person4 ,the three relations--paternity1 filiation1 and procession--are called personal properties1 constituting as it were the persons2 for paternity is the person of the ,father1 filiation is the person of the ,son1 procession is the person of the ,holy ,ghost proceeding4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that which proceeds by way of intelligence1 as word1 proceeds according to similitude1 as also that which proceeds by way of nature2 thus1 as above explained 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c71 the procession of the divine ,word is the very same as generation by way of nature4 ,but love1 as such1 does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds2 although in ,god love is co-essential as being divine2 and therefore the procession of love is not called generation in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as man is more perfect than other animals1 he has more intrinsic operations than other animals1 because his perfection is something composite4 ,hence the angels1 who are more perfect and more simple1 have fewer intrinsic operations than man1 for they have no imagination1 or feeling1 or the like4 ,in ,god there exists only one real operation--that is1 ,his essence4 ,how there are in ,him two processions was above explained 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this argument would prove if the ,holy ,ghost possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the ,father2 for then if the ,father produced a divine person by ,his goodness1 the ,holy ,ghost also would do so4 ,but the ,father and the ,holy ,ghost have one and the same goodness4 ,nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations4 ,so goodness belongs to the ,holy ,ghost1 as derived from another2 and it belongs to the ,father1 as the principle of its communication to another4 ,the opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the ,holy ,ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of another divine person2 because ,he ,himself proceeds from the other persons who are in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a determinate number1 if taken as a simple number1 existing in the mind only1 is measured by one4 ,but when we speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in ,god1 the notion of measure has no place1 because the magnitude of the three persons is the same 7,q4 #db1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d71 and the same is not measured by the same4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,numeral ,terms ,denote ,anything ,real in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in ,god4 ,for the divine unity is the divine essence4 ,but every number is unity repeated4 ,therefore every numeral term in ,god signifies the essence2 and therefore it denotes something real in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is said of ,god and of creatures1 belongs to ,god in a more eminent manner than to creatures4 ,but the numeral terms denote something real in creatures2 therefore much more so in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in ,god1 and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense1 as plurality is employed to remove unity1 and unity to remove plurality2 it follows that a vicious circle results1 confusing the mind and obscuring the truth2 and this ought not to be4 ,therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something real in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iv73 ,if we admit companionship--that is1 plurality--we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude2 and ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide i73 ,when we say one ,god1 unity excludes plurality of gods1 and does not imply quantity in ,god4 ,hence we see that these terms are applied to ,god in order to remove something2 and not to denote anything positive4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,master 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 #bd7 considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in ,god1 but have only a negative meaning4 ,others1 however1 assert the contrary4 ,in order to resolve this point1 we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division4 ,now division is twofold2 one is material1 and is division of the continuous2 from this results number1 which is a species of quantity4 ,number in this sense is found only in material things which have quantity4 ,the other kind of division is called formal1 and is effected by opposite or diverse forms2 and this kind of division results in a multitude1 which does not belong to a genus1 but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many4 ,this kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things4 ,some1 considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity1 and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in ,god1 asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in ,god1 but remove something from ,him4 ,others1 considering the same kind of multitude1 said that as knowledge exists in ,god according to the strict sense of the word1 but not in the sense of its genus 7as in ,god there is no such thing as a quality71 so number exists in ,god in the proper sense of number1 but not in the sense of its genus1 which is quantity4 ,but we say that numeral terms predicated of ,god are not derived from number1 a species of quantity1 for in that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in ,god1 like other corporeal properties1 such as length1 breadth1 and the like2 but that they are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense4 ,now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is predicated1 as one convertible with being is related to being2 which kind of oneness does not add anything to being1 except a negation of division1 as we saw when treating of the divine unity 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #a72 for one signifies undivided being4 ,so1 of whatever we say one1 we imply its undivided reality3 thus1 for instance1 one applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man4 ,in the same way1 when we speak of many things1 multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself4 ,but number1 if taken as a species of quantity1 denotes an accident added to being2 as also does one which is the principle of that number4 ,therefore the numeral terms in ,god signify the things of which they are said1 and beyond this they add negation only1 as stated 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 #bd72 in which respect the ,master was right 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 #bd74 ,so when we say1 the essence is one1 the term one signifies the essence undivided2 and when we say the person is one1 it signifies the person undivided2 and when we say the persons are many1 we signify those persons1 and their individual undividedness2 for it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one1 as it is a transcendental1 is wider and more general than substance and relation4 ,and so likewise is multitude2 hence in ,god it may mean both substance and relation1 according to the context4 ,still1 the very signification of such names adds a negation of division1 beyond substance and relation2 as was explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,multitude1 which denotes something real in creatures1 is a species of quantity1 and cannot be used when speaking of ,god3 unlike transcendental multitude1 which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated4 ,such a kind of multitude is applicable to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one does not exclude multitude1 but division1 which logically precedes one or multitude4 ,multitude does not remove unity1 but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude4 ,this was explained when we treated of the divine unity 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #b74 ,it must be observed1 nevertheless1 that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced4 ,although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality1 and the plurality of gods by unity1 it does not follow that these terms express this signification alone4 ,for blackness is excluded by whiteness2 nevertheless1 the term whiteness does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,this ,term ,person ,can ,be ,common to the ,three ,persons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this term person cannot be common to the three persons4 ,for nothing is common to the three persons but the essence4 ,but this term person does not signify the essence directly4 ,therefore it is not common to all three4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the common is the opposite to the incommunicable4 ,but the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable2 as appears from the definition given by ,richard of ,st4 ,victor 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #c1 ad #d74 ,therefore this term person is not common to all the three persons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the name person is common to the three1 it is common either really1 or logically4 ,but it is not so really2 otherwise the three persons would be one person2 nor again is it so logically2 otherwise person would be a universal4 ,but in ,god there is neither universal nor particular2 neither genus nor species1 as we proved above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore this term 'person' is not common to the three4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #d7 that when we ask1 ,three what8 we say1 ,three persons1 because what a person is1 is common to them4 ,i answer that1 ,the very mode of expression itself shows that this term person is common to the three when we say three persons2 for when we say three men we show that man is common to the three4 ,now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing1 as if one essence were common to the three2 otherwise there would be only one person of the three1 as also one essence4 ,what is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject4 ,some have called it a community of exclusion1 forasmuch as the definition of person contains the word incommunicable4 ,others thought it to be a community of intention1 as the definition of person contains the word individual2 as we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox4 ,both of these explanations1 however1 are excluded by the fact that person is not a name of exclusion nor of intention1 but the name of a reality4 ,we must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name person is common by a community of idea1 not as genus or species1 but as a vague individual thing4 ,the names of genera and species1 as man or animal1 are given to signify the common natures themselves1 but not the intentions of those common natures1 signified by the terms genus or species4 ,the vague individual thing1 as some man1 signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular things--that is1 something self-subsisting1 as distinct from others4 ,but the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing2 as the name ,socrates signifies this flesh and this bone4 ,but there is this difference--that the term some man signifies the nature1 or the individual on the part of its nature1 with the mode of existence of singular things2 while this name person is not given to signify the individual on the part of the nature1 but the subsistent reality in that nature4 ,now this is common in idea to the divine persons1 that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature4 ,thus this name person is common in idea to the three divine persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is founded on a real community4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although person is incommunicable1 yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although this community is logical and not real1 yet it does not follow that in ,god there is universal or particular1 or genus1 or species2 both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species2 and because the divine persons have one being2 whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being4 ,,question #ca ,,of ,,what ,,belongs ,,to ,,the ,,unity ,,or ,,plurality ,,in ,,god 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in ,god2 which gives rise to four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,concerning the word ,trinity2 7#b7 ,whether we can say that the ,son is other than the ,father8 7#c7 ,whether an exclusive term1 which seems to exclude otherness1 can be joined to an essential name in ,god8 7#d7 ,whether it can be joined to a personal term8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,trinity in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem there is not trinity in ,god4 ,for every name in ,god signifies substance or relation4 ,but this name ,trinity does not signify the substance2 otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons3 nor does it signify relation2 for it does not express a name that refers to another4 ,therefore the word ,trinity is not to be applied to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 this word trinity is a collective term1 since it signifies multitude4 ,but such a word does not apply to ,god2 as the unity of a collective name is the least of unities1 whereas in ,god there exists the greatest possible unity4 ,therefore this word trinity does not apply to ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every trine is threefold4 ,but in ,god there is not triplicity2 since triplicity is a kind of inequality4 ,therefore neither is there trinity in ,god4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 all that exists in ,god exists in the unity of the divine essence2 because ,god is ,his own essence4 ,therefore1 if ,trinity exists in ,god1 it exists in the unity of the divine essence2 and thus in ,god there would be three essential unities2 which is heresy4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 in all that is said of ,god1 the concrete is predicated of the abstract2 for ,deity is ,god and paternity is the ,father4 ,but the ,trinity cannot be called trine2 otherwise there would be nine realities in ,god2 which1 of course1 is erroneous4 ,therefore the word trinity is not to be applied to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,athanasius says3 ,unity in ,trinity2 and ,trinity in ,unity is to be revered4 ,i answer that1 ,the name ,trinity in ,god signifies the determinate number of persons4 ,and so the plurality of persons in ,god requires that we should use the word trinity2 because what is indeterminately signified by plurality1 is signified by trinity in a determinate manner4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in its etymological sense1 this word ,trinity seems to signify the one essence of the three persons1 according as trinity may mean trine-unity4 ,but in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence2 and on this account we cannot say that the ,father is the ,trinity1 as ,he is not three persons4 ,yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the ,persons1 but rather the number of persons related to each other2 and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,two things are implied in a collective term1 plurality of the supposita1 and a unity of some kind of order4 ,for people is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order4 ,in the first sense1 this word trinity is like other collective words2 but in the second sense it differs from them1 because in the divine ,trinity not only is there unity of order1 but also with this there is unity of essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,trinity is taken in an absolute sense2 for it signifies the threefold number of persons4 ,triplicity signifies a proportion of inequality2 for it is a species of unequal proportion1 according to ,boethius 7,arithm4 i1 #bc74 ,therefore in ,god there is not triplicity1 but ,trinity4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the divine ,trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered4 ,so when we say1 ,trinity in ,unity1 we do not place number in the unity of the essence1 as if we meant three times one2 but we place the ,persons numbered in the unity of nature2 as the supposita of a nature are said to exist in that nature4 ,on the other hand1 we say ,unity in ,trinity2 meaning that the nature is in its supposita4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,when we say1 ,trinity is trine1 by reason of the number implied1 we signify the multiplication of that number by itself2 since the word trine imports a distinction in the supposita of which it is spoken4 ,therefore it cannot be said that the ,trinity is trine2 otherwise it follows that1 if the ,trinity be trine1 there would be three supposita of the ,trinity2 as when we say1 ,god is trine1 it follows that there are three supposita of the ,godhead4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,son ,is ,other ,than the ,father8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,son is not other than the ,father4 ,for other is a relative term implying diversity of substance4 ,if1 then1 the ,son is other than the ,father1 ,he must be different from the ,father2 which is contrary to what ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii71 that when we speak of three persons1 we do not mean to imply diversity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whosoever are other from one another1 differ in some way from one another4 ,therefore1 if the ,son is other than the ,father1 it follows that ,he differs from the ,father2 which is against what ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide i71 that the ,father and the ,son are one in ,godhead2 nor is there any difference in substance between them1 nor any diversity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the term alien is taken from alius 7other74 ,but the ,son is not alien from the ,father1 for ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 vii7 that in the divine persons there is nothing diverse1 nothing alien1 nothing separable4 ,therefore the ,son is not other than the ,father4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the terms other person and other thing alius et aliud have the same meaning1 differing only in gender4 ,so if the ,son is another person from the ,father1 it follows that the ,son is a thing apart from the ,father4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 99,fulgentius1 ,de ,fide ad ,petrum i4 says3 ,there is one essence of the ,father and ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 in which the ,father is not one thing1 the ,son another1 and the ,holy ,ghost another2 although the ,father is one person1 the ,son another1 and the ,holy ,ghost another4 ,i answer that1 ,since as ,jerome remarks 99,in substance1 ,ep4 lvii41 a heresy arises from words wrongly used1 when we speak of the ,trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty2 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #c71 nowhere is error more harmful1 the quest more toilsome1 the finding more fruitful4 ,now1 in treating of the ,trinity1 we must beware of two opposite errors1 and proceed cautiously between them--namely1 the error of ,arius1 who placed a ,trinity of substance with the ,trinity of persons2 and the error of ,sabellius1 who placed unity of person with the unity of essence4 ,thus1 to avoid the error of ,arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in ,god1 lest we take away the unity of essence3 we may1 however1 use the term distinction on account of the relative opposition4 ,hence whenever we find terms of diversity or difference of ,persons used in an authentic work1 these terms of diversity or difference are taken to mean distinction4 ,but lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away1 the terms separation and division1 which belong to the parts of a whole1 are to be avoided3 and lest quality be taken away1 we avoid the use of the term disparity3 and lest we remove similitude1 we avoid the terms alien and discrepant4 ,for ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide i7 that in the ,father and the ,son there is no discrepancy1 but one ,godhead3 and according to ,hilary1 as quoted above1 in ,god there is nothing alien1 nothing separable4 ,to avoid the heresy of ,sabellius1 we must shun the term singularity1 lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence4 ,hence ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 vii73 ,it is sacrilege to assert that the ,father and the ,son are separate in ,godhead4 ,we must avoid the adjective only 7unici7 lest we take away the number of persons4 ,hence ,hilary says in the same book3 ,we exclude from ,god the idea of singularity or uniqueness4 ,nevertheless1 we say the only ,son1 for in ,god there is no plurality of ,sons4 ,yet1 we do not say the only ,god1 for the ,deity is common to several4 ,we avoid the word confused1 lest we take away from the ,persons the order of their nature4 ,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide i73 ,what is one is not confused2 and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference4 ,the word solitary is also to be avoided1 lest we take away the society of the three persons2 for1 as ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iv71 ,we confess neither a solitary nor a diverse ,god4 ,this word other alius1 however1 in the masculine sense1 means only a distinction of suppositum2 and hence we can properly say that the ,son is other than the ,father1 because ,he is another suppositum of the divine nature1 as ,he is another person and another hypostasis4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,other1 being like the name of a particular thing1 refers to the suppositum2 and so1 there is sufficient reason for using it1 where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person4 ,but diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence4 ,thus we cannot say that the ,son is diverse from the ,father1 although ,he is another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,difference implies distinction of form4 ,there is one form in ,god1 as appears from the text1 ,who1 when ,he was in the form of ,god 7,phil4 #b3f74 ,therefore the term difference does not properly apply to ,god1 as appears from the authority quoted4 ,yet1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #e7 employs the term difference in the divine persons1 as meaning that the relative property is signified by way of form4 ,hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance1 but according to determinate properties4 ,but difference is taken for distinction1 as above stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the term alien means what is extraneous and dissimilar2 which is not expressed by the term other alius2 and therefore we say that the ,son is other than the ,father1 but not that ,he is anything alien4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the neuter gender is formless2 whereas the masculine is formed and distinct2 and so is the feminine4 ,so the common essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender1 but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature4 ,hence also in human affairs1 if we ask1 ,who is this man8 we answer1 ,socrates1 which is the name of the suppositum2 whereas1 if we ask1 ,what is he8 we reply1 ,a rational and mortal animal4 ,so1 because in ,god distinction is by the persons1 and not by the essence1 we say that the ,father is other than the ,son1 but not something else2 while conversely we say that they are one thing1 but not one person4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,exclusive ,word ,alone ,should ,be ,added to the ,essential ,term in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the exclusive word alone solus is not to be added to an essential term in ,god4 ,for1 according to the ,philosopher 7,elench4 ii1 #c71 ,he is alone who is not with another4 ,but ,god is with the angels and the souls of the saints4 ,therefore we cannot say that ,god is alone4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is joined to the essential term in ,god can be predicated of every person per se1 and of all the persons together2 for1 as we can properly say that ,god is wise1 we can say the ,father is a wise ,god2 and the ,trinity is a wise ,god4 ,but ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #i73 ,we must consider the opinion that the ,father is not true ,god alone4 ,therefore ,god cannot be said to be alone4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further if this expression alone is joined to an essential term1 it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate4 ,but it cannot be the former1 as it is false to say1 ,god alone is ,father1 since man also is a father2 nor1 again1 can it be applied as regards the latter1 for1 if this saying were true1 ,god alone creates1 it would follow that the ,father alone creates1 as whatever is said of ,god can be said of the ,father2 and it would be false1 as the ,son also creates4 ,therefore this expression alone cannot be joined to an essential term in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said1 ,to the ,king of ages1 immortal1 invisible1 the only ,god 7#a ,tim4 #a3ag74 ,i answer that1 ,this term alone can be taken as a categorematical term1 or as a syncategorematical term4 ,a categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given suppositum2 as1 for instance1 white to man1 as when we say a white man4 ,if the term alone is taken in this sense1 it cannot in any way be joined to any term in ,god2 for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined2 and it would follow that ,god was solitary1 against what is above stated 7,a4 #b74 ,a syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject2 as this expression every one or no one2 and likewise the term alone1 as excluding every other suppositum from the predicate4 ,thus1 when we say1 ,socrates alone writes1 we do not mean that ,socrates is solitary1 but that he has no companion in writing1 though many others may be with him4 ,in this way nothing prevents the term alone being joined to any essential term in ,god1 as excluding the predicate from all things but ,god2 as if we said ,god alone is eternal1 because nothing but ,god is eternal4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with ,god1 nevertheless1 if plurality of persons did not exist in ,god1 ,he would be alone or solitary4 ,for solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature2 thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden1 though many plants and animals are with him in the garden4 ,likewise1 ,god would be alone or solitary1 though angels and men were with ,him1 supposing that several persons were not within ,him4 ,therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from ,god2 much less does it remove respective solitude1 in reference to a predicate4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this expression alone1 properly speaking1 does not affect the predicate1 which is taken formally1 for it refers to the suppositum1 as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies4 ,but the adverb only1 being exclusive1 can be applied either to subject or predicate4 ,for we can say1 ,only ,socrates--that is1 no one else--runs3 and ,socrates runs only--that is1 he does nothing else4 ,hence it is not properly said that the ,father is ,god alone1 or the ,trinity is ,god alone1 unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate1 as1 for instance1 ,the ,trinity is ,god ,who alone is ,god4 ,in that sense it can be true to say that the ,father is that ,god ,who alone is ,god1 if the relative be referred to the predicate1 and not to the suppositum4 ,so1 when ,augustine says that the ,father is not ,god alone1 but that the ,trinity is ,god alone1 he speaks expositively1 as he might explain the words1 ,to the ,king of ages1 invisible1 the only ,god1 as applying not to the ,father1 but to the ,trinity alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in both ways can the term alone be joined to an essential term4 ,for this proposition1 ,god alone is ,father1 can mean two things1 because the word ,father can signify the person of the ,father2 and then it is true2 for no man is that person3 or it can signify that relation only2 and thus it is false1 because the relation of paternity is found also in others1 though not in a univocal sense4 ,likewise it is true to say ,god alone creates2 nor1 does it follow1 therefore the ,father alone creates1 because1 as logicians say1 an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term3 for instance1 from the premiss1 ,man alone is a mortal rational animal1 we cannot conclude1 therefore ,socrates alone is such4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ca1 ,art4 #d ,whether an ,exclusive ,diction ,can ,be ,joined to the ,personal ,term8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term1 even though the predicate is common4 ,for our ,lord speaking to the ,father1 said3 ,that they may know ,thee1 the only true ,god 7,john #ag3c74 ,therefore the ,father alone is true ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,he said3 ,no one knows the ,son but the ,father 7,matt4 #aa3bg72 which means that the ,father alone knows the ,son4 ,but to know the ,son is common 7to the persons74 ,therefore the same conclusion follows4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined4 ,hence it does not exclude the part1 nor the universal2 for it does not follow that if we say ,socrates alone is white1 that therefore his hand is not white1 or that man is not white4 ,but one person is in the concept of another2 as the ,father is in the concept of the ,son2 and conversely4 ,therefore1 when we say1 ,the ,father alone is ,god1 we do not exclude the ,son1 nor the ,holy ,ghost2 so that such a mode of speaking is true4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,church sings3 ,thou alone art ,most ,high1 ,o ,jesus ,christ4 ,on the contrary1 ,this proposition ,the ,father alone is ,god includes two assertions--namely1 that the ,father is ,god1 and that no other besides the ,father is ,god4 ,but this second proposition is false1 for the ,son is another from the ,father1 and ,he is ,god4 ,therefore this is false1 ,the ,father alone is ,god2 and the same of the like sayings4 ,i answer that1 ,when we say1 ,the ,father alone is ,god1 such a proposition can be taken in several senses4 ,if alone means solitude in the ,father1 it is false in a categorematical sense2 but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways4 ,for if it exclude 7all others7 from the form of the subject1 it is true1 the sense being the ,father alone is ,god--that is1 ,he who with no other is the ,father1 is ,god4 ,in this way ,augustine expounds when he says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #f73 ,we say the ,father alone1 not because ,he is separate from the ,son1 or from the ,holy ,ghost1 but because they are not the ,father together with ,him4 ,this1 however1 is not the usual way of speaking1 unless we understand another implication1 as though we said ,he who alone is called the ,father is ,god4 ,but in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate4 ,and thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense2 but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense2 because the ,son is another person than the ,father1 but not another thing2 and the same applies to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but because this diction alone1 properly speaking1 refers to the subject1 it tends to exclude another ,person rather than other things4 ,hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally1 but it should be piously expounded1 whenever we find it in an authentic work4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when we say1 ,thee the only true ,god1 we do not understand it as referring to the person of the ,father1 but to the whole ,trinity1 as ,augustine expounds 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #i74 ,or1 if understood of the person of the ,father1 the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence2 in so far as the word only excludes another thing1 as above explained4 ,the same ,reply can be given to ,obj4 #b4 ,for an essential term applied to the ,father does not exclude the ,son or the ,holy ,ghost1 by reason of the unity of essence4 ,hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term no one 99,nemo non-homo1 i4e4 no man is not the same as no man1 which the word itself would seem to signify 7for the person of the ,father could not be excepted71 but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense1 to mean any rational nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined1 if they do not differ in suppositum1 as part and universal4 ,but the ,son differs in suppositum from the ,father2 and so there is no parity4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,we do not say absolutely that the ,son alone is ,most ,high2 but that ,he alone is ,most ,high with the ,holy ,ghost1 in the glory of ,god the ,father4 ,,question #cb ,,the ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,persons 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons2 and this involves four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason8 7#b7 ,whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons8 7#c7 ,the number of the notions8 7#d7 ,whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,trinity of the ,divine ,persons ,can ,be ,known by ,natural ,reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason4 ,for philosophers came to the knowledge of ,god not otherwise than by natural reason4 ,now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons1 for ,aristotle says 7,de ,coelo et ,mundo i1 #b73 ,through this number--namely1 three--we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one ,god1 surpassing all things created4 ,and ,augustine says 7,confess4 vii1 #i73 ,i have read in their works1 not in so many words1 but enforced by many and various reasons1 that in the beginning was the ,word1 and the ,word was with ,god1 and the ,word was ,god1 and so on2 in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down4 ,we read1 moreover1 in a gloss on ,rom4 #a and ,ex4 #h that the magicians of ,pharaoh failed in the third sign--that is1 as regards knowledge of a third person--i4e4 of the ,holy ,ghost--and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons4 ,likewise ,trismegistus says3 ,the monad begot a monad1 and reflected upon itself its own heat4 ,by which words the generation of the ,son and procession of the ,holy ,ghost seem to be indicated4 ,therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,richard ,st4 ,victor says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #d73 ,i believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth4 ,so even to prove the ,trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of ,god1 who communicates ,himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons2 while some are moved by the consideration that no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership4 ,augustine proceeds 7,de ,trin4 x1 #d2 x1 #aa1 #ab7 to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind2 and we have followed him in this 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason4 ,but it ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the ,trinity is superfluous4 ,therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 i71 ,let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind4 ,and ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide ii1 #e71 ,it is impossible to know the secret of generation4 ,the mind fails1 the voice is silent4 ,but the trinity of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b74 ,since1 therefore1 man cannot know1 and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given1 it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the ,trinity by natural reason4 ,for1 as above explained 7,q4 #ab1 ,,aa4 #d1 #ab71 man cannot obtain the knowledge of ,god by natural reason except from creatures4 ,now creatures lead us to the knowledge of ,god1 as effects do to their cause4 ,accordingly1 by natural reason we can know of ,god that only which of necessity belongs to ,him as the principle of things1 and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of ,god as above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #ab74 ,now1 the creative power of ,god is common to the whole ,trinity2 and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence1 and not to the distinction of the persons4 ,therefore1 by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence1 but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons4 ,whoever1 then1 tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason1 derogates from faith in two ways4 ,firstly1 as regards the dignity of faith itself1 which consists in its being concerned with invisible things1 that exceed human reason2 wherefore the ,apostle says that faith is of things that appear not 7,heb4 #aa3a71 and the same ,apostle says also1 ,we speak wisdom among the perfect1 but not the wisdom of this world1 nor of the princes of this world2 but we speak the wisdom of ,god in a mystery which is hidden 7#a ,cor4 #b3f1 #g74 ,secondly1 as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith4 ,for when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent1 he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers3 since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons1 and that we believe on such grounds4 ,therefore1 we must not attempt to prove what is of faith1 except by authority alone1 to those who receive the authority2 while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible4 ,hence it is said by ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 ii73 ,whoever wholly resists the word1 is far off from our philosophy2 whereas if he regards the truth of the word--i4e4 the sacred word1 we too follow this rule4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes1 such as paternity1 filiation1 and procession1 according to the ,apostle's words1 ,we speak the wisdom of ,god which none of the princes of the world--i4e4 the philosophers--knew 7#a ,cor4 #b3f74 ,nevertheless1 they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons1 as power to the ,father1 wisdom to the ,son1 goodness to the ,holy ,ghost2 as will later on appear4 ,so1 when ,aristotle said1 ,by this number1 etc41 we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in ,god1 but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three4 ,in the ,platonic books also we find1 ,in the beginning was the word1 not as meaning the ,person begotten in ,god1 but as meaning the ideal type whereby ,god made all things1 and which is appropriated to the ,son4 ,and although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons1 yet they are said to have failed in the third sign--that is1 in the knowledge of the third person1 because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost1 in that knowing ,god they did not glorify ,him as ,god 7,rom4 #a72 or1 because the ,platonists asserted the existence of one ,primal ,being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe1 they consequently maintained the existence of another substance beneath him1 which they called mind or the paternal intellect1 containing the idea of all things1 as ,macrobius relates 7,som4 ,scip4 iv74 ,they did not1 however1 assert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,so also we do not assert that the ,father and the ,son differ in substance1 which was the error of ,origen and ,arius1 who in this followed the ,platonists4 ,when ,trismegistus says1 ,monad begot monad1 etc41 this does not refer to the generation of the ,son1 or to the procession of the ,holy ,ghost1 but to the production of the world4 ,for one ,god produced one world by reason of ,his love for ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point3 firstly1 for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle1 as in natural science1 where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity4 ,reason is employed in another way1 not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle1 but as confirming an already established principle1 by showing the congruity of its results1 as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established1 because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained2 not1 however1 as if this proof were sufficient1 forasmuch as some other theory might explain them4 ,in the first way1 we can prove that ,god is one2 and the like4 ,in the second way1 reasons avail to prove the ,trinity2 as1 when assumed to be true1 such reasons confirm it4 ,we must not1 however1 think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons4 ,this becomes evident when we consider each point2 for the infinite goodness of ,god is manifested also in creation1 because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power4 ,for if ,god communicates ,himself by ,his infinite goodness1 it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from ,god3 but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness4 ,likewise1 when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership1 this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness3 hence it needs to share some other's good1 in order to have the goodness of complete happiness4 ,nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of ,god1 forasmuch as the intellect is not in ,god and ourselves univocally4 ,hence1 ,augustine says 7,tract4 xxvii4 in ,joan47 that by faith we arrive at knowledge1 and not conversely4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us4 ,it was necessary for the right idea of creation4 ,the fact of saying that ,god made all things by ,his ,word excludes the error of those who say that ,god produced things by necessity4 ,when we say that in ,him there is a procession of love1 we show that ,god produced creatures not because ,he needed them1 nor because of any other extrinsic reason1 but on account of the love of ,his own goodness4 ,so ,moses1 when he had said1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 subjoined1 ,god said1 ,let there be light1 to manifest the divine ,word2 and then said1 ,god saw the light that it was good1 to show proof of the divine love4 ,the same is also found in the other works of creation4 ,in another way1 and chiefly1 that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race1 accomplished by the ,incarnate ,son1 and by the gift of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,notions in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in ,god there are no notions4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i73 ,we must not dare to say anything of ,god but what is taught to us by the ,holy ,scripture4 ,but ,holy ,scripture does not say anything concerning notions4 ,therefore there are none in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all that exists in ,god concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons4 ,but the notions do not concern the unity of the essence1 nor the trinity of the persons2 for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions3 for instance1 we do not say that paternity is wise or creates2 nor can what belongs to the persons be so predicated2 for example1 we do not say that paternity begets1 nor that filiation is begotten4 ,therefore there do not exist notions in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition3 for they are known of themselves4 ,but the divine persons are supremely simple4 ,therefore we are not to suppose any notions in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #e73 ,we recognize difference of hypostases i4e4 of persons1 in the three properties2 i4e4 in the paternal1 the filial1 and the processional4 ,therefore we must admit properties and notions in ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,prepositivus1 considering the simplicity of the persons1 said that in ,god there were no properties or notions1 and wherever there were mentioned1 he propounded the abstract for the concrete4 ,for as we are accustomed to say1 ,i beseech your kindness--i4e4 you who are kind--so when we speak of paternity in ,god1 we mean ,god the ,father4 ,but1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a71 the use of concrete and abstract names in ,god is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity2 forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it4 ,now1 our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence1 considered in itself1 and therefore1 our human intellect apprehends and names divine things1 according to its own mode1 that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects1 whence its knowledge is derived4 ,in these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms2 and to signify subsistent things we use concrete terms4 ,hence also we signify divine things1 as above stated1 by abstract names1 to express their simplicity2 whereas1 to express their subsistence and completeness1 we use concrete names4 ,but not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete1 as when we say ,deity and ,god2 or wisdom and wise2 but the same applies to the personal names1 so that we may say paternity and ,father4 ,two chief motives for this can be cited4 ,the first arises from the obstinacy of heretics4 ,for since we confess the ,father1 the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost to be one ,god and three persons1 to those who ask3 ,whereby are ,they one ,god8 and whereby are ,they three persons8 as we answer that ,they are one in essence or deity2 so there must also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are distinguished2 and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract term1 as paternity and filiation4 ,therefore the divine essence is signified as ,what2 and the person as ,who2 and the property as ,whereby4 ,the second motive is because one person in ,god is related to two persons--namely1 the person of the ,father to the person of the ,son and the person of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,this is not1 however1 by one relation2 otherwise it would follow that the ,son also and the ,holy ,ghost would be related to the ,father by one and the same relation4 ,thus1 since relation alone multiplies the ,trinity1 it would follow that the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost would not be two persons4 ,nor can it be said with ,prepositivus that as ,god is related in one way to creatures1 while creatures are related to ,him in divers ways1 so the ,father is related by one relation to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost2 whereas these two persons are related to the ,father by two relations4 ,for1 since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another1 it must be said that two relations are not specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them4 ,for the relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of filiation and servitude4 ,now1 all creatures are related to ,god as ,his creatures by one specific relation4 ,but the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost are not related to the ,father by one and the same kind of relation4 ,hence there is no parity4 ,further1 in ,god there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #a1 #c72 while there is no reason against our admitting in ,god1 many logical relations4 ,but in the ,father there must be a real relation to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,hence1 corresponding to the two relations of the ,son and of the ,holy ,ghost1 whereby they are related to the ,father1 we must understand two relations in the ,father1 whereby ,he is related to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,hence1 since there is only one ,person of the ,father1 it is necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the abstract2 and these are what we mean by properties and notions4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the notions are not mentioned in ,holy ,scripture1 yet the persons are mentioned1 comprising the idea of notions1 as the abstract is contained in the concrete4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in ,god the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities1 but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons are known2 although in ,god these notions or relations are real1 as stated above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore whatever has order to any essential or personal act1 cannot be applied to the notions2 forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification4 ,hence we cannot say that paternity begets1 or creates1 or is wise1 or is intelligent4 ,the essentials1 however1 which are not ordered to any act1 but simply remove created conditions from ,god1 can be predicated of the notions2 for we can say that paternity is eternal1 or immense1 or such like4 ,so also on account of the real identity1 substantive terms1 whether personal or essential1 can be predicated of the notions2 for we can say that paternity is ,god1 and that paternity is the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the persons are simple1 still without prejudice to their simplicity1 the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly signified1 as above explained4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,are ,five ,notions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not five notions4 ,for the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished from each other4 ,but the relations in ,god are only four 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore the notions are only four in number4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as there is only one essence in ,god1 ,he is called one ,god1 and because in ,him there are three persons1 ,he is called the ,trine ,god4 ,therefore1 if in ,god there are five notions1 ,he may be called quinary2 which cannot be allowed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if there are five notions for the three persons in ,god1 there must be in some one person two or more notions1 as in the person of the ,father there is innascibility and paternity1 and common spiration4 ,either these three notions really differ1 or not4 ,if they really differ1 it follows that the person of the ,father is composed of several things4 ,but if they differ only logically1 it follows that one of them can be predicated of another1 so that we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality1 so common spiration is paternity2 which is not to be admitted4 ,therefore there are not five notions4 ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1 ,it seems that there are more2 because as the ,father is from no one1 and therefrom is derived the notion of innascibility2 so from the ,holy ,ghost no other person proceeds4 ,and in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 as the ,father and the ,son are the common origin of the ,holy ,ghost1 so it is common to the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost to proceed from the ,father4 ,therefore1 as one notion is common to the ,father and the ,son1 so there ought to be one notion common to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,i answer that1 ,a notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine ,person4 ,now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin3 and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes1 and of someone that comes from another1 and by these two modes a person can be known4 ,therefore the ,person of the ,father cannot be known by the fact that ,he is from another2 but by the fact that ,he is from no one2 and thus the notion that belongs to ,him is called innascibility4 ,as the source of another1 ,he can be known in two ways1 because as the ,son is from ,him1 the ,father is known by the notion of paternity2 and as the ,holy ,ghost is from ,him1 ,he is known by the notion of common spiration4 ,the ,son can be known as begotten by another1 and thus ,he is known by filiation2 and also by another person proceeding from ,him1 the ,holy ,ghost1 and thus ,he is known in the same way as the ,father is known1 by common spiration4 ,the ,holy ,ghost can be known by the fact that ,he is from another1 or from others2 thus ,he is known by procession2 but not by the fact that another is from ,him1 as no divine person proceeds from ,him4 ,therefore1 there are ,five notions in ,god3 innascibility1 paternity1 filiation1 common spiration1 and procession4 ,of these only four are relations1 for innascibility is not a relation1 except by reduction1 as will appear later 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,four only are properties4 ,for common spiration is not a property2 because it belongs to two persons4 ,three are personal notions--i4e4 constituting persons1 paternity1 filiation1 and procession4 ,common spiration and innascibility are called notions of ,persons1 but not personal notions1 as we shall explain further on 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,besides the four relations1 another notion must be admitted1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the divine essence is signified as a reality2 and likewise the persons are signified as realities2 whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons4 ,therefore1 although ,god is one by unity of essence1 and trine by trinity of persons1 nevertheless ,he is not quinary by the five notions4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the real plurality in ,god is founded only on relative opposition1 the several properties of one ,person1 as they are not relatively opposed to each other1 do not really differ4 ,nor again are they predicated of each other1 because they are different ideas of the persons2 as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge1 although we do say that knowledge is power4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since ,person implies dignity1 as stated above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c71 we cannot derive a notion of the ,holy ,spirit from the fact that no person is from ,him4 ,for this does not belong to ,his dignity1 as it belongs to the authority of the ,father that ,he is from no one4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the ,father2 as the ,father and the ,son agree in one special mode of producing the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but the principle on which a notion is based must be something special2 thus no parity of reasoning exists4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,it ,is ,lawful to ,have ,various ,contrary ,opinions of ,notions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #c73 ,no error is more dangerous than any as regards the ,trinity3 to which mystery the notions assuredly belong4 ,but contrary opinions must be in some way erroneous4 ,therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the persons are known by the notions4 ,but no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated4 ,therefore neither can there be about the notions4 ,on the contrary1 ,the notions are not articles of faith4 ,therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible4 ,i answer that1 ,anything is of faith in two ways2 directly1 where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught1 as the trinity and unity of ,god1 the ,incarnation of the ,son1 and the like2 and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy1 especially if it be held obstinately4 ,a thing is of faith1 indirectly1 if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against faith2 as for instance if anyone said that ,samuel was not the son of ,elcana1 for it follows that the divine ,scripture would be false4 ,concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy1 before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith1 and particularly if no obstinacy be shown2 whereas when it is manifest1 and especially if the ,church has decided that consequences follow against faith1 then the error cannot be free from heresy4 ,for this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were formerly not so considered1 as their consequences are now more manifest4 ,so we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions1 if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith4 ,if1 however1 anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions1 knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow1 he would lapse into heresy4 ,by what has been said all the objections may be solved4 ,,question #cc ,,of ,,the ,,person ,,of ,,the ,,father 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now consider the persons singly2 and first1 the ,person of the ,father1 concerning ,whom there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the ,father is the ,principle8 7#b7 ,whether the person of the ,father is properly signified by this name ,father8 7#c7 ,whether ,father in ,god is said personally before it is said essentially8 7#d7 ,whether it belongs to the ,father alone to be unbegotten8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,it ,belongs to the ,father to ,be the ,principle8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,father cannot be called the principle of the ,son1 or of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for principle and cause are the same1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 iv74 ,but we do not say that the ,father is the cause of the ,son4 ,therefore we must not say that ,he is the principle of the ,son4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a principle is so called in relation to the thing principled4 ,so if the ,father is the principle of the ,son1 it follows that the ,son is a person principled1 and is therefore created2 which appears false4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the word principle is taken from priority4 ,but in ,god there is no before and after1 as ,athanasius says4 ,therefore in speaking of ,god we ought not to used the term principle4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj71 ,the ,father is the ,principle of the whole ,deity4 ,i answer that1 ,the word principle signifies only that whence another proceeds3 since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle2 and conversely4 ,as the ,father then is the one whence another proceeds1 it follows that the ,father is a principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,greeks use the words cause and principle indifferently1 when speaking of ,god2 whereas the ,latin ,doctors do not use the word cause1 but only principle4 ,the reason is because principle is a wider term than cause2 as cause is more common than element4 ,for the first term of a thing1 as also the first part1 is called the principle1 but not the cause4 ,now the wider a term is1 the more suitable it is to use as regards ,god 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #aa71 because the more special terms are1 the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature4 ,hence this term cause seems to mean diversity of substance1 and dependence of one from another2 which is not implied in the word principle4 ,for in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power3 whereas we use the term principle even in things which have no such difference1 but have only a certain order to each other2 as when we say that a point is the principle of a line2 or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a line4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is the custom with the ,greeks to say that the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost are principled4 ,this is not1 however1 the custom with our ,doctors2 because1 although we attribute to the ,father something of authority by reason of ,his being the principle1 still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the ,son1 or to the ,holy ,ghost1 to avoid any occasion of error4 ,in this way1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 ix73 ,by authority of the ,giver1 the ,father is the greater2 nevertheless the ,son is not less to ,whom oneness of nature is give4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although this word principle1 as regards its derivation1 seems to be taken from priority1 still it does not signify priority1 but origin4 ,for what a term signifies1 and the reason why it was imposed1 are not the same thing1 as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #h74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,this ,name ,father ,is ,properly the ,name of a ,divine ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this name ,father is not properly the name of a divine person4 ,for the name ,father signifies relation4 ,moreover person is an individual substance4 ,therefore this name ,father is not properly a name signifying a ,person4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a begetter is more common than father2 for every father begets2 but it is not so conversely4 ,but a more common term is more properly applied to ,god1 as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #aa74 ,therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than ,father4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone4 ,but the word is by us metaphorically called begotten1 or offspring2 and consequently1 he of whom is the word1 is metaphorically called father4 ,therefore the principle of the ,word in ,god is not properly called ,father4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 everything which is said properly of ,god1 is said of ,god first before creatures4 ,but generation appears to apply to creatures before ,god2 because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds1 not only by relation but also by essence4 ,therefore the name ,father taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #hh3bg73 ,he shall cry out to me3 ,thou art my ,father4 ,i answer that1 ,the proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons4 ,for as body and soul belong to the nature of man1 so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body2 and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men4 ,now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the ,father from all other persons4 ,hence this name ,father1 whereby paternity is signified1 is the proper name of the person of the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,among us relation is not a subsisting person4 ,so this name father among us does not signify a person1 but the relation of a person4 ,in ,god1 however1 it is not so1 as some wrongly thought2 for in ,god the relation signified by the name ,father is a subsisting person4 ,hence1 as above explained 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #d71 this name person in ,god signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 text #di71 a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection1 and by its end4 ,now generation signifies something in process of being made1 whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation2 and therefore the name ,father is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in human nature the word is not a subsistence1 and hence is not properly called begotten or son4 ,but the divine ,word is something subsistent in the divine nature2 and hence ,he is properly and not metaphorically called ,son1 and ,his principle is called ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the terms generation and paternity like the other terms properly applied to ,god1 are said of ,god before creatures as regards the thing signified1 but not as regards the mode of signification4 ,hence also the ,apostle says1 ,i bend my knee to the ,father of my ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named 7,eph4 #c3ad74 ,this is explained thus4 ,it is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated2 and the nearer it is to the form of the generator1 the truer and more perfect is the generation2 as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal1 for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form4 ,hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the ,begetter and ,begotten is numerically the same1 whereas in creatures it is not numerically1 but only specifically1 the same1 shows that generation1 and consequently paternity1 is applied to ,god before creatures4 ,hence the very fact that in ,god a distinction exists of the ,begotten from the ,begetter as regards relation only1 belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,this ,name ,father ,is ,applied to ,god1 ,firstly ,as a ,personal ,name8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this name ,father is not applied to ,god1 firstly as a personal name4 ,for in the intellect the common precedes the particular4 ,but this name ,father as a personal name1 belongs to the person of the ,father2 and taken in an essential sense it is common to the whole ,trinity2 for we say ,our ,father to the whole ,trinity4 ,therefore ,father comes first as an essential name before its personal sense4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication4 ,but paternity and filiation seem to be of the same nature1 according as a divine person is ,father of the ,son1 and the whole ,trinity is our ,father1 or the creature's2 since1 according to ,basil 7,hom4 xv1 ,de ,fide71 to receive is common to the creature and to the ,son4 ,therefore ,father in ,god is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept4 ,but the ,son is compared to the creature by reason of filiation or generation1 according to ,col4 #a3ae3 ,who is the image of the invisible ,god1 the first-born of every creature4 ,therefore paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to1 but has the same concept as1 paternity taken essentially4 ,on the contrary1 ,the eternal comes before the temporal4 ,but ,god is the ,father of the ,son from eternity2 while ,he is the ,father of the creature in time4 ,therefore paternity in ,god is taken in a personal sense as regards the ,son1 before it is so taken as regards the creature4 ,i answer that1 ,a name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification1 before it is applied to that which only partially contains it2 for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the name2 since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things4 ,hence this name lion is applied first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion1 and which is properly so called1 before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature1 as courage1 or strength1 or the like2 and of whom it is said by way of similitude4 ,now it is manifest from the foregoing 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d71 that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in ,god the ,father1 and in ,god the ,son1 because one is the nature and glory of the ,father and the ,son4 ,but in the creature1 filiation is found in relation to ,god1 not in a perfect manner1 since the ,creator and the creature have not the same nature2 but by way of a certain likeness1 which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation4 ,for ,god is called the ,father of some creatures1 by reason only of a trace1 for instance of irrational creatures1 according to ,job #ch3bh3 ,who is the father of the rain8 or who begot the drops of dew8 ,of some1 namely1 the rational creature 7,he is the ,father71 by reason of the likeness of ,his image1 according to ,deut4 #cb3f3 ,is ,he not thy ,father1 who possessed1 and made1 and created thee8 ,and of others ,he is the ,father by similitude of grace1 and these are also called adoptive sons1 as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received1 according to ,rom4 #h3af1 #ag3 ,the ,spirit ,himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of ,god2 and if sons1 heirs also4 ,lastly1 ,he is the ,father of others by similitude of glory1 forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory1 according to ,rom4 #e3b3 ,we glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of ,god4 ,therefore it is plain that paternity is applied to ,god first1 as importing regard of one ,person to another ,person1 before it imports the regard of ,god to creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,common terms taken absolutely1 in the order of our intelligence1 come before proper terms2 because they are included in the understanding of proper terms2 but not conversely4 ,for in the concept of the person of the ,father1 ,god is understood2 but not conversely4 ,but common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations2 because the person proceeding in ,god proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures4 ,for as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed1 which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind2 so the ,son proceeds from the ,father before the creature1 to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the ,son1 as is clear from the words of ,rom4 #h3bi3 ,whom ,he foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of ,his ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to receive is said to be common to the creature and to the ,son not in a univocal sense1 but according to a certain remote similitude whereby ,he is called the ,first ,born of creatures4 ,hence the authority quoted subjoins3 ,that ,he may be the ,first ,born among many brethren1 after saying that some were conformed to the image of the ,son of ,god4 ,but the ,son of ,god possesses a position of singularity above others1 in having by nature what ,he receives1 as ,basil also declares 7,hom4 xv ,de ,fide72 hence ,he is called the only begotten 7,john #a3ah73 ,the only begotten ,who is in the bosom of the ,father1 ,he hath declared unto us4 ,from this appears the ,reply to the ,third ,objection4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cc1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,it ,is ,proper to the ,father to ,be ,unbegotten8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not proper to the ,father to be unbegotten4 ,for every property supposes something in that of which it is the property4 ,but unbegotten supposes nothing in the ,father2 it only removes something4 ,therefore it does not signify a property of the ,father4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,unbegotten is taken either in a privative1 or in a negative sense4 ,if in a negative sense1 then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost is not begotten2 neither is the divine essence4 ,therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the essence2 thus it is not proper to the ,father4 ,but if it be taken in a privative sense1 as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation1 it follows that the ,person of the ,father is imperfect2 which cannot be4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in ,god1 unbegotten does not signify relation1 for it is not used relatively4 ,therefore it signifies substance2 therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance4 ,but the ,son1 ,who is begotten1 does not differ from the ,father in substance4 ,therefore the ,father ought not to be called unbegotten4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 property means what belongs to one alone4 ,since1 then1 there are more than one in ,god proceeding from another1 there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another4 ,therefore the ,father is not alone unbegotten4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 as the ,father is the principle of the person begotten1 so is ,he of the person proceeding4 ,so if by reason of his opposition to the person begotten1 it is proper to the ,father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to ,him also to be unproceeding4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iv73 ,one is from one--that is1 the ,begotten is from the ,unbegotten--namely1 by the property in each one respectively of innascibility and origin4 ,i answer that1 ,as in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle1 so also in the divine ,persons1 in ,whom there is no before or after1 is formed the principle not from a principle1 ,who is the ,father2 and the principle from a principle1 ,who is the ,son4 ,now in things created a first principle is known in two ways2 in one way as the first principle1 by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself2 in another way1 inasmuch as it is a first principle by reason of its not being from another4 ,thus therefore the ,father is known both by paternity and by common spiration1 as regards the persons proceeding from ,himself4 ,but as the principle1 not from a principle ,he is known by the fact that ,he is not from another2 and this belongs to the property of innascibility1 signified by this word begotten4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some there are who say that innascibility1 signified by the word unbegotten1 as a property of the ,father1 is not a negative term only1 but either that it means both these things together--namely1 that the ,father is from no one1 and that ,he is the principle of others2 or that it imports universal authority1 or also ,his plenitude as the source of all4 ,this1 however1 does not seem true1 because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration2 but would include them as the proper is included in the common4 ,for source and authority signify in ,god nothing but the principle of origin4 ,we must therefore say with ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 v1 #g7 that unbegotten imports the negation of passive generation4 ,for he says that unbegotten has the same meaning as not a son4 ,nor does it follow that unbegotten is not the proper notion of the ,father2 for primary and simple things are notified by negations2 as1 for instance1 a point is defined as what has no part4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,unbegotten is taken sometimes in a negative sense only1 and in that sense ,jerome says that the ,holy ,ghost is unbegotten1 that is1 ,he is not begotten4 ,otherwise unbegotten may be taken in a kind of privative sense1 but not as implying any imperfection4 ,for privation can be taken in many ways2 in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another1 even though it is not of its own nature to have it2 as1 for instance1 if a stone be called a dead thing1 as wanting life1 which naturally belongs to some other things4 ,in another sense1 privation is so called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus2 as for instance when a mole is called blind4 ,in a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have2 in which sense1 privation imports an imperfection4 ,in this sense1 unbegotten is not attributed to the ,father as a privation1 but it may be so attributed in the second sense1 meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten1 while some person of the same nature is begotten4 ,in this sense the term unbegotten can be applied also to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,hence to consider it as a term proper to the ,father alone1 it must be further understood that the name unbegotten belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person2 so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in ,god4 ,or that there be understood in the term unbegotten that ,he is not in any way derived from another2 and not only that ,he is not from another by way only of generation4 ,in this sense the term unbegotten does not belong at all to the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is from another by procession1 as a subsisting person2 nor does it belong to the divine essence1 of which it may be said that it is in the ,son or in the ,holy ,ghost from another--namely1 from the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #i71 unbegotten in one sense signifies the same as uncreated2 and thus it applies to the substance1 for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated4 ,in another sense it signifies what is not begotten1 and in this sense it is a relative term2 just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation1 as not man is reduced to the genus of substance1 and not white to the genus of quality4 ,hence1 since begotten implies relation in ,god1 unbegotten belongs also to relation4 ,thus it does not follow that the ,father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the ,son begotten2 but only by relation2 that is1 as the relation of ,son is denied of the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in every genus there must be something first2 so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from another1 and which we call unbegotten4 ,to admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two ,gods1 and two divine natures4 ,hence ,hilary says 7,de ,synod473 ,as there is one ,god1 so there cannot be two innascibles4 ,and this especially because1 did two innascibles exist1 one would not be from the other1 and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition3 therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the property of the ,father1 whereby ,he is not from another1 is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the ,son1 than by the removal of the procession of the ,holy ,ghost2 both because the procession of the ,holy ,ghost has no special name1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c71 and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the ,son4 ,hence1 it being denied of the ,father that ,he is begotten1 although ,he is the principle of generation1 it follows1 as a consequence1 that ,he does not proceed by the procession of the ,holy ,ghost1 because the ,holy ,ghost is not the principle of generation1 but proceeds from the person begotten4 ,,question #cd ,,of ,,the ,,person ,,of ,,the ,,son 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we next consider the person of the ,son4 ,three names are attributed to the ,son--namely1 ,son1 ,word1 and ,image4 ,the idea of ,son is gathered from the idea of ,father4 ,hence it remains for us to consider ,word and ,image4 ,concerning ,word there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,word is an essential term in ,god1 or a personal term8 7#b7 ,whether it is the proper name of the ,son8 7#c7 ,whether in the name of ,word is expressed relation to creatures8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,word in ,god ,is a ,personal ,name8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,word in ,god is not a personal name4 ,for personal names are applied to ,god in a proper sense1 as ,father and ,son4 ,but ,word is applied to ,god metaphorically1 as ,origen says on 7,john #a3a71 ,in the beginning was the ,word4 ,therefore ,word is not a personal name in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #aj71 ,the ,word is knowledge with love2 and according to ,anselm 7,monol4 lx71 ,to speak is to the ,supreme ,spirit nothing but to see by thought4 ,but knowledge and thought1 and sight1 are essential terms in ,god4 ,therefore ,word is not a personal term in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is essential to word to be spoken4 ,but1 according to ,anselm 7,monol4 lix71 as the ,father is intelligent1 the ,son is intelligent1 and the ,holy ,ghost is intelligent1 so the ,father speaks1 the ,son speaks1 and the ,holy ,ghost speaks2 and likewise1 each one of them is spoken4 ,therefore1 the name ,word is used as an essential term in ,god1 and not in a personal sense4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 no divine person is made4 ,but the ,word of ,god is something made4 ,for it is said1 ,fire1 hail1 snow1 ice1 the storms which do ,his ,word 7,ps4 #adh3h74 ,therefore the ,word is not a personal name in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #aa73 ,as the ,son is related to the ,father1 so also is the ,word to ,him ,whose ,word ,he is4 ,but the ,son is a personal name1 since it is said relatively4 ,therefore so also is ,word4 ,i answer that1 ,the name of ,word in ,god1 if taken in its proper sense1 is a personal name1 and in no way an essential name4 ,to see how this is true1 we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning2 while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively4 ,the clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice2 and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word--that is1 the vocal sound itself1 and the signification of the sound4 ,for1 according to the ,philosopher 7,peri ,herm4 i7 vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect4 ,again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 text #ij4 ,the vocal sound1 which has no signification cannot be called a word3 wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind4 ,therefore it follows that1 first and chiefly1 the interior concept of the mind is called a word2 secondarily1 the vocal sound itself1 signifying the interior concept1 is so called2 and thirdly1 the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word4 ,damascene mentions these three kinds of words 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #ag71 saying that word is called the natural movement of the intellect1 whereby it is moved1 and understands1 and thinks1 as light and splendor2 which is the first kind4 ,again1 he says1 the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word1 but is uttered in the heart2 which is the third kind4 ,again1 also1 the word is the angel--that is1 the messenger of intelligence2 which is the second kind4 ,word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word2 thus we are wont to say1 this is the word ,i have said1 or which the king has commanded1 alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command4 ,now word is taken strictly in ,god1 as signifying the concept of the intellect4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #aj73 ,whoever can understand the word1 not only before it is sounded1 but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound1 can already see some likeness of that ,word of ,whom it is said3 ,in the beginning was the ,word4 ,the concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself--namely1 from the knowledge of the one conceiving4 ,hence ,word1 according as we use the term strictly of ,god1 signifies something proceeding from another2 which belongs to the nature of personal terms in ,god1 inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d1 #e74 ,hence the term ,word1 according as we use the term strictly of ,god1 is to be taken as said not essentially1 but personally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,arians1 who sprang from ,origen1 declared that the ,son differed in substance from the ,father4 ,hence1 they endeavored to maintain that when the ,son of ,god is called the ,word1 this is not to be understood in a strict sense2 lest the idea of the ,word proceeding should compel them to confess that the ,son of ,god is of the same substance as the ,father4 ,for the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it1 as to remain within him4 ,but supposing ,word to be said metaphorically of ,god1 we must still admit ,word in its strict sense4 ,for if a thing be called a word metaphorically1 this can only be by reason of some manifestation2 either it makes something manifest as a word1 or it is manifested by a word4 ,if manifested by a word1 there must exist a word whereby it is manifested4 ,if it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests1 what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind1 which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs4 ,therefore1 although ,word may be sometimes said of ,god metaphorically1 nevertheless we must also admit ,word in the proper sense1 and which is said personally4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to ,god personally1 except word alone2 for word alone signifies that which emanates from another4 ,for what the intellect forms in its conception is the word4 ,now1 the intellect itself1 according as it is made actual by the intelligible species1 is considered absolutely2 likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being2 since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent1 but an act remaining in the agent4 ,therefore when we say that word is knowledge1 the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect1 or any one of its habits1 but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing4 ,hence also ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #a7 that the ,word is begotten wisdom2 for it is nothing but the concept of the ,wise ,one2 and in the same way ,it can be called begotten knowledge4 ,thus can also be explained how to speak is in ,god to see by thought1 forasmuch as the ,word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought4 ,still the term thought does not properly apply to the ,word of ,god4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #af73 ,therefore do we speak of the ,word of ,god1 and not of the ,thought of ,god1 lest we believe that in ,god there is something unstable1 now assuming the form of ,word1 now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless4 ,for thought consists properly in the search after the truth1 and this has no place in ,god4 ,but when the intellect attains to the form of truth1 it does not think1 but perfectly contemplates the truth4 ,hence ,anselm 7,monol4 lx7 takes thought in an improper sense for contemplation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as1 properly speaking1 ,word in ,god is said personally1 and not essentially1 so likewise is to speak4 ,hence1 as the ,word is not common to the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 so it is not true that the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost are one speaker4 ,so ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #a73 ,he who speaks in that co-eternal ,word is understood as not alone in ,god1 but as being with that very ,word1 without which1 forsooth1 ,he would not be speaking4 ,on the other hand1 to be spoken belongs to each ,person1 for not only is the word spoken1 but also the thing understood or signified by the word4 ,therefore in this manner to one person alone in ,god does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken2 whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word1 it belongs to each ,person to be spoken4 ,for the ,father1 by understanding ,himself1 the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost1 and all other things comprised in this knowledge1 conceives the ,word2 so that thus the whole ,trinity is spoken in the ,word2 and likewise also all creatures3 as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone1 speaks a stone4 ,anselm took the term speak improperly for the act of understanding2 whereas they really differ from each other2 for to understand means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood1 in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed1 but only a certain information of our intellect2 forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood4 ,in ,god1 however1 it means complete identity1 because in ,god the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same1 as was proved above 7,q4 #ad1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e74 ,whereas to speak means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived2 for to speak is nothing but to utter a word4 ,but by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands4 ,thus1 only the ,person who utters the ,word is speaker in ,god1 although each ,person understands and is understood1 and consequently is spoken by the ,word4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the term word is there taken figuratively1 as the thing signified or effected by word is called word4 ,for thus creatures are said to do the word of ,god1 as executing any effect1 whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom2 as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,word ,is the ,son's ,proper ,name8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,word is not the proper name of the ,son4 ,for the ,son is a subsisting person in ,god4 ,but word does not signify a subsisting thing1 as appears in ourselves4 ,therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the ,son4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered4 ,therefore if the ,son is properly the word1 ,he proceeds from the ,father1 by way only of utterance2 which is the heresy of ,valentine2 as appears from ,augustine 7,de ,haeres4 xi74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person4 ,therefore1 if the ,word is the ,son's proper name1 it signifies some property of ,his2 and thus there will be several more properties in ,god than those above mentioned4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding4 ,but the ,son understands4 ,therefore some word belongs to the ,son2 and consequently to be ,word is not proper to the ,son4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it is said of the ,son 7,heb4 #a3c73 ,bearing all things by the word of ,his power2 whence ,basil infers 7,cont4 ,eunom4 v1 #aa7 that the ,holy ,ghost is the ,son's ,word4 ,therefore to be ,word is not proper to the ,son4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aa73 ,by ,word we understand the ,son alone4 ,i answer that1 ,word1 said of ,god in its proper sense1 is used personally1 and is the proper name of the person of the ,son4 ,for it signifies an emanation of the intellect3 and the person ,who proceeds in ,god1 by way of emanation of the intellect1 is called the ,son2 and this procession is called generation1 as we have shown above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence it follows that the ,son alone is properly called ,word in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to be and to understand are not the same in us4 ,hence that which in us has intellectual being1 does not belong to our nature4 ,but in ,god to be and to understand are one and the same3 hence the ,word of ,god is not an accident in ,him1 or an effect of ,his2 but belongs to ,his very nature4 ,and therefore it must needs be something subsistent2 for whatever is in the nature of ,god subsists2 and so ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #ah7 that the ,word of ,god is substantial and has a hypostatic being2 but other words as our own are activities if the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the error of ,valentine was condemned1 not as the ,arians pretended1 because he asserted that the ,son was born by being uttered1 as ,hilary relates 7,de ,trin4 vi72 but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author1 as appears from ,augustine 7,de ,haeres4 xi74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the term ,word the same property is comprised as in the name ,son4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #aa73 ,word and ,son express the same4 ,for the ,son's nativity1 which is ,his personal property1 is signified by different names1 which are attributed to the ,son to express ,his perfection in various ways4 ,to show that ,he is of the same nature as the ,father1 ,he is called the ,son2 to show that ,he is co-eternal1 ,he is called the ,splendor2 to show that ,he is altogether like1 ,he is called the ,image2 to show that ,he is begotten immaterially1 ,he is called the ,word4 ,all these truths cannot be expressed by only one name4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,to be intelligent belongs to the ,son1 in the same way as it belongs to ,him to be ,god1 since to understand is said of ,god essentially1 as stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d74 ,now the ,son is ,god begotten1 and not ,god begetting2 and hence ,he is intelligent1 not as producing a ,word1 but as the ,word proceeding2 forasmuch as in ,god the ,word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect1 but is distinguished from the principle of the ,word only by relation4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,when it is said of the ,son1 ,bearing all things by the word of ,his power2 word is taken figuratively for the effect of the ,word4 ,hence a gloss says that word is here taken to mean command2 inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the ,word1 things are kept in being1 as also by the effect of the power of the ,word things are brought into being4 ,basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying ,word to the ,holy ,ghost2 in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word1 and so in that way the ,holy ,ghost may be called the ,son's ,word1 because ,he manifests the ,son4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cd1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,name ,word ,imports ,relation to ,creatures8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the name ',word' does not import relation to creatures4 ,for every name that connotes some effect in creatures1 is said of ,god essentially4 ,but ,word is not said essentially1 but personally4 ,therefore ,word does not import relation to creatures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever imports relation to creatures is said of ,god in time2 as ,lord and ,creator4 ,but ,word is said of ,god from eternity4 ,therefore it does not import relation to the creature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds4 ,therefore1 if it imports relation to the creature1 it follows that the ,word proceeds from the creature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ideas 7in ,god7 are many according to their various relations to creatures4 ,therefore if ,word imports relation to creatures1 it follows that in ,god there is not one ,word only1 but many4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if ,word imports relation to the creature1 this can only be because creatures are known by ,god4 ,but ,god does not know beings only2 ,he knows also non-beings4 ,therefore in the ,word are implied relations to non-beings2 which appears to be false4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #fc71 that the name ,word signifies not only relation to the ,father1 but also relation to those beings which are made through the ,word1 by ,his operative power4 ,i answer that1 ,word implies relation to creatures4 ,for ,god by knowing ,himself1 knows every creature4 ,now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood4 ,hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand4 ,but because ,god by one act understands ,himself and all things1 ,his one only ,word is expressive not only of the ,father1 but of all creatures4 ,and as the knowledge of ,god is only cognitive as regards ,god1 whereas as regards creatures1 it is both cognitive and operative1 so the ,word of ,god is only expressive of what is in ,god the ,father1 but is both expressive and operative of creatures2 and therefore it is said 7,ps4 #cb3i73 ,he spake1 and they were made2 because in the ,word is implied the operative idea of what ,god makes4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person2 for person is an individual substance of a rational nature4 ,therefore the name of a divine person1 as regards the personal relation1 does not imply relation to the creature1 but it is implied in what belongs to the nature4 ,yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures1 so far as the essence is included in its meaning3 for as it properly belongs to the ,son to be the ,son1 so it properly belongs to ,him to be ,god begotten1 or the ,creator begotten2 and in this way the name ,word imports relation to creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since the relations result from actions1 some names import the relation of ,god to creatures1 which relation follows on the action of ,god which passes into some exterior effect1 as to create and to govern2 and the like are applied to ,god in time4 ,but others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect1 but abides in the agent--as to know and to will3 such are not applied to ,god in time2 and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the ,word4 ,nor is it true that all names which import the relation of ,god to creatures are applied to ,him in time2 but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of ,god passing into exterior effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,creatures are known to ,god not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves1 but by ,his own essence4 ,hence it is not necessary that the ,word should proceed from creatures1 although the ,word is expressive of creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the name of ,idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures2 and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to ,god2 and it is not said personally4 ,but the name of ,word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker1 and consequently1 relation to creatures1 inasmuch as ,god1 by understanding ,himself1 understands every creature2 and so there is only one ,word in ,god1 and that is a personal one4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,god's knowledge of non-beings and ,god's ,word about non-beings are the same2 because the ,word of ,god contains no less than does the knowledge of ,god1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ad74 ,nevertheless the ,word is expressive and operative of beings1 but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings4 ,,question #ce ,,of ,,the ,,image 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we next inquire concerning the image3 about which there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,image in ,god is said personally8 7#b7 ,whether this name belongs to the ,son alone8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,image in ,god ,is ,said ,personally8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that image is not said personally of ,god4 ,for ,augustine 7,fulgentius1 ,de ,fide ad ,petrum i7 says1 ,the ,godhead of the ,holy ,trinity and the ,image whereunto man is made are one4 ,therefore ,image is said of ,god essentially1 and not personally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,hilary says 7,de ,synod473 ,an image is a like species of that which it represents4 ,but species or form is said of ,god essentially4 ,therefore so also is ,image4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,image is derived from imitation1 which implies before and after4 ,but in the divine persons there is no before and after4 ,therefore ,image cannot be a personal name in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #a73 ,what is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself8 ,therefore the ,image in ,god is a relation1 and is thus a personal name4 ,i answer that1 ,image includes the idea of similitude4 ,still1 not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image1 but only similitude of species1 or at least of some specific sign4 ,in corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure4 ,for we see that the species of different animals are of different figures2 but not of different colors4 ,hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall1 this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted4 ,further1 neither the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image1 which requires also the idea of origin2 because1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #gd73 ,one egg is not the image of another1 because it is not derived from it4 ,therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species1 or at least in specific sign4 ,now whatever imports procession or origin in ,god1 belongs to the persons4 ,hence the name ,image is a personal name4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,image1 properly speaking1 means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another4 ,that to the likeness of which anything proceeds1 is properly speaking called the exemplar1 and is improperly called the image4 ,nevertheless ,augustine 7,fulgentius7 uses the name of ,image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the ,holy ,trinity is the ,image to whom man was made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 species1 as mentioned by ,hilary in the definition of image1 means the form derived from one thing to another4 ,in this sense image is said to be the species of anything1 as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form1 inasmuch as it has a like form4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,imitation in ,god does not signify posteriority1 but only assimilation4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ce1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,name of ,image ,is ,proper to the ,son8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the name of ,image is not proper to the ,son2 because1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #ah71 ,the ,holy ,ghost is the ,image of the ,son4 ,therefore ,image does not belong to the ,son alone4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 lxxxiii1 qu4 #gd74 ,but this belongs to the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who proceeds from another by way of similitude4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost is an ,image2 and so to be ,image does not belong to the ,son alone4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man is also called the image of ,god1 according to #a ,cor4 #aa3g1 ,the man ought not to cover his head1 for he is the image and the glory of ,god4 ,therefore ,image is not proper to the ,son4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #b73 ,the ,son alone is the ,image of the ,father4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,greek ,doctors commonly say that the ,holy ,ghost is the ,image of both the ,father and of the ,son2 but the ,latin ,doctors attribute the name ,image to the ,son alone4 ,for it is not found in the canonical ,scripture except as applied to the ,son2 as in the words1 ,who is the ,image of the invisible ,god1 the firstborn of creatures 7,col4 #a3ae7 and again3 ,who being the brightness of ,his glory1 and the figure of ,his substance4 7,heb4 #a3c74 ,some explain this by the fact that the ,son agrees with the ,father1 not in nature only1 but also in the notion of principle3 whereas the ,holy ,ghost agrees neither with the ,son1 nor with the ,father in any notion4 ,this1 however1 does not seem to suffice4 ,because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in ,god1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v1 #f71 so neither 7by reason thereof do we consider7 that similitude which is essential to image4 ,hence others say that the ,holy ,ghost cannot be called the ,image of the ,son1 because there cannot be an image of an image2 nor of the ,father1 because again the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image2 and the ,holy ,ghost is related to the ,father through the ,son2 nor again is ,he the ,image of the ,father and the ,son1 because then there would be one image of two2 which is impossible4 ,hence it follows that the ,holy ,ghost is in no way an ,image4 ,but this is no proof3 for the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 as we shall explain further on 7,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence there is nothing to prevent there being one ,image of the ,father and of the ,son1 inasmuch as they are one2 since even man is one image of the whole ,trinity4 ,therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that1 as the ,holy ,ghost1 although by ,his procession ,he receives the nature of the ,father1 as the ,son also receives it1 nevertheless is not said to be born2 so1 although ,he receives the likeness of the ,father1 ,he is not called the ,image2 because the ,son proceeds as word1 and it is essential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds2 whereas this does not essentially belong to love1 although it may belong to that love which is the ,holy ,ghost1 inasmuch as ,he is the divine love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,damascene and the other ,greek ,doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the ,holy ,ghost is like to the ,father and the ,son1 still it does not follow that ,he is the ,image1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the image of a thing may be found in something in two ways4 ,in one way it is found in something of the same specific nature2 as the image of the king is found in his son4 ,in another way it is found in something of a different nature1 as the king's image on the coin4 ,in the first sense the ,son is the ,image of the ,father2 in the second sense man is called the image of ,god2 and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man1 man is not simply called the image1 but to the image1 whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection4 ,but it cannot be said that the ,son of ,god is to the image1 because ,he is the perfect ,image of the ,father4 ,,question #cf ,,of ,,the ,,person ,,of ,,the ,,holy ,,ghost 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is called not only the ,holy ,ghost1 but also the ,love and ,gift of ,god4 ,concerning the name ,holy ,ghost there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether this name1 ,holy ,ghost1 is the proper name of one divine ,person8 7#b7 ,whether that divine person ,who is called the ,holy ,ghost1 proceeds from the ,father and the ,son8 7#c7 ,whether ,he proceeds from the ,father through the ,son8 7#d7 ,whether the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,this ,name ,holy ,ghost ,is the ,proper ,name of ,one ,divine ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this name1 ,holy ,ghost1 is not the proper name of one divine person4 ,for no name which is common to the three persons is the proper name of any one person4 ,but this name of ',holy ,ghost' 99,it should be borne in mind that the word ghost is the old ,english equivalent for the ,latin spiritus1 whether in the sense of breath or blast1 or in the sense of spirit1 as an immaterial substance4 ,thus1 we read in the former sense 7,hampole1 ,psalter x1 #g71 ,the ,gost of ,storms spiritus procellarum1 and in the latter ,trubled gost is sacrifice of ,god 7,prose ,psalter1 ,a4,d4 #acbe71 and ,oure wrestlynge is 4 4 4 against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre 7,more1 ,comfort against ,tribulation72 and in our modern expression of giving up the ghost4 ,as applied to ,god1 and not specially to the third ,holy ,person1 we have an example from ,maunder1 ,jhesu ,criste was the worde and the goste of ,good4 7,see ,oxford ,dictionary747 is common to the three persons2 for ,hilary 7,de ,trin4 viii7 shows that the ,spirit of ,god sometimes means the ,father1 as in the words of ,isa4 #fa3a3 ,the ,spirit of the ,lord is upon me2 and sometimes the ,son1 as when the ,son says3 ,in the ,spirit of ,god ,i cast out devils 7,matt4 #ab3bh71 showing that ,he cast out devils by ,his own natural power2 and that sometimes it means the ,holy ,ghost1 as in the words of ,joel #b3bh3 ,i will pour out of ,my ,spirit over all flesh4 ,therefore this name ',holy ,ghost' is not the proper name of a divine person4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the names of the divine persons are relative terms1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,trin474 ,but this name ,holy ,ghost is not a relative term4 ,therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine ,person4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 because the ,son is the name of a divine ,person ,he cannot be called the ,son of this or of that4 ,but the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man1 as appears in the words1 ,the ,lord said to ,moses1 ,i will take of thy spirit and will give to them 7,num4 #aa3ag7 and also ,the ,spirit of ,elias rested upon ,eliseus 7#d ,kings #b3ae74 ,therefore ,holy ,ghost does not seem to be the proper name of a divine ,person4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7#a ,john #e3g73 ,there are three who bear witness in heaven1 the ,father1 the ,word1 and the ,holy ,ghost4 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #d73 ,when we ask1 ,three what8 we say1 ,three persons4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost is the name of a divine person4 ,i answer that1 ,while there are two processions in ,god1 one of these1 the procession of love1 has no proper name of its own1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c74 ,hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d73 for which reason the ,person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name4 ,but as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations1 as when we use the names of procession and spiration1 which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations2 so to signify the divine ,person1 ,who proceeds by way of love1 this name ,holy ,ghost is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to ,him4 ,the appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways4 ,firstly1 from the fact that the person who is called ,holy ,ghost has something in common with the other ,persons4 ,for1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ag2 v1 #aa71 ,because the ,holy ,ghost is common to both1 ,he ,himself is called that properly which both are called in common4 ,for the ,father also is a spirit1 and the ,son is a spirit2 and the ,father is holy1 and the ,son is holy4 ,secondly1 from the proper signification of the name4 ,for the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion2 for we call the breath and the wind by the term spirit4 ,now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved4 ,further1 holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to ,god4 ,therefore because the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby ,god is loved1 that person is most properly named ,the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the expression ,holy ,spirit1 if taken as two words1 is applicable to the whole ,trinity3 because by 'spirit' the immateriality of the divine substance is signified2 for corporeal spirit is invisible1 and has but little matter2 hence we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances4 ,and by adding the word holy we signify the purity of divine goodness4 ,but if ,holy ,spirit be taken as one word1 it is thus that the expression1 in the usage of the ,church1 is accommodated to signify one of the three persons1 the one who proceeds by way of love1 for the reason above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although this name ,holy ,ghost does not indicate a relation1 still it takes the place of a relative term1 inasmuch as it is accommodated to signify a ,person distinct from the others by relation only4 ,yet this name may be understood as including a relation1 if we understand the ,holy ,spirit as being breathed spiratus4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the name ,son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle1 in regard to that principle3 but in the name ,father we understand the relation of principle2 and likewise in the name of ,spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power4 ,but to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person2 but rather the reverse4 ,therefore we can say our ,father1 and our ,spirit2 but we cannot say our ,son4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,holy ,ghost ,proceeds from the ,son8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,son4 ,for as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i73 ,we must not dare to say anything concerning the substantial ,divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles4 ,but in the ,sacred ,scripture we are not told that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,son2 but only that ,he proceeds from the ,father1 as appears from ,john #ae3bf3 ,the ,spirit of truth1 ,who proceeds from the ,father4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,son4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,in the creed of the council of ,constantinople 7,can4 vii7 we read3 ,we believe in the ,holy ,ghost1 the ,lord and ,life-giver1 who proceeds from the ,father2 with the ,father and the ,son to be adored and glorified4 ,therefore it should not be added in our ,creed that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,son2 and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i73 ,we say that the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,father1 and we name ,him the spirit of the ,father2 but we do not say that the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,son1 yet we name ,him the ,spirit of the ,son4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,son4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost rests in the ,son2 for it is said in the legend of ,st4 ,andrew3 ,peace be to you and to all who believe in the one ,god the ,father1 and in ,his only ,son our ,lord ,jesus ,christ1 and in the one ,holy ,ghost proceeding from the ,father1 and abiding in the ,son4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,son4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the ,son proceeds as the ,word4 ,but our breath spiritus does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,son4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 the ,holy ,ghost proceeds perfectly from the ,father4 ,therefore it is superfluous to say that ,he proceeds from the ,son4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual 7,phys4 iii1 text #cb71 and much less so in ,god4 ,but it is possible for the ,holy ,ghost to be distinguished from the ,son1 even if ,he did not proceed from ,him4 ,for ,anselm says 7,de ,process4 ,spir4 ,sancti1 ii73 ,the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost have their ,being from the ,father2 but each in a different way2 one by ,birth1 the other by ,procession1 so that they are thus distinct from one another4 ,and further on he says3 ,for even if for no other reason were the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost distinct1 this alone would suffice4 ,therefore the ,holy ,spirit is distinct from the ,son1 without proceeding from ,him4 ,on the contrary1 ,athanasius says3 ,the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,father and the ,son2 not made1 nor created1 nor begotten1 but proceeding4 ,i answer that1 ,it must be said that the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,son4 ,for if ,he were not from ,him1 ,he could in no wise be personally distinguished from ,him2 as appears from what has been said above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b74 ,for it cannot be said that the divine ,persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense2 for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons3 since everything that is spoken of ,god in an absolute sense1 belongs to the unity of essence4 ,therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations4 ,now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations2 which appears from the fact that the ,father has two relations1 by one of which ,he is related to the ,son1 and by the other to the ,holy ,ghost2 but these are not opposite relations1 and therefore they do not make two persons1 but belong only to the one person of the ,father4 ,if therefore in the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost there were two relations only1 whereby each of them were related to the ,father1 these relations would not be opposite to each other1 as neither would be the two relations whereby the ,father is related to them4 ,hence1 as the person of the ,father is one1 it would follow that the person of the ,son and of the ,holy ,ghost would be one1 having two relations opposed to the two relations of the ,father4 ,but this is heretical since it destroys the ,faith in the ,trinity4 ,therefore the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations4 ,now there cannot be in ,god any relations opposed to each other1 except relations of origin1 as proved above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d74 ,and opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a principle1 and of what is from the principle4 ,therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the ,son is from the ,holy ,ghost2 which no one says2 or that the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,son1 as we confess4 ,furthermore1 the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion4 ,for it was said above 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d2 ,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #d71 that the ,son proceeds by the way of the intellect as ,word1 and the ,holy ,ghost by way of the will as ,love4 ,now love must proceed from a word4 ,for we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception4 ,hence also in this way it is manifest that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,son4 ,we derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself4 ,for we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter2 as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially1 with no order to each other2 whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced4 ,hence also in the order of creatures produced1 the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed4 ,so if from the one ,person of the ,father1 two persons proceed1 the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost1 there must be some order between them4 ,nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature1 whereby one is from the other4 ,therefore it cannot be said that the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost proceed from the ,father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other1 unless we admit in them a material distinction2 which is impossible4 ,hence also the ,greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the ,holy ,ghost has some order to the ,son4 ,for they grant that the ,holy ,ghost is the ,spirit of the ,son2 and that ,he is from the ,father through the ,son4 ,some of them are said also to concede that ,he is from the ,son2 or that ,he flows from the ,son1 but not that ,he proceeds2 which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy4 ,for a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind4 ,for we use the term to describe any kind of origin2 as when we say that a line proceeds from a point1 a ray from the sun1 a stream from a source1 and likewise in everything else4 ,hence1 granted that the ,holy ,ghost originates in any way from the ,son1 we can conclude that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we ought not to say about ,god anything which is not found in ,holy ,scripture either explicitly or implicitly4 ,but although we do not find it verbally expressed in ,holy ,scripture that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,son1 still we do find it in the sense of ,scripture1 especially where the ,son says1 speaking of the ,holy ,ghost1 ,he will glorify ,me1 because ,he shall receive of ,mine 7,john #af3ad74 ,it is also a rule of ,holy ,scripture that whatever is said of the ,father1 applies to the ,son1 although there be added an exclusive term2 except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations1 whereby the ,father and the ,son are distinguished from each other4 ,for when the ,lord says1 ,no one knoweth the ,son1 but the ,father1 the idea of the ,son knowing ,himself is not excluded4 ,so therefore when we say that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father1 even though it be added that ,he proceeds from the ,father alone1 the ,son would not thereby be at all excluded2 because as regards being the principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 the ,father and the ,son are not opposed to each other1 but only as regards the fact that one is the ,father1 and the other is the ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in every council of the ,church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time4 ,hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith2 but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies4 ,hence in the decision of the council of ,chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the council of ,constantinople1 handed down the doctrine about the ,holy ,ghost1 not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at ,nicaea1 but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter4 ,therefore1 because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the ,holy ,ghost did not proceed from the ,son had not arisen1 it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point2 whereas1 later on1 when certain errors rose up1 another council 99,council of ,rome1 under ,pope ,damasus assembled in the west1 the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the ,roman ,pontiff1 by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed4 ,nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the ,holy ,ghost did not proceed from the ,son1 as appears in a ,nestorian creed condemned in the council of ,ephesus4 ,this error was embraced by ,theodoric the ,nestorian1 and several others after him1 among whom was also ,damascene4 ,hence1 in that point his opinion is not to be held4 ,although1 too1 it has been asserted by some that while ,damascene did not confess that the ,holy ,ghost was from the ,son1 neither do those words of his express a denial thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when the ,holy ,ghost is said to rest or abide in the ,son1 it does not mean that ,he does not proceed from ,him2 for the ,son also is said to abide in the ,father1 although ,he proceeds from the ,father4 ,also the ,holy ,ghost is said to rest in the ,son as the love of the lover abides in the beloved2 or in reference to the human nature of ,christ1 by reason of what is written3 ,on whom thou shalt see the ,spirit descending and remaining upon ,him1 ,he it is who baptizes 7,john #a3cc74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the ,word in ,god is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word1 whence the breath spiritus does not proceed2 for it would then be only metaphorical2 but after the similitude of the mental word1 whence proceeds love4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,for the reason that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father perfectly1 not only is it not superfluous to say ,he proceeds from the ,son1 but rather it is absolutely necessary4 ,forasmuch as one power belongs to the ,father and the ,son2 and because whatever is from the ,father1 must be from the ,son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation2 for the ,son is not from ,himself1 although ,he is from the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the ,holy ,ghost is distinguished from the ,son1 inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other2 but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the ,son is only from the ,father1 whereas the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,father and the ,son2 for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other1 as explained above1 and in ,q4 #bg4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,holy ,ghost ,proceeds from the ,father ,through the ,son8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,father through the ,son4 ,for whatever proceeds from one through another1 does not proceed immediately4 ,therefore1 if the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father through the ,son1 ,he does not proceed immediately2 which seems to be unfitting4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father through the ,son1 ,he does not proceed from the ,son1 except on account of the ,father4 ,but whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so4 ,therefore ,he proceeds more from the ,father than from the ,son4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,son has ,his being by generation4 ,therefore if the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,father through the ,son1 it follows that the ,son is first generated and afterwards the ,holy ,ghost proceeds2 and thus the procession of the ,holy ,ghost is not eternal1 which is heretical4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 when anyone acts through another1 the same may be said conversely4 ,for as we say that the king acts through the bailiff1 so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king4 ,but we can never say that the ,son spirates the ,holy ,ghost through the ,father4 ,therefore it can never be said that the ,father spirates the ,holy ,ghost through the ,son4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 xii73 ,keep me1 ,i pray1 in this expression of my faith1 that ,i may ever possess the ,father--namely ,thyself3 that ,i may adore ,thy ,son together with ,thee3 and that ,i may deserve ,thy ,holy ,spirit1 who is through ,thy ,only ,begotten4 ,i answer that1 ,whenever one is said to act through another1 this preposition through points out1 in what is covered by it1 some cause or principle of that act4 ,but since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done1 sometimes that which is covered by the preposition through is the cause of the action1 as proceeding from the agent2 and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts1 whether it be a final cause or a formal cause1 whether it be effective or motive4 ,it is a final cause when we say1 for instance1 that the artisan works through love of gain4 ,it is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art4 ,it is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another4 ,sometimes1 however1 that which is covered by this preposition through is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done2 as1 for instance1 when we say1 the artisan acts through the mallet1 for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts1 but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan1 and that it has even this effect from the artisan4 ,this is why it is sometimes said that this preposition through sometimes denotes direct authority1 as when we say1 the king works through the bailiff2 and sometimes indirect authority1 as when we say1 the bailiff works through the king4 ,therefore1 because the ,son receives from the ,father that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from ,him1 it can be said that the ,father spirates the ,holy ,ghost through the ,son1 or that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father through the ,son1 which has the same meaning4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in every action two things are to be considered1 the suppositum acting1 and the power whereby it acts2 as1 for instance1 fire heats through heat4 ,so if we consider in the ,father and the ,son the power whereby they spirate the ,holy ,ghost1 there is no mean1 for this is one and the same power4 ,but if we consider the persons themselves spirating1 then1 as the ,holy ,ghost proceeds both from the ,father and from the ,son1 the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father immediately1 as from ,him1 and mediately1 as from the ,son2 and thus ,he is said to proceed from the ,father through the ,son4 ,so also did ,abel proceed immediately from ,adam1 inasmuch as ,adam was his father2 and mediately1 as ,eve was his mother1 who proceeded from ,adam2 although1 indeed1 this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the ,son received from the ,father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the ,holy ,ghost1 it would follow that ,he would be a secondary and instrumental cause2 and thus the ,holy ,ghost would proceed more from the ,father than from the ,son2 whereas1 on the contrary1 the same spirative power belongs to the ,father and to the ,son2 and therefore the ,holy ,ghost proceeds equally from both1 although sometimes ,he is said to proceed principally or properly from the ,father1 because the ,son has this power from the ,father4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the begetting of the ,son is co-eternal with the begetter 7and hence the ,father does not exist before begetting the ,son71 so the procession of the ,holy ,ghost is co-eternal with ,his principle4 ,hence1 the ,son was not begotten before the ,holy ,ghost proceeded2 but each of the operations is eternal4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when anyone is said to work through anything1 the converse proposition is not always true4 ,for we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter2 whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king1 because it is the bailiff's place to act1 since he is master of his own act1 but it is not the mallet's place to act1 but only to be made to act1 and hence it is used only as an instrument4 ,the bailiff is1 however1 said to act through the king1 although this preposition through denotes a medium1 for the more a suppositum is prior in action1 so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect1 inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect4 ,hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences4 ,therefore1 so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the subject's acting1 the king is said to work through the bailiff2 but according to the order of powers1 the bailiff is said to act through the king1 forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff's action its effect4 ,now there is no order of power between ,father and ,son1 but only order of 'supposita'2 and hence we say that the ,father spirates through the ,son2 and not conversely4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cf1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,father and the ,son ,are ,one ,principle of the ,holy ,ghost8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,father and the ,son are not one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for the ,holy ,ghost does not proceed from the ,father and the ,son as they are one2 not as they are one in nature1 for the ,holy ,ghost would in that way proceed from ,himself1 as ,he is one in nature with ,them2 nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property1 for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father and the ,son as distinct from one another4 ,therefore the ,father and the ,son are not one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in this proposition the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 we do not designate personal unity1 because in that case the ,father and the ,son would be one person2 nor again do we designate the unity of property1 because if one property were the reason of the ,father and the ,son being one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 similarly1 on account of ,his two properties1 the ,father would be two principles of the ,son and of the ,holy ,ghost1 which cannot be admitted4 ,therefore the ,father and the ,son are not one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,son is not one with the ,father more than is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost and the ,father are not one principle as regards any other divine person4 ,therefore neither are the ,father and the ,son4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 this one is either the ,father or it is not the ,father4 ,but we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the ,father1 it follows that the ,son is the ,father2 and if the one is not the ,father1 it follows that the ,father is not the ,father4 ,therefore we cannot say that the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 it seems necessary to say1 conversely1 that the one principle of the ,holy ,ghost is the ,father and the ,son4 ,but this seems to be false2 for this word principle stands either for the person of the ,father1 or for the person of the ,son2 and in either sense it is false4 ,therefore this proposition also is false1 that the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 unity in substance makes identity4 ,so if the ,father and the ,son are the one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 it follows that they are the same principle2 which is denied by many4 ,therefore we cannot grant that the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost are called one ,creator1 because they are the one principle of the creature4 ,but the ,father and the ,son are not one1 but two ,spirators1 as many assert2 and this agrees also with what ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 ii7 that the ,holy ,ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from ,father and ,son as authors4 ,therefore the ,father and the ,son are not one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v1 #ad7 that the ,father and the ,son are not two principles1 but one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,father and the ,son are in everything one1 wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation4 ,hence since there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the ,holy ,ghost it follows that the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,some1 however1 assert that this proposition is incorrect3 ,the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 because1 they declare1 since the word principle in the singular number does not signify person1 but property1 it must be taken as an adjective2 and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective1 it cannot properly be said that the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost unless one be taken as an adverb1 so that the meaning should be3 ,they are one principle--that is1 in one and the same way4 ,but then it might be equally right to say that the ,father is two principles of the ,son and of the ,holy ,ghost--namely1 in two ways4 ,therefore1 we must say that1 although this word principle signifies a property1 it does so after the manner of a substantive1 as do the words father and son even in things created4 ,hence it takes its number from the form it signifies1 like other substantives4 ,therefore1 as the ,father and the ,son are one ,god1 by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word ,god2 so they are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if we consider the spirative power1 the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father and the ,son as they are one in the spirative power1 which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property1 as we shall see later 7ad #g74 ,nor is there any reason against one property being in two supposita that possess one common nature4 ,but if we consider the supposita of the spiration1 then we may say that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father and the ,son1 as distinct2 for ,he proceeds from them as the unitive love of both4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the proposition the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 one property is designated which is the form signified by the term4 ,it does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the ,father can be called several principles1 for this would imply in ,him a plurality of subjects4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in ,god1 but by reason of the essence4 ,hence1 as the ,father is not more like to ,himself than ,he is to the ,son2 so likewise neither is the ,son more like to the ,father than is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,these two propositions1 ,the ,father and the ,son are one principle which is the ,father1 or1 one principle which is not the ,father1 are not mutually contradictory2 and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them4 ,for when we say the ,father and the ,son are one principle1 this word principle has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together4 ,hence there is a fallacy of figure of speech as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,this proposition is also true3--,the one principle of the ,holy ,ghost is the ,father and the ,son2 because the word principle does not stand for one person only1 but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,there is no reason against saying that the ,father and the ,son are the same principle1 because the word principle stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two ,persons together4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,some say that although the ,father and the ,son are one principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 there are two spirators1 by reason of the distinction of supposita1 as also there are two spirating1 because acts refer to subjects4 ,yet this does not hold good as to the name ,creator2 because the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father and the ,son as from two distinct persons1 as above explained2 whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons1 but as united in essence4 ,it seems1 however1 better to say that because spirating is an adjective1 and spirator a substantive1 we can say that the ,father and the ,son are two spirating1 by reason of the plurality of the supposita but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration4 ,for adjectival words derive their number from the supposita but substantives from themselves1 according to the form signified4 ,as to what ,hilary says1 that the ,holy ,ghost is from the ,father and the ,son as ,his authors1 this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective4 ,,question #cg ,,of ,,the ,,name ,,of ,,the ,,holy ,,ghost--,,love 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we now inquire concerning the name ,love1 on which arise two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether it is the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost8 7#b7 ,whether the ,father and the ,son love each other by the ,holy ,ghost8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,love ,is the ,proper ,name of the ,holy ,ghost8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,love is not the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ag73 ,as the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost are called ,wisdom1 and are not three ,wisdoms1 but one2 ,i know not why the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost should not be called ,charity1 and all together one ,charity4 ,but no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of all together1 is a proper name of a person4 ,therefore this name1 ,love1 is not the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,holy ,ghost is a subsisting person1 but love is not used to signify a subsisting person1 but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved4 ,therefore ,love is not the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,love is the bond between lovers1 for as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,love is a unitive force4 ,but a bond is a medium between what it joins together1 not something proceeding from them4 ,therefore1 since the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father and the ,son1 as was shown above 7,q4 #cf1 ,a4 #b71 it seems that ,he is not the ,love or bond of the ,father and the ,son4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,love belongs to every lover4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost is a lover3 therefore ,he has love4 ,so if the ,holy ,ghost is ,love1 ,he must be love of love1 and spirit from spirit2 which is not admissible4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxx1 in ,pentecost473 ,the ,holy ,ghost ,himself is ,love4 ,i answer that1 ,the name ,love in ,god can be taken essentially and personally4 ,if taken personally it is the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost2 as ,word is the proper name of the ,son4 ,to see this we must know that since as shown above 7,q4 #bg1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d1 #e71 there are two processions in ,god1 one by way of the intellect1 which is the procession of the ,word1 and another by way of the will1 which is the procession of ,love2 forasmuch as the former is the more known to us1 we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession1 but not as regards the procession of the will4 ,hence1 we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person ,who proceeds1 and the relations following from this procession which are called procession and spiration1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d1 ad #c71 and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term4 ,nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply4 ,for as when a thing is understood by anyone1 there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood1 which conception we call word2 so when anyone loves an object1 a certain impression results1 so to speak1 of the thing loved in the affection of the lover2 by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover2 as also the thing understood is in the one who understands2 so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself1 not only by real identity1 but also as the object understood is in the one who understands1 and the thing loved is in the lover4 ,as regards the intellect1 however1 words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood1 as appears in the word to understand2 and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception--namely1 to speak1 and word4 ,hence in ,god1 to understand is applied only to the essence2 because it does not import relation to the ,word that proceeds2 whereas ,word is said personally1 because it signifies what proceeds2 and the term to speak is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the ,word to the ,word ,himself4 ,on the other hand1 on the part of the will1 with the exception of the words dilection and love1 which express the relation of the lover to the object loved1 there are no other terms in use1 which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved1 produced in the lover by fact that he loves--to the principle of that impression1 or vice versa4 ,and therefore1 on account of the poverty of our vocabulary1 we express these relations by the words love and dilection3 just as if we were to call the ,word intelligence conceived1 or wisdom begotten4 ,it follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved1 love and to love are said of the essence1 as understanding and to understand2 but1 on the other hand1 so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle1 of what proceeds by way of love1 and vice versa1 so that by love is understood the love proceeding1 and by to love is understood the spiration of the love proceeding1 in that sense love is the name of the person and to love is a notional term1 as to speak and to beget4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence1 as was said above 7here and ,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #b1 ad #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although to understand1 and to will1 and to love signify actions passing on to their objects1 nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents1 as stated above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #d71 yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object4 ,hence1 love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover1 and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker2 yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word1 or loved4 ,but in ,god1 in whom there is nothing accidental1 there is more than this2 because both ,word and ,love are subsistent4 ,therefore1 when we say that the ,holy ,ghost is the ,love of the ,father for the ,son1 or for something else2 we do not mean anything that passes into another1 but only the relation of love to the beloved2 as also in the ,word is imported the relation of the ,word to the thing expressed by the ,word4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,holy ,ghost is said to be the bond of the ,father and ,son1 inasmuch as ,he is ,love2 because1 since the ,father loves ,himself and the ,son with one ,love1 and conversely1 there is expressed in the ,holy ,ghost1 as ,love1 the relation of the ,father to the ,son1 and conversely1 as that of the lover to the beloved4 ,but from the fact that the ,father and the ,son mutually love one another1 it necessarily follows that this mutual ,love1 the ,holy ,ghost1 proceeds from both4 ,as regards origin1 therefore1 the ,holy ,ghost is not the medium1 but the third person in the ,trinity2 whereas as regards the aforesaid relation ,he is the bond between the two persons1 as proceeding from both4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as it does not belong to the ,son1 though ,he understands1 to produce a word1 for it belongs to ,him to understand as the word proceeding2 so in like manner1 although the ,holy ,ghost loves1 taking ,love as an essential term1 still it does not belong to ,him to spirate love1 which is to take love as a notional term2 because ,he loves essentially as love proceeding2 but not as the one whence love proceeds4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #cg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,father and the ,son ,love ,each ,other by the ,holy ,ghost8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,father and the ,son do not love each other by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #a7 proves that the ,father is not wise by the ,wisdom begotten4 ,but as the ,son is ,wisdom begotten1 so the ,holy ,ghost is the ,love proceeding1 as explained above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore the ,father and the ,son do not love ,themselves by the ,love proceeding1 which is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the proposition1 ,the ,father and the ,son love each other by the ,holy ,ghost1 this word love is to be taken either essentially or notionally4 ,but it cannot be true if taken essentially1 because in the same way we might say that the ,father understands by the ,son2 nor1 again1 if it is taken notionally1 for then1 in like manner1 it might be said that the ,father and the ,son spirate by the ,holy ,ghost1 or that the ,father generates by the ,son4 ,therefore in no way is this proposition true3 ,the ,father and the ,son love each other by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by the same love the ,father loves the ,son1 and ,himself1 and us4 ,but the ,father does not love ,himself by the ,holy ,ghost2 for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act2 since it cannot be said that the ,father begets ,himself1 or that ,he spirates ,himself4 ,therefore1 neither can it be said that ,he loves ,himself by the ,holy ,ghost1 if to love is taken in a notional sense4 ,again1 the love wherewith ,he loves us is not the ,holy ,ghost2 because it imports a relation to creatures1 and this belongs to the essence4 ,therefore this also is false3 ,the ,father loves the ,son by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #e73 ,the ,holy ,ghost is ,he whereby the ,begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves ,his ,begetter4 ,i answer that1 ,a difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say1 the ,father loves the ,son by the ,holy ,ghost1 since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause1 it seems to mean that the ,holy ,ghost is the principle of love to the ,father and the ,son2 which cannot be admitted4 ,in view of this difficulty some have held that it is false1 that the ,father and the ,son love each other by the ,holy ,ghost2 and they add that it was retracted by ,augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that the ,father is wise by the ,wisdom begotten4 ,others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded1 as that the ,father loves the ,son by the ,holy ,ghost--that is1 by ,his essential ,love1 which is appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign1 so that it means1 the ,holy ,ghost is the sign that the ,father loves the ,son2 inasmuch as the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from them both1 as ,love4 ,others1 again1 say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause1 because the ,holy ,ghost is the love whereby the ,father and the ,son formally love each other4 ,others1 again1 say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect2 and these approach nearer to the truth4 ,to make the matter clear1 we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms1 as white from whiteness1 and man from humanity2 everything whence anything is denominated1 in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form4 ,so when ,i say1 this man is clothed with a garment1 the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause1 although the garment is not the form4 ,now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it1 not only as an agent is from its action1 but also as from the term itself of the action--that is1 the effect1 when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action4 ,for we say that fire warms by heating1 although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire1 but is an action proceeding from the fire2 and we say that a tree flowers with the flower1 although the flower is not the tree's form1 but is the effect proceeding from the form4 ,in this way1 therefore1 we must say that since in ,god to love is taken in two ways1 essentially and notionally1 when it is taken essentially1 it means that the ,father and the ,son love each other not by the ,holy ,ghost1 but by their essence4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #g73 ,who dares to say that the ,father loves neither ,himself1 nor the ,son1 nor the ,holy ,ghost1 except by the ,holy ,ghost8 ,the opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense4 ,but when the term ,love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than to spirate love2 just as to speak is to produce a word1 and to flower is to produce flowers4 ,as therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower1 so do we say that the ,father1 by the ,word or the ,son1 speaks ,himself1 and ,his creatures2 and that the ,father and the ,son love each other and us1 by the ,holy ,ghost1 or by ,love proceeding4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in ,god2 therefore we cannot say that the ,father is wise or intelligent by the ,son4 ,but to love is taken not only essentially1 but also in a notional sense2 and in this way1 we can say that the ,father and the ,son love each other by the ,holy ,ghost1 as was above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when the idea of an action includes a determined effect1 the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action1 and from the effect2 so we can say1 for instance1 that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower4 ,when1 however1 the idea of an action does not include a determined effect1 then in that case1 the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect1 but only from the action4 ,for we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower1 but by the production of the flower4 ,so when we say1 spirates or begets1 this imports only a notional act4 ,hence we cannot say that the ,father spirates by the ,holy ,ghost1 or begets by the ,son4 ,but we can say that the ,father speaks by the ,word1 as by the ,person proceeding1 and speaks by the speaking1 as by a notional act2 forasmuch as to speak imports a determinate person proceeding2 since to speak means to produce a word4 ,likewise to love1 taken in a notional sense1 means to produce love2 and so it can be said that the ,father loves the ,son by the ,holy ,ghost1 as by the person proceeding1 and by ,love itself as a notional act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,father loves not only the ,son1 but also ,himself and us1 by the ,holy ,ghost2 because1 as above explained1 to love1 taken in a notional sense1 not only imports the production of a divine person1 but also the person produced1 by way of love1 which has relation to the object loved4 ,hence1 as the ,father speaks ,himself and every creature by ,his begotten ,word1 inasmuch as the ,word begotten adequately represents the ,father and every creature2 so ,he loves ,himself and every creature by the ,holy ,ghost1 inasmuch as the ,holy ,ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the ,father loves ,himself and every creature4 ,thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the ,word and in the proceeding ,love1 as it were in a secondary way1 inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures4 ,,question #ch ,,of ,,the ,,name ,,of ,,the ,,holy ,,ghost1 ,,as ,,gift 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,there now follows the consideration of the ,gift2 concerning which there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,gift can be a personal name8 7#b7 ,whether it is the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,gift ,is a ,personal ,name8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,gift is not a personal name4 ,for every personal name imports a distinction in ,god4 ,but the name of ,gift does not import a distinction in ,god2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ai73 that the ,holy ,ghost is so given as ,god's ,gift1 that ,he also gives ,himself as ,god4 ,therefore ,gift is not a personal name4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 no personal name belongs to the divine essence4 ,but the divine essence is the ,gift which the ,father gives to the ,son1 as ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 ix74 ,therefore ,gift is not a personal name4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iv1 #ai7 there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons4 ,but gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given1 and as regards him by whom it is given4 ,therefore ,gift is not a personal name4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,gift imports relation to the creature1 and it thus seems to be said of ,god in time4 ,but personal names are said of ,god from eternity2 as ,father1 and ,son4 ,therefore ,gift is not a personal name4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ai73 ,as the body of flesh is nothing but flesh2 so the gift of the ,holy ,ghost is nothing but the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost is a personal name2 so also therefore is ,gift4 ,i answer that1 ,the word gift imports an aptitude for being given4 ,and what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given4 ,for it would not be given by anyone1 unless it was his to give2 and it is given to someone to be his4 ,now a divine person is said to belong to another1 either by origin1 as the ,son belongs to the ,father2 or as possessed by another4 ,but we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please3 and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed1 except by a rational creature united to ,god4 ,other creatures can be moved by a divine person1 not1 however1 in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person1 and to use the effect thereof4 ,the rational creature does sometimes attain thereto2 as when it is made partaker of the divine ,word and of the ,love proceeding1 so as freely to know ,god truly and to love ,god rightly4 ,hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person4 ,nevertheless in order that it may possess ,him in this manner1 its own power avails nothing3 hence this must be given it from above2 for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source4 ,thus a divine person can be given1 and can be a gift4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the name ,gift imports a personal distinction1 in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin4 ,nevertheless1 the ,holy ,ghost gives ,himself1 inasmuch as ,he is ,his own1 and can use or rather enjoy ,himself2 as also a free man belongs to himself4 ,and as ,augustine says 7,in ,joan4 ,tract4 xxix73 ,what is more yours than yourself8 ,or we might say1 and more fittingly1 that a gift must belong in a way to the giver4 ,but the phrase1 this is this one's1 can be understood in several senses4 ,in one way it means identity1 as ,augustine says 7,in ,joan4 ,tract4 xxix72 and in that sense gift is the same as the giver1 but not the same as the one to whom it is given4 ,the ,holy ,ghost gives ,himself in that sense4 ,in another sense1 a thing is another's as a possession1 or as a slave2 and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver2 and the gift of ,god so taken is a created thing4 ,in a third sense this is this one's through its origin only2 and in this sense the ,son is the ,father's2 and the ,holy ,ghost belongs to both4 ,therefore1 so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver1 it is personally distinguished from the giver1 and is a personal name4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the divine essence is the ,father's gift in the first sense1 as being the ,father's by way of identity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,gift as a personal name in ,god does not imply subjection1 but only origin1 as regards the giver2 but as regards the one to whom it is given1 it implies a free use1 or enjoyment1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,gift is not so called from being actually given1 but from its aptitude to be given4 ,hence the divine person is called ,gift from eternity1 although ,he is given in time4 ,nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature2 but that it includes something essential in its meaning2 as the essence is included in the idea of person1 as stated above 7,q4 #cd1 ,a4 #c74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ch1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,gift ,is the ,proper ,name of the ,holy ,ghost8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,gift is not the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for the name ,gift comes from being given4 ,but1 as ,isaiah says 7#i3af73 ,a ,son is given to us4 ,therefore to be ,gift belongs to the ,son1 as well as to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every proper name of a person signifies a property4 ,but this word ,gift does not signify a property of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore ,gift is not a proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,holy ,ghost can be called the spirit of a man1 whereas ,he cannot be called the gift of any man1 but ,god's ,gift only4 ,therefore ,gift is not the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj73 ,as 'to be born' is1 for the ,son1 to be from the ,father1 so1 for the ,holy ,ghost1 'to be the ,gift of ,god' is to proceed from ,father and ,son4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost receives ,his proper name from the fact that ,he proceeds from ,father and ,son4 ,therefore ,gift is the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,i answer that1 ,gift1 taken personally in ,god1 is the proper name of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,in proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving1 as ,aristotle says 7,topic4 iv1 #d7--;i4e4 a thing which is not given with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation4 ,now1 the reason of donation being gratuitous is love2 since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well4 ,so what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well4 ,hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift1 through which all free gifts are given4 ,so since the ,holy ,ghost proceeds as love1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #a71 ,he proceeds as the first gift4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #bd73 ,by the gift1 which is the ,holy ,ghost1 many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of ,christ4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,son is properly called the ,image because ,he proceeds by way of a word1 whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle1 although the ,holy ,ghost also is like to the ,father2 so also1 because the ,holy ,ghost proceeds from the ,father as love1 ,he is properly called ,gift1 although the ,son1 too1 is given4 ,for that the ,son is given is from the ,father's love1 according to the words1 ,god so loved the world1 as to give ,his only begotten ,son 7,john #c3af74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the name ,gift involves the idea of belonging to the ,giver through its origin2 and thus it imports the property of the origin of the ,holy ,ghost--that is1 ,his procession4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,before a gift is given1 it belongs only to the giver2 but when it is given1 it is his to whom it is given4 ,therefore1 because ,gift does not import the actual giving1 it cannot be called a gift of man1 but the ,gift of ,god giving4 ,when1 however1 it has been given1 then it is the spirit of man1 or a gift bestowed on man4 ,,question #ci ,,of ,,the ,,persons ,,in ,,relation ,,to ,,the ,,essence 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely1 we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence1 to the properties1 and to the notional acts2 and of the comparison of these with each other4 ,as regards the first of these1 there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the essence in ,god is the same as the person8 7#b7 ,whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence8 7#c7 ,whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural1 or in the singular8 7#d7 ,whether notional adjectives1 or verbs1 or participles1 can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense8 7#e7 ,whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract8 7#f7 ,whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names8 7#g7 ,whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons8 7#h7 ,which attributes should be appropriated to each person8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #a ,whether in ,god the ,essence ,is the ,same ,as the ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in ,god the essence is not the same as person4 ,for whenever essence is the same as person or suppositum1 there can be only one suppositum of one nature1 as is clear in the case of all separate substances4 ,for in those things which are really one and the same1 one cannot be multiplied apart from the other4 ,but in ,god there is one essence and three persons1 as is clear from what is above expounded 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore essence is not the same as person4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true4 ,but affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person4 ,for person is distinct1 whereas essence is not4 ,therefore person and essence are not the same4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing can be subject to itself4 ,but person is subject to essence2 whence it is called suppositum or hypostasis4 ,therefore person is not the same as essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #g73 ,when we say the person of the ,father we mean nothing else but the substance of the ,father4 ,i answer that1 ,the truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity4 ,for it was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #c7 that the divine simplicity requires that in ,god essence is the same as suppositum1 which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person4 ,but a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied1 the essence nevertheless retains its unity4 ,and because1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 i71 relation multiplies the ,trinity of persons1 some have thought that in ,god essence and person differ1 forasmuch as they held the relations to be adjacent2 considering only in the relations the idea of reference to another1 and not the relations as realities4 ,but as it was shown above 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #b7 in creatures relations are accidental1 whereas in ,god they are the divine essence itself4 ,thence it follows that in ,god essence is not really distinct from person2 and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other4 ,for person1 as above stated 7,q4 #bi1 ,a4 #d71 signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature4 ,but relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really1 but only in our way of thinking2 while as referred to an opposite relation1 it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition4 ,thus there are one essence and three persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there cannot be a distinction of suppositum in creatures by means of relations1 but only by essential principles2 because in creatures relations are not subsistent4 ,but in ,god relations are subsistent1 and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the supposita2 and yet the essence is not distinguished1 because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as essence and person in ,god differ in our way of thinking1 it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other2 and therefore1 when we suppose the one1 we need not suppose the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,divine things are named by us after the way of created things1 as above explained 7,q4 #ac1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,and since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature1 it follows that individuals are called subjects1 supposita1 or hypostases4 ,so the divine persons are named supposita or hypostases1 but not as if there really existed any real supposition or subjection4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,it ,must ,be ,said ,that the ,three ,persons ,are of ,one ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence4 ,for ,hilary says 7,de ,synod47 that the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost are indeed three by substance1 but one in harmony4 ,but the substance of ,god is ,his essence4 ,therefore the three persons are not of one essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is to be affirmed of ,god except what can be confirmed by the authority of ,holy ,writ1 as appears from ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 i74 ,now ,holy ,writ never says that the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost are of one essence4 ,therefore this should not be asserted4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the divine nature is the same as the divine essence4 ,it suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence2 but rather that the essence is of the person4 ,therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #f7 that we do not say that the three persons are from one essence ex una essentia1 lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in ,god4 ,but prepositions which imply transition1 denote the oblique case4 ,therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are of one essence unius essentiae4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 nothing should be said of ,god which can be occasion of error4 ,now1 to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance1 furnishes occasion of error4 ,for1 as ,hilary says 7,de ,synod473 ,one substance predicated of the ,father and the ,son signifies either one subsistent1 with two denominations2 or one substance divided into two imperfect substances2 or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two4 ,therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,maxim4 iii7 that the word homoousion1 which the ,council of ,nicaea adopted against the ,arians1 means that the three persons are of one essence4 ,i answer that1 ,as above explained 7,q4 #ac1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 divine things are named by our intellect1 not as they really are in themselves1 for in that way it knows them not2 but in a way that belongs to things created4 ,and as in the objects of the senses1 whence the intellect derives its knowledge1 the nature of the species is made individual by the matter1 and thus the nature is as the form1 and the individual is the suppositum of the form2 so also in ,god the essence is taken as the form of the three persons1 according to our mode of signification4 ,now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form2 as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man4 ,but we do not say of that which has a form1 that it belongs to the form1 unless some adjective qualifies the form2 as when we say3 ,that woman is of a handsome figure1 or3 ,this man is of perfect virtue4 ,in like manner1 as in ,god the persons are multiplied1 and the essence is not multiplied1 we speak of one essence of the three persons1 and three persons of the one essence1 provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,substance is here taken for the hypostasis1 and not for the essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although we may not find it declared in ,holy ,writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence1 nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning2 for instance1 ,i and the ,father are one 7,john #aj3cj71 and ,i am in the ,father1 and the ,father in ,me 7,john #aj3ch72 and there are many other texts of the same import4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,because nature designates the principle of action while essence comes from being essendo1 things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action1 as all things which give heat2 but only those things can be said to be of one essence which have one being4 ,so the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are of one essence1 than by saying they are of one nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,form1 in the absolute sense1 is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form1 as we say the virtue of ,peter4 ,on the other hand1 the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form4 ,in which case two genitives are required1 one signifying the form1 and the other signifying the determination of the form1 as1 for instance1 when we say1 ,peter is of great virtue magnae virtutis1 or else one genitive must have the force of two1 as1 for instance1 he is a man of blood--that is1 he is a man who sheds much blood multi sanguinis4 ,so1 because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person1 it may properly be said that the essence is of the person2 but we cannot say the converse1 unless we add some term to designate the essence2 as1 for instance1 the ,father is a person of the divine essence2 or1 the three persons are of one essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the preposition from or out of does not designate the habitude of a formal cause1 but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause2 which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes4 ,for nothing can be its own matter1 nor its own active principle4 ,yet a thing may be its own form1 as appears in all immaterial things4 ,so1 when we say1 three persons of one essence1 taking essence as having the habitude of form1 we do not mean that essence is different from person1 which we should mean if we said1 three persons from the same essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as ,hilary says 7,de ,synod473 ,it would be prejudicial to holy things1 if we had to do away with them1 just because some do not think them holy4 ,so if some misunderstand homoousion1 what is that to me1 if ,i understand it rightly8 4 4 4 ,the oneness of nature does not result from division1 or from union or from community of possession1 but from one nature being proper to both ,father and ,son4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,essential ,names ,should ,be ,predicated in the ,singular of the ,three ,persons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that essential names1 as the name ,god1 should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons1 but in the plural4 ,for as man signifies one that has humanity1 so ,god signifies one that has ,godhead4 ,but the three persons are three who have ,godhead4 ,therefore the three persons are three ,gods4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gen4 #a3a1 where it is said1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 the ,hebrew original has ,elohim1 which may be rendered ,gods or ,judges3 and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons4 ,therefore the three persons are several ,gods1 and not one ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 this word thing when it is said absolutely1 seems to belong to substance4 ,but it is predicated of the three persons in the plural4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e73 ,the things that are the objects of our future glory are the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 as this word ,god signifies a being who has ,deity1 so also this word person signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature4 ,but we say there are three persons4 ,so for the same reason we can say there are three ,gods4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,deut4 #f3d73 ,hear1 ,o ,israel1 the ,lord thy ,god is one ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives2 while others signify it after the manner of adjectives4 ,those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only1 and not in the plural4 ,those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural4 ,the reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance1 while adjectives signify something by way of accident1 which adheres to a subject4 ,now just as substance has existence of itself1 so also it has of itself unity or multitude2 wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name4 ,but as accidents have their existence in a subject1 so they have unity or plurality from their subject2 and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their supposita4 ,in creatures1 one form does not exist in several supposita except by unity of order1 as the form of an ordered multitude4 ,so if the names signifying such a form are substantives1 they are predicated of many in the singular1 but otherwise if they adjectives4 ,for we say that many men are a college1 or an army1 or a people2 but we say that many men are collegians4 ,now in ,god the divine essence is signified by way of a form1 as above explained 7,a4 #b71 which1 indeed1 is simple and supremely one1 as shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #d74 ,so1 names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular1 and not in the plural4 ,this1 then1 is the reason why we say that ,socrates1 ,plato and ,cicero are three men2 whereas we do not say the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost are three ,gods1 but one ,god2 forasmuch as in the three supposita of human nature there are three humanities1 whereas in the three divine ,persons there is but one divine essence4 ,on the other hand1 the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally1 by reason of the plurality of supposita4 ,for we say there are three existent or three wise beings1 or three eternal1 uncreated1 and immense beings1 if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense4 ,but if taken in a substantive sense1 we say one uncreated1 immense1 eternal being1 as ,athanasius declares4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,though the name ,god signifies a being having ,godhead1 nevertheless the mode of signification is different4 ,for the name ,god is used substantively2 whereas having ,godhead is used adjectively4 ,consequently1 although there are three having ,godhead1 it does not follow that there are three ,gods4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,various languages have diverse modes of expression4 ,so as by reason of the plurality of supposita the ,greeks said three hypostases1 so also in ,hebrew ,elohim is in the plural4 ,we1 however1 do not apply the plural either to ,god or to substance1 lest plurality be referred to the substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this word thing is one of the transcendentals4 ,whence1 so far as it is referred to relation1 it is predicated of ,god in the plural2 whereas1 so far as it is referred to the substance1 it is predicated in the singular4 ,so ,augustine says1 in the passage quoted1 that the same ,trinity is a thing supreme4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the form signified by the word person is not essence or nature1 but personality4 ,so1 as there are three personalities--that is1 three personal properties in the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost--it is predicated of the three1 not in the singular1 but in the plural4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,concrete ,essential ,names ,can ,stand for the ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the concrete1 essential names cannot stand for the person1 so that we can truly say ,god begot ,god4 ,for1 as the logicians say1 a singular term signifies what it stands for4 ,but this name ,god seems to be a singular term1 for it cannot be predicated in the plural1 as above explained 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore1 since it signifies the essence1 it stands for essence1 and not for person4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate1 as to its signification2 but only as to the sense signified in the predicate4 ,but when ,i say1 ,god creates1 this name ,god stands for the essence4 ,so when we say ,god begot1 this term ,god cannot by reason of the notional predicate1 stand for person4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if this be true1 ,god begot1 because the ,father generates2 for the same reason this is true1 ,god does not beget1 because the ,son does not beget4 ,therefore there is ,god who begets1 and there is ,god who does not beget2 and thus it follows that there are two ,gods4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if ,god begot ,god1 ,he begot either ,god1 that is ,himself1 or another ,god4 ,but ,he did not beget ,god1 that is ,himself2 for1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #a71 nothing begets itself4 ,neither did ,he beget another ,god2 as there is only one ,god4 ,therefore it is false to say1 ,god begot ,god4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if ,god begot ,god1 ,he begot either ,god who is the ,father1 or ,god who is not the ,father4 ,if ,god who is the ,father1 then ,god the ,father was begotten4 ,if ,god who is not the ,father1 then there is a ,god who is not ,god the ,father3 which is false4 ,therefore it cannot be said that ,god begot ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,in the ,creed it is said1 ,god of ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,some have said that this name ,god and the like1 properly according to their nature1 stand for the essence1 but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the ,person4 ,this opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity1 which requires that in ,god1 ,he who possesses and what is possessed be the same4 ,so ,he who possesses ,godhead1 which is signified by the name ,god1 is the same as ,godhead4 ,but when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves1 the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified4 ,hence as this word ,god signifies the divine essence as in ,him ,who possesses it1 just as the name man signifies humanity in a subject1 others more truly have said that this word ,god1 from its mode of signification1 can1 in its proper sense1 stand for person1 as does the word man4 ,so this word ,god sometimes stands for the essence1 as when we say ,god creates2 because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified--that is1 ,godhead4 ,but sometimes it stands for the person1 either for only one1 as when we say1 ,god begets1 or for two1 as when we say1 ,god spirates2 or for three1 as when it is said3 ,to the ,king of ages1 immortal1 invisible1 the only ,god1 etc4 7#a ,tim4 #a3ag74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although this name ,god agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied2 nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several supposita4 ,so it need not always stand for the essence it signifies4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this holds good against those who say that the word ,god does not naturally stand for person4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the word ,god stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word man does2 for since the form signified by this word man--that is1 humanity--is really divided among its different subjects1 it stands of itself for the person1 even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person--that is1 to a distinct subject4 ,the unity or community of the human nature1 however1 is not a reality1 but is only in the consideration of the mind4 ,hence this term man does not stand for the common nature1 unless this is required by some adjunct1 as when we say1 man is a species2 whereas the form signified by the name ,god--that is1 the divine essence--is really one and common4 ,so of itself it stands for the common nature1 but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person4 ,so1 when we say1 ,god generates1 by reason of the notional act this name ,god stands for the person of the ,father4 ,but when we say1 ,god does not generate1 there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the ,son1 and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature4 ,if1 however1 something be added belonging to the person of the ,son1 this proposition1 for instance1 ,god begotten does not beget1 is true4 ,consequently1 it does not follow that there exists a ,god generator1 and a ,god not generator2 unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons2 as1 for instance1 if we were to say1 the ,father is ,god the generator and the ,son is ,god the non-generator and so it does not follow that there are many ,gods2 for the ,father and the ,son are one ,god1 as was said above 7,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this is false1 the ,father begot ,god1 that is ,himself1 because the word ,himself1 as a reciprocal term1 refers to the same suppositum4 ,nor is this contrary to what ,augustine says 7,ep4 lxvi ad ,maxim47 that ,god the ,father begot another self alterum se1 forasmuch as the word se is either in the ablative case1 and then it means ,he begot another from ,himself1 or it indicates a single relation1 and thus points to identity of nature4 ,this is1 however1 either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking1 so that it would really mean1 ,he begot another most like to ,himself4 ,likewise also it is false to say1 ,he begot another ,god1 because although the ,son is another than the ,father1 as above explained 7,q4 #ca1 ,a4 #b71 nevertheless it cannot be said that ,he is another ,god2 forasmuch as this adjective another would be understood to apply to the substantive ,god2 and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of ,godhead4 ,yet this proposition ,he begot another ,god is tolerated by some1 provided that another be taken as a substantive1 and the word ,god be construed in apposition with it4 ,this1 however1 is an inexact way of speaking1 and to be avoided1 for fear of giving occasion to error4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,to say1 ,god begot ,god ,who is ,god the ,father1 is wrong1 because since the word ,father is construed in apposition to ,god1 the word ,god is restricted to the person of the ,father2 so that it would mean1 ,he begot ,god1 ,who is ,himself the ,father2 and then the ,father would be spoken of as begotten1 which is false4 ,wherefore the negative of the proposition is true1 ,he begot ,god ,who is not ,god the ,father4 ,if however1 we understand these words not to be in apposition1 and require something to be added1 then1 on the contrary1 the affirmative proposition is true1 and the negative is false2 so that the meaning would be1 ,he begot ,god ,who is ,god ,who is the ,father4 ,such a rendering however appears to be forced1 so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false1 and the negative is true4 ,yet ,prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false1 because this relative ,who in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the suppositum2 whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the suppositum4 ,whence1 in the affirmative the sense is that to be ,god the ,father is befitting to the person of the ,son2 and in the negative sense is that to be ,god the ,father1 is to be removed from the ,son's divinity as well as from ,his personality4 ,this1 however1 appears to be irrational2 since1 according to the ,philosopher 7,peri ,herm4 ii71 what is open to affirmation1 is open also to negation4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,abstract ,essential ,names ,can ,stand for the ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person1 so that this proposition is true1 ,essence begets essence4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 i1 #b73 ,the ,father and the ,son are one ,wisdom1 because they are one essence2 and taken singly ,wisdom is from ,wisdom1 as essence from essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us4 ,but the ,son is generated4 ,therefore since the divine essence is in the ,son1 it seems that the divine essence is generated4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god and the divine essence are the same1 as is clear from what is above explained 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #c74 ,but1 as was shown1 it is true to say that ,god begets ,god4 ,therefore this is also true3 ,essence begets essence4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated4 ,but the ,father is the divine essence2 therefore essence can stand for the person of the ,father4 ,thus the essence begets4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the essence is a thing begetting1 because the essence is the ,father who is begetting4 ,therefore if the essence is not begetting1 the essence will be a thing begetting1 and not begetting3 which cannot be4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj73 ,the ,father is the principle of the whole ,godhead4 ,but ,he is principle only by begetting or spirating4 ,therefore the ,father begets or spirates the ,godhead4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 i1 #a73 ,nothing begets itself4 ,but if the essence begets the essence1 it begets itself only1 since nothing exists in ,god as distinguished from the divine essence4 ,therefore the essence does not beget essence4 ,i answer that1 ,concerning this1 the abbot ,joachim erred in asserting that as we can say ,god begot ,god1 so we can say ,essence begot essence3 considering that1 by reason of the divine simplicity ,god is nothing else but the divine essence4 ,in this he was wrong1 because if we wish to express ourselves correctly1 we must take into account not only the thing which is signified1 but also the mode of its signification as above stated 7,a4 #d74 ,now although ,god is really the same as ,godhead1 nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same4 ,for since this word ,god signifies the divine essence in ,him that possesses it1 from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person4 ,thus the things which properly belong to the persons1 can be predicated of this word1 ,god1 as1 for instance1 we can say ,god is begotten or is ,begetter1 as above explained 7,a4 #d74 ,the word essence1 however1 in its mode of signification1 cannot stand for ,person1 because it signifies the essence as an abstract form4 ,consequently1 what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other1 cannot be attributed to the essence4 ,for that would imply distinction in the divine essence1 in the same way as there exists distinction in the supposita4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to express unity of essence and of person1 the holy ,doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows4 ,whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them3 thus1 for instance1 abstract names should be explained by concrete names1 or even by personal names2 as when we find essence from essence2 or wisdom from wisdom2 we should take the sense to be1 the ,son who is essence and wisdom1 is from the ,father who is essence and wisdom4 ,nevertheless1 as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed1 forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to supposita4 ,so nature from nature1 and wisdom from wisdom are less inexact than essence from essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator1 but another nature1 numerically distinct1 which commences to exist in it anew by generation1 and ceases to exist by corruption1 and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally2 whereas ,god begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter4 ,so the divine nature in the ,son is not begotten either directly or accidentally4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although ,god and the divine essence are really the same1 nevertheless1 on account of their different mode of signification1 we must speak in a different way about each of them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the divine essence is predicated of the ,father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity2 yet it does not follow that it can stand for the ,father1 its mode of signification being different4 ,this objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this1 that the former carry their subject with them1 whereas the latter do not1 but add the thing signified to the substantive4 ,whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of suppositum1 whereas the adjective indicates something added to the suppositum4 ,therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence1 because they are really the same2 nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence2 but it belongs to the suppositum implied in the substantive4 ,but notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive4 ,we cannot say that the essence is begetting2 yet we can say that the essence is a thing begetting1 or that it is ,god begetting1 if thing and ,god stand for person1 but not if they stand for essence4 ,consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that essence is a thing begetting1 and a thing not begetting2 because in the first case thing stands for person1 and in the second it stands for the essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,so far as ,godhead is one in several supposita1 it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term4 ,so when we say1 the ,father is the principle of the whole ,godhead1 the term ,godhead can be taken for all the persons together1 inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons4 ,nor does it follow that ,he is ,his own principle2 as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself4 ,we may also say that ,he is the principle of the whole ,godhead2 not as generating or spirating it1 but as communicating it by generation and spiration4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,persons ,can ,be ,predicated of the ,essential ,terms8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names2 so that we can say for instance1 ,god is three persons2 or ,god is the ,trinity4 ,for it is false to say1 man is every man1 because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject4 ,for neither ,socrates1 nor ,plato1 nor anyone else is every man4 ,in the same way this proposition1 ,god is the ,trinity1 cannot be verified of any one of the supposita of the divine nature4 ,for the ,father is not the ,trinity2 nor is the ,son2 nor is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,so to say1 ,god is the ,trinity1 is false4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication2 as when ,i say1 animal is man2 for it is accidental to animal to be man4 ,but this name ,god as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #d74 ,therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name ,god1 except in an accidental sense4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says1 in his sermon on ,faith 99,serm4 ii1 in coena ,domini1 ,we believe that one ,god is one divinely named ,trinity4 ,i answer that1 ,as above explained 7,a4 #e71 although adjectival terms1 whether personal or notional1 cannot be predicated of the essence1 nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated1 owing to the real identity of essence and person4 ,the divine essence is not only really the same as one person1 but it is really the same as the three persons4 ,whence1 one person1 and two1 and three1 can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say1 ,the essence is the ,father1 and the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost4 ,and because this word ,god can of itself stand for the essence1 as above explained 7,a4 #d1 ad #c71 hence1 as it is true to say1 ,the essence is the three persons2 so likewise it is true to say1 ,god is the three persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as above explained this term man can of itself stand for person1 whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature4 ,so it is false to say1 ,man is every man2 because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject4 ,on the contrary1 this word ,god can of itself be taken for the divine essence4 ,so1 although to say of any of the supposita of the divine nature1 ,god is the ,trinity1 is untrue1 nevertheless it is true of the divine essence4 ,this was denied by ,porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when we say1 ,god1 or the divine essence is the ,father1 the predication is one of identity1 and not of the lower in regard to a higher species3 because in ,god there is no universal and singular4 ,hence1 as this proposition1 ,the ,father is ,god is of itself true1 so this proposition ,god is the ,father is true of itself1 and by no means accidentally4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,essential ,names ,should ,be ,appropriated to the ,persons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons4 ,for whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things2 for1 as ,jerome says1 careless words involve risk of heresy 99,in substance ,ep4 lvii44 ,but to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons1 may verge on error in faith2 for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to ,him in a fuller degree than to the others4 ,therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form4 ,but one person is not as a form to another2 since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form4 ,therefore the essential attributes1 especially when expressed in the abstract1 are not to be appropriated to the persons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 property is prior to the appropriated1 for property is included in the idea of the appropriated4 ,but the essential attributes1 in our way of understanding1 are prior to the persons2 as what is common is prior to what is proper4 ,therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons4 ,on the contrary1 the ,apostle says3 ,christ the power of ,god and the wisdom of ,god 7#a ,cor4 #a3bd74 ,i answer that1 ,for the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons4 ,for although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration1 as was above expounded 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #a71 nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us4 ,now the essential attributes of ,god are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties2 because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us1 such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties1 as was above explained 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #a74 ,as1 therefore1 we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons1 so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes4 ,and such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called appropriation4 ,the divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes2 in one way by similitude1 and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the ,son1 ,who proceeds by way of intellect1 as ,word4 ,in another way by dissimilitude2 as power is appropriated to the ,father1 as ,augustine says1 because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble2 lest anything of the kind be imagined of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them2 but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude1 or dissimilitude1 as above explained4 ,so1 no error in faith can arise1 but rather manifestation of the truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them1 then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another2 which ,augustine altogether repudiates 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #b71 showing that the ,father is wise1 not by ,wisdom begotten by ,him1 as though only the ,son were ,wisdom2 so that the ,father and the ,son together only can be called wise1 but not the ,father without the ,son4 ,but the ,son is called the ,wisdom of the ,father1 because ,he is ,wisdom from the ,father ,who is ,wisdom4 ,for each of them is of ,himself ,wisdom2 and both together are one ,wisdom4 ,whence the ,father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by ,him1 but by the wisdom which is ,his own essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person1 according to our way of understanding2 nevertheless1 so far as it is appropriated1 there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated4 ,thus color is posterior to body considered as body1 but is naturally prior to white body1 considered as white4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ci1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,essential ,attributes ,are ,appropriated to the ,persons in a ,fitting ,manner by the ,holy ,doctors8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors4 ,for ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 ii73 ,eternity is in the ,father1 the species in the ,image2 and use is in the ,gift4 ,in which words he designates three names proper to the persons3 the name of the ,father1 the name ,image proper to the ,son 7,q4 #ce1 ,a4 #b71 and the name ,bounty or ,gift1 which is proper to the ,holy ,ghost 7,q4 #ch1 ,a4 #b74 ,he also designates three appropriated terms4 ,for he appropriates eternity to the ,father1 species to the ,son1 and use to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,this he does apparently without reason4 ,for eternity imports duration of existence2 species1 the principle of existence2 and 'use' belongs to the operation4 ,but essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person4 ,therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e73 ,unity is in the ,father1 equality in the ,son1 and in the ,holy ,ghost is the concord of equality and unity4 ,this does not1 however1 seem fitting2 because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another4 ,for the ,father is not wise by the wisdom begotten1 as above explained 7,q4 #cg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,but1 as he subjoins1 ,all these three are one by the ,father2 all are equal by the ,son1 and all united by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,the above1 therefore1 are not fittingly appropriated to the ,persons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,augustine1 to the ,father is attributed power1 to the ,son wisdom1 to the ,holy ,ghost goodness4 ,nor does this seem fitting2 for strength is part of power1 whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the ,son1 according to the text1 ,christ the strength 99,douay3 power of ,god 7#a ,cor4 #a3bd74 ,so it is likewise appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost1 according to the words1 strength 99,douay3 virtue came out from ,him and healed all 7,luke #f3ai74 ,therefore power should not be appropriated to the ,father4 ,obj4 #d3 ,likewise ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj73 ,what the ,apostle says1 ,from ,him1 and by ,him1 and in ,him1 is not to be taken in a confused sense4 ,and 7,contra ,maxim4 ii7 'from ,him' refers to the ,father1 'by ,him' to the ,son1 'in ,him' to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,this1 however1 seems to be incorrectly said2 for the words in ,him seem to imply the relation of final cause1 which is first among the causes4 ,therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the ,father1 ,who is the principle from no principle4 ,obj4 #e3 ,likewise1 ,truth is appropriated to the ,son1 according to ,john #ad3f1 ,i am the ,way1 the ,truth1 and the ,life2 and likewise the book of life1 according to ,ps4 #ci3i1 ,in the beginning of the book it is written of ,me1 where a gloss observes1 that is1 with the ,father ,who is ,my head1 also this word ,who is2 because on the text of ,isaias1 ,behold ,i go to the ,gentiles 7#fe3a71 a gloss adds1 ,the ,son speaks ,who said to ,moses1 ,i am ,who am4 ,these appear to belong to the ,son1 and are not appropriated4 ,for truth1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 #cf71 is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude4 ,so it seems that it properly belongs to the ,son1 ,who has a principle4 ,also the book of life seems proper to the ,son1 as signifying a thing from another2 for every book is written by someone4 ,this also1 ,who is1 appears to be proper to the ,son2 because if when it was said to ,moses1 ,i am ,who am1 the ,trinity spoke1 then ,moses could have said1 ,he ,who is ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost1 and the ,holy ,ghost sent me to you1 so also he could have said further1 ,he ,who is the ,father1 and the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost sent me to you1 pointing out a certain person4 ,this1 however1 is false2 because no person is ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore it cannot be common to the ,trinity1 but is proper to the ,son4 ,i answer that1 ,our intellect1 which is led to the knowledge of ,god from creatures1 must consider ,god according to the mode derived from creatures4 ,in considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order4 ,firstly1 the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being4 ,secondly1 it is considered as one4 ,thirdly1 its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered4 ,the fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects4 ,hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to ,god4 ,according to the first point of consideration1 whereby we consider ,god absolutely in ,his being1 the appropriation mentioned by ,hilary applies1 according to which eternity is appropriated to the ,father1 species to the ,son1 use to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for eternity as meaning a being without a principle1 has a likeness to the property of the ,father1 ,who is a principle without a principle4 ,species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the ,son4 ,for beauty includes three conditions1 integrity or perfection1 since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly2 due proportion or harmony2 and lastly1 brightness or clarity1 whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color4 ,the first of these has a likeness to the property of the ,son1 inasmuch as ,he as ,son has in ,himself truly and perfectly the nature of the ,father4 ,to insinuate this1 ,augustine says in his explanation 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj73 ,where--that is1 in the ,son--there is supreme and primal life1 etc4 ,the second agrees with the ,son's property1 inasmuch as ,he is the express ,image of the ,father4 ,hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful1 if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing4 ,this is indicated by ,augustine when he says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj71 ,where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality1 etc4 ,the third agrees with the property of the ,son1 as the ,word1 which is the light and splendor of the intellect1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #c74 ,augustine alludes to the same when he says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj73 ,as the perfect ,word1 not wanting in anything1 and1 so to speak1 the art of the omnipotent ,god1 etc4 ,use has a likeness to the property of the ,holy ,ghost2 provided the use be taken in a wide sense1 as including also the sense of to enjoy2 according as to use is to employ something at the beck of the will1 and to enjoy means to use joyfully1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa74 ,so use1 whereby the ,father and the ,son enjoy each other1 agrees with the property of the ,holy ,ghost1 as ,love4 ,this is what ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj73 ,that love1 that delectation1 that felicity or beatitude1 is called use by him 7,hilary74 ,but the use by which we enjoy ,god1 is likened to the property of the ,holy ,ghost as the ,gift2 and ,augustine points to this when he says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj73 ,in the ,trinity1 the ,holy ,ghost1 the sweetness of the ,begettor and the ,begotten1 pours out upon us mere creatures ,his immense bounty and wealth4 ,thus it is clear how eternity1 species1 and use are attributed or appropriated to the persons1 but not essence or operation2 because1 being common1 there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the ,persons4 ,the second consideration of ,god regards ,him as one4 ,in that view ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e7 appropriates unity to the ,father1 equality to the ,son1 concord or union to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,it is manifest that these three imply unity1 but in different ways4 ,for unity is said absolutely1 as it does not presuppose anything else2 and for this reason it is appropriated to the ,father1 to ,whom any other person is not presupposed since ,he is the principle without principle4 ,equality implies unity as regards another2 for that is equal which has the same quantity as another4 ,so equality is appropriated to the ,son1 ,who is the principle from a principle4 ,union implies the unity of two2 and is therefore appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost1 inasmuch as ,he proceeds from two4 ,and from this we can understand what ,augustine means when he says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e7 that ,the ,three are one1 by reason of the ,father2 ,they are equal by reason of the ,son2 and are united by reason of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first3 just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul1 because therein we find the first trace of life4 ,now unity is perceived at once in the person of the ,father1 even if by an impossible hypothesis1 the other persons were removed4 ,so the other persons derive their unity from the ,father4 ,but if the other persons be removed1 we do not find equality in the ,father1 but we find it as soon as we suppose the ,son4 ,so1 all are equal by reason of the ,son1 not as if the ,son were the principle of equality in the ,father1 but that1 without the ,son equal to the ,father1 the ,father could not be called equal2 because ,his equality is considered firstly in regard to the ,son3 for that the ,holy ,ghost is equal to the ,father1 is also from the ,son4 ,likewise1 if the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is the union of the two1 be excluded1 we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the ,father and the ,son4 ,so all are connected by reason of the ,holy ,ghost2 because given the ,holy ,ghost1 we find whence the ,father and the ,son are said to be united4 ,according to the third consideration1 which brings before us the adequate power of ,god in the sphere of causality1 there is said to be a third kind of appropriation1 of power1 wisdom1 and goodness4 ,this kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons1 and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures4 ,for power has the nature of a principle1 and so it has a likeness to the heavenly ,father1 ,who is the principle of the whole ,godhead4 ,but in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age4 ,wisdom has likeness to the heavenly ,son1 as the ,word1 for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom4 ,in an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years4 ,goodness1 as the nature and object of love1 has likeness to the ,holy ,ghost2 but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit1 which often implies a certain violent impulse1 according to ,isa4 #be3d3 ,the spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall4 ,strength is appropriated to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost1 not as denoting the power itself of a thing1 but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power2 for instance1 we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength4 ,according to the fourth consideration1 i4e4 ,god's relation to ,his effects1 there arises appropriation of the expression from ,whom1 by ,whom1 and in ,whom4 ,for this preposition from ex sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause2 which has no place in ,god2 and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause1 which can be applied to ,god by reason of ,his active power2 hence it is appropriated to the ,father in the same way as power4 ,the preposition by per sometimes designates an intermediate cause2 thus we may say that a smith works by a hammer4 ,hence the word by is not always appropriated to the ,son1 but belongs to the ,son properly and strictly1 according to the text1 ,all things were made by ,him 7,john #a3c72 not that the ,son is an instrument1 but as the principle from a principle4 ,sometimes it designates the habitude of a form by which an agent works2 thus we say that an artificer works by his art4 ,hence1 as wisdom and art are appropriated to the ,son1 so also is the expression by ,whom4 ,the preposition in strictly denotes the habitude of one containing4 ,now1 ,god contains things in two ways3 in one way by their similitudes2 thus things are said to be in ,god1 as existing in ,his knowledge4 ,in this sense the expression in ,him should be appropriated to the ,son4 ,in another sense things are contained in ,god forasmuch as ,he in ,his goodness preserves and governs them1 by guiding them to a fitting end2 and in this sense the expression in ,him is appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost1 as likewise is goodness4 ,nor need the habitude of the final cause 7though the first of causes7 be appropriated to the ,father1 ,who is the principle without a principle3 because the divine persons1 of ,whom the ,father is the principle1 do not proceed from ,him as towards an end1 since each of ,them is the last end2 but ,they proceed by a natural procession1 which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power4 ,regarding the other points of inquiry1 we can say that since truth belongs to the intellect1 as stated above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a71 it is appropriated to the ,son1 without1 however1 being a property of ,his4 ,for truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself4 ,hence1 as intellect and thing in their essential meaning1 are referred to the essence1 and not to the persons1 so the same is to be said of truth4 ,the definition quoted from ,augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the ,son4 ,the book of life directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life4 ,for1 as above explained 7,q4 #bd1 ,a4 #a71 it is ,god's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life4 ,consequently1 it is appropriated to the ,son2 although life is appropriated to the ,holy ,ghost1 as implying a certain kind of interior movement1 agreeing in that sense with the property of the ,holy ,ghost as ,love4 ,to be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such2 but this belongs to it only as a work produced4 ,so this does not imply origin2 nor is it personal1 but an appropriation to a person4 ,the expression ,who is is appropriated to the person of the ,son1 not by reason of itself1 but by reason of an adjunct1 inasmuch as1 in ,god's word to ,moses1 was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the ,son4 ,yet1 forasmuch as the word ,who is taken in a relative sense1 it may sometimes relate to the person of the ,son2 and in that sense it would be taken personally2 as1 for instance1 were we to say1 ,the ,son is the begotten ',who is1' inasmuch as ,god begotten is personal4 ,but taken indefinitely1 it is an essential term4 ,and although the pronoun this iste seems grammatically to point to a particular person1 nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person1 although in its own nature it is not a person2 as we may say1 this stone1 and this ass4 ,so1 speaking in a grammatical sense1 so far as the word ,god signifies and stands for the divine essence1 the latter may be designated by the pronoun this1 according to ,ex4 #ae3b3 ,this is my ,god1 and ,i will glorify ,him4 ,,question #dj ,,of ,,the ,,persons ,,as ,,compared ,,to ,,the ,,relations ,,or ,,properties 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now consider the persons in connection with the relations1 or properties2 and there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether relation is the same as person8 7#b7 ,whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons8 7#c7 ,whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct8 7#d7 ,whether the relations1 according to our mode of understanding1 presuppose the acts of the persons1 or contrariwise8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,relation ,is the ,same ,as ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in ,god relation is not the same as person4 ,for when things are identical1 if one is multiplied the others are multiplied4 ,but in one person there are several relations2 as in the person of the ,father there is paternity and common spiration4 ,again1 one relation exists in two person1 as common spiration in the ,father and in the ,son4 ,therefore relation is not the same as person4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iv1 text4 #bd71 nothing is contained by itself4 ,but relation is in the person2 nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical1 for otherwise relation would be also in the essence4 ,therefore relation1 or property1 is not the same as person in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 when several things are identical1 what is predicated of one is predicated of the others4 ,but all that is predicated of a ,person is not predicated of ,his property4 ,for we say that the ,father begets2 but not that the paternity is begetting4 ,therefore property is not the same as person in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 in ,god what is and whereby it is are the same1 according to ,boethius 7,de ,hebdom474 ,but the ,father is ,father by paternity4 ,in the same way1 the other properties are the same as the persons4 ,i answer that1 ,different opinions have been held on this point4 ,some have said that the properties are not the persons1 nor in the persons2 and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations1 which do not indeed signify existence in something1 but rather existence towards something4 ,whence1 they styled the relations assistant1 as above explained 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #b74 ,but since relation1 considered as really existing in ,god1 is the divine essence ,itself1 and the essence is the same as person1 as appears from what was said above 7,q4 #ci1 ,a4 #a71 relation must necessarily be the same as person4 ,others1 therefore1 considering this identity1 said that the properties were indeed the persons2 but not in the persons2 for1 they said1 there are no properties in ,god except in our way of speaking1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #b74 ,we must1 however1 say that there are properties in ,god2 as we have shown 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #b74 ,these are designated by abstract terms1 being forms1 as it were1 of the persons4 ,so1 since the nature of a form requires it to be in that of which it is the form1 we must say that the properties are in the persons1 and yet that they are the persons2 as we say that the essence is in ,god1 and yet is ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,person and property are really the same1 but differ in concept4 ,consequently1 it does not follow that if one is multiplied1 the other must also be multiplied4 ,we must1 however1 consider that in ,god1 by reason of the divine simplicity1 a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct4 ,for1 since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form1 it follows that in ,god the abstract is the same as the concrete1 as ,godhead and ,god4 ,and as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident1 it follows that whatever is attributed to ,god1 is ,his essence ,itself2 and so1 wisdom and power are the same in ,god1 because they are both in the divine essence4 ,according to this twofold identity1 property in ,god is the same as person4 ,for personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in ,god2 since they are the subsisting persons themselves1 as paternity is the ,father ,himself1 and filiation is the ,son1 and procession is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity1 whereby whatever is attributed to ,god is ,his own essence4 ,thus1 common spiration is the same as the person of the ,father1 and the person of the ,son2 not that it is one self-subsisting person2 but that as there is one essence in the two persons1 so also there is one property in the two persons1 as above explained 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the properties are said to be in the essence1 only by mode of identity2 but in the persons they exist by mode of identity1 not merely in reality1 but also in the mode of signification2 as the form exists in its subject4 ,thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons1 but not the essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts3 and acts belong to a suppositum4 ,now1 properties are not designated as supposita1 but as forms of supposita4 ,and so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,persons ,are ,distinguished by the ,relations8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations4 ,for simple things are distinct by themselves4 ,but the persons are supremely simple4 ,therefore they are distinguished by themselves1 and not by the relation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus4 ,for white is distinguished from black only by quality4 ,but hypostasis signifies an individual in the genus of substance4 ,therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is absolute comes before what is relative4 ,but the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction4 ,therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction4 ,but relation presupposes distinction1 which comes into its definition2 for a relation is essentially what is towards another4 ,therefore the first distinctive principle in ,god cannot be relation4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,trin473 ,relation alone multiplies the ,trinity of the divine persons4 ,i answer that1 ,in whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all1 it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction4 ,so1 as the three persons agree in the unity of essence1 we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several4 ,now1 there are two principles of difference between the divine persons1 and these are origin and relation4 ,although these do not really differ1 yet they differ in the mode of signification2 for origin is signified by way of act1 as generation2 and relation by way of the form1 as paternity4 ,some1 then1 considering that relation follows upon act1 have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin1 so that we may say that the ,father is distinguished from the ,son1 inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten4 ,further1 that the relations1 or the properties1 make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom2 as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals1 which distinctions are caused by the material principles4 ,this opinion1 however1 cannot stand--for two reasons4 ,firstly1 because1 in order that two things be understood as distinct1 their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both2 thus in things created it results from their matter or their form4 ,now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic1 but means the way from something1 or to something2 as generation signifies the way to a thing generated1 and as proceeding from the generator4 ,hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone2 but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other4 ,in a divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence1 and relation or property4 ,whence1 since the persons agree in essence1 it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations4 ,secondly3 because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided1 because the common essence remains undivided2 but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct4 ,now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons1 inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons2 as paternity is the ,father1 and filiation is the ,son1 because in ,god the abstract and the concrete do not differ4 ,but it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person4 ,for origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person1 so that it presupposes the latter2 while in a passive sense origin1 as nativity1 signifies the way to a subsisting person1 and as not yet constituting the person4 ,it is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin4 ,for1 although in both ways they are distinguished1 nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations2 whence this name ,father signifies not only a property1 but also the hypostasis2 whereas this term ,begetter or ,begetting signifies property only2 forasmuch as this name ,father signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis2 and this term ,begetter or ,begotten signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the persons are the subsisting relations themselves4 ,hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the divine persons are not distinguished as regards being1 in which they subsist1 nor in anything absolute1 but only as regards something relative4 ,hence relation suffices for their distinction4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the more prior a distinction is1 the nearer it approaches to unity2 and so it must be the least possible distinction4 ,so the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible2 and this is by relation4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects1 when it is an accident2 but when the relation is subsistent1 it does not presuppose1 but brings about distinction4 ,for when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another1 the word another signifies the correlative which is not prior1 but simultaneous in the order of nature4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,hypostases ,remain ,if the ,relations ,are ,mentally ,abstracted from the ,persons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons4 ,for that to which something is added1 may be understood when the addition is taken away2 as man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be taken away4 ,but person is something added to hypostasis2 for person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity4 ,therefore1 if a personal property be taken away from a person1 the hypostasis remains4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that the ,father is ,father1 and that ,he is someone1 are not due to the same reason4 ,for as ,he is the ,father by paternity1 supposing ,he is some one by paternity1 it would follow that the ,son1 in ,whom there is not paternity1 would not be someone4 ,so when paternity is mentally abstracted from the ,father1 ,he still remains someone--that is1 a hypostasis4 ,therefore1 if property be removed from person1 the hypostasis remains4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v1 #f73 ,unbegotten is not the same as ,father2 for if the ,father had not begotten the ,son1 nothing would prevent ,him being called unbegotten4 ,but if ,he had not begotten the ,son1 there would be no paternity in ,him4 ,therefore1 if paternity be removed1 there still remains the hypostasis of the ,father as unbegotten4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iv73 ,the ,son has nothing else than birth4 ,but ,he is ,son by birth4 ,therefore1 if filiation be removed1 the ,son's hypostasis no more remains2 and the same holds as regards the other persons4 ,i answer that1 ,abstraction by the intellect is twofold--when the universal is abstracted from the particular1 as animal abstracted from man2 and when the form is abstracted from the matter1 as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter4 ,the difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the particular1 that from which the abstraction is made does not remain2 for when the difference of rationality is removed from man1 the man no longer remains in the intellect1 but animal alone remains4 ,but in the abstraction of the form from the matter1 both the form and the matter remain in the intellect2 as1 for instance1 if we abstract the form of a circle from brass1 there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle1 and of brass4 ,now1 although there is no universal nor particular in ,god1 nor form and matter1 in reality2 nevertheless1 as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in ,god2 and thus ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #f7 that substance is common and hypostasis is particular4 ,so1 if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular1 the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed2 but not the hypostasis of the ,father1 which is1 as it were1 a particular4 ,but as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter1 if the non-personal properties are removed1 then the idea of the hypostases and persons remains2 as1 for instance1 if the fact of the ,father's being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the ,father1 the ,father's hypostasis or person remains4 ,if1 however1 the personal property be mentally abstracted1 the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains4 ,for the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases1 as a form is added to a pre-existing subject3 but they carry with them their own supposita1 inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons2 thus paternity is the ,father ,himself4 ,for hypostasis signifies something distinct in ,god1 since hypostasis means an individual substance4 ,so1 as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases1 as above explained 7,a4 #b71 it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted1 the hypostases no longer remain4 ,some1 however1 think1 as above noted1 that the divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations1 but only by origin2 so that the ,father is a hypostasis as not from another1 and the ,son is a hypostasis as from another by generation4 ,and that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity1 constitute the notion of a person1 and are thus called personal properties4 ,hence1 if these relations are mentally abstracted1 the hypostasis1 but not the persons1 remain4 ,but this is impossible1 for two reasons3 first1 because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases1 as shown above 7,a4 #b72 secondly1 because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person1 as appears from the definition of ,boethius 7,de ,duab4 ,nat47 that1 person is the individual substance of a rational nature4 ,hence1 to have hypostasis and not person1 it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature1 but not the property from the person4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely1 but a distinguishing property of dignity1 all of which must be taken as the difference4 ,now1 this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature4 ,hence1 if the distinguishing property be removed from the person1 the hypostasis no longer remains2 whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed2 for both person and hypostasis are individual substances4 ,consequently1 in ,god the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by paternity the ,father is not only ,father1 but is a person1 and is someone1 or a hypostasis4 ,it does not follow1 however1 that the ,son is not someone or a hypostasis2 just as it does not follow that ,he is not a person4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the ,father would remain as unbegotten1 if ,his paternity were removed1 as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the ,father2 for this would be impossible1 since being unbegotten says nothing positive and is only a negation1 as he himself says4 ,but he speaks in a general sense1 forasmuch as not every unbegotten being is the ,father4 ,so1 if paternity be removed1 the hypostasis of the ,father does not remain in ,god1 as distinguished from the other persons1 but only as distinguished from creatures2 as the ,jews understand it4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dj1 ,art4 #d ,whether the properties presuppose the notional acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties4 ,for the ,master of the ,sentences says 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 xxvii7 that the ,father always is1 because ,he is ever begetting the ,son4 ,so it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded2 as equality presupposes quantity4 ,but paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation4 ,therefore paternity presupposes generation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation4 ,but filiation presupposes nativity2 for the ,son is so called because ,he is born4 ,therefore paternity also presupposes generation4 ,on the contrary1 ,generation is the operation of the person of the ,father4 ,but paternity constitutes the person of the ,father4 ,therefore in the order of intelligence1 paternity is prior to generation4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in ,god1 but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted1 we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts1 so that we can say1 without qualifying the phrase1 that because ,he begets1 ,he is the ,father4 ,a distinction1 however1 is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypostases4 ,for origin has in ,god an active and passive signification--active1 as generation is attributed to the ,father1 and spiration1 taken for the notional act1 is attributed to the ,father and the ,son2 passive1 as nativity is attributed to the ,son1 and procession to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for1 in the order of intelligence1 origin1 in the passive sense1 simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding2 because origin1 as passively understood1 signifies the way to a person constituted by the property4 ,likewise1 origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person originating2 as the notional act of spiration precedes1 in the order of intelligence1 the unnamed relative property common to the ,father and the ,son4 ,the personal property of the ,father can be considered in a twofold sense3 firstly1 as a relation2 and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act1 for relation1 as such1 is founded upon an act3 secondly1 according as it constitutes the person2 and thus the notional act presupposes the relation1 as an action presupposes a person acting4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the ,master says that because ,he begets1 ,he is ,father1 the term ,father is taken as meaning relation only1 but not as signifying the subsisting person2 for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because ,he is ,father ,he begets4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection avails of paternity as a relation1 but not as constituting a person4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nativity is the way to the person of the ,son2 and so1 in the order of intelligence1 it precedes filiation1 even as constituting the person of the ,son4 ,but active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the ,father2 wherefore it presupposes the personal property of the ,father4 ,,question #da ,,of ,,the ,,persons ,,in ,,reference ,,to ,,the ,,notional ,,acts 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts1 concerning which six points of inquiry arise3 7#a7 ,whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons8 7#b7 ,whether these acts are necessary1 or voluntary8 7#c7 ,whether as regards these acts1 a person proceeds from nothing or from something8 7#d7 ,whether in ,god there exists a power as regards the notional acts8 7#e7 ,what this power means8 7#f7 ,whether several persons can be the term of one notional act8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,notional ,acts ,are to ,be ,attributed to the ,persons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,trin473 ,whatever is predicated of ,god1 of whatever genus it be1 becomes the divine substance1 except what pertains to the relation4 ,but action is one of the ten genera4 ,therefore any action attributed to ,god belongs to ,his essence1 and not to a notion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 v1 #d1e7 that1 everything which is said of ,god1 is said of ,him as regards either ,his substance1 or relation4 ,but whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes2 and whatever belongs to the relations1 by the names of the persons1 or by the names of the properties4 ,therefore1 in addition to these1 notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the nature of action is of itself to cause passion4 ,but we do not place passions in ,god4 ,therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,fulgentius1 ,de ,fide ad ,petrum ii7 says3 ,it is a property of the ,father to beget the ,son4 ,therefore notional acts are to be placed in ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,in the divine persons distinction is founded on origin4 ,but origin can be properly designated only by certain acts4 ,wherefore1 to signify the order of origin in the divine persons1 we must attribute notional acts to the persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,every origin is designated by an act4 ,in ,god there is a twofold order of origin3 one1 inasmuch as the creature proceeds from ,him1 and this is common to the three persons2 and so those actions which are attributed to ,god to designate the proceeding of creatures from ,him1 belong to ,his essence4 ,another order of origin in ,god regards the procession of person from person2 wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional2 because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons1 as is clear from what was above explained 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification2 and in reality are altogether the same4 ,whence the ,master says that generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 xxvi74 ,to see this1 we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement3 for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause4 ,hence action1 in its primary sense1 means origin of movement2 for1 as movement derived from another into a mobile object1 is called passion1 so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved1 is called action4 ,hence1 if we take away movement1 action implies nothing more than order of origin1 in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle4 ,consequently1 since in ,god no movement exists1 the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle2 which habitudes are the relations1 or the notions4 ,nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things1 whence we derive our knowledge1 and wherein actions and passions1 so far as these imply movement1 differ from the relations which result from action and passion1 and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act1 and separately after the manner of relations4 ,thus it is evident that they are really the same1 differing only in their mode of signification4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,action1 so far as it means origin of movement1 naturally involves passion2 but action in that sense is not attributed to ,god4 ,whence1 passions are attributed to ,him only from a grammatical standpoint1 and in accordance with our manner of speaking1 as we attribute to beget with the ,father1 and to the ,son to be begotten4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,notional ,acts ,are ,voluntary8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the notional acts are voluntary4 ,for ,hilary says 7,de ,synod473 ,not by natural necessity was the ,father led to beget the ,son4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says1 ,he transferred us to the kingdom of the ,son of ,his love 7,col4 #a3ac74 ,but love belongs to the will4 ,therefore the ,son was begotten of the ,father by will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing is more voluntary than love4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost proceeds as ,love from the ,father and the ,son4 ,therefore ,he proceeds voluntarily4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,son proceeds by mode of the intellect1 as the ,word4 ,but every word proceeds by the will from a speaker4 ,therefore the ,son proceeds from the ,father by will1 and not by nature4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 what is not voluntary is necessary4 ,therefore if the ,father begot the ,son1 not by the will1 it seems to follow that ,he begot ,him by necessity2 and this is against what ,augustine says 7,ad ,orosium qu4 vii74 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says1 in the same book1 that1 the ,father begot the ,son neither by will1 nor by necessity4 ,i answer that1 ,when anything is said to be1 or to be made by the will1 this can be understood in two senses4 ,in one sense1 the ablative designates only concomitance1 as ,i can say that ,i am a man by my will--that is1 ,i will to be a man2 and in this way it can be said that the ,father begot the ,son by will2 as also ,he is ,god by will1 because ,he wills to be ,god1 and wills to beget the ,son4 ,in the other sense1 the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will1 as the will is the principle of his work2 and thus in that sense it must be said the ,god the ,father begot the ,son1 not by ,his will2 but that ,he produced the creature by ,his will4 ,whence in the book ,de ,synod41 it is said3 ,if anyone say that the ,son was made by the ,will of ,god1 as a creature is said to be made1 let him be anathema4 ,the reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation1 in such a way that nature is determined to one1 while the will is not determined to one2 and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent1 whereby the latter acts4 ,now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists2 and hence such as it is itself1 such also is its work4 ,but the form whereby the will acts is not only one1 but many1 according to the number of ideas understood4 ,hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent1 but on the agent's will and understanding4 ,so the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way2 whereas of those things which can be only in one way1 the principle is nature4 ,what1 however1 can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature1 whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being2 because ,god is of ,himself necessary being1 whereas a creature is made from nothing4 ,thus1 the ,arians1 wishing to prove the ,son to be a creature1 said that the ,father begot the ,son by will1 taking will in the sense of principle4 ,but we1 on the contrary1 must assert that the ,father begot the ,son1 not by will1 but by nature4 ,wherefore ,hilary says 7,de ,synod473 ,the will of ,god gave to all creatures their substance3 but perfect birth gave the ,son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn4 ,all things created are such as ,god willed them to be2 but the ,son1 born of ,god1 subsists in the perfect likeness of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the ,father's will in the generation of the ,son1 for they said that the ,father begot the ,son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting2 just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as1 for instance1 death1 old age1 and like ills4 ,this appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted1 for thus we read3 ,not against ,his will1 nor as it were1 forced1 nor as if ,he were led by natural necessity did the ,father beget the ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,apostle calls ,christ the ,son of the love of ,god1 inasmuch as ,he is superabundantly loved by ,god2 not1 however1 as if love were the principle of the ,son's generation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will1 as a natural faculty1 wills something naturally1 as man's will naturally tends to happiness2 and likewise ,god naturally wills and loves ,himself2 whereas in regard to things other than ,himself1 the will of ,god is in a way1 undetermined in itself1 as above explained 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c74 ,now1 the ,holy ,ghost proceeds as ,love1 inasmuch as ,god loves ,himself1 and hence ,he proceeds naturally1 although ,he proceeds by mode of will4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind1 a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood4 ,but ,god naturally understands ,himself1 and thus the conception of the divine ,word is natural4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a thing is said to be necessary of itself1 and by reason of another4 ,taken in the latter sense1 it has a twofold meaning3 firstly1 as an efficient and compelling cause1 and thus necessary means what is violent2 secondly1 it means a final cause1 when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end1 so far as without it the end could not be attained1 or1 at least1 so well attained4 ,in neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary2 because ,god is not the means to an end1 nor is ,he subject to compulsion4 ,but a thing is said to be necessary of itself which cannot but be3 in this sense it is necessary for ,god to be2 and in the same sense it is necessary that the ,father beget the ,son4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,notional ,acts ,proceed from ,something8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything4 ,for if the ,father begets the ,son from something1 this will be either from ,himself or from something else4 ,if from something else1 since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated1 it follows that something different from the ,father exists in the ,son1 and this contradicts what is laid down by ,hilary 7,de ,trin4 vii7 that1 ,in them nothing diverse or different exists4 ,if the ,father begets the ,son from ,himself1 since again that whence a thing is generated1 if it be something permanent1 receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say1 ,the man is white1 since the man remains1 when not from white he is made white--it follows that either the ,father does not remain after the ,son is begotten1 or that the ,father is the ,son1 which is false4 ,therefore the ,father does not beget the ,son from something1 but from nothing4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated4 ,so if the ,father generate the ,son from ,his own essence or nature1 it follows that the essence or nature of the ,father is the principle of the ,son4 ,but it is not a material principle1 because in ,god nothing material exists2 and therefore it is1 as it were1 an active principle1 as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten4 ,thus it follows that the essence generates1 which was disproved above 7,q4 #ci1 ,a4 #e74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vii1 #f7 that the three persons are not from the same essence2 because the essence is not another thing from person4 ,but the person of the ,son is not another thing from the ,father's essence4 ,therefore the ,son is not from the ,father's essence4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 every creature is from nothing4 ,but in ,scripture the ,son is called a creature2 for it is said 7,ecclus4 #bd3e71 in the person of the ,wisdom begotten1,i came out of the mouth of the ,most ,high1 the first-born before all creatures3 and further on 7,ecclus4 #bd3ad7 it is said as uttered by the same ,wisdom1 ,from the beginning1 and before the world was ,i created4 ,therefore the ,son was not begotten from something1 but from nothing4 ,likewise we can object concerning the ,holy ,ghost1 by reason of what is said 7,zech4 #ab3a73 ,thus saith the ,lord ,who stretcheth forth the heavens1 and layeth the foundations of the earth1 and formeth the spirit of man within him2 and 7,amos #d3ac7 according to another version 99,the ,septuagint3 ,i ,who form the earth1 and create the spirit4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,fulgentius1 ,de ,fide ad ,petrum i1 #a7 says3 ,god the ,father1 of ,his nature1 without beginning1 begot the ,son equal to ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,son was not begotten from nothing1 but from the ,father's substance4 ,for it was explained above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #cc1 ,,aa4 #b 1#c7 that paternity1 filiation and nativity really and truly exist in ,god4 ,now1 this is the difference between true generation1 whereby one proceeds from another as a son1 and making1 that the maker makes something out of external matter1 as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood1 whereas a man begets a son from himself4 ,now1 as a created workman makes a thing out of matter1 so ,god makes things out of nothing1 as will be shown later on 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #a71 not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made1 but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by ,him without anything else whatever presupposed4 ,so1 were the ,son to proceed from the ,father as out of nothing1 then the ,son would be to the ,father what the thing made is to the maker1 whereto1 as is evident1 the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude4 ,thus1 if the ,son of ,god proceeds from the ,father out of nothing1 ,he could not be properly and truly called the ,son1 whereas the contrary is stated 7#a ,john #e3bj73 ,that we may be in ,his true ,son ,jesus ,christ4 ,therefore the true ,son of ,god is not from nothing2 nor is ,he made1 but begotten4 ,that certain creatures made by ,god out of nothing are called sons of ,god is to be taken in a metaphorical sense1 according to a certain likeness of assimilation to ,him ,who is the true ,son4 ,whence1 as ,he is the only true and natural ,son of ,god1 ,he is called the only begotten1 according to ,john #a3ah1 ,the only begotten ,son1 ,who is in the bosom of the ,father1 ,he hath declared ,him2 and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to ,him1 ,he is called the first begotten1 according to ,rom4 #h3bi3 ,whom ,he foreknew ,he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of ,his ,son1 that ,he might be the first born of many brethren4 ,therefore the ,son of ,god is begotten of the substance of the ,father1 but not in the same way as man is born of man2 for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten1 whereas the divine nature cannot be parted2 whence it necessarily follows that the ,father in begetting the ,son does not transmit any part of ,his nature1 but communicates ,his whole nature to ,him1 the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when we say that the ,son was born of the ,father1 the preposition of designates a consubstantial generating principle1 but not a material principle4 ,for that which is produced from matter1 is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced4 ,but the divine essence is unchangeable1 and is not susceptive of another form4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when we say the ,son is begotten of the essence of the ,father1 as the ,master of the ,sentences explains 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 v71 this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle1 and as he expounds1 the ,son is begotten of the essence of the ,father--that is1 of the ,father ,who is essence2 and so ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #ac73 ,when ,i say of the ,father ,who is essence1 it is the same as if ,i said more explicitly1 of the essence of the ,father4 ,this1 however1 is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words4 ,for we can say that the creature is from ,god ,who is essence2 but not that it is from the essence of ,god4 ,so we may explain them otherwise1 by observing that the preposition of de always denotes consubstantiality4 ,we do not say that a house is of de the builder1 since he is not the consubstantial cause4 ,we can say1 however1 that something is of another1 if this is its consubstantial principle1 no matter in what way it is so1 whether it be an active principle1 as the son is said to be of the father1 or a material principle1 as a knife is of iron2 or a formal principle1 but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting1 and not accidental to another1 for we can say that an angel is of an intellectual nature4 ,in this way1 then1 we say that the ,son is begotten 'of' the essence of the ,father1 inasmuch as the essence of the ,father1 communicated by generation1 subsists in the ,son4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when we say that the ,son is begotten of the essence of the ,father1 a term is added which saves the distinction4 ,but when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence1 there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition1 so there is no parity of argument4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,when we say ,wisdom was created1 this may be understood not of ,wisdom which is the ,son of ,god1 but of created wisdom given by ,god to creatures3 for it is said1 ,he created her namely1 ,wisdom in the ,holy ,ghost1 and ,he poured her out over all ,his works 7,ecclus4 #a3i1 #aj74 ,nor is it inconsistent for ,scripture in one text to speak of the ,wisdom begotten and wisdom created1 for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated ,wisdom4 ,the saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the ,son1 so that the sense be1 ,from the beginning and before the world was ,i made--that is1 ,i was foreseen as united to the creature4 ,or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation2 for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection2 whereas in creation the ,creator is not changed1 but the creature does not receive the ,creator's nature4 ,thus the ,son is called both created and begotten1 in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the ,father may be understood1 and from generation the unity of nature in the ,father and the ,son4 ,in this way ,hilary expounds the sense of this text of ,scripture 7,de ,synod474 ,the other passages quoted do not refer to the ,holy ,ghost1 but to the created spirit1 sometimes called wind1 sometimes air1 sometimes the breath of man1 sometimes also the soul1 or any other invisible substance4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #d ,whether in ,god ,there ,is a ,power in ,respect of the ,notional ,acts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in ,god there is no power in respect of the notional acts4 ,for every kind of power is either active or passive2 neither of which can be here applied1 there being in ,god nothing which we call passive power1 as above explained 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a72 nor can active power belong to one person as regards another1 since the divine persons were not made1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore in ,god there is no power in respect of the notional acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of power is what is possible4 ,but the divine persons are not regarded as possible1 but necessary4 ,therefore1 as regards the notional acts1 whereby the divine persons proceed1 there cannot be power in ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,son proceeds as the word1 which is the concept of the intellect2 and the ,holy ,ghost proceeds as love1 which belongs to the will4 ,but in ,god power exists as regards effects1 and not as regards intellect and will1 as stated above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore1 in ,god power does not exist in reference to the notional acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,maxim4 iii1 #a73 ,if ,god the ,father could not beget a co-equal ,son1 where is the omnipotence of ,god the ,father8 ,power therefore exists in ,god regarding the notional acts4 ,i answer that1 ,as the notional acts exist in ,god1 so must there be also a power in ,god regarding these acts2 since power only means the principle of act4 ,so1 as we understand the ,father to be principle of generation2 and the ,father and the ,son to be the principle of spiration1 we must attribute the power of generating to the ,father1 and the power of spiration to the ,father and the ,son2 for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates4 ,now every generator generates by something4 ,therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating1 and in the spirator the power of spirating4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as a person1 according to notional acts1 does not proceed as if made2 so the power in ,god as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made1 but only as regards the person as proceeding4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,possible1 as opposed to what is necessary1 is a consequence of a passive power1 which does not exist in ,god4 ,hence1 in ,god there is no such thing as possibility in this sense1 but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary2 and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for ,god to be1 so also is it possible that the ,son should be generated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,power signifies a principle3 and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle4 ,now we must observe a double distinction in things said of ,god3 one is a real distinction1 the other is a distinction of reason only4 ,by a real distinction1 ,god by ,his essence is distinct from those things of which ,he is the principle by creation3 just as one person is distinct from the other of which ,he is principle by a notional act4 ,but in ,god the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only1 otherwise action would be an accident in ,god4 ,and therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from ,god1 either personally or essentially1 we may ascribe power to ,god in its proper sense of principle4 ,and as we ascribe to ,god the power of creating1 so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating4 ,but to understand and to will are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from ,god1 either essentially or personally4 ,wherefore1 with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to ,god in its proper sense1 but only after our way of understanding and speaking3 inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in ,god1 whereas in ,god the act of understanding is ,his very essence which has no principle4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,power of ,begetting ,signifies a ,relation1 and ,not the ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the power of begetting1 or of spirating1 signifies the relation and not the essence4 ,for power signifies a principle1 as appears from its definition3 for active power is the principle of action1 as we find in ,metaph4 v1 text #ag4 ,but in ,god principle in regard to ,person is said notionally4 ,therefore1 in ,god1 power does not signify essence but relation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in ,god1 the power to act posse and 'to act' are not distinct4 ,but in ,god1 begetting signifies relation4 ,therefore1 the same applies to the power of begetting4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 terms signifying the essence in ,god1 are common to the three persons4 ,but the power of begetting is not common to the three persons1 but proper to the ,father4 ,therefore it does not signify the essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,as ,god has the power to beget the ,son1 so also ,he wills to beget ,him4 ,but the will to beget signifies the essence4 ,therefore1 also1 the power to beget4 ,i answer that1 ,some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in ,god4 ,but this is not possible4 ,for in every agent1 that is properly called power1 by which the agent acts4 ,now1 everything that produces something by its action1 produces something like itself1 as to the form by which it acts2 just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature1 in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man4 ,in every begetter1 therefore1 that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter4 ,now the ,son of ,god is like the ,father1 who begets ,him1 in the divine nature4 ,wherefore the divine nature in the ,father is in ,him the power of begetting4 ,and so ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 v73 ,the birth of ,god cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded2 for ,he cannot subsist other than ,god1 ,who subsists from no other source than ,god4 ,we must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the ,master says 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 vii71 and not the relation only4 ,nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation1 so as to signify both equally4 ,for although paternity is signified as the form of the ,father1 nevertheless it is a personal property1 being in respect to the person of the ,father1 what the individual form is to the individual creature4 ,now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting1 but is not that by which the begetter begets1 otherwise ,socrates would beget ,socrates4 ,so neither can paternity be understood as that by which the ,father begets1 but as constituting the person of the ,father1 otherwise the ,father would beget the ,father4 ,but that by which the ,father begets is the divine nature1 in which the ,son is like to ,him4 ,and in this sense ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #ah7 that generation is the work of nature1 not of nature generating1 but of nature1 as being that by which the generator generates4 ,and therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly1 but the relation indirectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,power does not signify the relation itself of a principle1 for thus it would be in the genus of relation2 but it signifies that which is a principle2 not1 indeed1 in the sense in which we call the agent a principle1 but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts4 ,now the agent is distinct from that which it makes1 and the generator from that which it generates3 but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator1 and so much more perfectly1 as the generation is more perfect4 ,since1 therefore1 the divine generation is most perfect1 that by which the ,begetter begets1 is common to ,begotten and ,begetter by a community of identity1 and not only of species1 as in things created4 ,therefore1 from the fact that we say that the divine essence is the principle by which the ,begetter begets1 it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct 7from the ,begotten73 which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as in ,god1 the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting1 so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity2 although there is a distinction of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when ,i speak of the power of begetting1 power is signified directly1 generation indirectly3 just as if ,i were to say1 the essence of the ,father4 ,wherefore in respect of the essence1 which is signified1 the power of begetting is common to the three persons3 but in respect of the notion that is connoted1 it is proper to the person of the ,father4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #da1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,several ,persons ,can ,be the ,term of ,one ,notional ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a notional act can be directed to several ,persons1 so that there may be several ,persons begotten or spirated in ,god4 ,for whoever has the power of begetting can beget4 ,but the ,son has the power of begetting4 ,therefore ,he can beget4 ,but ,he cannot beget ,himself3 therefore ,he can beget another son4 ,therefore there can be several ,sons in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,maxim4 iii1 #ab73 ,the ,son did not beget a ,creator3 not that ,he could not1 but that it behoved ,him not4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god the ,father has greater power to beget than has a created father4 ,but a man can beget several sons4 ,therefore ,god can also3 the more so that the power of the ,father is not diminished after begetting the ,son4 ,on the contrary1 ,in ,god that which is possible1 and that which is do not differ4 ,if1 therefore1 in ,god it were possible for there to be several ,sons1 there would be several ,sons4 ,and thus there would be more than three ,persons in ,god2 which is heretical4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,athanasius says1 in ,god there is only one ,father1 one ,son1 one ,holy ,ghost4 ,for this four reasons may be given4 ,the first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the ,persons distinct4 ,for since the divine ,persons are the relations themselves as subsistent1 there would not be several ,fathers1 or several ,sons in ,god1 unless there were more than one paternity1 or more than one filiation4 ,and this1 indeed1 would not be possible except owing to a material distinction3 since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter1 which is not in ,god4 ,wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in ,god3 just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness4 ,the second reason is taken from the manner of the processions4 ,for ,god understands and wills all things by one simple act4 ,wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word1 which person is the ,son2 and but one person proceeding after the manner of love1 which person is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,the third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed4 ,for the persons proceed naturally1 as we have said 7,a4 #b71 and nature is determined to one4 ,the fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons4 ,for this reason is the ,son perfect1 that the entire divine filiation is contained in ,him1 and that there is but one ,son4 ,the argument is similar in regard to the other persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we can grant1 without distinction1 that the ,son has the same power as the ,father2 but we cannot grant that the ,son has the power generandi of begetting thus taking generandi as the gerund of the active verb1 so that the sense would be that the ,son has the power to beget4 ,just as1 although ,father and ,son have the same being1 it does not follow that the ,son is the ,father1 by reason of the notional term added4 ,but if the word generandi of being begotten is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb1 the power generandi is in the ,son--that is1 the power of being begotten4 ,the same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb1 so that the sense be the power of generation--that is1 a power by which it is generated by some person4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine does not mean to say by those words that the ,son could beget a ,son3 but that if ,he did not1 it was not because ,he could not1 as we shall see later on 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #f1 ad #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,divine perfection and the total absence of matter in ,god require that there cannot be several ,sons in ,god1 as we have explained4 ,wherefore that there are not several ,sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the ,father4 ,,question #db ,,of ,,equality ,,and ,,likeness ,,among ,,the ,,divine ,,persons 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we now have to consider the persons as compared to one another3 firstly1 with regard to equality and likeness2 secondly1 with regard to mission4 ,concerning the first there are six points of inquiry4 7#a7 ,whether there is equality among the divine persons8 7#b7 ,whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from ,whom ,he proceeds in eternity8 7#c7 ,whether there is any order among the divine persons8 7#d7 ,whether the divine persons are equal in greatness8 7#e7 ,whether the one divine person is in another8 7#f7 ,whether they are equal in power8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,equality in ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons4 ,for equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text #bj74 ,but in the divine persons there is no quantity1 neither continuous intrinsic quantity1 which we call size1 nor continuous extrinsic quantity1 which we call place and time4 ,nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity1 because two persons are more than one4 ,therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the divine persons are of one essence1 as we have said 7,q4 #ci1 ,a4 #b74 ,now essence is signified by way of form4 ,but agreement in form makes things to be alike1 not to be equal4 ,therefore1 we may speak of likeness in the divine persons1 but not of equality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things wherein there is to be found equality1 are equal to one another1 for equality is reciprocal4 ,but the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another4 ,for as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj73 ,if an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image1 it may be said to be equal to it2 but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image4 ,but the ,son is the image of the ,father2 and so the ,father is not equal to the ,son4 ,therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 equality is a relation4 ,but no relation is common to the three persons2 for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations4 ,therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons4 ,on the contrary1 ,athanasius says that the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another4 ,i answer that1 ,we must needs admit equality among the divine persons4 ,for1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 x1 text #ae1 #af1 #ag71 equality signifies the negation of greater or less4 ,now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons2 for as ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 i73 ,they must needs admit a difference namely1 of ,godhead who speak of either increase or decrease1 as the ,arians do1 who sunder the ,trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers1 thus involving a plurality4 ,now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity4 ,but quantity1 in ,god1 is nothing else than ,his essence4 ,wherefore it follows1 that if there were any inequality in the divine persons1 they would not have the same essence2 and thus the three persons would not be one ,god2 which is impossible4 ,we must therefore admit equality among the divine persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,quantity is twofold4 ,there is quantity of bulk or dimensive quantity1 which is to be found only in corporeal things1 and has1 therefore1 no place in ,god4 ,there is also quantity of virtue1 which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form3 to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more1 or less1 hot2 forasmuch as it is more or less1 perfect in heat4 ,now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source--that is1 by the perfection of that form or nature3 such is the greatness of spiritual things1 just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection4 ,and so ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #ah7 that in things which are great1 but not in bulk1 to be greater is to be better1 for the more perfect a thing is the better it is4 ,secondly1 virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form4 ,now the first effect of form is being1 for everything has being by reason of its form4 ,the second effect is operation1 for every agent acts through its form4 ,consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action3 in regard to being1 forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration2 and in regard to action1 forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act4 ,and so as ,augustine 7,fulgentius1 ,de ,fide ad ,petrum i7 says3 ,we understand equality to be in the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity1 or excels in greatness1 or surpasses in power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity1 equality includes likeness and something besides1 because it excludes excess4 ,for whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike1 even if they do not participate in that form equally1 just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat2 but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another4 ,and because not only is the same nature in both ,father and ,son1 but also is it in both in perfect equality1 therefore we say not only that the ,son is like to the ,father1 in order to exclude the error of ,eunomius1 but also that ,he is equal to the ,father to exclude the error of ,arius4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,equality and likeness in ,god may be designated in two ways--namely1 by nouns and by verbs4 ,when designated by nouns1 equality in the divine persons is mutual1 and so is likeness2 for the ,son is equal and like to the ,father1 and conversely4 ,this is because the divine essence is not more the ,father's than the ,son's4 ,wherefore1 just as the ,son has the greatness of the ,father1 and is therefore equal to the ,father1 so the ,father has the greatness of the ,son1 and is therefore equal to the ,son4 ,but in reference to creatures1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ix73 ,equality and likeness are not mutual4 ,for effects are said to be like their causes1 inasmuch as they have the form of their causes2 but not conversely1 for the form is principally in the cause1 and secondarily in the effect4 ,but verbs signify equality with movement4 ,and although movement is not in ,god1 there is something that receives4 ,since1 therefore1 the ,son receives from the ,father1 this1 namely1 that ,he is equal to the ,father1 and not conversely1 for this reason we say that the ,son is equalled to the ,father1 but not conversely4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct4 ,now equality implies both--namely1 distinction of persons1 for nothing can be said to be equal to itself2 and unity of essence1 since for this reason are the persons equal to one another1 that they are of the same greatness and essence4 ,now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation4 ,nor1 again1 is one relation referred to another by a further relation3 for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation1 opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation4 ,for in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely4 ,therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations3 but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons1 and the unity of essence4 ,for this reason the ,master says 7,sent4 i1 ,d1 xxxi7 that in these it is only the terms that are relative4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,person ,proceeding ,is ,co-eternal with ,his ,principle1 ,as the ,son with the ,father8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with ,his principle1 as the ,son with the ,father4 ,for ,arius gives twelve modes of generation4 ,the first mode is like the issue of a line from a point2 wherein is wanting equality of simplicity4 ,the second is like the emission of rays from the sun2 wherein is absent equality of nature4 ,the third is like the mark or impression made by a seal2 wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power4 ,the fourth is the infusion of a good will from ,god2 wherein also consubstantiality is wanting4 ,the fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject2 but the accident has no subsistence4 ,the sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter1 as sense receives the species from the sensible object2 wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity4 ,the seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge1 which excitation is merely temporal4 ,the eighth is transformation1 as an image is made of brass2 which transformation is material4 ,the ninth is motion from a mover2 and here again we have effect and cause4 ,the tenth is the taking of species from genera2 but this mode has no place in ,god1 for the ,father is not predicated of the ,son as the genus of a species4 ,the eleventh is the realization of an idea ideatio1 as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind4 ,the twelfth is birth1 as a man is begotten of his father2 which implies priority and posteriority of time4 ,thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another4 ,so if the ,son is from the ,father1 we must say that ,he is less than the ,father1 or later than the ,father1 or both4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything that comes from another has a principle4 ,but nothing eternal has a principle4 ,therefore the ,son is not eternal2 nor is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything which is corrupted ceases to be4 ,hence everything generated begins to be2 for the end of generation is existence4 ,but the ,son is generated by the ,father4 ,therefore ,he begins to exist1 and is not co-eternal with the ,father4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the ,son be begotten by the ,father1 either ,he is always being begotten1 or there is some moment in which ,he is begotten4 ,if ,he is always being begotten1 since1 during the process of generation1 a thing must be imperfect1 as appears in successive things1 which are always in process of becoming1 as time and motion1 it follows that the ,son must be always imperfect1 which cannot be admitted4 ,thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the ,son1 and before that moment the ,son did not exist4 ,on the contrary1 ,athanasius declares that all the three persons are co-eternal with each other4 ,i answer that1 ,we must say that the ,son is co-eternal with the ,father4 ,in proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons3 one on the part of the agent1 and the other on the part of the action4 ,on the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents4 ,in free agents1 on account of the choice of time2 for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect1 as stated above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b71 so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect4 ,in natural agents1 however1 the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first1 but obtaining it after a certain time2 as1 for instance1 a man is not able to generate from the very first4 ,considered on the part of action1 anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive4 ,so1 given that an agent1 as soon as it exists1 begins to act thus1 the effect would not exist in the same instant1 but in the instant of the action's termination4 ,now it is manifest1 according to what has been said 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b71 that the ,father does not beget the ,son by will1 but by nature2 and also that the ,father's nature was perfect from eternity2 and again that the action whereby the ,father produces the ,son is not successive1 because thus the ,son would be successively generated1 and this generation would be material1 and accompanied with movement2 which is quite impossible4 ,therefore we conclude that the ,son existed whensoever the ,father existed and thus the ,son is co-eternal with the ,father1 and likewise the ,holy ,ghost is co-eternal with both4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,verbis ,domini1 ,serm4 #ch71 no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation4 ,hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes1 so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another2 and thus it is declared in the council of ,ephesus3 ,let ,splendor tell thee that the co-eternal ,son existed always with the ,father2 let the ,word announce the impassibility of ,his birth2 let the name ,son insinuate ,his consubstantiality4 ,yet1 above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly2 the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act2 and this cannot be said of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,eternity excludes the principle of duration1 but not the principle of origin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every corruption is a change2 and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be4 ,the divine generation1 however1 is not changed1 as stated above 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence the ,son is ever being begotten1 and the ,father is always begetting4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in time there is something indivisible--namely1 the instant2 and there is something else which endures--namely1 time4 ,but in eternity the indivisible now stands ever still1 as we have said above 7,q4 #aj1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a2 ,a4 #d1 ad #b74 ,but the generation of the ,son is not in the now of time1 or in time1 but in eternity4 ,and so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity1 we can say that ,he is ever being born1 as ,origen said 7,hom4 in ,joan4 i74 ,but as ,gregory 99,moral4 xxix1 #ba and ,augustine 99,super ,ps4 #b3g said1 it is better to say ever born1 so that ever may denote the permanence of eternity1 and born the perfection of the only ,begotten4 ,thus1 therefore1 neither is the ,son imperfect1 nor was there a time when ,he was not1 as ,arius said4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #c ,whether in the ,divine ,persons ,there ,exists an ,order of ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature4 ,for whatever exists in ,god is the essence1 or a person1 or a notion4 ,but the order of nature does not signify the essence1 nor any of the persons1 or notions4 ,therefore there is no order of nature in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 wherever order of nature exists1 there one comes before another1 at least1 according to nature and intellect4 ,but in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority1 as declared by ,athanasius4 ,therefore1 in the divine persons there is no order of nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 wherever order exists1 distinction also exists4 ,but there is no distinction in the divine nature4 ,therefore it is not subject to order2 and order of nature does not exist in it4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the divine nature is the divine essence4 ,but there is no order of essence in ,god4 ,therefore neither is there of nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,where plurality exists without order1 confusion exists4 ,but in the divine persons there is no confusion1 as ,athanasius says4 ,therefore in ,god order exists4 ,i answer that1 ,order always has reference to some principle4 ,wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely1 according to site1 as a point2 according to intellect1 as the principle of demonstration2 and according to each individual cause--so are there many kinds of order4 ,now principle1 according to origin1 without priority1 exists in ,god as we have stated 7,q4 #cc1 ,a4 #a73 so there must likewise be order according to origin1 without priority2 and this is called 'the order of nature'3 in the words of ,augustine 7,contra ,maxim4 iv73 ,not whereby one is prior to another1 but whereby one is from another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general1 not a special kind of origin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in things created1 even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle1 the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason1 if formally considered as principle4 ,if1 however1 we consider the relations of cause and effect1 or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom1 it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason1 inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other4 ,but in ,god the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature4 ,so1 neither on the part of the nature1 nor on the part the relations1 can one person be prior to another1 not even in the order of nature and reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself1 but the existence of order in the divine ,persons according to natural origin4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle1 but essence does not2 and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #d1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,son ,is ,equal to the ,father in ,greatness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,son is not equal to the ,father in greatness4 ,for ,he ,himself said 7,john #ad3bh73 ,the ,father is greater than ,i2 and the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ae3bh73 ,the ,son ,himself shall be subject to ,him that put all things under ,him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 paternity is part of the ,father's dignity4 ,but paternity does not belong to the ,son4 ,therefore the ,son does not possess all the ,father's dignity2 and so ,he is not equal in greatness to the ,father4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 wherever there exist a whole and a part1 many parts are more than one only1 or than fewer parts2 as three men are more than two1 or than one4 ,but in ,god a universal whole exists1 and a part2 for under relation or notion1 several notions are included4 ,therefore1 since in the ,father there are three notions1 while in the ,son there are only two1 the ,son is evidently not equal to the ,father4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,phil4 #b3f73 ,he thought it not robbery to be equal with ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,son is necessarily equal to the ,father in greatness4 ,for the greatness of ,god is nothing but the perfection of ,his nature4 ,now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the ,son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the ,father1 in the same way as it is in the ,father ,himself4 ,but since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act1 it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him1 but attains to equality by due growth1 unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise4 ,from what precedes 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #cc1 ,,aa4 #b 1#c71 it is evident that in ,god there exist real true paternity and filiation4 ,nor can we say that the power of generation in the ,father was defective1 nor that the ,son of ,god arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change4 ,therefore we must say that the ,son was eternally equal to the ,father in greatness4 ,hence1 ,hilary says 7,de ,synod4 ,can4 #bg73 ,remove bodily weakness1 remove the beginning of conception1 remove pain and all human shortcomings1 then every son1 by reason of his natural nativity1 is the father's equal1 because he has a like nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words are to be understood of ,christ's human nature1 wherein ,he is less than the ,father1 and subject to ,him2 but in ,his divine nature ,he is equal to the ,father4 ,this is expressed by ,athanasius1 ,equal to the ,father in ,his ,godhead2 less than the ,father in humanity3 and by ,hilary 7,de ,trin4 ix73 ,by the fact of giving1 the ,father is greater2 but ,he is not less to ,whom the same being is given2 and 7,de ,synod473 ,the ,son subjects ,himself by ,his inborn piety--that is1 by ,his recognition of paternal authority2 whereas creatures are subject by their created weakness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,equality is measured by greatness4 ,in ,god greatness signifies the perfection of nature1 as above explained 7,a4 #a1 ad #a71 and belongs to the essence4 ,thus equality and likeness in ,god have reference to the essence2 nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,contra ,maxim4 iii1 #ac71 ,the question of origin is1 ,who is from whom8 but the question of equality is1 ,of what kind1 or how great1 is he8 ,therefore1 paternity is the ,father's dignity1 as also the ,father's essence3 since dignity is something absolute1 and pertains to the essence4 ,as1 therefore1 the same essence1 which in the ,father is paternity1 in the ,son is filiation1 so the same dignity which1 in the ,father is paternity1 in the ,son is filiation4 ,it is thus true to say that the ,son possesses whatever dignity the ,father has2 but we cannot argue--the ,father has paternity1 therefore the ,son has paternity1 for there is a transition from substance to relation4 ,for the ,father and the ,son have the same essence and dignity1 which exist in the ,father by the relation of giver1 and in the ,son by relation of receiver4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in ,god relation is not a universal whole1 although it is predicated of each of the relations2 because all the relations are one in essence and being1 which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal1 the parts of which are distinguished in being4 ,person likewise is not a universal term in ,god as we have seen above 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #d74 ,wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one2 nor are all the persons something greater than only one2 because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,son ,is in the ,father1 and ,conversely8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,son and the ,father are not in each other4 ,for the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iv1 text4 #bc7 gives eight modes of one thing existing in another1 according to none of which is the ,son in the ,father1 or conversely2 as is patent to anyone who examines each mode4 ,therefore the ,son and the ,father are not in each other4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing that has come out from another is within4 ,but the ,son from eternity came out from the ,father1 according to ,mic4 #e3b3 ,his going forth is from the beginning1 from the days of eternity4 ,therefore the ,son is not in the ,father4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one of two opposites cannot be in the other4 ,but the ,son and the ,father are relatively opposed4 ,therefore one cannot be in the other4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,john #ad3aj73 ,i am in the ,father1 and the ,father is in ,me4 ,i answer that1 ,there are three points of consideration as regards the ,father and the ,son2 the essence1 the relation and the origin2 and according to each the ,son and the ,father are in each other4 ,the ,father is in the ,son by ,his essence1 forasmuch as the ,father is ,his own essence and communicates ,his essence to the ,son not by any change on ,his part4 ,hence it follows that as the ,father's essence is in the ,son1 the ,father ,himself is in the ,son2 likewise1 since the ,son is ,his own essence1 it follows that ,he ,himself is in the ,father in ,whom is ,his essence4 ,this is expressed by ,hilary 7,de ,trin4 v71 ,the unchangeable ,god1 so to speak1 follows ,his own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting ,god4 ,so we understand the nature of ,god to subsist in ,him1 for ,he is ,god in ,god4 ,it is also manifest that as regards the relations1 each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other4 ,regarding origin also1 it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect1 inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word4 ,what also is uttered by the word is therein contained4 ,and the same applies to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,what is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in ,god2 so according to none of the modes enumerated by the ,philosopher1 are the ,son and the ,father in each other4 ,the mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle1 except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,son's going forth from the ,father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein4 ,hence this going forth in ,god is only by the distinction of the relations1 not by any kind of essential separation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,father and the ,son are relatively opposed1 but not essentially2 while1 as above explained1 one relative opposite is in the other4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #db1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,son ,is ,equal to the ,father in ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,son is not equal to the ,father in power4 ,for it is said 7,john #e3ai73 ,the ,son cannot do anything of ,himself but what ,he seeth the ,father doing4 ,but the ,father can act of ,himself4 ,therefore the ,father's power is greater than the ,son's4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears4 ,but the ,father commands the ,son according to ,john #ad3ca3 ,as the ,father gave ,me commandment so do ,i4 ,the ,father also teaches the ,son3 ,the ,father loveth the ,son1 and showeth ,him all things that ,himself doth 7,john #e3bj74 ,also1 the ,son hears3 ,as ,i hear1 so ,i judge 7,john #e3cj74 ,therefore the ,father has greater power than the ,son4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs to the ,father's omnipotence to be able to beget a ,son equal to ,himself4 ,for ,augustine says 7,contra ,maxim4 iii1 #g71 ,were ,he unable to beget one equal to ,himself1 where would be the omnipotence of ,god the ,father8 ,but the ,son cannot beget a ,son1 as proved above 7,q4 #da1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore the ,son cannot do all that belongs to the ,father's omnipotence2 and hence ,he is not equal to ,him power4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,john #e3ai73 ,whatsoever things the ,father doth1 these the ,son also doth in like manner4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,son is necessarily equal to the ,father in power4 ,power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature4 ,in creatures1 for instance1 we see that the more perfect the nature1 the greater power is there for action4 ,now it was shown above 7,a4 #d7 that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the ,son should be the ,father's equal in greatness--that is1 in perfection of nature4 ,hence it follows that the ,son is equal to the ,father in power2 and the same applies to the ,holy ,ghost in relation to both4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words1 the ,son cannot of ,himself do anything1 do not withdraw from the ,son any power possessed by the ,father1 since it is immediately added1 ,whatsoever things the ,father doth1 the ,son doth in like manner2 but their meaning is to show that the ,son derives ,his power from the ,father1 of ,whom ,he receives ,his nature4 ,hence1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 ix71 ,the unity of the divine nature implies that the ,son so acts of ,himself per se1 that ,he does not act by ,himself a se4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,father's showing and the ,son's hearing are to be taken in the sense that the ,father communicates knowledge to the ,son1 as ,he communicates ,his essence4 ,the command of the ,father can be explained in the same sense1 as giving ,him from eternity knowledge and will to act1 by begetting ,him4 ,or1 better still1 this may be referred to ,christ in ,his human nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the same essence is paternity in the ,father1 and filiation in the ,son3 so by the same power the ,father begets1 and the ,son is begotten4 ,hence it is clear that the ,son can do whatever the ,father can do2 yet it does not follow that the ,son can beget2 for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation1 for generation signifies a divine relation4 ,so the ,son has the same omnipotence as the ,father1 but with another relation2 the ,father possessing power as giving signified when we say that ,he is able to beget2 while the ,son possesses the power of receiving1 signified by saying that ,he can be begotten4 ,,question #dc ,,the ,,mission ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,persons 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we next consider the mission of the divine persons1 concerning which there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent8 7#b7 ,whether mission is eternal1 or only temporal8 7#c7 ,in what sense a divine person is invisibly sent8 7#d7 ,whether it is fitting that each person be sent8 7#e7 ,whether both the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost are invisibly sent8 7#f7 ,to whom the invisible mission is directed8 7#g7 ,of the visible mission4 7#h7 ,whether any person sends ,himself visibly or invisibly8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,divine ,person ,can ,be ,properly ,sent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent4 ,for one who is sent is less than the sender4 ,but one divine person is not less than another4 ,therefore one person is not sent by another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is sent is separated from the sender2 hence ,jerome says1 commenting on ,ezech4 #af3ec3 ,what is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent4 ,but in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable1 as ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 vii74 ,therefore one person is not sent by another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever is sent1 departs from one place and comes anew into another4 ,but this does not apply to a divine person1 ,who is everywhere4 ,therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,john #h3af73 ,i am not alone1 but ,i and the ,father that sent ,me4 ,i answer that1 the notion of mission includes two things3 the habitude of the one sent to the sender2 and that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent4 ,anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender3 either according to command1 as the master sends the servant2 or according to counsel1 as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle2 or according to origin1 as a tree sends forth its flowers4 ,the habitude to the term to which he is sent is also shown1 so that in some way he begins to be present there3 either because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent1 or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto4 ,thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing1 as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender1 and as meaning a new way of existing in another2 thus the ,son is said to be sent by the ,father into the world1 inasmuch as ,he began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature2 whereas ,he was previously in the world 7,john #a3a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,mission implies inferiority in the one sent1 when it means procession from the sender as principle1 by command or counsel2 forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater1 and the counsellor is the wiser4 ,in ,god1 however1 it means only procession of origin1 which is according to equality1 as explained above 7,q4 #db1 ,,aa4 #d1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist1 is locally moved by being sent2 hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender4 ,this1 however1 has no place in the mission of a divine person2 for the divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist1 nor ceases to exist where ,he was4 ,hence such a mission takes place without a separation1 having only distinction of origin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion1 which is not in ,god4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,mission ,is ,eternal1 or ,only ,temporal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that mission can be eternal4 ,for ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxvi1 in ,ev471 ,the ,son is sent as ,he is begotten4 ,but the ,son's generation is eternal4 ,therefore mission is eternal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally4 ,but a divine person is not changed4 ,therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal1 but eternal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 mission implies procession4 ,but the procession of the divine persons is eternal4 ,therefore mission is also eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gal4 #d3d73 ,when the fullness of the time was come1 ,god sent ,his ,son4 ,i answer that1 ,a certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the divine persons4 ,for some express only relation to the principle1 as procession and going forth4 ,others express the term of procession together with the relation to the principle4 ,of these some express the eternal term1 as generation and spiration2 for generation is the procession of the divine person into the divine nature1 and passive spiration is the procession of the subsisting love4 ,others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle1 as mission and giving4 ,for a thing is sent that it may be in something else1 and is given that it may be possessed2 but that a divine person be possessed by any creature1 or exist in it in a new mode1 is temporal4 ,hence mission and giving have only a temporal significance in ,god2 but generation and spiration are exclusively eternal2 whereas procession and giving1 in ,god1 have both an eternal and a temporal signification3 for the ,son may proceed eternally as ,god2 but temporally1 by becoming man1 according to ,his visible mission1 or likewise by dwelling in man according to ,his invisible mission4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the ,son1 not from the ,father1 but from ,his mother2 or it may be taken to mean that ,he could be sent because eternally begotten4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that a divine person may newly exist in anyone1 or be possessed by anyone in time1 does not come from change of the divine person1 but from change in the creature2 as ,god ,himself is called ,lord temporally by change of the creature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mission signifies not only procession from the principle1 but also determines the temporal term of the procession4 ,hence mission is only temporal4 ,or we may say that it includes the eternal procession1 with the addition of a temporal effect4 ,for the relation of a divine person to ,his principle must be eternal4 ,hence the procession may be called a twin procession1 eternal and temporal1 not that there is a double relation to the principle1 but a double term1 temporal and eternal4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,invisible ,mission of the ,divine ,person ,is ,only ,according to the ,gift of ,sanctifying ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace4 ,for the sending of a divine person means that ,he is given4 ,hence if the divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace1 the divine person ,himself will not be given1 but only ,his gifts2 and this is the error of those who say that the ,holy ,ghost is not given1 but that ,his gifts are given4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 this preposition1 according to1 denotes the habitude of some cause4 ,but the divine person is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed1 and not conversely1 according to ,rom4 #e3e1 the charity of ,god is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is given to us4 ,therefore it is improperly said that the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj7 that the ,son1 when temporally perceived by the mind1 is sent4 ,but the ,son is known not only by sanctifying grace1 but also by gratuitous grace1 as by faith and knowledge4 ,therefore the divine person is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,rabanus says that the ,holy ,ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles4 ,this1 however1 is not a gift of sanctifying grace1 but a gratuitous grace4 ,therefore the divine person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d7 that the ,holy ,ghost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification4 ,but mission is a temporal procession4 ,since then the creature's sanctification is by sanctifying grace1 it follows that the mission of the divine person is only by sanctifying grace4 ,i answer that1 ,the divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that ,he exists newly in any one2 and ,he is given as possessed by anyone2 and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace4 ,for ,god is in all things by ,his essence1 power and presence1 according to ,his one common mode1 as the cause existing in the effects which participate in ,his goodness4 ,above and beyond this common mode1 however1 there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein ,god is said to be present as the object known is in the knower1 and the beloved in the lover4 ,and since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to ,god ,himself1 according to this special mode ,god is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in ,his own temple4 ,so no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode1 except sanctifying grace4 ,hence1 the divine person is sent1 and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace4 ,again1 we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy3 and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace4 ,and yet the ,holy ,ghost is possessed by man1 and dwells within him1 in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace4 ,hence the ,holy ,ghost ,himself is given and sent4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself1 but enjoy also the divine person ,himself2 and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace2 and yet the divine person ,himself is given4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine person2 and this is signified when it is said that the ,holy ,ghost is given according to the gift of grace4 ,nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the ,holy ,ghost2 which is meant by the words1 the charity of ,god is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the ,son can be known by us according to other effects1 yet neither does ,he dwell in us1 nor is ,he possessed by us according to those effects4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces4 ,hence gratuitous grace is called the manifestation of the ,spirit 7#a ,cor4 #ab3g74 ,so the ,holy ,ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles1 because sanctifying grace was given to them with the outward sign4 ,were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself1 it would not be simply said that the ,holy ,ghost was given1 except with some qualifying term2 just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy1 or of miracles1 as having from the ,holy ,ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,father ,can ,be ,fittingly ,sent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is fitting also that the ,father should be sent4 ,for being sent means that the divine person is given4 ,but the ,father gives ,himself since ,he can only be possessed by ,his giving ,himself4 ,therefore it can be said that the ,father sends ,himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace4 ,but by grace the whole ,trinity dwells in us according to ,john #ad3bc3 ,we will come to him and make ,our abode with him4 ,therefore each one of the divine persons is sent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever belongs to one person1 belongs to them all1 except the notions and persons4 ,but mission does not signify any person2 nor even a notion1 since there are only five notions1 as stated above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore every divine person can be sent4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ii1 #c71 ,the ,father alone is never described as being sent4 ,i answer that1 ,the very idea of mission means procession from another1 and in ,god it means procession according to origin1 as above expounded4 ,hence1 as the ,father is not from another1 in no way is it fitting for ,him to be sent2 but this can only belong to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost1 to ,whom it belongs to be from another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the sense of giving as a free bestowal of something1 the ,father gives ,himself1 as freely bestowing ,himself to be enjoyed by the creature4 ,but as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given1 to be given only applies in ,god to the ,person ,who is from another2 and the same as regards being sent4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the effect of grace is also from the ,father1 ,who dwells in us by grace1 just as the ,son and the ,holy ,ghost1 still ,he is not described as being sent1 for ,he is not from another4 ,thus ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj7 that ,the ,father1 when known by anyone in time1 is not said to be sent2 for there is no one whence ,he is1 or from whom ,he proceeds4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,mission1 meaning procession from the sender1 includes the signification of a notion1 not of a special notion1 but in general2 thus to be from another is common to two of the notions4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,it ,is ,fitting for the ,son to ,be ,sent ,invisibly8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not fitting for the ,son to be sent invisibly4 ,for invisible mission of the divine person is according to the gift of grace4 ,but all gifts of grace belong to the ,holy ,ghost1 according to #a ,cor4 #ab3aa3 ,one and the same ,spirit worketh all things4 ,therefore only the ,holy ,ghost is sent invisibly4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace4 ,but the gifts belonging to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace1 since they can be held without the gift of charity1 according to #a ,cor4 #ac3b3 ,if ,i should have prophecy1 and should know all mysteries1 and all knowledge1 and if ,i should have all faith so that ,i could move mountains1 and have not charity1 ,i am nothing4 ,therefore1 since the ,son proceeds as the word of the intellect1 it seems unfitting for ,him to be sent invisibly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the mission of the divine person is a procession1 as expounded above 7,,aa4 #a1 #d74 ,but the procession of the ,son and of the ,holy ,ghost differ from each other4 ,therefore they are distinct missions if both are sent2 and then one of them would be superfluous1 since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said of divine ,wisdom 7,wis4 #i3aj73 ,send her from heaven to ,thy ,saints1 and from the seat of ,thy greatness4 ,i answer that1 ,the whole ,trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace1 according to ,john #ad3bc3 ,we will come to him1 and will make ,our abode with him4 ,but that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that ,he has ,his origin from another4 ,hence1 since both to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace1 and to be from another1 it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent4 ,as to the ,father1 though ,he dwells in us by grace1 still it does not belong to ,him to be from another1 and consequently ,he is not sent4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although all the gifts1 considered as such1 are attributed to the ,holy ,ghost1 forasmuch as ,he is by ,his nature the first ,gift1 since ,he is ,love1 as stated above 7,q4 #ch1 ,a4 #a71 some gifts nevertheless1 by reason of their own particular nature1 are appropriated in a certain way to the ,son1 those1 namely1 which belong to the intellect1 and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the ,son4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj7 that ,the ,son is sent to anyone invisibly1 whenever ,he is known and perceived by anyone4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the soul is made like to ,god by grace4 ,hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace1 there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine person ,who is sent1 by some gift of grace4 ,because the ,holy ,ghost is ,love1 the soul is assimilated to the ,holy ,ghost by the gift of charity3 hence the mission of the ,holy ,ghost is according to the mode of charity4 ,whereas the ,son is the ,word1 not any sort of word1 but one ,who breathes forth ,love4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix #aj73 ,the ,word we speak of is knowledge with love4 ,thus the ,son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection1 but according to the intellectual illumination1 which breaks forth into the affection of love1 as is said 7,john #f3de73 ,everyone that hath heard from the ,father and hath learned1 cometh to ,me1 and 7,ps4 #ch3d73 ,in my meditation a fire shall flame forth4 ,thus ,augustine plainly says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj73 ,the ,son is sent1 whenever ,he is known and perceived by anyone4 ,now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge2 and this is properly called wisdom sapientia1 as it were a sweet knowledge sapida scientia1 according to ,ecclus4 #f3bc3 ,the wisdom of doctrine is according to her name4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since mission implies the origin of the person ,who is sent1 and ,his indwelling by grace1 as above explained 7,a4 #a71 if we speak of mission according to origin1 in this sense the ,son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the ,holy ,ghost1 as generation is distinguished from procession4 ,if we consider mission as regards the effect of grace1 in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace1 but are distinguished in the effects of grace1 which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection4 ,thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other1 because neither takes place without sanctifying grace1 nor is one person separated from the other4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,invisible ,mission ,is to ,all ,who ,participate ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace4 ,for the ,fathers of the ,old ,testament had their share of grace4 ,yet to them was made no invisible mission2 for it is said 7,john #g3ci73 ,the ,spirit was not yet given1 because ,jesus was not yet glorified4 ,therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 progress in virtue is only by grace4 ,but the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue2 because progress in virtue is continuous1 since charity ever increases or decreases2 and thus the mission would be continuous4 ,therefore the invisible mission is not to all who share in grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,christ and the blessed have fullness of grace4 ,but mission is not to them1 for mission implies distance1 whereas ,christ1 as man1 and all the blessed are perfectly united to ,god4 ,therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,sacraments of the ,new ,law contain grace1 and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them4 ,therefore the invisible mission is not to all that have grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d2 xv1 #bg71 the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification4 ,now every creature that has grace is sanctified4 ,therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature4 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,,aa4 #c1 #d 1#e71 mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before1 as occurs to creatures2 or begins to exist where he was before1 but in a new way1 in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons4 ,thus1 mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things1 the indwelling of grace1 and a certain renewal by grace4 ,thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the invisible mission was directed to the ,old ,testament ,fathers1 as appears from what ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj71 that the invisible mission of the ,son is in man and with men4 ,this was done in former times with the ,fathers and the ,prophets4 ,thus the words1 the ,spirit was not yet given1 are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of ,pentecost4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj71 that the ,son is sent to each one when ,he is known and perceived by anyone1 so far as ,he can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul1 whether journeying towards ,god1 or united perfectly to ,him4 ,such invisible mission1 however1 chiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of a new act1 or in the acquisition of a new state of grace2 as1 for example1 the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy1 or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom1 or to renounce his possessions1 or to undertake any arduous work4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude4 ,the invisible mission is made to them subsequently1 not by intensity of grace1 but by the further revelation of mysteries2 which goes on till the day of judgment4 ,such an increase is by the extension of grace1 because it extends to a greater number of objects4 ,to ,christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of ,his conception2 but not afterwards1 since from the beginning of ,his conception ,he was filled with all wisdom and grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the ,new ,law1 as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the art designing1 according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object4 ,but mission is only spoken of as directed to its term4 ,hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments1 but to those who receive grace through the sacraments4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,it ,is ,fitting for the ,holy ,ghost to ,be ,sent ,visibly8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the ,holy ,ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner4 ,for the ,son as visibly sent to the world is said to be less than the ,father4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost is never said to be less than the ,father4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature1 as the ,son's mission according to the flesh4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost did not assume any visible creature2 and hence it cannot be said that ,he exists otherwise in some creatures than in others1 unless perhaps as in a sign1 as ,he is also present in the sacraments1 and in all the figures of the law4 ,thus the ,holy ,ghost is either not sent visibly at all1 or ,his visible mission takes place in all these things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole ,trinity4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other person4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature--namely1 the human nature4 ,therefore if the ,holy ,ghost is sent visibly1 ,he ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whatever is done visibly by ,god is dispensed by the ministry of the angels2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d1e1i74 ,so visible appearances1 if there have been any1 came by means of the angels4 ,thus the angels are sent1 and not the ,holy ,ghost4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 the ,holy ,ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission2 as invisible things are made known by the visible4 ,so those to whom the invisible mission was not sent1 ought not to receive the visible mission2 and to all who received the invisible mission1 whether in the ,new or in the ,old ,testament1 the visible mission ought likewise to be sent2 and this is clearly false4 ,therefore the ,holy ,ghost is not sent visibly4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,matt4 #c3af7 that1 when our ,lord was baptized1 the ,holy ,ghost descended upon ,him in the shape of a dove4 ,i answer that1 ,god provides for all things according to the nature of each thing4 ,now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things1 as explained above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #ab74 ,wherefore the invisible things of ,god must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible4 ,as ,god1 therefore1 in a certain way has demonstrated ,himself and ,his eternal processions to men by visible creatures1 according to certain signs2 so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures4 ,this mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the ,son and to the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for it belongs to the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who proceeds as ,love1 to be the gift of sanctification2 to the ,son as the principle of the ,holy ,ghost1 it belongs to the author of this sanctification4 ,thus the ,son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification2 the ,holy ,ghost as the sign of sanctification4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,son assumed the visible creature1 wherein ,he appeared1 into the unity of ,his person1 so that whatever can be said of that creature can be said of the ,son of ,god2 and so1 by reason of the nature assumed1 the ,son is called less than the ,father4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost did not assume the visible creature1 in which ,he appeared1 into the unity of ,his person2 so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of ,him4 ,hence ,he cannot be called less than the ,father by reason of any visible creature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the visible mission of the ,holy ,ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy2 because as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ii1 #f73 ,the prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes1 but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of bodies4 ,but whoever saw the dove and the fire1 saw them by their eyes4 ,nor1 again1 has the ,holy ,ghost the same relation to these images that the ,son has to the rock1 because it is said1 ',the rock was ,christ' 7#a ,cor4 #aj3d74 ,for that rock was already created1 and after the manner of an action was named ,christ1 ,whom it typified2 whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening4 ,they seem1 however1 to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by ,moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert1 and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain4 ,for the purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify1 and then pass away4 ,thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic vision1 which belongs to the imagination1 and not to the body1 nor by the sacramental signs of the ,old and ,new ,testament1 wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something4 ,but the ,holy ,ghost is said to be sent visibly1 inasmuch as ,he showed ,himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the whole ,trinity makes those creatures1 still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that person4 ,for as the ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost are signified by diverse names1 so also can ,they each one be signified by different things2 although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst ,them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it was necessary for the ,son to be declared as the author of sanctification1 as explained above4 ,thus the visible mission of the ,son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act1 and which is capable of sanctification2 whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification4 ,nor was such a visible creature1 formed for such a purpose1 necessarily assumed by the ,holy ,ghost into the unity of ,his person1 since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action1 but only for the purpose of a sign2 and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels1 not to signify the person of an angel1 but to signify the ,person of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,thus1 as the ,holy ,ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign1 on that account the ,holy ,ghost is said to be sent visibly1 and not as an angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,it is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign2 but1 as is said 7#a ,cor4 #ab3g7--the manifestation of the ,spirit is given to every man unto profit--that is1 of the ,church4 ,this utility consists in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs4 ,this has been done chiefly by ,christ and by the apostles1 according to ,heb4 #b3c1 which having begun to be declared by the ,lord1 was confirmed unto us by them that heard4 ,thus in a special sense1 a mission of the ,holy ,ghost was directed to ,christ1 to the apostles1 and to some of the early saints on whom the ,church was in a way founded2 in such a manner1 however1 that the visible mission made to ,christ should show forth the invisible mission made to ,him1 not at that particular time1 but at the first moment of ,his conception4 ,the visible mission was directed to ,christ at the time of ,his baptism by the figure of a dove1 a fruitful animal1 to show forth in ,christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration2 hence the ,father's voice spoke1 ,this is ,my beloved ,son 7,matt4 #c3ag71 that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only ,begotten4 ,the ,transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud1 to show the exuberance of doctrine2 and hence it was said1 ,hear ye ,him 7,matt4 #ag3e74 ,to the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments2 and hence it was said1 ,whose sins you shall forgive1 they are forgiven 7,john #bj3bc73 and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching2 whence it is said that1 they began to speak with divers tongues 7,acts #b3d74 ,the visible mission of the ,holy ,ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the ,old ,testament1 because the visible mission of the ,son was to be accomplished before that of the ,holy ,ghost2 since the ,holy ,ghost manifests the ,son1 as the ,son manifests the ,father4 ,visible apparitions of the divine persons were1 however1 given to the ,fathers of the ,old ,testament which1 indeed1 cannot be called visible missions2 because1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 ii1 #ag71 they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine person by grace1 but for the manifestation of something else4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dc1 ,art4 #h ,whether a ,divine ,person ,is ,sent ,only by the ,person ,whence ,he ,proceeds ,eternally8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence ,he proceeds eternally4 ,for as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv71 ,the ,father is sent by no one because ,he is from no one4 ,therefore if a divine person is sent by another1 ,he must be from that other4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sender has authority over the one sent4 ,but there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from origin4 ,therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a divine person can be sent by one whence ,he does not proceed1 then the ,holy ,ghost may be given by a man1 although ,he proceeds not from him2 which is contrary to what ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv74 ,therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence ,he proceeds4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,son is sent by the ,holy ,ghost1 according to ,isa4 #dh3af1 ,now the ,lord ,god hath sent ,me and ,his ,spirit4 ,but the ,son is not from the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore a divine person is sent by one from ,whom ,he does not proceed4 ,i answer that1 ,there are different opinions on this point4 ,some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence ,he proceeds eternally2 and so1 when it is said that the ,son of ,god is sent by the ,holy ,ghost1 this is to be explained as regards ,his human nature1 by reason of which ,he was sent to preach by the ,holy ,ghost4 ,augustine1 however1 says 7,de ,trin4 ii1 #e7 that the ,son is sent by ,himself1 and by the ,holy ,ghost2 and the ,holy ,ghost is sent by ,himself1 and by the ,son2 so that to be sent in ,god does not apply to each person1 but only to the person proceeding from another1 whereas to send belongs to each person4 ,there is some truth in both of these opinions2 because when a person is described as being sent1 the person ,himself existing from another is designated1 with the visible or invisible effect1 applicable to the mission of the divine person4 ,thus if the sender be designated as the principle of the person sent1 in this sense not each person sends1 but that person only ,who is the principle of that person who is sent2 and thus the ,son is sent only by the ,father2 and the ,holy ,ghost by the ,father and the ,son4 ,if1 however1 the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission1 in that sense the whole ,trinity sends the person sent4 ,this reason does not prove that a man can send the ,holy ,ghost1 forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect of grace4 ,the answers to the objections appear from the above4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,creation 7,,qq4 #dd-di7 ,,question #dd ,,the ,,procession ,,of ,,creatures ,,from ,,god1 ,,and ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,cause ,,of ,,all ,,things 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after treating of the procession of the divine persons1 we must consider the procession of creatures from ,god4 ,this consideration will be threefold3 7#a7 of the production of creatures2 7#b7 of the distinction between them2 7#c7 of their preservation and government4 ,concerning the first point there are three things to be considered3 7#a7 the first cause of beings2 7#b7 the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause2 7#c7 the principle of the duration of things4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god is the efficient cause of all beings8 7#b7 ,whether primary matter is created by ,god1 or is an independent coordinate principle with ,him8 7#c7 ,whether ,god is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes8 7#d7 ,whether ,he is the final cause of things8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,it ,is ,necessary ,that ,every ,being ,be ,created by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by ,god4 ,for there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence1 as a man can be found without whiteness4 ,but the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings1 for some beings can be understood without it2 therefore they can exist without it2 and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist4 ,therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause4 ,but no necessary thing can not exist1 because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist4 ,therefore as there are many necessary things in existence1 it appears that not all beings are from ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever things have a cause1 can be demonstrated by that cause4 ,but in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause1 as appears from the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 iii1 text #c72 therefore not all beings are from ,god as from their efficient cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,rom4 #aa3cf73 ,of ,him1 and by ,him1 and in ,him are all things4 ,i answer that1 ,it must be said that every being in any way existing is from ,god4 ,for whatever is found in anything by participation1 must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially1 as iron becomes ignited by fire4 ,now it has been shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d7 when treating of the divine simplicity that ,god is the essentially self-subsisting ,being2 and also it was shown 7,q4 #aa1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d7 that subsisting being must be one2 as1 if whiteness were self-subsisting1 it would be one1 since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients4 ,therefore all beings apart from ,god are not their own being1 but are beings by participation4 ,therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being1 so as to be more or less perfect1 are caused by one ,first ,being1 ,who possesses being most perfectly4 ,hence ,plato said 7,parmen4 xxvi7 that unity must come before multitude2 and ,aristotle said 7,metaph4 ii1 text #d7 that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth1 is the cause of every being and of every truth2 just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused1 still it follows1 as a consequence1 on what belongs to its essence2 because from the fact that a thing has being by participation1 it follows that it is caused4 ,hence such a being cannot be without being caused1 just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing4 ,but1 since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such1 therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause 7,phys4 viii1 text #df74 ,but this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences1 where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions4 ,and therefore ,aristotle says 7,metaph4 v1 text #f71 that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity4 ,but the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary1 but because the effect might not be if the cause were not4 ,for this conditional proposition is true1 whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally1 whereas it is not abstract in reality4 ,now1 it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being4 ,and so1 although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause1 still1 its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician1 who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,primary ,matter ,is ,created by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that primary matter is not created by ,god4 ,for whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else 7,phys4 i1 text #fb74 ,but primary matter has no subject4 ,therefore primary matter cannot have been made by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 action and passion are opposite members of a division4 ,but as the first active principle is ,god1 so the first passive principle is matter4 ,therefore ,god and primary matter are two principles divided against each other1 neither of which is from the other4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every agent produces its like1 and thus1 since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality1 it follows that everything made is in some degree actual4 ,but primary matter is only in potentiality1 formally considered in itself4 ,therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii1 #g71 ,two things hast ,thou made1 ,o ,lord2 one nigh unto ,thyself--viz4 angels--the other nigh unto nothing--viz4 primary matter4 ,i answer that1 ,the ancient philosophers gradually1 and as it were step by step1 advanced to the knowledge of truth4 ,at first being of grosser mind1 they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies4 ,and those among them who admitted movement1 did not consider it except as regards certain accidents1 for instance1 in relation to rarefaction and condensation1 by union and separation4 ,and supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated1 they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes1 as for instance1 affinity1 discord1 intellect1 or something of that kind4 ,an advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter1 which latter they imagined to be uncreated1 and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms4 ,such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes1 such as the oblique circle 99,the zodiac1 according to ,aristotle 7,de ,gener4 ii71 or ideas1 according to ,plato4 ,but we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species1 as a substance1 belonging to a certain species1 is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being2 for instance1 man by whiteness4 ,each of these opinions1 therefore1 considered being under some particular aspect1 either as this or as such2 and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things4 ,then others there were who arose to the consideration of being1 as being1 and who assigned a cause to things1 not as these1 or as such1 but as beings4 ,therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings1 must be the cause of things1 not only according as they are such by accidental forms1 nor according as they are these by substantial forms1 but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way4 ,and thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher 7,phys4 i1 text #fb71 is speaking of becoming in particular--that is1 from form to form1 either accidental or substantial4 ,but here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being2 from which emanation matter itself is not excluded1 although it is excluded from the former mode of being made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,passion is an effect of action4 ,hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle1 since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect4 ,for the first principle must be most perfect1 as ,aristotle says 7,metaph4 xii1 text #dj74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the reason adduced does not show that matter is not created1 but that it is not created without form2 for though everything created is actual1 still it is not pure act4 ,hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created1 if all that belongs to its being is created4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,exemplar ,cause ,is ,anything ,besides ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides ,god4 ,for the effect is like its exemplar cause4 ,but creatures are far from being like ,god4 ,therefore ,god is not their exemplar cause4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing1 as a thing ignited is reduced to fire1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species4 ,this appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species1 but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species4 ,therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species1 as for instance1 a per se man1 and a per se horse1 and the like1 which are called the exemplars4 ,therefore exemplar causes exist besides ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves1 but not as these are in particular things1 because there is no science or definition of particular things4 ,therefore there are some beings1 which are beings or species not existing in singular things1 and these are called exemplars4 ,therefore the same conclusion follows as above4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 this likewise appears from ,dionysius1 who says 7,div4 ,nom4 v7 that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life1 and before self-subsisting wisdom4 ,on the contrary1 ,the exemplar is the same as the idea4 ,but ideas1 according to ,augustine 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #df71 are the master forms1 which are contained in the divine intelligence4 ,therefore the exemplars of things are not outside ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,god is the first exemplar cause of all things4 ,in proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary1 it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form4 ,for an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him1 whether it is the exemplar beheld externally1 or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind4 ,now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms4 ,this determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle1 for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe1 which order consists in the variety of things4 ,and therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things1 which types we have called ideas--i4e4 exemplar forms existing in the divine mind 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #a74 ,and these ideas1 though multiplied by their relations to things1 in reality are not apart from the divine essence1 according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things4 ,in this manner therefore ,god ,himself is the first exemplar of all things4 ,moreover1 in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto1 either in species1 or by the analogy of some kind of imitation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to ,god according to similitude of species1 as a man begotten is like to the man begetting1 still they do attain to likeness to ,him1 forasmuch as they represent the divine idea1 as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is of a man's nature to be in matter1 and so a man without matter is impossible4 ,therefore although this particular man is a man by participation of the species1 he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species1 but to a superior species1 such as separate substances4 ,the same applies to other sensible things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although every science and definition is concerned only with beings1 still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding4 ,for we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions2 but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 by self-existing life and self-existing wisdom he sometimes denotes ,god ,himself1 sometimes the powers given to things themselves2 but not any self-subsisting things1 as the ancients asserted4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,god ,is the ,final ,cause of ,all ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god is not the final cause of all things4 ,for to act for an end seems to imply need of the end4 ,but ,god needs nothing4 ,therefore it does not become ,him to act for an end4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the end of generation1 and the form of the thing generated1 and the agent cannot be identical 7,phys4 ii1 text #gj71 because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated4 ,but ,god is the first agent producing all things4 ,therefore ,he is not the final cause of all things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all things desire their end4 ,but all things do not desire ,god1 for all do not even know ,him4 ,therefore ,god is not the end of all things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the final cause is the first of causes4 ,if1 therefore1 ,god is the efficient cause and the final cause1 it follows that before and after exist in ,him2 which is impossible4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,prov4 #af3d73 ,the ,lord has made all things for ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,every agent acts for an end3 otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent1 unless it were by chance4 ,now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same1 but in a different way respectively4 ,for the impression which the agent intends to produce1 and which the patient intends to receive1 are one and the same4 ,some things1 however1 are both agent and patient at the same time3 these are imperfect agents1 and to these it belongs to intend1 even while acting1 the acquisition of something4 ,but it does not belong to the ,first ,agent1 ,who is agent only1 to act for the acquisition of some end2 ,he intends only to communicate ,his perfection1 which is ,his goodness2 while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection1 which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness4 ,therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent1 which by its nature is both agent and patient4 ,but this does not belong to ,god1 and therefore ,he alone is the most perfectly liberal giver1 because ,he does not act for ,his own profit1 but only for ,his own goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the form of the thing generated is not the end of generation1 except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator1 which intends to communicate its own likeness2 otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator1 since the end is more noble than the means to the end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all things desire ,god as their end1 when they desire some good thing1 whether this desire be intellectual or sensible1 or natural1 i4e4 without knowledge2 because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since ,god is the efficient1 the exemplar and the final cause of all things1 and since primary matter is from ,him1 it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality4 ,but this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in ,him1 some of which come into our mind before others4 ,,question #de ,,the ,,mode ,,of ,,emanation ,,of ,,things ,,from ,,the ,,first ,,principle 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,the next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the ,first ,principle1 and this is called creation1 and includes eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,what is creation8 7#b7 ,whether ,god can create anything8 7#c7 ,whether creation is anything in the very nature of things8 7#d7 ,to what things it belongs to be created8 7#e7 ,whether it belongs to ,god alone to create8 7#f7 ,whether creation is common to the whole ,trinity1 or proper to any one ,person8 7#g7 ,whether any trace of the ,trinity is to be found in created things8 7#h7 ,whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #a ,whether to ,create ,is to ,make ,something from ,nothing8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing4 ,for ,augustine says 7,contra ,adv4 ,leg4 et ,proph4 i73 ,to make concerns what did not exist at all2 but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms4 ,action is therefore nobler from good to good1 and from being to being1 than from nothing to something4 ,but creation appears to be the most noble action1 and first among all actions4 ,therefore it is not from nothing to something1 but rather from being to being4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the preposition from ex imports relation of some cause1 and especially of the material cause2 as when we say that a statue is made from brass4 ,but nothing cannot be the matter of being1 nor in any way its cause4 ,therefore to create is not to make something from nothing4 ,on the contrary1 ,on the text of ,gen4 #a1 ,in the beginning ,god created1 etc41 the gloss has1 ,to create is to make something from nothing4 ,i answer that1 ,as said above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b71 we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent1 but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause1 which is ,god2 and this emanation we designate by the name of creation4 ,now what proceeds by particular emanation1 is not presupposed to that emanation2 as when a man is generated1 he was not before1 but man is made from not-man1 and white from not-white4 ,hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered1 it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation4 ,for nothing is the same as no being4 ,therefore as the generation of a man is from the not-being which is not-man1 so creation1 which is the emanation of all being1 is from the not-being which is nothing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense1 according as to be created signifies improvement in things2 as when we say that a bishop is created4 ,we do not1 however1 speak of creation in that way here1 but as it is described above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,changes receive species and dignity1 not from the term wherefrom1 but from the term whereto4 ,therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term whereto of the change is more noble and excellent1 although the term wherefrom1 corresponding to the term whereto1 may be more imperfect3 thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration1 because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form2 and yet the privation of the substantial form1 which is the term wherefrom in generation1 is more imperfect than the contrary1 which is the term wherefrom in alteration4 ,similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration1 because the term whereto is the whole substance of the thing2 whereas what is understood as the term wherefrom is simply not-being4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when anything is said to be made from nothing1 this preposition from ex does not signify the material cause1 but only order2 as when we say1 from morning comes midday--i4e4 after morning is midday4 ,but we must understand that this preposition from ex can comprise the negation implied when ,i say the word nothing1 or can be included in it4 ,if taken in the first sense1 then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence4 ,but if the negation includes the preposition1 then the order is denied1 and the sense is1 ,it is made from nothing--i4e4 it is not made from anything--as if we were to say1 ,he speaks of nothing1 because he does not speak of anything4 ,and this is verified in both ways1 when it is said1 that anything is made from nothing4 ,but in the first way this preposition from ex implies order1 as has been said in this reply4 ,in the second sense1 it imports the material cause1 which is denied4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,can ,create ,anything8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god cannot create anything1 because1 according to the ,philosopher 7,phys4 i1 text #cd71 the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that nothing is made from nothing4 ,but the power of ,god does not extend to the contraries of first principles2 as1 for instance1 that ,god could make the whole to be less than its part1 or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time4 ,therefore ,god cannot make anything from nothing1 or create4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if to create is to make something from nothing1 to be created is to be made4 ,but to be made is to be changed4 ,therefore creation is change4 ,but every change occurs in some subject1 as appears by the definition of movement3 for movement is the act of what is in potentiality4 ,therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what has been made must have at some time been becoming4 ,but it cannot be said that what is created1 at the same time1 is becoming and has been made1 because in permanent things what is becoming1 is not1 and what has been made1 already is3 and so it would follow that something would be1 and not be1 at the same time4 ,therefore when anything is made1 its becoming precedes its having been made4 ,but this is impossible1 unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained4 ,therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 infinite distance cannot be crossed4 ,but infinite distance exists between being and nothing4 ,therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3a73 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,i answer that1 ,not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by ,god1 but it is necessary to say that all things were created by ,god1 as appears from what has been said 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a74 ,for when anyone makes one thing from another1 this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action1 and is not produced by his action2 thus the craftsman works from natural things1 as wood or brass1 which are caused not by the action of art1 but by the action of nature4 ,so also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form1 but presupposes matter4 ,if therefore ,god did only act from something presupposed1 it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by ,him4 ,now it has been shown above 7,q4 #dd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 that nothing can be1 unless it is from ,god1 ,who is the universal cause of all being4 ,hence it is necessary to say that ,god brings things into being from nothing4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,ancient philosophers1 as is said above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b71 considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes1 which necessarily presuppose something in their action2 whence came their common opinion that nothing is made from nothing4 ,but this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,creation is not change1 except according to a mode of understanding4 ,for change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously4 ,sometimes1 indeed1 the same actual thing is different now from what it was before1 as in motion according to quantity1 quality and place2 but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality1 as in substantial change1 the subject of which is matter4 ,but in creation1 by which the whole substance of a thing is produced1 the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding1 so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all1 and afterwards as existing4 ,but as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion1 and differ only according to diverse relations 7,phys4 iii1 text #bj1 #ba71 it must follow that when motion is withdrawn1 only diverse relations remain in the ,creator and in the creature4 ,but because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #a71 creation is signified by mode of change2 and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing4 ,and yet to make and to be made are more suitable expressions here than to change and to be changed1 because to make and to be made import a relation of cause to the effect1 and of effect to the cause1 and imply change only as a consequence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in things which are made without movement1 to become and to be already made are simultaneous1 whether such making is the term of movement1 as illumination 7for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time7 or whether it is not the term of movement1 as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time4 ,in these things what is being made1 is2 but when we speak of its being made1 we mean that it is from another1 and was not previously4 ,hence since creation is without movement1 a thing is being created and is already created at the same time4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this objection proceeds from a false imagination1 as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being2 which is plainly false4 ,this false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,creation ,is ,anything in the ,creature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that creation is not anything in the creature4 ,for as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature1 so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the ,creator4 ,but creation taken actively is not anything in the ,creator1 because otherwise it would follow that in ,god there would be something temporal4 ,therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no medium between the ,creator and the creature4 ,but creation is signified as the medium between them both3 since it is not the ,creator1 as it is not eternal2 nor is it the creature1 because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it1 and so on to infinity4 ,therefore creation is not anything in the creature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if creation is anything besides the created substance1 it must be an accident belonging to it4 ,but every accident is in a subject4 ,therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation1 and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation4 ,this is impossible1 because the subject is before the accident1 and preserves the accident2 while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is1 and as soon as it exists1 action and passion cease4 ,therefore creation itself is not any thing4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance1 than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form4 ,but generation taken simply1 or relatively1 whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form1 is something in the thing generated4 ,therefore much more is creation1 whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance1 something in the thing created4 ,i answer that1 ,creation places something in the thing created according to relation only2 because what is created1 is not made by movement1 or by change4 ,for what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing4 ,and this happens1 indeed1 in the particular productions of some beings1 but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings1 which is ,god4 ,hence ,god by creation produces things without movement4 ,now when movement is removed from action and passion1 only relation remains1 as was said above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the ,creator as to the principle of its being2 even as in passion1 which implies movement1 is implied a relation to the principle of motion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,creation signified actively means the divine action1 which is ,god's essence1 with a relation to the creature4 ,but in ,god relation to the creature is not a real relation1 but only a relation of reason2 whereas the relation of the creature to ,god is a real relation1 as was said above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #g7 in treating of the divine names4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,because creation is signified as a change1 as was said above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b71 and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the moved1 therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the ,creator and the creature4 ,nevertheless passive creation is in the creature1 and is a creature4 ,nor is there need of a further creation in its creation2 because relations1 or their entire nature being referred to something1 are not referred by any other relations1 but by themselves2 as was also shown above 7,q4 #db1 ,a4 #a1 ad #d71 in treating of the equality of the ,persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the creature is the term of creation as signifying a change1 but is the subject of creation1 taken as a real relation1 and is prior to it in being1 as the subject is to the accident4 ,nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed1 which is the beginning of the creature4 ,nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created2 because creation imports a relation of the creature to the ,creator1 with a certain newness or beginning4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #d ,whether to ,be ,created ,belongs to ,composite and ,subsisting ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things4 ,for in the book1 ,de ,causis 7prop4 iv7 it is said1 ,the first of creatures is being4 ,but the being of a thing created is not subsisting4 ,therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is created is from nothing4 ,but composite things are not from nothing1 but are the result of their own component parts4 ,therefore composite things are not created4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first3 as natural generation produces the natural thing1 which is presupposed in the operation of art4 ,but the thing supposed in natural generation is matter4 ,therefore matter1 and not the composite1 is1 properly speaking1 that which is created4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3a73 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,but heaven and earth are subsisting composite things4 ,therefore creation belongs to them4 ,i answer that1 ,to be created is1 in a manner1 to be made1 as was shown above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b1 #c74 ,now1 to be made is directed to the being of a thing4 ,hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs2 which1 indeed1 belongs properly to subsisting things1 whether they are simple things1 as in the case of separate substances1 or composite1 as in the case of material substances4 ,for being belongs to that which has being--that is1 to what subsists in its own being4 ,but forms and accidents and the like are called beings1 not as if they themselves were1 but because something is by them2 as whiteness is called a being1 inasmuch as its subject is white by it4 ,hence1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 vii1 text #b7 accident is more properly said to be of a being than a being4 ,therefore1 as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist1 so they ought to be called rather concreated than created things2 whereas1 properly speaking1 created things are subsisting beings4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the proposition the first of created things is being1 the word being does not refer to the subject of creation1 but to the proper concept of the object of creation4 ,for a created thing is called created because it is a being1 not because it is this being1 since creation is the emanation of all being from the ,universal ,being1 as was said above 7,a4 #a74 ,we use a similar way of speaking when we say that the first visible thing is color1 although1 strictly speaking1 the thing colored is what is seen4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles2 but it means that the composite is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this reason does not prove that matter alone is created1 but that matter does not exist except by creation2 for creation is the production of the whole being1 and not only matter4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,it ,belongs to ,god ,alone to ,create8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it does not belong to ,god alone to create1 because1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 text #cd71 what is perfect can make its own likeness4 ,but immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures1 which nevertheless can make their own likeness1 for fire generates fire1 and man begets man4 ,therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself4 ,but immaterial substance can be made only by creation1 since it has no matter from which to be made4 ,therefore a creature can create4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made1 so much the greater power is required in the maker4 ,but a contrary resists more than nothing4 ,therefore it requires more power to make 7something7 from its contrary1 which nevertheless a creature can do1 than to make a thing from nothing4 ,much more therefore can a creature do this4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made4 ,but created being is finite1 as we proved above when treating of the infinity of ,god 7,q4 #g1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d74 ,therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation4 ,but to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature4 ,therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h7 that neither good nor bad angels can create anything4 ,much less therefore can any other creatures4 ,i answer that1 ,it sufficiently appears at the first glance1 according to what precedes 7,a4 #a71 that to create can be the action of ,god alone4 ,for the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes4 ,now among all effects the most universal is being itself3 and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause1 and that is ,god4 ,hence also it is said 7,de ,causis prop41 iii7 that neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being1 except inasmuch as it works by divine operation4 ,now to produce being absolutely1 not as this or that being1 belongs to creation4 ,hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of ,god alone4 ,it happens1 however1 that something participates the proper action of another1 not by its own power1 but instrumentally1 inasmuch as it acts by the power of another2 as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire4 ,and so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause1 still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause1 can create4 ,and thus ,avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by ,god created another after itself1 and the substance of the world and its soul2 and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies4 ,and in the same manner the ,master says 7,sent4 iv1 ,d1 #e7 that ,god can communicate to a creature the power of creating1 so that the latter can create ministerially1 not by its own power4 ,but such a thing cannot be1 because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause1 except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent4 ,if therefore it effects nothing1 according to what is proper to itself1 it is used to no purpose2 nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions4 ,thus we see that a saw1 in cutting wood1 which it does by the property of its own form1 produces the form of a bench1 which is the proper effect of the principal agent4 ,now the proper effect of ,god creating is what is presupposed to all other effects1 and that is absolute being4 ,hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect1 since creation is not from anything presupposed1 which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent4 ,so therefore it is impossible for any creature to create1 either by its own power or instrumentally--that is1 ministerially4 ,and above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create1 for no body acts except by touching or moving2 and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing1 which can be touched or moved1 which is contrary to the very idea of creation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a perfect thing participating any nature1 makes a likeness to itself1 not by absolutely producing that nature1 but by applying it to something else4 ,for an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely1 because he would then be the cause of himself2 but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten2 and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man4 ,but as an individual man participates human nature1 so every created being participates1 so to speak1 the nature of being2 for ,god alone is ,his own being1 as we have said above 7,q4 #g1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely1 except forasmuch as it causes being in this3 and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing1 before the action whereby it makes its own likeness4 ,but in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing2 because it is what it is by its form1 whereby it has being1 since it is a subsisting form4 ,therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being1 but only as regards some added perfection2 as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv1 x74 ,in this way even in heaven there is paternity1 as the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #c3ae73 ,from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named4 ,from which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything1 unless something is presupposed2 which is against the very idea of creation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a thing is made from its contrary indirectly 7,phys4 i1 text #dc71 but directly from the subject which is in potentiality4 ,and so the contrary resists the agent1 inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce1 as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself1 but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions1 whereby the potentiality 7of the water7 is restrained from being reduced to act2 and the more the potentiality is restrained1 the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act4 ,hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists4 ,thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing1 than from its contrary4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made1 but also from the mode of its being made2 for a greater heat heats not only more1 but quicker4 ,therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power1 yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power3 which appears from what has been said 7ad #b74 ,for if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act1 it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite1 because there is no proportion between no potentiality and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent1 as there is no proportion between not being and being4 ,and because no creature has simply an infinite power1 any more than it has an infinite being1 as was proved above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #b71 it follows that no creature can create4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #f ,whether to ,create ,is ,proper to ,any ,person8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to create is proper to some ,person4 ,for what comes first is the cause of what is after2 and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect4 ,but the procession of the divine ,person is prior to the procession of the creature3 and is more perfect1 because the divine ,person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle2 whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude4 ,therefore the processions of the divine ,persons are the cause of the processions of things1 and so to create belongs to a ,person4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the divine ,persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations4 ,therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine ,persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the ,persons4 ,but the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine ,persons2 for in the ,creed1 to the ,father is attributed that ,he is the ,creator of all things visible and invisible2 to the ,son is attributed that by ,him all things were made2 and to the ,holy ,ghost is attributed that ,he is ,lord and ,life-giver4 ,therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the ,persons according to processions and relations4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one ,person1 this does not appear to be sufficient2 because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute--viz4 by power1 goodness and wisdom--and thus does not belong to one more than to another4 ,therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one ,person more than to another1 unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii7 that all things caused are the common work of the whole ,godhead4 ,i answer that1 ,to create is1 properly speaking1 to cause or produce the being of things4 ,and as every agent produces its like1 the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action2 for it must be fire that generates fire4 ,and therefore to create belongs to ,god according to ,his being1 that is1 ,his essence1 which is common to the three ,persons4 ,hence to create is not proper to any one ,person1 but is common to the whole ,trinity4 ,nevertheless the divine ,persons1 according to the nature of their procession1 have a causality respecting the creation of things4 ,for as was said above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d71 when treating of the knowledge and will of ,god1 ,god is the cause of things by ,his intellect and will1 just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft4 ,now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind1 and through the love of his will regarding some object4 ,hence also ,god the ,father made the creature through ,his ,word1 which is ,his ,son2 and through ,his ,love1 which is the ,holy ,ghost4 ,and so the processions of the ,persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes1 knowledge and will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the processions of the divine ,persons are the cause of creation1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the divine nature1 although common to the three ,persons1 still belongs to them in a kind of order1 inasmuch as the ,son receives the divine nature from the ,father1 and the ,holy ,ghost from both3 so also likewise the power of creation1 whilst common to the three ,persons1 belongs to them in a kind of order4 ,for the ,son receives it from the ,father1 and the ,holy ,ghost from both4 ,hence to be the ,creator is attributed to the ,father as to ,him ,who does not receive the power of creation from another4 ,and of the ,son it is said 7,john #a3c71 ,through ,him all things were made1 inasmuch as ,he has the same power1 but from another2 for this preposition through usually denotes a mediate cause1 or a principle from a principle4 ,but to the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who has the same power from both1 is attributed that by ,his sway ,he governs1 and quickens what is created by the ,father through the ,son4 ,again1 the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes4 ,for1 as above stated 7,q4 #ci1 ,a4 #h1 ad #c71 to the ,father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation1 and therefore it is attributed to ,him to be the ,creator4 ,to the ,son is appropriated wisdom1 through which the intellectual agent acts2 and therefore it is said3 ,through ,whom all things were made4 ,and to the ,holy ,ghost is appropriated goodness1 to which belong both government1 which brings things to their proper end1 and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior movement2 and the first mover is the end1 and goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although every effect of ,god proceeds from each attribute1 each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected2 thus the order of things is reduced to wisdom1 and the justification of the sinner to mercy and goodness poured out super-abundantly4 ,but creation1 which is the production of the very substance of a thing1 is reduced to power4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #g ,whether in ,creatures ,is ,necessarily ,found a ,trace of the ,trinity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the ,trinity4 ,for anything can be traced through its traces4 ,but the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures1 as was above stated 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore there is no trace of the ,trinity in creatures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is in creatures is created4 ,therefore if the trace of the ,trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties1 and if everything created has a trace of the ,trinity1 it follows that we can find a trace of the ,trinity in each of these 7properties73 and so on to infinitude4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the effect represents only its own cause4 ,but the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature1 and not to the relations whereby the ,persons are distinguished and numbered4 ,therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the ,trinity but of the unity of essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #aj71 that the trace of the ,trinity appears in creatures4 ,i answer that1 ,every effect in some degree represents its cause1 but diversely4 ,for some effects represent only the causality of the cause1 but not its form2 as smoke represents fire4 ,such a representation is called a trace3 for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is4 ,other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form1 as fire generated represents fire generating2 and a statue of ,mercury represents ,mercury2 and this is called the representation of image4 ,now the processions of the divine ,persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will1 as was said above 7,q4 #bg74 ,for the ,son proceeds as the word of the intellect2 and the ,holy ,ghost proceeds as love of the will4 ,therefore in rational creatures1 possessing intellect and will1 there is found the representation of the ,trinity by way of image1 inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived1 and the love proceeding4 ,but in all creatures there is found the trace of the ,trinity1 inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine ,persons as to their cause4 ,for every creature subsists in its own being1 and has a form1 whereby it is determined to a species1 and has relation to something else4 ,therefore as it is a created substance1 it represents the cause and principle2 and so in that manner it shows the ,person of the ,father1 ,who is the principle from no principle4 ,according as it has a form and species1 it represents the ,word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman4 ,according as it has relation of order1 it represents the ,holy ,ghost1 inasmuch as ,he is love1 because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the ,creator4 ,and therefore ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi #aj7 that the trace of the ,trinity is found in every creature1 according as it is one individual1 and according as it is formed by a species1 and according as it has a certain relation of order4 ,and to these also are reduced those three1 number1 weight1 and measure1 mentioned in the ,book of ,wisdom 7#i3ba74 ,for measure refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles1 number refers to the species1 weight refers to the order4 ,and to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by ,augustine 7,de ,nat4 ,boni iii71 mode1 species1 and order1 and also those he mentions 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ah73 that which exists2 whereby it is distinguished2 whereby it agrees4 ,for a thing exists by its substance1 is distinct by its form1 and agrees by its order4 ,other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations3 in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures1 as we have said 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting2 and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found4 ,nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature2 but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation2 as appears from the above 7,a4 #f74 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #de1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,creation ,is ,mingled with ,works of ,nature and ,art8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art4 ,for in every operation of nature and art some form is produced4 ,but it is not produced from anything1 since matter has no part in it4 ,therefore it is produced from nothing2 and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the effect is not more powerful than its cause4 ,but in natural things the only agent is the accidental form1 which is an active or a passive form4 ,therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature2 and therefore it must be produced by creation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in nature like begets like4 ,but some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them2 as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction4 ,therefore the form of these is not from nature1 but by creation2 and the same reason applies to other things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 what is not created1 is not a creature4 ,if therefore in nature's productions there were not creation1 it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures2 which is heretical4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,super ,gen4 v1 #f1ad1ae7 distinguishes the work of propagation1 which is a work of nature1 from the work of creation4 ,i answer that1 ,the doubt on this subject arises from the forms which1 some said1 do not come into existence by the action of nature1 but previously exist in matter2 for they asserted that forms are latent4 ,this arose from ignorance concerning matter1 and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act4 ,for because forms pre-exist in matter1 in potentiality1 they asserted that they pre-exist simply4 ,others1 however1 said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation2 and accordingly1 that to each operation of nature is joined creation4 ,but this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form4 ,for they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting1 but is that by which a thing is4 ,and therefore1 since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone1 as shown above 7,a4 #d71 it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created1 but to be concreated4 ,what1 indeed1 is properly made by the natural agent is the composite1 which is made from matter4 ,hence in the works of nature creation does not enter1 but is presupposed to the work of nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made1 not as though they were made directly1 but only indirectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms3 and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality1 but according to species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,for the generation of imperfect animals1 a universal agent suffices1 and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated1 not in species1 but according to a kind of analogy4 ,nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent4 ,however1 for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice1 but a proper agent is required1 in the shape of a univocal generator4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles2 and thus the products of nature are called creatures4 ,,question #df ,,of ,,the ,,beginning ,,of ,,the ,,duration ,,of ,,creatures 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures1 about which there are three points for treatment3 7#a7 ,whether creatures always existed8 7#b7 ,whether that they began to exist is an article of ,faith8 7#c7 ,how ,god is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,universe of ,creatures ,always ,existed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the universe of creatures1 called the world1 had no beginning1 but existed from eternity4 ,for everything which begins to exist1 is a possible being before it exists3 otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist4 ,if therefore the world began to exist1 it was a possible being before it began to exist4 ,but possible being is matter1 which is in potentiality to existence1 which results from a form1 and to non-existence1 which results from privation of form4 ,if therefore the world began to exist1 matter must have existed before the world4 ,but matter cannot exist without form3 while the matter of the world with its form is the world4 ,therefore the world existed before it began to exist3 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing which has power to be always1 sometimes is and sometimes is not2 because so far as the power of a thing extends so long it exists4 ,but every incorruptible thing has power to be always2 for its power does not extend to any determinate time4 ,therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is1 and sometimes is not3 but everything which has a beginning at some time is1 and at some time is not2 therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist4 ,but there are many incorruptible things in the world1 as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances4 ,therefore the world did not begin to exist4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is unbegotten has no beginning4 ,but the ,philosopher 7,phys4 i1 text #hb7 proves that matter is unbegotten1 and also 7,de ,coelo et ,mundo i1 text #bj7 that the heaven is unbegotten4 ,therefore the universe did not begin to exist4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a vacuum is where there is not a body1 but there might be4 ,but if the world began to exist1 there was first no body where the body of the world now is2 and yet it could be there1 otherwise it would not be there now4 ,therefore before the world there was a vacuum2 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before4 ,but what is otherwise now than it was before1 is moved4 ,therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement4 ,therefore movement always was2 and therefore also the thing moved always was1 because movement is only in a movable thing4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 every mover is either natural or voluntary4 ,but neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement4 ,for nature always moves in the same manner3 hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover1 or in the movable thing1 there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before4 ,and the will1 without itself being changed1 puts off doing what it proposes to do2 but this can be only by some imagined change1 at least on the part of time4 ,thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow1 and not today1 awaits something which will be tomorrow1 but is not today2 and at least awaits for today to pass1 and for tomorrow to come2 and this cannot be without change1 because time is the measure of movement4 ,therefore it remains that before every new movement1 there was a previous movement2 and so the same conclusion follows as before4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 whatever is always in its beginning1 and always in its end1 cannot cease and cannot begin2 because what begins is not in its end1 and what ceases is not in its beginning4 ,but time always is in its beginning and end1 because there is no time except now which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future4 ,therefore time cannot begin or end1 and consequently neither can movement1 the measure of what is time4 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 ,god is before the world either in the order of nature only1 or also by duration4 ,if in the order of nature only1 therefore1 since ,god is eternal1 the world also is eternal4 ,but if ,god is prior by duration2 since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time1 it follows that time existed before the world1 which is impossible4 ,obj4 #i3 ,further1 if there is a sufficient cause1 there is an effect2 for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause1 requiring something else to make the effect follow4 ,but ,god is the sufficient cause of the world2 being the final cause1 by reason of ,his goodness1 the exemplar cause by reason of ,his wisdom1 and the efficient cause1 by reason of ,his power as appears from the above 7,q4 #dd1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c1 #d74 ,since therefore ,god is eternal1 the world is also eternal4 ,obj4 #aj3 ,further1 eternal action postulates an eternal effect4 ,but the action of ,god is ,his substance1 which is eternal4 ,therefore the world is eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,john #ag3e71 ,glorify ,me1 ,o ,father1 with ,thyself with the glory which ,i had before the world was2 and 7,prov4 #h3bb71 ,the ,lord possessed ,me in the beginning of ,his ways1 before ,he made anything from the beginning4 ,i answer that1 ,nothing except ,god can be eternal4 ,and this statement is far from impossible to uphold3 for it has been shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d7 that the will of ,god is the cause of things4 ,therefore things are necessary1 according as it is necessary for ,god to will them1 since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause 7,metaph4 v1 text #f74 ,now it was shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c71 that1 absolutely speaking1 it is not necessary that ,god should will anything except ,himself4 ,it is not therefore necessary for ,god to will that the world should always exist2 but the world exists forasmuch as ,god wills it to exist1 since the being of the world depends on the will of ,god1 as on its cause4 ,it is not therefore necessary for the world to be always2 and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration4 ,nor are ,aristotle's reasons 7,phys4 viii7 simply1 but relatively1 demonstrative--viz4 in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner4 ,this appears in three ways4 ,firstly1 because1 both in ,phys4 viii and in ,de ,coelo i1 text #aja1 he premises some opinions1 as those of ,anaxagoras1 ,empedocles and ,plato1 and brings forward reasons to refute them4 ,secondly1 because wherever he speaks of this subject1 he quotes the testimony of the ancients1 which is not the way of a demonstrator1 but of one persuading of what is probable4 ,thirdly1 because he expressly says 7,topic4 i1 #i71 that there are dialectical problems1 about which we have nothing to say from reason1 as1 whether the world is eternal4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,before the world existed it was possible for the world to be1 not1 indeed1 according to a passive power which is matter1 but according to the active power of ,god2 and also1 according as a thing is called absolutely possible1 not in relation to any power1 but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other2 in which sense possible is opposed to impossible1 as appears from the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 v1 text #ag74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whatever has power always to be1 from the fact of having that power1 cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be2 but before it received that power1 it did not exist4 ,hence this reason which is given by ,aristotle 7,de ,coelo i1 text #abj7 does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist2 but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,aristotle 7,phys4 i1 text #hb7 proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence2 and 7,de ,coelo et ,mundo i1 text #bj7 he proves that heaven is ungenerated1 forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated4 ,hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way1 except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation1 as some said1 especially about heaven4 ,but we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation1 as appears above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the notion of a vacuum is not only in which is nothing1 but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body1 as appears from ,aristotle 7,phys4 iv1 text #fj74 ,whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the first mover was always in the same state3 but the first movable thing was not always so1 because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not4 ,this1 however1 was not through change1 but by creation1 which is not change1 as said above 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,hence it is evident that this reason1 which ,aristotle gives 7,phys4 viii71 is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things1 but not eternal movement1 as appears from the opinions of ,anaxagoras and ,empedocles4 ,but we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the first agent is a voluntary agent4 ,and although ,he had the eternal will to produce some effect1 yet ,he did not produce an eternal effect4 ,nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed1 not even on account of imaginary time4 ,for we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent1 that presupposes something and produces something else1 and the universal agent1 who produces the whole4 ,the particular agent produces the form1 and presupposes the matter2 and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter4 ,hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter1 and not into another1 on account of the different kinds of matter4 ,but it is not correct to say so of ,god ,who produces form and matter together3 whereas it is correct to say of ,him that ,he produces matter fitting to the form and to the end4 ,now1 a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter4 ,hence it is correctly described as acting in time after and not in time before1 according to an imaginary succession of time after time4 ,but the universal agent who produces the thing and time also1 is not correctly described as acting now1 and not before1 according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time1 as if time were presupposed to ,his action2 but ,he must be considered as giving time to ,his effect as much as and when ,he willed1 and according to what was fitting to demonstrate ,his power4 ,for the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power1 if it was not always1 than if it had always been2 since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause2 whereas this is not so manifest of what always was4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,as is stated 7,phys4 iv1 text #ii71 before and after belong to time1 according as they are in movement4 ,hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement4 ,now1 granted the eternity of movement1 it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement2 which need not be if movement be a beginning4 ,the same applies to the now of time4 ,thus it appears that the idea of the instant now1 as being always the beginning and end of time1 presupposes the eternity of time and movement4 ,hence ,aristotle brings forward this reason 7,phys4 viii1 text #aj7 against those who asserted the eternity of time1 but denied the eternity of movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,god is prior to the world by priority of duration4 ,but the word prior signifies priority not of time1 but of eternity4 ,or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time1 and not of time really existing2 thus1 when we say that above heaven there is nothing1 the word above signifies only an imaginary place1 according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body4 ,reply ,obj4 #i3 ,as the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature1 according to the mode of its form1 so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent1 according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent1 as appears from what was said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #da1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore1 although ,god was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world1 we should not say that the world was produced by ,him1 except as preordained by ,his will--that is1 that it should have being after not being1 in order more manifestly to declare its author4 ,reply ,obj4 #aj3 ,given the action1 the effect follows according to the requirement of the form1 which is the principle of action4 ,but in agents acting by will1 what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form1 which is the principle of action4 ,therefore from the eternal action of ,god an eternal effect did not follow2 but such an effect as ,god willed1 an effect1 to wit1 which has being after not being4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,it ,is an ,article of ,faith ,that the ,world ,began8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began4 ,for everything that is made has a beginning of its duration4 ,but it can be proved demonstratively that ,god is the effective cause of the world2 indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers4 ,therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if it is necessary to say that the world was made by ,god1 it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something4 ,but it was not made from something2 otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world2 against which are the arguments of ,aristotle 7,de ,coelo i71 who held that heaven was ungenerated4 ,therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing2 and thus it has being after not being4 ,therefore it must have begun4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything which works by intellect works from some principle1 as appears in all kinds of craftsmen4 ,but ,god acts by intellect3 therefore ,his work has a principle4 ,the world1 therefore1 which is ,his effect1 did not always exist4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed1 and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time4 ,but this would not be the case if the world had been always4 ,therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it is certain that nothing can be equal to ,god4 ,but if the world had always been1 it would be equal to ,god in duration4 ,therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 if the world always was1 the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day4 ,but it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium4 ,therefore we should never have arrived at this present day2 which is manifestly false4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 if the world was eternal1 generation also was eternal4 ,therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series4 ,but the father is the efficient cause of the son 7,phys4 ii1 text #e74 ,therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series1 which is disproved 7,metaph4 ii1 text #e74 ,obj4 #h3 ,further1 if the world and generation always were1 there have been an infinite number of men4 ,but man's soul is immortal3 therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist1 which is impossible4 ,therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began1 and not only is it known by faith4 ,on the contrary1 ,the articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively1 because faith is of things that appear not 7,heb4 #aa3a74 ,but that ,god is the ,creator of the world3 hence that the world began1 is an article of faith2 for we say1 ,i believe in one ,god1 etc4 ,and again1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 i in ,ezech471 that ,moses prophesied of the past1 saying1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth3 in which words the newness of the world is stated4 ,therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation2 and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively4 ,i answer that1 ,by faith alone do we hold1 and by no demonstration can it be proved1 that the world did not always exist1 as was said above of the mystery of the ,trinity 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #a74 ,the reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself4 ,for the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing4 ,now everything according to its species is abstracted from here and now2 whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always4 ,hence it cannot be demonstrated that man1 or heaven1 or a stone were not always4 ,likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause1 which acts by will4 ,for the will of ,god cannot be investigated by reason1 except as regards those things which ,god must will of necessity2 and what ,he wills about creatures is not among these1 as was said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c74 ,but the divine will can be manifested by revelation1 on which faith rests4 ,hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith1 but not of demonstration or science4 ,and it is useful to consider this1 lest anyone1 presuming to demonstrate what is of faith1 should bring forward reasons that are not cogent1 so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh1 thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #d71 the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold4 ,for some said that the substance of the world was not from ,god1 which is an intolerable error2 and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent4 ,some1 however1 said that the world was eternal1 although made by ,god4 ,for they hold that the world has a beginning1 not of time1 but of creation1 so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made4 ,and they try to explain their meaning thus 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #ca73 for as1 if the foot were always in the dust from eternity1 there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it1 so also the world always was1 because its ,maker always existed4 ,to understand this we must consider that the efficient cause1 which acts by motion1 of necessity precedes its effect in time2 because the effect is only in the end of the action1 and every agent must be the principle of action4 ,but if the action is instantaneous and not successive1 it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination4 ,hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if ,god is the active cause of the world1 that ,he should be prior to the world in duration2 because creation1 by which ,he produced the world1 is not a successive change1 as was said above 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those who would say that the world was eternal1 would say that the world was made by ,god from nothing1 not that it was made after nothing1 according to what we understand by the word creation1 but that it was not made from anything2 and so also some of them do not reject the word creation1 as appears from ,avicenna 7,metaph4 ix1 text #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this is the argument of ,anaxagoras 7as quoted in ,phys4 viii1 text #ae74 ,but it does not lead to a necessary conclusion1 except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done1 which is like movement4 ,such is the human intellect1 but not the divine intellect 7,q4 #ad1 ,,aa4 #g1 #ab74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times1 from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and vice versa1 and likewise they hold that the arts1 by reason of various corruptions and accidents1 were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay4 ,hence ,aristotle says 7,meteor4 i71 that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,even supposing that the world always was1 it would not be equal to ,god in eternity1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 v1 #f72 because the divine ,being is all being simultaneously without succession2 but with the world it is otherwise4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,passage is always understood as being from term to term4 ,whatever bygone day we choose1 from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through4 ,the objection is founded on the idea that1 given two extremes1 there is an infinite number of mean terms4 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,in efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se--thus1 there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect2 for instance1 that a stone be moved by a stick1 the stick by the hand1 and so on to infinity4 ,but it is not impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes2 for instance1 if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause1 their multiplication being accidental1 as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally1 because one after the other may be broken4 ,it is accidental1 therefore1 that one particular hammer acts after the action of another2 and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man2 for he generates as a man1 and not as the son of another man4 ,for all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz4 the grade of a particular generator4 ,hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity2 but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man1 and on an elementary body1 and on the sun1 and so on to infinity4 ,reply ,obj4 #h3 ,those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways4 ,for some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls1 as appears from the ,metaphysics of ,algazel1 who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity4 ,but this was disproved above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #d74 ,some say that the soul is corrupted with the body4 ,and some say that of all souls only one will remain4 ,but others1 as ,augustine says 99,serm4 xiv1 ,de ,temp4 #d1 #e2 ,de ,haeres41 haeres4 #df2 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xii4 #ac1 asserted on this account a circuit of souls--viz4 that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time2 a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #f74 ,but be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case4 ,hence one might say that the world was eternal1 or at least some creature1 as an angel1 but not man4 ,but we are considering the question in general1 as to whether any creature can exist from eternity4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #df1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,creation of ,things ,was in the ,beginning of ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time4 ,for whatever is not in time1 is not of any part of time4 ,but the creation of things was not in time2 for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being2 and time does not measure the substance of things1 and especially of incorporeal things4 ,therefore creation was not in the beginning of time4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 vi1 text #dj7 that everything which is made1 was being made2 and so to be made implies a before and after4 ,but in the beginning of time1 since it is indivisible1 there is no before and after4 ,therefore1 since to be created is a kind of being made1 it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 even time itself is created4 ,but time cannot be created in the beginning of time1 since time is divisible1 and the beginning of time is indivisible4 ,therefore1 the creation of things was not in the beginning of time4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3a73 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,i answer that1 ,the words of ,genesis1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors4 ,for some said that the world always was1 and that time had no beginning2 and to exclude this the words ,in the beginning are expounded--viz4 of time4 ,and some said that there are two principles of creation1 one of good things and the other of evil things1 against which ,in the beginning is expounded--in the ,son4 ,for as the efficient principle is appropriated to the ,father by reason of power1 so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the ,son by reason of wisdom1 in order that1 as it is said 7,ps4 #ajc3bd71 ,thou hast made all things in wisdom1 it may be understood that ,god made all things in the beginning--that is1 in the ,son2 according to the word of the ,apostle 7,col4 #a3af71 ,in ,him--viz4 the ,son--were created all things4 ,but others said that corporeal things were created by ,god through the medium of spiritual creation2 and to exclude this it is expounded thus3 ,in the beginning--i4e4 before all things--,god created heaven and earth4 ,for four things are stated to be created together--viz4 the empyrean heaven1 corporeal matter1 by which is meant the earth1 time1 and the angelic nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,things are said to be created in the beginning of time1 not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation1 but because together with time heaven and earth were created4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this saying of the ,philosopher is understood of being made by means of movement1 or as the term of movement4 ,because1 since in every movement there is before and after1 before any one point in a given movement--that is1 whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made1 there is a before and also an after1 because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in being moved4 ,but creation is neither movement nor the term of movement1 as was said above 7,q4 #de1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c74 ,hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing is made except as it exists4 ,but nothing exists of time except now4 ,hence time cannot be made except according to some now2 not because in the first now is time1 but because from it time begins4 ,,question #dg ,,of ,,the ,,distinction ,,of ,,things ,,in ,,general 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,after considering the production of creatures1 we come to the consideration of the distinction of things4 ,this consideration will be threefold--first1 of the distinction of things in general2 secondly1 of the distinction of good and evil2 thirdly1 of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature4 ,under the first head1 there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,the multitude or distinction of things4 7#b7 ,their inequality4 7#c7 ,the unity of the world4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,multitude and ,distinction of ,things ,come from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from ,god4 ,for one naturally always makes one4 ,but ,god is supremely one1 as appears from what precedes 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore ,he produces but one effect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the representation is assimilated to its exemplar4 ,but ,god is the exemplar cause of ,his effect1 as was said above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore1 as ,god is one1 ,his effect is one only1 and not diverse4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the means are proportional to the end4 ,but the end of the creation is one--viz4 the divine goodness1 as was shown above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore the effect of ,god is but one4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3d1 #g7 that ,god divided the light from the darkness1 and divided waters from waters4 ,therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,the distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes4 ,for some attributed the distinction to matter1 either by itself or with the agent4 ,democritus1 for instance1 and all the ancient natural philosophers1 who admitted no cause but matter1 attributed it to matter alone2 and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter4 ,anaxagoras1 however1 attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together2 and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter4 ,but this cannot stand1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because1 as was shown above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b71 even matter itself was created by ,god4 ,hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause4 ,secondly1 because matter is for the sake of the form1 and not the form for the matter1 and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms4 ,therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter2 but rather1 on the contrary1 created matter is formless1 in order that it may be accommodated to different forms4 ,others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents1 as did ,avicenna1 who said that ,god by understanding ,himself1 produced the first intelligence2 in which1 forasmuch as it was not its own being1 there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act1 as will appear later 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #c74 ,and so the first intelligence1 inasmuch as it understood the first cause1 produced the second intelligence2 and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body1 which causes movement1 and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens4 ,but this opinion cannot stand1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because it was shown above 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #e7 that to create belongs to ,god alone1 and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by ,god alone--viz4 all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption4 ,secondly1 because1 according to this opinion1 the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent1 but from the concurrence of many active causes2 and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance4 ,therefore1 the perfection of the universe1 which consists of the diversity of things1 would thus be a thing of chance1 which is impossible4 ,hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent1 who is ,god4 ,for ,he brought things into being in order that ,his goodness might be communicated to creatures1 and be represented by them2 and because ,his goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone1 ,he produced many and diverse creatures1 that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another4 ,for goodness1 which in ,god is simple and uniform1 in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly1 and represents it better than any single creature whatever4 ,and because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things1 therefore ,moses said that things are made distinct by the word of ,god1 which is the concept of ,his wisdom2 and this is what we read in ,gen4 #a3c1 #d3 ,god said3 ,be light made 4 4 4 ,and ,he divided the light from the darkness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is1 and which is only one in one thing2 and therefore its effect is one only4 ,but the voluntary agent1 such as ,god is1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d71 acts by an intellectual form4 ,since1 therefore1 it is not against ,god's unity and simplicity to understand many things1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #b71 it follows that1 although ,he is one1 ,he can make many things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly1 and which is multiplied by reason of matter only2 hence the uncreated image1 which is perfect1 is only one4 ,but no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly1 which is the divine essence2 and1 therefore1 it can be represented by many things4 ,still1 according as ideas are called exemplars1 the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in speculative things the medium of demonstration1 which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly1 is one only2 whereas probable means of proof are many4 ,likewise when operation is concerned1 if the means be equal1 so to speak1 to the end1 one only is sufficient4 ,but the creature is not such a means to its end1 which is ,god2 and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,inequality of ,things ,is from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the inequality of things is not from ,god4 ,for it belongs to the best to produce the best4 ,but among things that are best1 one is not greater than another4 ,therefore1 it belongs to ,god1 ,who is the ,best1 to make all things equal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 equality is the effect of unity 7,metaph4 v1 text #bj74 ,but ,god is one4 ,therefore1 ,he has made all things equal4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things4 ,but ,god is just in all ,his works4 ,since1 therefore1 no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby ,he gives being to things1 it seems that ,he has made all things equal4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ecclus4 #cc3g73 ,why does one day excel another1 and one light another1 and one year another year1 one sun another sun8 ,vulg43 'when all come of the sun'4 ,by the knowledge of the ,lord they were distinguished4 ,i answer that1 ,when ,origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil1 he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by ,god4 ,for he asserted that ,god first created only the rational creatures and all equal2 and that inequality arose in them from free-will1 some being turned to ,god more and some less1 and others turned more and others less away from ,god4 ,and so those rational creatures which were turned to ,god by free-will1 were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits4 ,and those who were turned away from ,god were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin2 and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies4 ,but according to this opinion1 it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of ,god as communicated to creatures1 but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin1 which is contrary to what is said3 ,god saw all the things that ,he had made1 and they were very good 7,gen4 #a3ca74 ,and1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ii1 #c73 ,what can be more foolish than to say that the divine ,architect provided this one sun for the one world1 not to be an ornament to its beauty1 nor for the benefit of corporeal things1 but that it happened through the sin of one soul2 so that1 if a hundred souls had sinned1 there would be a hundred suns in the world8 ,therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of ,god is the cause of the distinction of things1 so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality4 ,this may be explained as follows4 ,a twofold distinction is found in things2 one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically2 the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only4 ,and as the matter is on account of the form1 material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction4 ,hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species1 forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one2 whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preservation of the species4 ,whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material4 ,now1 formal distinction always requires inequality1 because as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 viii1 #aj71 the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity4 ,hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees2 as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements1 and plants than minerals1 and animals than plants1 and men than other animals2 and in each of these one species is more perfect than others4 ,therefore1 as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe1 so it is the cause of inequality4 ,for the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety2 but this does not mean that ,he makes every part of the whole the best absolutely1 but in proportion to the whole2 in the case of an animal1 for instance1 its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye4 ,thus1 therefore1 ,god also made the universe to be best as a whole1 according to the mode of a creature2 whereas ,he did not make each single creature best1 but one better than another4 ,and therefore we find it said of each creature1 ,god saw the light that it was good 7,gen4 #a3d72 and in like manner of each one of the rest4 ,but of all together it is said1 ,god saw all the things that ,he had made1 and they were very good 7,gen4 #a3ca74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the first effect of unity is equality2 and then comes multiplicity2 and therefore from the ,father1 to ,whom1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #e71 is appropriated unity1 the ,son proceeds to ,whom is appropriated equality1 and then from ,him the creature proceeds1 to which belongs inequality2 but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality--namely1 of proportion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this is the argument that persuaded ,origen3 but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards1 the inequality of which is due to unequal merits4 ,but in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality1 either of merits or of the disposition of the matter2 but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole4 ,this appears also in works done by art2 for the roof of a house differs from the foundation1 not because it is made of other material2 but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts1 the artificer seeks different material2 indeed1 he would make such material if he could4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,one ,world8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is not only one world1 but many4 ,because1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #df71 it is unfitting to say that ,god has created things without a reason4 ,but for the same reason ,he created one1 ,he could create many1 since ,his power is not limited to the creation of one world2 but rather it is infinite1 as was shown above 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore ,god has produced many worlds4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nature does what is best and much more does ,god4 ,but it is better for there to be many worlds than one1 because many good things are better than a few4 ,therefore many worlds have been made by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number1 the species remaining the same1 because multiplication in number comes from matter4 ,but the world has a form in matter4 ,thus as when ,i say man ,i mean the form1 and when ,i say this man1 ,i mean the form in matter2 so when we say world1 the form is signified1 and when we say this world1 the form in the matter is signified4 ,therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,john #a3aj73 ,the world was made by ,him1 where the world is named as one1 as if only one existed4 ,i answer that1 ,the very order of things created by ,god shows the unity of the world4 ,for this world is called one by the unity of order1 whereby some things are ordered to others4 ,but whatever things come from ,god1 have relation of order to each other1 and to ,god ,himself1 as shown above 7,q4 #aa1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ba1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it must be that all things should belong to one world4 ,therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom1 but rather believe in chance1 as ,democritus1 who said that this world1 besides an infinite number of other worlds1 was made from a casual concourse of atoms4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order1 and to one end4 ,therefore from the unity of order in things ,aristotle infers 7,metaph4 xii1 text #eb7 the unity of ,god governing all2 and ,plato 7,tim471 from the unity of the exemplar1 proves the unity of the world1 as the thing designed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,no agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit1 but of itself tends to infinity1 and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end4 ,now when it is said that many worlds are better than one1 this has reference to material order4 ,but the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent2 forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if ,he had made two worlds1 it would be better if ,he had made three2 and so on to infinite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the world is composed of the whole of its matter4 ,for it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one1 since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one1 wherever it was4 ,the same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world4 ,,question #dh ,,the ,,distinction ,,of ,,things ,,in ,,particular 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we must now consider the distinction of things in particular2 and firstly the distinction of good and evil2 and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures4 ,concerning the first1 we inquire into evil and its cause4 ,concerning evil1 six points are to be considered3 7#a7 ,whether evil is a nature8 7#b7 ,whether evil is found in things8 7#c7 ,whether good is the subject of evil8 7#d7 ,whether evil totally corrupts good8 7#e7 ,the division of evil into pain and fault4 7#f7 ,whether pain1 or fault1 has more the nature of evil8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,evil ,is a ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil is a nature4 ,for every genus is a nature4 ,but evil is a genus2 for the ,philosopher says 7,praedic4 x7 that good and evil are not in a genus1 but are genera of other things4 ,therefore evil is a nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every difference which constitutes a species is a nature4 ,but evil is a difference constituting a species of morality2 for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit1 as liberality from illiberality4 ,therefore evil signifies a nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 each extreme of two contraries is a nature4 ,but evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit1 but as contraries1 as the ,philosopher shows 7,praedic4 x7 by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium1 and from evil there can be a return to good4 ,therefore evil signifies a nature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 what is not1 acts not4 ,but evil acts1 for it corrupts good4 ,therefore evil is a being and a nature4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature4 ,but evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things2 for ,augustine says 7,enchir4 #aj1 #aa7 that the admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things4 ,in which even what is called evil1 well ordered and in its place1 is the eminent commendation of what is good4 ,therefore evil is a nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 ,evil is neither a being nor a good4 ,i answer that1 ,one opposite is known through the other1 as darkness is known through light4 ,hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good4 ,now1 we have said above that good is everything appetible2 and thus1 since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection1 it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good4 ,hence it cannot be that evil signifies being1 or any form or nature4 ,therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good4 ,and this is what is meant by saying that evil is neither a being nor a good4 ,for since being1 as such1 is good1 the absence of one implies the absence of the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of ,pythagoreans1 who thought that evil was a kind of nature2 and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil4 ,for ,aristotle1 especially in his logical works1 brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers4 ,or1 it may be said that1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iv1 text #f71 the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation1 as being verified in all contraries2 since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another1 as black in relation to white1 and bitter in relation to sweet4 ,and in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply1 but in regard to contraries2 because1 as every form has the nature of good1 so every privation1 as such1 has the nature of evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals1 which receive their species from the end1 which is the object of the will1 the source of all morality4 ,and because good has the nature of an end1 therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things2 good in itself1 but evil as the absence of the due end4 ,yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species1 except as it is joined to the undue end2 just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things1 unless it is joined to another form4 ,thus1 therefore1 the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good2 as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason1 but the delight of sense without the order of reason4 ,hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such1 but by reason of the good that is annexed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this appears from the above4 ,for the ,philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality4 ,because in that respect1 between good and evil there is a medium1 as good is considered as something rightly ordered1 and evil as a thing not only out of right order1 but also as injurious to another4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 i7 that a prodigal man is foolish1 but not evil4 ,and from this evil in morality1 there may be a return to good1 but not from any sort of evil1 for from blindness there is no return to sight1 although blindness is an evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a thing is said to act in a threefold sense4 ,in one way1 formally1 as when we say that whiteness makes white2 and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good1 forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good4 ,in another sense a thing is said to act effectively1 as when a painter makes a wall white4 ,thirdly1 it is said in the sense of the final cause1 as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause4 ,but in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself1 that is1 as a privation1 but by virtue of the good annexed to it4 ,for every action comes from some form2 and everything which is desired as an end1 is a perfection4 ,and therefore1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,evil does not act1 nor is it desired1 except by virtue of some good joined to it3 while of itself it is nothing definite1 and beside the scope of our will and intention4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as was said above1 the parts of the universe are ordered to each other1 according as one acts on the other1 and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other4 ,but1 as was said above1 this can only happen to evil as joined to some good4 ,hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe1 nor does it come under the order of the same1 except accidentally1 that is1 by reason of some good joined to it4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,evil ,is ,found in ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil is not found in things4 ,for whatever is found in things1 is either something1 or a privation of something1 that is a not-being4 ,but ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil is distant from existence1 and even more distant from non-existence4 ,therefore evil is not at all found in things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 being and thing are convertible4 ,if therefore evil is a being in things1 it follows that evil is a thing1 which is contrary to what has been said 7,a4 #a74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the white unmixed with black is the most white1 as the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 iii1 #d74 ,therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good4 ,but ,god makes always what is best1 much more than nature does4 ,therefore in things made by ,god there is no evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,on the above assumptions1 all prohibitions and penalties would cease1 for they exist only for evils4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things1 so that every grade of goodness may be realized4 ,now1 one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail4 ,another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness1 and this grade is to be found in existence itself2 for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things1 while some there are which can lose it1 as things corruptible4 ,as1 therefore1 the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible1 but also corruptible beings2 so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness1 and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail4 ,now it is in this that evil consists1 namely1 in the fact that a thing fails in goodness4 ,hence it is clear that evil is found in things1 as corruption also is found2 for corruption is itself an evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evil is distant both from simple being and from simple not-being1 because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation1 but a privation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text #ad71 being is twofold4 ,in one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing1 as divisible by the ten predicaments2 and in that sense it is convertible with thing1 and thus no privation is a being1 and neither therefore is evil a being4 ,in another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula1 notified by this word is2 and in this sense being is what answers to the question1 ,does it exist8 and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye2 or of any other privation4 ,in this way even evil can be called a being4 ,through ignorance of this distinction some1 considering that things may be evil1 or that evil is said to be in things1 believed that evil was a positive thing in itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole1 but not what is best in every single part1 except in order to the whole1 as was said above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b74 ,and the whole itself1 which is the universe of creatures1 is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness1 and do sometimes fail1 ,god not preventing this4 ,this happens1 firstly1 because it belongs to ,providence not to destroy1 but to save nature1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv72 but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail2 secondly1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,enchir4 #aa71 ,god is so powerful that ,he can even make good out of evil4 ,hence many good things would be taken away if ,god permitted no evil to exist2 for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted1 nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed4 ,neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,evil ,is in ,good ,as in ,its ,subject8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil is not in good as its subject4 ,for good is something that exists4 ,but ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv1 #d7 that evil does not exist1 nor is it in that which exists4 ,therefore1 evil is not in good as its subject4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 evil is not a being2 whereas good is a being4 ,but non-being does not require being as its subject4 ,therefore1 neither does evil require good as its subject4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one contrary is not the subject of another4 ,but good and evil are contraries4 ,therefore1 evil is not in good as in its subject4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the subject of whiteness is called white4 ,therefore also the subject of evil is evil4 ,if1 therefore1 evil is in good as in its subject1 it follows that good is evil1 against what is said 7,isa4 #e3bj73 ,woe to you who call evil good1 and good evil6 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ad7 that evil exists only in good4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,a4 #a71 evil imports the absence of good4 ,but not every absence of good is evil4 ,for absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense4 ,absence of good1 taken negatively1 is not evil2 otherwise1 it would follow that what does not exist is evil1 and also that everything would be evil1 through not having the good belonging to something else2 for instance1 a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe1 or the strength of a lion4 ,but the absence of good1 taken in a privative sense1 is an evil2 as1 for instance1 the privation of sight is called blindness4 ,now1 the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz4 being in potentiality1 whether it be being in absolute potentiality1 as primary matter1 which is the subject of the substantial form1 and of privation of the opposite form2 or whether it be being in relative potentiality1 and absolute actuality1 as in the case of a transparent body1 which is the subject both of darkness and light4 ,it is1 however1 manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good2 and thus every actual being is a good2 and likewise every potential being1 as such1 is a good1 as having a relation to good4 ,for as it has being in potentiality1 so has it goodness in potentiality4 ,therefore1 the subject of evil is good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part1 or as a natural property of any existing thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not-being1 understood negatively1 does not require a subject2 but privation is negation in a subject1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iv1 text #d71 and such not-being is an evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject1 but in some other good1 for the subject of blindness is not sight1 but animal4 ,yet1 it appears1 as ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ac71 that the rule of dialectics here fails1 where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together4 ,but this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general1 but not in reference to any particular good and evil4 ,for white and black1 sweet and bitter1 and the like contraries1 are only considered as contraries in a special sense1 because they exist in some determinate genus2 whereas good enters into every genus4 ,hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil4 ,but this does not follow from what is said above1 as is clear from the explanation given4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,evil ,corrupts the ,whole ,good8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil corrupts the whole good4 ,for one contrary is wholly corrupted by another4 ,but good and evil are contraries4 ,therefore evil corrupts the whole good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ab7 that evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good4 ,but good is all of a piece and uniform4 ,therefore it is wholly taken away by evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 evil1 as long as it lasts1 hurts1 and takes away good4 ,but that from which something is always being removed1 is at some time consumed1 unless it is infinite1 which cannot be said of any created good4 ,therefore evil wholly consumes good4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ab7 that evil cannot wholly consume good4 ,i answer that1 ,evil cannot wholly consume good4 ,to prove this we must consider that good is threefold4 ,one kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil1 and this is the good opposed to evil1 as light is wholly destroyed by darkness1 and sight by blindness4 ,another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil1 and that is the good which is the subject of evil2 for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured4 ,and there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil1 but is not wholly taken away2 and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality4 ,the diminution1 however1 of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction1 as diminution in quantity1 but rather by way of remission1 as diminution in qualities and forms4 ,the remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity4 ,for this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality2 which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form2 and1 on the contrary1 it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which1 the more they are multiplied in the matter1 and the more they are intensified1 the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality4 ,therefore1 if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity1 but only to a certain limit1 neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely1 as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements2 for coldness and humidity1 whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted1 cannot be infinitely multiplied4 ,but if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied1 the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted2 yet1 nevertheless1 it is not wholly taken away1 because its root always remains1 which is the substance of the subject4 ,thus1 if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air1 the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished1 but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained1 which in its very nature is transparent4 ,likewise1 addition in sin can be made to infinitude1 whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened2 and these sins1 indeed1 are like obstacles interposed between us and ,god1 according to ,isa4 #ei3b3 ,our sins have divided between us and ,god4 ,yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away1 for it belongs to its very nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away2 but other goods are not wholly removed1 as said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act4 ,hence1 where it touches act1 it is diminished by evil2 but where it touches the subject1 it remains as it was4 ,therefore1 although good is like to itself1 yet1 on account of its relation to different things1 it is not wholly1 but only partially taken away4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some1 imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity1 said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible1 if the division be made in an ever same proportion 7for instance1 half of half1 or a third of a third71 so is it in the present case4 ,but this explanation does not avail here4 ,for when in a division we keep the same proportion1 we continue to subtract less and less2 for half of half is less than half of the whole4 ,but a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin1 but perchance either equally or more4 ,therefore it must be said that1 although this aptitude is a finite thing1 still it may be so diminished infinitely1 not per se1 but accidentally2 according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely1 as explained above4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,evil ,is ,adequately ,divided into ,pain99 and ,fault8 99,pain here means penalty3 such was its original signification1 being derived from poena4 ,in this sense we say ,pain of death1 ,pain of loss1 ,pain of sense4--,ed4 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault4 ,for every defect is a kind of evil4 ,but in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence1 which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault4 ,therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain2 but1 nevertheless1 they have corruption and defect1 which are evils4 ,therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 temptation is an evil1 but it is not a fault2 for temptation which involves no consent1 is not a sin1 but an occasion for the exercise of virtue1 as is said in a gloss on #b ,cor4 #ab2 not is it a pain2 because temptation precedes the fault1 and the pain follows afterwards4 ,therefore1 evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault4 ,obj4 #d3 ,on the contrary1 ,it would seem that this division is superfluous3 for1 as ,augustine says 7,enchiridion #ab71 a thing is evil because it hurts4 ,but whatever hurts is penal4 ,therefore every evil comes under pain4 ,i answer that1 ,evil1 as was said above 7,a4 #c71 is the privation of good1 which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act4 ,act1 however1 is twofold2 first1 and second4 ,the first act is the form and integrity of a thing2 the second act is its operation4 ,therefore evil also is twofold4 ,in one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form1 or of any part required for the integrity of the thing1 as blindness is an evil1 as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body4 ,in another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation1 either because it does not exist1 or because it has not its due mode and order4 ,but because good in itself is the object of the will1 evil1 which is the privation of good1 is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will4 ,therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing1 has the nature of a pain2 and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice1 as was shown above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b72 for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will4 ,but the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault2 for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action1 of which he is master by the will4 ,therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,because evil is the privation of good1 and not a mere negation1 as was said above 7,a4 #c71 therefore not every defect of good is an evil1 but the defect of the good which is naturally due4 ,for the want of sight is not an evil in a stone1 but it is an evil in an animal2 since it is against the nature of a stone to see4 ,so1 likewise1 it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself1 because existence and conservation come from one and the same source4 ,hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered1 but evil that is found in voluntary things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,temptation1 as importing provocation to evil1 is always an evil of fault in the tempter2 but in the one tempted it is not1 properly speaking1 a fault2 unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted2 for thus is the action of the agent in the patient4 ,and if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in answer to the opposite argument1 it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in himself1 whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation2 and thus both are contained in evil1 as including the idea of injury4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #dh1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,pain ,has the ,nature of ,evil ,more ,than ,fault ,has8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that pain has more of evil than fault4 ,for fault is to pain what merit is to reward4 ,but reward has more good than merit1 as its end4 ,therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good4 ,but pain1 as was said above 7,a4 #e71 is opposed to the good of the agent1 while fault is opposed to the good of the action4 ,therefore1 since the agent is better than the action1 it seems that pain is worse than fault4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of ,god2 whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end4 ,therefore pain is a greater evil than fault4 ,on the contrary1 ,a wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater1 as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body4 ,but divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault4 ,therefore fault is a greater evil than pain4 ,i answer that1 ,fault has the nature of evil more than pain has2 not only more than pain of sense1 consisting in the privation of corporeal goods1 which kind of pain appeals to most men2 but also more than any kind of pain1 thus taking pain in its most general meaning1 so as to include privation of grace or glory4 ,there is a twofold reason for this4 ,the first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault1 but not by the evil of pain1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,to be punished is not an evil2 but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment4 ,and this because1 since good absolutely considered consists in act1 and not in potentiality1 and the ultimate act is operation1 or the use of something possessed1 it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation1 or the good use of something possessed4 ,now we use all things by the act of the will4 ,hence from a good will1 which makes a man use well what he has1 man is called good1 and from a bad will he is called bad4 ,for a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has1 as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly4 ,therefore1 because the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will1 and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will1 fault has more of evil in it than pain has4 ,the second reason can be taken from the fact that ,god is the author of the evil of pain1 but not of the evil of fault4 ,and this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature's good1 which may be either something created1 as sight1 destroyed by blindness1 or something uncreated1 as by being deprived of the vision of ,god1 the creature forfeits its uncreated good4 ,but the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good2 for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine will1 and to divine love1 whereby the divine good is loved for itself1 and not only as shared by the creature4 ,therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although fault results in pain1 as merit in reward1 yet fault is not intended on account of the pain1 as merit is for the reward2 but rather1 on the contrary1 pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided1 and thus fault is worse than pain4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent1 since it is the second perfection1 than the good taken away by pain1 which is the first perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end2 because one may be deprived of both of these in some way1 both by fault and by pain2 by pain1 accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end2 by fault1 inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end4 ,,question #di ,,the ,,cause ,,of ,,evil 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we next inquire into the cause of evil4 ,concerning this there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether good can be the cause of evil8 7#b7 ,whether the supreme good1 ,god1 is the cause of evil8 7#c7 ,whether there be any supreme evil1 which is the first cause of all evils8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,good ,can ,be the ,cause of ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil4 ,for it is said 7,matt4 #g3ah73 ,a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 one contrary cannot be the cause of another4 ,but evil is the contrary to good4 ,therefore good cannot be the cause of evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause4 ,but evil is a deficient effect4 ,therefore its cause1 if it has one1 is deficient4 ,but everything deficient is an evil4 ,therefore the cause of evil can only be evil4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil has no cause4 ,therefore good is not the cause of evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,julian4 i1 #i73 ,there is no possible source of evil except good4 ,i answer that1 ,it must be said that every evil in some way has a cause4 ,for evil is the absence of the good1 which is natural and due to a thing4 ,but that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition4 ,for a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force2 nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment4 ,but only good can be a cause2 because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being1 and every being1 as such1 is good4 ,and if we consider the special kinds of causes1 we see that the agent1 the form1 and the end1 import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good4 ,even matter1 as a potentiality to good1 has the nature of good4 ,now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #c74 ,for it was shown that good is the subject of evil4 ,but evil has no formal cause1 rather is it a privation of form2 likewise1 neither has it a final cause1 but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end2 since not only the end has the nature of good1 but also the useful1 which is ordered to the end4 ,evil1 however1 has a cause by way of an agent1 not directly1 but accidentally4 ,in proof of this1 we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect4 ,in the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action1 either of the principal or the instrumental agent2 thus the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power1 as in the case of children1 or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument1 as in the lame4 ,on the other hand1 evil is caused in a thing1 but not in the proper effect of the agent1 sometimes by the power of the agent1 sometimes by reason of a defect1 either of the agent or of the matter4 ,it is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form2 as1 for instance1 when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water4 ,therefore1 as the more perfect the fire is in strength1 so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form1 so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary4 ,hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire3 but this is accidental2 because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water1 but at the bringing in of its own form1 though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other4 ,but if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire--as1 for instance1 that it fails to heat--this comes either by defect of the action1 which implies the defect of some principle1 as was said above1 or by the indisposition of the matter1 which does not receive the action of the fire1 the agent4 ,but this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act4 ,hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause2 and thus is good the cause of evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,contra ,julian4 i73 ,the ,lord calls an evil will the evil tree1 and a good will a good tree4 ,now1 a good will does not produce a morally bad act1 since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good4 ,nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature1 which is good2 and thus good is the cause of evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself1 but some other evil3 thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water1 and man1 good as to his nature1 causes an act morally evil4 ,and1 as explained above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #i71 this is by accident4 ,moreover1 it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident3 for instance1 the exterior surrounding cold heats 7the body7 through the concentration of the inward heat4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things4 ,for the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself1 unless it is impeded by some exterior thing2 and this amounts to some defect belonging to it4 ,hence evil never follows in the effect1 unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter1 as was said above4 ,but in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient1 inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule4 ,this defect1 however1 is not a fault1 but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,evil has no direct cause1 but only an accidental cause1 as was said above4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,supreme ,good1 ,god1 ,is the ,cause of ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the supreme good1 ,god1 is the cause of evil4 ,for it is said 7,isa4 #de3e1g73 ,i am the ,lord1 and there is no other ,god1 forming the light1 and creating darkness1 making peace1 and creating evil4 ,and ,amos #c3f1 ,shall there be evil in a city1 which the ,lord hath not done8 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause4 ,but good is the cause of evil1 as was said above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore1 since ,god is the cause of every good1 as was shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d71 it follows that also every evil is from ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as is said by the ,philosopher 7,phys4 ii1 text #cj71 the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same4 ,but ,god is the cause of the safety of all things4 ,therefore ,he is the cause of all perdition and of all evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ba71 that1 ,god is not the author of evil because ,he is not the cause of tending to not-being4 ,i answer that1 ,as appears from what was said 7,a4 #a71 the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent4 ,but in ,god there is no defect1 but the highest perfection1 as was shown above 7,q4 #d1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence1 the evil which consists in defect of action1 or which is caused by defect of the agent1 is not reduced to ,god as to its cause4 ,but the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to ,god as the cause4 ,and this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things4 ,for it was said 7,a4 #a7 that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect1 causes by its power that corruption and defect4 ,but it is manifest that the form which ,god chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe4 ,now1 the order of the universe requires1 as was said above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b2 ,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #b71 that there should be some things that can1 and do sometimes1 fail4 ,and thus ,god1 by causing in things the good of the order of the universe1 consequently and as it were by accident1 causes the corruptions of things1 according to #a ,kings #b3f3 ,the ,lord killeth and maketh alive4 ,but when we read that ,god hath not made death 7,wis4 #a3ac71 the sense is that ,god does not will death for its own sake4 ,nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe2 and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners4 ,and so ,god is the author of the evil which is penalty1 but not of the evil which is fault1 by reason of what is said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these passages refer to the evil of penalty1 and not to the evil of fault4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection1 but not as regards what it has of defect2 just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power1 whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power1 but from the curvature of the leg4 ,and1 likewise1 whatever there is of being and action in a bad action1 is reduced to ,god as the cause2 whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by ,god1 but by the deficient secondary cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause1 from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires2 but ,god does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all4 ,hence there is no parity4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #di1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,be ,one ,supreme ,evil ,which ,is the ,cause of ,every ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil4 ,for contrary effects have contrary causes4 ,but contrariety is found in things1 according to ,ecclus4 #cc3ae3 ,good is set against evil1 and life against death2 so also is the sinner against a just man4 ,therefore there are many contrary principles1 one of good1 the other of evil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if one contrary is in nature1 so is the other4 ,but the supreme good is in nature1 and is the cause of every good1 as was shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #b1 #d74 ,therefore1 also1 there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as we find good and better things1 so we find evil and worse4 ,but good and better are so considered in relation to what is best4 ,therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 everything participated is reduced to what is essential4 ,but things which are evil among us are evil not essentially1 but by participation4 ,therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil1 which is the cause of every evil4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is per se4 ,but good is the accidental cause of evil4 ,therefore1 we must suppose some supreme evil which is the per se cause of evils4 ,nor can it be said that evil has no per se cause1 but only an accidental cause2 for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many1 but only in the few4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause2 because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause1 as was said above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter4 ,therefore1 we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil4 ,on the contrary1 ,the supreme good is the cause of every being1 as was shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #f1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils4 ,i answer that1 ,it appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil1 as there is one first principle of good4 ,first1 indeed1 because the first principle of good is essentially good1 as was shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,but nothing can be essentially bad4 ,for it was shown above that every being1 as such1 is good 7,q4 #e1 ,a4 #c72 and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #c74 ,secondly1 because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness1 as shown above 7,q4 #f1 ,a4 #b74 ,but there cannot be a supreme evil2 because1 as was shown above 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #d71 although evil always lessens good1 yet it never wholly consumes it2 and thus1 while good ever remains1 nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad4 ,therefore1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iv1 #e7 that if the wholly evil could be1 it would destroy itself2 because all good being destroyed 7which it need be for something to be wholly evil71 evil itself would be taken away1 since its subject is good4 ,thirdly1 because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle2 both because every evil is caused by good1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a71 and because evil can be only an accidental cause1 and thus it cannot be the first cause1 for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause4 ,those1 however1 who upheld two first principles1 one good and the other evil1 fell into this error from the same cause1 whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients2 namely1 because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being1 and considered only the particular causes of particular effects4 ,for on that account1 if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature1 they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil2 as1 for instance1 if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man4 ,the judgment1 however1 of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing1 but rather upon what it is in itself1 and on its order to the whole universe1 wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place1 as was said above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,likewise1 because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects1 they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause2 and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles4 ,but since all contraries agree in something common1 it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes2 as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body2 and above all things that exist1 no matter how1 there exists one first principle of being1 as was shown above 7,q4 #b1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,contraries agree in one genus1 and they also agree in the nature of being2 and therefore1 although they have contrary particular causes1 nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject4 ,now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality1 as was said above 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence1 since evil is privation of good1 as appears from what was said above 7,q4 #dh1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c71 it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality1 but not to the supreme good1 who is pure act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing4 ,and as the form is a perfection1 so privation removes a perfection4 ,hence every form1 perfection1 and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term2 but privation and evil by receding from that term4 ,hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse1 by reason of access to the supreme evil1 in the same way as it is said to be good and better1 by reason of access to the supreme good4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,no being is called evil by participation1 but by privation of participation4 ,hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,evil can only have an accidental cause1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a74 ,hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is impossible4 ,and to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false4 ,for things which are generated and corrupted1 in which alone can there be natural evil1 are the smaller part of the whole universe4 ,and again1 in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number4 ,in man alone does evil appear as in the greater number2 because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man--that is1 in regard to reason2 and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,in the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity1 but reduce all evils to some good cause1 whence evil follows accidentally4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,angels 7,,qq4 #ej-fd7 ,,question #ej ,,of ,,the ,,substance ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,absolutely ,,considered 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures3 firstly1 the purely spiritual creature which in ,holy ,scripture is called angel2 secondly1 the creature wholly corporeal2 thirdly1 the composite creature1 corporeal and spiritual1 which is man4 ,concerning the angels1 we consider first what belongs to their substance2 secondly1 what belongs to their intellect2 thirdly1 what belongs to their will2 fourthly1 what belongs to their creation4 ,their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things4 ,concerning their substance absolutely considered1 there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is any entirely spiritual creature1 altogether incorporeal8 7#b7 ,supposing that an angel is such1 we ask whether it is composed of matter and form8 7#c7 ,we ask concerning their number4 7#d7 ,of their difference from each other4 7#e7 ,of their immortality or incorruptibility4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #a ,whether an ,angel ,is ,altogether ,incorporeal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal4 ,for what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves1 and not in relation to ,god1 is not absolutely incorporeal4 ,but ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us2 but compared to ,god it is corporeal and material4 ,therefore he is not simply incorporeal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is moved except a body1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vi1 text #cb74 ,but ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance4 ,therefore an angel is a corporeal substance4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,spir4 ,sanct4 i1 #g73 ,every creature is limited within its own nature4 ,but to be limited belongs to bodies4 ,therefore1 every creature is corporeal4 ,now angels are ,god's creatures1 as appears from ,ps4 #adh3b3 ,praise ye the ,lord1 all ,his angels2 and1 farther on 7verse #d71 ,for ,he spoke1 and they were made2 ,he commanded1 and they were created4 ,therefore angels are corporeal4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #ajc3d73 ,who makes ,his angels spirits4 ,i answer that1 ,there must be some incorporeal creatures4 ,for what is principally intended by ,god in creatures is good1 and this consists in assimilation to ,god ,himself4 ,and the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect2 as heat makes heat4 ,now1 ,god produces the creature by ,his intellect and will 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures4 ,now intelligence cannot be the action of a body1 nor of any corporeal faculty2 for every body is limited to here and now4 ,hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature4 ,the ancients1 however1 not properly realizing the force of intelligence1 and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect1 thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination4 ,and because bodies alone fall under imagination1 they supposed that no being existed except bodies1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,phys4 iv1 text #eb1eg74 ,thence came the error of the ,sadducees1 who said there was no spirit 7,acts #bc3h74 ,but the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,incorporeal substances rank between ,god and corporeal creatures4 ,now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme1 as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold2 and thus it is said that angels1 compared to ,god1 are material and corporeal1 not1 however1 as if anything corporeal existed in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will4 ,therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance1 because he is ever actually intelligent1 and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially1 as we are4 ,hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only2 whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures1 both corporeal and spiritual4 ,hence ,ambrose says 7,de ,spir4 ,sanct4 i1 #g7 that although some things are not contained in corporeal place1 still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #b ,whether an ,angel ,is ,composed of ,matter and ,form8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form4 ,for everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus1 and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species4 ,but the genus comes from the matter1 and the difference from the form 7,metaph4 xiii1 text #f74 ,therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form4 ,but an angel is in the genus of substance4 ,therefore he is composed of matter and form4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 wherever the properties of matter exist1 there is matter4 ,now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand2 whence ,boethius says 7,de ,trin47 that a simple form cannot be a subject3 and the above properties are found in the angel4 ,therefore an angel is composed of matter and form4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 form is act4 ,so what is form only is pure act4 ,but an angel is not pure act1 for this belongs to ,god alone4 ,therefore an angel is not form only1 but has a form in matter4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 form is properly limited and perfected by matter4 ,so the form which is not in matter is an infinite form4 ,but the form of an angel is not infinite1 for every creature is finite4 ,therefore the form of an angel is in matter4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,the first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal4 ,i answer that1 ,some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form2 which opinion ,avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the ,fount of ,life4 ,for he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct4 ,now as regards incorporeal substance1 the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance1 and that which it has in common with it4 ,hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it1 and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form1 as it were something common1 is its matter4 ,therefore1 he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same2 so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things1 in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things4 ,but one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things4 ,for it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter1 otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual4 ,hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form1 and another receives the spiritual form4 ,matter1 however1 is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity2 and without quantity substance is indivisible1 as ,aristotle says 7,phys4 i1 text #ae74 ,therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity2 which cannot be4 ,therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter4 ,it is1 further1 impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter4 ,for the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance4 ,now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation1 as appears from its object1 whence any act receives its species and nature4 ,for a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality2 because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such4 ,hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial4 ,but things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality2 because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode1 but according to its own mode4 ,hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves4 ,angelic substances1 on the other hand1 are above our intellect2 and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them1 as they are in themselves1 but by its own mode1 according as it apprehends composite things2 and in this way also it apprehends ,god 7,q4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is difference which constitutes the species4 ,now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because the species of things are like numbers1 which differ by addition and subtraction of unity1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 viii1 text #aj74 ,but in material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade1 and that is the form2 and another thing which is determined1 and this is the matter2 and hence from the latter the genus is derived1 and from the former the difference4 ,whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined2 each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being2 and therefore in them genus and difference are not derived from different things1 but from one and the same4 ,nevertheless1 this differs in our mode of conception2 for1 inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate1 it derives the idea of their genus2 and inasmuch as it considers it determinately1 it derives the idea of their difference4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this reason is given in the book on the ,fount of ,life1 and it would be cogent1 supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same4 ,but this is clearly false4 ,for matter receives the form1 that thereby it may be constituted in some species1 either of air1 or of fire1 or of something else4 ,but the intellect does not receive the form in the same way2 otherwise the opinion of ,empedocles 7,de ,anima i1 #e1 text #bf7 would be true1 to the effect that we know earth by earth1 and fire by fire4 ,but the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form2 for as such is it so known by the intellect4 ,hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter1 but of an immaterial substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel1 yet there is act and potentiality4 ,and this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition4 ,the first is that of form and matter1 whereby the nature is constituted4 ,such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act4 ,hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act4 ,therefore if there be no matter1 and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter1 there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence1 as of potentiality to act4 ,and such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels2 and this is what some say1 that an angel is composed of1 whereby he is1 and what is1 or existence1 and what is1 as ,boethius says4 ,for what is1 is the form itself subsisting2 and the existence itself is whereby the substance is2 as the running is whereby the runner runs4 ,but in ,god existence and what is are not different as was explained above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,hence ,god alone is pure act4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,every creature is simply finite1 inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting1 but is limited to some nature to which it belongs4 ,but there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite4 ,material creatures are infinite on the part of matter1 but finite in their form1 which is limited by the matter which receives it4 ,but immaterial created substances are finite in their being2 whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else2 as if we were to say1 for example1 that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness1 forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject2 while its being is finite as determined to some one special nature4 ,whence it is said 7,de ,causis1 prop4 #af7 that intelligence is finite from above1 as receiving its being from above itself1 and is infinite from below1 as not received in any matter4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,angels ,exist in ,any ,great ,number8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels are not in great numbers4 ,for number is a species of quantity1 and follows the division of a continuous body4 ,but this cannot be in the angels1 since they are incorporeal1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more a thing approaches to unity1 so much the less is it multiplied1 as is evident in numbers4 ,but among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to ,god4 ,therefore since ,god is supremely one1 it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies4 ,but the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number1 which we can apprehend4 ,therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies4 ,obj4 #d3 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness4 ,but a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it4 ,now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray1 since intellectual substances are immaterial1 as was shown above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies--that is1 of the heavenly ones1 so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them2 and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,dan4 #g3aj73 ,thousands of thousands ministered to ,him1 and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before ,him4 ,i answer that1 ,there have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances4 ,plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things2 as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself3 and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things4 ,aristotle1 however1 rejects this view 7,metaph4 i1 text #ca7 because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things4 ,consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things2 but have their own fixed natures1 which are higher than the natures of sensible things4 ,nevertheless ,aristotle held 7,metaph4 xi1 text #dc7 that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things1 as that of mover and end2 and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first movements4 ,but since this appears to militate against the teachings of ,sacred ,scripture1 ,rabbi ,moses the ,jew1 wishing to bring both into harmony1 held that the angels1 in so far as they are styled immaterial substances1 are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies1 as ,aristotle held 7,metaph4 xi1 text #dc72 while he contended that in the ,scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels2 and again1 even the powers of natural things1 which manifest ,god's almighty power4 ,it is1 however1 quite foreign to the custom of the ,scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels4 ,hence it must be said that the angels1 even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances1 exist in exceeding great number1 far beyond all material multitude4 ,this is what ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xiv73 ,there are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences1 surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers4 ,the reason whereof is this1 because1 since it is the perfection of the universe that ,god chiefly intends in the creation of things1 the more perfect some things are1 in so much greater an excess are they created by ,god4 ,now1 as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude1 so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude4 ,we see1 in fact1 that incorruptible bodies1 exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude2 for the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies4 ,hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the angels number is not that of discrete quantity1 brought about by division of what is continuous1 but that which is caused by distinction of forms2 according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals1 as was said above 7,q4 #cj1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #aa74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,from the angelic nature being the nighest unto ,god1 it must needs have least of multitude in its composition1 but not so as to be found in few subjects4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this is ,aristotle's argument 7,metaph4 xii1 text #dd71 and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made for corporeal substances4 ,for thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose1 unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal things4 ,but it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal1 because the end is nobler than the means to the end4 ,hence ,aristotle says 7,metaph4 xii1 text #dd7 that this is not a necessary argument1 but a probable one4 ,he was forced to make use of this argument1 since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things2 but this was refuted above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #a74 ,accordingly1 the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter1 nor according to bodies1 but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,angels ,differ in ,species8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels do not differ in species4 ,for since the difference is nobler than the 'genus1' all things which agree in what is noblest in them1 agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference2 and so they are the same according to species4 ,but all angels agree in what is noblest in them--that is to say1 in intellectuality4 ,therefore all the angels are of one species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 more and less do not change a species4 ,but the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less--namely1 as one is simpler than another1 and of keener intellect4 ,therefore the angels do not differ specifically4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other4 ,but all souls are of the one species4 ,so therefore are the angels4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the more perfect a thing is in nature1 the more ought it to be multiplied4 ,but this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species4 ,therefore there are many angels of one species4 ,on the contrary1 ,in things of one species there is no such thing as first and second prius et posterius1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 iii1 text #b74 ,but in the angels even of the one order there are first1 middle1 and last1 as ,dionysius says 7,hier4 ,ang4 x74 ,therefore the angels are not of the same species4 ,i answer that1 ,some have said that all spiritual substances1 even souls1 are of the one species4 ,others1 again1 that all the angels are of the one species1 but not souls2 while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy1 or even of one order1 are of the one species4 ,but this is impossible4 ,for such things as agree in species but differ in number1 agree in form1 but are distinguished materially4 ,if1 therefore1 the angels be not composed of matter and form1 as was said above 7,a4 #b71 it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species2 just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart1 or several humanities1 since whitenesses are not several1 except in so far as they are in several substances4 ,and if the angels had matter1 not even then could there be several angels of one species4 ,for it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other1 not1 indeed1 according to the division of quantity1 since they are incorporeal1 but according to the diversity of their powers2 and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species1 but of genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,difference is nobler than genus1 as the determined is more noble than the undetermined1 and the proper than the common1 but not as one nature is nobler than another2 otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species2 or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul4 ,therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature2 and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,more and less change the species1 not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form1 but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees2 for instance1 if we say that fire is more perfect than air3 and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual4 ,hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,numerical multiplication1 since it can be drawn out infinitely1 is not intended by the agent1 but only specific multiplication1 as was said above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species1 but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ej1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,angels ,are ,incorruptible8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels are not incorruptible2 for ,damascene1 speaking of the angel1 says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #c7 that he is an intellectual substance1 partaking of immortality by favor1 and not by nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,plato says in the ,timaeus3 ,o gods of gods1 whose maker and father am ,i3 ,you are indeed my works1 dissoluble by nature1 yet indissoluble because ,i so will it4 ,but gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels4 ,therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xvi71 all things would tend towards nothing1 unless the hand of the ,almighty preserved them4 ,but what can be brought to nothing is corruptible4 ,therefore1 since the angels were made by ,god1 it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the intellectual substances have unfailing life1 being free from all corruption1 death1 matter1 and generation4 ,i answer that1 ,it must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature4 ,the reason for this is1 that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter4 ,hence1 since an angel is a subsisting form1 as is clear from what was said above 7,a4 #b71 it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible4 ,for what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it2 but what belongs to a thing1 considered in relation to something else1 can be separated1 when that something else is taken away1 in view of which it belonged to it4 ,roundness can never be taken from the circle1 because it belongs to it of itself2 but a bronze circle can lose roundness1 if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape4 ,now to be belongs to a form considered in itself2 for everything is an actual being according to its form3 whereas matter is an actual being by the form4 ,consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter4 ,but if the form subsists in its own being1 as happens in the angels1 as was said above 7,a4 #b71 it cannot lose its being4 ,therefore1 the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature4 ,a token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation2 for since everything acts according as it is actual1 the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being4 ,now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object4 ,but an intelligible object1 being above time1 is everlasting4 ,hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,damascene is dealing with perfect immortality1 which includes complete immutability2 since every change is a kind of death1 as ,augustine says 7,contra ,maxim4 iii74 ,the angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor1 as will appear later 7,q4 #fb74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the expression 'gods' ,plato understands the heavenly bodies1 which he supposed to be made up of elements1 and therefore dissoluble of their own nature2 yet they are for ever preserved in existence by the ,divine will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as was observed above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a7 there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity4 ,hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause4 ,therefore1 when it is said that all things1 even the angels1 would lapse into nothing1 unless preserved by ,god1 it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels2 but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon ,god as its cause4 ,for a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because ,god can reduce it to non-existence1 by withdrawing ,his act of preservation2 but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself1 or some contrariety1 or at least the potentiality of matter4 ,,question #ea ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,in ,,comparison ,,with ,,bodies 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things2 and in the first place about their comparison with bodies2 secondly1 of the angels in comparison with corporeal places2 and1 thirdly1 of their comparison with local movement4 ,under the first heading there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether angels have bodies naturally united to them8 7#b7 ,whether they assume bodies8 7#c7 ,whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angels ,have ,bodies ,naturally ,united to ,them8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them4 ,for ,origen says 7,peri ,archon i73 ,it is ,god's attribute alone--that is1 it belongs to the ,father1 the ,son1 and the ,holy ,ghost1 as a property of nature1 that ,he is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition4 ,bernard likewise says 7,hom4 vi4 super ,cant473 ,let us assign incorporeity to ,god alone even as we do immortality1 whose nature alone1 neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else1 needs the help of any corporeal organ4 ,but it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance4 ,augustine also says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iii73 ,the demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies4 ,but the nature of demons and angels is the same4 ,therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory 7,hom4 x in ,ev47 calls an angel a rational animal4 ,but every animal is composed of body and soul4 ,therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 life is more perfect in the angels than in souls4 ,but the soul not only lives1 but gives life to the body4 ,therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the angels are understood to be incorporeal4 ,i answer that1 ,the angels have not bodies naturally united to them4 ,for whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature2 thus1 for instance1 to have wings1 because it is not of the essence of an animal1 does not belong to every animal4 ,now since to understand is not the act of a body1 nor of any corporeal energy1 as will be shown later 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b71 it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance1 as such2 but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else4 ,even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body1 because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances1 not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature1 but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses1 as will be explained later on 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #f2 ,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #a74 ,now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus4 ,therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances1 which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things4 ,consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies2 but some are quite separated from bodies1 and these we call angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as was said above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #a7 it was the opinion of some that every being is a body2 and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies2 so much so that some even held that ,god was the soul of the world1 as ,augustine tells us 7,de ,civ4 ,dei vii74 ,as this is contrary to ,catholic ,faith1 which asserts that ,god is exalted above all things1 according to ,ps4 #h3b3 ,thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens2 ,origen1 while refusing to say such a thing of ,god1 followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances2 being deceived here as he was also in many other points1 by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers4 ,bernard's expression can be explained1 that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument1 which is not naturally united to it1 but assumed for some purpose1 as will be explained 7,a4 #b74 ,augustine speaks1 not as asserting the fact1 but merely using the opinion of the ,platonists1 who maintained that there are some aerial animals1 which they termed demons4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically1 on account of the likeness to the rational nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking2 hence it belongs to ,god1 as is said 7#a ,kings #b3f73 ,the ,lord killeth1 and maketh alive4 ,but to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature1 and which has not within itself the full nature of the species4 ,hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,angels ,assume ,bodies8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that angels do not assume bodies4 ,for there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel1 as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature4 ,but it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies1 because an angel has no need for a body1 since his own power exceeds all bodily power4 ,therefore an angel does not assume a body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every assumption is terminated in some union2 because to assume implies a taking to oneself ad se sumere4 ,but a body is not united to an angel as to a form1 as stated 7,a4 #a72 while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover1 it is not said to be assumed1 otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them4 ,therefore the angels do not assume bodies4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water1 or they could not suddenly disappear2 nor again from fire1 otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched2 nor again from air1 because air is without shape or color4 ,therefore the angels do not assume bodies4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xvi7 that angels appeared to ,abraham under assumed bodies4 ,i answer that1 ,some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies1 but that all that we read in ,scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision--that is1 according to imagination4 ,but this is contrary to the intent of ,scripture2 for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's imagination1 and consequently is not seen by everybody4 ,yet ,divine ,scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all2 just as the angels who appeared to ,abraham were seen by him and by his whole family1 by ,lot1 and by the citizens of ,sodom2 in like manner the angel who appeared to ,tobias was seen by all present4 ,from all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision1 whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it1 and can accordingly be seen by all4 ,now by such a vision only a body can be beheld4 ,consequently1 since the angels are not bodies1 nor have they bodies naturally united with them1 as is clear from what has been said 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #a71 it follows that they sometimes assume bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,angels need an assumed body1 not for themselves1 but on our account2 that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come4 ,moreover that angels assumed bodies under the ,old ,law was a figurative indication that the ,word of ,god would take a human body2 because all the apparitions in the ,old ,testament were ordained to that one whereby the ,son of ,god appeared in the flesh4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the body assumed is united to the angel not as its form1 nor merely as its mover1 but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body4 ,for as in the ,sacred ,scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible1 in the same way by ,divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel4 ,and this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color1 yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds4 ,even so the angels assume bodies of air1 condensing it by the ,divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ea1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,angels ,exercise ,functions of ,life in the ,bodies ,assumed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies4 ,for pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth4 ,but it would be pretence if the body assumed by them1 which seems to live and to exercise vital functions1 did not possess these functions4 ,therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose4 ,but eyes1 nostrils1 and the other instruments of the senses1 would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel1 if he perceived nothing by their means4 ,consequently1 the angel perceives by the assumed body2 and this is the most special function of life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii74 ,but the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies4 ,for it was said 7,gen4 #ah3af7 that ,abraham walked with the angels1 who had appeared to him1 bringing them on the way2 and when ,tobias said to the angel 7,tob4 #e3g1 #h73 ,knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of ,medes8 he answered3 ,i know it2 and ,i have often walked through all the ways thereof4 ,therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 speech is the function of a living subject1 for it is produced by the voice1 while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth4 ,but it is evident from many passages of ,sacred ,scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies4 ,therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 eating is a purely animal function4 ,hence the ,lord after ,his ,resurrection ate with ,his disciples in proof of having resumed life 7,luke #bd74 ,now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate1 and ,abraham offered them food1 after having previously adored them as ,god 7,gen4 #ah74 ,therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 to beget offspring is a vital act4 ,but this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies2 for it is related3 ,after the sons of ,god went in to the daughters of men1 and they brought forth children1 these are the mighty men of old1 men of renown 7,gen4 #f3d74 ,consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies4 ,on the contrary1 ,the bodies assumed by angels have no life1 as was stated in the previous article 7ad #c74 ,therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies4 ,i answer that1 ,some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations2 just as speech1 which is the function of a living creature1 agrees with other sounds of inanimate things1 in so far as it is sound2 and walking agrees with other movements1 in so far as it is movement4 ,consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels1 as to that which is common in such operations2 but not as to that which is special to living subjects2 because1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,somn4 et ,vig4 i71 that which has the faculty has the action4 ,hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life1 which is the potential principle of such action4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in ,scripture under sensible figures1 since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible1 but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures2 so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men1 although they are really not4 ,for the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose1 that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works4 ,this could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men2 because the properties of such men would lead us to men1 and not to angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sensation is entirely a vital function4 ,consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies4 ,yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain2 for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them1 but to this end1 that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest2 just as by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is pointed out1 and other powers by the other members1 as ,dionysius teaches 7,coel4 ,hier474 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life2 but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved1 since the angels are not their forms4 ,yet the angels are moved accidentally1 when such bodies are moved1 since they are in them as movers are in the moved2 and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere1 which cannot be said of ,god4 ,accordingly1 although ,god is not moved when the things are moved in which ,he exists1 since ,he is everywhere2 yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed4 ,but they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies1 even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved1 because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety2 nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world's substance1 which now is in the east1 and now in the west1 but according to a fixed quarter2 because the moving energy is always in the east1 as stated in ,phys4 viii1 text #hd4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,properly speaking1 the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies2 yet there is a semblance of speech1 in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,properly speaking1 the angels cannot be said to eat1 because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater4 ,although after the ,resurrection food was not converted into the substance of ,christ's body1 but resolved into pre-existing matter2 nevertheless ,christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it2 hence it was a true eating4 ,but the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body1 nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it2 consequently1 it was not a true eating1 but figurative of spiritual eating4 ,this is what the angel said to ,tobias3 ,when ,i was with you1 ,i seemed indeed to eat and to drink2 but ,i use an invisible meat and drink 7,tob4 #ab3ai74 ,abraham offered them food1 deeming them to be men1 in whom1 nevertheless1 he worshipped ,god1 as ,god is wont to be in the prophets1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xvi74 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xv73 ,many persons affirm that they have had the experience1 or have heard from such as have experienced it1 that the ,satyrs and ,fauns1 whom the common folk call incubi1 have often presented themselves before women1 and have sought and procured intercourse with them4 ,hence it is folly to deny it4 ,but ,god's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge4 ,hence by the sons of ,god are to be understood the sons of ,seth1 who were good2 while by the daughters of men the ,scripture designates those who sprang from the race of ,cain4 ,nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them2 for they were not all giants1 albeit there were many more before than after the deluge4 ,still if some are occasionally begotten from demons1 it is not from the seed of such demons1 nor from their assumed bodies1 but from the seed of men taken for the purpose2 as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman1 and afterwards of a man2 just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii71 so that the person born is not the child of a demon1 but of a man4 ,,question #eb ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,in ,,relation ,,to ,,place 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we now inquire into the place of the angels4 ,touching this there are three subjects of inquiry3 7#a7 ,is the angel in a place8 7#b7 ,can he be in several places at once8 7#c7 ,can several angels be in the same place8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #a ,whether an ,angel ,is in a ,place8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel is not in a place4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,hebdom473 ,the common opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place4 ,and again1 ,aristotle observes 7,phys4 iv1 text #dh1eg7 that it is not everything existing which is in a place1 but only a movable body4 ,but an angel is not a body1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ej74 ,therefore an angel is not in a place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 place is a quantity having position4 ,but everything which is in a place has some position4 ,now to have a position cannot befit an angel1 since his substance is devoid of quantity1 the proper difference of which is to have a position4 ,therefore an angel is not in a place4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place1 as is evident from the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iv1 text #ad1aai74 ,but an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place1 because the container is more formal than the contained2 as air with regard to water 7,phys4 iv1 text #ce1di74 ,therefore an angel is not in a place4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in the ,collect 99,prayer at ,compline1 ,dominican ,breviary3 ,let ,thy holy angels who dwell herein1 keep us in peace4 ,i answer that1 ,it is befitting an angel to be in a place2 yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense4 ,a body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity2 but there is no such quantity in the angels1 for theirs is a virtual one4 ,consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place4 ,accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place1 or that he occupies a space in the continuous2 for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity4 ,in similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place2 because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact1 and is not contained by it3 for the soul is in the body as containing it1 not as contained by it4 ,in the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal1 not as the thing contained1 but as somehow containing it4 ,and hereby we have the answers to the objections4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #b ,whether an ,angel ,can ,be in ,several ,places at ,once8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel can be in several places at once4 ,for an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul4 ,but the soul is in several places at once1 for it is entirely in every part of the body1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi74 ,therefore an angel can be in several places at once4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an angel is in the body which he assumes2 and1 since the body which he assumes is continuous1 it would appear that he is in every part thereof4 ,but according to the various parts there are various places4 ,therefore the angel is at one time in various places4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that where the angel operates1 there he is4 ,but occasionally he operates in several places at one time1 as is evident from the angel destroying ,sodom 7,gen4 #ai3be74 ,therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that while the angels are in heaven1 they are not on earth4 ,i answer that1 ,an angel's power and nature are finite1 whereas the ,divine power and essence1 which is the universal cause of all things1 is infinite3 consequently ,god through ,his power touches all things1 and is not merely present in some places1 but is everywhere4 ,now since the angel's power is finite1 it does not extend to all things1 but to one determined thing4 ,for whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing4 ,consequently since all being is compared as one thing to ,god's universal power1 so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power4 ,hence1 since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place1 it follows that he is not everywhere1 nor in several places1 but in only one place4 ,some1 however1 have been deceived in this matter4 ,for some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point2 consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point4 ,but they were manifestly deceived1 because a point is something indivisible1 yet having its situation2 whereas the angel is indivisible1 and beyond the genus of quantity and situation4 ,consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation3 any place which is either divisible or indivisible1 great or small suffices1 according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body4 ,so the entire body to which he is applied by his power1 corresponds as one place to him4 ,neither1 if any angel moves the heavens1 is it necessary for him to be everywhere4 ,first of all1 because his power is applied only to what is first moved by him4 ,now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all1 namely1 the part to the east3 hence the ,philosopher 7,phys4 vii1 text #hd7 attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east4 ,secondly1 because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately4 ,hence it need not be everywhere4 ,so1 then1 it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body1 to an angel1 and to ,god4 ,for a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion1 since it is measured by the place4 ,an angel1 however1 is not there in a circumscribed fashion1 since he is not measured by the place1 but definitively1 because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another4 ,but ,god is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there1 because ,he is everywhere4 ,from this we can easily gather an answer to the objections3 because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied1 is reputed as one place1 even though it be continuous4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,several ,angels ,can ,be at the ,same ,time in the ,same ,place8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place4 ,for several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place1 because they fill the place4 ,but the angels do not fill a place1 because only a body fills a place1 so that it be not empty1 as appears from the ,philosopher 7,phys4 iv1 text #eb1eh74 ,therefore several angels can be in the one place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels4 ,but an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place3 because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body1 as we find proved in ,phys4 iv1 text4 #eh4 ,much more1 then1 can two angels be in the same place4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the soul is in every part of the body1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 vi74 ,but demons1 although they do not obsess souls1 do obsess bodies occasionally2 and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place2 and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances4 ,on the contrary1 ,there are not two souls in the same body4 ,therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place4 ,i answer that1 ,there are not two angels in the same place4 ,the reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing4 ,this is evident in every class of causes3 for there is one proximate form of one thing1 and there is one proximate mover1 although there may be several remote movers4 ,nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat1 since no one of them is a perfect mover1 because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat2 while all together are as one mover1 in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement4 ,hence1 since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container1 as was said 7,a4 #a71 there can be but one angel in one place4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place2 but for another reason1 as has been said4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angel and a body are not in a place in the same way2 hence the conclusion does not follow4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality2 since the soul is its form1 while the demon is not4 ,hence the inference does not follow4 ,,question #ec ,,of ,,the ,,local ,,movement ,,of ,,the ,,angels 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must next consider the local movement of the angels2 under which heading there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether an angel can be moved locally4 7#b7 ,whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space8 7#c7 ,whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #a ,whether an ,angel ,can ,be ,moved ,locally8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that an angel cannot be moved locally4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 vi1 text #cb1 #hf7 nothing which is devoid of parts is moved2 because1 while it is in the term wherefrom1 it is not moved2 nor while it is in the term whereto1 for it is then already moved2 consequently it remains that everything which is moved1 while it is being moved1 is partly in the term wherefrom and partly in the term whereto4 ,but an angel is without parts4 ,therefore an angel cannot be moved locally4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 movement is the act of an imperfect being1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iii1 text #ad74 ,but a beatified angel is not imperfect4 ,consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 movement is simply because of want4 ,but the holy angels have no want4 ,therefore the holy angels are not moved locally4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved4 ,but it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally1 because it is an article of faith that ,christ's soul descended into ,hell4 ,therefore a beatified angel is moved locally4 ,i answer that1 ,a beatified angel can be moved locally4 ,as1 however1 to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel1 so likewise does local movement4 ,for a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place1 and is commensurate with the place4 ,hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place1 and according to its exigency4 ,hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude2 and according to priority and posteriority of local movement1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iv1 text #ii74 ,but an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained1 but rather as containing it4 ,hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place1 nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place1 so as to have continuity therefrom2 but it is a non-continuous movement4 ,for since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact1 as was said above 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #a71 it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively1 and not at once2 because an angel cannot be in several places at one time1 as was said above 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #b74 ,nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous4 ,nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts4 ,because1 as was said above 7,q4 #eb1 ,a4 #a71 there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact2 just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude4 ,hence as a body successively1 and not all at once1 quits the place in which it was before1 and thence arises continuity in its local movement2 so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before1 and so his movement will be continuous4 ,and he can all at once quit the whole place1 and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place1 and thus his movement will not be continuous4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason4 ,first of all1 because ,aristotle's demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity1 to which responds a place necessarily indivisible4 ,and this cannot be said of an angel4 ,secondly1 because ,aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which is continuous4 ,for if the movement were not continuous1 it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term wherefrom1 and while it is in the term whereto3 because the very succession of wheres1 regarding the same thing1 would be called movement3 hence1 in whichever of those wheres the thing might be1 it could be said to be moved4 ,but the continuity of movement prevents this2 because nothing which is continuous is in its term1 as is clear1 because the line is not in the point4 ,therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved2 but partly in the one1 and partly in the other4 ,therefore1 according as the angel's movement is not continuous1 ,aristotle's demonstration does not hold good4 ,but according as the angel's movement is held to be continuous1 it can be so granted1 that1 while an angel is in movement1 he is partly in the term wherefrom1 and partly in the term whereto 7yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel's substance1 but to the place72 because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved2 but while he is actually in movement1 he is in part of the first place which he quits1 and in part of the second place which he occupies4 ,this very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this1 that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power2 as a body does by application of magnitude4 ,hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place1 that it is divisible according to magnitude2 but regarding an angel1 that his power can be applied to something which is divisible4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent4 ,but the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act3 because energy implies actuality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own1 but for another's need4 ,in this way1 because of our need1 the angel is moved locally1 according to ,heb4 #a3ad3 ,they are all 99,vulg43 ',are they not all 4 4 4 8' ministering spirits1 sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #b ,whether an ,angel ,passes ,through ,intermediate ,space8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space4 ,for everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions1 before passing through a greater4 ,but the place responding to an angel1 who is indivisible1 is confined to a point4 ,therefore if the angel passes through middle space1 he must reckon infinite points in his movement3 which is not possible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an angel is of simpler substance than the soul4 ,but our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle3 for ,i can think of ,france and afterwards of ,syria1 without ever thinking of ,italy1 which stands between them4 ,therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle4 ,on the contrary1 ,if the angel be moved from one place to another1 then1 when he is in the term whither1 he is no longer in motion1 but is changed4 ,but a process of changing precedes every actual change3 consequently he was being moved while existing in some place4 ,but he was not moved so long as he was in the term whence4 ,therefore1 he was moved while he was in mid-space3 and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space4 ,i answer that1 ,as was observed above in the preceding article1 the local motion of an angel can be continuous1 and non-continuous4 ,if it be continuous1 the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space2 because1 as is said by the ,philosopher 7,phys4 v1 text #bb2 vi1 text #gg71 ,the middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes1 before arriving at the last into which it is moved2 because the order of first and last in continuous movement1 is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude1 as he says 7,phys4 iv1 text #ii74 ,but if an angel's movement be not continuous1 it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle3 which is evident thus4 ,between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places2 whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible4 ,this is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible2 because between every two points that are infinite intermediate points1 since no two points follow one another without a middle1 as is proved in ,phys4 vi1 text4 #a4 ,and the same must of necessity be said of divisible places3 and this is shown from the continuous movement of a body4 ,for a body is not moved from place to place except in time4 ,but in the whole time which measures the movement of a body1 there are not two nows in which the body moved is not in one place and in another2 for if it were in one and the same place in two nows1 it would follow that it would be at rest there2 since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously4 ,therefore since there are infinite nows between the first and the last now of the time which measures the movement1 there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins1 and the last where the movement ceases4 ,this again is made evident from sensible experience4 ,let there be a body of a palm's length1 and let there be a plane measuring two palms1 along which it travels2 it is evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of the one palm2 and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm4 ,now it is clear that when it begins to move1 it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second4 ,according1 then1 as the magnitude of the palm is divided1 even so are the intermediate places multiplied2 because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place1 and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same4 ,accordingly1 since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality1 it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places4 ,now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement2 because1 as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality1 so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous4 ,consequently1 if the movement be not continuous1 then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered4 ,if1 therefore1 any movable body be moved1 but not by continuous movement1 it follows1 either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places1 or else that it actually numbers infinite places3 which is not possible4 ,accordingly1 then1 as the angel's movement is not continuous1 he does not pass through all intermediate places4 ,now1 the actual passing from one extreme to the other1 without going through the mid-space1 is quite in keeping with an angel's nature2 but not with that of a body1 because a body is measured by and contained under a place2 hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its movement4 ,but an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby1 but is above it as containing it3 hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills1 either through or without the intervening place4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude1 but according to contact of power3 and so the angel's place can be divisible1 and is not always a mere point4 ,yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite1 as was said above3 but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement1 as is evident from the foregoing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,while an angel is moved locally1 his essence is applied to various places3 but the soul's essence is not applied to the things thought of1 but rather the things thought of are in it4 ,so there is no comparison4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement1 but its conclusion2 hence movement must precede change4 ,accordingly such movement is through the mid-space4 ,but in movement which is not continuous1 the change is a part1 as a unit is a part of number3 hence the succession of the various places1 even without the mid-space1 constitutes such movement4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ec1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,movement of an ,angel ,is ,instantaneous8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous4 ,for the greater the power of the mover1 and the less the moved resist the mover1 the more rapid is the movement4 ,but the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body4 ,now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time4 ,but between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion4 ,if therefore a body is moved in time1 an angel is moved in an instant4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily change4 ,but some bodily change is effected in an instant1 such as illumination2 both because the subject is not illuminated successively1 as it gets hot successively2 and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote4 ,much more therefore is the angel's movement instantaneous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if an angel be moved from place to place in time1 it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term whereto3 but in the whole of the preceding time1 he is either in the place immediately preceding1 which is taken as the term wherefrom2 or else he is partly in the one1 and partly in the other1 it follows that he is divisible2 which is impossible4 ,therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term wherefrom4 ,therefore he rests there3 since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously1 as was said 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time4 ,on the contrary1 ,in every change there is a before and after4 ,now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time4 ,consequently every movement1 even of an angel1 is in time1 since there is a before and after in it4 ,i answer that1 ,some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous4 ,they said that when an angel is moved from place to place1 during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term wherefrom2 but in the last instant of such time he is in the term whereto4 ,nor is there any need for a medium between the terms1 just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time4 ,but there is a mid-time between two nows of time3 hence they say that a last now cannot be assigned in which it was in the term wherefrom1 just as in illumination1 and in the substantial generation of fire1 there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark1 or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire3 but a last time can be assigned1 so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air1 or the form of fire in the matter4 ,and so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements4 ,but this does not hold good in the present case2 and it is shown thus4 ,it is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before3 and therefore in every now of time which measures rest1 the subject reposing is in the same where in the first1 in the middle1 and in the last now4 ,on the other hand1 it is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before3 and therefore in every now of time which measures movement1 the movable subject is in various dispositions2 hence in the last now it must have a different form from what it had before4 ,so it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some 7disposition71 for instance1 in whiteness1 is to be in it in every instant of such time4 ,hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time1 and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term4 ,but this is possible in movement3 because to be moved in any whole time1 is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time4 ,therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement3 just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter1 and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body4 ,now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement1 but is of itself1 depending upon no other movement4 ,consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time1 and that in the last now he is in another place3 but some now must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place4 ,but where there are many nows succeeding one another1 there is necessarily time2 since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement4 ,it remains1 then1 that the movement of an angel is in time4 ,it is in continuous time if his movement be continuous1 and in non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for1 as was said 7,a4 #a71 his movement can be of either kind1 since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iv1 text #ii74 ,but that time1 whether it be continuous or not1 is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens1 and whereby all corporeal things are measured1 which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens2 because the angel's movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if the time of the angel's movement be not continuous1 but a kind of succession of 'nows1' it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things1 which is continuous2 since it is not of the same nature4 ,if1 however1 it be continuous1 it is indeed proportionable1 not1 indeed1 because of the proportion of the mover and the movable1 but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists4 ,besides1 the swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity of his power1 but according to the determination of his will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,illumination is the term of a movement2 and is an alteration1 not a local movement1 as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near1 before being moved to what is remote4 ,but the angel's movement is local1 and1 besides1 it is not the term of movement2 hence there is no comparison4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this objection is based on continuous time4 ,but the same time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous4 ,so an angel can be in one place in one instant1 and in another place in the next instant1 without any time intervening4 ,if the time of the angel's movement be continuous1 he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'2 as was already shown 7,a4 #b74 ,nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places1 and partly in another1 not because his substance is susceptible of parts1 but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second1 as was said above 7,a4 #b74 ,,question #ed ,,of ,,the ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,angels 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,after considering what belongs to the angel's substance1 we now proceed to his knowledge4 ,this investigation will be fourfold4 ,in the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge3 secondly1 into his medium of knowledge3 thirdly1 into the objects known3 and fourthly1 into the manner whereby he knows them4 ,under the first heading there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,is the angel's understanding his substance8 7#b7 ,is his being his understanding8 7#c7 ,is his substance his power of intelligence8 7#d7 ,is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect8 7#e7 ,is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #a ,whether an ,angel's ,act of ,understanding ,is ,his ,substance8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance4 ,for the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul4 ,but the substance of the active intellect is its own action2 as is evident from ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii7 and from his ,commentator 99,averroes1 ,a4,d4 #aabf-aaih4 ,therefore much more is the angel's substance his action--that is1 his act of understanding4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 xii1 text #ci7 that the action of the intellect is life4 ,but since in living things to live is to be1 as he says 7,de ,anima ii1 text #cg71 it seems that life is essence4 ,therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the extremes be one1 then the middle does not differ from them2 because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is4 ,but in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same1 at least in so far as he understands his own essence4 ,therefore the act of understanding1 which is between the intellect and the thing understood1 is one with the substance of the angel who understands4 ,on the contrary1 ,the action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence4 ,but no creature's existence is its substance1 for this belongs to ,god only1 as is evident from what was said above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore neither the action of an angel1 nor of any other creature1 is its substance4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for the action of an angel1 or of any creature1 to be its own substance4 ,for an action is properly the actuality of a power2 just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence4 ,now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act1 but which has some admixture of potentiality1 to be its own actuality3 because actuality is opposed to potentiality4 ,but ,god alone is pure act4 ,hence only in ,god is ,his substance the same as ,his existence and ,his action4 ,besides1 if an angel's act of understanding were his substance1 it would be necessary for it to be subsisting4 ,now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one2 just as an abstract thing that subsists4 ,consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from ,god's substance1 which is ,his very act of understanding subsisting in itself1 nor from the substance of another angel4 ,also1 if the angel were his own act of understanding1 there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly2 for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when the active intellect is said to be its own action1 such predication is not essential1 but concomitant1 because1 since its very nature consists in act1 instantly1 so far as lies in itself1 action accompanies it3 which cannot be said of the passive intellect1 for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the relation between life and to live is not the same as that between essence and to be2 but rather as that between a race and to run1 one of which signifies the act in the abstract1 and the other in the concrete4 ,hence it does not follow1 if to live is to be1 that life is essence4 ,although life is sometimes put for the essence1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x71 ,memory and understanding and will are one essence1 one life3 yet it is not taken in this sense by the ,philosopher1 when he says that the act of the intellect is life4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the action which is transient1 passing to some extrinsic object1 is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action4 ,the action which remains within the agent1 is not really a medium between the agent and the object1 but only according to the manner of expression2 for it really follows the union of the object with the agent4 ,for the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it1 as an effect which differs from both4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #b ,whether in the ,angel to ,understand ,is to ,exist8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist4 ,for in living things to live is to be1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 text4 #cg74 ,but to understand is in a sense to live 7,de ,anima ii1 text4 #cg74 ,therefore in the angel to understand is to exist4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 cause bears the same relation to cause1 as effect to effect4 ,but the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself4 ,therefore in the angel to understand is to exist4 ,on the contrary1 ,the angel's act of understanding is his movement1 as is clear from ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but to exist is not movement4 ,therefore in the angel to be is not to understand4 ,i answer that1 ,the action of the angel1 as also the action of any creature1 is not his existence4 ,for as it is said 7,metaph4 ix1 text4 #af71 there is a twofold class of action2 one which passes out to something beyond1 and causes passion in it1 as burning and cutting2 and another which does not pass outwards1 but which remains within the agent1 as to feel1 to understand1 to will2 by such actions nothing outside is changed1 but the whole action takes place within the agent4 ,it is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent's very existence3 because the agent's existence is signified as within him1 while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done4 ,but the second action of its own nature has infinity1 either simple or relative4 ,as an example of simple infinity1 we have the act to understand1 of which the object is the true2 and the act to will1 of which the object is the good2 each of which is convertible with being2 and so1 to understand and to will1 of themselves1 bear relation to all things1 and each receives its species from its object4 ,but the act of sensation is relatively infinite1 for it bears relation to all sensible things2 as sight does to all things visible4 ,now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species2 ,god's being alone is simply infinite1 comprehending all things in itself1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,hence the ,divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject3 sometimes also for a vital operation1 that is1 for one whereby something is shown to be living4 ,in this way the ,philosopher says that to understand is1 in a sense1 to live3 for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence1 but not the reason of his whole act of understanding1 since he cannot understand everything by his essence4 ,consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence1 it is compared to the existence of the angel1 whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object1 namely1 truth and being4 ,thus it is evident1 that1 although the form is the same1 yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality4 ,on this account it does not follow that in the angel to be is the same as 'to understand4' ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,angel's ,power of ,intelligence ,is ,his ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence4 ,for1 mind and intellect express the power of understanding4 ,but in many passages of his writings1 ,dionysius styles angels intellects and minds4 ,therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence1 then it must needs be an accident2 for that which is besides the essence of anything1 we call it accident4 ,but a simple form cannot be a subject1 as ,boethius states 7,de ,trin4 #a74 ,thus an angel would not be a simple form1 which is contrary to what has been previously said 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #b74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,confess4 xii7 says1 that ,god made the angelic nature nigh unto ,himself1 while ,he made primary matter nigh unto nothing2 from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter1 as being closer to ,god4 ,but primary matter is its own power4 ,therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xi7 that the angels are divided into substance1 power1 and operation4 ,therefore substance1 power1 and operation1 are all distinct in them4 ,i answer that1 ,neither in an angel nor in any creature1 is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence3 which is made evident thus4 ,since every power is ordained to an act1 then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers2 and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power4 ,but in every creature the essence differs from the existence1 and is compared to it as potentiality is to act1 as is evident from what has been already said 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #a74 ,now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation4 ,but in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist1 nor is any operation in him1 nor in any other created thing1 the same as his existence4 ,hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence3 nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,an angel is called intellect and mind1 because all his knowledge is intellectual3 whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident1 because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act4 ,god alone is such a form3 and of such is ,boethius speaking there4 ,but a simple form which is not its own existence1 but is compared to it as potentiality is to act1 can be the subject of accident2 and especially of such accident as follows the species3 for such accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs to the individual1 and which does not belong to the whole species1 results from the matter1 which is the principle of individuation4 ,and such a simple form is an angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself1 whereas the power of operation regards accidental being4 ,hence there is no comparison4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,is an ,active and a ,passive ,intellect in an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel4 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ag7 that1 in the soul1 just as in every nature1 there is something whereby it can become all things1 and there is something whereby it can make all things4 ,but an angel is a kind of nature4 ,therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive2 whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect1 as is made clear in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #b1 #c1 #ah4 ,but an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel1 and enlightens a lower one4 ,therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,the distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms1 which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight2 but to the active intellect as colors to the light1 as is clear from ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ah4 ,but this is not so in the angel4 ,therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel4 ,i answer that1 ,the necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality1 and not actually4 ,hence there must exist some power1 which1 previous to the act of understanding1 is in potentiality to intelligible things1 but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them1 and still more when it reflects upon them4 ,this is the power which is denominated the passive intellect4 ,the necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul1 as immaterial and actually intelligible1 but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul4 ,consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible3 and this power in us is called the active intellect4 ,but each of these necessities is absent from the angels4 ,they are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality1 with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend2 nor1 again1 are their intelligible objects intelligible in potentiality1 but they are actually such2 for they first and principally understand immaterial things1 as will appear later 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them1 except equivocally4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the words themselves show1 the ,philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making4 ,knowledge1 however1 is not generated in the angels1 but is present naturally4 ,hence there is no need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is the function of the active intellect to enlighten1 not another intellect1 but things which are intelligible in potentiality1 in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible4 ,it belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known1 and sometimes to apprehend them actually4 ,hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect3 neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries1 to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality4 ,but if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect1 he will then be speaking equivocally2 and it is not about names that we need trouble4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ed1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,intellectual ,knowledge in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei viii7 that in the angels there is life which understands and feels4 ,therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,isidore says 7,de ,summo ,bono7 that the angels have learnt many things by experience4 ,but experience comes of many remembrances1 as stated in ,metaph4 i1 #a4 ,consequently they have likewise a power of memory4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that there is a sort of perverted phantasy in the demons4 ,but phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty4 ,therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons2 and for the same reason it is in the angels1 since they are of the same nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 #bi in ,ev471 that man senses in common with the brutes1 and understands with the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,in our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs2 such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body1 as sight of the eye1 and hearing of the ear4 ,there are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs1 as intellect and will3 these are not acts of any parts of the body4 ,now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them1 as is manifest from what has been said already 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them4 ,the ,commentator 7,metaph4 xii7 says the same thing1 namely1 that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will4 ,and it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent2 and not in part1 as is our soul4 ,for this reason the angels are called intellects and minds1 as was said above 7,a4 #c1 ad #a74 ,a twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections4 ,first1 it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them4 ,augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books1 although he does not mean to assert it2 hence he says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi7 that such an inquiry does not call for much labor4 ,secondly1 it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude4 ,because1 since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object1 it is a common usage of speech1 when we understand something for certain1 to say that we sense it4 ,and hence it is that we use the word sentence4 ,experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known1 although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them4 ,we have experience when we know single objects through the senses3 the angels likewise know single objects1 as we shall show 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #b71 yet not through the senses4 ,but memory can be allowed in the angels1 according as ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 x7 puts it in the mind2 although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul4 ,in like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed to demons1 since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good2 while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy1 whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves1 as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics4 ,,question #ee ,,of ,,the ,,medium ,,of ,,the ,,angelic ,,knowledge 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,next in order1 the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge4 ,under this heading there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,do the angels know everything by their substance1 or by some species8 7#b7 ,if by species1 is it by connatural species1 or is it by such as they have derived from things8 7#c7 ,do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angels ,know ,all ,things by ,their ,substance8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels know all things by their substance4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 that the angels1 according to the proper nature of a mind1 know the things which are happening upon earth4 ,but the angel's nature is his essence4 ,therefore the angel knows things by his essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 xii1 text4 #ea2 ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ae71 in things which are without matter1 the intellect is the same as the object understood4 ,but the object understood is the same as the one who understands it1 as regards that whereby it is understood4 ,therefore in things without matter1 such as the angels1 the medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container4 ,but an angel has an intellectual nature4 ,therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode4 ,but all things are in him3 because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher1 while the higher are in the lower participatively3 and therefore ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that ,god enfolds the whole in the whole1 i4e4 all in all4 ,therefore the angel knows all things in his substance4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the angels are enlightened by the forms of things4 ,therefore they know by the forms of things1 and not by their own substance4 ,i answer that1 ,the medium through which the intellect understands1 is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form1 because it is by the form that the agent acts4 ,now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form1 it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form4 ,hence it is that in things which are corruptible1 the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter3 because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form4 ,but the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things3 because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth4 ,the angel's essence1 however1 does not comprise all things in itself1 since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species4 ,this is proper to the ,divine essence1 which is infinite1 simply and perfectly to comprise all things in ,itself4 ,therefore ,god alone knows all things by ,his essence4 ,but an angel cannot know all things by his essence2 and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,when it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature1 the words according to do not determine the medium of such knowledge1 since the medium is the similitude of the thing known2 but they denote the knowing power1 which belongs to the angel of his own nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the sense in act is the sensible in act1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 text4 #ec1 not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense1 but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality3 so likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act1 not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands1 but because that similitude is its form4 ,now1 it is precisely the same thing to say in things which are without matter1 the intellect is the same thing as the object understood1 as to say that the intellect in act is the thing understood in act2 for a thing is actually understood1 precisely because it is immaterial4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the things which are beneath the angel1 and those which are above him1 are in a measure in his substance1 not indeed perfectly1 nor according to their own proper formality--because the angel's essence1 as being finite1 is distinguished by its own formality from other things--but according to some common formality4 ,yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in ,god's essence1 as in the first and universal operative power1 from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything4 ,therefore ,god has a proper knowledge of all things by ,his own essence3 and this the angel has not1 but only a common knowledge4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,angels ,understand by ,species ,drawn from ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things4 ,for everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it4 ,but the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar1 so that the likeness is the cause of the thing2 or else by way of an image1 so that it is caused by such thing4 ,all knowledge1 then1 of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood1 or else caused by it4 ,now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things2 that belongs to the ,divine knowledge alone4 ,therefore it is necessary for the species1 by which the angelic mind understands1 to be derived from things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul4 ,but the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms4 ,therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things4 ,so there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant1 except in so far as they are taken from sensible objects4 ,therefore1 if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things1 his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant2 and so he would be moved locally to no purpose4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 that the angels do not gather their ,divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible4 ,i answer that1 ,the species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things1 but are connatural to them4 ,for we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances4 ,the highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form2 whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form1 but receives from some agent1 now one form1 now another4 ,in like fashion also the lower intellectual substances --that is to say1 human souls--have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete1 but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things4 ,but in the higher spiritual substances--that is1 the angels--the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species1 in so far as they have such species connatural to them1 so as to understand all things which they can know naturally4 ,the same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances4 ,the lower spiritual substances--that is1 souls--have a nature akin to a body1 in so far as they are the forms of bodies3 and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies1 and through bodies2 otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose4 ,on the other hand1 the higher substances--that is1 the angels--are utterly free from bodies1 and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature2 consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring1 whereby they received from ,god the species of things known1 together with their intellectual nature4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h73 ,the other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature1 and then in their own nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there are images of creatures in the angel's mind1 not1 indeed derived from creatures1 but from ,god1 ,who is the cause of creatures1 and in ,whom the likenesses of creatures first exist4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h7 that1 ,as the type1 according to which the creature is fashioned1 is in the ,word of ,god before the creature which is fashioned1 so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature1 and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle4 ,now the nature of a form in the imagination1 which form is without matter but not without material conditions1 stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter1 and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions4 ,consequently1 however powerful the angelic mind might be1 it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition1 except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms2 which is impossible1 since the angel has no imagination1 as was said above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #e74 ,even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things1 yet he would not do so2 because he would not need them1 for he has connatural intelligible species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant4 ,nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on that account3 for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge1 but for the purpose of operation4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ee1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,higher ,angels ,understand by ,more ,universal ,species ,than the ,lower ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels4 ,for the universal1 seemingly1 is what is abstracted from particulars4 ,but angels do not understand by species abstracted from things4 ,therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically2 because to know anything generically is1 in a fashion1 midway between potentiality and act4 ,if1 therefore1 the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower1 it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower2 which is not befitting4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same cannot be the proper type of many4 ,but if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form1 which the lower angel knows by several special forms1 it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things4 ,therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each2 which seems unbecoming4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xii7 that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower4 ,and in ,de ,causis it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms4 ,i answer that1 ,for this reason are some things of a more exalted nature1 because they are nearer to and more like unto the first1 which is ,god4 ,now in ,god the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing1 that is to say1 in the ,divine essence1 by which ,god knows all things4 ,this plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner1 and less simply4 ,consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what ,god knows by one1 and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower4 ,thus the higher the angel is1 by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects4 ,therefore his forms must be more universal2 each one of them1 as it were1 extending to more things4 ,an example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves4 ,for some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth1 unless it be explained to them in every part and detail2 this comes of their weakness of intellect3 while there are others of stronger intellect1 who can grasp many things from few4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars1 in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things4 ,but if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things1 the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things1 but in a measure will be pre-existing to them2 either according to the order of causality1 as the universal ideas of things are in the ,word of ,god2 or at least in the order of nature1 as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to know anything universally can be taken in two senses4 ,in one way1 on the part of the thing known1 namely1 that only the universal nature of the thing is known4 ,to know a thing thus is something less perfect3 for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal4 ,in another way1 on the part of the medium of such knowledge4 ,in this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal2 for the intellect1 which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it1 is more perfect than one which cannot4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things4 ,but if it be eminent1 then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many4 ,just as in man1 there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues2 which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity1 and in the fox to acts of wariness2 and so on of the rest4 ,the ,divine essence1 on account of ,its eminence1 is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein3 hence each one is likened to ,it according to its proper type4 ,the same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel1 so that1 on account of its excellence1 many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge4 ,,question #ef ,,of ,,the ,,angel',s ,,knowledge ,,of ,,immaterial ,,things 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them4 ,we shall treat of their knowledge1 first1 of immaterial things1 secondly of things material4 ,under the first heading there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,does an angel know himself8 7#b7 ,does one angel know another8 7#c7 ,does the angel know ,god by his own natural principles8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art #a ,whether an ,angel ,knows ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel does not know himself4 ,for ,dionysius says that the angels do not know their own powers 7,coel4 ,hier4 vi74 ,but1 when the substance is known1 the power is known4 ,therefore an angel does not know his own essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an angel is a single substance1 otherwise he would not act1 since acts belong to single subsistences4 ,but nothing single is intelligible4 ,therefore1 since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual1 no angel can know himself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect is moved by the intelligible object3 because1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 #d understanding is a kind of passion4 ,but nothing is moved by or is passive to itself2 as appears in corporeal things4 ,therefore the angel cannot understand himself4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii7 that the angel knew himself when he was established1 that is1 enlightened by truth4 ,i answer that1 ,as is evident from what has been previously said 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #b71 the object is on a different footing in an immanent1 and in a transient1 action4 ,in a transient action the object or matter into which the action passes is something separate from the agent1 as the thing heated is from what gave it heat1 and the building from the builder2 whereas in an immanent action1 for the action to proceed1 the object must be united with the agent2 just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense1 in order that sense may actually perceive4 ,and the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which is the principle of action in other agents3 for1 as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire1 so is the species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye4 ,it must1 however1 be borne in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty2 and then there is only knowledge in potentiality2 and in order that there may be actual knowledge1 it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species4 ,but if it always actually possesses the species1 it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or reception4 ,from this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower1 as knowing1 to be moved by the object1 but as knowing in potentiality4 ,now1 for the form to be the principle of the action1 it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else1 or self-subsisting2 because heat would give forth heat none the less if it were self-subsisting1 than it does by inhering in something else4 ,so therefore1 if in the order of intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form1 it will understand itself4 ,and since an angel is immaterial1 he is a subsisting form2 and1 consequently1 he is actually intelligible4 ,hence it follows that he understands himself by his form1 which is his substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that is the text of the old translation1 which is amended in the new one1 and runs thus3 furthermore they1 that is to say the angels1 knew their own powers3 instead of which the old translation read--and furthermore they do not know their own powers4 ,although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect1 that the angels do not know their own power perfectly2 according as it proceeds from the order of the ,divine ,wisdom1 ,which to the angels is incomprehensible4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we have no knowledge of single corporeal things1 not because of their particularity1 but on account of the matter1 which is their principle of individuation4 ,accordingly1 if there be any single things subsisting without matter1 as the angels are1 there is nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it belongs to the intellect1 in so far as it is in potentiality1 to be moved and to be passive4 ,hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect1 especially as regards the fact that he understands himself4 ,besides the action of the intellect is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things1 which passes into some other matter4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,one ,angel ,knows ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one angel does not know another4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #d71 that if the human intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things1 then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending external things2 as likewise1 if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular color1 it could not see every color4 ,but as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things1 so is the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things4 ,therefore1 since the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature from the number of such natures1 it would seem that it cannot understand other natures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is stated in ,de ,causis that every intelligence knows what is above it1 in so far as it is caused by it2 and what is beneath it1 in so far as it is its cause4 ,but one angel is not the cause of another4 ,therefore one angel does not know another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing2 because all knowledge is effected by way of a likeness4 ,but the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known1 except generically2 as is clear from what has been said before 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #a1 ad #c74 ,hence1 it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another1 but only a general knowledge4 ,in like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known2 because that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect2 whereas the ,trinity alone can penetrate the mind4 ,again1 it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species2 because that species would not differ from the angel understood1 since each is immaterial4 ,therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if one angel did understand another1 this would be either by an innate species2 and so it would follow that1 if ,god were now to create another angel1 such an angel could not be known by the existing angels2 or else he would have to be known by a species drawn from things2 and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower1 from whom they receive nothing4 ,therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another4 ,on the contrary1 ,we read in ,de ,causis that every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 lit4 ii71 such things as pre-existed from eternity in the ,word of ,god1 came forth from ,him in two ways3 first1 into the angelic mind2 and secondly1 so as to subsist in their own natures4 ,they proceeded into the angelic mind in such a way1 that ,god impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which ,he produced in their own natural being4 ,now in the ,word of ,god from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things1 but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures4 ,so in every one of these spiritual creatures1 the forms of all things1 both corporeal and spiritual1 were impressed by the ,word of ,god2 yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition1 so that he should subsist in the nature of his species1 and understand himself by it2 while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures1 so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order1 as was already observed 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a1 #b74 ,so the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures1 since both the higher and lower bear affinity to his nature1 the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another1 except on account of likeness1 so far as cause and effect are alike4 ,therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels1 this will suffice for one to know another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect1 which differs from the angel whose image it is1 not according to material and immaterial nature1 but according to natural and intentional existence4 ,the angel is himself a subsisting form in his natural being2 but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so1 for there it possesses only an intelligible existence4 ,as the form of color on the wall has a natural existence2 but1 in the deferent medium1 it has only intentional existence4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,god made every creature proportionate to the universe which ,he determined to make4 ,therefore had ,god resolved to make more angels or more natures of things1 ,he would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds2 as a builder who1 if he had intended to build a larger house1 would have made larger foundations4 ,hence1 for ,god to add a new creature to the universe1 means that ,he would add a new intelligible species to an angel4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ef1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,angel ,knows ,god by ,his ,own ,natural ,principles8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels cannot know ,god by their natural principles4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i7 that ,god by ,his incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds4 ,afterwards he adds that1 since ,he is above all substances1 ,he is remote from all knowledge4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god is infinitely above the intellect of an angel4 ,but what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached4 ,therefore it appears that an angel cannot know ,god by his natural principles4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is written 7#a ,cor4 #ac3ab73 ,we see now through a glass in a dark manner2 but then face to face4 ,from this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of ,god2 the one1 whereby ,he is seen in ,his essence1 according to which ,he is said to be seen face to face2 the other whereby ,he is seen in the mirror of creatures4 ,as was already shown 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d71 an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural principles4 ,nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels1 since they do not derive their knowledge of ,god from sensible things1 as ,dionysius observes 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74 ,therefore the angels cannot know ,god by their natural powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,the angels are mightier in knowledge than men4 ,yet men can know ,god through their natural principles2 according to ,rom4 #a3ai3 what is known of ,god is manifest in them4 ,therefore much more so can the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,the angels can have some knowledge of ,god by their own principles4 ,in evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways3 first1 by the presence of its essence in the knower1 as light can be seen in the eye2 and so we have said that an angel knows himself--secondly1 by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it1 as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye--thirdly1 when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself1 but from something else in which it is made to appear1 as when we behold a man in a mirror4 ,to the first-named class that knowledge of ,god is likened by which ,he is seen through ,his essence2 and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles1 as was said above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d74 ,the third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know ,god while we are on earth1 by ,his likeness reflected in creatures1 according to ,rom4 #a3bj3 ,the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made4 ,hence1 too1 we are said to see ,god in a mirror4 ,but the knowledge1 whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows ,god1 stands midway between these two2 and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it4 ,for since ,god's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence1 the angel knows ,god in as much as he is the image of ,god4 ,yet he does not behold ,god's essence2 because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the ,divine essence4 ,such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind2 because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the ,divine image4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension1 as his words expressly state4 ,in this way ,god is not known by any created intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from ,god1 it follows that he cannot comprehend ,him2 nor can he see ,god's essence through his own nature4 ,yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of ,him at all3 because1 as ,god is infinitely remote from the angel1 so the knowledge which ,god has of ,himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the knowledge which an angel has of ,god is midway between these two kinds of knowledge2 nevertheless it approaches more to one of them1 as was said above4 ,,question #eg ,,of ,,the ,,angel',s ,,knowledge ,,of ,,material ,,things 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels4 ,under this heading there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the angels know the natures of material things8 7#b7 ,whether they know single things8 7#c7 ,whether they know the future8 7#d7 ,whether they know secret thoughts8 7#e7 ,whether they know all mysteries of grace8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angels ,know ,material ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels do not know material things4 ,for the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it4 ,but material things cannot be the perfections of angels1 since they are beneath them4 ,therefore the angels do not know material things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence1 as is said in the gloss 99,on #b ,cor4 #ab3b1 taken from ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii4 #bh74 ,but the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul1 nor into the angel's mind4 ,therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision1 but only by imaginary vision1 whereby the images of bodies are apprehended1 and by sensible vision1 which regards bodies in themselves4 ,now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels1 but only intellectual4 ,therefore the angels cannot know material things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 material things are not actually intelligible1 but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination1 which does not exist in angels4 ,therefore angels do not know material things4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever the lower power can do1 the higher can do likewise4 ,but man's intellect1 which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel's1 can know material things4 ,therefore much more can the mind of an angel4 ,i answer that1 ,the established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower2 and for whatever is contained deficiently1 partially1 and in manifold manner in the lower beings1 to be contained in the higher eminently1 and in a certain degree of fulness and simplicity4 ,therefore1 in ,god1 as in the highest source of things1 all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of ,his simple ,being itself1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 #a74 ,but among other creatures the angels are nearest to ,god1 and resemble ,him most2 hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the ,divine goodness1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv74 ,consequently1 all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves1 yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in ,god4 ,now whatever exists in any subject1 is contained in it after the manner of such subject4 ,but the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature4 ,therefore1 as ,god knows material things by ,his essence1 so do the angels know them1 forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands1 by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect4 ,and thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sense does not apprehend the essences of things1 but only their outward accidents4 ,in like manner neither does the imagination2 for it apprehends only the images of bodies4 ,the intellect alone apprehends the essences of things4 ,hence it is said 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bf7 that the object of the intellect is what a thing is1 regarding which it does not err2 as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object4 ,so therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels1 as the thing understood is in him who understands1 and not according to their real natures4 ,but some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures2 and in either case there is intellectual vision4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves1 he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction4 ,but he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves2 he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things1 which species are connatural to him2 just as our intellect has1 by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #b ,whether an ,angel ,knows ,singulars8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that angels do not know singulars4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,poster4 i1 text4 #bb73 ,the sense has for its object singulars1 but the intellect1 universals4 ,now1 in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power1 as is evident from what was said above 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #e74 ,consequently they do not know singulars4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known4 ,but it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object1 in so far as it is singular2 because1 as was observed above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #b71 an angel is immaterial1 while matter is the principle of singularity4 ,therefore the angel cannot know singulars4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if an angel does know singulars1 it is either by singular or by universal species4 ,it is not by singular species2 because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species4 ,nor is it by universal species2 since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such1 because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially4 ,therefore the angel does not know singulars4 ,on the contrary1 ,no one can guard what he does not know4 ,but angels guard individual men1 according to ,ps4 #ij3aa3 ,he hath given ,his angels charge over ,thee4 ,consequently the angels know singulars4 ,i answer that1 ,some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars4 ,in the first place this derogates from the ,catholic faith1 which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels1 according to ,heb4 #a3ad3 ,they are all ministering spirits4 ,now1 if they had no knowledge of singulars1 they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world2 since acts belong to individuals3 and this is against the text of ,eccles4 #e3e3 ,say not before the angel3 ,there is no providence4 ,secondly1 it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy1 according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres1 and to move them according to their knowledge and will4 ,consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars1 but in their universal causes1 to which all particular effects are reduced2 as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens4 ,this opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications2 because1 to know a singular1 merely in its universal causes1 is not to know it as singular1 that is1 as it exists here and now4 ,the astronomer1 knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen1 knows it in the universal2 yet he does not know it as taking place now1 except by the senses4 ,but administration1 providence and movement are of singulars1 as they are here and now existing4 ,therefore1 it must be said differently1 that1 as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things1 apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect1 and things singular and corporeal by the senses1 so an angel knows both by his one mental power4 ,for the order of things runs in this way1 that the higher a thing is1 so much the more is its power united and far-reaching3 thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense1 although it is but one faculty1 knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses1 and some other things which no outer sense knows2 for example1 the difference between white and sweet4 ,the same is to be observed in other cases4 ,accordingly1 since an angel is above man in the order of nature1 it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge1 namely1 the intellect1 does not know4 ,hence ,aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord1 which is known to us1 should be unknown to ,god 7,de ,anima i1 text4 #hj2 ,metaph4 text4 #ae74 ,the manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this1 that1 as things proceed from ,god in order that they may subsist in their own natures1 so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind4 ,now it is clear that there comes forth from ,god not only whatever belongs to their universal nature1 but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation2 since ,he is the cause of the entire substance of the thing1 as to both its matter and its form4 ,and for as much as ,he causes1 does ,he know2 for ,his knowledge is the cause of a thing1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore as by ,his essence1 by which ,he causes all things1 ,god is the likeness of all things1 and knows all things1 not only as to their universal natures1 but also as to their singularity2 so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things1 not only as to their universal nature1 but likewise in their individual conditions1 in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking of our intellect1 which apprehends only by a process of abstraction2 and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal4 ,such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels1 as was said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b1 ,a4 #c ad #a71 and consequently there is no comparison4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things1 as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus1 species1 or accident2 but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower1 as the sun does to fire4 ,even in this way there is in ,god a resemblance of all things1 as to both matter and form1 in so far as there pre-exists in ,him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things4 ,for the same reason1 the species in the angel's intellect1 which are images drawn from the ,divine essence1 are the images of things not only as to their form1 but also as to their matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,angels know singulars by universal forms1 which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal1 and as to their individuating principles4 ,how many things can be known by the same species1 has been already stated above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,angels ,know the ,future8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels know future events4 ,for angels are mightier in knowledge than men4 ,but some men know many future events4 ,therefore much more do the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the present and the future are differences of time4 ,but the angel's intellect is above time2 because1 as is said in ,de ,causis1 an intelligence keeps pace with eternity1 that is1 aeviternity4 ,therefore1 to the angel's mind1 past and future are not different1 but he knows each indifferently4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angel does not understand by species derived from things1 but by innate universal species4 ,but universal species refer equally to present1 past1 and future4 ,therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past1 present1 and future4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time1 so is it by reason of place4 ,but angels know things which are distant according to place4 ,therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time4 ,on the contrary1 ,whatever is the exclusive sign of the ,divinity1 does not belong to the angels4 ,but to know future events is the exclusive sign of the ,divinity1 according to ,isa4 #da3bc3 ,show the things that are to come hereafter1 and we shall know that ye are gods4 ,therefore the angels do not know future events4 ,i answer that1 ,the future can be known in two ways4 ,first1 it can be known in its cause4 ,and thus1 future events which proceed necessarily from their causes1 are known with sure knowledge2 as that the sun will rise tomorrow4 ,but events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases1 are not known for certain1 but conjecturally2 thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient4 ,this manner of knowing future events exists in the angels1 and by so much the more than it does in us1 as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly2 thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof4 ,but events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown2 such as casual and chance events4 ,in another way future events are known in themselves4 ,to know the future in this way belongs to ,god alone2 and not merely to know those events which happen of necessity1 or in the majority of cases1 but even casual and chance events2 for ,god sees all things in ,his eternity1 which1 being simple1 is present to all time1 and embraces all time4 ,and therefore ,god's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before ,him2 and ,he beholds all things as they are in themselves1 as was said before when dealing with ,god's knowledge 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac74 ,but the mind of an angel1 and every created intellect1 fall far short of ,god's eternity2 hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,men cannot know future things except in their causes1 or by ,god's revelation4 ,the angels know the future in the same way1 but much more distinctly4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned1 yet there is a time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts2 of which ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii7 that ,god moves the spiritual creature according to time4 ,and thus1 since there is succession in the angel's intellect1 not all things that happen through all time1 are present to the angelic mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the species in the intellect of an angel1 in so far as they are species1 refer equally to things present1 past1 and future2 nevertheless the present1 past1 and future2 nevertheless the present1 past1 and future do not bear the same relations to the species4 ,present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel3 and so they can be known thereby4 ,things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species2 consequently1 they cannot be known by those species4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,things distant according to place are already existing in nature2 and share in some species1 whose image is in the angel2 whereas this is not true of future things1 as has been stated4 ,consequently there is no comparison4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,angels ,know ,secret ,thoughts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels know secret thoughts4 ,for ,gregory 7,moral4 xviii71 explaining ,job #bh3ag3 ,gold or crystal cannot equal it1 says that then1 namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead1 one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself1 and when once the mind of each is seen1 his conscience will at the same time be penetrated4 ,but those who rise shall be like the angels1 as is stated 7,matt4 #bb3cj74 ,therefore an angel can see what is in another's conscience4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies4 ,but when the body is seen its shape is seen4 ,therefore1 when an intellectual substance is seen1 the intelligible species within it is also seen4 ,consequently1 when one angel beholds another1 or even a soul1 it seems that he can see the thoughts of both4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination2 because the former are actually understood1 while the latter are understood only potentially4 ,but the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known3 because the imagination is a corporeal faculty4 ,therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,what is proper to ,god does not belong to the angels4 ,but it is proper to ,god to read the secrets of hearts1 according to ,jer4 #ag3i3 ,the heart is perverse above all things1 and unsearchable2 who can know it8 ,i am the ,lord1 ,who search the heart4 ,therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts4 ,i answer that1 ,a secret thought can be known in two ways3 first1 in its effect4 ,in this way it can be known not only by an angel1 but also by man2 and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden4 ,for thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward act1 but also by change of countenance2 and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse4 ,much more then can angels1 or even demons1 the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de divin4 daemon47 that demons sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions1 not only when expressed by speech1 but even when conceived in thought1 when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body2 although 7,retract4 ii1 #cj7 he says it cannot be asserted how this is done4 ,in another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind1 and affections as they are in the will3 and thus ,god alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills4 ,the reason of this is1 because the rational creature is subject to ,god only1 and ,he alone can work in it ,who is its principal object and last end3 this will be developed later 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #e74 ,consequently all that is in the will1 and all things that depend only on the will1 are known to ,god alone4 ,now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider anything2 because a man who has a habit of knowledge1 or any intelligible species1 uses them at will4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #b3aa73 ,for what man knoweth the things of a man1 but the spirit of a man that is in him8 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance2 namely1 on account of the grossness of the body1 and because the will shuts up its secrets4 ,the first obstacle will be removed at the ,resurrection1 and does not exist at all in the angels2 while the second will remain1 and is in the angels now4 ,nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul2 as to its amount of grace and of glory4 ,in this way one will be able to see the mind of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although one angel sees the intelligible species of another1 by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of these substances according to greater or lesser universality1 yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the appetite of the brute does not control its act1 but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause4 ,since1 therefore1 the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions1 they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts1 and even of man1 in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes1 through following some bodily impression1 influences his conduct1 as always happens in brutes4 ,yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason2 because1 even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason1 as obeying its ruler1 as is said in ,ethics iii1 #ab4 ,but it does not follow that1 if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination1 he knows what is in the thought or will3 because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination1 but can make various uses of them4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eg1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,angels ,know the ,mysteries of ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace4 ,for1 the mystery of the ,incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries4 ,but the angels knew of it from the beginning2 for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #ai73 ,this mystery was hidden in ,god through the ages1 yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places4 ,and the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #c3af73 ,that great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels994 99,vulg43 ',great is the mystery of godliness1 which 4 4 4 appeared unto angels4' ,therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the ,divine wisdom4 ,but the angels behold ,god's wisdom1 which is ,his essence4 ,therefore they know the mysteries of grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the prophets are enlightened by the angels1 as is clear from ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv74 ,but the prophets knew mysteries of grace2 for it is said 7,amos #c3g73 ,for the ,lord ,god doth nothing without revealing ,his secret to ,his servants the prophets4 ,therefore angels know the mysteries of grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,no one learns what he knows already4 ,yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace4 ,for it is stated 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 that ,sacred ,scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning ,jesus1 and learning from ,him the knowledge of ,his ,divine work for us2 and ,jesus as teaching them directly3 as is evident in ,isa4 #fc3a1 where1 on the angels asking1 ,who is he who cometh up from ,edom8 ,jesus answered1 ,it is ,i1 ,who speak justice4 ,therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace4 ,i answer that1 ,there is a twofold knowledge in the angel4 ,the first is his natural knowledge1 according to which he knows things both by his essence1 and by innate species4 ,by such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace4 ,for these mysteries depend upon the pure will of ,god3 and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel1 which depend upon the will of such angel1 much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon ,god's will4 ,the ,apostle reasons in this fashion 7#a ,cor4 #b3aa73 ,no one knoweth the things of a man 99,vulg43 ',what man knoweth the things of a man1 but 4 4 4 8'1 but the spirit of a man that is in him4 ,so1 the things also that are of ,god no man knoweth but the ,spirit of ,god4 ,there is another knowledge of the angels1 which renders them happy2 it is the knowledge whereby they see the ,word1 and things in the ,word4 ,by such vision they know mysteries of grace1 but not all mysteries3 nor do they all know them equally2 but just as ,god wills them to learn by revelation2 as the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #b3aj73 ,but to us ,god hath revealed them through ,his ,spirit2 yet so that the higher angels beholding the ,divine wisdom more clearly1 learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of ,god1 which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them4 ,some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation2 others they are taught afterwards1 as befits their ministrations4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,one can speak in two ways of the mystery of the ,incarnation4 ,first of all1 in general2 and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude4 ,the reason of this is1 that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered4 ,for all are 99,vulg43 ',are they not all4' ministering spirits1 sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation 7,heb4 #a3ad72 and this is brought about by the mystery of the ,incarnation4 ,hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning4 ,we can speak of the mystery of the ,incarnation in another way1 as to its special conditions4 ,thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning2 even the higher angels learned these afterwards1 as appears from the passage of ,dionysius already quoted4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the angels in bliss behold the ,divine wisdom1 yet they do not comprehend it4 ,so it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace1 was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels4 ,and although ,god revealed in general to the prophets what ,he was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race1 still the apostles knew some particulars of the same1 which the prophets did not know4 ,thus we read 7,eph4 #c3d1 #e73 ,as you reading1 may understand my knowledge in the mystery of ,christ1 which in other generations was not known to the sons of men1 as it is now revealed to ,his holy apostles4 ,among the prophets also1 the later ones knew what the former did not know2 according to ,ps4 #aah3ajj3 ,i have had understanding above ancients1 and ,gregory says3 ,the knowledge of ,divine things increased as time went on 7,hom4 xvi in ,ezech474 ,,question #eh ,,of ,,the ,,mode ,,of ,,angelic ,,knowledge 7,in ,seven ,articles7 ,after the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge1 concerning which there are seven points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality1 and sometimes in act8 7#b7 ,whether the angel can understand many things at the same time8 7#c7 ,whether the angel's knowledge is discursive8 7#d7 ,whether he understands by composing and dividing8 7#e7 ,whether there can be error in the angel's intellect8 7#f7 ,whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening8 7#g7 ,whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same1 or do they differ8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angel's ,intellect ,is ,sometimes in ,potentiality1 ,sometimes in ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act4 ,for movement is the act of what is in potentiality1 as stated in ,phys4 iii1 #f4 ,but the angels' minds are moved by understanding1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have1 whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto4 ,but it is said 7#a ,pet4 #a3ab73 ,on ,whom the angels desire to look4 ,therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the book ,de ,causis it is stated that an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance4 ,but the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality4 ,therefore it sometimes understands potentially4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii73 ,since the angels were created1 in the eternity of the ,word1 they enjoy holy and devout contemplation4 ,now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality1 but in act4 ,therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality4 ,i answer that1 ,as the ,philosopher states 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #h2 ,phys4 viii1 #cb71 the intellect is in potentiality in two ways2 first1 as before learning or discovering1 that is1 before it has the habit of knowledge2 secondly1 as when it possesses the habit of knowledge1 but does not actually consider4 ,in the first way an angel's intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends4 ,for1 as the higher1 namely1 the heavenly1 bodies have no potentiality to existence1 which is not fully actuated1 in the same way the heavenly intellects1 the angels1 have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species4 ,but with regard to things divinely revealed to them1 there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality3 because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun4 ,in the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge2 for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge4 ,but as to the knowledge of the ,word1 and of the things he beholds in the ,word1 he is never in this way in potentiality2 because he is always actually beholding the ,word1 and the things he sees in the ,word4 ,for the bliss of the angels consists in such vision2 and beatitude does not consist in habit1 but in act1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #h74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect1 that is1 of something existing in potentiality1 but as the act of something perfect1 that is1 of one actually existing4 ,in this way understanding and feeling are termed movements1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bh4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired1 but weariness thereof4 ,or they are said to desire the vision of ,god with regard to fresh revelations1 which they receive from ,god to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested of act4 ,in the same way1 the angel's intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #b ,whether an ,angel ,can ,understand ,many ,things at the ,same ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 ii1 #d7 that it may happen that we know many things1 but understand only one4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species2 just at the body is formed by shape4 ,but one body cannot be formed into many shapes4 ,therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to understand is a kind of movement4 ,but no movement terminates in various terms4 ,therefore many things cannot be understood altogether4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #cb73 ,the spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills4 ,i answer that1 ,as unity of term is requisite for unity of movement1 so is unity of object required for unity of operation4 ,now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one2 like the parts of a continuous whole4 ,for if each of the parts be considered severally they are many3 consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation1 nor all at once4 ,in another way they are taken as forming one in the whole2 and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation2 as long as the entire continuous whole is considered1 as is stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bc4 ,in this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate1 as forming parts of one proposition2 and also two things compared together1 according as they agree in one point of comparison4 ,from this it is evident that many things1 in so far as they are distinct1 cannot be understood at once2 but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept1 they can be understood together4 ,now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect4 ,all things1 then1 which can be known by one intelligible species1 are known as one intelligible object1 and therefore are understood simultaneously4 ,but things known by various intelligible species1 are apprehended as different intelligible objects4 ,consequently1 by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the ,word1 they know all things under one intelligible species1 which is the ,divine essence4 ,therefore1 as regards such knowledge1 they know all things at once3 just as in heaven our thoughts will not be fleeting1 going and returning from one thing to another1 but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #af74 ,but by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species1 they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species2 but not such as are under various species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,to understand many things as one1 is1 so to speak1 to understand one thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it4 ,so it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species2 as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies4 ,to the third objection the answer is the same as the first4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,angel's ,knowledge ,is ,discursive8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive4 ,for the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known through another4 ,but the angels know one thing through another2 for they know creatures through the ,word4 ,therefore the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever a lower power can do1 the higher can do4 ,but the human intellect can syllogize1 and know causes in effects2 all of which is the discursive method4 ,therefore the intellect of the angel1 which is higher in the order of nature1 can with greater reason do this4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,isidore 7,de sum4 bono i1 #aj7 says that demons learn more things by experience4 ,but experimental knowledge is discursive3 for1 one experience comes of many remembrances1 and one universal from many experiences1 as ,aristotle observes 7,poster4 ii2 ,metaph4 vii74 ,therefore an angel's knowledge is discursive4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 that the angels do not acquire ,divine knowledge from separate discourses1 nor are they led to something particular from something common4 ,i answer that1 ,as has often been stated 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #a71 the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances3 for ,dionysius calls them heavenly minds 7loc4 cit474 ,now1 the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this1 that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement3 while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature4 ,so1 likewise1 the lower1 namely1 the human1 intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation2 that is to say1 as they advance from one known thing to another4 ,but1 if from the knowledge of a known principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions1 then there would be no discursive process at all4 ,such is the condition of the angels1 because in the truths which they know naturally1 they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them4 ,therefore they are called intellectual beings3 because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood intelligi2 hence intellect is defined as the habit of first principles4 ,but human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called rational2 and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light4 ,for if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light1 like the angels1 then in the first aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range1 by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,discursion expresses movement of a kind4 ,now all movement is from something before to something after4 ,hence discursive knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known1 and which was previously unknown4 ,but if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time1 as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror1 it is not discursive knowledge4 ,and in this way the angels know things in the ,word4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angels can syllogize1 in the sense of knowing a syllogism2 and they see effects in causes1 and causes in effects3 yet they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way1 by syllogizing from causes to effect1 or from effect to cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude1 forasmuch as they know sensible things which are present1 yet without any discursion withal4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,angels ,understand by ,composing and ,dividing8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing4 ,for1 where there is multiplicity of things understood1 there is composition of the same1 as is said in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ba4 ,but there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind2 because angels apprehend different things by various species1 and not all at one time4 ,therefore there is composition and division in the angel's mind4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are2 because the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation4 ,but the angel knows certain distant natures not by one1 but by diverse species1 as is evident from what was said 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species4 ,and so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 speech is a sign of the intellect4 ,but in speaking to men1 angels use affirmative and negative expressions1 which are signs of composition and of division in the intellect2 as is manifest from many passages of ,sacred ,scripture4 ,therefore it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 that the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine concepts4 ,but a simple intelligence is without composition and division4 ,therefore the angel understands without composition or division4 ,i answer that1 ,as in the intellect1 when reasoning1 the conclusion is compared with the principle1 so in the intellect composing and dividing1 the predicate is compared with the subject4 ,for if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle1 it would never understand by discursion and reasoning4 ,in like manner1 if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to1 or removed from1 the subject1 it would never understand by composing and dividing1 but only by understanding the essence4 ,thus it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion1 and by composing and dividing1 namely1 that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it4 ,and this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us1 as has been said 7,a4 #c74 ,hence1 since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel1 for he is a pure and most clear mirror1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning1 so neither does he by composing and dividing4 ,nevertheless1 he understands the composition and the division of enunciations1 just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms3 for he understands simply1 such things as are composite1 things movable immovably1 and material things immaterially4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every multitude of things understood causes composition1 but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is attributed to1 or denied of1 another4 ,when an angel apprehends the nature of anything1 he at the same time understands whatever can be either attributed to it1 or denied of it4 ,hence1 in apprehending a nature1 he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation4 ,yet1 as to the way in which they are known1 affirmation and negation have something more in common2 because directly the truth of an affirmation is known1 the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech1 shows that they know both composition and division3 yet not that they know by composing and dividing1 but by knowing simply the nature of a thing4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,falsehood in the ,intellect of an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's intellect4 ,for perversity appertains to falsehood4 ,but1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 there is a perverted fancy in the demons4 ,therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nescience is the cause of estimating falsely4 ,but1 as ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi71 there can be nescience in the angels4 ,therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom1 and which has a depraved reason1 has falsehood or error in its intellect4 ,but ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 vii7 affirms this of the demons4 ,therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #da7 that the intelligence is always true4 ,augustine likewise says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cb7 that nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence ,therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's knowledge4 ,i answer that1 ,the truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before4 ,for it has been said 7,a4 #d7 that an angel understands not by composing and dividing1 but by understanding what a thing is4 ,now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is1 just as the sense regarding its proper object1 as is said in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bf4 ,but by accident1 deception and falsehood creep in1 when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition1 and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another1 or when the parts of a definition do not hang together1 as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature1 a four-footed flying beast1 for there is no such animal4 ,and this comes about in things composite1 the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements1 one of which is as matter to the other4 ,but there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities1 as is stated in ,metaph4 ix1 text4 #bb2 for either they are not grasped at all1 and so we know nothing respecting them2 or else they are known precisely as they exist4 ,so therefore1 no falsehood1 error1 or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel2 yet it does so happen accidentally2 but very differently from the way it befalls us4 ,for we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process1 as when1 by division and demonstration1 we seek out the truth of a definition4 ,such is not the method of the angels2 but through the 7knowledge of the7 essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it4 ,now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing1 or excluded from it2 but not of what may be dependent on ,god's supernatural ordinance4 ,consequently1 owing to their upright will1 from their knowing the nature of every creature1 the good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein1 save under the ,divine ordinance2 hence there can be no error or falsehood in them4 ,but since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the ,divine wisdom1 they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of the same4 ,nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything2 but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters2 for example1 on seeing a dead man1 they may suppose that he will not rise again1 or1 on beholding ,christ1 they may judge ,him not to be ,god4 ,from all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident4 ,for the perversity of the demons comes of their not being subject to the ,divine wisdom2 while nescience is in the angels as regards things knowable1 not naturally but supernaturally4 ,it is1 furthermore1 evident that their understanding of what a thing is1 is always true1 save accidentally1 according as it is1 in an undue manner1 referred to some composition or division4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #f ,whether ,there ,is a ,morning and an ,evening ,knowledge in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels2 because evening and morning have an admixture of darkness4 ,but there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel2 since there is no error nor falsehood4 ,therefore the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 between evening and morning the night intervenes2 while noonday falls between morning and evening4 ,consequently1 if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels1 for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known3 hence the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #ch71 ,the sciences are divided just as things are4 ,but there is a threefold existence of things3 to wit1 in the ,word2 in their own natures2 and in the angelic knowledge1 as ,augustine observes 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h74 ,if1 therefore1 a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels1 because of the existence of things in the ,word1 and in their own nature1 then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge1 on account of the existence of things in the angelic mind4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bb1 #ca2 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #g1 #bj7 divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge4 ,i answer that1 ,the expression morning and evening knowledge was devised by ,augustine2 who interprets the six days wherein ,god made all things1 not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit1 since the sun was only made on the fourth day1 but as one day1 namely1 the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things4 ,as in the ordinary day1 morning is the beginning1 and evening the close of day1 so1 their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge2 and this is according as things exist in the ,word4 ,but their knowledge of the very being of the thing created1 as it stands in its own nature1 is termed evening knowledge2 because the being of things flows from the ,word1 as from a kind of primordial principle2 and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness1 but as compared to beginning and end4 ,or else it can be said1 as ,augustine puts it 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bc71 that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something light in comparison with one thing1 and darkness with respect to another4 ,in the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked1 according to ,eph4 #e3h3 ,you were heretofore darkness2 but now1 light in the ,lord3 yet this very life of the faithful1 when set in contrast to the life of glory1 is termed darkness1 according to #b ,pet4 #a3ai3 ,you have the firm prophetic word1 whereunto you do well to attend1 as to a light that shineth in a dark place4 ,so the angel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature1 is day in comparison with ignorance or error2 yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the ,word4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the morning and evening knowledge belong to the day1 that is1 to the enlightened angels1 who are quite apart from the darkness1 that is1 from the evil spirits4 ,the good angels1 while knowing the creature1 do not adhere to it1 for that would be to turn to darkness and to night2 but they refer this back to the praise of ,god1 in ,whom1 as in their principle1 they know all things4 ,consequently after evening there is no night1 but morning2 so that morning is the end of the preceding day1 and the beginning of the following1 in so far as the angels refer to ,god's praise their knowledge of the preceding work4 ,noonday is comprised under the name of day1 as the middle between the two extremes4 ,or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of ,god ,himself1 ,who has neither beginning nor end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the angels themselves are also creatures4 ,accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge1 as also the existence of things in their own nature4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #eh1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,morning and ,evening ,knowledge ,are ,one8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one4 ,for it is said 7,gen4 #a3e73 ,there was evening and morning1 one day4 ,but by the expression day the knowledge of the angels is to be understood1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bc74 ,therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time4 ,but the angels are always using their morning knowledge2 because they are always beholding ,god and things in ,god1 according to ,matt4 #ah3aj4 ,therefore1 if the evening knowledge were different from the morning1 the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3aj73 ,when that which is perfect is come1 then that which is in part shall be done away4 ,but1 if the evening knowledge be different from the morning1 it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect4 ,therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bd73 ,there is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the ,word of ,god1 and as it is in its own nature2 so that the former belongs to the day1 and the latter to the evening4 ,i answer that1 ,as was observed 7,a4 #f71 the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature4 ,this cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things1 so that the preposition in denotes the form of a principle2 because1 as has been already stated 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b71 the angels do not draw their knowledge from things4 ,it follows1 then1 that when we say in their proper nature we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge2 that is to say1 that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature4 ,now they know this through a twofold medium1 namely1 by innate ideas1 or by the forms of things existing in the ,word4 ,for by beholding the ,word1 they know not merely the being of things as existing in the ,word1 but the being as possessed by the things themselves2 as ,god by contemplating ,himself sees that being which things have in their own nature4 ,it1 therefore1 it be called evening knowledge1 in so far as when the angels behold the ,word1 they know the being which things have in their proper nature1 then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same1 and only differ as to the things known4 ,if it be called evening knowledge1 in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own natures1 then the morning and the evening knowledge differ4 ,thus ,augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the six days1 as ,augustine understands them1 are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels2 so that the day's unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood2 which1 nevertheless1 can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time1 one of which is referred to the other2 as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end2 and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles1 when it has already acquired knowledge4 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bd71 the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels2 hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,on the coming of what is perfect1 the opposite imperfect is done away3 just as faith1 which is of the things that are not seen1 is made void when vision succeeds4 ,but the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge4 ,for that a thing be known in itself1 is not opposite to its being known in its cause4 ,nor1 again1 is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums1 one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect2 just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion4 ,in like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated ,word1 and through an innate idea4 ,,question #ei ,,the ,,will ,,of ,,the ,,angels 7,,four ,,articles7 ,in the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels4 ,in the first place we shall treat of the will itself2 secondly1 of its movement1 which is love4 ,under the first heading there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is will in the angels8 7#b7 ,whether the will of the angel is his nature1 or his intellect8 7#c7 ,is there free-will in the angels8 7#d7 ,is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,will in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no will in the angels4 ,for as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #db71 ,the will is in the reason4 ,but there is no reason in the angels1 but something higher than reason4 ,therefore there is no will in the angels1 but something higher than the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the will is comprised under the appetite1 as is evident from the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #db74 ,but the appetite argues something imperfect2 because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed4 ,therefore1 since there is no imperfection in the angels1 especially in the blessed ones1 it seems that there is no will in them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 text4 #ed7 that the will is a mover which is moved2 for it is moved by the appetible object understood4 ,now the angels are immovable1 since they are incorporeal4 ,therefore there is no will in the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa1ab7 that the image of the ,trinity is found in the soul according to memory1 understanding1 and will4 ,but ,god's image is found not only in the soul of man1 but also in the angelic mind1 since it also is capable of knowing ,god4 ,therefore there is will in the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,we must necessarily place a will in the angels4 ,in evidence thereof1 it must be borne in mind that1 since all things flow from the ,divine will1 all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good1 but in different ways4 ,some are inclined to good by their natural inclination1 without knowledge1 as plants and inanimate bodies4 ,such inclination towards good is called a natural appetite4 ,others1 again1 are inclined towards good1 but with some knowledge2 not that they know the aspect of goodness1 but that they apprehend some particular good2 as in the sense1 which knows the sweet1 the white1 and so on4 ,the inclination which follows this apprehension is called a sensitive appetite4 ,other things1 again1 have an inclination towards good1 but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness2 this belongs to the intellect4 ,this is most perfectly inclined towards what is good2 not1 indeed1 as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only1 like things devoid of knowledge1 nor towards some particular good only1 as things which have only sensitive knowledge1 but as inclined towards good in general4 ,such inclination is termed will4 ,accordingly1 since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness1 it is manifest that there is a will in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason4 ,reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known2 for sense judges of particular objects1 while reason judges of universals4 ,therefore there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract1 which appetite belongs to reason2 and another with a tendency towards particular good1 which appetite belongs to sense4 ,but intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing2 because the intellect knows by simple intuition1 while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another4 ,nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it1 namely1 the universal4 ,consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same4 ,therefore in the angels1 who are purely intellectual1 there is no appetite higher than the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed1 yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these things only1 but also to many other things2 thus the name of a stone lapis is derived from injuring the foot laesione pedis1 though not this alone belongs to a stone4 ,in the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger ira2 though at the same time there are several other passions in it1 as hope1 daring1 and the rest4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the will is called a mover which is moved1 according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind2 and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels1 since such movement is the act of a perfect agent1 as stated in ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bh4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #b ,whether in the ,angels the ,will ,differs from the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature4 ,for an angel is more simple than a natural body4 ,but a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end1 which is its good4 ,therefore much more so is the angel4 ,now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists1 or else it is some species within his intellect4 ,therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature1 or through an intelligible species4 ,but such inclination towards the good belongs to the will4 ,therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of the intellect is the true1 while the object of the will is the good4 ,now the good and the true differ1 not really but only logically 99,cf4 ,q4 #af1 ,a4 #d4 ,therefore will and intellect are not really different4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties2 for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness4 ,but the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular2 for the true is a particular good1 to wit1 of the intellect4 ,therefore the will1 whose object is the good1 does not differ from the intellect1 whose object is the true4 ,on the contrary1 ,the will in the angels regards good things only1 while their intellect regards both good and bad things1 for they know both4 ,therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,in the angels the will is a special faculty or power1 which is neither their nature nor their intellect4 ,that it is not their nature is manifest from this1 that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it3 whatever1 then1 extends to anything beyond it1 is not its essence4 ,hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence1 but from the matter which desires being before possessing it1 and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists4 ,but the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence2 as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness1 while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities4 ,now the will has a natural tendency towards good4 ,consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills2 that is to say1 in ,god1 ,who wills nothing beyond ,himself except on account of ,his goodness4 ,this cannot be said of any creature1 because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing4 ,accordingly1 neither the will of the angel1 nor that of any creature1 can be the same thing as its essence4 ,in like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man4 ,because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower2 consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it1 according as what1 in its essence1 is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it4 ,on the other hand1 the will goes out to what is beyond it1 according as by a kind of inclination it tends1 in a manner1 to what is outside it4 ,now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it1 and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it4 ,consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature4 ,it is not so with ,god1 for ,he has within ,himself universal being1 and the universal good4 ,therefore both intellect and will are ,his nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form3 while it is inclined to something outside by something additional1 as has been said4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects1 but according to their formal distinction1 which is taken from the nature of the object as such4 ,consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,because the good and the true are really convertible1 it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true2 while the true is desired by the will as something good4 ,nevertheless1 the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties1 as was said above 7ad #b74 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is ,free-,will in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no free-will in the angels4 ,for the act of free-will is to choose4 ,but there can be no choice with the angels1 because choice is the desire of something after taking counsel1 while counsel is a kind of inquiry1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #c4 ,but the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring1 for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason4 ,therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 free-will implies indifference to alternatives4 ,but in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference2 because1 as was observed already 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #e71 their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them4 ,therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less2 because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower4 ,but the free-will does not admit of degrees4 ,therefore there is no free-will in them4 ,on the contrary1 ,free-will is part of man's dignity4 ,but the angels' dignity surpasses that of men4 ,therefore1 since free-will is in men1 with much more reason is it in the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,some things there are which act1 not from any previous judgment1 but1 as it were1 moved and made to act by others2 just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer4 ,others act from some kind of judgment2 but not from free-will1 such as irrational animals2 for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself3 such a judgment is not a free one1 but implanted by nature4 ,only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free1 in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness2 from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good4 ,consequently1 wherever there is intellect1 there is free-will4 ,it is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect1 so is there free-will in the angels1 and in a higher degree of perfection than in man4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking of choice1 as it is in man4 ,as a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this1 that the one needs not to inquire1 while the other does so need2 so is it in practical matters4 ,hence there is choice in the angels1 yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel1 but by the sudden acceptance of truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as was observed already 7,a4 #b71 knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower4 ,now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have4 ,consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature1 if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally4 ,but the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this1 that the affection is directed to something outside4 ,yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined1 but only from something which is higher than it4 ,therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him2 but it would argue imperfection in him1 were he to be indeterminate to what is above him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower1 as also does the judgment of the intellect4 ,yet it is true that liberty1 in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered1 is not susceptible of greater and less degree2 because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves2 but only by their cause1 or through the addition of some qualification4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ei1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,is an ,irascible and a ,concupiscible ,appetite in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that in the demons there is unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence4 ,but demons are of the same nature as angels2 for sin has not altered their nature4 ,therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 love and joy are in the concupiscible2 while anger1 hope1 and fear are in the irascible appetite4 ,but in the ,sacred ,scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels4 ,therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible3 thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible1 while hope and fortitude are in the irascible4 ,but these virtues are in the angels4 ,therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 text4 #db7 that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part1 which does not exist in angels4 ,consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,the intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible2 only the sensitive appetite is so divided4 ,the reason of this is because1 since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects1 if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea1 there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea4 ,just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such1 then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white3 whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white1 as white1 then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black4 ,now it is quite evident from what has been said 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a71 that the object of the intellective appetite1 otherwise known as the will1 is good according to the common aspect of goodness2 nor can there be any appetite except of what is good4 ,hence1 in the intellective part1 the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things1 as the sensitive appetite is divided1 which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect1 but for some particular good object4 ,accordingly1 since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite1 their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible1 but remains undivided2 and it is called the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons1 as anger is sometimes attributed to ,god2--on account of the resemblance in the effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,love and joy1 in so far as they are passions1 are in the concupiscible appetite1 but in so far as they express a simple act of the will1 they are in the intellective part3 in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone2 and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed4 ,universally speaking1 none of these things is said of the angels1 as by way of passions2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,charity1 as a virtue1 is not in the concupiscible appetite1 but in the will2 because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses4 ,but the ,divine goodness1 which is the object of charity1 is not of any such kind4 ,for the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite2 because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order1 which the virtue of hope does not regard2 since the object of hope is arduous and divine4 ,temperance1 however1 considered as a human virtue1 deals with the desires of sensible pleasures1 which belong to the concupiscible faculty4 ,similarly1 fortitude regulates daring and fear1 which reside in the irascible part4 ,consequently temperance1 in so far as it is a human virtue1 resides in the concupiscible part1 and fortitude in the irascible4 ,but they do not exist in the angels in this manner4 ,for in them there are no passions of concupiscence1 nor of fear and daring1 to be regulated by temperance and fortitude4 ,but temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the ,divine will4 ,fortitude is likewise attributed to them1 in so far as they firmly carry out the ,divine will4 ,all of this is done by their will1 and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite4 ,,question #fj ,,of ,,the ,,love ,,or ,,dilection ,,of ,,the ,,angels 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,the next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection2 because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of love4 ,under this heading there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there is natural love in the angels8 7#b7 ,whether there is in them love of choice8 7#c7 ,whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice8 7#d7 ,whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself8 7#e7 ,whether the angel loves ,god more than self with natural love8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,is ,natural ,love or ,dilection in an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels4 ,for1 natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love1 as stated by ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,but an angel's love is intellectual4 ,therefore it is not natural4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves2 for nothing has control over its own nature4 ,now the angels are not acted upon1 but act of themselves2 because they possess free-will1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #c74 ,consequently there is no natural love in them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every love is either ordinate or inordinate4 ,now ordinate love belongs to charity2 while inordinate love belongs to wickedness4 ,but neither of these belongs to nature2 because charity is above nature1 while wickedness is against nature4 ,therefore there is no natural love in the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,love results from knowledge2 for1 nothing is loved except it be first known1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #a1b74 ,but there is natural knowledge in the angels4 ,therefore there is also natural love4 ,i answer that1 ,we must necessarily place natural love in the angels4 ,in evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it4 ,now nature comes before intellect1 because the nature of every subject is its essence4 ,consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect4 ,but it is common to every nature to have some inclination2 and this is its natural appetite or love4 ,this inclination is found to exist differently in different natures2 but in each according to its mode4 ,consequently1 in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will2 in the sensitive nature1 according to the sensitive appetite2 but in a nature devoid of knowledge1 only according to the tendency of the nature to something4 ,therefore1 since an angel is an intellectual nature1 there must be a natural love in his will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love1 which is merely natural1 in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all things in the world are moved to act by something else except the ,first ,agent1 ,who acts in such a manner that ,he is in no way moved to act by another2 and in ,whom nature and will are the same4 ,so there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the ,author of his nature4 ,yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself1 because he has free-will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as natural knowledge is always true1 so is natural love well regulated2 because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its ,author4 ,to say that a natural inclination is not well regulated1 is to derogate from the ,author of nature4 ,yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue3 because the one rectitude perfects the other2 even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind1 and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,is ,love of ,choice in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels4 ,for love of choice appears to be rational love2 since choice follows counsel1 which lies in inquiry1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #c4 ,now rational love is contrasted with intellectual1 which is proper to angels1 as is said 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore there is no love of choice in the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused3 since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions4 ,hence they are disposed to everything they can know1 as our intellect is disposed towards first principles1 which it can know naturally4 ,now love follows knowledge1 as has been already stated 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a74 ,consequently1 besides their infused love1 there is only natural love in the angels4 ,therefore there is no love of choice in them4 ,on the contrary1 ,we neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts4 ,but by their love the angels merit or demerit4 ,therefore there is love of choice in them4 ,i answer that1 ,there exists in the angels a natural love1 and a love of choice4 ,their natural love is the principle of their love of choice2 because1 what belongs to that which precedes1 has always the nature of a principle4 ,wherefore1 since nature is first in everything1 what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything4 ,this is clearly evident in man1 with respect to both his intellect and his will4 ,for the intellect knows principles naturally2 and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions1 which are known by him not naturally1 but by discovery1 or by teaching4 ,in like manner1 the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect1 as is laid down in ,phys4 ii1 text4 #hi4 ,consequently the will tends naturally to its last end2 for every man naturally wills happiness3 and all other desires are caused by this natural desire2 since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end4 ,therefore the love of that good1 which a man naturally wills as an end1 is his natural love2 but the love which comes of this1 which is of something loved for the end's sake1 is the love of choice4 ,there is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will4 ,because1 as was stated already 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #b71 the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower4 ,it comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood1 but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things4 ,the act of the appetitive faculty1 on the contrary1 follows the inclination of man towards things2 some of which are good in themselves1 and consequently are appetible in themselves2 others being good only in relation to something else1 and being appetible on account of something else4 ,consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring1 for him to seek one thing naturally as his end1 and something else from choice as ordained to such end4 ,therefore1 since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect1 only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them1 but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice4 ,in saying all this1 we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature1 since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof3 but we shall speak of them later on 7,q4 #fb74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not all love of choice is rational love1 according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love4 ,for rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge3 but1 as was said above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #c1 ad #a71 when treating of free-will1 every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason2 but only human choice4 ,consequently the conclusion does not follow4 ,the reply to the second objection follows from what has been said4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,angel ,loves ,himself with ,both ,natural ,love1 and ,love of ,choice8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice4 ,for1 as was said 7,a4 #b71 natural love regards the end itself2 while love of choice regards the means to the end4 ,but the same thing1 with regard to the same1 cannot be both the end and a means to the end4 ,therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as ,dionysius observes 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 ,love is a uniting and a binding power4 ,but uniting and binding imply various things brought together4 ,therefore the angel cannot love himself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 love is a kind of movement4 ,but every movement tends towards something else4 ,therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #h73 ,love for others comes of love for oneself4 ,i answer that1 ,since the object of love is good1 and good is to be found both in substance and in accident1 as is clear from ,ethic4 i1 #f1 a thing may be loved in two ways2 first of all as a subsisting good2 and secondly as an accidental or inherent good4 ,that is loved as a subsisting good1 which is so loved that we wish well to it4 ,but that which we wish unto another1 is loved as an accidental or inherent good3 thus knowledge is loved1 not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed4 ,this kind of love has been called by the name concupiscence while the first is called friendship4 ,now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge1 everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself2 as fire seeks to mount upwards4 ,consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection4 ,this is to love self4 ,hence angel and man naturally love self1 in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self4 ,on the other hand1 each loves self with the love of choice1 in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love1 as was observed above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as to be one is better than to be united1 so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one to others4 ,dionysius used the terms uniting and binding in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self2 as uniting is derived from unity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as love is an action which remains within the agent1 so also is it a movement which abides within the lover1 but does not of necessity tend towards something else2 yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself2 just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower1 in such a way that he knows himself4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #d ,whether an ,angel ,loves ,another with ,natural ,love ,as ,he ,loves ,himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself4 ,for love follows knowledge4 ,but an angel does not know another as he knows himself3 because he knows himself by his essence1 while he knows another by his similitude1 as was said above 7,q4 #ef1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the cause is more powerful than the effect2 and the principle than what is derived from it4 ,but love for another comes of love for self1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ix1 #h74 ,therefore one angel does not love another as himself1 but loves himself more4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 natural love is of something as an end1 and is unremovable4 ,but no angel is the end of another2 and again1 such love can be severed from him1 as is the case with the demons1 who have no love for the good angels4 ,therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself4 ,on the contrary1 ,that seems to be a natural property which is found in all1 even in such as devoid of reason4 ,but1 every beast loves its like1 as is said1 ,ecclus4 #ac3ai4 ,therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself4 ,i answer that1 ,as was observed 7,a4 #c71 both angel and man naturally love self4 ,now what is one with a thing1 is that thing itself3 consequently every thing loves what is one with itself4 ,so1 if this be one with it by natural union1 it loves it with natural love2 but if it be one with it by non-natural union1 then it loves it with non-natural love4 ,thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love1 while he loves a blood relation with natural affection1 in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation4 ,now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another1 is the one according to nature4 ,and so everything loves another which is one with it in species1 with a natural affection1 in so far as it loves its own species4 ,this is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge3 for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing1 wherein consists this other thing's good2 as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good1 namely1 to be borne upwards4 ,so then1 it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection1 in so far as he is one with him in nature4 ,but so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel1 or differs from him in other respects1 he does not love him with natural love4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved3 and thus one angel knows another as himself1 because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be4 ,in another way the expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover4 ,and thus one angel does not know another as himself1 because he knows himself by his essence1 and the other not by the other's essence4 ,in like manner he does not love another as he loves himself1 because he loves himself by his own will2 but he does not love another by the other's will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the expression as does not denote equality1 but likeness4 ,for since natural affection rests upon natural unity1 the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him4 ,consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself1 than what is one only generically or specifically4 ,but it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself1 in this respect1 that as he loves self in wishing well to self1 so he loves another in wishing well to him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,natural love is said to be of the end1 not as of that end to which good is willed1 but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself1 and in consequence for another1 as united to oneself4 ,nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels1 without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels1 in so far as they share the same nature with them4 ,but they hate them1 in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fj1 ,art4 #e ,whether an angel by natural love loves ,god more than he loves himself8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel does not love ,god by natural love more than he loves himself4 ,for1 as was stated 7,a4 #d71 natural love rests upon natural union4 ,now the ,divine nature is far above the angelic nature4 ,therefore1 according to natural love1 the angel loves ,god less than self1 or even than another angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,that on account of which a thing is such1 is yet more so4 ,but every one loves another with natural love for his own sake3 because one thing loves another as good for itself4 ,therefore the angel does not love ,god more than self with natural love4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nature is self-centered in its operation2 for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation4 ,but nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself4 ,therefore the angel does not love ,god more than himself from natural love4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is proper to charity to love ,god more than self4 ,but to love from charity is not natural to the angels2 for it is poured out upon their hearts by the ,holy ,spirit ,who is given to them1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #i74 ,therefore the angels do not love ,god more than themselves by natural love4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 natural love lasts while nature endures4 ,but the love of ,god more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv71 ,two loves have made two cities2 namely love of self unto the contempt of ,god has made the earthly city2 while love of ,god unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city4 ,therefore it is not natural to love ,god more than self4 ,on the contrary1 ,all the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature4 ,but the precept of loving ,god more than self is a moral precept of the law4 ,therefore1 it is of the law of nature4 ,consequently from natural love the angel loves ,god more than himself4 ,i answer that1 ,there have been some who maintained that an angel loves ,god more than himself with natural love1 both as to the love of concupiscence1 through his seeking the ,divine good for himself rather than his own good2 and1 in a fashion1 as to the love of friendship1 in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to ,god than to himself2 because he naturally wishes ,god to be ,god1 while as for himself1 he wills to have his own nature4 ,but absolutely speaking1 out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does ,god1 because he naturally loves himself before ,god1 and with greater intensity4 ,the falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence1 if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things2 because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature4 ,now1 in natural things1 everything which1 as such1 naturally belongs to another1 is principally1 and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs1 than towards itself4 ,such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature3 because according as a thing is moved naturally1 it has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved1 as stated in ,phys4 ii1 text4 #gh4 ,for we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole2 as1 for instance1 the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body's safety4 ,and since reason copies nature1 we find the same inclination among the social virtues2 for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state2 and if man were a natural part of the city1 then such inclination would be natural to him4 ,consequently1 since ,god is the universal good1 and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised1 because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to ,god1 it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love ,god before themselves and with a greater love4 ,otherwise1 if either of them loved self more than ,god1 it would follow that natural love would be perverse1 and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other2 for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other1 inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with the other4 ,but where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other1 that one is naturally more loved than self2 because1 as we said above1 each part naturally loves the whole more than itself3 and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good4 ,now ,god is not only the good of one species1 but is absolutely the universal good2 hence everything in its own way naturally loves ,god more than itself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when it is said that ,god is loved by an angel in so far as ,he is good to the angel1 if the expression in so far denotes an end1 then it is false2 for he does not naturally love ,god for his own good1 but for ,god's sake4 ,if it denotes the nature of love on the lover's part1 then it is true2 for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love ,god1 except from this--that everything is dependent on that good which is ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to certain particular details1 but much more as to what is common2 for everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality1 but likewise its species4 ,and much more has everything a natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,god1 in so far as ,he is the universal good1 from ,whom every natural good depends1 is loved by everything with natural love4 ,so far as ,he is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude1 ,he is love with the love of charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,since ,god's substance and universal goodness are one and the same1 all who behold ,god's essence are by the same movement of love moved towards the ,divine essence as it is distinct from other things1 and according as it is the universal good4 ,and because ,he is naturally loved by all so far as ,he is the universal good1 it is impossible that whoever sees ,him in ,his essence should not love ,him4 ,but such as do not behold ,his essence1 know ,him by some particular effects1 which are sometimes opposed to their will4 ,so in this way they are said to hate ,god2 yet nevertheless1 so far as ,he is the universal good of all1 every thing naturally loves ,god more than itself4 ,,question #fa ,,of ,,the ,,production ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,in ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,natural ,,being 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after dealing with the nature of the angels1 their knowledge and will1 it now remains for us to treat of their creation1 or1 speaking in a general way1 of their origin4 ,such consideration is threefold4 ,in the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence2 secondly1 how they were made perfect in grace or glory2 and thirdly1 how some of them became wicked4 ,under the first heading there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the angel has a cause of his existence8 7#b7 ,whether he has existed from eternity8 7#c7 ,whether he was created before corporeal creatures8 7#d7 ,whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angels ,have a ,cause of ,their ,existence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence4 ,for the first chapter of ,genesis treats of things created by ,god4 ,but there is no mention of angels4 ,therefore the angels were not created by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 viii1 text4 #af7 that if any substance be a form without matter1 straightway it has being and unity of itself1 and has no cause of its being and unity4 ,but the angels are immaterial forms1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore they have no cause of their being4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is produced by any agent1 from the very fact of its being produced1 receives form from it4 ,but since the angels are forms1 they do not derive their form from any agent4 ,therefore the angels have no active cause4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #adh3b73 ,praise ye ,him1 all ,his angels2 and further on1 verse #e3 ,for ,he spoke and they were made4 ,i answer that1 ,it must be affirmed that angels and everything existing1 except ,god1 were made by ,god4 ,god alone is ,his own existence2 while in everything else the essence differs from the existence1 as was shown above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #d74 ,from this it is clear that ,god alone exists of ,his own essence3 while all other things have their existence by participation4 ,now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially2 as everything ignited is caused by fire4 ,consequently the angels1 of necessity1 were made by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #ej7 that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things1 but are designated by the name heavens or of light4 ,and they were either passed over1 or else designated by the names of corporeal things1 because ,moses was addressing an uncultured people1 as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature2 and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature1 it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry1 to which they were inclined1 and from which ,moses especially meant to safeguard them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal' cause of their existence and unity1 nor such active cause as produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality2 but they have a cause productive of their entire substance4 ,from this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,angel ,was ,produced by ,god from ,eternity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel was produced by ,god from eternity4 ,for ,god is the cause of the angel by ,his being3 for ,he does not act through something besides ,his essence4 ,but ,his being is eternal4 ,therefore ,he produced the angels from eternity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything which exists at one period and not at another1 is subject to time4 ,but the angel is above time1 as is laid down in the book ,de ,causis4 ,therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing1 but exists always4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xiii7 proves the soul's incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth4 ,but as truth is incorruptible1 so is it eternal4 ,therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible1 but likewise eternal4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,prov4 #h3bb71 in the person of begotten ,wisdom3 ,the ,lord possessed me in the beginning of ,his ways1 before ,he made anything from the beginning4 ,but1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a71 the angels were made by ,god4 ,therefore at one time the angels were not4 ,i answer that1 ,god alone1 ,father1 ,son and ,holy ,ghost1 is from eternity4 ,catholic ,faith holds this without doubt2 and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical4 ,for ,god so produced creatures that ,he made them from nothing2 that is1 after they had not been4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god's being is ,his will4 ,so the fact that ,god produced the angels and other creatures by ,his being does not exclude that ,he made them also by ,his will4 ,but1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #df1 ,a4 #a71 ,god's will does not act by necessity in producing creatures4 ,therefore ,he produced such as ,he willed1 and when ,he willed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens2 because he is above every movement of a corporeal nature4 ,nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence1 and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #bj1ba7 that ,god moves the spiritual creature according to time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth4 ,but they did not possess this nature from eternity2 it was bestowed upon them when ,god ,himself willed it4 ,consequently it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,angels ,were ,created ,before the ,corporeal ,world8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world4 ,for ,jerome says 7,in ,ep4 ad ,tit4 i1 #b73 ,six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed2 yet how shall we measure the time1 how shall we count the ages1 in which the ,angels1 ,thrones1 ,dominations1 and the other orders served ,god8 ,damascene also says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii73 ,some say that the angels were begotten before all creation2 as ,gregory the ,theologian declares1 ,he first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers1 and the devising was the making thereof4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angelic nature stands midway between the ,divine and the corporeal natures4 ,but the ,divine nature is from eternity2 while corporeal nature is from time4 ,therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made1 and after eternity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another4 ,but one corporeal nature was made before another2 hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of ,genesis4 ,much more1 therefore1 was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3a73 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,now1 this would not be true if anything had been created previously4 ,consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature4 ,i answer that1 ,there is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the ,fathers4 ,the more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures4 ,for the angels are part of the universe3 they do not constitute a universe of themselves2 but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe4 ,this stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature2 because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe4 ,but no part is perfect if separate from the whole4 ,consequently it is improbable that ,god1 ,whose works are perfect1 as it is said ,deut4 #cb3d1 should have created the angelic creature before other creatures4 ,at the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous2 especially on account of the opinion of ,gregory ,nazianzen1 whose authority in ,christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching1 as is also the case with the doctrine of ,athanasius1 as ,jerome says4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the ,greek ,fathers2 all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god is not a part of1 but far above1 the whole universe1 possessing within ,himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way4 ,but an angel is a part of the universe4 ,hence the comparison does not hold4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all corporeal creatures are one in matter2 while the angels do not agree with them in matter4 ,consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things2 but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe4 ,if the contrary view be held1 then in the text of ,gen4 #a1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 the words1 ,in the beginning1 must be interpreted1 ,in the ,son1 or ,in the beginning of time3 but not1 ,in the beginning1 before which there was nothing1 unless we say ,before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fa1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,angels ,were ,created in the ,empyrean ,heaven8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven4 ,for the angels are incorporeal substances4 ,now a substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence2 and as a consequence1 neither is it for its creation4 ,therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine remarks 7,gen4 ad lit4 iii1 #aj71 that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere3 therefore not in the empyrean heaven4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven4 ,if therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven1 it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven4 ,and this is contrary to what is said in ,isaias1 speaking in the person of the sinning angel3 ,i will ascend into heaven 7,isa4 #ad3ac74 ,on the contrary1 ,strabus1 commenting on the text ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 says3 ,by heaven he does not mean the visible firmament1 but the empyrean1 that is1 the fiery or intellectual firmament1 which is not so styled from its heat1 but from its splendor2 and which was filled with angels directly it was made4 ,i answer that1 ,as was observed 7,a4 #c71 the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures4 ,consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature1 and to rule over every corporeal creature4 ,hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place1 as presiding over all corporeal nature2 whether it be styled the empyrean heaven1 or whatever else it be called4 ,so ,isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels1 explaining the passage of ,deut4 #aj3ad3 ,behold heaven is the ,lord's thy ,god1 and the heaven of heaven4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the angels were created in a corporeal place1 not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being made2 because ,god could have created them before all corporeal creation1 as many holy ,doctors hold4 ,they were made in a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature1 and that they are by their power in touch with bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the uppermost atmosphere ,augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven1 to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency4 ,or else he is not speaking of all the angels2 but only of such as sinned1 who1 in the opinion of some1 belonged to the inferior orders4 ,but there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels1 as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things1 were created in the highest place of the corporeal creature2 while the other angels1 as having more restricted powers1 were created among the inferior bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven1 but of the heaven of the ,blessed ,trinity2 unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend1 when he desired to be equal in some manner to ,god1 as will appear later on 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #c74 ,,question #fb ,,of ,,the ,,perfection ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,in ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,grace ,,and ,,of ,,glory 7,in ,nine ,articles7 ,in due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory2 under which heading there are nine points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,were the angels created in beatitude8 7#b7 ,did they need grace in order to turn to ,god8 7#c7 ,were they created in grace8 7#d7 ,did they merit their beatitude8 7#e7 ,did they at once enter into beatitude after merit8 7#f7 ,did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities8 7#g7 ,after entering glory1 did their natural love and knowledge remain8 7#h7 ,could they have sinned afterwards8 7#i7 ,after entering into glory1 could they advance farther8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angels ,were ,created in ,beatitude8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels were created in beatitude4 ,for it is stated 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogm4 xxix7 that the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created1 do not of their nature possess the excellence they have4 ,therefore the angels were created in beatitude4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature4 ,but the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete2 nor did its lack of form take precedence in time1 but only in nature1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ae74 ,therefore neither did ,god create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete4 ,but its formation and perfection are derived from its beatitude1 whereby it enjoys ,god4 ,therefore it was created in beatitude4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #cd2 v1 #e71 the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six days1 were made together at one time2 and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation4 ,but1 according to his exposition1 in those six days1 the morning was the angelic knowledge1 according to which they knew the ,word and things in the ,word4 ,therefore straightway from their creation they knew the ,word1 and things in the ,word4 ,but the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the ,word4 ,consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very beginning of their creation4 ,on the contrary1 ,to be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of beatitude4 ,but the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as they were created2 the fall of some of them shows this4 ,therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation4 ,i answer that1 ,by the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature2 and hence it is that it is naturally desired1 since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection4 ,now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature4 ,the first is one which it can procure of its own natural power2 and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness4 ,hence ,aristotle 7,ethic4 x7 says that man's ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation1 whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object2 and that is ,god4 ,above this happiness there is still another1 which we look forward to in the future1 whereby we shall see ,god as ,he is4 ,this is beyond the nature of every created intellect1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d74 ,so1 then1 it remains to be said1 that1 as regards this first beatitude1 which the angel could procure by his natural power1 he was created already blessed4 ,because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action1 as man does1 but1 as was observed above 7,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d71 is straightway in possession thereof1 owing to his natural dignity4 ,but the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature2 because such beatitude is no part of their nature1 but its end2 and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation2 consequently1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad4 lit4 v1 #d1 #bc2 viii1 #c71 the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works1 in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth4 ,in the same way1 the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature2 but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the angel has a twofold knowledge of the ,word2 the one which is natural1 and the other according to glory4 ,he has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the ,word through a similitude thereof shining in his nature2 and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the ,word through ,his essence4 ,by both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the ,word2 imperfectly by his natural knowledge1 and perfectly by his knowledge of glory4 ,therefore the first knowledge of things in the ,word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation2 while the second was not1 but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good4 ,and this is properly termed their morning knowledge4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #b ,whether an ,angel ,needs ,grace in ,order to ,turn to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to ,god4 ,for1 we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally4 ,but the angel naturally turns to ,god3 because he loves ,god naturally1 as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks4 ,now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to ,god2 because there was no obstacle in him to such turning4 ,therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to turn oneself to ,god is to dispose oneself for grace2 hence it is said 7,zech4 #a3c73 ,turn ye to ,me1 and ,i will turn to you4 ,but we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace3 for thus we should go on to infinity4 ,therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it was by turning to ,god that the angel reached to beatitude4 ,if1 then1 he had needed no grace in order to turn to ,god1 it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life4 ,but this is contrary to the saying of the ,apostle 7,rom4 #f3bc73 ,the grace of ,god is life everlasting4 ,i answer that1 ,the angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to ,god1 as the object of beatitude4 ,for1 as was observed above 7,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #b7 the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will4 ,but the will's natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature4 ,therefore1 if there is anything which is above nature1 the will cannot be inclined towards it1 unless helped by some other supernatural principle4 ,thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat1 and to generate fire2 whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire2 consequently1 fire has no tendency thereto1 except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul4 ,now it was shown above 7,q4 #ab1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e71 when we were treating of ,god's knowledge1 that to see ,god in ,his essence1 wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational creature consists1 is beyond the nature of every created intellect4 ,consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such beatitude1 except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent4 ,this is what we call the help of grace4 ,therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude1 except by the help of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the angel loves ,god naturally1 so far as ,god is the author of his natural being4 ,but here we are speaking of turning to ,god1 so far as ,god bestows beatitude by the vision of ,his essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a thing is difficult which is beyond a power2 and this happens in two ways4 ,first of all1 because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power4 ,thus1 if it can be attained by some help1 it is said to be difficult2 but if it can in no way be attained1 then it is impossible2 thus it is impossible for a man to fly4 ,in another way a thing may be beyond the power1 not according to the natural order of such power1 but owing to some intervening hindrance2 as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul2 because the soul1 considered in itself1 can be moved in any direction2 but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body2 consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards4 ,to be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man1 both because it is beyond his nature1 and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin4 ,but it is difficult for an angel1 only because it is supernatural4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every movement of the will towards ,god can be termed a conversion to ,god4 ,and so there is a threefold turning to ,god4 ,the first is by the perfect love of ,god2 this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of ,god2 and for such conversion1 consummate grace is required4 ,the next turning to ,god is that which merits beatitude2 and for this there is required habitual grace1 which is the principle of merit4 ,the third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace2 for this no habitual grace is required2 but the operation of ,god1 ,who draws the soul towards ,himself1 according to ,lament4 #e3ba3 ,convert us1 ,o ,lord1 to ,thee1 and we shall be converted4 ,hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,angels ,were ,created in ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels were not created in grace4 ,for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h7 that the angelic nature was first made without form1 and was called heaven3 but afterwards it received its form1 and was then called light4 ,but such formation comes from grace4 ,therefore they were not created in grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 grace turns the rational creature towards ,god4 ,if1 therefore1 the angel had been created in grace1 no angel would ever have turned away from ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 grace comes midway between nature and glory4 ,but the angels were not beatified in their creation4 ,therefore it seems that they were not created in grace2 but that they were first created in nature only1 and then received grace1 and that last of all they were beatified4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #i71 ,who wrought the good will of the angels8 ,who1 save ,him ,who created them with ,his will1 that is1 with the pure love wherewith they cling to ,him2 at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them8 ,i answer that1 ,although there are conflicting opinions on this point1 some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state1 while others maintain that they were created in grace2 yet it seems more probable1 and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men1 that they were created in sanctifying grace4 ,for we see that all things which1 in the process of time1 being created by the work of ,divine ,providence1 were produced by the operation of ,god1 were created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #c71 such as trees1 animals1 and the rest4 ,now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect2 hence 7#a ,john #c3i7 grace is called the seed of ,god4 ,as1 then1 in ,augustine's opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created1 so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory2 and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time4 ,or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace3 and so it did not precede in the order of time1 but in the order of nature2 as ,augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ae74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature4 ,now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires4 ,consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity2 but he who has grace can fail to make use of it1 and can sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory1 nevertheless1 in the order of time1 in created nature1 glory is not simultaneous with nature2 because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace4 ,but grace stands not as the end of operation1 because it is not of works1 but as the principle of right operation4 ,therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #d ,whether an ,angel ,merits ,his ,beatitude8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude4 ,for merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act4 ,but the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly4 ,therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we do not merit by merely natural operations4 ,but it was quite natural for the angel to turn to ,god4 ,therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if a beatified angel merited his beatitude1 he did so either before he had it1 or else afterwards4 ,but it was not before2 because1 in the opinion of many1 he had no grace before whereby to merit it4 ,nor did he merit it afterwards1 because thus he would be meriting it now2 which is clearly false1 because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher1 and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent2 which is not admissible4 ,consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is stated 7,apoc4 #ba3ag7 that the measure of the angel in that heavenly ,jerusalem is the measure of a man4 ,therefore the same is the case with the angel4 ,i answer that1 ,perfect beatitude is natural only to ,god1 because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in ,him4 ,beatitude1 however1 is not of the nature of the creature1 but is its end4 ,now everything attains its last end by its operation4 ,such operation leading to the end is either productive of the end1 when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end1 as the healing art is productive of health2 or else it is deserving of the end1 when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it2 wherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing4 ,now it is evident from what has gone before 7,,aa4 #a1 #b2 ,q4 #ab1 ,,aa4 #d1 #e71 ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature4 ,it remains1 then1 that both man and angel merited their beatitude4 ,and if the angel was created in grace1 without which there is no merit1 there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude3 as also1 if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory4 ,but if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude1 it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit1 even as we have grace4 ,this1 however1 is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude2 which conveys the notion of an end1 and is the reward of virtue1 as even the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #i74 ,or else it will have to be said1 as some others have maintained1 that the angels merit beatitude by their present ministrations1 while in beatitude4 ,this is quite contrary1 again1 to the notion of merit3 since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end2 while what is already in its end cannot1 properly speaking1 be moved towards such end2 and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys4 ,or else it will have to be said that one and the same act of turning to ,god1 so far as it comes of free-will1 is meritorious2 and so far as it attains the end1 is the fruition of beatitude4 ,even this view will not stand1 because free-will is not the sufficient cause of merit2 and1 consequently1 an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will1 except in so far as it is informed by grace2 but it cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace1 which is the principle of meriting1 and by perfect grace1 which is the principle of enjoying4 ,hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude1 and at the same time to merit it4 ,consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was admitted to beatitude1 and that by such grace he merited beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers2 but from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement towards ,god2 but by the movement of charity1 which comes of grace4 ,the answer to the ,third ,objection is evident from what we have said4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,angel ,obtained ,beatitude ,immediately ,after ,one ,act of ,merit8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit4 ,for it is more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel4 ,but man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit4 ,therefore neither was the angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an angel could act at once1 and in an instant1 from the very outset of his creation1 for even natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of their creation2 and if the movement of a body could be instantaneous1 like operations of mind and will1 it would have movement in the first instant of its generation4 ,consequently1 if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will1 he merited it in the first instant of his creation2 and so1 if their beatitude was not retarded1 then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 there must be many intervals between things which are far apart4 ,but the beatific state of the angels is very far remote from their natural condition3 while merit comes midway between4 ,therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach beatitude4 ,on the contrary1 ,man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude3 consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints4 ,now the soul separated from the body1 if it has merit deserving beatitude1 enters at once into beatitude1 unless there be some obstacle4 ,therefore so does an angel4 ,now an angel instantly1 in his first act of charity1 had the merit of beatitude4 ,therefore1 since there was no obstacle within him1 he passed at once into beatitude by only one meritorious act4 ,i answer that1 ,the angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity1 whereby he merited beatitude4 ,the reason whereof is because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature2 as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection1 according to its mode4 ,now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another2 but to have it at once naturally1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #eh1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,but as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection1 so is he by merit inclined to glory4 ,hence instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude4 ,now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act2 because man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity4 ,hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once1 like the angel4 ,hence a longer way was assigned to man than to the angel for securing beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angel is above the time of corporeal things2 hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succession of their acts4 ,now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beatitude1 which is fruition2 since the one belongs to imperfect grace1 and the other to consummate grace4 ,consequently1 it remains for different instants to be conceived1 in one of which the angel merited beatitude1 and in another was beatified4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained4 ,consequently1 only one meritorious act is required2 which act can so far be called an interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,angels ,receive ,grace and ,glory ,according to the ,degree of ,their ,natural ,gifts8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts4 ,for grace is bestowed of ,god's absolute will4 ,therefore the degree of grace depends on ,god's will1 and not on the degree of their natural gifts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than nature is2 because a moral act is preparatory to grace4 ,but grace does not come of works1 as is said ,rom4 #aa3f4 ,therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace4 ,but man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts4 ,therefore neither does the angel4 ,on the contrary1 ,is the saying of the ,master of the ,sentences 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 #c7 that those angels who were created with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom1 were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace4 ,i answer that1 ,it is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts4 ,the reason for this can be drawn from two sources4 ,first of all1 on the part of ,god1 ,who1 in the order of ,his wisdom1 established various degrees in the angelic nature4 ,now as the angelic nature was made by ,god for attaining grace and beatitude1 so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory2 just as when1 for example1 the builder chisels the stones for building a house1 from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others1 it is clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the house4 ,so it seems that ,god destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude1 whom ,he made of a higher nature4 ,secondly1 the same is evident on the part of the angel4 ,the angel is not a compound of different natures1 so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other2 as happens in man1 in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part4 ,but when there is nothing to retard or thwart it1 nature is moved with its whole energy4 ,so it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature1 were turned to ,god more mightily and efficaciously4 ,the same thing happens in men1 since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to ,god4 ,hence it appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers1 had the more grace and glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as grace comes of ,god's will alone1 so likewise does the nature of the angel3 and as ,god's will ordained nature for grace1 so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself2 whereas nature is immediately from ,god4 ,accordingly it seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels1 who are themselves different specifically2 and in quite another way in men1 who differ only numerically4 ,for specific difference is on account of the end2 while numerical difference is because of the matter4 ,furthermore1 there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature2 but not in the angels4 ,consequently the argument is not the same for both4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,natural ,knowledge and ,love ,remain in the ,beatified ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels4 ,for it is said 7#a ,cor4 #ac3aj73 ,when that which is perfect is come1 then that which is in part shall be done away4 ,but natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love4 ,therefore1 in beatitude1 natural knowledge and love cease4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 where one suffices1 another is superfluous4 ,but the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels4 ,therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts1 as the same line cannot1 at the same end1 be terminated in two points4 ,but the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love2 for1 as is said ,ethic4 i1 #h1 happiness consists not in habit1 but in act4 ,therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,so long as a nature endures1 its operation remains4 ,but beatitude does not destroy nature1 since it is its perfection4 ,therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love4 ,i answer that1 ,natural knowledge and love remain in the angels4 ,for as principles of operations are mutually related1 so are the operations themselves4 ,now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second2 because beatitude is superadded to nature4 ,but the first must ever be preserved in the second4 ,consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude3 and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection4 ,now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude1 but underlies it2 as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form1 and the power is not taken away by the form1 but the privation which is opposed to the form4 ,in the same way1 the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge in glory2 for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums1 as a thing may be known at the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one4 ,in like manner1 an angel can know ,god by ,his essence1 and this appertains to his knowledge of glory2 and at the same time he can know ,god by his own essence1 which belongs to his natural knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves4 ,but in order for them to exist1 they presuppose the natural gifts2 because no beatitude is self-subsisting1 except the uncreated beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time1 except the one be ordained to the other4 ,but natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory4 ,accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #h ,whether a ,beatified ,angel ,can ,sin8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a beatified angel can sin4 ,for1 as as said above 7,a4 #g71 beatitude does not do away with nature4 ,but it is of the very notion of created nature1 that it can fail4 ,therefore a beatified angel can sin4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the rational powers are referred to opposites1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,metaph4 iv1 text4 #c74 ,but the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational4 ,therefore it is inclined towards good and evil4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil4 ,but the freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels4 ,therefore they can sin4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi7 that there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin4 ,therefore the holy angels cannot sin4 ,i answer that1 ,the beatified angels cannot sin4 ,the reason for this is1 because their beatitude consists in seeing ,god through ,his essence4 ,now1 ,god's essence is the very essence of goodness4 ,consequently the angel beholding ,god is disposed towards ,god in the same way as anyone else not seeing ,god is to the common form of goodness4 ,now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good2 or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such4 ,therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act1 except as aiming towards ,god4 ,now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin4 ,consequently the beatified angel cannot sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,created good1 considered in itself1 can fail4 ,but from its perfect union with the uncreated good1 such as is the union of beatitude1 it is rendered unable to sin1 for the reason already alleged4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally2 but as to the things whereunto they have a natural tendency1 they are not referred to opposites4 ,for the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles2 in the same way1 the will cannot help clinging to good1 formally as good2 because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object4 ,consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites1 as to doing many things1 or not doing them4 ,but they have no tendency to opposites with regard to ,god ,himself1 ,whom they see to be the very nature of goodness2 but in all things their aim is towards ,god1 which ever alternative they choose1 that is not sinful4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions4 ,now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions1 according to given principles2 but for it to proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles1 comes of its own defect4 ,hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things1 keeping the order of the end in view2 but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end2 and this is to sin4 ,hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels1 who cannot sin1 than there is in ourselves1 who can sin4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fb1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,beatified ,angels ,advance in ,beatitude8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude4 ,for charity is the principle of merit4 ,but there is perfect charity in the angels4 ,therefore the beatified angels can merit4 ,now1 as merit increases1 the reward of beatitude increases4 ,therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i7 that ,god makes use of us for our own gain1 and for ,his own goodness4 ,the same thing happens to the angels1 whom ,he uses for spiritual ministrations2 since they are all 99,vulg43 ',are they not all 4 4 4 8' ministering spirits1 sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation 7,heb4 #a3ad74 ,this would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby1 nor to advance to beatitude4 ,it remains1 then1 that the beatified angels can merit1 and can advance in beatitude4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance4 ,but the angels are not in the highest degree of beatitude4 ,therefore if unable to ascend higher1 it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them2 which is not admissible4 ,on the contrary1 ,merit and progress belong to this present condition of life4 ,but angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude1 they are already in possession of beatitude4 ,consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude4 ,i answer that1 ,in every movement the mover's intention is centered upon one determined end1 to which he intends to lead the movable subject2 because intention looks to the end1 to which infinite progress is repugnant4 ,now it is evident1 since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude1 which consists in the vision of ,god1 as is clear from what has gone before 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d71 that it needs to be moved by ,god towards its beatitude4 ,therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end4 ,now this one determinate object cannot1 in the vision of ,god1 consist precisely in that which is seen2 for the ,supreme ,truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees3 but it is on the part of the mode of vision1 that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of ,him ,who directs towards the end4 ,for it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the ,supreme ,essence1 it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision1 which is comprehension1 for this belongs to ,god only2 as is evident from what was said above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #c74 ,but since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending ,god1 while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite2 and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite2 it comes to pass that the rational creature understands ,god more or less clearly according to infinite degrees4 ,and as beatitude consists in vision1 so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision4 ,therefore every rational creature is so led by ,god to the end of its beatitude1 that from ,god's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude4 ,consequently1 when that degree is once secured1 it cannot pass to a higher degree4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end4 ,now the rational creature is moved towards its end1 not merely passively1 but also by working actively4 ,if the end is within the power of the rational creature1 then its action is said to procure the end2 as man acquires knowledge by reflection3 but if the end be beyond its power1 and is looked for from another1 then the action will be meritorious of such end4 ,but what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved1 but to have been moved4 ,consequently1 to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life2 whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward4 ,even as in acquired habits1 the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit2 but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable4 ,in the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit1 but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a thing can be termed useful in two ways4 ,first of all1 as being on the way to an end2 and so the merit of beatitude is useful4 ,secondly1 as the part is useful for the whole2 as the wall for a house4 ,in this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels1 inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude2 for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect1 considered as perfect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude1 yet1 in his own regard he is in the highest degree1 according to ,divine predestination4 ,nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations1 according to ,luke #ae3aj3 ,there is ,vulg4'shall be' joy before the angels of ,god upon one sinner doing penance4 ,such joy belongs to their accidental reward1 which can be increased unto judgment day4 ,hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward4 ,but it is better to say that the ,blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor2 like ,christ1 ,who alone was such4 ,for the ,blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude1 rather than merit it4 ,,question #fc ,,the ,,malice ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,with ,,regard ,,to ,,sin 7,in ,nine ,articles7 ,in the next place we must consider how angels became evil3 first of all with regard to the evil of fault2 and secondly1 as to the evil of punishment4 ,under the first heading there are nine points for consideration3 7#a7 ,can there be evil of fault in the angels8 7#b7 ,what kind of sins can be in them8 7#c7 ,what did the angel seek in sinning8 7#d7 ,supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing1 are any of them naturally evil8 7#e7 ,supposing that it is not so1 could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will8 7#f7 ,supposing that he did not1 was there any interval between his creation and fall8 7#g7 ,was the highest of them who fell1 absolutely the highest among the angels8 7#h7 ,was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning8 7#i7 ,did as many sin as remained steadfast8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,evil of ,fault ,can ,be in the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels4 ,for there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality1 as is said by the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 ix1 text4 #ai71 because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality4 ,but the angels have not being in potentiality1 since they are subsisting forms4 ,therefore there can be no evil in them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies4 ,but philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies4 ,therefore neither can there be in the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is natural to a thing is always in it4 ,but it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards ,god4 ,therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them4 ,but in loving ,god they do not sin4 ,consequently the angels cannot sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 desire is only of what is good or apparently good4 ,now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good2 because in them either there can be no error at all1 or at least not before guilt4 ,therefore the angels can desire only what it truly good4 ,but no one sins by desiring what is truly good4 ,consequently the angel does not sin by desire4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,job #d3ah73 ,in ,his angels ,he found wickedness4 ,i answer that1 ,an angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature1 can sin2 and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin1 such creature has it as a gift of grace1 and not from the condition of nature4 ,the reason of this is1 because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have2 whether we speak of sin in nature1 art1 or morals4 ,that act alone1 the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent1 can never fall short of rectitude4 ,were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving1 he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly2 but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule1 then the engraving may be right or faulty4 ,now the ,divine will is the sole rule of ,god's act1 because it is not referred to any higher end4 ,but every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the ,divine will1 to which the last end is to be referred3 as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior2 for instance1 the soldier's will1 according to the will of his commanding officer4 ,thus only in the ,divine will can there be no sin2 whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature2 considering the condition of its nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence4 ,yet there is potentiality in their intellective part1 as regards their being inclined to this or the other object4 ,in this respect there can be evil in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation4 ,therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature2 so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action4 ,but besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels1 by reason of which evil may be in them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is natural for the angel to turn to ,god by the movement of love1 according as ,god is the principle of his natural being4 ,but for him to turn to ,god as the object of supernatural beatitude1 comes of infused love1 from which he could be turned away by sinning4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will4 ,first1 when something evil is chosen2 as man sins by choosing adultery1 which is evil of itself4 ,such sin always comes of ignorance or error2 otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good4 ,the adulterer errs in the particular1 choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now1 from the inclination of passion or of habit2 even though he does not err in his universal judgment1 but retains a right opinion in this respect4 ,in this way there can be no sin in the angel2 because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect1 as is manifest from what has been said above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d72 nor1 again1 could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin4 ,in another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself1 but not according to proper measure or rule2 so that the defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated1 but not on the part of the thing chosen2 as if one were to pray1 without heeding the order established by the ,church4 ,such a sin does not presuppose ignorance1 but merely absence of consideration of the things which ought to be considered4 ,in this way the angel sinned1 by seeking his own good1 from his own free-will1 insubordinately to the rule of the ,divine will4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,only the ,sin of ,pride and ,envy ,can ,exist in an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy4 ,because whosoever can delight in any kind of sin1 can fall into the sin itself4 ,but the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #c74 ,therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as pride and envy are spiritual sins1 so are sloth1 avarice1 and anger4 ,but spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit1 just as carnal sins are with the flesh4 ,therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels2 but likewise sloth and avarice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxi71 many vices spring from pride2 and in like manner from envy4 ,but1 if the cause is granted1 the effect follows4 ,if1 therefore1 there can be pride and envy in the angels1 for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #c7 that the devil is not a fornicator nor a drunkard1 nor anything of the like sort2 yet he is proud and envious4 ,i answer that1 ,sin can exist in a subject in two ways3 first of all by actual guilt1 and secondly by affection4 ,as to guilt1 all sins are in the demons2 since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins4 ,but as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature4 ,now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies1 but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things2 because nothing is affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature4 ,but there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order2 unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept4 ,such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due4 ,consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride4 ,yet1 as a consequence1 it was possible for envy also to be in them1 since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary4 ,now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another1 inasmuch as he deems his neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own4 ,but another's good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel1 except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence1 which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other4 ,so1 after the sin of pride1 there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel1 whereby he grieved over man's good1 and also over the ,divine excellence1 according as against the devil's will ,god makes use of man for the ,divine glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh1 as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures3 it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins1 so far as these are hindrances to a man's good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,avarice1 considered as a special kind of sin1 is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life1 and which can be estimated in value of money2 to these demons are not at all inclined1 any more than they are to carnal pleasures4 ,consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them4 ,but if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice1 in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons4 ,anger implies passion1 and so does concupiscence2 consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons4 ,sloth is a kind of sadness1 whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body2 which does not apply to the demons4 ,so it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons2 yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion1 but for a will resisting the good of another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,under envy and pride1 as found in the demons1 are comprised all other sins derived from them4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,devil ,desired to ,be ,as ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the devil did not desire to be as ,god4 ,for what does not fall under apprehension1 does not fall under desire2 because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite1 whether sensible1 rational1 or intellectual2 and sin consists only in such desire4 ,but for any creature to be ,god's equal does not fall under apprehension1 because it implies a contradiction2 for it the finite equals the infinite1 then it would itself be infinite4 ,therefore an angel could not desire to be as ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the natural end can always be desired without sin4 ,but to be likened unto ,god is the end to which every creature naturally tends4 ,if1 therefore1 the angel desired to be as ,god1 not by equality1 but by likeness1 it would seem that he did not thereby sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man4 ,but no man1 save a fool1 ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel1 still less of ,god2 because choice regards only things which are possible1 regarding which one takes deliberation4 ,therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said1 in the person of the devil 7,isa4 #ad3ac1 #ad71 ,i will ascend into heaven 4 4 4 ,i will be like the ,most ,high4 ,and ,augustine 7,de ,qu4 ,vet4 ,test4 cxiii7 says that being inflated with pride1 he wished to be called ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as ,god4 ,but this can be understood in two ways3 first1 by equality2 secondly1 by likeness4 ,he could not seek to be as ,god in the first way2 because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible3 and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act1 nor any passion fettering his mind1 so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular2 as sometimes happens in ourselves4 ,and even supposing it were possible1 it would be against the natural desire2 because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature2 which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature4 ,consequently1 no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature2 just as an ass does not desire to be a horse3 for were it to be so upraised1 it would cease to be itself4 ,but herein the imagination plays us false2 for one is liable to think that1 because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals1 which can increase without the destruction of the subject1 he can also seek a higher grade of nature1 to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist4 ,now it is quite evident that ,god surpasses the angels1 not merely in accidentals1 but also in degree of nature2 and one angel1 another4 ,consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher2 and still more to covet equality with ,god4 ,to desire to be as ,god according to likeness can happen in two ways4 ,in one way1 as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto ,god4 ,and so1 if anyone desire in this way to be ,godlike1 he commits no sin2 provided that he desires such likeness in proper order1 that is to say1 that he may obtain it of ,god4 ,but he would sin were he to desire to be like unto ,god even in the right way1 as of his own1 and not of ,god's power4 ,in another way one may desire to be like unto ,god in some respect which is not natural to one2 as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth1 which is proper to ,god2 in which desire there would be sin4 ,it was in this way that the devil desired to be as ,god4 ,not that he desired to resemble ,god by being subject to no one else absolutely2 for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'2 since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under ,god4 ,but he desired resemblance with ,god in this respect--by desiring1 as his last end of beatitude1 something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature1 turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude1 which is attained by ,god's grace4 ,or1 if he desired as his last end that likeness of ,god which is bestowed by grace1 he sought to have it by the power of his own nature2 and not from ,divine assistance according to ,god's ordering4 ,this harmonizes with ,anselm's opinion1 who says 99,de casu diaboli1 iv4 that he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast4 ,these two views in a manner coincide2 because according to both1 he sought to have final beatitude of his own power1 whereas this is proper to ,god alone4 ,since1 then1 what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another1 it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others2 wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto ,god4 ,from this we have the answer to all the objections4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,any ,demons ,are ,naturally ,wicked8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that some demons are naturally wicked4 ,for ,porphyry says1 as quoted by ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #aa73 ,there is a class of demons of crafty nature1 pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead4 ,but to be deceitful is to be evil4 ,therefore some demons are naturally wicked4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the angels are created by ,god1 so are men4 ,but some men are naturally wicked1 of whom it is said 7,wis4 #ab3aj73 ,their malice is natural4 ,therefore some angels may be naturally wicked4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature3 thus the fox is naturally sly1 and the wolf naturally rapacious2 yet they are ,god's creatures4 ,therefore1 although the demons are ,god's creatures1 they may be naturally wicked4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the demons are not naturally wicked4 ,i answer that1 ,everything which exists1 so far as it exists and has a particular nature1 tends naturally towards some good2 since it comes from a good principle2 because the effect always reverts to its principle4 ,now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it2 thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things3 but with the universal good no evil can be connected4 ,if1 then1 there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good1 it can tend naturally to some evil2 not as evil1 but accidentally1 as connected with some good4 ,but if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general1 then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil4 ,now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general1 which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will4 ,hence1 since the demons are intellectual substances1 they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever2 consequently they cannot be naturally evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine rebukes ,porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful2 himself maintaining that they are not naturally so1 but of their own will4 ,now the reason why ,porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that1 as he contended1 demons are animals with a sensitive nature4 ,now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good1 with which evil may be connected4 ,in this way1 then1 it can have a natural inclination to evil2 yet only accidentally1 inasmuch as evil is connected with good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the malice of some men can be called natural1 either because of custom which is a second nature2 or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion1 as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful2 but not on the part of the intellectual nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods1 with which certain evils are connected2 thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit4 ,wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly1 since it is natural to him2 as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce1 as ,dionysius observes 7,de ,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,devil ,was ,wicked by the ,fault of ,his ,own ,will in the ,first ,instant of ,his ,creation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation4 ,for it is said of the devil 7,john #h3dd73 ,he was a murderer from the beginning4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ae71 the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time1 but merely in order of nature4 ,now according to him 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h71 the heaven1 which is said to have been created in the beginning1 signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed3 and when it is said that ,god said3 ,be light made3 and light was made1 we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the ,word4 ,consequently1 the nature of the angel was created1 and light was made1 in the one instant4 ,but at the same moment that light was made1 it was made distinct from darkness1 whereby the angels who sinned are denoted4 ,therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed1 and some sinned4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin is opposed to merit4 ,but some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation2 as the soul of ,christ1 or also the good angels4 ,therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature4 ,but a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation2 as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced4 ,therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation4 ,now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate4 ,if ordinate1 then1 since he had grace1 he thereby merited beatitude4 ,but with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit2 as was said above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #e74 ,consequently they would have become blessed at once2 and so would never have sinned1 which is false4 ,it remains1 then1 that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3ca73 ,god saw all the things that ,he had made1 and they were very good4 ,but among them were also the demons4 ,therefore the demons were at some time good4 ,i answer that1 ,some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation2 not by their nature1 but by the sin of their own will2 because1 as soon as he was made1 the devil refused righteousness4 ,to this opinion1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #ac71 if anyone subscribes1 he does not agree with those ,manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil of itself4 ,since this opinion1 however1 is in contradiction with the authority of ,scripture--for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of ,babylon 7,isa4 #ad3ab73 ,how art thou fallen 4 4 4 ,o ,lucifer1 who didst rise in the morning6 and it is said to the devil in the person of the ,king of ,tyre 7,ezech4 #bh3ac73 ,thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of ,god1--consequently1 this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous4 ,hence others have said that the angels1 in the first instant of their creation1 could have sinned1 but did not4 ,yet this view also is repudiated by some1 because1 when two operations follow one upon the other1 it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant4 ,now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to his creation4 ,but the term of the creative act is the angel's very being1 while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked4 ,it seems1 then1 an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence4 ,this argument1 however1 does not satisfy4 ,for it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time1 and take place successively2 thus1 if local movement follows a change1 then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant4 ,but if the changes are instantaneous1 then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change2 thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun1 the atmosphere is lit up by the moon4 ,now1 it is manifest that creation is instantaneous2 so also is the movement of free-will in the angels2 for1 as has been already stated1 they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c74 ,consequently1 there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant4 ,we must therefore reply that1 on the contrary1 it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will4 ,for although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence1 nevertheless1 that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature2 just as upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause4 ,therefore1 if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause1 which can be the cause of a defective action1 it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation2 just as the leg1 which is defective from birth1 through a defect in the principle of generation1 begins at once to limp4 ,but the agent which brought the angels into existence1 namely1 ,god1 cannot be the cause of sin4 ,consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #ae71 when it is stated that the devil sins from the beginning1 he is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created1 but from the beginning of sin3 that is to say1 because he never went back from his sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that distinction of light and darkness1 whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness1 must be taken as according to ,god's foreknowledge4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #ae71 that ,he alone could discern light and darkness1 ,who also could foreknow1 before they fell1 those who would fall4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all that is in merit is from ,god2 and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation4 ,the same reason does not hold good of sin2 as has been said4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,god did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them1 and the turning of others to ,himself1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #ae74 ,therefore1 as all were created in grace1 all merited in their first instant4 ,but some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude1 thereby destroying their preceding merit2 and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,there ,was ,any ,interval ,between the ,creation and the ,fall of the ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there was some interval between the angel's creation and his fall4 ,for1 it is said 7,ezech4 #bh3ae73 ,thou didst walk perfect 99,vulg43 ',thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire2 thou wast perfect 4 4 4' in thy ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee4 ,but since walking is continuous movement1 it requires an interval4 ,therefore there was some interval between the devil's creation and his fall4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,origen says 7,hom4 i in ,ezech47 that the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly2 which refers to his sin4 ,therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel4 ,but there was some delay between man's formation and his sin4 ,therefore1 for the like reason there was some interval between the devil's formation and his sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created4 ,but there is a middle time between every two instants4 ,therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said of the devil 7,john #h3dd73 ,he stood not in the truth3 and1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #ae71 we must understand this in the sense1 that he was in the truth1 but did not remain in it4 ,i answer that1 ,there is a twofold opinion on this point4 ,but the more probable one1 which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the ,saints1 is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation4 ,this must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation1 and that he was created in grace2 as we have said 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,for since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act1 as was said above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #e71 if the devil1 created in grace1 merited in the first instant1 he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant1 if he had not placed an impediment by sinning4 ,if1 however1 it be contended that the angel was not created in grace1 or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant1 then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sometimes in ,holy ,scripture spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by time4 ,in this way by walking we are to understand the movement of free-will tending towards good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,origen says1 ,the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly1 because of the first instant in which he was not wicked4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing2 consequently1 if after the first instant1 in which he had a natural movement to good1 he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude1 he would have been confirmed in good4 ,it is not so with man2 and therefore the argument does not hold good4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,it is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants1 so far as time is continuous1 as it is proved ,phys4 vi1 text4 #b4 ,but in the angels1 who are not subject to the heavenly movement1 which is primarily measured by continuous time1 time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts1 or of their affections4 ,so the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind1 whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned1 but not morning4 ,this operation was good in them all4 ,from such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the ,word by their morning knowledge while others1 absorbed in themselves1 became night1 swelling up with pride1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bd74 ,hence the first act was common to them all2 but in their second they were separated4 ,consequently they were all of them good in the first instant2 but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,highest ,angel ,among ,those ,who ,sinned ,was the ,highest of ,all8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all4 ,for it is stated 7,ezech4 #bh3ad73 ,thou wast a cherub stretched out1 and protecting1 and ,i set thee in the holy mountain of ,god4 ,now the order of the ,cherubim is under the order of the ,seraphim1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vi1 vii74 ,therefore1 the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude4 ,if therefore the highest of the angels sinned1 it follows that the ,divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is unfitting4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more a subject is inclined towards anything1 so much the less can it fall away from it4 ,but the higher an angel is1 so much the more is he inclined towards ,god4 ,therefore so much the less can he turn away from ,god by sinning4 ,and so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all1 but one of the lower angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,ev47 says that the chief angel who sinned1 being set over all the hosts of angels1 surpassed them in brightness1 and was by comparison the most illustrious among them4 ,i answer that1 ,two things have to be considered in sin1 namely1 the proneness to sin1 and the motive for sinning4 ,if1 then1 in the angels we consider the proneness to sin1 it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower4 ,on this account ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii71 that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order4 ,this opinion seems to agree with the view of the ,platonists1 which ,augustine quotes 7,de ,civ4 ,dei vii1 #f1 #g2 x1 #i1 #aj1 #aa74 ,for they said that all the gods were good2 whereas some of the demons were good1 and some bad2 naming as 'gods' the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere1 and calling by the name of demons the intellectual substances which are beneath it1 yet higher than men in the order of nature4 ,nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith2 because the whole corporeal creation is governed by ,god through the angels1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d1e74 ,consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies1 the higher over the higher bodies2 and the highest to stand before ,god4 ,and in this sense ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels2 yet in that order some of them remained good4 ,but if the motive for sinning be considered1 we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower4 ,for1 as has been said 7,a4 #b71 the demons' sin was pride2 and the motive of pride is excellence1 which was greater in the higher spirits4 ,hence ,gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all4 ,this seems to be the more probable view3 because the angels' sin did not come of any proneness1 but of free choice alone4 ,consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning4 ,yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view2 because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,cherubim is interpreted fulness of knowledge1 while ,seraphim means those who are on fire1 or who set on fire4 ,consequently ,cherubim is derived from knowledge2 which is compatible with mortal sin2 but ,seraphim is derived from the heat of charity1 which is incompatible with mortal sin4 ,therefore the first angel who sinned is called1 not a ,seraph1 but a ,cherub4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin1 or in those who are saved2 for ,god knows beforehand the end of both2 and ,he procures glory from both1 saving these of ,his goodness1 and punishing those of ,his justice4 ,but the intellectual creature1 when it sins1 falls away from its due end4 ,nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature2 because the intellectual creature was so made by ,god1 that it lies within its own will to act for its end4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,however great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel1 there was no necessity imposed upon him3 consequently it was in his power not to follow it4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,sin of the ,highest ,angel ,was the ,cause of the ,others ,sinning8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning4 ,for the cause precedes the effect4 ,but1 as ,damascene observes 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii71 they all sinned at one time4 ,therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others' sinning4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an angel's first sin can only be pride1 as was shown above 7,a4 #b74 ,but pride seeks excellence4 ,now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior2 and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to ,god4 ,yet the sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning1 if he had induced them to be his subjects4 ,therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against ,god1 than to wish to be over another against ,god2 because there is less motive for sinning4 ,if1 therefore1 the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning1 in that he induced them to subject themselves to him1 then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one2 which is contrary to a gloss on ,ps4 #ajc3bf3 ,this dragon which ,thou hast formed--,he who was the more excellent than the rest in nature1 became the greater in malice4 ,therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,apoc4 #ab3d7 that the dragon drew with him the third part of the stars of heaven4 ,i answer that1 ,the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning2 not as compelling them1 but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation4 ,a token thereof appears in this1 that all the demons are subjects of that highest one2 as is evident from our ,lord's words3 ,go ,vulg4 ',depart from ,me'1 you cursed1 into everlasting fire1 which was prepared for the devil and his angels 7,matt4 #be3da74 ,for the order of ,divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil suggestion1 shall be subjected to him in his punishment2 according to 7#b ,pet4 #b3ai73 ,by whom a man is overcome1 of the same also he is the slave4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the demons all sinned in the one instant1 yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning4 ,for the angel needs no delay of time for choice1 exhortation1 or consent1 as man1 who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent1 and vocal speech in order to exhort2 both of which are the work of time4 ,and it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought2 and in the last instant of speech1 another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said2 as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts1 which everyone accepts directly they are heard 99,boethius1 ,de ,hebdom44 ,taking away1 then1 the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us2 in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech1 it was possible for the others to consent thereto4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,other things being equal1 the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior4 ,yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior1 if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior4 ,consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule2 for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader1 so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers2 especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as was observed above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #f71 an angel has nothing in him to retard his action1 and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved1 be it good or bad4 ,consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels1 he fell into sin with intenser energy1 and therefore he became the greater in malice4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fc1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,those ,who ,sinned ,were ,as ,many ,as ,those ,who ,remained ,firm8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm4 ,for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #f73 ,evil is in many1 but good is in few4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels4 ,but there are more wicked men to be found than good2 according to ,eccles4 #a3ae3 ,the number of fools is infinite4 ,therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders4 ,therefore if more angelic persons stood firm1 it would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7#d ,kings #f3af73 ,there are more with us than with them3 which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid us1 and the wicked spirits who are our foes4 ,i answer that1 ,more angels stood firm than sinned4 ,because sin is contrary to the natural inclination2 while that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency2 for nature procures its effects either always1 or more often than not4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking with regard to men1 in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures1 which are known to most men1 and from forsaking the good dictated by reason1 which good is known to the few4 ,in the angels there is only an intellectual nature2 hence the argument does not hold4 ,and from this we have the answer to the second difficulty4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels1 who are set over earthly affairs1 it is evident that some of every order did not fall1 but only those of the lowest order4 ,according to those who maintain that the chief devil was of the highest order1 it is probable that some fell of every order2 just as men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin4 ,in this view the liberty of free-will is more established2 which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil4 ,in the ,sacred ,scripture1 however1 the names of some orders1 as of ,seraphim and ,thrones1 are not attributed to demons2 since they are derived from the ardor of love and from ,god's indwelling1 which are not consistent with mortal sin4 ,yet the names of ,cherubim1 ,powers1 and ,principalities are attributed to them2 because these names are derived from knowledge and from power1 which can be common to both good and bad4 ,,question #fd ,,the ,,punishment ,,of ,,the ,,demons 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,it now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons2 under which heading there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,of their darkness of intellect2 7#b7 ,of their obstinacy of will2 7#c7 ,of their grief2 7#d7 ,of their place of punishment4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,demons' ,intellect ,is ,darkened by ,privation of the ,knowledge of ,all ,truth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth4 ,for if they knew any truth at all1 they would most of all know themselves2 which is to know separated substances4 ,but this is not in keeping with their unhappiness3 for this seems to belong to great happiness1 insomuch as that some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge of the separated substances4 ,therefore the demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is most manifest in its nature1 seems to be specially manifest to the angels1 whether good or bad4 ,that the same is not manifest with regard to ourselves1 comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms2 as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun4 ,but the demons cannot know ,god1 ,who is most manifest of ,himself1 because ,he is the sovereign truth2 and this is because they are not clean of heart1 whereby alone can ,god be seen4 ,therefore neither can they know other things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bb71 the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold2 namely1 morning and evening4 ,but the demons have no morning knowledge1 because they do not see things in the ,word2 nor have they the evening knowledge1 because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the ,creator's praise 7hence1 after evening comes morning ,gen4 #a74 ,therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of ,god1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #ai2 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xi74 ,but the demons are deprived of such knowledge3 for if they had known it1 they would never have crucified the ,lord of glory1 as is said #a ,cor4 #b3h4 ,therefore1 for the same reason1 they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whatever truth anyone knows is known either naturally1 as we know first principles2 or by deriving it from someone else1 as we know by learning2 or by long experience1 as the things we learn by discovery4 ,now1 the demons cannot know the truth by their own nature1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #cc71 the good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness2 and every manifestation is made through light1 as is said ,eph4 #e3ac4 ,in like manner they cannot learn by revelation1 nor by learning from the good angels3 because there is no fellowship of light with darkness 99,vulg43 ',what fellowship hath 4 4 4 8' 7#b ,cor4 #f3ad74 ,nor can they learn by long experience3 because experience comes of the senses4 ,consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that1 certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which1 we say1 have not been changed at all1 but remain entire and most brilliant4 ,now1 the knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts4 ,consequently there is some knowledge of truth in them4 ,i answer that1 ,the knowledge of truth is twofold3 one which comes of nature1 and one which comes of grace4 ,the knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold3 the first is purely speculative1 as when ,divine secrets are imparted to an individual2 the other is effective1 and produces love for ,god2 which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom4 ,of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor lessened in the demons4 ,for it follows from the very nature of the angel1 who1 according to his nature1 is an intellect or mind3 since on account of the simplicity of his substance1 nothing can be withdrawn from his nature1 so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers1 as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else4 ,therefore ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the natural gifts remain entire in them4 ,consequently their natural knowledge was not diminished4 ,the second kind of knowledge1 however1 which comes of grace1 and consists in speculation1 has not been utterly taken away from them1 but lessened2 because1 of these ,divine secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary2 and that is done either by means of the angels1 or through some temporal workings of ,divine power1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #ba72 but not in the same degree as to the holy angels1 to whom many more things are revealed1 and more fully1 in the ,word ,himself4 ,but of the third knowledge1 as likewise of charity1 they are utterly deprived4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,happiness consists in self-application to something higher4 ,the separated substances are above us in the order of nature2 hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances1 although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the first substance1 namely1 ,god4 ,but it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another2 as it is natural for us to know sensible natures4 ,hence1 as man's happiness does not consist in knowing sensible natures2 so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect2 and not merely because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms4 ,now the ,divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect1 but even of the angelic4 ,consequently1 not even an angel can of his own nature know ,god's substance4 ,yet on account of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of ,god than man can have4 ,such knowledge of ,god remains also in the demons4 ,although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace1 nevertheless they have purity of nature2 and this suffices for the knowledge of ,god which belongs to them from their nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the ,divine light2 and therefore the creature's knowledge in its own nature is called evening knowledge4 ,for the evening is akin to darkness1 yet it possesses some light3 but when the light fails utterly1 then it is night4 ,so then the knowledge of things in their own nature1 when referred to the praise of the ,creator1 as it is in the good angels1 has something of the ,divine light1 and can be called evening knowledge2 but if it be not referred to ,god1 as is the case with the demons1 it is not called evening1 but nocturnal knowledge4 ,accordingly we read in ,gen4 #a3e that the darkness1 which ,god separated from the light1 ,he called night4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of ,god's kingdom1 which found its completion in ,christ2 and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the ,word1 which vision the demons never had4 ,yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it2 hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the ,incarnation1 when ,christ was in the world4 ,for1 as ,augustine observes 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #ba71 ,it was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels1 who enjoy a participated eternity of the ,word2 but it was made known by some temporal effects1 so as to strike terror into them4 ,for had they fully and certainly known that ,he was the ,son of ,god and the effect of ,his passion1 they would never have procured the crucifixion of the ,lord of glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the demons know a truth in three ways3 first of all by the subtlety of their nature2 for although they are darkened by privation of the light of grace1 yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature3 secondly1 by revelation from the holy angels2 for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will1 they do agree1 nevertheless1 by their likeness of intellectual nature1 according to which they can accept what is manifested by others3 thirdly1 they know by long experience2 not as deriving it from the senses2 but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed in individual things1 they know some things as present1 which they previously did not know would come to pass1 as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #c74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,will of the ,demons ,is ,obstinate in ,evil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil4 ,for liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being1 which nature remains in the demons1 as we said above 7,a4 #a74 ,but liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil4 ,therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since ,god's mercy is infinite1 it is greater than the demons' malice1 which is finite4 ,but no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through ,god's mercy4 ,therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of justice4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the demons have a will obstinate in evil1 then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell4 ,but that sin1 namely1 pride1 is in them no longer2 because the motive for the sin no longer endures1 namely1 excellence4 ,therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 iv7 that man can be reinstated by another1 since he fell through another4 ,but1 as was observed already 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #h71 the lower demons fell through the highest one4 ,therefore their fall can be repaired by another4 ,consequently they are not obstinate in malice4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whoever is obstinate in malice1 never performs any good work4 ,but the demon performs some good works3 for he confesses the truth1 saying to ,christ3 ,i know ,who ,thou art1 the holy one of ,god 7,mark #a3bd74 ,the demons also believe and tremble 7,james #b3ai74 ,and ,dionysius observes 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 that they desire what is good and best1 which is1 to be1 to live1 to understand4 ,therefore they are not obstinate in malice4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #gc3bc73 ,the pride of them that hate ,thee1 ascendeth continually2 and this is understood of the demons4 ,therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice4 ,i answer that1 ,it was ,origen's opinion 99,peri ,archon i4 #f that every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good and evil2 with the exception of the soul of ,christ on account of the union of the ,word4 ,such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude1 because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude2 hence it is termed life everlasting4 ,it is also contrary to the authority of ,sacred ,scripture1 which declares that demons and wicked men shall be sent into everlasting punishment1 and the good brought into everlasting life4 ,consequently such an opinion must be considered erroneous2 while according to ,catholic ,faith1 it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good1 and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil4 ,we must seek for the cause of this obstinacy1 not in the gravity of the sin1 but in the condition of their nature or state4 ,for as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii71 death is to men1 what the fall is to the angels4 ,now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men1 grave or less grave1 are pardonable before death2 whereas after death they are without remission and endure for ever4 ,to find the cause1 then1 of this obstinacy1 it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the apprehensive1 whereby it is moved1 as the movable by its mover4 ,for the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good2 while the will seeks the universal good1 as was said above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #a72 as also the sense apprehends particular objects1 while the intellect considers universals4 ,now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this respect1 that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably1 as we apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit of intelligence2 whereas man by his reason apprehends movably1 passing from one consideration to another2 and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites4 ,consequently man's will adheres to a thing movably1 and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite2 whereas the angel's will adheres fixedly and immovably4 ,therefore1 if his will be considered before its adhesion1 it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite 7namely1 in such things as he does not will naturally72 but after he has once adhered1 he clings immovably4 ,so it is customary to say that man's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice2 but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before the choice1 but not after4 ,therefore the good angels who adhered to justice1 were confirmed therein2 whereas the wicked ones1 sinning1 are obstinate in sin4 ,later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned 7,suppl41 ,q4 #ih1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the good and wicked angels have free-will1 but according to the manner and condition of their state1 as has been said4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god's mercy delivers from sin those who repent4 ,but such as are not capable of repenting1 cling immovably to sin1 and are not delivered by the ,divine mercy4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the devil's first sin still remains in him according to desire2 although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he desired4 ,even so1 if a man were to believe that he can commit murder1 and wills to commit it1 and afterwards the power is taken from him2 nevertheless1 the will to murder can stay with him1 so that he would he had done it1 or still would do it if he could4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the fact that man sinned from another's suggestion1 is not the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable4 ,consequently the argument does not hold good4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,a demon's act is twofold4 ,one comes of deliberate will2 and this is properly called his own act4 ,such an act on the demon's part is always wicked2 because1 although at times he does something good1 yet he does not do it well2 as when he tells the truth in order to deceive2 and when he believes and confesses1 yet not willingly1 but compelled by the evidence of things4 ,another kind of act is natural to the demon2 this can be good and bears witness to the goodness of nature4 ,yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is ,sorrow in the ,demons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons4 ,for since sorrow and joy are opposites1 they cannot be together in the same subject4 ,but there is joy in the demons3 for ,augustine writing against the ,maniches 7,de ,gen4 ,contra ,manich4 ii1 #ag7 says3 ,the devil has power over them who despise ,god's commandments1 and he rejoices over this sinister power4 ,therefore there is no sorrow in the demons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sorrow is the cause of fear1 for those things cause fear while they are future1 which cause sorrow when they are present4 ,but there is no fear in the demons1 according to ,job #da3bd1 ,who was made to fear no one4 ,therefore there is no grief in the demons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is a good thing to be sorry for evil4 ,but the demons can do no good action4 ,therefore they cannot be sorry1 at least for the evil of sin2 which applies to the worm of conscience4 ,on the contrary1 ,the demon's sin is greater than man's sin4 ,but man is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin1 according to ,apoc4 #ah3g1 ,as much as she hath glorified herself1 and lived in delicacies1 so much torment and sorrow give ye to her4 ,consequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow1 because he especially glorified himself4 ,i answer that1 ,fear1 sorrow1 joy1 and the like1 so far as they are passions1 cannot exist in the demons2 for thus they are proper to the sensitive appetite1 which is a power in a corporeal organ4 ,according1 however1 as they denote simple acts of the will1 they can be in the demons4 ,and it must be said that there is sorrow in them2 because sorrow1 as denoting a simple act of the will1 is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is1 or to what is not4 ,now it is evident that the demons would wish many things not to be1 which are1 and others to be1 which are not3 for1 out of envy1 they would wish others to be damned1 who are saved4 ,consequently1 sorrow must be said to exist in them3 and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will4 ,moreover1 they are deprived of happiness1 which they desire naturally2 and their wicked will is curbed in many respects4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites1 but not about different things4 ,hence there is nothing to hinder a man from being sorry for one thing1 and joyful for another2 especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will2 because1 not merely in different things1 but even in one and the same thing1 there can be something that we will1 and something that we will not4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as there is sorrow in the demons over present evil1 so also there is fear of future evil4 ,now when it is said1 ,he was made to fear no one1 this is to be understood of the fear of ,god which restrains from sin4 ,for it is written elsewhere that the devils believe and tremble 7,james #b3ai74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will1 to which the evil of sin is opposed4 ,but to be sorry for the evil of punishment1 or for the evil of sin on account of the punishment1 bears witness to the goodness of nature1 to which the evil of punishment is opposed4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ac71 that sorrow for good lost by punishment1 is the witness to a good nature4 ,consequently1 since the demon has a perverse and obstinate will1 he is not sorry for the evil of sin4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,our ,atmosphere ,is the ,demons' ,place of ,punishment8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons' place of punishment4 ,for a demon is a spiritual nature4 ,but a spiritual nature is not affected by place4 ,therefore there is no place of punishment for demons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man's sin is not graver than the demons'4 ,but man's place of punishment is hell4 ,much more1 therefore1 is it the demons' place of punishment2 and consequently not the darksome atmosphere4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the demons are punished with the pain of fire4 ,but there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere4 ,therefore the darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iii1 #aj71 that the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day4 ,i answer that1 ,the angels in their own nature stand midway between ,god and men4 ,now the order of ,divine providence so disposes1 that it procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior4 ,but man's welfare is disposed by ,divine providence in two ways3 first of all1 directly1 when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil2 and this is fittingly done through the good angels4 ,in another way1 indirectly1 as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against opposition4 ,it was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits1 lest they should cease to be of service in the natural order4 ,consequently a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons3 one1 by reason of their sin1 and this is hell2 and another1 in order that they may tempt men1 and thus the darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment4 ,now the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day3 consequently1 the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons endure until then4 ,hence until then the good angels are sent to us here2 and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial3 although some of them are even now in hell1 to torment those whom they have led astray2 just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven4 ,but after the judgment day all the wicked1 both men and angels1 will be in hell1 and the good in heaven4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it1 but as affecting the will by saddening it3 because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one soul is not set over another in the order of nature1 as the demons are over men in the order of nature2 consequently there is no parallel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day3 and that the beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day4 ,but this is erroneous1 and contrary to the teaching of the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #e3a73 ,if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved1 we have a house in heaven4 ,others1 again1 while not admitting the same of souls1 admit it as to demons4 ,but it is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels1 even as on good souls and good angels4 ,consequently1 it must be said that1 although a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels1 yet their glory is not lessened by their coming to us1 for they consider that place to be their own2 in the same way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not actually sitting on his throne4 ,in like manner it must be said1 that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere1 nevertheless their punishment is none the less2 because they know that such confinement is their due4 ,hence it is said in a gloss upon ,james #c3f3 ,they carry fire of hell with them wherever they go4 ,nor is this contrary to what is said 7,luke #h3ca71 ,they besought the ,lord not to cast them into the abyss2 for they asked for this1 deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men4 ,hence it is stated1 ,they ,vulg4 ',he' besought ,him that ,he would not expel them ,vulg4 'him' out of the country 7,mark #e3aj74 ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,the ,,six ,,days 7,,qq4 #fe-gd7 ,,question #fe ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,creation ,,of ,,corporeal ,,creatures 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,from the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures1 in the production of which1 as ,holy ,scripture makes mention1 three works are found1 namely1 the work of creation1 as given in the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth2 the work of distinction as given in the words1 ,he divided the light from the darkness1 and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament2 and the work of adornment1 expressed thus1 ,let there be lights in the firmament4 ,first1 then1 we must consider the work of creation2 secondly1 the work of distinction2 and thirdly1 the work of adornment4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether corporeal creatures are from ,god8 7#b7 ,whether they were created on account of ,god's goodness8 7#c7 ,whether they were created by ,god through the medium of the angels8 7#d7 ,whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from ,god4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,corporeal ,creatures ,are from ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that corporeal creatures are not from ,god4 ,for it is said 7,eccles4 #c3ad73 ,i have learned that all the works which ,god hath made1 continue for ever4 ,but visible bodies do not continue for ever1 for it is said 7#b ,cor4 #d3ah73 ,the things which are seen are temporal1 but the things which are not seen are eternal4 ,therefore ,god did not make visible bodies4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is said 7,gen4 #a3ca73 ,god saw all things that ,he had made1 and they were very good4 ,but corporeal creatures are evil1 since we find them harmful in many ways2 as may be seen in serpents1 in the sun's heat1 and other things4 ,now a thing is called evil1 in so far as it is harmful4 ,corporeal creatures1 therefore1 are not from ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is from ,god does not withdraw us from ,god1 but leads us to ,him4 ,but corporeal creatures withdraw us from ,god4 ,hence the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #d3ah73 ,while we look not at the things which are seen4 ,corporeal creatures1 therefore1 are not from ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #ade3f73 ,who made heaven and earth1 the sea1 and all things that are in them4 ,i answer that1 ,certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good ,god1 but by an evil principle1 and allege in proof of their error the words of the ,apostle 7#b ,cor4 #d3d71 ,the god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers4 ,but this position is altogether untenable4 ,for1 if things that differ agree in some point1 there must be some cause for that agreement1 since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves4 ,hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found1 it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause1 as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire4 ,but being is found to be common to all things1 however otherwise different4 ,there must1 therefore1 be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being1 whether they are invisible and spiritual1 or visible and corporeal4 ,but the devil is called the god of this world1 not as having created it1 but because worldlings serve him1 of whom also the ,apostle says1 speaking in the same sense1 ,whose god is their belly 7,phil4 #c3ai74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the creatures of ,god in some respects continue for ever1 at least as to matter1 since what is created will never be annihilated1 even though it be corruptible4 ,and the nearer a creature approaches ,god1 ,who is immovable1 the more it also is immovable4 ,for corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter1 though they change as regards their substantial form4 ,but incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance1 though they are mutable in other respects1 such as place1 for instance1 the heavenly bodies2 or the affections1 as spiritual creatures4 ,but the ,apostle's words1 ,the things which are seen are temporal1 though true even as regards such things considered in themselves 7in so far as every visible creature is subject to time1 either as to being or as to movement71 are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards4 ,for such rewards1 as consist in these visible things1 are temporal2 while those that are invisible endure for ever4 ,hence he said before 7#b ,cor4 #d3ag73 ,it worketh for us 4 4 4 an eternal weight of glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,corporeal creatures according to their nature are good1 though this good is not universal1 but partial and limited1 the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities1 though each quality is good in itself4 ,to those1 however1 who estimate things1 not by the nature thereof1 but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom1 everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil4 ,for they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person1 to another is beneficial1 and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects1 but good in others4 ,and this could not be1 if bodies were essentially evil and harmful4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from ,god1 but lead us to ,him2 for the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made 7,rom4 #a3bj74 ,if1 then1 they withdraw men from ,god1 it is the fault of those who use them foolishly4 ,thus it is said 7,wis4 #ad3aa73 ,creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise4 ,and the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from ,god proves that they came from ,him1 for they cannot lead the foolish away from ,god except by the allurements of some good that they have from ,him4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,corporeal ,things ,were ,made on ,account of ,god's ,goodness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of ,god's goodness4 ,for it is said 7,wis4 #a3ad7 that ,god created all things that they might be4 ,therefore all things were created for their own being's sake1 and not on account of ,god's goodness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 good has the nature of an end2 therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good4 ,but spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures1 as the greater good to the lesser4 ,corporeal creatures1 therefore1 are created for the sake of spiritual creatures1 and not on account of ,god's goodness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal4 ,now ,god is just3 therefore inequality not created by ,god must precede all inequality created by ,him4 ,but an inequality not created by ,god can only arise from free-will1 and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will4 ,now1 corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures4 ,therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will1 and not on account of ,god's goodness4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,prov4 #af3d73 ,the ,lord hath made all things for ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,origen laid down 99,peri ,archon ii4 that corporeal creatures were not made according to ,god's original purpose1 but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures4 ,for he maintained that ,god in the beginning made spiritual creatures only1 and all of equal nature2 but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to ,god1 and1 according to the measure of their conversion1 were given a higher or a lower rank1 retaining their simplicity2 while others turned from ,god1 and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away4 ,but this position is erroneous4 ,in the first place1 because it is contrary to ,scripture1 which1 after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures1 subjoins1 ,god saw that it was good 7,gen4 #a71 as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be4 ,but according to ,origen's opinion1 the corporeal creature was made1 not because it was good that it should be1 but that the evil in another might be punished4 ,secondly1 because it would follow that the arrangement1 which now exists1 of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance4 ,for it the sun's body was made what it is1 that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature1 it would follow1 if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created1 that many suns would exist in the world2 and so of other things4 ,but such a consequence is altogether inadmissible4 ,hence we must set aside this theory as false1 and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures1 as a whole consists of its parts4 ,now if we wish to assign an end to any whole1 and to the parts of that whole1 we shall find1 first1 that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act1 as the eye for the act of seeing2 secondly1 that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable1 as the senses for the intellect1 the lungs for the heart2 and1 thirdly1 that all parts are for the perfection of the whole1 as the matter for the form1 since the parts are1 as it were1 the matter of the whole4 ,furthermore1 the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end1 that end being the fruition of ,god4 ,so1 therefore1 in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection1 and the less noble for the nobler1 as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man1 whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe4 ,furthermore1 the entire universe1 with all its parts1 is ordained towards ,god as its end1 inasmuch as it imitates1 as it were1 and shows forth the ,divine goodness1 to the glory of ,god4 ,reasonable creatures1 however1 have in some special and higher manner ,god as their end1 since they can attain to ,him by their own operations1 by knowing and loving ,him4 ,thus it is plain that the ,divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the very fact of any creature possessing being1 it represents the ,divine being and ,its goodness4 ,and1 therefore1 that ,god created all things1 that they might have being1 does not exclude that ,he created them for ,his own goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end4 ,therefore that corporeal creatures were1 in a manner1 made for the sake of the spiritual1 does not prevent their being made on account of ,god's goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,equality of justice has its place in retribution1 since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit4 ,but this does not apply to things as at first instituted4 ,for just as an architect1 without injustice1 places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building1 not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones1 but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building1 which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones2 even so1 ,god from the beginning1 to secure perfection in the universe1 has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures1 according to ,his wisdom1 and without injustice1 since no diversity of merit is presupposed4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,corporeal ,creatures ,were ,produced by ,god ,through the ,medium of the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by ,god through the medium of the angels4 ,for1 as all things are governed by the ,divine wisdom1 so by it were all things made1 according to ,ps4 #ajc3bd3 ,thou hast made all things in wisdom4 ,but it belongs to wisdom to ordain1 as stated in the beginning of the ,metaphysics 7i1 #b74 ,hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d74 ,therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual1 as the lower by the higher4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 diversity of effects shows diversity of causes1 since like always produces like4 ,if then all creatures1 both spiritual and corporeal1 were produced immediately by ,god1 there would be no diversity in creatures1 for one would not be further removed from ,god than another4 ,but this is clearly false2 for the ,philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from ,god 7,de ,gen4 et ,corrup4 ii1 text4 #ei74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect4 ,but every corporeal thing is finite4 ,therefore1 it could be1 and was1 produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures3 for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible3 especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature1 unless it be in punishment of a fault4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3a73 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth2 by which are understood corporeal creatures4 ,these1 therefore1 were produced immediately by ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,some have maintained that creatures proceeded from ,god by degrees1 in such a way that the first creature proceeded from ,him immediately1 and in its turn produced another1 and so on until the production of corporeal creatures4 ,but this position is untenable1 since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation1 by which matter itself is produced3 for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect3 and it is impossible that anything should be created1 save by ,god alone4 ,in proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause1 the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends4 ,now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it2 thus1 being is more universal than living1 living than understanding1 matter than form4 ,the more widely1 then1 one thing underlies others1 the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause4 ,thus the thing that underlies primarily all things1 belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause4 ,therefore no secondary cause can produce anything1 unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause4 ,but creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance1 nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created4 ,hence it remains that nothing can create except ,god alone1 ,who is the first cause4 ,therefore1 in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by ,god1 ,moses said3 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the production of things an order exists1 but not such that one creature is created by another1 for that is impossible2 but rather such that by the ,divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god ,himself1 though one1 has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of ,his nature1 as has been shown above 7,q4 #ae1 ,a4 #b72 so that by ,his wisdom ,he is the cause of diverse things as known by ,him1 even as an artificer1 by apprehending diverse forms1 produces diverse works of art4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made1 but also by the manner of making it2 for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power1 in another by a lower4 ,but the production of finite things1 where nothing is presupposed as existing1 is the work of infinite power1 and1 as such1 can belong to no creature4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fe1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,forms of ,bodies ,are from the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,trin4 i73 ,from forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter4 ,but forms that are without matter are spiritual substances1 and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies4 ,therefore1 the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence4 ,but spiritual substances are forms essentially1 whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation4 ,therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies4 ,but the heavenly bodies give form to things here below1 for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption4 ,much more1 therefore1 are material forms derived from spiritual substances4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h73 ,we must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod1 but rather that it obeys ,god thus4 ,but corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form4 ,corporeal forms1 then1 are not from the angels1 but from ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,it was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances1 which we call the angels4 ,and there are two ways in which this has been stated4 ,for ,plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from1 and formed by1 forms immaterially subsisting1 by a kind of participation4 ,thus he held that there exists an immaterial man1 and an immaterial horse1 and so forth1 and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted1 in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms1 by a kind of assimilation1 or as he calls it1 participation 7,phaedo xlix74 ,and1 according to the ,platonists1 the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances2 for example1 that there is a single separate substance1 which is horse and the cause of all horses1 whilst above this is separate life1 or per se life1 as they term it1 which is the cause of all life1 and that above this again is that which they call being itself1 which is the cause of all being4 ,avicenna1 however1 and certain others1 have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist per se in matter1 but in the intellect only4 ,thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures 7called intelligences by them1 but angels by us7 proceed all the forms of corporeal matter1 as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman4 ,this theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times1 who say that ,god indeed created all things1 but that the devil formed corporeal matter1 and differentiated it into species4 ,but all these opinions seem to have a common origin2 they all1 in fact1 sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being4 ,whereas1 as ,aristotle 7,metaph4 vii1 text4 #bf1 #bg1 #bh71 proves1 what is1 properly speaking1 made1 is the composite4 ,now1 such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not1 without being themselves generated or corrupted1 but by reason of the generation or corruption of the composite2 since even forms have not being1 but composites have being through forms3 for1 according to a thing's mode of being1 is the mode in which it is brought into being4 ,since1 then1 like is produced from like1 we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form1 but in something that is composite1 as this fire is generated by that fire4 ,corporeal forms1 therefore1 are caused1 not as emanations from some immaterial form1 but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent4 ,but since the composite agent1 which is a body1 is moved by a created spiritual substance1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d1 #e71 it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances1 not emanating from them1 but as the term of their movement4 ,and1 further still1 the species of the angelic intellect1 which are1 as it were1 the seminal types of corporeal forms1 must be referred to ,god as the first cause4 ,but in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place1 and accordingly1 the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately form ,god1 whose bidding alone matter obeys1 as its own proper cause4 ,to signify this1 ,moses prefaces each work with the words1 ,god said1 ,let this thing be1 or that1 to denote the formation of all things by the ,word of ,god1 from ,whom1 according to ,augustine 99,tract4 i4 in ,joan4 and ,gen4 ad lit4 i4 #d1 is all form and fitness and concord of parts4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by immaterial forms ,boethius understands the types of things in the mind of ,god4 ,thus the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #aa3c73 ,by faith we understand that the world was framed by the ,word of ,god2 that from invisible things visible things might be made4 ,but if by immaterial forms he understands the angels1 we say that from them come material forms1 not by emanation1 but by motion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,forms received into matter are to be referred1 not to self-subsisting forms of the same type1 as the ,platonists held1 but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect1 from which they proceed by movement1 or1 still higher1 to the types in the ,divine intellect1 by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things1 that they may be able to be brought by movement into act4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement1 not by emanation4 ,,question #ff ,,on ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,creation ,,towards ,,distinction 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must next consider the work of distinction2 first1 the ordering of creation towards distinction2 secondly1 the distinction itself4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation8 7#b7 ,whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same8 7#c7 ,whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter8 7#d7 ,whether time was created simultaneously with it8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #a ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation4 ,for it is said 7,gen4 #a3b73 ,the earth was void and empty1 or invisible and shapeless1 according to another version 99,septuagint2 by which is understood the formlessness of matter1 as ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii1 #ab74 ,therefore matter was formless until it received its form4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nature in its working imitates the working of ,god1 as a secondary cause imitates a first cause4 ,but in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time4 ,it does so1 therefore1 in the ,divine working4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 matter is higher than accident1 for matter is part of substance4 ,but ,god can effect that accident exist without substance1 as in the ,sacrament of the ,altar4 ,he could1 therefore1 cause matter to exist without form4 ,on the contrary1 ,an imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent4 ,but ,god is an agent absolutely perfect2 wherefore it is said of ,him 7,deut4 #cb3d73 ,the works of ,god are perfect4 ,therefore the work of ,his creation was at no time formless4 ,further1 the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction4 ,but confusion is opposed to distinction1 as formlessness to form4 ,if1 therefore1 formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter1 it follows that at the beginning confusion1 called by the ancients chaos1 existed in the corporeal creation4 ,i answer that1 ,on this point holy men differ in opinion4 ,augustine for instance 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ae71 believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation1 but only in origin or the order of nature1 whereas others1 as ,basil 7,hom4 ii ,in ,hexaem471 ,ambrose 7,in ,hexaem4 i71 and ,chrysostom 7,hom4 ii ,in ,gen471 hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation4 ,and although these opinions seem mutually contradictory1 in reality they differ but little2 for ,augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others4 ,in his sense it means the absence of all form1 and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction4 ,as to formation1 the argument is clear4 ,for if formless matter preceded in duration1 it already existed2 for this is implied by duration1 since the end of creation is being in act3 and act itself is a form4 ,to say1 then1 that matter preceded1 but without form1 is to say that being existed actually1 yet without act1 which is a contradiction in terms4 ,nor can it be said that it possessed some common form1 on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it4 ,for this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers1 who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act1 as fire1 air1 water1 or some intermediate substance4 ,hence1 it followed that to be made means merely to be changed2 for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being1 and made some particular thing to be1 it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being1 but 'this' actual being2 which is the proper effect of an accidental form4 ,thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents1 implying not generation1 but alteration4 ,hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless1 nor under any one common form1 but under distinct forms4 ,and so1 if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter1 which in itself is formless1 this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction1 but only in origin and nature1 as ,augustine says2 in the same way as potentiality is prior to act1 and the part to the whole4 ,but the other holy writers understand by formlessness1 not the exclusion of all form1 but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation4 ,accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration4 ,and so1 when this is considered1 it appears that ,augustine agrees with them in some respects1 and in others disagrees1 as will be shown later 7,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #b74 ,as far as may be gathered from the text of ,genesis a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures1 for which reason they are said to be without form4 ,for the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens1 whence it is said that darkness was upon the fact of the deep4 ,and the earth lacked beauty in two ways3 first1 that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn1 and so we read that the earth was void1 or invisible1 inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view2 secondly1 that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants1 for which reason it is called empty1 or1 according to another reading 99,septuagint1 shapeless--that is1 unadorned4 ,thus after mention of two created natures1 the heaven and the earth1 the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words1 darkness was upon the face of the deep1 since the air is included under heaven2 and the formlessness of the earth1 by the words1 the earth was void and empty4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the word earth is taken differently in this passage by ,augustine1 and by other writers4 ,augustine holds that by the words earth and water1 in this passage1 primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for ,moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people1 except under the similitude of well-known objects4 ,hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it1 calling it not water only1 nor earth only1 lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth4 ,at the same time it has so far a likeness to earth1 in that it is susceptible of form1 and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms4 ,in this respect1 then1 the earth is said to be void and empty1 or invisible and shapeless1 that matter is known by means of form4 ,hence1 considered in itself1 it is called invisible or void1 and its potentiality is completed by form2 thus ,plato says that matter is place 99,timaeus1 quoted by ,aristotle1 ,phys4 iv1 text4 #ae4 ,but other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth1 and we have said 7,a4 #a7 how1 in this sense1 the earth was1 according to them1 without form4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality2 and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time1 and formlessness precede form4 ,but ,god produces being in act out of nothing1 and can1 therefore1 produce a perfect thing in an instant1 according to the greatness of ,his power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,accident1 inasmuch as it is a form1 is a kind of act2 whereas matter1 as such1 is essentially being in potentiality4 ,hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form1 than for accident to be without subject4 ,in reply to the first argument in the contrary sense1 we say that if1 according to some holy writers1 formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter1 this arose1 not from want of power on ,god's part1 but from ,his wisdom1 and from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection4 ,in reply to the second argument1 we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction2 except ,anaxagoras1 who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture4 ,but previous to the work of distinction ,holy ,scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation1 the first being that of the heaven from the earth1 in which even a material distinction is expressed1 as will be shown later 7,a4 #c2 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #a74 ,this is signified by the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,the second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms1 since both earth and water are named4 ,that air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water1 to the ignorant people to whom ,moses spoke4 ,plato 7,timaeus xxvi71 nevertheless1 understood air to be signified by the words1 ,spirit of ,god1 since spirit is another name for air1 and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire1 for he held heaven to be composed of fire1 as ,augustine relates 7,de ,civ4 ,dei viii1 #aa74 ,but ,rabbi ,moses 7,perplex4 ii71 though otherwise agreeing with ,plato1 says that fire is signified by the word darkness1 since1 said he1 fire does not shine in its own sphere4 ,however1 it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above2 because by the words ,spirit of ,god ,scripture usually means the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is said to move over the waters1 not1 indeed1 in bodily shape1 but as the craftsman's will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form4 ,the third distinction is that of place2 since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible1 whilst the air1 the subject of darkness1 is described as being above the waters1 in the words3 ,darkness was upon the face of the deep4 ,the remaining distinctions will appear from what follows 7,q4 #ga74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,formless ,matter of ,all ,corporeal ,things ,is the ,same8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same4 ,for ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii1 #ab73 ,i find two things ,thou hast made1 one formed1 the other formless1 and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless1 whereby1 he says1 the matter of all corporeal things is designated4 ,therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 text4 #aj73 ,things that are one in genus are one in matter4 ,but all corporeal things are in the same genus of body4 ,therefore the matter of all bodies is the same4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 different acts befit different potentialities1 and the same act befits the same potentiality4 ,but all bodies have the same form1 corporeity4 ,therefore all bodies have the same matter4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 matter1 considered in itself1 is only in potentiality4 ,but distinction is due to form4 ,therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things4 ,on the contrary1 ,things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive1 as is said 7,de ,gener4 i1 text4 #ej74 ,but heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually4 ,therefore their matter is not the same4 ,i answer that1 ,on this question the opinions of philosophers have differed4 ,plato and all who preceded ,aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements4 ,hence because the four elements have one common matter1 as their mutual generation and corruption prove1 it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same4 ,but the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by ,plato1 not to the condition of matter1 but to the will of the artificer1 ,god1 ,whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies3 ,by your own nature you are subject to dissolution1 but by ,my will you are indissoluble1 for ,my will is more powerful than the link that binds you together4 ,but this theory ,aristotle 7,de ,caelo i1 text4 #e7 disproves by the natural movements of bodies4 ,for since1 he says1 the heavenly bodies have a natural movement1 different from that of the elements1 it follows that they have a different nature from them4 ,for movement in a circle1 which is proper to the heavenly bodies1 is not by contraries1 whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite1 one tending upwards1 another downwards3 so1 therefore1 the heavenly body is without contrariety1 whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature4 ,and as generation and corruption are from contraries1 it follows that1 whereas the elements are corruptible1 the heavenly bodies are incorruptible4 ,but in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption1 ,avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies1 arguing from their unity of form4 ,and1 indeed1 if corporeity were one form in itself1 on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene1 this argument would necessarily be true2 for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible4 ,but corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms--that is to say1 it would be corruption1 not pure and simple1 but partial1 since a being in act would subsist under the transient form4 ,thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being1 such as air or fire4 ,but supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption1 it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same4 ,for matter1 as it is in itself1 is in potentiality to form4 ,considered in itself1 then1 it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common1 and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form4 ,hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms4 ,and this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others1 and contain these others virtually in themselves4 ,for potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection1 so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form1 and vice versa4 ,matter1 therefore1 whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body1 would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body2 and as it does not actually possess the latter1 it has both form and the privation of form2 for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation4 ,but this condition implies corruptibility4 ,it is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible1 and those by nature incorruptible1 should possess the same matter4 ,neither can we say1 as ,averroes 99,de ,substantia ,orbis ii4 imagines1 that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven--being in potentiality with regard to place1 though not to being1 and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force4 ,for it is impossible to suppose any being in act1 unless in its totality it be act and form1 or be something which has act or form4 ,setting aside1 then1 in thought1 the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power1 if the heavenly body is not something having form--that is1 something composed of a form and the subject of that form--it follows that in its totality it is form and act4 ,but every such thing is something actually understood1 which the heavenly bodies are not1 being sensible4 ,it follows1 then1 that the matter of the heavenly bodies1 considered in itself1 is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses4 ,nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing4 ,hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being1 but only to place1 as ,aristotle 99,de ,coelo i1 text4 #bj says4 ,so1 then1 the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same1 except by analogy1 in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine follows in this the opinion of ,plato1 who does not admit a fifth essence4 ,or we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of order1 as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if genus is taken in a physical sense1 corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus1 on account of their different modes of potentiality1 as is said in ,metaph4 x1 text4 #bf4 ,logically considered1 however1 there is but one genus of all bodies1 since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies1 being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as potentiality is directed towards act1 potential beings are differentiated by their different acts1 as sight is by color1 hearing by sound4 ,therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental1 because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,empyrean ,heaven ,was ,created at the ,same ,time ,as ,formless ,matter8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter4 ,for the empyrean1 if it is anything at all1 must be a sensible body4 ,but all sensible bodies are movable1 and the empyrean heaven is not movable4 ,for if it were so1 its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body1 which is not the case4 ,the empyrean heaven1 then1 was not created contemporaneously with formless matter4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d7 that the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order4 ,if1 therefore1 the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies1 it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it4 ,but this does not seem to be the case1 especially as it is presumed to be without movement2 for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved4 ,therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation1 and not ordained to natural effects2 on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj73 ,in so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things1 so far are we not of this world2 from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world4 ,corporeal place1 therefore1 cannot be the seat of contemplation4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 among the heavenly bodies exists a body1 partly transparent and partly luminous1 which we call the sidereal heaven4 ,there exists also a heaven wholly transparent1 called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven4 ,if1 then1 there exists a still higher heaven1 it must be wholly luminous4 ,but this cannot be1 for then the air would be constantly illuminated1 and there would be no night4 ,therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter4 ,on the contrary1 ,strabus says that in the passage1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 heaven denotes not the visible firmament1 but the empyrean or fiery heaven4 ,i answer that1 ,the empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of ,strabus and ,bede1 and also of ,basil2 all of whom agree in one respect1 namely1 in holding it to be the place of the blessed4 ,strabus and ,bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels2 and ,basil 99,hom4 ii4 in ,hexaem4 says3 ,just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness1 so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world1 where the just shall obtain the abode of rest4 ,but they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement4 ,strabus and ,bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven1 because the firmament1 which they take to mean the sidereal heaven1 is said to have been made1 not in the beginning1 but on the second day3 whereas the reason given by ,basil is that otherwise ,god would seem to have made darkness ,his first work1 as the ,manicheans falsely assert1 when they call the ,god of the ,old ,testament the ,god of darkness4 ,these reasons1 however1 are not very cogent4 ,for the question of the firmament1 said to have been made on the second day1 is solved in one way by ,augustine1 and in another by other holy writers4 ,but the question of the darkness is explained according to ,augustine 99,gen4 ad lit4 i2 vii41 by supposing that formlessness1 signified by darkness1 preceded form not by duration1 but by origin4 ,according to others1 however1 since darkness is no creature1 but a privation of light1 it is a proof of ,divine wisdom1 that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state1 and afterwards brought them to perfection4 ,but a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself4 ,for in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for1 spiritual and corporeal1 not only in the human body to be glorified1 but in the whole world which is to be made new4 ,now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world1 in the blessedness of the angels1 equality with whom is promised to the saints4 ,it was fitting1 then1 that even from the beginning1 there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal1 free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change1 and wholly luminous1 even as the whole bodily creation1 after the ,resurrection1 is expected to be4 ,so1 then1 that heaven is called the empyrean1 i4e4 fiery1 not from its heat1 but from its brightness4 ,it is to be noticed1 however1 that ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #i1 #bg7 says that ,porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air1 the latter the ether1 or empyrean4 ,but ,porphyry1 as a ,platonist1 held the heaven1 known as sidereal1 to be fiery1 and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal1 taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame1 and not as ,aristotle understands it1 swiftness of movement 7,de ,coel4 i1 text4 #bb74 ,this much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that ,augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world1 for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements4 ,but when glory is finally consummated1 the movement of bodies will cease4 ,and such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is sufficiently probable1 as some assert1 that the empyrean heaven1 having the state of glory for its ordained end1 does not influence inferior bodies of another order--those1 namely1 that are directed only to natural ends4 ,yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved1 though itself motionless1 just as angels of the highest rank1 who assist 99,infra1 ,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #c1 influence those of lower degree who act as messengers1 though they themselves are not sent1 as ,dionysius teaches 7,coel4 ,hier4 xii74 ,for this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven1 and is moved1 produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement1 but something of a fixed and stable nature1 as the power of conservation or causation1 or something of the kind pertaining to dignity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,corporeal place is assigned to contemplation1 not as necessary1 but as congruous1 that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within4 ,hence ,basil 7,hom4 ii in ,hexaem47 says3 ,the ministering spirit could not live in darkness1 but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,basil says 7,hom4 ii in ,hexaem473 ,it is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape1 of dense body1 and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses4 ,on this account it darkens the region external to it1 the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region4 ,but since the body of the firmament1 though solid1 is transparent1 for that it does not exclude light 7as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens71 we may also say that the empyrean has light1 not condensed so as to emit rays1 as the sun does1 but of a more subtle nature4 ,or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ff1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,time ,was ,created ,simultaneously with ,formless ,matter8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter4 ,for ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii1 #ab73 ,i find two things that ,thou didst create before time was1 the primary corporeal matter1 and the angelic nature4 ,therefore time was not created with formless matter4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 time is divided by day and night4 ,but in the beginning there was neither day nor night1 for these began when ,god divided the light from the darkness4 ,therefore in the beginning time was not4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 time is the measure of the firmament's movement2 and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day4 ,therefore in the beginning time was not4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 movement precedes time1 and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created1 rather than time4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 as time is the extrinsic measure of created things1 so is place4 ,place1 then1 as truly as time1 must be reckoned among the things first created4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #c73 ,both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time4 ,i answer that1 ,it is commonly said that the first things created were these four--the angelic nature1 the empyrean heaven1 formless corporeal matter1 and time4 ,it must be observed1 however1 that this is not the opinion of ,augustine4 ,for he 7,confess4 xii1 #ab7 specifies only two things as first created--the angelic nature and corporeal matter--making no mention of the empyrean heaven4 ,but these two1 namely1 the angelic nature and formless matter1 precede the formation1 by nature only1 and not by duration2 and therefore1 as they precede formation1 so do they precede movement and time4 ,time1 therefore1 cannot be included among them4 ,but the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers1 who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form1 and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration3 for otherwise there would be no such measure4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the teaching of ,augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form1 so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning1 then the time that preceded was the measure1 not of the firmament's movement1 but of the first movement of whatsoever kind4 ,for it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement1 in so far as this is the first movement4 ,but if the first movement was another than this1 time would have been its measure1 for everything is measured by the first of its kind4 ,and it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning1 there was movement of some kind1 at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind3 while movement without time cannot be conceived1 since time is nothing else than the measure of priority and succession in movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things4 ,and1 therefore1 among these time must be included1 as having the nature of a common measure2 but not movement1 which is related only to the movable subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven1 this being the boundary of the universe4 ,and since place has reference to things permanent1 it was created at once in its totality4 ,but time1 as not being permanent1 was created in its beginning3 even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the now4 ,,question #fg ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,distinction ,,in ,,itself 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must consider next the work of distinction in itself4 ,first1 the work of the first day2 secondly1 the work of the second day2 thirdly the work of the third day4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things8 7#b7 ,whether light1 in corporeal things1 is itself corporeal8 7#c7 ,whether light is a quality8 7#d7 ,whether light was fittingly made on the first day8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,word ,light ,is ,used in ,its ,proper ,sense in ,speaking of ,spiritual ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that light is used in its proper sense in spiritual things4 ,for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bh7 that in spiritual things light is better and surer3 and that ,christ is not called ,light in the same sense as ,he is called the ,stone2 the former is to be taken literally1 and the latter metaphorically4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 includes ,light among the intellectual names of ,god4 ,but such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things4 ,therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3ac73 ,all that is made manifest is light4 ,but to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal4 ,therefore also does light4 ,on the contrary1 ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide ii7 that ,splendor is among those things which are said of ,god metaphorically4 ,i answer that1 ,any word may be used in two ways--that is to say1 either in its original application or in its more extended meaning4 ,this is clearly shown in the word sight1 originally applied to the act of the sense1 and then1 as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses1 extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses4 ,thus we say1 ,seeing how it tastes1 or smells1 or burns4 ,further1 sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect1 as in those words3 ,blessed are the clean of heart1 for they shall see ,god 7,matt4 #e3h74 ,and thus it is with the word light4 ,in its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight2 afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind4 ,if1 then1 the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning1 it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things1 as ,ambrose says 7,de ,fide ii74 ,but if taken in its common and extended use1 as applied to manifestation of every kind1 it may properly be applied to spiritual things4 ,the answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,light ,is a ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that light is a body4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #e7 that light takes the first place among bodies4,therefore light is a body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 v1 #b7 that light is a species of fire4 ,but fire is a body1 and therefore so is light4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the powers of movement1 intersection1 reflection1 belong properly to bodies2 and all these are attributes of light and its rays4 ,moreover1 different rays of light1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii7 are united and separated1 which seems impossible unless they are bodies4 ,therefore light is a body4 ,on the contrary1 ,two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously4 ,but this is the case with light and air4 ,therefore light is not a body4 ,i answer that1 ,light cannot be a body1 for three evident reasons4 ,first1 on the part of place4 ,for the place of any one body is different from that of any other1 nor is it possible1 naturally speaking1 for any two bodies of whatever nature1 to exist simultaneously in the same place2 since contiguity requires distinction of place4 ,the second reason is from movement4 ,for if light were a body1 its diffusion would be the local movement of a body4 ,now no local movement of a body can be instantaneous1 as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end3 whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous4 ,nor can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived2 for though this may be the case in short distances1 it cannot be so in distances so great as that which separates the ,east from the ,west4 ,yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon1 the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end4 ,it must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement1 that of light is indifferent as regards direction1 working equally in a circle as in a straight line4 ,hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body4 ,the third reason is from generation and corruption4 ,for if light were a body1 it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary1 the body of light would be corrupted1 and its matter would receive a new form4 ,but unless we are to say that darkness is a body1 this does not appear to be the case4 ,neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere4 ,also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary4 ,and should anyone reply that it is not corrupted1 but approaches and moves around with the sun1 we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened8 ,it is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done1 since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before4 ,since1 therefore1 these things are repugnant1 not only to reason1 but to common sense1 we must conclude that light cannot be a body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in other words1 to be fire1 the noblest of the four elements4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter3 just as fire in aerial matter is flame1 or in earthly matter is burning coal4 ,nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by ,aristotle in his works on logic1 as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all these properties are assigned to light metaphorically1 and might in the same way be attributed to heat4 ,for because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved ,phys4 viii1 text4 #ee1 we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds4 ,for even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place1 to that of all contraries1 as is said ,metaph4 x1 text4 #ac4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,light ,is a ,quality8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that light is not a quality4 ,for every quality remains in its subject1 though the active cause of the quality be removed1 as heat remains in water removed from the fire4 ,but light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn4 ,therefore light is not a quality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every sensible quality has its opposite1 as cold is opposed to heat1 blackness to whiteness4 ,but this is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light4 ,light therefore is not a sensible quality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a cause is more potent than its effect4 ,but the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies1 and also gives to colors their immaterial being1 by making them actually visible4 ,light1 then1 is not a sensible quality1 but rather a substantial or spiritual form4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i7 says that light is a species of quality4 ,i answer that1 ,some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has1 but only an intentional being1 as a similitude of color in the air4 ,but this cannot be the case for two reasons4 ,first1 because light gives a name to the air1 since by it the air becomes actually luminous4 ,but color does not do this1 for we do not speak of the air as colored4 ,secondly1 because light produces natural effects1 for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed1 and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions4 ,others have said that light is the sun's substantial form1 but this also seems impossible for two reasons4 ,first1 because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses2 for the object of the intellect is what a thing is1 as is said ,de ,anima iii1 text4 #bf3 whereas light is visible of itself4 ,in the second place1 because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another2 since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species3 wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species4 ,but light is not the substantial form of air1 for if it were1 the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn4 ,hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun4 ,we must say1 then1 that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire1 so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun1 or of another body that is of itself luminous1 if there is any such body4 ,a proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,since quality is consequent upon substantial form1 the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form4 ,for when matter receives its form perfectly1 the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and enduring2 as when1 for instance1 water is converted into fire4 ,when1 however1 substantial form is received imperfectly1 so as to be1 as it were1 in process of being received1 rather than fully impressed1 the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent2 as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state4 ,but light is not produced by the transmutation of matter1 as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form1 and light were a certain inception of substantial form4 ,for this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is accidental to light not to have a contrary1 forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change1 which is itself removed from contrariety4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire1 as an instrumental cause1 by virtue of the substantial form1 so does light act instrumentally1 by virtue of the heavenly bodies1 towards producing substantial forms2 and towards rendering colors actually visible1 inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fg1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,production of ,light ,is ,fittingly ,assigned to the ,first ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day4 ,for light1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 is a quality4 ,but qualities are accidents1 and as such should have1 not the first1 but a subordinate place4 ,the production of light1 then1 ought not to be assigned to the first day4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is light that distinguishes night from day1 and this is effected by the sun1 which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day4 ,therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 night and day are brought about by the circular movement of a luminous body4 ,but movement of this kind is an attribute of the firmament1 and we read that the firmament was made on the second day4 ,therefore the production of light1 dividing night from day1 ought not to be assigned to the first day4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of1 it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness4 ,but in the beginning spiritual darkness was not1 for even the demons were in the beginning good1 as has been shown 7,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day4 ,on the contrary1 ,that without which there could not be day1 must have been made on the first day4 ,but there can be no day without light4 ,therefore light must have been made on the first day4 ,i answer that1 ,there are two opinions as to the production of light4 ,augustine seems to say 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #i1cc7 that ,moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature1 and therefore when we read1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word heaven1 and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word earth4 ,and spiritual nature was formed first1 as being of higher dignity than corporeal4 ,the forming1 therefore1 of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light1 that is to say1 of spiritual light4 ,for a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the ,word of ,god4 ,other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by ,moses1 and give various reasons4 ,basil 99,hom4 i in ,hexaem4 says that ,moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things2 but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over1 as created beforehand4 ,chrysostom 99,hom4 ii in ,genes4 gives as a reason for the omission that ,moses was addressing an ignorant people1 to whom material things alone appealed1 and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of idols4 ,it would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures2 for they would have paid them ,divine worship1 since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun1 moon1 and stars1 which was forbidden them 7,deut4 #d74 ,but mention is made of several kinds of formlessness1 in regard to the corporeal creature4 ,one is where we read that the earth was void and empty1 and another where it is said that darkness was upon the face of the deep4 ,now it seems to be required1 for two reasons1 that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light4 ,in the first place because light is a quality of the first body1 as was stated 7,a4 #c71 and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form4 ,the second reason is because light is a common quality4 ,for light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies4 ,but as in knowledge we proceed from general principles1 so do we in work of every kind4 ,for the living thing is generated before the animal1 and the animal before the man1 as is shown in ,de ,gener4 ,anim4 ii1 #c4 ,it was fitting1 then1 as an evidence of the ,divine wisdom1 that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place1 since light is a form of the primary body1 and because it is more common quality4 ,basil 99,hom4 ii in ,hexaem41 indeed1 adds a third reason3 that all other things are made manifest by light4 ,and there is yet a fourth1 already touched upon in the objections2 that day cannot be unless light exists1 which was made therefore on the first day4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration1 matter must be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms1 afterwards receiving those that are accidental1 among which light holds the first place4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula1 and that on the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which it had been formed4 ,but this cannot well be maintained1 as in the beginning of ,genesis ,holy ,scripture records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure4 ,we cannot1 then1 say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to exist4 ,others1 therefore1 held that this luminous nebula continues in existence1 but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable4 ,but this is as much as to say that it is superfluous1 whereas none of ,god's works have been made in vain4 ,on this account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of this nebula4 ,this1 too1 is impossible to those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements1 and naturally incorruptible4 ,for in that case its matter cannot take on another form4 ,i answer1 then1 with ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 that the light was the sun's light1 formless as yet1 being already the solar substance1 and possessing illuminative power in a general way1 to which was afterwards added the special and determinative power required to produce determinate effects4 ,thus1 then1 in the production of this light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness4 ,first1 as to the cause1 forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause of light1 and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of darkness4 ,secondly1 as to place1 for in one hemisphere there was light1 in the other darkness4 ,thirdly1 as to time2 because there was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere2 and this is signified by the words1 ,he called the light day1 and the darkness night4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,basil says 7,hom4 ii in ,hexaem47 that day and night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light1 rather than by movement4 ,but ,augustine objects to this 7,gen4 ad lit4 i71 that there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time1 for whose service this was required4 ,nor does the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light1 so long as the body is actually present2 though this might be effected by a miracle4 ,as to this1 however1 ,augustine remarks 7,gen4 ad lit4 i7 that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles1 but for what is in accordance with nature4 ,we hold1 then1 that the movement of the heavens is twofold4 ,of these movements1 one is common to the entire heaven1 and is the cause of day and night4 ,this1 as it seems1 had its beginning on the first day4 ,the other varies in proportion as it affects various bodies1 and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days1 months1 and years4 ,thus it is1 that in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is mentioned2 this distinction being brought about by the common movement of the heavens4 ,the further distinction into successive days1 seasons1 and years recorded as begun on the fourth day1 in the words1 let them be for seasons1 and for days1 and years is due to proper movements4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,augustine teaches 7,confess4 xii2 ,gen4 ad lit4 #a1 #ae71 formlessness did not precede forms in duration2 and so we must understand the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures1 not1 indeed1 with the perfection of glory1 in which they were not created1 but with the perfection of grace1 which they possessed from their creation as said above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c74 ,thus the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form4 ,but if all created things received their form at the same time1 the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked1 not as existing from the beginning but such as ,god foresaw would exist4 ,,question #fh ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,the ,,second ,,day 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must next consider the work of the second day4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the firmament was made on the second day8 7#b7 ,whether there are waters above the firmament8 7#c7 ,whether the firmament divides waters from waters8 7#d7 ,whether there is more than one heaven8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,firmament ,was ,made on the ,second ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day4 ,for it is said 7,gen4 #a3h73 ,god called the firmament heaven4 ,but the heaven existed before days1 as is clear from the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,therefore the firmament was not made on the second day4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of ,divine wisdom4 ,now it would ill become the ,divine wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first4 ,but though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters1 these are mentioned before the formation of light1 which was on the first day4 ,therefore the firmament was not made on the second day4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began4 ,but the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter1 for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption4 ,therefore the firmament was not made on the second day4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3f73 ,god said3 let there be a firmament1 and further on 7verse #h72 ,and the evening and morning were the second day4 ,i answer that1 ,in discussing questions of this kind two rules are to be observed1 as ,augustine teaches 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ah74 ,the first is1 to hold the truth of ,scripture without wavering4 ,the second is that since ,holy ,scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses1 one should adhere to a particular explanation1 only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it1 if it be proved with certainty to be false2 lest ,holy ,scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers1 and obstacles be placed to their believing4 ,we say1 therefore1 that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses4 ,they may be understood1 first1 of the starry firmament1 on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers4 ,some of these believed it to be composed of the elements2 and this was the opinion of ,empedocles1 who1 however1 held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution1 because its parts are1 so to say1 not in disunion1 but in harmony4 ,others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements1 not1 indeed1 compounded of them1 but being as it were a simple element4 ,such was the opinion of ,plato1 who held that element to be fire4 ,others1 again1 have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements1 but is itself a fifth body1 existing over and above these4 ,this is the opinion of ,aristotle 7,de ,coel4 i1 text4 #f1cb74 ,according to the first opinion1 it may1 strictly speaking1 be granted that the firmament was made1 even as to substance1 on the second day4 ,for it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements1 while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist4 ,but the belief that the firmament was made1 as to its substance1 on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of ,plato1 according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire4 ,this production1 however1 belongs to the work of creation1 at least1 according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation1 since the first form received by matter is the elemental4 ,still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of ,aristotle1 seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time1 whereas the firmament1 being naturally incorruptible1 is of a matter not susceptible of change of form2 wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time4 ,hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation4 ,but its formation1 in some degree1 belongs to the second day1 according to both opinions3 for as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv71 the light of the sun was without form during the first three days1 and afterwards1 on the fourth day1 received its form4 ,if1 however1 we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order1 as ,augustine holds 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bb1bd71 and not succession in time1 there is then nothing to prevent our saying1 whilst holding any one of the opinions given above1 that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day4 ,another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day1 not that in which the stars are set1 but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected1 and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air4 ,for a body is called firm1 that is dense and solid1 thereby differing from a mathematical body as is remarked by ,basil 7,hom4 iii in ,hexaem474 ,if1 then1 this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason4 ,augustine1 in fact 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #d71 recommends it thus3 ,i consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation1 as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,chrysostom 7,hom4 iii in ,genes471 ,moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of ,god collectively1 in the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 and then proceeds to explain them part by part2 in somewhat the same way as one might say3 ,this house was constructed by that builder1 and then add3 ,first1 he laid the foundations1 then built the walls1 and thirdly1 put on the roof4 ,in accepting this explanation we are1 therefore1 not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words3 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth1 and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day4 ,we may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is not the same as that made on the second day2 and there are several senses in which this may be understood4 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #i7 that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual nature1 and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven4 ,according to ,bede 7,hexaem4 i7 and ,strabus1 the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean1 and the firmament made on the second day1 the starry heaven4 ,according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars1 the same1 in fact1 that the philosophers speak of1 calling it the ninth sphere1 and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal movement3 while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven4 ,according to another theory1 touched upon by ,augustine 99,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #a the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven1 and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected1 which is also called heaven1 but equivocally4 ,and to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense1 it is expressly said that ,god called the firmament heaven2 just as in a preceding verse it said that ,god called the light day 7since the word day is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours74 ,other instances of a similar use occur1 as pointed out by ,rabbi ,moses4 ,the second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has been already said4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,waters ,above the ,firmament8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not waters above the firmament4 ,for water is heavy by nature1 and heavy things tend naturally downwards1 not upwards4 ,therefore there are not waters above the firmament4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 water is fluid by nature1 and fluids cannot rest on a sphere1 as experience shows4 ,therefore1 since the firmament is a sphere1 there cannot be water above it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 water is an element1 and appointed to the generation of composite bodies1 according to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards perfect4 ,but bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth1 and not above the firmament1 so that water would be useless there4 ,but none of ,god's works are useless4 ,therefore there are not waters above the firmament4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3g73 7,god7 divided the waters that were under the firmament1 from those that were above the firmament4 ,i answer with ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #e7 that1 ,these words of ,scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect4 ,hence1 whatever these waters are1 and whatever their mode of existence1 we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there4 ,as to the nature of these waters1 all are not agreed4 ,origen says 7,hom4 i in ,gen47 that the waters that are above the firmament are spiritual substances4 ,wherefore it is written 7,ps4 #adh3d73 ,let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the ,lord1 and 7,dan4 #c3fj73 ,ye waters that are above the heavens1 bless the ,lord4,to this ,basil answers 7,hom4 iii in ,hexaem47 that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures1 but that the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the ,creator4 ,hence in the same context1 fire1 hail1 and other like creatures1 are invoked in the same way1 though no one would attribute reason to these4 ,we must hold1 then1 these waters to be material1 but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament differ4 ,for if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven1 and as being of the nature of the four elements1 for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters4 ,but if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven1 not1 however1 as being of the nature of the four elements1 then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters1 but just as1 according to ,strabus1 one heaven is called empyrean1 that is1 fiery1 solely on account of its splendor3 so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence2 and this heaven is above the starry heaven4 ,again1 if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements1 it may still be said to divide the waters1 if we understand by water not the element but formless matter4 ,augustine1 in fact1 says 7,super ,gen4 cont4 ,manich4 i1 #e1g7 that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters4 ,if1 however1 we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected1 then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere1 and from which the rain falls4 ,but to say1 as some writers alluded to by ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #d71 that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven1 is a mere absurdity4 ,the solid nature of the firmament1 the intervening region of fire1 wherein all vapor must be consumed1 the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon1 as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains1 all to go to show the impossibility of this4 ,nor is it less absurd to say1 in support of this opinion1 that bodies may be rarefied infinitely1 since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided1 but up to a certain point only4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water1 it is kept in its place above the firmament by the ,divine power4 ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #a71 however will not admit this solution1 but says ,it is our business here to inquire how ,god has constituted the natures of ,his creatures1 not how far it may have pleased ,him to work on them by way of miracle4 ,we leave this view1 then1 and answer that according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said4 ,according to the first opinion1 an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by ,aristotle1 that is to say1 that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency1 and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency1 in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven4 ,or by the water1 as stated1 we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the solution is clear from what has been said1 according to the last two opinions4 ,but according to the first opinion1 ,basil gives two replies 7,hom4 iii in ,hexaem474 ,he answers first1 that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded1 or convex1 above4 ,secondly1 that the waters above the firmament are not fluid1 but exist outside it in a solid state1 as a mass of ice1 and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to the third opinion given1 the waters above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors1 and serve to give rain to the earth4 ,but according to the second opinion1 they are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless4 ,this1 according to some1 is the primary mobile1 the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven1 whereby the continuance of generation is secured4 ,in the same way the starry heaven1 by the zodiacal movement1 is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted1 through the rising and setting of the stars1 and their various influences4 ,but according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies1 as ,basil supposes 7,hom4 iii in ,hexaem474 ,and ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #e7 that some have considered this to be proved by the extreme cold of ,saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,firmament ,divides ,waters from ,waters8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters4 ,for bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place4 ,but the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 i1 #f73 ,all water is the same species4 ,water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament1 it may be argued1 on the contrary1 that things distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them4 ,if then1 these waters differ in species1 it is not the firmament that distinguishes them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side1 as a wall standing in the midst of a river4 ,but it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament4 ,therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3f73 ,let there be a firmament made amidst the waters2 and let it divide the waters from the waters4 ,i answer that1 ,the text of ,genesis1 considered superficially1 might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers of antiquity1 who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension1 and the primary element of all bodies4 ,thus in the words1 ,darkness was upon the face of the deep1 the word deep might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water1 understood as the principle of all other bodies4 ,these philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses1 but that a body of water1 infinite in extent1 exists above that heaven4 ,on this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within--that is to say1 from all bodies under the heaven1 since they took water to be the principle of them all4 ,as1 however1 this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons1 it cannot be held to be the sense of ,holy ,scripture4 ,it should rather be considered that ,moses was speaking to ignorant people1 and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense4 ,now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal1 whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal1 for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing1 and called a space filled with air a vacuum4 ,moses1 then1 while he expressly mentions water and earth1 makes no express mention of air by name1 to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge4 ,in order1 however1 to express the truth to those capable of understanding it1 he implies in the words3 ,darkness was upon the face of the deep1 the existence of air as attendant1 so to say1 upon the water4 ,for it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended1 the subject of light and darkness1 which1 in fact1 is the air4 ,whether1 then1 we understand by the firmament the starry heaven1 or the cloudy region of the air1 it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters1 according as we take water to denote formless matter1 or any kind of transparent body1 as fittingly designated under the name of waters4 ,for the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher1 and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air1 where the rain and similar things are generated1 from the lower part1 which is connected with the water and included under that name4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if by the firmament is understood the starry heaven1 the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath4 ,but if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air1 both these waters are of the same species1 and two places are assigned to them1 though not for the same purpose1 the higher being the place of their begetting1 the lower1 the place of their repose4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if the waters are held to differ in species1 the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters1 as the cause of their destruction1 but only as the boundary of each4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,on account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible1 ,moses includes all such bodies under the name of water1 and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament1 whatever be the sense in which the word is used4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fh1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,there ,is ,only ,one ,heaven8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is only one heaven4 ,for the heaven is contrasted with the earth1 in the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,but there is only one earth4 ,therefore there is only one heaven4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter1 must be one2 and such is the heaven1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,de ,coel4 i1 text4 #ie74 ,therefore there is but one heaven4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion4 ,but if there are more heavens than one1 they are so called univocally1 for if equivocally only1 they could not properly be called many4 ,if1 then1 they are many1 there must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven1 but this common notion cannot be assigned4 ,therefore there cannot be more than one heaven4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,ps4 #adh3d73 ,praise ,him1 ye heavens of heavens4 ,i answer that1 ,on this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between ,basil and ,chrysostom4 ,the latter says that there is only one heaven 7,hom4 iv in ,gen471 and that the words 'heavens of heavens' are merely the translation of the ,hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural1 just as in ,latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular4 ,on the other hand1 ,basil 7,hom4 iii in ,hexaem471 whom ,damascene follows 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii71 says that there are many heavens4 ,the difference1 however1 is more nominal than real4 ,for ,chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water1 for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven 99,ps4 #h3i4 ,but since in this body there are many distinct parts1 ,basil said that there are more heavens than one4 ,in order1 then1 to understand the distinction of heavens1 it must be borne in mind that ,scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense4 ,sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning1 when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially1 and incorruptible by nature4 ,in this body there are three heavens2 the first is the empyrean1 which is wholly luminous2 the second is the aqueous or crystalline1 wholly transparent2 and the third is called the starry heaven1 in part transparent1 and in part actually luminous1 and divided into eight spheres4 ,one of these is the sphere of the fixed stars2 the other seven1 which may be called the seven heavens1 are the spheres of the planets4 ,in the second place1 the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body1 as sublimity and luminosity1 actual or potential4 ,thus ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's orb1 calling it the aerial4 ,according to him1 then1 there are three heavens1 the aerial1 the starry1 and one higher than both these1 of which the ,apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was rapt to the third heaven4 ,but since this space contains two elements1 namely1 fire and air1 and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region ,rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens4 ,the higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven2 the lower1 the ,olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name3 the higher region of air he calls1 from its brightness1 the ethereal heaven2 the lower1 the aerial4 ,when1 therefore1 these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above1 there are seven corporeal heavens in all1 in the opinion of ,rabanus4 ,thirdly1 there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven1 as when this name is applied to the ,blessed ,trinity1 ,who is the ,light and the ,most ,high ,spirit4 ,it is explained by some1 as thus applied1 in the words1 ,i will ascend into heaven2 whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with ,god4 ,sometimes also spiritual blessings1 the recompense of the ,saints1 from being the highest of all good gifts1 are signified by the word heaven1 and1 in fact1 are so signified1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,serm4 ,dom4 in ,monte71 in the words1 ,your reward is very great in heaven 7,matt4 #e3ab74 ,again1 three kinds of supernatural visions1 bodily1 imaginative1 and intellectual1 are called sometimes so many heavens1 in reference to which ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii7 expounds ,paul's rapture to the third heaven4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference4 ,but as one center may have many circumferences1 so1 though there is but one earth1 there may be many heavens4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the argument holds good as to the heaven1 in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation1 for in that sense it is one4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity1 as appears from what has been said4 ,,question #fi ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,the ,,third ,,day 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we next consider the work of the third day4 ,under this head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,about the gathering together of the waters4 7#b7 ,about the production of plants4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,it ,was ,fitting ,that the ,gathering ,together of the ,waters ,should ,take ,place1 ,as ,recorded1 on the ,third ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day4 ,for what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been made in the words1 ,god said3 ,be light made1 and ,let there be a firmament made4,but the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days4 ,therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters1 wherefore it was described as invisible 99 ,see ,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #a1 ,obj4 #a4 ,there was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place4 ,but not all the waters are in continuous contact1 and therefore all were not gathered together into one place4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a gathering together is a mode of local movement4 ,but the waters flow naturally1 and take their course towards the sea4 ,in their case1 therefore1 a ,divine precept of this kind was unnecessary4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created heaven and earth4 ,therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity4 ,on the contrary1 ,the authority of ,scripture suffices4 ,i answer that1 ,it is necessary to reply differently to this question according to the different interpretations given by ,augustine and other holy writers4 ,in all these works1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ae2 iv1 #bb1 #cd2 ,de ,gen4 ,contr4 ,manich4 i1 #e1 #g71 there is no order of duration1 but only of origin and nature4 ,he says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all1 and that the latter are at first indicated by the words earth and water4 ,not that this formlessness preceded formation1 in time1 but only in origin2 nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration1 but merely in the order of nature4 ,agreeably1 then1 to this order1 the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place1 where it is said that light was made on the first day4 ,for as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal1 so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower4 ,hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place1 by the words1 ,let there be made a firmament1 by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter1 that preceded with priority not of time1 but of origin only4 ,but in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded1 also with a priority of origin only4 ,therefore the words1 ,let the waters be gathered together1 and the dry land appear1 mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water1 so as to have such movement1 and with the substantial form of earth1 so as to have such an appearance4 ,according1 however1 to other holy writers 99 ,see ,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #a1 an order of duration in the works is to be understood1 by which is meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation1 and one form another1 in order of time4 ,nevertheless1 they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form1 since heaven1 earth1 and water already existed1 since these three are named as already clearly perceptible to the senses2 rather they understand by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty1 and in respect of these three ,scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness4 ,heaven1 the highest of them1 was without form so long as darkness filled it1 because it was the source of light4 ,the formlessness of water1 which holds the middle place1 is called the deep1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,contr4 ,faust4 xxii1 #aa71 this word signifies the mass of waters without order4 ,thirdly1 the formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to be void or invisible1 because it was covered by the waters4 ,thus1 then1 the formation of the highest body took place on the first day4 ,and since time results from the movement of the heaven1 and is the numerical measure of the movement of the highest body1 from this formation1 resulted the distinction of time1 namely1 that of night and day4 ,on the second day the intermediate body1 water1 was formed1 receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order 7so that water be understood as including certain other things1 as explained above 7,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #c774 ,on the third day the earth1 the lowest body1 received its form by the withdrawal of the waters1 and there resulted the distinction in the lowest body1 namely1 of land and sea4 ,hence ,scripture1 having clearly expressed the formless state of the earth1 by saying that it was invisible or void1 expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words1 ,let the dry land appear4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,augustine 99,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #g1 #h2 iii1 #bj1 ,scripture does not say of the work of the third day1 that it was made1 as it says of those that precede1 in order to show that higher and spiritual forms1 such as the angels and the heavenly bodies1 are perfect and stable in being1 whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable4 ,hence the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters1 and the appearing of the land4 ,for water1 to use ,augustine's words1 glides and flows away1 the earth abides 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #aa74 ,others1 again1 hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place1 and that for this reason ,scripture had no reason to speak of it as made4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument is easily solved1 according to ,augustine's opinion 7,de ,gen4 ,contr4 ,manich4 i71 because we need not suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters1 and that these were afterwards gathered together1 but that they were produced in this very gathering together4 ,but according to the other writers there are three solutions1 which ,augustine gives 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #ab74 ,the first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together1 for it has been proved in regard to the ,red ,sea1 that the sea is higher than the land1 as ,basil remarks 7,hom4 iv in ,hexaem474 ,the second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous1 which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together4 ,the third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth1 to receive the confluence of waters4 ,of the above the first seems the most probable4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all the waters have the sea as their goal1 into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent1 and this may be the reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place4 ,or1 one place is to be understood not simply1 but as contrasted with the place of the dry land1 so that the sense would be1 ,let the waters be gathered together in one place1 that is1 apart from the dry land4 ,that the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow1 ,the gathering together of the waters ,he called ,seas4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the ,divine command gives bodies their natural movement and by these natural movements they are said to fulfill ,his word4 ,or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth1 just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth2 but as a necessary means towards an end1 namely1 that plants and animals might be on the earth1 it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth4 ,some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land4 ,scripture1 however1 attributes it to the ,divine power1 not only in the ,book of ,genesis1 but also ,job #ch3aj where in the person of the ,lord it is said1 ,i set ,my bounds around the sea1 and ,jer4 #e3bb1 where it is written3 ,will you not then fear ,me1 saith the ,lord1 who have set the sand a bound for the sea8 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,according to ,augustine 7,de ,gen4 ,contr4 ,manich4 i71 primary matter is meant by the word earth1 where first mentioned1 but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself4 ,again it may be said with ,basil 7,hom4 iv in ,hexaem471 that the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature1 but here in respect of its principal property1 namely1 dryness4 ,wherefore it is written3 ,he called the dry land1 ,earth4 ,it may also be said with ,rabbi ,moses1 that the expression1 ,he called1 denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name imposed4 ,thus we find it said at first that ,he called the light ,day3 for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day1 where it is said that there was evening and morning1 one day4 ,in like manner it is said that the firmament1 that is1 the air1 ,he called heaven3 for that which was first created was also called heaven4 ,and here1 again1 it is said that the dry land1 that is1 the part from which the waters had withdrawn1 ,he called1 ,earth1 as distinct from the sea2 although the name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or not4 ,so by the expression ,he called we are to understand throughout that the nature or property ,he bestowed corresponded to the name ,he gave4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #fi1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,it ,was ,fitting ,that the ,production of ,plants ,should ,take ,place on the ,third ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day4 ,for plants have life1 as animals have4 ,but the production of animals belongs to the work1 not of distinction1 but of adornment4 ,therefore the production of plants1 as also belonging to the work of adornment1 ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day1 which is devoted to the work of distinction4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form4 ,but the words of ,gen4 #c3ag1 ,cursed is the earth in thy work1 thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee1 show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed4 ,therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day1 which is concerned with the work of formation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as plants are firmly fixed to the earth1 so are stones and metals1 which are1 nevertheless1 not mentioned in the work of formation4 ,plants1 therefore1 ought not to have been made on the third day4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #a3ab73 ,the earth brought forth the green herb1 after which there follows1 ,the evening and the morning were the third day4 ,i answer that1 ,on the third day1 as said 7,a4 #a71 the formless state of the earth comes to an end4 ,but this state is described as twofold4 ,on the one hand1 the earth was invisible or void1 being covered by the waters2 on the other hand1 it was shapeless or empty1 that is1 without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it1 as it were1 with a garment4 ,thus1 therefore1 in either respect this formless state ends on the third day3 first1 when the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared2 secondly1 when the earth brought forth the green herb4 ,but concerning the production of plants1 ,augustine's opinion differs from that of others4 ,for other commentators1 in accordance with the surface meaning of the text1 consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on this third day2 whereas ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #e2 viii1 #c7 says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes1 that is1 it received then the power to produce them4 ,he supports this view by the authority of ,scripture1 for it is said 7,gen4 #b3d1 #e73 ,these are the generations of the heaven and the earth1 when they were created1 in the day that 4 4 4 ,god made the heaven and the earth1 and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth1 and every herb of the ground before it grew4 ,therefore1 the production of plants in their causes1 within the earth1 took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface4 ,and this is confirmed by reason1 as follows4 ,in these first days ,god created all things in their origin or causes1 and from this work ,he subsequently rested4 ,yet afterwards1 by governing ,his creatures1 in the work of propagation1 ,he worketh until now4 ,now the production of plants from the earth is a work of propagation1 and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day1 but in their causes only4 ,however1 in accordance with other writers1 it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days1 but the reproduction among them of like from like1 to the government of the universe4 ,and ,scripture indicates this in the words1 before it sprung up in the earth1 and before it grew1 that is1 before like was produced from like2 just as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed4 ,wherefore ,scripture says pointedly 7,gen4 #a3aa73 ,let the earth bring forth the green herb1 and such as may seed1 as indicating the production of perfect species1 from which the seed of others should arise4 ,nor does the question where the seminal power may reside1 whether in root1 stem1 or fruit1 affect the argument4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,life in plants is hidden1 since they lack sense and local movement1 by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible4 ,and therefore1 since they are firmly fixed in the earth1 their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even before the earth was accursed1 thorns and thistles had been produced1 either virtually or actually4 ,but they were not produced in punishment of man2 as though the earth1 which he tilled to gain his food1 produced unfruitful and noxious plants4 ,hence it is said3 ,shall it bring forth to thee4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses1 as we have said 7,q4 #fg1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #c74 ,but minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth4 ,moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth1 and would seem to be species thereof4 ,for this reason1 therefore1 he makes no mention of them4 ,,question #gj ,,of ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,adornment1 ,,as ,,regards ,,the ,,fourth ,,day 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must next consider the work of adornment1 first as to each day by itself1 secondly as to all seven days in general4 ,in the first place1 then1 we consider the work of the fourth day1 secondly1 that of the fifth day1 thirdly1 that of the sixth day1 and fourthly1 such matters as belong to the seventh day4 ,under the first head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,as to the production of the lights2 7#b7 ,as to the end of their production2 7#c7 ,whether they are living beings8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,lights ,ought to ,have ,been ,produced on the ,fourth ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day4 ,for the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies3 wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form4 ,but as their matter was produced in the work of creation1 before there was any day1 so therefore were their forms4 ,it follows1 then1 that the lights were not produced on the fourth day4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the luminaries are1 as it were1 vessels of light4 ,but light was made on the first day4 ,the luminaries1 therefore1 should have been made on the first day1 not on the fourth4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the lights are fixed in the firmament1 as plants are fixed in the earth4 ,for1 the ,scripture says3 ,he set them in the firmament4 ,but plants are described as produced when the earth1 to which they are attached1 received its form4 ,the lights1 therefore1 should have been produced at the same time as the firmament1 that is to say1 on the second day4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 plants are an effect of the sun1 moon1 and other heavenly bodies4 ,now1 cause precedes effect in the order of nature4 ,the lights1 therefore1 ought not to have been produced on the fourth day1 but on the third day4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 as astronomers say1 there are many stars larger than the moon4 ,therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly described as the two great lights4 ,on the contrary1 ,suffices the authority of ,scripture4 ,i answer that1 ,in recapitulating the ,divine works1 ,scripture says 7,gen4 #b3a73 ,so the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them1 thereby indicating that the work was threefold4 ,in the first work1 that of creation1 the heaven and the earth were produced1 but as yet without form4 ,in the second1 or work of distinction1 the heaven and the earth were perfected1 either by adding substantial form to formless matter1 as ,augustine holds 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #aa71 or by giving them the order and beauty due to them1 as other holy writers suppose4 ,to these two works is added the work of adornment1 which is distinct from perfection4 ,for the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards1 seemingly1 those things that belong to them intrinsically1 but the adornment1 those that are extrinsic1 just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts and forms1 and his adornment1 in clothing or such like4 ,now just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement1 as separating one from another2 so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens1 and upon the earth4 ,but it has been stated above 7,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #a71 that three things are recorded as created1 namely1 the heaven1 the water1 and the earth2 and these three received their form from the three days' work of distinction1 so that heaven was formed on the first day2 on the second day the waters were separated2 and on the third day1 the earth was divided into sea and dry land4 ,so also is it in the work of adornment2 on the first day of this work1 which is the fourth of creation1 are produced the lights1 to adorn the heaven by their movements2 on the second day1 which is the fifth1 birds and fishes are called into being1 to make beautiful the intermediate element1 for they move in air and water1 which are here taken as one2 while on the third day1 which is the sixth1 animals are brought forth1 to move upon the earth and adorn it4 ,it must also here be noted that ,augustine's opinion 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #e7 on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers1 since he says that they were made actually1 and not merely virtually1 for the firmament has not the power of producing lights1 as the earth has of producing plants4 ,wherefore ,scripture does not say3 ,let the firmament produce lights1 though it says3 ,let the earth bring forth the green herb4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in ,augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here2 for he does not hold a succession of time in these works1 and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form4 ,nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements1 for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing1 as animals and plants were formed4 ,for those1 however1 who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements1 and naturally incorruptible1 the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning1 but that their substance1 at first formless1 is formed on this day1 by receiving not its substantial form1 but a determination of power4 ,as to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning1 but only as made on the fourth day1 ,chrysostom 7,hom4 vi in ,gen47 explains this by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry3 since the lights are proved not to be gods1 by the fact that they were not from the beginning4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,no difficulty exists if we follow ,augustine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual1 and that made on this day to be corporeal4 ,if1 however1 the light made on the first day is understood to be itself corporeal1 then it must be held to have been produced on that day merely as light in general2 and that on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate effects4 ,thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect1 those of the moon another1 and so forth4 ,hence1 speaking of such a determination of power1 ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 says that the sun's light which previously was without form1 was formed on the fourth day4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,according to ,ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres1 but have their own movement distinct from the movement of the spheres4 ,wherefore ,chrysostom says 7,hom4 vi in ,gen47 that ,he is said to have set them in the firmament1 not because ,he fixed them there immovably1 but because ,he bade them to be there1 even as ,he placed man in ,paradise1 to be there4 ,in the opinion of ,aristotle1 however1 the stars are fixed in their orbits1 and in reality have no other movement but that of the spheres2 and yet our senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres 7,de ,coel4 ii1 text4 #dc74 ,but ,moses describes what is obvious to sense1 out of condescension to popular ignorance1 as we have already said 7,q4 #fg1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fh1 ,a4 #c74 ,the objection1 however1 falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed1 even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses1 the testimony of which ,moses follows1 as stated above 7,de ,coel4 ii1 text4 #dc74 ,for although to the senses there appears but one firmament2 if we admit a higher and a lower firmament1 the lower will be that which was made on the second day1 and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher firmament4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the words of ,basil 7,hom4 v in ,hexaem471 plants were recorded as produced before the sun and moon1 to prevent idolatry1 since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods1 hold that plants originate primarily from these bodies4 ,although as ,chrysostom remarks 7,hom4 vi in ,gen471 the sun1 moon1 and stars cooperate in the work of production by their movements1 as the husbandman cooperates by his labor4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as ,chrysostom says1 the two lights are called great1 not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and power4 ,for though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon1 yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world4 ,moreover1 as far as the senses are concerned1 its apparent size is greater4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,cause ,assigned for the ,production of the ,lights ,is ,reasonable8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable4 ,for it is said 7,jer4 #aj3b73 ,be not afraid of the signs of heaven1 which the heathens fear4 ,therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sign is contradistinguished from cause4 ,but the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth4 ,therefore they are not signs4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day4 ,therefore the lights were not made for seasons1 and days1 and years1 that is1 in order to distinguish them4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself1 since the end is better than the means 7,topic4 iii74 ,but the lights are nobler than the earth4 ,therefore they were not made to enlighten it4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the new moon cannot be said to rule the night4 ,but such it probably did when first made2 for men begin to count from the new moon4 ,the moon1 therefore1 was not made to rule the night4 ,on the contrary1 ,suffices the authority of ,scripture4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #b71 a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act1 or for other creatures1 or for the whole universe1 or for the glory of ,god4 ,of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man1 is touched upon by ,moses1 in order to withdraw his people from idolatry4 ,hence it is written 7,deut4 #d3ai73 ,lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven1 thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven1 and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them1 which the ,lord thy ,god created for the service of all nations4 ,now1 he explains this service at the beginning of ,genesis as threefold4 ,first1 the lights are of service to man1 in regard to sight1 which directs him in his works1 and is most useful for perceiving objects4 ,in reference to this he says3 ,let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth4 ,secondly1 as regards the changes of the seasons1 which prevent weariness1 preserve health1 and provide for the necessities of food2 all of which things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter4 ,in reference to this he says3 ,let them be for seasons1 and for days1 and years4 ,thirdly1 as regards the convenience of business and work1 in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather1 as favorable to various occupations4 ,and in this respect he says3 ,let them be for signs4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures1 but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes1 and conversely4 ,hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign4 ,but he says signs1 rather than causes1 to guard against idolatry4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the general division of time into day and night took place on the first day1 as regards the diurnal movement1 which is common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day4 ,but the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years1 according as one day is hotter than another1 one season than another1 and one year than another1 are due to certain particular movements of the stars3 which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,light was given to the earth for the service of man1 who1 by reason of his soul1 is nobler than the heavenly bodies4 ,nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower1 considered not in itself1 but as ordained to the good of the universe4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,when the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning1 and thus it rules the night1 and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed1 as also were animals and man himself4 ,for although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes1 yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect4 ,augustine1 however 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii71 does not say this1 for he says that it is not unfitting that ,god made things imperfect1 which ,he afterwards perfected4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gj1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,lights of ,heaven ,are ,living ,beings8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings4 ,for the nobler a body is1 the more nobly it should be adorned4 ,but a body less noble than the heaven1 is adorned with living beings1 with fish1 birds1 and the beasts of the field4 ,therefore the lights of heaven1 as pertaining to its adornment1 should be living beings also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the nobler a body is1 the nobler must be its form4 ,but the sun1 moon1 and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals1 and must therefore have nobler forms4 ,now the noblest of all forms is the soul1 as being the first principle of life4 ,hence ,augustine 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xxix7 says3 ,every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life4 ,the lights of heaven1 therefore1 are living beings4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a cause is nobler than its effect4 ,but the sun1 moon1 and stars are a cause of life1 as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction1 which receive life from the power of the sun and stars4 ,much more1 therefore1 have the heavenly bodies a living soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural 7,de ,coel4 i1 text4 #g1 #h73 and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle4 ,now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension1 and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired 7,metaph4 xii1 text4 #cf74 ,therefore1 seemingly1 the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies3 and consequently they are living beings4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the first of movables is the heaven4 ,now1 of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself1 as is proved in ,phys4 viii1 text4 #cd1 because1 what is such of itself precedes that which is by another4 ,but only beings that are living move themselves1 as is shown in the same book 7text4 #bg74 ,therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii71 ,let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things1 for they have neither life nor sense4 ,i answer that1 ,philosophers have differed on this question4 ,anaxagoras1 for instance1 as ,augustine mentions 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xviii1 #da71 was condemned by the ,athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone1 and neither a god nor even a living being4 ,on the other hand1 the ,platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life4 ,nor was there less diversity of opinion among the ,doctors of the ,church4 ,it was the belief of ,origen 7,peri ,archon i7 and ,jerome that these bodies were alive1 and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words 7,eccles4 #a3f71 ,the spirit goeth forward1 surveying all places round about4 ,but ,basil 7,hom4 iii1 vi in ,hexaem47 and ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate4 ,augustine leaves the matter in doubt1 without committing himself to either theory1 though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings1 their souls must be akin to the angelic nature 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #ah2 ,enchiridion lviii74 ,in examining the truth of this question1 where such diversity of opinion exists1 we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body2 for the form does not exist for the matter1 but the matter for the form4 ,now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation1 which is to a certain extent its end4 ,yet for some of these operations1 as sensation and nutrition1 our body is a necessary instrument4 ,hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions4 ,there are1 however1 operations of the soul1 which are not exercised through the medium of the body1 though the body ministers1 as it were1 to their production4 ,the intellect1 for example1 makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses1 and thus far is dependent on the body1 although capable of existing apart from it4 ,it is not1 however1 possible that the functions of nutrition1 growth1 and generation1 through which the nutritive soul operates1 can be exercised by the heavenly bodies1 for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible4 ,equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body1 since all the senses depend on the sense of touch1 which perceives elemental qualities1 and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements1 whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental4 ,it follows1 then1 that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving2 for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception1 and is in proportion thereto4 ,but the operations of the intellect1 which does not act through the body1 do not need a body as their instrument1 except to supply phantasms through the senses4 ,moreover1 the operations of the sensitive soul1 as we have seen1 cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies4 ,accordingly1 the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect4 ,it remains1 then1 only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power1 not that the soul1 in order to move the heavenly body1 need be united to the latter as its form2 but by contact of power1 as a mover is united to that which he moves4 ,wherefore ,aristotle 7,phys4 viii1 text4 #db1 #dc71 after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts1 the moving and the moved1 goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts4 ,this1 he says1 is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies2 on the part of one only1 if one is a body and the other not4 ,the ,platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way1 as a contact of a moving power with the object moved1 and since ,plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings1 this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them1 and act as their moving power4 ,a proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance1 and not1 like bodies of specific gravity1 by nature1 lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained1 it rests2 this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies4 ,hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances4 ,augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by ,god through the spirit of life 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d74 ,from what has been said1 then1 it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals1 and that if they are called so1 it can only be equivocally4 ,it will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm1 and those who deny1 that these bodies have life1 is not a difference of things but of words4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement2 and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment1 for they are moved by a living substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one being may be nobler than another absolutely1 but not in a particular respect4 ,while1 then1 it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms1 since their form perfects their matter entirely1 which is not in potentiality to other forms2 whereas a soul does not do this4 ,also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the heavenly body is a mover moved1 it is of the nature of an instrument1 which acts in virtue of the agent3 and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the movements of the heavenly bodies are natural1 not on account of their active principle1 but on account of their passive principle2 that is to say1 from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved2 not by the union of the mover1 as the form1 with the moved1 as the matter1 but by contact with the motive power1 as we have said4 ,so far1 then1 the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic1 and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle2 just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal 7,phys4 viii1 text4 #bg74 ,,question #ga ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,the ,,fifth ,,day 7,in ,one ,article7 ,we must next consider the work of the fifth day4 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this work is not fittingly described4 ,for the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce4 ,but the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed4 ,therefore the words1 ,let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life1 and the fowl that may fly over the earth1 do not fittingly describe this work4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fishes and birds are not produced from water only1 but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition1 as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it4 ,it is not1 then1 fittingly said that fishes and birds are produced from water4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fishes move in the waters1 and birds in the air4 ,if1 then1 fishes are produced from the waters1 birds ought to be produced from the air1 and not from the waters4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 not all fishes creep through the waters1 for some1 as seals1 have feet and walk on land4 ,therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words1 ,let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs1 and generation of a higher order4 ,for they bring forth living beings1 whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs4 ,but the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature4 ,therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day1 before land animals4 ,on the contrary1 ,suffices the authority of ,scripture4 ,i answer that1 ,as said above1 7,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #a71 the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction4 ,hence1 as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction1 the middle1 or second1 day is devoted to the work of distinction of water1 which is the intermediate body1 so in the three days of the work of adornment1 the middle day1 which is the fifth1 is assigned to the adornment of the intermediate body1 by the production of birds and fishes4 ,as1 then1 ,moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day1 to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made1 so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second4 ,it must1 however1 be observed that ,augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds1 as he differs about the production of plants4 ,for while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually1 he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it was laid down by ,avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements1 and naturally1 without any kind of seed4 ,this1 however1 seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means1 and consequently1 those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way4 ,it ought1 then1 rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed1 the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed1 but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction1 the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies4 ,the material principle1 however1 in the generation of either kind of animals1 is either some element1 or something compounded of the elements4 ,but at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the ,word of ,god1 which produced animals from material elements1 either in act1 as some holy writers say1 or virtually1 as ,augustine teaches4 ,not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves1 as ,avicenna held1 but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view4 ,if considered in themselves1 it will be evident that the earthly element must predominate1 since the element that is least active1 namely1 the earth1 must be the most abundant in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal4 ,but if considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific motions1 thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which they move2 and hence the words in which their generation is described4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the air1 as not being so apparent to the senses1 is not enumerated by itself1 but with other things3 partly with the water1 because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations2 partly with the heaven as to the higher region4 ,but birds move in the lower part of the air1 and so are said to fly beneath the firmament1 even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds4 ,hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium2 and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water1 having something in common with both2 and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied1 through the characters possessed in common with that class1 rather than with the other4 ,but in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs1 the words1 ,let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life1 are followed by these3 ,god created great whales1 etc4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn1 rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves4 ,moreover1 in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect4 ,,question #gb ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,of ,,the ,,sixth ,,day 7,in ,one ,article7 ,we must now consider the work of the sixth day4 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that this work is not fittingly described4 ,for as birds and fishes have a living soul1 so also have land animals4 ,but these animals are not themselves living souls4 ,therefore the words1 ,let the earth bring forth the living creature1 should rather have been1 ,let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a genus ought not to be opposed to its species4 ,but beasts and cattle are quadrupeds4 ,therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as animals belong to a determinate genus and species1 so also does man4 ,but in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species1 and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals1 whereas it is said according to its genus and in its species4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 land animals are more like man1 whom ,god is recorded to have blessed1 than are birds and fishes4 ,but as birds and fishes are said to be blessed1 this should have been said1 with much more reason1 of the other animals as well4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 certain animals are generated from putrefaction1 which is a kind of corruption4 ,but corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world4 ,therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 certain animals are poisonous1 and injurious to man4 ,but there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned4 ,therefore such animals ought not to have been made by ,god at all1 since ,he is the ,author of good2 or at least not until man had sinned4 ,on the contrary1 ,suffices the authority of ,scripture4 ,i answer that1 ,as on the fifth day the intermediate body1 namely1 the water1 is adorned1 and thus that day corresponds to the second day2 so the sixth day1 on which the lowest body1 or the earth1 is adorned by the production of land animals1 corresponds to the third day4 ,hence the earth is mentioned in both places4 ,and here again ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 v7 that the production was potential1 and other holy writers that it was actual4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which ,scripture speaks of them1 as ,basil says 7,hom4 viii in ,hexaem474 ,the life of plants1 for instance1 is very imperfect and difficult to discern1 and hence1 in speaking of their production1 nothing is said of their life1 but only their generation is mentioned1 since only in generation is a vital act observed in them4 ,for the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life1 as will be shown later on 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #b74 ,but amongst animals1 those that live on land are1 generally speaking1 more perfect than birds and fishes1 not because the fish is devoid of memory1 as ,basil upholds 7,hom4 viii in ,hexaem47 and ,augustine rejects 7,gen4 ad lit4 iii71 but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order1 7yet some imperfect animals1 such as bees and ants1 are more intelligent in certain ways74 ,scripture1 therefore1 does not call fishes living creatures1 but creeping creatures having life2 whereas it does call land animals living creatures on account of their more perfect life1 and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul1 whilst land animals1 from the higher perfection of their life1 are1 as it were1 living souls with bodies subject to them4 ,but the life of man1 as being the most perfect grade1 is not said to be produced1 like the life of other animals1 by earth or water1 but immediately by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by cattle1 domestic animals are signified1 which in any way are of service to man3 but by beasts1 wild animals such as bears and lions are designated4 ,by creeping things those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth1 as serpents1 or those whose feet are too short to lift them far from the ground1 as the lizard and tortoise4 ,but since certain animals1 as deer and goats1 seem to fall under none of these classes1 the word quadrupeds is added4 ,or perhaps the word quadruped is used first as being the genus1 to which the others are added as species1 for even some reptiles1 such as lizards and tortoises1 are four-footed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in other animals1 and in plants1 mention is made of genus and species1 to denote the generation of like from like4 ,but it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man1 as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him4 ,again1 animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds1 to signify their remoteness from the ,divine image and likeness1 whereas man is said to be made to the image and likeness of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the blessing of ,god gives power to multiply by generation1 and1 having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes1 could be understood of the beasts of the earth1 without requiring to be repeated4 ,the blessing1 however1 is repeated in the case of man1 since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect 99,cf4 ,augustine1 ,gen4 ad lit4 iii1 #ab1 and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children4 ,as to plants1 since they experience neither desire of propagation1 nor sensation in generating1 they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another1 it was not incompatible with the first formation of things1 that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated4 ,hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things1 or of plants1 may have been generated then4 ,but those generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise than potentially4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,in the words of ,augustine 7,super4 ,gen4 contr4 ,manich4 i73 ,if an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use1 and which1 if he is a foolish fellow1 he considers unnecessary4 ,moreover1 should he carelessly fall into the fire1 or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool1 he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful2 whereas the craftsman1 knowing their use1 laughs at his folly4 ,and thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world1 through not seeing the reasons for their existence4 ,for though not required for the furnishing of our house1 these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe4 ,and1 since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed1 poisonous animals would not have injured him4 ,,question #gc ,,on ,,the ,,things ,,that ,,belong ,,to ,,the ,,seventh ,,day 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day4 ,under this head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,about the completion of the works2 7#b7 ,about the resting of ,god2 7#c7 ,about the blessing and sanctifying of this day4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,completion of the ,divine ,works ,ought to ,be ,ascribed to the ,seventh ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the completion of the ,divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day4 ,for all things that are done in this world belong to the ,divine works4 ,but the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world 7,matt4 #ac3ci1 #dj74 ,moreover1 the time of ,christ's ,incarnation is a time of completion1 wherefore it is called the time of fulness 99,vulg43 'the fulness of time' 7,gal4 #d3d74 ,and ,christ ,himself1 at the moment of ,his death1 cried out1 ,it is consummated 7,john #ai3cj74 ,hence the completion of the ,divine works does not belong to the seventh day4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the completion of a work is an act in itself4 ,but we do not read that ,god acted at all on the seventh day1 but rather that ,he rested from all ,his work4 ,therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added1 unless they are merely superfluous1 for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess4 ,but many things were made after the seventh day1 as the production of many individual beings1 and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing1 especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction4 ,also1 ,god creates daily new souls4 ,again1 the work of the ,incarnation was a new work1 of which it is said 7,jer4 #ca3bb73 ,the ,lord hath created a new thing upon the earth4 ,miracles also are new works1 of which it is said 7,eccles4 #cf3f73 ,renew thy signs1 and work new miracles4 ,moreover1 all things will be made new when the ,saints are glorified1 according to ,apoc4 #ba3e3 ,and ,he that sat on the throne said3 ,behold ,i make all things new4 ,therefore the completion of the ,divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #b3b73 ,on the seventh day ,god ended ,his work which ,he had made4 ,i answer that1 ,the perfection of a thing is twofold1 the first perfection and the second perfection4 ,the first perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect1 and this perfection is the form of the whole2 which form results from the whole having its parts complete4 ,but the second perfection is the end1 which is either an operation1 as the end of the harpist is to play the harp2 or something that is attained by an operation1 as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building4 ,but the first perfection is the cause of the second1 because the form is the principle of operation4 ,now the final perfection1 which is the end of the whole universe1 is the perfect beatitude of the ,saints at the consummation of the world2 and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding1 and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the first perfection is the cause of the second1 as above said4 ,now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required1 nature and grace4 ,therefore1 as said above1 the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world4 ,but this consummation existed previously in its causes1 as to nature1 at the first founding of the world1 as to grace1 in the ,incarnation of ,christ4 ,for1 ,grace and truth came by ,jesus ,christ 7,john #a3ag74 ,so1 then1 on the seventh day was the consummation of nature1 in ,christ's ,incarnation the consummation of grace1 and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god did act on the seventh day1 not by creating new creatures1 but by directing and moving ,his creatures to the work proper to them1 and thus ,he made some beginning of the second perfection4 ,so that1 according to our version of the ,scripture1 the completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day1 though according to another it is assigned to the sixth4 ,either version1 however1 may stand1 since the completion of the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day1 but its completion as regards their operation1 to the seventh4 ,it may also be added that in continuous movement1 so long as any movement further is possible1 movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest1 for rest denotes consummation of movement4 ,now ,god might have made many other creatures besides those which ,he made in the six days1 and hence1 by the fact that ,he ceased making them on the seventh day1 ,he is said on that day to have consummated ,his work4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing entirely new was afterwards made by ,god1 but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days4 ,some things1 indeed1 had a previous experience materially1 as the rib from the side of ,adam out of which ,god formed ,eve2 whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes1 as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind4 ,species1 also1 that are new1 if any such appear1 existed beforehand in various active powers2 so that animals1 and perhaps even new species of animals1 are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning4 ,again1 animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species1 as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare2 but even these existed previously in their causes1 in the works of the six days4 ,some also existed beforehand by way of similitude1 as the souls now created4 ,and the work of the ,incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed1 for as we read 7,phil4 #b3g71 ,the ,son of ,god was made in the likeness of men4 ,and again1 the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude2 and that of the body in the heaven1 especially the empyrean4 ,hence it is written 7,eccles4 #a3aj71 ,nothing under the sun is new1 for it hath already gone before1 in the ages that were before us4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,rested on the ,seventh ,day from ,all ,his ,work8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god did not rest on the seventh day from all ,his work4 ,for it is said 7,john #e3ag71 ,my ,father worketh until now1 and ,i work4 ,god1 then1 did not rest on the seventh day from all ,his work4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 rest is opposed to movement1 or to labor1 which movement causes4 ,but1 as ,god produced ,his work without movement and without labor1 ,he cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from ,his work4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 should it be said that ,god rested on the seventh day by causing man to rest2 against this it may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction to ,his work2 now the words ,god created or made this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that ,he made man create or make these things4 ,therefore the resting of ,god cannot be explained as ,his making man to rest4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,gen4 #b3b73 ,god rested on the seventh day from all the work which ,he had done4 ,i answer that1 ,rest is1 properly speaking1 opposed to movement1 and consequently to the labor that arises from movement4 ,but although movement1 strictly speaking1 is a quality of bodies1 yet the word is applied also to spiritual things1 and in a twofold sense4 ,on the one hand1 every operation may be called a movement1 and thus the ,divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its object1 in communicating itself to that object1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii74 ,on the other hand1 the desire that tends to an object outside itself1 is said to move towards it4 ,hence rest is taken in two senses1 in one sense meaning a cessation from work1 in the other1 the satisfying of desire4 ,now1 in either sense ,god is said to have rested on the seventh day4 ,first1 because ,he ceased from creating new creatures on that day1 for1 as said above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c71 ,he made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously1 in some degree1 in the first works2 secondly1 because ,he ,himself had no need of the things that ,he had made1 but was happy in the fruition of ,himself4 ,hence1 when all things were made ,he is not said to have rested in ,his works1 as though needing them for ,his own happiness1 but to have rested from them1 as in fact resting in ,himself1 as ,he suffices for ,himself and fulfils ,his own desire4 ,and even though from all eternity ,he rested in ,himself1 yet the rest in ,himself1 which ,he took after ,he had finished ,his works1 is that rest which belongs to the seventh day4 ,and this1 says ,augustine1 is the meaning of ,god's resting from ,his works on that day 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god indeed worketh until now by preserving and providing for the creatures ,he has made1 but not by the making of new ones4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement1 but to the production of new creatures1 and to the desire tending to an external object4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even as ,god rests in ,himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of ,himself1 so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of ,god4 ,thus1 also1 ,he makes us find rest in ,himself1 both from ,his works and our own4 ,it is not1 then1 unreasonable to say that ,god rested in giving rest to us4 ,still1 this explanation must not be set down as the only one1 and the other is the first and principal explanation4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,blessing and ,sanctifying ,are ,due to the ,seventh ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the seventh day4 ,for it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has happened in it1 or some evil been avoided4 ,but whether ,god works or ceases from work nothing accrues to ,him or is lost to ,him4 ,therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,latin benedictio blessing is derived from bonitas goodness4 ,but it is the nature of good to spread and communicate itself1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,the days1 therefore1 in which ,god produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than the day on which ,he ceased producing them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 over each creature a blessing was pronounced1 as upon each work it was said1 ,god saw that it was good4 ,therefore it was not necessary that after all had been produced1 the seventh day should be blessed4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3c71 ,god blessed the seventh day and sanctified it1 because in it ,he had rested from all ,his work4 ,i answer that1 ,as said above 7,a4 #b71 ,god's rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways4 ,first1 in that ,he ceased from producing new works1 though ,he still preserves and provides for the creatures ,he has made4 ,secondly1 in that after all ,his works ,he rested in ,himself4 ,according to the first meaning1 then1 a blessing befits the seventh day1 since1 as we explained 7,q4 #gb1 ad #d71 the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication2 for which reason ,god said to the creatures which ,he blessed3 ,increase and multiply4 ,now1 this increase is effected through ,god's ,providence over ,his creatures1 securing the generation of like from like4 ,and according to the second meaning1 it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified1 since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in ,god4 ,for this reason things dedicated to ,god are said to be sanctified4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to ,god1 or be taken from ,him1 but because something is added to creatures by their multiplying1 and by their resting in ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes1 but after being thus produced1 they are multiplied and preserved1 and this work also belongs to the ,divine goodness4 ,and the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone ,god finds ,his own rest1 and we may find ours in its fruition4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature2 but the blessing attached to the seventh day1 to its propagation4 ,,question #gd ,,on ,,all ,,the ,,seven ,,days ,,in ,,common 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we next consider all the seven days in common3 and there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,as to the sufficiency of these days2 7#b7 ,whether they are all one day1 or more than one8 7#c7 ,as to certain modes of speaking which ,scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #a ,whether these days are sufficiently enumerated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that these days are not sufficiently enumerated4 ,for the work of creation is no less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another4 ,but separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment1 and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water4 ,but one day is assigned to the distinction of water1 and another to the distinction of the land4 ,therefore1 other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the beasts of the earth1 whereas man differs more from other animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other4 ,but one day is devoted to the production of fishes1 and another to that of the beast of the earth4 ,another day1 then1 ought to be assigned to the production of birds and another to that of man4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it would seem1 on the other hand1 that some of these days are superfluous4 ,light1 for instance1 stands to the luminaries in the relation of accident to subject4 ,but the subject is produced at the same time as the accident proper to it4 ,the light and the luminaries1 therefore1 ought not to have been produced on different days4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 these days are devoted to the first instituting of the world4 ,but as on the seventh day nothing was instituted1 that day ought not to be enumerated with the others4 ,i answer that1 ,the reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above 7,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #a71 namely1 that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished1 and then each part adorned and filled1 as it were1 by the beings that inhabit it4 ,now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three1 according to some holy writers1 these parts being the heaven1 or highest part1 the water1 or middle part1 and the earth1 or the lowest part4 ,thus the ,pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things1 the beginning1 the middle1 and the end4 ,the first part1 then1 is distinguished on the first day1 and adorned on the fourth1 the middle part distinguished on the middle day1 and adorned on the fifth1 and the third part distinguished on the third day1 and adorned on the sixth4 ,but ,augustine1 while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days1 differs as to the first three1 for1 according to him1 spiritual creatures are formed on the first day1 and corporeal on the two others1 the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days1 and the lower on the second4 ,thus1 then1 the perfection of the ,divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six1 which is the sum of its aliquot parts1 one1 two1 three2 since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures1 two to that of corporeal creatures1 and three to the work of adornment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,augustine1 the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter1 and of the formless spiritual nature1 both of which are outside of time1 as he himself says 7,confess4 xii1 #ab74 ,thus1 then1 the creation of either is set down before there was any day4 ,but it may also be said1 following other holy writers1 that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time2 whereas the work of creation lies only in the ,divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously4 ,for this reason1 therefore1 every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place in a day1 but creation in the beginning which denotes something indivisible4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fire and air1 as not distinctly known by the unlettered1 are not expressly named by ,moses among the parts of the world1 but reckoned with the intermediate part1 or water1 especially as regards the lowest part of the air2 or with the heaven1 to which the higher region of air approaches1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #ac74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world1 and therefore the days of their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world1 or different parts4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the nature of light1 as existing in a subject1 was made on the first day2 and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew1 but that they then received a form that they had not before1 as said above 7,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #a ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #ae71 after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days1 something distinct is attributed to the seventh--namely1 that on it ,god rested in ,himself from ,his works3 and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six4 ,it may also be said1 with the other writers1 that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state1 in that nothing new was to be added to it1 and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six1 from its being devoted to cessation from work4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,all ,these ,days ,are ,one ,day8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all these days are one day4 ,for it is written 7,gen4 #b3d1 #e73 ,these are the generations of the heaven and the earth1 when they were created1 in the day that the ,lord 4 4 4 made the heaven and the earth1 and every plant of the field1 before it sprung up in the earth4 ,therefore the day in which ,god made the heaven and the earth1 and every plant of the field1 is one and the same day4 ,but ,he made the heaven and the earth on the first day1 or rather before there was any day1 but the plant of the field ,he made on the third day4 ,therefore the first and third days are but one day1 and for a like reason all the rest4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is said 7,ecclus4 #ah3a73 ,he that liveth for ever1 created all things together4 ,but this would not be the case if the days of these works were more than one4 ,therefore they are not many but one only4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 on the seventh day ,god ceased from all new works4 ,if1 then1 the seventh day is distinct from the other days1 it follows that ,he did not make that day2 which is not admissible4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the entire work ascribed to one day ,god perfected in an instant1 for with each work are the words 7,god7 said 4 4 4 4 and it was 4 4 4 done4 ,if1 then1 ,he had kept back ,his next work to another day1 it would follow that for the remainder of a day ,he would have ceased from working and left it vacant1 which would be superfluous4 ,the day1 therefore1 of the preceding work is one with the day of the work that follows4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a71 ,the evening and the morning were the second day 4 4 4 the third day1 and so on4 ,but where there is a second and third there are more than one4 ,there was not1 therefore1 only one day4 ,i answer that1 ,on this question ,augustine differs from other expositors4 ,his opinion is that all the days that are called seven1 are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bb2 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #i2 ,ad ,orosium xxvi72 while others consider there were seven distinct days1 not one only4 ,now1 these two opinions1 taken as explaining the literal text of ,genesis1 are certainly widely different4 ,for ,augustine understands by the word day1 the knowledge in the mind of the angels1 and hence1 according to him1 the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the ,divine works1 the second day their knowledge of the second work1 and similarly with the rest4 ,thus1 then1 each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days1 inasmuch as ,god wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind2 which can know many things at the same time1 especially in the ,word1 in ,whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated4 ,so the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known1 and not a succession in the knowledge acquired1 or in the things produced4 ,moreover1 angelic knowledge is appropriately called day1 since light1 the cause of day1 is to be found in spiritual things1 as ,augustine observes 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bh74 ,in the opinion of the others1 however1 the days signify a succession both in time1 and in the things produced4 ,if1 however1 these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production1 they will be found not greatly to differ1 if the diversity of opinion existing on two points1 as already shown 7,q4 #fg1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #a71 between ,augustine and other writers is taken into account4 ,first1 because ,augustine takes the earth and the water as first created1 to signify matter totally without form2 but the making of the firmament1 the gathering of the waters1 and the appearing of dry land1 to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter4 ,but other holy writers take the earth and the water1 as first created1 to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms1 and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing1 as also has been shown 7,q4 #fg1 ,,aa4 #a1 #d2 ,q4 #fi1 ,a4 #a74 ,secondly1 some writers hold that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days2 ,augustine1 that they were produced potentially4 ,now the opinion of ,augustine1 that the works of the six days were simultaneous1 is consistent with either view of the mode of production4 ,for the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements1 and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually4 ,there remains1 however1 a difference as to four points2 since1 according to the latter1 there was a time1 after the production of creatures1 in which light did not exist1 the firmament had not been formed1 and the earth was still covered by the waters1 nor had the heavenly bodies been formed1 which is the fourth difference2 which are not consistent with ,augustine's explanation4 ,in order1 therefore1 to be impartial1 we must meet the arguments of either side4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,on the day on which ,god created the heaven and the earth1 ,he created also every plant of the field1 not1 indeed1 actually1 but before it sprung up in the earth1 that is1 potentially4 ,and this work ,augustine ascribes to the third day1 but other writers to the first instituting of the world4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless4 ,but ,he did not create all things together1 so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment4 ,hence the word creation is significant4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,on the seventh day ,god ceased from making new things1 but not from providing for their increase1 and to this latter work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all things were not distinguished and adorned together1 not from a want of power on ,god's part1 as requiring time in which to work1 but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world4 ,hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world1 as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,according to ,augustine1 the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,scripture ,uses ,suitable ,words to ,express the ,work of the ,six ,days8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem the ,scripture does not use suitable words to express the works of the six days4 ,for as light1 the firmament1 and other similar works were made by the ,word of ,god1 so were the heaven and the earth4 ,for all things were made by ,him 7,john #a3c74 ,therefore in the creation of heaven and earth1 as in the other works1 mention should have been made of the ,word of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the water was created by ,god1 yet its creation is not mentioned4 ,therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently described4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is said 7,gen4 #a3ca73 ,god saw all the things that ,he had made1 and they were very good4 ,it ought1 then1 to have been said of each work1 ,god saw that it was good4 ,the omission1 therefore1 of these words in the work of creation and in that of the second day1 is not fitting4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,spirit of ,god is ,god ,himself4 ,but it does not befit ,god to move and to occupy place4 ,therefore the words1 ,the ,spirit of ,god moved over the waters1 are unbecoming4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 what is already made is not made over again4 ,therefore to the words1 ,god said3 ,let the firmament be made 4 4 4 and it was so1 it is superfluous to add1 ,god made the firmament4 ,and the like is to be said of other works4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day1 since the day has many parts4 ,therefore the words1 ,the evening and morning were the second day or1 the third day1 are not suitable4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 first1 not one1 corresponds to second and third4 ,it should therefore have been said that1 ,the evening and the morning were the first day1 rather than one day4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #d71 the person of the ,son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world1 and in its distinction and adornment1 but differently in either place4 ,for distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form4 ,but as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist1 which may be called his intelligible word1 so the giving form to every creature is by the word of ,god2 and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the ,word is mentioned4 ,but in creation the ,son is mentioned as the beginning1 by the words1 ,in the beginning ,god created1 since by creation is understood the production of formless matter4 ,but according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms1 another explanation must be given2 and therefore ,basil says 7,hom4 ii1 iii in ,hexaem47 that the words1 ,god said1 signify a ,divine command4 ,such a command1 however1 could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei ix1 #cc71 by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature1 and by the earth1 the formless matter of all corporeal things1 and thus no creature is omitted4 ,but1 according to ,basil 7,hom4 i in ,hexaem471 the heaven and the earth1 as the two extremes1 are alone mentioned1 the intervening things being left to be understood1 since all these move heavenwards1 if light1 or earthwards1 if heavy4 ,and others say that under the word1 earth1 ,scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements as 7,ps4 #adh3g1h7 after the words1 ,praise the ,lord from the earth1 is added1 fire1 hail1 snow1 and ice4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the account of the creation there is found something to correspond to the words1 ,god saw that it was good1 used in the work of distinction and adornment1 and this appears from the consideration that the ,holy ,spirit is ,love4 ,now1 there are two things1 says ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #h7 which came from ,god's love of ,his creatures1 their existence and their permanence4 ,that they might then exist1 and exist permanently1 the ,spirit of ,god1 it is said1 moved over the waters--that is to say1 over that formless matter1 signified by water1 even as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art1 that out of them he may form his work4 ,and the words1 ,god saw that it was good1 signify that the things that ,he had made were to endure1 since they express a certain satisfaction taken by ,god in ,his works1 as of an artist in his art3 not as though ,he knew the creature otherwise1 or that the creature was pleasing to ,him otherwise1 than before ,he made it4 ,thus in either work1 of creation and of formation1 the ,trinity of ,persons is implied4 ,in creation the ,person of the ,father is indicated by ,god the ,creator1 the ,person of the ,son by the beginning1 in which ,he created1 and the ,person of the ,holy ,ghost by the ,spirit that moved over the waters4 ,but in the formation1 the ,person of the ,father is indicated by ,god that speaks1 and the ,person of the ,son by the ,word in which ,he speaks1 and the ,person of the ,holy ,spirit by the satisfaction with which ,god saw that what was made was good4 ,and if the words1 ,god saw that it was good1 are not said of the work of the second day1 this is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day1 but perfected on the third4 ,hence these words1 that are said of the third day1 refer also to the second4 ,or it may be that ,scripture does not use these words of approval of the second day's work1 because this is concerned with the distinction of things not evident to the senses of mankind4 ,or1 again1 because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air1 which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe1 nor of the principal divisions of the world4 ,the above three reasons are given by ,rabbi ,moses 99,perplex4 ii41 and to these may be added a mystical one derived from numbers and assigned by some writers1 according to whom the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number is an imperfect number1 as receding from the perfection of unity4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,rabbi ,moses 7,perplex4 ii7 understands by the ,spirit of the ,lord1 the air or the wind1 as ,plato also did1 and says that it is so called according to the custom of ,scripture1 in which these things are throughout attributed to ,god4 ,but according to the holy writers1 the ,spirit of the ,lord signifies the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is said to move over the water--that is to say1 over what ,augustine holds to mean formless matter1 lest it should be supposed that ,god loved of necessity the works ,he was to produce1 as though ,he stood in need of them4 ,for love of that kind is subject to1 not superior to1 the object of love4 ,moreover1 it is fittingly implied that the ,spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished1 since that movement is not one of place1 but of pre-eminent power1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #g74 ,it is the opinion1 however1 of ,basil 7,hom4 ii in ,hexaem47 that the ,spirit moved over the element of water1 fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power1 as the hen broods over her chickens4 ,for water has especially a life-giving power1 since many animals are generated in water1 and the seed of all animals is liquid4 ,also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism1 according to ,john #c3e3 ,unless a man be born again of water and the ,holy ,ghost1 he cannot enter into the kingdom of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 i1 #h71 these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures2 first1 their being in the ,word1 denoted by the command ,let 4 4 4 be made2 secondly1 their being in the angelic mind1 signified by the words1 ,it was 4 4 4 done2 thirdly1 their being in their proper nature1 by the words1 ,he made4 ,and because the formation of the angels is recorded on the first day1 it was not necessary there to add1 ,he made4 ,it may also be said1 following other writers1 that the words1 ,he said1 and ,let 4 4 4 be made1 denote ,god's command1 and the words1 ,it was done1 the fulfilment of that command4 ,but as it was necessary1 for the sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were made by the angels1 to mention how things were made1 it is added1 in order to remove that error1 that ,god ,himself made them4 ,hence1 in each work1 after the words1 ,it was done1 some act of ,god is expressed by some such words as1 ,he made1 or1 ,he divided1 or1 ,he called4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #bb1 #cj71 by the evening and the morning are understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the angels1 which has been explained 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #f1 #g74 ,but1 according to ,basil 7,hom4 ii in ,hexaem471 the entire period takes its name1 as is customary1 from its more important part1 the day4 ,an instance of this is found in the words of ,jacob1 ,the days of my pilgrimage1 where night is not mentioned at all4 ,but the evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day1 since day begins with morning and ends with evening1 or because evening denotes the beginning of night1 and morning the beginning of day4 ,it seems fitting1 also1 that where the first distinction of creatures is described1 divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their beginning4 ,and the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends the day1 which begins with the light1 the termination of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness1 which ends with the morning4 ,but ,chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening1 but with the morning 7,hom4 v in ,gen474 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,the words one day are used when day is first instituted1 to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours4 ,hence1 by mentioning one1 the measure of a natural day is fixed4 ,another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course4 ,and yet another1 because at the completion of a week of seven days1 the first day returns which is one with the eighth day4 ,the three reasons assigned above are those given by ,basil 7,hom4 ii in ,hexaem474 ,,treatise ,,on ,,man 7,,qq4 #ge-ajb7 ,,question #ge ,,of ,,man ,,who ,,is ,,composed ,,of ,a ,,spiritual ,,and ,a ,,corporeal ,,substance3 ,,and ,,in ,,the ,,first ,,place1 ,,concerning ,,what ,,belongs ,,to ,,the ,,essence ,,of ,,the ,,soul 7,in ,seven ,articles7 ,having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature1 we now proceed to treat of man1 who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance4 ,we shall treat first of the nature of man1 and secondly of his origin4 ,now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul2 but not in relation to the body1 except in so far as the body has relation to the soul4 ,hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul4 ,and since ,dionysius 7,ang4 ,hier4 xi7 says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances--essence1 power1 and operation--we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul2 secondly1 of what belongs to its power2 thirdly1 of what belongs to its operation4 ,concerning the first1 two points have to be considered2 the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself2 the second is the union of the soul with the body4 ,under the first head there are seven points of inquiry4 7#a7 ,whether the soul is a body8 7#b7 ,whether the human soul is a subsistence8 7#c7 ,whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent8 7#d7 ,whether the soul is man1 or is man composed of soul and body8 7#e7 ,whether the soul is composed of matter and form8 7#f7 ,whether the soul is incorruptible8 7#g7 ,whether the soul is of the same species as an angel8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,soul ,is a ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul is a body4 ,for the soul is the moving principle of the body4 ,nor does it move unless moved4 ,first1 because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved1 since nothing gives what it has not2 for instance1 what is not hot does not give heat4 ,secondly1 because if there be anything that moves and is not moved1 it must be the cause of eternal1 unchanging movement1 as we find proved ,phys4 viii1 #f2 and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal1 which is caused by the soul4 ,therefore the soul is a mover moved4 ,but every mover moved is a body4 ,therefore the soul is a body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness4 ,but there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing4 ,if1 therefore1 the soul were not a body1 it could not have knowledge of corporeal things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 between the mover and the moved there must be contact4 ,but contact is only between bodies4 ,since1 therefore1 the soul moves the body1 it seems that the soul must be a body4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #f7 that the soul is simple in comparison with the body1 inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk4 ,i answer that1 ,to seek the nature of the soul1 we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live3 for we call living things animate1 99i4e4 having a soul and those things which have no life1 inanimate4 ,now life is shown principally by two actions1 knowledge and movement4 ,the philosophers of old1 not being able to rise above their imagination1 supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal3 for they asserted that only bodies were real things2 and that what is not corporeal is nothing3 hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal4 ,this opinion can be proved to be false in many ways2 but we shall make use of only one proof1 based on universal and certain principles1 which shows clearly that the soul is not a body4 ,it is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul1 for then the eye would be a soul1 as it is a principle of vision2 and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul3 but it is the first principle of life1 which we call the soul4 ,now1 though a body may be a principle of life1 as the heart is a principle of life in an animal1 yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life4 ,for it is clear that to be a principle of life1 or to be a living thing1 does not belong to a body as such2 since1 if that were the case1 every body would be a living thing1 or a principle of life4 ,therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life1 as such a body4 ,now that it is actually such a body1 it owes to some principle which is called its act4 ,therefore the soul1 which is the first principle of life1 is not a body1 but the act of a body2 thus heat1 which is the principle of calefaction1 is not a body1 but an act of a body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as everything which is in motion must be moved by something else1 a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely1 we must allow that not every mover is moved4 ,for1 since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality1 the mover gives what it has to the thing moved1 inasmuch as it causes it to be in act4 ,but1 as is shown in ,phys4 viii1 #f1 there is a mover which is altogether immovable1 and not moved either essentially1 or accidentally2 and such a mover can cause an invariable movement4 ,there is1 however1 another kind of mover1 which1 though not moved essentially1 is moved accidentally2 and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement2 such a mover1 is the soul4 ,there is1 again1 another mover1 which is moved essentially--namely1 the body4 ,and because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies1 they maintained that every mover is moved2 and that the soul is moved directly1 and is a body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower2 but given a thing which knows potentially1 and afterwards knows actually1 the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower1 not actually1 but only potentially2 thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye1 but only potentially4 ,hence it is necessary1 not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul1 but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness4 ,but the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality2 and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body2 and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are two kinds of contact2 of quantity1 and of power4 ,by the former a body can be touched only by a body2 by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing1 which moves that body4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,human ,soul ,is ,something ,subsistent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent4 ,for that which subsists is said to be this particular thing4 ,now this particular thing is said not of the soul1 but of that which is composed of soul and body4 ,therefore the soul is not something subsistent4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 everything subsistent operates4 ,but the soul does not operate2 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #d71 to say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds4 ,therefore the soul is not subsistent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the soul were subsistent1 it would have some operation apart from the body4 ,but it has no operation apart from the body1 not even that of understanding3 for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm1 which cannot exist apart from the body4 ,therefore the human soul is not something subsistent4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #g73 ,who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body1 will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul1 are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature--i4e4 imaginary pictures of corporeal things4 ,therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal1 but it is also a substance1 that is1 something subsistent4 ,i answer that1 ,it must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul1 is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent4 ,for it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things4 ,now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature2 because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else4 ,thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor1 is insensible to anything sweet1 and everything seems bitter to it4 ,therefore1 if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies4 ,now every body has its own determinate nature4 ,therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body4 ,it is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ2 since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies2 as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye1 but also in a glass vase1 the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color4 ,therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body4 ,now only that which subsists can have an operation per se4 ,for nothing can operate but what is actual3 for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat1 but that what is hot gives heat4 ,we must conclude1 therefore1 that the human soul1 which is called the intellect or the mind1 is something incorporeal and subsistent4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this particular thing can be taken in two senses4 ,firstly1 for anything subsistent2 secondly1 for that which subsists1 and is complete in a specific nature4 ,the former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form2 the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part1 so that a hand can be called this particular thing in the first sense1 but not in the second4 ,therefore1 as the human soul is a part of human nature1 it can indeed be called this particular thing1 in the first sense1 as being something subsistent2 but not in the second1 for in this sense1 what is composed of body and soul is said to be this particular thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion1 but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved1 as is clear from the context4 ,or we may reply that to operate per se belongs to what exists per se4 ,but for a thing to exist per se1 it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent1 as an accident or a material form2 even though it be part of something4 ,nevertheless1 that is rightly said to subsist per se1 which is neither inherent in the above sense1 nor part of anything else4 ,in this sense1 the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist per se2 nor can it for that reason be said to operate per se4 ,hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole4 ,for we say that man sees with the eye1 and feels with the hand1 and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat2 for heat1 strictly speaking1 does not give heat4 ,we may therefore say that the soul understands1 as the eye sees2 but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the body is necessary for the action of the intellect1 not as its origin of action1 but on the part of the object2 for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight4 ,neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent2 otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent1 since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,souls of ,brute ,animals ,are ,subsistent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent4 ,for man is of the same genus as other animals2 and1 as we have just shown 7,a4 #b71 the soul of man is subsistent4 ,therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects4 ,but the intellect1 apart from the body1 apprehends intelligible objects4 ,therefore the sensitive faculty1 apart from the body1 perceives sensible objects4 ,therefore1 since the souls of brute animals are sensitive1 it follows that they are subsistent2 just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the soul of brute animals moves the body4 ,but the body is not a mover1 but is moved4 ,therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,is what is written in the book ,de ,eccl4 ,dogm4 xvi1 xvii3 ,man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul3 whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent4 ,i answer that1 ,the ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect1 and referred both to a corporeal principle1 as has been said 7,a4 #a74 ,plato1 however1 drew a distinction between intellect and sense2 yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle1 maintaining that sensing1 just as understanding1 belongs to the soul as such4 ,from this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent4 ,but ,aristotle held that of the operations of the soul1 understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ4 ,on the other hand1 sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body2 thus in the act of vision1 the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color3 and so with the other senses4 ,hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no per se operation of its own1 and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite4 ,wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no per se operations they are not subsistent4 ,for the operation of anything follows the mode of its being4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although man is of the same genus as other animals1 he is of a different species4 ,specific difference is derived from the difference of form2 nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object1 in so far as each is in potentiality to its object4 ,but in another way their relations differ1 inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body2 so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense2 a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect4 ,for an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower4 ,if1 however1 in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary1 this result is accidental1 inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,motive power is of two kinds4 ,one1 the appetitive power1 commands motion4 ,the operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body2 for anger1 joy1 and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body4 ,the other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite2 and the act of this power does not consist in moving1 but in being moved4 ,whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,soul ,is ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul is man4 ,for it is written 7#b ,cor4 #d3af73 ,though our outward man is corrupted1 yet the inward man is renewed day by day4 ,but that which is within man is the soul4 ,therefore the soul is the inward man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the human soul is a substance4 ,but it is not a universal substance4 ,therefore it is a particular substance4 ,therefore it is a hypostasis or a person2 and it can only be a human person4 ,therefore the soul is man2 for a human person is a man4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #c7 commends ,varro as holding that man is not a mere soul1 nor a mere body2 but both soul and body4 ,i answer that1 ,the assertion the soul is man1 can be taken in two senses4 ,first1 that man is a soul2 though this particular man1 ,socrates1 for instance1 is not a soul1 but composed of soul and body4 ,i say this1 forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species2 while matter is part of the individual1 and not the species4 ,this cannot be true2 for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies2 and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only1 but the form and the matter4 ,hence in natural things the matter is part of the species2 not1 indeed1 signate matter1 which is the principle of individuality2 but the common matter4 ,for as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul1 of this flesh1 and of these bones2 so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul1 flesh1 and bones2 for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species1 must belong to the substance of the species4 ,it may also be understood in this sense1 that this soul is this man2 and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it1 apart from the body2 because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only2 and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing1 is that thing2 wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man4 ,but it has been shown above 7,a4 #c7 that sensation is not the operation of the soul only4 ,since1 then1 sensation is an operation of man1 but not proper to him1 it is clear that man is not a soul only1 but something composed of soul and body4 ,plato1 through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul1 could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 ix1 #h71 a thing seems to be chiefly what is principal in it2 thus what the governor of a state does1 the state is said to do4 ,in this way sometimes what is principal in man is said to be man2 sometimes1 indeed1 the intellectual part which1 in accordance with truth1 is called the inward man2 and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses4 ,and this is called the outward man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person1 but that which has the complete nature of its species4 ,hence a hand1 or a foot1 is not called a hypostasis1 or a person2 nor1 likewise1 is the soul alone so called1 since it is a part of the human species4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,soul ,is ,composed of ,matter and ,form8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form4 ,for potentiality is opposed to actuality4 ,now1 whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the ,first ,act1 which is ,god2 by participation of ,whom1 all things are good1 are beings1 and are living things1 as is clear from the teaching of ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality4 ,but the first potentiality is primary matter4 ,therefore1 since the human soul is1 after a manner1 in potentiality2 which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding2 it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter1 as part of itself4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 wherever the properties of matter are found1 there matter is4 ,but the properties of matter are found in the soul--namely1 to be a subject1 and to be changed1 for it is a subject to science1 and virtue2 and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue4 ,therefore matter is in the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things which have no matter1 have no cause of their existence1 as the ,philosopher says ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii1 #f74 ,but the soul has a cause of its existence1 since it is created by ,god4 ,therefore the soul has matter4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 what has no matter1 and is a form only1 is a pure act1 and is infinite4 ,but this belongs to ,god alone4 ,therefore the soul has matter4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 vii1 #g1h1i7 proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter1 nor of spiritual matter4 ,i answer that1 ,the soul has no matter4 ,we may consider this question in two ways4 ,first1 from the notion of a soul in general2 for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body4 ,now1 either it is a form by virtue of itself1 in its entirety1 or by virtue of some part of itself4 ,if by virtue of itself in its entirety1 then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter1 if by matter we understand something purely potential3 for a form1 as such1 is an act2 and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act1 since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto4 ,if1 however1 it be a form by virtue of a part of itself1 then we call that part the soul3 and that matter1 which it actualizes first1 we call the primary animate4 ,secondly1 we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual4 ,for it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient4 ,now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower4 ,but the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely3 for instance1 it knows a stone absolutely as a stone2 and therefore the form of a stone absolutely1 as to its proper formal idea1 is in the intellectual soul4 ,therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form1 and not something composed of matter and form4 ,for if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form1 the forms of things would be received into it as individuals1 and so it would only know the individual3 just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ2 since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that the intellectual soul1 and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely1 is exempt from composition of matter and form4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,first ,act is the universal principle of all acts2 because ,it is infinite1 virtually precontaining all things1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,wherefore things participate of ,it not as a part of themselves1 but by diffusion of ,its processions4 ,now as potentiality is receptive of act1 it must be proportionate to act4 ,but the acts received which proceed from the ,first ,infinite ,act1 and are participations thereof1 are diverse1 so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts1 as there is one act1 from which all participated acts are derived2 for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the ,first ,act4 ,now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter1 as appears from the diversity of the things received by each4 ,for primary matter receives individual forms2 whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms4 ,hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality4 ,as1 therefore1 the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another1 so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change4 ,for the intelligence is subject to knowledge1 and is changed from ignorance to knowledge1 by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the form causes matter to be1 and so does the agent2 wherefore the agent causes matter to be1 so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form4 ,a subsistent form1 however1 does not owe its existence to some formal principle1 nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act4 ,so after the words quoted above1 the ,philosopher concludes1 that in things composed of matter and form there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act2 while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once4 99,the ,leonine edition has1 simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid4 ,the ,parma edition of ,st4 ,thomas's ,commentary on ,aristotle has1 statim per se unum quiddam est 4 4 4 et ens quiddam4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,everything participated is compared to the participator as its act4 ,but whatever created form be supposed to subsist per se1 must have existence by participation2 for even life1 or anything of that sort1 is a participator of existence1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator2 so that ,god alone1 ,who is ,his own existence1 is pure act and infinite4 ,but in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality1 not1 indeed1 of matter and form1 but of form and participated existence4 ,wherefore some say that they are composed of that whereby they are and that which they are2 for existence itself is that by which a thing is4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,human ,soul ,is ,incorruptible8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human soul is corruptible4 ,for those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end4 ,but the beginning1 by generation1 of men is like that of animals1 for they are made from the earth4 ,and the process of life is alike in both2 because all things breathe alike1 and man hath nothing more than the beast1 as it is written 7,eccles4 #c3ai74 ,therefore1 as the same text concludes1 the death of man and beast is one1 and the condition of both is equal4 ,but the souls of brute animals are corruptible4 ,therefore1 also1 the human soul is corruptible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness2 because the end should correspond to the beginning4 ,but as it is written 7,wis4 #b3b71 ,we are born of nothing2 which is true1 not only of the body1 but also of the soul4 ,therefore1 as is concluded in the same passage1 ,after this we shall be as if we had not been1 even as to our soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing is without its own proper operation4 ,but the operation proper to the soul1 which is to understand through a phantasm1 cannot be without the body4 ,for the soul understands nothing without a phantasm2 and there is no phantasm without the body as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #a74 ,therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that human souls owe to ,divine goodness that they are intellectual1 and that they have an incorruptible substantial life4 ,i answer that1 ,we must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible4 ,for a thing may be corrupted in two ways--per se1 and accidentally4 ,now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally1 that is1 by the generation or corruption of something else4 ,for generation and corruption belong to a thing1 just as existence belongs to it1 which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption4 ,therefore1 whatever has existence per se cannot be generated or corrupted except per se2 while things which do not subsist1 such as accidents and material forms1 acquire existence or lose it through the generation or corruption of composite things4 ,now it was shown above 7,,aa4 #b1 #c7 that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent1 whereas the human soul is2 so that the souls of brutes are corrupted1 when their bodies are corrupted2 while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted per se4 ,this1 indeed1 is impossible1 not only as regards the human soul1 but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone4 ,for it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it2 but existence belongs to a form1 which is an act1 by virtue of itself4 ,wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form2 while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it4 ,but it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself2 and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist4 ,granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form1 as some pretend1 we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible4 ,for corruption is found only where there is contrariety2 since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries4 ,wherefore the heavenly bodies1 since they have no matter subject to contrariety1 are incorruptible4 ,now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul2 for it receives according to the manner of its existence1 and those things which it receives are without contrariety2 for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary1 since contraries belong to the same knowledge4 ,therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible4 ,moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner4 ,now1 in things that have knowledge1 desire ensues upon knowledge4 ,the senses indeed do not know existence1 except under the conditions of here and now1 whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely1 and for all time2 so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist4 ,but a natural desire cannot be in vain4 ,therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish1 as expressed in the words of ,wisdom #b4 ,therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body2 for all animals alike are made of earth4 ,but it is not true of the soul4 ,for the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body2 whereas the human soul is produced by ,god4 ,to signify this it is written as to other animals3 ,let the earth bring forth the living soul 7,gen4 #a3bd73 while of man it is written 7,gen4 #b3g7 that ,he breathed into his face the breath of life4 ,and so in the last chapter of ,ecclesiastes 7#ab3g7 it is concluded3 7,before7 the dust return into its earth from whence it was2 and the spirit return to ,god ,who gave it4 ,again the process of life is alike as to the body1 concerning which it is written 7,eccles4 #c3ai73 ,all things breathe alike1 and 7,wis4 #b3b71 ,the breath in our nostrils is smoke4 ,but the process is not alike of the soul2 for man is intelligent1 whereas animals are not4 ,hence it is false to say3 ,man has nothing more than beasts4 ,thus death comes to both alike as to the body1 by not as to the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as a thing can be created by reason1 not of a passive potentiality1 but only of the active potentiality of the ,creator1 ,who can produce something out of nothing1 so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing1 we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-existence1 but in the ,creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence4 ,but a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,to understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body4 ,after separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding1 similar to other substances separated from bodies1 as will appear later on 7,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #a74 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ge1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,soul ,is of the ,same ,species ,as an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel4 ,for each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species1 whence is derived its inclination for that end4 ,but the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel--namely1 eternal happiness4 ,therefore they are of the same species4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ultimate specific difference is the noblest1 because it completes the nature of the species4 ,but there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature4 ,therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference3 therefore they belong to the same species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body4 ,but as the body is outside the essence of the soul1 it seems that it does not belong to its species4 ,therefore the soul and angel are of the same species4 ,on the contrary1 ,things which have different natural operations are of different species4 ,but the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different2 since1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii71 ,angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence1 not gathering their knowledge of ,divine things from visible things4 ,subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul4 ,therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species4 ,i answer that1 ,origen 7,peri ,archon iii1 #e7 held that human souls and angels are all of the same species2 and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental1 as resulting from their free-will3 as we have seen above 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b74 ,but this cannot be2 for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature2 because1 as they are not composed of matter and form1 but are subsistent forms1 it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species4 ,for a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species2 thus1 supposing a separate whiteness to exist1 it could only be one2 forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject4 ,but diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature2 thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another2 and the same applies to other species1 because differences which divide a genus are contrary to one another4 ,contraries1 however1 are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect1 since the principle of contrariety is habit1 and privation thereof1 as is written1 ,metaph4 x 7,did4 ix1 #d74 ,the same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form4 ,for if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another1 it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter--that is to say1 that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms2 and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature3 or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms4 ,but one matter cannot be distinct from another1 except by a distinction of quantity1 which has no place in these incorporeal substances1 such as an angel and the soul4 ,so that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species4 ,how it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #b1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end4 ,eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate1 in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality4 ,thus1 however1 the intellectual faculty is not the noblest1 because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality2 as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature4 ,hence1 as all sensible things are not of one species1 so neither are all intellectual things of one species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the body is not of the essence of the soul2 but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body1 so that1 properly speaking1 not the soul alone1 but the composite1 is the species4 ,and the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation1 proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel1 who is not united to a body4 ,,question #gf ,,of ,,the ,,union ,,of ,,body ,,and ,,soul 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we now consider the union of the soul with the body2 and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form8 7#b7 ,whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies2 or is there one intelligence for all men8 7#c7 ,whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle1 there is some other soul8 7#d7 ,whether in the body there is any other substantial form8 7#e7 ,of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form8 7#f7 ,whether it be united to such a body by means of another body8 7#g7 ,whether by means of an accident8 7#h7 ,whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,intellectual ,principle ,is ,united to the ,body ,as ,its ,form8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that the intellect is separate1 and that it is not the act of any body4 ,therefore it is not united to the body as its form4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form2 otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form4 ,therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form1 since every body has a determinate nature1 it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature2 and thus1 it would not be capable of knowing all things1 as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b72 which is contrary to the nature of the intellect4 ,therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever receptive power is an act of a body1 receives a form materially and individually2 for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver4 ,but the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually1 but rather immaterially and universally3 otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects1 but only of individuals1 like the senses4 ,therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 power and action have the same subject2 for the same subject is what can1 and does1 act4 ,but the intellectual action is not the action of a body1 as appears from above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body4 ,but virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived4 ,therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whatever has per se existence is not united to the body as its form2 because a form is that by which a thing exists3 so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself4 ,but the intellectual principle has per se existence and is subsistent1 as was said above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore it is not united to the body as its form4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always4 ,but to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature2 because form is the act of matter1 not by an accidental quality1 but by its own essence2 otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one1 but only accidentally one4 ,therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter4 ,but the intellectual principle1 since it is incorruptible1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #f71 remains separate from the body1 after the dissolution of the body4 ,therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form4 ,on the contrary1 ,according to the ,philosopher1 ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii #b71 difference is derived from the form4 ,but the difference which constitutes man is rational1 which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle4 ,therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man4 ,i answer that1 ,we must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body4 ,for that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed3 for instance1 that whereby a body is primarily healed is health1 and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge2 hence health is a form of the body1 and knowledge is a form of the soul4 ,the reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act2 wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act4 ,now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul4 ,and as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things1 that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul4 ,for the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment1 sensation1 and local movement2 and likewise of our understanding4 ,therefore this principle by which we primarily understand1 whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul1 is the form of the body4 ,this is the demonstration used by ,aristotle 7,de ,anima ii1 #b74 ,but if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man2 for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands4 ,now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,phys4 v1 #a72 for a thing is said to move or act1 either by virtue of its whole self1 for instance1 as a physician heals2 or by virtue of a part1 as a man sees by his eye2 or through an accidental quality1 as when we say that something that is white builds1 because it is accidental to the builder to be white4 ,so when we say that ,socrates or ,plato understands1 it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally2 since it is ascribed to him as man1 which is predicated of him essentially4 ,we must therefore say either that ,socrates understands by virtue of his whole self1 as ,plato maintained1 holding that man is an intellectual soul2 or that intelligence is a part of ,socrates4 ,the first cannot stand1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #d71 for this reason1 that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands1 and that he senses4 ,but one cannot sense without a body3 therefore the body must be some part of man4 ,it follows therefore that the intellect by which ,socrates understands is a part of ,socrates1 so that in some way it is united to the body of ,socrates4 ,the ,commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species1 as having a double subject1 in the possible intellect1 and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs4 ,thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man4 ,but this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact1 that the act of the intellect is the act of ,socrates4 ,this can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty1 from which ,aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect4 ,for the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight1 as he says ,de ,anima iii1 #e1g4 ,therefore1 as the species of colors are in the sight1 so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect4 ,now it is clear that because the colors1 the images of which are in the sight1 are on a wall1 the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall3 for we do not say that the wall sees1 but rather that it is seen4 ,therefore1 from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect1 it does not follow that ,socrates1 in whom are the phantasms1 understands1 but that he or his phantasms are understood4 ,some1 however1 tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor2 and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole4 ,this is1 however1 absurd for many reasons4 ,first1 because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite1 the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect4 ,the reason therefore why ,socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect1 but rather1 contrariwise1 he is moved by his intellect because he understands4 ,secondly1 because since ,socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form1 if the intellect be not the form1 it follows that it must be outside the essence1 and then the intellect is the whole ,socrates as a motor to the thing moved4 ,whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent1 and does not pass into something else1 as does the action of heating4 ,therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to ,socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect4 ,thirdly1 because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved1 except as to an instrument2 as the action of a carpenter to a saw4 ,therefore if understanding is attributed to ,socrates1 as the action of what moves him1 it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument4 ,this is contrary to the teaching of the ,philosopher1 who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,fourthly1 because1 although the action of a part be attributed to the whole1 as the action of the eye is attributed to a man2 yet it is never attributed to another part1 except perhaps indirectly2 for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees4 ,therefore if the intellect and ,socrates are united in the above manner1 the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to ,socrates4 ,if1 however1 ,socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to ,socrates1 and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor1 it follows that ,socrates is not one absolutely1 and consequently neither a being absolutely1 for a thing is a being according as it is one4 ,there remains1 therefore1 no other explanation than that given by ,aristotle--namely1 that this particular man understands1 because the intellectual principle is his form4 ,thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form4 ,the same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species4 ,for the nature of each thing is shown by its operation4 ,now the proper operation of man as man is to understand2 because he thereby surpasses all other animals4 ,whence ,aristotle concludes 7,ethic4 x1 #g7 that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him4 ,man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation4 ,but the species of anything is derived from its form4 ,it follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man4 ,but we must observe that the nobler a form is1 the more it rises above corporeal matter1 the less it is merged in matter1 and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation2 hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities4 ,and the higher we advance in the nobility of forms1 the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter2 as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal1 and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul4 ,now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms4 ,wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever4 ,this power is called the intellect4 ,it is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form1 it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body4 ,for since the form is an act1 and matter is only in potentiality1 that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole4 ,but if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself1 then that part which is the form we call the soul1 and that of which it is the form we call the primary animate1 as was said above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #b71 the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate2 yet it exists in matter4 ,he proves this from the fact that man and the sun generate man from matter4 ,it is separate indeed according to its intellectual power1 because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ1 as the power of seeing is the act of the eye2 for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ1 like the act of seeing4 ,but it exists in matter so far as the soul itself1 to which this power belongs1 is the form of the body1 and the term of human generation4 ,and so the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii7 that the intellect is separate1 because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ4 ,from this it is clear how to answer the ,second and ,third objections3 since1 in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect1 and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals1 it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the human soul1 by reason of its perfection1 is not a form merged in matter1 or entirely embraced by matter4 ,therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body1 although the soul is essentially the form of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter1 out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence2 so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul4 ,this is not the case with other non-subsistent forms4 ,for this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body2 whereas it is not so with other forms4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,to be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself1 as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up4 ,and as a light body remains light1 when removed from its proper place1 retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place2 so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body1 having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,intellectual ,principle ,is ,multiplied ,according to the ,number of ,bodies8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies1 but that there is one intellect in all men4 ,for an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species4 ,but the human soul is an immaterial substance2 since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore there are not many human souls in one species4 ,but all men are of one species4 ,therefore there is but one intellect in all men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 when the cause is removed1 the effect is also removed4 ,therefore1 if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies1 it follows that the bodies being removed1 the number of souls would not remain2 but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder4 ,this is heretical2 for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if my intellect is distinct from your intellect1 my intellect is an individual1 and so is yours2 for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species4 ,now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver4 ,therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect1 and also into yours3 which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the thing understood is in the intellect which understands4 ,if1 therefore1 my intellect is distinct from yours1 what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you2 and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual1 and be only potentially something understood2 so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both2 since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted4 ,but this is contrary to the nature of the intellect2 for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination4 ,it seems1 therefore1 to follow that there is one intellect in all men4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 when the disciple receives knowledge from the master1 it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple1 because then also knowledge would be an active form1 such as heat is1 which is clearly false4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple2 which cannot be1 unless there is one intellect in both4 ,seemingly1 therefore1 the intellect of the disciple and master is but one2 and1 consequently1 the same applies to all men4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,quant4 ,animae xxxii7 says3 ,if ,i were to say that there are many human souls1 ,i should laugh at myself4 ,but the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect4 ,therefore there is one intellect of all men4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #c7 that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals4 ,but it is impossible that a soul1 one in species1 should belong to animals of different species4 ,therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals4 ,i answer that1 ,it is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men4 ,this is clear if1 as ,plato maintained1 man is the intellect itself4 ,for it would follow that ,socrates and ,plato are one man2 and that they are not distinct from each other1 except by something outside the essence of each4 ,the distinction between ,socrates and ,plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak2 which is quite absurd4 ,it is likewise clear that this is impossible if1 according to the opinion of ,aristotle 7,de ,anima ii1 #b71 it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man4 ,for it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form1 as it is impossible for them to have one existence1 for the form is the principle of existence4 ,again1 this is clearly impossible1 whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man4 ,for it is manifest that1 supposing there is one principal agent1 and two instruments1 we can say that there is one agent absolutely1 but several actions2 as when one man touches several things with his two hands1 there will be one who touches1 but two contacts4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we suppose one instrument and several principal agents1 we might say that there are several agents1 but one act2 for example1 if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope2 there will be many drawing1 but one pull4 ,if1 however1 there is one principal agent1 and one instrument1 we say that there is one agent and one action1 as when the smith strikes with one hammer1 there is one striker and one stroke4 ,now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man1 the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man2 for the sensitive powers obey the intellect1 and are at its service4 ,therefore1 if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sense--for instance1 if two men had one eye--there would be several seers1 but one sight4 ,but if there is one intellect1 no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments1 in no way is it possible to say that ,socrates and ,plato are otherwise than one understanding man4 ,and if to this we add that to understand1 which is the act of the intellect1 is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself2 it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action3 that is to say that all men are but one understander1 and have but one act of understanding1 in regard1 that is1 of one intelligible object4 ,however1 it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action from yours by the distinction of the phantasms--that is to say1 were there one phantasm of a stone in me1 and another in you--if the phantasm itself1 as it is one thing in me and another in you1 were a form of the possible intellect2 since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions2 as1 according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye1 there are divers visions4 ,but the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect2 it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form4 ,now in one intellect1 from different phantasms of the same species1 only one intelligible species is abstracted2 as appears in one man1 in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone2 yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted2 by which the intellect of that one man1 by one operation1 understands the nature of a stone1 notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms4 ,therefore1 if there were one intellect for all men1 the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the intellectual soul1 like an angel1 has no matter from which it is produced1 yet it is the form of a certain matter2 in which it is unlike an angel4 ,therefore1 according to the division of matter1 there are many souls of one species2 while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,everything has unity in the same way that it has being2 consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being4 ,now it is clear that the intellectual soul1 by virtue of its very being1 is united to the body as its form2 yet1 after the dissolution of the body1 the intellectual soul retains its own being4 ,in like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies2 yet1 after the dissolution of the bodies1 the souls retain their multiplied being4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,individuality of the intelligent being1 or of the species whereby it understands1 does not exclude the understanding of universals2 otherwise1 since separate intellects are subsistent substances1 and consequently individual1 they could not understand universals4 ,but the materiality of the knower1 and of the species whereby it knows1 impedes the knowledge of the universal4 ,for as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts1 as heating is according to the mode of the heat2 so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows4 ,now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter4 ,therefore if the form1 which is the means of knowledge1 is material--that is1 not abstracted from material conditions--its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles2 so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible4 ,but if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter1 there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied2 thus there will be knowledge of the universal4 ,nor does it matter1 as to this particular point1 whether there be one intellect or many2 because1 even if there were but one1 it would necessarily be an individual intellect1 and the species whereby it understands1 an individual species4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,whether the intellect be one or many1 what is understood is one2 for what is understood is in the intellect1 not according to its own nature1 but according to its likeness2 for the stone is not in the soul1 but its likeness is1 as is said1 ,de ,anima iii1 #h4 ,yet it is the stone which is understood1 not the likeness of the stone2 except by a reflection of the intellect on itself3 otherwise1 the objects of sciences would not be things1 but only intelligible species4 ,now it happens that different things1 according to different forms1 are likened to the same thing4 ,and since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known1 it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers2 as is apparent in regard to the senses2 for several see the same color1 according to different likenesses4 ,in the same way several intellects understand one object understood4 ,but there is this difference1 according to the opinion of ,aristotle1 between the sense and the intelligence--that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul--that is1 in its individuality2 whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul1 but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood4 ,for the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles2 whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul4 ,but1 according to the opinion of ,plato1 the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood2 for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,one knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master4 ,how it is caused will be shown later on 7,q4 #aag1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,augustine denies a plurality of souls1 that would involve a plurality of species4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,besides the ,intellectual ,soul ,there ,are in ,man ,other ,souls ,essentially ,different from ,one ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another1 such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul4 ,for corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance4 ,but the intellectual soul is incorruptible2 whereas the other souls1 as the sensitive and the nutritive1 are corruptible1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #f74 ,therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul1 the sensitive soul1 and the nutritive soul1 cannot be the same4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible2 on the contrary1 corruptible and incorruptible differ generically1 says the ,philosopher1 ,metaph4 x 7,did4 ix1 #aj74 ,but the sensitive soul in the horse1 the lion1 and other brute animals1 is corruptible4 ,if1 therefore1 in man it be incorruptible1 the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same genus4 ,now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul2 and1 therefore1 animal will not be one genus common to man and other animals1 which is absurd4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says1 ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii1 #b71 that the genus is taken from the matter1 and difference from the form4 ,but rational1 which is the difference constituting man1 is taken from the intellectual soul2 while he is called animal by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul4 ,therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul1 as form to matter4 ,therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul1 but presupposes it as a material subject4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said in the book ,de ,ecclesiasticis ,dogmatibus xv3 ,nor do we say that there are two souls in one man1 as ,james and other ,syrians write2 one1 animal1 by which the body is animated1 and which is mingled with the blood2 the other1 spiritual1 which obeys the reason2 but we say that it is one and the same soul in man1 that both gives life to the body by being united to it1 and orders itself by its own reasoning4 ,i answer that1 ,plato held that there were several souls in one body1 distinct even as to organs1 to which souls he referred the different vital actions1 saying that the nutritive power is in the liver1 the concupiscible in the heart1 and the power of knowledge in the brain4 ,which opinion is rejected by ,aristotle 7,de ,anima ii1 #b71 with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs2 for this reason1 that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul1 as sense and appetite4 ,now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different1 and distributed in the various parts of the body4 ,but with regard to the intellectual part1 he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be only logically distinct from the other parts of the soul1 or also locally4 ,the opinion of ,plato might be maintained if1 as he held1 the soul was supposed to be united to the body1 not as its form1 but as its motor4 ,for it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors2 and still less if it be moved according to its various parts4 ,if we suppose1 however1 that the soul is united to the body as its form1 it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body4 ,this can be made clear by three different reasons4 ,in the first place1 an animal would not be absolutely one1 in which there were several souls4 ,for nothing is absolutely one except by one form1 by which a thing has existence3 because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity2 and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one2 as1 for instance1 a white man4 ,if1 therefore1 man were living by one form1 the vegetative soul1 and animal by another form1 the sensitive soul1 and man by another form1 the intellectual soul1 it would follow that man is not absolutely one4 ,thus ,aristotle argues1 ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii1 #f71 against ,plato1 that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped1 then a biped animal is not absolutely one4 ,for this reason1 against those who hold that there are several souls in the body1 he asks 7,de ,anima i1 #e71 what contains them8--that is1 what makes them one8 ,it cannot be said that they are united by the one body2 because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one1 than the reverse4 ,secondly1 this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another4 ,those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another1 either accidentally1 7if the forms are not ordered to one another1 as when we say that something white is sweet71 or essentially1 in the second manner of essential predication1 7if the forms are ordered one to another1 the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate2 as a surface is presupposed to color2 so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored1 we have the second manner of essential predication47 ,therefore1 if we have one form by which a thing is an animal1 and another form by which it is a man1 it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other1 except accidentally1 supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another--or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication1 if one soul be presupposed to the other4 ,but both of these consequences are clearly false3 because animal is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally2 and man is not part of the definition of an animal1 but the other way about4 ,therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man2 otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal1 so that animal can be essentially predicated of man4 ,thirdly1 this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another1 which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one4 ,we must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul1 the intellectual soul1 and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul4 ,this can easily be explained1 if we consider the differences of species and forms4 ,for we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another1 as the perfect and imperfect2 as in the order of things1 the animate are more perfect than the inanimate1 and animals more perfect than plants1 and man than brute animals2 and in each of these genera there are various degrees4 ,for this reason ,aristotle1 ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii1 #c71 compares the species of things to numbers1 which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity4 ,and 7,de ,anima ii1 #c7 he compares the various souls to the species of figures1 one of which contains another2 as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon4 ,thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals1 and to the nutritive souls of plants4 ,therefore1 as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape1 is not tetragonal by one shape1 and pentagonal by another--since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal--so neither is ,socrates a man by one soul1 and animal by another2 but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sensitive soul is incorruptible1 not by reason of its being sensitive1 but by reason of its being intellectual4 ,when1 therefore1 a soul is sensitive only1 it is corruptible2 but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality1 it is incorruptible4 ,for although sensibility does not give incorruptibility1 yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not forms1 but composites1 are classified either generically or specifically4 ,now man is corruptible like other animals4 ,and so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive1 and when this is removed1 it is supplanted by a more perfect soul1 which is both sensitive and intellectual3 as will be shown further on 7,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,we must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions1 which flow from our manner of understanding1 because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways4 ,therefore since1 as we have said1 the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul1 and something more1 reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul1 as something imperfect and material4 ,and because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals1 it forms thence the notion of the genus2 while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul1 it takes as formal and perfecting2 thence it gathers the difference of man4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #d ,whether in ,man ,there ,is ,another ,form ,besides the ,intellectual ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #a71 that the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially4 ,therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter4 ,but the body has a substantial form by which it is a body4 ,therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man moves himself as every animal does4 ,now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts1 of which one moves1 and the other is moved1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #e74 ,but the part which moves is the soul4 ,therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved4 ,but primary matter cannot be moved 7,phys4 v1 #a71 since it is a being only potentially2 indeed everything that is moved is a body4 ,therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form1 by which the body is constituted4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter2 for before and after apply by comparison to some beginning4 ,therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul1 and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter2 it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the human body is a mixed body4 ,now mingling does not result from matter alone2 for then we should have mere corruption4 ,therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body2 and these are substantial forms4 ,therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,of one thing there is but one substantial being4 ,but the substantial form gives substantial being4 ,therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form4 ,but the soul is the substantial form of man4 ,therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul4 ,i answer that1 ,if we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form1 but only as its motor1 as the ,platonists maintain1 it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form1 by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul4 ,if1 however1 the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a71 it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man4 ,in order to make this evident1 we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this1 that the accidental form does not make a thing to be simply1 but to be such1 as heat does not make a thing to be simply1 but only to be hot4 ,therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply1 but to be made such1 or to be in some particular condition2 and in like manner1 when an accidental form is removed1 a thing is said to be corrupted1 not simply1 but relatively4 ,now the substantial form gives being simply2 therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply2 and by its removal to be corrupted simply4 ,for this reason1 the old natural philosophers1 who held that primary matter was some actual being--for instance1 fire or air1 or something of that sort--maintained that nothing is generated simply1 or corrupted simply2 and stated that every becoming is nothing but an alteration1 as we read1 ,phys4 i1 #d4 ,therefore1 if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being1 it would follow that the soul does not give being simply2 and consequently that it is not the substantial form3 and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation2 nor at its removal simple corruption1 all of which is clearly false4 ,whence we must conclude1 that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul2 and that the soul1 as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls1 so does it virtually contain all inferior forms1 and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things4 ,the same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals1 and of the nutritive soul in plants1 and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only1 but the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially2 and that this potentiality does not reject the soul4 ,whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act1 the soul itself is included2 as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot1 and light of what is lucid2 not as though lucid and light were two separate things1 but because a thing is made lucid by the light4 ,in like manner1 the soul is said to be the act of a body1 etc41 because by the soul it is a body1 and is organic1 and has life potentially4 ,yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act1 which is operation2 for such a potentiality does not reject--that is1 does not exclude--the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the soul does not move the body by its essence1 as the form of the body1 but by the motive power1 the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul3 so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves2 and the animate body is the part moved4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we observe in matter various degrees of perfection1 as existence1 living1 sensing1 and understanding4 ,now what is added is always more perfect4 ,therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect2 while that form which gives the first1 second1 and third degree1 and so on1 is the most perfect3 and yet it inheres to matter immediately4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body2 and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average4 ,but this is impossible1 because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter2 for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions1 without which matter cannot be divisible4 ,now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body4 ,but various bodies cannot be in the same place4 ,whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation4 ,and then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole2 but only a mixture apparent to sense1 by the juxtaposition of particles4 ,averroes maintained that the forms of elements1 by reason of their imperfection1 are a medium between accidental and substantial forms1 and so can be more or less2 and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average1 so that one form emerges from them4 ,but this is even still more impossible4 ,for the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible1 and every addition and subtraction varies the species1 as in numbers1 as stated in ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii1 #c72 and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive more or less4 ,nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident4 ,therefore we must say1 in accordance with the ,philosopher 7,de ,gener4 i1 #aj71 that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body1 not actually but virtually4 ,for the proper qualities of the elements remain1 though modified2 and in them is the power of the elementary forms4 ,this quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body2 for instance1 the form of a stone1 or of any sort of soul4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,intellectual ,soul ,is ,properly ,united to ,such a ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body4 ,for matter must be proportionate to the form4 ,but the intellectual soul is incorruptible4 ,therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form2 a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share4 ,but the more subtle is the body1 the less has it of matter4 ,therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body1 to fire1 for instance1 and not to a mixed body1 still less to a terrestrial body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 since the form is the principle of the species1 one form cannot produce a variety of species4 ,but the intellectual soul is one form4 ,therefore1 it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect4 ,but the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls4 ,therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering1 for instance1 with hair instead of clothes1 and hoofs instead of shoes2 and are1 moreover1 naturally provided with arms1 as claws1 teeth1 and horns2 it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #a71 that the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially4 ,i answer that1 ,since the form is not for the matter1 but rather the matter for the form1 we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is2 and not conversely4 ,now the intellectual soul1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b7 in the order of nature1 holds the lowest place among intellectual substances2 inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth1 as the angels are2 but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74 ,but nature never fails in necessary things3 therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding1 but also with the power of feeling4 ,now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument4 ,therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense4 ,now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch4 ,but the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries1 such as hot and cold1 wet and dry1 and the like1 of which the sense of touch has the perception2 thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries1 and is able to perceive them4 ,therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion1 the more sensitive will be the touch4 ,but the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness2 because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body1 above others reduced to the most equable complexion4 ,for this reason among animals1 man has the best sense of touch4 ,and among men1 those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence4 ,a sign of which is that we observe those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind1 as stated in ,de ,anima ii1 #i4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible4 ,this answer does not seem sufficient2 because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature1 but by a gift of ,divine grace2 otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin1 as neither was the immortality of the devil4 ,therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found2 one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form2 the other which follows by force of the first disposition4 ,the artisan1 for instance1 for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material2 but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted1 follows by force of the matter itself4 ,so the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion1 which1 however1 is corruptible by force of its matter4 ,if1 however1 it be said that ,god could avoid this1 we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what ,god might do2 but what is suitable to the nature of things1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #a74 ,god1 however1 provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such2 but on account of the sensitive power1 which requires an organ of equable temperament4 ,therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body1 and not to a simple element1 or to a mixed body1 in which fire was in excess2 because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament4 ,and this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries1 thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the parts of an animal1 for instance1 the eye1 hand1 flesh1 and bones1 and so forth1 do not make the species2 but the whole does1 and therefore1 properly speaking1 we cannot say that these are of different species1 but that they are of various dispositions4 ,this is suitable to the intellectual soul1 which1 although it be one in its essence1 yet on account of its perfection1 is manifold in power3 and therefore1 for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united4 ,for this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals2 and in these a greater variety than in plants4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the intellectual soul as comprehending universals1 has a power extending to the infinite2 therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions1 or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing1 as is the case with other animals1 the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things4 ,instead of all these1 man has by nature his reason and his hands1 which are the organs of organs 7,de ,anima iii71 since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety1 and for any number of purposes4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,intellectual ,soul ,is ,united to the ,body ,through the ,medium of ,accidental ,dispositions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions4 ,for every form exists in its proper disposed matter4 ,but dispositions to a form are accidents4 ,therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form2 and therefore before the soul1 since the soul is a substantial form4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 various forms of one species require various parts of matter4 ,but various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities4 ,therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms1 which are many belonging to one species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact4 ,but the virtue of the soul is its power4 ,therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power1 which is an accident4 ,on the contrary1 ,accident is posterior to substance1 both in the order of time and in the order of reason1 as the ,philosopher says1 ,metaph4 vii 7,did4 vi1 #a74 ,therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul1 which is the substantial form4 ,i answer that1 ,if the soul were united to the body1 merely as a motor1 there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body2 on the contrary1 they would be necessary1 for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body2 and on the part of the body1 a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul4 ,if1 however1 the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form1 as we have already said above 7,a4 #a71 it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul1 or between any substantial form whatever and its matter4 ,the reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order1 what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter4 ,now the first among all acts is existence4 ,therefore1 it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot1 or as having quantity1 before it is actual4 ,but matter has actual existence by the substantial form1 which makes it to exist absolutely1 as we have said above 7,a4 #d74 ,wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form1 and consequently before the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as appears from what has been already said 7,a4 #d71 the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms2 therefore while remaining one and the same1 it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection4 ,for the same essential form makes man an actual being1 a body1 a living being1 an animal1 and a man4 ,now it is clear that to every genus follow its own proper accidents4 ,therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence1 before it is understood as corporeal1 and so on2 so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity2 and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form1 not as regards all its effects1 but as regards the subsequent effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter4 ,wherefore matter1 once understood as corporeal and measurable1 can be understood as distinct in its various parts1 and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection4 ,for although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection1 as we have said 7ad #a71 yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only1 is united thereto by power or virtue4 ,but the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form2 and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,soul ,is ,united to the ,animal ,body by ,means of a ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body4 ,for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 vii1 #ai71 that the soul administers the body by light1 that is1 by fire1 and by air1 which is most akin to a spirit4 ,but fire and air are bodies4 ,therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union4 ,but when breathing ceases1 the soul is separated from the body4 ,therefore the breath1 which is a subtle body1 is the means of union between soul and body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things which are very distant from one another1 are not united except by something between them4 ,but the intellectual soul is very distant from the body1 both because it is incorporeal1 and because it is incorruptible4 ,therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body1 and such would be some heavenly light1 which would harmonize the elements1 and unite them together4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #a73 ,we need not ask if the soul and body are one1 as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one4 ,but the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening4 ,therefore also the soul is thus united to the body4 ,i answer that1 ,if the soul1 according to the ,platonists1 were united to the body merely as a motor1 it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man1 or any animal whatever2 for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer4 ,if1 however1 the soul is united to the body as its form1 as we have said 7,a4 #a71 it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body4 ,the reason of this is that a thing is one1 according as it is a being4 ,now the form1 through itself1 makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act2 nor does it give existence by means of something else4 ,wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form1 is by virtue of the form itself1 which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act4 ,nor is there any other cause of union except the agent1 which causes matter to be in act1 as the ,philosopher says1 ,metaph4 viii 7,did4 vii1 #f74 ,from this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man4 ,of these certain ,platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it1 from which it is never separated1 and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man4 ,others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit4 ,others said it is united to the body by means of light1 which1 they say1 is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence2 so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven2 the sensible soul1 by means of the light of the crystal heaven2 and the intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven4 ,now all this is fictitious and ridiculous3 for light is not a body2 and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body 7since it is unchangeable71 but only virtually3 and lastly1 because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body2 whence he uses the word administration4 ,it is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts4 ,and the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit1 as the ,philosopher says in ,de causa motus animalium 7,de mot4 animal4 x74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath1 not because this is the means of union1 but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union4 ,nevertheless the breath is a means of moving1 as the first instrument of motion4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the soul is indeed very distant from the body1 if we consider the condition of each separately3 so that if each had a separate existence1 many means of connection would have to intervene4 ,but inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body1 it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body1 but by its own existence is united to the body immediately4 ,this is the case with every form which1 if considered as an act1 is very distant from matter1 which is a being only in potentiality4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gf1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,soul ,is in ,each ,part of the ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body2 for the ,philosopher says in ,de causa motus animalium 7,de mot4 animal4 x73 ,it is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body2 it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to live1 for each part has a natural movement of its own4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the soul is in the body of which it is the act4 ,but it is the act of an organic body4 ,therefore it exists only in an organic body4 ,but each part of the human body is not an organic body4 ,therefore the whole soul is not in each part4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #a7 that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body1 such as the sight to the pupil of the eye1 is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal4 ,if1 therefore1 the whole soul is in each part of the body1 it follows that each part of the body is an animal4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul4 ,if1 therefore1 the whole soul be in each part of the body1 it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body2 thus the sight will be in the ear1 and hearing in the eye1 and this is absurd4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if the whole soul is in each part of the body1 each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul4 ,thus one part would not depend on another2 nor would one part be nobler than another2 which is clearly untrue4 ,therefore the soul is not in each part of the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #f71 that in each body the whole soul is in the whole body1 and in each part is entire4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said1 if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor1 we might say that it is not in each part of the body1 but only in one part through which it would move the others4 ,but since the soul is united to the body as its form1 it must necessarily be in the whole body1 and in each part thereof4 ,for it is not an accidental form1 but the substantial form of the body4 ,now the substantial form perfects not only the whole1 but each part of the whole4 ,for since a whole consists of parts1 a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body1 is a form consisting in composition and order1 such as the form of a house2 and such a form is accidental4 ,but the soul is a substantial form2 and therefore it must be the form and the act1 not only of the whole1 but also of each part4 ,therefore1 on the withdrawal of the soul1 as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally1 as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal2 so is it with the hand1 the eye1 the flesh and bones1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #a74 ,a proof of which is1 that on the withdrawal of the soul1 no part of the body retains its proper action2 although that which retains its species1 retains the action of the species4 ,but act is in that which it actuates3 wherefore the soul must be in the whole body1 and in each part thereof4 ,that it is entire in each part thereof1 may be concluded from this1 that since a whole is that which is divided into parts1 there are three kinds of totality1 corresponding to three kinds of division4 ,there is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity1 as a whole line1 or a whole body4 ,there is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts3 as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition1 and a composite into matter and form4 ,there is1 further1 a third kind of whole which is potential1 divided into virtual parts4 ,the first kind of totality does not apply to forms1 except perhaps accidentally2 and then only to those forms1 which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts2 as whiteness1 as far as its essence is concerned1 is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface2 and1 therefore1 the surface being divided1 the whiteness is accidentally divided4 ,but a form which requires variety in the parts1 such as a soul1 and specially the soul of perfect animals1 is not equally related to the whole and the parts3 hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided4 ,so therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul1 either essentially or accidentally4 ,but the second kind of totality1 which depends on logical and essential perfection1 properly and essentially belongs to forms3 and likewise the virtual totality1 because a form is the principle of operation4 ,therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof1 it is necessary to distinguish4 ,if we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally1 then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface4 ,the same is to be said of totality of power3 since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof4 ,but if we mean totality of species and essence1 then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface4 ,since1 however1 the soul has not quantitative totality1 neither essentially1 nor accidentally1 as we have seen2 it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body1 by totality of perfection and of essence1 but not by totality of power4 ,for it is not in each part of the body1 with regard to each of its powers2 but with regard to sight1 it is in the eye2 and with regard to hearing1 it is in the ear2 and so forth4 ,we must observe1 however1 that since the soul requires variety of parts1 its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts2 for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially1 as to its proper and proportionate perfectible2 but to the parts1 secondarily1 inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the soul is the act of an organic body1 as of its primary and proportionate perfectible4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body1 which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible4 ,thus the soul is not in a part4 ,whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body1 namely the intellect and the will2 whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body4 ,other powers are common to the soul and body2 wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is1 but only in that part of the body1 which is adapted to the operation of such a power4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,one part of the body is said to be nobler than another1 on account of the various powers1 of which the parts of the body are the organs4 ,for that part which is the organ of a nobler power1 is a nobler part of the body3 as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner4 ,,question #gg ,,of ,,those ,,things ,,which ,,belong ,,to ,,the ,,powers ,,of ,,the ,,soul ,,in ,,general 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul2 first1 in general1 secondly1 in particular4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the essence of the soul is its power8 7#b7 ,whether there is one power of the soul1 or several8 7#c7 ,how the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another8 7#d7 ,of the orders of the powers1 one to another2 7#e7 ,whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject8 7#f7 ,whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul8 7#g7 ,whether one power rises from another8 7#h7 ,whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,essence of the ,soul ,is ,its ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the essence of the soul is its power4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #d71 that mind1 knowledge1 and love are in the soul substantially1 or1 which is the same thing1 essentially3 and 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa71 that memory1 understanding1 and will are one life1 one mind1 one essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the soul is nobler than primary matter4 ,but primary matter is its own potentiality4 ,much more therefore is the soul its own power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form2 a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or relaxed1 but is indivisible4 ,but the accidental form is its own power4 ,much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power4 ,but that by which we first sense and understand is the soul1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #b74 ,therefore the soul is its own power4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident4 ,therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence thereof1 it is an accident1 which is contrary to ,augustine1 who says that the foregoing 7see ,obj4 #a7 are not in the soul as in a subject as color or shape1 or any other quality1 or quantity1 are in a body2 for whatever is so1 does not exceed the subject in which it is3 ,whereas the mind can love and know other things 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #d74 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 a simple form cannot be a subject4 ,but the soul is a simple form2 since it is not composed of matter and form1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e74 ,therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject4 ,obj4 #g3 ,further1 an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference4 ,but sensitive and rational are substantial differences2 and they are taken from sense and reason1 which are powers of the soul4 ,therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents2 and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 xi7 says that heavenly spirits are divided into essence1 power1 and operation4 ,much more1 then1 in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence1 although some have maintained it4 ,for the present purpose this may be proved in two ways4 ,first1 because1 since power and act divide being and every kind of being1 we must refer a power and its act to the same genus4 ,therefore1 if the act be not in the genus of substance1 the power directed to that act cannot be in the genus of substance4 ,now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance2 for this belongs to ,god alone1 whose operation is ,his own substance4 ,wherefore the ,divine power which is the principle of ,his operation is the ,divine ,essence itself4 ,this cannot be true either of the soul1 or of any creature2 as we have said above when speaking of the angels 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #c74 ,secondly1 this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul4 ,for the soul by its very essence is an act4 ,therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation1 whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions1 as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing4 ,for as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act1 but the ultimate term of generation4 ,wherefore1 for it to be in potentiality to another act1 does not belong to it according to its essence1 as a form1 but according to its power4 ,so the soul itself1 as the subject of its power1 is called the first act1 with a further relation to the second act4 ,now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations2 whence also it is said in the definition of the soul1 that it is the act of a body having life potentially2 which potentiality1 however1 does not exclude the soul4 ,therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power4 ,for nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act1 as act4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself4 ,thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and loved1 are substantially or essentially in the soul1 for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved4 ,in the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage1 that those things are one life1 one mind1 one essence4 ,or1 as some say1 this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts1 being midway between the universal whole1 and the integral whole4 ,for the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power2 as animal in a man and in a horse2 and therefore it is properly predicated of each part4 ,but the integral whole is not in each part1 neither according to its whole essence1 nor according to its whole power4 ,therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part2 yet in a way it is predicated1 though improperly1 of all the parts together2 as if we were to say that the wall1 roof1 and foundations are a house4 ,but the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence1 not1 however1 according to its whole power4 ,therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part1 but not so properly as the universal whole4 ,in this sense1 ,augustine says that the memory1 understanding1 and the will are the one essence of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form4 ,therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,action belongs to the composite1 as does existence2 for to act belongs to what exists4 ,now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form2 and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form4 ,hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent 7for instance1 heat compared to the form of fire7 as the power of the soul is to the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,that the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form4 ,therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action2 but not the proximate principle4 ,in this sense the ,philosopher says that the soul is that whereby we understand and sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,if we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance1 then there can be no medium between substance and accident2 because they are divided by affirmation and negation1 that is1 according to existence in a subject1 and non-existence in a subject4 ,in this sense1 as the power of the soul is not its essence1 it must be an accident2 and it belongs to the second species of accident1 that of quality4 ,but if we take accident as one of the five universals1 in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident4 ,for the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing2 whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense2 but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species4 ,for the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing1 but is caused by the essential principles of the species2 wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood4 ,in this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident1 as being natural properties of the soul4 ,when ,augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject1 this must be understood in the sense given above1 inasmuch as they are compared to the soul1 not as loving and knowing1 but as loved and known4 ,his argument proceeds in this sense2 for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject1 it would follow that an accident transcends its subject1 since even other things are loved through the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,although the soul is not composed of matter and form1 yet it has an admixture of potentiality1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d72 and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident4 ,the statement quoted is verified in ,god1 ,who is the ,pure ,act2 in treating of which subject ,boethius employs that phrase 7,de ,trin4 i74 ,reply ,obj4 #g3 ,rational and sensitive1 as differences1 are not taken from the powers of sense and reason1 but from the sensitive and rational soul itself4 ,but because substantial forms1 which in themselves are unknown to us1 are known by their accidents2 nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,several ,powers of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not several powers of the soul4 ,for the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of ,god4 ,but in ,god there is one simple power3 and therefore also in the intellectual soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the higher a power is1 the more unified it is4 ,but the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power4 ,therefore above all others it has one virtue or power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 to operate belongs to what is in act4 ,but by the one essence of the soul1 man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #gf1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d74 ,therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher places several powers in the soul 7,de ,anima ii1 #b1c74 ,i answer that1 ,of necessity we must place several powers in the soul4 ,to make this evident1 we observe that1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,coelo ii1 #ab71 the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness1 but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness1 by few movements2 and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements2 and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements2 and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever4 ,thus he is least of all disposed of health1 who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies2 better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies2 and better still1 he who can by few remedies2 best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies4 ,we conclude1 therefore1 that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness2 and so they have a few determinate operations and powers4 ,but man can acquire universal and perfect goodness1 because he can acquire beatitude4 ,yet he is in the last degree1 according to his nature1 of those to whom beatitude is possible2 therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers4 ,but to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient4 ,in ,god there is no power or action beyond ,his own ,essence4 ,there is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures2 and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellectual soul approaches to the ,divine likeness1 more than inferior creatures1 in being able to acquire perfect goodness2 although by many and various means2 and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a unified power is superior if it extends to equal things3 but a multiform power is superior to it1 if it is over many things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,one thing has one substantial existence1 but may have several operations4 ,so there is one essence of the soul1 with several powers4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,powers ,are ,distinguished by ,their ,acts and ,objects8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects4 ,for nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it4 ,but the act is subsequent to the power2 and the object is extrinsic to it4 ,therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 contraries are what differ most from each other4 ,therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects1 it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects4 ,this is clearly false in almost all the powers2 for the power of vision extends to white and black1 and the power to taste to sweet and bitter4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the cause be removed1 the effect is removed4 ,hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects1 the same object would not come under different powers4 ,this is clearly false2 for the same thing is known by the cognitive power1 and desired by the appetitive4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 that which of itself is the cause of anything1 is the cause thereof1 wherever it is4 ,but various objects which belong to various powers1 belong also to some one power2 as sound and color belong to sight and hearing1 which are different powers1 yet they come under the one power of common sense4 ,therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects4 ,on the contrary1 ,things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes4 ,but the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d7 that acts and operations precede the powers according to reason2 and these again are preceded by their opposites1 that is their objects4 ,therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects4 ,i answer that1 ,a power as such is directed to an act4 ,wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed1 and consequently the nature of a power is diversified1 as the nature of the act is diversified4 ,now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects4 ,for every act is either of an active power or of a passive power4 ,now1 the object is to the act of a passive power1 as the principle and moving cause3 for color is the principle of vision1 inasmuch as it moves the sight4 ,on the other hand1 to the act of an active power the object is a term and end2 as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity1 which is the end of growth4 ,now1 from these two things an act receives its species1 namely1 from its principle1 or from its end or term2 for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling1 in this1 that the former proceeds from something hot1 which is the active principle1 to heat2 the latter from something cold1 which is the active principle1 to cold4 ,therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects4 ,nevertheless1 we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species4 ,for since to be colored is accidental to an animal1 its species is not changed by a difference of color1 but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal1 that is to say1 by a difference in the sensitive soul1 which is sometimes rational1 and sometimes otherwise4 ,hence rational and irrational are differences dividing animal1 constituting its various species4 ,in like manner therefore1 not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul1 but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed4 ,thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color1 sound1 and the like1 and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color1 namely1 the sight1 and another with regard to sound1 namely1 hearing4 ,but it is accidental to a passive quality1 for instance1 to something colored1 to be a musician or a grammarian1 great or small1 a man or a stone4 ,therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,act1 though subsequent in existence to power1 is1 nevertheless1 prior to it in intention and logically2 as the end is with regard to the agent4 ,and the object1 although extrinsic1 is1 nevertheless1 the principle or end of the action2 and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing1 are proportionate to its principle and end4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object1 the other contrary would belong to another power4 ,but the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such1 but rather the common aspect of both contraries2 as sight does not regard white as such1 but as color4 ,this is because of two contraries one1 in a manner1 includes the idea of the other1 since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,nothing prevents things which coincide in subject1 from being considered under different aspects2 therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power2 because the higher a power is1 to a greater number of things does it extend4 ,therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object1 which the higher power considers of itself2 while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves4 ,thus it is that various objects belong to various lower powers2 which objects1 however1 are subject to one higher power4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,among the ,powers of the ,soul ,there ,is ,order8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul4 ,for in those things which come under one division1 there is no before and after1 but all are naturally simultaneous4 ,but the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another4 ,therefore there is no order among them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself4 ,on the part of the soul1 there is not order among them1 because the soul is one4 ,in like manner the objects are various and dissimilar1 as color and sound4 ,therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 where there is order among powers1 we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another4 ,but the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another2 for sight can act independently of hearing1 and conversely4 ,therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #c7 compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures4 ,but figures have an order among themselves4 ,therefore the powers of the soul have order4 ,i answer that1 ,since the soul is one1 and the powers are many2 and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order2 there must be some order among the powers of the soul4 ,accordingly we may observe a triple order among them1 two of which correspond to the dependence of one power on another2 while the third is taken from the order of the objects4 ,now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways2 according to the order of nature1 forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things2 and according to the order of generation and time2 forasmuch as from being imperfect1 a thing comes to be perfect4 ,thus1 according to the first kind of order among the powers1 the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers2 wherefore they direct them and command them4 ,likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul4 ,in the second kind of order1 it is the other way about4 ,for the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul2 for which1 therefore1 they prepare the body4 ,the same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual4 ,but in the third kind of order1 certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves1 namely1 sight1 hearing1 and smelling4 ,for the visible naturally comes first2 since it is common to higher and lower bodies4 ,but sound is audible in the air1 which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements1 of which smell is the result4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the species of a given genus are to one another as before and after1 like numbers and figures1 if considered in their nature2 although they may be said to be simultaneous1 according as they receive the predication of the common genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul 7which1 though it be one according to its essence1 has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order7 and on the part of the objects1 and furthermore on the part of the acts1 as we have said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists4 ,those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,all the ,powers of the ,soul ,are in the ,soul ,as ,their ,subject8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject4 ,for as the powers of the body are to the body2 so are the powers of the soul to the soul4 ,but the body is the subject of the corporeal powers4 ,therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul2 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #b71 ,the soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily4 ,but the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers4 ,therefore the powers are primarily in the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #g1bd7 that the soul senses certain things1 not through the body1 in fact1 without the body1 as fear and such like2 and some things through the body4 ,but if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject1 the soul could not sense anything without the body4 ,therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers2 and for a similar reason1 of all the other powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,somno et ,vigilia i7 that sensation belongs neither to the soul1 nor to the body1 but to the composite4 ,therefore the sensitive power is in the composite as its subject4 ,therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers4 ,i answer that1 ,the subject of operative power is that which is able to operate1 for every accident denominates its proper subject4 ,now the same is that which is able to operate1 and that which does operate4 ,wherefore the subject of power is of necessity the subject of operation1 as again the ,philosopher says in the beginning of ,de ,somno et ,vigilia4 ,now1 it is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #ge1 ,,aa4 #b1 #c2 ,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a71 that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ1 as understanding and will4 ,hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject4 ,but some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs2 as sight by the eye1 and hearing by the ear4 ,and so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts4 ,therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite1 and not in the soul alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the powers are said to belong to the soul1 not as their subject1 but as their principle2 because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all such powers are primarily in the soul1 as compared to the composite2 not as in their subject1 but as in their principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul1 just as understanding is4 ,now in many things relating to ,philosophy ,augustine makes use of the opinions of ,plato1 not asserting them as true1 but relating them4 ,however1 as far as the present question is concerned1 when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body1 and some without the body1 this can be taken in two ways4 ,firstly1 the words with the body or without the body may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient4 ,thus the soul senses nothing without the body1 because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ4 ,secondly1 they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed4 ,thus the soul senses some things with the body1 that is1 things existing in the body1 as when it feels a wound or something of that sort2 while it senses some things without the body1 that is1 which do not exist in the body1 but only in the apprehension of the soul1 as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,powers of the ,soul ,flow from ,its ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence4 ,for different things do not proceed from one simple thing4 ,but the essence of the soul is one and simple4 ,since1 therefore1 the powers of the soul are many and various1 they cannot proceed from its essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 that from which a thing proceeds is its cause4 ,but the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers2 as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes4 ,therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 emanation involves some sort of movement4 ,but nothing is moved by itself1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 vii1 #a1b72 except1 perhaps1 by reason of a part of itself1 as an animal is said to be moved by itself1 because one part thereof moves and another is moved4 ,neither is the soul moved1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,de ,anima i1 #d74 ,therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself4 ,on the contrary1 ,the powers of the soul are its natural properties4 ,but the subject is the cause of its proper accidents2 whence also it is included in the definition of accident1 as is clear from ,metaph4 vii 7,did4 vi1 #d74 ,therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause4 ,i answer that1 ,the substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ4 ,they agree in this1 that each is an act2 and that by each of them something is after a manner actual4 ,they differ1 however1 in two respects4 ,first1 because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely1 and its subject is something purely potential4 ,but the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such1 or so great1 or in some particular condition2 for its subject is an actual being4 ,hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject3 and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus1 the substantial form causes existence in its subject4 ,on the other hand1 actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form2 wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject4 ,so the subject1 forasmuch as it is in potentiality1 is receptive of the accidental form3 but forasmuch as it is in act1 it produces it4 ,this ,i say of the proper and per se accident2 for with regard to the extraneous accident1 the subject is receptive only1 the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent4 ,secondly1 substantial and accidental forms differ1 because1 since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal1 matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form2 while on the contrary1 the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject4 ,now it is clear1 from what has been said 7,a4 #e71 that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone1 which can be the subject of an accident1 forasmuch as it has something of potentiality1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a1 ad #f72 or else this subject is the composite4 ,now the composite is actual by the soul4 ,whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul1 whether their subject be the soul alone1 or the composite1 flow from the essence of the soul1 as from their principle2 because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual1 and is received into it according as it is in potentiality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from one simple thing many things may proceed naturally1 in a certain order2 or again if there be diversity of recipients4 ,thus1 from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed2 both because order exists among these powers2 and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the subject is both the final cause1 and in a way the active cause1 of its proper accident4 ,it is also as it were the material cause1 inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident4 ,from this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers1 as their end1 and as their active principle2 and of some as receptive thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation1 but by a certain natural resultance2 thus one thing results naturally from another1 as color from light4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,one ,power of the ,soul ,arises from ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another4 ,for if several things arise together1 one of them does not arise from another4 ,but all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul4 ,therefore one of them does not arise from another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject4 ,but one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another2 because nothing is the accident of an accident4 ,therefore one power does not arise from another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one opposite does not arise from the other opposite2 but everything arises from that which is like it in species4 ,now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided1 as various species4 ,therefore one of them does not proceed from another4 ,on the contrary1 ,powers are known by their actions4 ,but the action of one power is caused by the action of another power1 as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses4 ,therefore one power of the soul is caused by another4 ,i answer that1 ,in those things which proceed from one according to a natural order1 as the first is the cause of all1 so that which is nearer to the first is1 in a way1 the cause of those which are more remote4 ,now it has been shown above 7,a4 #d7 that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order4 ,therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another4 ,but since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final1 and as a receptive principle1 either separately by itself1 or together with the body2 and since the agent and the end are more perfect1 while the receptive principle1 as such1 is less perfect2 it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others1 in the order of perfection and nature1 are the principles of the others1 after the manner of the end and active principle4 ,for we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence1 and not the other way about4 ,the senses1 moreover1 are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence2 wherefore1 according to their natural origin1 they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect4 ,but considered as receptive principles1 the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others2 thus the soul1 according as it has the sensitive power1 is considered as the subject1 and as something material with regard to the intelligence4 ,on this account1 the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation1 for the animal is generated before the man4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as the power of the soul flows from the essence1 not by a transmutation1 but by a certain natural resultance1 and is simultaneous with the soul1 so is it the case with one power as regards another4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident2 but one accident is received prior to another into substance1 as quantity prior to quality4 ,in this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another2 as surface is of color1 inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another4 ,the same thing may be said of the powers of the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the powers of the soul are opposed to one another1 as perfect and imperfect2 as also are the species of numbers and figures4 ,but this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another1 because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gg1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,all the ,powers ,remain in the ,soul ,when ,separated from the ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body4 ,for we read in the book ,de ,spiritu et ,anima that the soul withdraws from the body1 taking with itself sense and imagination1 reason and intelligence1 concupiscibility and irascibility4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the powers of the soul are its natural properties4 ,but properties are always in that to which they belong2 and are never separated from it4 ,therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak2 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #d71 ,if an old man were given the eye of a young man1 he would see even as well as a young man4 ,but weakness is the road to corruption4 ,therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted1 but remain in the separated soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 memory is a power of the sensitive soul1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 #a74 ,but memory remains in the separated soul2 for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell3 ,remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime 7,luke #af3be74 ,therefore memory remains in the separated soul2 and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part1 which is a power of the sensitive soul4 ,but it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive4 ,therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #cb7 that1 as the soul1 when the body lies senseless1 yet not quite dead1 sees some things by imaginary vision2 so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body4 ,but the imagination is a power of the sensitive part4 ,therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul2 and consequently all the other powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogm4 xix7 that of two substances only does man consist2 the soul with its reason1 and the body with its senses4 ,therefore the body being dead1 the sensitive powers do not remain4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said already 7,,aa4 #e1 #f1 #g71 all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle4 ,but some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject2 as the intelligence and the will4 ,these powers must remain in the soul1 after the destruction of the body4 ,but other powers are subjected in the composite2 as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts4 ,now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject4 ,wherefore1 the composite being destroyed1 such powers do not remain actually2 but they remain virtually in the soul1 as in their principle or root4 ,so it is false that1 as some say1 these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body4 ,it is much more false that1 as they say also1 the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul2 because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that book has no authority1 and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said2 although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers1 not actually but virtually4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these powers1 which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul1 are not the properties of the soul alone1 but of the composite4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak1 because the soul remains unchangeable1 and is the virtual principle of these powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa2 xiv1 #g7 places memory in the mind2 not as a part of the sensitive soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,in the separate soul1 sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive1 but in the intellectual appetite1 as in the angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring1 not as asserting4 ,wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there 7,retrac4 ii1 #bd74 ,,question #gh ,,of ,,the ,,specific ,,powers ,,of ,,the ,,soul 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next treat of the powers of the soul specifically4 ,the theologian1 however1 has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers1 in which the virtues reside4 ,and since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers1 our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts3 first1 we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect2 secondly1 the intellectual powers2 thirdly1 the appetitive powers4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,the powers of the soul considered generally2 7#b7 ,the various species of the vegetative part2 7#c7 ,the exterior senses2 7#d7 ,the interior senses4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,are to ,be ,distinguished ,five ,genera of ,powers in the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul--namely1 vegetative1 sensitive1 appetitive1 locomotive1 and intellectual4 ,for the powers of the soul are called its parts4 ,but only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned--namely1 the vegetative soul1 the sensitive soul1 and the rational soul4 ,therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul1 and not five4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital operations4 ,now1 in four ways is a thing said to live4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #b73 ,in several ways a thing is said to live1 and even if only one of these is present1 the thing is said to live2 as intellect and sense1 local movement and rest1 and lastly1 movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment4 ,therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul1 as the appetitive is excluded4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers4 ,now desire is common to each power of the soul4 ,for sight desires an appropriate visible object2 whence we read 7,ecclus4 #dj3bb73 ,the eye desireth favor and beauty1 but more than these green sown fields4 ,in the same way every other power desires its appropriate object4 ,therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the moving principle in animals is sense1 intellect or appetite1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj74 ,therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #c71 ,the powers are the vegetative1 the sensitive1 the appetitive1 the locomotion1 and the intellectual4 ,i answer that1 ,there are five genera of powers of the soul1 as above numbered4 ,of these1 three are called souls1 and four are called modes of living4 ,the reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways2 for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul1 and is related to it as its matter and instrument4 ,there exists1 therefore1 an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ2 and such is the operation of the rational soul4 ,below this1 there is another operation of the soul1 which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ1 but not through a corporeal quality1 and this is the operation of the sensitive soul2 for though hot and cold1 wet and dry1 and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses1 yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities2 but only for the proper disposition of the organ4 ,the lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ1 and by virtue of a corporeal quality4 ,yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature2 because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle1 while these operations are from an intrinsic principle2 for this is common to all the operations of the soul2 since every animate thing1 in some way1 moves itself4 ,such is the operation of the vegetative soul2 for digestion1 and what follows1 is caused instrumentally by the action of heat1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d74 ,now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects4 ,for the higher a power is1 the more universal is the object to which it extends1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #d74 ,but the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order4 ,for in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul2 the powers of this genus are called vegetative for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united4 ,there is another genus in the powers of the soul1 which genus regards a more universal object--namely1 every sensible body1 not only the body to which the soul is united4 ,and there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul1 which genus regards a still more universal object--namely1 not only the sensible body1 but all being in universal4 ,wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them1 but also to something extrinsic4 ,now1 since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates1 it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic1 which is the object of the soul's operation1 must be related to the soul in a twofold manner4 ,first1 inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul1 and to be by its likeness in the soul4 ,in this way there are two kinds of powers--namely1 the sensitive in regard to the less common object--the sensible body2 and the intellectual1 in regard to the most common object--universal being4 ,secondly1 forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic4 ,and in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul3 one--the appetitive--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end1 which is first in the intention2 the other--the locomotive power--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement2 for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions4 ,the modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things4 ,there are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power1 as the plants4 ,there are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive1 but not the locomotive power2 such as immovable animals1 as shellfish4 ,there are others which besides this have locomotive powers1 as perfect animals1 which require many things for their life1 and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance4 ,and there are some living things which with these have intellectual power--namely1 men4 ,but the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things2 because wherever there is sense there is also appetite 7,de ,anima ii1 #c74 ,thus the first two objections are hereby solved4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has1 of its own nature1 for something2 wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself4 ,but the animal appetite results from the form apprehended2 this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul--mere apprehension does not suffice4 ,for a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature1 whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature1 but according to its likeness4 ,whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only--namely1 for the purpose of seeing2 but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen1 not merely for the purpose of seeing it1 but also for other purposes4 ,but if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses1 except on account of the actions of the senses1 that is1 for the purpose of sensing them2 there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers1 since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals1 yet sense and appetite1 as such1 are not sufficient to cause movement1 unless another power be added to them2 for immovable animals have sense and appetite1 and yet they have not the power of motion4 ,now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement1 but also in the parts of the body1 to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them4 ,of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition1 they do not move in obedience to the appetite4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,parts of the ,vegetative ,soul ,are ,fittingly ,described ,as the ,nutritive1 ,augmentative1 and ,generative8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described--namely1 the nutritive1 augmentative1 and generative4 ,for these are called natural forces4 ,but the powers of the soul are above the natural forces4 ,therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things4 ,but generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted1 whether living or not living4 ,therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the soul is more powerful than the body4 ,but the body by the same force gives species and quantity2 much more1 therefore1 does the soul4 ,therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists4 ,but the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists4 ,therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved4 ,now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing 7,de ,anima ii1 #d71 being a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it4 ,therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #b1d7 that the operations of this soul are generation1 the use of food1 and 7cf4 ,de ,anima iii1 #i7 growth4 ,i answer that1 ,the vegetative part has three powers4 ,for the vegetative part1 as we have said 7,a4 #a71 has for its object the body itself1 living by the soul2 for which body a triple operation of the soul is required4 ,one is whereby it acquires existence1 and to this is directed the generative power4 ,another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity2 to this is directed the augmentative power4 ,another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity2 to this is directed the nutritive power4 ,we must1 however1 observe a difference among these powers4 ,the nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist1 since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul4 ,but the generative power has its effect1 not in one and the same body but in another2 for a thing cannot generate itself4 ,therefore the generative power1 in a way1 approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul1 which has an operation extending to extrinsic things1 although in a more excellent and more universal manner2 for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature1 as is made clear by ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74 ,therefore1 of these three powers1 the generative has the greater finality1 nobility1 and perfection1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d71 for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to produce another like unto itself4 ,and the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers2 and the augmentative power by the nutritive4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,such forces are called natural1 both because they produce an effect like that of nature1 which also gives existence1 quantity and preservation 7although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way72 and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally1 through the active and passive qualities1 which are the principles of natural actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source2 whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way1 through something in the living thing itself1 which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body4 ,therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen2 and this is the generative power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,since the generation of living things is from a semen1 it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated4 ,for this reason it must have a power in the soul1 whereby it is brought to its appropriate size4 ,but the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent2 therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity1 according to the condition of the matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as we have said above 7,a4 #a71 the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat1 the property of which is to consume humidity4 ,therefore1 in order to restore the humidity thus lost1 the nutritive power is required1 whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body4 ,this is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,five ,exterior ,senses ,are ,properly ,distinguished8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses4 ,for sense can know accidents4 ,but there are many kinds of accidents4 ,therefore1 as powers are distinguished by their objects1 it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 magnitude and shape1 and other things which are called common sensibles1 are not sensibles by accident1 but are contradistinguished from them by the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #f74 ,now the diversity of objects1 as such1 diversifies the powers4 ,since1 therefore1 magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is1 it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one sense regards one contrariety2 as sight regards white and black4 ,but the sense of touch grasps several contraries2 such as hot or cold1 damp or dry1 and suchlike4 ,therefore it is not a single sense but several4 ,therefore there are more than five senses4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a species is not divided against its genus4 ,but taste is a kind of touch4 ,therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #a73 ,there is no other besides the five senses4 ,i answer that1 ,the reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate1 as water1 air1 or the like4 ,by others it has been assigned to the medium1 which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is either water or air1 or such like4 ,others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities1 according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity4 ,but none of these explanations is apt4 ,for the powers are not for the organs1 but the organs for the powers2 wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs2 on the contrary1 for this has nature provided a variety of organs1 that they might be adapted to various powers4 ,in the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses1 according to the convenience of the acts of the powers4 ,and to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses1 but to the intellect4 ,the reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and per se4 ,now1 sense is a passive power1 and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible4 ,wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is per se perceived by the sense1 and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified4 ,now1 immutation is of two kinds1 one natural1 the other spiritual4 ,natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence1 into the thing immuted1 as heat is received into the thing heated4 ,whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received1 according to a spiritual mode of existence1 into the thing immuted1 as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored4 ,now1 for the operation of the senses1 a spiritual immutation is required1 whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ4 ,otherwise1 if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action1 all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration4 ,but in some senses we find spiritual immutation only1 as in sight3 while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation2 either on the part of the object only1 or likewise on the part of the organ4 ,on the part of the object we find natural immutation1 as to place1 in sound which is the object of hearing2 for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air3 and we find natural immutation by alteration1 in odor which is the object of smelling2 for in order to exhale an odor1 a body must be in a measure affected by heat4 ,on the part of an organ1 natural immutation takes place in touch and taste2 for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot1 while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel4 ,but the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly4 ,now1 the sight1 which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object1 is the most spiritual1 the most perfect1 and the most universal of all the senses4 ,after this comes the hearing and then the smell1 which require a natural immutation on the part of the object2 while local motion is more perfect than1 and naturally prior to1 the motion of alteration1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #g74 ,touch and taste are the most material of all3 of the distinction of which we shall speak later on 7ad #c1 #d74 ,hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them1 to obviate any natural immutation in their organ2 as happens as regards these two senses4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species1 which are the principles of alteration3 therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses2 because the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected1 as stated in ,phys4 vii1 #b4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,size1 shape1 and the like1 which are called common sensibles1 are midway between accidental sensibles and proper sensibles1 which are the objects of the senses4 ,for the proper sensibles first1 and of their very nature1 affect the senses2 since they are qualities that cause alteration4 ,but the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity4 ,as to size and number1 it is clear that they are species of quantity4 ,shape is a quality about quantity1 since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude4 ,movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance1 as in the movement of growth or of locomotion1 or again1 according as it is affected in some sensible qualities1 as in the movement of alteration2 and thus to sense movement and rest is1 in a way1 to sense one thing and many4 ,now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration1 as surface is of color4 ,therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature1 but by reason of the sensible quality2 as the surface by reason of color4 ,yet they are not accidental sensibles1 for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses4 ,for sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface3 since whiteness itself is said to be great or small1 and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as the ,philosopher seems to say 7,de ,anima ii1 #aa71 the sense of touch is generically one1 but is divided into several specific senses1 and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties2 which senses1 however1 are not separate from one another in their organ1 but are spread throughout the whole body1 so that their distinction is not evident4 ,but taste1 which perceives the sweet and the bitter1 accompanies touch in the tongue1 but not in the whole body2 so it is easily distinguished from touch4 ,we might also say that all those contrarieties agree1 each in some proximate genus1 and all in a common genus1 which is the common and formal object of touch4 ,such common genus is1 however1 unnamed1 just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the sense of taste1 according to a saying of the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #i71 is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only4 ,it is not distinct from touch in general1 but only from the species of touch distributed in the body4 ,but if touch is one sense only1 on account of the common formality of its object3 we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation4 ,for touch involves a natural1 and not only a spiritual1 immutation in its organ1 by reason of the quality which is its proper object4 ,but the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object1 so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter3 but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to1 and on which is based1 the flavor1 which quality is moisture1 the object of touch4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gh1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,interior ,senses ,are ,suitably ,distinguished8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished4 ,for the common is not divided against the proper4 ,therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers1 in addition to the proper exterior senses4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices4 ,but the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things2 for each sense judges of its proper object4 ,in like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions2 for since the action of the sense is1 in a way1 between the power and its object1 it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision1 as being nearer to it1 than the color2 and in like manner with the other senses4 ,therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power1 called the common sense4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,memor4 et ,remin4 i71 the imagination and the memory are passions of the first sensitive4 ,but passion is not divided against its subject4 ,therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part4 ,but the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses2 whence we read 7,poster4 i1 #h71 that those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge4 ,therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power1 which they call the estimative power1 for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the action of the cogitative power1 which consists in comparing1 adding and dividing1 and the action of the reminiscence1 which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry1 is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers1 than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination4 ,therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers1 or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #f1 #g1 #bd7 describes three kinds of vision2 namely1 corporeal1 which is the action of the sense2 spiritual1 which is an action of the imagination or phantasy2 and intellectual1 which is an action of the intellect4 ,therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect1 besides the imagination4 ,on the contrary1 ,avicenna 7,de ,anima iv1 #a7 assigns five interior sensitive powers2 namely1 common sense1 phantasy1 imagination1 and the estimative and memorative powers4 ,i answer that1 ,as nature does not fail in necessary things1 there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal4 ,if any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle1 they must be assigned to diverse powers2 since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation4 ,now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal1 the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation1 but also when it is absent4 ,otherwise1 since animal motion and action follow apprehension1 an animal would not be moved to seek something absent3 the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals1 which are moved by progression1 for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent4 ,therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things1 when it is actually affected by them1 but it must also retain and preserve them4 ,now to receive and retain are1 in corporeal things1 reduced to diverse principles2 for moist things are apt to receive1 but retain with difficulty1 while it is the reverse with dry things4 ,wherefore1 since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ1 it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them4 ,again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense1 there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive1 and in which the animal takes pleasure1 or from which it shrinks with horror4 ,but the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things1 not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses1 but also on account of other advantages and uses1 or disadvantages3 just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf1 not on account of its color or shape1 but as a natural enemy3 and again a bird gathers together straws1 not because they are pleasant to the sense1 but because they are useful for building its nest4 ,animals1 therefore1 need to perceive such intentions1 which the exterior sense does not perceive4 ,and some distinct principle is necessary for this2 since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible1 which is not the case with the perception of those intentions4 ,thus1 therefore1 for the reception of sensible forms1 the proper sense and the common sense are appointed1 and of their distinction we shall speak farther on 7ad #a1 #b74 ,but for the retention and preservation of these forms1 the phantasy or imagination is appointed2 which are the same1 for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses4 ,furthermore1 for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses1 the estimative power is appointed3 and for the preservation thereof1 the memorative power1 which is a storehouse of such-like intentions4 ,a sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention1 for instance1 that something is harmful or otherwise4 ,and the very formality of the past1 which memory observes1 is to be reckoned among these intentions4 ,now1 we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals2 for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible4 ,but there is a difference as to the above intentions3 for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct1 while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas4 ,therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative1 in man is called the cogitative1 which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions4 ,wherefore it is also called the particular reason1 to which medical men assign a certain particular organ1 namely1 the middle part of the head3 for it compares individual intentions1 just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions4 ,as to the memorative power1 man has not only memory1 as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past2 but also reminiscence by syllogistically1 as it were1 seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions4 ,avicenna1 however1 assigns between the estimative and the imaginative1 a fifth power1 which combines and divides imaginary forms3 as when from the imaginary form of gold1 and imaginary form of a mountain1 we compose the one form of a golden mountain1 which we have never seen4 ,but this operation is not to be found in animals other than man1 in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto4 ,to man also does ,averroes attribute this action in his book ,de sensu et sensibilibus 7viii74 ,so there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part--namely1 the common sense1 the imagination1 and the estimative and memorative powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the interior sense is called common not by predication1 as if it were a genus2 but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense2 for instance1 by discerning white from black or green4 ,but neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet3 because what discerns between two things must know both4 ,wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense2 to which1 as to a common term1 all apprehensions of the senses must be referred3 and by which1 again1 all the intentions of the senses are perceived2 as when someone sees that he sees4 ,for this cannot be done by the proper sense1 which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted1 in which immutation the action of sight is completed1 and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as one power arises from the soul by means of another1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #g71 so also the soul is the subject of one power through another4 ,in this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the first sensitive4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses3 yet1 in the thing apprehended through the senses1 the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive4 ,in like manner does the estimative power1 though in a less perfect manner4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part2 but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason1 which1 so to speak1 overflows into them4 ,therefore they are not distinct powers1 but the same1 yet more perfect than in other animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies4 ,whence it is clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions4 ,,question #gi ,,of ,,the ,,intellectual ,,powers 7,in ,thirteen ,articles7 ,the next question concerns the intellectual powers1 under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the intellect is a power of the soul1 or its essence8 7#b7 ,if it be a power1 whether it is a passive power8 7#c7 ,if it is a passive power1 whether there is an active intellect8 7#d7 ,whether it is something in the soul8 7#e7 ,whether the active intellect is one in all8 7#f7 ,whether memory is in the intellect8 7#g7 ,whether the memory be distinct from the intellect8 7#h7 ,whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect8 7#i7 ,whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers8 7#aj7 ,whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect8 7#aa7 ,whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers8 7#ab7 ,whether synderesis is a power of the intellectual part8 7#ac7 ,whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,intellect ,is a ,power of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul1 but the essence of the soul4 ,for the intellect seems to be the same as the mind4 ,now the mind is not a power of the soul1 but the essence2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #b73 ,mind and spirit are not relative things1 but denominate the essence4 ,therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power1 but only in the essence of the soul4 ,now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #c71 but they are united in the mind1 for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa7 places the intelligence and will in the mind4 ,therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,gregory1 in a homily for the ,ascension 7xxix in ,ev471 man understands with the angels4 ,but angels are called minds and intellects4 ,therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul1 but the soul itself4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial4 ,but the soul is immaterial through its essence4 ,therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul 7,de ,anima ii1 #c74 ,i answer that1 ,in accordance with what has been already shown 7,q4 #ed1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #a7 it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul1 and not the very essence of the soul4 ,for then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation1 when operation itself is its being3 for as power is to operation as its act1 so is the essence to being4 ,but in ,god alone ,his action of understanding is ,his very ,being4 ,wherefore in ,god alone is ,his intellect ,his essence3 while in other intellectual creatures1 the intellect is a power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sense is sometimes taken for the power1 and sometimes for the sensitive soul2 for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power1 which is sense4 ,and in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect1 as from its chief power2 and thus we read 7,de ,anima i1 #d71 that the intellect is a substance4 ,and in this sense also ,augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #b2 xiv1 #af74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul1 by reason of the different formalities of their objects4 ,but the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it3 for appetite follows apprehension4 ,and in this way ,augustine puts the will in the mind2 and the ,philosopher1 in the reason 7,de ,anima iii1 #i74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the angels there is no other power besides the intellect1 and the will1 which follows the intellect4 ,and for this reason an angel is called a mind or an intellect2 because his whole power consists in this4 ,but the soul has many other powers1 such as the sensitive and nutritive powers1 and therefore the comparison fails4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect2 and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence4 ,wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul1 but that it is its virtue and power4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,intellect ,is a ,passive ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect is not a passive power4 ,for everything is passive by its matter1 and acts by its form4 ,but the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance4 ,therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intellectual power is incorruptible1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #f74 ,but if the intellect is passive1 it is corruptible 7,de ,anima iii1 #e74 ,therefore the intellectual power is not passive4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the agent is nobler than the patient1 as ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #af7 and ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 #e7 says4 ,but all the powers of the vegetative part are active2 yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul4 ,much more1 therefore1 all the intellectual powers1 which are the highest1 are active4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that to understand is in a way to be passive4 ,i answer that1 ,to be passive may be taken in three ways4 ,firstly1 in its most strict sense1 when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature1 or of its proper inclination3 as when water loses coolness by heating1 and as when a man becomes ill or sad4 ,secondly1 less strictly1 a thing is said to be passive1 when something1 whether suitable or unsuitable1 is taken away from it4 ,and in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive1 but also he who is healed2 not only he that is sad1 but also he that is joyful2 or whatever way he be altered or moved4 ,thirdly1 in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive1 from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality1 without being deprived of anything4 ,and accordingly1 whatever passes from potentiality to act1 may be said to be passive1 even when it is perfected4 ,and thus with us to understand is to be passive4 ,this is clear from the following reason4 ,for the intellect1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #a71 has an operation extending to universal being4 ,we may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being4 ,for we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being3 and such is the ,divine intellect1 which is the ,essence of ,god1 in which originally and virtually1 all being pre-exists as in its first cause4 ,and therefore the ,divine intellect is not in potentiality1 but is pure act4 ,but no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being2 otherwise it would needs be an infinite being4 ,wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible1 by reason of its very existence2 but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act4 ,now1 potentiality has a double relation to act4 ,there is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act3 as the matter of the heavenly bodies 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #a74 ,and there is another potentiality which is not always in act1 but proceeds from potentiality to act2 as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated4 ,wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand1 by reason of its proximity to the first intellect1 which is pure act1 as we have said above4 ,but the human intellect1 which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the ,divine intellect1 is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible1 and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,this is made clear from the fact1 that at first we are only in potentiality to understand1 and afterwards we are made to understand actually4 ,and so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to be passive2 taking passion in the third sense4 ,and consequently the intellect is a passive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses1 which belong to primary matter4 ,but in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,passive intellect is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite1 in which are the passions of the soul2 which appetite is also called rational by participation1 because it obeys the reason 7,ethic4 i1 #ac74 ,others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power1 which is called the particular reason4 ,and in each case passive may be taken in the two first senses2 forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ4 ,but the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible1 and which for this reason ,aristotle calls the possible intellect 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 is not passive except in the third sense3 for it is not an act of a corporeal organ4 ,hence it is incorruptible4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the agent is nobler than the patient1 if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing3 but not always1 if they refer to different things4 ,now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being3 while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing1 namely1 the body as united to the soul4 ,wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is an ,active ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no active intellect4 ,for as the senses are to things sensible1 so is our intellect to things intelligible4 ,but because sense is in potentiality to things sensible1 the sense is not said to be active1 but only passive4 ,therefore1 since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible1 it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active1 but only that it is passive4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if we say that also in the senses there is something active1 such as light3 on the contrary1 light is required for sight1 inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous2 for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium4 ,but in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act4 ,therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient4 ,but the passive intellect is an immaterial power4 ,therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially4 ,now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial4 ,therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #e71 ,as in every nature1 so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things1 and something by which it makes all things4 ,therefore we must admit an active intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the opinion of ,plato1 there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible2 but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect1 as will be explained farther on 7,a4 #d74 ,for ,plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter1 and consequently that they are intelligible3 since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial4 ,and he called such forms species or ideas2 from a participation of which1 he said that even corporeal matter was formed1 in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species3 and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things4 ,but since ,aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter1 and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible2 it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible4 ,now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act2 as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible4 ,we must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible1 by abstraction of the species from material conditions4 ,and such is the necessity for an active intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sensible things are found in act outside the soul2 and hence there is no need for an active sense4 ,wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active1 whereas in the sensitive part all are passive3 but in the intellectual part1 there is something active and something passive4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,there are two opinions as to the effect of light4 ,for some say that light is required for sight1 in order to make colors actually visible4 ,and according to this the active intellect is required for understanding1 in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing4 ,but in the opinion of others1 light is required for sight2 not for the colors to become actually visible2 but in order that the medium may become actually luminous1 as the ,commentator says on ,de ,anima ii4 ,and according to this1 ,aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this1 that as it is required for understanding1 so is light required for seeing2 but not for the same reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the agent pre-exist1 it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things1 on account of their dispositions4 ,but if the agent does not pre-exist1 the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter4 ,now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature2 if we consider the nature of things sensible1 which do not subsist apart from matter4 ,and therefore in order to understand them1 the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,active ,intellect ,is ,something in the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul4 ,for the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding4 ,but this is done by something higher than the soul3 according to ,john #a3i1 ,he was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world4 ,therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #e7 says of the active intellect1 that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand4 ,but our soul does not always understand3 sometimes it understands1 sometimes it does not understand4 ,therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 agent and patient suffice for action4 ,if1 therefore1 the passive intellect1 which is a passive power1 is something belonging to the soul2 and also the active intellect1 which is an active power3 it follows that a man would always be able to understand when he wished1 which is clearly false4 ,therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #e7 says that the active intellect is a substance in actual being4 ,but nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing4 ,if1 therefore1 the passive intellect1 which is in potentiality to all things intelligible1 is something in the soul1 it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if the active intellect is something in the soul1 it must be a power4 ,for it is neither a passion nor a habit2 since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul2 but rather passion is the very action of the passive power2 while habit is something which results from acts4 ,but every power flows from the essence of the soul4 ,it would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul4 ,and thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect3 which is unfitting4 ,therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #e71 that it is necessary for these differences1 namely1 the passive and active intellect1 to be in the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,the active intellect1 of which the ,philosopher speaks1 is something in the soul4 ,in order to make this evident1 we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect1 from which the soul acquires the power of understanding4 ,for what is such by participation1 and what is mobile1 and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such1 immovable and perfect4 ,now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power2 a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part4 ,moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing1 with a certain amount of reasoning and movement4 ,again it has an imperfect understanding2 both because it does not understand everything1 and because1 in those things which it does understand1 it passes from potentiality to act4 ,therefore there must needs be some higher intellect1 by which the soul is helped to understand4 ,wherefore some held that this intellect1 substantially separate1 is the active intellect1 which by lighting up the phantasms as it were1 makes them to be actually intelligible4 ,but1 even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect1 it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect1 by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible4 ,just as in other perfect natural things1 besides the universal active causes1 each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes3 for the sun alone does not generate man2 but in man is the power of begetting man3 and in like manner with other perfect animals4 ,now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul4 ,wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect1 whereby it is able to light up the phantasms4 ,and we know this by experience1 since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions1 which is to make them actually intelligible4 ,now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein2 as we have said above of the passive intellect 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul4 ,for this reason ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 #e7 compared the active intellect to light1 which is something received into the air3 while ,plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun1 as ,themistius says in his commentary on ,de ,anima iii4 ,but the separate intellect1 according to the teaching of our faith1 is ,god ,himself1 ,who is the soul's ,creator1 and only beatitude2 as will be shown later on 7,q4 #ij1 ,a4 #c2 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #c1 ,a4 #g74 ,wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from ,him1 according to ,ps4 #d3g1 ,the light of ,thy countenance1 ,o ,lord1 is signed upon us4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that true light enlightens as a universal cause1 from which the human soul derives a particular power1 as we have explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,philosopher says those words not of the active intellect1 but of the intellect in act3 of which he had already said3 ,knowledge in act is the same as the thing4 ,or1 if we refer those words to the active intellect1 then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do1 and sometimes we do not understand1 but to the intellect which is in potentiality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power1 as1 for instance1 of the visible in act to the sight2 it would follow that we could understand all things instantly1 since the active intellect is that which makes all things 7in act74 ,but now the active intellect is not an object1 rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act3 for which1 besides the presence of the active intellect1 we require the presence of phantasms1 the good disposition of the sensitive powers1 and practice in this sort of operation2 since through one thing understood1 other things come to be understood1 as from terms are made propositions1 and from first principles1 conclusions4 ,from this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul1 or something separate from the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial1 but it is in potentiality to determinate species4 ,on the contrary1 phantasms are actual images of certain species1 but are immaterial in potentiality4 ,wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul1 inasmuch as it is actually immaterial1 having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial1 by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter3 which power is called the active intellect2 and another power1 receptive of such species1 which is called the passive intellect by reason of its being in potentiality to such species4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,since the essence of the soul is immaterial1 created by the supreme intellect1 nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect1 and whereby it abstracts from matter1 flowing from the essence of the soul1 in the same way as its other powers4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,active ,intellect ,is ,one in ,all8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is one active intellect in all4 ,for what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies4 ,but the active intellect is separate1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #e74 ,therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies1 but is one for all men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the active intellect is the cause of the universal1 which is one in many4 ,but that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one4 ,therefore the active intellect is the same in all4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all men agree in the first intellectual concepts4 ,but to these they assent by the active intellect4 ,therefore all agree in one active intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #e7 that the active intellect is as a light4 ,but light is not the same in the various things enlightened4 ,therefore the same active intellect is not in various men4 ,i answer that1 ,the truth about this question depends on what we have already said 7,a4 #d74 ,for if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul1 but were some separate substance1 there would be one active intellect for all men4 ,and this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all4 ,but if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul1 as one of its powers1 we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls1 which are multiplied according to the number of men1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #b74 ,for it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate1 by the fact that the passive intellect is separate3 because1 as he says 7,de ,anima iii1 #e71 the agent is more noble than the patient4 ,now the passive intellect is said to be separate1 because it is not the act of any corporeal organ4 ,and in the same sense the active intellect is also called separate2 but not as a separate substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the active intellect is the cause of the universal1 by abstracting it from matter4 ,but for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings2 but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal1 with respect to which things the universal is one4 ,and this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species1 and consequently the power which is the principle of such action2 but not so as that power be identical in all4 ,now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species4 ,wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action3 and this power is the active intellect4 ,but there is no need for it to be identical in all4 ,yet it must be derived by all from one principle4 ,and thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect1 which ,plato compares to the sun2 but not the unity of the active intellect1 which ,aristotle compares to light4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,memory ,is in the ,intellectual ,part of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #b1c1h7 that to the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not common to man and beast4 ,but memory is common to man and beast1 for he says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #b1 #c1 #h7 that beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body1 and commit them to memory4 ,therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 memory is of the past4 ,but the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time4 ,memory1 therefore1 knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time2 which involves knowledge under the conditions of here and now4 ,but this is not the province of the intellect1 but of the sense4 ,therefore memory is not in the intellectual part1 but only in the sensitive4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking4 ,but this cannot happen in the intellect1 because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it4 ,now the intellect in act implies understanding in act2 and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species4 ,therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa7 that memory1 understanding1 and will are one mind4 ,i answer that1 ,since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended1 we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect3 because ,avicenna held that this was impossible4 ,for he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part1 as to some powers1 inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs1 in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension4 ,but in the intellect1 which has no corporeal organ1 nothing but what is intelligible exists4 ,wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood4 ,thus1 therefore1 according to him1 as soon as we cease to understand something actually1 the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect1 and if we wish to understand that thing anew1 we must turn to the active intellect1 which he held to be a separate substance1 in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect4 ,and from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed1 according to him1 a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect2 which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge4 ,according1 therefore1 to this supposition1 nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood3 wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part4 ,but this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of ,aristotle4 ,for he says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that1 when the passive intellect is identified with each thing as knowing it1 it is said to be in act1 and that this happens when it can operate of itself4 ,and1 even then1 it is in potentiality1 but not in the same way as before learning and discovering4 ,now1 the passive intellect is said to be each thing1 inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing4 ,to the fact1 therefore1 that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills1 but not so that it be always operating3 for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense1 though otherwise than before the act of understanding--namely1 in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration4 ,the foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason4 ,for what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient4 ,but the intellect is of a more stable nature1 and is more immovable than corporeal nature4 ,if1 therefore1 corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives1 not only while it actually does something through them1 but also after ceasing to act through them1 much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly1 whether it receive them from things sensible1 or derive them from some superior intellect4 ,thus1 therefore1 if we take memory only for the power of retaining species1 we must say that it is in the intellectual part4 ,but if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past1 then the memory is not in the intellectual1 but only in the sensitive part1 which apprehends individual things4 ,for past1 as past1 since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time1 is something individual4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,memory1 if considered as retentive of species1 is not common to us and other animals4 ,for species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only1 but rather in the body and soul united3 since the memorative power is the act of some organ4 ,but the intellect in itself is retentive of species1 without the association of any corporeal organ4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that the soul is the seat of the species1 not the whole soul1 but the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the condition of past may be referred to two things--namely1 to the object which is known1 and to the act of knowledge4 ,these two are found together in the sensitive part1 which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible3 wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past1 and to have sensed some past sensible thing4 ,but as concerns the intellectual part1 the past is accidental1 and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect4 ,for the intellect understands man1 as man3 and to man1 as man1 it is accidental that he exist in the present1 past1 or future4 ,but on the part of the act1 the condition of past1 even as such1 may be understood to be in the intellect1 as well as in the senses4 ,because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act1 existing in this or that time1 inasmuch as a man is said to understand now1 or yesterday1 or tomorrow4 ,and this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature3 for such an act of understanding1 though something individual1 is yet an immaterial act1 as we have said above of the intellect 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a72 and therefore1 as the intellect understands itself1 though it be itself an individual intellect1 so also it understands its act of understanding1 which is an individual act1 in the past1 present1 or future4 ,in this way1 then1 the notion of memory1 in as far as it regards past events1 is preserved in the intellect1 forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood3 but not in the sense that it understands the past as something here and now4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality1 and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality4 ,sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act1 and then it understands in act4 ,and sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state1 between potentiality and act3 and then we have habitual knowledge4 ,in this way the intellect retains the species1 even when it does not understand in act4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,intellectual ,memory ,is a ,power ,distinct from the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa7 assigns to the soul memory1 understanding1 and will4 ,but it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will4 ,therefore it is also distinct from the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part4 ,but memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense1 as we have said 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa2 xi1 #g71 memory1 understanding1 and will are equal to one another1 and one flows from the other4 ,but this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power4 ,therefore they are not the same power4 ,on the contrary1 ,from its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species4 ,but the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii7 attributes this to the intellect1 as we have said 7,a4 #f1 ad #a74 ,therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,as has been said above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c71 the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects3 since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object4 ,it has also been said above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d7 that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object1 that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object3 just as the power of sight1 which regards its object under the common ratio of color1 is not differentiated by differences of black and white4 ,now1 the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being3 since the passive intellect is that in which all are in potentiality4 ,wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being4 ,nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect3 because as regards the same object1 the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power1 which is moved by the object existing in act4 ,thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality2 whereas the passive power1 on the contrary1 is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act4 ,therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect1 but that of passive and active4 ,wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect3 for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although it is said 7#c ,sent4 ,d1 #a7 that memory1 intellect1 and will are three powers1 this is not in accordance with the meaning of ,augustine1 who says expressly 7,de ,trin4 xiv7 that if we take memory1 intelligence1 and will as always present in the soul1 whether we actually attend to them or not1 they seem to pertain to the memory only4 ,and by intelligence ,i mean that by which we understand when actually thinking2 and by will ,i mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent4 ,wherefore it is clear that ,augustine does not take the above three for three powers2 but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention2 by intelligence1 the act of the intellect2 and by will1 the act of the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers1 but not the intellectual powers1 for the reason give above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,intelligence arises from memory1 as act from habit2 and in this way it is equal to it1 but not as a power to a power4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,reason ,is ,distinct from the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect4 ,for it is stated in ,de ,spiritu et ,anima that when we wish to rise from lower things to higher1 first the sense comes to our aid1 then imagination1 then reason1 then the intellect4 ,therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect1 as imagination is from sense4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv1 #f71 that intellect is compared to reason1 as eternity to time4 ,but it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time4 ,therefore reason and intellect are not the same power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man has intellect in common with the angels1 and sense in common with the brutes4 ,but reason1 which is proper to man1 whence he is called a rational animal1 is a power distinct from sense4 ,therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect1 which properly belongs to the angel3 whence they are called intellectual4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iii1 #bj7 that that in which man excels irrational animals is reason1 or mind1 or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it4 ,therefore1 reason1 intellect and mind are one power4 ,i answer that1 ,reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers4 ,we shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions4 ,for to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth3 and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another1 so as to know an intelligible truth4 ,and therefore angels1 who according to their nature1 possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth1 have no need to advance from one thing to another2 but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74 ,but man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another2 and therefore he is called rational4 ,reasoning1 therefore1 is compared to understanding1 as movement is to rest1 or acquisition to possession2 of which one belongs to the perfect1 the other to the imperfect4 ,and since movement always proceeds from something immovable1 and ends in something at rest2 hence it is that human reasoning1 by way of inquiry and discovery1 advances from certain things simply understood--namely1 the first principles2 and1 again1 by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles1 in the light of which it examines what it has found4 ,now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers1 but to one and the same1 even in natural things3 since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place1 and rests in that place4 ,much more1 therefore1 by the same power do we understand and reason3 and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that enumeration is made according to the order of actions1 not according to the distinction of powers4 ,moreover1 that book is not of great authority4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the answer is clear from what we have said4 ,for eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable4 ,and thus ,boethius compared the intellect to eternity1 and reason to time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth1 which reason seeks4 ,but man attains1 although imperfectly1 to the knowledge of intelligible truth1 which angels know4 ,therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason1 but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #i ,whether the ,higher and ,lower ,reason ,are ,distinct ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #d1g71 that the image of the ,trinity is in the higher part of the reason1 and not in the lower4 ,but the parts of the soul are its powers4 ,therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing flows from itself4 ,now1 the lower reason flows from the higher1 and is ruled and directed by it4 ,therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #a7 that the scientific part of the soul1 by which the soul knows necessary things1 is another principle1 and another part from the opinionative and reasoning part by which it knows contingent things4 ,and he proves this from the principle that for those things which are generically different1 generically different parts of the soul are ordained4 ,now contingent and necessary are generically different1 as corruptible and incorruptible4 ,since1 therefore1 necessary is the same as eternal1 and temporal the same as contingent1 it seems that what the ,philosopher calls the scientific part must be the same as the higher reason1 which1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #g7 is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal2 and that what the ,philosopher calls the reasoning or opinionative part is the same as the lower reason1 which1 according to ,augustine1 is intent on the disposal of temporal things4 ,therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that opinion rises from the imagination3 then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth3 whence mens 7mind7 is derived from metiendo 7measuring74 ,and therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision4 ,therefore the opinionative power1 which is the lower reason1 is distinct from the mind and the intellect1 by which we may understand the higher reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #d7 that the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions4 ,therefore they are not two powers4 ,i answer that1 ,the higher and lower reason1 as they are understood by ,augustine1 can in no way be two powers of the soul4 ,for he says that the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal3 forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves1 and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them4 ,but he calls the lower reason that which is intent on the disposal of temporal things4 ,now these two--namely1 eternal and temporal--are related to our knowledge in this way1 that one of them is the means of knowing the other4 ,for by way of discovery1 we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal1 according to the words of the ,apostle 7,rom4 #a3bj71 ,the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made3 while by way of judgment1 from eternal things already known1 we judge of temporal things1 and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things4 ,but it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits3 as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect2 whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science4 ,and so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science--for example1 perspective4 ,but the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it4 ,for the act of the reason is1 as it were1 a movement from one thing to another4 ,but the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end4 ,wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power4 ,but according to ,augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions1 and according to their various habits3 for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason1 science to the lower4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we speak of parts1 in whatever way a thing is divided4 ,and so far as reason is divided according to its various acts1 the higher and lower reason are called parts2 but not because they are different powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the lower reason is said to flow from the higher1 or to be ruled by it1 as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the scientific part1 of which the ,philosopher speaks1 is not the same as the higher reason3 for necessary truths are found even among temporal things1 of which natural science and mathematics treat4 ,and the opinionative and ratiocinative part is more limited than the lower reason2 for it regards only things contingent4 ,neither must we say1 without any qualification1 that a power1 by which the intellect knows necessary things1 is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things3 because it knows both under the same objective aspect--namely1 under the aspect of being and truth4 ,wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth2 since it penetrates to their very essence1 from which it demonstrates their proper accidents4 ,on the other hand1 it knows contingent things1 but imperfectly2 forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth4 ,now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power1 but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting1 and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves4 ,and therefore the ,philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul--namely1 the scientific and the ratiocinative1 not because they are two powers1 but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits1 concerning the variety of which he inquires4 ,for contingent and necessary1 though differing according to their proper genera1 nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being1 which the intellect considers1 and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,that distinction given by ,damascene is according to the variety of acts1 not according to the variety of powers4 ,for opinion signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction1 whilst in fear of the other4 ,while to judge or measure mensurare is an act of the intellect1 applying certain principles to examine propositions4 ,from this is taken the word mens mind4 ,lastly1 to understand is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval4 ,,tenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #aj ,whether ,intelligence ,is a ,power ,distinct from ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect4 ,for we read in ,de ,spiritu et ,anima that when we wish to rise from lower to higher things1 first the sense comes to our aid1 then imagination1 then reason1 then intellect1 and afterwards intelligence4 ,but imagination and sense are distinct powers4 ,therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 v1 #d7 that sense considers man in one way1 imagination in another1 reason in another1 intelligence in another4 ,but intellect is the same power as reason4 ,therefore1 seemingly1 intelligence is a distinct power from intellect1 as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 actions came before powers1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d74 ,but intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii7 that the first movement is called intelligence2 but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention2 that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention1 and invention when it remains in the same man1 examining and judging of itself1 is called phronesis 7that is1 wisdom71 and phronesis if dilated makes thought1 that is1 orderly internal speech2 from which1 they say1 comes speech expressed by the tongue4 ,therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #f7 that intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false4 ,but the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect4 ,therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,this word intelligence properly signifies the intellect's very act1 which is to understand4 ,however1 in some works translated from the ,arabic1 the separate substances which we call angels are called intelligences1 and perhaps for this reason1 that such substances are always actually understanding4 ,but in works translated from the ,greek1 they are called intellects or minds4 ,thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect1 as power is from power2 but as act is from power4 ,and such a division is recognized even by the philosophers4 ,for sometimes they assign four intellects--namely1 the active and passive intellects1 the intellect in habit1 and the actual intellect4 ,of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers2 just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive4 ,but three of these are distinct1 as three states of the passive intellect1 which is sometimes in potentiality only1 and thus it is called passive2 sometimes it is in the first act1 which is knowledge1 and thus it is called intellect in habit2 and sometimes it is in the second act1 which is to consider1 and thus it is called intellect in act1 or actual intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if this authority is accepted1 intelligence there means the act of the intellect4 ,and thus it is divided against intellect as act against power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason4 ,wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race1 as intelligence alone belongs to ,god1 for it belongs to ,god to understand all things without any investigation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all those acts which ,damascene enumerates belong to one power--namely1 the intellectual power4 ,for this power first of all only apprehends something2 and this act is called intelligence4 ,secondly1 it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else1 or to some operation2 and this is called intention4 ,and when it goes on in search of what it intends1 it is called invention4 ,when1 by reference to something known for certain1 it examines what it has found1 it is said to know or to be wise1 which belongs to phronesis or wisdom2 for it belongs to the wise man to judge1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 i1 #b74 ,and when once it has obtained something for certain1 as being fully examined1 it thinks about the means of making it known to others2 and this is the ordering of interior speech1 from which proceeds external speech4 ,for every difference of acts does not make the powers vary1 but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d74 ,,eleventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #aa ,whether the ,speculative and ,practical ,intellects ,are ,distinct ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers4 ,for the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers1 as is clear from ,de ,anima ii1 #c4 ,but the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power2 while the practical intellect is a motive power4 ,therefore they are distinct powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the different nature of the object differentiates the power4 ,but the object of the speculative intellect is truth1 and of the practical is good2 which differ in nature4 ,therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the intellectual part1 the practical intellect is compared to the speculative1 as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part4 ,but the estimative differs from the imaginative1 as power form power1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical4 ,on the contrary1 ,the speculative intellect by extension becomes practical 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj74 ,but one power is not changed into another4 ,therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers4 ,i answer that1 ,the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers4 ,the reason of which is that1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c71 what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power1 does not differentiate that power2 for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man1 or to be great or small2 hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight4 ,now1 to a thing apprehended by the intellect1 it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not1 and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ4 ,for it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends1 not to operation1 but to the consideration of truth2 while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation4 ,and this is what the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj72 that the speculative differs from the practical in its end4 ,whence each is named from its end3 the one speculative1 the other practical--i4e4 operative4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the practical intellect is a motive power1 not as executing movement1 but as directing towards it2 and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,truth and good include one another2 for truth is something good1 otherwise it would not be desirable2 and good is something true1 otherwise it would not be intelligible4 ,therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true1 as having the aspect of good1 for example1 when some one desires to know the truth2 so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation1 and under the aspect of truth4 ,for the practical intellect knows truth1 just as the speculative1 but it directs the known truth to operation4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,many differences differentiate the sensitive powers1 which do not differentiate the intellectual powers1 as we have said above 7,a4 #g1 ad #b2 ,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c1 ad #d74 ,,twelfth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #ab ,whether ,synderesis ,is a ,special ,power of the ,soul ,distinct from the ,others8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that synderesis is a special power1 distinct from the others4 ,for those things which fall under one division1 seem to be of the same genus4 ,but in the gloss of ,jerome on ,ezech4 #a3f1 synderesis is divided against the irascible1 the concupiscible1 and the rational1 which are powers4 ,therefore synderesis is a power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 opposite things are of the same genus4 ,but synderesis and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because synderesis always incites to good2 while sensuality always incites to evil3 whence it is signified by the serpent1 as is clear from ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab1ac74 ,it seems1 therefore1 that synderesis is a power just as sensuality is4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 ii1 #aj7 that in the natural power of judgment there are certain rules and seeds of virtue1 both true and unchangeable4 ,and this is what we call synderesis4 ,since1 therefore1 the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #b71 it seems that synderesis is the same as reason3 and thus it is a power4 ,on the contrary1 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 viii1 #b71 rational powers regard opposite things4 ,but synderesis does not regard opposites1 but inclines to good only4 ,therefore synderesis is not a power4 ,for if it were a power it would be a rational power1 since it is not found in brute animals4 ,i answer that1 ,synderesis is not a power but a habit2 though some held that it is a power higher than reason2 while others 99,cf4 ,alexander of ,hales1 ,sum4 ,theol4 ,,ii1 ,q4 #gc said that it is reason itself1 not as reason1 but as a nature4 ,in order to make this clear we must observe that1 as we have said above 7,a4 #h71 man's act of reasoning1 since it is a kind of movement1 proceeds from the understanding of certain things--namely1 those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason1 as from an immovable principle--and ends also at the understanding1 inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known1 we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning4 ,now it is clear that1 as the speculative reason argues about speculative things1 so that practical reason argues about practical things4 ,therefore we must have1 bestowed on us by nature1 not only speculative principles1 but also practical principles4 ,now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power1 but to a special habit1 which is called the understanding of principles1 as the ,philosopher explains 7,ethic4 vi1 #f74 ,wherefore the first practical principles1 bestowed on us by nature1 do not belong to a special power1 but to a special natural habit1 which we call synderesis4 ,whence synderesis is said to incite to good1 and to murmur at evil1 inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover1 and judge of what we have discovered4 ,it is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power1 but a natural habit4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the division given by ,jerome is taken from the variety of acts1 and not from the variety of powers2 and various acts can belong to one power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in like manner1 the opposition of sensuality to syneresis is an opposition of acts1 and not of the different species of one genus4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles1 concerning which no one errs2 and they are attributed to reason as to a power1 and to synderesis as to a habit4 ,wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by synderesis4 ,,thirteenth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #gi1 ,art4 #ac ,whether ,conscience ,be a ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that conscience is a power2 for ,origen says 99,commentary on ,rom4 #b3ae that conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul1 by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good4 ,but in the soul1 spirit designates a power--either the mind itself1 according to the text 7,eph4 #d3ac71 ,be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind--or the imagination1 whence imaginary vision is called spiritual1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #g1bd74 ,therefore conscience is a power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing is a subject of sin1 except a power of the soul4 ,but conscience is a subject of sin2 for it is said of some that their mind and conscience are defiled 7,titus #a3ae74 ,therefore it seems that conscience is a power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 conscience must of necessity be either an act1 a habit1 or a power4 ,but it is not an act2 for thus it would not always exist in man4 ,nor is it a habit2 for conscience is not one thing but many1 since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge4 ,therefore conscience is a power4 ,on the contrary1 ,conscience can be laid aside4 ,but a power cannot be laid aside4 ,therefore conscience is not a power4 ,i answer that1 ,properly speaking1 conscience is not a power1 but an act4 ,this is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience4 ,for conscience1 according to the very nature of the word1 implies the relation of knowledge to something3 for conscience may be resolved into cum alio scientia1 i4e4 knowledge applied to an individual case4 ,but the application of knowledge to something is done by some act4 ,wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act4 ,the same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience4 ,for conscience is said to witness1 to bind1 or incite1 and also to accuse1 torment1 or rebuke4 ,and all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do3 which application is made in three ways4 ,one way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something2 ,thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others 7,eccles4 #g3bc71 and according to this1 conscience is said to witness4 ,in another way1 so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done2 and in this sense1 conscience is said to incite or to bind4 ,in the third way1 so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done1 and in this sense conscience is said to excuse1 accuse1 or torment4 ,now1 it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do4 ,wherefore1 properly speaking1 conscience denominates an act4 ,but since habit is a principle of act1 sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit--namely1 synderesis3 thus ,jerome calls synderesis conscience 7,gloss4 ,ezech4 #a3f72 ,basil 99,hom4 in princ4 ,proverb41 the natural power of judgment1 and ,damascene 99,de ,fide ,orth4 iv4 #bb says that it is the law of our intellect4 ,for it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,conscience is called a spirit1 so far as spirit is the same as mind2 because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the conscience is said to be defiled1 not as a subject1 but as the thing known is in knowledge2 so far as someone knows he is defiled4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although an act does not always remain in itself1 yet it always remains in its cause1 which is power and habit4 ,now all the habits by which conscience is formed1 although many1 nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit1 the habit of first principles1 which is called synderesis4 ,and for this special reason1 this habit is sometimes called conscience1 as we have said above4 ,,question #hj ,,of ,,the ,,appetitive ,,powers ,,in ,,general 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,next we consider the appetitive powers1 concerning which there are four heads of consideration3 first1 the appetitive powers in general2 second1 sensuality2 third1 the will2 fourth1 the free-will4 ,under the first there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul8 7#b7 ,whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hj1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,appetite ,is a ,special ,power of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul4 ,for no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things4 ,but appetite is common to animate and inanimate things3 since all desire good1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #a74 ,therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 powers are differentiated by their objects4 ,but what we desire is the same as what we know4 ,therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the common is not divided from the proper4 ,but each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing--namely its own suitable object4 ,therefore1 with regard to this object which is the desirable in general1 we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others1 called the appetitive power4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher distinguishes 7,de ,anima ii1 #c7 the appetitive from the other powers4 ,damascene also 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers4 ,i answer that1 ,it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul4 ,to make this evident1 we must observe that some inclination follows every form3 for example1 fire1 by its form1 is inclined to rise1 and to generate its like4 ,now1 the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge4 ,for in those which lack knowledge1 the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is1 to its nature4 ,therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination1 which is called the natural appetite4 ,but in those things which have knowledge1 each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form1 in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things3 for example1 sense receives the species of all things sensible1 and the intellect1 of all things intelligible1 so that the soul of man is1 in a way1 all things by sense and intellect3 and thereby1 those things that have knowledge1 in a way1 approach to a likeness to ,god1 in ,whom all things pre-exist1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v74 ,therefore1 as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms2 so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination1 which is called the natural appetite4 ,and this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul1 through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends1 and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form4 ,and so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,appetite is found in things which have knowledge1 above the common manner in which it is found in all things1 as we have said above4 ,therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality1 but differ in aspect3 for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible1 whereas it is desired as suitable or good4 ,now1 it is diversity of aspect in the objects1 and not material diversity1 which demands a diversity of powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,each power of the soul is a form or nature1 and has a natural inclination to something4 ,wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself4 ,above which natural appetite is the animal appetite1 which follows the apprehension1 and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power1 such as sight for seeing1 or sound for hearing2 but simply as suitable to the animal4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hj1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,sensitive and ,intellectual ,appetites ,are ,distinct ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers4 ,for powers are not differentiated by accidental differences1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #c74 ,but it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect4 ,therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 intellectual knowledge is of universals2 and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge1 which is of individual things4 ,but there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part3 for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things1 seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing4 ,therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as under the apprehensive power1 the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power1 so also is the motive power4 ,but the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense4 ,therefore1 for a like reason1 neither is there distinction in the appetitive part4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #i7 distinguishes a double appetite1 and says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aa7 that the higher appetite moves the lower4 ,i answer that1 ,we must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite4 ,for the appetitive power is a passive power1 which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended3 wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved1 while the appetite is a mover moved1 as the ,philosopher says in ,de ,anima iii1 #aj and ,metaph4 xii 7,did4 xi1 #g74 ,now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles2 because the motive must be proportionate to the movable1 and the active to the passive3 indeed1 the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle4 ,therefore1 since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different2 consequently1 the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect2 on the contrary1 this belongs to it by its nature2 for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended4 ,wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible4 ,and so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended1 as their proper objects4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellectual appetite1 though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul1 yet tends to them as standing under the universal2 as when it desires something because it is good4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,rhetoric4 ii1 #d7 that hatred can regard a universal1 as when we hate every kind of thief4 ,in the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good1 which is not apprehended by sense1 such as knowledge1 virtue1 and suchlike4 ,,question #ha ,,of ,,the ,,power ,,of ,,sensuality 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,next we have to consider the power of sensuality1 concerning which there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether sensuality is only an appetitive power8 7#b7 ,whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers8 7#c7 ,whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,sensuality ,is ,only ,appetitive8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive1 but also cognitive4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 that the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts4 ,but the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers4 ,therefore sensuality is a cognitive power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things which come under one division seem to be of one genus4 ,but ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab7 divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason1 which belong to knowledge4 ,therefore sensuality also is apprehensive4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the serpent4 ,but in the temptation of our first parents1 the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin1 which belong to the cognitive power4 ,therefore sensuality is a cognitive power4 ,on the contrary1 ,sensuality is defined as the appetite of things belonging to the body4 ,i answer that1 ,the name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement1 of which ,augustine speaks 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab1 #ac71 just as the name of a power is taken from its act2 for instance1 sight from seeing4 ,now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension4 ,for the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite3 since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends3 while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable4 ,therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest3 whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement4 ,wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power3 so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses1 ,augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality1 but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses1 since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses4 ,and thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason1 as having in common with them the act of movement3 for the apprehensive power1 to which belong the higher and lower reason1 is a motive power2 as is appetite1 to which appertains sensuality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the serpent not only showed and proposed sin1 but also incited to the commission of sin4 ,and in this1 sensuality is signified by the serpent4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,sensitive ,appetite ,is ,divided into the ,irascible and ,concupiscible ,as ,distinct ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers4 ,for the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety1 as sight regards both black and white1 according to the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima ii1 #aa74 ,but suitable and harmful are contraries4 ,since1 then1 the concupiscible power regards what is suitable1 while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful1 it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses4 ,but such is the object of the concupiscible power4 ,therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 hatred is in the irascible part3 for ,jerome says on ,matt4 #ac3cc3 ,we ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power4 ,but hatred is contrary to love1 and is in the concupiscible part4 ,therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,nemesius1 ,de ,natura ,hominis7 and ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 assign two parts to the sensitive appetite1 the irascible and the concupiscible4 ,i answer that1 ,the sensitive appetite is one generic power1 and is called sensuality2 but it is divided into two powers1 which are species of the sensitive appetite--the irascible and the concupiscible4 ,in order to make this clear1 we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful1 but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable1 and are productive of harm4 ,for example1 fire has a natural inclination1 not only to rise from a lower position1 which is unsuitable to it1 towards a higher position which is suitable1 but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action4 ,therefore1 since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension1 as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form1 there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable1 according to the senses1 and to fly from what is hurtful1 and this is called the concupiscible3 and another1 whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable1 and inflict harm1 and this is called the irascible4 ,whence we say that its object is something arduous1 because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles4 ,now these two are not to be reduced to one principle3 for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things1 against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite1 in order that1 following the impulse of the irascible appetite1 it may fight against obstacles4 ,wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite3 since the concupiscence1 on being aroused1 diminishes anger2 and anger being roused1 diminishes concupiscence in many cases4 ,this is clear also from the fact that the irascible is1 as it were1 the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires1 or against what inflicts harm1 from which the concupiscible flies4 ,and for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them2 for instance1 anger rises from sadness1 and having wrought vengeance1 terminates in joy4 ,for this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible--namely1 food and sex1 as the ,philosopher says 99,de ,animal4 ,histor4 viii44 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable4 ,but the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power1 which perceives those things which do not impress the senses1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #b72 so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable1 not because it pleases the senses1 but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense3 and this is the irascible power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite3 but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred1 it may belong to the irascible appetite4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ha1 ,art4 #c ,whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason4 ,for irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality4 ,but sensuality does not obey reason1 wherefore it is signified by the serpent1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #ab1ac74 ,therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what obeys a certain thing does not resist it4 ,but the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason3 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #g3bc73 ,i see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind4 ,therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul1 so also is the sensitive power4 ,but the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason3 for we neither hear nor see just when we wish4 ,therefore1 in like manner1 neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite1 the irascible and concupiscible1 obey reason4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger4 ,i answer that1 ,in two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part1 in which are the intellect or reason1 and the will2 first1 as to reason1 secondly as to the will4 ,they obey the reason in their own acts1 because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power2 for instance1 a sheep1 esteeming the wolf as an enemy1 is afraid4 ,in man the estimative power1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d71 is replaced by the cogitative power1 which is called by some the particular reason1 because it compares individual intentions4 ,wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason4 ,but this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason3 wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions4 ,therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite1 which is divided into concupiscible and irascible2 and this appetite obeys it4 ,but because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect1 as such1 but of the reason3 hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect4 ,anyone can experience this in himself3 for by applying certain universal considerations1 anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited4 ,to the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution1 which is accomplished by the motive power4 ,for in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites3 for instance1 the sheep1 fearing the wolf1 flees at once1 because it has no superior counteracting appetite4 ,on the contrary1 man is not moved at once1 according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites3 but he awaits the command of the will1 which is the superior appetite4 ,for wherever there is order among a number of motive powers1 the second only moves by virtue of the first3 wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement1 unless the higher appetite consents4 ,and this is what the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aa71 that the higher appetite moves the lower appetite1 as the higher sphere moves the lower4 ,in this way1 therefore1 the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,sensuality is signified by the serpent1 in what is proper to it as a sensitive power4 ,but the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act1 to which they are led by the reason1 as we have said4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #b73 ,we observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle3 for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power2 but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power4 ,for a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves1 who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them1 since they have nothing of their own4 ,but that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects1 who1 though subject to the government of the ruler1 have nevertheless something of their own1 by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands4 ,and so1 the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power1 because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul1 but at the soul's command both hand and foot1 and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement1 are moved at once4 ,but the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power3 because the sensitive appetite has something of its own1 by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason4 ,for the sensitive appetite is naturally moved1 not only by the estimative power in other animals1 and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides1 but also by the imagination and sense4 ,whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason1 inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant1 which reason forbids1 or unpleasant1 which reason commands4 ,and so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something1 we must not conclude that they do not obey4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things1 whereby they are affected1 and the presence of which is not ruled by reason4 ,but the interior powers1 both appetitive and apprehensive1 do not require exterior things4 ,therefore they are subject to the command of reason1 which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power1 but can also form the phantasms of the imagination4 ,,question #hb ,,of ,,the ,,will 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we next consider the will4 ,under this head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the will desires something of necessity8 7#b7 ,whether it desires everything of necessity8 7#c7 ,whether it is a higher power than the intellect8 7#d7 ,whether the will moves the intellect8 7#e7 ,whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,will ,desires ,something of ,necessity8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will desires nothing of necessity4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #aj7 that it anything is necessary1 it is not voluntary4 ,but whatever the will desires is voluntary4 ,therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the rational powers1 according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 viii1 #b71 extend to opposite things4 ,but the will is a rational power1 because1 as he says 7,de ,anima iii1 #i71 the will is in the reason4 ,therefore the will extends to opposite things1 and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by the will we are masters of our own actions4 ,but we are not masters of that which is of necessity4 ,therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #d7 that all desire happiness with one will4 ,now if this were not necessary1 but contingent1 there would at least be a few exceptions4 ,therefore the will desires something of necessity4 ,i answer that1 ,the word necessity is employed in many ways4 ,for that which must be is necessary4 ,now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle--either material1 as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible--or formal1 as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles4 ,and this is natural and absolute necessity4 ,in another way1 that a thing must be1 belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic1 which is either the end or the agent4 ,on the part of the end1 as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained3 for instance1 food is said to be necessary for life1 and a horse is necessary for a journey4 ,this is called necessity of end1 and sometimes also utility4 ,on the part of the agent1 a thing must be1 when someone is forced by some agent1 so that he is not able to do the contrary4 ,this is called necessity of coercion4 ,now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will4 ,for we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing4 ,but the very movement of the will is an inclination to something4 ,therefore1 as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature1 so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will4 ,therefore1 just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural1 so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent1 and voluntary4 ,but necessity of end is not repugnant to the will1 when the end cannot be attained except in one way3 thus from the will to cross the sea1 arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship4 ,in like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will4 ,indeed1 more than this1 for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles1 the will must of necessity adhere to the last end1 which is happiness3 since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters4 ,for what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto1 since the nature of a thing is the first in everything1 and every movement arises from something immovable4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the words of ,augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion4 ,but natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will1 as he says himself 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #aj74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will1 so far as it desires a thing naturally1 corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason1 which extends to opposite things4 ,wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,we are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that4 ,but choice regards not the end1 but the means to the end1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #i74 ,wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,will ,desires of ,necessity1 ,whatever ,it ,desires8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will desires all things of necessity1 whatever it desires4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that evil is outside the scope of the will4 ,therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable4 ,but the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover4 ,therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite1 so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite1 which is called the will4 ,but what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity3 for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #ad7 that animals are moved by things seen4 ,therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,retract4 i1 #i7 that it is the will by which we sin and live well1 and so the will extends to opposite things4 ,therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires4 ,i answer that1 ,the will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires4 ,in order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles1 so the will adheres to the last end1 as we have said already 7,a4 #a74 ,now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles2 such as contingent propositions1 the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles4 ,and to such the intellect does not assent of necessity4 ,but there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles3 such as demonstrable conclusions1 a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles4 ,and to these the intellect assents of necessity1 when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles2 but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection4 ,it is the same with the will4 ,for there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness1 because without them a man can be happy3 and to such the will does not adhere of necessity4 ,but there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness1 by means of which things man adheres to ,god1 in ,whom alone true happiness consists4 ,nevertheless1 until through the certitude of the ,divine ,vision the necessity of such connection be shown1 the will does not adhere to ,god of necessity1 nor to those things which are of ,god4 ,but the will of the man who sees ,god in ,his essence of necessity adheres to ,god1 just as now we desire of necessity to be happy4 ,it is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good4 ,but because good is of many kinds1 for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the mover1 then1 of necessity causes movement in the thing movable1 when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable1 so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover4 ,but as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good1 its capacity is not subjected to any individual good4 ,and therefore it is not of necessity moved by it4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the sensitive power does not compare different things with each other1 as reason does3 but it simply apprehends some one thing4 ,therefore1 according to that one thing1 it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way4 ,but the reason is a power that compares several things together3 therefore from several things the intellectual appetite--that is1 the will--may be moved2 but not of necessity from one thing4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,will ,is a ,higher ,power ,than the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect4 ,for the object of the will is good and the end4 ,but the end is the first and highest cause4 ,therefore the will is the first and highest power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect4 ,and this also appears in the powers of the soul3 for sense precedes the intellect1 which is more noble4 ,now the act of the will1 in the natural order1 follows the act of the intellect4 ,therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 habits are proportioned to their powers1 as perfections to what they make perfect4 ,but the habit which perfects the will--namely1 charity--is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect3 for it is written 7#a ,cor4 #ac3b73 ,if ,i should know all mysteries1 and if ,i should have all faith1 and have not charity1 ,i am nothing4 ,therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,the superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways3 absolutely and relatively4 ,now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself3 but relatively as it is such with regard to something else4 ,if therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves1 then the intellect is the higher power4 ,and this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another4 ,for the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will2 since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good2 and the appetible good1 the idea of which is in the intellect1 is the object of the will4 ,now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is1 the nobler and higher it is in itself2 and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will4 ,therefore1 since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object1 it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will4 ,but relatively and by comparison with something else1 we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect1 from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect4 ,thus1 for instance1 ,i might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight1 inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color1 though color is nobler and simpler than sound4 ,for as we have said above 7,q4 #af1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #d71 the action of the intellect consists in this--that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands2 while the act of the will consists in this--that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself4 ,and therefore the ,philosopher says in ,metaph4 vi 7,did4 v1 #b7 that good and evil1 which are objects of the will1 are in things1 but truth and error1 which are objects of the intellect1 are in the mind4 ,when1 therefore1 the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself1 in which is the idea understood2 by comparison with such a thing1 the will is higher than the intellect4 ,but when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul1 then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will4 ,wherefore the love of ,god is better than the knowledge of ,god2 but1 on the contrary1 the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof4 ,absolutely1 however1 the intellect is nobler than the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another1 and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler3 but truth signifies something more absolute1 and extends to the idea of good itself3 wherefore even good is something true4 ,but1 again1 truth is something good3 forasmuch as the intellect is a thing1 and truth its end4 ,and among other ends this is the most excellent3 as also is the intellect among the other powers4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,what precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect3 for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act1 and imperfection precedes perfection4 ,but what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect3 for thus act precedes potentiality4 ,and in this way the intellect precedes the will1 as the motive power precedes the thing movable1 and as the active precedes the passive2 for good which is understood moves the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul4 ,for charity is the virtue by which we love ,god4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,will ,moves the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the will does not move the intellect4 ,for what moves excels and precedes what is moved1 because what moves is an agent1 and the agent is nobler than the patient1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #af71 and the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #e74 ,but the intellect excels and precedes the will1 as we have said above 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore the will does not move the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what moves is not moved by what is moved1 except perhaps accidentally4 ,but the intellect moves the will1 because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved2 whereas the appetite moves and is moved4 ,therefore the intellect is not moved by the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we can will nothing but what we understand4 ,if1 therefore1 in order to understand1 the will moves by willing to understand1 that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect1 and this act of the intellect by another act of the will1 and so on indefinitely1 which is impossible4 ,therefore the will does not move the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bf73 ,it is in our power to learn an art or not1 as we list4 ,but a thing is in our power by the will1 and we learn art by the intellect4 ,therefore the will moves the intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing is said to move in two ways3 ,first1 as an end2 for instance1 when we say that the end moves the agent4 ,in this way the intellect moves the will1 because the good understood is the object of the will1 and moves it as an end4 ,secondly1 a thing is said to move as an agent1 as what alters moves what is altered1 and what impels moves what is impelled4 ,in this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul1 as ,anselm says 7,eadmer1 ,de ,similitudinibus74 ,the reason is1 because wherever we have order among a number of active powers1 that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends4 ,and we may observe this both in nature and in things politic4 ,for the heaven1 which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption1 moves all inferior bodies1 each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual4 ,the king also1 who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom1 by his rule moves all the governors of cities1 each of whom rules over his own particular city4 ,now the object of the will is good and the end in general1 and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it1 as sight is directed to the perception of color1 and the intellect to the knowledge of truth4 ,therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts1 except the natural powers of the vegetative part1 which are not subject to our will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellect may be considered in two ways3 as apprehensive of universal being and truth1 and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act4 ,in like manner also the will may be considered in two ways3 according to the common nature of its object--that is to say1 as appetitive of universal good--and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act4 ,if1 therefore1 the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects1 then1 as we have said above 7,a4 #c71 the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will4 ,if1 however1 we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power1 then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will1 because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself1 and its act1 and its object4 ,wherefore the intellect understands the will1 and its act1 and its object1 just as it understands other species of things1 as stone or wood1 which are contained in the common notion of being and truth4 ,but if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object1 which is good1 and the intellect as a thing and a special power2 then the intellect itself1 and its act1 and its object1 which is truth1 each of which is some species of good1 are contained under the common notion of good4 ,and in this way the will is higher than the intellect1 and can move it4 ,from this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts1 because the intellect understands that the will wills1 and the will wills the intellect to understand4 ,in the same way good is contained in truth1 inasmuch as it is an understood truth1 and truth in good1 inasmuch as it is a desired good4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellect moves the will in one sense1 and the will moves the intellect in another1 as we have said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is no need to go on indefinitely1 but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest4 ,for every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension1 whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will2 but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect--namely1 ,god--as also ,aristotle says 7,eth4 ,eudemic4 vii1 #ad71 and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hb1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,we ,should ,distinguish ,irascible and ,concupiscible ,parts in the ,superior ,appetite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite1 which is the will4 ,for the concupiscible power is so called from concupiscere 7to desire71 and the irascible part from irasci 7to be angry74 ,but there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite1 but only to the intellectual1 which is the will2 as the concupiscence of wisdom1 of which it is said 7,wis4 #f3ba73 ,the concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom4 ,there is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite1 but only to the intellectual2 as when our anger is directed against vice4 ,wherefore ,jerome commenting on ,matt4 #ac3cc warns us to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part4 ,therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as is commonly said1 charity is in the concupiscible1 and hope in the irascible part4 ,but they cannot be in the sensitive appetite1 because their objects are not sensible1 but intellectual4 ,therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is said 7,de ,spiritu et ,anima7 that the soul has these powers--namely1 the irascible1 concupiscible1 and rational--before it is united to the body4 ,but no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone1 but to the soul and body united1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gh1 ,,aa4 #e1 #h74 ,therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will1 which is the intellectual appetite4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom47 says that the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible1 and ,damascene says the same 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab74 ,and the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #i7 that the will is in reason1 while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger1 or desire and animus4 ,i answer that1 ,the irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite1 which is called the will4 ,because1 as was said above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #g71 a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion4 ,for instance1 because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored1 the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color3 but if there were a power regarding white as white1 and not as something colored1 it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black4 ,now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good1 because neither do the senses apprehend the universal4 ,and therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good3 for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good1 as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature3 whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful4 ,but the will regards good according to the common notion of good1 and therefore in the will1 which is the intellectual appetite1 there is no differentiation of appetitive powers1 so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power3 just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied1 although they are on the part of the senses4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,love1 concupiscence1 and the like can be understood in two ways4 ,sometimes they are taken as passions--arising1 that is1 with a certain commotion of the soul4 ,and thus they are commonly understood1 and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite4 ,they may1 however1 be taken in another way1 as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul1 and thus they are acts of the will4 ,and in this sense1 too1 they are attributed to the angels and to ,god4 ,but if taken in this sense1 they do not belong to different powers1 but only to one power1 which is called the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the will itself may be said to be irascible1 as far as it wills to repel evil1 not from any sudden movement of a passion1 but from a judgment of the reason4 ,and in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good4 ,and thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that is1 in the will as ordered to such acts4 ,and in this way1 too1 we may understand the words quoted 7,de ,spiritu et ,anima72 that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body 7as long as we understand priority of nature1 and not of time71 although there is no need to have faith in what that book says4 ,whence the answer to the third objection is clear4 ,,question #hc ,,of ,,free-,,will 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now inquire concerning free-will4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether man has free-will8 7#b7 ,what is free-will--a power1 an act1 or a habit8 7#c7 ,if it is a power1 is it appetitive or cognitive8 7#d7 ,if it is appetitive1 is it the same power as the will1 or distinct8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,man ,has ,free-,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man has not free-will4 ,for whoever has free-will does what he wills4 ,but man does not what he wills2 for it is written 7,rom4 #g3ai73 ,for the good which ,i will ,i do not1 but the evil which ,i will not1 that ,i do4 ,therefore man has not free-will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will1 to do or not to do4 ,but this is not in man's power3 for it is written 7,rom4 #i3af73 ,it is not of him that willeth--namely1 to will--nor of him that runneth--namely1 to run4 ,therefore man has not free-will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is free is cause of itself1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 i1 #b74 ,therefore what is moved by another is not free4 ,but ,god moves the will1 for it is written 7,prov4 #ba3a73 ,the heart of the king is in the hand of the ,lord2 whithersoever ,he will ,he shall turn it and 7,phil4 #b3ac73 ,it is ,god ,who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish4 ,therefore man has not free-will4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 whoever has free-will is master of his own actions4 ,but man is not master of his own actions3 for it is written 7,jer4 #aj3bc73 ,the way of a man is not his3 neither is it in a man to walk4 ,therefore man has not free-will4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #e73 ,according as each one is1 such does the end seem to him4 ,but it is not in our power to be of one quality or another2 for this comes to us from nature4 ,therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end1 and therefore we are not free in so doing4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ae3ad73 ,god made man from the beginning1 and left him in the hand of his own counsel2 and the gloss adds3 ,that is of his free-will4 ,i answer that1 ,man has free-will3 otherwise counsels1 exhortations1 commands1 prohibitions1 rewards1 and punishments would be in vain4 ,in order to make this evident1 we must observe that some things act without judgment2 as a stone moves downwards2 and in like manner all things which lack knowledge4 ,and some act from judgment1 but not a free judgment2 as brute animals4 ,for the sheep1 seeing the wolf1 judges it a thing to be shunned1 from a natural and not a free judgment1 because it judges1 not from reason1 but from natural instinct4 ,and the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals4 ,but man acts from judgment1 because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought4 ,but because this judgment1 in the case of some particular act1 is not from a natural instinct1 but from some act of comparison in the reason1 therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things4 ,for reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses1 as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments4 ,now particular operations are contingent1 and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses1 and is not determinate to one4 ,and forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 the sensitive appetite1 though it obeys the reason1 yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids4 ,this is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes--namely1 not to desire against reason1 as ,augustine says4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,those words of the ,apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will1 but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,free-will is the cause of its own movement1 because by his free-will man moves himself to act4 ,but it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself1 as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause4 ,god1 therefore1 is the first cause1 ,who moves causes both natural and voluntary4 ,and just as by moving natural causes ,he does not prevent their acts being natural1 so by moving voluntary causes ,he does not deprive their actions of being voluntary3 but rather is ,he the cause of this very thing in them2 for ,he operates in each thing according to its own nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,man's way is said not to be his in the execution of his choice1 wherein he may be impeded1 whether he will or not4 ,the choice itself1 however1 is in us1 but presupposes the help of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,quality in man is of two kinds3 natural and adventitious4 ,now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part1 or in the body and its powers4 ,from the very fact1 therefore1 that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part1 he naturally desires his last end1 which is happiness4 ,which desire1 indeed1 is a natural desire1 and is not subject to free-will1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #hb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,but on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality1 inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes1 which cannot affect the intellectual part1 since it is not the act of a corporeal organ4 ,and such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality1 such also does his end seem to him1 because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something4 ,but these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason1 which the lower appetite obeys1 as we have said 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #c74 ,wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will4 ,the adventitious qualities are habits and passions1 by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another4 ,and yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason4 ,such qualities1 too1 are subject to reason1 as it is in our power either to acquire them1 whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them1 or to reject them4 ,and so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,free-,will ,is a ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that free-will is not a power4 ,for free-will is nothing but a free judgment4 ,but judgment denominates an act1 not a power4 ,therefore free-will is not a power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 free-will is defined as the faculty of the will and reason4 ,but faculty denominates a facility of power1 which is due to a habit4 ,therefore free-will is a habit4 ,moreover ,bernard says 7,de ,gratia et ,lib4 ,arb4 #a1b7 that free-will is the soul's habit of disposing of itself4 ,therefore it is not a power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no natural power is forfeited through sin4 ,but free-will is forfeited through sin2 for ,augustine says that man1 by abusing free-will1 loses both it and himself4 ,therefore free-will is not a power4 ,on the contrary1 ,nothing but a power1 seemingly1 is the subject of a habit4 ,but free-will is the subject of grace1 by the help of which it chooses what is good4 ,therefore free-will is a power4 ,i answer that1 ,although free-will 99,liberum arbitrium--i4e4 free judgment in its strict sense denotes an act1 in the common manner of speaking we call free-will1 that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely4 ,now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit2 for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power4 ,therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit1 or a power with a habit4 ,that it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit1 can be clearly proved in two ways4 ,first of all1 because1 if it is a habit1 it must be a natural habit2 for it is natural to man to have a free-will4 ,but there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will3 for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits--for instance1 to assent to first principles3 while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will1 as we have said of the desire of happiness 7,q4 #hb1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit4 ,and that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature4 ,therefore in no sense is it a habit4 ,secondly1 this is clear because habits are defined as that by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions 7,ethic4 ii1 #e72 for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences1 and by intemperance ill-disposed3 and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth1 and by the contrary ill-disposed4 ,but the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice3 wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit4 ,therefore it is a power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is not unusual for a power to be named from its act4 ,and so from this act1 which is a free judgment1 is named the power which is the principle of this act4 ,otherwise1 if free-will denominated an act1 it would not always remain in man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation1 and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will4 ,but ,bernard takes habit1 not as divided against power1 but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act4 ,and this may be both by a power and by a habit3 for by a power man is1 as it were1 empowered to do the action1 and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin1 not as to natural liberty1 which is freedom from coercion1 but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness4 ,of this we shall treat later in the treatise on ,morals in the second part of this work 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 seqq42 ,q4 #aji74 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,free-will ,is an ,appetitive ,power8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that free-will is not an appetitive1 but a cognitive power4 ,for ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bg7 says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature4 ,but reason is a cognitive power4 ,therefore free-will is a cognitive power4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment4 ,but to judge is an act of a cognitive power4 ,therefore free-will is a cognitive power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the principal function of free-will is to choose4 ,but choice seems to belong to knowledge1 because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another1 which belongs to the cognitive power4 ,therefore free-will is a cognitive power4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #c7 that choice is the desire of those things which are in us4 ,but desire is an act of the appetitive power3 therefore choice is also4 ,but free-will is that by which we choose4 ,therefore free-will is an appetitive power4 ,i answer that1 ,the proper act of free-will is choice3 for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another2 and this is to choose4 ,therefore we must consider the nature of free-will1 by considering the nature of choice4 ,now two things concur in choice3 one on the part of the cognitive power1 the other on the part of the appetitive power4 ,on the part of the cognitive power1 counsel is required1 by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another3 and on the part of the appetitive power1 it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel4 ,therefore ,aristotle 7,ethic4 vi1 #b7 leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power3 since he says that choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite4 ,but 7,ethic4 iii1 #c7 he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as a desire proceeding from counsel4 ,and the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end3 and this1 as such1 is in the nature of that good which is called useful3 wherefore since good1 as such1 is the object of the appetite1 it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power4 ,and thus free-will is an appetitive power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive1 and in this sense ,damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,judgment1 as it were1 concludes and terminates counsel4 ,now counsel is terminated1 first1 by the judgment of reason2 secondly1 by the acceptation of the appetite3 whence the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 iii1 #c7 says that1 having formed a judgment by counsel1 we desire in accordance with that counsel4 ,and in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel1 which is an act of reason4 ,for though the appetite does not make comparisons1 yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare1 it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hc1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,free-will ,is a ,power ,distinct from the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #bb7 that thelesis is one thing and boulesis another4 ,but thelesis is the will1 while boulesis seems to be the free-will1 because boulesis1 according to him1 is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things4 ,therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 powers are known by their acts4 ,but choice1 which is the act of free-will1 is distinct from the act of willing1 because the act of the will regards the end1 whereas choice regards the means to the end 7,ethic4 iii1 #b74 ,therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the will is the intellectual appetite4 ,but in the intellect there are two powers--the active and the passive4 ,therefore1 also on the part of the intellectual appetite1 there must be another power besides the will4 ,and this1 seemingly1 can only be free-will4 ,therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 iii1 #ad7 free-will is nothing else than the will4 ,i answer that1 ,the appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers1 as we have said above 7,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #b74 ,now1 as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason1 so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will1 and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice4 ,and this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts4 ,for the act of understanding implies the simple acceptation of something2 whence we say that we understand first principles1 which are known of themselves without any comparison4 ,but to reason1 properly speaking1 is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another3 wherefore1 properly speaking1 we reason about conclusions1 which are known from the principles4 ,in like manner on the part of the appetite to will implies the simple appetite for something3 wherefore the will is said to regard the end1 which is desired for itself4 ,but to choose is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else3 wherefore1 properly speaking1 it regards the means to the end4 ,now1 in matters of knowledge1 the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles3 just as1 in appetitive matters1 the end is related to the means1 which is desired on account of the end4 ,wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason1 so is the will to the power of choice1 which is free-will4 ,but it has been shown above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #h7 that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason1 even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement4 ,wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose3 and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers1 but one4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,boulesis is distinct from thelesis on account of a distinction1 not of powers1 but of acts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,choice and will--that is1 the act of willing--are different acts3 yet they belong to the same power1 as also to understand and to reason1 as we have said4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellect is compared to the will as moving the will4 ,and therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will4 ,,question #hd ,,how ,,the ,,soul ,,while ,,united ,,to ,,the ,,body ,,understands ,,corporeal ,,things ,,beneath ,,it 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers3 for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian4 ,furthermore1 the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals2 wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work1 to which the consideration of moral matters belongs4 ,but of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now4 ,in treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order3 ,first1 we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body2 secondly1 how it understands when separated therefrom4 ,the former of these inquiries will be threefold3 7#a7 ,how the soul understands bodies which are beneath it2 7#b7 ,how it understands itself and things contained in itself2 7#c7 ,how it understands immaterial substances1 which are above it4 ,in treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered3 7#a7 ,through what does the soul know them8 7#b7 ,how and in what order does it know them8 7#c7 ,what does it know in them8 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect8 7#b7 ,whether it understands them through its essence1 or through any species8 7#c7 ,if through some species1 whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul8 7#d7 ,whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms8 7#e7 ,whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands8 7#f7 ,whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses8 7#g7 ,whether the intellect can1 through the species of which it is possessed1 actually understand1 without turning to the phantasms8 7#h7 ,whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,soul ,knows ,bodies ,through the ,intellect8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect4 ,for ,augustine says 7,soliloq4 ii1 #d7 that bodies cannot be understood by the intellect2 nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses4 ,he says also 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bd7 that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence4 ,but such are not bodies4 ,therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as sense is to the intelligible1 so is the intellect to the sensible4 ,but the soul can by no means1 through the senses1 understand spiritual things1 which are intelligible4 ,therefore by no means can it1 through the intellect1 know bodies1 which are sensible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable4 ,but all bodies are mobile and changeable4 ,therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,science is in the intellect4 ,if1 therefore1 the intellect does not know bodies1 it follows that there is no science of bodies2 and thus perishes natural science1 which treats of mobile bodies4 ,i answer that1 ,it should be said in order to elucidate this question1 that the early philosophers1 who inquired into the natures of things1 thought there was nothing in the world save bodies4 ,and because they observed that all bodies are mobile1 and considered them to be ever in a state of flux1 they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things4 ,for what is in a continual state of flux1 cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude1 for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon3 according to the saying of ,heraclitus1 that it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent1 as the ,philosopher relates 7,metaph4 iv1 ,did4 iii1 #e74 ,after these came ,plato1 who1 wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect1 maintained that1 besides these things corporeal1 there is another genus of beings1 separate from matter and movement1 which beings he called species or ideas1 by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man1 or a horse1 or the like4 ,wherefore he said that sciences and definitions1 and whatever appertains to the act of the intellect1 are not referred to these sensible bodies1 but to those beings immaterial and separate3 so that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal things1 but the separate species thereof4 ,now this may be shown to be false for two reasons4 ,first1 because1 since those species are immaterial and immovable1 knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science 7which knowledge is proper to natural science71 and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes4 ,secondly1 because it seems ridiculous1 when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest1 to introduce other beings1 which cannot be the substance of those others1 since they differ from them essentially3 so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances1 we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things4 ,now it seems that ,plato strayed from the truth because1 having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude1 he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known4 ,then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality1 immateriality1 and immobility3 which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect1 whose act of understanding has a universal extension1 and is subject to a certain amount of necessity3 for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form4 ,wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility4 ,but there is no necessity for this4 ,for even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another3 for instance1 whiteness may be of great intensity in one1 and of a less intensity in another3 in one we find whiteness with sweetness1 in another without sweetness4 ,in the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul1 and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter1 such as the color of gold without receiving gold4 ,so also the intellect1 according to its own mode1 receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility1 the species of material and mobile bodies3 for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver4 ,we must conclude1 therefore1 that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial1 universal1 and necessary4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of ,augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge1 and not to its object4 ,for the intellect knows bodies by understanding them1 not indeed through bodies1 nor through material and corporeal species2 but through immaterial and intelligible species1 which can be in the soul by their own essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxii1 #bi71 it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things2 for it follows that ,god and the angels would not know corporeal things4 ,the reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power2 whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every movement presupposes something immovable3 for when a change of quality occurs1 the substance remains unmoved2 and when there is a change of substantial form1 matter remains unmoved4 ,moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable2 for instance1 though ,socrates be not always sitting1 yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place4 ,for this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,soul ,understands ,corporeal ,things ,through ,its ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #e7 that the soul collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul3 for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance4 ,but the soul understands bodies by images of bodies4 ,therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence1 which it employs for the formation of such images1 and from which it forms them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #h7 that the soul1 after a fashion1 is everything4 ,since1 therefore1 like is known by like1 it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the soul is superior to corporeal creatures4 ,now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xii74 ,therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves4 ,therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #c7 that the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses4 ,but the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses4 ,therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself4 ,i answer that1 ,the ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence4 ,for it was universally admitted that like is known by like4 ,but they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known4 ,the ,platonists however were of a contrary opinion4 ,for ,plato1 having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature1 and an immaterial mode of knowledge1 held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially4 ,while the earlier natural philosophers1 observing that things known are corporeal and material1 held that things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them4 ,and therefore1 in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things1 they held that it has the same nature in common with all4 ,and because the nature of a result is determined by its principles1 they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle2 so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all1 held that the soul had the nature of fire2 and in like manner as to air and water4 ,lastly1 ,empedocles1 who held the existence of our four material elements and two principles of movement1 said that the soul was composed of these4 ,consequently1 since they held that things exist in the soul materially1 they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material1 thus failing to discern intellect from sense4 ,but this opinion will not hold4 ,first1 because in the material principle of which they spoke1 the various results do not exist save in potentiality4 ,but a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality1 but only according as it is in act1 as is shown ,metaph4 ix 7,did4 viii1 #i73 wherefore neither is a power known except through its act4 ,it is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all1 unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result1 for instance1 of bone1 flesh1 and the like2 thus does ,aristotle argue against ,empedocles 7,de ,anima i1 #e74 ,secondly1 because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower1 there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge2 why1 for instance1 if by fire the soul knows fire1 that fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire4 ,we must conclude1 therefore1 that material things known must needs exist in the knower1 not materially1 but immaterially4 ,the reason of this is1 because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower3 for we know things even that are external to us4 ,now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing4 ,wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality4 ,and consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially1 have no power of knowledge whatever--such as plants1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #ab74 ,but the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known1 the more perfect is its knowledge4 ,therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter1 but also from the individuating conditions of matter1 has more perfect knowledge than the senses1 which receive the form of the thing known1 without matter indeed1 but subject to material conditions4 ,moreover1 among the senses1 sight has the most perfect knowledge1 because it is the least material1 as we have remarked above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #c73 while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial4 ,it is therefore clear from the foregoing1 that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence1 then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially2 thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul1 that it may know all things1 must be actually composed of the principles of all material things4 ,now this is proper to ,god1 that ,his ,essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause4 ,god alone1 therefore1 understands all things through ,his ,essence3 but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision1 which takes place through the image of bodies4 ,to the formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance1 just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form4 ,in this way the soul makes such images from itself2 not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image2 but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its being informed with color4 ,that this is the sense1 is clear from what follows4 ,for he says that the soul keeps something--namely1 not informed with such image--which is able freely to judge of the species of these images3 and that this is the mind or intellect4 ,and he says that the part which is informed with these images--namely1 the imagination--is common to us and beasts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things1 as did the earlier philosophers2 he said that the soul is all things1 after a fashion1 forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all--through the senses1 to all things sensible--through the intellect1 to all things intelligible4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every creature has a finite and determinate essence4 ,wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature1 forasmuch as they have something in common generically1 yet it has not a complete likeness thereof1 because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature4 ,but the ,divine ,essence is a perfect likeness of all1 whatsoever may be found to exist in things created1 being the universal principle of all4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,soul ,understands ,all ,things ,through ,innate ,species8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species4 ,for ,gregory says1 in a homily for the ,ascension 7xxix in ,ev471 that man has understanding in common with the angels4 ,but angels understand all things through innate species3 wherefore in the book ,de ,causis it is said that every intelligence is full of forms4 ,therefore the soul also has innate species of things1 by means of which it understands corporeal things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter4 ,but primary matter was created by ,god under the forms to which it has potentiality4 ,therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by ,god under intelligible species4 ,and so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows4 ,but even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge1 answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion1 as we find related in the ,meno 7xv seqq47 of ,plato1 concerning a certain individual4 ,therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge2 which would not be the case unless we had innate species4 ,therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate species4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher1 speaking of the intellect1 says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that it is like a tablet on which nothing is written4 ,i answer that1 ,since form is the principle of action1 a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action1 as it is to that action3 for instance1 if upward motion is from lightness1 then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light1 but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light4 ,now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower1 both as to sense and as to intellect4 ,and he is reduced from such potentiality to act--through the action of sensible objects on his senses1 to the act of sensation--by instruction or discovery1 to the act of understanding4 ,wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of sensing1 and to those which are the principles of understanding4 ,for this reason ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species1 but is at first in potentiality to all such species4 ,but since that which has a form actually1 is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance1 as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards2 for this reason did ,plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible species1 but that1 by being united to the body1 it is hindered from the realization of its act4 ,but this seems to be unreasonable4 ,first1 because1 if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things1 it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof3 for no man forgets what he knows naturally2 that1 for instance1 the whole is larger than the part1 and such like4 ,and especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body1 as we have established above 7,q4 #gf 1 ,a4 #a73 for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally4 ,secondly1 the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting1 the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also3 for instance1 a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors4 ,this would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things4 ,we must therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels1 but not in the same degree of perfection3 just as the lower grades of bodies1 which merely exist1 according to ,gregory 7,homily on ,ascension1 xxix ,in ,ev471 have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies4 ,for the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form1 but is in potentiality to forms which it has not3 whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form1 so that it is not in potentiality to any other form1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #b74 ,in the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species1 in accordance with its nature2 whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,primary matter has substantial being through its form1 consequently it had need to be created under some form3 else it would not be in act4 ,but when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others4 ,on the other hand1 the intellect does not receive substantial being through the intelligible species2 and therefore there is no comparison4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular4 ,now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner4 ,wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question1 this is not because he had knowledge previously1 but because he thus learns for the first time4 ,for it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting2 for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,intelligible ,species ,are ,derived by the ,soul from ,certain ,separate ,forms8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms4 ,for whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such essentially2 for instance1 that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof4 ,but the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding1 participates the thing understood3 for1 in a way1 the intellect in act is the thing understood in act4 ,therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act1 is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands4 ,now that which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without matter4 ,therefore the intelligible species1 by which the soul understands1 are caused by some separate forms4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intelligible is to the intellect1 as the sensible is to the sense4 ,but the sensible species which are in the senses1 and by which we sense1 are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul4 ,therefore the intelligible species1 by which our intellect understands1 are caused by some things actually intelligible1 existing outside the soul4 ,but these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter4 ,therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual4 ,if1 therefore1 our intellect1 previously in potentiality1 afterwards actually understands1 this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act4 ,but this is a separate intellect4 ,therefore the intelligible species1 by which we actually understand1 are caused by some separate substances4 ,on the contrary1 ,if this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand4 ,and this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense1 he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense4 ,i answer that1 ,some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances4 ,and this in two ways4 ,for ,plato1 as we have said 7,a4 #a71 held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter2 for instance1 the form of a man which he called per se man1 and the form or idea of a horse which is called per se horse1 and so forth4 ,he said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter2 by our soul1 to the effect of knowledge thereof1 and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence3 so that1 just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone1 becomes an individuating stone1 so our intellect1 by participating the idea of a stone1 is made to understand a stone4 ,now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator1 just as a model is participated by a copy4 ,so just as he held that the sensible forms1 which are in corporeal matter1 are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof3 so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas1 derived therefrom4 ,and for this reason1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a71 he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas4 ,but since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter1 as ,aristotle proves in many ways 7,metaph4 vi71 ,avicenna 7,de ,anima v7 setting this opinion aside1 held that the intelligible species of all sensible things1 instead of subsisting in themselves without matter1 pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects3 from the first of which1 said he1 such species are derived by a second1 and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the active intelligence1 from which1 according to him1 intelligible species flow into our souls1 and sensible species into corporeal matter4 ,and so ,avicenna agrees with ,plato in this1 that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms2 but these ,plato held to subsist of themselves1 while ,avicenna placed them in the active intelligence4 ,they differ1 too1 in this respect1 that ,avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand1 and that it needs to turn 7to the active intellect7 in order to receive them anew4 ,consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge1 as ,plato1 who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul4 ,but in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body4 ,for it cannot be said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body3 for neither is form for the sake of matter1 nor is the mover for the sake of the moved1 but rather the reverse4 ,especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul1 for the latter's proper operation which is to understand3 since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body4 ,but if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles1 and were not to receive them from the senses1 it would not need the body in order to understand3 wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body4 ,but if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand1 through being in some way awakened by them to the consideration of those things1 the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles3 even this seems an insufficient explanation4 ,for this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul1 except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness1 as the ,platonists expressed it1 and by forgetfulness1 through its union with the body3 and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body4 ,consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought4 ,and if it be said with ,avicenna1 that the senses are necessary to the soul1 because by them it is aroused to turn to the active intelligence from which it receives the species3 neither is this a sufficient explanation4 ,because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the active intelligence1 it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence1 either from the inclination of its very nature1 or through being roused by another sense1 to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting4 ,and thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors2 which is clearly untrue4 ,we must therefore conclude that the intelligible species1 by which our soul understands1 are not derived from separate forms4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced1 as to their first cause1 to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible--namely1 ,god4 ,but they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things1 from which we gather knowledge1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,material things1 as to the being which they have outside the soul1 may be actually sensible1 but not actually intelligible4 ,wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act1 that is1 by the active intellect1 which is a power of the soul1 as we have said 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #d72 and not by a separate intelligence1 as proximate cause1 although perchance as remote cause4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,intellectual ,soul ,knows ,material ,things in the ,eternal ,types8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types4 ,for that in which anything is known must itself be known more and previously4 ,but the intellectual soul of man1 in the present state of life1 does not know the eternal types3 for it does not know ,god in ,whom the eternal types exist1 but is united to ,god as to the unknown1 as ,dionysius says 7,myst4 ,theolog4 i74 ,therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal types4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,rom4 #a3bj7 that the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen 4 4 4 by the things that are made4 ,but among the invisible things of ,god are the eternal types4 ,therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the eternal types are nothing else but ideas1 for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #df7 that ideas are permanent types existing in the ,divine mind4 ,if therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types1 we come back to the opinion of ,plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii1 #be73 ,if we both see that what you say is true1 and if we both see that what ,i say is true1 where do we see this1 ,i pray8 ,neither do ,i see it in you1 nor do you see it in me3 but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds4 ,now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types4 ,therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 ii1 #aa73 ,if those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith1 we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors4 ,for some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions1 which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens4 ,consequently whenever ,augustine1 who was imbued with the doctrines of the ,platonists1 found in their teaching anything consistent with faith1 he adopted it3 and those thing which he found contrary to faith he amended4 ,now ,plato held1 as we have said above 7,a4 #d71 that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter2 and these he called ideas1 by participation of which he said that our intellect knows all things3 so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone1 so our intellect1 by participating the same idea1 has knowledge of a stone4 ,but since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves1 outside the things themselves and apart from matter1 as the ,platonists held1 asserting that per se life or per se wisdom are creative substances1 as ,dionysius relates 7,div4 ,nom4 xi72 therefore ,augustine 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #df71 for the ideas defended by ,plato1 substituted the types of all creatures existing in the ,divine mind1 according to which types all things are made in themselves1 and are known to the human soul4 ,when1 therefore1 the question is asked3 ,does the human soul know all things in the eternal types8 we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways4 ,first1 as in an object itself known2 as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein4 ,in this way the soul1 in the present state of life1 cannot see all things in the eternal types2 but the blessed who see ,god1 and all things in ,him1 thus know all things in the eternal types4 ,secondly1 one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge3 thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun4 ,and thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types1 since by participation of these types we know all things4 ,for the intellectual light itself which is in us1 is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light1 in which are contained the eternal types4 ,whence it is written 7,ps4 #d3f1 #g71 ,many say3 ,who showeth us good things8 which question the ,psalmist answers1 ,the light of ,thy countenance1 ,o ,lord1 is signed upon us1 as though he were to say3 ,by the seal of the ,divine light in us1 all things are made known to us4 ,but since besides the intellectual light which is in us1 intelligible species1 which are derived from things1 are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things2 therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types1 as the ,platonists held1 maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #af73 ,although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types1 were they able to see in the eternal types1 or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each8 ,did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places8 ,but that ,augustine did not understand all things to be known in their eternal types or in the unchangeable truth1 as though the eternal types themselves were seen1 is clear from what he says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #df7--viz4 that not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision1 namely1 of the eternal types1 but only those that are holy and pure1 such as the souls of the blessed4 ,from what has been said the objections are easily solved4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,intellectual ,knowledge ,is ,derived from ,sensible ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #i7 that we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body4 ,this he proves in two ways4 ,first1 because whatever the bodily senses reach1 is continually being changed2 and what is never the same cannot be perceived4 ,secondly1 because1 whatever we perceive by the body1 even when not present to the senses1 may be present to the imagination1 as when we are asleep or angry3 yet we cannot discern by the senses1 whether what we perceive be the sensible object or the deceptive image thereof4 ,now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit4 ,and so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses4 ,but intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth4 ,therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #af73 ,we must not think that the body can make any impression on the spirit1 as though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action2 for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on4 ,whence he concludes that the body does not cause its image in the spirit1 but the spirit causes it in itself4 ,therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an effect does not surpass the power of its cause4 ,but intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things3 for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses4 ,therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 i1 #a2 ,poster4 ii1 #ae7 that the principle of knowledge is in the senses4 ,i answer that1 ,on this point the philosophers held three opinions4 ,for ,democritus held that all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls1 as ,augustine says in his letter to ,dioscorus 7cxviii1 #d74 ,and ,aristotle says 7,de ,somn4 et ,vigil47 that ,democritus held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images4 ,and the reason for this opinion was that both ,democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense1 as ,aristotle relates 7,de ,anima iii1 #c74 ,consequently1 since the sense is affected by the sensible1 they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things4 ,which impression ,democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images4 ,plato1 on the other hand1 held that the intellect is distinct from the senses3 and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action4 ,and since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal1 he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect1 but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect1 as we have said above 7,,aa4 #d 1#e74 ,moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself4 ,consequently neither is sense1 since it is a spiritual power1 affected by the sensible3 but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible1 the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible4 ,augustine seems to touch on this opinion 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #bd7 where he says that the body feels not1 but the soul through the body1 which it makes use of as a kind of messenger1 for reproducing within itself what is announced from without4 ,thus according to ,plato1 neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge1 nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things2 but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act1 while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding4 ,aristotle chose a middle course4 ,for with ,plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different4 ,but he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body2 so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone1 but of the composite4 ,and he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part4 ,since1 therefore1 it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the composite1 ,aristotle agreed with ,democritus in this1 that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense3 not by a discharge1 as ,democritus said1 but by some kind of operation4 ,for ,democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms1 as we gather from ,de ,gener4 i1 #h4 ,but ,aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation4 ,now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal4 ,and therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to ,aristotle1 the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice1 but something more noble is required1 for the agent is more noble than the patient1 as he says 7,de ,gener4 i1 #e74 ,not1 indeed1 in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings1 as ,plato held2 but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect1 of which we have spoken above 7,q4 #gi1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d7 causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible1 by a process of abstraction4 ,according to this opinion1 then1 on the part of the phantasms1 intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses4 ,but since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect1 and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect1 it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge1 but rather that it is in a way the material cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those words of ,augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses4 ,for the light of the active intellect is needed1 through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things1 and discern things themselves from their likeness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in this passage ,augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge4 ,and since1 according to the opinion of ,plato1 the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only1 ,augustine1 in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination1 not by bodies but by the soul1 uses the same argument as ,aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must be separate1 namely1 because the agent is more noble than the patient4 ,and without doubt1 according to the above opinion1 in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power4 ,but if we hold1 according to the opinion of ,aristotle1 that the action of the imagination is an action of the composite1 there is no difficulty2 because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal1 in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality2 even as the object actually colored is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored4 ,it may1 however1 be said1 although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible1 since fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation 7,de ,anima iii1 #c71 that nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things1 even of things not perceived by the senses4 ,and ,augustine's words may be taken in this sense4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge4 ,and therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,intellect ,can ,actually ,understand ,through the ,intelligible ,species of ,which ,it ,is ,possessed1 ,without ,turning to the ,phantasms8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed1 without turning to the phantasms4 ,for the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed4 ,but if the intellect is in act1 it understands4 ,therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually1 without turning to the phantasms4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination4 ,but the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible4 ,therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms4 ,obj4 #c3 ,there are no phantasms of incorporeal things3 for the imagination does not transcend time and space4 ,if1 therefore1 our intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms1 it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal4 ,which is clearly false3 for we understand truth1 and ,god1 and the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #g7 that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm4 ,i answer that1 ,in the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body1 it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually1 except by turning to the phantasms4 ,first of all because the intellect1 being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ1 would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ1 if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ4 ,now sense1 imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part1 make use of a corporeal organ4 ,wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually1 not only when it acquires fresh knowledge1 but also when it applies knowledge already acquired1 there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers4 ,for when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ1 for instance in a case of frenzy2 or when the act of the memory is hindered1 as in the case of lethargy1 we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge4 ,secondly1 anyone can experience this of himself1 that when he tries to understand something1 he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples1 in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding4 ,for this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something1 we lay examples before him1 from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding4 ,now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known4 ,wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect1 which is entirely separate from a body1 is an intelligible substance separate from a body4 ,whereas the proper object of the human intellect1 which is united to a body1 is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter2 and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible4 ,now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual1 and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter3 for instance1 it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone1 and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse1 and so forth4 ,wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly1 except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual4 ,now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination4 ,and1 therefore1 for the intellect to understand actually its proper object1 it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual4 ,but if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form2 or if1 as the ,platonists say1 the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual2 there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #f74 ,wherefore for us to understand actually1 the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice2 we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species1 which things are natures existing in individuals4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing2 wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual1 whereas the intellect does4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,incorporeal things1 of which there are no phantasms1 are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms4 ,thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth2 and ,god1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i71 we know as cause1 by way of excess and by way of remotion4 ,other incorporeal substances we know1 in the present state of life1 only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things4 ,and1 therefore1 when we understand something about these things1 we need to turn to phantasms of bodies1 although there are no phantasms of the things themselves4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hd1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,judgment of the ,intellect ,is ,hindered ,through ,suspension of the ,sensitive ,powers8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers4 ,for the superior does not depend on the inferior4 ,but the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses4 ,therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to syllogize is an act of the intellect4 ,but during sleep the senses are suspended1 as is said in ,de ,somn4 et ,vigil4 i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep4 ,therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses4 ,on the contrary1 ,what a man does while asleep1 against the moral law1 is not imputed to him as a sin2 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ae74 ,but this would not be the case if man1 while asleep1 had free use of his reason and intellect4 ,therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses4 ,i answer that1 ,as we have said above 7,a4 #g71 our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing4 ,now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed1 unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known2 especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment4 ,now the ,philosopher says 7,de ,coel4 iii71 that as the end of a practical science is action1 so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses2 for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action1 in order that he may produce a certain individual knife2 and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse1 save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses4 ,now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife3 and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things1 unless he knows sensible things4 ,but in the present state of life whatever we understand1 we know by comparison to natural sensible things4 ,consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment1 while the senses are suspended1 through which sensible things are known to us4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the intellect is superior to the senses1 nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses1 and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things4 ,and therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations1 as we read in ,de ,somn4 et ,vigil4 iii4 ,and1 therefore1 according to the amount of such evaporation1 the senses are more or less suspended4 ,for when the amount is considerable1 not only are the senses suspended1 but also the imagination1 so that there are no phantasms2 thus does it happen1 especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously4 ,if1 however1 the evaporation be somewhat less1 phantasms appear1 but distorted and without sequence2 thus it happens in a case of fever4 ,and if the evaporation be still more attenuated1 the phantasms will have a certain sequence3 thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination4 ,if the evaporation be very slight1 not only does the imagination retain its freedom1 but also the common sense is partly freed2 so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream1 discerning1 as it were1 between things1 and their images4 ,nevertheless1 the common sense remains partly suspended2 and therefore1 although it discriminates some images from the reality1 yet is it always deceived in some particular4 ,therefore1 while man is asleep1 according as sense and imagination are free1 so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered1 though not entirely4 ,consequently1 if a man syllogizes while asleep1 when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect4 ,,question #he ,,of ,,the ,,mode ,,and ,,order ,,of ,,understanding 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we come now to consider the mode and order of understanding4 ,under this head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms8 7#b7 ,whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands1 or that whereby it understands8 7#c7 ,whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal8 7#d7 ,whether our intellect can know many things at the same time8 7#e7 ,whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division8 7#f7 ,whether the intellect can err8 7#g7 ,whether one intellect can understand better than another8 7#h7 ,whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,our ,intellect ,understands ,corporeal and ,material ,things by ,abstraction from ,phantasms8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms4 ,for the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is4 ,now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms4 ,therefore1 if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phantasm1 there will be error in the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition4 ,but nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition4 ,therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter4 ,now matter is the principle of individualization4 ,therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular1 which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #g7 that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight4 ,but seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color1 but by color impressing itself on the sight4 ,therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm1 but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #e7 there are two things in the intellectual soul--the passive intellect and the active intellect4 ,but it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm1 but to receive them when abstracted4 ,neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect1 which is related to the phantasm1 as light is to color2 since light does not abstract anything from color1 but rather streams on to it4 ,therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #g7 says that the intellect understands the species in the phantasm2 and not1 therefore1 by abstraction4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter4 ,therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images1 namely1 phantasms4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g71 the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge4 ,now there are three grades of the cognitive powers4 ,for one cognitive power1 namely1 the sense1 is the act of a corporeal organ4 ,and therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter4 ,and since such matter is the principle of individuality1 therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual4 ,there is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ1 nor in any way connected with corporeal matter2 such is the angelic intellect1 the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter3 for though angels know material things1 yet they do not know them save in something immaterial1 namely1 either in themselves or in ,god4 ,but the human intellect holds a middle place3 for it is not the act of an organ2 yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a74 ,and therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter1 but not as existing in this individual matter4 ,but to know what is in individual matter1 not as existing in such matter1 is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms4 ,therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms2 and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things1 just as1 on the contrary1 angels know material things through the immaterial4 ,but ,plato1 considering only the immateriality of the human intellect1 and not its being in a way united to the body1 held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas2 and that we understand not by abstraction1 but by participating things abstract1 as stated above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,abstraction may occur in two ways3 ,first1 by way of composition and division2 thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other1 or that it is separate therefrom4 ,secondly1 by way of simple and absolute consideration2 thus we understand one thing without considering the other4 ,thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from one another1 does1 in the first mode of abstraction1 imply falsehood4 ,but1 in the second mode of abstraction1 for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another1 does not involve falsehood1 as clearly appears in the case of the senses4 ,for if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body1 or that it is separate from it1 there would be error in this opinion or assertion4 ,but if we consider color and its properties1 without reference to the apple which is colored2 or if we express in word what we thus understand1 there is no error in such an opinion or assertion1 because an apple is not essential to color1 and therefore color can be understood independently of the apple4 ,likewise1 the things which belong to the species of a material thing1 such as a stone1 or a man1 or a horse1 can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species4 ,this is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular1 or the intelligible species from the phantasm2 that is1 by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms4 ,if1 therefore1 the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is1 that is so1 if the word otherwise refers to the thing understood2 for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is2 and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter1 as ,plato held4 ,but it is not so1 if the word otherwise be taken as referring to the one who understands4 ,for it is quite true that the mode of understanding1 in one who understands1 is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing3 since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands1 according to the mode of the intellect1 and not materially1 according to the mode of a material thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only1 and that matter is not part of the species4 ,if that were so1 matter would not enter into the definition of natural things4 ,therefore it must be said otherwise1 that matter is twofold1 common1 and signate or individual2 common1 such as flesh and bone2 and individual1 as this flesh and these bones4 ,the intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter1 but not from the common sensible matter2 for example1 it abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these bones1 which do not belong to the species as such1 but to the individual 7,metaph4 vii1 ,did4 vi1 #aj71 and need not be considered in the species3 whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones4 ,mathematical species1 however1 can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter1 not only from individual1 but also from common matter2 not from common intelligible matter1 but only from individual matter4 ,for sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities1 such as being cold or hot1 hard or soft1 and the like3 while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity4 ,now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are4 ,hence quantities1 such as number1 dimension1 and figures1 which are the terminations of quantity1 can be considered apart from sensible qualities2 and this is to abstract them from sensible matter2 but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity2 for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter4 ,yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance2 for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter4 ,but some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter1 such as being1 unity1 power1 act1 and the like2 all these can exist without matter1 as is plain regarding immaterial things4 ,because ,plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction1 as above explained 7ad #a71 he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect1 are abstract in reality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,colors1 as being in individual corporeal matter1 have the same mode of existence as the power of sight3 therefore they can impress their own image on the eye4 ,but phantasms1 since they are images of individuals1 and exist in corporeal organs1 have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect1 and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect4 ,this is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents1 as to its specific conditions only1 the thing reflected in the phantasm4 ,it is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm2 not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect1 as a body transferred from one place to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm3 it does more2 by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm4 ,it throws light on the phantasm1 because1 just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part1 so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions4 ,furthermore1 the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm1 forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality1 and to take into our consideration the specific nature1 the image of which informs the passive intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms1 inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal1 and1 nevertheless1 understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species1 without turning to the phantasms1 as we have said above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,intelligible ,species ,abstracted from the ,phantasm ,is ,related to ,our ,intellect ,as ,that ,which ,is ,understood8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood4 ,for the understood in act is in the one who understands3 since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act4 ,but nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding1 save the abstracted intelligible species4 ,therefore this species is what is actually understood4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what is actually understood must be in something2 else it would be nothing4 ,but it is not in something outside the soul3 for1 since what is outside the soul is material1 nothing therein can be actually understood4 ,therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect4 ,consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7#a ,peri ,herm4 i7 that words are signs of the passions in the soul4 ,but words signify the things understood1 for we express by word what we understand4 ,therefore these passions of the soul--viz4 the intelligible species1 are what is actually understood4 ,on the contrary1 ,the intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense4 ,but the sensible image is not what is perceived1 but rather that by which sense perceives4 ,therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood1 but that by which the intellect understands4 ,i answer that1 ,some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them2 as1 for example1 that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ4 ,according to this theory1 the intellect understands only its own impression1 namely1 the intelligible species which it has received1 so that this species is what is understood4 ,this is1 however1 manifestly false for two reasons4 ,first1 because the things we understand are the objects of science2 therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul1 it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul1 but only with the intelligible species within the soul2 thus1 according to the teaching of the ,platonists all science is about ideas1 which they held to be actually understood 99,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #a4 ,secondly1 it is untrue1 because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that whatever seems1 is true 99,aristotle1 ,metaph4 iii4 #e1 and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously4 ,for if the faculty knows its own impression only1 it can judge of that only4 ,now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty4 ,consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such2 and so every judgment will be true3 for instance1 if taste perceived only its own impression1 when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet1 he would judge truly2 and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter1 this would be equally true2 for each would judge according to the impression on his taste4 ,thus every opinion would be equally true2 in fact1 every sort of apprehension4 ,therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands3 which is proved thus4 ,there is a twofold action 7,metaph4 ix1 ,did4 viii1 #h71 one which remains in the agent2 for instance1 to see and to understand2 and another which passes into an external object2 for instance1 to heat and to cut2 and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form4 ,and as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action1 as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated2 so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object4 ,hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing2 and the likeness of the thing understood1 that is1 the intelligible species1 is the form by which the intellect understands4 ,but since the intellect reflects upon itself1 by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence1 and the species by which it understands4 ,thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily2 but that which is primarily understood is the object1 of which the species is the likeness4 ,this also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers1 who said that like is known by like4 ,for they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself1 by the earth within itself2 and so of the rest4 ,if1 therefore1 we take the species of the earth instead of the earth1 according to ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 #h71 who says that a stone is not in the soul1 but only the likeness of the stone2 it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness2 and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act1 because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect1 as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act4 ,hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood2 but rather that it is the likeness thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in these words the thing actually understood there is a double implication--the thing which is understood1 and the fact that it is understood4 ,in like manner the words abstract universal imply two things1 the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality4 ,therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood1 abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals2 but that it is understood1 abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect4 ,we see something similar to this is in the senses4 ,for the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its smell4 ,if therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell1 it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the apple3 but that it be perceived apart from the smell1 this is owing to the sight1 forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell4 ,in like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man2 but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality1 that is1 that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal1 occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect1 in which there is a likeness of the specific nature1 but not of the principles of individuality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there are two operations in the sensitive part4 ,one1 in regard of impression only1 and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible4 ,the other is formation1 inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing1 or even of something never seen4 ,both of these operations are found in the intellect4 ,for in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species2 and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition1 or a division1 or a composition1 expressed by a word4 ,wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition2 and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition4 ,words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves2 but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,more ,universal ,is ,first in ,our ,intellectual ,cognition8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition4 ,for what is first and more known in its own nature1 is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves4 ,but universals come first as regards their nature1 because that is first which does not involve the existence of its correlative 7,categor4 ix74 ,therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the composition precedes the simple in relation to us4 ,but universals are the more simple4 ,therefore they are known secondarily by us4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 i1 #a71 that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition4 ,but the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal1 as animal is part of the definition of man4 ,therefore the universals are secondarily known by us4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 we know causes and principles by their effects4 ,but universals are principles4 ,therefore universals are secondarily known by us4 ,on the contrary1 ,we must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual 7,phys4 i1 #a7 ,i answer that1 ,in our knowledge there are two things to be considered4 ,first1 that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge3 and1 because sense has singular and individual things for its object1 and intellect has the universal for its object1 it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter4 ,secondly1 we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality2 and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act1 which is the medium between potentiality and actuality1 before accomplishing the perfect act4 ,the perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge1 when the object is distinctly and determinately known2 whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge1 when the object is known indistinctly1 and as it were confusedly4 ,a thing thus imperfectly known1 is known partly in act and partly in potentiality1 and hence the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 i1 #a71 that what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly2 afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements4 ,now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things1 without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it1 is to know that thing confusedly4 ,in this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole1 which contains parts potentially1 but also of the integral whole2 for each whole can be known confusedly1 without its parts being known4 ,but to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common1 as to animal indistinctly is to know it as animal2 whereas to know animal distinctly is know it as rational or irrational animal1 that is1 to know a man or a lion3 therefore our intellect knows animal before it knows man2 and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal4 ,moreover1 as sense1 like the intellect1 proceeds from potentiality to act1 the same order of knowledge appears in the senses4 ,for by sense we judge of the more common before the less common1 in reference both to place and time2 in reference to place1 when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal2 and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man1 and to be a man before it seen to be ,socrates or ,plato2 and the same is true as regards time1 for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that1 and therefore children at first call men fathers1 and later on distinguish each one from the others 7,phys4 i1 #a74 ,the reason of this is clear3 because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction2 as he who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards difference4 ,thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act4 ,we must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior1 as regards us1 to the knowledge of the universal2 as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge4 ,but in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the universal can be considered in two ways4 ,first1 the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality4 ,and since the intention of universality--viz4 the relation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual abstraction1 the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration4 ,hence it is said 7,de ,anima i1 #a7 that the universal animal is either nothing or something secondary4 ,but according to ,plato1 who held that universals are subsistent1 the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular1 for the latter1 according to him1 are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas4 ,secondly1 the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for instance1 animality or humanity as existing in the individual4 ,and thus we must distinguish two orders of nature3 one1 by way of generation and time2 and thus the imperfect and the potential come first4 ,in this way the more common comes first in the order of nature2 as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal2 for the animal is generated before man1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ,animal ii1 #c74 ,the other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature3 for instance1 act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality1 and the perfect to the imperfect3 thus the less common comes naturally before the more common2 as man comes before animal4 ,for the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the more common universal may be compared to the less common1 as the whole1 and as the part4 ,as the whole1 considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal1 but also other things1 as in animal is contained not only man but also horse4 ,as part1 considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common1 but also more2 as man contains not only animal but also rational4 ,therefore animal in itself comes into our knowledge before man2 but man comes before animal considered as part of the same idea4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a part can be known in two ways4 ,first1 absolutely considered in itself2 and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole1 as stones are known before a house is known4 ,secondly as belonging to a certain whole2 and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts4 ,for we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts4 ,so likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known2 otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all4 ,but as parts of the definition they are known after4 ,for we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the universal1 as understood with the intention of universality1 is1 indeed1 in a way1 a principle of knowledge1 in so far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction4 ,but what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence1 as ,plato thought3 since at times we know a cause through its effect1 and substance through accidents4 ,wherefore the universal thus considered1 according to the opinion of ,aristotle1 is neither a principle of existence1 nor a substance1 as he makes clear 7,metaph4 vii1 ,did4 vi1 #ac74 ,but if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular1 thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulars3 for the singular is the result of matter1 while the idea of species is from the form4 ,but the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle1 because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing1 while the idea of species is taken from that which is formal3 thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part1 whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part4 ,thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual1 or the genus3 because the form is the end of generation1 while matter is for the sake of the form4 ,neither is it necessary that1 as regards us1 knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary3 since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects1 and sometimes conversely4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,we ,can ,understand ,many ,things at the ,same ,time8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that we can understand many things at the same time4 ,for intellect is above time1 whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time4 ,therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession1 but at the same time4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject1 as1 for instance1 color and smell are in the apple4 ,but intelligible species are not opposed to each other4 ,therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species1 and thus it can understand many things at the same time4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect understands a whole at the same time1 such as a man or a house4 ,but a whole contains many parts4 ,therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time 7,de ,anima iii1 #b71 and the same is to be said of any other comparison4 ,but our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another4 ,therefore it knows many things at the same time4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,topic4 ii1 #aj7 that understanding is of one thing only1 knowledge is of many4 ,i answer that1 ,the intellect can1 indeed1 understand many things as one1 but not as many3 that is to say by one but not by many intelligible species4 ,for the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action4 ,therefore whatever things the intellect can understand under one species1 it can understand at the same time3 hence it is that ,god sees all things at the same time1 because ,he sees all in one1 that is1 in ,his ,essence4 ,but whatever things the intellect understands under different species1 it does not understand at the same time4 ,the reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species1 just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes4 ,now all intelligible species belong to one genus1 because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty3 although the things which the species represent belong to different genera4 ,therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellect is above that time1 which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things4 ,but the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations1 according as one operation succeeds another4 ,and this vicissitude is called time by ,augustine1 who says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #bj1 #bb71 that ,god moves the spiritual creature through time4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject1 but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus1 although they be not opposed to one another1 as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,parts can be understood in two ways4 ,first1 in a confused way1 as existing in the whole1 and thus they are known through the one form of the whole1 and so are known together4 ,in another way they are known distinctly3 thus each is known by its species2 and so they are not understood at the same time4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,if the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another1 it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison2 just1 as we have said above 7ad #c71 as it knows the parts in the whole4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,our ,intellect ,understands by ,composition and ,division8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division4 ,for composition and division are only of many2 whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time4 ,therefore it cannot understand by composition and division4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every composition and division implies past1 present1 or future time4 ,but the intellect abstracts from time1 as also from other individual conditions4 ,therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them4 ,but composition and division are not in things1 for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject1 and which is one and the same1 provided that the composition be true1 for man is truly what animal is4 ,therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division4 ,on the contrary1 ,words signify the conceptions of the intellect1 as the ,philosopher says 7,peri ,herm4 i74 ,but in words we find composition and division1 as appears in affirmative and negative propositions4 ,therefore the intellect acts by composition and division4 ,i answer that1 ,the human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division4 ,for since the intellect passes from potentiality to act1 it has a likeness to things which are generated1 which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees3 so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension2 but it first apprehends something about its object1 such as its quiddity1 and this is its first and proper object2 and then it understands the properties1 accidents1 and the various relations of the essence4 ,thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division2 and from one composition and division it proceeds to another1 which is the process of reasoning4 ,but the angelic and the ,divine intellect1 like all incorruptible things1 have their perfection at once from the beginning4 ,hence the angelic and the ,divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly2 and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition1 division1 and reasoning4 ,therefore the human intellect knows by composition1 division and reasoning4 ,but the ,divine intellect and the angelic intellect know1 indeed1 composition1 division1 and reasoning1 not by the process itself1 but by understanding the simple essence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing4 ,hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division1 as by knowing the difference and comparison of things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms1 it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms1 as we have said 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,and forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms1 composition and division of the intellect involve time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect1 not according to the mode of the thing4 ,wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect2 but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing4 ,for the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing1 which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination4 ,now in a material thing there is a twofold composition4 ,first1 there is the composition of form with matter2 and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part3 for the genus is derived from common matter1 while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form1 and the particular from individual matter4 ,the second comparison is of accident with subject3 and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect1 whereby accident is predicated of subject1 as when we say the man is white4 ,nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things2 for in the latter the things are diverse1 whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components4 ,for the above composition of the intellect does not imply that man and whiteness are identical1 but the assertion1 the man is white1 means that the man is something having whiteness3 and the subject1 which is a man1 is identified with a subject having whiteness4 ,it is the same with the composition of form and matter3 for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature2 rational1 that which has an intellectual nature2 man1 that which has both2 and ,socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter2 and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,intellect ,can ,be ,false8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect can be false2 for the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 vi1 ,did4 v1 #d7 that truth and falsehood are in the mind4 ,but the mind and intellect are the same1 as is shown above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore falsehood may be in the mind4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect4 ,but falsehood exists in both4 ,therefore falsehood can be in the intellect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 sin is in the intellectual faculty4 ,but sin involves falsehood3 for those err that work evil 7,prov4 #ad3bb74 ,therefore falsehood can be in the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cb71 that everyone who is deceived1 does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived4 ,and the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aj71 that the intellect is always true4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,philosopher 7,de ,anima iii1 #f7 compares intellect with sense on this point4 ,for sense is not deceived in its proper object1 as sight in regard to color2 unless accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ--for example1 the taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter1 through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors4 ,sense1 however1 may be deceived as regards common sensible objects1 as size or figure2 when1 for example1 it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter1 whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size4 ,much more is sense deceived concerning accidental sensible objects1 as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same4 ,the reason of this is evident2 for every faculty1 as such1 is per se directed to its proper object2 and things of this kind are always the same4 ,hence1 as long as the faculty exists1 its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail4 ,now the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing2 and hence1 properly speaking1 the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity2 whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity1 in referring one thing to another1 as regards composition or division1 or also in the process of reasoning4 ,therefore1 also in regard to those propositions1 which are understood1 the intellect cannot err1 as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions4 ,the intellect1 however1 may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things1 not by the defect of its organ1 for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ2 but on the part of the composition affecting the definition1 when1 for instance1 the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else1 as the definition of a circle applied to a triangle2 or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible2 as1 for instance1 to describe anything as a rational winged animal4 ,hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless1 indeed1 we understand nothing whatever about them1 as is said ,metaph4 ix1 ,did4 viii1 #aj4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division4 ,the same answer applies to the ,second ,objection concerning opinion and reasoning1 and to the ,third ,objection1 concerning the error of the sinner1 who errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object4 ,but in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing1 and of those things which are known thereby1 the intellect is never deceived4 ,in this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,one ,person ,can ,understand ,one and the ,same ,thing ,better ,than ,another ,can8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cb71 ,whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is1 does not understand it at all4 ,hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding1 than which none other is more perfect3 and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing3 nor can one person understand a thing better than another can4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the intellect is true in its act of understanding4 ,but truth1 being a certain equality between thought and thing1 is not subject to more or less2 for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal4 ,therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man4 ,but different forms cause different species4 ,therefore if one man understands better than another1 it would seem that they do not belong to the same species4 ,on the contrary1 ,experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others2 as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses4 ,first1 so that the word more be taken as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood2 and thus1 one cannot understand the same thing more than another1 because to understand it otherwise than as it is1 either better or worse1 would entail being deceived1 and such a one would not understand it1 as ,augustine argues 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #cb74 ,in another sense the word more can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands2 and so one may understand the same thing better than someone else1 through having a greater power of understanding3 just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight1 whose power is greater1 and whose sight is more perfect4 ,the same applies to the intellect in two ways4 ,first1 as regards the intellect itself1 which is more perfect4 ,for it is plain that the better the disposition of a body1 the better the soul allotted to it2 which clearly appears in things of different species3 and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to matter's capacity3 thus because some men have bodies of better disposition1 their souls have a greater power of understanding1 wherefore it is said 7,de ,anima ii1 #i71 that it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt mind4 ,secondly1 this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its operation3 for those in whom the imaginative1 cogitative1 and memorative powers are of better disposition1 are better disposed to understand4 ,the reply to the ,first ,objection is clear from the above2 likewise the reply to the ,second1 for the truth of the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter1 causes not a specific but only a numerical difference3 for different individuals have different forms1 diversified according to the difference of matter4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #he1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,intellect ,understands the ,indivisible ,before the ,divisible8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 i1 #a7 that we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements4 ,but principles are indivisible1 and elements are of divisible things4 ,therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the definition of a thing contains what is known previously1 for a definition proceeds from the first and more known1 as is said ,topic4 vi1 #d4 ,but the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible2 as a point comes into the definition of a line2 for as ,euclid says1 a line is length without breadth1 the extremities of which are points2 also unity comes into the definition of number1 for number is multitude measured by one1 as is said ,metaph4 x1 ,did4 ix1 #f4 ,therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,like is known by like4 ,but the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible2 because the intellect is simple 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,de ,anima iii1 #f7 that the indivisible is expressed as a privation4 ,but privation is known secondarily4 ,therefore likewise is the indivisible4 ,i answer that1 ,the object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing1 which it abstracts from the phantasms1 as above stated 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,and since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object1 we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known4 ,now the indivisible is threefold1 as is said ,de ,anima iii1 #f4 ,first1 the continuous is indivisible1 since actually it is undivided1 although potentially divisible3 and this indivisible is known to us before its division1 which is a division into parts3 because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge1 as we have said above 7,a4 #c74 ,secondly1 the indivisible is so called in relation to species1 as man's reason is something indivisible4 ,this way1 also1 the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts1 as we have said above 7,de ,anima iii1 #f72 and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation4 ,the reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself1 as being its proper object4 ,the third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible1 as a point and unity1 which cannot be divided either actually or potentially4 ,and this indivisible is known secondarily1 through the privation of divisibility4 ,wherefore a point is defined by way of privation as that which has no parts2 and in like manner the notion of one is that is indivisible1 as stated in ,metaph4 x1 ,did4 ix1 #a4 ,and the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being1 the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect4 ,but if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible 7forms71 as the ,platonists maintained1 it would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily2 for according to the ,platonists what is first is first participated by things4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the acquisition of knowledge1 principles and elements are not always 7known7 first3 for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes4 ,but in perfect knowledge1 the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements3 for as the ,philosopher says in the same passage3 ,then do we consider that we know1 when we can resolve principles into their causes4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a point is not included in the definition of a line in general3 for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length1 and in a circular line1 there is no point1 save potentially4 ,euclid defines a finite straight line3 and therefore he mentions a point in the definition1 as the limit in the definition of that which is limited4 ,unity is the measure of number3 wherefore it is included in the definition of a measured number4 ,but it is not included in the definition of the divisible1 but rather conversely4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower2 therefore a thing is known first1 not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power1 but on account of the power's aptitude for the object3 otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather than color4 ,,question #hf ,,what ,,our ,,intellect ,,knows ,,in ,,material ,,things 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether it knows singulars8 7#b7 ,whether it knows the infinite8 7#c7 ,whether it knows contingent things8 7#d7 ,whether it knows future things8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,our ,intellect ,knows ,singulars8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect knows singulars4 ,for whoever knows composition1 knows the terms of composition4 ,but our intellect knows this composition2 ,socrates is a man3 for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition4 ,therefore our intellect knows this singular1 ,socrates4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the practical intellect directs to action4 ,but action has relation to singular things4 ,therefore the intellect knows the singular4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 our intellect understands itself4 ,but in itself it is a singular1 otherwise it would have no action of its own2 for actions belong to singulars4 ,therefore our intellect knows singulars4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power4 ,but sense knows the singular4 ,much more1 therefore1 can the intellect know it4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 i1 #e71 that the universal is known by reason2 and the singular is known by sense4 ,i answer that1 ,our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily4 ,the reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter1 whereas our intellect1 as have said above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a71 understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter4 ,now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal4 ,hence our intellect knows directly the universal only4 ,but indirectly1 and as it were by a kind of reflection1 it can know the singular1 because1 as we have said above 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #g71 even after abstracting the intelligible species1 the intellect1 in order to understand1 needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species1 as is said ,de ,anima iii1 #g4 ,therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species1 and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm4 ,and thus it forms the proposition ,socrates is a man4 ,wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect1 as is said ,ethic4 vii1 #c4 ,but a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition1 except through the medium of a singular proposition4 ,therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part1 as is said ,de ,anima iii1 #aa4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such1 but as material1 for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially4 ,therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect1 there is no reason why it should not be intelligible4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the higher power can do what the lower power can1 but in a more eminent way4 ,wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely1 which is to know the singular directly1 the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract1 which is to know the universal4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,our ,intellect ,can ,know the ,infinite8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect can know the infinite4 ,for ,god excels all infinite things4 ,but our intellect can know ,god1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #a74 ,much more1 therefore1 can our intellect know all other infinite things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 our intellect can naturally know genera and species4 ,but there is an infinity of species in some genera1 as in number1 proportion1 and figure4 ,therefore our intellect can know the infinite4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if one body can coexist with another in the same place1 there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place4 ,but one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect1 for many things can be habitually known at the same time4 ,therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty1 as we have said 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a71 it appears to be an infinite power4 ,but an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object4 ,therefore our intellect can know the infinite4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,phys4 i1 #d7 that the infinite1 considered as such1 is unknown4 ,i answer that1 ,since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other1 the intellect must be related to the infinite1 as is its object1 which is the quiddity of a material thing4 ,now in material things the infinite does not exist actually1 but only potentially1 in the sense of one succeeding another1 as is said ,phys4 iii1 #f4 ,therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another3 because never does our intellect understand so many things1 that it cannot understand more4 ,on the other hand1 our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually4 ,not actually1 for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time1 except what it knows through one species4 ,but the infinite is not represented by one species1 for if it were it would be something whole and complete4 ,consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another1 as is clear from its definition 7,phys4 iii1 #f73 for the infinite is that from which1 however much we may take1 there always remains something to be taken4 ,thus the infinite could not be known actually1 unless all its parts were counted3 which is impossible4 ,for the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite3 because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration3 since by understanding we acquire knowledge1 as is said ,ethic4 ii1 #a4 ,wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known1 unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof1 counting them according to the succession of our knowledge3 which is impossible4 ,and therefore neither actually nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite1 but only potentially as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #g1 ,a4 #a71 ,god is called infinite1 because ,he is a form unlimited by matter2 whereas in material things1 the term infinite is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term4 ,and form being known in itself1 whereas matter cannot be known without form1 it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable4 ,but the formal infinite1 ,god1 is of ,himself known2 but ,he is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect1 which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only4 ,therefore we cannot know ,god in our present life except through material effects4 ,in the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory1 when we shall be able to see the ,essence of ,god ,himself1 but without being able to comprehend ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms2 therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination1 except in a general way and in their universal principles2 and this is to know them potentially and confusedly4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if two or more bodies were in the same place1 there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively1 in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation4 ,on the other hand1 the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively2 since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time3 and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as our intellect is infinite in power1 so does it know the infinite4 ,for its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter4 ,moreover it can know the universal1 which is abstracted from individual matter1 and which consequently is not limited to one individual1 but1 considered in itself1 extends to an infinite number of individuals4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,our ,intellect ,can ,know ,contingent ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things3 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #f71 the objects of understanding1 wisdom and knowledge are not contingent1 but necessary things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as stated in ,phys4 iv1 #ab1 what sometimes is and sometimes is not1 is measured by time4 ,now the intellect abstracts from time1 and from other material conditions4 ,therefore1 as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be1 it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,all knowledge is in the intellect4 ,but some sciences are of the contingent things1 as the moral sciences1 the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will2 and again1 the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible4 ,therefore the intellect knows contingent things4 ,i answer that1 ,contingent things can be considered in two ways2 either as contingent1 or as containing some element of necessity1 since every contingent thing has in it something necessary3 for example1 that ,socrates runs1 is in itself contingent2 but the relation of running to motion is necessary1 for it is necessary that ,socrates move if he runs4 ,now contingency arises from matter1 for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be1 and potentiality belongs to matter2 whereas necessity results from form1 because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject4 ,but matter is the individualizing principle3 whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter4 ,moreover it was laid down above 7,a4 #a7 that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object2 while the object of sense is the singular1 which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore the contingent1 considered as such1 is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect2 while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect4 ,hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles1 then all science is of necessary things4 ,but if we consider the things themselves1 thus some sciences are of necessary things1 some of contingent things4 ,from which the replies to the objections are clear4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hf1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,our ,intellect ,can ,know the ,future8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect knows the future4 ,for our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the here and now1 and related indifferently to all time4 ,but it can know the present4 ,therefore it can know the future4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 man1 while his senses are in suspense1 can know some future things1 as in sleep1 and in frenzy4 ,but the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense4 ,therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future4 ,obj4 #c3 ,the intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes4 ,but some animals know the future2 thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain4 ,therefore much more can the intellect know the future4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eccles4 #h3f1 #g71 ,there is a great affliction for man1 because he is ignorant of things past2 and things to come he cannot know by any messenger4 ,i answer that1 ,we must apply the same distinction to future things1 as we applied above 7,a4 #c7 to contingent things4 ,for future things considered as subject to time are singular1 and the human intellect knows them by reflection only1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,but the principles of future things may be universal2 and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science4 ,speaking1 however1 of the knowledge of the future in a general way1 we must observe that the future may be known in two ways3 either in itself1 or in its cause4 ,the future cannot be known in itself save by ,god alone2 to ,whom even that is present which in the course of events is future1 forasmuch as from eternity ,his glance embraces the whole course of time1 as we have said above when treating of ,god's knowledge 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #ac74 ,but forasmuch as it exists in its cause1 the future can be known by us also4 ,and if1 indeed1 the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result1 then the future is known with scientific certitude1 just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse4 ,if1 however1 the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not1 then can the future be known more or less conjecturally1 according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles2 from these the future may be known1 according to the order of the effects to the cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,confess4 xii 99,gen4 ad lit4 xii4 #ac71 the soul has a certain power of forecasting1 so that by its very nature it can know the future2 hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense1 and1 as it were1 concentrated on itself1 it shares in the knowledge of the future4 ,such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the ,platonists maintained1 because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects1 and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body1 and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future4 ,but since it is connatural to our intellect to know things1 not thus1 but by receiving its knowledge from the senses2 it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses3 rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes2 of spiritual causes1 when by ,divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels1 and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events2 or1 by the influence of demons1 when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons1 as explained above 7,q4 #eg1 ,a4 #c74 ,the soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses1 as it is then nearer to the spiritual world1 and freer from external distractions4 ,the same may also come from superior corporeal causes4 ,for it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies4 ,hence1 in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs1 the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected1 and so1 as the heavenly bodies cause many future events1 the imagination receives certain images of some such events4 ,these images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake1 because1 as stated in ,de ,somn4 et ,vigil4 ii 99,de ,divinat4 per somn4 ii1 impressions made by day are evanescent4 ,the night air is calmer1 when silence reigns1 hence bodily impressions are made in sleep1 when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness1 and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it1 as man has his reason1 and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies4 ,thus from such animals' movements some future things1 such as rain and the like1 may be known rather than from human movements directed by reason4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,de ,somn4 et ,vig471 that some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing2 for their intelligence is not burdened with cares1 but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it4 ,,question #hg ,,how ,,the ,,intellectual ,,soul ,,knows ,,itself ,,and ,,all ,,within ,,itself 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the soul knows itself by its own essence8 7#b7 ,whether it knows its own habits8 7#c7 ,how does the intellect know its own act8 7#d7 ,how does it know the act of the will8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,intellectual ,soul ,knows ,itself by ,its ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #c71 that the mind knows itself1 because it is incorporeal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance4 ,but an angel understands itself by its own essence4 ,therefore likewise does the human soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in things void of matter1 the intellect and that which is understood are the same 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,but the human mind is void of matter1 not being the act of a body as stated above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind2 and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,de ,anima iii1 #d7 that the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things4 ,but it understands other things1 not by their essence1 but by their similitudes4 ,therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence4 ,i answer that1 ,everything is knowable so far as it is in act1 and not1 so far as it is in potentiality 7,metaph4 ix1 ,did4 viii1 #i73 for a thing is a being1 and is true1 and therefore knowable1 according as it is actual4 ,this is quite clear as regards sensible things1 for the eye does not see what is potentially1 but what is actually colored4 ,in like manner it is clear that the intellect1 so far as it knows material things1 does not know save what is in act3 and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form1 as is stated ,phys4 i1 #g4 ,consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence4 ,therefore it is that the ,essence of ,god1 the pure and perfect act1 is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible2 and hence ,god by ,his own ,essence knows ,himself1 and all other things also4 ,the angelic essence belongs1 indeed1 to the genus of intelligible things as act1 but not as a pure act1 nor as a complete act1 and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed by his essence4 ,for although an angel understands himself by his own essence1 still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence2 for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses4 ,now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings1 just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings2 and hence it is called possible 99,possibilis--elsewhere in this translation rendered passive--,ed44 ,therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding4 ,hence it has in itself the power to understand1 but not to be understood1 except as it is made actual4 ,for even the ,platonists asserted that an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects1 forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible2 for they said that the participator is below what it participates4 ,if1 therefore1 the human intellect1 as the ,platonists held1 became actual by participating separate intelligible forms1 it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings4 ,but as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object1 as stated above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g71 it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things1 through the light of the active intellect1 which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves1 but also1 by their instrumentality1 actuates the passive intellect4 ,therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence1 but by its act4 ,this happens in two ways3 ,in the first place1 singularly1 as when ,socrates or ,plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands4 ,in the second place1 universally1 as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act4 ,it is true1 however1 that the judgment and force of this knowledge1 whereby we know the nature of the soul1 comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the ,divine ,truth which contains the types of all things as above stated 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #e74 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #f73 ,we gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define1 not what each man's mind is1 but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types4 ,there is1 however1 a difference between these two kinds of knowledge1 and it consists in this1 that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first2 the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself1 and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence4 ,but as regards the second kind of knowledge1 the mere presence of the mind does not suffice1 and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry4 ,hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature1 and many have erred about it4 ,so ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #i71 concerning such mental inquiry3 ,let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent1 but to discern itself as present--i4e4 to know how it differs from other things2 which is to know its essence and nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the mind knows itself by means of itself1 because at length it acquires knowledge of itself1 though led thereto by its own act3 because it is itself that it knows1 since it loves itself1 as he says in the same passage4 ,for a thing can be called self-evident in two ways1 either because we can know it by nothing else except itself1 as first principles are called self-evident2 or because it is not accidentally knowable1 as color is visible of itself1 whereas substance is visible by its accident4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things1 and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood4 ,hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself3 not so the human mind1 which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things--as is the passive intellect--or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms--as is the active intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this saying of the ,philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect4 ,for as sense in act is the sensible in act1 by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act1 so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act1 by reason of the likeness of the thing understood1 which is the form of the intellect in act4 ,so the human intellect1 which becomes actual by the species of the object understood1 is itself understood by the same species as by its own form4 ,now to say that in things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same1 is equal to saying that as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same4 ,for a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial4 ,but a distinction must be drawn3 since the essences of some things are immaterial--as the separate substances called angels1 each of which is understood and understands1 whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial1 but only the abstract likenesses thereof4 ,hence the ,commentator says 7,de ,anima iii7 that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances2 because in a sense it is verified in their regard1 and not in regard of other substances1 as already stated 7,reply ,obj4 #b74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,our ,intellect ,knows the ,habits of the ,soul by ,their ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiii1 #a73 ,faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides1 as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body2 but we know most certainly that it is there1 and conscience proclaims its existence2 and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul4 ,therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts1 but by themselves4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul1 and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses4 ,but the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul4 ,therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so4 ,but habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul4 ,therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves4 ,on the contrary1 ,habits like powers are the principles of acts4 ,but as is said 7,de ,anima ii1 #d71 acts and operations are logically prior to powers4 ,therefore in the same way they are prior to habits2 and thus habits1 like the powers1 are known by their acts4 ,i answer that1 ,a habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act4 ,now1 it has been said 7,a4 #a7 that nothing is known but as it is actual3 therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act1 it falls short in being of itself knowable1 and can be known only by its act2 thus1 for example1 anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit2 or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act4 ,the first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present1 for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known4 ,the second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry1 as is explained above of the mind 7,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although faith is not known by external movement of the body1 it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides1 by the interior act of the heart4 ,for no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,habits are present in our intellect1 not as its object since1 in the present state of life1 our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g71 but as that by which it understands4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the axiom1 whatever is the cause of a thing being such1 is still more so1 is true of things that are of the same order1 for instance1 of the same kind of cause2 for example1 we may say that health is desirable on account of life1 and therefore life is more desirable still4 ,but if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true3 for we may say that health is caused by medicine1 but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health1 for health belongs to the order of final causes1 whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes4 ,so of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge1 the one which is the cause of the other being known1 is the more known1 as principles are more known than conclusions4 ,but habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge2 nor are things known on account of the habit1 as on account of an object known1 but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows3 and therefore the argument does not prove4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,our ,intellect ,knows ,its ,own ,act8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect does not know its own act4 ,for what is known is the object of the knowing faculty4 ,but the act differs from the object4 ,therefore the intellect does not know its own act4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is known is known by some act4 ,if1 then1 the intellect knows its own act1 it knows it by some act1 and again it knows that act by some other act2 this is to proceed indefinitely1 which seems impossible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act4 ,but the proper sense does not feel its own act1 for this belongs to the common sense1 as stated ,de ,anima iii1 #b4 ,therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa71 ,i understand that ,i understand4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b7 a thing is intelligible according as it is in act4 ,now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation3 for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished1 as building is the perfection of the thing built2 but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act1 as is said ,metaph4 ix1 ,did4 viii1 #h4 ,therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding4 ,this occurs in different ways with different intellects4 ,for there is an intellect1 namely1 the ,divine1 which is ,its own act of intelligence1 so that in ,god the understanding of ,his intelligence1 and the understanding of ,his ,essence1 are one and the same act1 because ,his ,essence is ,his act of understanding4 ,but there is another intellect1 the angelic1 which is not its own act of understanding1 as we have said above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #a71 and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence4 ,wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands1 and that whereby he understands his essence1 yet he understands both by one and the same act2 because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence1 and by one and the same act is a thing1 together with its perfection1 understood4 ,and there is yet another1 namely1 the human intellect1 which neither is its own act of understanding1 nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding1 for this object is the nature of a material thing4 ,and therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind1 and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known2 and through the act the intellect itself is known1 the perfection of which is this act of understanding4 ,for this reason did the ,philosopher assert that objects are known before acts1 and acts before powers 7,de ,anima ii1 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the object of the intellect is something universal1 namely1 being and the true1 in which the act also of understanding is comprised4 ,wherefore the intellect can understand its own act4 ,but not primarily1 since the first object of our intellect1 in this state of life1 is not every being and everything true1 but being and true1 as considered in material things1 as we have said above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g71 from which it acquires knowledge of all other things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood1 as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act2 just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act4 ,hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone2 and so on4 ,nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite1 as explained above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible4 ,a material object1 however1 cannot immute itself2 but one is immuted by another1 and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense4 ,the intellect1 on the contrary1 does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ2 and so there is no comparison4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hg1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,intellect ,understands the ,act of the ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will4 ,for nothing is known by the intellect1 unless it be in some way present in the intellect4 ,but the act of the will is not in the intellect2 since the will and the intellect are distinct4 ,therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the act is specified by the object4 ,but the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect4 ,therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect1 and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect4 ,obj4 #c3 ,augustine 7,confess4 x1 #ag7 says of the soul's affections that they are known neither by images as bodies are known2 nor by their presence1 like the arts2 but by certain notions4 ,now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof4 ,therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa71 ,i understand that ,i will4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ei1 ,a4 #a71 the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood2 just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form4 ,now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence2 and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally1 and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly2 and likewise the intelligible inclination1 which is the act of the will1 is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject4 ,hence the ,philosopher expresses himself thus 7,de ,anima iii1 #i7--that the will is in the reason4 ,now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject1 is understood by that subject4 ,therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect1 both inasmuch as one knows that one wills2 and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act1 and consequently1 the nature of its principle which is the habit or power4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects1 as they are distinct powers2 for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect4 ,but as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul1 and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other1 consequently what is in the will is1 in a certain way1 also in the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the good and the true which are the objects of the will and of the intellect1 differ logically1 but one is contained in the other1 as we have said above 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a2 ,q4 #af1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a72 for the true is good and the good is true4 ,therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect1 and those of the intellect can fall under the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only1 like bodies2 nor by being present in their subject1 as the arts2 but as the thing caused is in its principle1 which contains some notion of the thing caused4 ,and so ,augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions4 ,,question #hh ,,how ,,the ,,human ,,soul ,,knows ,,what ,,is ,,above ,,itself 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself1 viz4 immaterial substances4 ,under this head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels1 in themselves8 7#b7 ,whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things8 7#c7 ,whether ,god is the first object of our knowledge8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,human ,soul in the ,present ,state of ,life ,can ,understand ,immaterial ,substances in ,themselves8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves4 ,for ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #c7 says3 ,as the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses1 so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things4 ,but these are the immaterial substances4 ,therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 like is known by like4 ,but the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things2 since its own nature is immaterial1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a74 ,since then our mind understands material things1 much more is it able to understand immaterial things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us1 comes from sense being corrupted by their very excellence4 ,but the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object1 as is stated ,de ,anima iii1 #d4 ,therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility1 are likewise to us most intelligible4 ,as material things1 however1 are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions1 it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial4 ,therefore they are much more known to us than are material things4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,commentator says 7,metaph4 ii7 that nature would be frustrated in its end were we unable to understand abstract substances1 because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all4 ,but in nature nothing is idle or purposeless4 ,therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 as sense is to the sensible1 so is intellect to the intelligible4 ,but our sight can see all things corporeal1 whether superior and incorruptible2 or lower and corruptible4 ,therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances1 even the superior and immaterial4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #i3af73 ,the things that are in heaven1 who shall search out8 ,but these substances are said to be in heaven1 according to ,matt4 #ah3aj1 ,their angels in heaven1 etc4 ,therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation4 ,i answer that1 ,in the opinion of ,plato1 immaterial substances are not only understood by us1 but are the objects we understand first of all4 ,for ,plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms1 which he called ,ideas1 are the proper objects of our intellect1 and thus first and per se understood by us2 and1 further1 that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind4 ,hence the purer the intellect is1 so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things4 ,but in ,aristotle's opinion1 which experience corroborates1 our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things2 and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms1 as we have said above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination1 cannot first and per se be known by us1 according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have4 ,nevertheless ,averroes 7,comment4 ,de ,anima iii7 teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance1 which he calls the active intellect1 and which1 being a separate substance itself1 can naturally understand separate substances4 ,hence1 when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly1 we also shall be able to understand separate substances1 as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us1 we can understand material things4 ,now he said that the active intellect is united to us1 thus4 ,for since we understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible objects1 as1 for instance1 we understand conclusions by principles understood2 it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood1 either as the principal agent is to the instrument1 or as form to matter4 ,for an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways2 to a principal agent and to an instrument1 as cutting to the workman and the saw2 to a form and its subject1 as heating to heat and fire4 ,in both these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible1 and as act is to potentiality4 ,now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time1 as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye4 ,therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together2 and the more numerous the intelligible objects received1 so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect2 so much so that when we understand all the intelligible objects1 the active intellect becomes one with us1 and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and immaterial4 ,in this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist4 ,nor1 as regards the present inquiry1 does it matter whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect1 as he himself maintains1 or whether 7as he says ,alexander holds7 the passive intellect can never understand separate substances 7because according to him it is corruptible71 but man understands separate substances by means of the active intellect4 ,this opinion1 however1 is untrue4 ,first1 because1 supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance1 we could not formally understand by its instrumentality1 for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act1 since every agent acts according to its actuality1 as was said of the passive intellect 7,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #a74 ,secondly1 this opinion is untrue1 because in the above explanation1 the active intellect1 supposing it to be a separate substance1 would not be joined to us in its substance1 but only in its light1 as participated in things understood2 and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances2 just as when we see colors set off by the sun1 we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun1 but its light only is united to us1 that we may see the colors4 ,thirdly1 this opinion is untrue1 because granted that1 as above explained1 the active intellect were united to us in substance1 still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object1 or two2 but rather in regard to all intelligible objects4 ,but all such objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect1 as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand all material things4 ,hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances4 ,fourthly1 this opinion is untrue1 because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things3 and thus no one1 or very few1 could reach to perfect felicity2 which is against what the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #i71 that happiness is a kind of common good1 communicable to all capable of virtue4 ,further1 it is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the species4 ,fifthly1 the ,philosopher expressly says 7,ethic4 i1 #aj71 that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue2 and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book1 he concludes 7,ethic4 i1 #g7 that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom1 which in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences4 ,hence ,aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances1 obtainable by speculative science2 and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined4 ,sixthly1 as was shown above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #d71 the active intellect is not a separate substance2 but a faculty of the soul1 extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively2 because1 as is stated 7,de ,anima iii1 #e71 the passive intellect is all things potentially1 and the active intellect is all things in act4 ,therefore both intellects1 according to the present state of life1 extend to material things only1 which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect1 and are received in the passive intellect4 ,hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves1 either by the passive or by the active intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself4 ,this is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances4 ,for by knowing itself1 it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances1 such as is within its compass2 not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge2 otherwise what ,empedocles said would be true--that the soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all4 ,but knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower1 as a kind of form thereof4 ,now our passive intellect1 in the present state of life1 is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms3 and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge2 such as of the active to the passive1 and of perfection to the perfectible4 ,hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses1 is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ1 but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power4 ,and thus it is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect1 in our present state of life1 so that it cannot understand them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this argument of the ,commentator fails in several ways4 ,first1 because if separate substances are not understood by us1 it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect2 for they are understood by themselves1 and by one another4 ,secondly1 to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances3 while only that is vain and purposeless1 which fails to attain its end4 ,it does not follow1 therefore1 that immaterial substances are purposeless1 even if they are not understood by us at all4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,sense knows bodies1 whether superior or inferior1 in the same way1 that is1 by the sensible acting on the organ4 ,but we do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way4 ,the former we understand by a process of abstraction1 which is impossible in the case of the latter1 for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,our ,intellect ,can ,understand ,immaterial ,substances ,through ,its ,knowledge of ,material ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i7 that the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies1 unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature4 ,therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 science resides in the intellect4 ,but there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances2 for ,damascene defines an angel 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #c72 and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy4 ,therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances4 ,but it can be understood by us through its act by which it understands material things4 ,therefore also other material substances can be understood by us1 through their material effects4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them1 and this belongs to ,god alone4 ,therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 i7 that intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things1 nor composite things through simple1 nor incorporeal through corporeal4 ,i answer that1 ,averroes says 7,de ,anima iii7 that a philosopher named ,avempace 99,ibn-,badja1 ,arabian ,philosopher2 ob4 #aahc taught that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led1 according to true philosophical principles1 to the knowledge of immaterial substances4 ,for since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter1 anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction2 and as the process of abstraction cannot go on forever1 it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity1 absolutely without matter2 and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance4 ,now this opinion would be true1 were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things2 as the ,platonists supposed4 ,but supposing1 on the contrary1 that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things1 it follows that however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter1 it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance4 ,therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,from material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things1 but not to the perfect knowledge thereof2 for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things1 and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 ii74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,science treats of higher things principally by way of negation4 ,thus ,aristotle 7,de ,coel4 i1 #c7 explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties4 ,hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to make us know their quiddity2 but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material things4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding1 which is proper to it1 showing perfectly its power and nature4 ,but the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act1 nor through any other material thing1 because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances1 for they do not agree in power or in matter2 but they belong to the same logical genus1 because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance1 as their essence is distinct from their existence4 ,but ,god has no connection with material things1 as regards either natural genus or logical genus2 because ,god is in no genus1 as stated above 7,q4 #c1 ,a4 #e74 ,hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels1 according to some common notion1 though not according to the specific nature2 whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about ,god4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,is the ,first ,object ,known by the ,human ,mind8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god is the first object known by the human mind4 ,for that object in which all others are known1 and by which we judge others1 is the first thing known to us2 as light is to the eye1 and first principles to the intellect4 ,but we know all things in the light of the first truth1 and thereby judge of all things1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #b2 ,de ,vera ,relig4 xxxi72 99,confess4 xii1 #be4 ,therefore ,god is the first object known to us4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever causes a thing to be such is more so4 ,but ,god is the cause of all our knowledge2 for ,he is the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world 7,john #a3i74 ,therefore ,god is our first and most known object4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made4 ,but in our mind is the image of ,god1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #d1g74 ,therefore ,god is the first object known to our mind4 ,on the contrary1 ,no man hath seen ,god at any time 7,john #a3ah74 ,i answer that1 ,since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances 7,a4 #a71 much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance4 ,hence it must be said simply that ,god is not the first object of our knowledge4 ,rather do we know ,god through creatures1 according to the ,apostle 7,rom4 #a3bj71 the invisible things of ,god are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made3 while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the quiddity of a material thing1 which is the proper object of our intellect1 as appears above in many passages 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #h2 ,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b7 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth1 forasmuch as the light itself of our mind1 whether natural or gratuitous1 is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it1 as stated above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #b74 ,hence1 as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands1 much less can it be said that ,god is the first object known by our intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the axiom1 ,whatever causes a thing to be such is more so1 must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order1 as explained above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #b1 ad #c74 ,other things than ,god are known because of ,god2 not as if ,he were the first known object1 but because ,he is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if there existed in our souls a perfect image of ,god1 as the ,son is the perfect image of the ,father1 our mind would know ,god at once4 ,but the image in our mind is imperfect2 hence the argument does not prove4 ,,question #hi ,,of ,,the ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,separated ,,soul 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul4 ,under this head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the soul separated from the body can understand8 7#b7 ,whether it understands separate substances8 7#c7 ,whether it understands all natural things8 7#d7 ,whether it understands individuals and singulars8 7#e7 ,whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain8 7#f7 ,whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired8 7#g7 ,whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge8 7#h7 ,whether souls separated from the body know what happens here8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,separated ,soul ,can ,understand ,anything8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #d7 that the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle4 ,but by death all human interior principles are corrupted4 ,therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied1 and by a distracted imagination1 as explained above 7,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #g1h74 ,but death destroys the senses and imagination1 as we have shown above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore after death the soul understands nothing4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the separated soul can understand1 this must be by means of some species4 ,but it does not understand by means of innate species1 because it has none such2 being at first like a tablet on which nothing is written3 nor does it understand by species abstracted from things1 for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species3 nor does it understand by means of species1 formerly abstracted and retained in the soul2 for if that were so1 a child's soul would have no means of understanding at all3 nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused1 for such knowledge would not be natural1 such as we treat of now1 but the effect of grace4 ,therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #a71 ,if the soul had no proper operation1 it could not be separated from the body4 ,but the soul is separated from the body2 therefore it has a proper operation and above all1 that which consists in intelligence4 ,therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body4 ,i answer that1 ,the difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms1 as experience shows4 ,did this not proceed from the soul's very nature1 but accidentally through its being bound up with the body1 as the ,platonists said1 the difficulty would vanish2 for in that case when the body was once removed1 the soul would at once return to its own nature1 and would understand intelligible things simply1 without turning to the phantasms1 as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances4 ,in that case1 however1 the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good1 for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it2 but for the good of the body1 which would be unreasonable1 since matter exists on account of the form1 and not the form for the sake of matter4 ,but if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms1 it will seem1 since death does not change its nature1 that it can then naturally understand nothing2 as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn4 ,to solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual1 the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence4 ,now the soul has one mode of being when in the body1 and another when apart from it1 its nature remaining always the same2 but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing1 for1 on the contrary1 such union belongs to its very nature1 just as the nature of a light object is not changed1 when it is in its proper place1 which is natural to it1 and outside its proper place1 which is beside its nature4 ,the soul1 therefore1 when united to the body1 consistently with that mode of existence1 has a mode of understanding1 by turning to corporeal phantasms1 which are in corporeal organs2 but when it is separated from the body1 it has a mode of understanding1 by turning to simply intelligible objects1 as is proper to other separate substances4 ,hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body2 but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature1 and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it2 and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature4 ,but here again a difficulty arises4 ,for since nature is always ordered to what is best1 and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms2 ,god should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it1 and it would not have needed the body for that purpose4 ,in order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms1 nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul4 ,this will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the ,divine light1 which is one and simple in its first principle1 and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified1 as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle4 ,hence it is that ,god by ,his one ,essence understands all things2 while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species1 which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things1 because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures3 whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species1 which are less universal1 and bestow a lower degree of comprehension1 in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures4 ,if1 therefore1 the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances1 since they are not so strong in understanding1 the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect1 and of a general and confused nature4 ,we can see this to a certain extent in man1 for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding1 unless things are explained to them singly and in detail4 ,now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances4 ,but the perfection of the universe required various grades of being4 ,if1 therefore1 ,god had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances1 it would follow that human knowledge1 so far from being perfect1 would be confused and general4 ,therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge1 they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies1 and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves2 thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples4 ,it is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body1 and that it understands by turning to the phantasms4 ,nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body1 and also to understand in another way4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul as united1 just as sensation is1 for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense4 ,we may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms4 ,this is also the meaning of the second objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the separated soul does not understand by way of innate species1 nor by species abstracted then1 nor only by species retained1 and this the objection proves2 but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the ,divine light1 shared by the soul as by other separate substances2 though in a lesser degree4 ,hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal 7phantasms71 the soul turns at once to the superior things2 nor is this way of knowledge unnatural1 for ,god is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,separated ,soul ,understands ,separate ,substances8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances4 ,for the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it1 being an essential part of human nature2 and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole4 ,but the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above 7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species4 ,but separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence1 for ,god alone can enter into the soul2 nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel1 for an angel is more simple than a soul4 ,therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances4 ,if1 therefore1 the separated soul can understand separate substances1 its happiness would be secured by its separation alone2 which cannot be reasonably be said4 ,on the contrary1 ,souls apart from the body know other separated souls2 as we see in the case of the rich man in hell1 who saw ,lazarus and ,abraham 7,luke #af3bc74 ,therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #c71 our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself--i4e4 by knowing itself 7,q4 #hh1 ,a4 #a1 ad #a74 ,therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself1 we can judge how it knows other separate things4 ,now it was said above 7,a4 #a71 that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms1 and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms2 for thus it understands itself through its own act1 as shown above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #a74 ,when1 however1 it is separated from the body1 it understands no longer by turning to phantasms1 but by turning to simply intelligible objects2 hence in that state it understands itself through itself4 ,now1 every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is below itself1 according to the mode of its substance 7,de ,causis viii73 for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands2 while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is4 ,and the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel1 but is the same as that of other separated souls4 ,therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls1 but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned4 ,but the knowledge of glory is otherwise4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the separated soul is1 indeed1 less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body3 but it has a greater freedom of intelligence1 since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas2 which1 however1 fail to give perfect knowledge of them1 forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances2 but in the knowledge of ,god1 ,who is seen only by grace4 ,the knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness--not final and ultimate happiness4 ,but the separated soul does not understand them perfectly1 as was shown above in this article4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,separated ,soul ,knows ,all ,natural ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things4 ,for the types of all natural things exist in separate substances4 ,therefore1 as separated souls know separate substances1 they also know all natural things4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whoever understands the greater intelligible1 will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible4 ,but the separated soul understands immaterial substances1 which are in the highest degree of intelligibility4 ,therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility4 ,on the contrary1 ,the devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul2 yet they do not know all natural things1 but have to learn many things by long experience1 as ,isidore says 7,de ,summo ,bono i74 ,therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 the separated soul1 like the angels1 understands by means of species1 received from the influence of the ,divine light4 ,nevertheless1 as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel1 to whom this kind of knowledge is natural1 the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge1 but only a general and confused kind of knowledge4 ,separated souls1 therefore1 have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof4 ,now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly2 because all that ,god has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by ,him in the angelic intelligence1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ii1 #h74 ,hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge1 but in a general and confused manner4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance1 but through certain species1 as stated above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #a74 ,so it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances1 so neither does it know all natural things perfectly2 but it knows them confusedly1 as above explained in this article4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels1 nor demons1 nor separated souls1 know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by ,divine revelation4 ,but we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect2 the knowledge of which we speak is confused4 ,hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,separated ,soul ,knows ,singulars8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars4 ,for no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul1 as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #h74 ,but the intellect cannot know singulars1 as we have shown 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #a74 ,therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal4 ,but the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things1 therefore much less can it know singulars4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if it knew the singulars1 yet not by sense1 for the same reason it would know all singulars4 ,but it does not know all singulars4 ,therefore it knows none4 ,on the contrary1 ,the rich man in hell said3 ,i have five brethren 7,luke #af3bh74 ,i answer that1 ,separated souls know some singulars1 but not all1 not even all present singulars4 ,to understand this1 we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things1 one by means of abstraction from phantasms1 and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect1 but only indirectly1 as stated above 7,q4 #hf1 ,a4 #a74 ,the other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by ,god1 and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars4 ,for as ,god knows all things1 universal and singular1 by ,his ,essence1 as the cause of universal and individual principles 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b71 so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the ,divine ,essence4 ,there is a difference1 however1 between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things2 whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge4 ,hence the angels1 by reason of their perfect intellect1 through these species1 know not only the specific natures of things1 but also the singulars contained in those species2 whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life1 or by some affection1 or by natural aptitude1 or by the disposition of the ,divine order2 because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction2 neither does the separated soul know it thus2 but as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation1 as we have said4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars1 but one relation to some1 and another to others4 ,therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,habit of ,knowledge ,here ,acquired ,remains in the ,separated ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body3 for the ,apostle says3 ,knowledge shall be destroyed 7#a ,cor4 #ac3h74 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better4 ,if1 therefore1 the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death1 it would follow that some who are less good would1 even in the future life1 excel some who are better2 which seems unreasonable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the ,divine light4 ,supposing1 therefore1 that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul1 it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot be4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,praedic4 vi1 #d1 #e71 that a habit is a quality hard to remove3 yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like4 ,but in this life there is no change so thorough as death4 ,therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death4 ,on the contrary1 ,jerome says 7,ep4 liii1 ad ,paulinum71 ,let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven4 ,i answer that1 ,some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself1 but in the sensitive powers1 namely1 the imaginative1 cogitative1 and memorative1 and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect4 ,if this were true1 it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death1 knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed4 ,but1 since knowledge resides in the intellect1 which is the abode of species1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d71 the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect4 ,this can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises4 ,for habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired 7,ethic4 ii1 #a74 ,now the actions of the intellect1 by which knowledge is here acquired1 are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers4 ,hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received3 and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object4 ,but as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself1 whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers1 the same distinction is to be applied to habit4 ,knowledge1 therefore1 acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul1 as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers2 but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself1 it must remain2 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,long4 et ,brev4 ,vitae ii71 a form may be corrupted in two ways2 first1 directly1 when corrupted by its contrary1 as heat1 by cold2 and secondly1 indirectly1 when its subject is corrupted4 ,now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject1 for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty1 as above stated 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b1 ad #b74 ,neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary2 for there is no contrary to intelligible intentions1 above all as regards simple intelligence of what a thing is4 ,but contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division1 or also reasoning2 so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth4 ,and thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly3 namely1 forgetfulness on the part of the memorative power1 and deception on the part of a false argument4 ,but these have no place in the separated soul4 ,therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge1 so far as it is in the intellect1 remains in the separated soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit1 but as to the act of knowing2 and hence he says1 in proof of the assertion quoted1 ,now1 ,i know in part4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature1 so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have4 ,such knowledge1 however1 cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,these two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species1 so there is no impossibility4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,this objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,act of ,knowledge ,acquired ,here ,remains in the ,separated ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #d71 that when the body is corrupted1 the soul neither remembers nor loves4 ,but to consider what is previously known is an act of memory4 ,therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body4 ,but in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms1 as shown above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,therefore the separated soul cannot do so1 and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #a71 that habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired4 ,but the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms3 therefore it cannot produce any other acts4 ,these acts1 however1 are not adapted to the separated soul4 ,therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life4 ,on the contrary1 ,it was said to ,dives in hell 7,luke #af3be73 ,remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime4 ,i answer that1 ,action offers two things for our consideration--its species and its mode4 ,its species comes from the object1 whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the 7intelligible7 species1 which is the object's similitude2 whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent4 ,thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye2 but that he see it clearly1 is due to the eye's visual power4 ,therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul1 as stated above 7,a4 #e71 and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life1 it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly1 but in a different way2 not by turning to phantasms1 but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body4 ,thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul1 but in a different way4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,philosopher speaks of remembrance1 according as memory belongs to the sensitive part1 but not as belonging in a way to the intellect1 as explained above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul2 not by diversity of species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit1 in species1 but not in mode4 ,for example1 to do just things1 but not justly1 that is1 pleasurably1 causes the habit of political justice1 whereby we act pleasurably4 7,cf4 ,aristotle1 ,ethic4 v1 #h3 ,magn4 ,moral4 i1 #cd74 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,local ,distance ,impedes the ,knowledge in the ,separated ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,cura pro ,mort4 xiii71 that the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here4 ,but they know what is done among themselves4 ,therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,divin4 ,daemon4 iii71 that the demons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us4 ,but agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance2 which1 therefore1 is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul1 whose nature is inferior to the demon's4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as there is distance of place1 so is there distance of time4 ,but distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul1 for the soul is ignorant of the future4 ,therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,luke #af3bc71 that ,dives1 lifting up his eyes when he was in torment1 saw ,abraham afar off4 ,therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul4 ,i answer that1 ,some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible4 ,if that were so1 it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge2 for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul1 or the soul upon the sensible1 and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary4 ,this is1 however1 impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body4 ,but the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the ,divine light1 which is indifferent to what is near or distant4 ,hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here1 not because they are there1 as if impeded by local distance2 but for some other cause1 as we shall explain 7,a4 #h74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them1 and so have sensitive powers1 which require local distance4 ,in the same book he expressly sets down this opinion1 though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion1 as we may gather from ,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi1 #aj4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the future1 which is distant in time1 does not actually exist1 and therefore is not knowable in itself1 because so far as a thing falls short of being1 so far does it fall short of being knowable4 ,but what is locally distant exists actually1 and is knowable in itself4 ,hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #hi1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,separated ,souls ,know ,what ,takes ,place on ,earth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth2 for otherwise they would have no care for it1 as they have1 according to what ,dives said 7,luke #af3bg1 #bh71 ,i have five brethren 4 4 4 he may testify unto them1 lest they also come into the place of torments4 ,therefore separated souls know what passes on earth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the dead often appear to the living1 asleep or awake1 and tell them of what takes place there2 as ,samuel appeared to ,saul 7#a ,kings #bh3aa74 ,but this could not be unless they knew what takes place here4 ,therefore they know what takes place on earth4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 separated souls know what happens among themselves4 ,if1 therefore1 they do not know what takes place among us1 it must be by reason of local distance2 which has been shown to be false 7,a4 #g74 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,job #ad3ba73 ,he will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor4 ,i answer that1 ,by natural knowledge1 of which we are treating now1 the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth4 ,this follows from what has been laid down 7,a4 #d71 since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars1 by being in a way determined to them1 either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection1 or by the ,divine order4 ,now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living1 both by ,divine order and by their mode of existence1 whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances2 and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us4 ,whereof ,gregory gives the reason thus3 ,the dead do not know how the living act1 for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh2 and so1 as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus1 so they are distinct in knowledge 7,moral4 xii74 ,augustine seems to say the same 7,de ,cura pro ,mort4 xiii71 when he asserts that1 the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living4 ,gregory and ,augustine1 however1 seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven1 for ,gregory continues the passage above quoted3 ,the case of the holy souls is different1 for since they see the light of ,almighty ,god1 we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them4 ,but ,augustine 7,de ,cura pro ,mort4 xiii7 expressly says3 ,the dead1 even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children1 as a gloss quotes on the text1 ,abraham hath not known us 7,isa4 #fc3af74 ,he confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited1 nor consoled in sorrow by his mother1 as when she was alive2 and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state2 and again by the fact that the ,lord promised to king ,josias that he should die1 lest he should see his people's afflictions 7#d ,kings #bb3bj74 ,yet ,augustine says this in doubt2 and premises1 ,let every one take1 as he pleases1 what ,i say4 ,gregory1 on the other hand1 is positive1 since he says1 ,we cannot believe4 ,his opinion1 indeed1 seems to be the more probable one--that the souls of the blessed who see ,god do know all that passes here4 ,for they are equal to the angels1 of whom ,augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth4 ,but as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to ,divine justice1 they do not suffer from sorrow1 nor do they interfere in mundane affairs1 except in accordance with ,divine justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the souls of the departed may care for the living1 even if ignorant of their state2 just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf1 though we are ignorant of their state4 ,moreover1 the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately1 but the souls who pass hence thither1 or by angels and demons1 or even by the revelation of the ,holy ,ghost1 as ,augustine says in the same book4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of ,god2 in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be accounted as miraculous4 ,or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels1 without the knowledge of the departed2 as may likewise happen when the living appear1 without their own knowledge1 to others living1 as ,augustine says in the same book4 ,and so it may be said of ,samuel that he appeared through ,divine revelation2 according to ,ecclus4 #df3bc1 he slept1 and told the king the end of his life4 ,or1 again1 this apparition was procured by the demons2 unless1 indeed1 the authority of ,ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the ,jews as canonical ,scripture4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance1 but from the cause mentioned above4 ,,question #ij ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,production ,,of ,,man',s ,,soul 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,after the foregoing we must consider the first production of man1 concerning which there are four subjects of treatment3 7#a7 the production of man himself2 7#b7 the end of this production2 7#c7 the state and condition of the first man2 7#d7 the place of his abode4 ,concerning the production of man1 there are three things to be considered3 7#a7 the production of man's soul2 7#b7 the production of man's body2 7#c7 the production of the woman4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether man's soul was something made1 or was of the ,divine substance8 7#b7 ,whether1 if made1 it was created8 7#c7 ,whether it was made by angelic instrumentality8 7#d7 ,whether it was made before the body8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,soul ,was ,made or ,was of ,god's ,substance8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul was not made1 but was ,god's substance4 ,for it is written 7,gen4 #b3g73 ,god formed man of the slime of the earth1 and breathed into his face the breath of life1 and man was made a living soul4 ,but he who breathes sends forth something of himself4 ,therefore the soul1 whereby man lives1 is of the ,divine substance4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as above explained 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e71 the soul is a simple form4 ,but a form is an act4 ,therefore the soul is a pure act2 which applies to ,god alone4 ,therefore the soul is of ,god's substance4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 things that exist and do not differ are the same4 ,but ,god and the mind exist1 and in no way differ1 for they could only be differentiated by certain differences1 and thus would be composite4 ,therefore ,god and the human mind are the same4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,orig4 ,animae iii1 #ae7 mentions certain opinions which he calls exceedingly and evidently perverse1 and contrary to the ,catholic ,faith1 among which the first is the opinion that ,god made the soul not out of nothing1 but from ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,to say that the soul is of the ,divine substance involves a manifest improbability4 ,for1 as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #gg1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #f71 the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence --acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various powers2 all of which are incompatible with the ,divine ,nature1 ,which is a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no variety in itself1 as we have proved 7,q4 #c1 ,,aa4 #a1 #g2 ,q4 #i1 ,a4 #a74 ,this error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients4 ,for those who first began to observe the nature of things1 being unable to rise above their imagination1 supposed that nothing but bodies existed4 ,therefore they said that ,god was a body1 which they considered to be the principle of other bodies4 ,and since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle1 as is stated ,de ,anima i1 #b1 it followed that the soul was of the nature of ,god ,himself4 ,according to this supposition1 also1 the ,manichaeans1 thinking that ,god was corporeal light1 held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body4 ,then a further step in advance was made1 and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal1 not apart from the body1 but the form of a body2 so that ,varro said1 ,god is a soul governing the world by movement and reason1 as ,augustine relates 7,de ,civ4 ,dei vii1 #f 99,the words as quoted are to be found iv4 #ca474 ,so some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul1 as man is a part of the whole world2 for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance1 except according to the distinction of bodies4 ,but1 all these theories are impossible1 as proved above 7,q4 #c1 ,,aa4 #a1 #h2 and ,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #a71 wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the term breathe is not to be taken in the material sense2 but as regards the act of ,god1 to breathe 7spirare71 is the same as to make a spirit4 ,moreover1 in the material sense1 man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance1 but an extraneous thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the soul is a simple form in its essence1 yet it is not its own existence1 but is a being by participation1 as above explained 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #e1 ad #d74 ,therefore it is not a pure act like ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that which differs1 properly speaking1 differs in something2 wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance4 ,for this reason things which differ must in some way be compound2 since they differ in something1 and in something resemble each other4 ,in this sense1 although all that differ are diverse1 yet all things that are diverse do not differ4 ,for simple things are diverse2 yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition4 ,for instance1 a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational2 but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,soul ,was ,produced by ,creation8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the soul was not produced by creation4 ,for that which has in itself something material is produced from matter4 ,but the soul is in part material1 since it is not a pure act4 ,therefore the soul was made of matter2 and hence it was not created4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter2 for since matter is in potentiality to act1 any act pre-exists in matter potentially4 ,but the soul is the act of corporeal matter1 as is clear from its definition4 ,therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the soul is a form4 ,therefore1 if the soul is created1 all other forms also are created4 ,thus no forms would come into existence by generation2 which is not true4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3bg73 ,god created man to ,his own image4 ,but man is like to ,god in his soul4 ,therefore the soul was created4 ,i answer that1 ,the rational soul can be made only by creation2 which1 however1 is not true of other forms4 ,the reason is because1 since to be made is the way to existence1 a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence4 ,now that properly exists which itself has existence2 as it were1 subsisting in its own existence4 ,wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings2 whereas an accident has not existence1 but something is 7modified7 by it1 and so far is it called a being2 for instance1 whiteness is called a being1 because by it something is white4 ,hence it is said ,metaph4 vii1 ,did4 vi1 #a that an accident should be described as of something rather than as something4 ,the same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms4 ,therefore1 properly speaking1 it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made2 but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made4 ,on the other hand1 the rational soul is a subsistent form1 as above explained 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b74 ,wherefore it is competent to be and to be made4 ,and since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether corporeal1 which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual1 which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another1 we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the soul's simple essence is as the material element1 while its participated existence is its formal element2 which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence1 because existence naturally follows the form4 ,the same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter1 as some maintain2 because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form1 as neither is the matter of a celestial body2 otherwise the soul would be corruptible4 ,wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality4 ,but since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter1 and is subsistent1 and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter1 as we have seen 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b71 it is not educed from the potentiality of matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as we have said1 there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,rational ,soul ,is ,produced by ,god ,immediately8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by ,god1 but by the instrumentality of the angels4 ,for spiritual things have more order than corporeal things4 ,but inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,therefore also the inferior spirits1 who are the rational souls1 are produced by means of the superior spirits1 the angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the end corresponds to the beginning of things2 for ,god is the beginning and end of all4 ,therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end4 ,but inferior things are forwarded by the higher1 as ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 v72 therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher1 and souls by angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 perfect is that which can produce its like1 as is stated ,metaph4 v4 ,but spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal4 ,therefore1 since bodies produce their like in their own species1 much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves2 and such is the rational soul4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3g7 that ,god ,himself breathed into the face of man the breath of life4 ,i answer that1 ,some have held that angels1 acting by the power of ,god1 produce rational souls4 ,but this is quite impossible1 and is against faith4 ,for it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation4 ,now1 ,god alone can create2 for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything2 while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause1 as above explained 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #c73 and every agent1 that presupposes something to its act1 acts by making a change therein4 ,therefore everything else acts by producing a change1 whereas ,god alone acts by creation4 ,since1 therefore1 the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter1 it cannot be produced1 save immediately by ,god4 ,thus the replies to the objections are clear4 ,for that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves1 and that the higher things lead forward the inferior--all these things are effected through a certain transmutation4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ij1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,human ,soul ,was ,produced ,before the ,body8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human soul was made before the body4 ,for the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment1 as shown above 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #gj1 ,a4 #a74 ,but the soul was made by creation2 whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment4 ,therefore the soul of man was made before the body4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals4 ,but angels were created before bodies1 or at least1 at the beginning with corporeal matter2 whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day1 when also the animals were made4 ,therefore the soul of man was created before the body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the end is proportionate to the beginning4 ,but in the end the soul outlasts the body4 ,therefore in the beginning it was created before the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,the proper act is produced in its proper potentiality4 ,therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body1 the soul was produced in the body4 ,i answer that1 ,origen 7,peri ,archon i1 #g1h7 held that not only the soul of the first man1 but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels1 before their bodies3 because he thought that all spiritual substances1 whether souls or angels1 are equal in their natural condition1 and differ only by merit2 so that some of them--namely1 the souls of men or of heavenly bodies--are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter4 ,of this opinion we have already spoken 7,q4 #dg1 ,a4 #b72 and so we need say nothing about it here4 ,augustine1 however 7,gen4 ad lit4 vii1 #bd71 says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels1 before the body1 for another reason2 because he supposes that the body of man1 during the work of the six days1 was produced1 not actually1 but only as to some causal virtues2 which cannot be said of the soul1 because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter1 nor could it be produced from any created virtue4 ,therefore it seems that the soul itself1 during the work of the six days1 when all things were made1 was created1 together with the angels2 and that afterwards1 by its own will1 was joined to the service of the body4 ,but he does not say this by way of assertion2 as his words prove4 ,for he says 7,gen4 ad lit4 vii1 #bi73 ,we may believe1 if neither ,scripture nor reason forbid1 that man was made on the sixth day1 in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world1 but that the soul was already created4 ,now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature1 and that it is not united to the body as its form1 but as its administrator4 ,but if the soul is united to the body as its form1 and is naturally a part of human nature1 the above supposition is quite impossible4 ,for it is clear that ,god made the first things in their perfect natural state1 as their species required4 ,now the soul1 as a part of human nature1 has its natural perfection only as united to the body4 ,therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body4 ,therefore1 if we admit the opinion of ,augustine about the work of the six days 7,q4 #gd1 ,a4 #b71 we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude1 so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels2 but was itself created at the same time as the body4 ,according to the other saints1 both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if the soul by its nature were a complete species1 so that it might be created as to itself1 this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning4 ,but as the soul is naturally the form of the body1 it was necessarily created1 not separately1 but in the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the same observation applies to the second objection4 ,for if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels4 ,but1 as the form of the body1 it belongs to the animal genus1 as a formal principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that the soul remains after the body1 is due to a defect of the body1 namely1 death4 ,which defect was not due when the soul was first created4 ,,question #ia ,,the ,,production ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,man',s ,,body 7,,four ,,articles7 ,we have now to consider the production of the first man's body4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,the matter from which it was produced2 7#b7 ,the author by whom it was produced2 7#c7 ,the disposition it received in its production2 7#d7 ,the mode and order of its production4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,body of the ,first ,man ,was ,made of the ,slime of the ,earth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth4 ,for it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something2 because not being is farther off from actual existence than being in potentiality4 ,but since man is the most honorable of ,god's lower creatures1 it was fitting that in the production of man's body1 the power of ,god should be most clearly shown4 ,therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth1 but out of nothing4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies4 ,but the human body has the greatest nobility2 since it is perfected by the noblest form1 which is the rational soul4 ,therefore it should not be made of an earthly body1 but of a heavenly body4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 fire and air are nobler than earth and water1 as is clear from their subtlety4 ,therefore1 since the human body is most noble1 it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the human body is composed of the four elements4 ,therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth1 but of the four elements4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3g73 ,god made man of the slime of the earth4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,god is perfect in ,his works1 ,he bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity3 ,god's works are perfect 7,deut4 #cb3d74 ,he ,himself is simply perfect by the fact that all things are pre-contained in ,him1 not as component parts1 but as united in one simple whole1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 v72 in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause1 according to its one virtue4 ,this perfection is bestowed on the angels1 inasmuch as all things which are produced by ,god in nature through various forms come under their knowledge4 ,but on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way4 ,for he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things1 but is in a manner composed of all things1 since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances1 and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament4 ,as to the elements1 he has them in their very substance1 yet in such a way that the higher elements1 fire and air1 predominate in him by their power2 for life is mostly found where there is heat1 which is from fire2 and where there is humor1 which is of the air4 ,but the inferior elements abound in man by their substance2 otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced1 unless the inferior elements1 which have the less power1 predominated in quantity4 ,therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth2 because earth and water mingled are called slime1 and for this reason man is called a little world1 because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the power of the ,divine ,creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation4 ,but it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements1 that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies1 as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body1 yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted4 ,for the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses1 the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible4 ,nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body1 as some say1 who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light4 ,for1 first of all1 what they say is false--that light is a body4 ,secondly1 it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence1 or from a heavenly body1 and to be mingled with the elements1 since a heavenly body is impassible2 wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies1 except as in the effects of its power4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if fire and air1 whose action is of greater power1 predominated also in quantity in the human body1 they would entirely draw the rest into themselves1 and there would be no equality in the mingling1 such as is required in the composition of man1 for the sense of touch1 which is the foundation of the other senses4 ,for the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception1 but only potentially2 either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole genus of such contraries--thus1 for instance1 the pupil of the eye is without color1 so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors2 which is not possible in the organ of touch1 since it is composed of the very elements1 the qualities of which are perceived by that sense--or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries1 as much needs be the case with regard to touch2 for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the slime of the earth are earth1 and water binding the earth together4 ,of the other elements1 ,scripture makes no mention1 because they are less in quantity in the human body1 as we have said2 and because also in the account of the ,creation no mention is made of fire and air1 which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the ,scripture was immediately addressed4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,human ,body ,was ,immediately ,produced by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the human body was not produced by ,god immediately4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d71 that corporeal things are disposed by ,god through the angels4 ,but the human body was made of corporeal matter1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels1 and not immediately by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever can be made by a created power1 is not necessarily produced immediately by ,god4 ,but the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body2 for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body2 and ,albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme1 but only in temperate regions4 ,therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change4 ,but all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body1 which is the first movement4 ,therefore1 since the human body was produced from corporeal matter1 it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 vii1 #bd7 that man's body was made during the work of the six days1 according to the causal virtues which ,god inserted in corporeal creatures2 and that afterwards it was actually produced4 ,but what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body4 ,therefore the human body was produced by some created power1 and not immediately by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ag3a73 ,god created man out of the earth4 ,i answer that1 ,the first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power1 but was immediately from ,god4 ,some1 indeed1 supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms2 but the ,philosopher refutes this opinion 7,metaph4 vii71 for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves1 but only in the composite1 as we have explained 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #d72 and because the agent must be like its effect1 it is not fitting that a pure form1 not existing in matter1 should produce a form which is in matter1 and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made4 ,so a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter1 according as composite is made by composite4 ,now ,god1 though ,he is absolutely immaterial1 can alone by ,his own power produce matter by creation3 wherefore ,he alone can produce a form in matter1 without the aid of any preceding material form4 ,for this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #ai74 ,therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated1 the first human body was of necessity made immediately by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,although the angels are the ministers of ,god1 as regards what ,he does in bodies1 yet ,god does something in bodies beyond the angels' power1 as1 for instance1 raising the dead1 or giving sight to the blind3 and by this power ,he formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth4 ,nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man1 in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,perfect animals1 produced from seed1 cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body1 as ,avicenna imagined2 although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #bf71 man and the sun beget man from matter4 ,for this reason1 a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals4 ,but the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter3 for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the movement of the heavens causes natural changes2 but not changes that surpass the order of nature1 and are caused by the ,divine ,power alone1 as for the dead to be raised to life1 or the blind to see3 like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,an effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures1 in two ways4 ,first1 both in active and in passive potentiality1 so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter1 but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it4 ,secondly1 in passive potentiality only2 that is1 that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by ,god4 ,in this sense1 according to ,augustine1 the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,body of ,man ,was ,given an ,apt ,disposition8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition4 ,for since man is the noblest of animals1 his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal1 that is1 in sense and movement4 ,but some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man2 thus dogs have a keener smell1 and birds a swifter flight4 ,therefore man's body was not aptly disposed4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 perfect is what lacks nothing4 ,but the human body lacks more than the body of other animals1 for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense1 in which man is lacking4 ,therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes4 ,but plants are erect in stature1 while brutes are prone in stature4 ,therefore man should not be of erect stature4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eccles4 #g3cj73 ,god made man right4 ,i answer that1 ,all natural things were produced by the ,divine art1 and so may be called ,god's works of art4 ,now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition2 not absolutely the best1 but the best as regards the proposed end2 and even if this entails some defect1 the artist cares not3 thus1 for instance1 when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting1 he makes it of iron1 which is suitable for the object in view2 and he does not prefer to make it of glass1 though this be a more beautiful material1 because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view4 ,therefore ,god gave to each natural being the best disposition2 not absolutely so1 but in the view of its proper end4 ,this is what the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #g73 ,and because it is better so1 not absolutely1 but for each one's substance4 ,now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations2 since matter is for the sake of the form1 and instruments are for the action of the agent4 ,i say1 therefore1 that ,god fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best1 as most suited to such a form and to such operations4 ,if defect exists in the disposition of the human body1 it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter1 from the conditions required in the body1 in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sense of touch1 which is the foundation of the other senses1 is more perfect in man than in any other animal2 and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals4 ,moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #gh1 ,a4 #d74 ,but by a kind of necessity1 man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses2 thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell4 ,for man needs the largest brain as compared to the body2 both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g72 and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart1 which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect4 ,so that size of the brain1 by reason of its humidity1 is an impediment to the smell1 which requires dryness4 ,in the same way1 we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight1 and a more acute hearing than man2 namely1 on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament4 ,the same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man1 since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,horns and claws1 which are the weapons of some animals1 and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers1 which are the clothing of animals1 are signs of an abundance of the earthly element2 which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament4 ,therefore such things do not suit the nature of man4 ,instead of these1 he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes1 and other necessaries of life1 of infinite variety4 ,wherefore the hand is called by ,aristotle 7,de ,anima iii1 #h71 the organ of organs4 ,moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature1 which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things1 so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons4 ,first1 because the senses are given to man1 not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life1 which they are bestowed on other animals1 but also for the purpose of knowledge4 ,hence1 whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex1 man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake4 ,therefore1 as the senses are situated chiefly in the face1 other animals have the face turned to the ground1 as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood2 whereas man has his face erect1 in order that by the senses1 and chiefly by sight1 which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things1 he may freely survey the sensible objects around him1 both heavenly and earthly1 so as to gather intelligible truth from all things4 ,secondly1 for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers2 the brain1 wherein these actions are1 in a way1 performed1 not being low down1 but lifted up above other parts of the body4 ,thirdly1 because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet2 and thus their utility for other purposes would cease4 ,fourthly1 because if man's stature were prone to the ground1 and he used his hands as fore-feet1 he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth4 ,thus he would have a protruding mouth1 with thick and hard lips1 and also a hard tongue1 so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things2 as we see in other animals4 ,moreover1 such an attitude would quite hinder speech1 which is reason's proper operation4 ,nevertheless1 though of erect stature1 man is far above plants4 ,for man's superior part1 his head1 is turned towards the superior part of the world1 and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world2 and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body4 ,plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world1 since their roots correspond to the mouth2 and their inferior part towards the upper world4 ,but brute animals have a middle disposition1 for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food1 and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ia1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,production of the ,human ,body ,is ,fittingly ,described in ,scripture8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in ,scripture4 ,for1 as the human body was made by ,god1 so also were the other works of the six days4 ,but in the other works it is written1 ,god said2 ,let it be made1 and it was made4 ,therefore the same should have been said of man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the human body was made by ,god immediately1 as explained above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore it was not fittingly said1 ,let us make man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life4 ,therefore1 having said1 ,god made man of the slime of the earth1 he should not have added3 ,and ,he breathed into him the breath of life4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the soul1 which is the breath of life1 is in the whole body1 and chiefly in the heart4 ,therefore it was not fittingly said3 ,he breathed into his face the breath of life4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the male and female sex belong to the body1 while the image of ,god belongs to the soul4 ,but the soul1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 vii1 #bd71 was made before the body4 ,therefore having said3 ,to ,his image ,he made them1 he should not have added1 male and female ,he created them4 ,on the contrary1 ,is the authority of ,scripture4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine observes 7,gen4 ad lit4 vi1 #ab71 man surpasses other things1 not in the fact that ,god ,himself made man1 as though ,he did not make other things2 since it is written 7,ps4 #aja3bf71 ,the work of ,thy hands is the heaven1 and elsewhere 7,ps4 #id3e71 ,his hands laid down the dry land2 but in this1 that man is made to ,god's image4 ,yet in describing man's production1 ,scripture uses a special way of speaking1 to show that other things were made for man's sake4 ,for we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,we must not imagine that when ,god said ,let us make man1 ,he spoke to the angels1 as some were perverse enough to think4 ,but by these words is signified the plurality of the ,divine ,person1 ,whose image is more clearly expressed in man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time1 and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body4 ,but it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things1 that ,god should have made either the body without the soul1 or the soul without the body1 since each is a part of human nature4 ,this is especially unfitting as regards the body1 for the body depends on the soul1 and not the soul on the body4 ,to remove the difficulty some have said that the words1 ,god made man1 must be understood of the production of the body with the soul2 and that the subsequent words1 and ,he breathed into his face the breath of life1 should be understood of the ,holy ,ghost2 as the ,lord breathed on ,his ,apostles1 saying1 ,receive ye the ,holy ,ghost 7,john #bj3bb74 ,but this explanation1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1 #bd71 is excluded by the very words of ,scripture4 ,for we read farther on1 ,and man was made a living soul2 which words the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #ae3de7 refers not to spiritual life1 but to animal life4 ,therefore1 by breath of life we must understand the soul1 so that the words1 ,he breathed into his face the breath of life1 are a sort of exposition of what goes before2 for the soul is the form of the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face1 on account of the senses which are there expressed2 therefore ,scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #cd71 the works of the six days were done all at one time2 wherefore according to him man's soul1 which he holds to have been made with the angels1 was not made before the sixth day2 but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually1 and his body in its causal elements4 ,but other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made4 ,,question #ib ,,the ,,production ,,of ,,the ,,woman 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we must next consider the production of the woman4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things8 7#b7 ,whether the woman should have been made from man8 7#c7 ,whether of man's rib8 7#d7 ,whether the woman was made immediately by ,god8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,woman ,should ,have ,been ,made in the ,first ,production of ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ii1 #c71 that the female is a misbegotten male4 ,but nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things4 ,therefore woman should not have been made at that first production4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 subjection and limitation were a result of sin1 for to the woman was it said after sin 7,gen4 #c3af73 ,thou shalt be under the man's power2 and ,gregory says that1 ,where there is no sin1 there is no inequality4 ,but woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man2 for the agent is always more honorable than the patient1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #af74 ,therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 occasions of sin should be cut off4 ,but ,god foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man4 ,therefore ,he should not have made woman4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3ah73 ,it is not good for man to be alone2 let us make him a helper like to himself4 ,i answer that1 ,it was necessary for woman to be made1 as the ,scripture says1 as a helper to man2 not1 indeed1 as a helpmate in other works1 as some say1 since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works2 but as a helper in the work of generation4 ,this can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things4 ,some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation1 but are generated by some other specific agent1 such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies1 from some fitting matter and not from seed3 others possess the active and passive generative power together2 as we see in plants which are generated from seed2 for the noblest vital function in plants is generation4 ,wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power4 ,among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex1 and the passive power to the female4 ,and as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation1 to which their life is principally directed2 therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals1 but only at the time of coition2 so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one1 as in plants they are always united2 although in some cases one of them preponderates1 and in some the other4 ,but man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action1 and that is intellectual operation4 ,therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man2 so that the female should be produced separately from the male2 although they are carnally united for generation4 ,therefore directly after the formation of woman1 it was said3 ,and they shall be two in one flesh 7,gen4 #b3bd74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as regards the individual nature1 woman is defective and misbegotten1 for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex2 while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition1 or even from some external influence2 such as that of a south wind1 which is moist1 as the ,philosopher observes 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 iv1 #b74 ,on the other hand1 as regards human nature in general1 woman is not misbegotten1 but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation4 ,now the general intention of nature depends on ,god1 ,who is the universal ,author of nature4 ,therefore1 in producing nature1 ,god formed not only the male but also the female4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,subjection is twofold4 ,one is servile1 by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit2 and this kind of subjection began after sin4 ,there is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil1 whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good2 and this kind of subjection existed even before sin4 ,for good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves4 ,so by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man1 because in man the discretion of reason predominates4 ,nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence1 as we shall prove 7,q4 #if1 ,a4 #c74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if ,god had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin1 the universe would have been imperfect4 ,nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided2 especially as ,god is so powerful that ,he can direct any evil to a good end4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,woman ,should ,have ,been ,made from ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that woman should not have been made from man4 ,for sex belongs both to man and animals4 ,but in the other animals the female was not made from the male4 ,therefore neither should it have been so with man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things of the same species are of the same matter4 ,but male and female are of the same species4 ,therefore1 as man was made of the slime of the earth1 so woman should have been made of the same1 and not from man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation4 ,but close relationship makes a person unfit for that office2 hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage1 as is written 7,lev4 #ah3f74 ,therefore woman should not have been made from man4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ecclus4 #ag3e73 ,he created of him1 that is1 out of man1 a helpmate like to himself1 that is1 woman4 ,i answer that1 ,when all things were first formed1 it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man than 7for the female to be from the male7 in other animals4 ,first1 in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this1 that as ,god is the principle of the whole universe1 so the first man1 in likeness to ,god1 was the principle of the whole human race4 ,wherefore ,paul says that ,god made the whole human race from one 7,acts #ag3bf74 ,secondly1 that man might love woman all the more1 and cleave to her more closely1 knowing her to be fashioned from himself4 ,hence it is written 7,gen4 #b3bc1 #bd73 ,she was taken out of man1 wherefore a man shall leave father and mother1 and shall cleave to his wife4 ,this was most necessary as regards the human race1 in which the male and female live together for life2 which is not the case with other animals4 ,thirdly1 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 viii1 #ab71 the human male and female are united1 not only for generation1 as with other animals1 but also for the purpose of domestic life1 in which each has his or her particular duty1 and in which the man is the head of the woman4 ,wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man1 as out of her principle4 ,fourthly1 there is a sacramental reason for this4 ,for by this is signified that the ,church takes her origin from ,christ4 ,wherefore the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #e3cb73 ,this is a great sacrament2 but ,i speak in ,christ and in the ,church4 ,reply ,obj4 #a is clear from the foregoing4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,matter is that from which something is made4 ,now created nature has a determinate principle2 and since it is determined to one thing1 it has also a determinate mode of proceeding4 ,wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species4 ,on the other hand1 the ,divine ,power1 being infinite1 can produce things of the same species out of any matter1 such as a man from the slime of the earth1 and a woman from out of man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a certain affinity arises from natural generation1 and this is an impediment to matrimony4 ,woman1 however1 was not produced from man by natural generation1 but by the ,divine ,power alone4 ,wherefore ,eve is not called the daughter of ,adam2 and so this argument does not prove4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,woman ,was ,fittingly ,made from the ,rib of ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man4 ,for the rib was much smaller than the woman's body4 ,now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only--either by addition 7and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added1 rather than out of the rib itself7--or by rarefaction1 because1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 x73 ,a body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction4 ,but the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least1 not in the proportion of a rib to ,eve's body4 ,therefore ,eve was not formed from a rib of ,adam4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous4 ,therefore a rib of ,adam belonged to the integrity of his body4 ,so1 if a rib was removed1 his body remained imperfect2 which is unreasonable to suppose4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a rib cannot be removed from man without pain4 ,but there was no pain before sin4 ,therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man1 that ,eve might be made from it4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3bb73 ,god built the rib1 which ,he took from ,adam1 into a woman4 ,i answer that1 ,it was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man4 ,first1 to signify the social union of man and woman1 for the woman should neither use authority over man1 and so she was not made from his head2 nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as his slave1 and so she was not made from his feet4 ,secondly1 for the sacramental signification2 for from the side of ,christ sleeping on the ,cross the ,sacraments flowed--namely1 blood and water--on which the ,church was established4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase1 without anything being added2 in the same way as our ,lord multiplied the five loaves4 ,but this is quite impossible4 ,for such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself1 or by a change of its dimensions4 ,not by change of the substance of the matter1 both because matter1 considered in itself1 is quite unchangeable1 since it has a potential existence1 and has nothing but the nature of a subject1 and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself4 ,wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible1 as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it2 unless it receives greater dimensions4 ,this implies rarefaction1 which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 iv74 ,to say1 therefore1 that the same matter is enlarged1 without being rarefied1 is to combine contradictories--viz4 the definition with the absence of the thing defined4 ,wherefore1 as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter1 we must admit an addition of matter3 either by creation1 or which is more probable1 by conversion4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,tract4 xxiv in ,joan47 that ,christ filled five thousand men with five loaves1 in the same way as from a few seeds ,he produces the harvest of corn--that is1 by transformation of the nourishment4 ,nevertheless1 we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves1 or that woman was made from the rib1 because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the rib belonged to the integral perfection of ,adam1 not as an individual1 but as the principle of the human race2 just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter1 and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation4 ,much more1 therefore1 was it possible that by the ,divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib4 ,from this it is clear how to answer the third objection4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ib1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,woman ,was ,formed ,immediately by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by ,god4 ,for no individual is produced immediately by ,god from another individual alike in species4 ,but the woman was made from a man who is of the same species4 ,therefore she was not made immediately by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d7 says that corporeal things are governed by ,god through the angels4 ,but the woman's body was formed from corporeal matter4 ,therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels1 and not immediately by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature1 and not immediately by ,god4 ,but the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #ae74 ,therefore it was not produced immediately by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says1 in the same work3 ,god alone1 to ,whom all nature owes its existence1 could form or build up the woman from the man's rib4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,a4 #b1 ad #b71 the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter4 ,now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman4 ,wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated4 ,now ,god alone1 the ,author of nature1 can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature4 ,therefore ,god alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth1 or a woman from the rib of man4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this argument is verified when an individual is begotten1 by natural generation1 from that which is like it in the same species4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #ae71 we do not know whether the angels were employed by ,god in the formation of the woman2 but it is certain that1 as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth1 so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #ah73 ,the first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus2 it made it possible for her to be thus made4 ,therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues1 in the things first created2 not as regards active potentiality1 but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the ,creator4 ,,question #ic ,,the ,,end ,,or ,,term ,,of ,,the ,,production ,,of ,,man 7,in ,nine ,articles7 ,we now treat of the end or term of man's production1 inasmuch as he is said to be made to the image and likeness of ,god4 ,there are under this head nine points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the image of ,god is in man8 7#b7 ,whether the image of ,god is in irrational creatures8 7#c7 ,whether the image of ,god is in the angels more than in man8 7#d7 ,whether the image of ,god is in every man8 7#e7 ,whether the image of ,god is in man by comparison with the ,essence1 or with all the ,divine ,persons1 or with one of them8 7#f7 ,whether the image of ,god is in man1 as to his mind only8 7#g7 ,whether the image of ,god is in man's power or in his habits and acts8 7#h7 ,whether the image of ,god is in man by comparison with every object8 7#i7 ,of the difference between image and likeness4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,image of ,god ,is in ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of ,god is not in man4 ,for it is written 7,isa4 #dj3ah73 ,to whom have you likened ,god8 or what image will you make for ,him8 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to be the image of ,god is the property of the ,first-,begotten1 of ,whom the ,apostle says 7,col4 #a3ae73 ,who is the image of the invisible ,god1 the ,first-,born of every creature4 ,therefore the image of ,god is not to be found in man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,hilary says 7,de ,synod 99,super i can4 ,synod4 ,ancyr47 that an image is of the same species as that which it represents2 and he also says that an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another4 ,but there is no species common to both ,god and man2 nor can there be a comparison of equality between ,god and man4 ,therefore there can be no image of ,god in man4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3bf73 ,let ,us make man to ,our own image and likeness4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #gd73 ,where an image exists1 there forthwith is likeness2 but where there is likeness1 there is not necessarily an image4 ,hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image2 and that an image adds something to likeness--namely1 that it is copied from something else4 ,for an image is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else2 wherefore1 for instance1 an egg1 however much like and equal to another egg1 is not called an image of the other egg1 because it is not copied from it4 ,but equality does not belong to the essence of an image2 for as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #gd73 ,where there is an image there is not necessarily equality1 as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass4 ,yet this is of the essence of a perfect image2 for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy4 ,now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to ,god1 copied from ,god as from an exemplar2 yet this likeness is not one of equality1 for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy4 ,therefore there is in man a likeness to ,god2 not1 indeed1 a perfect likeness1 but imperfect4 ,and ,scripture implies the same when it says that man was made to ,god's likeness2 for the preposition to signifies a certain approach1 as of something at a distance4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,prophet speaks of bodily images made by man4 ,therefore he says pointedly3 ,what image will you make for ,him8 ,but ,god made a spiritual image to ,himself in man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,first-,born of creatures is the perfect ,image of ,god1 reflecting perfectly that of which ,he is the ,image1 and so ,he is said to be the ,image1 and never to the image4 ,but man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness2 and to the image by reason of the imperfect likeness4 ,and since the perfect likeness to ,god cannot be except in an identical nature1 the ,image of ,god exists in ,his first-born ,son2 as the image of the king is in his son1 who is of the same nature as himself3 whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature1 as the image of the king is in a silver coin1 as ,augustine says explains in ,de decem ,chordis 7,serm4 ix1 al1 xcvi1 ,de ,tempore74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as unity means absence of division1 a species is said to be the same as far as it is one4 ,now a thing is said to be one not only numerically1 specifically1 or generically1 but also according to a certain analogy or proportion4 ,in this sense a creature is one with ,god1 or like to ,him2 but when ,hilary says of a thing which adequately represents another1 this is to be understood of a perfect image4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,image of ,god ,is to ,be ,found in ,irrational ,creatures8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of ,god is to be found in irrational creatures4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 ii73 ,effects are contingent images of their causes4 ,but ,god is the cause not only of rational1 but also of irrational creatures4 ,therefore the image of ,god is to be found in irrational creatures4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the more distinct a likeness is1 the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image4 ,but ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the solar ray has a very great similitude to the ,divine goodness4 ,therefore it is made to the image of ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the more perfect anything is in goodness1 the more it is like ,god4 ,but the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man2 for though each individual thing is good1 all things together are called very good 7,gen4 #a3ca74 ,therefore the whole universe is to the image of ,god1 and not only man4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 iii7 says of ,god3 ,holding the world in ,his mind1 and forming it into ,his image4 ,therefore the whole world is to the image of ,god1 and not only the rational creature4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 vi1 #ab73 ,man's excellence consists in the fact that ,god made him to ,his own image by giving him an intellectual soul1 which raises him above the beasts of the field4 ,therefore things without intellect are not made to ,god's image4 ,i answer that1 ,not every likeness1 not even what is copied from something else1 is sufficient to make an image2 for if the likeness be only generic1 or existing by virtue of some common accident1 this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another4 ,for instance1 a worm1 though from man it may originate1 cannot be called man's image1 merely because of the generic likeness4 ,nor1 if anything is made white like something else1 can we say that it is the image of that thing2 for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species4 ,but the nature of an image requires likeness in species2 thus the image of the king exists in his son3 or1 at least1 in some specific accident1 and chiefly in the shape2 thus1 we speak of a man's image in copper4 ,whence ,hilary says pointedly that an image is of the same species4 ,now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference4 ,but some things are like to ,god first and most commonly because they exist2 secondly1 because they live2 and thirdly because they know or understand2 and these last1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ea7 approach so near to ,god in likeness1 that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to ,him4 ,it is clear1 therefore1 that intellectual creatures alone1 properly speaking1 are made to ,god's image4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect4 ,therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image1 so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to ,god1 participates in some degree the nature of an image4 ,so ,dionysius says that effects are contingent images of their causes2 that is1 as much as they happen 7contingit7 to be so1 but not absolutely4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,dionysius compares the solar ray to ,divine goodness1 as regards its causality2 not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion2 but intensively and collectively the likeness to the ,divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature1 which has a capacity for the highest good4 ,or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole1 but only against another part4 ,wherefore1 when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of ,god1 we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to ,god's image1 but that the other parts are excluded4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,boethius here uses the word image to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist4 ,thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the ,divine mind4 ,we are not1 however1 using the word image in this sense2 but as it implies a likeness in nature1 that is1 inasmuch as all things1 as being1 are like to the ,first ,being2 as living1 like to the ,first ,life2 and as intelligent1 like to the ,supreme ,wisdom4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,angels ,are ,more to the ,image of ,god ,than ,man ,is8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels are not more to the image of ,god than man is4 ,for ,augustine says in a sermon de ,imagine xliii 7de verbis ,apost4 xxvii7 that ,god granted to no other creature besides man to be to ,his image4 ,therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ea71 man is so much to ,god's image that ,god did not make any creature to be between ,him and man3 and therefore nothing is more akin to ,him4 ,but a creature is called ,god's image so far as it is akin to ,god4 ,therefore the angels are not more to the image of ,god than man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a creature is said to be to ,god's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature4 ,but the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness2 for it is not an accidental thing1 since it is a substance4 ,therefore the angels are not more to the image of ,god than man4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 in ,evang4 xxxiv73 ,the angel is called a seal of resemblance 7,ezech4 #bh3ab7 because in him the resemblance of the ,divine image is wrought with greater expression4 ,i answer that1 ,we may speak of ,god's image in two ways4 ,first1 we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists1 that is1 the intellectual nature4 ,thus the image of ,god is more perfect in the angels than in man1 because their intellectual nature is more perfect1 as is clear from what has been said 7,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #h74 ,secondly1 we may consider the image of ,god in man as regards its accidental qualities1 so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of ,god1 consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man1 as ,god from ,god2 and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body1 and again1 in every part1 as ,god is in regard to the whole world4 ,in these and the like things the image of ,god is more perfect in man than it is in the angels4 ,but these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the ,divine image in man1 unless we presuppose the first likeness1 which is in the intellectual nature2 otherwise even brute animals would be to ,god's image4 ,therefore1 as in their intellectual nature1 the angels are more to the image of ,god than man is1 we must grant that1 absolutely speaking1 the angels are more to the image of ,god than man is1 but that in some respects man is more like to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of ,god2 but not the angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies1 while1 nevertheless1 one kind of fire is more subtle than another2 so we say that nothing is more like to ,god than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature1 because as ,augustine had said previously1 things which have knowledge1 are so near to ,him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer4 ,wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to ,god's image4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,when we say that substance does not admit of more or less1 we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another2 but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another2 nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,image of ,god ,is ,found in ,every ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of ,god is not found in every man4 ,for the ,apostle says that man is the image of ,god1 but woman is the image ,vulg4 glory of man 7#a ,cor4 #aa3g74 ,therefore1 as woman is an individual of the human species1 it is clear that every individual is not an image of ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #h3bi73 ,whom ,god foreknew1 ,he also predestined to be made conformable to the image of ,his ,son4 ,but all men are not predestined4 ,therefore all men have not the conformity of image4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 likeness belongs to the nature of the image1 as above explained 7,a4 #a74 ,but by sin man becomes unlike ,god4 ,therefore he loses the image of ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ch3g73 ,surely man passeth as an image4 ,i answer that1 ,since man is said to be the image of ,god by reason of his intellectual nature1 he is the most perfectly like ,god according to that in which he can best imitate ,god in his intellectual nature4 ,now the intellectual nature imitates ,god chiefly in this1 that ,god understands and loves ,himself4 ,wherefore we see that the image of ,god is in man in three ways4 ,first1 inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving ,god2 and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind1 which is common to all men4 ,secondly1 inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves ,god1 though imperfectly2 and this image consists in the conformity of grace4 ,thirdly1 inasmuch as man knows and loves ,god perfectly2 and this image consists in the likeness of glory4 ,wherefore on the words1 ,the light of ,thy countenance1 ,o ,lord1 is signed upon us 7,ps4 #d3g71 the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of creation1 of re-creation1 and of likeness4 ,the first is found in all men1 the second only in the just1 the third only in the blessed4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the image of ,god1 in its principal signification1 namely the intellectual nature1 is found both in man and in woman4 ,hence after the words1 ,to the image of ,god ,he created him1 it is added1 ,male and female ,he created them 7,gen4 #a3bg74 ,moreover it is said them in the plural1 as ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 iii1 #bb7 remarks1 lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual4 ,but in a secondary sense the image of ,god is found in man1 and not in woman3 for man is the beginning and end of woman2 as ,god is the beginning and end of every creature4 ,so when the ,apostle had said that man is the image and glory of ,god1 but woman is the glory of man1 he adds his reason for saying this3 ,for man is not of woman1 but woman of man2 and man was not created for woman1 but woman for man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b and #c3 ,these reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,image of ,god ,is in ,man ,according to the ,trinity of ,persons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of ,god does not exist in man as to the ,trinity of ,persons4 ,for ,augustine says 7,fulgentius ,de ,fide ad ,petrum i73 ,one in essence is the ,godhead of the ,holy ,trinity2 and one is the image to which man was made4 ,and ,hilary 7,de ,trin4 v7 says3 ,man is made to the image of that which is common in the ,trinity4 ,therefore the image of ,god in man is of the ,divine ,essence1 and not of the ,trinity of ,persons4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is said 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogmat47 that the image of ,god in man is to be referred to eternity4 ,damascene also says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that the image of ,god in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement4 ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,de ,homin4 ,opificio xvi7 also asserts that1 when ,scripture says that man was made to the image of ,god1 it means that human nature was made a participator of all good3 for the ,godhead is the fulness of goodness4 ,now all these things belong more to the unity of the ,essence than to the distinction of the ,persons4 ,therefore the image of ,god in man regards1 not the ,trinity of ,persons1 but the unity of the ,essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image4 ,therefore1 if there is in man the image of ,god as to the ,trinity of ,persons2 since man can know himself by his natural reason1 it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the ,trinity of the ,divine ,persons2 which is untrue1 as was shown above 7,q4 #cb1 ,a4 #a74 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the name of ,image is not applicable to any of the ,three ,persons1 but only to the ,son2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 vi1 #b7 that the ,son alone is the image of the ,father4 ,therefore1 if in man there were an image of ,god as regards the ,person1 this would not be an image of the ,trinity1 but only of the ,son4 ,on the contrary1 ,hilary says 7,de ,trin4 iv73 ,the plurality of the ,divine ,persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of ,god4 ,i answer that1 as we have seen 7,q4 #dj1 ,a4 #b71 the distinction of the ,divine ,persons is only according to origin1 or1 rather1 relations of origin4 ,now the mode of origin is not the same in all things1 but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof2 animated things being produced in one way1 and inanimate in another2 animals in one way1 and plants in another4 ,wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the ,divine ,persons is suitable to the ,divine ,nature2 and therefore to be to the image of ,god by imitation of the ,divine ,nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the ,divine ,persons3 but rather one follows from the other4 ,we must1 therefore1 say that in man there exists the image of ,god1 both as regards the ,divine ,nature and as regards the ,trinity of ,persons2 for also in ,god ,himself there is one ,nature in ,three ,persons4 ,thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument would avail if the image of ,god in man represented ,god in a perfect manner4 ,but1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #f71 there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the ,divine ,trinity4 ,therefore1 as he there says3 ,we see1 rather than believe1 the trinity which is in ourselves2 whereas we believe rather than see that ,god is ,trinity4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,some have said that in man there is an image of the ,son only4 ,augustine rejects this opinion 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #e1f74 ,first1 because as the ,son is like to the ,father by a likeness of essence1 it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the ,son1 that he is made to the likeness of the ,father4 ,secondly1 because if man were made only to the image of the ,son1 the ,father would not have said1 ,let ,us make man to ,our own image and likeness2 but to ,thy image4 ,when1 therefore1 it is written1 ,he made him to the image of ,god1 the sense is not that the ,father made man to the image of the ,son only1 ,who is ,god1 as some explained it1 but that the ,divine ,trinity made man to ,its image1 that is1 of the whole ,trinity4 ,when it is said that ,god made man to ,his image1 this can be understood in two ways3 first1 so that this preposition to points to the term of the making1 and then the sense is1 ,let ,us make man in such a way that ,our image may be in him4 ,secondly1 this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause1 as when we say1 ,this book is made 7like7 to that one4 ,thus the image of ,god is the very ,essence of ,god1 ,which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar4 ,or1 as some say1 the ,divine ,essence is called an image because thereby one ,person imitates another4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,image of ,god ,is in ,man ,as ,regards the ,mind ,only8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of ,god is not only in man's mind4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #aa3g7 that the man is the image 4 4 4 of ,god4 ,but man is not only mind4 ,therefore the image of ,god is to be observed not only in his mind4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is written 7,gen4 #a3bg73 ,god created man to ,his own image2 to the image of ,god ,he created him2 male and female ,he created them4 ,but the distinction of male and female is in the body4 ,therefore the image of ,god is also in the body1 and not only in the mind4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing4 ,but shape belongs to the body4 ,therefore the image of ,god is to be seen in man's body also1 and not in his mind4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #g1bd7 there is a threefold vision in us1 corporeal1 spiritual1 or imaginary1 and intellectual4 ,therefore1 if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of ,god1 for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #d3bc1bd73 ,be renewed in the spirit of your mind1 and put on the new man4 ,whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man1 belongs to the mind4 ,now1 he says 7,col4 #c3aj73 ,putting on the new man2 him who is renewed unto knowledge of ,god1 according to the image of ,him that created him1 where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of ,god4 ,therefore to be to the image of ,god belongs to the mind only4 ,i answer that1 ,while in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to ,god1 in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of image as we have explained above 7,,aa4 #a1b72 whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a trace4 ,now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures2 wherefore this image of ,god is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind2 while in the other parts1 which the rational creature may happen to possess1 we find the likeness of a trace1 as in other creatures to which1 in reference to such parts1 the rational creature can be likened4 ,we may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a trace1 and the way in which an image1 represents anything4 ,an image represents something by likeness in species1 as we have said2 while a trace represents something by way of an effect1 which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species4 ,for imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called traces3 so also ashes are a trace of fire1 and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army4 ,therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others1 both as to the representation of the likeness of the ,divine ,nature in creatures1 and as to the representation in them of the uncreated ,trinity4 ,for as to the likeness of the ,divine ,nature1 rational creatures seem to attain1 after a fashion1 to the representation of the species1 inasmuch as they imitate ,god1 not only in being and life1 but also in intelligence1 as above explained 7,a4 #b72 whereas other creatures do not understand1 although we observe in them a certain trace of the ,intellect that created them1 if we consider their disposition4 ,likewise as the uncreated ,trinity is distinguished by the procession of the ,word from the ,speaker1 and of ,love from both of these1 as we have seen 7,q4 #bh1 ,a4 #c72 so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect1 and a procession of the love in the will1 there exists an image of the uncreated ,trinity1 by a certain representation of the species4 ,in other creatures1 however1 we do not find the principle of the word1 and the word and love2 but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the ,cause that produced them4 ,for in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature1 proves that it proceeds from a principle2 while its species points to the 7mental7 word of the maker1 just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect2 and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end2 as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect4 ,so we find in man a likeness to ,god by way of an image in his mind2 but in the other parts of his being by way of a trace4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man is called to the image of ,god2 not that he is essentially an image2 but that the image of ,god is impressed on his mind2 as a coin is an image of the king1 as having the image of the king4 ,wherefore there is no need to consider the image of ,god as existing in every part of man4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #e71 some have thought that the image of ,god was not in man individually1 but severally4 ,they held that the man represents the ,person of the ,father2 those born of man denote the person of the ,son2 and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the ,holy ,ghost1 since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter4 ,all of this is manifestly absurd2 first1 because it would follow that the ,holy ,ghost is the principle of the ,son1 as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring2 secondly1 because one man would be only the image of one ,person2 thirdly1 because in that case ,scripture should not have mentioned the image of ,god in man until after the birth of the offspring4 ,therefore we must understand that when ,scripture had said1 to the image of ,god ,he created him1 it added1 male and female ,he created them1 not to imply that the image of ,god came through the distinction of sex1 but that the image of ,god belongs to both sexes1 since it is in the mind1 wherein there is no sexual distinction4 ,wherefore the ,apostle 7,col4 #c3aj71 after saying1 ,according to the image of ,him that created him1 added1 ,where there is neither male nor female 99these words are in reality from ,gal4 #c3bh 7,vulg4 neither ,gentile nor ,jew74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the image of ,god in man is not to be found in his bodily shape1 yet because the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground1 but is adapted to look upward to heaven1 for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to ,god's image and likeness1 rather than the bodies of other animals1 as ,augustine remarks 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ea74 ,but this is not to be understood as though the image of ,god were in man's body2 but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of ,god in the soul by way of a trace4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xi1 #b74 ,for in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body2 secondly1 the act of vision1 which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species2 thirdly1 the intention of the will applying the sight to see1 and to rest on what is seen4 ,likewise1 in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory2 secondly1 the vision itself1 which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul1 that is1 the faculty of imagination1 informed by the species2 and thirdly1 we find the intention of the will joining both together4 ,but each of these trinities falls short of the ,divine image4 ,for the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul2 while the species in the memory1 though not extrinsic to the soul1 is adventitious to it2 and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the ,divine ,persons4 ,the corporeal vision1 too1 does not proceed only from the species of the external body1 but from this1 and at the same time from the sense of the seer2 in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory1 but also from the imagination4 ,for these reasons the procession of the ,son from the ,father alone is not suitably represented4 ,lastly the intention of the will joining the two together1 does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision4 ,wherefore the procession of the ,holy ,ghost from the ,father and the ,son is not thus properly represented4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,image of ,god ,is to ,be ,found in the ,acts of the ,soul8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of ,god is not found in the acts of the soul4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xi1 #bf71 that man was made to ,god's image1 inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist1 and love this existence and knowledge4 ,but to exist does not signify an act4 ,therefore the image of ,god is not to be found in the soul's acts4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #d7 assigns ,god's image in the soul to these three things--mind1 knowledge1 and love4 ,but mind does not signify an act1 but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul4 ,therefore the image of ,god does not extend to the acts of the soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 x1 #aa7 assigns the image of the ,trinity in the soul to memory1 understanding1 and will4 ,but these three are natural powers of the soul1 as the ,master of the ,sentences says 7#a ,sent4 ,d iii74 ,therefore the image of ,god is in the powers1 and does not extend to the acts of the soul4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the image of the ,trinity always remains in the soul4 ,but an act does not always remain4 ,therefore the image of ,god does not extend to the acts4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 xi1 #b seqq47 assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul1 in relation to the actual vision1 whether sensible or imaginative4 ,therefore1 also1 the trinity in the mind1 by reason of which man is like to ,god's image1 must be referred to actual vision4 ,i answer that1 ,as above explained 7,a4 #b71 a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image4 ,hence1 if the image of the ,divine ,trinity is to be found in the soul1 we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the ,divine ,persons4 ,now the ,divine ,persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the ,word from the ,speaker1 and the procession of ,love connecting ,both4 ,but in our soul word cannot exist without actual thought1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #g74 ,therefore1 first and chiefly1 the image of the ,trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul1 that is1 inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess1 by actual thought we form an internal word2 and thence break forth into love4 ,but1 since the principles of acts are the habits and powers1 and everything exists virtually in its principle1 therefore1 secondarily and consequently1 the image of the ,trinity may be considered as existing in the powers1 and still more in the habits1 forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our being bears the image of ,god so far as it is proper to us1 and excels that of the other animals1 that is to say1 in so far as we are endowed with a mind4 ,therefore1 this trinity is the same as that which ,augustine mentions 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #d71 and which consists in mind1 knowledge1 and love4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine observed this trinity1 first1 as existing in the mind4 ,but because the mind1 though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree1 yet also in a way does not know itself--namely1 as being distinct from others 7and thus also it searches itself1 as ,augustine subsequently proves--,de ,trin4 x1 #c1d72 therefore1 as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind1 he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind1 namely1 memory1 understanding1 and will2 which everyone is conscious of possessing2 and assigns the image of the ,trinity pre-eminently to these three1 as though the first assignation were in part deficient4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine proves 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #g71 we may be said to understand1 will1 and to love certain things1 both when we actually consider them1 and when we do not think of them4 ,when they are not under our actual consideration1 they are objects of our memory only1 which1 in his opinion1 is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love 99,cf4 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #g1 ad #a4 ,but since1 as he says1 a word cannot be there without actual thought 7for we think everything that we say1 even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue71 this image chiefly consists in these three things1 memory1 understanding1 and will4 ,and by understanding ,i mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought2 and by will1 love1 or dilection ,i mean that which unites this child with its parent4 ,from which it is clear that he places the image of the ,divine ,trinity more in actual understanding and will1 than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory2 although even thus the image of the ,trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree1 as he says in the same place4 ,thus it is clear that memory1 understanding1 and will are not three powers as stated in the ,sentences4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,someone might answer by referring to ,augustine's statement 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #f71 that the mind ever remembers itself1 ever understands itself1 ever loves itself2 which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands1 and loves itself4 ,but he excludes this interpretation by adding that it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things4 ,thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself1 not actually but habitually2 though we might say that by perceiving its own act1 it understands itself whenever it understands anything4 ,but since it is not always actually understanding1 as in the case of sleep1 we must say that these acts1 although not always actually existing1 yet ever exist in their principles1 the habits and powers4 ,wherefore1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #d73 ,if the rational soul is made to the image of ,god in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider ,god1 then the image of ,god was in the soul from the beginning of its existence4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #h ,whether the ,image of the ,divine ,trinity ,is in the ,soul ,only by ,comparison with ,god ,as ,its ,object8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the image of the ,divine ,trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with ,god as its object4 ,for the image of the ,divine ,trinity is to be found in the soul1 as shown above 7,a4 #g71 according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker2 and love from both4 ,but this is to be found in us as regards any object4 ,therefore the image of the ,divine ,trinity is in our mind as regards any object4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xii1 #d7 that when we seek trinity in the soul1 we seek it in the whole of the soul1 without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal4 ,therefore the image of the ,trinity is to be found in the soul1 even as regards temporal objects4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is by grace that we can know and love ,god4 ,if1 therefore1 the image of the ,trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory1 understanding1 and will or love of ,god1 this image is not in man by nature but by grace1 and thus is not common to all4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of ,god by the beatific vision2 wherefore it is written 7#b ,cor4 #c3ah73 ,we 4 4 4 are transformed into the same image from glory to glory4 ,but temporal things are known by the beatific vision4 ,therefore the image of ,god exists in us even according to temporal things4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #ab73 ,the image of ,god exists in the mind1 not because it has a remembrance of itself1 loves itself1 and understands itself2 but because it can also remember1 understand1 and love ,god by ,whom it was made4 ,much less1 therefore1 is the image of ,god in the soul1 in respect of other objects4 ,i answer that1 ,as above explained 7,,aa4 #b1 #g71 image means a likeness which in some degree1 however small1 attains to a representation of the species4 ,wherefore we need to seek in the image of the ,divine ,trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the ,divine ,persons1 so far as this is possible to a creature4 ,now the ,divine ,persons1 as above stated 7,,aa4 #f1 #g71 are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker1 and the procession of love from both4 ,moreover the ,word of ,god is born of ,god by the knowledge of ,himself2 and ,love proceeds from ,god according as ,he loves ,himself4 ,but it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love2 for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse1 which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different4 ,hence we refer the ,divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of ,god1 and to the love derived therefrom4 ,thus the image of ,god is found in the soul according as the soul turns to ,god1 or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to ,god4 ,now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways3 directly and immediately1 or indirectly and mediately2 as1 for instance1 when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man4 ,so ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #h71 that the mind remembers itself1 understands itself1 and loves itself4 ,if we perceive this1 we perceive a trinity1 not1 indeed1 ,god1 but1 nevertheless1 rightly called the image of ,god4 ,but this is due to the fact1 not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely1 but that thereby it can furthermore turn to ,god1 as appears from the authority quoted above 7,arg4 ,on the contrary74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,for the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another1 but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds2 namely1 that what is ,word of ,god proceeds from knowledge of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in all the soul we may see a kind of trinity1 not1 however1 as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things1 any third thing should be required to make up the trinity1 as he adds in the same passage4 ,but in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things1 although a trinity may be found2 yet the image of ,god is not to be seen there1 as he says farther on2 forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul4 ,moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present2 but sometimes they are actually present1 and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul4 ,such is clearly the case with faith1 which comes to us temporally for this present life2 while in the future life faith will no longer exist1 but only the remembrance of faith4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the meritorious knowledge and love of ,god can be in us only by grace4 ,yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #ab2 ,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #fj1 ,a4 #e74 ,this1 too1 is natural that the mind1 in order to understand ,god1 can make use of reason1 in which sense we have already said that the image of ,god abides ever in the soul2 whether this image of ,god be so obsolete1 as it were clouded1 as almost to amount to nothing1 as in those who have not the use of reason2 or obscured and disfigured1 as in sinners2 or clear and beautiful1 as in the just2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #f74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,by the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in ,god ,himself2 and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of ,god4 ,this is what ,augustine means 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #f71 when he says that in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere1 whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable2 for in the ,uncreated ,word are the types of all creatures4 ,,ninth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ic1 ,art4 #i ,whether ,likeness ,is ,properly ,distinguished from ,image8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that likeness is not properly distinguished from image4 ,for genus is not properly distinguished from species4 ,now1 likeness is to image as genus to species3 because1 where there is image1 forthwith there is likeness1 but not conversely as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #gd74 ,therefore likeness is not properly to be distinguished from image4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the ,divine ,persons1 but also in the representation of the ,divine ,essence1 to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility4 ,so it is not true to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible2 whereas the image is in other things 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 xvi74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the image of ,god in man is threefold--the image of nature1 of grace1 and of glory1 as above explained 7,a4 #d74 ,but innocence and righteousness belong to grace4 ,therefore it is incorrectly said 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 xvi7 that the image is taken from the memory1 the understanding and the will1 while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect1 and love of virtue to the will2 which two things are parts of the image4 ,therefore it is incorrect to say 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 xvi7 that the image consists in the knowledge of truth1 and the likeness in the love of virtue4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ea73 ,some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason1 namely image and likeness1 since1 if they meant the same1 one would have sufficed4 ,i answer that1 ,likeness is a kind of unity1 for oneness in quality causes likeness1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 ,did4 iv1 #ae74 ,now1 since one is a transcendental1 it is both common to all1 and adapted to each single thing1 just as the good and the true4 ,wherefore1 as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble1 and as subsequent to it1 as signifying some perfection in it1 so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between likeness and image4 ,for the good is a preamble to man1 inasmuch as man is an individual good2 and1 again1 the good is subsequent to man1 inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good1 by reason of his perfect virtue4 ,in like manner1 likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image1 inasmuch as it is something more general than image1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a73 and1 again1 it may be considered as subsequent to image1 inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image4 ,for we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents1 according as the representation is perfect or imperfect4 ,thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways3 first as its preamble and existing in more things1 and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties1 wherein the image is properly to be seen4 ,in this sense it is stated 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ea7 that the spirit 7namely1 the mind7 without doubt was made to the image of ,god4 ,but the other parts of man1 belonging to the soul's inferior faculties1 or even to the body1 are in the opinion of some made to ,god's likeness4 ,in this sense he says 7,de ,quant4 ,animae ii7 that the likeness of ,god is found in the soul's incorruptibility2 for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings4 ,but likeness may be considered in another way1 as signifying the expression and perfection of the image4 ,in this sense ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #ab7 that the image implies an intelligent being1 endowed with free-will and self-movement1 whereas likeness implies a likeness of power1 as far as this may be possible in man4 ,in the same sense likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue3 for there is no virtue without love of virtue4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,likeness is not distinct from image in the general notion of likeness 7for thus it is included in image72 but so far as any likeness falls short of image1 or again1 as it perfects the idea of image4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the soul's essence belongs to the image1 as representing the ,divine ,essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature2 but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being1 such as simplicity and indissolubility4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even certain virtues are natural to the soul1 at least1 in their seeds1 by reason of which we may say that a natural likeness exists in the soul4 ,nor it is unfitting to us the term image from one point of view and from another the term likeness4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,love of the word1 which is knowledge loved1 belongs to the nature of image2 but love of virtue belongs to likeness1 as virtue itself belongs to likeness4 ,,question #id ,,of ,,the ,,state ,,and ,,condition ,,of ,,the ,,first ,,man ,,as ,,regards ,,his ,,intellect 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider the state or condition of the first man2 first1 as regards his soul2 secondly1 as regards his body4 ,concerning the first there are two things to be considered3 7#a7 ,the condition of man as to his intellect2 7#b7 the condition of man as to his will4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the first man saw the ,essence of ,god8 7#b7 ,whether he could see the separate substances1 that is1 the angels8 7#c7 ,whether he possessed all knowledge8 7#d7 ,whether he could err or be deceived8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,first ,man ,saw ,god ,through ,his ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the first man saw ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,for man's happiness consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,but the first man1 while established in paradise1 led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #aa74 ,and ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj73 ,if man was gifted with the same tastes as now1 how happy must he have been in paradise1 that place of ineffable happiness6 ,therefore the first man in paradise saw ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 loc4 cit47 that the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain4 ,but our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,therefore man saw ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the vision of ,god in ,his ,essence is whereby ,god is seen without a medium or enigma4 ,but man in the state of innocence saw ,god immediately1 as the ,master of the ,sentences asserts 7,sent4 iv1 ,d1 i74 ,he also saw without an enigma1 for an enigma implies obscurity1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xv1 #i74 ,now1 obscurity resulted from sin4 ,therefore man in the primitive state saw ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ae3df73 ,that was not first which is spiritual1 but that which is natural4 ,but to see ,god through ,his ,essence is most spiritual4 ,therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,i answer that1 ,the first man did not see ,god through ,his ,essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life2 unless1 perhaps1 it be said that he saw ,god in a vision1 when ,god cast a deep sleep upon ,adam 7,gen4 #b3ba74 ,the reason is because1 since in the ,divine ,essence is beatitude itself1 the intellect of a man who sees the ,divine ,essence has the same relation to ,god as a man has to beatitude4 ,now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude1 since naturally and necessarily he desires it1 and shuns unhappiness4 ,wherefore no one who sees the ,essence of ,god can willingly turn away from ,god1 which means to sin4 ,hence all who see ,god through ,his ,essence are so firmly established in the love of ,god1 that for eternity they can never sin4 ,therefore1 as ,adam did sin1 it is clear that he did not see ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,nevertheless he knew ,god with a more perfect knowledge than we do now4 ,thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state1 and the knowledge we shall have in heaven1 when we see ,god through ,his ,essence4 ,to make this clear1 we must consider that the vision of ,god through ,his ,essence is contradistinguished from the vision of ,god through ,his creatures4 ,now the higher the creature is1 and the more like it is to ,god1 the more clearly is ,god seen in it2 for instance1 a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed4 ,thus ,god is seen in a much more perfect manner through ,his intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal4 ,but in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures1 because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things4 ,now1 it is written 7,eccles4 #g3cj73 ,god made man right4 ,and man was made right by ,god in this sense1 that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher1 and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower4 ,wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth1 whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #cc7 that1 perhaps ,god used to speak to the first man as ,he speaks to the angels2 by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth1 yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the ,divine ,essence4 ,therefore1 through these intelligible effects of ,god1 man knew ,god then more clearly than we know ,him now4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,man was happy in paradise1 but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined1 which consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence4 ,he was1 however1 endowed with a life of happiness in a certain measure1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #ah71 so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a good will is a well-ordered will2 but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have1 while in the state of merit1 what had been promised to him as a reward4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a medium 7of knowledge7 is twofold2 one through which1 and1 at the same time1 in which1 something is seen1 as1 for example1 a man is seen through a mirror1 and is seen with the mirror3 another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown2 such as the medium in a demonstration4 ,god was seen without this second kind of medium1 but not without the first kind4 ,for there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of ,god by demonstration drawn from an effect1 such as we need2 since he knew ,god simultaneously in ,his effects1 especially in the intelligible effects1 according to ,his capacity4 ,again1 we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds3 first1 so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the ,divine light2 and thus ,adam saw ,god in an enigma1 because he saw ,him in a created effect3 secondly1 we may take obscurity as an effect of sin1 so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things2 in which sense ,adam did not see ,god in an enigma4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,adam in the ,state of ,innocence ,saw the ,angels ,through ,their ,essence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,adam1 in the state of innocence1 saw the angels through their essence4 ,for ,gregory says 7,dialog4 iv1 #a73 ,in paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of ,god2 and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which is a load upon the soul1 as is written ,wis4 #i3ae4 ,wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances1 as above explained 7,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul2 for the latter was not corruptible4 ,therefore he was able to see separate substances4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one separate substance knows another separate substance1 by knowing itself 7,de ,causis xiii74 ,but the soul of the first man knew itself4 ,therefore it knew separate substances4 ,on the contrary1 ,the soul of ,adam was of the same nature as ours4 ,but our souls cannot now understand separate substances4 ,therefore neither could ,adam's soul4 ,i answer that1 ,the state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways4 ,first1 from a diversity of mode in its natural existence2 and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body4 ,secondly1 the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption1 the state of natural existence remaining the same3 and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin4 ,for man's soul1 in the state of innocence1 was adapted to perfect and govern the body2 wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a living soul2 that is1 a soul giving life to the body--namely animal life4 ,but he was endowed with integrity as to this life1 in that the body was entirely subject to the soul1 hindering it in no way1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a74 ,now it is clear from what has been already said 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #hi1 ,a4 #a7 that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body1 as regards animal life1 it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms4 ,wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also4 ,now1 in virtue of this mode of understanding1 there are three degrees of movement in the soul1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,the first is by the soul passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself2 the second is by the soul ascending so as to be associated with the united superior powers1 namely the angels2 the third is when the soul is led on yet further to the supreme good1 that is1 to ,god4 ,in virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself1 the soul's knowledge is perfected4 ,this is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things1 as we have said above 7,q4 #hg1 ,a4 #c73 and so by the knowledge thereof1 our intellectual operation can be known perfectly1 as an act through its object4 ,and through the intellectual operation itself1 the human intellect can be known perfectly1 as a power through its proper act4 ,but in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge4 ,because1 since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms1 but by a far more excellent process1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b72 the above-mentioned mode of knowledge1 by which the soul knows itself1 is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel4 ,much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge3 for even the angels themselves1 by the fact that they know themselves1 are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the ,divine ,substance1 by reason of its surpassing excellence4 ,therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence4 ,nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess1 because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge4 ,and it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that ,gregory says that he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits4 ,this makes clear the reply to the first objection4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances1 was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it2 but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances4 ,we1 in our present state1 fall short on account of both these reasons4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge1 as we have shown above2 for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,first ,man ,knew ,all ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the first man did not know all things4 ,for if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species1 or by connatural species1 or by infused species4 ,not1 however1 by acquired species2 for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience1 as stated in ,metaph4 i1 #a2 and the first man had not then gained experience of all things4 ,nor through connatural species1 because he was of the same nature as we are2 and our soul1 as ,aristotle says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d71 is like a clean tablet on which nothing is written4 ,and if his knowledge came by infused species1 it would have been of a different kind from ours1 which we acquire from things themselves4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection4 ,now other men have not1 from the beginning1 knowledge of all things1 but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity4 ,therefore neither did ,adam know all things when he was first created4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit2 indeed1 the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose4 ,now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life2 therefore also in knowledge4 ,therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,man named the animals 7,gen4 #b3bj74 ,but names should be adapted to the nature of things4 ,therefore ,adam knew the animals' natures2 and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things4 ,i answer that1 ,in the natural order1 perfection comes before imperfection1 as act precedes potentiality2 for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual4 ,and since ,god created things not only for their own existence1 but also that they might be the principles of other things2 so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others4 ,now man can be the principle of another man1 not only by generation of the body1 but also by instruction and government4 ,hence1 as the first man was produced in his perfect state1 as regards his body1 for the work of generation1 so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others4 ,now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge1 and so the first man was established by ,god in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude4 ,and such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles1 that is1 whatever truths man is naturally able to know4 ,moreover1 in order to direct his own life and that of others1 man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known1 but also things surpassing natural knowledge2 because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end3 just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives4 ,wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state4 ,but those things which cannot be known by merely human effort1 and which are not necessary for the direction of human life1 were not known by the first man2 such as the thoughts of men1 future contingent events1 and some individual facts1 as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream2 and the like4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species4 ,yet his knowledge was not different from ours2 as the eyes which ,christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to ,adam1 as being the first man1 was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men1 as is clear from what is above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,adam would have advanced in natural knowledge1 not in the number of things known1 but in the manner of knowing2 because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience4 ,but as regards supernatural knowledge1 he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known1 by further revelation2 as the angels advance by further enlightenment4 ,moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit2 since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another1 although he can be to another a principle of knowledge4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #id1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,man in ,his ,first ,state ,could ,be ,deceived8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #b3ad7 that the woman being seduced was in the transgression4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,master says 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 xxi7 that1 the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking1 because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from ,god4 ,but this was untrue4 ,therefore before sin the woman was deceived4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is natural that the farther off anything is from us1 the smaller it seems to be4 ,now1 the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin4 ,therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence4 ,wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw1 just as he is deceived now4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #b7 that1 in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves4 ,but in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed4 ,therefore he would have been deceived1 adhering to images as to realities4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts1 and of future contingent events1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,so if anyone had told him what was false about these things1 he would have been deceived4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,lib4 ,arb4 iii1 #ah73 ,to regard what is true as false1 is not natural to man as created2 but is a punishment of man condemned4 ,i answer that1 in the opinion of some1 deception may mean two things2 namely1 any slight surmise1 in which one adheres to what is false1 as though it were true1 but without the assent of belief--or it may mean a firm belief4 ,thus before sin ,adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended2 but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend1 he might have been deceived1 if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief4 ,this opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters1 and that provided he does not assent rashly1 he is not to be blamed4 ,such an opinion1 however1 is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life2 because1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj71 in that state of life sin was avoided without struggle1 and while it remained so1 no evil could exist4 ,now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect1 so falsehood is its evil1 as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 vi1 #b74 ,so that1 as long as the state of innocence continued1 it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth4 ,for as some perfections1 such as clarity1 were lacking in the bodily members of the first man1 though no evil could be therein2 so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge1 but no false opinion4 ,this is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state1 by virtue of which1 while the soul remained subject to ,god1 the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher1 and were no impediment to their action4 ,and from what has preceded 7,q4 #he1 ,a4 #f71 it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true2 and hence it is never deceived of itself2 but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty1 such as the imagination or the like4 ,hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images1 but only when it is not free1 as is the case in sleep4 ,therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed1 still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride4 ,for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xi1 #cj7 that the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent1 had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power1 and in a presumption of self-conceit4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty1 not as acting in accordance with nature1 but by virtue of some supernatural operation4 ,we need not1 however1 follow the ,master of the ,sentences in this point4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man1 not in accordance with the nature of things1 he would not have been deceived1 for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep2 as he has not then the use of his reason1 wherein consists man's proper action4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,if anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies1 or as regards secret thoughts1 man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so3 but he might have believed that such a thing was possible2 which would not have been to entertain a false opinion4 ,it might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above1 so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend4 ,if any object1 as some do1 that he was not guided1 when tempted1 though he was then most in need of guidance1 we reply that man had already sinned in his heart1 and that he failed to have recourse to the ,divine aid4 ,,question #ie ,,of ,,things ,,pertaining ,,to ,,the ,,first ,,man',s ,,will--,,namely1 ,,grace ,,and ,,righteousness 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider what belongs to the will of the first man2 concerning which there are two points of treatment3 7#a7 the grace and righteousness of the first man2 7#b7 the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the first man was created in grace8 7#b7 ,whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul8 7#c7 ,whether he had all virtues8 7#d7 ,whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,first ,man ,was ,created in ,grace8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the first man was not created in grace4 ,for the ,apostle1 distinguishing between ,adam and ,christ1 says 7#a ,cor4 #ae3de73 ,the first ,adam was made into a living soul2 the last ,adam into a quickening spirit4 ,but the spirit is quickened by grace4 ,therefore ,christ alone was made in grace4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 ,vet4 et ,nov4 ,test41 qu4 #abc7 99,work of an anonymous author1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine that ,adam did not possess the ,holy ,ghost4 ,but whoever possesses grace has the ,holy ,ghost4 ,therefore ,adam was not created in grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,correp4 et ,grat4 x7 that ,god so ordered the life of the angels and men1 as to show first what they could do by free-will1 then what they could do by ,his grace1 and by the discernment of righteousness4 ,god thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only2 and afterwards bestowed grace on them4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the ,master says 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 xxiv73 ,when man was created he was given sufficient help to stand1 but not sufficient to advance4 ,but whoever has grace can advance by merit4 ,therefore the first man was not created in grace4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient1 since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between ,god and the soul4 ,but consent presupposes existence4 ,therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory1 which is but grace consummated4 ,but in man grace precedes glory4 ,therefore much more did nature precede grace4 ,on the contrary1 ,man and angel are both ordained to grace4 ,but the angels were created in grace1 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #i73 ,god at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace4 ,therefore man also was created in grace4 ,i answer that1 ,some say that man was not created in grace2 but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin3 and many authorities of the ,saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence4 ,but the very rectitude of the primitive state1 wherewith man was endowed by ,god1 seems to require that1 as others say1 he was created in grace1 according to ,eccles4 #g3cj1 ,god made man right4 ,for this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to ,god1 the lower powers to reason1 and the body to the soul3 and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third2 since while reason was subject to ,god1 the lower powers remained subject to reason1 as ,augustine says 99,cf4 ,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1 #ac2 ,de ,pecc4 ,merit4 et ,remiss4 i1 #af4 ,now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason1 was not from nature2 otherwise it would have remained after sin2 since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin1 as ,dionysius declared 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to ,god1 was not a merely natural gift1 but a supernatural endowment of grace2 for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1 #ac7 that1 as soon as they disobeyed the ,divine command1 and forfeited ,divine grace1 they were ashamed of their nakedness1 for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh1 as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience4 ,hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul1 we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body1 if there is an animal body1 inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in ,christ1 who is the firstborn of the dead1 as the body's animal life began in ,adam4 ,from the ,apostle's words1 therefore1 we cannot gather that ,adam had no spiritual life in his soul2 but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says in the same passage1 it is not disputed that ,adam1 like other just souls1 was in some degree gifted with the ,holy ,ghost2 but he did not possess the ,holy ,ghost1 as the faithful possess ,him now1 who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this passage from ,augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace2 but that ,god shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace1 and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the ,master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace1 but only in a state of nature4 ,we may also say that1 though man was created in grace1 yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit1 but by virtue of the grace which was added4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,we merit glory by an act of grace2 but we do not merit grace by an act of nature2 hence the comparison fails4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,passions ,existed in the ,soul of the ,first ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the first man's soul had no passions4 ,for by the passions of the soul the flesh lusteth against the spirit 7,gal4 #e3g74 ,but this did not happen in the state of innocence4 ,therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,adam's soul was nobler than his body4 ,but his body was impassible4 ,therefore no passions were in his soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues4 ,but in ,adam the moral virtues were perfect4 ,therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj7 that in our first parents there was undisturbed love of ,god1 and other passions of the soul4 ,i answer that1 ,the passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite1 the object of which is good and evil4 ,wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good1 as love and joy2 others to what is evil1 as fear and sorrow4 ,and since in the primitive state1 evil was neither present nor imminent1 nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj71 therefore ,adam had no passion with evil as its object2 such as fear1 sorrow1 and the like2 neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed1 but to be possessed then1 as burning concupiscence4 ,but those passions which regard present good1 as joy and love2 or which regard future good to be had at the proper time1 as desire and hope that casteth not down1 existed in the state of innocence2 otherwise1 however1 than as they exist in ourselves4 ,for our sensual appetite1 wherein the passions reside1 is not entirely subject to reason2 hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment2 at other times they follow reason's judgment1 accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent4 ,but in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason3 so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason2 which could not occur in the state of innocence4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature1 as will be explained later on 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #b72 likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions1 but regulates them2 for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire1 and what he ought to desire1 as stated in ,ethic4 iii1 #aa4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,adam ,had ,all the ,virtues8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,adam had not all the virtues4 ,for some virtues are directed to curb passions3 thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance1 and immoderate fear by fortitude4 ,but in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions4 ,therefore neither did these virtues then exist4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object2 as meekness with anger2 fortitude with fear4 ,but these passions did not exist in the state of innocence1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore neither did those virtues exist then4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 penance is a virtue that regards sin committed4 ,mercy1 too1 is a virtue concerned with unhappiness4 ,but in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed4 ,therefore neither did those virtues exist4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 perseverance is a virtue4 ,but ,adam possessed it not2 as proved by his subsequent sin4 ,therefore he possessed not every virtue4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 faith is a virtue4 ,but it did not exist in the state of innocence2 for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says1 in a homily 7,serm4 contra ,judaeos73 ,the prince of sin overcame ,adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of ,god1 adorned with modesty1 restrained by temperance1 refulgent with brightness4 ,i answer that1 in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues2 and this can be proved from what precedes4 ,for it was shown above 7,a4 #a7 that such was the rectitude of the primitive state1 that reason was subject to ,god1 and the lower powers to reason4 ,now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to ,god1 and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason1 as will be explained in the ,treatise on the ,virtues 7,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #fc1 ,a4 #b74 ,wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue4 ,it must1 however1 be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection1 such as charity and justice2 and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely1 both in habit and in act4 ,but other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act1 or on the part of the matter4 ,if such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state1 such virtues necessarily existed in that state2 as faith1 which is of things not seen1 and hope which is of things not yet possessed4 ,for the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 and the possession of ,god with the enjoyment of final beatitude4 ,hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state1 both as to habit and as to act4 ,but any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state1 could exist in that state as a habit1 but not as to the act2 for instance1 penance1 which is sorrow for sin committed2 and mercy1 which is sorrow for others' unhappiness2 because sorrow1 guilt1 and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state4 ,wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man1 but not as to their acts2 for he was so disposed that he would repent1 if there had been a sin to repent for2 and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor1 he would have done his best to remedy it4 ,this is in accordance with what the ,philosopher says1 ,shame1 which regards what is ill done1 may be found in a virtuous man1 but only conditionally2 as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong 7,ethic4 iv1 #i74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,it is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion1 in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions1 and yet those virtues are per se competent to moderate the passions4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state1 if that evil be in the one affected by the passion2 such as fear and sorrow4 ,but passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state2 for in that state man could hate the demons' malice1 as he could love ,god's goodness4 ,thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state1 in habit and in act4 ,virtues1 however1 relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject1 if relating to such passions only1 could not exist in the primitive state in act1 but only in habit1 as we have said above of penance and of mercy4 ,but other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only1 but to others2 such as temperance1 which relates not only to sorrow1 but also to joy2 and fortitude1 which relates not only to fear1 but also to daring and hope4 ,thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state1 so far as it moderates pleasure2 and in like manner1 fortitude1 as moderating daring and hope1 but not as moderating sorrow and fear4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 appears from what has been said above4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,perseverance may be taken in two ways3 in one sense as a particular virtue1 signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good2 in that sense ,adam possessed perseverance4 ,in another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue2 signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue2 in which sense ,adam did not possess perseverance4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 appears from what has been said above4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ie1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,actions of the ,first ,man ,were ,less ,meritorious ,than ,ours ,are8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are4 ,for grace is given to us through the mercy of ,god1 ,who succors most those who are most in need4 ,now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence4 ,therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us2 and since grace is the source of merit1 our actions are more meritorious4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 struggle and difficulty are required for merit2 for it is written 7#b ,tim4 #b3e73 ,he 4 4 4 is not crowned except he strive lawfully and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 ii1 #c73 ,the object of virtue is the difficult and the good4 ,but there is more strife and difficulty now4 ,therefore there is greater efficacy for merit4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,master says 7,sent4 ii41 ,d1 xxiv7 that man would not have merited in resisting temptation2 whereas he does merit now1 when he resists4 ,therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state4 ,on the contrary1 if such were the case1 man would be better off after sinning4 ,i answer that1 ,merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways4 ,first1 in its root1 which is grace and charity4 ,merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward1 which consists in the enjoyment of ,god2 for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed1 the more perfectly shall we enjoy ,god4 ,secondly1 the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself4 ,this degree is of two kinds1 absolute and proportional4 ,the widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein4 ,but in proportionate degree the widow gave more1 as ,our ,lord said2 because she gave more in proportion to her means4 ,in each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward1 which consists in rejoicing for created good4 ,we conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed1 if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace1 which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature3 and in like manner1 if we consider the absolute degree of the work done2 because1 as man would have had greater virtue1 he would have performed greater works4 ,but if we consider the proportionate degree1 a greater reason for merit exists after sin1 on account of man's weakness2 because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,after sin man requires grace for more things than before sin2 but he does not need grace more2 forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life1 which is the chief reason for the need of grace4 ,but after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin1 and for the support of his weakness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done1 as above explained4 ,it is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself3 and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity4 ,yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed2 because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him4 ,but the actual difficulty1 by its penal character1 enables the deed to satisfy for sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation1 according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace2 even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace4 ,but in this point there is a difference1 inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil1 as in our present state4 ,hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace4 ,,question #if ,,of ,,the ,,mastership ,,belonging ,,to ,,man ,,in ,,the ,,state ,,of ,,innocence 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals8 7#b7 ,whether he was master over all creatures8 7#c7 ,whether in the state of innocence all men were equal8 7#d7 ,whether in that state man would have been master over men8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,adam in the ,state of ,innocence ,had ,mastership ,over the ,animals8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence ,adam had no mastership over the animals4 ,for ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #ad71 that the animals were brought to ,adam1 under the direction of the angels1 to receive their names from him4 ,but the angels need not have intervened thus1 if man himself were master over the animals4 ,therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one4 ,but many animals are hostile to one another1 as the sheep and the wolf4 ,therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,jerome says 99,the words quoted are not in ,st4 ,jerome's works4 ,st4 ,thomas may have had in mind ,bede1 ,hexaem41 as quoted in the ,glossa ordinaria on ,gen4 #a3bf3 ,god gave man mastership over the animals1 although before sin he had no need of them3 for ,god foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man4 ,therefore1 at least before sin1 it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 it is proper to a master to command4 ,but a command is not given rightly save to a rational being4 ,therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3bf73 ,let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea1 and the birds of the air1 and the beasts of the earth ,vulg4and the whole earth4 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #a7 for his disobedience to ,god1 man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him4 ,therefore in the state of innocence1 before man had disobeyed1 nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him4 ,now all animals are naturally subject to man4 ,this can be proved in three ways4 ,first1 from the order observed by nature2 for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect 7thus matter is for the sake of form2 and the imperfect form1 for the sake of the perfect71 so also is there order in the use of natural things2 thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect2 as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment1 and animals make use of plants1 and man makes use of both plants and animals4 ,therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature1 that man should be master over animals4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,polit4 i1 #e7 that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural1 because man thereby exercises a natural right4 ,secondly1 this is proved by the order of ,divine ,providence which always governs inferior things by the superior4 ,wherefore1 as man1 being made to the image of ,god1 is above other animals1 these are rightly subject to his government4 ,thirdly1 this is proved from a property of man and of other animals4 ,for we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct1 in regard to certain particular acts2 whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters4 ,now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal4 ,therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them4 ,now an angel is naturally higher than man4 ,therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels1 which could not be done by man2 for instance1 the rapid gathering together of all the animals4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the opinion of some1 those animals which now are fierce and kill others1 would1 in that state1 have been tame1 not only in regard to man1 but also in regard to other animals4 ,but this is quite unreasonable4 ,for the nature of animals was not changed by man's sin1 as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others1 would then have lived on herbs1 as the lion and falcon4 ,nor does ,bede's gloss on ,gen4 #a3cj1 say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds1 but to some4 ,thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals4 ,they would not1 however1 on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man3 as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of ,god1 ,whose ,providence has ordained all this4 ,of this ,providence man would have been the executor1 as appears even now in regard to domestic animals1 since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals--neither for clothing1 since then they were naked and not ashamed1 there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence--nor for food1 since they fed on the trees of paradise--nor to carry him about1 his body being strong enough for that purpose4 ,but man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures4 ,this is signified by the fact that ,god led the animals to man1 that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason3 which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader1 and bees obey their queen4 ,so all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord1 as in the present state some domestic animals obey him4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,man ,had ,mastership ,over ,all ,other ,creatures8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures4 ,for an angel naturally has a greater power than man4 ,but1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h71 corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels4 ,much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive1 augmentative1 and generative4 ,now these do not naturally obey reason2 as we can see in the case of any one man4 ,therefore1 since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership1 it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whosoever is master of a thing1 can change it4 ,but man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies2 for this belongs to ,god alone1 as ,dionysius says 7,ep4 ad ,polycarp4 vii74 ,therefore man had no dominion over them4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3bf73 ,that he may have dominion over 4 4 4 every creature4 ,i answer that1 ,man in a certain sense contains all things2 and so according as he is master of what is within himself1 in the same way he can have mastership over other things4 ,now we may consider four things in man3 his reason1 which makes him like to the angels2 his sensitive powers1 whereby he is like the animals2 his natural forces1 which liken him to the plants2 and the body itself1 wherein he is like to inanimate things4 ,now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject4 ,wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state2 so when we read all creatures1 we must understand the creatures which are not made to ,god's image4 ,over the sensitive powers1 as the irascible and concupiscible1 which obey reason in some degree1 the soul has mastership by commanding4 ,so in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them4 ,but of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding1 but by using them4 ,thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them1 but in making use of them without hindrance4 ,the answers to the objections appear from the above4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,men ,were ,equal in the ,state of ,innocence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 xxi73 ,where there is no sin1 there is no inequality4 ,but in the state of innocence there was no sin4 ,therefore all were equal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love1 according to ,ecclus4 #ac3ai1 ,every beast loveth its like2 so also every man him that is nearest to himself4 ,now in that state there was among men an abundance of love1 which is the bond of peace4 ,therefore all were equal in the state of innocence4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the cause ceasing1 the effect also ceases4 ,but the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise1 on the part of ,god1 from the fact that ,he rewards some and punishes others2 and on the part of nature1 from the fact that some1 through a defect of nature1 are born weak and deficient1 others strong and perfect1 which would not have been the case in the primitive state4 ,therefore1 etc4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #ac3a73 ,the things which are of ,god1 are well ordered ,vulg4,those that are1 are ordained of ,god4 ,but order chiefly consists in inequality2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ac73 ,order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place4 ,therefore in the primitive state1 which was most proper and orderly1 inequality would have existed4 ,i answer that1 ,we must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality1 at least as regards sex1 because generation depends upon diversity of sex3 and likewise as regards age2 for some would have been born of others2 nor would sexual union have been sterile4 ,moreover1 as regards the soul1 there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge4 ,for man worked not of necessity1 but of his own free-will1 by virtue of which man can apply himself1 more or less1 to action1 desire1 or knowledge2 hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others4 ,there might also have been bodily disparity4 ,for the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature1 so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help3 since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life4 ,so we may say that1 according to the climate1 or the movement of the stars1 some would have been born more robust in body than others1 and also greater1 and more beautiful1 and all ways better disposed2 so that1 however1 in those who were thus surpassed1 there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by those words ,gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice2 the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,equality is the cause of equality in mutual love4 ,yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals2 although there be not an equal response3 for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother2 although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the cause of inequality could be on the part of ,god2 not indeed that ,he would punish some and reward others1 but that ,he would exalt some above others2 so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men4 ,inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described1 without any defect of nature4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #if1 ,art4 #d ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,man ,would ,have ,been ,master ,over ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ae73 ,god willed that man1 who was endowed with reason and made to ,his image1 should rule over none but irrational creatures2 not over men1 but over cattle4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence4 ,but man was made subject to man as a penalty2 for after sin it was said to the woman 7,gen4 #c3af73 ,thou shalt be under thy husband's power4 ,therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 subjection is opposed to liberty4 ,but liberty is one of the chief blessings1 and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence1 where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj74 ,therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence4 ,on the contrary1 ,the condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels4 ,but among the angels some rule over others2 and so one order is called that of ,dominations4 ,therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another4 ,i answer that1 ,mastership has a twofold meaning4 ,first1 as opposed to slavery1 in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave4 ,in another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject2 and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men1 can be called a master4 ,in the state of innocence man could have been a master of men1 not in the former but in the latter sense4 ,this distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself1 as is stated in the beginning of the ,metaphysics1 whereas a slave is ordered to another4 ,so that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is1 to his own--namely the master's use4 ,and since every man's proper good is desirable to himself1 and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own1 therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject2 and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man4 ,but a man is the master of a free subject1 by directing him either towards his proper welfare1 or to the common good4 ,such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man1 for two reasons4 ,first1 because man is naturally a social being1 and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life4 ,now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good2 for many1 as such1 seek many things1 whereas one attends only to one4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher says1 in the beginning of the ,politics1 that wherever many things are directed to one1 we shall always find one at the head directing them4 ,secondly1 if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue1 this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others1 according to #a ,pet4 #d3aj1 ,as every man hath received grace1 ministering the same one to another4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ad73 ,just men command not by the love of domineering1 but by the service of counsel3 and 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ae73 ,the natural order of things requires this2 and thus did ,god make man4 ,from this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership4 ,,question #ig ,,of ,,the ,,preservation ,,of ,,the ,,individual ,,in ,,the ,,primitive ,,state 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man3 first1 as regards the preservation of the individual2 secondly1 as regards the preservation of the species4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether man in the state of innocence was immortal8 7#b7 ,whether he was impassible8 7#c7 ,whether he stood in need of food8 7#d7 ,whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #a ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,man ,would ,have ,been ,immortal8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal4 ,for the term mortal belongs to the definition of man4 ,but if you take away the definition1 you take away the thing defined4 ,therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 x1 ,did4 ix1 #aj74 ,but there can be no passing from one genus to another4 ,therefore if the first man was incorruptible1 man could not be corruptible in the present state4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if man were immortal in the state of innocence1 this would have been due either to nature or to grace4 ,not to nature1 for since nature does not change within the same species1 he would also have been immortal now4 ,likewise neither would this be owing to grace2 for the first man recovered grace by repentance1 according to ,wis4 #aj3b3 ,he brought him out of his sins4 ,hence he would have regained his immortality2 which is clearly not the case4 ,therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 immortality is promised to man as a reward1 according to ,apoc4 #ba3d3 ,death shall be no more4 ,but man was not created in the state of reward1 but that he might deserve the reward4 ,therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,rom4 #e3ab73 ,by sin death came into the world4 ,therefore man was immortal before sin4 ,i answer that1 ,a thing may be incorruptible in three ways4 ,first1 on the part of matter--that is to say1 either because it possesses no matter1 like an angel2 or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only1 like the heavenly bodies4 ,such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature4 ,secondly1 a thing is incorruptible in its form1 inasmuch as being by nature corruptible1 yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption2 and this is called incorruptibility of glory2 because as ,augustine says 7,ep4 ad ,dioscor473 ,god made man's soul of such a powerful nature1 that from its fulness of beatitude1 there redounds to the body a fulness of health1 with the vigor of incorruption4 ,thirdly1 a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause2 in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence4 ,for1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 ,vet4 et ,nov4 ,test4 qu4 #ai 99,work of an anonymous author1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine73 ,god made man immortal as long as he did not sin2 so that he might achieve for himself life or death4 ,for man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality1 but by reason of a supernatural force given by ,god to the soul1 whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to ,god4 ,this entirely agrees with reason2 for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter1 as above explained 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #a71 it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #a and #b3 ,these objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul1 but was the gift of grace4 ,and though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory2 yet he did not recover immortality1 the loss of which was an effect of sin2 for this was reserved for ,christ to accomplish1 by ,whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better1 as we shall explain further on 7,,iii1 ,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #d1 ad #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #b ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,man ,would ,have ,been ,passible8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible4 ,for sensation is a kind of passion4 ,but in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive4 ,therefore he would have been passible4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 sleep is a kind of passion4 ,now1 man slept in the state of innocence1 according to ,gen4 #b3ba1 ,god cast a deep sleep upon ,adam4 ,therefore he would have been passible4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the same passage goes on to say that ,he took a rib out of ,adam4 ,therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 man's body was soft4 ,but a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body2 therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man1 the latter would have suffered from the impact4 ,therefore the first man was passible4 ,on the contrary1 ,had man been passible1 he would have been also corruptible1 because1 as the ,philosopher says 7,top4 vi1 #c73 ,excessive suffering wastes the very substance4 ,i answer that1 ,passion may be taken in two senses4 ,first1 in its proper sense1 and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition4 ,for passion is the effect of action2 and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive1 according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition4 ,secondly1 passion can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change1 even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature4 ,thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions4 ,in this second sense1 man was passible in the state of innocence1 and was passive both in soul and body4 ,in the first sense1 man was impassible1 both in soul and body1 as he was likewise immortal2 for he could curb his passion1 as he could avoid death1 so long as he refrained from sin4 ,thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections2 since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition1 but are ordered to his natural welfare4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as already explained 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b71 the rib was in ,adam as the principle of the human race1 as the semen in man1 who is a principle through generation4 ,hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue2 so neither did he through the separation of the rib4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body2 partly by the use of his reason1 whereby he could avoid what was harmful2 and partly also by ,divine ,providence1 so preserving him1 that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #c ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,man ,had ,need of ,food8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food4 ,for food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost4 ,but ,adam's body suffered no loss1 as being incorruptible4 ,therefore he had no need of food4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 food is needed for nourishment4 ,but nourishment involves passibility4 ,since1 then1 man's body was impassible2 it does not appear how food could be needful to him4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 we need food for the preservation of life4 ,but ,adam could preserve his life otherwise2 for had he not sinned1 he would not have died4 ,therefore he did not require food4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus1 which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence4 ,therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3af73 ,of every tree in paradise ye shall ,vulg4 'thou shalt' eat4 ,i answer that1 ,in the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food2 but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food4 ,in order to make this clear1 we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit4 ,it is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is1 as giving life to the body2 whence it is written 7,gen4 #b3g73 ,man was made into a living soul2 that is1 a soul giving life to the body4 ,but the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself1 and not to other souls1 as possessing an intellectual immaterial power4 ,thus in the primitive state1 the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul2 and so the body was called animal 99,from 'anima'1 a soul2 ,cf4 #a ,cor4 #ae3dd seqq41 through having its life from the soul4 ,now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d7 is the vegetative soul3 the operations of which are the use of food1 generation1 and growth4 ,wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence4 ,but in the final state1 after the resurrection1 the soul will1 to a certain extent1 communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit2 immortality to everyone1 impassibility1 glory1 and power to the good1 whose bodies will be called spiritual4 ,so1 after the resurrection1 man will not require food2 whereas he required it in the state of innocence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 ,vet4 et ,nov4 ,test4 qu4 #ai 99,works of an anonymous author1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine73 ,how could man have an immortal body1 which was sustained by food8 ,since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink4 ,for we have explained 7,a4 #a7 that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul1 and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body3 so that by the action of heat1 the body might lose part of its humid qualities2 and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor1 man was obliged to take food4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a certain passion and alteration attends nutriment1 on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished4 ,so we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible1 but that the food taken was passible2 although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if man had not taken food he would have sinned2 as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit4 ,for he was told at the same time1 to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil1 and to eat of every other tree of ,paradise4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food1 so that there would have been nothing superfluous2 which1 however1 is unreasonable to suppose1 as implying that there would have been no faecal matter4 ,wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus1 yet so disposed by ,god as to be decorous and suitable to the state4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ig1 ,art4 #d ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,man ,would ,have ,acquired ,immortality by the ,tree of ,life8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality4 ,for nothing can act beyond its own species2 as an effect does not exceed its cause4 ,but the tree of life was corruptible1 otherwise it could not be taken as food2 since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished4 ,therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural4 ,if therefore the tree of life caused immortality1 this would have been natural immortality4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable1 that the gods1 by eating a certain food1 became immortal2 which the ,philosopher ridicules 7,metaph4 iii1 ,did4 ii1 #d74 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #c3bb73 ,lest perhaps he put forth his hand1 and take of the tree of life1 and eat1 and live for ever4 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 ,vet4 et ,nov4 ,test4 qu4 #ai 99,work of an anonymous author1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine73 ,a taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body2 and even after sin man would have remained immortal1 had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life4 ,i answer that1 ,the tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality1 but not absolutely4 ,to understand this1 we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed1 for the preservation of life1 two remedies1 against two defects4 ,one of these defects was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat1 which acts as the soul's instrument3 as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food1 taken from the other trees of paradise1 as now we are provided with the food1 which we take for the same purpose4 ,the second defect1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 i1 #e71 arises from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources1 being added to the humor already existing1 lessens the specific active power3 as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine1 then1 as more water is added1 the strength of the wine is diminished1 till the wine becomes watery4 ,in like manner1 we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue1 as well as what suffices for growth2 later on1 however1 the assimilated food does not suffice for growth1 but only replaces what is lost4 ,last of all1 in old age1 it does not suffice even for this purpose2 whereupon the body declines1 and finally dies from natural causes4 ,against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life2 for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bf73 ,man had food to appease his hunger1 drink to slake his thirst2 and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age2 and 7,,qq4 ,vet4 et ,nov4 ,test4 qu4 #ai 99,work of an anonymous author1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine7 ,the tree of life1 like a drug1 warded off all bodily corruption4 ,yet it did not absolutely cause immortality2 for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life1 nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality1 whereby it might become indissoluble2 which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite2 so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time1 but only for a definite time4 ,for it is manifest that the greater a force is1 the more durable is its effect2 therefore1 since the power of the tree of life was finite1 man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once2 and when that time had elapsed1 man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life1 or had need to eat once more of the tree of life4 ,from this the replies to the objections clearly appear4 ,for the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality2 while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption1 according to the explanation above given4 ,,question #ih ,,of ,,the ,,preservation ,,of ,,the ,,species 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species2 and1 first1 of generation2 secondly1 of the state of the offspring4 ,under the first head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation8 7#b7 ,whether generation would have been through coition8 ,,first ,,article ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #a ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,generation ,existed8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence4 ,for1 as stated in ,phys4 v1 #e1 corruption is contrary to generation4 ,but contraries affect the same subject3 also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence4 ,therefore neither would there have been generation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual4 ,wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever4 ,but in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever4 ,therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 by generation man is multiplied4 ,but the multiplication of masters requires the division of property1 to avoid confusion of mastership4 ,therefore1 since man was made master of the animals1 it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation4 ,this is against the natural law1 according to which all things are in common1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 v1 #d74 ,therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #a3bh73 ,increase and multiply1 and fill the earth4 ,but this increase could not come about save by generation1 since the original number of mankind was two only4 ,therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence4 ,i answer that1 ,in the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race2 otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary1 for such a great blessing to be its result4 ,we must1 therefore1 observe that man1 by his nature1 is established1 as it were1 midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures1 his soul being naturally incorruptible1 while his body is naturally corruptible4 ,we must also observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things4 ,for that seems to be the direct purpose of nature1 which is invariable and perpetual2 while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature1 but as it were1 subordinate to something else2 otherwise1 when it ceased to exist1 nature's purpose would become void4 ,therefore1 since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species1 it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species2 for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained4 ,on the other hand1 incorruptible substances survive1 not only in the species1 but also in the individual2 wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature4 ,hence it belongs to man to beget offspring1 on the part of the naturally corruptible body4 ,but on the part of the soul1 which is incorruptible1 it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature1 or rather of the ,author of nature1 ,who alone is the ,creator of the human soul4 ,wherefore1 to provide for the multiplication of the human race1 ,he established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible1 but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul4 ,therefore1 since generation belongs to things corruptible1 man was not to be deprived thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species1 yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters1 inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife1 as the ,philosopher says 7,politic4 ii1 #e74 ,in the state of innocence1 however1 the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common1 according to each one's need1 those things of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed even now among many good men4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ih1 ,art4 #b ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,there ,would ,have ,been ,generation by ,coition8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence4 ,for1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #aa2 iv1 #be71 the first man in the terrestrial ,paradise was like an angel4 ,but in the future state of the resurrection1 when men will be like the angels1 they shall neither marry nor be married1 as is written ,matt4 #bb3cj4 ,therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 our first parents were created at the age of perfect development4 ,therefore1 if generation by coition had existed before sin1 they would have had intercourse while still in paradise3 which was not the case according to ,scripture 7,gen4 #d3a74 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in carnal intercourse1 more than at any other time1 man becomes like the beasts1 on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein2 whence contingency is praiseworthy1 whereby man refrains from such pleasures4 ,but man is compared to beasts by reason of sin1 according to ,ps4 #dh3ac3 ,man1 when he was in honor1 did not understand2 he is compared to senseless beasts1 and is become like to them4 ,therefore1 before sin1 there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption4 ,but virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse4 ,therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence4 ,on the contrary1 ,god made man and woman before sin 7,gen4 #a1 #b74 ,but nothing is void in ,god's works4 ,therefore1 even if man had not sinned1 there would have been such intercourse1 to which the distinction of sex is ordained4 ,moreover1 we are told that woman was made to be a help to man 7,gen4 #b3ah1 #bj74 ,but she is not fitted to help man except in generation1 because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else4 ,therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence4 ,i answer that1 ,some of the earlier doctors1 considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state1 concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way4 ,thus ,gregory of ,nyssa says 7,de ,hom4 ,opif4 xvii7 that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means1 as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the ,divine ,power4 ,he adds that ,god made man male and female before sin1 because ,he foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin1 which ,he foresaw4 ,but this is unreasonable4 ,for what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin4 ,now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life1 which he possessed even before sin1 as above explained 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #c71 just as it is natural to other perfect animals1 as the corporeal members make it clear4 ,so we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use1 as other members had1 before sin4 ,thus1 as regards generation by coition1 there are1 in the present state of life1 two things to be considered4 ,one1 which comes from nature1 is the union of man and woman2 for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle4 ,wherefore1 since wherever there is distinction of sex1 the active principle is male and the passive is female2 the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female4 ,the second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence1 which in the state of innocence would not have existed1 when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bf73 ,we must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence4 ,all the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will1 without ardent or wanton incentive1 with calmness of soul and body4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind1 yet with an animal life in his body4 ,after the resurrection man will be like an angel1 spiritualized in soul and body4 ,wherefore there is no parallel4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 ix1 #d71 our first parents did not come together in paradise1 because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman2 or because1 having received the general ,divine command relative to generation1 they awaited the special command relative to time4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,beasts are without reason4 ,in this way man becomes1 as it were1 like them in coition1 because he cannot moderate concupiscence4 ,in the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason1 not because delight of sense was less1 as some say 7rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body71 but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure1 being curbed by reason1 whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure1 but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately4 ,by immoderately ,i mean going beyond the bounds of reason1 as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton1 but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures4 ,this is what ,augustine means by the words quoted1 which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence1 but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind4 ,therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence1 whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state1 not because it removes fecundity1 but because it excludes inordinate desire4 ,in that state fecundity would have been without lust4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #bf73 ,in that state intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity2 this would have remained intact1 as it does in the menses4 ,and just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved1 not by groans of pain1 but by the instigations of maturity2 so in conceiving1 the union was one1 not of lustful desire1 but of deliberate action4 ,,question #ii ,,of ,,the ,,condition ,,of ,,the ,,offspring ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,body 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we must now consider the condition of the offspring--first1 as regards the body2 secondly1 as regards virtue2 thirdly1 in knowledge4 ,under the first head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth8 7#b7 ,whether all infants would have been of the male sex8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #a ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,children ,would ,have ,had ,perfect ,strength of ,body ,as to the ,use of ,its ,members ,immediately ,after ,birth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body1 as to the use of its members1 immediately after birth4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,pecc4 ,merit4 et ,remiss4 i1 #ch73 ,this weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind4 ,but in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind4 ,therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members4 ,but man is nobler than other animals4 ,therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth2 and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction4 ,but if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs1 they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them2 and so they would have been afflicted1 which was not possible before sin4 ,therefore1 in the state of innocence1 children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy4 ,but in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age4 ,therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy4 ,on the contrary1 ,everything generated is first imperfect4 ,but in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation4 ,therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power4 ,i answer that1 ,by faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature1 and what we believe rests on authority4 ,wherefore1 in making any assertion1 we must be guided by the nature of things1 except in those things which are above nature1 and are made known to us by ,divine authority4 ,now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth4 ,because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain4 ,wherefore it is natural1 on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children1 that the nerves which are instruments of movement1 should not be apt for moving the limbs4 ,on the other hand1 no ,catholic doubts it possible for a child to have1 by ,divine power1 the use of its limbs immediately after birth4 ,now we have it on the authority of ,scripture that ,god made man right 7,eccles4 #g3cj71 which rightness1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aa71 consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul4 ,as1 therefore1 in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will1 so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands4 ,now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man4 ,but the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life4 ,we must1 therefore1 conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act2 but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy1 such as suckling1 and the like4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy2 as is clear from his preceding remark that even when close to the breast1 and longing for it1 they are more apt to cry than to suckle4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth1 is due1 not to their superiority1 since more perfect animals are not so endowed2 but to the dryness of the brain1 and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect1 so that a small amount of strength suffices them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c is clear from what we have said above4 ,we may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will2 and only what was befitting to their state of life4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in the state of innocence man would have been born1 yet not subject to corruption4 ,therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth2 but not senile defects leading to corruption4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ii1 ,art4 #b ,whether1 in the ,primitive ,state1 ,women ,would ,have ,been ,born8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born4 ,for the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ii1 #c7 that woman is a misbegotten male1 as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature4 ,but in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation4 ,therefore in that state women would not have been born4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every agent produces its like1 unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter3 thus a small fire cannot burn green wood4 ,but in generation the active force is in the male4 ,since1 therefore1 in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect1 nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman1 it seems that males would always have been born4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race4 ,but the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman1 from the fact that they would have lived for ever4 ,therefore1 in the state of innocence1 there was no need for women to be born4 ,on the contrary1 ,nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by ,god4 ,but ,god established male and female in human nature1 as it is written 7,gen4 #a1 #b74 ,therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born4 ,i answer that1 ,nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence4 ,and as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe1 so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature4 ,therefore in the state of innocence1 both sexes would have been begotten4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,woman is said to be a misbegotten male1 as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case3 but not against the purpose of universal nature1 as above explained 7,q4 #ib1 ,a4 #a1 ad #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter1 as the objection proposes2 but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause2 thus the ,philosopher says 7,de ,animal4 ,histor4 vi1 #ai73 ,the northern wind favors the generation of males1 and the southern wind that of females3 sometimes also by some impression in the soul 7of the parents71 which may easily have some effect on the body 7of the child74 ,especially was this the case in the state of innocence1 when the body was more subject to the soul2 so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the offspring would have been begotten to an animal life1 as to the use of food and generation4 ,hence it was fitting that all should generate1 and not only the first parents4 ,from this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number4 ,,question #ajj ,,of ,,the ,,condition ,,of ,,the ,,offspring ,,as ,,regards ,,righteousness 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness4 ,under this head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness8 7#b7 ,whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,men ,would ,have ,been ,born in a ,state of ,righteousness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness4 ,for ,hugh of ,st4 ,victor says 7,de ,sacram4 i73 ,before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless2 but not heirs to their father's righteousness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 righteousness is effected by grace1 as the ,apostle says 7,rom4 #e3af1 #ba74 ,now grace is not transfused from one to another1 for thus it would be natural2 but is infused by ,god alone4 ,therefore children would not have been born righteous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 righteousness is in the soul4 ,but the soul is not transmitted from the parent4 ,therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents1 to the children4 ,on the contrary1 ,anselm says 7,de ,concep4 ,virg4 x73 ,as long as man did not sin1 he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul4 ,i answer that1 ,man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself4 ,hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species1 must be alike in parent and child1 unless nature fails in its operation1 which would not have occurred in the state of innocence4 ,but individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child4 ,now original righteousness1 in which the first man was created1 was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species1 not as caused by the principles of the species1 but as a gift conferred by ,god on the entire human nature4 ,this is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus2 and original sin1 which is opposed to original righteousness1 is called the sin of nature1 wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring2 and for this reason also1 the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of ,hugh are to be understood as referring1 not to the habit of righteousness1 but to the execution of the act thereof4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some say that children would have been born1 not with the righteousness of grace1 which is the principle of merit1 but with original righteousness4 ,but since the root of original righteousness1 which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made1 consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to ,god1 which subjection results from sanctifying grace1 as above explained 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #a71 we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness1 they would also have been born in grace2 thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace 7,q4 #ie1 ,a4 #a74 ,this grace1 however1 would not have been natural1 for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen2 but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul4 ,in the same way the rational soul1 which is not transmitted by the parent1 is infused by ,god as soon as the human body is apt to receive it4 ,from this the reply to the third objection is clear4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajj1 ,art4 #b ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,children ,would ,have ,been ,born ,confirmed in ,righteousness8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 iv7 on the words of ,job #c3ac3 ,for now ,i should have been asleep1 etc43 ,if no sinful corruption had infected our first parent1 he would not have begotten 'children of hell'2 no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the ,redeemer4 ,therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,anselm says 7,cur ,deus ,homo i1 #ah73 ,if our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation1 they would have been confirmed in grace1 so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more4 ,therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 good is stronger than evil4 ,but by the sin of the first man there resulted1 in those born of him1 the necessity of sin4 ,therefore1 if the first man had persevered in righteousness1 his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the angels who remained faithful to ,god1 while the others sinned1 were at once confirmed in grace1 so as to be unable henceforth to sin4 ,in like manner1 therefore1 man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered4 ,but he would have begotten children like himself4 ,therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #aj73 ,happy would have been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first parents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants1 nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned4 ,from which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned1 any of their descendants might have done evil2 and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,i answer that1 ,it does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,for it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting4 ,now the parents1 as long as they begot children1 would not have been confirmed in righteousness4 ,for the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of ,god2 and when once it has seen ,god1 it cannot but cleave to ,him ,who is the essence of goodness1 wherefrom no one can turn away1 since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good4 ,i say this according to the general law2 for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege1 such as we believe was granted to the ,virgin ,mother of ,god4 ,and as soon as ,adam had attained to that happy state of seeing ,god in ,his ,essence1 he would have become spiritual in soul and body2 and his animal life would have ceased1 wherein alone there is generation4 ,hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,if ,adam had not sinned1 he would not have begotten children of hell in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell3 yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become children of hell4 ,if1 however1 they did not become children of hell by falling into sin1 this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness1 but to ,divine ,providence preserving them free from sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,anselm does not say this by way of assertion1 but only as an opinion1 which is clear from his mode of expression as follows3 ,it seems that if they had lived1 etc4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument is not conclusive1 though ,anselm seems to have been influenced by it1 as appears from his words above quoted4 ,for the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness1 which is the case only with the damned4 ,wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning1 which is only in the blessed4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,there is no comparison between man and the angels2 for man's free-will is changeable1 both before and after choice2 whereas the angel's is not changeable1 as we have said above in treating of the angels 7,q4 #fd1 ,a4 #b74 ,,question #aja ,,of ,,the ,,condition ,,of ,,the ,,offspring ,,as ,,regards ,,knowledge 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge4 ,under this head there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge8 7#b7 ,whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #a ,whether in the ,state of ,innocence ,children ,would ,have ,been ,born with ,perfect ,knowledge8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge4 ,for ,adam would have begotten children like himself4 ,but ,adam was gifted with perfect knowledge 7,q4 #id1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ignorance is a result of sin1 as ,bede says 7,cf4 ,i-,,ii1 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #c74 ,but ignorance is privation of knowledge4 ,therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth4 ,but knowledge is required for righteousness1 since it directs our actions4 ,therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge4 ,on the contrary1 ,the human soul is naturally like a blank tablet on which nothing is written1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,but the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence4 ,therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth4 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #a71 as regards belief in matters which are above nature1 we rely on authority alone2 and so1 when authority is wanting1 we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature4 ,now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses1 as above explained 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #f72 and for this reason is the soul united to the body1 that it needs it for its proper operation2 and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers4 ,we must conclude then1 that1 in the state of innocence1 children would not have been born with perfect knowledge2 but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent1 so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race4 ,therefore he begot children like himself1 not in that respect1 but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time2 and this would not have been in children from their birth1 for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time4 ,hence1 no ignorance would have been in them1 but only nescience in regard to certain matters4 ,such nescience was even in the holy angels1 according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness1 in which men are guided by universal principles of right2 and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature1 as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aja1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,children ,would ,have ,had ,perfect ,use of ,reason at ,birth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth4 ,for that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state1 is due to the soul being weighed down by the body2 which was not the case in paradise1 because1 as it is written1 ,the corruptible body is a load upon the soul 7,wis4 #i3ae74 ,therefore1 before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom1 children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers1 as the lamb at once flees from the wolf4 ,much more1 therefore1 would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth4 ,on the contrary1 ,in all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect4 ,therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset4 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g71 the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers2 wherefore1 while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered1 man has not the perfect use of reason1 as we see in those who are asleep or delirious4 ,now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs2 and therefore1 so long as the latter are hindered1 the action of the former is of necessity hindered also2 and likewise1 consequently1 the use of reason4 ,now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain2 wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason4 ,therefore1 in the state of innocence1 children would not have had the perfect use of reason1 which they would have enjoyed later on in life4 ,yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now1 as to matters regarding that particular state1 as explained above regarding the use of their limbs 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the corruptible body is a load upon the soul1 because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on4 ,this is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly2 and the like may be observed in other animals4 ,moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ii1 ,a4 #a74 ,,question #ajb ,,of ,,man',s ,,abode1 ,,which ,,is ,,paradise 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider man's abode1 which is paradise4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether paradise is a corporeal place8 7#b7 ,whether it is a place apt for human habitation8 7#c7 ,for what purpose was man placed in paradise8 7#d7 ,whether he should have been created in paradise8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,paradise ,is a ,corporeal ,place8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place4 ,for ,bede 99,strabus1 ,gloss on ,gen4 #b3h says that paradise reaches to the lunar circle4 ,but no earthly place answers that description1 both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high1 and because beneath the moon is the region of fire1 which would consume the earth4 ,therefore paradise is not a corporeal place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise 7,gen4 #b3aj74 ,but the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere1 as is clear from the ,philosopher 7,meteor4 i74 ,therefore paradise is not a corporeal place4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 although men have explored the entire habitable world1 yet none have made mention of the place of paradise4 ,therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the tree of life is described as growing in paradise4 ,but the tree of life is a spiritual thing1 for it is written of ,wisdom that ,she is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her 7,prov4 #c3ah74 ,therefore paradise also is not a corporeal1 but a spiritual place4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if paradise be a corporeal place1 the trees also of paradise must be corporeal4 ,but it seems they were not2 for corporeal trees were produced on the third day1 while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days4 ,therefore paradise was not a corporeal place4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #a73 ,three general opinions prevail about paradise4 ,some understand a place merely corporeal2 others a place entirely spiritual2 while others1 whose opinion1 ,i confess1 pleases me1 hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiii1 #ba73 ,nothing prevents us from holding1 within proper limits1 a spiritual paradise2 so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred4 ,for whatever ,scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history2 and wherever ,scripture makes use of this method1 we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer4 ,and so paradise1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 xiv1 #c71 is a place situated in the east1 its name being the ,greek for garden4 ,it was fitting that it should be in the east2 for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth4 ,now the east is the right hand on the heavens1 as the ,philosopher explains 7,de ,coel4 ii1 #b72 and the right hand is nobler than the left3 hence it was fitting that ,god should place the earthly paradise in the east4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,bede's assertion is untrue1 if taken in its obvious sense4 ,it may1 however1 be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon1 not literally1 but figuratively2 because1 as ,isidore says 7,etym4 xiv1 #c71 the atmosphere there is a continually even temperature2 and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies1 which are devoid of opposing elements4 ,mention1 however1 is made of the moon rather than of other bodies1 because1 of all the heavenly bodies1 the moon is nearest to us1 and is1 moreover1 the most akin to the earth2 hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured4 ,others say that paradise reached to the moon--that is1 to the middle space of the air1 where rain1 and wind1 and the like arise2 because the moon is said to have influence on such changes4 ,but in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling1 through being uneven in temperature1 and not attuned to the human temperament1 as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #g73 ,it is probable that man has no idea where paradise was1 and that the rivers1 whose sources are said to be known1 flowed for some distance underground1 and then sprang up elsewhere4 ,for who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams8 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains1 or seas1 or some torrid region1 which cannot be crossed2 and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the tree of life is a material tree1 and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #d74 ,yet it had a spiritual signification2 as the rock in the desert was of a material nature1 and yet signified ,christ4 ,in like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree1 so called in view of future events2 because1 after eating of it1 man was to learn1 by experience of the consequent punishment1 the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion4 ,it may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,according to ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #e1 viii1 #c71 the plants were not actually produced on the third day1 but in their seminal virtues2 whereas1 after the work of the six days1 the plants1 both of paradise and others1 were actually produced4 ,according to other holy writers1 we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day1 including the trees of paradise2 and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood1 they say1 by way of recapitulation4 ,whence our text reads3 ,the ,lord ,god had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning 7,gen4 #b3h74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,paradise ,was a ,place ,adapted to ,be the ,abode of ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man4 ,for man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude4 ,but the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is1 the empyrean heaven4 ,therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if some definite place were required for man's abode1 this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body4 ,if on the part of the soul1 the place would be in heaven1 which is adapted to the nature of the soul2 since the desire of heaven is implanted in all4 ,on the part of the body1 there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals4 ,therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a place which contains nothing is useless4 ,but after sin1 paradise was not occupied by man4 ,therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man1 it seems that ,god made paradise to no purpose4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 since man is of an even temperament1 a fitting place for him should be of even temperature4 ,but paradise was not of an even temperature2 for it is said to have been on the equator--a situation of extreme heat1 since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants4 ,therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #aa73 ,paradise was a divinely ordered region1 and worthy of him who was made to ,god's image4 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #a71 ,man was incorruptible and immortal1 not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility1 but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption4 ,now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without4 ,from within1 the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors1 and by old age1 as above explained 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #d71 and man was able to ward off such corruption by food4 ,among those things which corrupt the body from without1 the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature2 and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature4 ,in paradise both conditions were found2 because1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #aa73 ,paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate1 pure1 and exquisite atmosphere1 and decked with ever-flowering plants4 ,whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man1 and in keeping with his original state of immortality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places1 and is outside the region of change4 ,by the first of these two conditions1 it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature3 for1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ii71 ,god rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures4 ,hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature1 as presiding over it4 ,by the second condition1 it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude1 which is endowed with the highest degree of stability4 ,thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel2 therefore he was created there4 ,but it is not suited to man's nature1 since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation3 it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude4 ,wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven1 but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,it is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances1 though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances4 ,for the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man1 as regards both his body and his soul--that is1 inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption4 ,this could not be said of the other animals4 ,therefore1 as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #aa73 ,no irrational animal inhabited paradise2 although1 by a certain dispensation1 the animals were brought thither by ,god to ,adam2 and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin1 just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain1 though he was to lose it4 ,for thereby we learn ,god's kindness to man1 and what man lost by sin4 ,moreover1 some say that ,enoch and ,elias still dwell in that paradise4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate1 on account of the unvarying equality of day and night2 that it is never too cold there1 because the sun is never too far off2 and never too hot1 because1 although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants1 it does not remain long in that position4 ,however1 ,aristotle distinctly says 7,meteor4 ii1 #e7 that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat4 ,this seems to be more probable2 because1 even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead1 are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun4 ,but whatever be the truth of the matter1 we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation1 whether on the equator or elsewhere4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,man ,was ,placed in ,paradise to ,dress ,it and ,keep ,it8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it4 ,for what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence4 ,but the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin 7,gen4 #c3ag74 ,therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence4 ,but in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence4 ,therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it1 man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise1 and not contrariwise2 which seems to be false4 ,therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3 #ae73 ,the ,lord ,god took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure1 to dress and keep it4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #aj71 these words in ,genesis may be understood in two ways4 ,first1 in the sense that ,god placed man in paradise that ,he might ,himself work in man and keep him1 by sanctifying him 7for if this work cease1 man at once relapses into darkness1 as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine72 and by keeping man from all corruption and evil4 ,secondly1 that man might dress and keep paradise1 which dressing would not have involved labor1 as it did after sin2 but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature4 ,nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser2 but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin4 ,all of which was for man's good2 wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit1 and not conversely4 ,whence the ,replies to the ,objections are made clear4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajb1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,man ,was ,created in ,paradise8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man was created in paradise4 ,for the angel was created in his dwelling-place--namely1 the empyrean heaven4 ,but before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man4 ,therefore it seems that man was created in paradise4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 other animals remain in the place where they are produced1 as the fish in the water1 and walking animals on the earth from which they were made4 ,now man would have remained in paradise after he was created 7,q4 #ig1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore he was created in paradise4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 woman was made in paradise4 ,but man is greater than woman4 ,therefore much more should man have been made in paradise4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3ae73 ,god took man and placed him in paradise4 ,i answer that1 ,paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state4 ,now this incorruptibility was man's1 not by nature1 but by a supernatural gift of ,god4 ,therefore that this might be attributed to ,god1 and not to human nature1 ,god made man outside of paradise1 and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life2 and1 having attained to the spiritual life1 to be transferred thence to heaven4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature1 and therefore they were created there4 ,in the same way ,i reply to the second objection1 for those places befit those animals in their nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,woman was made in paradise1 not by reason of her own dignity1 but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed4 ,for the same reason the children would have been born in paradise1 where their parents were already4 ,,treatise ,,on ,,the ,,conservation ,,and ,,government ,,of ,,creatures 7,,qq4 #ajc-aai7 ,,question #ajc ,,of ,,the ,,government ,,of ,,things ,,in ,,general 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,having considered the creation of things and their distinction1 we now consider in the third place the government thereof1 and 7#a7 the government of things in general2 7#b7 in particular1 the effects of this government4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the world is governed by someone8 7#b7 ,what is the end of this government8 7#c7 ,whether the world is governed by one8 7#d7 ,of the effects of this government8 7#e7 ,whether all things are subject to ,divine government8 7#f7 ,whether all things are immediately governed by ,god8 7#g7 ,whether the ,divine government is frustrated in anything8 7#h7 ,whether anything is contrary to the ,divine ,providence8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,world ,is ,governed by ,anyone8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the world is not governed by anyone4 ,for it belongs to those things to be governed1 which move or work for an end4 ,but natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move1 or work for an end2 for they have no knowledge of their end4 ,therefore the world is not governed4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 those things are governed which are moved towards an object4 ,but the world does not appear to be so directed1 but has stability in itself4 ,therefore it is not governed4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing1 does not require any external principle of government4 ,but the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements4 ,therefore the world does not require to be governed4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,wis4 #ad3c73 ,but ,thou1 ,o ,father1 governest all things by ,thy ,providence4 ,and ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii73 ,thou ,who governest this universe by mandate eternal4 ,i answer that1 ,certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world1 saying that all things happened by chance4 ,but such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways4 ,first1 by observation of things themselves3 for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best2 which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end2 which is to govern4 ,wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed2 for instance1 if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order1 as ,tullius says 7,de ,nat4 ,deorum ii71 quoting ,aristotle 99,cleanthes4 ,secondly1 this is clear from a consideration of ,divine goodness1 which1 as we have said above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #b71 was the cause of the production of things in existence4 ,for as it belongs to the best to produce the best1 it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of ,god should produce things without giving them their perfection4 ,now a thing's ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end4 ,therefore it belongs to the ,divine goodness1 as it brought things into existence1 so to lead them to their end3 and this is to govern4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a thing moves or operates for an end in two ways4 ,first1 in moving itself to the end1 as man and other rational creatures2 and such things have knowledge of their end1 and of the means to the end4 ,secondly1 a thing is said to move or operate for an end1 as though moved or directed by another thereto1 as an arrow directed to the target by the archer1 who knows the end unknown to the arrow4 ,wherefore1 as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge1 so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge1 shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in all created things there is a stable element1 at least primary matter2 and something belonging to movement1 if under movement we include operation4 ,and things need governing as to both3 because even that which is stable1 since it is created from nothing1 would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand1 as will be explained later 7,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing1 is a kind of impression from ,god1 directing them to their end2 as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer1 and not from the arrow4 ,but there is a difference1 inasmuch as that which creatures receive from ,god is their nature1 while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent4 ,wherefore1 as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer1 so the natural necessity of things shows the government of ,divine ,providence4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,end of the ,government of the ,world ,is ,something ,outside the ,world8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world4 ,for the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought4 ,but that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself2 thus a sick man is brought back to health1 which is something good in him4 ,therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside1 but within the things themselves4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 i1 #a73 ,some ends are an operation2 some are a work--i4e4 produced by an operation4 ,but nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself2 and operation exists in the agent4 ,therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the good of the multitude seems to consist in order1 and peace which is the tranquillity of order1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xix1 #ac74 ,but the world is composed of a multitude of things4 ,therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves4 ,therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,prov4 #af3d73 ,the ,lord hath made all things for ,himself4 ,but ,god is outside the entire order of the universe4 ,therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them4 ,i answer that1 ,as the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning1 it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning4 ,therefore1 since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe1 namely1 ,god1 it is clear from what has been expounded above 7,q4 #dd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b71 that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good4 ,this can be proved by reason4 ,for it is clear that good has the nature of an end2 wherefore1 a particular end of anything consists in some particular good2 while the universal end of all things is the ,universal ,good2 ,which is good of ,itself by virtue of ,its ,essence1 ,which is the very essence of goodness2 whereas a particular good is good by participation4 ,now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation4 ,wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,we may acquire some good in many ways3 first1 as a form existing in us1 such as health or knowledge2 secondly1 as something done by us1 as a builder attains his end by building a house2 thirdly1 as something good possessed or acquired by us1 as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession4 ,wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts2 for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself1 as the end of a harpist is to play the harp2 whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced1 as the end of a builder is not the act of building1 but the house he builds4 ,now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made1 but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented1 as if we were to say that ,hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him4 ,therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe1 as something possessed and represented2 for each thing tends to a participation thereof1 and to an assimilation thereto1 as far as is possible4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,a good existing in the universe1 namely1 the order of the universe1 is an end thereof2 this1 however1 is not its ultimate end1 but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end3 thus the order in an army is ordered to the general1 as stated in ,metaph4 xii1 ,did4 xi1 #aj4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,world ,is ,governed by ,one8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the world is not governed by one4 ,for we judge the cause by the effect4 ,now1 we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly1 but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways4 ,therefore the world is not governed by one4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 things which are governed by one do not act against each other1 except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler2 which cannot apply to ,god4 ,but created things agree not together1 and act against each other2 as is evident in the case of contraries4 ,therefore the world is not governed by one4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in nature we always find what is the better4 ,but it is better that two should be together than one 7,eccles4 #d3i74 ,therefore the world is not governed by one1 but by many4 ,on the contrary1 ,we confess our belief in one ,god and one ,lord1 according to the words of the ,apostle 7#a ,cor4 #h3f73 ,to us there is but one ,god1 the ,father 4 4 4 and one ,lord3 and both of these pertain to government4 ,for to the ,lord belongs dominion over subjects2 and the name of ,god is taken from ,providence as stated above 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #h74 ,therefore the world is governed by one4 ,i answer that1 ,we must of necessity say that the world is governed by one4 ,for since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good1 which is the greatest good2 the government of the world must be the best kind of government4 ,now the best government is the government by one4 ,the reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end2 which consists in some good4 ,but unity belongs to the idea of goodness1 as ,boethius proves 7,de ,consol4 iii1 #aa7 from this1 that1 as all things desire good1 so do they desire unity2 without which they would cease to exist4 ,for a thing so far exists as it is one4 ,whence we observe that things resist division1 as far as they can2 and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein4 ,therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity1 or peace4 ,now the proper cause of unity is one4 ,for it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord1 except so far as they are united4 ,furthermore1 what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united4 ,therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several4 ,from this it follows that the government of the world1 being the best form of government1 must be by one4 ,this is expressed by the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 xii1 ,did4 xi1 #aj73 ,things refuse to be ill governed2 and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing1 therefore there should be one ruler4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,movement is the act of a thing moved1 caused by the mover4 ,wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved1 which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe 7,q4 #dg1 ,,aa4 #a1b2 ,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #b71 and not by a diversity of governors4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends1 nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end1 so far as they are included in the one order of the universe4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if we consider individual goods1 then two are better than one4 ,but if we consider the essential good1 then no addition is possible4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,effect of ,government ,is ,one or ,many8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many4 ,for the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed4 ,this is one1 namely1 the good which consists in order2 as may be seen in the example of an army4 ,therefore the government of the world has but one effect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 from one there naturally proceeds but one4 ,but the world is governed by one as we have proved 7,a4 #c74 ,therefore also the effect of this government is but one4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the ,governor1 it must be many by reason of the many things governed4 ,but these are too numerous to be counted4 ,therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 xii73 ,god contains all and fills all by ,his providence and perfect goodness4 ,but government belongs to providence4 ,therefore there are certain definite effects of the ,divine government4 ,i answer that1 ,the effect of any action may be judged from its end2 because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected4 ,now the end of the government of the world is the essential good1 to the participation and similarity of which all things tend4 ,consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways4 ,first1 on the part of the end itself2 and in this way there is but one effect1 that is1 assimilation to the supreme good4 ,secondly1 the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to ,god4 ,thus there are1 in general1 two effects of the government4 ,for the creature is assimilated to ,god in two things2 first1 with regard to this1 that ,god is good2 and so the creature becomes like ,him by being good2 and secondly1 with regard to this1 that ,god is the cause of goodness in others2 and so the creature becomes like ,god by moving others to be good4 ,wherefore there are two effects of government1 the preservation of things in their goodness1 and the moving of things to good4 ,thirdly1 we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world2 and in this way they are without number4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by ,god and their movement4 ,as regards these two things we find order among them1 inasmuch as one is better than another2 and one is moved by another4 ,from what has been said above1 we can gather the replies to the other two objections4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,all ,things ,are ,subject to the ,divine ,government8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not all things are subject to the ,divine government4 ,for it is written 7,eccles4 #i3aa73 ,i saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift1 nor the battle to the strong1 nor bread to the wise1 nor riches to the learned1 nor favor to the skillful1 but time and chance in all4 ,but things subject to the ,divine government are not ruled by chance4 ,therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the ,divine government4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #i3i73 ,god hath no care for oxen4 ,but he that governs has care for the things he governs4 ,therefore all things are not subject to the ,divine government4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another4 ,but the rational creature can govern itself2 since it is master of its own act1 and acts of itself2 and is not made to act by another1 which seems proper to things which are governed4 ,therefore all things are not subject to the ,divine government4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #aa73 ,not only heaven and earth1 not only man and angel1 even the bowels of the lowest animal1 even the wing of the bird1 the flower of the plant1 the leaf of the tree1 hath ,god endowed with every fitting detail of their nature4 ,therefore all things are subject to ,his government4 ,i answer that1 ,for the same reason is ,god the ruler of things as ,he is their cause1 because the same gives existence as gives perfection2 and this belongs to government4 ,now ,god is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being1 but of the whole universal being1 as proved above 7,q4 #dd1 ,,aa4 #a1 #b74 ,wherefore1 as there can be nothing which is not created by ,god1 so there can be nothing which is not subject to ,his government4 ,this can also be proved from the nature of the end of government4 ,for a man's government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government4 ,now the end of the ,divine government is the ,divine goodness2 as we have shown 7,a4 #b74 ,wherefore1 as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the ,divine goodness as its end1 as is clear from what we have said above 7,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #b71 so it is impossible for anything to escape from the ,divine government4 ,foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world1 or individual things1 or that even human affairs1 were not subject to the ,divine government4 ,these are represented as saying1 ,god hath abandoned the earth 7,ezech4 #i3i74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun's movement4 ,in all such things we find chance3 not that everything is casual which occurs in such things2 but that in each one there is an element of chance4 ,and the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind4 ,for unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being1 they would tend to nothing definite1 especially those which possess no kind of knowledge4 ,so nothing would happen unintentionally2 which constitutes the nature of chance4 ,wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause1 he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things1 but time and chance1 that is to say1 that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed4 ,now every movement is the act of a movable thing1 caused by the moving principle1 as is laid down ,phys4 iii1 #c4 ,and every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act4 ,consequently1 various movable things must be moved variously1 even as regards movement by one and the same mover4 ,thus by the one art of the ,divine governor1 various things are variously governed according to their variety4 ,some1 according to their nature1 act of themselves1 having dominion over their actions2 and these are governed by ,god1 not only in this1 that they are moved by ,god ,himself1 ,who works in them interiorly2 but also in this1 that they are induced by ,him to do good and to fly from evil1 by precepts and prohibitions1 rewards and punishments4 ,but irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon1 are not thus governed by ,god4 ,hence1 when the ,apostle says that ,god hath no care for oxen1 he does not wholly withdraw them from the ,divine government1 but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will1 both of which require to be governed and perfected by the ,divine intellect and will4 ,therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act1 it requires to be governed by ,god4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #f ,whether all things are immediately governed by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all things are governed by ,god immediately4 ,for ,gregory of ,nyssa 7,nemesius1 ,de ,nat4 ,hom47 reproves the opinion of ,plato who divides providence into three parts4 ,the first he ascribes to the supreme god1 who watches over heavenly things and all universals2 the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities1 who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption2 while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions4 ,therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is better that a thing be done by one1 if possible1 than by many1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 viii1 #f74 ,but ,god can by ,himself govern all things without any intermediary cause4 ,therefore it seems that ,he governs all things immediately4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in ,god nothing is defective or imperfect4 ,but it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others2 thus an earthly king1 by reason of his not being able to do everything himself1 and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time1 requires to govern by means of ministers4 ,therefore ,god governs all things immediately4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d73 ,as the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power2 so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life2 and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life2 and this spirit by ,god ,himself4 ,i answer that1 ,in government there are two things to be considered2 the design of government1 which is providence itself2 and the execution of the design4 ,as to the design of government1 ,god governs all things immediately2 whereas in its execution1 ,he governs some things by means of others4 ,the reason of this is that as ,god is the very essence of goodness1 so everything must be attributed to ,god in its highest degree of goodness4 ,now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order1 design or knowledge 7and such is the design of government7 consists in knowing the individuals acted upon2 as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles1 but who can consider the least details2 and so on in other things4 ,therefore we must say that ,god has the design of the government of all things1 even of the very least4 ,but since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government1 this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection4 ,now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others1 than only to be good in itself4 ,therefore ,god so governs things that ,he makes some of them to be causes of others in government2 as a master1 who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils1 but gives also the faculty of teaching others4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,plato's opinion is to be rejected1 because he held that ,god did not govern all things immediately1 even in the design of government2 this is clear from the fact that he divided providence1 which is the design of government1 into three parts4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if ,god governed alone1 things would be deprived of the perfection of causality4 ,wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect1 but also of his dignity2 because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,anything ,can ,happen ,outside the ,order of the ,divine ,government8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the ,divine government4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii7 that ,god disposes all for good4 ,therefore1 if nothing happens outside the order of the ,divine government1 it would follow that no evil exists4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 nothing that is in accordance with the pre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance4 ,therefore1 if nothing occurs outside the order of the ,divine government1 it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the order of ,divine ,providence is certain and unchangeable2 because it is in accordance with the eternal design4 ,therefore1 if nothing happens outside the order of the ,divine government1 it follows that all things happen by necessity1 and nothing is contingent2 which is false4 ,therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the ,divine government4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,esther #ac3i73 ,o ,lord1 ,lord1 almighty ,king1 all things are in ,thy power1 and there is none that can resist ,thy will4 ,i answer that1 ,it is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause2 but not outside the order of the universal cause4 ,the reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause1 except through some other impeding cause2 which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause2 as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food1 which again is to be ascribed to some other cause1 and so on till we come to the first universal cause4 ,therefore as ,god is the first universal cause1 not of one genus only1 but of all being in general1 it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the ,divine government2 but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of ,divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause1 it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there is nothing wholly evil in the world1 for evil is ever founded on good1 as shown above 7,q4 #dh1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good4 ,if it wholly escaped from the order of the ,divine government1 it would wholly cease to exist4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape4 ,but as to the order of ,divine providence1 nothing in the world happens by chance1 as ,augustine declares 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #bd74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes1 which may fail in their effects2 and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of ,divine government4 ,the very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause1 is owing to some other cause1 itself subject to the ,divine government4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajc1 ,art4 #h ,whether anything can resist the order of the ,divine government8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the ,divine government4 ,for it is written 7,isa4 #c3h73 ,their tongue and their devices are against the ,lord4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands4 ,therefore if no one rebelled against ,god's commands1 no one would be justly punished by ,god4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 everything is subject to the order of the ,divine government4 ,but some things oppose others4 ,therefore some things rebel against the order of the ,divine government4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iii73 ,there is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good4 ,it is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly1 as is said 7,wis4 #h7 of ,divine wisdom4 ,i answer that1 ,we may consider the order of ,divine providence in two ways3 in general1 inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all2 and in particular1 inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the ,divine government4 ,considered in the first way1 nothing can resist the order of the ,divine government4 ,this can be proved in two ways3 firstly from the fact that the order of the ,divine government is wholly directed to good1 and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only1 for no one acts intending evil1 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv73 secondly from the fact that1 as we have said above 7,a4 #a1 ad #c2 ,a4 #e1 ad #b71 every inclination of anything1 whether natural or voluntary1 is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover2 as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer4 ,wherefore every agent1 whether natural or free1 attains to its divinely appointed end1 as though of its own accord4 ,for this reason ,god is said to order all things sweetly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some are said to think or speak1 or act against ,god3 not that they entirely resist the order of the ,divine government2 for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good3 but because they resist some particular good1 which belongs to their nature or state4 ,therefore they are justly punished by ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b is clear from the above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,from the fact that one thing opposes another1 it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause2 but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things4 ,,question #ajd ,,the ,,special ,,effects ,,of ,,the ,,divine ,,government 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider the effects of the ,divine government in particular2 concerning which four points of inquiry arise3 7#a7 ,whether creatures need to be kept in existence by ,god8 7#b7 ,whether they are immediately preserved by ,god8 7#c7 ,whether ,god can reduce anything to nothingness8 7#d7 ,whether anything is reduced to nothingness8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,creatures ,need to ,be ,kept in ,being by ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by ,god4 ,for what cannot not-be1 does not need to be kept in being2 just as that which cannot depart1 does not need to be kept from departing4 ,but some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be4 ,therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by ,god4 ,the middle proposition is proved thus4 ,that which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing1 and its contrary cannot be in it2 thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even1 and cannot possibly be an odd number4 ,now form brings being with itself1 because everything is actually in being1 so far as it has form4 ,but some creatures are subsistent forms1 as we have said of the angels 7,q4 #ej1 ,,aa4 #b1 #e73 and thus to be is in them of themselves4 ,the same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only1 as above explained of heavenly bodies 7,q4 #ff1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily1 and cannot not-be2 for there can be no potentiality to not-being1 either in the form which has being of itself1 or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose1 since it is not in potentiality to any other form4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god is more powerful than any created agent4 ,but a created agent1 even after ceasing to act1 can cause its effect to be preserved in being2 thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build2 and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat4 ,much more1 therefore1 can ,god cause ,his creature to be kept in being1 after ,he has ceased to create it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 nothing violent can occur1 except there be some active cause thereof4 ,but tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature1 since all creatures naturally desire to be4 ,therefore no creature can tend to not-being1 except through some active cause of corruption4 ,now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt2 such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies4 ,therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being1 even if ,god were to withdraw ,his action4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if ,god keeps creatures in being1 this is done by some action4 ,now every action of an agent1 if that action be efficacious1 produces something in the effect4 ,therefore the preserving power of ,god must produce something in the creature4 ,but this is not so2 because this action does not give being to the creature1 since being is not given to that which already is3 nor does it add anything new to the creature2 because either ,god would not keep the creature in being continually1 or ,he would be continually adding something new to the creature2 either of which is unreasonable4 ,therefore creatures are not kept in being by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,heb4 #a3c73 ,upholding all things by the word of ,his power4 ,i answer that1 ,both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by ,god4 ,to make this clear1 we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways4 ,first1 indirectly1 and accidentally2 thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption1 as a man may be said to preserve a child1 whom he guards from falling into the fire4 ,in this way ,god preserves some things1 but not all1 for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them1 so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption4 ,secondly1 a thing is said to preserve another per se and directly1 namely1 when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it4 ,in this manner all creatures need to be preserved by ,god4 ,for the being of every creature depends on ,god1 so that not for a moment could it subsist1 but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the ,divine power1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4 xvi74 ,this is made clear as follows3 ,every effect depends on its cause1 so far as it is its cause4 ,but we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the becoming of its effect1 but not directly of its being4 ,this may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings3 for the builder causes the house in its becoming1 but he is not the direct cause of its being4 ,for it is clear that the being of the house is a result of its form1 which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials1 and results from the natural qualities of certain things4 ,thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire2 thus a builder constructs a house1 by making use of cement1 stones1 and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it4 ,therefore the being of a house depends on the nature of these materials1 just as its becoming depends on the action of the builder4 ,the same principle applies to natural things4 ,for if an agent is not the cause of a form as such1 neither will it be directly the cause of being which results from that form2 but it will be the cause of the effect1 in its becoming only4 ,now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other's form as such1 since it would then be the cause of its own form1 which is essentially the same as the form of the other2 but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter--in other words1 it may be the cause that this matter receives this form4 ,and this is to be the cause of becoming1 as when man begets man1 and fire causes fire4 ,thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause1 then the becoming of the effect1 but not its being1 depends on the agent4 ,sometimes1 however1 the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause1 in the same way as it exists in the agent3 as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves3 thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species4 ,such an agent can be the cause of a form as such1 and not merely as existing in this matter1 consequently it is not merely the cause of becoming but also the cause of being4 ,therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the becoming of the effect3 so neither can the being of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased1 which is the cause of the effect not only in becoming but also in being4 ,this is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire's action2 while1 on the contrary1 the air does not continue to be lit up1 even for a moment1 when the sun ceases to act upon it1 because water is a matter susceptive of the fire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire4 ,wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire1 it would retain that form always2 whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately1 the heat will remain for a time only1 by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat4 ,on the other hand1 air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun1 which is the principle of light4 ,therefore1 since it has not root in the air1 the light ceases with the action of the sun4 ,now every creature may be compared to ,god1 as the air is to the sun which enlightens it4 ,for as the sun possesses light by its nature1 and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature2 so ,god alone is ,being in virtue of ,his own ,essence1 since ,his ,essence is ,his existence2 whereas every creature has being by participation1 so that its essence is not its existence4 ,therefore1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 iv1 #ab73 ,if the ruling power of ,god were withdrawn from ,his creatures1 their nature would at once cease1 and all nature would collapse4 ,in the same work 7,gen4 ad lit4 viii1 #ab7 he says3 ,as the air becomes light by the presence of the sun1 so is man enlightened by the presence of ,god1 and in ,his absence returns at once to darkness4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,being naturally results from the form of a creature1 given the influence of the ,divine action2 just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air1 given the action of the sun4 ,wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in ,god1 ,who can withdraw ,his influence1 than in the form or matter of those creatures4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the ,divine influence3 as neither can ,he make it not to have received its being from ,himself4 ,for the creature needs to be preserved by ,god in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being4 ,so that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of being but only of becoming4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption3 but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the preservation of things by ,god is a continuation of that action whereby ,he gives existence1 which action is without either motion or time2 so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,preserves ,every ,creature ,immediately8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god preserves every creature immediately4 ,for ,god creates and preserves things by the same action1 as above stated 7,a4 #a1 ad #d74 ,but ,god created all things immediately4 ,therefore ,he preserves all things immediately4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a thing is nearer to itself than to another4 ,but it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself2 much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another4 ,therefore ,god preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an effect is kept in being by the cause1 not only of its becoming1 but also of its being4 ,but all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their becoming1 for they cause only by moving1 as above stated 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being4 ,on the contrary1 ,a thing is kept in being by that which gives it being4 ,but ,god gives being by means of certain intermediate causes4 ,therefore ,he also keeps things in being by means of certain causes4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #a71 a thing keeps another in being in two ways2 first1 indirectly and accidentally1 by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause2 secondly1 directly and per se1 by the fact that that on it depends the other's being1 as the being of the effect depends on the cause4 ,and in both ways a created thing keeps another in being4 ,for it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents1 and for that reason are called preservatives2 just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction2 and in like manner with many other things4 ,it happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being4 ,for when we have a series of causes depending on one another1 it necessarily follows that1 while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause1 it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes4 ,therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way2 and all the more so1 as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause4 ,for this reason1 even in things corporeal1 the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes3 thus the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 xii1 ,did4 xi1 #f71 that the first1 namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated2 whereas the second movement1 which is from the zodiac1 is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption4 ,in like manner astrologers ascribe to ,saturn1 the highest of the planets1 those things which are permanent and fixed4 ,so we conclude that ,god keeps certain things in being1 by means of certain causes4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god created all things immediately1 but in the creation itself ,he established an order among things1 so that some depend on others1 by which they are preserved in being1 though ,he remains the principal cause of their preservation4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends2 just as no effect can be its own cause1 but can only produce another effect1 so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation1 but only with the power of preserving another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,no created nature can be the cause of another1 as regards the latter acquiring a new form1 or disposition1 except by virtue of some change2 for the created nature acts always on something presupposed4 ,but after causing the form or disposition in the effect1 without any fresh change in the effect1 the cause preserves that form or disposition2 as in the air1 when it is lit up anew1 we must allow some change to have taken place1 while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,can ,annihilate ,anything8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god cannot annihilate anything4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ba7 that ,god is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence4 ,but ,he would be such a cause if ,he were to annihilate anything4 ,therefore ,he cannot annihilate anything4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 by ,his goodness ,god is the cause why things exist1 since1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,doctr4 ,christ4 i1 #cb73 ,because ,god is good1 we exist4 ,but ,god cannot cease to be good4 ,therefore ,he cannot cause things to cease to exist2 which would be the case were ,he to annihilate anything4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if ,god were to annihilate anything it would be by ,his action4 ,but this cannot be2 because the term of every action is existence4 ,hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated2 for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption4 ,therefore ,god cannot annihilate anything4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,jer4 #aj3bd73 ,correct me1 ,o ,lord1 but yet with judgment2 and not in ,thy fury1 lest ,thou bring me to nothing4 ,i answer that1 ,some have held that ,god1 in giving existence to creatures1 acted from natural necessity4 ,were this true1 ,god could not annihilate anything1 since ,his nature cannot change4 ,but1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ai1 ,a4 #d71 such an opinion is entirely false1 and absolutely contrary to the ,catholic faith1 which confesses that ,god created things of ,his own free-will1 according to ,ps4 #acd3f3 ,whatsoever the ,lord pleased1 ,he hath done4 ,therefore that ,god gives existence to a creature depends on ,his will2 nor does ,he preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them1 as we have said4 ,therefore1 just as before things existed1 ,god was free not to give them existence1 and not to make them2 so after they are made1 ,he is free not to continue their existence2 and thus they would cease to exist2 and this would be to annihilate them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,non-existence has no direct cause2 for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence1 and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing4 ,therefore ,god cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence1 whereas a creature has this tendency of itself1 since it is produced from nothing4 ,but indirectly ,god can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence1 by withdrawing ,his action therefrom4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god's goodness is the cause of things1 not as though by natural necessity1 because the ,divine goodness does not depend on creatures2 but by ,his free-will4 ,wherefore1 as without prejudice to ,his goodness1 ,he might not have produced things into existence1 so1 without prejudice to ,his goodness1 ,he might not preserve things in existence4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if ,god were to annihilate anything1 this would not imply an action on ,god's part2 but a mere cessation of ,his action4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajd1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,anything ,is ,annihilated8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that something is annihilated4 ,for the end corresponds to the beginning4 ,but in the beginning there was nothing but ,god4 ,therefore all things must tend to this end1 that there shall be nothing but ,god4 ,therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every creature has a finite power4 ,but no finite power extends to the infinite4 ,wherefore the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #aj7 that1 a finite power cannot move in infinite time4 ,therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration2 and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves4 ,but at some time they cease to exist4 ,therefore they are reduced to nothing4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,eccles4 #c3ad73 ,i have learned that all the works that ,god hath made continue for ever4 ,i answer that1 ,some of those things which ,god does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things2 others happen miraculously1 and not in accordance with the natural order1 as will be explained 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #f74 ,now whatever ,god wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature2 but those things which occur miraculously1 are ordered for the manifestation of grace1 according to the ,apostle1 ,to each one is given the manifestation of the ,spirit1 unto profit 7#a ,cor4 #ab3g72 and subsequently he mentions1 among others1 the working of miracles4 ,now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated4 ,for1 either they are immaterial1 and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence2 or they are material1 and then they continue to exist1 at least in matter1 which is incorruptible1 since it is the subject of generation and corruption4 ,moreover1 the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace2 since rather the power and goodness of ,god are manifested by the preservation of things in existence4 ,wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence1 clearly shows the power of ,him ,who made them2 but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation1 since the power of ,god is conspicuously shown in ,his preserving all things in existence1 according to the ,apostle3 ,upholding all things by the word of ,his power 7,heb4 #a3c74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive2 the active power belongs to ,god ,himself1 from ,whom existence is derived4 ,wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the ,divine power4 ,to some things1 however1 is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time1 so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from ,him ,whom finite power cannot resist1 for an infinite1 but only for a fixed time4 ,so things which have no contrary1 although they have a finite power1 continue to exist for ever4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,forms and accidents are not complete beings1 since they do not subsist3 but each one of them is something of a being2 for it is called a being1 because something is by it4 ,yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned1 they are not entirely reduced to nothingness2 not that any part of them survives1 but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter1 or of the subject4 ,,question #aje ,,of ,,the ,,change ,,of ,,creatures ,,by ,,god 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we now consider the second effect of the ,divine government1 i4e4 the change of creatures2 and first1 the change of creatures by ,god2 secondly1 the change of one creature by another4 ,under the first head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether ,god can move immediately the matter to the form8 7#b7 ,whether ,he can immediately move a body8 7#c7 ,whether ,he can move the intellect8 7#d7 ,whether ,he can move the will8 7#e7 ,whether ,god works in every worker8 7#f7 ,whether ,he can do anything outside the order imposed on things8 7#g7 ,whether all that ,god does is miraculous8 7#h7 ,of the diversity of miracles4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,god ,can ,move the ,matter ,immediately to the ,form8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form4 ,for as the ,philosopher proves 7,metaph4 vii1 ,did4 vi1 #h71 nothing can bring a form into any particular matter1 except that form which is in matter2 because1 like begets like4 ,but ,god is not a form in matter4 ,therefore ,he cannot cause a form in matter4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them1 unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause2 for1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aa71 a general assertion does not move the mind1 except by means of some particular apprehension4 ,but the ,divine power is the universal cause of all things4 ,therefore it cannot produce any particular form1 except by means of a particular agent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,as universal being depends on the first universal cause1 so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes2 as we have seen above 7,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #b74 ,but the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form4 ,therefore the forms of things are produced by ,god1 only by means of particular causes4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,gen4 #b3g73 ,god formed man of the slime of the earth4 ,i answer that1 ,god can move matter immediately to form2 because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality4 ,therefore1 since the ,divine power extends over matter1 as produced by ,god1 it can be reduced to act by the ,divine power3 and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form2 for a form is nothing else but the act of matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,an effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways4 ,first1 according to the same species2 as man is generated by man1 and fire by fire4 ,secondly1 by being virtually contained in the cause2 as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause3 thus animals produced by putrefaction1 and plants1 and minerals are like the sun and stars1 by whose power they are produced4 ,in this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends4 ,now the power of ,god extends to both matter and form2 as we have said above 7,q4 #ad1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #dd1 ,a4 #b72 wherefore if a composite thing be produced1 it is likened to ,god by way of a virtual inclusion2 or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species4 ,therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself2 so also can ,god4 ,but no other form not existing in matter can do this2 because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter4 ,hence angels and demons operate on visible matter2 not by imprinting forms in matter1 but by making use of corporeal seeds4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,this argument would hold if ,god were to act of natural necessity4 ,but since ,he acts by ,his will and intellect1 which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms1 it follows that ,he can determinately imprint this or that form on matter4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to ,god2 wherefore since ,god ordains other causes to certain effects ,he can also produce certain effects by ,himself without any other cause4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,god ,can ,move a ,body ,immediately8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god cannot move a body immediately4 ,for as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 vii1 #b71 it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved4 ,but there can be no contact between ,god and a body2 for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 #a73 ,there is no contact with ,god4 ,therefore ,god cannot move a body immediately4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god is the mover unmoved4 ,but such also is the desirable object when apprehended4 ,therefore ,god moves as the object of desire and apprehension4 ,but ,he cannot be apprehended except by the intellect1 which is neither a body nor a corporeal power4 ,therefore ,god cannot move a body immediately4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #aj7 that an infinite power moves instantaneously4 ,but it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant2 for since every movement is between opposites1 it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject1 which is impossible4 ,therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power4 ,but ,god's power is infinite1 as we have explained 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore ,god cannot move a body immediately4 ,on the contrary1 ,god produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies1 as is clear from ,gen4 #a3i ,let the waters be gathered together into one place4 ,therefore ,god alone can move a body immediately4 ,i answer that1 ,it is erroneous to say that ,god cannot ,himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause4 ,wherefore1 since bodies are moved immediately by created causes1 we cannot possibly doubt that ,god can move immediately any bodies whatever4 ,this indeed follows from what is above stated 7,a4 #a74 ,for every movement of any body whatever1 either results from a form1 as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause1 for which reason the generator is called the mover2 or else tends to a form1 as heating tends to the form of heat4 ,now it belongs to the same cause1 to imprint a form1 to dispose to that form1 and to give the movement which results from that form2 for fire not only generates fire1 but it also heats and moves things upwards4 ,therefore1 as ,god can imprint form immediately in matter1 it follows that ,he can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there are two kinds of contact2 corporeal contact1 when two bodies touch each other2 and virtual contact1 as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad4 ,according to the first kind of contact1 ,god1 as being incorporeal1 neither touches1 nor is touched2 but according to virtual contact ,he touches creatures by moving them2 but ,he is not touched1 because the natural power of no creature can reach up to ,him4 ,thus did ,dionysius understand the words1 ,there is no contact with ,god2 that is1 so that ,god ,himself be touched4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,god moves as the object of desire and apprehension2 but it does not follow that ,he always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved2 but as being desired and known by ,himself2 for ,he does all things for ,his own goodness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher 7,phys4 viii1 #aj7 intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover of bulk1 by the following argument4 ,the power of the first mover is infinite 7which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time74 ,now an infinite power1 if it were a power of bulk1 would move without time1 which is impossible2 therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk4 ,whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power4 ,the reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety2 since it moves by the necessity of its nature4 ,but an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power4 ,now the greater the power of the mover1 the greater is the velocity of the movement4 ,therefore1 since a finite power moves in a determinate time1 it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time2 for between one time and any other time there is some proportion4 ,on the other hand1 a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being1 which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them2 and therefore1 since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time1 it does not follow that it moves without time4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,god ,moves the ,created ,intellect ,immediately8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god does not immediately move the created intellect4 ,for the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject2 since it does not pass into external matter2 as stated in ,metaph4 ix1 ,did4 viii1 #h4 ,but the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is2 but from the mover4 ,therefore the intellect is not moved by another2 and so apparently ,god cannot move the created intellect4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement1 is not moved by another4 ,but the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding2 in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #g74 ,but the intellectual light which is natural to the soul1 is a sufficient principle of understanding4 ,therefore it is not moved by another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the senses are moved by the sensible1 so the intellect is moved by the intelligible4 ,but ,god is not intelligible to us1 and exceeds the capacity of our intellect4 ,therefore ,god cannot move our intellect4 ,on the contrary1 ,the teacher moves the intellect of the one taught4 ,but it is written 7,ps4 #ic3aj7 that ,god teaches man knowledge4 ,therefore ,god moves the human intellect4 ,i answer that1 ,as in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement1 so that is said to move the intellect1 which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation1 called the movement of the intellect4 ,now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being2 one which is the intellectual power itself1 which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality2 while the other is the principle of actual understanding1 namely1 the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands4 ,so a thing is said to move the intellect1 whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding2 or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood4 ,now ,god moves the created intellect in both ways4 ,for ,he is the ,first immaterial ,being2 and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality1 it follows that ,he is the ,first intelligent ,being4 ,therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows1 we must conclude that from ,him proceeds all intellectual power4 ,in like manner1 since ,he is the ,first ,being1 and all other beings pre-exist in ,him as in their ,first ,cause1 it follows that they exist intelligibly in ,him1 after the mode of ,his own ,nature4 ,for as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in ,god1 and are derived from ,him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand2 so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist4 ,therefore ,god so moves the created intellect1 inasmuch as ,he gives it the intellectual power1 whether natural1 or superadded2 and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species1 and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists1 as by a secondary cause2 but it proceeds from ,god as from its first cause4 ,for by ,him the power to understand is given to the one who understands4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding2 but it is a secondary principle1 and depends upon the ,first ,principle4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the intelligible object moves our human intellect1 so far as1 in a way1 it impresses on it its own likeness1 by means of which the intellect is able to understand it4 ,but the likenesses which ,god impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand ,him through ,his ,essence1 as we have seen above 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #ef1 ,a4 #c74 ,hence ,he moves the created intellect1 and yet ,he cannot be intelligible to it1 as we have explained 7,q4 #ab1 ,a4 #d74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,god ,can ,move the ,created ,will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god cannot move the created will4 ,for whatever is moved from without1 is forced4 ,but the will cannot be forced4 ,therefore it is not moved from without2 and therefore cannot be moved by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time4 ,but this would follow if ,he moved the will2 for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within1 and not by another4 ,therefore ,god cannot move the will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved2 wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone1 but to the thrower4 ,therefore1 if ,god moves the will1 it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame4 ,but this is false4 ,therefore ,god does not move the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,phil4 #b3ac73 ,it is ,god who worketh in us ,vulgate--'you' both to will and to accomplish4 ,i answer that1 ,as the intellect is moved by the object and by the ,giver of the power of intelligence1 as stated above 7,a4 #c71 so is the will moved by its object1 which is good1 and by ,him who creates the power of willing4 ,now the will can be moved by good as its object1 but by ,god alone sufficiently and efficaciously4 ,for nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable4 ,now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good2 for its object is the universal good2 just as the object of the intellect is the universal being4 ,but every created good is some particular good2 ,god alone is the universal good4 ,whereas ,he alone fills the capacity of the will1 and moves it sufficiently as its object4 ,in like manner the power of willing is caused by ,god alone4 ,for to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will1 which is universal good4 ,but to incline towards the universal good belongs to the ,first ,mover1 to ,whom the ultimate end is proportionate2 just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal4 ,wherefore in both ways it belongs to ,god to move the will2 but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination2 but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination1 it is not forced2 as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it1 then it is not forced4 ,in like manner ,god1 while moving the will1 does not force it1 because ,he gives the will its own natural inclination4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,to be moved voluntarily1 is to be moved from within1 that is1 by an interior principle3 yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle2 and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,if the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself1 the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame4 ,but since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself1 as we have stated 7ad #b71 it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,god ,works in ,every ,agent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god does not work in every agent4 ,for we must not attribute any insufficiency to ,god4 ,if therefore ,god works in every agent1 ,he works sufficiently in each one4 ,hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources2 as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things4 ,therefore if the creature's operation is from ,god operating in the creature1 it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature2 and so no creature works at all4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made1 as giving it the form whereby it operates4 ,therefore1 if ,god is the cause of the operation of things made by ,him1 this would be inasmuch as ,he gives them the power of operating4 ,but this is in the beginning1 when ,he makes them4 ,thus it seems that ,god does not operate any further in the operating creature4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,isa4 #bf3ab73 ,lord1 ,thou hast wrought all our works in ,vulg43 'for' us4 ,i answer that1 ,some have understood ,god to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things1 but that ,god alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought2 for instance1 that it is not fire that gives heat1 but ,god in the fire1 and so forth4 ,but this is impossible4 ,first1 because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things3 and this would imply lack of power in the ,creator3 for it is due to the power of the cause1 that it bestows active power on its effect4 ,secondly1 because the active powers which are seen to exist in things1 would be bestowed on things to no purpose1 if these wrought nothing through them4 ,indeed1 all things created would seem1 in a way1 to be purposeless1 if they lacked an operation proper to them2 since the purpose of everything is its operation4 ,for the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect3 and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form1 so the form which is the first act1 is for the sake of its operation1 which is the second act2 and thus operation is the end of the creature4 ,we must therefore understand that ,god works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation4 ,in order to make this clear1 we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes2 matter is not a principle of action1 but is the subject that receives the effect of action4 ,on the other hand1 the end1 the agent1 and the form are principles of action1 but in a certain order4 ,for the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent2 the second is the agent2 the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action 7although the agent also acts through its own form72 as may be clearly seen in things made by art4 ,for the craftsman is moved to action by the end1 which is the thing wrought1 for instance a chest or a bed2 and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp4 ,thus then does ,god work in every worker1 according to these three things4 ,first as an end4 ,for since every operation is for the sake of some good1 real or apparent2 and nothing is good either really or apparently1 except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the ,supreme ,good1 which is ,god2 it follows that ,god ,himself is the cause of every operation as its end4 ,again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order1 the second always acts in virtue of the first2 for the first agent moves the second to act4 ,and thus all agents act in virtue of ,god ,himself3 and therefore ,he is the cause of action in every agent4 ,thirdly1 we must observe that ,god not only moves things to operate1 as it were applying their forms and powers to operation1 just as the workman applies the axe to cut1 who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form2 but ,he also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being4 ,therefore ,he is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action1 as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light2 but also as preserving the forms and powers of things2 just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors1 inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest4 ,and since the form of a thing is within the thing1 and all the more1 as it approaches nearer to the ,first and ,universal ,cause2 and because in all things ,god ,himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things2 it follows that in all things ,god works intimately4 ,for this reason in ,holy ,scripture the operations of nature are attributed to ,god as operating in nature1 according to ,job #aj3aa3 ,thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh3 ,thou hast put me together with bones and sinews4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god works sufficiently in things as ,first ,agent1 but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one action does not proceed from two agents of the same order4 ,but nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god not only gives things their form1 but ,he also preserves them in existence1 and applies them to act1 and is moreover the end of every action1 as above explained4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,god ,can ,do ,anything ,outside the ,established ,order of ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that ,god cannot do anything outside the established order of nature4 ,for ,augustine 7,contra ,faust4 xxvi1 #c7 says3 ,god the ,maker and ,creator of each nature1 does nothing against nature4 ,but that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature4 ,therefore ,god can do nothing outside the natural order4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the order of justice is from ,god1 so is the order of nature4 ,but ,god cannot do anything outside the order of justice2 for then ,he would do something unjust4 ,therefore ,he cannot do anything outside the order of nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,god established the order of nature4 ,therefore it ,god does anything outside the order of nature1 it would seem that ,he is changeable2 which cannot be said4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxvi1 #c73 ,god sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature4 ,i answer that1 ,from each cause there results a certain order to its effects1 since every cause is a principle2 and so1 according to the multiplicity of causes1 there results a multiplicity of orders1 subjected one to the other1 as cause is subjected to cause4 ,wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order2 but conversely4 ,an example of this may be seen in human affairs4 ,on the father of a family depends the order of the household2 which order is contained in the order of the city2 which order again depends on the ruler of the city2 while this last order depends on that of the king1 by whom the whole kingdom is ordered4 ,if therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause1 ,god cannot do anything against this order2 for1 if ,he did so1 ,he would act against ,his foreknowledge1 or ,his will1 or ,his goodness4 ,but if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause1 thus ,god can do something outside such order2 for ,he is not subject to the order of secondary causes2 but1 on the contrary1 this order is subject to ,him1 as proceeding from ,him1 not by a natural necessity1 but by the choice of ,his own will2 for ,he could have created another order of things4 ,wherefore ,god can do something outside this order created by ,him1 when ,he chooses1 for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them1 or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend4 ,so ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxvi1 #c73 ,god acts against the wonted course of nature1 but by no means does ,he act against the supreme law2 because ,he does not act against ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in natural things something may happen outside this natural order1 in two ways4 ,it may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination2 as1 for example1 when a man moves a heavy body upwards1 which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards2 and that would be against nature4 ,it may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends2 and this is not against nature1 as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide1 which is not against nature2 although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction2 for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body1 on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends4 ,therefore since the order of nature is given to things by ,god2 if ,he does anything outside this order1 it is not against nature4 ,wherefore ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxvi1 #c73 ,that is natural to each thing which is caused by ,him from ,whom is all mode1 number1 and order in nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the order of justice arises by relation to the ,first ,cause1 ,who is the rule of all justice2 and therefore ,god can do nothing against such order4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,god fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time ,he reserved to ,himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause4 ,so when ,he acts outside this order1 ,he does not change4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,whatever ,god ,does ,outside the ,natural ,order ,is ,miraculous8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that not everything which ,god does outside the natural order of things1 is miraculous4 ,for the creation of the world1 and of souls1 and the justification of the unrighteous1 are done by ,god outside the natural order2 as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause4 ,yet these things are not called miracles4 ,therefore not everything that ,god does outside the natural order is a miracle4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a miracle is something difficult1 which seldom occurs1 surpassing the faculty of nature1 and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment 99,st4 ,augustine1 ,de utilitate credendi xvi44 ,but some things outside the order of nature are not arduous2 for they occur in small things1 such as the recovery and healing of the sick4 ,nor are they of rare occurrence1 since they happen frequently2 as when the sick were placed in the streets1 to be healed by the shadow of ,peter 7,acts #e3ae74 ,nor do they surpass the faculty of nature2 as when people are cured of a fever4 ,nor are they beyond our hopes1 since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead1 which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature4 ,therefore not all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the word miracle is derived from admiration4 ,now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses4 ,but sometimes things happen outside the order of nature1 which are not manifest to the senses2 as when the ,apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught4 ,therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,contra ,faust4 xxvi1 #c73 ,where ,god does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe1 we call it a miracle4 ,i answer that1 ,the word miracle is derived from admiration1 which arises when an effect is manifest1 whereas its cause is hidden2 as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause1 as the ,philosopher says in the beginning of his ,metaphysics4 ,now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one1 but unknown to others4 ,wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man1 and not at all to others3 as an eclipse is to a rustic1 but not to an astronomer4 ,now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder2 as having a cause absolutely hidden from all3 and this cause is ,god4 ,wherefore those things which ,god does outside those causes which we know1 are called miracles4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,creation1 and the justification of the unrighteous1 though done by ,god alone1 are not1 properly speaking1 miracles1 because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause2 so they do not occur outside the order of nature1 since they do not belong to that order4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an arduous thing is called a miracle1 not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done1 but because it surpasses the faculty of nature3 likewise a thing is called unusual1 not because it does not often happen1 but because it is outside the usual natural course of things4 ,furthermore1 a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature1 not only by reason of the substance of the thing done1 but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done4 ,again1 a miracle is said to go beyond the hope of nature1 not above the hope of grace1 which hope comes from faith1 whereby we believe in the future resurrection4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the knowledge of the ,apostles1 although not manifest in itself1 yet was made manifest in its effect1 from which it was shown to be wonderful4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aje1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,one ,miracle ,is ,greater ,than ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one miracle is not greater than another4 ,for ,augustine says 7,epist4 ad ,volusian4 cxxxvii73 ,in miraculous deeds1 the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer4 ,but by the same power of ,god all miracles are done4 ,therefore one miracle is not greater than another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the power of ,god is infinite4 ,but the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion2 and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another4 ,therefore one miracle is not greater than another4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,lord says1 speaking of miraculous works 7,john #ad3ab73 ,the works that ,i do1 he also shall do1 and greater than these shall he do4 ,i answer that1 ,nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the ,divine ,power2 because no action is of any account compared with the power of ,god1 according to ,isa4 #dj3ae3 ,behold the ,gentiles are as a drop from a bucket1 and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance4 ,but a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses4 ,so the more the power of nature is surpassed1 the greater the miracle4 ,now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways3 firstly1 in the substance of the deed1 for instance1 if two bodies occupy the same place1 or if the sun goes backwards2 or if a human body is glorified3 such things nature is absolutely unable to do2 and these hold the highest rank among miracles4 ,secondly1 a thing surpasses the power of nature1 not in the deed1 but in that wherein it is done2 as the raising of the dead1 and giving sight to the blind1 and the like2 for nature can give life1 but not to the dead2 and such hold the second rank in miracles4 ,thirdly1 a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is done2 as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly1 without treatment or the usual process of nature2 or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain1 by ,divine power without a natural cause1 as occurred at the prayers of ,samuel and ,elias2 and these hold the lowest place in miracles4 ,moreover1 each of these kinds has various degrees1 according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed4 ,from this is clear how to reply to the objections1 arguing as they do from the ,divine power4 ,,question #ajf ,,how ,,one ,,creature ,,moves ,,another 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider how one creature moves another4 ,this consideration will be threefold3 7#a7 ,how the angels move1 who are purely spiritual creatures2 7#b7 ,how bodies move2 7#c7 ,how man moves1 who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature4 ,concerning the first point1 there are three things to be considered3 7#a7 ,how an angel acts on an angel2 7#b7 ,how an angel acts on a corporeal nature2 7#c7 ,how an angel acts on man4 ,the first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels2 and of their mutual coordination1 both of the good and of the bad angels4 ,concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment8 7#b7 ,whether one angel moves the will of another8 7#c7 ,whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel8 7#d7 ,whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,one ,angel ,enlightens ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one angel does not enlighten another4 ,for the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain4 ,but one man will not then enlighten another1 according to ,jer4 #ca3cd3 ,they shall teach no more every man his neighbor1 and every man his brother4 ,therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 light in the angels is threefold2 of nature1 of grace1 and of glory4 ,but an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the ,creator2 in the light of grace by the ,justifier2 in the light of glory by the ,beatifier2 all of which comes from ,god4 ,therefore one angel does not enlighten another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 light is a form in the mind4 ,but the rational mind is informed by ,god alone1 without created intervention1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #ea74 ,therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 viii7 that the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed1 enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy4 ,i answer that1 ,one angel enlightens another4 ,to make this clear1 we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth1 according to ,eph4 #e3ac3 ,all that is made manifest is light4 ,hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth2 according to the ,apostle 7,eph4 #c3h73 ,to me the least of all the saints is given this grace 4 4 4 to enlighten all men1 that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in ,god4 ,therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii73 ,theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught ,divine science by the higher minds4 ,now since two things concur in the intellectual operation1 as we have said 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #c71 namely1 the intellectual power1 and the likeness of the thing understood2 in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another4 ,first1 by strengthening his intellectual power2 for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body--for instance1 the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter2 so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him3 since in spiritual things1 for one thing to turn to another1 corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things4 ,secondly1 one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood4 ,for the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception1 to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful1 for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner4 ,therefore the superior angel distinguishes1 in a way1 the truth which he conceives universally1 so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel2 and thus he proposes it to his knowledge4 ,thus it is with us that the teacher1 in order to adapt himself to others1 divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal4 ,this is thus expressed by ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 xv73 ,every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to ,god1 so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the angels1 both inferior and superior1 see the ,essence of ,god immediately1 and in this respect one does not teach another4 ,it is of this truth that the prophet speaks2 wherefore he adds3 ,they shall teach no more every man his brother1 saying3 ',know the ,lord'3 for all shall know ,me1 from the least of them even to the greatest4 ,but all the types of the ,divine works1 which are known in ,god as in their cause1 ,god knows in ,himself1 because ,he comprehends ,himself2 but of others who see ,god1 each one knows the more types1 the more perfectly he sees ,god4 ,hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the ,divine works than an inferior angel1 and concerning these the former enlightens the latter2 and as to this ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the angels are enlightened by the types of existing things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature1 grace1 or glory2 but by strengthening his natural light1 and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature1 of grace1 and of glory1 as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the rational mind is formed immediately by ,god1 either as the image from the exemplar1 forasmuch as it is made to the image of ,god alone2 or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form3 for the created mind is always considered to be unformed1 except it adhere to the first truth2 while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel1 are1 as it were1 dispositions to this ultimate form4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #b ,whether one angel moves another angel's will8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one angel can move another angel's will4 ,because1 according to ,dionysius quoted above 7,a4 #a71 as one angel enlightens another1 so does he cleanse and perfect another4 ,but cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will3 for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will2 while to be perfected is to obtain an end1 which is the object of the will4 ,therefore an angel can move another angel's will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii73 ,the names of the angels designate their properties4 ,now the ,seraphim are so called because they kindle or give heat3 and this is by love which belongs to the will4 ,therefore one angel moves another angel's will4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima iii1 #aa7 that the higher appetite moves the lower4 ,but as the intellect of the superior angel is higher1 so also is his will4 ,it seems1 therefore1 that the superior angel can change the will of another angel4 ,on the contrary1 ,to him it belongs to change the will1 to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness3 for righteousness is the rightness of the will4 ,but ,god alone bestows righteousness4 ,therefore one angel cannot change another angel's will4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #d71 the will is changed in two ways2 on the part of the object1 and on the part of the power4 ,on the part of the object1 both the good itself which is the object of the will1 moves the will1 as the appetible moves the appetite2 and he who points out the object1 as1 for instance1 one who proves something to be good4 ,but as we have said above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #d71 other goods in a measure incline the will1 yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good1 and that is ,god4 ,and this good ,he alone shows1 that it may be seen by the blessed1 ,who1 when ,moses asked3 ,show me ,thy glory1 answered3 ,i will show thee all good 7,ex4 #cc3ah1 #ai74 ,therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently1 either as the object or as showing the object4 ,but he inclines the will as something lovable1 and as manifesting some created good ordered to ,god's goodness4 ,and thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of ,god1 by way of persuasion4 ,but on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by ,god4 ,for the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed4 ,and ,he alone can change this inclination1 ,who bestowed on the creature the power to will3 just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination1 which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination4 ,now ,god alone gave to the creature the power to will1 because ,he alone is the author of the intellectual nature4 ,therefore an angel cannot move another angel's will4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment4 ,and since ,god enlightens by changing the intellect and will1 ,he cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will1 and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will4 ,but the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect1 as explained above 7,a4 #a72 therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect2 and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect1 and this is the knowledge of truth4 ,thus ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 vi73 that in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown1 that leads them to more perfect knowledge4 ,for instance1 we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness2 enlightened by the diffusion of light2 and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,one angel can induce another to love ,god by persuasion as explained above4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite1 because it belongs to the same nature of the soul1 and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ4 ,but this does not apply to the angels4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,inferior ,angel ,can ,enlighten a ,superior ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel4 ,for the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from1 and represents the heavenly hierarchy2 and hence the heavenly ,jerusalem is called our mother 7,gal4 #d3bf74 ,but in the ,church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors1 as the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ad3ca73 ,you may all prophesy one by one1 that all may learn and all may be exhorted4 ,therefore1 likewise in the heavenly hierarchy1 the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of ,god1 so also does the order of spiritual substances4 ,but1 as was said above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #f71 ,god sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances4 ,therefore ,he also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances1 by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors4 ,therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by ,god can enlighten superiors4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns1 as was above explained 7,a4 #a74 ,but since this turning to another is voluntary1 the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others4 ,therefore he can enlighten him immediately2 and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says that this is the ,divine unalterable law1 that inferior things are led to ,god by the superior 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv2 ,eccl4 ,hier4 v74 ,i answer that1 ,the inferior angels never enlighten the superior1 but are always enlightened by them4 ,the reason is1 because1 as above explained 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #f71 one order is under another1 as cause is under cause2 and hence as cause is ordered to cause1 so is order to order4 ,therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause1 to be ordered to the superior cause1 as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince4 ,so it happens that ,god works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature1 that men may be ordered to the knowledge of ,him4 ,but the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to ,god2 since the angelic operations are not made known to us2 as are the operations of sensible bodies4 ,thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by ,god2 so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior1 and not conversely4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree1 but not by a perfect likeness4 ,for in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to ,god2 so that those who are the nearer to ,god are the more sublime in grade1 and more clear in knowledge2 and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors1 whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy1 sometimes those who are the nearer to ,god in sanctity1 are in the lowest grade1 and are not conspicuous for science2 and some also are eminent in one kind of science1 and fail in another2 and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as above explained1 there is no similarity between what ,god does outside the order of corporeal nature1 and that of spiritual nature4 ,hence the argument does not hold4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel1 but the angel's will is ever regulated by the ,divine law which made the order in the angels4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajf1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,superior ,angel ,enlightens the ,inferior ,as ,regards ,all ,he ,himself ,knows8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xii7 that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge2 and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge4 ,but more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge4 ,therefore not all that the superior angels know1 is known by the inferior1 through these being enlightened by the former4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,master of the ,sentences 7ii1 ,d1 #aa7 says that the superior angels had long known the ,mystery of the ,incarnation1 whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished4 ,thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring1 as it were1 in ignorance3 ,who is this ,king of glory8 other angels1 who knew1 answered3 ,the ,lord of ,hosts1 ,he is the ,king of glory1 as ,dionysius expounds 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74 ,but this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves4 ,therefore they do not do so4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know1 nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels4 ,therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior2 which appears open to objection4 ,therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory 99,peter ,lombard1 ,sent4 ii1 ,d1 ix2 ,cf4 ,gregory1 ,hom4 xxxiv1 in ,ev4 says3 ,in that heavenly country1 though there are some excellent gifts1 yet nothing is held individually4 ,and ,dionysius says3 ,each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior 7,coel4 ,hier4 xv71 as quoted above 7,a4 #a74 ,i answer that1 ,every creature participates in the ,divine goodness1 so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others2 for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others4 ,hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can4 ,so the more an agent is established in the share of the ,divine goodness1 so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible4 ,hence the ,blessed ,peter admonishes those who by grace share in the ,divine goodness2 saying3 ,as every man hath received grace1 ministering the same one to another2 as good stewards of the manifold grace of ,god 7#a ,pet4 #d3aj74 ,much more therefore do the holy angels1 who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the ,divine goodness1 impart the same to those below them4 ,nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels2 and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order1 and have a more perfect knowledge2 as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the ,master's words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the ,mystery of the ,incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels2 and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the ,mystery was accomplished4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,till the ,judgment ,day some new things are always being revealed by ,god to the highest angels1 concerning the course of the world1 and especially the salvation of the elect4 ,hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior4 ,,question #ajg ,,the ,,speech ,,of ,,the ,,angels 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we next consider the speech of the angels4 ,here there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether one angel speaks to another8 7#b7 ,whether the inferior speaks to the superior8 7#c7 ,whether an angel speaks to ,god8 7#d7 ,whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance8 7#e7 ,whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,one ,angel ,speaks to ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one angel does not speak to another4 ,for ,gregory says 7,moral4 xviii7 that1 in the state of the resurrection each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows4 ,much less1 therefore1 is one angel's mind hidden from another4 ,but speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind4 ,therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 speech is twofold2 interior1 whereby one speaks to oneself2 and exterior1 whereby one speaks to another4 ,but exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign1 as by voice1 or gesture1 or some bodily member1 as the tongue1 or the fingers1 and this cannot apply to the angels4 ,therefore one angel does not speak to another4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says4 ,but it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen2 for this happens among us by some sensible sign4 ,therefore one angel does not speak to another4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ac3a73 ,if ,i speak with the tongues of men and of angels4 ,i answer that1 ,the angels speak in a certain way4 ,but1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii73 ,it is fitting that our mind1 rising above the properties of bodily speech1 should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech4 ,to understand how one angel speaks to another1 we must consider that1 as we explained above 7,q4 #hb1 ,a4 #d71 when treating of the actions and powers of the soul1 the will moves the intellect to its operation4 ,now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways2 first1 habitually1 or in the memory1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 xiv1 #f1 #g72 secondly1 as actually considered or conceived2 thirdly1 as related to something else4 ,and it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will1 and hence in the definition of habit these words occur1 which anyone uses when he wills4 ,so likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will2 for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else1 as1 for instance1 either to the performing of an action1 or to being made known to another4 ,now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge1 then a person speaks to himself2 for the concept of the mind is called the interior word4 ,and by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself1 the concept of one angel is made known to another2 and in this way one angel speaks to another2 for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle4 ,the first is in the will1 which can retain the mental concept within1 or can direct it externally4 ,in this way ,god alone can see the mind of another1 according to #a ,cor4 #b3aa3 ,what man knoweth the things of a man1 but the spirit of a man that is in him8 ,the other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge1 comes from the body2 and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known1 it is not at once make known to another2 but some sensible sign must be used4 ,gregory alludes to this fact when he says 7,moral4 ii73 ,to other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body2 and when we wish to make ourselves known1 we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are4 ,but an angel is under no such obstacle1 and so he can make his concept known to another at once4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,external speech1 made by the voice1 is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body4 ,hence it does not befit an angel2 but only interior speech belongs to him1 and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept1 but also its being ordered to another's knowledge by the will4 ,so the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel's power1 whereby he manifests his mental concept4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is no need to draw the attention of the good angels1 inasmuch as they always see each other in the ,word2 for as one ever sees the other1 so he ever sees what is ordered to himself4 ,but because by their very nature they can speak to each other1 and even now the bad angels speak to each other1 we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object4 ,therefore1 as sense is aroused by the sensible object1 so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,inferior ,angel ,speaks to the ,superior8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior4 ,for on the text 7#a ,cor4 #ac3a71 ,if ,i speak with the tongues of men and of angels1 a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior4 ,but the inferior never enlightens the superior1 as was above explained 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as was said above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a71 to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another2 and this is to speak4 ,therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same2 so the same conclusion follows4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii73 ,god speaks to the angels by the very fact that ,he shows to their hearts ,his hidden and invisible things4 ,but this is to enlighten them4 ,therefore1 whenever ,god speaks1 ,he enlightens4 ,in the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening4 ,therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel4 ,on the contrary1 ,according to the exposition of ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 the inferior angels said to the superior3 ,who is this ,king of ,glory8 ,i answer that1 ,the inferior angels can speak to the superior4 ,to make this clear1 we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech2 but on the other hand1 not every speech is an enlightening2 because1 as we have said 7,a4 #a71 for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else1 but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way1 that it becomes known to the other4 ,now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle2 to ,god ,himself1 ,who is the primal truth2 and to the will of the one who understands1 whereby we actually consider anything4 ,but because truth is the light of the intellect1 and ,god ,himself is the rule of all truth2 the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind1 as depending on the primary truth1 is both speech and enlightenment2 for example1 when one man says to another3 ,heaven was created by ,god2 or1 ,man is an animal4 ,the manifestation1 however1 of what depends on the will of the one who understands1 cannot be called an enlightenment1 but is only a speech2 for instance1 when one says to another3 ,i wish to learn this2 ,i wish to do this or that4 ,the reason is that the created will is not a light1 nor a rule of truth2 but participates of light4 ,hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not1 as such1 an enlightening4 ,for to know what you may will1 or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect2 but only to know the truth in reality4 ,now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle1 ,god2 and therefore enlightenment1 which depends on the principle which is ,god1 is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior4 ,but as regards the will as the principle1 he who wills is first and supreme2 and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will1 is conveyed to others by the one who wills4 ,in that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior1 and the inferior speak to the superior4 ,from this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,every speech of ,god to the angels is an enlightening2 because since the will of ,god is the rule of truth1 it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what ,god wills4 ,but the same does not apply to the will of the angels1 as was explained above4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,angel ,speaks to ,god8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel does not speak to ,god4 ,for speech makes known something to another4 ,but an angel cannot make known anything to ,god1 ,who knows all things4 ,therefore an angel does not speak to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another1 as was shown above 7,a4 #a74 ,but an angel ever orders his mental concept to ,god4 ,so if an angel speaks to ,god1 he ever speaks to ,god2 which in some ways appears to be unreasonable1 since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel4 ,therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,zech4 #a3ab73 ,the angel of the ,lord answered and said3 ,o ,lord of hosts1 how long wilt ,thou not have mercy on ,jerusalem4 ,therefore an angel speaks to ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,as was said above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else4 ,now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner4 ,in one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another1 as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient1 and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner2 and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to ,god either of what concerns the truth1 or of whatever depends on the created will2 because ,god is the principle and source of all truth and of all will4 ,in another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something1 as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent1 and in human speech the disciple to the master2 and in this way an angel speaks to ,god1 either by consulting the ,divine will of what ought to be done1 or by admiring the ,divine excellence which he can never comprehend2 thus ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii7 that the angels speak to ,god1 when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another2 but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself2 as when the disciples ask instruction from the master4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angels are ever speaking to ,god in the sense of praising and admiring ,him and ,his works2 but they speak to ,him by consulting ,him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work1 concerning which they desire enlightenment4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,local ,distance ,influences the ,angelic ,speech8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech4 ,for as ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #ac73 ,an angel works where he is4 ,but speech is an angelic operation4 ,therefore1 as an angel is in a determinate place1 it seems that an angel's speech is limited by the bounds of that place4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer4 ,but it is said of the ,seraphim that they cried one to another 7,isa4 #f3c74 ,therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said that the rich man in hell spoke to ,abraham1 notwithstanding the local distance 7,luke #af3bd74 ,much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another4 ,i answer that1 ,the angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation1 as explained above 7,,aa4 #a1 #b1 #c74 ,and the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the here and now4 ,for even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the here and now1 except accidentally on the part of the phantasms1 which do not exist at all in an angel4 ,but as regards whatever is abstracted from here and now1 neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever4 ,hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the angelic speech1 as above explained 7,a4 #a1 ad #b71 is interior2 perceived1 nevertheless1 by another2 and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks1 and consequently where the angel is who speaks4 ,but as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another1 so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another2 and this is to perceive his speech4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance2 but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said1 or the intensity of the affection1 according to what ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii73 ,the less one desires1 the less one cries out4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajg1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,all the ,angels ,know ,what ,one ,speaks to ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another4 ,for unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another4 ,but in the angelic speech local distance has no effect1 as above explained 7,a4 #d74 ,therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 all the angels have the intellectual power in common4 ,so if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one1 it is for the same reason known by all4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 enlightenment is a kind of speech4 ,but the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels1 because1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xv73 ,each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others4 ,therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all4 ,on the contrary1 ,one man can speak to another alone2 much more can this be the case among the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,as above explained 7,,aa4 #a1 #b71 the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another4 ,now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another2 consequently the concept of one 7angel7 may be known by one and not by another2 and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another2 whereas others do not1 not through the obstacle of local distance1 but on account of the will so ordering1 as explained above4 ,from this appear the replies to the first and second objections4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth1 which is the principle common to all the angels2 and in that way all enlightenments are common to all4 ,but speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will1 which is proper to each angel2 and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all4 ,,question #ajh ,,of ,,the ,,angelic ,,degrees ,,of ,,hierarchies ,,and ,,orders 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders2 for it was said above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #c71 that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels2 and not conversely4 ,under this head there are eight points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy8 7#b7 ,whether in one hierarchy there is only one order8 7#c7 ,whether in one order there are many angels8 7#d7 ,whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural8 7#e7 ,of the names and properties of each order4 7#f7 ,of the comparison of the orders to one another4 7#g7 ,whether the orders will outlast the ,day of ,judgment8 7#h7 ,whether men are taken up into the angelic orders8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,all the ,angels ,are of ,one ,hierarchy8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy4 ,for since the angels are supreme among creatures1 it is evident that they are ordered for the best4 ,but the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority1 as the ,philosopher shows 7,metaph4 xii1 ,did4 xi1 #aj2 ,polit4 iii1 #d74 ,therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality1 it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iii7 that hierarchy is order1 knowledge1 and action4 ,but all the angels agree in one order towards ,god1 ,whom they know1 and by ,whom in their actions they are ruled4 ,therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels4 ,but all men are of one hierarchy4 ,therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vi7 distinguishes three hierarchies of angels4 ,i answer that1 ,hierarchy means a sacred principality1 as above explained4 ,now principality includes two things3 the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince4 ,therefore because there is one ,god1 the ,prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures2 so there is one hierarchy1 not only of all the angels1 but also of all rational creatures1 who can be participators of sacred things2 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #a73 ,there are two cities1 that is1 two societies1 one of the good angels and men1 the other of the wicked4 ,but if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince1 then principality is said to be one accordingly as the multitude can be subject in one way to the government of the prince4 ,and those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities3 thus1 under one king there are different cities1 which are governed by different laws and administrators4 ,now it is evident that men do not receive the ,divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels2 for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity1 whereas men receive them under sensible signs1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i74 ,therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy4 ,in the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies4 ,for it was shown above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c71 in treating of the angelic knowledge1 that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels4 ,this universal knowledge has three grades among the angels4 ,for the types of things1 concerning which the angels are enlightened1 can be considered in a threefold manner4 ,first as preceding from ,god as the first universal principle1 which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy1 connected immediately with ,god1 and1 as it were1 placed in the vestibule of ,god1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74 ,secondly1 forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied2 which mode belongs to the second hierarchy4 ,thirdly1 forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes2 which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy4 ,all this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders 7,a4 #f74 ,in this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects4 ,hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of ,dionysius who place a hierarchy in the ,divine ,persons1 and call it the supercelestial hierarchy4 ,for in the ,divine ,persons there exists1 indeed1 a natural order1 but there is no hierarchical order1 for as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iii73 ,the hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed1 enlightened1 and perfected2 and that others cleanse1 enlighten1 and perfect2 which far be it from us to apply to the ,divine ,persons4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this objection considers principality on the part of the ruler1 inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler1 as the ,philosopher asserts in those passages4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as regards knowing ,god ,himself1 ,whom all see in one way--that is1 in ,his essence--there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels2 but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,all men are of one species1 and have one connatural mode of understanding2 which is not the case in the angels3 and hence the same argument does not apply to both4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,several ,orders in ,one ,hierarchy8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders4 ,for when a definition is multiplied1 the thing defined is also multiplied4 ,but hierarchy is order1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iii74 ,therefore1 if there are many orders1 there is not one hierarchy only1 but many4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 different orders are different grades1 and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts4 ,but among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all1 for nothing is possessed individually 7,sent4 ii1 ,d1 ix74 ,therefore there are not different orders of angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of cleansing1 enlightening1 and perfecting4 ,for the order of deacons is cleansing1 the order of priests1 is enlightening1 and of bishops perfecting1 as ,dionysius says 7,eccl4 ,hier4 v74 ,but each of the angels cleanses1 enlightens1 and perfects4 ,therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #a3bj1ba7 that ,god has set the ,man ,christ above all principality and power1 and virtue1 and dominion3 which are the various orders of the angels1 and some of them belong to one hierarchy1 as will be explained 7,a4 #f74 ,i answer that1 ,as explained above1 one hierarchy is one principality--that is1 one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince4 ,now such a multitude would not be ordered1 but confused1 if there were not in it different orders4 ,so the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders4 ,this diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions1 as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions2 for there is one order of those who judge1 and another of those who fight1 and another of those who labor in the fields1 and so forth4 ,but although one city thus comprises several orders1 all may be reduced to three1 when we consider that every multitude has a beginning1 a middle1 and an end4 ,so in every city1 a threefold order of men is to be seen1 some of whom are supreme1 as the nobles2 others are the last1 as the common people1 while others hold a place between these1 as the middle-class populus honorabilis4 ,in the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices1 and all this diversity is reduced to three--namely1 to the summit1 the middle1 and the base2 and so in every hierarchy ,dionysius places three orders 7,coel4 ,hier4 vi74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,order is twofold4 ,in one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades2 and in that way a hierarchy is called an order4 ,in another way one grade is called an order2 and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,all things are possessed in common by the angelic society1 some things1 however1 being held more excellently by some than by others4 ,each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it1 than by the one who cannot communicate it2 as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat4 ,and the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift1 the higher grade he occupies1 as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science4 ,by this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels1 according to their different offices and actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy1 according to the words1 ,he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven1 is greater than he--namely1 ,john the ,baptist1 than whom there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women 7,matt4 #aa3aa74 ,hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse1 but also enlighten and perfect1 and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy4 ,thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these1 but by reason of other different acts4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,are ,many ,angels in ,one ,order8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that there are not many angels in one order4 ,for it was shown above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #d71 that all the angels are unequal4 ,but equals belong to one order4 ,therefore there are not many angels in one order4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many1 which can be done sufficiently by one4 ,but that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel2 so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun1 as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body4 ,if1 therefore1 the orders are distinguished by their offices1 as stated above 7,a4 #b71 several angels in one order would be superfluous4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it was said above 7,obj4 #a7 that all the angels are unequal4 ,therefore1 if several angels 7for instance1 three or four71 are of one order1 the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order2 and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former4 ,therefore there are not many angels of one order4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written3 ,the ,seraphim cried to one another 7,isa4 #f3c74 ,therefore there are many angels in the one order of the ,seraphim4 ,i answer that1 ,whoever knows anything perfectly1 is able to distinguish its acts1 powers1 and nature1 down to the minutest details1 whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way1 and only as regards a few points4 ,thus1 one who knows natural things imperfectly1 can distinguish their orders in a general way1 placing the heavenly bodies in one order1 inanimate inferior bodies in another1 plants in another1 and animals in another2 whilst he who knows natural things perfectly1 is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves1 and in each of the other orders4 ,now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vi74 ,hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way1 so as to place many angels in one order4 ,but if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly1 we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things1 and much more so than any star1 though this be hidden from us4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude1 whereby they are placed in that order2 but absolutely speaking they are not equal4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 x7 that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first1 middle1 and last4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,that special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order1 is hidden from us4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as in a surface which is partly white and partly black1 the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts1 but are less akin in quality2 so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order1 but less akin in their fitness for similar offices1 which fitness1 indeed1 extends to a definite limit4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,distinction of ,hierarchies and ,orders ,comes from the ,angelic ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels4 ,for hierarchy is a sacred principality1 and ,dionysius places in its definition that it approaches a resemblance to ,god1 as far as may be 7,coel4 ,hier4 iii74 ,but sanctity and resemblance to ,god is in the angels by grace1 and not by nature4 ,therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace1 and not by nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,seraphim are called burning or kindling1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii74 ,this belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace2 for it is poured forth in our hearts by the ,holy ,ghost ,who is given to us 7,rom4 #e3e73 which is said not only of holy men1 but also of the holy angels1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii74 ,therefore the angelic orders are not from nature1 but from grace4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly4 ,but the orders among men are not from nature1 but by the gift of grace2 for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop1 and another a priest1 and another a deacon4 ,therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature1 but from grace only4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,master says 7ii1 ,d4 #i7 that an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits1 who are likened to each other by some gift of grace1 just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts4 ,therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace1 but also by gifts of nature4 ,i answer that1 ,the order of government1 which is the order of a multitude under authority1 is derived from its end4 ,now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways4 ,first1 according to the faculty of nature1 so that they may know and love ,god by natural knowledge and love2 and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts4 ,secondly1 the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers1 which consists in the vision of the ,divine ,essence1 and in the unchangeable fruition of ,his goodness2 to which end they can reach only by grace2 and hence as regards this end1 the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace1 but dispositively by natural gifts1 forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts2 which is not the case with men1 as above explained 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #f74 ,hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only1 and not according to natural gifts4 ,from the above the replies to the objections are evident4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #e ,whether the ,orders of the ,angels ,are ,properly ,named8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named4 ,for all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues4 ,but common names should not be appropriated to individuals4 ,therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it belongs to ,god alone to be ,lord1 according to the words1 ,know ye that the ,lord ,he is ,god 7,ps4 #ii3c74 ,therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called ,dominations4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the name ,domination seems to imply government and likewise the names ,principalities and ,powers4 ,therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 archangels are as it were angel princes4 ,therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the ,principalities4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 the name ,seraphim is derived from ardor1 which pertains to charity2 and the name ,cherubim from knowledge4 ,but charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels4 ,therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders4 ,obj4 #f3 ,further1 ,thrones are seats4 ,but from the fact that ,god knows and loves the rational creature ,he is said to sit within it4 ,therefore there ought not to be any order of ,thrones besides the ,cherubim and ,seraphim4 ,therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled4 ,on the contrary is the authority of ,holy ,scripture wherein they are so named4 ,for the name ,seraphim is found in ,isa4 #f3b2 the name ,cherubim in ,ezech4 #a 7,cf4 #aj3ae1bj72 ,thrones in ,col4 #a3af2 ,dominations1 ,virtues1 ,powers1 and ,principalities are mentioned in ,eph4 #a3ba2 the name ,archangels in the canonical epistle of ,st4 ,jude 7#i71 and the name ,angels is found in many places of ,scripture4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property4 ,now to see what is the property of each order1 we must consider that in coordinated things1 something may be found in a threefold manner3 by way of property1 by way of excess1 and by way of participation4 ,a thing is said to be in another by way of property1 if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature3 by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed1 but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner1 as we have stated 7,q4 #ac1 ,a4 #b7 concerning all the names which are attributed to ,god3 by participation1 when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially2 thus holy men are called gods by participation4 ,therefore1 if anything is to be called by a name designating its property1 it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly1 nor from that which it possesses in excess1 but from that which is adequate thereto2 as1 for instance1 when we wish properly to name a man1 we should call him a rational substance1 but not an intellectual substance1 which latter is the proper name of an angel2 because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property1 and to man by participation2 nor do we call him a sensible substance1 which is the proper name of a brute2 because sense is less than the property of a man1 and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals4 ,so we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels1 and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels4 ,further1 as in these perfections there are grades1 the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property1 whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation2 and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property1 and to the superior by way of excess2 and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection4 ,so in this way ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify4 ,gregory1 on the other hand1 in expounding these names 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang47 seems to regard more the exterior ministrations2 for he says that angels are so called as announcing the least things2 and the archangels in the greatest2 by the virtues miracles are wrought2 by the powers hostile powers are repulsed2 and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,angel means messenger4 ,so all the heavenly spirits1 so far as they make known ,divine things1 are called angels4 ,but the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence1 as regards this manifestation1 from which the superior orders are denominated4 ,the lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation2 and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only2 and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 v74 ,or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of angels1 forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately4 ,virtue can be taken in two ways4 ,first1 commonly1 considered as the medium between the essence and the operation1 and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues1 as also heavenly essences4 ,secondly1 as meaning a certain excellence of strength2 and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order4 ,hence ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 viii7 that the name 'virtues' signifies a certain virile and immovable strength2 first1 in regard of those ,divine operations which befit them2 secondly1 in regard to receiving ,divine gifts4 ,thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the ,divine behests appointed to them2 and this seems to imply strength of mind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 xii73 ,dominion is attributed to ,god in a special manner1 by way of excess3 but the ,divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of ,lord by participation1 through whom the inferior angels receive the ,divine gifts4 ,hence ,dionysius also states 7,coel4 ,hier4 viii7 that the name ,domination means first a certain liberty1 free from servile condition and common subjection1 such as that of plebeians1 and from tyrannical oppression1 endured sometimes even by the great4 ,secondly1 it signifies a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act1 or to the act of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants4 ,thirdly1 it signifies the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to ,god4 ,likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to ,god2 as the name ,virtues signifies the participation of the ,divine virtue2 and the same principle applies to the rest4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the names ,domination1 ,power1 and ,principality belong to government in different ways4 ,the place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done4 ,so ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxiv in ,evang471 that some companies of the angels1 because others are subject to obedience to them1 are called dominations4 ,the name ,power points out a kind of order1 according to what the ,apostle says1 ,he that resisteth the power1 resisteth the ordination of ,god 7,rom4 #ac3b74 ,and so ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 viii7 that the name ,power signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of ,divine things1 and as regards the ,divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above4 ,therefore1 to the order of ,powers it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them4 ,to preside principari as ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxiv in ,ev47 is to be first among others1 as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done4 ,and so ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 ix7 that the name of ,principalities signifies one who leads in a sacred order4 ,for those who lead others1 being first among them1 are properly called princes1 according to the words1 ,princes went before joined with singers 7,ps4 #fg3bf74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the ,archangels1 according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 ix71 are between the ,principalities and the ,angels4 ,a medium compared to one extreme seems like the other1 as participating in the nature of both extremes2 thus tepid seems cold compared to hot1 and hot compared to cold4 ,so the ,archangels are called the angel princes2 forasmuch as they are princes as regards the ,angels1 and angels as regards the ,principalities4 ,but according to ,gregory 7,hom4 xxiv in ,ev47 they are called ,archangels1 because they preside over the one order of the ,angels2 as it were1 announcing greater things3 and the ,principalities are so called as presiding over all the heavenly ,virtues who fulfil the ,divine commands4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the name ,seraphim does not come from charity only1 but from the excess of charity1 expressed by the word ardor or fire4 ,hence ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 expounds the name ,seraphim according to the properties of fire1 containing an excess of heat4 ,now in fire we may consider three things4 ,first1 the movement which is upwards and continuous4 ,this signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards ,god4 ,secondly1 the active force which is heat1 which is not found in fire simply1 but exists with a certain sharpness1 as being of most penetrating action1 and reaching even to the smallest things1 and as it were1 with superabundant fervor2 whereby is signified the action of these angels1 exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them1 rousing them to a like fervor1 and cleansing them wholly by their heat4 ,thirdly we consider in fire the quality of clarity1 or brightness2 which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light1 and that they also perfectly enlighten others4 ,in the same way the name ,cherubim comes from a certain excess of knowledge2 hence it is interpreted fulness of knowledge1 which ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 expounds in regard to four things3 the perfect vision of ,god2 the full reception of the ,divine ,light2 their contemplation in ,god of the beauty of the ,divine order2 and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully1 they pour it forth copiously upon others4 ,reply ,obj4 #f3 ,the order of the ,thrones excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the ,divine works2 whereas the ,cherubim have the excellence of knowledge and the ,seraphim the excellence of ardor4 ,and although these two excellent attributes include the third1 yet the gift belonging to the ,thrones does not include the other two2 and so the order of the ,thrones is distinguished from the orders of the ,cherubim and the ,seraphim4 ,for it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior1 but not conversely4 ,but ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii7 explains the name ,thrones by its relation to material seats1 in which we may consider four things4 ,first1 the site2 because seats are raised above the earth1 and to the angels who are called ,thrones are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in ,god4 ,secondly1 because in material seats is displayed strength1 forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them4 ,but here the reverse is the case2 for the angels themselves are made firm by ,god4 ,thirdly1 because the seat receives him who sits thereon1 and he can be carried thereupon2 and so the angels receive ,god in themselves1 and in a certain way bear ,him to the inferior creatures4 ,fourthly1 because in its shape1 a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter2 and thus are the angels promptly open to receive ,god and to serve ,him4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,grades of the ,orders ,are ,properly ,assigned8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned4 ,for the order of prelates is the highest4 ,but the names of ,dominations1 ,principalities1 and ,powers of themselves imply prelacy4 ,therefore these orders ought not to be supreme4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the nearer an order is to ,god1 the higher it is4 ,but the order of ,thrones is the nearest to ,god2 for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat4 ,therefore the order of the ,thrones is the highest4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 knowledge comes before love1 and intellect is higher than will4 ,therefore the order of ,cherubim seems to be higher than the ,seraphim4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,gregory 7,hom4 xxiv in ,evang47 places the ,principalities above the ,powers4 ,these therefore are not placed immediately above the ,archangels1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 ix74 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 places in the highest hierarchy the ,seraphim as the first1 the ,cherubim as the middle1 the ,thrones as the last2 in the middle hierarchy he places the ,dominations1 as the first1 the ,virtues in the middle1 the ,powers last2 in the lowest hierarchy the ,principalities first1 then the ,archangels1 and lastly the ,angels4 ,i answer that1 ,the grades of the angelic orders are assigned by ,gregory 7,hom4 xxiv in ,ev47 and ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii71 who agree as regards all except the ,principalities and ,virtues4 ,for ,dionysius places the ,virtues beneath the ,dominations1 and above the ,powers2 the ,principalities beneath the ,powers and above the ,archangels4 ,gregory1 however1 places the ,principalities between the ,dominations and the ,powers2 and the ,virtues between the ,powers and the ,archangels4 ,each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the ,apostle1 who 7,eph4 #a3bj1ba7 enumerates the middle orders1 beginning from the lowest saying that ,god set ,him1 i4e4 ,christ1 on ,his right hand in the heavenly places above all ,principality and ,power1 and ,virtue1 and ,dominion4 ,here he places ,virtues between ,powers and ,dominations1 according to the placing of ,dionysius4 ,writing however to the ,colossians 7#a3af71 numbering the same orders from the highest1 he says3 ,whether ,thrones1 or ,dominations1 or ,principalities1 or ,powers1 all things were created by ,him and in ,him4 ,here he places the ,principalities between ,dominations and ,powers1 as does also ,gregory4 ,let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of ,dionysius1 in which we see1 that1 as said above 7,a4 #a71 the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in ,god ,himself2 the second in the universal causes2 and third in their application to particular effects4 ,and because ,god is the end not only of the angelic ministrations1 but also of the whole creation1 it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end2 to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done2 and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect1 which is the carrying out of the work2 for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation4 ,so ,dionysius1 considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names1 places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to ,god1 the ,seraphim1 ,cherubim1 and ,thrones2 and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition--the ,dominations1 ,virtues1 and ,powers2 and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work1 the ,principalities1 ,angels1 and ,archangels4 ,as regards the end1 three things may be considered4 ,for firstly we consider the end2 then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end2 thirdly1 we fix our intention on the end2 of which the second is an addition to the first1 and the third an addition to both4 ,and because ,god is the end of creatures1 as the leader is the end of an army1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 xii1 ,did4 xi1 #aj72 so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs4 ,for there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader2 others in addition are privileged to know his secrets2 and others above these ever abide with him1 in a close union4 ,according to this similitude1 we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy2 for the ,thrones are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of ,god in themselves1 in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in ,himself2 and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy4 ,the ,cherubim know the ,divine secrets supereminently2 and the ,seraphim excel in what is the supreme excellence of all1 in being united to ,god ,himself2 and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the ,thrones2 as1 from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together1 they are all called ,angels4 ,as regards government1 three things are comprised therein1 the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done1 and this belongs to the ,dominations2 the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done1 which belongs to the ,virtues2 the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others1 which belongs to the ,powers4 ,the execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing ,divine things4 ,now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders2 as in singing1 the precentors2 and in war1 generals and officers2 this belongs to the ,principalities4 ,there are others who simply execute what is to be done2 and these are the ,angels4 ,others hold a middle place2 and these are the ,archangels1 as above explained4 ,this explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one4 ,for the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order2 as the lowest animals are near to the plants4 ,now the first order is that of the ,divine ,persons1 which terminates in the ,holy ,ghost1 ,who is ,love proceeding1 with ,whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity1 denominated as it is from the fire of love4 ,the lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the ,thrones1 who in their own order are akin to the ,dominations2 for the ,thrones1 according to ,gregory 7,hom4 xxiv in ,ev471 are so called because through them ,god accomplishes ,his judgments1 since they are enlightened by ,him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy1 to which belongs the disposition of the ,divine ministrations4 ,the order of the ,powers is akin to the order of the ,principalities2 for as it belongs to the ,powers to impose order on those subject to them1 this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of ,principalities1 who1 as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms 7which occupies the first and principal place in the ,divine ministrations71 are the first in the execution thereof2 for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man 7,ethic4 i1 #b72 and hence it is written1 ,the prince of the kingdom of the ,persians resisted me 7,dan4 #aj3ac74 ,the disposition of the orders which is mentioned by ,gregory is also reasonable4 ,for since the ,dominations appoint and order what belongs to the ,divine ministrations1 the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the ,divine ministrations are effected4 ,still1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii71 bodies are ruled in a certain order2 the inferior by the superior2 and all of them by the spiritual creature1 and the bad spirit by the good spirit4 ,so the first order after the ,dominations is called that of ,principalities1 who rule even over good spirits2 then the ,powers1 who coerce the evil spirits2 even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers1 as it is written 7,rom4 #ac3c1d74 ,after these come the ,virtues1 which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles2 after these are the ,angels and the ,archangels1 who announce to men either great things above reason1 or small things within the purview of reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the angels' subjection to ,god is greater than their presiding over inferior things2 and the latter is derived from the former4 ,thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest2 but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the nearness to ,god designated by the name of the ,thrones1 belongs also to the ,cherubim and ,seraphim1 and in a more excellent way1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as above explained 7,q4 #bg1 ,a4 #c71 knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower2 but love as the lover is united to the object loved4 ,now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things2 whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves4 ,therefore to know lower things is better than to love them2 and to love the higher things1 ,god above all1 is better than to know them4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to ,dionysius and ,gregory4 ,for ,gregory expounds the name ,principalities from their presiding over good spirits1 which also agrees with the ,virtues accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength1 giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the ,divine ministrations4 ,again1 according to ,gregory1 the ,virtues seem to be the same as ,principalities of ,dionysius4 ,for to work miracles holds the first place in the ,divine ministrations2 since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the ,archangels and the ,angels4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #g ,whether the ,orders ,will ,outlast the ,day of ,judgment8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the ,day of ,judgment4 ,for the ,apostle says 7#a ,cor4 #ae3bd71 that ,christ will bring to naught all principality and power1 when ,he shall have delivered up the kingdom to ,god and the ,father1 and this will be in the final consummation4 ,therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse1 enlighten1 and perfect4 ,but after the ,day of ,judgment one angel will not cleanse1 enlighten1 or perfect another1 because they will not advance any more in knowledge4 ,therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,apostle says of the angels 7,heb4 #a3ad71 that they are all ministering spirits1 sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation2 whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation4 ,but all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the ,day of ,judgment4 ,therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the ,day of ,judgment4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,judges #e3bj73 ,stars remaining in their order and courses1 which is applied to the angels4 ,therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders4 ,i answer that1 ,in the angelic orders we may consider two things2 the distinction of grades1 and the execution of their offices4 ,the distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature1 as above explained 7,a4 #d72 and these differences will ever remain in the angels2 for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted4 ,the difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit4 ,as to the execution of the angelic offices1 it will to a certain degree remain after the ,day of ,judgment1 and to a certain degree will cease4 ,it will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end2 but it will remain1 accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end4 ,thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end2 because when the end is attained1 it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end4 ,this is clear from the words of the ,apostle1 ,when ,he shall have delivered up the kingdom of ,god and the ,father1 i4e4 when ,he shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of ,god ,himself4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions4 ,in ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect2 as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms4 ,now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge1 but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired4 ,a proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion1 but not knowledge2 as he is ignorant of the order of the causes4 ,so1 since the inferior angels know the types of the ,divine works by the light of the superior angels1 their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge1 but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed4 ,so1 although after the ,judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things1 still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although after the ,day of ,judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels1 still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #ajh1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,men ,are ,taken ,up into the ,angelic ,orders8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels4 ,for the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy1 as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first4 ,but the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle1 or the first4 ,therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 certain offices belong to the orders of the angels1 as to guard1 to work miracles1 to coerce the demons1 and the like2 which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints4 ,therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as the good angels lead on to good1 so do the demons to what is evil4 ,but it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons2 for ,chrysostom rejects this 7,hom4 xxviii in ,matt474 ,therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,lord says of the saints that1 they will be as the angels of ,god 7,matt4 #bb3cj74 ,i answer that1 ,as above explained 7,,aa4 #d1g71 the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace4 ,considered only as regards the grade of nature1 men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders2 for the natural distinction will always remain4 ,in view of this distinction1 some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels2 but this is erroneous1 contradicting as it does the promise of ,christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven 7,luke #bj3cf74 ,for whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order2 whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of ,god1 and not on the order of nature4 ,therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels1 in each of the angelic grades2 and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels4 ,some1 however1 say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders1 but only virgins or the perfect2 and that the other will constitute their own order1 as it were1 corresponding to the whole society of the angels4 ,but this is against what ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xii1 #i71 that there will not be two societies of men and angels1 but only one2 because the beatitude of all is to cleave to ,god alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts4 ,this1 however1 does not apply to men1 as above explained 7,a4 #d2 ,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #f74 ,so1 as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior1 neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace2 whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace1 but not of nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angels according to the order of nature are between us and ,god2 and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them1 but also all corporeal matters4 ,but holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves2 and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs1 nor do they interfere in the things of the living1 as ,augustine says 7,de cura pro mortuis xiii1 xvi74 ,still1 by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices2 by working miracles1 by coercing the demons1 or by doing something of that kind1 as ,augustine says 7,de cura pro mortuis xvi74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,it is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons2 but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead2 and it is this that ,chrysostom rejects4 ,,question #aji ,,the ,,ordering ,,of ,,the ,,bad ,,angels 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now consider the ordering of the bad angels2 concerning which there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether there are orders among the demons8 7#b7 ,whether among them there is precedence8 7#c7 ,whether one enlightens another8 7#d7 ,whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,are ,orders ,among the ,demons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are no orders among the demons4 ,for order belongs to good1 as also mode1 and species1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,nat4 ,boni iii72 and on the contrary1 disorder belongs to evil4 ,but there is nothing disorderly in the good angels4 ,therefore in the bad angels there are no orders4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy4 ,but the demons are not in a hierarchy1 which is defined as a holy principality2 for they are void of all holiness4 ,therefore among the demons there are no orders4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders2 as is commonly supposed4 ,therefore1 if some demons are said to belong to an order1 as falling from that order1 it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders4 ,but we never find that they are called ,seraphim1 or ,thrones1 or ,dominations4 ,therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #f3ab73 ,our wrestling 4 4 4 is against principalities and powers1 against the rulers of the world of this darkness4 ,i answer that1 ,as explained above 7,q4 #ajh1 ,,aa4 #d1 #g1 #h71 order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature2 and according to that of grace4 ,now grace has a twofold state1 the imperfect1 which is that of merit2 and the perfect1 which is that of consummate glory4 ,if therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory1 then the demons are not in the angelic orders1 and never were4 ,but if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace1 in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels1 but fell away from them1 according to what was said above 7,q4 #fb1 ,a4 #c71 that all the angels were created in grace4 ,but if we consider them in the light of nature1 in that view they are still in those orders2 because they have not lost their natural gifts2 as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,good can exist without evil2 whereas evil cannot exist without good 7,q4 #di1 ,a4 #c72 so there is order in the demons1 as possessing a good nature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,if we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of ,god ,who orders them1 it is sacred2 for ,he uses the demons for ,himself2 but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred thing1 because they abuse their nature for evil4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the name ,seraphim is given from the ardor of charity2 and the name ,thrones from the ,divine indwelling2 and the name ,dominations imports a certain liberty2 all of which are opposed to sin2 and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #b ,whether among the demons there is precedence8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there is no precedence among the demons4 ,for every precedence is according to some order of justice4 ,but the demons are wholly fallen from justice4 ,therefore there is no precedence among them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist4 ,but these cannot be without concord2 which is not to be found among the demons1 according to the text1 ,among the proud there are always contentions 7,prov4 #ac3aj74 ,therefore there is no precedence among the demons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,if there be precedence among them it is either according to nature1 or according to their sin or punishment4 ,but it is not according to their nature1 for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin2 neither is it according to sin or punishment1 because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously1 would be subject to the inferior4 ,therefore there is no precedence among the demons4 ,on the contrary1 ,on #a ,cor4 #ae3bd the gloss says3 ,while the world lasts1 angels will preside over angels1 men over men1 and demons over demons4 ,i answer that1 ,since action follows the nature of a thing1 where natures are subordinate1 actions also must be subordinate to each other4 ,thus it is in corporeal things1 for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies1 their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies4 ,now it is plain from what we have said 7,a4 #a71 that the demons are by natural order subject to others2 and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them1 and this is what we mean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate4 ,so the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them4 ,this agrees too with ,divine wisdom1 which leaves nothing inordinate1 which reacheth from end to end mightily1 and ordereth all things sweetly 7,wis4 #h3a74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the authority of the demons is not founded on their justice1 but on the justice of ,god ordering all things4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the concord of the demons1 whereby some obey others1 does not arise from mutual friendships1 but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men1 and fight against ,god's justice4 ,for it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger1 in order to carry out their own wickedness4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the demons are not equal in nature2 and so among them there exists a natural precedence2 which is not the case with men1 who are naturally equal4 ,that the inferior are subject to the superior1 is not for the benefit of the superior1 but rather to their detriment2 because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness1 it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,there ,is ,enlightenment in the ,demons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that enlightenment is in the demons4 ,for enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth4 ,but one demon can manifest truth to another1 because the superior excel in natural knowledge4 ,therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light1 as the sun enlightens the moon4 ,but the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light4 ,therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior4 ,on the contrary1 ,enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a74 ,but to cleanse does not befit the demons1 according to the words3 ,what can be made clean by the unclean8 7,ecclus4 #cd3d74 ,therefore neither can they enlighten4 ,i answer that1 ,there can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons4 ,for1 as above explained 7,q4 #ajg1 ,a4 #b71 enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to ,god1 ,who enlightens every intellect4 ,another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech1 as when one angel manifests his concept to another4 ,now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another to ,god1 but rather to lead away from the ,divine order2 and so one demon does not enlighten another2 but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment1 but only that which is above described4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to what belongs to natural knowledge1 there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels1 or in the demons1 because1 as above explained 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #eh1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b71 they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge4 ,so the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aji1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,good ,angels ,have ,precedence ,over the ,bad ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels4 ,for the angels' precedence is especially connected with enlightenment4 ,but the bad angels1 being darkness1 are not enlightened by the good angels4 ,therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects4 ,but the demons do much evil4 ,therefore if they are subject to the good angels1 it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels2 which cannot be admitted4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angels' precedence follows upon the order of nature1 as above explained 7,a4 #b74 ,but if the demons fell from every order1 as is commonly said1 many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order4 ,therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii71 that the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational1 pious1 and just spirit of life2 and ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxxiv7 that the ,powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers4 ,i answer that1 ,the whole order of precedence is first and originally in ,god2 and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to ,god4 ,for those creatures1 which are more perfect and nearer to ,god1 have the power to act on others4 ,now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to ,god belongs to the creatures who enjoy ,god1 as the holy angels2 of which perfection the demons are deprived2 and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad1 and these are ruled by them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,many things concerning ,divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels1 whenever the ,divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil2 or for the trial of the good2 as in human affairs the judge's assessors make known his sentence to the executioners4 ,this revelation1 if compared to the angelic revealers1 can be called an enlightenment1 forasmuch as they direct it to ,god2 but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons1 for these do not direct it to ,god2 but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the holy angels are the ministers of the ,divine wisdom4 ,hence as the ,divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men1 for the sake of the good that follows2 so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons1 although these may be naturally superior2 because the power of ,divine justice to which the good angels cleave1 is stronger than the natural power of the angels4 ,hence likewise among men1 the spiritual man judgeth all things 7#a ,cor4 #b3ae71 and the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #d2 x1 #e7 that the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts4 ,,question #aaj ,,how ,,angels ,,act ,,on ,,bodies 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels8 7#b7 ,whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels8 7#c7 ,whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally8 7#d7 ,whether the good or bad angels can work miracles8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,corporeal ,creature ,is ,governed by the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels4 ,for whatever possesses a determinate mode of action1 needs not to be governed by any superior power2 for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not4 ,but corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them4 ,therefore they do not need the government of angels4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the lowest things are ruled by the superior4 ,but some corporeal things are inferior1 and others are superior4 ,therefore they need not be governed by the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices4 ,but if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels1 there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things4 ,so also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things2 which is against what is laid down above 7,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d7 that all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life2 and ,gregory says 7,dial4 iv1 #f71 that in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature4 ,i answer that1 ,it is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power2 as1 for example1 the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king4 ,among the angels also1 as explained above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #a71 the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge4 ,now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance2 for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter1 and determined to the here and now2 whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible4 ,therefore1 as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms1 are ruled by the superior2 so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels4 ,this is not only laid down by the holy doctors1 but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,corporeal things have determinate actions2 but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved2 because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved4 ,hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the reason alleged is according to the opinion of ,aristotle who laid down 7,metaph4 xi1 #h7 that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances2 the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies4 ,but he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies1 except perhaps human souls2 and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed4 ,but because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions1 for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient2 therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies1 but also over the inferior bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances4 ,for ,plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies2 and that some were more universal than others2 and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies1 and different ones over different bodies4 ,but ,aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies1 but something higher and more universal2 and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies1 but only over the universal agents1 the heavenly bodies4 ,avicenna followed a middle course4 ,for he agreed with ,plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements2 because1 as ,plato also said1 he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances4 ,but he differed from ,plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies1 which he called the active intelligence4 ,the holy doctors held with the ,platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things4 ,for ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #gi73 ,every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it2 and ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d73 ,the devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order2 and ,origen says on the text1 ,when the ass saw the angel 7,num4 #bb3bc71 that the world has need of angels who preside over beasts1 and over the birth of animals1 and trees1 and plants1 and over the increase of all other things 7,hom4 xiv in ,num474 ,the reason of this1 however1 is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants2 because each angel1 even the least1 has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things3 the reason is to be sought in the order of ,divine wisdom1 ,who places different rulers over different things4 ,nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels1 because1 as above expounded 7,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #b71 the orders are distinguished by their general offices4 ,hence as according to ,gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the powers2 so to the order of the virtues do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures2 for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,corporeal ,matter ,obeys the ,mere ,will of an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel4 ,for the power of an angel excels the power of the soul4 ,but corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul2 for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold1 and sometimes even as regards health and sickness4 ,therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 whatever can be done by an inferior power1 can be done by a superior power4 ,now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power4 ,but a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter2 as appears when fire begets fire4 ,therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 all corporeal nature is under angelic administration1 as appears above 7,a4 #a71 and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels1 for an instrument is essentially a mover moved4 ,now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents1 and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument2 and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect4 ,for example1 digestion is due to the force of natural heat1 which is the instrument of the nutritive soul3 but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul4 ,again the cutting of the wood is from the saw2 but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the joiner's art4 ,therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects1 is due to the angelic power4 ,therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says ,it is not to be thought1 that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels2 for it obeys ,god alone4 ,i answer that1 ,the ,platonists 99,phaedo4 xlix3 ,tim4 7,did47 vol4 ii1 p4 #bah asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms1 because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms4 ,avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent1 for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the intellect2 and that corporeal agents only dispose matter for the forms4 ,they seem to have been deceived on this point1 through supposing a form to be something made per se1 so that it would be the effect of a formal principle4 ,but1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,metaph4 vii1 ,did4 vi1 #h71 what is made1 properly speaking1 is the composite3 for this properly speaking1 is1 as it were1 what subsists4 ,whereas the form is called a being1 not as that which is1 but as that by which something is2 and consequently neither is a form1 properly speaking1 made2 for that is made which is2 since to be is nothing but the way to existence4 ,now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker1 forasmuch as every agent makes its like4 ,so whatever makes natural things1 has a likeness to the composite2 either because it is composite itself1 as when fire begets fire1 or because the whole composite as to both matter and form is within its power2 and this belongs to ,god alone4 ,therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from ,god1 or form some corporeal agent2 but not immediately from an angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our soul is united to the body as the form2 and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept2 especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite1 which is accompanied with a certain bodily change1 is subject to the command of reason4 ,an angel1 however1 has not the same connection with natural bodies2 and hence the argument does not hold4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,whatever an inferior power can do1 that a superior power can do1 not in the same way1 but in a more excellent way2 for example1 the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them4 ,so an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents1 that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves1 as being the superior cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,there is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power1 for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice4 ,this1 however1 is not to obey an angel's will 7as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook1 when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself72 since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent2 for it is natural for like to make like4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,bodies ,obey the ,angels ,as ,regards ,local ,motion8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion4 ,for the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms4 ,but the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies1 as stated above 7,a4 #b74 ,therefore neither can they cause in them local motion4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,phys4 viii1 #g7 proves that local motion is the first of all movements4 ,but the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter4 ,therefore neither can they cause local motion4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement1 as having in themselves some principle of life4 ,in natural bodies1 however1 there is no vital principle4 ,therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h1i7 that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects4 ,but they cannot do this without causing local movement4 ,therefore bodies obey them in local motion4 ,i answer that1 ,as ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 vii73 ,divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second4 ,hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature4 ,now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature4 ,but among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion1 as the ,philosopher proves 7,phys4 viii1 #g74 ,the reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic1 but only to something extrinsic--that is1 to place4 ,therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place4 ,hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances2 whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms2 for instance1 the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water1 but from the influence of the moon2 and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the angels1 by causing local motion1 as the first motion1 can thereby cause other movements2 that is1 by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects1 as a workman employs fire to soften iron4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul4 ,hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it1 which is vivified by it1 and by which it can move other things4 ,but an angel's power is not limited to any body2 hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaj1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,angels ,can ,work ,miracles8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels can work miracles4 ,for ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang473 ,those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #gi7 that magicians work miracles by private contracts2 good ,christians by public justice1 bad ,christians by the signs of public justice4 ,but magicians work miracles because they are heard by the demons1 as he says elsewhere in the same work 99,cf4 ,liber xxi1 ,sentent41 sent4 #d3 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine4 ,therefore the demons can work miracles4 ,therefore much more can the good angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says in the same work 99,cf4 ,liber xxi1 ,sentent41 sent4 #d3 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine that it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere4 ,but when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause1 we call it a miracle1 as1 for instance1 when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature4 ,therefore the angels and demons can work miracles4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause4 ,but corporeal nature is inferior to an angel4 ,therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents2 which is to work miracles4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written of ,god 7,ps4 #ace3d73 ,who alone doth great wonders4 ,i answer that1 ,a miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature4 ,but it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature2 for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards1 as such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature4 ,so for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature4 ,but ,god alone can do this1 because1 whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power1 is according to the order of created nature2 and thus it is not a miracle4 ,hence ,god alone can work miracles4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,some angels are said to work miracles2 either because ,god works miracles at their request1 in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles2 or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place2 as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection1 or by doing something of that kind4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,properly speaking1 as said above1 miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature4 ,but as we do not know all the power of created nature1 it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us1 it is called a miracle as regards ourselves4 ,so when the demons do anything of their own natural power1 these things are called miracles not in an absolute sense1 but in reference to ourselves4 ,in this way the magicians work miracles through the demons2 and these are said to be done by private contracts1 forasmuch as every power of the creature1 in the universe1 may be compared to the power of a private person in a city4 ,hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil1 this is done as it were by private contract4 ,on the other hand1 the ,divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city4 ,therefore good ,christians1 so far as they work miracles by ,divine justice1 are said to work miracles by public justice3 but bad ,christians by the signs of public justice1 as by invoking the name of ,christ1 or by making use of other sacred signs4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world1 by employing corporeal seeds by local movement4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature1 yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order1 which is essential to a miracle1 as above explained4 ,,question #aaa ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,the ,,angels ,,on ,,man 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we now consider the action of the angels on man1 and inquire3 7#a7 ,how far they can change them by their own natural power2 7#b7 ,how they are sent by ,god to the ministry of men2 7#c7 ,how they guard and protect men4 ,under the first head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect8 7#b7 ,whether he can change man's will8 7#c7 ,whether he can change man's imagination8 7#d7 ,whether he can change man's senses8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #a ,whether an ,angel ,can ,enlighten ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man4 ,for man is enlightened by faith2 hence ,dionysius 7,eccl4 ,hier4 iii7 attributes enlightenment to baptism1 as the sacrament of faith4 ,but faith is immediately from ,god1 according to ,eph4 #b3h3 ,by grace you are saved through faith1 and that not of yourselves1 for it is the gift of ,god4 ,therefore man is not enlightened by an angel2 but immediately by ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 on the words1 ,god hath manifested it to them 7,rom4 #a3ai71 the gloss observes that not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of ,divine truths to men1 but ,god also revealed them by ,his work1 that is1 by ,his creature4 ,but both are immediately from ,god--that is1 natural reason and the creature4 ,therefore ,god enlightens man immediately4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened4 ,but man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels4 ,therefore he is not enlightened by them4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv7 that the revelation of ,divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels4 ,but such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ajg1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore men are enlightened by the angels4 ,i answer that1 ,since the order of ,divine ,providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher1 as explained above 7,q4 #aji1 ,a4 #b72 as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior1 so men1 who are inferior to the angels1 are enlightened by them4 ,the modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike4 ,for1 as was shown above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a71 the enlightenment which consists in making known ,divine truth has two functions2 namely1 according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect1 and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby4 ,this takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel1 as explained above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a74 ,the human intellect1 however1 cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled2 because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms1 as above explained 7,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #g74 ,so the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things1 according to what ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 i71 that1 ,it is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us1 otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils4 ,on the other hand1 the human intellect as the inferior1 is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect4 ,and in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith2 first1 the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to ,divine truth4 ,for the intellect assents to the truth of faith1 not as convinced by the reason1 but as commanded by the will2 hence ,augustine says1 ,no one believes except willingly4 ,in this respect faith comes from ,god alone4 ,secondly1 faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer2 which is accomplished by man1 according to ,rom4 #aj3ag1 ,faith cometh by hearing2 principally1 however1 by the angels1 by whom ,divine things are revealed to men4 ,hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith4 ,moreover1 men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed2 but also as regards what is to be done4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,natural reason1 which is immediately from ,god1 can be strengthened by an angel1 as we have said above4 ,again1 the more the human intellect is strengthened1 so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures4 ,thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways4 ,first1 on the part of the object understood2 thus whoever understands or is enlightened1 knows that he understands or is enlightened1 because he knows that the object is made known to him4 ,secondly1 on the part of the principle2 and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth1 knows what the intellect is1 which is the principle of the intellectual operation4 ,in like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel1 knows that he is enlightened by him4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,angels ,can ,change the ,will of ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels can change the will of man4 ,for1 upon the text1 ,who maketh ,his angels spirits and ,his ministers a flame of fire 7,heb4 #a3g71 the gloss notes that they are fire1 as being spiritually fervent1 and as burning away our vices4 ,this could not be1 however1 unless they changed the will4 ,therefore the angels can change the will4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,bede says 7,super ,matth4 xv1 #aa71 that1 the devil does not send wicked thoughts1 but kindles them4 ,damascene1 however1 says that he also sends them2 for he remarks that every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d72 in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts4 ,but this could only be if they changed the will4 ,therefore the will is changed by them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the angel1 as above explained1 enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms4 ,but as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel1 so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will1 because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ4 ,therefore as the angel enlightens the mind1 so can he change the will4 ,on the contrary1 ,to change the will belongs to ,god alone1 according to ,prov4 #ba3a3 ,the heart of the king is in the hand of the ,lord1 whithersoever ,he will ,he shall turn it4 ,i answer that1 ,the will can be changed in two ways4 ,first1 from within2 in which way1 since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed1 ,god alone can thus change the will1 because ,he gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature4 ,for as the natural inclination is from ,god alone ,who gives the nature1 so the inclination of the will is from ,god alone1 ,who causes the will4 ,secondly1 the will is moved from without4 ,as regards an angel1 this can be only in one way--by the good apprehended by the intellect4 ,hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good1 so far does he move the will4 ,in this way also ,god alone can move the will efficaciously2 but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion1 as above explained 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #b74 ,in addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way2 namely1 by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite3 thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something4 ,in this manner the angels1 as being able to rouse these passions1 can move the will1 not however by necessity1 for the will ever remains free to consent to1 or to resist1 the passion4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,those who act as ,god's ministers1 either men or angels1 are said to burn away vices1 and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within1 since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will2 nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts1 inasmuch as he incites to thought1 by the desire of the things thought of1 by way of persuasion1 or by rousing the passions4 ,damascene calls this kindling a putting in because such a work is accomplished within4 ,but good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle1 namely1 ,god1 though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms2 but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite4 ,hence the comparison does not hold4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #c ,whether an ,angel ,can ,change ,man's ,imagination8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel cannot change man's imagination4 ,for the phantasy1 as is said ,de ,anima iii1 is a motion caused by the sense in act4 ,but if this motion were caused by an angel1 it would not be caused by the sense in act4 ,therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy1 which is the act of the imaginative faculty1 to be changed by an angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 since the forms in the imagination are spiritual1 they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter4 ,but an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination1 and so he cannot change it4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #ab73 ,one spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images1 so that the latter either understands it himself1 or accepts it as understood by the other4 ,but it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination1 nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel4 ,therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves4 ,but in this there is deception4 ,so as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception1 it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision1 by changing the imagination4 ,on the contrary1 ,those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision4 ,but the angels reveal things in dreams1 as appears from ,matt4 #a3bj2 #b3ac1 #ai in regard to the angel who appeared to ,joseph in dreams4 ,therefore an angel can move the imagination4 ,i answer that1 ,both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination4 ,this may be explained as follows4 ,for it was said above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #c71 that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement1 so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels4 ,now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors4 ,hence ,aristotle says 7,de ,somn4 et ,vigil47 99,de ,insomniis iii1 when assigning the cause of visions in dreams1 that when an animal sleeps1 the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle1 and movements descend with it1 that is1 the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits1 and move the sensitive principle2 so that a certain appearance ensues1 as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves4 ,indeed1 the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake1 as is seen in mad people1 and the like4 ,so1 as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors1 and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced1 so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel1 sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses1 sometimes without such alienation4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act4 ,for we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses1 either wholly or partly2 as a man born blind cannot imagine color4 ,sometimes1 however1 the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,an angel changes the imagination1 not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses 7for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color71 but by local movement of the spirits and humors1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences1 but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated2 so that he shows man what he the angel knows1 but not in the way he knows4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,an angel causing an imaginative vision1 sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time1 so that it knows what these images signify2 and then there is no deception4 ,but sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination2 but neither then is deception caused by the angel1 but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear4 ,thus neither was ,christ a cause of deception when ,he spoke many things to the people in parables1 which ,he did not explain to them4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaa1 ,art4 #d ,whether an ,angel ,can ,change the ,human ,senses8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that an angel cannot change the human senses4 ,for the sensitive operation is a vital operation4 ,but such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle4 ,therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive4 ,but the angel cannot change the nutritive power1 nor other natural forms4 ,therefore neither can he change the sensitive power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects4 ,but an angel cannot change the order of nature 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore an angel cannot change the senses2 but these are changed always by the sensible object4 ,on the contrary1 ,the angels who overturned ,sodom1 struck the people of ,sodom with blindness or aorasia1 so that they could not find the door 7,gen4 #ai3aa74 99,it is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the ,greek version where the word aorasia appears4 ,it expresses1 in fact1 the effect produced on the people of ,sodom--namely1 dazzling 7,french version1 eblouissement71 which the ,latin caecitas 7blindness7 does not necessarily imply4 ,the same is recorded of the ,syrians whom ,eliseus led into ,samaria 7#d ,kings #f3ah74 ,i answer that1 ,the senses may be changed in a twofold manner2 from without1 as when affected by the sensible object3 and from within1 for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed2 as for example1 a sick man's tongue1 charged with choleric humor1 tastes everything as bitter1 and the like with the other senses4 ,now an angel1 by his natural power1 can work a change in the senses both ways4 ,for an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without1 formed by nature or by the angel himself1 as when he assumes a body1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #b74 ,likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within1 as above remarked1 whereby the senses are changed in various ways4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power2 but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power1 and also of the appetitive and sensitive power1 and of any other power using a corporeal organ4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,an angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures2 but he can outside some particular order of nature1 since he is not subject to that order2 thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature4 ,,question #aab ,,the ,,mission ,,of ,,the ,,angels 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we next consider the mission of the angels4 ,under this head arise four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether any angels are sent on works of ministry8 7#b7 ,whether all are sent8 7#c7 ,whether those who are sent1 assist8 7#d7 ,from what orders they are sent4 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,angels ,are ,sent on ,works of ,ministry8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry4 ,for every mission is to some determinate place4 ,but intellectual actions do not determine a place1 for intellect abstracts from the here and now4 ,since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual1 it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity4 ,therefore if they are sent to us in ministry1 it seems that something of their dignity would be lost2 which is unseemly4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom2 hence it is said3 ,he that is less in action1 shall receive wisdom 7,ecclus4 #ch3be74 ,so if some angels are sent on external ministrations1 they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation4 ,but the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of ,god4 ,so if they were sent1 their beatitude would be lessened2 which is unfitting4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 to minister is the part of an inferior2 hence it is written 7,luke #bb3bg73 ,which is the greater1 he that sitteth at table1 or he that serveth8 is not he that sitteth at table8 ,but the angels are naturally greater than we are4 ,therefore they are not sent to administer to us4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ex4 #bc3bj73 ,behold ,i will send ,my angels who shall go before thee4 ,i answer that1 ,from what has been said above 7,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #f71 it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by ,god4 ,for1 as we have already stated 7,q4 #dc1 ,a4 #a71 in treating of the mission of the ,divine ,persons1 he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to be where he was not1 or to be in another way1 where he already was4 ,thus the ,son1 or the ,holy ,ghost is said to be sent as proceeding from the ,father by origin2 and begins to be in a new way1 by grace or by the nature assumed1 where ,he was before by the presence of ,his ,godhead2 for it belongs to ,god to be present everywhere1 because1 since ,he is the universal agent1 ,his power reaches to all being1 and hence ,he exists in all things 7,q4 #h1 ,a4 #a74 ,an angel's power1 however1 as a particular agent1 does not reach to the whole universe1 but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another2 and so he is here in such a manner as not to be there4 ,but it is clear from what was above stated 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a71 that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels4 ,hence1 whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature1 the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power2 and in that way begins to be there afresh4 ,now all this takes place by ,divine command4 ,hence it follows that an angel is sent by ,god4 ,yet the action performed by the angel who is sent1 proceeds from ,god as from its first principle1 at ,whose nod and by ,whose authority the angels work2 and is reduced to ,god as to its last end4 ,now this is what is meant by a minister3 for a minister is an intelligent instrument2 while an instrument is moved by another1 and its action is ordered to another4 ,hence angels' actions are called ministries2 and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,an operation can be intellectual in two ways4 ,in one way1 as dwelling in the intellect itself1 as contemplation2 such an operation does not demand to occupy a place2 indeed1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iv1 #bj73 ,even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal1 are not in this world4 ,in another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect2 in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity2 forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies4 ,yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven2 so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven1 nothing of his dignity is lost1 as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne1 which suits his dignity4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,in ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation2 because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties1 the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers4 ,an angel1 on the contrary1 regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone4 ,hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation2 because given two actions1 one of which is the rule and the reason of the other1 one does not hinder but helps the other4 ,wherefore ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii7 that the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in their external actions the angels chiefly minister to ,god1 and secondarily to us2 not because we are superior to them1 absolutely speaking1 but because1 since every man or angel by cleaving to ,god is made one spirit with ,god1 he is thereby superior to every creature4 ,hence the ,apostle says 7,phil4 #b3c73 ,esteeming others better than themselves4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,all the ,angels ,are ,sent in ,ministry8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #a3ad73 ,all are ministering spirits1 sent to minister ,vulg4 ',are they not all 4 4 4 8'4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 among the orders1 the highest is that of the ,seraphim1 as stated above 7,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #f74 ,but a ,seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet 7,isa4 #f3f1 #g74 ,therefore much more are the inferior orders sent4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the ,divine ,persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders4 ,but the ,divine ,persons are sent4 ,therefore much more are even the highest angels sent4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries1 this can only be because the superior angels execute the ,divine ministries by means of the inferior angels4 ,but as all the angels are unequal1 as stated above 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #d71 each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one4 ,therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry2 which contradicts the words1 ,thousands of thousands ministered to ,him 7,dan4 #g3aj74 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang471 quoting the statement of ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 xiii71 that the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service4 ,i answer that1 ,as appears from what has been said above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a71 the order of ,divine ,providence has so disposed not only among the angels1 but also in the whole universe1 that inferior things are administered by the superior4 ,but the ,divine dispensation1 however1 this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things1 for the sake of a higher order1 that is1 according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace4 ,that the man born blind was enlightened1 that ,lazarus was raised from the dead1 was accomplished immediately by ,god without the action of the heavenly bodies4 ,moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies1 by the condensation of the clouds to rain1 and by producing some such effects4 ,nor can anyone doubt that ,god can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels1 and the superior angels without the inferior4 ,from this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent1 but only the inferior2 yet that sometimes1 by ,divine dispensation1 the superior angels also are sent4 ,it may also be said that the ,apostle wishes to prove that ,christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law2 in order that ,he might show the excellence of the new over the old law4 ,hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 xiii71 the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order2 but was called a ,seraph1 that is1 kindling in an equivocal sense1 because he came to kindle the lips of the prophet4 ,it may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated1 through the ministry of the inferior angels4 ,thus one of the ,seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet's lips1 not as if he did so immediately1 but because an inferior angel did so by his power2 as the ,pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the ,divine ,persons are not sent in ministry1 but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense1 as appears from what has been said 7,q4 #dc1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a manifold grade exists in the ,divine ministries4 ,hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent immediately in ministry1 in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries1 and the lower to the inferior ministries4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,all the ,angels ,who ,are ,sent1 ,assist8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angels who are sent also assist4 ,for ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang473 ,so the angels are sent1 and assist2 for1 though the angelic spirit is limited1 yet the supreme ,spirit1 ,god1 is not limited4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the angel was sent to administer to ,tobias4 ,yet he said1 ,i am the angel ,raphael1 one of the seven who stand before the ,lord 7,tob4 #ab3ae74 ,therefore the angels who are sent1 assist4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every holy angel is nearer to ,god than ,satan is4 ,yet ,satan assisted ,god1 according to ,job #a3f3 ,when the sons of ,god came to stand before the ,lord1 ,satan also was present among them4 ,therefore much more do the angels1 who are sent to minister1 assist4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the inferior angels do not assist1 the reason is because they receive the ,divine enlightenment1 not immediately1 but through the superior angels4 ,but every angel receives the ,divine enlightenment from a superior1 except the one who is highest of all4 ,therefore only the highest angel would assist2 which is contrary to the text of ,dan4 #g3aj3 ,ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before ,him4 ,therefore the angels who are sent also assist4 ,on the contrary1 ,gregory says1 on ,job #be3c3 ,is there any numbering of ,his soldiers8 7,moral4 xvii73 ,those powers assist1 who do not go forth as messengers to men4 ,therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist4 ,i answer that1 ,the angels are spoken of as assisting and administering1 after the likeness of those who attend upon a king2 some of whom ever wait upon him1 and hear his commands immediately2 while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance--for instance1 those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities2 these are said to administer1 not to assist4 ,we must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the ,divine ,essence immediately2 in regard to which all1 even those who minister1 are said to assist4 ,hence ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii7 that those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the ,father4 ,yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the ,divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the ,divine ,essence2 but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior3 and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist1 whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by ,god4 ,from this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections1 which are based on the first mode of assisting4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,satan is not described as having assisted1 but as present among the assistants2 for1 as ,gregory says 7,moral4 ii71 though he has lost beatitude1 still he has retained a nature like to the angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,all the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the ,divine ,essence2 and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by ,god2 while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior2 some of whom enlighten others3 as also among those who assist the king1 one knows more of the king's secrets than another4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aab1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all the ,angels of the ,second ,hierarchy ,are ,sent8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent4 ,for all the angels either assist1 or minister1 according to ,dan4 #g3aj4 ,but the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist2 for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 viii74 ,therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,gregory says 7,moral4 xvii7 that there are more who minister than who assist4 ,this would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry4 ,therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 viii7 that the ,dominations are above all subjection4 ,but to be sent implies subjection4 ,therefore the dominations are not sent to minister4 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,a4 #a71 to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by ,divine command in respect of any corporeal creature2 which is part of the execution of the ,divine ministry4 ,now the angelic properties are manifested by their names1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 vii72 and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration4 ,but the name dominations does not signify any such administration1 but only disposition and command in administering4 ,on the other hand1 the names of the inferior orders imply administration1 for the ,angels and ,archangels are so called from announcing2 the ,virtues and ,powers are so called in respect of some act2 and it is right that the ,prince1 according to what ,gregory says 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang471 be first among the workers4 ,hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry2 not to the four superior orders4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ,dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels1 not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others2 thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art1 but only disposes and orders what others are to do4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,a twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels4 ,for ,gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist2 because he takes the words 7,dan4 #g3aj7 thousands of thousands ministered to ,him1 not in a multiple but in a partitive sense1 to mean thousands out of thousands2 thus the number of those who minister is indefinite1 and signifies excess2 while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added1 and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted ,him4 ,this explanation rests on the opinion of the ,platonists1 who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle1 the smaller they are in number2 as the nearer a number is to unity1 the lesser it is than multitude4 ,this opinion is verified as regards the number of orders1 as six administer and three assist4 ,dionysius1 however1 7,coel4 ,hier4 xiv7 declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things2 so that1 as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree1 so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude2 because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by ,god4 ,hence1 as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers4 ,in this way1 the words thousands of thousands are taken by way of multiplication1 to signify a thousand times a thousand4 ,and because ten times a hundred is a thousand1 if it were said ten times a hundred thousand it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers3 but since it is written ten thousand times a hundred thousand1 we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers4 ,nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels1 but rather that it is much greater1 in that it exceeds all material multitude4 ,this is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers1 namely ten1 a hundred1 and a thousand1 as ,dionysius remarks in the same passage4 ,,question #aac ,,of ,,the ,,guardianship ,,of ,,the ,,good ,,angels 7,in ,eight ,articles7 ,we next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels2 and their warfare against the bad angels4 ,under the first head eight points of inquiry arise3 7#a7 ,whether men are guarded by the angels8 7#b7 ,whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel8 7#c7 ,whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels8 7#d7 ,whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian8 7#e7 ,when does an angel's guardianship of a man begin8 7#f7 ,whether the angel guardians always watch over men8 7#g7 ,whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded8 7#h7 ,whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,men ,are ,guarded by the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that men are not guarded by the angels4 ,for guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how1 or are not able1 to guard themselves1 as children and the sick4 ,but man is able to guard himself by his free-will2 and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law4 ,therefore man is not guarded by an angel4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous4 ,but men are guarded by ,god1 according to ,ps4 #abj3d3 ,he shall neither slumber nor sleep1 that keepeth ,israel4 ,therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian2 hence it was said to a certain one3 ,keep this man2 and if he shall slip away1 thy life shall be for his life 7#c ,kings #bj3ci74 ,now many perish daily through falling into sin2 whom the angels could help by visible appearance1 or by miracles1 or in some such-like way4 ,the angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship4 ,but that is clearly false4 ,therefore the angels are not the guardians of men4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,ps4 #ij3aa73 ,he hath given ,his angels charge over thee1 to keep thee in all thy ways4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the plan of ,divine ,providence1 we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable2 as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances1 and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance4 ,we ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions1 about which we may have various opinions1 by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner4 ,it is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways2 and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men1 in order to regulate them and move them to good4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,by free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree1 but not in any sufficient degree2 forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul4 ,likewise universal natural knowledge of the law1 which by nature belongs to man1 to a certain degree directs man to good1 but not in a sufficient degree2 because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways4 ,hence it is written 7,wis4 #i3ad73 ,the thoughts of mortal men are fearful1 and our counsels uncertain4 ,thus man needs to be guarded by the angels4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,two things are required for a good action2 first1 that the affection be inclined to good1 which is effected in us by the habit of mortal virtue4 ,secondly1 that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue2 this the ,philosopher 7,ethic4 vi7 attributes to prudence4 ,as regards the first1 ,god guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues2 as regards the second1 ,god guards man as his universal instructor1 ,whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels1 as above stated 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a74 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion1 so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels1 which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right4 ,hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men4 ,that they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of ,god1 as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,each ,man ,is ,guarded by an ,angel8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel4 ,for an angel is stronger than a man4 ,but one man suffices to guard many men4 ,therefore much more can one angel guard many men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the lower things are brought to ,god through the medium of the higher1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 iv1 xiii74 ,but as all the angels are unequal 7,q4 #ej1 ,a4 #d71 there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium4 ,therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices4 ,but it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another2 since all men are naturally equal4 ,since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 x71 it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,on the text1 ,their angels in heaven1 etc4 7,matt4 #h3aj71 ,jerome says3 ,great is the dignity of souls1 for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth4 ,i answer that1 ,each man has an angel guardian appointed to him4 ,this rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of ,divine providence concerning men4 ,but ,god's providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures1 for they are related differently to incorruptibility4 ,for men are not only incorruptible in the common species1 but also in the proper forms of each individual1 which are the rational souls1 which cannot be said of other incorruptible things4 ,now it is manifest that the providence of ,god is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever2 whereas as regards things which pass away1 the providence of ,god acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual4 ,thus the providence of ,god is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible4 ,but1 according to ,gregory 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang471 the different orders are deputed to the different genera of things1 for instance1 the ,powers to coerce the demons1 the ,virtues to work miracles in things corporeal2 while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order4 ,hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,a guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons3 first1 inasmuch as a man is an individual1 and thus to one man one guardian is due2 and sometimes several are appointed to guard one4 ,secondly1 inasmuch as a man is part of a community1 and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community2 to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community1 such as external works1 which are sources of strength or weakness to others4 ,but angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things1 concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard4 ,hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as above stated 7,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #c1 ad #d71 all the angels of the first hierarchy are1 as to some things1 enlightened by ,god directly2 but as to other things1 only the superior are directly enlightened by ,god1 and these reveal them to the inferior4 ,and the same also applies to the inferior orders3 for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest1 and in other respects by the one immediately above him4 ,thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately1 and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although men are equal in nature1 still inequality exists among them1 according as ,divine ,providence orders some to the greater1 and others to the lesser things1 according to ,ecclus4 #cc3aa1 #ab3 ,with much knowledge the ,lord hath divided them1 and diversified their ways3 some of them hath ,he blessed and exalted1 and some of them hath ,he cursed and brought low4 ,thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #c ,whether to ,guard ,men ,belongs ,only to the ,lowest ,order of ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels4 ,for ,chrysostom says that the text 7,matt4 #ah3aj71 ,their angels in heaven1 etc4 is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest4 ,therefore the superior angels guard men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,apostle says that angels are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation 7,heb4 #a3ad72 and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men4 ,but five orders are sent in external ministry 7,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #d74 ,therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons1 which belongs most of all to the ,powers1 according to ,gregory 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang472 and to work miracles1 which belongs to the ,virtues4 ,therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship1 and not only the lowest order4 ,on the contrary1 ,in the ,psalm 7#ij7 the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels2 who belong to the lowest order1 according to ,dionysius 7,coel4 ,hier4 v1 ix74 ,i answer that1 ,as above stated 7,a4 #b71 man is guarded in two ways2 in one way by particular guardianship1 according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him2 and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels1 whose place it is1 according to ,gregory1 to announce the lesser things2 for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man4 ,the other kind of guardianship is universal1 multiplied according to the different orders4 ,for the more universal an agent is1 the higher it is4 ,thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of ,principalities1 or perhaps to the ,archangels1 whom we call the angel princes4 ,hence1 ,michael1 whom we call an archangel1 is also styled one of the princes 7,dan4 #aj3ac74 ,moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the ,virtues2 and likewise the demons by the ,powers1 and the good spirits by the ,principalities1 according to ,gregory's opinion 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,ev474 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels2 for1 as ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 x7 in each order there are first1 middle1 and last4 ,it is1 however1 probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by ,god for the higher degree of glory4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men2 but some orders have a universal guardianship1 greater or less1 as above explained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior1 as they share in their gifts1 and they are executors of the superiors' power2 and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons1 and work miracles4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,angels ,are ,appointed to the ,guardianship of ,all ,men8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men4 ,for it is written of ,christ 7,phil4 #b3g7 that ,he was made in the likeness of men1 and in habit found as a man4 ,if therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men1 ,christ also would have had an angel guardian4 ,but this is unseemly1 for ,christ is greater than all the angels4 ,therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,adam was the first of all men4 ,but it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian1 at least in the state of innocence3 for then he was not beset by any dangers4 ,therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 angels are appointed to the guardianship of men1 that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life1 encourage them to good works1 and protect them against the assaults of the demons4 ,but men who are foreknown to damnation1 never attain to eternal life4 ,infidels1 also1 though at times they perform good works1 do not perform them well1 for they have not a right intention3 for faith directs the intention as ,augustine says 7,enarr4 ii in ,ps4 #ca74 ,moreover1 the coming of ,antichrist will be according to the working of ,satan1 as it is written 7#b ,thess4 #b3i74 ,therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men4 ,on the contrary1 is the authority of ,jerome quoted above 7,a4 #b71 for he says that each soul has an angel appointed to guard it4 ,i answer that1 ,man while in this state of life1 is1 as it were1 on a road by which he should journey towards heaven4 ,on this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without1 according to ,ps4 #aei3d3 ,in this way wherein ,i walked1 they have hidden a snare for me4 ,and therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road1 so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer4 ,when1 however1 he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel2 but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him1 in hell a demon to punish him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,christ as man was guided immediately by the ,word of ,god3 wherefore ,he needed not be guarded by an angel4 ,again as regards ,his soul1 ,he was a comprehensor1 although in regard to ,his passible body1 ,he was a wayfarer4 ,in this latter respect it was right that ,he should have not a guardian angel as superior to ,him1 but a ministering angel as inferior to ,him4 ,whence it is written 7,matt4 #d3aa7 that angels came and ministered to ,him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within3 because within him all was well ordered1 as we have said above 7,q4 #ie1 ,,aa4 #a1 #c74 ,but peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons2 as was proved by the event4 ,for this reason he needed a guardian angel4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,just as the foreknown1 the infidels1 and even ,antichrist1 are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason2 so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by ,god to the whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels4 ,and although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works1 it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others4 ,for even the demons are held off by the good angels1 lest they hurt as much as they would4 ,in like manner ,antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #e ,whether an ,angel ,is ,appointed to ,guard a ,man from ,his ,birth8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth4 ,for angels are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation1 as the ,apostle says 7,heb4 #a3ad74 ,but men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation1 when they are baptized4 ,therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism1 not of his birth4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them4 ,but children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born1 for they have not the use of reason4 ,therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 a child has a rational soul for some time before birth1 just as well as after4 ,but it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth1 for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the ,church4 ,therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth4 ,on the contrary1 ,jerome says 7vide ,a4 #d7 that each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth4 ,i answer that1 as ,origen observes 7,tract4 v1 super ,matt47 there are two opinions on this matter4 ,for some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism1 others1 that he is appointed at the time of birth4 ,the latter opinion ,jerome approves 7loc4 cit471 and with reason4 ,for those benefits which are conferred by ,god on man as a ,christian1 begin with his baptism2 such as receiving the ,eucharist1 and the like4 ,but those which are conferred by ,god on man as a rational being1 are bestowed on him at his birth1 for then it is that he receives that nature4 ,among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels1 as we have said above 7,,aa4 #a1 #d74 ,wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,angels are sent to minister1 and that efficaciously indeed1 for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation1 if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship1 which is the realizing of that inheritance4 ,but for all that1 the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation3 efficacious1 nevertheless1 they are1 inasmuch as they ward off many evils4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction1 as to its ultimate and principal effect4 ,nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood2 for instance to ward off the demons1 and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not entirely separate1 but by reason of a certain intimate tie1 is still part of her3 just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree4 ,and therefore it can be said with some degree of probability1 that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb4 ,but at its birth1 when it becomes separate from the mother1 an angel guardian is appointed to it2 as ,jerome1 above quoted1 says4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #f ,whether the ,angel ,guardian ,ever ,forsakes a ,man8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard4 ,for it is said 7,jer4 #ea3i7 in the person of the angels3 ,we would have cured ,babylon1 but she is not healed3 let us forsake her4 ,and 7,isa4 #e3e7 it is written3 ,i will take away the hedge--that is1 the guardianship of the angels gloss--and it shall be wasted4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,god's guardianship excels that of the angels4 ,but ,god forsakes man at times1 according to ,ps4 #ba3b3 ,o ,god1 my ,god1 look upon me3 why hast ,thou forsaken me8 ,much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 according to ,damascene 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #c71 ,when the angels are here with us1 they are not in heaven4 ,but sometimes they are in heaven4 ,therefore sometimes they forsake us4 ,on the contrary1 ,the demons are ever assailing us1 according to #a ,pet4 #e3h3 ,your adversary the devil1 as a roaring lion1 goeth about1 seeking whom he may devour4 ,much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us4 ,i answer that1 ,as appears above 7,a4 #b71 the guardianship of the angels is an effect of ,divine providence in regard to man4 ,now it is evident that neither man1 nor anything at all1 is entirely withdrawn from the providence of ,god3 for in as far as a thing participates being1 so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being4 ,god indeed is said to forsake man1 according to the ordering of ,his providence1 but only in so far as ,he allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault4 ,in like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely1 but sometimes he leaves him in some particular1 for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble1 or even from falling into sin1 according to the ordering of ,divine judgments4 ,in this sense ,babylon and the ,house of ,israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels1 because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation4 ,from this the answers are clear to the first and second objections4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally1 he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship3 for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man2 nor does he need time for his local motion1 for he can be with man in an instant4 ,,seventh ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #g ,whether ,angels ,grieve for the ,ills of ,those ,whom ,they ,guard8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard4 ,for it is written 7,isa4 #cc3g73 ,the angels of peace shall weep bitterly4 ,but weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow4 ,therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ae71 sorrow is for those things that happen against our will4 ,but the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's will4 ,therefore angels grieve for the loss of men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as sorrow is contrary to joy1 so penance is contrary to sin4 ,but angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance1 as we are told1 ,luke #ae3g4 ,therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 on ,numbers #ah3ab3 ,whatsoever first-fruits they offer1 etc4 the gloss of ,origen says3 ,the angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault4 ,but it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment4 ,therefore angels grieve for men's sins4 ,on the contrary1 ,where there is grief and sorrow1 there is not perfect happiness3 wherefore it is written 7,apoc4 #ba3d73 ,death shall be no more1 nor mourning1 nor crying1 nor sorrow4 ,but the angels are perfectly happy4 ,therefore they have no cause for grief4 ,i answer that1 ,angels do not grieve1 either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men4 ,for grief and sorrow1 according to ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xiv1 #ae7 are for those things which occur against our will4 ,but nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed1 because their will cleaves entirely to the ordering of ,divine justice2 while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by ,divine justice4 ,therefore simply speaking1 nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed4 ,for as the ,philosopher says 7,ethic4 iii1 #a7 that is called simply voluntary1 which a man wills in a particular case1 and at a particular time1 having considered all the circumstances2 although universally speaking1 such a thing would not be voluntary3 thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea1 considered universally and absolutely1 but on account of the threatened danger of his life1 he wills it4 ,wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary1 as stated in the same passage4 ,therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account3 but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of ,divine justice in this matter1 in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of ,isaias may be understood of the angels1 i4e4 the messengers1 of ,ezechias1 who wept on account of the words of ,rabsaces1 as related ,isa4 #cg3b seqq43 this would be the literal sense4 ,according to the allegorical sense the angels of peace are the apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins4 ,if according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels1 then the expression is metaphorical1 and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind3 for in this sense we attribute passions to ,god and the angels4 ,the reply to the second objection appears from what has been said4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one reason for the angel's joy1 namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the ,divine ,providence4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men1 not as guilty1 but as witnesses to convict man of weakness4 ,,eighth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aac1 ,art4 #h ,whether ,there ,can ,be ,strife or ,discord ,among the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there can be no strife or discord among the angels4 ,for it is written 7,job #be3b73 ,who maketh peace in ,his high places4 ,but strife is opposed to peace4 ,therefore among the high angels there is no strife4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife4 ,but all this exists among the angels4 ,therefore there is no strife among the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard1 one angel must needs take one side1 and another angel the opposite side4 ,but if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong4 ,it will follow therefore1 that a good angel is a compounder of wrong2 which is unseemly4 ,therefore there is no strife among good angels4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,dan4 #aj3ac73 ,the prince of the kingdom of the ,persians resisted me one and twenty days4 ,but this prince of the ,persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the ,persians4 ,therefore one good angel resists the others2 and thus there is strife among them4 ,i answer that1 ,the raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of ,daniel4 ,jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the ,persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of ,israel1 for whom ,daniel was praying1 his prayers being offered to ,god by ,gabriel4 ,and this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the ,jewish captives in ,persia into sin2 which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which ,daniel put up for that same people4 ,but according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xvii71 the prince of the kingdom of ,persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom4 ,to see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another1 we must note that the ,divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels4 ,now in their actions1 the angels are ruled by the ,divine decree4 ,but it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits1 so that one of them is subject to or placed over another4 ,as to what is the ordering of ,divine wisdom on such matters1 the angels cannot know it unless ,god reveal it to them3 and so they need to consult ,divine wisdom thereupon4 ,wherefore forasmuch as they consult the ,divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits1 they are said to resist one another3 not that their wills are in opposition1 since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the ,divine decree2 but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition4 ,from this the answers to the objections are clear4 ,,question #aad ,,of ,,the ,,assaults ,,of ,,the ,,demons 7,in ,five ,articles7 ,we now consider the assaults of the demons4 ,under this head there are five points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether men are assailed by the demons8 7#b7 ,whether to tempt is proper to the devil8 7#c7 ,whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons8 7#d7 ,whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray8 7#e7 ,whether the demons who are overcome by men1 are hindered from making further assaults8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,men ,are ,assailed by the ,demons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that men are not assailed by the demons4 ,for angels are sent by ,god to guard man4 ,but demons are not sent by ,god3 for the demons' intention is the loss of souls2 whereas ,god's is the salvation of souls4 ,therefore demons are not deputed to assail man4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 it is not a fair fight1 for the weak to be set against the strong1 and the ignorant against the astute4 ,but men are weak and ignorant1 whereas the demons are strong and astute4 ,it is not therefore to be permitted by ,god1 the author of all justice1 that men should be assailed by demons4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise4 ,but ,god permits ,his elect to be assailed that they may be exercised4 ,therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #f3ab73 ,our wrestling is not against flesh and blood2 but against ,principalities and ,powers1 against the rulers of the world of this darkness1 against the spirits of wickedness in the high places4 ,i answer that1 ,two things may be considered in the assault of the demons--the assault itself1 and the ordering thereof4 ,the assault itself is due to the malice of the demons1 who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress2 and through pride usurp a semblance of ,divine power1 by deputing certain ministers to assail man1 as the angels of ,god in their various offices minister to man's salvation4 ,but the ordering of the assault is from ,god1 ,who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good4 ,on the other hand1 in regard to the angels1 both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to ,god as their first author4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the wicked angels assail men in two ways4 ,firstly by instigating them to sin2 and thus they are not sent by ,god to assail us1 but are sometimes permitted to do so according to ,god's just judgments4 ,but sometimes their assault is a punishment to man3 and thus they are sent by ,god2 as the lying spirit was sent to punish ,achab1 ,king of ,israel1 as is related in #c ,kings #bb3bj4 ,for punishment is referred to ,god as its first author4 ,nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish1 do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent2 for they punish from hatred or envy2 whereas they are sent by ,god on account of ,his justice4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,in order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal1 there is as regards man the promised recompense1 to be gained principally through the grace of ,god1 secondarily through the guardianship of the angels4 ,wherefore 7#d ,kings #f3af71 ,eliseus said to his servant3 ,fear not1 for there are more with us than with them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness3 but it does not suffice for the demon's malice1 which makes use of both the above in assailing men4 ,but by the ,divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #b ,whether to ,tempt ,is ,proper to the ,devil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil4 ,for ,god is said to tempt1 according to ,gen4 #bb3a1 ,god tempted ,abraham4 ,moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world4 ,again1 man is said to tempt ,god1 and to tempt man4 ,therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to tempt is a sign of ignorance4 ,but the demons know what happens among men4 ,therefore the demons do not tempt4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 temptation is the road to sin4 ,now sin dwells in the will4 ,since therefore the demons cannot change man's will1 as appears from what has been said above 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #b71 it seems that it is not in their province to tempt4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7#a ,thess4 #c3e73 ,lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you3 to which the gloss adds1 that is1 the devil1 whose office it is to tempt4 ,i answer that1 ,to tempt is1 properly speaking1 to make trial of something4 ,now we make trial of something in order to know something about it3 hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge4 ,but sometimes another end1 either good or bad1 is sought to be acquired through that knowledge2 a good end1 when1 for instance1 one desires to know of someone1 what sort of a man he is as to knowledge1 or virtue1 with a view to his promotion2 a bad end1 when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him4 ,from this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways4 ,for man is said to tempt1 sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something2 and for this reason it is a sin to tempt ,god2 for man1 being uncertain as it were1 presumes to make an experiment of ,god's power4 ,sometimes too he tempts in order to help1 sometimes in order to hurt4 ,the devil1 however1 always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin4 ,in this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt3 for thought at times man tempts thus1 he does this as minister of the devil4 ,god is said to tempt that ,he may know1 in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know4 ,hence it is written 7,deut4 #ac3c73 ,the ,lord your ,god trieth you1 that it may appear whether you love him4 ,the flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations2 inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is1 according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh1 and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity3 of which things the devil also makes use in tempting4 ,thus the reply to the first objection is clear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the demons know what happens outwardly among men2 but the inward disposition of man ,god alone knows1 ,who is the weigher of spirits 7,prov4 #af3b74 ,it is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another3 hence the devil tempts1 in order to explore this inward disposition of man1 so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although a demon cannot change the will1 yet1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #c71 he can change the inferior powers of man1 in a certain degree3 by which powers1 though the will cannot be forced1 it can nevertheless be inclined4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,all ,sins ,are ,due to the ,temptation of the ,devil8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil4 ,for ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils1 both to themselves and to others4 ,and ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #d7 that all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 of every sinner can be said what the ,lord said of the ,jews 7,john #h3dd73 ,you are of your father the devil4 ,but this was in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation4 ,therefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 as angels are deputed to guard men1 so demons are deputed to assail men4 ,but every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels3 because the ,divine gifts are borne to us by the angels4 ,therefore all the evil we do1 is due to the instigation of the devil4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogmat4 xlix73 ,not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil1 but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will4 ,i answer that1 ,one thing can be the cause of another in two ways2 directly and indirectly4 ,indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect1 it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect3 for instance1 we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning4 ,in this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins2 because he it was who instigated the first man to sin1 from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race3 and in this sense we must take the words of ,damascene and ,dionysius4 ,but a thing is said to be the direct cause of something1 when its action tends directly thereunto4 ,and in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin3 for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation1 but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh4 ,for1 as ,origen says 7,peri ,archon iii71 even if there were no devil1 men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures2 with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason1 especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures4 ,now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order4 ,consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil4 ,but those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents1 as ,isidore says 7,de ,summo ,bono ii74 ,thus the answer to the first objection is clear4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,when man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil1 he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby1 in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,man can of his own accord fall into sin3 but he cannot advance in merit without the ,divine assistance1 which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels4 ,for this reason the angels take part in all our good works3 whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation4 ,nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,demons ,can ,lead ,men ,astray by ,means of ,real ,miracles8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles4 ,for the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of ,antichrist4 ,but as the ,apostle says 7#b ,thess4 #b3i71 his coming is according to the working of ,satan1 in all power1 and signs1 and lying wonders4 ,much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change4 ,but demons are unable to change the nature of a body2 for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xviii1 #ah73 ,i cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power4 ,therefore the demons cannot work real miracles4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 an argument is useless which may prove both ways4 ,if therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons1 to persuade one of what is false1 they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith4 ,this is unfitting2 for it is written 7,mk4 #af3bj73 ,the ,lord working withal1 and confirming the word with signs that followed4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,q4 #hc7 99,lib4 xxi1 ,sent4 sent #d1 among the supposititious works of ,st4 ,augustine3 ,often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of ,god4 ,i answer that1 ,as is clear from what has been said above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #d71 if we take a miracle in the strict sense1 the demons cannot work miracles1 nor can any creature1 but ,god alone3 since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature1 under which order every power of a creature is contained4 ,but sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense1 for whatever exceeds the human power and experience4 ,and thus demons can work miracles1 that is1 things which rouse man's astonishment1 by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge4 ,for even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another1 leads him to marvel at what he has done1 so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle4 ,it is to be noted1 however1 that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles1 they are sometimes nevertheless something real4 ,thus the magicians of ,pharaoh by the demons' power produced real serpents and frogs4 ,and when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed ,job's servants and sheep2 when the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these were the work of ,satan1 not phantoms2 as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xx1 #ai74 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as ,augustine says in the same place1 the works of ,antichrist may be called lying wonders1 either because he will deceive men's senses by means of phantoms1 so that he will not really do what he will seem to do2 or because1 if he work real prodigies1 they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as we have said above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b71 corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will1 so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another2 but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world1 in order to produce these effects1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h1 #i74 ,therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers1 to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned1 can alike be produced by the operation of the demons1 by the employment of these seeds2 such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs1 which can be produced by putrefaction4 ,on the contrary1 those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature1 cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons2 for instance1 that the human body be changed into the body of a beast1 or that the body of a dead man return to life4 ,and if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons1 it is not real but a mere semblance of reality4 ,now this may happen in two ways4 ,firstly1 from within2 in this way a demon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses1 so that something seems otherwise that it is1 as explained above 7,q4 #aaa1 ,,aa4 #c1d74 ,it is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies4 ,secondly1 from without3 for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape1 and assume it so as to appear in it visibly3 so1 in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form1 so as to appear therein4 ,this is what ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xviii1 #ah73 ,man's imagination1 which whether thinking or dreaming1 takes the forms of an innumerable number of things1 appears to other men's senses1 as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal4 ,this not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man3 but that the demon1 who forms an image in a man's imagination1 can offer the same picture to another man's senses4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #gi73 ,when magicians do what holy men do1 they do it for a different end and by a different right4 ,the former do it for their own glory2 the latter1 for the glory of ,god3 the former1 by certain private compacts2 the latter by the evident assistance and command of ,god1 to ,whom every creature is subject4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aad1 ,art4 #e ,whether a ,demon ,who ,is ,overcome by ,man1 ,is for ,this ,reason ,hindered from ,making ,further ,assaults8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man1 is not for that reason hindered from any further assault4 ,for ,christ overcame the tempter most effectively4 ,yet afterwards the demon assailed ,him by instigating the ,jews to kill ,him4 ,therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight1 is to incite him to a sharper attack4 ,but this is not befitting ,god's mercy4 ,therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written 7,matt4 #d3aa73 ,then the devil left ,him1 i4e4 ,christ ,who overcame4 ,i answer that1 ,some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all1 neither to the same nor to any other sin4 ,and others say that he can tempt others1 but not the same man4 ,this seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time3 wherefore 7,luke #d3ac7 it is written3 ,all temptation being ended1 the devil departed from ,him for a time4 ,there are two reasons for this4 ,one is on the part of ,god's clemency2 for as ,chrysostom says 7,super ,matt4 ,hom4 v7 99,in the ,opus ,imperfectum1 among his supposititious works1 the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes1 but for as long as ,god allows2 for although ,he allows him to tempt for a short time1 ,he orders him off on account of our weakness4 ,the other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil4 ,as to this1 ,ambrose says on ,luke #d3ac3 ,the devil is afraid of persisting1 because he shrinks from frequent defeat4 ,that the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault1 is apparent from ,matt4 #ab3dd3 ,i will return into my house from whence ,i came out4 ,from what has been said1 the objections can easily be solved4 ,,question #aae ,,of ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,the ,,corporeal ,,creature 7,in ,six ,articles7 ,we have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature2 and fate1 which is ascribed to certain bodies4 ,concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether a body can be active8 7#b7 ,whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues8 7#c7 ,whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies8 7#d7 ,whether they are the cause of human acts8 7#e7 ,whether demons are subject to their influence8 7#f7 ,whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #a ,whether a ,body ,can ,be ,active8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that no bodies are active4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #i73 ,there are things that are acted upon1 but do not act2 such are bodies3 there is one ,who acts but is not acted upon2 this is ,god3 there are things that both act and are acted upon2 these are the spiritual substances4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action4 ,but there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter's action2 since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings4 ,therefore corporeal substance is not active4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 every corporeal substance is limited by quantity4 ,but quantity hinders substance from movement and action1 because it surrounds it and penetrates it3 just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light4 ,a proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity1 the heavier it is and the more difficult to move4 ,therefore no corporeal substance is active4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause4 ,but bodies1 being most composite1 are most remote from the first active cause1 which is most simple4 ,therefore no bodies are active4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if a body is an agent1 the term of its action is either a substantial1 or an accidental form4 ,but it is not a substantial form2 for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action1 save an active quality1 which is an accident2 and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form1 since the cause is always more excellent than the effect4 ,likewise1 neither is it an accidental form1 for an accident does not extend beyond its subject1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 ix1 #d74 ,therefore no bodies are active4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,coel4 ,hier4 xv7 that among other qualities of corporeal fire1 it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold4 ,i answer that1 ,it is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active4 ,but concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors4 ,for some denied all action to bodies4 ,this is the opinion of ,avicebron in his book on ,the ,fount of ,life1 where1 by the arguments mentioned above1 he endeavors to prove that no bodies act1 but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies1 are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies3 so that1 according to him1 it is not fire that heats1 but a spiritual power which penetrates1 by means of the fire4 ,and this opinion seems to be derived from that of ,plato4 ,for ,plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby1 and determined and limited thereto2 and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal2 wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter4 ,therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity1 ,avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity1 as the principle of individuality1 so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter3 and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone1 which is not hedged in by quantity1 can issue forth by acting on something else4 ,but this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent1 but that it is not a universal agent4 ,for in proportion as a thing is participated1 so1 of necessity1 must that be participated which is proper thereto2 thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility4 ,but to act1 which is nothing else than to make something to be in act1 is essentially proper to an act as such2 wherefore every agent produces its like4 ,so therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity1 a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal3 but to the fact that it is determined to this matter1 it owes its being an agent limited and particular4 ,wherefore if the form of fire were separate1 as the ,platonists supposed1 it would be1 in a fashion1 the cause of every ignition4 ,but this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter1 is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that4 ,hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies4 ,but this opinion of ,avicebron goes further than that of ,plato4 ,for ,plato held only substantial forms to be separate2 while he referred accidents to the material principles which are the great and the small1 which he considered to be the first contraries1 by others considered to the the rare and the dense4 ,consequently both ,plato and ,avicenna1 who follows him to a certain extent1 held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms1 by disposing matter for the substantial form2 but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle4 ,and this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies2 of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation 7,q4 #de1 ,a4 #h74 ,the third opinion is that of ,democritus1 who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent1 while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body4 ,this opinion is disproved by ,aristotle 7,de ,gener4 i1 #h1 #i74 ,for it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole1 and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action2 which things are manifestly untrue4 ,we must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act1 on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,this passage of ,augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole1 which thus has no nature inferior to it1 on which it can act2 as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal1 and the uncreated nature on the created4 ,nevertheless one body is inferior to another1 forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act4 ,from this follows the solution of the second objection4 ,but it must be observed1 when ,avicebron argues thus1 ,there is a mover who is not moved1 to wit1 the first maker of all2 therefore1 on the other hand1 there exists something moved which is purely passive1 that this is to be conceded4 ,but this latter is primary matter1 which is a pure potentiality1 just as ,god is pure act4 ,now a body is composed of potentiality and act2 and therefore it is both active and passive4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action1 as stated above2 but from being a universal agent1 forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity4 ,the proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose4 ,first1 because addition of quantity does not cause weight2 as is proved 7,de ,coelo et ,mundo iv1 #b74 ,secondly1 it is false that weight retards movement2 on the contrary1 the heavier a thing1 the greater its movement1 if we consider the movement proper thereto4 ,thirdly1 because action is not effected by local movement1 as ,democritus held3 but by something being reduced from potentiality to act4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,a body is not that which is most distant from ,god2 for it participates something of a likeness to the ,divine ,being1 forasmuch as it has a form4 ,that which is most distant from ,god is primary matter2 which is in no way active1 since it is a pure potentiality4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,the term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form4 ,for the active quality1 such as heat1 although itself an accident1 acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form1 as its instrument3 wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form2 thus natural heat1 as the instrument of the soul1 has an action terminating in the generation of flesh4 ,but by its own virtue it produces an accident4 ,nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting1 but it is to surpass it in being2 unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient2 thus ,democritus explained action by an issue of atoms4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,there ,are ,any ,seminal ,virtues in ,corporeal ,matter8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter4 ,for virtue 7ratio7 implies something of a spiritual order4 ,but in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually1 but only materially1 that is1 according to the mode of that in which it is4 ,therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h1 #i7 says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds1 which they know to exist in matter4 ,but bodies1 not virtues1 can be employed with local movement4 ,therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 seeds are active principles4 ,but there are no active principles in corporeal matter2 since1 as we have said above1 matter is not competent to act 7,a4 #a1 ad #b1 #d74 ,therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 there are said to be certain causal virtues 7,augustine1 ,de ,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #d7 which seem to suffice for the production of things4 ,but seminal virtues are not causal virtues3 for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues1 but not of causal virtues4 ,therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h73 ,of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion1 certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world4 ,i answer that1 ,it is customary to name things after what is more perfect1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d74 ,now in the whole corporeal nature1 living bodies are the most perfect3 wherefore the word nature has been transferred from living things to all natural things4 ,for the word itself1 nature1 as the ,philosopher says 7,metaph4 v1 ,did4 iv1 #d71 was first applied to signify the generation of living things1 which is called nativity3 and because living things are generated from a principle united to them1 as fruit from a tree1 and the offspring from the mother1 to whom it is united1 consequently the word nature has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved4 ,now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated4 ,therefore ,augustine fittingly gave the name of seminal virtues seminales rationes to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement4 ,these active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders4 ,for in the first place1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 vi1 #aj71 they are principally and originally in the ,word of ,god1 as typal ideas4 ,secondly1 they are in the elements of the world1 where they were produced altogether at the beginning1 as in universal causes4 ,thirdly1 they are in those things which1 in the succession of time1 are produced by universal causes1 for instance in this plant1 and in that animal1 as in particular causes4 ,fourthly1 they are in the seeds produced from animals and plants4 ,and these again are compared to further particular effects1 as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these active and passive virtues of natural things1 though not called virtues 7rationes7 by reason of their being in corporeal matter1 can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin1 forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas rationes ideales4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,these active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things3 and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results1 we speak of the demons as employing seeds4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal4 ,but that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle4 ,and thus the word seed covers both active and passive principles4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,from the words of ,augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues1 it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues1 just as seed is a kind of cause3 for he says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #i7 that1 as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring1 so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things4 ,nevertheless1 the typal ideas can be called causal virtues1 but not1 strictly speaking1 seminal virtues1 because seed is not a separate principle2 and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues4 ,likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature1 that the latter can be used to any purpose that ,god commands4 ,but miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues1 and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues1 and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #c ,whether the ,heavenly ,bodies ,are the ,cause of ,what ,is ,produced in ,bodies ,here ,below8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #g73 ,we say that they--namely1 the heavenly bodies--are not the cause of generation or corruption3 they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 for the production of anything1 an agent and matter suffice4 ,but in things here below there is passive matter2 and there are contrary agents--heat and cold1 and the like4 ,therefore for the production of things here below1 there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the agent produces its like4 ,now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold1 moisture and dryness1 and other such qualities1 which do not exist in heavenly bodies4 ,therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #f73 ,nothing is more corporeal than sex4 ,but sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies3 a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation1 one may be male1 the other female4 ,therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #d73 ,bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature4 ,and ,dionysius 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 says that the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies1 moves them to life1 gives them nourishment1 growth1 and perfection4 ,i answer that1 ,since every multitude proceeds from unity2 and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being1 whereas what is moved has many ways of being3 it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature1 all movement proceeds from the immovable4 ,therefore the more immovable certain things are1 the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable4 ,now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable1 for they are not moved save locally4 ,therefore the movements of bodies here below1 which are various and multiform1 must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies1 as to their cause4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,these words of ,damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below2 for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements1 such as hot and cold and the like4 ,if therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind1 the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the rare and the dense2 there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies1 for they would be of themselves sufficient to act4 ,but to anyone who considers the matter aright1 it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies4 ,now matter is not of itself sufficient to act4 ,and therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions4 ,this is why the ,platonists maintained the existence of separate species1 by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms4 ,but this does not seem enough4 ,for the separate species1 since they are supposed to be immovable1 would always have the same mode of being3 and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies3 which is clearly false4 ,therefore it is necessary1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ii1 #aj71 to suppose a movable principle1 which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies4 ,such are the heavenly bodies4 ,consequently whatever generates here below1 moves to the production of the species1 as the instrument of a heavenly body3 thus the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 ii1 #b7 that man and the sun generate man4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below4 ,their likeness consists in this1 that by reason of their universal power1 whatever is generated in inferior bodies1 is contained in them4 ,in this way also we say that all things are like ,god4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies1 according to the various dispositions of matter4 ,now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex2 wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male1 sometimes into a female4 ,augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars3 because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things1 according to the various dispositions of matter4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,heavenly ,bodies ,are the ,cause of ,human ,actions8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions4 ,for since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #c71 they act by virtue thereof as their instruments4 ,but those spiritual substances are superior to our souls4 ,therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls1 and thereby cause human actions4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle4 ,but human actions are various and multiform4 ,therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies1 as to their principles4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars1 and other human actions1 of which the intellect and will are the principles4 ,but they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies1 unless these were the cause of human actions4 ,therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions4 ,on the contrary1 ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 ii1 #g7 that the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions4 ,i answer that1 ,the heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies1 as stated above 7,a4 #c74 ,they can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs1 but accidentally3 because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs2 thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well4 ,wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs1 as some maintained1 holding that intellect does not differ from sense2 it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action4 ,it would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions1 just as other animals1 in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs3 for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies1 is done naturally4 ,it would therefore follow that man has no free-will1 and that he would have determinate actions1 like other natural things4 ,all of which is manifestly false1 and contrary to human habit4 ,it must be observed1 however1 that indirectly and accidentally1 the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will1 forasmuch1 namely1 as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs4 ,but in this the intellect and will are differently situated4 ,for the intellect1 of necessity1 receives from the inferior apprehensive powers3 wherefore if the imaginative1 cogitative1 or memorative powers be disturbed1 the action of the intellect is1 of necessity1 disturbed also4 ,the will1 on the contrary1 does not1 of necessity1 follow the inclination of the inferior appetite2 for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will2 nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them4 ,therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies1 by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed1 has less influence on the will1 which is the proximate cause of human actions1 than on the intellect4 ,to maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense4 ,wherefore some of these said that such is the will of men1 as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on 7,odyssey xviii #ace74 ,since1 therefore1 it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs1 it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the spiritual substances1 that move the heavenly bodies1 do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies2 but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it4 ,on the other hand1 they cannot compel the will1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #b74 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause3 so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the ,divine intellect and will4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the majority of men follow their passions1 which are movements of the sensitive appetite1 in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate3 but few are wise enough to resist these passions4 ,consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases1 especially in a general way4 ,but not in particular cases2 for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will4 ,wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that the wise man is stronger than the stars 99,ptolemy1 ,centiloquium1 prop4 #e1 forasmuch as1 to wit1 he conquers his passions4 ,,fifth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #e ,whether ,heavenly ,bodies ,can ,act on the ,demons8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons4 ,for the demons1 according to certain phases of the moon1 can harass men1 who on that account are called lunatics1 as appears from ,matt4 #d3bd and #ag3ad4 ,but this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies4 ,therefore the demons are subject to them4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons4 ,but these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them4 ,therefore they are subject to them4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies4 ,but the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies1 namely1 herbs1 stones1 animals1 and to certain sounds and words1 forms and figures1 as ,porphyry says1 quoted by ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #aa74 ,much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies4 ,on the contrary1 ,the demons are superior in the order of nature1 to the heavenly bodies4 ,but the agent is superior to the patient1 as ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 xii1 #af74 ,therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies4 ,i answer that1 ,there have been three opinions about the demons4 ,in the first place the ,peripatetics denied the existence of demons2 and held that what is ascribed to the demons1 according to the necromantic art1 is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies4 ,this is what ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #aa7 relates as having been held by ,porphyry1 namely1 that on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars4 ,but this opinion is manifestly false4 ,for we know by experience that many things are done by demons1 for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice3 for instance1 that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue1 recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge2 that necromancers make statues to speak and move1 and other like things4 ,for this reason the ,platonists were led to hold that demons are animals with an aerial body and a passive soul1 as ,apuleius says1 quoted by ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei viii1 #af74 ,and this is the second of the opinions mentioned above3 according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto 7,a4 #d74 ,but this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above 7,q4 #ea1 ,a4 #a73 for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies4 ,hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally1 neither directly nor indirectly4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,that demons harass men1 according to certain phases of the moon1 happens in two ways4 ,firstly1 they do so in order to defame ,god's creature1 namely1 the moon2 as ,jerome 7,in ,matt4 iv1 #bd7 and ,chrysostom 7,hom4 lvii in ,matt47 say4 ,secondly1 because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces1 as stated above 7,q4 #aad1 ,a4 #d1 ad #b7 they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result4 ,now it is manifest that the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body1 as ,aristotle says 99,de ,part4 ,animal4 ii1 #g3 ,de ,sens4 et ,sensato ii3 ,de ,somn4 et ,vigil4 iii3 wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon1 the property of which is to move what is moist4 ,and it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate3 wherefore the demons1 according to certain phases of the moon1 disturb man's imagination1 when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,demons when summoned through certain constellations1 come for two reasons4 ,firstly1 in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some ,divine power in the stars4 ,secondly1 because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei xxi1 #f71 the demons are enticed through various kinds of stones1 herbs1 trees1 animals1 songs1 rites1 not as an animal is enticed by food1 but as a spirit by signs2 that is to say1 forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to ,god1 of which they are covetous4 ,,sixth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aae1 ,art4 #f ,whether ,heavenly ,bodies ,impose ,necessity on ,things ,subject to ,their ,action8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action4 ,for given a sufficient cause1 the effect follows of necessity4 ,but heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects4 ,since1 therefore1 heavenly bodies1 with their movements and dispositions1 are necessary beings2 it seems that their effects follow of necessity4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 an agent's effect results of necessity in matter1 when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely4 ,but the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies1 since this is a higher power than theirs4 ,therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity1 this is due to some hindering cause4 ,but any corporeal cause1 that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body1 must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle3 since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below4 ,therefore1 since also that heavenly principle is necessary1 it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered4 ,consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher says 7,de ,somn4 et ,vigil4 99,de ,divin4 per ,somn4 ii73 ,it is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies1 of occurrences in the heavens1 such as rain and wind1 should not be fulfilled4 ,therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity4 ,i answer that1 ,this question is partly solved by what was said above 7,a4 #d72 and in part presents some difficulty4 ,for it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature1 the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations4 ,therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will1 not only in man himself1 but also in other things to which human action extends4 ,but in natural things there is no such principle1 endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents4 ,wherefore it seems that in such things at least1 everything happens of necessity2 according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is1 has a cause2 and that1 given the cause1 the effect follows of necessity2 concluded that all things happen of necessity4 ,this opinion is refuted by ,aristotle 7,metaph4 vi1 ,did4 v1 #c7 as to this double supposition4 ,for in the first place it is not true that1 given any cause whatever1 the effect must follow of necessity4 ,for some causes are so ordered to their effects1 as to produce them1 not of necessity1 but in the majority of cases1 and in the minority to fail in producing them4 ,but that such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause2 consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided1 since the cause in question is hindered of necessity4 ,therefore we must say1 in the second place1 that everything that is a being per se1 has a cause2 but what is accidentally1 has not a cause1 because it is not truly a being1 since it is not truly one4 ,for 7that a thing is7 white has a cause1 likewise 7that a man is7 musical has not a cause1 but 7that a being is7 white-musical has not a cause1 because it is not truly a being1 nor truly one4 ,now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases1 clashes sometimes with this cause by accident3 and the clashing of these two causes1 inasmuch as it is accidental1 has no cause4 ,consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause1 from which it follows of necessity4 ,for instance1 that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth1 is caused by some heavenly power3 again1 that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter1 is reducible to some heavenly principle4 ,but that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it1 is not caused by a heavenly body1 but is accidental4 ,consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below1 through the means of particular inferior causes1 which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the power of a heavenly body is not infinite4 ,wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter1 both as to local distance and as to other conditions1 in order to produce its effect4 ,therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body 7for the sun has not the same effect in heat in ,dacia as in ,ethiopia72 so the grossness of matter1 its low or high temperature or other such disposition1 can hinder the effect of a heavenly body4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause2 nevertheless the clashing of two causes1 being accidental1 is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body1 as stated above4 ,,on ,,fate 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we come now to the consideration of fate4 ,under this head there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,is there such a thing as fate8 7#b7 ,where is it8 7#c7 ,is it unchangeable8 7#d7 ,are all things subject to fate8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaf1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,there ,be ,such a ,thing ,as ,fate8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fate is nothing4 ,for ,gregory says in a homily for the ,epiphany 7,hom4 x in ,evang473 ,far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 what happens by fate is not unforeseen1 for as ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #d71 fate is understood to be derived from the verb 'fari' which means to speak2 as though things were said to happen by fate1 which are fore-spoken by one who decrees them to happen4 ,now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like4 ,if therefore things happen by fate1 there will be neither luck nor chance in the world4 ,on the contrary1 ,what does not exist cannot be defined4 ,but ,boethius 7,de ,consol4 iv7 defines fate thus3 ,fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things1 by which ,providence connects each one with its proper order4 ,i answer that1 ,in this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance4 ,now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like as compared to inferior causes1 which1 if compared to some higher cause1 is directly intended4 ,for instance1 if two servants are sent by their master to the same place2 the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance2 but as compared to the master1 who had ordered it1 it is directly intended4 ,so there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below4 ,these denied the existence of fate and ,providence1 as ,augustine relates of ,tully 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #i74 ,and this is contrary to what we have said above about ,providence 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #b74 ,on the other hand1 some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance1 whether in natural things or in human affairs1 is to be reduced to a superior cause1 namely1 the heavenly bodies4 ,according to these fate is nothing else than a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born 99,cf4 ,st4 ,augustine 1 loc4 cit41 v1 #a1 #h1 #i4 ,but this will not hold4 ,first1 as to human affairs3 because we have proved above 7,q4 #aae1 ,a4 #d7 that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies1 save accidentally and indirectly4 ,now the cause of fate1 since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate1 must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place4 ,secondly1 as to all things that happen accidentally3 for it has been said 7,q4 #aae1 ,a4 #f7 that what is accidental1 is properly speaking neither a being1 nor a unity4 ,but every action of nature terminates in some one thing4 ,wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle4 ,no natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grave finds a treasure4 ,now it is manifest that a acts after the manner of a natural principle3 wherefore its effects in this world are natural4 ,it is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below1 whether by luck or by chance4 ,we must therefore say that what happens here by accident1 both in natural things and in human affairs1 is reduced to a preordaining cause1 which is ,divine ,providence4 ,for nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect3 otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition3 ,the digger of a grave found a treasure4 ,and just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it2 for instance1 someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden1 might instigate a rustic1 ignorant of this1 to dig a grave there4 ,consequently1 nothing hinders what happens here by accident1 by luck or by chance1 being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect1 especially the ,divine intellect4 ,for ,god alone can change the will1 as shown above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #d74 ,consequently the ordering of human actions1 the principle of which is the will1 must be ascribed to ,god alone4 ,so therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to ,divine ,providence1 as being pre-ordained1 and as it were fore-spoken1 we can admit the existence of fate3 although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word1 on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars4 ,hence ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #a73 ,if anyone ascribes human affairs to fate1 meaning thereby the will or power of ,god1 let him keep to his opinion1 but hold his tongue4 ,for this reason ,gregory denies the existence of fate3 wherefore the first objection's solution is manifest4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance1 if compared to their proximate causes3 but not if compared to ,divine ,providence1 whereby nothing happens at random in the world1 as ,augustine says 7,,qq4 #hc1 qu4 #bd74 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaf1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,fate ,is in ,created ,things8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that fate is not in created things4 ,for ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #a7 that the ,divine will or power is called fate4 ,but the ,divine will or power is not in creatures1 but in ,god4 ,therefore fate is not in creatures but in ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 fate is compared to things that happen by fate1 as their cause2 as the very use of the word proves4 ,but the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below1 is ,god alone1 as stated above 7,a4 #a74 ,therefore fate is in ,god1 and not in creatures4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if fate is in creatures1 it is either a substance or an accident3 and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures4 ,since1 therefore1 fate seems to be one thing only1 it seems that fate is not in creatures1 but in ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv73 ,fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things4 ,i answer that1 ,as is clear from what has been stated above 7,q4 #bb1 ,a4 #c2 ,q4 #ajc1 ,a4 #f71 ,divine ,providence produces effects through mediate causes4 ,we can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways4 ,firstly1 as being in ,god ,himself3 and thus the ordering of the effects is called ,providence4 ,but if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by ,god to the production of certain effects1 thus it has the nature of fate4 ,this is what ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv73 ,fate is worked out when ,divine ,providence is served by certain spirits2 whether by the soul1 or by all nature itself which obeys ,him1 whether by the heavenly movements of the stars1 whether by the angelic power1 or by the ingenuity of the demons1 whether by some of these1 or by all1 the chain of fate is forged4 ,of each of these things we have spoken above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ajd1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aac2 ,q4 #aad74 ,it is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves1 as ordered by ,god to the production of their effects4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the ordering itself of second causes1 which ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #h7 calls the series of causes1 has not the nature of fate1 except as dependent on ,god4 ,wherefore the ,divine power or will can be called fate1 as being the cause of fate4 ,but essentially fate is the very disposition or series1 i4e4 order1 of second causes4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fate has the nature of a cause1 just as much as the second causes themselves1 the ordering of which is called fate4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,fate is called a disposition1 not that disposition which is a species of quality1 but in the sense in which it signifies order1 which is not a substance1 but a relation4 ,and if this order be considered in relation to its principle1 it is one2 and thus fate is one4 ,but if it be considered in relation to its effects1 or to the mediate causes1 this fate is multiple4 ,in this sense the poet wrote3 ,thy fate draws thee4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaf1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,fate ,is ,unchangeable8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that fate is not unchangeable4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv73 ,as reasoning is to the intellect1 as the begotten is to that which is1 as time to eternity1 as the circle to its centre2 so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of ,providence4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher says 7,topic4 ii1 #g73 ,if we be moved1 what is in us is moved4 ,but fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things1 as ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv74 ,therefore fate is changeable4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 if fate is unchangeable1 what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity4 ,but things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies4 ,therefore there would be no contingencies in the world1 but all things would happen of necessity4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv7 that fate is an unchangeable disposition4 ,i answer that1 ,the disposition of second causes which we call fate1 can be considered in two ways3 firstly1 in regard to the second causes1 which are thus disposed or ordered2 secondly1 in regard to the first principle1 namely1 ,god1 by ,whom they are ordered4 ,some1 therefore1 have held that the series itself of dispositions of causes is in itself necessary1 so that all things would happen of necessity2 for this reason that each effect has a cause1 and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity4 ,but this is false1 as proved above 7,q4 #aae1 ,a4 #f74 ,others1 on the other hand1 held that fate is changeable1 even as dependent on ,divine ,providence4 ,wherefore the ,egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices1 as ,gregory of ,nyssa says 7,nemesius1 ,de ,homine74 ,this too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to ,divine ,providence4 ,we must therefore say that fate1 considered in regard to second causes1 is changeable2 but as subject to ,divine ,providence1 it derives a certain unchangeableness1 not of absolute but of conditional necessity4 ,in this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary3 ,if ,god foreknew that this would happen1 it will happen4 ,wherefore ,boethius1 having said that the chain of fate is fickle1 shortly afterwards adds--which1 since it is derived from an unchangeable ,providence must also itself be unchangeable4 ,from this the answers to the objections are clear4 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aaf1 ,art4 #d ,whether ,all ,things ,are ,subject to ,fate8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that all things are subject to fate4 ,for ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv73 ,the chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars1 tempers the elements to one another1 and models them by a reciprocal transformation4 ,by fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed4 ,nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,de ,civ4 ,dei v1 #a7 that fate is something real1 as referred to the ,divine will and power4 ,but the ,divine will is cause of all things that happen1 as ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #a seqq474 ,therefore all things are subject to fate4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv7 that fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things4 ,but all creatures are changeable1 and ,god alone is truly unchangeable1 as stated above 7,q4 #i1 ,a4 #b74 ,therefore fate is in all things4 ,on the contrary1 ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv7 that some things subject to ,providence are above the ordering of fate4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,a4 #b71 fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by ,god4 ,whatever1 therefore1 is subject to second causes1 is subject also to fate4 ,but whatever is done immediately by ,god1 since it is not subject to second causes1 neither is it subject to fate2 such are creation1 the glorification of spiritual substances1 and the like4 ,and this is what ,boethius says 7,de ,consol4 iv73 viz4 that those things which are nigh to ,god have a state of immobility1 and exceed the changeable order of fate4 ,hence it is clear that the further a thing is from the ,first ,mind1 the more it is involved in the chain of fate2 since so much the more it is bound up with second causes4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,all the things mentioned in this passage are done by ,god by means of second causes2 for this reason they are contained in the order of fate4 ,but it is not the same with everything else1 as stated above4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,fate is to be referred to the ,divine will and power1 as to its first principle4 ,consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the ,divine will or power1 is subject also to fate1 as already stated4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,although all creatures are in some way changeable1 yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes4 ,and these1 therefore1 are not subject to fate1 as stated above4 ,,question #aag ,,of ,,things ,,pertaining ,,to ,,the ,,action ,,of ,,man 7,in ,four ,articles7 ,we have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man1 who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature4 ,in the first place we shall consider that action 7in general7 and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man4 ,as to the first1 there are four points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether one man can teach another1 as being the cause of his knowledge8 7#b7 ,whether man can teach an angel8 7#c7 ,whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter8 7#d7 ,whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,one ,man ,can ,teach ,another8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that one man cannot teach another4 ,for the ,lord says 7,matt4 #bb3h73 ,be not you called ,rabbi3 on which the gloss of ,jerome says1 ,lest you give to men the honor due to ,god4 ,therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to ,god4 ,but it belongs to a master to teach4 ,therefore man cannot teach1 and this is proper to ,god4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge1 so as to cause knowledge in the other4 ,but a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like1 is an active quality4 ,therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 for knowledge we require intellectual light1 and the species of the thing understood4 ,but a man cannot cause either of these in another man4 ,therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs1 so as to signify something by words or gestures4 ,but it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him1 by putting signs before him4 ,for these are signs either of things that he knows1 or of things he does not know4 ,if of things that he knows1 he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge1 and does not acquire it from the master4 ,if they are signs of things that he does not know1 he can learn nothing therefrom3 for instance1 if one were to speak ,greek to a man who only knows ,latin1 he would learn nothing thereby4 ,therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,apostle says 7#a ,tim4 #b3g73 ,whereunto ,i am appointed a preacher and an apostle 4 4 4 a doctor of the ,gentiles in faith and truth4 ,i answer that1 ,on this question there have been various opinions4 ,for ,averroes1 commenting on ,de ,anima iii1 maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common1 as stated above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #b74 ,from this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men4 ,consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself2 but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself1 by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul1 so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension4 ,this opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master1 if we consider the identity of the thing known3 for the same objective truth is known by both of them4 ,but so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect1 and the same intelligible species1 differing only as to various phantasms1 his opinion is false1 as stated above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #b74 ,besides this1 there is the opinion of the ,platonists1 who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning1 through the participation of separate forms1 as stated above 7,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #c1 #d72 but that the soul is hindered1 through its union with the body1 from the free consideration of those things which it knows4 ,according to this1 the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master1 but is roused by him to consider what he knows2 so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember4 ,in the same way they held that natural agents only dispose 7matter7 to receive forms1 which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances4 ,but against this we have proved above 7,q4 #gi1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #hd1 ,a4 #c7 that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible 7species71 as ,aristotle says 7,de ,anima iii1 #d74 ,we must therefore decide the question differently1 by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner1 by reducing him from potentiality to act1 as the ,philosopher says 7,phys4 viii1 #d74 ,in order to make this clear1 we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle1 some proceed from the exterior principle alone2 as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone3 whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle1 sometimes from an interior principle3 thus health is caused in a sick man1 sometimes by an exterior principle1 namely by the medical art1 sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature4 ,in these latter effects two things must be noticed4 ,first1 that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration1 digestion1 rejection of the matter that caused the sickness1 so does art4 ,secondly1 we must remark that the exterior principle1 art1 acts1 not as principal agent1 but as helping the principal agent1 but as helping the principal agent1 which is the interior principle1 by strengthening it1 and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance1 of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect4 ,thus the physician strengthens nature1 and employs food and medicine1 of which nature makes use for the intended end4 ,now knowledge is acquired in man1 both from an interior principle1 as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research2 and from an exterior principle1 as is clear in one who learns 7by instruction74 ,for in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge1 namely the light of the active intellect1 through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect4 ,now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things1 the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses2 then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown1 he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before4 ,wherefore anyone who teaches1 leads the disciple from things known by the latter1 to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him2 according to what the ,philosopher says 7,poster4 i1 #a73 ,all teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge4 ,now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown1 in a twofold manner4 ,firstly1 by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction1 which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science3 for instance1 he may put before him certain less universal propositions1 of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge3 or he may propose to him some sensible examples1 either by way of likeness or of opposition1 or something of the sort1 from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown4 ,secondly1 by strengthening the intellect of the learner2 not1 indeed1 by some active power as of a higher nature1 as explained above 7,q4 #ajf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aaa1 ,a4 #a7 of the angelic enlightenment1 because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order2 but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions1 by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,poster4 i1 #b7 that a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge4 ,in this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,as stated above1 the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals3 but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing1 so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge4 ,but both of these are from ,god4 ,therefore as of ,god is it written3 ,who healeth all thy diseases 7,ps4 #ajb3c72 so of ,him is it written3 ,he that teacheth man knowledge 7,ps4 #ic3aj71 inasmuch as the light of ,his countenance is signed upon us 7,ps4 #d3g71 through which light all things are shown to us4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,averroes argues1 the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause4 ,wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality3 but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching1 just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple1 nor does he cause the intelligible species directly3 but he moves the disciple by teaching1 so that the latter1 by the power of his intellect1 forms intelligible concepts1 the signs of which are proposed to him from without4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,the signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner2 but not known in detail and distinctly4 ,therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself1 he cannot be called self-taught1 or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him1 such as is required in a master4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #b ,whether ,man ,can ,teach the ,angels8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that men teach angels4 ,for the ,apostle says 7,eph4 #c3aj73 ,that the manifold wisdom of ,god may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the ,church4 ,but the ,church is the union of all the faithful4 ,therefore some things are made known to angels through men4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the superior angels1 who are enlightened immediately concerning ,divine things by ,god1 can instruct the inferior angels1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaf1 ,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aab1 ,a4 #c74 ,but some men are instructed immediately concerning ,divine things by the ,word of ,god2 as appears principally of the apostles from ,heb4 #a3a1 #b3 ,last of all1 in these days 7,god7 hath spoken to us by ,his ,son4 ,therefore some men have been able to teach the angels4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the inferior angels are instructed by the superior4 ,but some men are higher than some angels2 since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders1 as ,gregory says in a homily 7,hom4 xxxiv in ,evang474 ,therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning ,divine things4 ,on the contrary1 ,dionysius says 7,div4 ,nom4 iv7 that every ,divine enlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels4 ,therefore angels are not instructed by men concerning ,divine things4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #ajg1 ,a4 #b71 the inferior angels can indeed speak to the superior angels1 by making their thoughts known to them2 but concerning ,divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels4 ,now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior1 the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels4 ,this is clear from ,our ,lord's words 7,matt4 #aa3aa73 ,there hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than ,john the ,baptist2 yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he4 ,therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning ,divine things4 ,but men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts3 because it belongs to ,god alone to know the heart's secrets4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,augustine 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #ai7 thus explains this passage of the ,apostle1 who in the preceding verses says3 ,to me1 the least of all the saints1 is given this grace 4 4 4 to enlighten all men1 that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in ,god4 ,hidden1 yet so that the multiform wisdom of ,god was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places--that is1 through the ,church4 ,as though he were to say3 ,this mystery was hidden from men1 but not from the ,church in heaven1 which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it from all ages1 but not before all ages3 because the ,church was at first there1 where after the resurrection this ,church composed of men will be gathered together4 ,it can also be explained otherwise that what is hidden1 is known by the angels1 not only in ,god1 but also here where when it takes place and is made public1 as ,augustine says further on 7,gen4 ad lit4 v1 #ai74 ,thus when the mysteries of ,christ and the ,church were fulfilled by the apostles1 some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels1 which were hidden from them before4 ,in this way we can understand what ,jerome says 7,comment4 in ,ep4 ad ,eph47--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries2 that is to say1 through the preaching of the apostles1 the mysteries were realized in the things themselves3 thus by the preaching of ,paul the ,gentiles were converted1 of which mystery the ,apostle is speaking in the passage quoted4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the apostles were instructed immediately by the ,word of ,god1 not according to ,his ,divinity1 but according as ,he spoke in ,his human nature4 ,hence the argument does not prove4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels1 not actually1 but virtually2 forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels4 ,in the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree1 though actually it is much smaller4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,man by the ,power of ,his ,soul ,can ,change ,corporeal ,matter8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter4 ,for ,gregory says 7,dialog4 ii1 #cj73 ,saints work miracles sometimes by prayer1 sometimes by their power3 thus ,peter1 by prayer1 raised the dead ,tabitha to life1 and by his reproof delivered to death the lying ,ananias and ,saphira4 ,but in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter4 ,therefore men1 by the power of the soul1 can change corporeal matter4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 on these words 7,gal4 #c3a73 ,who hath bewitched you1 that you should not obey the truth8 the gloss says that some have blazing eyes1 who by a single look bewitch others1 especially children4 ,but this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter4 ,therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies4 ,but by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold1 as appears when a man is angry or afraid3 indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death4 ,much more1 then1 can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,trin4 iii1 #h73 ,corporeal matter obeys ,god alone at will4 ,i answer that1 ,as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b71 corporeal matter is not changed to 7the reception of7 a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form1 or by ,god ,himself1 in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually1 as in the primordial cause of both4 ,wherefore of the angels also we have stated 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b7 that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power1 except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects4 ,much less therefore can the soul1 by its natural power1 change corporeal matter1 except by means of bodies4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace1 not of nature4 ,this is clear from what ,gregory says in the same place3 ,those who are sons of ,god1 in power1 as ,john says--what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power8 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents4 ,therefore when the soul is of strong imagination1 it can change corporeal matter4 ,this he says is the cause of the evil eye4 ,but it has been shown above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #b7 that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will1 but the ,creator alone4 ,therefore it is better to say1 that by a strong imagination the 7corporeal7 spirits of the body united to that soul are changed1 which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes1 to which the more subtle spirits can reach4 ,and the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance3 in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a menstruata1 as ,aristotle says 7,de ,somn4 et ,vigil42 99,de ,insomniis ii74 ,hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness1 as occurs mostly in little old women1 according to the above explanation1 the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful1 especially to children1 who have a tender and most impressionable body4 ,it is also possible that by ,god's permission1 or from some hidden deed1 the spiteful demons co-operate in this1 as the witches may have some compact with them4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the soul is united to the body as its form2 and the sensitive appetite1 which obeys the reason in a certain way1 as stated above 7,q4 #ha1 ,a4 #c71 it is the act of a corporeal organ4 ,therefore at the apprehension of the human soul1 the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation4 ,but the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies1 except by means of a change in the body united to it1 as stated above 7ad #b74 ,,fourth ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aag1 ,art4 #d ,whether the ,separate ,human ,soul ,can ,move ,bodies at ,least ,locally8 ,objection #a3 ,it seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally4 ,for a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion1 as stated above 7,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #e74 ,but the separate soul is a spiritual substance4 ,therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in the ,itinerary of ,clement it is said in the narrative of ,nicetas to ,peter1 that ,simon ,magus1 by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain1 and that through this soul he worked magical wonders4 ,but this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place4 ,therefore1 the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally4 ,on the contrary1 the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima i1 #c7 that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own4 ,i answer that1 ,the separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body4 ,for it is manifest that1 even while the soul is united to the body1 it does not move the body except as endowed with life3 so that if one of the members become lifeless1 it does not obey the soul as to local motion4 ,now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul4 ,therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body2 though1 by the power of ,god1 it can exceed those limits4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,there are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies2 such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body2 consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement4 ,but if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body1 that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree1 but only one of lower degree3 thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven4 ,wherefore1 since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form1 it cannot by its natural power move any other body4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,as ,augustine 7,de ,civ4 ,dei x1 #aa7 and ,chrysostom 7,hom4 xxviii in ,matt47 say1 the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead1 in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition4 ,it is therefore credible that ,simon ,magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain4 ,,question #aah ,,of ,,the ,,production ,,of ,,man ,,from ,,man ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,soul 7,in ,three ,articles7 ,we next consider the production of man from man3 first1 as to the soul2 secondly1 as to the body4 ,under the first head there are three points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen8 7#b7 ,whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted8 7#c7 ,whether all souls were created at the same time8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #a ,whether the ,sensitive ,soul ,is ,transmitted with the ,semen8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen1 but created by ,god4 ,for every perfect substance1 not composed of matter and form1 that begins to exist1 acquires existence not by generation1 but by creation3 for nothing is generated save from matter4 ,but the sensitive soul is a perfect substance1 otherwise it could not move the body2 and since it is the form of a body1 it is not composed of matter and form4 ,therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 in living things the principle of generation is the generating power2 which1 since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul1 is of a lower order than the sensitive soul4 ,now nothing acts beyond its species4 ,therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal's generating power4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the generator begets its like3 so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation4 ,but neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen1 for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body2 while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body1 because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof4 ,therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul1 this principle either remains after the animal is begotten1 or it does not remain4 ,now it cannot remain4 ,for either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal2 which is impossible1 for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten1 maker and made3 or it would be distinct therefrom2 and again this is impossible1 for it has been proved above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #d7 that in one animal there is but one formal principle1 which is the soul4 ,if on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain1 this again seems to be impossible3 for thus an agent would act to its own destruction1 which cannot be4 ,therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen4 ,on the contrary1 ,the power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated1 as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction4 ,but in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power1 according to ,gen4 #a3bj3 ,let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life4 ,therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power4 ,i answer that1 ,some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by ,god 7,q4 #fe1 ,a4 #d74 ,this opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent1 having being and operation of itself4 ,for thus1 as having being and operation of itself1 to be made would needs be proper to it4 ,and since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation1 it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation4 ,but this principle is false--namely1 that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul1 as has been made clear above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #c73 for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes4 ,since1 therefore1 it is not a subsistent form1 its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms1 to which existence does not belong as proper to them1 but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them4 ,wherefore to be made is proper to composites4 ,and since the generator is like the generated1 it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul1 and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act1 through some corporeal power of which they are possessed4 ,now the more powerful an agent1 the greater scope its action has3 for instance1 the hotter a body1 the greater the distance to which its heat carries4 ,therefore bodies not endowed with life1 which are the lowest in the order of nature1 generate their like1 not through some medium1 but by themselves2 thus fire by itself generates fire4 ,but living bodies1 as being more powerful1 act so as to generate their like1 both without and with a medium4 ,without a medium--in the work of nutrition1 in which flesh generates flesh3 with a medium--in the act of generation1 because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator1 just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent4 ,and as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent1 so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator1 or by some seminal power derived therefrom4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,the sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance4 ,we have said enough 7,q4 #be1 ,a4 #c7 on this point1 nor need we repeat it here4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul1 of which it is a power4 ,therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant1 and that of an animal begets an animal4 ,for the more perfect the soul is1 to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this active force which is in the semen1 and which is derived from the soul of the generator1 is1 as it were1 a certain movement of this soul itself3 nor is it the soul or a part of the soul1 save virtually2 thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe1 but a certain movement towards that form4 ,consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ2 but it is based on the 7vital7 spirit in the semen which is frothy1 as is attested by its whiteness4 ,in which spirit1 moreover1 there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies1 by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above 7,q4 #aae1 ,a4 #c1 ad #b74 ,and since in this 7vital7 spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body1 it has been said that man and the sun generate man4 ,moreover1 elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul's power1 as also by the nutritive power1 as stated 7,de ,anima ii1 #d74 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,in perfect animals1 generated by coition1 the active force is in the semen of the male1 as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ii1 #c72 but the foetal matter is provided by the female4 ,in this matter1 the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning1 not as to the second act1 but as to the first act1 as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps4 ,but as soon as it begins to attract nourishment1 then it already operates in act4 ,this matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male1 until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul2 not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul2 for thus1 indeed1 the generator and generated would be identical2 moreover1 this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation1 as the ,philosopher says4 ,and after the sensitive soul1 by the power of the active principle in the semen1 has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated1 then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body1 by nourishment and growth4 ,as to the active power which was in the semen1 it ceases to exist1 when the semen is dissolved and the 7vital7 spirit thereof vanishes4 ,nor is there anything unreasonable in this1 because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent2 and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,intellectual ,soul ,is ,produced from the ,semen8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen4 ,for it is written 7,gen4 #df3bf73 ,all the souls that came out of ,jacob's thigh1 sixty-six4 ,but nothing is produced from the thigh of a man1 except from the semen4 ,therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 as shown above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #c71 the intellectual1 sensitive1 and nutritive souls are1 in substance1 one soul in man4 ,but the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen1 as in other animals2 wherefore the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ii1 #c7 that the animal and the man are not made at the same time1 but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul4 ,therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form3 else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one4 ,but the intellectual soul is the form of the human body1 which is produced by the power of the semen4 ,therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 man begets his like in species4 ,but the human species is constituted by the rational soul4 ,therefore the rational soul is from the begetter4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 it cannot be said that ,god concurs in sin4 ,but if the rational soul be created by ,god1 sometimes ,god concurs in the sin of adultery1 since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse4 ,therefore the rational soul is not created by ,god4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is written in ,de ,eccl4 ,dogmat4 xiv that the rational soul is not engendered by coition4 ,i answer that1 ,it is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect4 ,now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter2 for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever4 ,it is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle4 ,again1 the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body1 making use of the body in its operation4 ,now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect4 ,therefore the power of the intellectual principle1 as intellectual1 cannot reach the semen4 ,hence the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 ii1 #c73 ,it follows that the intellect alone comes from without4 ,again1 since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body1 it is subsistent1 as proved above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #b73 therefore to be and to be made are proper to it4 ,moreover1 since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation1 but only through creation by ,god4 ,therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter1 is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body4 ,it is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,in the passage quoted1 the part is put instead of the whole1 the soul for the whole man1 by the figure of synecdoche4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul1 but from the soul of the mother2 or from the formative power of the semen4 ,both of these explanations are false2 for vital functions such as feeling1 nourishment1 and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle4 ,consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo2 the nutritive soul from the beginning1 then the sensitive1 lastly the intellectual soul4 ,therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first1 another1 namely the sensitive1 soul supervenes2 and in addition to this1 again another1 namely the intellectual soul4 ,thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another4 ,this has been disproved above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #c74 ,therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative1 afterwards through the action of the seminal power1 becomes a sensitive soul2 and finally this same soul becomes intellectual1 not indeed through the active seminal power1 but by the power of a higher agent1 namely ,god enlightening 7the soul7 from without4 ,for this reason the ,philosopher says that the intellect comes from without4 ,but this will not hold4 ,first1 because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less2 but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species1 just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number4 ,now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species4 ,secondly1 because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement1 proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect1 as happens in alteration4 ,thirdly1 because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply1 because the subject thereof would be a being in act4 ,for if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring1 and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection2 this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection4 ,and this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called4 ,fourthly1 because either that which is caused by the action of ,god is something subsistent3 and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form1 which was non-subsistent2 and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is not subsistent1 but a perfection of the pre-existing soul3 and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body1 which cannot be admitted4 ,there is again another explanation1 according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common3 but this has been disproved above 7,q4 #gf1 ,a4 #b74 ,we must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another1 it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals1 when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted3 yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form1 and something in addition4 ,it is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form1 both in man and other animals4 ,this indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction4 ,we conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by ,god at the end of human generation1 and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive1 the pre-existing forms being corrupted4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,this argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another4 ,but where there are many agents ordered to one another1 nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form2 while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter3 thus in the generation of an animal1 the seminal power disposes the matter1 but the power of the soul gives the form4 ,now it is manifest from what has been said above 7,q4 #aje1 ,a4 #e2 ,q4 #aaj1 ,a4 #a7 that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power1 especially of ,god4 ,therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power1 while the intellectual soul is from ,god alone4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,man begets his like1 forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form4 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,in the action of the adulterer1 what is of nature is good2 in this ,god concurs4 ,but what there is of inordinate lust is evil2 in this ,god does not concur4 ,,third ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aah1 ,art4 #c ,whether ,human ,souls ,were ,created ,together at the ,beginning of the ,world8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world4 ,for it is written 7,gen4 #b3b73 ,god rested ,him from all ,his work which ,he had done4 ,this would not be true if ,he created new souls every day4 ,therefore all souls were created at the same time4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe4 ,if therefore souls were created with the bodies1 every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe3 consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect4 ,this is contrary to ,gen4 #b3b1 where it is said that ,god ended all ,his work4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning4 ,but the intellectual soul remains1 when the body perishes4 ,therefore it began to exist before the body4 ,on the contrary1 ,it is said 7,de ,eccl4 ,dogmat4 xiv1 xviii7 that the soul is created together with the body4 ,i answer that1 ,some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body1 asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body4 ,these1 therefore1 stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning4 ,but this statement is false4 ,firstly1 in the very principle on which it is based4 ,for if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body1 it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident2 or that the soul is a man1 which is false1 as proved above 7,q4 #ge1 ,a4 #d74 ,moreover1 that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels1 is proved from the different mode of understanding1 as shown above 7,q4 #ee1 ,a4 #b2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a73 for man understands through receiving from the senses1 and turning to phantasms1 as stated above 7,q4 #hd1 ,,aa4 #f1 #g2 ,q4 #he1 ,a4 #a74 ,for this reason the soul needs to be united to the body1 which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part3 whereas this cannot be said of an angel4 ,secondly1 this statement can be proved to be false in itself4 ,for if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body1 it is unnatural to it to be without a body1 and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection4 ,now it was not fitting that ,god should begin ,his work with things imperfect and unnatural1 for ,he did not make man without a hand or a foot1 which are natural parts of a man4 ,much less1 therefore1 did ,he make the soul without a body4 ,but if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body1 he must give the reason why it is united to a body4 ,and the reason must be either because the soul so willed1 or for some other reason4 ,if because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous4 ,first1 because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body1 if it did not need the body3 for if it did need it1 it would be natural for it to be united to it1 since nature does not fail in what is necessary4 ,secondly1 because there would be no reason why1 having been created from the beginning of the world1 the soul should1 after such a long time1 come to wish to be united to the body4 ,for a spiritual substance is above time1 and superior to the heavenly revolutions4 ,thirdly1 because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance3 since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur--to wit1 that of the incoming soul1 and that of the begetter4 ,if1 however1 this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul1 then it must be the result of some violent cause1 and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature4 ,this is in keeping with the opinion of ,origen1 who held that souls were embodied in punishment of sin4 ,since1 therefore1 all these opinions are unreasonable1 we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies1 but are created at the same time as they are infused into them4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,god is said to have rested on the seventh day1 not from all work1 since we read 7,john #e3ag73 ,my ,father worketh until now2 but from the creation of any new genera and species1 which may not have already existed in the first works4 ,for in this sense1 the souls which are created now1 existed already1 as to the likeness of the species1 in the first works1 which included the creation of ,adam's soul4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe1 as to the number of individuals1 but not as to the number of species4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,that the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body1 which was a result of sin4 ,consequently it was not fitting that ,god should make the soul without the body from the beginning3 for as it is written 7,wis4 #a3ac1 #af73 ,god made not death 4 4 4 but the wicked with works and words have called it to them4 ,,question #aai ,,of ,,the ,,propagation ,,of ,,man ,,as ,,to ,,the ,,body 7,in ,two ,articles7 ,we now consider the propagation of man1 as to the body4 ,concerning this there are two points of inquiry3 7#a7 ,whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature8 7#b7 ,whether the semen1 which is the principle of human generation1 is produced from the surplus food8 ,,first ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aai1 ,art4 #a ,whether ,some ,part of the ,food ,is ,changed into ,true ,human ,nature8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature4 ,for it is written 7,matt4 #ae3ag73 ,whatsoever entereth into the mouth1 goeth into the belly1 and is cast out into the privy4 ,but what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature4 ,therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the ,philosopher 7,de ,gener4 i1 #e7 distinguishes flesh belonging to the species from flesh belonging to matter2 and says that the latter comes and goes4 ,now what is formed from food comes and goes4 ,therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter1 not to the species4 ,but what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species4 ,therefore the food is not changed into true human nature4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the radical humor seems to belong to the reality of human nature2 and if it be lost1 it cannot be recovered1 according to physicians4 ,but it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor4 ,therefore food is not changed into true human nature4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 if the food were changed into true human nature1 whatever is lost in man could be restored4 ,but man's death is due only to the loss of something4 ,therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity4 ,obj4 #e3 ,further1 if the food is changed into true human nature1 there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired3 for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired4 ,if therefore a man lived long enough1 it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning4 ,consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life2 since for the thing to be numerically the same1 identity of matter is necessary4 ,but this is incongruous4 ,therefore the food is not changed into true human nature4 ,on the contrary1 ,augustine says 7,de ,vera ,relig4 xi73 ,the bodily food when corrupted1 that is1 having lost its form1 is changed into the texture of the members4 ,but the texture of the members belongs to true human nature4 ,therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature4 ,i answer that1 ,according to the ,philosopher 7,metaph4 ii71 ,the relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being4 ,therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature4 ,but nature can be considered in two ways3 firstly1 in general according to the species2 secondly1 as in the individual4 ,and whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing's true nature considered in general2 individual signate matter1 and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual4 ,thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general1 but to the true human nature of ,peter and ,martin belong this soul and this body4 ,now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter3 thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is4 ,and in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter1 which1 they said1 was given that form at the very beginning in the first man4 ,so that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent1 does not belong to the truth of human nature1 as not receiving in truth the form of human nature4 ,but1 said they1 that matter which1 in the first man1 was the subject of the human form1 was multiplied in itself3 and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man4 ,according to these1 the food is not changed into true human nature2 we take food1 they stated1 in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat1 and prevent the consumption of the radical humor2 just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire4 ,but this is unreasonable in many ways4 ,firstly1 because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter1 or that it can cease to be in its proper matter2 wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible1 and conversely4 ,now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this 7particular7 matter which is its subject3 else the human body would not be corruptible4 ,consequently it can begin to exist in another matter1 so that something else be changed into true human nature4 ,secondly1 because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species3 as is clearly the case with the sun1 moon and such like4 ,thus there would only be one individual of the human species4 ,thirdly1 because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only1 as in things which are rarefied1 so that their matter increases in dimensions2 or in respect of the substance itself of the matter4 ,but as long as the substance alone of matter remains1 it cannot be said to be multiplied2 for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself1 since of necessity it can only result from division4 ,therefore some other substance must be added to matter1 either by creation1 or by something else being changed into it4 ,consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water2 or by the change of some other things1 as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood2 or lastly by creation4 ,now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction3 for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child4 ,nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter3 for1 according to ,gregory 7,moral4 xxxii73 ,all things were created together as to the substance of matter1 but not as to the specific form4 ,consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature4 ,fourthly1 because1 since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul1 it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished1 but through some kind of multiplication4 ,which multiplication cannot be natural3 since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity2 nor again does anything increase naturally1 save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it4 ,consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment1 which are called natural forces1 would be miraculous4 ,which is altogether inadmissible4 ,wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter1 if we consider the human nature in general3 but not if we consider it as in this individual4 ,for in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter1 on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual1 so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual4 ,and this matter1 say they1 principally belongs to the true human nature4 ,but since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity1 some other matter must be added1 through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof1 in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required4 ,and this matter1 they state1 belongs secondarily to the true human nature3 because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual1 but for the quantity due to him4 ,and if anything further is produced from the food1 this does not belong to true human nature1 properly speaking4 ,however1 this also is inadmissible4 ,first1 because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies2 in which1 although there be a power of generating their like in species1 there is not the power of generating their like in the individual2 which power in living bodies is the nutritive power4 ,nothing1 therefore1 would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power1 if their food were not changed into their true nature4 ,secondly1 because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter1 as stated above 7,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #a74 ,hence it cannot have a greater power in acting1 than the soul from which it is derived4 ,if1 therefore1 by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature1 much more can the soul1 by the nutritive power1 imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated4 ,thirdly1 because food is needed not only for growth1 else at the term of growth1 food would be needful no longer2 but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat4 ,but there would be no renewal1 unless what is formed from the food1 took the place of what is lost4 ,wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature1 so also does that which is formed from the food4 ,therefore1 according to others1 it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh1 bones and such like parts4 ,this is what the ,philosopher says 7,de ,anima ii1 #d73 ,food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,our ,lord does not say that the whole of what enters into the mouth1 but all--because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy4 ,it may also be said that whatever is generated from food1 can be dissolved by natural heat1 and be cast aside through the pores1 as ,jerome expounds the passage4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,by flesh belonging to the species1 some have understood that which first receives the human species1 which is derived from the begetter3 this1 they say1 lasts as long as the individual does4 ,by flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food3 and this1 they say1 does not always remain1 but as it comes so it goes4 ,but this is contrary to the mind of ,aristotle4 ,for he says there1 that just as in things which have their species in matter--for instance1 wood or stone--so in flesh1 there is something belonging to the species1 and something belonging to matter4 ,now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things1 which are not generated seminally1 or nourished4 ,again1 since what is generated from food is united to1 by mixing with1 the body so nourished1 just as water is mixed with wine1 as the ,philosopher says there by way of example3 that which is added1 and that to which it is added1 cannot be different natures1 since they are already made one by being mixed together4 ,therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat1 while the other remains4 ,it must therefore be said that this distinction of the ,philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh1 but of the same flesh considered from different points of view4 ,for if we consider the flesh according to the species1 that is1 according to that which is formed therein1 thus it remains always3 because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition4 ,but if we consider flesh according to matter1 then it does not remain1 but is gradually destroyed and renewed3 thus in the fire of a furnace1 the form of fire remains1 but the matter is gradually consumed1 and other matter is substituted in its place4 ,reply ,obj4 #c3 ,the radical humor is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on4 ,if this be taken away it cannot be renewed2 as when a man's hand or foot is amputated4 ,but the nutritive humor is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature1 but is on the way thereto2 such is the blood1 and the like4 ,wherefore if such be taken away1 the virtue of the species remains in its root1 which is not destroyed4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action1 because such agents are also patient4 ,therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost1 but also for growth4 ,later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost1 and then growth ceases4 ,at last it cannot even do this2 and then begins decline4 ,in fine1 when this virtue fails altogether1 the animal dies4 ,thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it1 is weakened by further additions of water1 so as to become at length watery1 as the ,philosopher says by way of example 7,de ,gener4 i1 #e74 ,reply ,obj4 #e3 ,as the ,philosopher says 7,de ,gener4 i1 #e71 when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire1 then fire is said to be generated anew3 but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing1 then fire is said to be fed4 ,wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire1 and another matter transformed into fire1 there will be another distinct fire4 ,but if1 while one piece of wood is burning1 other wood is laid on1 and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed1 the same identical fire will remain all the time3 because that which is added passes into what pre-existed4 ,it is the same with living bodies1 in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat4 ,,second ,,article ,i1 ,q4 #aai1 ,art4 #b ,whether the ,semen ,is ,produced from ,surplus ,food8 ,objection #a3 ,it would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food1 but from the substance of the begetter4 ,for ,damascene says 7,de ,fide ,orth4 i1 #h7 that generation is a work of nature1 producing1 from the substance of the begetter1 that which is begotten4 ,but that which is generated is produced from the semen4 ,therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter4 ,obj4 #b3 ,further1 the son is like his father1 in respect of that which he receives from him4 ,but if the semen from which something is generated1 is produced from the surplus food1 a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed4 ,therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors1 than to any other men4 ,obj4 #c3 ,further1 the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows1 pigs and suchlike4 ,if therefore1 the semen were produced from surplus food1 the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig1 than to his father or other relations4 ,obj4 #d3 ,further1 ,augustine says 7,gen4 ad lit4 x1 #bj7 that we were in ,adam not only by seminal virtue1 but also in the very substance of the body4 ,but this would not be1 if the semen were produced from surplus food4 ,therefore the semen is not produced therefrom4 ,on the contrary1 ,the ,philosopher proves in many ways 7,de ,gener4 ,animal4 i1 #ah7 that the semen is surplus food4 ,i answer that1 ,this question depends in some way on what has been stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #aah1 ,a4 #a74 ,for if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another1 but also in its own subject2 it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar1 becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it4 ,now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually3 hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected4 ,but it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate1 as imperfect is to perfect3 therefore we see that in the generation of an animal1 the animal is generated first1 then the man or the horse4 ,so therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body1 which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part4 ,now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members4 ,for this solution1 if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from1 it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter1 and would be due to a process of corruption2 and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature4 ,but if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from1 then1 since it is limited to a certain part of the body1 it would not have the power of moving towards 7the production of7 the whole nature1 but only the nature of that part4 ,unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body1 and that it retains the nature of each part4 ,thus the semen would be a small animal in act2 and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division1 as mud is generated from mud1 and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two3 which is inadmissible4 ,it remains to be said1 therefore1 that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole2 rather is it the whole1 though potentially1 having the power1 derived from the soul of the begetter1 to produce the whole body1 as stated above 7,a4 #a2 ,q4 #ajh1 ,a4 #a74 ,now that which is in potentiality to the whole1 is that which is generated from the food1 before it is transformed into the substance of the members4 ,therefore the semen is taken from this4 ,in this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power3 because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power4 ,a sign of this1 according to the ,philosopher1 is that animals of great size1 which require much food1 have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies1 and generate seldom2 in like manner fat men1 and for the same reason4 ,reply ,obj4 #a3 ,generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants1 inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter1 and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance4 ,reply ,obj4 #b3 ,the likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter1 but of the form of the agent that generates its like4 ,wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather1 there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather2 but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father4 ,in like manner the third objection is answered4 ,for kinship is not in relation to matter1 but rather to the derivation of the forms4 ,reply ,obj4 #d3 ,these words of ,augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue1 or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in ,adam3 but so that both were in ,adam as in principle4 ,for even the corporeal matter1 which is supplied by the mother1 and which he calls the corporeal substance1 is originally derived from ,adam3 and likewise the active seminal power of the father1 which is the immediate seminal virtue 7in the production7 of this man4 ,but ,christ is said to have been in ,adam according to the corporeal substance1 not according to the seminal virtue4 ,because the matter from which ,his ,body was formed1 and which was supplied by the ,virgin ,mother1 was derived from ,adam2 whereas the active virtue was not derived from ,adam1 because ,his ,body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man1 but by the operation of the ,holy ,ghost4 ,for such a birth was becoming to ,him1 99,hymn for ,vespers at ,christmas2 ,breviary1 ,o4 ,p41 ,,who ,,is ,,above ,,all ,,god ,,for ,,ever ,,blessed4 ,amen4