,,sextus ,,empiricus ,,and ,,greek ,,scepticism ,a ,thesis accepted for the ,degree of ,doctor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,bern ,switzerland1 ,november #ahig by ,,mary ,,mills ,,patrick ,,president ,,of ,,the ,,american ,,college1 ,,constantinople ,,turkey ,this ,thesis is accompanied by a ,translation from the ,greek of the ,first ,book of the ,pyrrhonic ,sketches by ,sextus ,empiricus ,,cambridge ,,deighton ,,bell ,,co4 ,,london ,,george ,,bell ,,sons #ahii ,,cambridge ,,printed ,,by ,,jonathan ,,palmer ,,alexandra ,,street ,,preface ,the following treatise on ,sextus ,empiricus and ,greek ,scepticism has been prepared to supply a need much felt in the ,english language by students of ,greek philosophy4 ,for while other schools of ,greek philosophy have been exhaustively and critically discussed by ,english scholars1 there are few sources of information available to the student who wishes to make himself familiar with the teachings of ,pyrrhonism4 ,the aim has been1 accordingly1 to give a concise presentation of ,pyrrhonism in relation to its historical development and the ,scepticism of the ,academy1 with critical references to the ,french and ,german works existing on the subject4 ,the time and manner of the connection of ,sextus ,empiricus with the ,pyrrhonean ,school has also been discussed4 ,as the ,first ,book of the ,hypotyposes1 or ,pyrrhonic ,sketches by ,sextus ,empiricus1 contains the substance of the teachings of ,pyrrhonism1 it has been hoped that a translation of it into ,english might prove a useful contribution to the literature on ,pyrrhonism1 and this translation has been added to the critical part of the work4 ,in making this translation1 and in the general study of the works of ,sextus1 the ,greek text of ,immanuel ,bekker1 ,berlin1 #ahdb1 has been used1 with frequent consultation of the text of ,j4,a4 ,fabricius1 #agah1 which was taken directly from the existing manuscripts of the works of ,sextus4 ,the divisions into chapters1 with the headings of the chapters in the translation1 is the same as ,fabricius gives from the manuscripts1 although not used by ,bekker1 and the numbers of the paragraphs are the same as those given by both ,fabricius and ,bekker4 ,references to ,diogenes ,laertius and other ancient works have been carefully verified4 ,the principal modern authors consulted are the following3 ,ritter1 ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,,ii4 ,auf41 ,hamburg1 #ahcf-ch4 ,zeller1 ,philosophie der ,griechen1 ,,iii4 ,auf41 ,leipzig1 #ahgi-hi4 ,lewes1 ,history of ,philosophy1 ,vol4 ,i41 ,london1 #ahff4 ,ueberweg1 ,history of ,philosophy1 ,,iv4 ed41 translated by ,morris1 #ahga4 ,brochard1 ,les ,sceptiques ,grecs1 ,paris1 #ahgg4 ,brochard1 ,pyrrhon et le ,scepticism ,primitive1 ,no4 #e1 ,ribot's ,revue ,phil41 ,paris1 #ahhe4 ,saisset1 ,le ,scepticism ,aensidme-,pascal-,kant1 ,paris1 #ahfg4 ,chaignet1 ,histoire de la ,psychologie des ,grecs1 ,paris1 #ahhg-ij4 ,haas1 ,leben des ,sextus ,empiricus1 ,burghausen1 #ahhb4 ,natorp1 ,forschungen zur ,geschichte des ,erkenntnisproblems bei den ,alten1 ,berlin1 #ahhd4 ,hirzel1 ,untersuchungen zu ,cicero's philosophischen ,schriften1 ,leipzig1 #ahgg-hc4 ,pappenheim1 ,erluterung zu des ,sextus ,empiricus ,pyrrhoneischen ,grundzgen1 ,heidelberg1 #ahhb4 ,pappenheim1 ,die ,tropen der ,greichischen ,skeptiker1 ,berlin1 #ahhe4 ,pappenheim1 ,lebensverhltnisse des ,sextus ,empiricus1 ,berlin1 #ahhg4 ,pappenheim1 ,der angebliche ,heraclitismus des ,skeptikers ,ainesidemos1 ,berlin1 #ahhg4 ,pappenheim1 ,der ,sitz der ,schule der ,griechischen ,skeptiker1 ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,philosophie1 ,i4 #a1 ,s4 #dg1 #ahhg4 ,maccoll1 ,the ,greek ,sceptics from ,pyrrho to ,sextus1 ,london1 #ahfi4 ,my grateful acknowledgments are due to ,dr4 ,ludwig ,stein1 ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,university of ,bern1 for valuable assistance in relation to the plan of the work and advice in regard to the best authorities to be consulted4 ,thanks are also due to ,dr4 ,louisos ,iliou1 of ,robert ,college1 ,constantinople1 for kind suggestions concerning the translation4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,historical ,,relations ,,of ,,sextus ,,empiricus 444 #a ,introductory paragraph4--,the name of ,sextus ,empiricus4 ,his profession4--,the time when he lived4--,the place of his birth4--,the seat of the ,sceptical ,school while ,sextus was at its head4--,the character of the writings of ,sextus ,empiricus4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,position ,,and ,,aim ,,of ,,pyrrhonic ,,scepticism 444 #bc ,the subject-matter of the ,hypotyposes4--,the origin of ,pyrrhonism4--,the nomenclature of ,pyrrhonism4--,its criterion4--,its aim4--,greek3 epoch and ,greek3 ataraxia4--,the standpoint of ,pyrrhonism4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,sceptical ,,tropes 444 #ca ,origin of the name4--,the ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch4--,the ,first ,trope4--,the ,second ,trope4--,the ,third ,trope4--,the ,fourth ,trope4--,the ,fifth ,trope4--,the ,sixth ,trope4--,the ,seventh ,trope4--,the ,eighth ,trope4--,the ,ninth ,trope4--,the ,tenth ,trope4--,the five ,tropes of ,agrippa4--,the two ,tropes4--,the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus against ,aetiology4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,aenesidemus ,,and ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,heraclitus 444 #fc ,statement of the problem4--,the theory of ,pappenheim4--,the theory of ,brochard4--,zeller's theory4--,the theory of ,ritter and ,saisset4--,the theory of ,hirzel and ,natorp4--,critical examination of the subject4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,critical ,,examination ,,of ,,pyrrhonism 444 #ha ,pyrrhonism and ,pyrrho4--,pyrrhonism and the ,academy4 ,strength and weakness of ,pyrrhonism4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,the ,,first ,,book ,,of ,,the ,,pyrrhonic ,,sketches ,,by ,,sextus ,,empiricus1 ,,translated ,,from ,,the ,,greek 444 #aja ,,chapter ,i4 ,the ,historical ,relations of ,sextus ,empiricus4 ,interest has revived in the works of ,sextus ,empiricus in recent times1 especially1 one may say1 since the date of ,herbart4 ,there is much in the writings of ,sextus that finds a parallel in the methods of modern philosophy4 ,there is a common starting-point in the study of the power and limitations of human thought4 ,there is a common desire to investigate the phenomena of sense-perception1 and the genetic relations of man to the lower animals1 and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge4 ,while1 however1 some of the pages of ,sextus' works would form a possible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical thought1 we cannot carry the analogy farther1 for ,pyrrhonism as a whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical progress1 which is a belief in the possibility of finding and establishing the truth in the subjects investigated4 ,before beginning a critical study of the writings of ,sextus ,empiricus1 and the light which they throw on the development of ,greek ,scepticism1 it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat familiar with the environment in which he lived and wrote4 ,we shall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from which he regarded philosophical questions4 ,let us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life1 including his profession1 the time when he lived1 the place of his birth1 the country in which he taught1 and the general aim and character of his works4 ,here1 however1 we encounter great difficulties1 for although we possess most of the writings of ,sextus well preserved1 the evidence which they provide on the points mentioned is very slight4 ,he does not give us biographical details in regard to himself1 nor does he refer to his contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge of them4 ,his name even furnishes us with a problem impossible of solution4 ,he is called ,greek3 ,sextos ho empeirikos by ,diogenes ,laertius#a3 ,greek3 ,hrodotou de dikouse ,sextos ho empeirikos hou kai ta deka tn skeptikn kai alla kallista' ,sextou de dikouse ,satorninos ho ,kythnas1 empeirikos kai autos4 ,although in this passage ,diogenes speaks of ,sextus the second time without the surname1 we cannot understand the meaning otherwise than that ,diogenes considered ,sextus a physician of the ,empirical ,school4 ,other evidence also is not wanting that ,sextus bore this surname4 ,fabricius1 in his edition of the works of ,sextus1 quotes from the ,tabella de ,sectis ,medicorum of ,lambecius the statement that ,sextus was called ,empiricus because of his position in medicine4#b ,pseudo-,galen also refers to him as one of the directors of the ,empirical ,school1 and calls him ,greek3 ,sextos ho empeirikos4#c ,his name is often found in the manuscripts written with the surname1 as for example at the end of ,logic ,,ii4#d ,in other places it is found written without the surname1 as ,fabricius testifies1 where ,sextus is mentioned as a ,sceptic in connection with ,pyrrho4 #a ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aaf4 #b ,fabricius ,testimonia1 p4 #b4 #c ,pseudo-,galen ,isag4 #d2 ,fabricius ,testimonia1 p4 #b4 #d ,bekker ,math4 ,,viii4 #dha4 ,the ,sceptical ,school was long closely connected with the ,empirical ,school of medicine1 and the later ,pyrrhoneans1 when they were physicians1 as was often the case1 belonged for the most part to this school4 ,menedotus of ,nicomedia is the first ,sceptic1 however1 who is formally spoken of as an ,empirical physician1#a and his contemporary ,theodas of ,laodicea was also an ,empirical physician4 ,the date of ,menedotus and ,theodas is difficult to fix1 but ,brochard and ,hass agree that it was about #aej ,a4,d4#b ,after the time of these two physicians1 who were also each in turn at the head of the ,sceptical ,school1#c there seems to have been a definite alliance between ,pyrrhonism and ,empiricism in medicine1 and we have every reason to believe that this alliance existed until the time of ,sextus4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aae4 #b ,brochard ,op4 cit4 ,livre ,,iv4 p4 #caa4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aaf4 ,the difficulty in regard to the name arises from ,sextus' own testimony4 ,in the first book of the ,hypotyposes he takes strong ground against the identity of ,pyrrhonism and ,empiricism in medicine4 ,although he introduces his objections with the admission that some say that they are the same1 in recognition of the close union that had existed between them1 he goes on to say that ,empiricism is neither ,scepticism itself1 nor would it suit the ,sceptic to take that sect upon himself1#a for the reason that ,empiricism maintains dogmatically the impossibility of knowledge1 but he would prefer to belong to the ,methodical ,school1 which was the only medical school worthy of the ,sceptic4 ,for this alone of all the medical sects1 does not proceed rashly it seems to me1 in regard to unknown things1 and does not presume to say whether they are comprehensible or not1 but it is guided by phenomena4#b ,it will thus be seen that the ,methodical ,school of medicine has a certain relationship to ,scepticism which is closer than that of the other medical sects4#c #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcf4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcg4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bda4 ,we know from the testimony of ,sextus himself that he was a physician4 ,in one case he uses the first person for himself as a physician1#a and in another he speaks of ,asclepius as the founder of our science1#b and all his illustrations show a breadth and variety of medical knowledge that only a physician could possess4 ,he published a medical work which he refers to once as ,greek3 iatrika hupomnmata1#c and again as ,greek3 empeirika hupomnmata#d ,these passages probably refer to the same work1#e which1 unfortunately for the solution of the difficult question that we have in hand1 is lost1 and nothing is known of its contents4 ,in apparent contradiction to his statement in ,hypotyposes ,i41 that ,scepticism and ,empiricism are opposed to each other1 in that ,empiricism denies the possibility of knowledge1 and ,scepticism makes no dogmatic statements of any kind1 ,sextus classes the ,sceptics and ,empiricists together in another instance1 as regarding knowledge as impossible#f ,greek3 all oi men phasin auta m katalambanesthai1 hster hoi apo ts empeirias iatroi kai hoi apo ts skepses phiolosophoi4 ,in another case1 on the contrary1 he contrasts the ,sceptics sharply with the ,empiricists in regard to the ,greek3 apodeixeis4#g ,greek3 hoi de empeirikoi anairousin1 hoi de skeptikoi en epoch tautn ephylaxan4 #a ,hyp4 ii4 #bch4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,a4 #bfj4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 vii4 #bjb4 #d ,adv4 ,math4 ,a4 #fa4 #e ,zeller ,op4 cit44 iii4 #dc4 #f ,adv4 ,math4 viii4 #aia4 #g ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #cbh4 ,pappenheim thinks that ,sextus belonged to the ,methodical ,school1 both from his strong expression in favor of that school in ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcf1 as above1 and also because many of his medical opinions1 as found in his works1 agree with the teachings of the ,methodical ,school1 more nearly than with those of the ,empiricists4 ,pappenheim also claims that we find no inconsistency with this view in the passage given where ,sextus classes the ,sceptics with the ,empiricists1 but considers that statement an instance of carelessness in expressing himself1 on the part of ,sextus4#a #a ,lebensverhltnisse des ,sex4 ,em4 #cf4 ,the position of ,pappenheim is assailable for the reason that in dealing with any problem regarding an author on the basis of internal evidence1 we have no right to consider one of his statements worthy of weight1 and another one unworthy1 on the supposition that he expressed himself carelessly in the second instance4 ,rather must we attempt to find his true standpoint by fairly meeting all the difficulties offered in apparently conflicting passages4 ,this has been attempted by ,zeller1 ,brochard1 ,natorp and others1 with the general result that all things considered they think without doubt that ,sextus belonged to the ,empirical ,school4#a ,his other references are too strong to allow his fidelity to it to be doubted4 ,he is called one of the leaders of ,empiricism by ,pseudo-,galen1 and his only medical work bore the title ,greek3 empeirika hupomnmata4 ,the opinion of the writers above referred to is that the passage which we have quoted from the ,hypotyposes does not necessarily mean that ,sextus was not an ,empiricist1 but as he was more of a ,sceptic than a physician1 he gave preference to those doctrines that were most consistent with ,scepticism1 and accordingly claimed that it was not absolutely necessary that a ,sceptic physician should be an ,empiricist4 ,natorp considers that the different standpoint from which ,sextus judges the ,empirical and ,methodical ,schools in his different works is accounted for on the supposition that he was an ,empiricist1 but disagreed with that school on the one point only4#b ,natorp points out that ,sextus does not speak more favourably of the medical stand of the ,methodical ,school1 but only compares the way in which both schools regarded the question of the possibility of knowledge1 and thinks that ,sextus could have been an ,empiricist as a physician notwithstanding his condemnation of the attitude of the ,empirical ,school in relation to the theory of knowledge4 ,this difference between the two schools was a small one1 and on a subtle and unimportant point2 in fact1 a difference in philosophical theory1 and not in medical practice4 #a ,brochard ,op4 cit4 ,livre ,,iv4 #cag2 ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 #ae2 ,natorp ,op4 cit4 p4 #aee4 #b ,natorp ,op4 cit4 #aeg4 ,while we would agree with the authors above referred to1 that ,sextus very probably recognized the bond between the ,empirical ,school of medicine and ,pyrrhonism1 yet to make his possible connection with that school the explanation of his name1 gives him more prominence as a physician than is consistent with what we know of his career4 ,the long continued union of ,empiricism and ,scepticism would naturally support the view that ,sextus was1 at least during the earlier part of his life1 a physician of that school1 and yet it may be that he was not named ,empiricus for that reason4 ,there is one instance in ancient writings where ,empiricus is known as a simple proper name4#a ,it may have been a proper name in ,sextus' case1 or there are many other ways in which it could have originated1 as those who have studied the origin of names will readily grant1 perhaps indeed1 from the title of the above-named work1 ,greek3 empeirika hupomnmata4 ,the chief argument for this view of the case is that there were other leaders of the ,sceptical ,school1 for whom we can claim far greater influence as ,empiricists than for ,sextus1 and for whom the surname ,empiricus would have been more appropriate1 if it was given in consequence of prominence in the ,empirical ,school4 ,sextus is known to the world as a ,sceptic1 and not as a physician4 ,he was classed in later times with ,pyrrho1 and his philosophical works survived1 while his medical writings did not1 but are chiefly known from his own mention of them4 ,moreover1 the passage which we have quoted from the ,hypotyposes is too strong to allow us easily to believe that ,sextus remained all his life a member of the ,empirical ,school4 ,he could hardly have said1 ,nor would it suit the ,sceptic to take that sect upon himself1 if he at the same time belonged to it4 ,his other references to the ,empirical ,school1 of a more favorable character1 can be easily explained on the ground of the long continued connection which had existed between the two schools4 ,it is quite possible to suppose that ,sextus was an ,empiricist a part of his life1 and afterwards found the ,methodical ,school more to his liking1 and such a change would not in any way have affected his stand as a physician4 #a ,pappenheim ,leb4 ,ver4 ,sex4 ,em4 #f4 ,in regard to the exact time when ,sextus ,empiricus lived1 we gain very little knowledge from internal evidence1 and outside sources of information are equally uncertain4 ,diogenes ,laertius must have been a generation younger than ,sextus1 as he mentions the disciple of ,sextus1 ,saturninus1 as an ,empirical physician4#a ,the time of ,diogenes is usually estimated as the first half of the third century ,a4,d41#b therefore ,sextus cannot be brought forward later than the beginning of the century4 ,sextus1 however1 directs his writings entirely against the ,dogmatics1 by whom he distinctly states that he means the ,stoics1#c and the influence of the ,stoics began to decline in the beginning of the third century ,a4,d4 ,a fact often used as a help in fixing the date of ,sextus is his mention of ,basilides the ,stoic1#d ,greek3 alla kai oi stikoi1 s oi peri ton ,basileidn4 ,this ,basilides was supposed to be identical with one of the teachers of ,marcus ,aurelius4#e ,this is accepted by ,zeller in the second edition of his ,history of ,philosophy1 but not in the third for the reason that ,sextus1 in all the work from which this reference is taken1 i4e4 ,math4 ,,vii4-,,xi41 mentions no one besides ,aenesidemus1 who lived later than the middle of the last century ,b4,c4#f ,the ,basilides referred to by ,sextus may be one mentioned in a list of twenty ,stoics1 in a fragment of ,diogenes ,laertius1 recently published in ,berlin by ,val ,rose4#g ,too much importance has1 however1 been given to the relation of the mention of ,basilides the ,stoic to the question of the date of ,sextus4 ,even if the ,basilides referred to by ,sextus is granted to have been the teacher of ,marcus ,aurelius1 it only serves to show that ,sextus lived either at the same time with ,marcus ,aurelius or after him1 which is a conclusion that we must in any case reach for other reasons4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aaf4 #b ,ueberweg ,hist4 of ,phil4 p4 #ba4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #fe4 #d ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #beh4 #e ,fabricius ,vita ,sexti4 #f ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 #h4 #g ,brochard ,op4 cit4 ,,iv4 #cae4 ,the fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in regard to the date of ,sextus is that ,claudius ,galen in his works mentions several ,sceptics who were also physicians of the ,empirical ,school1#a and often speaks of ,herodotus1 supposed to be identical with the teacher of ,sextus given by ,diogenes ,laertius1#b but makes no reference whatever to ,sextus4 ,as ,galen's time passes the limit of the second century ,a4,d41 we must either infer that ,sextus was not the well-known physician that he was stated to be by ,pseudo-,galen1 and consequently not known to ,galen1 or that ,galen wrote before ,sextus became prominent as a ,sceptic4 ,this silence on the part of ,galen in regard to ,sextus increases the doubt1 caused by ,sextus' own criticism of the ,empirical ,school of medicine1 as to his having been an ,empiricist4 ,the question is made more complicated1 as it is difficult to fix the identity of the ,herodotus so often referred to by ,galen4#c ,as ,galen died about #bjj ,a4,d4 at the age of seventy1#d we should fix the date of ,sextus early in the third century1 and that of ,diogenes perhaps a little later than the middle1 were it not that early in the third century the ,stoics began to decline in influence1 and could hardly have excited the warmth of animosity displayed by ,sextus4 ,we must then suppose that ,sextus wrote at the very latter part of the second century1 and either that ,galen did not know him1 or that ,galen's books were published before ,sextus became prominent either as a physician or as a ,sceptic4 ,the fact that he may have been better known as the latter than as the former does not sufficiently account for ,galen's silence1 as other ,sceptics are mentioned by him of less importance than ,sextus1 and the latter1 even if not as great a physician as ,pseudo-,galen asserts1 was certainly both a ,sceptic and a physician1 and must have belonged to one of the two medical schools so thoroughly discussed by ,galen--either the ,empirical or the ,methodical4 ,therefore1 if ,sextus were a contemporary of ,galen1 he was so far removed from the circle of ,galen's acquaintances as to have made no impression upon him1 either as a ,sceptic or a physician1 a supposition that is very improbable4 ,we must then fix the date of ,sextus late in the second century1 and conclude that the climax of his public career was reached after ,galen had finished those of his writings which are still extant4 #a ,zeller1 ,,iii4 #g4 #b ,diog4 ,,xi4 #ab1 #aaf4 #c ,pappenheim ,lebens4 ,ver4 ,sex4 ,em4 #cj4 #d ,zeller ,grundriss der ,ges4 der ,phil4 p4 #bfj4 ,sextus has a ,latin name1 but he was a ,greek2 we know this from his own statement4#a ,we also know that he must have been a ,greek from the beauty and facility of his style1 and from his acquaintance with ,greek dialects4 ,the place of his birth can only1 however1 be conjectured1 from arguments indirectly derived from his writings4 ,his constant references throughout his works to the minute customs of different nations ought to give us a clue to the solution of this question1 but strange to say they do not give us a decided one4 ,of these references a large number1 however1 relate to the customs of ,libya1 showing a minute knowledge in regard to the political and religious customs of this land that he displays in regard to no other country except ,egypt4#b ,fabricius thinks ,libya was not his birth place because of a reference which he makes to it in the ,hypotyposes--,greek3 ,thrakn de kai ,gaitouln 7,libyn de ethnos touto74#c ,this conclusion is1 however1 entirely unfounded1 as the explanation of ,sextus simply shows that the people whom he was then addressing were not familiar with the nations of ,libya4 ,suidas speaks of two men called ,sextus1 one from ,chronea and one from ,libya1 both of whom he calls ,sceptics1 and to one of whom he attributes ,sextus' books4 ,all authorities agree in asserting that great confusion exists in the works of ,suidas2 and ,fabricius1 ,zeller1 and ,pappenheim place no weight upon this testimony of ,suidas4#d ,haas1 however1 contends#e that it is unreasonable to suppose that this confusion could go as far as to attribute the writings of ,sextus ,empiricus to ,sextus of ,chronea1 and also make the latter a ,sceptic1 and he considers it far more reasonable to accept the testimony of ,suidas1 as it coincides so well with the internal evidence of ,sextus' writings in regard to his native land4 ,it is nevertheless evident1 from his familiarity with the customs1 language1 and laws of ,athens1 ,alexandria and ,rome1 that he must have resided at some time in each of these cities4 #a ,adv4 ,math4 ,a4 #bdf2 ,hyp4 ,i4 #aeb2 ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #baa1 #bad4 #b ,haas ,op4 cit4 p4 #aj4 #c ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #bac4 #d ,pappenheim ,lebens4 ,ver4 ,sex4 ,em4 #e1 #bb2 ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 #ci2 ,fabricius ,vita de ,sextus4 #e ,haas ,op4 cit4 p4 #f4 ,of all the problems connected with the historical details of the life of ,sextus1 the one that is the most difficult of solution1 and also the most important for our present purpose of making a critical study of his teaching1 is to fix the seat of the ,sceptical ,school during the time that he was in charge of it4 ,the ,hypotyposes are lectures delivered in public in that period of his life4 ,where then were they delivered8 ,we know that the ,sceptical ,school must have had a long continued existence as a definite philosophical movement1 although some have contended otherwise4 ,the fact of its existence as an organized direction of thought1 is demonstrated by its formulated teachings1 and the list given by ,diogenes ,laertius of its principal leaders1#a and by references from the writings of ,sextus4 ,in the first book of ,hypotyposes he refers to ,scepticism as a distinct system of philosophy1 ,greek3 kai taen diakrisin taes skepseos apo ton parakeimenon autae philosophion4#b ,he speaks also of the older ,sceptics1#c and the later ,sceptics4#d ,pyrrho1 the founder of the school1 taught in ,elis1 his native village2 but even as early as the time of ,timon1 his immediate follower1 his teachings were somewhat known in ,alexandria1 where ,timon for a while resided4#e ,the immediate disciples of ,timon1 as given by ,diogenes1 were not men known in ,greece or mentioned in ,greek writings4 ,then we have the well-known testimony of ,aristocles the ,peripatetic in regard to ,aenesidemus1 that he taught ,pyrrhonism in ,alexandria#f--;,greek3 echthes kai proaen en ,alexandreia tae kat' ,aigypton ,ainaesidaemos tis anazopyrein aerxato ton huthlon touton4 #a ,diog4 ,,xi4 #ab1 #aae1 #aaf4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #e4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #cf4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #afd4 #e ,chaignet ,op4 cit4 #de4 #f ,aristocles of ,euseb4 ,praep4 ,ev4 ,,xiv4 ,e4 #ddf4 ,this was after the dogmatic tendency of the ,academy under ,antiochus and his followers had driven ,pyrrhonism from the partial union with the ,academy1 which it had experienced after the breaking up of the school under the immediate successors of ,timon4 ,aenesidemus taught about the time of our era in ,alexandria1 and established the school there anew2 and his followers are spoken of in a way that presupposes their continuing in the same place4 ,there is every reason to think that the connection of ,sextus with ,alexandria was an intimate one1 not only because ,alexandria had been for so long a time the seat of ,pyrrhonism1 but also from internal evidence from his writings and their subsequent historical influence2 and yet the ,hypotyposes could not have been delivered in ,alexandria1 as he often refers to that place in comparison with the place where he was then speaking4 ,he says1 furthermore1 that he teaches in the same place where his master taught4#a ,greek3 ,blepon te hoti entha ho huphaegaetaes ho emos dielegeto1 entautha ego nun dialegomai4 ,therefore the school must have been removed from ,alexandria1 in or before the time of the teacher of ,sextus1 to some other centre4 ,the ,hypotyposes are from beginning to end a direct attack on the ,dogmatics2 therefore ,sextus must have taught either in some city where the dogmatic philosophy was strong1 or in some rival philosophical centre4 ,the ,hypotyposes show also that the writer had access to some large library4 ,alexandria1 ,rome and ,athens are the three places the most probable for selection for such a purpose4 ,for whatever reason the seat of the school was removed from ,alexandria by the master of ,sextus1 or by himself1 from the place where it had so long been united with the ,empirical ,school of medicine1 ,athens would seem the most suitable city for its recontinuance1 in the land where ,pyrrhonism first had its birth4 ,sextus1 however1 in one instance1 in referring to things invisible because of their outward relations1 says in illustration1 as the city of ,athens is invisible to us at present4#b ,in other places also he contrasts the ,athenians with the people whom he is addressing1 equally with the ,alexandrians1 thus putting ,athens as well as ,alexandria out of the question4 #a ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #abj4 #b ,hyp4 ,,ii4 #ih4 ,of the different writers on ,sextus ,empiricus1 those who have treated this part of the subject most critically are ,haas and ,pappenheim4 ,we will therefore consider1 somewhat at length1 the results presented by these two authors4 ,haas thinks that the ,hypotyposes were delivered in ,rome for the following reasons4 ,sextus' lectures must have been given in some centre of philosophical schools and of learning4 ,he never opposes ,roman relations to those of the place where he is speaking1 as he does in regard to ,athens and ,alexandria4 ,he uses the name ,romans only three times1#a once comparing them to the ,rhodians1 once to the ,persians1 and once in general to other nations4#b ,in the first two of these references1 the expression among the ,romans in the first part of the antithesis is followed by the expression1 among us1 in the second part1 which ,haas understands to be synonymous4 ,the third reference is in regard to a ,roman law1 and the use of the word ',roman' does not at all show that ,sextus was not then in ,rome4 ,the character of the laws referred to by ,sextus as ,greek3 par' haemin shows that they were always ,roman laws1 and his definition of law#c is especially a definition of ,roman law4 ,this argument might1 it would seem1 apply to any part of the ,roman ,empire1 but ,haas claims that the whole relation of law to custom as treated of by ,sextus1 and all his statements of customs forbidden at that time by law1 point to ,rome as the place of his residence4 ,further1 ,haas considers the ,herodotus mentioned by ,galen#d as a prominent physician in ,rome1 to have been the predecessor and master of ,sextus1 in whose place ,sextus says that he is teaching4#e ,haas also thinks that ,sextus' refutation of the identity of ,pyrrhonism with ,empiricism evidently refers to a paragraph in ,galen's ,subfiguratio ,empirica1#f which would be natural if the ,hypotyposes were written shortly after ,galen's ,sub4 ,em41 and in the same place4 ,further1 ,hippolytus1 who wrote in or near ,rome very soon after the time of ,sextus1 apparently used the ,hypotyposes1 which would be more natural if he wrote in the same place4 ,according to ,haas1 every thing in internal evidence1 and outward testimony1 points to ,rome as having been the city where ,sextus occupied his position as the head of the ,sceptical ,school4 #a ,haas ,op4 cit4 p4 #ae4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #adi1 #aeb2 ,,iii4 #baa4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #adf4 #d ,galen de puls4 ,,iv4 #aa2 ,bd4 ,,viii4 #gea4 #e ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #abj4 #f ,galen ,sub4 ,em4 #abc ,b-#abf ,d4 7,basileae1 #aedb74 ,coming now to the position of ,pappenheim on this subject1 we find that he takes very decided ground against the seat of the ,sceptical ,school having been in ,rome1 even for a short time1 in his latest publication regarding it4#a ,this opinion is the result of late study on the part of ,pappenheim1 for in his work on the ,lebensverhltnisse des ,sextus ,empiricus ,berlin #ahge1 he says1 ,dass ,herodotus in ,rom lebte sagt ,galen4 ,vermuthlich auch ,sextus4 ,his reasons given in the later article for not connecting the ,sceptical ,school at all with ,rome are as follows4 ,he finds no proof of the influence of ,scepticism in ,rome1 as ,cicero remarks that ,pyrrhonism is extinct1#b and he also gives weight to the well-known sarcastic saying of ,seneca1 ,quis est qui tradat praecepta ,pyrrhonis6#c ,while ,haas claims that ,sextus would naturally seek one of the centres of dogmatism1 in order most effectively to combat it1 ,pappenheim1 on the contrary1 contends that it would have been foolishness on the part of ,sextus to think of starting the ,sceptical ,school in ,rome1 where ,stoicism was the favored philosophy of the ,roman ,emperors2 and when either for the possible reason of strife between the ,empirical and ,methodical ,schools1 or for some other cause1 the ,pyrrhonean ,school was removed from ,alexandria1 ,pappenheim claims that all testimony points to the conclusion that it was founded in some city of the ,east4 ,the name of ,sextus is never known in ,roman literature1 but in the ,east1 on the contrary1 literature speaks for centuries of ,sextus and ,pyrrho4 ,the ,hypotyposes1 especially1 were well-known in the ,east1 and references to ,sextus are found there in philosophical and religious dogmatic writings4 ,the ,emperor ,julian makes use of the works of ,sextus1 and he is frequently quoted by the ,church ,fathers of the ,eastern ,church4#d ,pappenheim accordingly concludes that the seat of ,pyrrhonism after the school was removed from ,alexandria1 was in some unknown city of the ,east4 #a ,pappenheim ,sitz der ,skeptischen ,schule4 ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,phil4 #ahhh4 #b ,cicero ,de ,orat4 ,,iii4 #ag1 #fb4 #c ,seneca nat4 qu4 ,,vii4 #cb4 #b4 #d ,fabricius de ,sexto ,empirico ,testimonia4 ,in estimating the weight of these arguments1 we must accept with ,pappenheim the close connection of ,pyrrhonism with ,alexandria1 and the subsequent influence which it exerted upon the literature of the ,east4 ,all historical relations tend to fix the permanent seat of ,pyrrhonism1 after its separation from the ,academy1 in ,alexandria4 ,there is nothing to point to its removal from ,alexandria before the time of ,menodotus1 who is the teacher of ,herodotus1#a and for many reasons to be considered the real teacher of ,sextus4 ,it was ,menodotus who perfected the ,empirical doctrines1 and who brought about an official union between ,scepticism and ,empiricism1 and who gave ,pyrrhonism in great measure1 the clat that it enjoyed in ,alexandria1 and who appears to have been the most powerful influence in the school1 from the time of ,aenesidemus to that of ,sextus4 ,furthermore1 ,sextus' familiarity with ,alexandrian customs bears the imprint of original knowledge1 and he cannot1 as ,zeller implies1 be accepted as simply quoting4 ,one could hardly agree with ,zeller1#b that the familiarity shown by ,sextus with the customs of both ,alexandria and ,rome in the ,hypotyposes does not necessarily show that he ever lived in either of those places1 because a large part of his works are compilations from other books2 but on the contrary1 the careful reader of ,sextus' works must find in all of them much evidence of personal knowledge of ,alexandria1 ,athens and ,rome4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aaf4 #b ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 p4 #ci4 ,a part of ,sextus' books also may have been written in ,alexandria4 ,greek3 ,pros phusikous could have been written in ,alexandria4#a ,if these were also lectures1 then ,sextus taught in ,alexandria as well as elsewhere4 ,the history of ,eastern literature for the centuries immediately following the time of ,sextus1 showing as it does in so many instances the influence of ,pyrrhonism1 and a knowledge of the ,hypotyposes1 furnishes us with an incontestable proof that the school could not have been for a long time removed from the ,east1 and the absence of such knowledge in ,roman literature is also a strong argument against its long continuance in that city4 ,it would seem1 however1 from all the data at command1 that during the years that the ,sceptical ,school was removed from ,alexandria1 its head quarters were in ,rome1 and that the ,pyrrhonean ,hypotyposes were delivered in ,rome4 ,let us briefly consider the arguments in favour of such a hypothesis4 ,scepticism was not unknown in ,rome4 ,pappenheim quotes the remark of ,cicero that ,pyrrhonism was long since dead1 and the sarcasm of ,seneca1 ,quis est qui tradat praecepta ,pyrrhonis8 as an argument against the knowledge of ,pyrrhonism in ,rome4 ,we must remember1 however1 that in ,cicero's time ,aenesidemus had not yet separated himself from the ,academy2 or if we consider the ,lucius ,tubero to whom ,aenesidemus dedicated his works1 as the same ,lucius ,tubero who was the friend of ,cicero in his youth1 and accordingly fix the date of ,aenesidemus about #ej ,b4,c41#b even then ,aenesidemus' work in ,alexandria was too late to have necessarily been known to ,cicero1 whose remark must have been referred to the old school of ,scepticism4 ,should we grant1 however1 that the statements of ,cicero and ,seneca prove that in their time ,pyrrhonism was extinct in ,rome1 they certainly do not show that after their death it could not have again revived1 for the ,hypotyposes were delivered more than a century after the death of ,seneca4 ,there are very few writers in ,aenesidemus' own time who showed any influence of his teachings4#c ,this influence was felt later1 as ,pyrrhonism became better known4 ,that ,pyrrhonism received some attention in ,rome before the time of ,sextus is nevertheless demonstrated by the teachings of ,favorinus there4 ,although ,favorinus was known as an ,academician1 the title of his principal work was ,greek3 tous philosophoumenous aut tn logn1 hn aristoi hoi ,purrhneioi4#d ,suidas calls ,favorinus a great author and learned in all science and philosophy1#e and ,favorinus made ,rome the centre of his teaching and writing4 ,his date is fixed by ,zeller at #hj-aej ,a4,d41 therefore ,pyrrhonism was known in ,rome shortly before the time of ,sextus4 #a ,pappenheim ,sitz der ,skeptischen ,schule2 ,archiv fr ,geschichte der ,phil41 #ahhh2 ,adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #ae1 #ie4 #b ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 #aj4 #c ,zeller ,op4 cit4 p4 #fc4 #d ,zeller ,op4 cit4 p4 #fg4 #e ,brochard ,op4 cit4 #cbi4 ,the whole tone of the ,hypotyposes1 with the constant references to the ,stoics as living present opponents1 shows that these lectures must have been delivered in one of the centres of ,stoicism4 ,as ,alexandria and ,athens are out of the question1 all testimony points to ,rome as having been the seat of the ,pyrrhonean ,school1 for at least a part of the time that ,sextus was at its head4 ,we would then accept the teacher of ,sextus1 in whose place he says he taught1 as the ,herodotus so often referred to by ,galen#a who lived in ,rome4 ,sextus' frequent references to ,asclepiades1 whom he mentions ten different times by name in his works1#b speak in favour of ,rome in the matter under discussion1 as ,asclepiades made that city one of the centres of medical culture4 ,on the other hand1 the fact that there is no trace of the ,hypotyposes in later ,roman literature1 with the one exception of the works of ,hippolytus1 as opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of them shown in the ,east for centuries1 is incontestable historical proof that the ,sceptical ,school could not long have had its seat at ,rome4 ,from the two passages given above from ,sextus' work against physics1 he must either have written that book in ,alexandria1 it would seem1 or have quoted those passages from some other work4 ,may we not then conclude1 that ,sextus was at the head of the school in ,rome for a short time1 where it may have been removed temporarily1 on account of the difficulty with the ,empiricists1 implied in ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcf-bda1 or in order to be better able to attack the ,stoics1 but that he also taught in ,alexandria1 where the real home of the school was certainly found8 ,there it probably came to an end about fifty years after the time of ,sextus1 and from that centre the ,sceptical works of ,sextus had their wide-spread influence in the ,east4 #a ,galen ,,viii4 #gea4 #b ,bekker ,index4 ,the books of ,sextus ,empiricus furnish us with the best and fullest presentation of ancient ,scepticism which has been preserved to modern times1 and give ,sextus the position of one of the greatest men of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,his works which are still extant are the ,pyrrhonean ,hypotyposes in three volumes1 and the two works comprising eleven books which have been united in later times under the title of ,greek3 pros mathmatikous1 one of which is directed against the sciences in general1 and the other against the dogmatic philosophers4 ,the six books composing the first of these are written respectively against grammarians1 rhetoricians1 geometricians1 arithmeticians1 astronomers and musicians4 ,the five books of the latter consist of two against the logicians1 two against physics1 and one against systems of morals4 ,if the last short work of the first book directed against the arithmeticians is combined with the one preceding against the geometricians1 as it well could be1 the two works together would be divided into ten different parts2 there is evidence to show that in ancient times such a division was made4#a ,there were two other works of ,sextus which are now lost1 the medical work before referred to1 and a book entitled ,greek3 peri psuchs4 ,the character of the extant works of ,sextus is similar1 as they are all directed either against science or against the dogmatics1 and they all present the negative side of ,pyrrhonism4 ,the vast array of arguments comprising the subject-matter1 often repeated in the same and different forms1 are evidently taken largely from the ,sceptical works which ,sextus had resource to1 and are1 in fact1 a summing up of all the wisdom of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,the style of these books is fluent1 and the ,greek reminds one of ,plutarch and ,thucydides1 and although ,sextus does not claim originality1 but presents in all cases the arguments of the ,sceptic1 yet the illustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented1 often bear the marks of his own thought1 and are characterized here and there by a wealth of humor that has not been sufficiently noticed in the critical works on ,sextus4 ,of all the authors who have reviewed ,sextus1 ,brochard is the only one who seems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side4 ,we shall now proceed to the consideration of the general position and aim of ,pyrrhonism4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aaf4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,the ,position and ,aim of ,pyrrhonism4 ,the first volume of the ,pyrrhonean ,hypotyposes gives the most complete statement found in any of the works of ,sextus ,empiricus of the teachings of ,pyrrhonism and its relation to other schools of philosophy4 ,the chief source of the subject-matter presented is a work of the same name by ,aenesidemus1#a either directly used by ,sextus1 or through the writings of those who followed ,aenesidemus4 ,the comprehensive title ,greek3 ,purrhneioi hupotupseis was very probably used in general to designate courses of lectures given by the leaders of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,in the opening chapters of the ,hypotyposes ,sextus undertakes to define the position and aim of ,pyrrhonism4#b ,in introducing his subject he treats briefly of the differences between philosophical schools1 dividing them into three classes2 those which claim that they have found the truth1 like the schools of ,aristotle and ,epicurus and the ,stoics2 those which deny the possibility of finding it1 like that of the ,academicians2 and those that still seek it1 like the ,sceptical ,school4 ,the accusation against the ,academicians1 that they denied the possibility of finding the truth1 was one that the ,sceptics were very fond of making4 ,we shall discuss the justice of it later1 simply remarking here1 that to affirm the incomprehensibility of the unknown1 was a form of expression that the ,pyrrhonists themselves were sometimes betrayed into1 notwithstanding their careful avoidance of dogmatic statements4#c #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gh4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #c1 #d4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #aia4 ,after defining the three kinds of philosophy as the ,dogmatic1 the ,academic and the ,sceptic1 ,sextus reminds his hearers that he does not speak dogmatically in anything that he says1 but that he intends simply to present the ,sceptical arguments historically1 and as they appear to him4 ,he characterizes his treatment of the subject as general rather than critical1 including a statement of the character of ,scepticism1 its idea1 its principles1 its manner of reasoning1 its criterion and aim1 and a presentation of the ,tropes1 or aspects of doubt1 and the ,sceptical formulae and the distinction between ,scepticism and the related schools of philosophy4#a ,the result of all the gradual changes which the development of thought had brought about in the outward relations of the ,sceptical ,school1 was to increase the earnestness of the claim of the ,sceptics to be simply followers of ,pyrrho1 the great founder of the movement4 ,in discussing the names given to the ,sceptics1 ,sextus gives precedence very decidedly to the title ,pyrrhonean1 because ,pyrrho appears the best representative of ,scepticism1 and more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it4#b ,it was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancient times1 whether ,pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophical sect or not4 ,thus we find that ,hippobotus in his work entitled ,greek3 peri hairesen1 written shortly before our era1 does not include ,pyrrhonism among the other sects4#c ,diogenes himself1 after some hesitation remarking that many do not consider it a sect1 finally decides to call it so4#d #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #e1 #f4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #g4 #c ,diog4 ,pro4 #ai4 #d ,diog4 ,pro4 #bj4 ,sextus in discussing this subject calls ,scepticism an ,greek3 agog1 or a movement1 rather than a ,greek3 hairesis1 saying that ,scepticism is not a sect1 if that word implies a systematic arrangement of dogmas1 for the ,sceptic has no dogmas4 ,if1 however1 a sect may mean simply the following of a certain system of reasoning according to what appears to be true1 then ,scepticism is a sect4#a ,from a quotation given later on by ,sextus from ,aenesidemus1 we know that the latter used the term ,greek3 agog4#b ,sextus gives also the other titles1 so well known as having been applied to ,scepticism1 namely1 ,greek3 zttik1 ,greek3 ephektik1 and ,greek3 aportik4#c ,the ,greek3 dunamis#d of ,scepticism is to oppose the things of sense and intellect in every possible way to each other1 and through the equal weight of things opposed1 or ,greek3 isostheneia1 to reach first the state of suspension of judgement1 and afterwards ataraxia1 or repose and tranquillity of soul4#e ,the purpose of ,scepticism is then the hope of ataraxia1 and its origin was in the troubled state of mind induced by the inequality of things1 and uncertainty in regard to the truth4 ,therefore1 says ,sextus1 men of the greatest talent began the ,sceptical system by placing in opposition to every argument an equal one1 thus leading to a philosophical system without a dogma1 for the ,sceptic claims that he has no dogma4#f ,the ,sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion1 but only to say what appears to him4 ,even the ,sceptical formulae1 such as ,nothing more1#g or ,i decide nothing1#h or ,all is false1 include themselves with other things4 ,the only statements that the ,sceptic can make1 are in regard to his own sensations4 ,he cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ae1 #ag4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #baj4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #g2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gj4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #h4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #aj4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #ab4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #ad4 #h ,hyp4 ,i4 #ad4 ,sextus replies to the charge that the ,sceptics deny phenomena by refuting it4#a ,the ,sceptic does not deny phenomena1 because they are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions4 ,we call the criterion of the ,sceptical ,school the phenomenon1 meaning by this name the idea of it4#b ,phenomena are the only things which the ,sceptic does not deny1 and he guides his life by them4 ,they are1 however1 subjective4 ,sextus distinctly affirms that sensations are the phenomena1#c and that they lie in susceptibility and voluntary feeling1 and that they constitute the appearances of objects4#d ,we see from this that ,sextus makes the only reality to consist in subjective experience1 but he does not follow this to its logical conclusion1 and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind4 ,he rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown outside1 about which the ,sceptic can make no assertions4 ,phenomena are the criteria according to which the ,sceptic orders his daily life1 as he cannot be entirely inactive1 and they affect life in four different ways4 ,they constitute the guidance of nature1 the impulse of feeling2 they give rise to the traditions of customs and laws1 and make the teaching of the arts important4#e ,according to the tradition of laws and customs1 piety is a good in daily life1 but it is not in itself an abstract good4 ,the ,sceptic of ,sextus' time also inculcated the teaching of the arts1 as indeed must be the case with professing physicians1 as most of the leading ,sceptics were4 ,sextus says1 ,we are not without energy in the arts which we undertake4#f ,this was a positive tendency which no philosophy1 however negative1 could escape1 and the ,sceptic tried to avoid inconsistency in this respect1 by separating his philosophy from his theory of life4 ,his philosophy controlled his opinions1 and his life was governed by phenomena4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ai4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #ai4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bb2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #aje4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #bb4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #bc4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #bd4 ,the aim of ,pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion1 and moderation in the things which life imposes4#a ,in other words1 we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and passion impose1 which is expressed in other forms1 and under other names1 in other schools of philosophy4 ,the method1 however1 by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached1 was peculiar to the ,sceptic4 ,it is a state of psychological equilibrium1 which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other1 and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one1 that it is correct4#b ,the discovery of ataraxia was1 in the first instance1 apparently accidental1 for while the ,sceptic withheld his opinion1 unable to decide what things were true1 and what things were false1 ataraxia fortunately followed4#c ,after he had begun to philosophize1 with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas1 and to separate the true from the false#d during the time of ,greek3 epoch1 or suspension of judgement1 ataraxia followed as if by chance1 as the shadow follows the body4#e #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #be4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bf4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bf4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ajg4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #bi4 ,the ,sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion1 does not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations4 ,he is not wholly undisturbed1 for he is sometimes cold and hungry1 and so on4#a ,he claims1 nevertheless1 that he suffers less than the dogmatist1 who is beset with two kinds of suffering1 one from the feelings themselves1 and also from the conviction that they are by nature an evil4#b ,to the ,sceptic nothing is in itself either an evil or a good1 and so he thinks that he escapes from difficulties easier4#c ,for instance1 he who considers riches a good in themselves1 is unhappy in the loss of them1 and in possession of them is in fear of losing them1 while the ,sceptic1 remembering the ,sceptical saying ,no more1 is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found1 as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good4#d ,for he who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled1 and when that which seemed good is not present with him1 he thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad1 and follows after what he thinks to be good4 ,having acquired it1 however1 he is not at rest1 for his reason tells him that a sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good4#e ,the ,sceptic1 however1 endeavours neither to avoid nor seek anything eagerly4#f #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #cj4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #cj4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #cj2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 #d ,adv4 ,math4 ,,xi4 #adf-afj4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #bg4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #bh4 ,ataraxia came to the ,sceptic as success in painting the foam on a horse's mouth came to ,apelles the painter4 ,after many attempts to do this1 and many failures1 he gave up in despair1 and threw the sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors from the painting with4 ,as soon as it touched the picture it produced a representation of the foam4#a ,thus the ,sceptics were never able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly between the phenomena and the things of thought1 but it came to them of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it4 ,the intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia1 consists in placing arguments in opposition to each other1 both in regard to phenomena1 and to things of the intellect4 ,by placing the phenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal1 the intellectual to the intellectual1 and the phenomenal to the intellectual1 and vice versa1 the present to the present1 past1 and future1 one will find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible4 ,it is not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true1 and consequently a state of ,greek3 epoch may always be maintained4#b ,although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion1 and must be preceded by the intellectual process described above1 it is not itself a function of the intellect1 or any subtle kind of reasoning1 but seems to be rather a unique form of moral perfection1 leading to happiness1 or is itself happiness4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bh1 #bi4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #cb-ce4 ,it was the aim of ,scepticism to know nothing1 and to assert nothing in regard to any subject1 but at the same time not to affirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible1 and consequently to have the attitude of still seeking4 ,the standpoint of ,pyrrhonism was materialistic4 ,we find from the teachings of ,sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of the soul1#a or the ego1 and denied absolute existence altogether4#b ,the introductory statements of ,diogenes regarding ,pyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint4#c ,there is no criterion of truth in ,scepticism4 ,we cannot prove that the phenomena represent objects1 or find out what the relation of phenomena to objects is4 ,there is no criterion to tell us which one is true of all the different representations of the same object1 and of all the varieties of sensation that arise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions which control the character of the phenomena4 ,every effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena1 and absolute reality can never be known4 #a ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ee2 ,hyp4 ,,ii4 #cb4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,xi4 #adj4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,sceptical ,tropes4 ,the exposition of the ,tropes of ,pyrrhonism constitutes historically and philosophically the most important part of the writings of ,sextus ,empiricus4 ,these ,tropes represent the sum total of the wisdom of the older ,sceptical ,school1 and were held in high respect for centuries1 not only by the ,pyrrhoneans1 but also by many outside the narrow limits of that ,school4 ,in the first book of the ,hypotyposes ,sextus gives two classes of ,tropes1 those of ,greek3 epoch and the eight ,tropes of ,aenesidemus against ,aetiology4 ,the ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch are arranged in groups of ten1 five and two1 according to the period of the ,sceptical ,school to which they belong2 the first of these groups is historically the most important1 or the ,ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch1 as these are far more closely connected with the general development of ,scepticism1 than the later ones4 ,by the name ,greek3 tropos or ,trope1 the ,sceptic understood a manner of thought1 or form of argument1 or standpoint of judgement4 ,it was a term common in ,greek philosophy1 used in this sense1 from the time of ,aristotle4#a ,the ,stoics1 however1 used the word with a different meaning from that attributed to it by the ,sceptics4#b ,stephanus and ,fabricius translate it by the ,latin word modus#c and ,greek3 tropos also is often used interchangeably with the word ,greek3 logos by ,sextus1 ,diogenes ,laertius1 and others2 sometimes also as synonymous with ,greek3 topos1#d and ,greek3 typos is found in the oldest edition of ,sextus4#e ,diogenes defines the word as the standpoint1 or manner of argument1 by which the ,sceptics arrived at the condition of doubt1 in consequence of the equality of probabilities1 and he calls the ,tropes1 the ten ,tropes of doubt4#f ,all writers on ,pyrrhonism after the time of ,aenesidemus give the ,tropes the principal place in their treatment of the subject4 ,sextus occupies two thirds of the first book of the ,hypotyposes in stating and discussing them2 and about one fourth of his presentation of ,scepticism is devoted to the ,tropes by ,diogenes4 ,in addition to these two authors1 ,aristocles the ,peripatetic refers to them in his attack on ,scepticism4#g ,favorinus wrote a book entitled ,pyrrhonean ,tropes1 and ,plutarch one called ,the ,ten 7,greek3 topoi7 ,topes of ,pyrrho4#h ,both of these latter works are lost4 #a ,pappenheim ,erlauterung ,pyrrh4 ,grundzugen1 p4 #ce4 #b ,diog ,i4 #gf2 ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #bbg4 #c ,fabricius1 ,cap4 ,,xiv4 #g4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #cf4 #e ,fabricius on ,hyp4 ,i4 #cf2 ,cap4 ,,xiv4 ,g4 #f ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gi-ajh4 #g ,aristocles ,euseb4 praep4 ev4 ,x4 #ad1 #ah4 #h ,fabricius on ,hyp4 ,i4 #cf4 ,all authorities unite in attributing to ,aenesidemus the work of systematizing and presenting to the world the ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch4 ,he was the first to conceive the project of opposing an organized philosophical system of ,pyrrhonism to the dogmatism of his contemporaries4#a ,moreover1 the fact that ,diogenes introduces the ,tropes into his life of ,pyrrho1 does not necessarily imply that he considered ,pyrrho their author1 for ,diogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a movement with those of the founders themselves2 he gives these ,tropes after speaking of ,aenesidemus' work entitled ,pyrrhonean ,hypotyposes1 and apparently quotes from this book1 in giving at least a part of his presentation of ,pyrrhonism1 either directly or through1 the works of others4 ,nietzsche proposes a correction of the text of ,diogenes ,,ix4 #aa1 #gi1 which would make him quote the ,tropes from a book by ,theodosius1#b author of a commentary on the works of ,theodas4 ,no writer of antiquity claims for the ,tropes an older source than the books of ,aenesidemus1 to whom ,aristocles also attributes them4#c ,they are not mentioned in ,diogenes' life of ,timon1 the immediate disciple of ,pyrrho4 ,cicero has no knowledge of them1 and does not refer to them in his discussion of ,scepticism4 #a ,compare ,saisset ,op4 cit4 p4 #gh4 #b ,brochard ,op4 cit4 #bed1 ,note #d4 #c ,aristocles ,eus4 praep4 ev4 ,,xiv4 #ah4 #h4 ,aenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these ,tropes1 but many things tend to show that they resulted1 in reality1 from the gradual classification of the results of the teachings of ,pyrrho1 in the subsequent development of thought from his own time to that of ,aenesidemus4 ,the ideas contained in the ,tropes were not original with ,aenesidemus1 but are more closely connected with the thought of earlier times4 ,the decidedly empirical character of the ,tropes proves this connection1 for the eight ,tropes of ,aetiology1 which were original with ,aenesidemus1 bear a far stronger dialectic stamp1 thus showing a more decided dialectic influence of the ,academy than is found in the ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch4 ,many of the illustrations given of the ,tropes also1 testify to a time of greater antiquity than that of ,aenesidemus4 ,the name ,trope was well known in ancient times1 and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing principles of ,pythagoras1 and the ten categories of ,aristotle1 the fourth of which was the same as the eighth ,trope4 ,the terminology1 however1 with very few exceptions1 points to a later period than that of ,pyrrho4 ,zeller points out a number of expressions in both ,diogenes' and ,sextus' exposition of the ,tropes1 which could not date back farther than the time of ,aenesidemus4#a ,one of the most striking features of the whole presentation of the ,tropes1 especially as given by ,sextus1 is their mosaic character1 stamping them not as the work of one person1 but as a growth1 and also an agglutinous growth1 lacking very decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind would have shown4 #a ,zeller ,op4 cit4 p4 #be4 ,at the time of the separation of ,pyrrhonism from the ,academy1 no other force was as strong in giving life to the school as the systematic treatment by ,aenesidemus of the ,ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch4 ,the reason of this is evident4 ,it was not that the ideas of the ,sceptical ,tropes were original with ,aenesidemus1 but because a definite statement of belief is always a far more powerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood and accepted4 ,there is always1 however1 the danger to the ,sceptic1 in making a statement even of the principles of ,scepticism1 that the psychological result would be a dogmatic tendency of mind1 as we shall see later was the case1 even with ,aenesidemus himself4 ,that the ,sceptical ,school could not escape the accusation of dogmatizing1 from the ,dogmatics1 even in stating the grounds of their ,scepticism1 we know from ,diogenes4#a ,to avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten ,tropes1 ,sextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm things to be absolutely true1 but states them as they appear to him1 and that they may be otherwise from what he has said4#b #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ajb4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #d1 #bd4 ,sextus tells us that ,certain ,tropes1 ten in number1 for producing the state of ,greek3 epoch have been handed down from the older ,sceptics4#a ,he refers to them in another work as the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus4#b ,there is no evidence that the substance of these ,tropes was changed after the time of ,aenesidemus1 although many of the illustrations given by ,sextus must have been of a later date1 added during the two centuries that elapsed between the time of ,aenesidemus and ,sextus4 ,in giving these ,tropes ,sextus does not claim to offer a systematic methodical classification1 and closes his list of them1 in their original concise form1 with the remark1 ,we make this order ourselves4#c ,the order is given differently by ,diogenes1 and also by ,favorinus4#d ,the ,trope which ,sextus gives as the tenth is the fifth given by ,diogenes1 the seventh by ,sextus is the eighth given by ,diogenes1 the fifth by ,sextus1 the seventh by ,diogenes1 the tenth by ,diogenes1 the eighth by ,sextus4 ,diogenes says that the one he gives as the ninth ,favorinus calls the eighth1 and ,sextus and ,aenesidemus the tenth4 ,this statement does not correspond with the list of the ,tropes which ,sextus gives1 proving that ,diogenes took some other text than that of ,sextus as his authority4#e ,the difference in the order of the ,tropes shows1 also1 that the order was not considered a matter of great importance4 ,there is a marked contrast in the spirit of the two presentations of the ,tropes given by ,sextus and ,diogenes4 ,the former gives them not only as an orator1 but as one who feels that he is defending his own cause1 and the school of which he is the leader1 against mortal enemies1 while ,diogenes relates them as an historian4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #cf4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #cde4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #ch4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hg4 #e ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hg4 ,pappenheim tries to prove#a that ,aenesidemus originally gave only nine ,tropes in his ,pyrrhonean ,hypotyposes1 as ,aristocles mentions only nine in referring to the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus1 and that the tenth was added later4 ,had this been the case1 however1 the fact would surely have been mentioned either by ,diogenes or ,sextus1 who both refer to the ten ,tropes of ,aenesidemus4 ,the ,tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is so relative and changeable1 that certain knowledge cannot be based upon them1 and as we have shown1 there is no other criterion of knowledge for the ,sceptic than phenomena4#b ,all of the ,tropes1 except the tenth1 are connected with sense-perception1 and relate to the difference of the results obtained through the senses under different circumstances4 ,they may be divided into two classes1 i4e41 those based upon differences of our physical organism1 and those based upon external differences4 ,to the first class belong the first1 second1 third and fourth2 to the second class1 the fifth1 sixth1 seventh and eighth1 and also the ninth4 ,the eighth1 or that of relation1 is applied objectively both by ,sextus and ,diogenes in their treatment of the ,tropes1 and is not used for objects of thought alone1 but principally to show the relation of outward objects to each other4 ,the tenth is the only one which has a moral significance1 and it has also a higher subjective value than the others2 it takes its arguments from an entirely different sphere of thought1 and deals with metaphysical and religious contradictions in opinion1 and with the question of good and evil4 ,that this ,trope is one of the oldest1 we know from its distinct mention in connection with the foundation theories of ,pyrrho1 by ,diogenes4#c ,in treating of the subjective reasons for doubt as to the character of external reality1 the ,sceptics were very near the denial of all outward reality1 a point1 however1 which they never quite reached4 #a ,pappenheim1 ,die ,tropen der ,griechen1 p4 #bc4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bb4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 ,there is evidently much of ,sextus' own thought mixed with the illustrations of the ,tropes1 but it is impossible to separate the original parts from the material that was the common property of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,many of these illustrations show1 however1 perfect familiarity with the scientific and medical teachings of the time4 ,before entering upon his exposition of the ,tropes1 ,sextus gives them in the short concise form in which they must first have existed#a-- 7i7 ,based upon the variety of animals4 7ii7 ,based upon the differences between men4 7iii7 ,based upon differences in the constitution of the sense organs4 7iv7 ,based upon circumstances4 7v7 ,based upon position1 distance and place4 7vi7 ,based upon mixtures4 7vii7 ,based upon the quantities and constitutions of objects4 7viii7 ,relation4 7ix7 ,based upon frequency or rarity of occurences4 7x7 ,based upon systems1 customs and laws1 mythical beliefs1 and dogmatic opinions4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #cf-ch4 ,although ,sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the arrangement of the ,tropes1 yet there is in his classification of them a regular gradation1 from the arguments based upon differences in animals to those in man1 first considering the latter in relation to the physical constitution1 and then to circumstances outside of us1 and finally the treatment of metaphysical and moral differences4 ,the ,first ,trope4#a ,that the same mental representations are not found in different animals1 may be inferred from their differences in constitution resulting from their different origins1 and from the variety in their organs of sense4 ,sextus takes up the five senses in order1 giving illustrations to prove the relative results of the mental representations in all of them1 as for example the subjectivity of color#b and sound4#c ,all knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not absolute4 ,sextus does not1 accordingly1 confine the impossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that ,locke regards as secondary1 but includes also the primary ones in this statement4#d ,the form and shape of objects as they appear to us may be changed by pressure on the eyeball4 ,furthermore1 the character of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on their shape1 as the images in concave mirrors are very different from those in convex ones2 and so in the same way as the eyes of animals are of different shapes1 and supplied with different fluids1 the ideas of dogs1 fishes1 men and grasshoppers must be very different4#e #a ,hyp44 ,i4 #dj-fa4 #b ,hyp44 ,i4 #dd-df4 #c ,hyp44 ,i4 #ej4 #d ,hyp44 ,i4 #dg4 #e ,hyp44 ,i4 #di4 ,in discussing the mental representations of animals of different grades of intelligence1 ,sextus shows a very good comprehension of the philogenetic development of the organs of sense1 and draws the final conclusion that external objects are regarded differently by animals1 according to their difference in constitution4#a ,these differences in the ideas which different animals have of the same objects are demonstrated by their different tastes1 as the things desired by some are fatal to others4#b ,the practical illustrations given of this result show a familiarity with natural history1 and cognizance of the tastes and habits of many animals1#c but were probably few of them original with ,sextus1 unless perhaps in their application2 that this train of reasoning was the common property of the ,sceptic ,school1 we know from the fact that ,diogenes begins his exposition of the first ,trope in a way similar to that of ,sextus4#d ,his illustrations are1 however1 few and meagre compared with those of ,sextus1 and the scientific facts used by both of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquity given in a similar way4#e ,the logical result of the reasoning used to explain the first ,trope1 is that we cannot compare the ideas of the animals with each other1 nor with our own2 nor can we prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of the animals4#f ,as therefore an examination of ideas is impossible1 any decided opinion about their trustworthiness is also impossible1 and this ,trope leads to the suspension of judgment regarding external objects1 or to ,greek3 epoch4#g #a ,hyp44 ,i4 #ed4 #b ,hyp44 ,i4 #ee4 #c ,hyp44 ,i4 #ee-ei4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gi-hj4 #e ,pappenheim ,erlauterung ,pyrr4 ,grundzge ,par4 #da4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #ei4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #fa4 ,after reaching this conclusion1 ,sextus introduces a long chapter to prove that animals can reason4 ,there is no reference to this in ,diogenes1 but there is other testimony to show that it was a favourite line of argument with the ,sceptics4#a ,sextus1 however1 says that his course of reasoning is different from that of most of the ,sceptics on the subject1#b as they usually applied their arguments to all animals1 while he selected only one1 namely the dog4#c ,this chapter is full of sarcastic attacks on the ,dogmatics1 and contains the special allusion to the ,stoics as the greatest opponents of the ,sceptics1 which has been before referred to4#d ,sextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in some apparently less original chapters1 and with a wealth of special illustrations1 that the dog is superior to man in acuteness of perception1#e that he has the power of choice1 and possesses an art1 that of hunting1#f and1 also1 is not deprived of virtue1#g as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to all1 which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind to him1 and keeping off those who do evil4#h ,the reasoning power of this animal is proved by the story taken from ,chrysippus1 of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in following a scent4 ,after seeking the scent in vain in two of the roads1 he takes the third road without scenting it as a result of a quick process of thought1 which proves that he shares in the famous dialectic of ,chrysippus1#i the five forms of ,greek3 anapodeiktoi logoi1 of which the dog chooses the fifth4 ,either ,a or ,b or ,c1 not ,a or ,b1 therefore ,c4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bch4 #b ,compare ,brochard ,op4 cit4 #bef4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #fb-fc4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #fe4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #fd4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #ff4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #fg4 #h ,hyp4 ,i4 #fg4 #i ,hyp4 ,i4 #fi2 ,hyp4 ,,ii4 #aff2 ,diog4 ,,vii4 #a1 #gi4 ,the dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken language1 as the only proof that we have to the contrary1 is the fact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make4#a ,we have an example in this chapter of the humor of ,sextus1 who after enlarging on the perfect character of the dog1 remarks1 ,for which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal1#b thus making a sarcastic allusion to the ,cynics1 especially ,antisthenes4#c #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #gd4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #gb4 #c ,diog4 ,,vi4 #a1 #ac4 ,the ,second ,trope4 ,passing on to the second ,trope1 ,sextus aims to prove that even if we leave the differences of the mental images of animals out of the discussion1 there is not a sufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings to allow us to base any assertions upon them in regard to the character of external objects4#a ,he had previously announced that he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual in any way whatever1#b so he begins here by referring to the two parts of which man is said to be composed1 the soul and the body1 and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in sense-perception and in opinion4#c ,most of the illustrations given of differences in sense-perception are medical ones2 of the more general of these ,i will note the only two which are also given by ,diogenes in his exposition of this ,trope1#d viz41 ,demophon1 ,alexander's table waiter1 who shivered in the sun1 and ,andron the ,argive1 who was so free from thirst that he travelled through the desert of ,libya without seeking a drink4 ,some have reasoned from the presence of the first of these illustrations in the exposition of the ,tropes1 that a part of this material at least goes back to the time of ,pyrrho1 as ,pyrrho from his intimacy with ,alexander1 when he accompanied him to ,india1 had abundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of his servant ,demophon4#e ,the illustration of ,andron the ,argive is taken from ,aristotle1 according to ,diogenes4#f #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #gi4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #h4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #hj4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hj-ha4 #e ,compare ,pyrrhon et le ,scepticism primitive1 ,revue phil41 ,paris #ahhe1 ,no4 #e2 ,victor ,brochard1 p4 #eba4 #f ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ha4 ,passing on to differences of opinion1 we have another example of the sarcastic humor of ,sextus1 as he refers to the ,greek3 physiognmonik sophia#a as the authority for believing that the body is a type of the soul4 ,as the bodies of men differ1 so the souls also probably differ4 ,the differences of mind among men is not referred to by ,diogenes1 except in the general statement that they choose different professions2 while ,sextus elaborates this point1 speaking of the great differences in opposing schools of philosophy1 and in the objects of choice and avoidance1 and sources of pleasure for different men4#b ,the poets well understand this marked difference in human desires1 as ,homer says1 ,one man enjoys this1 another enjoys that4 ,sextus also quotes the beautiful lines of ,pindar1#c ,one delights in getting honours and crowns through stormfooted horses1 ,others in passing life in rooms rich in gold1 ,another safe travelling enjoys1 in a swift ship1 on a wave of the sea4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #he4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #hg-hi4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #hf4 ,the ,third ,trope4 ,the third ,trope limits the argument to the sense-perceptions of one man1 a ,dogmatic1 if preferred1 or to one whom the ,dogmatics consider wise1#a and states that as the ideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a way that does not admit of their being compared with each other1 they furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of objects4#b ,each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms1 as the apple1 smooth1 fragrant brown and sweet4 ,the apple was evidently the ordinary example given for this ,trope1 for ,diogenes uses the same1 but in a much more condensed form1 and not with equal understanding of the results to be deduced from it4#c ,the consequence of the incompatibility of the mental representations produced through the several sense organs by the apple1 may be the acceptance of either of the three following propositions3 7i7 ,that only those qualities exist in the apple which we perceive4 7ii7 ,that more than these exist4 7iii7 ,that even those perceived do not exist4#d ,accordingly1 any experience which can give rise to such different views regarding outward objects1 cannot be relied upon as a testimony concerning them4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ij4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #id4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa #ha4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #ii4 ,the non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected with the different sense organs1 as presented by ,sextus1 reminds us of the discussion of the same subject by ,berkeley in his ,theory of ,vision4 ,sextus says that a man born with less than the usual number of senses1 would form altogether different ideas of the external world than those who have the usual number1 and as our ideas of objects depend on our mental images1 a greater number of sense organs would give us still different ideas of outward reality4#a ,the strong argument of the ,stoics against such reasoning as this1 was their doctrine of pre-established harmony between nature and the soul1 so that when a representation is produced in us of a real object1 a ,greek3 katalptik phantasia1#b by this representation the soul grasps a real existence4 ,there is a ,greek3 logos in us which is of the same kind1 ,greek3 syngenos1 or in relation to all nature4 ,this argument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the soul and the objects of nature1 is the one that has been used in all ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we apprehend the external world as it is4 ,it was used against ,kant by his opponents1 who thought in this way to refute his teachings4#c ,the ,sceptics could not1 of course1 accept a theory of nature that included the soul and the external world in one harmonious whole1 but ,sextus in his discussion of the third ,trope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in his work against logic4#d ,he simply states here that philosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is1 and furthermore1 that a philosopher himself is a part of the discord1 and to be judged1 rather than being capable of judging1 and that no conclusion can be reached by those who are themselves an element of the uncertainty4#e #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #if-ig4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ic4 #c ,ueberweg ,op4 cit4 #aie4 #d ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #ced4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #ih-ii4 ,the ,fourth ,trope4 ,this ,trope limits the argument to each separate sense1 and the effect is considered of the condition of body and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the several sense-organs4#a ,the physical states which modify sense-perception are health and illness1 sleeping and waking1 youth and age1 hunger and satiety1 drunkenness and sobriety4 ,all of these conditions of the body entirely change the character of the mental images1 producing different judgments of the color1 taste1 and temperature of objects1 and of the character of sounds4 ,a man who is asleep is in a different world from one awake1 the existence of both worlds being relative to the condition of waking and sleeping4#b ,the subjective states which ,sextus mentions here as modifying the character of the mental representations are hating or loving1 courage or fear1 sorrow or joy1 and sanity or insanity4#c ,no man is ever twice in exactly the same condition of body or mind1 and never able to review the differences of his ideas as a sum total1 for those of the present moment only are subject to careful inspection4#d ,furthermore1 no one is free from the influence of all conditions of body or mind1 so that he can be unbiassed to judge his ideas1 and no criterion can be established that can be shown to be true1 but on the contrary1 whatever course is pursued on the subject1 both the criterion and the proof will be thrown into the circulus in probando1 for the truth of each rests on the other4#e #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ajj4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #ajd4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #ajj4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #aab4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #aag4 ,diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this ,trope1 but in a much more condensed form4 ,the marked characteristic of this train of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal conditions are also natural4 ,in referring at first to the opposing states of body and mind1 which so change the character of sense-perception1 ,sextus classifies them according to the popular usage as ,greek3 kata physin and ,greek3 para physin4 ,this distinction was an important one1 even with ,aristotle1 and was especially developed by the ,stoics#a in a broader sense than referring merely to health and sickness4 ,the ,stoics1 however1 considered only normal conditions as being according to nature4 ,sextus1 on the contrary1 declares that abnormal states are also conditions according to nature1#b and just as those who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who are in health1 so also those not in health are in a state that is natural to those not in health1 and in some respects according to nature4 ,existence1 then1 and non-existence are not absolute1 but relative1 and the world of sleep as really exists for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking exist1 although they do not exist in sleep4#c ,one mental representation1 therefore1 cannot be judged by another1 which is also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental conditions4 ,diogenes states this principle even more decidedly in his exposition of this ,trope4 ,the insane are not in a condition opposed to nature2 why they more than we8 ,for we also see the sun as if it were stationary4#d ,furthermore1 in different periods of life ideas differ4 ,children are fond of balls and hoops1 while those in their prime prefer other things1 and the aged still others4#e ,the wisdom contained in this ,trope in reference to the relative value of the things most sought after is not original with ,sextus1 but is found in the more earnest ethical teachings of older writers4 ,sextus does not1 however1 draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning1 but only uses it as an argument for ,greek3 epoch4 #a ,diog4 ,,vii4 #a1 #hf4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #ajc4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #ajd4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hb4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #ajf4 ,the ,fifth ,trope4 ,this ,trope leaves the discussion of the dependence of the ideas upon the physical nature1 and takes up the influence of the environment upon them4 ,it makes the difference in ideas depend upon the position1 distance1 and place of objects1 thus taking apparently their real existence for granted4 ,things change their form and shape according to the distance from which they are observed1 and the position in which they stand4#a ,the same light or tone alters decidedly in different surroundings4 ,perspective in paintings depends on the angle at which the picture is suspended4#b ,with ,diogenes this ,trope is the seventh1#c and his exposition of it is similar1 but as usual1 shorter4 ,both ,sextus and ,diogenes give the illustration#d of the neck of the dove differing in color in different degrees of inclination1 an illustration used by ,protagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the senses4 ,the black neck of the dove in the shade appears black1 but in the light sunny and purple4#e ,since1 then1 all phenomena are regarded in a certain place1 and from a certain distance1 and according to a certain position1 each of which relations makes a great difference with the mental images1 we shall be obliged also by this ,trope to come to the reserving of the opinion4#f #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #aah4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #abj4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #he4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #abj2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hf4 #e ,schol4 zu ,arist4 #fj1 #ah1 ed4 ,brandis2 ,pappen4 ,er4 ,pyrr4 ,grundzge1 p4 #ed4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #aba4 ,the ,sixth ,trope4 ,this ,trope leads to ,greek3 epoch regarding the nature of objects1 because no object can ever be presented to the organs of sense directly1 but must always be perceived through some medium1 or in some mixture4#a ,this mixture may be an outward one1 connected with the temperature1 or the rarity of the air1 or the water#b surrounding an object1 or it may be a mixture resulting from the different humors of the sense-organs4#c ,a man with the jaundice1 for example1 sees colors differently from one who is in health4 ,the illustration of the jaundice is a favorite one with the ,sceptics4 ,diogenes uses it several times in his presentation of ,scepticism1 and it occurs in ,sextus' writings in all1 as an illustration1 in eight different places4#d ,the condition of the organ of the ,greek3 hgemonikon1 or the ruling faculty1 may also cause mixtures4 ,pappenheim thinks that we have here ,kant's idea of a priori1 only on a materialistic foundation4#e ,a careful consideration of the passage1 however1 shows us that ,sextus' thought is more in harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with the philosophy of ,kant4 ,if the sentence1 ,greek3 iss de kai aut 7h dianoia7 epimixian tina idian poieitai pros ta hypo tn aisthsen anangellomena1#f stood alone1 without further explanation1 it might well refer to a priori laws of thought1 but the explanation which follows beginning with because makes that impossible4#g ,because in each of the places where the ,dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is1 we see present certain humors1 which are the cause of mixtures4 ,sextus does not advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty in the body1 which is1 according to the ,stoics1 the principal part of the soul1 where ideas1 desires1 and reasoning originate1#h but simply refers to the two theories of the ,dogmatics1 which claim on the one hand that it is in the brain1 and on the other that it is in the heart4#i ,this subject he deals with more fully in his work against logic4#aj ,as1 however1 he bases his argument1 in discussing possible intellectual mixtures in illustration of the sixth ,trope1 entirely on the condition of the organ of the intellect1 it is evident that his theory of the soul was a materialistic one4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #abd4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #abe4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #abf4 #d ,see ,index to ,bekker's edition of ,sextus4 #e ,papp4 ,er4 ,pyr4 ,gr4 p4 #ee4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #abh4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #abh4 #h ,diog4 ,,vii4 #a1 #aei4 #i ,hyp4 ,i4 #abh4 #aj ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #cac4 ,the ,seventh ,trope4 ,this ,trope1 based upon the quantities and compositions of objects1 is illustrated by examples of different kinds of food1 drink1 and medicine1 showing the different effects according to the quantity taken1 as the harmfulness and the usefulness of most things depend on their quantity4 ,things act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large quantities1 as filings of metal or horn1 and separate grains of sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the form of a solid4#a ,the result is that ideas vary according to the composition of the object1 and this ,trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward objects1 and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard to them4#b ,this ,trope is illustrated by ,diogenes with exceeding brevity4#c #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #abi-aca4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #acd4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hf4 ,the ,eighth ,trope4 ,the ,trope based upon relation contains1 as ,sextus rightly remarks1 the substance of the other nine1#a for the general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes the other statements made4 ,the prominence which ,sextus gave this ,trope in his introduction to the ten ,tropes leads one to expect here new illustrations and added#b arguments for ,greek3 epoch4 ,we find1 however1 neither of these1 but simply a statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways1 either directly1 or as being a part of a difference4 ,these two kinds of relation are given by ,protagoras1 and might have been used to good purpose in the introduction to the ,tropes1 or at the end1 to prove that all the others were really subordinate to the eighth4 ,the reasoning is1 however simply applied to the relation of objects to each other1 and nothing is added that is not found elsewhere where as an argument for ,greek3 epoch4#c ,this ,trope is the tenth by ,diogenes1 and he strengthens his reasoning in regard to it1 by a statement that ,sextus does not directly make1 i4e41 that everything is in relation to the understanding4#d #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ci4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #ace-adj4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #ace-adj4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hh4 ,the ,ninth ,trope4 ,this is based upon the frequency and rarity of events1 and refers to some of the phenomena of nature1 such as the rising of the sun1 and the sea1 as no longer a source of astonishment1 while a comet or an earthquake are wonders to those not accustomed to them4#a ,the value of objects also depends on their rarity1 as for example the value of gold4#b ,furthermore1 things may be valuable at one time1 and at another not so1 according to the frequency and rarity of the occurrence4#c ,therefore this ,trope also leads to ,greek3 epoch4 ,diogenes gives only two illustrations to this ,trope1 that of the sun and the earthquake4#d #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ada-adb4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #adc4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #add4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hg4 ,the ,tenth ,trope4 ,we have already remarked on the difference in the character of the tenth ,trope1 dealing as it does1 not with the ideas of objects1 like the other nine ,tropes1 but with philosophical and religious opinions1 and questions of right and wrong4 ,it was the well-known aim of the ,sceptics to submit to the laws and customs of the land where they were found1 and to conform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies2 this they did without either affirming or denying the truth of the principles upon which these teachings were based1#a and also without any passion or strong feeling in regard to them1#b as nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil4 ,the tenth ,trope accordingly1 brings forward contradictions in customs1 laws1 and the beliefs of different lands1 to show that they are also changeable and relative1 and not of absolute worth4 ,the foundation-thought of this ,trope is given twice by ,diogenes1 once as we have before stated in his introduction#c to the life of ,pyrrho1 and also as one of the ,tropes4#d ,as it is apparently one of the oldest of the ,tropes1 it would naturally be much used in discussing with the ,stoics1 whose philosophy had such a wide ethical significance1 and must also have held an important place in the ,sceptical ,school in all metaphysical and philosophical discussions4 ,the definition#e in the beginning of ,sextus' exposition of this ,trope ,fabricius thinks was taken from ,aristotle1 of schools1 laws1 customs1 mythical beliefs and dogmatic opinions1#f and the definition which ,diogenes gives of law in his life of ,plato#g is similar4 ,pappenheim1 however1 thinks they were taken from the ,stoics1 perhaps from ,chrysippus4#h ,the argument is based upon the differences in development of thought1 as affecting the standpoint of judgment in philosophy1 in morals1 and religion1 the results of which we find in the widely opposing schools of philosophy1 in the variety in religious belief1 and in the laws and customs of different countries4 ,therefore the decisions reached in the world of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding the absolute value of any standards1 with those obtained through sense-perception1 and the universal conflict of opinion regarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us also according to this ,trope to the reserving of the opinion4#i ,this ,trope is the fifth as given by ,diogenes1 who placed it directly after the first four which relate more especially to human development1#aj while ,sextus uses it as the final one1 perhaps thinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of man deserves the last place1 or is the summation of the other arguments4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bd4 #b ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #bce4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hc4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #ade-adg4 #f ,fabricius1 ,cap4 ,,iv4 ,h4 #g ,diog4 ,,iii4 #hf4 #h ,pappenheim ,gr4 ,pyrr4 ,grundzge1 p4 #ej4 #i ,hyp4 ,i4 #afc4 #aj ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hc4 ,following the exposition of the ten ,tropes of the older ,sceptics1 ,sextus gives the five ,tropes which he attributes to the later ,sceptics4#a ,sextus nowhere mentions the author of these ,tropes4 ,diogenes1 however1 attributes them to ,agrippa1 a man of whom we know nothing except his mention of him4 ,he was evidently one of the followers of ,aenesidemus1 and a scholar of influence in the ,sceptical ,school1 who must have himself had disciples1 as ,diogenes says1 ,greek3 hoi peri ,agrippan#b add to these tropes other five tropes1 using the plural verb4 ,another ,sceptic1 also mentioned by ,diogenes1 and a man unknown from other sources1 named some of his books after ,agrippa4#c ,agrippa is not given by ,diogenes in the list of the leaders of the ,sceptical ,school1 but#d his influence in the development of the thought of the ,school must have been great1 as the transition from the ten ,tropes of the older ,sceptics to the five attributed to ,agrippa is a marked one1 and shows the entrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in it4 ,the latter are not a reduction of the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus1 but are written from an entirely different standpoint4 ,the ten ,tropes are empirical1 and aim to furnish objective proofs of the foundation theories of ,pyrrhonism1 while the five are rather rules of thought leading to logical proof1 and are dialectic in their character4 ,we find this distinction illustrated by the different way in which the ,trope of relativity is treated in the two groups4 ,in the first it points to an objective relativity1 but with ,agrippa to a general subjective logical principle4 ,the originality of the ,tropes of ,agrippa does not lie in their substance matter1 but in their formulation and use in the ,sceptical ,school4 ,these methods of proof were1 of course1 not new1 but were well known to ,aristotle1 and were used by the ,sceptical ,academy1 and probably also by ,timon1#e while the ,greek3 pros ti goes back at least to ,protagoras4 ,the five ,tropes are as follows4 7i7 ,the one based upon discord4 7ii7 ,the regressus in infinitum4 7iii7 ,relation4 7iv7 ,the hypothetical4 7v7 ,the circulus in probando4 ,two of these are taken from the old list1 the first and the third1 and ,sextus says that the five ,tropes are intended to supplement the ten ,tropes1 and to show the audacity of the ,dogmatics in a variety of ways4#f ,the order of these ,tropes is the same with ,diogenes as with ,sextus1 but the definitions of them differ sufficiently to show that the two authors took their material from different sources4 ,according to the first one everything in question is either sensible or intellectual1 and in attempting to judge it either in life1 practically1 or among philosophers1 a position is developed from which it is impossible to reach a conclusion4#g ,according to the second1 every proof requires another proof1 and so on to infinity1 and there is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning4#h ,according to the third1 all perceptions are relative1 as the object is colored by the condition of the judge1 and the influence of other things around it4#i ,according to the fourth1 it is impossible to escape from the regressus in infinitum by making a hypothesis the starting point1 as the ,dogmatics attempt to do4#aj ,and the fifth1 or the circulus in probando1 arises when that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the thing to be proved4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #afd4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #hh4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ajf4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aae-aaf4 #e ,compare ,natorp4 ,op4 cit4 p4 #cjb4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #agg4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #afe4 #h ,hyp4 ,i4 #aff4 #i ,hyp4 ,i4 #afg4 #aj ,hyp4 ,i4 #afh4 ,sextus claims that all things can be included in these ,tropes1 whether sensible or intellectual4#a ,for whether1 as some say1 only the things of sense are true1 or as others claim1 only those of the understanding1 or as still others contend1 some things both of sense and understanding are true1 a discord must arise that is impossible to be judged1 for it cannot be judged by the sensible1 nor by the intellectual1 for the things of the intellect themselves require a proof2 accordingly1 the result of all reasoning must be either hypothetical1 or fall into the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in probando4#b ,the reference above to some who say that only the things of sense are true1 is to ,epicurus and ,protagoras2 to some that only the things of thought are true1 to ,democritus and ,plato2 and to those that claimed some of both to be true1 to the ,stoics and the ,peripatetics4#c ,the three new ,tropes added by ,agrippa have nothing to do with sense-perception1 but bear entirely upon the possibility of reasoning1 as demanded by the science of logic1 in contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely1 with the exception of the tenth1 to material objects4 ,sextus claims that these five ,tropes also lead to the suspension of judgment1#d but their logical result is rather the dogmatic denial of all possibility of knowledge1 showing as ,hirzel has well demonstrated1 far more the influence of the ,new ,academy than the spirit of the ,sceptical ,school4#e ,it was the standpoint of the older ,sceptics1 that although the search for the truth had not yet succeeded1 yet they were still seekers1 and ,sextus claims to be faithful to this old aim of the ,pyrrhonists4 ,he calls himself a seeker1#f and in reproaching the ,new ,academy for affirming that knowledge is impossible1 ,sextus says1 ,moreover1 we say that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness4#g ,the ten ,tropes claim to establish doubt only in regard to a knowledge of the truth1 but the five ,tropes of ,agrippa aim to logically prove the impossibility of knowledge4 ,it is very strange that ,sextus does not see this decided contrast in the attitude of the two sets of ,tropes1 and expresses his approval of those of ,agrippa1 and makes more frequent use of the fifth of these1 ,greek3 ho dialllos1 in his subsequent reasoning than of any other argument4#h #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #afi4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #agj-aga4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #ahe-ahf2 ,,viii4 #ef2 ,,vii4 #cfi4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #agg4 #e ,hirzel ,op4 cit4 p4 #aca4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #c1 #g4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbg4 #h ,see ,index of ,bekker's edition of ,sextus' works4 ,we find here in the ,sceptical ,school1 shortly after the time of ,aenesidemus1 the same tendency to dogmatic teaching that--so far as the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the ,new ,academy can be unravelled1 and the separation of ,pyrrhonism can be understood1 at the time that the ,academy passed over into eclecticism--was one of the causes of that separation4 ,it is true that the ,tropes of ,agrippa show great progress in the development of thought4 ,they furnish an organisation of the ,school far superior to what went before1 placing the reasoning on the firm basis of the laws of logic1 and simplifying the amount of material to be used4 ,in a certain sense ,saisset is correct in saying that ,agrippa contributed more than any other in completing the organisation of ,scepticism1#a but it is not correct when we consider the true spirit of ,scepticism with which the ,tropes of ,agrippa were not in harmony4 ,it was through the very progress shown in the production of these ,tropes that the school finally lost the strength of its position4 ,not content with having reduced the number of the ,tropes from ten to five1 others tried to limit the number still further to two4#b ,sextus gives us no hint of the authorship of the two ,tropes4 ,ritter attributes them to ,menodotus and his followers1 and ,zeller agrees with that opinion1#c while ,saisset thinks that ,agrippa was also the author of these1#d which is a strange theory to propound1 as some of the material of the five is repeated in the two1 and the same man could certainly not appear as an advocate of five1 and at the same time of two ,tropes4 #a ,saisset ,op4 cit4 p4 #bcg4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #agh4 #c ,zeller ,,iii4 #ch2 ,ritter ,,iv4 #bgg4 #d ,saisset ,op4 cit4 p4 #bca4 ,the two ,tropes are founded on the principle that anything must be known through itself or through something else4 ,it cannot be known through itself1 because of the discord existing between all things of the senses and intellect1 nor can it be known through something else1 as then either the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in probando follow4#a ,diogenes ,laertius does not refer to these two ,tropes4 ,in regard to all these ,tropes of the suspension of judgment1 ,sextus has well remarked in his introduction to them1 that they are included in the eighth1 or that of relation4#b #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #agh-agi4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #ci4 ,the ,tropes of ,aetiology4 ,the eight ,tropes against causality belong chronologically before the five ,tropes of ,agrippa1 in the history of the development of sceptical thought4 ,they have a much closer connection with the spirit of ,scepticism than the ,tropes of ,agrippa1 including1 as they do1 the fundamental thought of ,pyrrhonism1 i4e41 that the phenomena do not reveal the unknown4 ,the ,sceptics did not deny the phenomena1 but they denied that the phenomena are signs capable of being interpreted1 or of revealing the reality of causes4 ,it is impossible by a research of the signs to find out the unknown1 or the explanation of things1 as the ,stoics and ,epicureans claim4 ,the theory of ,aenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight ,tropes against aetiology1 is given to us by ,photius as follows3#a ,there are no visible signs of the unknown1 and those who believe in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion4 ,this statement of ,aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller explanation of it given later on by ,sextus4#b ,if phenomena are not signs of the unknown there is no causality1 and a refutation of causality is a proof of the impossibility of science1 as all science is the science of causes1 the power of studying causes from effects1 or as ,sextus calls them1 phenomena4 ,it is very noticeable to any one who reads the refutation of causality by ,aenesidemus1 as given by ,sextus1#c that there is no reference to the strongest argument of modern ,scepticism1 since the time of ,hume1 against causality1 namely that the origin of the idea of causality cannot be so accounted for as to justify our relying upon it as a form of cognition4#d #a ,myriob4 #agj ,b4 #ab4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #bjg4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #ahj-ahf4 #d ,ueberweg ,op4 cit4 p4 #bag4 ,the eight ,tropes are directed against the possibility of knowledge of nature1 which ,aenesidemus contested against in all his ,tropes1 the ten as well as the eight4#a ,they are written from a materialistic standpoint4 ,these ,tropes are given with illustrations by ,fabricius as follows3 ,i4 ,since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen1 it does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to phenomena4 ,for example1 the ,pythagoreans explain the distance of the planets by a musical proportion4 ,,ii4 ,from many equally plausible reasons which might be given for the same thing1 one only is arbitrarily chosen1 as some explain the inundation of the ,nile by a fall of snow at its source1 while there could be other causes1 as rain1 or wind1 or the action of the sun4 ,,iii4 ,things take place in an orderly manner1 but the causes presented do not show any order1 as for example1 the motion of the stars is explained by their mutual pressure1 which does not take into account the order that reigns among them4 ,,iv4 ,the unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way as phenomena1 as vision is explained in the same way as the appearance of images in a dark room4 ,v4 ,most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree with their own individual hypotheses about the elements1 but not with common and accepted ideas1 as to explain the world by atoms like ,epicurus1 by homoeomeriae like ,anaxagoras1 or by matter and form like ,aristotle4 ,,vi4 ,theories are accepted which agree with individual hypotheses1 and others equally probable are passed by1 as ,aristotle's explanation of comets1 that they are a collection of vapors near the earth1 because that coincided with his theory of the universe4 ,,vii4 ,theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only with individual hypotheses1 but also with phenomena1 as to admit like ,epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul1 which was incompatible with the necessity which he advocated4 ,,viii4 ,the inscrutable is explained by things equally inscrutable1 as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the attraction of a sponge for water1 a fact contested by some4#b #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ih4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #ahj-ahf2 ,fabricius1 ,cap4 ,,xvii4 #ahj z4 ,diogenes does not mention these ,tropes in this form1 but he gives a resum of the general arguments of the ,sceptics against aetiology1#a which has less in common with the eight ,tropes of ,aenesidemus1 than with the presentation of the subject by ,sextus later1#b when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to show ,greek3 mden einai aition4 ,although the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character1 it would not seem that he made the distinction1 which is so prominent with ,sextus1 between the signs ,greek3 hypomnstika and ,greek3 endeiktika1#c especially as ,diogenes sums up his argument on the subject with the general assertion1 ,greek3 ,smeion ouk einai1#d and proceeds to introduce the logical consequence of the denial of aetiology4 ,the summing up of the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus is given as follows1 in the ,hypotyposes1 by ,sextus3--,a cause in harmony with all the sects of philosophy1 and with ,scepticism1 and with phenomena1 is perhaps not possible1 for the phenomena and the unknown altogether disagree4#e ,it is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of these ,tropes1 that ,aenesidemus asserts that causality has only a subjective value1 which from his materialistic standpoint was an argument against its real existence1 and the same argument is used by ,kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of thought4#f ,chaignet characterises the ,tropes of ,aenesidemus as false and sophistical1#g but as ,maccoll has well said1 they are remarkable for their judicious and strong criticism1 and are directed against the false method of observing facts through the light of preconceived opinion4#h ,they have1 however1 a stronger critical side than sceptical1 and show the positive tendency of the thought of ,aenesidemus4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #if-ih4 #b ,hyp4 ,,iii4 #bd-bh4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #aea4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #if4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #ahe4 #f ,compare ,maccoll ,op4 cit4 p4 #gg4 #g ,chaignet ,op4 cit4 #ejg4 #h ,maccoll ,op4 cit4 p4 #hh4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,aenesidemus and the ,philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,a paragraph in the ,first ,book of the ,hypotyposes which has given rise to much speculation and many different theories1 is the comparison which ,sextus makes of ,scepticism with the philosophy of ,heraclitus4#a ,in this paragraph the statement is made that ,aenesidemus and his followers1 ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainsidmon1 said that ,scepticism is the path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 because the doctrine that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing1 leads the way to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing4#b ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainsidmon elegon hodon einai tn skeptikn aggn epi tn ,hrakleiteion philosophian1 dioti progeitai tou tanantia peri to auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai4 ,as the ,sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing1 the ,heraclitans come from this to the more positive doctrine that they are in reality so4#c #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #baj4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #baj4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #baj4 ,this connection which ,aenesidemus is said to have affirmed between ,scepticism and the philosophy of ,heraclitus is earnestly combated by ,sextus1 who declares that the fact that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of the ,sceptics1 but a fact which presents itself to all men1 and not to the ,sceptics only4 ,no one for instance1 whether he be a ,sceptic or not1 would dare to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in health1 and bitter to those who have the jaundice1 so that ,heraclitus begins from a preconception common to all men1 as to us also1 and perhaps to the other schools of philosophy as well4#a ,as the statement concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one1 then ,scepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus than to other schools of philosophy1 or to life1 as all use common subject matter4 ,but we are afraid that the ,sceptical ,school not only does not help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 but even hinders that result4 ,since the ,sceptic accuses ,heraclitus of having rashly dogmatised1 presenting on the one hand the doctrine of 'conflagration' and on the other that 'contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing4'#b ,it is absurd1 then1 to say that this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it conflicts4 ,it is therefore absurd to say that the ,sceptical ,school is a path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus4#c #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #baa4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bab4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bab4 ,this is not the only place in the writings of ,sextus which states that ,aenesidemus at some time of his life was an advocate of the doctrines of ,heraclitus4 ,in no instance1 however1 where ,sextus refers to this remarkable fact1 does he offer any explanation of it1 or express any bitterness against ,aenesidemus1 whom he always speaks of with respect as a leader of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,we are thus furnished with one of the most difficult problems of ancient ,scepticism1 the problem of reconciling the apparent advocacy of ,aenesidemus of the teachings of ,heraclitus with his position in the ,sceptical ,school4 ,a comparison with each other of the references made by ,sextus and other writers to the teachings of ,aenesidemus1 and a consideration of the result1 gives us two pictures of ,aenesidemus which conflict most decidedly with each other4 ,we have on the one hand1 the man who was the first to give ,pyrrhonism a position as an influential school1 and the first to collect and present to the world the results of preceding ,sceptical thought4 ,he was the compiler of the ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch1 and perhaps in part their author1 and the author of the eight ,tropes against aetiology4#a ,he develops his ,scepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor the intellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality4#b ,he denied the possibility of studying phenomena as signs of the unknown4#c ,he denied all possibility of truth1 and the reality of motion1 origin and decay4 ,there was according to his teaching no pleasure or happiness1 and no wisdom or supreme good4 ,he denied the possibility of finding out the nature of things1 or of proving the existence of the gods1 and finally he declared that no ethical aim is possible4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #ahj4 #b ,photius #agj1 ,b4 #ab4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #dj4 ,the picture on the other hand1 presented to us by ,sextus and ,tertullian1 is that of a man with a system of beliefs and dogmas1 which lead1 he says1 to the philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,in strange contradiction to his assertion of the impossibility of all knowledge1 he advocates a theory that the original substance is air1#a which is most certainly a dogma1 although indeed a deviation from the teachings of ,heraclitus1 of which ,sextus seemed unconscious1 as he says1 ,greek3 to te on kata ton ,hrakleiton ar estin1 hs physin ho ,ainsidmos4 ,aenesidemus dogmatised also regarding number and time and unity of the original world-stuff4#b ,he seems to have dogmatised further about motion1#c and about the soul4#d ,if ,sextus' language is taken according to its apparent meaning1 we find ourselves here in the presence of a system of beliefs which would be naturally held by a follower of the ,stoic-,heraclitan physics1#e and absolutely inexplicable from the standpoint of a man who advocated so radical a ,scepticism as ,aenesidemus4 ,sextus in the passage that we first quoted1#f expresses great indignation against the idea that ,scepticism could form the path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 but he does not express surprise or indignation against ,aenesidemus personally1 or offer any explanation of the apparent contradiction2 and while his writings abound in references to him as a respected leader of the ,sceptical ,school1 he sometimes seems to include him with the ,dogmatics1 mentioning him with the ,greek3 dogmatikn philosophn4#g ,in fact1 the task of presenting any consistent history of the development of thought through which ,aenesidemus passed is such a puzzling one1 that ,brochard brilliantly remarks that possibly the best attitude to take towards it would be to follow the advice of ,aenesidemus himself1 and suspend one's judgment altogether regarding it4 ,is it possible to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as ,aenesidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions8 #a ,adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #bcc4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,ix4 #ccg2 ,x4 #baf4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 ,x4 #ch4 #d ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #cdi4 #e ,compare ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 p4 #cc4 #f ,hyp4 ,i4 #baj-bab4 #g ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #h2 ,x4 #bae4 ,the conjecture that he was first a ,heraclitan ,stoic1 and later a ,sceptic1 which might be possible1 does not offer any explanation of ,sextus' statement1 that he regarded ,scepticism as a path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,nor would it be logical to think that after establishing the ,sceptical ,school in renewed influence and power1 he reverted to the ,heraclitan theories as they were modified by the ,stoics4 ,these same theories were the cause of his separation from the ,academy1 for his chief accusation against the ,academy was that it was adopting the dogmatism of the ,stoics4#a ,the matter is complicated by the fact that ,tertullian also attributes to ,aenesidemus anthropological and physical teachings that agree with the ,stoical ,heraclitan doctrines4 ,it is not strange that in view of these contradictory assertions in regard to the same man1 some have suggested the possibility that they referred to two different men of the same name1 a supposition1 however1 that no one has been able to authoritatively vindicate4 ,let us consider briefly some of the explanations which have been attempted of the apparent heresy of ,aenesidemus towards the ,sceptical ,school4 ,we will begin with the most ingenious1 that of ,pappenheim4#b ,pappenheim claims that ,sextus was not referring to ,aenesidemus himself in these statements which he joins with his name4 ,in the most important of these1 the one quoted from the ,hypotyposes1#c which represents ,aenesidemus as claiming that ,scepticism is the path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 the expression used is ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainsidmon1 and in many of the other places where ,sextus refers to the dogmatic statements of ,aenesidemus1 the expression is either ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainsidmon1 or ,greek3 ,ainsidmos kath' ,hrakleiton1 while when ,sextus quotes ,aenesidemus to sustain ,scepticism1 he uses his name alone4 #a ,compare ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii4 p4 #af4 #b ,die angebliche ,heraclitismus des ,skeptikers ,ainesidemos1 ,berlin #ahhi4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #baj-bab4 ,pappenheim thinks that ,sextus' conflict was not with the dead ,aenesidemus1 who had lived two centuries before him1 but with his own contemporaries4 ,he also seeks to prove that ,sextus could not have gained his knowledge of these sayings of ,aenesidemus from any of ,aenesidemus' own writings1 as neither by the ancients1 nor by later writers1 was any book spoken of which could well have contained them4 ,neither ,aristocles nor ,diogenes mentions any such book4 ,pappenheim also makes much of the argument that ,sextus in no instance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part of ,aenesidemus1 even when most earnestly combating his alleged teachings1 but in referring to him personally he always speaks of him with great respect4 ,pappenheim suggests1 accordingly1 that the polemic of ,sextus was against contemporaries1 those who accepted the philosophy of ,heraclitus in consequence of1 or in some connection with1 the teachings of ,aenesidemus4 ,he entirely ignores the fact that there is no trace of any such school or sect in history1 calling themselves followers of ,aenesidemus according to ,heraclitus1 but still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in ,alexandria at the time of ,sextus1 where so many different sects were found4 ,sextus use ,aenesidemus' name in four different ways3--alone1 ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainesidmon1 ,greek3 ,ainsidmos kath' ,hrakleiton1 and in one instance ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainsidmon kath' ,hrakleiton4#a #a ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #h4 ,pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries against whom ,sextus directed his arguments had written a book entitled ,greek3 ,ainsidmos kath' ,hrakleiton1 to prove the harmony between ,aenesidemus and ,heraclitus1 and that it was from this book that ,sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he introduced with that formula4 ,he claims1 further1 that the passage quoted from ,hypotyposes ,i4 even1 is directed against contemporaries1 who founded their system of proofs of the harmony between ,aenesidemus and ,heraclitus on the connection of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the ,sceptics3 ,contrary predicates appear to apply to the same thing1 with the apparent deduction from this1 that ,contrary predicates in reality apply to the same thing4 ,sextus wishes1 according to ,pappenheim1 to prove to these contemporaries that they had misunderstood ,aenesidemus1 and ,sextus does not report ,aenesidemus to be a ,dogmatic1 nor to have taught the doctrines of ,heraclitus2 neither has he misunderstood ,aenesidemus1 nor consequently misrepresented him2 but on the contrary1 these dogmatic quotations have nothing to do with ,aenesidemus1 but refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be ,sceptics while they accepted the teachings of ,heraclitus4 ,sextus naturally warmly combats this tendency1 as he wishes to preserve ,pyrrhonism pure4 ,brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of ,aenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question4#a ,he starts from the supposition1 the reasonableness of which we shall consider later1 that ,aenesidemus had passed through one change of opinion already when he severed his connection with the ,new ,academy2 and to the two phases of his life1 which such a change has already made us familiar with1 he adds a third4 ,aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different beliefs at different periods of his life1 and ,brochard claims that such a development in the opinions of ,aenesidemus is logical4 ,he does not accuse ,aenesidemus of having1 as might seem from the perusal of ,sextus1 suddenly changed his basis1 but rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings of ,heraclitus4 ,aenesidemus modifies his ,scepticism only to the extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality4 ,the ,sceptic says1 ,contradictory predicates are apparently applicable to the same thing1 and ,aenesidemus accepts the ,heraclitan result--,contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing4 ,from ,sextus' report1 ,aenesidemus would seem to have renounced his position as a ,sceptic in saying that ,scepticism is the path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,he does not1 however1 renounce ,scepticism1 but he finds it incomplete4 ,in deliberating concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same object1 he would naturally ask1 ,whence come these contradictory appearances8 ,after having doubted all things1 he wished to know wherefore he doubts4 ,the system of ,heraclitus offers a solution1 and he accepts it4 ,contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the soul because they are an expression of reality4 #a ,brochard ,op4 cit4 #bgb4 ,as a ,sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible1 and he does not find that the statement of ,heraclitus disproves this1 but rather that it supports his theory4 ,he had denied the existence of science4 ,he still does so1 but now he knows why he denies it4 ,brochard asks why it is any more impossible that ,aenesidemus should have been a follower of ,heraclitus than that ,protagoras was so1 as ,protagoras was after all a ,sceptic4 ,in conclusion1 ,brochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to ,aenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory predicates1 which seemed to him a logical explanation of the foundation theories of ,scepticism4 ,it is right to call him a ,sceptic1 for he was so1 and that sincerely2 and he deserves his rank as one of the chiefs of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,coming now to the opinion of ,zeller1#a we find that he advocates a misconception of ,aenesidemus on the part of ,sextus4 ,the whole difficulty is removed1 ,zeller thinks1 by the simple fact that ,sextus had not understood ,aenesidemus2 and as ,tertullian and ,sextus agree in this misconception of the views of ,aenesidemus1 they must have been misled by consulting a common author in regard to ,aenesidemus1 who confused what ,aenesidemus said of ,heraclitus with his own opinion4 ,zeller maintains that the expression so often repeated by ,sextus--,greek3 ,ainsidmos kath' ,hrakleiton--shows that some one of ,aenesidemus' books contained a report of ,heraclitus' doctrines1 as ,aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many authorities as possible to sustain his ,scepticism4 ,to justify his quotations from ,heraclitus1 he had possibly given a short abstract of ,heraclitus' teachings2 and the misconception advocated by ,zeller and found both in ,tertullian and ,sextus1 refers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted from ,aenesidemus1 and is a misconception due to some earlier author1 who had given a false impression of the meaning of ,aenesidemus in quoting what ,aenesidemus wrote about ,heraclitus4 ,that is to say1 ,heraclitus was classed by ,aenesidemus only among those who prepared the way for ,scepticism1 just as ,diogenes#b mentions many philosophers in that way2 and that ,soranus#c and ,sextus both had the same misunderstanding can only be explained by a mistake on the part of the authority whom they consulted4 #a ,zeller ,op4 cit4 ,,iii1 pp4 #ca-ce2 ,grundriss der ,geschichte der ,griechischen ,phil4 p4 #bfc4 #b ,diog4 ,laert4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ga-gd4 #c ,tertullian4 ,this explanation1 however1 makes ,sextus a very stupid man4 ,aenesidemus' books were well known1 and ,sextus would most certainly take the trouble to read them4 ,his reputation as an historian would not sustain such an accusation1 as ,diogenes calls his books ,greek3 ta deka tn skeptikn kai alla kallista4#a ,furthermore1 that ,sextus used ,aenesidemus' own books we know from the direct quotation from them in regard to ,plato1#b which he combines with the ideas of ,menodotus#c and his own4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aaf4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbb4 #c ,following the ,greek of ,bekker4 ,sextus' references to ,aenesidemus in connection with ,heraclitus are very numerous1 and it is absurd to suppose that he would have trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authority on such a subject4 ,even were it possible that ,sextus did not refer directly to the works of ,aenesidemus1 which we do not admit1 even then1 there had been many writers in the ,sceptical ,school since the time of ,aenesidemus1 and they certainly could not all have misrepresented him4 ,we must remember that ,sextus was at the head of the ,school1 and had access to all of its literature4 ,his honor would not allow of such a mistake1 and if he had indeed made it1 his contemporaries must surely have discovered it before ,diogenes characterised his books as ,greek3 kallista4 ,whatever may be said against the accuracy of ,sextus as a general historian of philosophy1 especially in regard to the older schools1 he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance respecting the school of which he was at that time the head4 ,the opinion of ,ritter on this subject is that ,aenesidemus must have been a ,dogmatic4#a ,saisset contends#b that ,aenesidemus really passed from the philosophy of ,heraclitus to that of ,pyrrho1 and made the statement that ,scepticism is the path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus to defend his change of view1 although in his case the change had been just the opposite to the one he defends4 ,saisset propounds as a law in the history of philosophy a fact which he claims to be true1 that ,scepticism always follows sensationalism1 for which he gives two examples1 ,pyrrho1 who was first a disciple of ,democritus1 and ,hume1 who was a disciple of ,locke ,it is not necessary to discuss the absurdity of such a law1 which someone has well remarked would involve an a priori construction of history4 ,there is no apparent reason for ,saisset's conjecture in regard to ,aenesidemus1 for it is exactly the opposite of what ,sextus has reported4 ,strange to say1 ,saisset himself remarks in another place that we owe religious respect to any text1 and that it should be the first law of criticism to render this4#c ,such respect to the text of ,sextus1 as he himself advocates1 puts ,saisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of the question4 #a ,ritter1 ,op4 cit4 p4 #bhj4 ,book ,,iv4 #b ,saisset1 ,op4 cit4 p4 #bjf4 #c ,saisset ,op4 cit4 p4 #bjf4 ,hirzel and ,natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in the two views presented of the theories of ,aenesidemus1 nor do they think that ,sextus has misrepresented them4 ,they rather maintain1 that in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates regarding the same object1 ,aenesidemus does not cease to be a ,sceptic1 for he did not believe that the predicates are applicable in a dogmatic sense of the word1 but are only applicable in appearance1 that is1 applicable to phenomena4 ,the ,heraclitism of ,aenesidemus would be then only in appearance1 as he understood the statement1 that ,contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing1 only in the phenomenal sense4#a ,hirzel says in addition1 that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same for all1 and consequently true1 for ,aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that are the same for all4#b ,as ,protagoras1 the disciple of ,heraclitus1 declared the relative character of sensations1 that things exist only for us1 and that their nature depends on our perception of them2 so1 in the phenomenal sense1 ,aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing4 #a ,natorp ,op4 cit4 #aae1 #abb4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #h2 ,hirzel ,op4 cit4 p4 #ie4 ,this explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do with the word ,greek3 huparchein1 in the statement that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing2 while in the passage quoted where ,aenesidemus declares common phenomena to be true ones1 we have the word ,greek3 alth1 so that this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very strange use of the word ,greek3 huparchein4 ,all of these different views of the possible solution of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect1 as the opinion of men who have given much thought to this and other closely ,belated subjects4 ,while we may not altogether agree with any one of them1 they nevertheless furnish many suggestions1 which are very valuable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties1 and present a consistent view of the attitude of ,aenesidemus4 ,first1 in regard to the ,greek expression ,greek3 hoi peri in connection with proper names1 upon which ,pappenheim bases so much of his argument4 ,all ,greek scholars would agree that the expression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any teacher1 but ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,ainsidmon1 for instance1 includes ,aenesidemus with his followers1 and is literally translated1 ,aenesidemus and his followers4 ,it is noticeable1 however1 in the writings of ,sextus that he uses the expression ,greek3 hoi peri often for the name of the founder of a school alone1 as ,pappenheim himself admits4#a ,we find examples of this in the mention of ,plato and ,democritus and ,arcesilaus1 as ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,platna kai ,dmokriton#b and ,greek3 hoi peri ton ,arkesilaon1#c and accordingly we have no right to infer that his use of the name ,aenesidemus in this way has an exceptional significance4 ,it may mean ,aenesidemus alone1 or it may signify ,aenesidemus in connection with his followers4 #a ,pappenheim ,op4 cit4 p4 #ba4 #b ,adv4 ,math4 ,,viii4 #f4 #c ,adv4 ,math4 ,,vii4 #aej4 ,in reply to ,zeller's position1 that ,sextus and ,tertullian have misunderstood ,aenesidemus1 and quote from some common author who misrepresents him1 we would admit that such a misunderstanding might be possible where ,sextus gives long explanations of ,heraclitus' teachings1 beginning with quoting ,aenesidemus1 and continuing in such a way that it is not always possible to distinguish just the part that is attributed to ,aenesidemus2 but such a misunderstanding certainly cannot be asserted in regard to the direct statement that ,aenesidemus regarded ,scepticism as the path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 for the reasons previously given4 ,neither would we agree with ,brochard1 whose solution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical1 i4e41 that ,aenesidemus had necessarily already passed through two phases of philosophical belief4 ,it is possible to admit a gradual evolution of thought in ,aenesidemus without supposing in either case a change of basis4 ,his withdrawal from the ,academy is an argument against1 rather than in favor of a change on his part1 and was caused by the well-known change in the attitude of the ,academy4 ,many of the teachings of the ,sceptical ,school were taken directly from the ,academy1 belonging to those doctrines advocated in the ,academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendency introduced by ,antiochus4 ,in fact1 ,sextus himself claims a close relation between the ,middle ,academy and ,pyrrhonism4#a ,aenesidemus1 although he was a ,sceptic1 belonged to the ,academy1 and on leaving it became1 as it were1 a pioneer in ,pyrrhonism1 and cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge a ,sceptic of ,sextus' time4 ,it seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries which elapsed between the time of ,aenesidemus and ,sextus1 the standpoint of judgment in the ,sceptical ,school had greatly changed4 ,an example illustrating this change we find in a comparison of the presentation of ,scepticism by ,diogenes with that of ,sextus4 ,the author ,whom ,diogenes follows1 probably one of the ,sceptical writers1 considers ,xenophanes1 ,zeno1 and ,democritus1 ,sceptics1 and also ,plato1#b while ,sextus1 in regard to all of these men1 opposes the idea that they were ,sceptics4#c ,diogenes also calls ,heraclitus a ,sceptic1 and even ,homer1#d and quotes sceptical sayings from the ,seven ,wise ,men2#e he includes in the list of ,sceptics1 ,archilochus1 ,euripides1 ,empedocles1 and ,hippocrates1#f and1 furthermore1 says that ,theodosius1 probably one of the younger ,sceptics1 objected to the name ',pyrrhonean' on the ground that ,pyrrho was not the first ,sceptic4#g #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcb4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ag-gb4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bac-bad2 ,i4 #bbc-bbe4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ga4 #e ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ga4 #f ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ga-gc4 #g ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa4 #gj4 ,we have given the testimony from many sources to the effect that before the time of ,sextus the ,empirical ,school of ,medicine was considered identical with ,scepticism1 although not so by ,sextus himself4 ,from all of these things we may infer a narrowing of the limits of ,pyrrhonism in the time of ,sextus4 ,let us accept with ,brochard the development of thought seen in ,aenesidemus from the beginning to the end of his career1 without agreeing with him that ,aenesidemus ever consciously changed his basis4 ,he was a ,sceptic in the ,academy4 ,he left the ,academy on that account1 and he remained a ,sceptic to the end1 in so far as a man can be a ,sceptic1 and take the positive stand that ,aenesidemus did4 ,two things might account for his apparent dogmatism-- 7i7 ,the eclectic spirit of his time4 7ii7 ,the psychological effect upon himself of this careful systemisation of the ,sceptical teachings4 ,let us consider the first of these causes4 ,aenesidemus1 although not the first of the later ,sceptics1 was apparently the first to separate himself from the ,academy4 ,he was the founder of a new movement1 the attempt to revive the older ,scepticism as taught by ,pyrrho and ,timon1 and separate it from the dogmatic teachings of the ,stoics which were so greatly affecting the ,scepticism of the ,new ,academy4 ,it was the spirit of his time to seek to sustain all philosophical teaching by the authority of as many as possible of the older philosophers1 and he could hardly escape the tendency which his training in the ,academy had unconsciously given him4 ,therefore we find him trying to prove that the philosophy of ,heraclitus follows from ,scepticism4 ,it is not necessary either to explain the matter1 as both ,hirzel and ,natorp so ingeniously attempt to do1 by claiming that the truth of contradictory predicates which ,aenesidemus accepted from ,heraclitus referred only to phenomena4 ,the history of philosophy gives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absolute ,scepticism1 and ,aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of many of this impossibility1 and of the dogmatism that must exist in connection with all thought4 ,in the case of ,aenesidemus1 who evidently gave the best efforts of his life to establish the ,sceptical ,school1 the dogmatism was probably unconscious4 ,that he remained to the end a ,sceptic is shown by the fact that he was known as such to posterity4 ,nowhere do we find a change of basis referred to in regard to him1 and ,sextus1 in refuting the mistakes which he attributes to ,aenesidemus1 does it1 as it were1 to point out something of which ,aenesidemus had been unconscious4 ,let us consider here the second cause of ,aenesidemus' ,dogmatism1 the psychological effect upon himself of formulating ,sceptical beliefs4 ,the work that he did for the ,sceptical ,school was a positive one4 ,it occupied years of his life1 and stamped itself upon his mental development4 ,in formulating ,scepticism1 and in advocating it against the many enemies of the ,school1 and amidst all the excitement of the disruption from the ,academy1 and of establishing a new ,school1 it was inevitable that his mind should take a dogmatic tendency4 ,he remained a ,sceptic as he had always been1 but must have grown dogmatic in his attitude towards the ,sceptical formulae1 and was thus able to adopt some of the teachings of ,heraclitus1 unconscious of their inconsistency4 ,where should we find a modern writer who is consistent in all his statements8 ,could we read the works of ,aenesidemus1 we might better understand the connection between the apparently contradictory ideas in his teaching1 but the inconsistencies in statement would probably remain4 ,it is necessary to remember the position of ,aenesidemus in breaking away from the ,academy and in founding a new school1 the full significance of which he could not foresee4 ,there must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneer work1 and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts1 and a compiler like ,sextus could point out the inconsistencies which the two centuries since the time of ,aenesidemus had made plain4 ,aenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absolute ,sceptical consistency4 ,he was nevertheless the greatest thinker the ,sceptical ,school had known since the age of ,pyrrho1 its founder4 ,in claiming a union between ,pyrrhonism and the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 he recognised also the pre-,socratic tendency of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,the name of ,socrates was all powerful in the ,academy1 but ,aenesidemus comprehended the fact that the true spirit of ,pyrrhonism was of earlier origin than the ,academic ,scepsis4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,critical ,examination of ,pyrrhonism4 ,the distinct philosophical movement of which ,pyrrho was the author bore his name for five centuries after his death4 ,it had an acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency1 if indeed not a sect1 for a great part of that time4 ,yet1 when we carefully analyse the relation of ,pyrrhonism1 as presented to us by ,sextus1 to the teachings of ,pyrrho himself1 in so far as they can be known1 we find many things in ,pyrrhonism for which ,pyrrho was not responsible4 ,the foundation elements of the movement1 the spirit of ,empirical doubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certain directions rather than others1 are due to ,pyrrho4 ,the methods of the school1 however1 were very foreign to anything found in the life or teachings of ,pyrrho4 ,pyrrho was eminently a moralist4 ,he was also to a great degree an ascetic1 and he lived his philosophy1 giving it thus a positive side wanting in the ,pyrrhonism presented to us by ,sextus4 ,timon represents him as desiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions of his time-- ,greek3 geron ,purrhn1 ps pothen ekdusin heures latreis doxn te kenophrosuns te sophistn2 and again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life-- ,greek3 touto moi1 ,purrhn1 himeiretai tor akousai ps pot' anr et' ageis panta meth' hsuchis mounos d'anthrpoisi theou tropon hgemoneueis 44444 phista meth' hsuchis aiei aphrontists kai akints kata tauta m prosech' indalmois hdulogou sophis4#a ,pyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace1 and his dislike of the ,sophists#b may well have made him try to avoid dialectic2 while1 on the contrary1 in the ,pyrrhonean ,school of later times discussion was one of the principal methods of contest1 at least after the time of ,agrippa4 ,pyrrhonism seems to have been originally a theory of life1 like the philosophy of ,socrates1 to whom ,pyrrho is often compared1#c and ,pyrrho1 like ,socrates1 lived his philosophy4 ,our knowledge of ,pyrrho is gained from ,aristocles1 ,sextus ,empiricus1 and ,diogenes1 and from the ,academic traditions given by ,cicero4 ,diogenes gives us details of his life which he attributes to ,antigonus of ,carystius1 who lived about the time of ,pyrrho4#d ,pyrrho was a disciple and admirer of ,democritus1#e some of whose teachings bore a lasting influence over the subsequent development of ,pyrrhonism4 ,he accompanied ,alexander the ,great to ,india1 where he remained as a member of his suite for some time1 and the philosophical ideas of ,india were not without influence on his teachings4 ,oriental philosophy was not unknown in ,greece long before the time of ,pyrrho1 but his personal contact with the ,magi and the ,gymnosophists of the far ,east1 apparently impressed upon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by his previous study and natural disposition4 ,in his indifference to worldly goods we find a strong trace of the ,buddhistic teaching regarding the vanity of human life4 ,he showed also a similar hopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding a satisfactory philosophy1 or absolute truth4 ,he evidently returned from ,india with the conviction that truth was not to be attained4#f #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fe4 ,given from ,mullach's edition of ,timon by ,brochard1 ,pyrrhon et le ,scepticism primitive1 p4 #ebe4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fi4 #c ,lewes ,op4 cit4 p4 #dfj4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fb4 #e ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fg4 #f ,compare ,maccoll ,op4 cit4 ,after the death of ,alexander and ,pyrrho's return to ,greece1 he lived quietly with his sister at ,elis1 and ,diogenes says that he was consistent in his life1 asserting and denying nothing1 but in everything withholding his opinion1 as nothing in itself is good or shameful1 just or unjust4#a ,he was not a victim of false pride1 but sold animals in the market place1 and1 if necessary1 washed the utensils himself4#b ,he lived in equality of spirit1 and practised his teachings with serenity4 ,if one went out while he was talking he paid no attention1 but went calmly on with his remarks4#c ,he liked to live alone1 and to travel alone1 and on one occasion1 being knocked about in a vessel by a storm at sea1 he did not lose his imperturbability1 but pointed to a swine calmly eating on board1 and said that the wise man should have as much calmness of soul as that4 ,he endured difficult surgical operations with indifference1#d and when his friend ,anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall into a morass1 he went calmly by without stopping to help him1 for which consistency of conduct ,anaxarchus afterwards praised him4 ,there are two instances given by ,diogenes when he lost control of himself2 once in getting angry with his sister1 and once in trying to save himself when chased by a dog4 ,when accused of inconsistency1 he said it was difficult to entirely give up one's humanity4#e ,he was greatly venerated by the people among whom he lived1 who made him high priest1 and on his account exempted all philosophers from taxation1#f and after his death erected a statue to his memory4 ,these facts testify to his moral character1 and also to fulfil the functions of high priest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary4 #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa1 #fb4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ff4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fc4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fg4 #e ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #ff4 #f ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fd4 ,according to ,diogenes1 ,we cannot know1 said ,pyrrho1 what things are in themselves1 either by sensation or by judgment1 and1 as we cannot distinguish the true from the false1 therefore we should live impassively1 and without an opinion4 ,the term ,greek3 epoch1 so characteristic of ,pyrrhonism1 goes back1 according to ,diogenes1 to the time of ,pyrrho4#a ,nothing is1 in itself1 one thing more than another1 but all experience is related to phenomena1 and no knowledge is possible through the senses4#b ,pyrrho's aim was ,greek3 ataraxia and his life furnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference1 for which the expression ,greek3 apatheia is better suited than the later one1 ,greek3 ataraxia4 ,the description of his life with his sister confirms this1 where the term ,greek3 adiaphoria is used to describe his conduct4#c ,he founded his ,scepticism on the equivalence of opposing arguments4#d #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa-fb4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa4 #ff4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa4 #ajf4 ,the picture given of ,pyrrho by ,cicero is entirely different from that of ,diogenes1 and contrasts decidedly with it4#a ,cicero knows ,pyrrho as a severe moralist1 not as a ,sceptic4 ,both authors attribute to ,pyrrho the doctrine of indifference and apathy1 but1 according to ,cicero1 ,pyrrho taught of virtue1 honesty1 and the summum bonum1 while ,diogenes plainly tells us that he considered nothing as good in itself1 and of all things nothing as true4#b ,cicero does not once allude to ,pyrrhonean doubt4 ,we see on the one hand1 in ,cicero's idea of ,pyrrho1 the influence of the ,academy1 perhaps even of ,antiochus himself1#c which probably colored the representations given of ,pyrrho2 but1 on the other hand1 there is much in ,diogenes' account of ,pyrrho's life and teachings1 and in the writings of ,timon1 which shows us the positive side of ,pyrrho4 ,pyrrho1 in denying the possibility of all knowledge1 made that rather a motive for indifference in the relations of life1 than the foundation thought of a philosophical system4 ,his teaching has a decided ethical side1 showing in that respect the strong influence of ,democritus over him1 who1 like ,pyrrho1 made happiness to consist in a state of feeling4#d ,the one motive of all of ,pyrrho's teaching is a positive one1 the desire for happiness4 #a ,de orat4 ,,iii1 #fb4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 #c ,compare ,natorp ,op4 cit4 p4 #ga4 #d ,zeller ,grundriss der ,griechischen ,phil4 p4 #gj4 ,the essence of ,pyrrhonism as given by ,timon is as follows3#a ,man desires to be happy4 ,to realise his desire he must consider three things3 7i7 ,what is the nature of things8 7ii7 ,how should man conduct himself in relation to them8 7iii7 ,what is the result to him of this relation8 ,the nature of things is unknown4 ,our relation to them must be one of suspension of judgment1 without activity1 desire1 or belief1--that is1 an entirely negative relation4 ,the result is that state of having no opinion1 called ,greek3 epoch1 which is followed in turn by ,greek3 ataraxia4 #a ,aristocles ap4 ,eusebium ,praep4 ,ev4 ,,xiv4 #ah4 #a,the problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the terms of ,kant1 but not with the positive motive1 like that of the great philosopher of ,germany1 of evolving a system to present the truth4 ,yet the importance of these questions shows the originality of ,pyrrho4 ,the earnestness of ,pyrrho is further shown by an example given by ,diogenes4 ,once on being found talking to himself alone1 he said1 when asked the reason1 that he was meditating how to become a good man 7,greek3 chrstos71#b thus showing an entirely different spirit from anything found in ,sextus' books4 ,the explanation of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition4 ,such an attitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature1 and cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system1 and1 while it can be aimed at1 it can never be perfectly imitated4 ,one of his disciples recognised this1 and said that it was necessary to have the disposition of ,pyrrho in order to hold his doctrines4#c ,diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance any formulae of ,scepticism1#d but they must have been very elementary1 as ,pyrrho himself wrote nothing4 ,we find no trace of formulated ,tropes in ,pyrrho's teachings1 yet it is probable that he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation1 and possibly the ,tropes in some rudimentary form4 ,of the large number of sceptical formulae1 or ,greek3 phnai1 the three which seem to have the oldest connection with ,scepticism are the ,greek3 antilogia1 the ,greek3 ouden horiz1 and the ,greek3 ou mallon4#e ,we know from ,diogenes that ,protagoras is the authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two opposing arguments4#f ,the saying to determine nothing is quoted from ,timon's ,python by ,diogenes1#g and the other two mentioned are also attributed to him by ,aristocles4#h ,we have also in the ,greek3 ou mallon a direct connection with ,democritus1 although the difference in the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by ,sextus4#i ,so while the expression is the same1 the explanation of it given by ,pyrrho must have been different4 ,it would seem probable that ,pyrrho used all of these three sayings1 from the account of ,diogenes1 and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of the ,dogmatics1 that simply by possessing such sayings the ,sceptics dogmatised1#aj for the refutation of this used by ,sextus occurs in the old account of the sayings1 namely1 that these formulae include also themselves in the meaning1 as a cathartic removes itself together with other harmful objects4#aa #a ,compare ,maccoll ,op4 cit4 p4 #ba4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fd4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gj1 #fd4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fi2 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #bjb2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #h1 #ea2 ,photius ,bekker's ed4 #bhj ,h4 #f ,photius ,bekker's ed4 #bhj ,h4 #g ,hyp4 ,i4 #aig2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gf4 #h ,aristocles ap4 ,eusebium1 ,praep4 ,ev4 ,,xiv4 #ah4 #i ,hyp4 ,i4 #bac4 #aj ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fh-gf4 #aa ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gf2 ,hyp4 ,i4 #bjf4 ,in comparing the later ,pyrrhonism with the teachings of ,pyrrho1 we would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two4 ,with ,pyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his positive theory of life2 with the later ,pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained4 ,we would attribute1 however1 the empirical tendency shown during the whole history of ,pyrrhonism to ,pyrrho as its originator4 ,he was an empirical philosopher1 and the result of his influence in this respect1 as seen in the subsequent development of the school1 stands in marked contrast to the dialectic spirit of the ,academic ,scepsis4 ,the empiricism of the school is shown in its scientific lore1 in the fact that so many of the ,sceptics were physicians1 and in the character of the ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch4 ,we may safely affirm that the foundation principles of ,pyrrhonism are due to ,pyrrho1 and the originality which gave the school its power4 ,the elaborated arguments1 however1 and the details of its formulae belong to later times4 ,coming now to the relation of ,pyrrhonism to the ,academy1 the connection between the two is difficult to exactly determine1 between the time of ,pyrrho and that of ,aenesidemus4 ,scepticism in the ,academy was1 however1 never absolutely identical with ,pyrrhonism1 although at certain periods of the history of the ,academy the difference was slight4 ,we can trace throughout the evolution of doubt1 as shown to us in ,pyrrhonism1 and in ,academic ,scepticism1 the different results which followed the difference in origin of the two movements1 and these differences followed according to general laws of development of thought4 ,arcesilaus1 who introduced doubt into the ,academy1 claimed to return to the dialectic of ,socrates1 and suppressing the lectures1#a which were the method of teaching in the later schools of philosophy1 introduced discussions instead1 as being more decidedly a ,socratic method4 ,although1 according to ,sextus1 he was the one leader of the ,academy whose ,scepticism most nearly approached that of ,pyrrhonism1#b yet underneath his whole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly in opposition to the empiricism of ,pyrrho4 ,the belief of ,socrates and ,plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lost its influence over the ,academy1 but was like a hidden germ1 destined to reappear after ,scepticism had passed away4 ,it finally led the ,academy back to ,dogmatism1 and prepared the way for the ,eclecticism with which it disappeared from history4 #a ,compare ,maccoll ,op4 cit4 p4 #cf4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcb4 ,the history of ,pyrrhonism and that of ,academic ,scepticism were for a time contemporaneous4 ,the immediate follower of ,pyrrho1 ,timon1 called by ,sextus the prophet of ,pyrrho1#a was a contemporary of ,arcesilaus4 ,that he did not consider the ,scepticism of the ,academy identical with ,pyrrhonism is proved from the fact that he did not himself join the ,academy1 but was1 on the contrary1 far from doing so4 ,that he regarded ,arcesilaus as a ,dogmatic is evident from his writings4#b ,one day1 on seeing the chief of the ,academy approaching1 he cried out1 ,what are you doing here among us who are free8#c ,after the death of ,timon1 the ,pyrrhonean ,school had no representative till the time of ,ptolemy of ,cyrene1#d and ,greek ,scepticism was represented by the ,academy4 ,that ,pyrrho had a strong influence over ,arcesilaus1 the founder of the ,middle ,academy1 is evident#e2 but there was also never a time when the ,academy entirely broke away from all the teachings of ,plato1 even in their deepest doubt4#f ,it is true that ,arcesilaus removed1 nominally as well as in spirit1 some of the dialogues of ,plato from the ,academy1 but only those that bore a dogmatic character1 while those that presented a more decided ,socratic mode of questioning without reaching any decided result1 men regarded as authority for ,scepticism4 #a ,adv4 ,math4 ,i4 #ec4 #b ,diog4 ,,iv4 #f1 #cc1 #cd4 #c ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aad4 #d ,diog4 ,,ix4 #ab1 #aae4 #e ,diog4 ,,iv4 #f1 #cc4 #f ,diog4 ,,iv4 #f1 #cb4 ,sextus does not deny that ,arcesilaus was almost a ,pyrrhonean1 but he claims that his ,pyrrhonism was only apparent1 and not real1 and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to the teachings of ,plato4#a ,as ,ariston said of him1#b ,plato before1 ,pyrrho behind1 ,diodorus in the middle4 ,sextus also characterises the method of ,arcesilaus as dialectic1#c and we know from ,cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return to the dialectic of ,socrates4 ,it is interesting to note that ,sextus1 in his refutation of the position that the ,academy is the same as ,pyrrhonism1 takes up the entire development of ,academic thought from the time of ,plato till that of ,antiochus1 and does not limit the argument to ,scepticism under ,arcesilaus4 ,the claim made by some that the two schools were the same1 is stated by him1#d and the word 'some' probably refers to members of both schools at different periods of their history4 ,sextus recognises three ,academies1 although he remarks that some make even a further division1 calling that of ,philo and ,charmides1 the fourth1 and that of ,antiochus and his followers1 the fifth4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcd4 #b ,diog4 ,,iv4 #f1 #cc4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcd4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbj4 ,that many in the ,academy1 and even outside of it1 regarded ,plato as a ,sceptic1 and an authority for subsequent ,scepticism1 we find both from ,sextus and ,diogenes4#a ,as ,lewes justly remarks1 one could well find authority for ,scepticism in the works of ,plato1 as indeed the ,academicians did1 but not when the sum total of his teachings was considered4 ,the spirit of ,plato's teachings was dogmatic1 as ,sextus most decidedly recognises1 and as ,aenesidemus and ,menodotus#b recognised before him4#c ,sextus himself shows us that ,plato's idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing in common with ,scepticism1 for if he accepts the desirability of the virtuous life1 and the existence of ,providence1 he dogmatises2 and if he even regards them as probable1 he gives preference to one set of ideas over another1 and departs from the sceptical character4 ,sextus characterises the sceptical side of ,plato's writings as mental gymnastics1#d which do not authorise his being called a ,sceptic1 and affirms that ,plato is not a ,sceptic1 since he prefers some unknown things to others in trustworthiness4 ,the ethical difference underlying the teachings of the ,academy and ,pyrrhonism1 ,sextus was very quick to see1 and although it is very probable that the part of the ,hypotyposes which defines the difference between the ,academy and ,pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduction to ,aenesidemus' works1 yet ,sextus certainly gives these statements the strong stamp of his approval4 ,he condemns the ,academy because of the theory that good and evil exist1 or if this cannot be decidedly proved1 yet that it is more probable that what is called good exists than the contrary4#e #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bba2 ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #gb4 #b ,bekker's edition of ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbb4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbb4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbc4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbf4 ,the whole ,academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the standpoint of the ,sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness1#a for the ,academicians declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable1 and they make a difference even in those ideas that they call probable4 ,sextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of difference between ,pyrrhonism and the ,academy4 ,the first is the doctrine of probability which the ,academicians accept in regard to the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others4#b ,the second is the different way in which the two schools follow their teachers4 ,the ,pyrrhoneans follow without striving or strong effort1 or even strong inclination1 as a child follows his teacher1 while the ,academicians follow with sympathy and assent1 as ,carneades and ,clitomachus affirm4#c ,the third difference is in the aim1 for the ,academicians follow what is probable in life4 ,the ,sceptics follow nothing1 but live according to laws1 customs1 and natural feelings undogmatically4#d ,the difference between the later teaching of the ,academy and ,pyrrhonism is evident1 and ,sextus treats of it briefly1 as not requiring discussion1#e as ,philo taught that the nature of facts is incomprehensible1 and ,antiochus transferred the ,stoa to the ,academy4 ,it is therefore evident1 from the comparison which we have made1 that we do not find in the ,academy1 with which ,scepticism after the death of ,timon was so long united1 the exact continuance of ,pyrrhonism4 ,the philosophical enmity of the two contemporaries1 ,timon and ,arcesilaus1 the ,academician who had most in common with ,pyrrhonism1 is an expression of the fundamental incompatibility between the two schools4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbg4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbi4 #c ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcj4 #d ,hyp4 ,i4 #bca4 #e ,hyp4 ,i4 #bce4 ,during all the chequered history of the ,academy the dormant idealism was there1 underlying the outward development4 ,although during the time of ,arcesilaus and ,carneades the difference was so slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression1 yet the different foundations on which the two schools stood was always recognisable4 ,on the one hand there was the germ of idealism which was destined to awake to a new life1 and on the other1 the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in the final extinction of ,pyrrhonism4 ,we find in both1 it is true1 especially in the time of ,arcesilaus1 the aim of ,greek3 epoch4#a ,both placed great weight on ,greek3 isostheneia1 or the equal value of opposing arguments4#b ,the foundation of the ,greek3 epoch was1 however1 different in the two cases4 ,arcesilaus founded his on dialectic1 while ,pyrrho's was empirical4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #bcb4 #b ,diog4 ,,ix4 #gc2 ,hyp4 ,,ii4 #acj2 ,,iii4 #fe4 ,the ,pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the outer world2 the ,academic ,sceptic believed that we cannot distinguish between true and false ideas1 so such knowledge is impossible4 ,the ,pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in ideas because of their contradictory nature1 and consequently the existence of all truth1 ,greek3 mden einai t altheia epi pantn4#a ,the ,academic ,sceptic granted that the truth was possibly contained in ideas1 but affirmed that it could never be known to us4 ,the ,pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being seekers1 for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to give knowledge of the outer world1 they did not deny that such knowledge might be possible1 but simply suspended the judgment regarding it4 ,to the ,pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the method4 ,all ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth1 therefore he still sought4 ,the ,academician tried logically to prove that the truth is impossible to find4 ,it is the relation of the dialectician to the empiricist1 and the two varieties of ,scepticism are explained by their difference in origin4 ,in ,pyrrhonism there was no constructive element4 ,in the ,academic ,scepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in the theory of ,probability4 ,arcesilaus himself laid great stress upon this doctrine1 which ,sextus carefully shows us#b is utterly inconsistent with ,pyrrhonism4 ,arcesilaus plainly teaches that1 having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of knowledge1 one should control his choices1 his refusals1 and his actions by the probable4#c #a ,diog4 ,,ix4 #aa1 #fa4 #b ,hyp4 ,i4 #bbi4 #c ,compare ,maccoll ,op4 cit4 #ci4 ,after ,antiochus introduced ,eclecticism into the ,academy1 ,pyrrhonism was the only representative of ,greek ,scepticism1 and it flourished for over two centuries after our era1 and then also disappeared1 no more to exist as a regular philosophical school4 ,having considered at length the essence of ,pyrrhonism as presented by ,sextus ,empiricus1 it now remains to briefly note the characteristics that formed its strength and weakness1 and the causes of its final downfall4 ,herbart says that every philosopher is a ,sceptic in the beginning1 but every ,sceptic remains always in the beginning4 ,this remark may well be applied to ,pyrrhonism4 ,we find in its teachings many fundamental philosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of great philosophical progress1 but which were never developed to any positive results4 ,the teachings of ,pyrrhonism were some of them well fitted to prepare the way to idealism4 ,the great idea of the relativity of ,vorstellungen is made very prominent by the ten ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch4 ,aenesidemus1 in his eight ,tropes against aetiology1 shows the absurdity of the doctrine of causality when upheld on materialistic grounds4 ,that was to him final1 ,greek3 epei ouk estai aition4 ,he could not divine that although the result which he presented was logical1 it only led to a higher truth4 ,it was reserved for the greatest of modern philosophers to reveal to the world that causality is a condition1 and a necessary condition1 of thought4 ,when ,aenesidemus proved by his seventh ,trope that causality is subjective1 he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine2 yet this conclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy1 although ,aenesidemus could not himself see it in all its bearings4 ,the great difference between ,aenesidemus and ,kant is the difference between the materialist and the believer in subjective reality4 ,both agreed in the unknown nature of the ,ding an sich1 but this was to the ,pyrrhonist the end of all his philosophy2 to ,kant1 however1 the beginning4 ,pyrrhonism has rendered1 notwithstanding its points of fatal weakness1 marked service to the world in science1 philosophy1 ethics1 and religion4 ,it quickened scientific thought by emphasising empirical methods of investigation1 and by criticising all results founded without sufficient data upon false hypotheses4 ,if1 instead of denying the possibility of all science because of the want of a criterion of the truth of phenomena1 the ,pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a science of phenomena1 they might have led the world in scientific progress4#a ,their service to philosophy lay in the stimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmatic beliefs occasioned4 ,pyrrhonism brought together all the most prominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to test their weakness and expose their contradictions1 and this very process of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truth which they contained4 ,sextus ,empiricus was often charged by the ,church ,fathers with corrupting religious belief1 and yet the greatest service which ,pyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethical lines4 ,this service did not1 naturally1 consist in destroying belief in absolute truth1 as the ,sceptic professed to do1 but in preparing the way to find it4 ,the bold attacks of ,scepticism on all truth led men to investigate ethical and religious teachings1 to examine the grounds of their belief1 and to put in practical use the right of reason and free discussion4 ,scepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience and rational criticism1#b and the absolute right of scientific thought4 ,the ,sceptics1 however1 reaped none of the benefits of their own system4 ,they remained1 as it were1 always on the threshold of possible progress4 ,with the keys to great discoveries in their hands1 the doors of philosophical and scientific advancement were for ever closed to them by the limitations of their own system4 ,the inherent weakness of ,pyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in its negative character4 ,i think that we may safely say that ,pyrrhonism was the most consistent system of ,scepticism ever offered to the world1 and yet it proves most decidedly that complete ,scepticism is psychologically impossible4 ,a man may give up his belief in one set of ideas1 and1 if they are ideas that are popularly accepted1 he will be called a ,sceptic1 as was the case with ,hume4 ,he must1 however1 replace these ideas by others equally positive1 and then he is no longer a ,sceptic1 but a ,dogmatic1 for he believes in something4 #a ,compare ,lewes ,op4 cit4 p4 #dfc4 #b ,compare ,chaignet ,op4 cit4 p4 #dfj4 ,we have shown that the greatest thinkers of ,pyrrhonism1 ,pyrrho1 ,aenesidemus1 and ,agrippa1 were not examples of absolute ,scepticism1 and although ,sextus ,empiricus realised what consistency demanded in this respect1 and affirmed on almost every page that he was asserting nothing1 yet there is not a paragraph of his books in which he does not1 after all1 dogmatise on some subject4 ,complete ,scepticism is contrary to the fundamental laws of language1 as all use of verbs involves some affirmation4 ,the ,pyrrhonists realised this1 and therefore some of them wrote nothing1 like ,pyrrho1 their leader1 and others advocated ,greek3 aphasia#a as one of the doctrines of their system4 #a ,hyp4 ,i4 #aib4 ,the very aim of ,pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one4 ,greek3 ,ataraxia was only another name for happiness1 and in one instance1 even1 is given as ,greek3 hdon1 and thus1 in spite of themselves1 the ,sceptics introduced a theory of happiness4 ,pyrrho1 like others of his time1 sought the highest good1 and thought that he had found it in ,greek3 ataraxia1 the peace of mind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms4 ,the difference of aim between the ,pyrrhonists1 ,stoics1 and ,epicureans was more apparent than real4 ,to them all philosophy was a path to lead to happiness4 ,the method of ,pyrrhonism was1 however1 negative4 ,its strength consisted in its attacks on ,dogmatism1 and not in any positive aim of its own1 for its positive side could not be recognised according to its own doctrines4 ,therefore there was no real development in ,pyrrhonism1 for a negative thought cannot be developed4 ,we find1 accordingly1 from the time of ,pyrrho to ,sextus1 no growth in breadth of philosophical outlook1 only improvement in methods4 ,philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim1 as that would form1 as we have shown1 a psychological contradiction4 ,the true essence of ,pyrrhonism was passivity1 but passivity can never lead to progress4 ,much of the polemical work of ,pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by providing a vast store of scientific data1 but progress was to the ,pyrrhonists impossible4 ,they sounded their own scientific death-knell by declaring the impossibility of science1 and putting an end to all theories4 ,the life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the attempt to find the hidden truth4 ,to the ,sceptic there was no truth1 and there could be no progress4 ,as progress is a law in the evolution of the human race1 so ,scepticism as a philosophy could never be a permanent growth1 any more than asceticism in religion can be a lasting influence4 ,both of them are only outgrowths4 ,as the foundation principles of ,scepticism were opposed to anything like real growth1 it was a system that could never originate anything4 ,pyrrho taught from the beginning that the ,sceptic must live according to law and custom2 not1 however1 because one law or custom is better than another in itself1 but simply for the sake of peace4 ,this basis of action was itself a death-blow to all reform in social or political life4 ,it was a selfish1 negative way of seeking what was1 after all1 a positive thing1 the ,greek3 ataraxia that the ,sceptic desired4 ,life with the ,pyrrhonist was phenomenal1 and not phenomenal simply in regard to the outer world1 but also subjectively1 and no absolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personal existence was possible4 ,the cause of the downfall of ,pyrrhonism lay in the fact that it had nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it had destroyed4 ,it made no appeal to human sympathies1 and ignored all the highest motives to human action4 ,the especial materialistic standpoint from which ,pyrrhonism judged all that pertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal1 and all possibility of absolute truth4 ,it was an expression of the philosophic decadence of the age when it flourished1 and although it possessed some philosophic worth1 yet it bore in itself the causes of its decay4 ,,pyrrhonic ,,sketches ,,by ,,sextus ,,empiricus4 ,,book ,i4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,the ,principal ,differences between ,philosophers4 ,it is probable that those who seek after anything whatever1 will #a either find it as they continue the search1 will deny that it can be found and confess it to be out of reach1 or will go on seeking it4 ,some have said1 accordingly1 in regard to the things sought in philosophy1 that they have found the truth1 while #b others have declared it impossible to find1 and still others continue to seek it4 ,those who think that they have found it are those who are especially called ,dogmatics1 as for example1 the ,schools of ,aristotle and ,epicurus1 the ,stoics and some others4 ,those who have declared it impossible to find are ,clitomachus1 #c ,carneades1 with their respective followers1 and other ,academicians4 ,those who still seek it are the ,sceptics4 ,it appears therefore1 reasonable to conclude that the three #d principal kinds of philosophy are the ,dogmatic1 the ,academic1 and the ,sceptic4 ,others may suitably treat of the other ,schools1 but as for the ,sceptical ,school1 we shall now give an outline of it1 remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be said do we speak positively1 that it must be absolutely so1 but we shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,ways of ,treating ,scepticism4 ,one way of treating the ,sceptical philosophy is called #e general1 and the other special4 ,the general method is that by which we set forth the character of ,scepticism1 declaring what its idea is1 what its principles are1 its mode of reasoning1 its criterion1 and its aim4 ,it presents also1 the aspects of doubt1 ,greek3 hoi tropoi ts epochs1 and the way in which we should understand the ,sceptical formulae1 and the distinction between ,scepticism and the related ,schools of philosophy4 ,the special method1 on the contrary1 is that by which we #f speak against #f each part of so-called philosophy4 ,let us then treat ,scepticism at first in the general way1 beginning our delineation with the nomenclature of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,nomenclature of ,scepticism4 ,the ,sceptical ,school is also called the ,seeking ,school1 from #g its spirit of research and examination2 the ,suspending ,school1 from the condition of mind in which one is left after the search1 in regard to the things that he has examined2 and the ,doubting ,school1 either because1 as some say1 the ,sceptics doubt and are seeking in regard to everything1 or because they never know whether to deny or affirm4 ,it is also called the ,pyrrhonean ,school1 because ,pyrrho appears to us the best representative of ,scepticism1 and is more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,what is ,scepticism8 ,the ,greek3 dynamis of the ,sceptical ,school is to place the #h phenomenal in opposition to the intellectual in any way whatever1 and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and things 7,greek3 isostheneia tn logn7 opposed to each other1 to reach1 first the state of suspension of judgment1 ,greek3 epoch and afterwards that of imperturbability1 ,greek3 ataraxia4 ,we do not use the word ,greek3 dynamis in any #i unusual sense1 but simply1 meaning the force of the system4 ,by the phenomenal1 we understand the sensible1 hence we place the intellectual in opposition to it4 ,the phrase in any way whatever1 may refer to the word ,greek3 dynamis in order that we may understand that word in a simple sense as we said1 or it may refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in opposition4 ,for we place these in opposition to each other in a variety of ways1 the phenomenal to the phenomenal1 and the intellectual to the intellectual1 or reciprocally1 and we say in any way whatever1 in order that all methods of opposition may be included4 ,or in any way whatever may refer to the phenomenal and the intellectual1 so that we need not ask how does the phenomenal appear1 or how are the thoughts conceived1 but that we may understand these things in a simple sense4 ,by reasons opposed to each other1 we do not by any means #aj understand that they deny or affirm anything1 but simply that they offset each other4 ,by equilibrium1 we mean equality in regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness1 so that of the reasons that are placed in opposition to each other1 one should not excel another in trustworthiness4 ,greek3 epoch is a holding back of the opinion1 in consequence of which we neither deny nor affirm anything4 ,greek3 ataraxia is repose and tranquillity of soul4 ,we shall explain how ,greek3 ataraxia accompanies ,greek3 epoch when we speak of the aim4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,the ,sceptic4 ,what is meant by a ,pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from #aa the idea of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,he is a ,pyrrhonean1 namely1 who identifies himself with this system4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,the ,origin of ,scepticism4 ,scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining #ab ,greek3 ataraxia2 for men of the greatest talent were perplexed by the contradiction of things1 and being at a loss what to believe1 began to question what things are true1 and what false1 hoping to attain ,greek3 ataraxia as a result of the decision4 ,the fundamental principle of the ,sceptical system is especially this1 namely1 to oppose every argument by one of equal weight1 for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,does the ,sceptic ,dogmatise8 ,we say that the ,sceptic does not dogmatise4 ,we do not say #ac this1 meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain things rather than others 7for the ,sceptic does assent to feelings that are a necessary result of sensation1 as for example1 when he is warm or cold1 he cannot say that he thinks he is not warm or cold71 but we say this1 meaning by dogma the acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things investigated by science4 ,for the ,pyrrhonean assents to nothing that is unknown4 ,furthermore1 he does not dogmatise even when #ad he utters the ,sceptical formulae in regard to things that are unknown1 such as ,nothing more1 or ,i decide nothing1 or any of the others about which we shall speak later4 ,for the one who dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to dogmatise1 as existing in itself2 the ,sceptic does not however regard these formulae as having an absolute existence1 for he assumes that the saying ,all is false1 includes itself with other things as false1 and likewise the saying ,nothing is true2 in the same way ,nothing more1 states that together with other things it itself is nothing more1 and cancels itself therefore1 as well as other things4 ,we say the same also in regard to the other ,sceptical expressions4 ,in short1 if he who #ae dogmatises1 assumes as existing in itself that about which he dogmatises1 the ,sceptic1 on the contrary1 expresses his sayings in such a way that they are understood to be themselves included1 and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying these things4 ,the principal thing in uttering these formulae is that he says what appears to him1 and communicates his own feelings in an unprejudiced way1 without asserting anything in regard to external objects4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,is ,scepticism a ,sect8 ,we respond in a similar way if we are asked whether #af ,scepticism is a sect or not4 ,if the word sect is defined as meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in conformity with each other1 and also with phenomena1 and dogma means an assent to anything that is unknown1 then we reply that we have no sect4 ,if1 however1 one means by sect1 a school #ag which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena1 and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live rightly1 not understanding rightly as referring to virtue only1 but in a broader sense2 if1 also1 it leads one to be able to suspend the judgment1 then we reply that we have a sect4 ,for we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon phenomena1 and which shows us how to live according to the habits1 laws1 and teachings of the fatherland1 and our own feelings4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,does the ,sceptic ,study ,natural ,science8 ,we reply similarly also to the question whether the ,sceptic #ah should study natural science4 ,for we do not study natural science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding any of the dogmas that it teaches1 but we take it up in order to be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight1 and also for the sake of ,greek3 ataraxia4 ,in the same way we study the logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,do the ,sceptics deny ,phenomena8 ,those who say that the ,sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to #ai be in ignorance of our teachings4 ,for as we said before1 we do not deny the sensations which we think we have1 and which lead us to assent involuntarily to them1 and these are the phenomena4 ,when1 however1 we ask whether the object is such as it appears to be1 while we concede that it appears so and so1 we question1 not the phenomenon1 but in regard to that which is asserted of the phenomenon1 and that is different from doubting the phenomenon itself4 ,for example1 it appears to us that honey is sweet4 ,this we concede1 for we experience sweetness through #bj sensation4 ,we doubt1 however1 whether it is sweet by reason of its essence1 which is not a question of the phenomenon1 but of that which is asserted of the phenomenon4 ,should we1 however1 argue directly against the phenomena1 it is not with the intention of denying their existence1 but to show the rashness of the ,dogmatics4 ,for if reasoning is such a deceiver that it well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes1 how should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown1 so as not to rashly follow it8 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,the ,criterion of ,scepticism4 ,it is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from #ba what we say about the criterion of the ,sceptical ,school4 ,the word criterion is used in two ways4 ,first1 it is understood as a proof of existence or non-existence1 in regard to which we shall speak in the opposing argument4 ,secondly1 when it refers to action1 meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life1 in doing some things and refraining from doing others1 and it is about this that we shall now speak4 ,we say1 consequently1 that the criterion of the ,sceptical ,school is the phenomenon1 and in calling it so1 we mean the idea of it4 ,it cannot be doubted1 #bb as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling4 ,hence no one doubts1 perhaps1 that an object appears so and so1 but one questions if it is as it appears4 ,therefore1 as we cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily life1 we live by giving heed to phenomena1 and in an unprejudiced way4 ,but this observance of what pertains to the #bc daily life1 appears to be of four different kinds4 ,sometimes it is directed by the guidance of nature1 sometimes by the necessity of the feelings1 sometimes by the tradition of laws and of customs1 and sometimes by the teaching of the arts4 ,it is directed by the guidance of nature1 for by nature we are #bd capable of sensation and thought2 by the necessity of the feelings1 for hunger leads us to food1 and thirst to drink2 by the traditions of laws and customs1 for according to them we consider piety a good in daily life1 and impiety an evil2 by the teaching of the arts1 for we are not inactive in the arts we undertake4 ,we say all these things1 however1 without expressing a decided opinion4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,what is the aim of ,scepticism8 ,it follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of the #be ,sceptical ,school4 ,an aim is that for which as an end all things are done or thought1 itself depending on nothing1 or in other words1 it is the ultimatum of things to be desired4 ,we say1 then1 that the aim of the ,sceptic is ,greek3 ataraxia in those things which pertain to the opinion1 and moderation in the things that life imposes4 ,for as soon as he began to #bf philosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas1 and to understand which are true and which are false1 in order to attain ,greek3 ataraxia4 ,he met1 however1 with contradictions of equal weight1 and1 being unable to judge1 he withheld his opinion2 and while his judgment was in suspension ,greek3 ataraxia followed1 as if by chance1 in regard to matters of opinion4 ,for he who is of the opinion that anything is either #bg good or bad by nature is always troubled1 and when he does not possess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he is tortured by the things which are by nature bad1 and pursues those that he thinks to be good4 ,having acquired them1 however1 he falls into greater perturbation1 because he is excited beyond reason and without measure from fear of a change1 and he does everything in his power to retain the things that seem to him good4 ,but he who is undecided1 on the contrary1 regarding #bh things that are good and bad by nature1 neither seeks nor avoids anything eagerly1 and is therefore in a state of ,greek3 ataraxia4 ,for that which is related of ,apelles the painter happened to the ,sceptic4 ,it is said that as he was once painting a horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the picture1 but he could not succeed in doing so1 and he gave it up and threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the colors from the painting4 ,as soon1 however1 as it touched the picture it produced a good copy of the foam4 ,the ,sceptics likewise hoped to gain ,greek3 ataraxia by forming judgments #bi in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of thought1 but they were unable to do this1 and so they suspended their judgment2 and while their judgment was in suspension ,greek3 ataraxia followed1 as if by chance1 as the shadow follows a body4 ,nevertheless1 we do not consider the ,sceptic wholly undisturbed1 but he is disturbed by some things that are inevitable4 ,we confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty1 and that he suffers in such ways4 ,but in these things even the ignorant are beset in two ways1 from the feelings themselves1 #cj and not less also from the fact that they think these conditions are bad by nature4 ,the ,sceptic1 however1 escapes more easily1 as he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature4 ,therefore we say that the aim of the ,sceptic is ,greek3 ataraxia in matters of opinion1 and moderation of feeling in those things that are inevitable4 ,some notable ,sceptics have added also suspension of judgment in investigation4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,the ,general ,method of ,scepticism4 ,since we have said that ,greek3 ataraxia follows the suspension #ca of judgment in regard to everything1 it behooves us to explain how the suspension of judgment takes place4 ,speaking in general it takes place through placing things in opposition to each other4 ,we either place phenomena in opposition to phenomena1 or the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual1 or reciprocally4 ,for example1 we place #cb phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower appears round from a distance but square near by2 the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual1 when to the one who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to prove that a providence exists1 we oppose the fact that adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil1 and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no providence4 ,the intellectual is placed in opposition to #cc phenomena1 as when ,anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is white1 by saying that snow is frozen water1 and1 as water is black1 snow must also be black4 ,likewise we sometimes place the present in opposition to the present1 similarly to the above-mentioned cases1 and sometimes also the present in opposition to the past or the future4 ,as for example1 when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute1 we say to him1 ,before the founder of the sect to which you belong #cd was born1 the argument which you propose in accordance with it had not appeared as a valid argument1 but was dormant in nature1 so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature1 but has not yet appeared to us1 so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now seems to be strong4 ,in order to make it clearer to us what #ce we mean by these oppositions1 ,i will proceed to give the ,tropes 7,greek3 tropoi71 through which the suspension of judgment is produced1 without asserting anything about their meaning or their number1 because they may be unsound1 or there may be more than ,i shall enumerate4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,the ,ten ,tropes4 ,certain ,tropes were commonly handed down by the older ,sceptics1 #cf by means of which ,greek3 epoch seems to take place4 ,they are ten in number1 and are called synonymously ,greek3 logoi and ,greek3 tropoi4 ,they are these3 ,the first is based upon the differences in animals2 the second upon the differences in men2 the third upon the difference in the constitution of the organs of sense2 the fourth upon circumstances2 the fifth upon position1 distance1 and place2 the sixth upon mixtures2 the seventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects2 the eighth upon relation2 the ninth upon frequency or rarity of #cg occurences2 the tenth upon systems1 customs1 laws1 mythical beliefs1 and dogmatic opinions4 ,we make this order ourselves4 #ch ,these ,tropes come under three general heads3 the standpoint of the judge1 the standpoint of the thing judged1 and the standpoint of both together4 ,under the standpoint of the judge come the first four1 for the judge is either an animal1 or a man1 or a sense1 and exists under certain circumstances4 ,under the standpoint of that which is judged1 come the seventh and the tenth4 ,under the one composed of both together1 come the fifth and the sixth1 the eighth and the ninth4 ,again1 these three divisions are included under the ,trope of relation1 because #ci that is the most general one2 it includes the three special divisions1 and these in turn include the ten4 ,we say these things in regard to their probable number1 and we proceed in the following chapter to speak of their meaning4 ,,the ,,first ,,trope4 ,the first ,trope1 we said1 is the one based upon the #dj differences in animals1 and according to this ,trope1 different animals do not get the same ideas of the same objects through the senses4 ,this we conclude from the different origin of the animals1 and also from the difference in the constitution of their bodies4 ,in regard to the difference in origin1 some animals originate without mixture of the sexes1 while others originate through sexual intercourse4 ,of those which #da originate without intercourse of the sexes1 some come from fire1 as the little animals which appear in the chimneys1 others from stagnant water1 as musquitoes1 others from fermented wine1 as the stinging ants1 others from the earth1 others from the mud1 like the frogs1 others from slime1 as the worms1 others from donkeys1 as the beetles1 others from cabbage1 as caterpillars1 others from fruit1 as the gall insect from the wild figs1 others from putrified animals1 as bees from bulls1 and wasps from horses4 ,again1 of those originating from intercourse of the #db sexes1 some come from animals of the same kind1 as in most cases1 and others from those of different kinds1 as mules4 ,again1 of animals in general1 some are born alive1 as men1 others from eggs1 as birds1 and others are born a lump of flesh1 as bears4 ,it is probable therefore1 that the inequalities and #dc differences in origin cause great antipathies in the animals1 and the result is incompatibility1 discord1 and conflict between the sensations of the different animals4 ,again1 the differences in the principal parts of the body1 especially in those #dd fitted by nature to judge and to perceive1 may cause the greatest differences in their ideas of objects1 according to the differences in the animals themselves4 ,as for example1 those who have the jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white1 and those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red4 ,accordingly1 as some animals have yellow eyes1 and others blood-shot ones1 and still others whitish ones1 and others eyes of other colors1 it is probable1 ,i think1 that they have a different perception of colors4 ,furthermore1 when we look steadily at the sun for a long time1 and then look down at a #de book1 the letters seem to us gold colored1 and dance around4 ,now some animals have by nature a lustre in their eyes1 and these emit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night1 and we may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear the same to them as to us4 ,jugglers by lightly rubbing the wick #df of the lamp with metal rust1 or with the dark yellow fluid of the sepia1 make those who are present appear now copper-colored and now black1 according to the amount of the mixture used2 if this be so it is much more reasonable to suppose that because of the mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals1 their ideas of objects would be different4 ,furthermore1 when we #dg press the eye on the side1 the figures1 forms and sizes of things seen appear elongated and narrow4 ,it is therefore probable that such animals as have the pupil oblique and long1 as goats1 cats1 and similar animals1 have ideas different from those of the animals which have a round pupil4 ,mirrors according to their different construction1 sometimes show the external #dh object smaller than reality1 as concave ones1 and sometimes long and narrow1 as the convex ones do2 others show the head of the one looking into it down1 and the feet up4 ,as some of the vessels around the eye fall entirely outside the eye1 on #di account of their protuberance1 while others are more sunken1 and still others are placed in an even surface1 it is probable that for this reason also the ideas vary1 and dogs1 fishes1 lions1 men1 and grasshoppers do not see the same things1 either of the same size1 or of similar form1 but according to the impression on the organ of sight of each animal respectively4 ,the same thing is true in regard to the other senses2 for how can it #ej be said that shell-fish1 birds of prey1 animals covered with spines1 those with feathers and those with scales would be affected in the same way by the sense of touch8 and how can the sense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have the narrowest auditory passages1 and in those that are furnished with the widest1 or in those with hairy ears and those with smooth ones8 ,for we1 even1 hear differently when we partially stop up the ears1 from what we do when we use them naturally4 ,the sense of smell also varies according to differences in #ea animals1 since even our sense of smell is affected when we have taken cold and the phlegm is too abundant1 and also when parts around our head are flooded with too much blood1 for we then avoid odors that seem agreeable to others1 and feel as if we were injured by them4 ,since also some of the animals are moist by nature and full of secretions1 and others are very full of blood1 and still others have either yellow or black bile prevalent and abundant1 it is reasonable because of this to think that odorous things appear different to each one of them4 ,and it is the same in regard to things of taste1 as some #eb animals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist4 ,we too1 when we have a dry tongue in fever1 think that whatever we take is gritty1 bad tasting1 or bitter2 and this we experience because of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to be in us4 ,since1 then1 different animals have different organs for taste1 and a greater or less amount of the various humors1 it can well be that they form different ideas of the same objects as regards their taste4 ,for just as the same food on being #ec absorbed becomes in some places veins1 in other places arteries1 and in other places bones1 nerves1 or other tissues1 showing different power according to the difference of the parts receiving it2 just as the same water absorbed by the trees becomes in some places bark1 in other places branches1 and in other places fruit1 perhaps a fig or a pomegranate1 or something else2 just as the breath of the musician1 one and the same #ed when blown into the flute1 becomes sometimes a high tone and sometimes a low one1 and the same pressure of the hand upon the lyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone1 so it is natural to suppose that external objects are regarded differently according to the different constitution of the animals which perceive them4 ,we may see this more clearly in #ee the things that are sought for and avoided by animals4 ,for example1 myrrh appears very agreeable to men and intolerable to beetles and bees4 ,oil also1 which is useful to men1 destroys wasps and bees if sprinkled on them2 and sea-water1 while it is unpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it1 is most agreeable and sweet to fishes4 ,swine also prefer to wash in vile filth rather than in pure clean water4 ,furthermore1 some #ef animals eat grass and some eat herbs2 some live in the woods1 others eat seeds2 some are carnivorous1 and others lactivorous2 some enjoy putrified food1 and others fresh food2 some raw food and others that which is prepared by cooking2 and in general that which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal to others1 and should be avoided by them4 ,thus hemlock makes the #eg quail fat1 and henbane the hogs1 and these1 as it is known1 enjoy eating lizards2 deer also eat poisonous animals1 and swallows1 the cantharidae4 ,moreover1 ants and flying ants1 when swallowed by men1 cause discomfort and colic2 but the bear1 on the contrary1 whatever sickness he may have1 becomes stronger by devouring them4 ,the viper is benumbed if one twig of the oak #eh touches it1 as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree4 ,the elephant flees before the ram1 and the lion before the cock1 and seals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded1 and the tiger from the sound of the drum4 ,many other examples could be given1 but that we may not seem to dwell longer than is necessary on this subject1 we conclude by saying that since the same things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others1 and the pleasure and displeasure depend on the ideas1 it must be that different animals have different ideas of objects4 ,and since the same things appear different according to the #ei difference in the animals1 it will be possible for us to say how the external object appears to us1 but as to how it is in reality we shall suspend our judgment4 ,for we cannot ourselves judge between our own ideas and those of other animals1 being ourselves involved in the difference1 and therefore much more in need of being judged than being ourselves able to judge4 ,and furthermore1 we cannot give the preference to our own mental #fj representations over those of other animals1 either without evidence or with evidence1 for besides the fact that perhaps there is no evidence1 as we shall show1 the evidence so called will be either manifest to us or not4 ,if it is not manifest to us1 then we cannot accept it with conviction2 if it is manifest to us1 since the question is in regard to what is manifest to animals1 and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us who are animals1 then it is to be questioned if it is true as it is manifest to us4 ,it is absurd1 however1 to try to base the #fa questionable on the questionable1 because the same thing is to be believed and not to be believed1 which is certainly impossible4 ,the evidence is to be believed in so far as it will furnish a proof1 and disbelieved in so far as it is itself to be proved4 ,we shall therefore have no evidence according to which we can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-called irrational animals4 ,since therefore ideas differ according to the difference in animals1 and it is impossible to judge them1 it is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external objects4 ,have the ,so-called ,irrational ,animals ,reason8 ,we continue the comparison of the so-called irrational animals #fb with man1 although it is needless to do so1 for in truth we do not refuse to hold up to ridicule the conceited and bragging ,dogmatics1 after having given the practical arguments4 ,now most #fc of our number were accustomed to compare all the irrational animals together with man1 but because the ,dogmatics playing upon words say that the comparison is unequal1 we carry our ridicule farther1 although it is most superfluous to do so1 and fix the discussion on one animal1 as the dog1 if it suits you1 which seems to be the most contemptible animal2 for we shall even then find that animals1 about which we are speaking1 are not inferior to us in respect to the trustworthiness of their perceptions4 ,now the ,dogmatics grant that this animal is #fd superior to us in sense perception1 for he perceives better through smell than we1 as by this sense he tracks wild animals that he cannot see1 and he sees them quicker with his eyes than we do1 and he perceives them more acutely by hearing4 ,let us also consider reasoning1 which is of two kinds1 reasoning in #fe thought and in speech4 ,let us look first to that of thought4 ,this kind of reasoning1 judging from the teachings of those ,dogmatics who are now our greatest opponents1 those of the ,stoa1 seems to fluctuate between the following things3 the choice of the familiar1 and avoidance of the alien2 the knowledge of the arts that lead to this choice2 and the comprehension of those virtues that belong to the individual nature1 as regards the feelings4 ,the dog then1 upon whom it was decided to fix the argument as an example1 makes a choice of things suitable to #ff him1 and avoids those that are harmful1 for he hunts for food1 but draws back when the whip is lifted up2 he possesses also an art by which he procures the things that are suitable for him1 the art of hunting4 ,he is not also without virtue2 since the #fg true nature of justice is to give to every one according to his merit1 as the dog wags his tail to those who belong to the family1 and to those who behave well to him1 guards them1 and keeps off strangers and evil doers1 he is surely not without justice4 ,now if he has this virtue1 since the virtues follow #fh each other in turn1 he has the other virtues also1 which the wise men say1 most men do not possess4 ,we see the dog also brave in warding off attacks1 and sagacious1 as ,homer testified when he represented ,odysseus as unrecognised by all in his house1 and recognised only by ,argos1 because the dog was not deceived by the physical change in the man1 and had not lost the ,greek3 phantasia katalptik which he proved that he had kept better than the men had4 ,but according to ,chrysippus even1 who most #fi attacked the irrational animals1 the dog takes a part in the dialectic about which so much is said4 ,at any rate1 the man above referred to said that the dog follows the fifth of the several non-apodictic syllogisms1 for when he comes to a meeting of three roads1 after seeking the scent in the two roads1 through which his prey has not passed1 he presses forward quickly in the third without scenting it4 ,for the dog reasons in this way1 potentially said the man of olden time2 the animal passed through this1 or this1 or this2 it was neither through this nor this1 therefore it was through this4 ,the dog also understands his own sufferings and mitigates them4 ,as soon as #gj a sharp stick is thrust into him1 he sets out to remove it1 by rubbing his foot on the ground1 as also with his teeth2 and if ever he has a wound anywhere1 for the reason that uncleansed wounds are difficult to cure1 and those that are cleansed are easily cured1 he gently wipes off the collected matter2 and #ga he observes the ,hippocratic advice exceedingly well1 for since quiet is a relief for the foot1 if he has ever a wound in the foot1 he lifts it up1 and keeps it undisturbed as much as possible4 ,when he is troubled by disturbing humours1 he eats grass1 with which he vomits up that which was unfitting1 and recovers4 ,since therefore it has been shown that the animal #gb that we fixed the argument upon for the sake of an example1 chooses that which is suitable for him1 and avoids what is harmful1 and that he has an art by which he provides what is suitable1 and that he comprehends his own sufferings and mitigates them1 and that he is not without virtue1 things in which perfection of reasoning in thought consists1 so according to this it would seem that the dog has reached perfection4 ,it is for this reason1 it appears to me1 that some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal4 ,in regard to reasoning in speech1 it is not necessary at present to bring #gc the matter in question4 ,for some of the ,dogmatics1 even1 have put this aside1 as opposing the acquisition of virtue1 for which reason they practiced silence when studying4 ,besides1 let it be supposed that a man is dumb1 no one would say that he is consequently irrational4 ,however1 aside from this1 we see after all1 that animals1 about which we are speaking1 do produce human sounds1 as the jay and some others4 ,aside from this also1 even if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational #gd irrational animals1 it is not at all unlikely that they converse1 and that we do not understand their conversation4 ,for when we hear the language of foreigners1 we do not understand but it all seems like one sound to us4 ,furthermore1 we hear dogs giving out one kind of sound when they are resisting someone1 #ge and another sound when they howl1 and another when they are beaten1 and a different kind when they wag their tails1 and generally speaking1 if one examines into this1 he will find a great difference in the sounds of this and other animals under different circumstances2 so that in all likelihood1 it may be said that the so-called irrational animals partake also in spoken language4 ,if then1 they are not inferior to men in the #gf accuracy of their perceptions1 nor in reasoning in thought1 nor in reasoning by speech1 as it is superfluous to say1 then they are not more untrustworthy than we are1 it seems to me1 in regard to their ideas4 ,perhaps it would be possible to prove this1 should we direct the argument to each of the irrational #gg animals in turn4 ,as for example1 who would not say that the birds are distinguished for shrewdness1 and make use of articulate speech8 for they not only know the present but the future1 and this they augur to those that are able to understand it1 audibly as well as in other ways4 ,i have made this comparison superfluously1 as ,i pointed out above1 as ,i think #gh ,i had sufficiently shown before1 that we cannot consider our own ideas superior to those of the irrational animals4 ,in short1 if the irrational animals are not more untrustworthy than we in regard to the judgment of their ideas1 and the ideas are different according to the difference in the animals1 ,i shall be able to say how each object appears to me1 but in regard to what it is by nature ,i shall be obliged to suspend my judgment4 ,,the ,,second ,,trope4 ,such is the first ,trope of ,greek3 epoch4 ,the second1 we said #gi above1 is based upon the differences in men4 ,for even if one assent to the hypothesis that men are more trustworthy than the irrational animals1 we shall find that doubt arises as soon as we consider our own differences4 ,for since man is said to be composed of two things1 soul and body1 we differ from each other in respect to both of these things2 for example1 as regards the body1 we differ both in form and personal peculiarities4 ,for the #hj body of a ,scythian differs from the body of an ,indian in form1 the difference resulting1 it is said1 from the different control of the humors4 ,according to different control of the humors1 differences in ideas arise also1 as we represented under the first ,trope4 ,for this reason there is certainly a great difference among men in the choice and avoidance of external things4 ,the ,indians delight in different things from our own people1 and the enjoyment of different things is a sign that different ideas are received of the external objects4 ,we differ #ha in personal peculiarities1 as some digest beef better than the little fish from rocky places1 and some are affected with purging by the weak wine of ,lesbos4 ,there was1 they say1 an old woman in ,attica who could drink thirty drachmas of hemlock without danger1 and ,lysis took four drachmas of opium unhurt1 and ,demophon1 ,alexander's table waiter1 shivered when he was #hb in the sun or in a hot bath1 and felt warm in the shade2 ,athenagoras also1 from ,argos1 did not suffer harm if stung by scorpions and venomous spiders2 the so-called ,psylli were not injured when bitten by snakes or by the aspis1 and the ,tentyrites among the ,egyptians are not harmed by the crocodiles around them2 those also of the ,ethiopians who live on the #hc ,hydaspes river1 opposite ,meroe1 eat scorpions and serpents1 and similar things without danger2 ,rufinus in ,chalcis could drink hellebore without vomiting or purging1 and he enjoyed and digested it as something to which he was accustomed2 ,chrysermos1 the ,herophilian1 ran the risk of stomach-ache if he ever took #hd pepper1 and ,soterichus1 the surgeon1 was seized by purging if he perceived the odor of roasting shad2 ,andron1 the ,argive1 was so free from thirst that he could travel even through the waterless ,libya without looking for a drink2 ,tiberius1 the emperor1 saw in the dark1 and ,aristotle tells the story of a certain ,thracian1 who thought that he saw the figure of a man always going before him as a guide4 ,while therefore such a difference exists in men #he in regard to the body1 and we must be satisfied with referring to a few only of the many examples given by the ,dogmatics1 it is probable that men also differ from each other in respect to the soul itself1 for the body is a kind of type of the soul1 as the physiognomical craft also shows4 ,the best example of the numerous and infinite differences of opinion among men is the contradiction in the sayings of the ,dogmatics1 not only about other things1 but about what it is well to seek and to avoid4 ,the poets have also fittingly spoken about #hf this1 for ,pindar said-- ,one delights in getting honors and crowns through storm-footed horses1 ,another in passing life in rooms rich in gold1 ,another still1 safe travelling enjoys1 in a swift ship1 on a wave of the sea4 ,and the poet says-- ,one man enjoys this1 another enjoys that4 ,the tragedies also abound in such expressions1 for instance1 it is said-- ,if to all1 the same were good and wise1 ,quarrels and disputes among men would not have been4 ,and again-- ,it is awful indeed1 that the same thing some mortals should please1 ,and by others be hated4 ,since therefore the choice and the avoidance of things1 #hg depends on the pleasure and displeasure which they give1 and the pleasure and displeasure have their seat in perception and ideas1 when some choose the things that others avoid1 it is logical for us to conclude that they are not acted upon similarly by the same things1 for otherwise they would have chosen or avoided alike4 ,now if the same things act upon different men differently1 on account of the difference in the men1 for this cause also suspension of the judgment may reasonably be introduced1 and we may perhaps say how each object appears to us1 and what its individual differences are1 but we shall not be able to declare what it is as to the nature of its essence4 ,for we must either believe all men or some men2 but #hh to believe all is to undertake an impossibility1 and to accept things that are in opposition to each other4 ,if we believe some only1 let someone tell us with whom to agree1 for the ,platonist would say with ,plato1 the ,epicurean with ,epicurus1 and others would advise in a corresponding manner2 and so as they disagree1 with no one to decide1 they bring us round again to the suspension of judgment4 ,furthermore1 he who tells us to agree #hi with the majority proposes something childish1 as no one could go to all men and find out what pleases the majority1 for it is possible that in some nations which we do not know the things which to us are rare are common to the majority1 and those things which happen commonly to us are rare4 ,as for example1 it might happen that the majority should not suffer when bitten by venomous spiders1 or that they should seldom feel pain1 or have other personal peculiarities similar to those spoken of above4 ,it is necessary therefore to suspend the judgment on account of the differences in men4 ,,the ,,third ,,trope4 ,while1 however1 the ,dogmatics are conceited enough to think #ij that they should be preferred to other men in the judgement of things1 we know that their claim is absurd1 for they themselves form a part of the disagreement2 and if they give themselves preference in this way in the judgment of phenomena1 they beg the question before they begin the judgment1 as they trust the judgment to themselves4 ,nevertheless1 in order that we should #ia reach the result of the suspension of judgment by limiting the argument to one man1 one who for example they deem to be wise1 let us take up the third ,trope4 ,this is the one that is based upon differences in perception4 ,that the perceptions #ib differ from each other is evident4 ,for example1 paintings seem to have hollows and prominences to the sense of sight1 but not to the sense of touch1 and honey to the tongue of some people appears pleasant1 but unpleasant to the eyes2 therefore it is impossible to say whether it is really pleasant or unpleasant4 ,in regard to myrrh it is the same1 for it delights the sense of smell1 but disgusts the sense of taste4 ,also in regard to #ic euphorbium1 since it is harmful to the eyes and harmless to all the rest of the body1 we are not able to say whether it is really harmless to bodies or not1 as far as its own nature is concerned4 ,rain-water1 too1 is useful to the eyes1 but it makes the trachea and the lungs rough1 just as oil does1 although it soothes the skin2 and the sea-torpedo placed on the extremities makes them numb1 but is harmless when placed on the rest of the body4 ,wherefore we cannot say what each of these things is by nature4 ,it is possible only to say how it appears each time4 ,we #id could cite more examples than these1 but in order not to spend too long in laying out the plan of this book we shall simply say the following3 ,each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms1 as the apple1 smooth1 fragrant1 sweet1 yellow4 ,now it is not known whether it has in reality only those qualities which appear to us1 or if it has only one quality1 but appears different on account of the different constitution of the sense organs1 or if it has more qualities than appear to us1 but some of them do not affect us4 ,that it has only one quality might be concluded from what we #ie have said about the food distributed in bodies1 and the water distributed in trees1 and the breath in the flute and syrinx1 and in similar instruments2 for it is possible that the apple also has only one quality1 but appears different on account of the difference in the sense organs by which it is perceived4 ,on #if the other hand1 that the apple has more qualities than those that appear to us1 can be argued in this way3 ,let us imagine someone born with the sense of touch1 of smell1 and of taste1 but neither hearing nor seeing4 ,he will then assume that neither anything visible nor anything audible exists at all1 but only the three kinds of qualities which he can apprehend4 ,it is #ig possible then that as we have only the five senses1 we apprehend only those qualities of the apple which we are able to grasp1 but it may be supposed that other qualities exist which would affect other sense organs if we possessed them2 as it is1 we do not feel the sensations which would be felt through them4 ,but #ih nature1 one will say1 has brought the senses into harmony with the objects to be perceived4 ,what kind of nature8 ,among the ,dogmatics a great difference of opinion reigns about the real existence of nature anyway2 for he who decides whether there is a nature or not1 if he is an uneducated man1 would be according to them untrustworthy2 if he is a philosopher1 he is a part of the disagreement1 and is himself to be judged1 but is not a judge4 ,in short1 if it is possible that only those qualities #ii exist in the apple which we seem to perceive1 or that more than these are there1 or that not even those which we perceive exist1 it will be unknown to us what kind of a thing the apple is4 ,the same argument holds for other objects of perception4 ,if1 however1 the senses do not comprehend the external world1 the intellect cannot comprehend it either1 so that for this reason also it will appear that the suspension of judgment follows in regard to external objects4 ,,the ,,fourth ,,trope4 ,in order to attain to ,greek3 epoch by fixing the argument on #ajj each separate sense1 or even by putting aside the senses altogether1 we take up the fourth ,trope of ,greek3 epoch4 ,this is the one based upon circumstances1 and by circumstances we mean conditions4 ,this ,trope comes under consideration1 we may say1 with regard to conditions that are according to nature1 or contrary to nature2 such as waking or sleeping1 the age of life1 moving or keeping still1 hating or loving1 need or satiety1 drunkenness or sobriety1 predispositions1 being courageous or afraid1 sorrowing or rejoicing4 ,for example1 things appear #aja different as they are according to nature1 or contrary to it2 as for instance1 the insane and those inspired by a god1 think that they hear gods1 while we do not2 in like manner they often say that they perceive the odor of storax or frankincense1 or the like1 and many other things which we do not perceive4 ,water1 also1 that seems lukewarm to us1 if poured over places that are inflamed1 will feel hot1 and a garment that appears orange-coloured to those that have blood-shot eyes1 would not look so to me1 and the same honey appears sweet to me1 but bitter to those who have the jaundice4 ,if one should say #ajb that those who are not in a natural state have unusual ideas of objects1 because of the intermingling of certain humors1 then one must also say1 that it may be that objects which are really what they seem to be to those who are in an unnatural condition1 appear different to those who are in health1 for even those who are in health have humors that are mixed with each other4 ,for to #ajc give to one kind of fluid a power to change objects1 and not to another kind1 is a fiction of the mind2 for just as those who are in health are in a condition that is natural to those who are in health1 and contrary to the nature of those who are not in health1 so also those who are not in health1 are in a condition contrary to the nature of those in health1 but natural to those not in health1 and we must therefore believe that they also are in some respect in a natural condition4 ,furthermore1 #ajd in sleep or in waking1 the ideas are different1 because we do not see things in the same way when we are awake as we do in sleep2 neither do we see them in the same way in sleep as we do when awake1 so that the existence or non-existence of these things is not absolute1 but relative1 that is in relation to a sleeping or waking condition4 ,it is therefore probable that we see those things in sleep which in a waking condition do not exist1 but they are not altogether non-existent1 for they exist in sleep1 just as those things which exist when we are awake1 exist1 although they do not exist in sleep4 ,furthermore1 things #aje present themselves differently according to the age of life1 for the same air seems cold to the aged1 but temperate to those in their prime1 and the same color appears dim to those who are old1 and bright to those in their prime1 and likewise the same tone seems faint to the former1 and audible to the latter4 ,people in different ages are also differently disposed #ajf towards things to be chosen or avoided2 children1 for example1 are very fond of balls and hoops1 while those in their prime prefer other things1 and the old still others1 from which it follows that the ideas in regard to the same objects differ in different periods of life4 ,furthermore1 things appear different #ajg in a condition of motion and rest1 since that which we see at rest when we are still1 seems to move when we are sailing by it4 ,there are also differences which depend on liking or #ajh disliking1 as some detest swine flesh exceedingly1 but others eat it with pleasure4 ,as ,menander said-- ,o how his face appears ,since he became such a man6 ,what a creature6 ,doing no injustice would make us also beautiful4 ,many also that love ugly women consider them very beautiful ,furthermore1 there are differences which depend on hunger or #aji satiety1 as the same food seems agreeable to those who are hungry1 and disagreeable to those who are satisfied4 ,there are also differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety1 as that which we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly to us when we are drunk4 ,again1 there are differences depending #aaj on predispositions1 as the same wine appears sourish to those who have previously eaten dates or dried figs1 but agreeable to those who have taken nuts or chickpeas2 the vestibule of the bath warms those who enter from without1 but cools those who go out1 if they rest in it4 ,furthermore1 there are differences #aaa depending on being afraid or courageous1 as the same thing seems fearful and terrible to the coward1 but in no wise so to him who is brave4 ,there are differences1 also1 depending on being sad or joyful1 as the same things are unpleasant to the sad1 but pleasant to the joyful4 ,since therefore the #aab anomalies depending on conditions are so great1 and since men are in different conditions at different times1 it is perhaps easy to say how each object appears to each man1 but not so of what kind it is1 because the anomaly is not of a kind to be judged4 ,for he who would pass judgment upon this is either in some one of the conditions mentioned above1 or is in absolutely no condition whatever2 but to say that he is in no condition at all1 as1 for example1 that he is neither in health nor in illness1 that he is neither moving nor quiet1 that he is not of any age1 and also that he is free from the other conditions1 is wholly absurd4 ,but if he judges the ideas while he is in any #aac condition whatever1 he is a part of the contradiction1 and1 besides1 he is no genuine critic of external objects1 because he is confused by the condition in which he finds himself4 ,therefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of those who are asleep with those who are awake1 nor can he who is in health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well2 for we believe more in the things that are present1 and affecting us at present1 than in the things not present4 ,in #aad another way1 the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to be judged1 for whoever prefers one idea to another1 and one condition to another1 does this either without a criterion and a proof1 or with a criterion and a proof2 but he can do this neither without them1 for he would then be untrustworthy1 nor with them2 for if he judges ideas1 he judges them wholly by a criterion1 and he will say that this criterion is either true or false4 ,but if it is false1 he will be untrustworthy2 if1 on #aae the contrary1 he says that it is true1 he will say that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof4 ,if without proof1 he will be untrustworthy2 if he says that it is true with proof1 it is certainly necessary that the proof be true1 or he will be untrustworthy4 ,now will he say that the proof which he has accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true1 having judged it1 or without having judged it8 ,if he says so #aaf without judging it1 he will be untrustworthy2 if he has judged it1 it is evident that he will say that he has judged according to some criterion1 and we must seek a proof for this criterion1 and for that proof a criterion4 ,for the proof always needs a criterion to establish it1 and the criterion needs a proof that it may be shown to be true2 and a proof can neither be sound without a pre-existing criterion that is true1 nor a criterion true without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy4 ,and so both the criterion and the proof are thrown into the #aag circulus in probando1 by which it is found that they are both of them untrustworthy1 for as each looks for proof from the other1 each is as untrustworthy as the other4 ,since then one cannot prefer one idea to another1 either without a proof and a criterion or with them1 the ideas that differ according to different conditions cannot be judged1 so that the suspension of judgment in regard to the nature of external objects follows through this ,trope also4 ,,the ,,fifth ,,trope4 ,the fifth ,trope is that based upon position1 distance1 and #aah place1 for1 according to each of these1 the same things appear different1 as for example1 the same arcade seen from either end appears curtailed1 but from the middle it looks symmetrical on every side2 and the same ship appears small and motionless from afar1 and large and in motion near by1 and the same tower appears round from a distance1 but square near by4 ,so much for distance4 ,now in reference to place1 we say that the light #aai of the lamp appears dim in the sun1 but bright in the dark2 and the same rudder appears broken in the sea1 but straight out of it2 and the egg in the bird is soft1 but in the air hard2 and the lyngurion is a fluid in the lynx1 but is hard in the air2 and the coral is soft in the sea1 but hard in the air2 and a tone of voice appears different produced by a syrinx1 and by a flute1 and different simply in the air4 ,also in reference to #abj position1 the same picture leaned back appears smooth1 and leaned forward a little seems to have hollows and protuberances1 and the necks of doves appear different in color according to the difference in inclination4 ,since then all phenomena are #aba seen in relation to place1 distance1 and position1 each of which relation makes a great difference with the idea1 as we have mentioned1 we shall be obliged by this ,trope also to come to the suspension of judgment4 ,for he who wishes to give preference to certain ones of these ideas will attempt the impossible4 ,for if #abb he simply makes the decision without proof he will be untrustworthy4 ,if1 however1 he wishes to make use of a proof1 should he say that the proof is false1 he contradicts himself1 but if he declares the proof to be true1 proof of its proof will be demanded of him1 and another proof for that1 which proof also must be true1 and so on to the regressus in infinitum4 ,it is impossible1 however1 to present proofs in infinitum1 so #abc that one will not be able to prove that one idea is to be preferred to another4 ,since then one cannot either without proof or with proof judge the ideas in question1 the suspension of judgment results1 and how each thing appears according to this or that position1 or this or that distance1 or this or that place1 we perhaps are able to say1 but what it really is it is impossible to declare1 for the reasons which we have mentioned4 ,,the ,,sixth ,,trope4 ,the sixth ,trope is the one based upon mixtures1 according to #abd which we conclude that since no object presents itself alone1 but always together with something else1 it is perhaps possible to say of what nature the mixture is1 of the thing itself1 and of that with which it is seen1 but of what sort the external object really is we shall not be able to say4 ,now it is evident1 ,i think1 that nothing from without is known to us by itself1 but always with something else1 and that because of this fact it appears different4 ,the color of our skin1 for example1 is #abe different seen in warm air from what it is in cold1 and we could not say what our color really is1 only what it is when viewed under each of these conditions4 ,the same sound appears different in rare air from what it is in dense1 and aromas are more overpowering in the warm bath and in the sun than they are in the cold air1 and a body surrounded by water is light1 but by air heavy4 ,leaving aside1 however1 outer mixtures1 our eyes #abf have inside of them coatings and humors4 ,since then visible things are not seen without these1 they will not be accurately comprehended1 for it is the mixture that we perceive1 and for this reason those who have the jaundice see everything yellow1 and those with bloodshot eyes bloody4 ,since the same sound appears different in broad open places from what it does in narrow and winding ones1 and different in pure air and in impure1 it is probable that we do not perceive the tones unmixed2 for the ears have narrow winding passages filled with vaporous secretions1 which it is said gather from places around the head4 ,since also there are substances present in the #abg nostrils and in the seat of the sense of taste1 we perceive the things smelled and the things tasted in connection with them1 and not unmixed4 ,so that because of mixture the senses do not perceive accurately what the external objects are4 ,the intellect #abh even does not do this1 chiefly because its guides1 the senses1 make mistakes1 and perhaps it itself adds a certain special mixture to those messages communicated by the senses2 for in each place where the ,dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is situated1 we see that certain humors are present1 whether one would locate it in the region of the brain1 in the region of the heart1 or somewhere else4 ,since therefore according to this ,trope also1 we see that we cannot say anything regarding the nature of external objects1 we are obliged to suspend our judgment4 ,,the ,,seventh ,,trope4 ,the seventh ,trope is the one which1 as we said1 is based #abi upon the quantity and constitution of objects1 constitution commonly meaning composition4 ,and it is evident that we are obliged to suspend our judgment according to this ,trope also in regard to the nature of things4 ,as for example1 filings from the horn of the goat appear white when they are seen separately and without being put together2 put together1 however1 in the form of a horn1 they look black4 ,and the parts of silver1 the filings that is1 by themselves appear black1 but as a whole appear white2 and parts of the ,taenarus stone look white when ground1 but in the whole stone appear yellow2 grains of sand #acj scattered apart from each other appear to be rough1 but put together in a heap1 they produce a soft feeling2 hellebore taken fine and downy1 causes choking1 but it no longer does so when taken coarse2 wine also taken moderately strengthens us1 but #aca when taken in excess relaxes the body2 food similarly1 has a different effect according to the quantity1 at least1 it often disturbs the body when too much is taken1 causing dyspepsia and discharge4 ,we shall be able here also to say of what kind #acb the cutting from the horn is1 and what many cuttings put together are1 of what kind a filing of silver is1 and what many of them put together are1 of what kind the tiny ,taenarus stone1 and what one composed of many small ones is1 and in regard to the grains of sand1 and the hellebore1 and the wine1 and the food1 what they are in relation1 but no longer the nature of the thing by itself1 because of the anomaly in the ideas which we have of things1 according to the way in which they are put together4 ,in general it appears that useful things become #acc harmful when an intemperate use is made of them1 and things that seem harmful when taken in excess1 are not injurious in a small quantity4 ,what we see in the effect of medicines witnesses especially to this fact1 as an exact mixture of simple remedies makes a compound which is helpful1 but sometimes when a very small inclination of the balance is overlooked1 the medicine is not only not helpful1 but very harmful1 and often poisonous4 ,so #acd the argument based upon the quantity and constitution of objects1 puts in confusion the existence of external objects4 ,therefore this ,trope naturally leads us to suspend our judgment1 as we are not able to declare exactly the nature of external objects4 ,,the ,,eighth ,,trope4 ,the eighth ,trope is the one based upon relation1 from which #ace we conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things are absolutely1 in their nature1 since every thing is in relation to something else4 ,and we must bear in mind that we use the word is incorrectly1 in place of appears1 meaning to say1 every thing appears to be in relation4 ,this is said1 however1 with two meanings3 first1 that every thing is in relation to the one who judges1 for the external object1 i4e4 the thing judged1 appears to be in relation to the judge2 the other way is that every thing is in relation to the things considered together with it1 as the relation of the right hand to the left4 ,but we #acf came to the conclusion above1 that every thing is in relation to something1 as for example1 to the one judging2 each thing appears in relation to this or that animal1 and this or that man1 and this or that sense1 and in certain circumstances2 as regards things considered together1 also1 each thing appears in relation to this or that mixture1 and this or that ,trope1 and this or that composition1 quantity and place4 ,and in another way it is possible to conclude that every thing is in relation #acg to something1 as follows3 does the being in difference differ from the being in relation1 or not8 ,if it does not differ1 then it is the same as relation2 if it does differ1 since every thing which differs is in some relation1 for it is said to be in relation to that from which it differs1 those things which are in a difference are in a relation to something4 ,now according #ach to the ,dogmatics1 some beings belong to the highest genera1 others to the lowest species1 and others to both genera and species at the same time2 all of these are in relation to something1 therefore every thing is in relation to something4 ,furthermore1 among things1 some things are manifest1 and others are hidden1 as the ,dogmatics themselves say1 and the things that make themselves known to us are the phenomena1 and the things that are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden things1 for according to the ,dogmatics1 the phenomena are the outward appearance of the unknown2 then that which makes known1 and that which is made known1 are in relation to something2 every thing1 therefore1 is in relation to something4 ,in #aci addition to this1 some things are similar to each other1 and others are dissimilar1 some are equal1 and others are unequal4 ,now these things are in relation to something1 therefore every thing is in relation to something1 and whoever says that every thing is not in relation to something1 himself establishes the fact that every thing is in relation to something1 for even in saying that every thing is not in relation to something1 he #adj proves it in reference to us1 and not in general1 by his objections to us4 ,in short1 as we have shown that every thing is in relation to something1 it is then evident that we shall not be able to say exactly what each object is by nature1 but what it appears to be like in relation to something else4 ,it follows from this1 that we must suspend our judgment regarding the nature of things4 ,,the ,,ninth ,,trope4 ,in regard to the ,trope based on the frequency and rarity of #ada events1 which we call the ninth of the series1 we give the following explanation3 ,the sun is certainly a much more astonishing thing than a comet1 but because we see the sun continually and the comet rarely we are so much astonished at the comet that it even seems an omen1 while we are not at all astonished at the sun4 ,if1 however1 we should imagine the sun appearing at rare intervals1 and at rare intervals setting1 in the first instance suddenly lighting up all things1 and in the second casting everything into shade1 we should see great astonishment at the sight4 ,an earthquake1 too1 does not trouble #adb those who experience it for the first time in the same manner as those who have become accustomed to it4 ,how great the astonishment of a man who beholds the sea for the first time6 ,and the beauty of the human body1 seen suddenly for the first time1 moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it4 ,that which is rare seems valuable1 while things that are familiar #adc and easily obtained seem by no means so4 ,if1 for example1 we should imagine water as rare1 of how much greater value would it seem than all other valuable things6 or if we imagine gold as simply thrown about on the ground in large quantities like stones1 to whom do we think it would be valuable1 or by whom would it be hoarded1 as it is now8 ,since then the same things according to the frequency or rarity that they are met with seem to be now valuable and now not so1 we conclude that it may be that we shall be able to say what kind of a thing each of #add them appears to be according to the frequency or rarity with which it occurs1 but we are not able to say what each external object is absolutely4 ,therefore1 according to this ,trope also1 we suspend our judgment regarding these things4 ,,the ,,tenth ,,trope4 ,the tenth ,trope is the one principally connected with #ade morals1 relating to schools1 customs1 laws1 mythical beliefs1 and dogmatic opinions4 ,now a school is a choice of a manner of life1 or of something held by one or many1 as for example the school of ,diogenes or the ,laconians4 ,a law is a written #adf contract among citizens1 the transgressor of which is punished4 ,a custom or habit1 for there is no difference1 is a common acceptance of a certain thing by many1 the deviator from which is in no wise punished4 ,for example1 it is a law not to commit adultery1 and it is a custom with us ,greek3 to m dmosia gynaiki mignusthai4 ,a mythical belief is a tradition #adg regarding things which never took place1 but were invented1 as among others1 the tales about ,cronus1 for many are led to believe them4 ,a dogmatic opinion is the acceptance of something that seems to be established by a course of reasoning1 or by some proof1 as for example1 that atoms are elements of things1 and that they are either homogeneous1 or infinitesimal1 or of some other description4 ,now we place each of these things sometimes in opposition to itself1 and sometimes in opposition to each one of the others4 ,for example1 we place a custom in #adh opposition to a custom thus3 some of the ,ethiopians tattoo new-born children1 but we do not1 and the ,persians think it is seemly to have a garment of many colors and reaching to the feet1 but we think it not so4 ,the ,indians ,greek3 tais gynaixi domosia mignyntai but most of the other nations consider it a shame4 ,we place a law in opposition to a law in this way3 #adi among the ,romans he who renounces his paternal inheritance does not pay his father's debts1 but among the ,rhodians he pays them in any case2 and among the ,tauri in ,scythia it was a law to offer strangers in sacrifice to ,artemis1 but with us it is forbidden to kill a man near a temple4 ,we place a school in #aej opposition to a school when we oppose the school of ,diogenes to that of ,aristippus1 or that of the ,laconians to that of the ,italians4 ,we place a mythical belief in opposition to a mythical belief1 as by some traditions ,jupiter is said to be the father of men and gods1 and by others ,oceanus1 as we say-- ,oceanus father of the gods1 and ,tethys the mother4 ,we place dogmatic opinions in opposition to each other1 when #aea we say that some declare that there is only one element1 but others that they are infinite in number1 and some that the soul is mortal1 others that it is immortal2 and some say that our affairs are directed by the providence of the gods1 but others that there is no providence4 ,we place custom in opposition #aeb to other things1 as for example to a law1 when we say that among the ,persians it is the custom to practice ,greek3 arrenomixiai1 but among the ,romans it is forbidden by law to do it2 by us adultery is forbidden1 but among the ,massagetae indifference in this respect is allowed by custom1 as ,eudoxos of ,cnidus relates in the first part of his book of travels2 among us it is forbidden ,greek3 mtrasi mignusthai1 but among the ,persians it is the custom by preference to marry so2 the ,egyptians marry sisters also1 which among us is forbidden by law4 ,further1 #aec we place a custom in opposition to a school1 when we say that most men ,greek3 anachrountes mignuntai tais heautn gunaixin1 ho de ,krats t ,hipparchia dmosia1 and ,diogenes went around with one shoulder bare1 but we go around with our customary clothes4 ,we place a custom in opposition to a mythical #aed belief1 as when the myths say that ,cronus ate his own children1 while with us it is the custom to take care of our children2 and among us it is the custom to venerate the gods as good1 and not liable to evil1 but they are described by the poets as being wounded1 and also as being jealous of each other4 ,we place a custom in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that #aee it is a custom with us to seek good things from the gods1 but that ,epicurus says that the divine pays no heed to us2 ,aristippus also held it to be a matter of indifference to wear a woman's robe1 but we consider it shameful4 ,we place a school in opposition to a law1 as according to the law it is not allowed #aef to beat a free and noble born man1 but the wrestlers and boxers strike each other according to the teaching of their manner of life1 and although murder is forbidden1 the gladiators kill each other for the same reason4 ,we place a mythical #aeg belief in opposition to a school when we say that1 although the myths say of ,hercules that in company with ,omphale-- ,he carded wool1 and bore servitude1 and did things that not even an ordinary good man would have done1 yet ,hercules' theory of life was noble4 ,we place a #aeh mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that athletes seeking after glory as a good1 enter for its sake upon a laborious profession1 but many philosophers1 on the other hand1 teach that glory is worthless4 ,we place law in opposition to mythical belief when we say the poets #aei represent the gods as working adultery and sin1 but among us the law forbids those things4 ,we place law in opposition to dogmatic opinion when we say that the followers of ,chrysippus hold #afj that it is a matter of indifference to marry one's mother or sister1 but the law forbids these things4 ,we place a mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that #afa the poets represent ,jupiter as descending and holding intercourse with mortal women1 but the ,dogmatics think this was impossible2 also that the poet says that ,jupiter1 on account #afb of his sorrow for ,sarpedon1 rained drops of blood upon the earth1 but it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divine is exempt from suffering2 and they deny the myth of the horse-centaurs1 giving us the horse-centaur as an example of non-existence4 ,now we could give many other examples of each #afc of the antitheses mentioned above1 but for a brief argument1 these are sufficient4 ,since1 however1 such anomaly of things is shown by this ,trope also1 we shall not be able to say what objects are by nature1 but only what each thing appears to be like1 according to this or that school1 or this or that law1 or this or that custom1 or according to each of the other conditions4 ,therefore1 by this ,trope also1 we must suspend our judgment in regard to the nature of external objects4 ,thus we arrive at ,greek3 epoch through the ten ,tropes4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,the ,five ,tropes4 ,the later ,sceptics1 however1 teach the following five ,tropes #afd of ,greek3 epoch3 first1 the one based upon contradiction2 second1 the regressus in infinitum2 third1 relation2 fourth1 the hypothetical2 fifth1 the circulus in probando4 ,the one #afe based upon contradiction is the one from which we find1 that in reference to the thing put before us for investigation1 a position has been developed which is impossible to be judged1 either practically1 or theoretically1 and therefore1 as we are not able to either accept or reject anything1 we end in suspending the judgment4 ,the one based upon the regressus #aff in infinitum is that in which we say that the proof brought forward for the thing set before us calls for another proof1 and that one another1 and so on to infinity1 so that1 not having anything from which to begin the reasoning1 the suspension of judgment follows4 ,the one based upon relation1 as we have #afg said before1 is that one in which the object appears of this kind or that kind1 as related to the judge and to the things regarded together with it1 but we suspend our judgment as to what it is in reality4 ,the one based upon hypothesis is #afh illustrated by the ,dogmatics1 when in the regressus in infinitum they begin from something that they do not found on reason1 but which they simply take for granted without proof4 ,the ,trope1 circulus in probando1 arises when the thing #afi which ought to prove the thing sought for1 needs to be sustained by the thing sought for1 and as we are unable to take the one for the proof of the other1 we suspend our judgment in regard to both4 ,now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer every thing under investigation to one or another of these ,tropes1 as follows3 the thing before us is either sensible or intellectual2 difference of opinion exists1 however1 as to what it is in itself1 for some say that only the things of sense #agj are true1 others1 only those belonging to the understanding1 and others say that some things of sense1 and some of thought1 are true4 ,now1 will it be said that this difference of opinion can be judged or cannot be judged8 ,if it cannot be judged1 then we have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment1 because it is impossible to express opinion in regard to things about which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged4 ,if it can be judged1 then we ask how it is to be judged8 ,for #aga example1 the sensible1 for we shall limit the argument first to this--,is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual standards8 ,for if it is to be judged by a sensible one1 since we are in doubt about the sensible1 that will also need something else to sustain it2 and if that proof is also something sensible1 something else will again be necessary to prove it1 and so on in infinitum4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the sensible must be judged by something intellectual1 as there is disagreement #agb in regard to the intellectual1 this intellectual thing will require also judgment and proof4 ,now1 how is it to be proved8 ,if by something intellectual1 it will likewise be thrown into infinitum2 if by something sensible1 as the intellectual has been taken for the proof of the sensible1 and the sensible has been taken for that of the intellectual1 the circulus in probando is introduced4 ,if1 however1 in order to escape #agc from this1 the one who is speaking to us expects us to take something for granted which has not been proved1 in order to prove what follows1 the hypothetical ,trope is introduced1 which provides no way of escape4 ,for if the one who makes the hypothesis is worthy of confidence1 we should in every case be no less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis4 ,if the one who makes the assumption assumes something true1 he makes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis1 and not as an established fact2 if it is false1 the foundation of the reasoning is unsound4 ,if a hypothesis is any help towards a #agd trustworthy result1 let the thing in question itself be assumed1 and not something else1 by which1 forsooth1 one would establish the thing under discussion4 ,if it is absurd to assume the thing questioned1 it is also absurd to assume that upon which it rests4 ,that all things belonging to the senses are also in #age relation to something else is evident1 because they are in relation to those who perceive them4 ,it is clear then1 that whatever thing of sense is brought before us1 it may be easily referred to one of the five ,tropes4 ,and we come to a similar conclusion in regard to intellectual things4 ,for if it should be said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which cannot be judged1 it will be granted that we must suspend the judgment concerning it4 ,in case the difference of opinion #agf can be judged1 if it is judged through anything intellectual1 we fall into the regressus in infinitum1 and if through anything sensible into the circulus in probando2 for1 as the sensible is again subject to difference of opinion1 and cannot be judged by the sensible on account of the regressus in infinitum1 it will have need of the intellectual1 just as the intellectual has need of the sensible4 ,but he who accepts anything which is hypothetical again is absurd4 ,intellectual things stand also #agg in relation1 because the form in which they are expressed depends on the mind of the thinker1 and1 if they were in reality exactly as they are described1 there would not have been any difference of opinion about them4 ,therefore the intellectual also is brought under the five ,tropes1 and consequently it is necessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to every thing that is brought before us4 ,such are the five ,tropes taught by the later ,sceptics4 ,they set them forth1 not to throw out the ten ,tropes1 but in order to put to shame the audacity of the ,dogmatics in a variety of ways1 by these ,tropes as well as by those4 ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,the ,two ,tropes4 ,two other ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch are also taught4 ,for as it #agh appears that everything that is comprehended is either comprehended through itself or through something else1 it is thought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things4 ,and that nothing can be understood through itself is evident1 it is said1 from the disagreement which exists altogether among the physicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things4 ,i mean1 of course1 a disagreement which cannot be judged1 as we are not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion in judging it1 for everything that we would take has a part in the disagreement1 and is untrustworthy4 ,nor is it conceded that anything can be comprehended through something else2 for if #agi a thing is comprehended through something1 that must always in turn be comprehended through something else1 and the regressus in infinitum or the circulus in probando follow4 ,if1 on the contrary1 a thing is comprehended through something that one wishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself1 this is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehended through itself1 according to what we have said4 ,we do not know how that which contradicts itself can be comprehended1 either through itself or through something else1 as no criterion of the truth or of comprehension appears1 and signs without proof would be rejected1 as we shall see in the next book4 ,so much will suffice for the present about suspension of judgment4 ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,what are the ,tropes for the overturning of ,aetiology8 ,in the same manner as we teach the ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch1 #ahj some set forth ,tropes through which we oppose the ,dogmatics1 by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are especially proud4 ,so ,aenesidemus teaches eight ,tropes1 by which he thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless4 ,the first of these ,tropes1 he said1 relates to the character #aha of aetiology in general1 which does not give incontestable testimony in regard to phenomena1 because it treats of unseen things4 ,the second ,trope states that although abundant resources exist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question1 some ,dogmatics investigate it in one way only4 ,the third ,trope #ahb states that the ,dogmatics assign causes which do not show any order for things which have taken place in an orderly manner4 ,the fourth ,trope states that the ,dogmatics1 accepting phenomena as they take place1 think that they also understand how unseen things take place1 although perhaps the unseen things have taken place in the same way as the phenomena1 and perhaps in some other way peculiar to themselves4 ,the fifth ,trope states #ahc that they all1 so to speak1 assign causes according to their own hypotheses about the elements1 but not according to any commonly accepted methods4 ,the sixth states that they often explain things investigated according to their own hypotheses1 but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability4 ,the seventh states that they often give reasons for things that #ahd not only conflict with phenomena1 but also with their own hypotheses4 ,the eighth states that although that which seems manifest1 and that which is to be investigated1 are often equally inscrutable1 they build up a theory from the one about the other1 although both are equally inscrutable4 ,it is not impossible1 ,aenesidemus said also1 that some ,dogmatics #ahe should fail in their theories of causality from other combinations of reasons deducible from the ,tropes given above4 ,perhaps also the five ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch are sufficient to refute aetiology1 for he who proposes a cause will propose one which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy1 with ,scepticism1 and with phenomena1 or one that is not4 ,perhaps1 however1 it is not possible that a cause should be in harmony with them1 for phenomena and unknown things altogether disagree with each other4 ,if it is not in harmony with them1 the reason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed #ahf it2 and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon1 or something unknown as the cause of the unknown1 he will be thrown into the regressus in infinitum2 if he uses one cause to account for another one1 into the circulus in probando2 but if he stops anywhere1 he will either say that the cause that he proposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been said1 and introduce relation1 abolishing an absolute standpoint2 or if he accepts anything by hypothesis1 he will be attacked by us4 ,therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the ,dogmatics to shame in aetiology by these ,tropes4 ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,the ,sceptical ,formulae4 ,when we use any one of these ,tropes1 or the ,tropes of #ahg ,greek3 epoch1 we employ with them certain formulae which show the ,sceptical method and our own feeling1 as for instance1 the sayings1 ,no more1 ,one must determine nothing1 and certain others4 ,it is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place4 ,let us begin with ,no more4 ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,the ,formula ,no more4 ,we sometimes express this as ,i have given it1 and sometimes #ahh thus1 ,nothing more4 ,for we do not accept the ,no more1 as some understand it1 for the examination of the special1 and ,nothing more for that of the general1 but we use ,no more and ,nothing more without any difference1 and we shall at present treat of them as one and the same expression4 ,now this formula is defective1 for as when we say a double one we really mean a double garment1 and when we say a broad one we really mean a broad road2 so when we say ,no more we mean really no more than this1 or in every way the same4 ,but some of the ,sceptics use #ahi instead of the interrogation ,no8 the interrogation ,what1 this rather than this8 using the word what in the sense of what is the reason1 so that the formula means1 ,what is the reason for this rather than for this8 ,it is a customary thing1 however1 to use an interrogation instead of a statement1 as ,who of the mortals does not know the wife of ,jupiter8 and also to use a statement instead of an interrogation1 as ,i seek where ,dion dwells1 and ,i ask why one should admire a poet4 ,the word what is also used instead of what for by ,menander--7,for7 what did ,i remain behind8 ,the formula ,not more this than this expresses our own condition of mind1 and signifies that #aij because of the equality of the things that are opposed to each other we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul4 ,we mean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable1 by things placed in opposition to each other we mean simply things which conflict with each other1 and by a state of equilibrium we mean a state in which we do not assent to one thing more than to another4 ,even if the formula ,nothing #aia more seems to express assent or denial1 we do not use it so1 but we use it loosely1 and not with accuracy1 either instead of an interrogation or instead of saying1 ,i do not know to which of these ,i would assent1 and to which ,i would not4 ,what lies before us is to express what appears to us1 but we are indifferent to the words by which we express it4 ,this must be understood1 however1 that we use the formula ,nothing more without affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure and true1 but we present it as it appears to us4 ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,aphasia4 ,we explain ,aphasia as follows3 ,the word ,greek3 phasis is used #aib in two ways1 having a general and a special signification4 ,according to the general signification1 it expresses affirmation or negation1 as ,it is day or ,it is not day2 according to the special signification1 it expresses an affirmation only1 and negations are not called ,greek3 phaseis4 ,now ,aphasia is the opposite of ,greek3 phasis in its general signification1 which1 as we said1 comprises both affirmation and negation4 ,it follows that ,aphasia is a condition of mind1 according to which we say that we neither affirm nor deny anything4 ,it is evident from this that we do not understand by ,aphasia something that #aic inevitably results from the nature of things1 but we mean that we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it in regard to the things that are under investigation4 ,it is necessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny any of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to the unknown1 for we yield assent only to those things which affect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them4 ,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,perhaps1 and ,it is possible1 and ,it may be4 ,the formulae ,perhaps1 and ,perhaps not1 and ,it is #aid possible1 and ,it is not possible1 and ,it may be1 and ,it may not be1 we use instead of ,perhaps it is1 and ,perhaps it is not1 and ,it is possible that it is1 and ,it is possible that it is not1 and ,it may be that it is1 and ,it may be that it is not4 ,that is1 we use the formula ,it is not possible for the sake of brevity1 instead of saying ,it is not possible to be1 and ,it may not be instead of ,it may not be that it is1 and ,perhaps not instead of ,perhaps it is not4 ,again1 we do not here dispute about words1 neither do we question if the #aie formulae mean these things absolutely1 but we use them loosely1 as ,i said before4 ,yet ,i think it is evident that these formulae express ,aphasia4 ,for certainly the formula ,perhaps it is really includes that which seems to contradict it1 i4e4 the formula ,perhaps it is not1 because it does not affirm in in regard to anything that it is really so4 ,it is the same also in regard to the others4 ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,greek3 epoch or the ,suspension of ,judgment4 ,when ,i say that ,i suspend my judgment1 ,i mean that ,i cannot #aif say which of those things presented should be believed1 and which should not be believed1 showing that things appear equal to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness4 ,now we do not affirm that they are equal1 but we state what appears to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves to us4 ,greek3 epoch means the holding back of the opinion1 so as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality of the things in question4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,the ,formula ,i determine ,nothing4 ,in regard to the formula ,i determine nothing1 we say the #aig following3 ,by determine we mean1 not simply to speak1 but to give assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing4 ,for it will soon be found that the ,sceptic determines nothing1 not even the formula ,i determine nothing1 for this formula is not a dogmatic opinion1 that is an assent to something unknown1 but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is4 ,when1 for example1 the ,sceptic says1 ,i determine nothing1 he means this3 ,according to my present feeling ,i can assert or deny nothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation1 and in saying this he expresses what appears to him in reference to the things under discussion4 ,he does not express himself positively1 but he states what he feels4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv4 ,the ,formula ,every thing is ,undetermined4 ,the expression ,indetermination furthermore shows a state #aih of mind in which we neither deny nor affirm positively anything regarding things that are investigated in a dogmatic way1 that is the things that are unknown4 ,when then the ,sceptic says ,every thing is undetermined1 he uses is undetermined1 in the sense of it appears undetermined to him4 ,the words every thing do not mean all existences1 but those that he has examined of the unknown things that are investigated by the ,dogmatists4 ,by undetermined1 he means that there is no preference in the things that are placed in opposition to each other1 or that they simply conflict with each other in respect to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness4 ,and as the one who #aii says ,i am walking really means ,it is ,i that am walking1 so he who says ,every thing is undetermined means at the same time1 according to our teachings1 as far as ,i am concerned1 or as it appears to me1 as if he were saying ,as far as ,i have examined the things that are under investigation in a dogmatic manner1 it appears to me that no one of them excels the one which conflicts with it in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness4 ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,the ,formula ,every thing is ,incomprehensible4 ,we treat the formula ,every thing is incomprehensible in #bjj the same way4 ,for every thing we interpret in the same way as above1 and we supply the words to me so that what we say is this3 ,as far as ,i have inspected the unknown things which are dogmatically examined1 it appears to me that every thing is incomprehensible4 ,this is not1 however1 to affirm that the things which are examined by the ,dogmatists are of such a nature as to be necessarily incomprehensible1 but one expresses his own feeling in saying ,i see that ,i have not thus far comprehended any of those things because of the equilibrium of the things that are placed in opposition to each other4 ,whence it seems to me that every thing that has been brought forward to dispute our formulae has fallen wide of the mark4 ,,chapter ,,xxvi4 ,the ,formulae ,i do not comprehend and ,i do not understand4 ,the formulae ,i do not comprehend and ,i do not understand #bja show a condition of mind in which the ,sceptic stands aloof for the present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the unknown things under investigation1 as is evident from what we said before about the other formulae4 ,,chapter ,,xxvii4 ,the ,formula ,to place an equal ,statement in opposition to every ,statement4 ,furthermore1 when we say ,every statement may have an equal #bjb statement placed in opposition to it1 by every1 we mean all the statements that we have examined2 we do not use the word statement simply1 but for a statement which seeks to prove something dogmatically about things that are unknown1 and not at all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and conclusions1 but something which is put together in any sort of way4 ,we use the word equal in reference to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness4 ,is placed in opposition we use instead of the common expression to conflict with1 and we supply as it appears to me4 ,when therefore one says1 ,it seems to me #bjc that every statement which ,i have examined1 which proves something dogmatically1 may have another statement placed in opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically1 and which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness1 this is not asserted dogmatically1 but is an expression of human feeling as it appears to the one who feels it4 ,some ,sceptics #bjd express the formula as follows3 ,every statement should have an equal one placed in opposition to it1 demanding it authoritatively thus3 ,let us place in opposition to every statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically1 and is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness4 ,naturally this is directed to the ,sceptics1 but the infinitive should be used instead of the imperative1 that is1 to oppose instead of let us oppose4 ,this formula is recommended to the #bje ,sceptic1 lest he should be deceived by the ,dogmatists and give up his investigations1 and rashly fail of the ,greek3 ataraxia which is thought to accompany ,greek3 epoch in regard to everything1 as we have explained above4 ,,chapter ,,xxviii4 ,general ,observations on the ,formulae of the ,sceptics4 ,we have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for #bjf an outline1 especially since what we have said about those mentioned applies also to others that we have omitted4 ,in regard to all the ,sceptical formulae1 it must be understood in advance that we do not affirm them to be absolutely true1 because we say that they can even refute themselves1 since they are themselves included in those things to which they refer1 just as cathartic medicines not only purge the body of humors1 but carry off themselves with the humors4 ,we say then that we use these #bjg formulae1 not as literally making known the things for which they are used1 but loosely1 and if one wishes1 inaccurately4 ,it is not fitting for the ,sceptic to dispute about words1 especially as it contributes to our purpose to say that these formulae have no absolute meaning2 their meaning is a relative one1 that is1 relative to the ,sceptics4 ,besides1 it is to be #bjh remembered that we do not say them about all things in general1 but about the unknown1 and things that are dogmatically investigated1 and that we say what appears to us1 and that we do not express ourselves decidedly about the nature of external objects4 ,by this means ,i think that every sophism brought against the ,sceptical formulae can be overturned4 ,we have now #bji shown the character of ,scepticism by examining its idea1 its parts1 its criterion and aim1 and also the ,tropes of ,greek3 epoch1 and by treating of the ,sceptical formulae4 ,we think it therefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinction between ,scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophy in order to more clearly understand the ,sceptical ,school4 ,we will begin with the philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,,chapter ,,xxix4 ,in what does the ,sceptical ,school differ from the ,philosophy of ,heraclitus8 ,now that this school differs from ours is evident1 for #baj ,heraclitus expresses himself about many unknown things dogmatically1 which we do not1 as has been said4 ,aenesidemus and his followers said that the ,sceptical ,school is the way to the philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,they gave as a reason for this that the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing1 leads the way to the statement that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing2 and as the ,sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing1 the ,heraclitans proceed from this to the doctrine that such predicates are in reality applicable4 ,we reply to this that the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of the ,sceptics1 but is a fact that presents itself not only to the ,sceptics1 but to other philosophers1 and to all men4 ,no one1 for instance1 would #baa venture to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in health1 and bitter to those who have the jaundice1 so that the ,heraclitans start from a preconception common to all men1 as do we also1 and perhaps the other schools of philosophy likewise4 ,if1 however1 they had attributed the origin of the statement that contradictory predicates are present in the same thing to any of the ,sceptical teachings1 as1 for example1 to the formula ,every thing is incomprehensible1 or ,i determine nothing1 or any of the other similar ones1 it may be that which they say would follow2 but since they start from that which is a common experience1 not only to us1 but to other philosophers1 and in life1 why should one say that our school is a path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus more than any of the other schools of philosophy1 or than life itself1 as we all make use of the same subject matter8 ,on the other hand1 the ,sceptical ,school may not #bab only fail to help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of ,heraclitus1 but may even hinder it6 ,for the ,sceptic attacks all the dogmas of ,heraclitus as having been rashly given1 and opposes on the one hand the doctrine of conflagration1 and on the other1 the doctrine that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing1 and in regard to every dogma of ,heraclitus he scorns his dogmatic rashness1 and then1 in the manner that ,i have before referred to1 adduces the formulae ,i do not understand and ,i determine nothing1 which conflict with the ,heraclitan doctrines4 ,it is absurd to say that this conflicting school is a path to the very sect with which it conflicts4 ,it is then absurd to say that the ,sceptical ,school is a path to the philosophy of ,heraclitus4 ,,chapter ,,xxx4 ,in what does the ,sceptical ,school differ from the ,philosophy of ,democritus8 ,the philosophy of ,democritus is also said to have community #bac with ,scepticism1 because it seems to use the same matter that we do4 ,for1 from the fact that honey seems sweet to some and bitter to others1 ,democritus reasons1 it is said1 that honey is neither sweet nor bitter1 and therefore he accords with the formula ,no more1 which is a formula of the ,sceptics4 ,but the ,sceptics and the ,democritans use the formula ,no more differently from each other1 for they emphasise the negation in the expression1 but we1 the not knowing whether both of the phenomena exist or neither one1 and so we differ in this respect4 ,the distinction1 however1 becomes most evident when ,democritus says that #bad atoms and empty space are real1 for by real he means existing in reality4 ,now1 although he begins with the anomaly in phenomena1 yet1 since he says that atoms and empty space really exist1 it is superfluous1 ,i think1 even to say that he differs from us4 ,,chapter ,,xxxi4 ,in what does ,scepticism differ from the ,cyrenaic ,philosophy8 ,some say that the ,cyrenaic ,school is the same as the #bae ,sceptical1 because that school also claims to comprehend only conditions of mind4 ,it differs1 however1 from it1 because1 while the former makes pleasure and the gentle motion of the flesh its aim1 we make ,greek3 ataraxia ours1 and this is opposed to the aim of their school4 ,for whether pleasure is present or not1 confusion awaits him who maintains that pleasure is an aim1 as ,i have shown in what ,i said about the aim4 ,and then1 in addition1 we suspend our judgment as far as the reasoning with regard to external objects is concerned1 but the ,cyrenaics pronounce the nature of these inscrutable4 ,,chapter ,,xxxii4 ,in what does ,scepticism differ from the ,philosophy of ,protagoras8 ,protagoras makes man the measure of all things1 of things #baf that are that they are1 and things that are not that they are not1 meaning by measure1 criterion1 and by things1 events1 that is to say really1 man is the criterion for all events1 of things that are that they are1 and of things that are not that they are not4 ,and for that reason he accepts only the phenomena that appear to each man1 and thus he introduces relation4 ,therefore #bag he seems to have community with the ,pyrrhoneans4 ,he differs1 however1 from them1 and we shall see the difference after we have somewhat explained how things seemed to ,protagoras4 ,he says1 for example1 that matter is fluid1 and as it flows1 additions are constantly made in the place of that which is carried away2 the perceptions also are arranged anew and changed1 according to the age and according to other conditions of the body4 ,he says also1 that the reasons of all phenomena #bah are present in matter1 so that matter can be all that it appears to be to all men as far as its power is concerned4 ,men1 however1 apprehend differently at different times1 according to the different conditions that they are in2 for he that is in a natural condition will apprehend those qualities in matter that can appear to those who are in a natural condition1 while on #bai the contrary1 those who are in an unnatural condition will apprehend those qualities that can appear to the abnormal4 ,furthermore1 the same reasoning would hold true in regard to differences in age1 to sleeping and waking1 and each of the other different conditions4 ,therefore man becomes the criterion of things that are1 for all things that appear to men exist for men1 and those things that do not appear to any one among men do not exist4 ,we see that he dogmatises in saying that matter is fluid1 and also in saying that the reasons for all phenomena have their foundation in matter1 while these things are unknown1 and to us are things regarding which we suspend our judgment4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiii4 ,in what does ,scepticism differ from the ,academic ,philosophy8 ,some say further that the ,academic philosophy is the same as #bbj ,scepticism1 therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of that also4 ,there have been1 as the most say1 three ,academies--the most ancient one1 that of ,plato and his followers2 the second and middle one1 that of ,arcesilaus and his followers1 ,arcesilaus being the pupil of ,polemo2 the third and new ,academy1 that of ,carneades and ,clitomachus and their followers2 some add also a fourth1 that of ,philo and ,charmides1 and their followers2 and some count even a fifth1 that of ,antiochus and his followers4 ,beginning then from the old ,academy1 let us consider the difference between the schools of philosophy mentioned4 ,now some have said that ,plato was a #bba ,dogmatic1 others that he was a ,sceptic1 and others that he was in some things a ,sceptic and in some things a ,dogmatic4 ,for in the fencing dialogues1 where ,socrates is introduced as either making sport of someone or contending against the ,sophists1 ,plato has1 they say1 a fencing and sceptical character1 but he is dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously1 either through ,socrates or ,timaeus or any such person4 ,in regard to those #bbb who say that he is a ,dogmatic1 or a ,dogmatic in some things and a ,sceptic in others1 it would be superfluous1 it seems to me1 to speak now1 for they themselves grant that he is different from us4 ,the question as to whether he was really a ,sceptic or not we treat more fully in the ,memoranda1 but here we state briefly that according to ,menodotus and ,aenesidemus 7for these especially defended this position7 ,plato dogmatises when he expresses himself regarding ideas1 and regarding the existence of ,providence1 and when he states that the virtuous life is more to be chosen than the one of vice4 ,if he assents to these things as true1 he dogmatises2 or even if he accepts them as more probable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character1 since he gives a preference to one thing above another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness2 for how foreign this is to us is evident from what we have said before4 ,even if when he #bbc performs mental gymnastics1 as they say1 he expresses some things sceptically1 he is not because of this a ,sceptic4 ,for he who dogmatises about one thing1 or1 in short1 gives preference to one mental image over another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown1 is a ,dogmatic in character1 as ,timon shows by what he said of ,xenophanes4 ,for after having praised ,xenophanes in many #bbd things1 and even after having dedicated his ,satires to him1 he made him mourn and say-- ,would that ,i also might gain that mind profound1 ,able to look both ways4 ,in a treacherous path have ,i been decoyed1 ,and still in old age am with all wisdom unwed4 ,for wherever ,i turned my view ,all things were resolved into unity2 all things1 alway ,from all sources drawn1 were merged into nature the same4 ,timon calls him somewhat1 but not entirely1 free from vanity1 when he said-- ,xenophanes somewhat free from vanity1 mocker of ,homeric deceit1 ,far from men he conceived a god1 on all sides equal1 ,above pain1 a being spiritualised1 or intellect4 ,in saying that he was somewhat free from vanity1 he meant that he was in some things free from vanity4 ,he called him a mocker of the ,homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in ,homer4 ,xenophanes also dogmatised1 contrary to the assumptions #bbe of other men1 that all things are one1 and that ,god is grown together with all things1 that ,he is spherical1 insensible1 unchangeable1 and reasonable1 whence the difference of ,xenophanes from us is easily proved4 ,in short1 from what has been said1 it is evident that although ,plato expresses doubt about some things1 so long as he has expressed himself in certain places in regard to the existence of unknown things1 or as preferring some things to others in trustworthiness1 he cannot be1 it seems to me1 a ,sceptic4 ,those of the ,new ,academy1 although they say that all things are incomprehensible1 #bbf differ from the ,sceptics1 perhaps even in saying that all things are incomprehensible 7for they assert decidedly in regard to this1 but the ,sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be comprehended71 but they differ evidently still further from us in their judgment of good and evil4 ,for the ,academicians say that there is such a thing as good and evil1 not as we say it1 but more with the conviction that that which they call good exists than that it does not2 and likewise in regard to the evil1 while we do not say anything is good or evil with the conviction that it is probably so1 but we live our lives in an unprejudiced way in order not to be inactive4 ,moreover1 we say that our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness #bbg and untrustworthiness1 as far as their nature goes1 while they say that some are probable and others improbable4 ,they make a difference also between the improbable ones1 for they believe that some of them are only probable1 others probable and undisputed1 still others probable1 undisputed1 and tested4 ,as for example1 when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark room1 he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it1 and thinks that it is a serpent2 but it appears to be a rope #bbh to him who has looked carefully around1 and found out that it does not move1 and that it is of such a color1 and so on1 according to an idea which is probable and undisputed4 ,the tested idea is like this3 ,it is said that ,hercules led ,alcestis after she was dead back again from ,hades and showed her to ,admetus1 and he received an idea that was probable and undisputed regarding ,alcestis4 ,as1 however1 he knew that she was dead1 his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief4 ,now those belonging to the ,new ,academy prefer the idea which #bbi is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one4 ,to both of these1 however1 they prefer that which is probable1 undisputed1 and tested4 ,if1 however1 both those of the ,academy and the ,sceptics say that they believe certain things1 there is an evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even in this2 for to believe is used in a different sense1 #bcj meaning1 on the one hand1 not to resist1 but simply to accept without strong inclination and approval1 as the child is said to believe the teacher2 on the other hand1 to believe is used to signify assenting to something with choice1 and1 as it were1 with the sympathy that accompanies strong will1 as the prodigal follows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life4 ,therefore1 since ,carneades1 ,clitomachus1 and their followers say that they are strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable1 and we simply allow that it may be so without assent1 we differ #bca from them1 ,i think1 in this way4 ,we differ from the ,new ,academy likewise in things concerning the aim2 for while the men who say that they govern themselves according to that ,school avail themselves of the idea of the probable in life1 we live according to the laws and customs1 and our natural feelings1 in an unprejudiced way4 ,we could say more regarding the distinction between the two schools if we did not aim at brevity4 ,nevertheless1 ,arcesilaus1 who as we said was the leader and #bcb chief of the ,middle ,academy1 seems to me to have very much in common with the ,pyrrhonean teachings1 so that his school and ours are almost one4 ,for neither does one find that he expressed an opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything1 nor does he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness or untrustworthiness2 he suspends his judgment regarding all things1 and the aim of his philosophy is ,greek3 epoch1 which is accompanied by ,greek3 ataraxia1 and this agrees with what we have said4 ,but he calls the particular instances of #bcc ,greek3 epoch bona1 and the particular instances of assent mala4 ,the difference is that we say these things according to what appears to us1 and not affirmatively1 while he says them as if speaking of realities1 that is1 he says that ,greek3 epoch is in itself good1 and assent an evil4 ,if we are to believe also the things that are said about him1 he appeared at first #bcd sight to be a ,pyrrhonean1 but he was in truth a ,dogmatic1 for he used to test his companions by the method of doubt to see whether they were gifted enough to take in ,plato's dogmas1 so that he appeared to be a ,sceptic1 but at the same time he communicated the doctrines of ,plato to those of his companions who were gifted4 ,hence ,ariston also said about him-- ,plato in front1 ,pyrrhon behind1 ,diodorus in the middle1 because he availed himself of the dialectic of ,diodorus1 but was #bce wholly a ,platonist4 ,now ,philo and his followers say that as far as the ,stoic criterion is concerned1 that is to say the ,greek3 phantasia katalptik1 things are incomprehensible1 but as far as the nature of things is concerned1 they are comprehensible4 ,antiochus1 however1 transferred the ,stoa to the ,academy1 so that it was even said of him that he taught the ,stoic philosophy in the ,academy1 because he tried to show that the ,stoic doctrines are found in ,plato4 ,the difference1 therefore1 between the ,sceptical ,school and the ,fourth and ,fifth ,academy is evident4 ,,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,is ,empiricism in ,medicine the same as ,scepticism8 ,some say that the medical sect called ,empiricism is the same #bcf as ,scepticism4 ,yet the fact must be recognised1 that even if ,empiricism does maintain the impossibility of knowledge1 it is neither ,scepticism itself1 nor would it suit the ,sceptic to take that sect upon himself4 ,he could rather1 it seems to me1 belong to the so-called ,methodic ,school4 ,for this alone1 of all the medical sects1 does not seem to proceed rashly in regard to #bcg unknown things1 and does not presume to say whether they are comprehensible or not1 but is guided by phenomena1 and receives from them the same help which they seem to give to the ,sceptical system4 ,for we have said in what has gone before1 that the every-day life which the ,sceptic lives is of four parts1 depending on the guidance of nature1 on the necessity of the feelings1 on the traditions of laws and customs1 and on the teaching of the arts4 ,now as by necessity of the feelings #bch the ,sceptic is led by thirst to drink1 and by hunger to food1 and to supply similar needs in the same way1 so also the physician of the ,methodic ,school is led by the feelings to find suitable remedies2 in constipation he produces a relaxation1 as one takes refuge in the sun from the shrinking on account of intense cold2 he is led by a flux to the stopping of it1 as those in a hot bath who are dripping from a profuse perspiration and are relaxed1 hasten to check it by going into the cold air4 ,moreover1 it is evident that the ,methodic physician forces those things which are of a foreign nature to adapt themselves to their own nature1 as even the dog tries to get a sharp stick out that is thrust into him4 ,in order1 however1 that ,i should #bci not overstep the outline character of this work by discussing details1 ,i think that all the things that the ,methodics have thus said can be classified as referring to the necessity of the feelings that are natural or those that are unnatural4 ,besides this1 it is common to both schools to have no dogmas1 and to use words loosely4 ,for as the ,sceptic uses the formula ,i #bdj determine nothing1 and ,i understand nothing1 as we said above1 so the ,methodic also uses the expressions ,community1 and ,to go through1 and other similar ones without over much care4 ,in a similar way he uses the word ,indication undogmatically1 meaning that the symptoms of the patient either natural or unnatural1 indicate the remedies that would be suitable1 as we said in speaking of thirst1 hunger1 and other things4 ,it will thus be seen that the ,methodic ,school of #bda medicine has a certain relationship to ,scepticism which is closer than that of the other medical sects1 speaking comparatively if not absolutely from these and similar tokens4 ,having said so much in reference to the schools that seem to closely resemble ,scepticism1 we conclude the general consideration of ,scepticism and the ,first ,book of the ,sketches4