,,philebus  ,by ,plato   ,translated by 
,benjamin ,jowett     ,,introduction    
,,and ,,analysis4  ,the ,philebus       
appears to be one of the later writings 
of ,plato1 in which the style has begun 
to alter1 and the dramatic and poetical 
element has become subordinate to the   
speculative and philosophical4 ,in the  
development of abstract thought great   
advances have been made on the          
,protagoras or the ,phaedrus1 and even  
on the ,republic4 ,but there is a       
corresponding diminution of artistic    
skill1 a want of character in the       
persons1 a laboured march in the        
dialogue1 and a degree of confusion and 
incompleteness in the general design4   
,as in the speeches of ,thucydides1 the 
multiplication of ideas seems to        
interfere with the power of expression4 
,instead of the equally diffused grace  
and ease of the earlier dialogues there 
occur two or three highly-wrought       
passages2 instead of the ever-flowing   
play of humour1 now appearing1 now      

concealed1 but always present1 are      
inserted a good many bad jests1 as we   
may venture to term them4 ,we may       
observe an attempt at artificial        
ornament1 and far-fetched modes of      
expression2 also clamorous demands on   
the part of his companions1 that        
,socrates shall answer his own          
questions1 as well as other defects of  
style1 which remind us of the ,laws4    
,the connection is often abrupt and     
inharmonious1 and far from clear4 ,many 
points require further explanation2 e4g4
 the reference of pleasure to the       
indefinite class1 compared with the     
assertion which almost immediately      
follows1 that pleasure and pain         
naturally have their seat in the third  
or mixed class3 these two statements are
 unreconciled4 ,in like manner1 the     
table of goods does not distinguish     
between the two heads of measure and    
symmetry2 and though a hint is given    
that the divine mind has the first      
place1 nothing is said of this in the   

final summing up4 ,the relation of the  
goods to the sciences does not appear2  
though dialectic may be thought to      
correspond to the highest good1 the     
sciences and arts and true opinions are 
enumerated in the fourth class4 ,we seem
 to have an intimation of a further     
discussion1 in which some topics lightly
 passed over were to receive a fuller   
consideration4 ,the various uses of the 
word 'mixed1' for the mixed life1 the   
mixed class of elements1 the mixture of 
pleasures1 or of pleasure and pain1 are 
a further source of perplexity4 ,our    
ignorance of the opinions which ,plato  
is attacking is also an element of      
obscurity4 ,many things in a controversy
 might seem relevant1 if we knew to what
 they were intended to refer4 ,but no   
conjecture will enable us to supply what
 ,plato has not told us2 or to explain1 
from our fragmentary knowledge of them1 
the relation in which his doctrine stood
 to the ,eleatic ,being or the ,megarian
 good1 or to the theories of ,aristippus

 or ,antisthenes respecting pleasure4   
,nor are we able to say how far ,plato  
in the ,philebus conceives the finite   
and infinite 7which occur both in the   
fragments of ,philolaus and in the      
,pythagorean table of opposites7 in the 
same manner as contemporary             
,pythagoreans4  ,there is little in the 
characters which is worthy of remark4   
,the ,socrates of the ,philebus is      
devoid of any touch of ,socratic irony1 
though here1 as in the ,phaedrus1 he    
twice attributes the flow of his ideas  
to a sudden inspiration4 ,the           
interlocutor ,protarchus1 the son of    
,callias1 who has been a hearer of      
,gorgias1 is supposed to begin as a     
disciple of the partisans of pleasure1  
but is drawn over to the opposite side  
by the arguments of ,socrates4 ,the     
instincts of ingenuous youth are easily 
induced to take the better part4        
,philebus1 who has withdrawn from the   
argument1 is several times brought back 
again1 that he may support pleasure1 of 

which he remains to the end the         
uncompromising advocate4 ,on the other  
hand1 the youthful group of listeners by
 whom he is surrounded1 ',philebus'     
boys' as they are termed1 whose presence
 is several times intimated1 are        
described as all of them at last        
convinced by the arguments of ,socrates4
 ,they bear a very faded resemblance to 
the interested audiences of the         
,charmides1 ,lysis1 or ,protagoras4     
,other signs of relation to external    
life in the dialogue1 or references to  
contemporary things and persons1 with   
the single exception of the allusions to
 the anonymous enemies of pleasure1 and 
the teachers of the flux1 there are     
none4  ,the omission of the doctrine of 
recollection1 derived from a previous   
state of existence1 is a note of        
progress in the philosophy of ,plato4   
,the transcendental theory of           
pre-existent ideas1 which is chiefly    
discussed by him in the ,meno1 the      
,phaedo1 and the ,phaedrus1 has given   

way to a psychological one4 ,the        
omission is rendered more significant by
 his having occasion to speak of memory 
as the basis of desire4 ,of the ideas he
 treats in the same sceptical spirit    
which appears in his criticism of them  
in the ,parmenides4 ,he touches on the  
same difficulties and he gives no answer
 to them4 ,his mode of speaking of the  
analytical and synthetical processes may
 be compared with his discussion of the 
same subject in the ,phaedrus2 here he  
dwells on the importance of dividing the
 genera into all the species1 while in  
the ,phaedrus he conveys the same truth 
in a figure1 when he speaks of carving  
the whole1 which is described under the 
image of a victim1 into parts or        
members1 'according to their natural    
articulation1 without breaking any of   
them4' ,there is also a difference1     
which may be noted1 between the two     
dialogues4 ,for whereas in the          
,phaedrus1 and also in the ,symposium1  
the dialectician is described as a sort 

of enthusiast or lover1 in the          
,philebus1 as in all the later writings 
of ,plato1 the element of love is       
wanting2 the topic is only introduced1  
as in the ,republic1 by way of          
illustration4 ,on other subjects of     
which they treat in common1 such as the 
nature and kinds of pleasure1 true and  
false opinion1 the nature of the good1  
the order and relation of the sciences1 
the ,republic is less advanced than the 
,philebus1 which contains1 perhaps1 more
 metaphysical truth more obscurely      
expressed than any other ,platonic      
dialogue4 ,here1 as ,plato expressly    
tells us1 he is 'forging weapons of     
another make1' i4e4 new categories and  
modes of conception1 though 'some of the
 old ones might do again4'  ,but if     
superior in thought and dialectical     
power1 the ,philebus falls very far     
short of the ,republic in fancy and     
feeling4 ,the development of the reason 
undisturbed by the emotions seems to be 
the ideal at which ,plato aims in his   

later dialogues4 ,there is no mystic    
enthusiasm or rapturous contemplation of
 ideas4 ,whether we attribute this      
change to the greater feebleness of age1
 or to the development of the quarrel   
between philosophy and poetry in        
,plato's own mind1 or perhaps1 in some  
degree1 to a carelessness about artistic
 effect1 when he was absorbed in        
abstract ideas1 we can hardly be wrong  
in assuming1 amid such a variety of     
indications1 derived from style as well 
as subject1 that the ,philebus belongs  
to the later period of his life and     
authorship4 ,but in this1 as in all the 
later writings of ,plato1 there are not 
wanting thoughts and expressions in     
which he rises to his highest level4    
,the plan is complicated1 or rather1    
perhaps1 the want of plan renders the   
progress of the dialogue difficult to   
follow4 ,a few leading ideas seem to    
emerge3 the relation of the one and     
many1 the four original elements1 the   
kinds of pleasure1 the kinds of         

knowledge1 the scale of goods4 ,these   
are only partially connected with one   
another4 ,the dialogue is not rightly   
entitled ',concerning pleasure' or      
',concerning good1' but should rather be
 described as treating of the relations 
of pleasure and knowledge1 after they   
have been duly analyzed1 to the good4   
7#a7 ,the question is asked1 whether    
pleasure or wisdom is the chief good1 or
 some nature higher than either2 and if 
the latter1 how pleasure and wisdom are 
related to this higher good4 7#b7       
,before we can reply with exactness1 we 
must know the kinds of pleasure and the 
kinds of knowledge4 7#c7 ,but still we  
may affirm generally1 that the combined 
life of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge
 has more of the character of the good  
than either of them when isolated4 7#d7 
to determine which of them partakes most
 of the higher nature1 we must know     
under which of the four unities or      
elements they respectively fall4 ,these 
are1 first1 the infinite2 secondly1 the 

finite2 thirdly1 the union of the two2  
fourthly1 the cause of the union4       
,pleasure is of the first1 wisdom or    
knowledge of the third class1 while     
reason or mind is akin to the fourth or 
highest4  7#e7 ,pleasures are of two    
kinds1 the mixed and unmixed4 ,of mixed 
pleasures there are three classes--7a7  
those in which both the pleasures and   
pains are corporeal1 as in eating and   
hunger2 7b7 those in which there is a   
pain of the body and pleasure of the    
mind1 as when you are hungry and are    
looking forward to a feast2 7c7 those in
 which the pleasure and pain are both   
mental4 ,of unmixed pleasures there are 
four kinds3 those of sight1 hearing1    
smell1 knowledge4  7#f7 ,the sciences   
are likewise divided into two classes1  
theoretical and productive3 of the      
latter1 one part is pure1 the other     
impure4 ,the pure part consists of      
arithmetic1 mensuration1 and weighing4  
,arts like carpentering1 which have an  
exact measure1 are to be regarded as    

higher than music1 which for the most   
part is mere guess-work4 ,but there is  
also a higher arithmetic1 and a higher  
mensuration1 which is exclusively       
theoretical2 and a dialectical science1 
which is higher still and the truest and
 purest knowledge4  7#g7 ,we are now    
able to determine the composition of the
 perfect life4 ,first1 we admit the pure
 pleasures and the pure sciences2       
secondly1 the impure sciences1 but not  
the impure pleasures4 ,we have next to  
discover what element of goodness is    
contained in this mixture4 ,there are   
three criteria of goodness--beauty1     
symmetry1 truth4 ,these are clearly more
 akin to reason than to pleasure1 and   
will enable us to fix the places of both
 of them in the scale of good4 ,first in
 the scale is measure2 the second place 
is assigned to symmetry2 the third1 to  
reason and wisdom2 the fourth1 to       
knowledge and true opinion2 the fifth1  
to pure pleasures2 and here the ,muse   
says ',enough4'  ',bidding farewell to  

,philebus and ,socrates1' we may now    
consider the metaphysical conceptions   
which are presented to us4 ,these are   
7,i7 the paradox of unity and plurality2
 7,,ii7 the table of categories or      
elements2 7,,iii7 the kinds of pleasure2
 7,,iv7 the kinds of knowledge2 7,v7 the
 conception of the good4 ,we may then   
proceed to examine 7,,vi7 the relation  
of the ,philebus to the ,republic1 and  
to other dialogues4  ,i4 ,the paradox of
 the one and many originated in the     
restless dialectic of ,zeno1 who sought 
to prove the absolute existence of the  
one by showing the contradictions that  
are involved in admitting the existence 
of the many 7compare ,parm474 ,zeno     
illustrated the contradiction by        
well-known examples taken from outward  
objects4 ,but ,socrates seems to        
intimate that the time had arrived for  
discarding these hackneyed              
illustrations2 such difficulties had    
long been solved by common sense        
7'solvitur ambulando'72 the fact of the 

co-existence of opposites was a         
sufficient answer to them4 ,he will     
leave them to ,cynics and ,eristics2 the
 youth of ,athens may discourse of them 
to their parents4 ,to no rational man   
could the circumstance that the body is 
one1 but has many members1 be any longer
 a stumbling-block4  ,plato's difficulty
 seems to begin in the region of ideas4 
,he cannot understand how an absolute   
unity1 such as the ,eleatic ,being1 can 
be broken up into a number of           
individuals1 or be in and out of them at
 once4 ,philosophy had so deepened or   
intensified the nature of one or ,being1
 by the thoughts of successive          
generations1 that the mind could no     
longer imagine ',being' as in a state of
 change or division4 ,to say that the   
verb of existence is the copula1 or that
 unity is a mere unit1 is to us easy2   
but to the ,greek in a particular stage 
of thought such an analysis involved the
 same kind of difficulty as the         
conception of ,god existing both in and 

out of the world would to ourselves4    
,nor was he assisted by the analogy of  
sensible objects4 ,the sphere of mind   
was dark and mysterious to him2 but     
instead of being illustrated by sense1  
the greatest light appeared to be thrown
 on the nature of ideas when they were  
contrasted with sense4  ,both here and  
in the ,parmenides1 where similar       
difficulties are raised1 ,plato seems   
prepared to desert his ancient ground4  
,he cannot tell the relation in which   
abstract ideas stand to one another1 and
 therefore he transfers the one and many
 out of his transcendental world1 and   
proceeds to lay down practical rules for
 their application to different branches
 of knowledge4 ,as in the ,republic he  
supposes the philosopher to proceed by  
regular steps1 until he arrives at the  
idea of good2 as in the ,sophist and    
,politicus he insists that in dividing  
the whole into its parts we should      
bisect in the middle in the hope of     
finding species2 as in the ,phaedrus    

7see above7 he would have 'no limb      
broken' of the organism of              
knowledge2--so in the ,philebus he urges
 the necessity of filling up all the    
intermediate links which occur 7compare 
,bacon's 'media axiomata'7 in the       
passage from unity to infinity4 ,with   
him the idea of science may be said to  
anticipate science2 at a time when the  
sciences were not yet divided1 he wants 
to impress upon us the importance of    
classification2 neither neglecting the  
many individuals1 nor attempting to     
count them all1 but finding the genera  
and species under which they naturally  
fall4 ,here1 then1 and in the parallel  
passages of the ,phaedrus and of the    
,sophist1 is found the germ of the most 
fruitful notion of modern science4      
,plato describes with ludicrous         
exaggeration the influence exerted by   
the one and many on the minds of young  
men in their first fervour of           
metaphysical enthusiasm 7compare        
,republic74 ,but they are none the less 

an everlasting quality of reason or     
reasoning which never grows old in us4  
,at first we have but a confused        
conception of them1 analogous to the    
eyes blinking at the light in the       
,republic4 ,to this ,plato opposes the  
revelation from ,heaven of the real     
relations of them1 which some           
,prometheus1 who gave the true fire from
 heaven1 is supposed to have imparted to
 us4 ,plato is speaking of two          
things--7#a7 the crude notion of the one
 and many1 which powerfully affects the 
ordinary mind when first beginning to   
think2 7#b7 the same notion when cleared
 up by the help of dialectic4  ,to us   
the problem of the one and many has lost
 its chief interest and perplexity4 ,we 
readily acknowledge that a whole has    
many parts1 that the continuous is also 
the divisible1 that in all objects of   
sense there is a one and many1 and that 
a like principle may be applied to      
analogy to purely intellectual          
conceptions4 ,if we attend to the       

meaning of the words1 we are compelled  
to admit that two contradictory         
statements are true4 ,but the antinomy  
is so familiar as to be scarcely        
observed by us4 ,our sense of the       
contradiction1 like ,plato's1 only      
begins in a higher sphere1 when we speak
 of necessity and free-will1 of mind and
 body1 of ,three ,persons and ,one      
,substance1 and the like4 ,the world of 
knowledge is always dividing more and   
more2 every truth is at first the enemy 
of every other truth4 ,yet without this 
division there can be no truth2 nor any 
complete truth without the reunion of   
the parts into a whole4 ,and hence the  
coexistence of opposites in the unity of
 the idea is regarded by ,hegel as the  
supreme principle of philosophy2 and the
 law of contradiction1 which is affirmed
 by logicians to be an ultimate         
principle of the human mind1 is         
displaced by another law1 which asserts 
the coexistence of contradictories as   
imperfect and divided elements of the   

truth4 ,without entering further into   
the depths of ,hegelianism1 we may      
remark that this and all similar        
attempts to reconcile antinomies have   
their origin in the old ,platonic       
problem of the ',one and ,many4'  ,,ii4 
#a4 ,the first of ,plato's categories or
 elements is the infinite4 ,this is the 
negative of measure or limit2 the       
unthinkable1 the unknowable2 of which   
nothing can be affirmed2 the mixture or 
chaos which preceded distinct kinds in  
the creation of the world2 the first    
vague impression of sense2 the more or  
less which refuses to be reduced to     
rule1 having certain affinities with    
evil1 with pleasure1 with ignorance1 and
 which in the scale of being is farthest
 removed from the beautiful and good4   
,to a ,greek of the age of ,plato1 the  
idea of an infinite mind would have been
 an absurdity4 ,he would have insisted  
that 'the good is of the nature of the  
finite1' and that the infinite is a mere
 negative1 which is on the level of     

sensation1 and not of thought4 ,he was  
aware that there was a distinction      
between the infinitely great and the    
infinitely small1 but he would have     
equally denied the claim of either to   
true existence4 ,of that positive       
infinity1 or infinite reality1 which we 
attribute to ,god1 he had no conception4
  ,the ,greek conception of the infinite
 would be more truly described1 in our  
way of speaking1 as the indefinite4 ,to 
us1 the notion of infinity is subsequent
 rather than prior to the finite1       
expressing not absolute vacancy or      
negation1 but only the removal of limit 
or restraint1 which we suppose to exist 
not before but after we have already set
 bounds to thought and matter1 and      
divided them after their kinds4 ,from   
different points of view1 either the    
finite or infinite may be looked upon   
respectively both as positive and       
negative 7compare ',omnis determinatio  
est negatio'7' and the conception of the
 one determines that of the other4 ,the 

,greeks and the moderns seem to be      
nearly at the opposite poles in their   
manner of regarding them4 ,and both are 
surprised when they make the discovery1 
as ,plato has done in the ,sophist1 how 
large an element negation forms in the  
framework of their thoughts4  #b1 #c4   
,the finite element which mingles with  
and regulates the infinite is best      
expressed to us by the word 'law4' ,it  
is that which measures all things and   
assigns to them their limit2 which      
preserves them in their natural state1  
and brings them within the sphere of    
human cognition4 ,this is described by  
the terms harmony1 health1 order1       
perfection1 and the like4 ,all things1  
in as far as they are good1 even        
pleasures1 which are for the most part  
indefinite1 partake of this element4 ,we
 should be wrong in attributing to      
,plato the conception of laws of nature 
derived from observation and experiment4
 ,and yet he has as intense a conviction
 as any modern philosopher that nature  

does not proceed by chance4 ,but        
observing that the wonderful            
construction of number and figure1 which
 he had within himself1 and which seemed
 to be prior to himself1 explained a    
part of the phenomena of the external   
world1 he extended their principles to  
the whole1 finding in them the true type
 both of human life and of the order of 
nature4  ,two other points may be       
noticed respecting the third class4     
,first1 that ,plato seems to be         
unconscious of any interval or chasm    
which separates the finite from the     
infinite4 ,the one is in various ways   
and degrees working in the other4 ,hence
 he has implicitly answered the         
difficulty with which he started1 of how
 the one could remain one and yet be    
divided among many individuals1 or 'how 
ideas could be in and out of            
themselves1' and the like4 ,secondly1   
that in this mixed class we find the    
idea of beauty4 ,good1 when exhibited   
under the aspect of measure or symmetry1

 becomes beauty4 ,and if we translate   
his language into corresponding modern  
terms1 we shall not be far wrong in     
saying that here1 as well as in the     
,republic1 ,plato conceives beauty under
 the idea of proportion4  #d4 ,last and 
highest in the list of principles or    
elements is the cause of the union of   
the finite and infinite1 to which ,plato
 ascribes the order of the world4       
,reasoning from man to the universe1 he 
argues that as there is a mind in the   
one1 there must be a mind in the other1 
which he identifies with the royal mind 
of ,zeus4 ,this is the first cause of   
which 'our ancestors spoke1' as he says1
 appealing to tradition1 in the         
,philebus as well as in the ,timaeus4   
,the 'one and many' is also supposed to 
have been revealed by tradition4 ,for   
the mythical element has not altogether 
disappeared4  ,some characteristic      
differences may here be noted1 which    
distinguish the ancient from the modern 
mode of conceiving ,god4  a4 ,to ,plato1

 the idea of ,god or mind is both       
personal and impersonal4 ,nor in        
ascribing1 as appears to us1 both these 
attributes to him1 and in speaking of   
,god both in the masculine and neuter   
gender1 did he seem to himself          
inconsistent4 ,for the difference       
between the personal and impersonal was 
not marked to him as to ourselves4 ,we  
make a fundamental distinction between a
 thing and a person1 while to ,plato1 by
 the help of various intermediate       
abstractions1 such as end1 good1 cause1 
they appear almost to meet in one1 or to
 be two aspects of the same4 ,hence1    
without any reconciliation or even      
remark1 in the ,republic he speaks at   
one time of ,god or ,gods1 and at       
another time of the ,good4 ,so in the   
,phaedrus he seems to pass unconsciously
 from the concrete to the abstract      
conception of the ,ideas in the same    
dialogue4 ,nor in the ,philebus is he   
careful to show in what relation the    
idea of the divine mind stands to the   

supreme principle of measure4  b4       
,again1 to us there is a strongly-marked
 distinction between a first cause and a
 final cause4 ,and we should commonly   
identify a first cause with ,god1 and   
the final cause with the world1 which is
 ,his work4 ,but ,plato1 though not a   
,pantheist1 and very far from           
confounding ,god with the world1 tends  
to identify the first with the final    
cause4 ,the cause of the union of the   
finite and infinite might be described  
as a higher law2 the final measure which
 is the highest expression of the good  
may also be described as the supreme    
law4 ,both these conceptions are        
realized chiefly by the help of the     
material world2 and therefore when we   
pass into the sphere of ideas can hardly
 be distinguished4  ,the four principles
 are required for the determination of  
the relative places of pleasure and     
wisdom4 ,plato has been saying that we  
should proceed by regular steps from the
 one to the many4 ,accordingly1 before  

assigning the precedence either to good 
or pleasure1 he must first find out and 
arrange in order the general principles 
of things4 ,mind is ascertained to be   
akin to the nature of the cause1 while  
pleasure is found in the infinite or    
indefinite class4 ,we may now proceed to
 divide pleasure and knowledge after    
their kinds4  ,,iii4 #a4 ,plato speaks  
of pleasure as indefinite1 as relative1 
as a generation1 and in all these points
 of view as in a category distinct from 
good4 ,for again we must repeat1 that to
 the ,greek 'the good is of the nature  
of the finite1' and1 like virtue1 either
 is1 or is nearly allied to1 knowledge4 
,the modern philosopher would remark    
that the indefinite is equally real with
 the definite4 ,health and mental       
qualities are in the concrete undefined2
 they are nevertheless real goods1 and  
,plato rightly regards them as falling  
under the finite class4 ,again1 we are  
able to define objects or ideas1 not in 
so far as they are in the mind1 but in  

so far as they are manifested           
externally1 and can therefore be reduced
 to rule and measure4 ,and if we adopt  
the test of definiteness1 the pleasures 
of the body are more capable of being   
defined than any other pleasures4 ,as in
 art and knowledge generally1 we proceed
 from without inwards1 beginning with   
facts of sense1 and passing to the more 
ideal conceptions of mental pleasure1   
happiness1 and the like4  #b4 ,pleasure 
is depreciated as relative1 while good  
is exalted as absolute4 ,but this       
distinction seems to arise from an      
unfair mode of regarding them2 the      
abstract idea of the one is compared    
with the concrete experience of the     
other4 ,for all pleasure and all        
knowledge may be viewed either          
abstracted from the mind1 or in relation
 to the mind 7compare ,aristot4 ,nic4   
,ethics74 ,the first is an idea only1   
which may be conceived as absolute and  
unchangeable1 and then the abstract idea
 of pleasure will be equally            

unchangeable with that of knowledge4    
,but when we come to view either as     
phenomena of consciousness1 the same    
defects are for the most part incident  
to both of them4 ,our hold upon them is 
equally transient and uncertain2 the    
mind cannot be always in a state of     
intellectual tension1 any more than     
capable of feeling pleasure always4 ,the
 knowledge which is at one time clear   
and distinct1 at another seems to fade  
away1 just as the pleasure of health    
after sickness1 or of eating after      
hunger1 soon passes into a neutral state
 of unconsciousness and indifference4   
,change and alternation are necessary   
for the mind as well as for the body2   
and in this is to be acknowledged1 not  
an element of evil1 but rather a law of 
nature4 ,the chief difference between   
subjective pleasure and subjective      
knowledge in respect of permanence is   
that the latter1 when our feeble        
faculties are able to grasp it1 still   
conveys to us an idea of                

unchangeableness which cannot be got rid
 of4  #c4 ,in the language of ancient   
philosophy1 the relative character of   
pleasure is described as becoming or    
generation4 ,this is relative to ,being 
or ,essence1 and from one point of view 
may be regarded as the ,heraclitean flux
 in contrast with the ,eleatic ,being2  
from another1 as the transient enjoyment
 of eating and drinking compared with   
the supposed permanence of intellectual 
pleasures4 ,but to us the distinction is
 unmeaning1 and belongs to a stage of   
philosophy which has passed away4 ,plato
 himself seems to have suspected that   
the continuance or life of things is    
quite as much to be attributed to a     
principle of rest as of motion 7compare 
,charm4 ,cratyl474 ,a later view of     
pleasure is found in ,aristotle1 who    
agrees with ,plato in many points1 e4g4 
in his view of pleasure as a restoration
 to nature1 in his distinction between  
bodily and mental1 between necessary and
 non-necessary pleasures4 ,but he is    

also in advance of ,plato2 for he       
affirms that pleasure is not in the body
 at all2 and hence not even the bodily  
pleasures are to be spoken of as        
generations1 but only as accompanied by 
generation 7,nic4 ,eth474  #d4 ,plato   
attempts to identify vicious pleasures  
with some form of error1 and insists    
that the term false may be applied to   
them3 in this he appears to be carrying 
out in a confused manner the ,socratic  
doctrine1 that virtue is knowledge1 vice
 ignorance4 ,he will allow of no        
distinction between the pleasures and   
the erroneous opinions on which they are
 founded1 whether arising out of the    
illusion of distance or not4 ,but to    
this we naturally reply with            
,protarchus1 that the pleasure is what  
it is1 although the calculation may be  
false1 or the after-effects painful4 ,it
 is difficult to acquit ,plato1 to use  
his own language1 of being a 'tyro in   
dialectics1' when he overlooks such a   
distinction4 ,yet1 on the other hand1 we

 are hardly fair judges of confusions of
 thought in those who view things       
differently from ourselves4  #e4 ,there 
appears also to be an incorrectness in  
the notion which occurs both here and in
 the ,gorgias1 of the simultaneousness  
of merely bodily pleasures and pains4   
,we may1 perhaps1 admit1 though even    
this is not free from doubt1 that the   
feeling of pleasureable hope or         
recollection is1 or rather may be1      
simultaneous with acute bodily          
suffering4 ,but there is no such        
coexistence of the pain of thirst with  
the pleasures of drinking2 they are not 
really simultaneous1 for the one expels 
the other4 ,nor does ,plato seem to have
 considered that the bodily pleasures1  
except in certain extreme cases1 are    
unattended with pain4 ,few philosophers 
will deny that a degree of pleasure     
attends eating and drinking2 and yet    
surely we might as well speak of the    
pains of digestion which follow1 as of  
the pains of hunger and thirst which    

precede them4 ,plato's conception is    
derived partly from the extreme case of 
a man suffering pain from hunger or     
thirst1 partly from the image of a full 
and empty vessel4 ,but the truth is     
rather1 that while the gratification of 
our bodily desires constantly affords   
some degree of pleasure1 the antecedent 
pains are scarcely perceived by us1     
being almost done away with by use and  
regularity4  #f4 ,the desire to classify
 pleasures as accompanied or not        
accompanied by antecedent pains1 has led
 ,plato to place under one head the     
pleasures of smell and sight1 as well as
 those derived from sounds of music and 
from knowledge4 ,he would have done     
better to make a separate class of the  
pleasures of smell1 having no           
association of mind1 or perhaps to have 
divided them into natural and           
artificial4 ,the pleasures of sight and 
sound might then have been regarded as  
being the expression of ideas4 ,but this
 higher and truer point of view never   

appears to have occurred to ,plato4 ,nor
 has he any distinction between the fine
 arts and the mechanical2 and1 neither  
here nor anywhere1 an adequate          
conception of the beautiful in external 
things4  #g4 ,plato agrees partially    
with certain 'surly or fastidious'      
philosophers1 as he terms them1 who     
defined pleasure to be the absence of   
pain4 ,they are also described as       
eminent in physics4 ,there is           
unfortunately no school of ,greek       
philosophy known to us which combined   
these two characteristics4 ,antisthenes1
 who was an enemy of pleasure1 was not a
 physical philosopher2 the atomists1 who
 were physical philosophers1 were not   
enemies of pleasure4 ,yet such a        
combination of opinions is far from     
being impossible4 ,plato's omission to  
mention them by name has created the    
same uncertainty respecting them which  
also occurs respecting the 'friends of  
the ideas' and the 'materialists' in the
 ,sophist4  ,on the whole1 this         

discussion is one of the least          
satisfactory in the dialogues of ,plato4
 ,while the ethical nature of pleasure  
is scarcely considered1 and the merely  
physical phenomenon imperfectly         
analysed1 too much weight is given to   
ideas of measure and number1 as the sole
 principle of good4 ,the comparison of  
pleasure and knowledge is really a      
comparison of two elements1 which have  
no common measure1 and which cannot be  
excluded from each other4 ,feeling is   
not opposed to knowledge1 and in all    
consciousness there is an element of    
both4 ,the most abstract kinds of       
knowledge are inseparable from some     
pleasure or pain1 which accompanies the 
acquisition or possession of them3 the  
student is liable to grow weary of them1
 and soon discovers that continuous     
mental energy is not granted to men4    
,the most sensual pleasure1 on the other
 hand1 is inseparable from the          
consciousness of pleasure2 no man can be
 happy who1 to borrow ,plato's          

illustration1 is leading the life of an 
oyster4 ,hence 7by his own confession7  
the main thesis is not worth            
determining2 the real interest lies in  
the incidental discussion4 ,we can no   
more separate pleasure from knowledge in
 the ,philebus than we can separate     
justice from happiness in the ,republic4
  ,,iv4 ,an interesting account is given
 in the ,philebus of the rank and order 
of the sciences or arts1 which agrees   
generally with the scheme of knowledge  
in the ,sixth ,book of the ,republic4   
,the chief difference is1 that the      
position of the arts is more exactly    
defined4 ,they are divided into an      
empirical part and a scientific part1 of
 which the first is mere guess-work1 the
 second is determined by rule and       
measure4 ,of the more empirical arts1   
music is given as an example2 this1     
although affirmed to be necessary to    
human life1 is depreciated4 ,music is   
regarded from a point of view entirely  
opposite to that of the ,republic1 not  

as a sublime science1 coordinate with   
astronomy1 but as full of doubt and     
conjecture4 ,according to the standard  
of accuracy which is here adopted1 it is
 rightly placed lower in the scale than 
carpentering1 because the latter is more
 capable of being reduced to measure4   
,the theoretical element of the arts may
 also become a purely abstract science1 
when separated from matter1 and is then 
said to be pure and unmixed4 ,the       
distinction which ,plato here makes     
seems to be the same as that between    
pure and applied mathematics1 and may be
 expressed in the modern                
formula--science is art theoretical1 art
 is science practical4 ,in the reason   
which he gives for the superiority of   
the pure science of number over the     
mixed or applied1 we can only agree with
 him in part4 ,he says that the numbers 
which the philosopher employs are always
 the same1 whereas the numbers which are
 used in practice represent different   
sizes or quantities4 ,he does not see   

that this power of expressing different 
quantities by the same symbol is the    
characteristic and not the defect of    
numbers1 and is due to their abstract   
nature2--although we admit of course    
what ,plato seems to feel in his        
distinctions between pure and impure    
knowledge1 that the imperfection of     
matter enters into the applications of  
them4  ,above the other sciences1 as in 
the ,republic1 towers dialectic1 which  
is the science of eternal ,being1       
apprehended by the purest mind and      
reason4 ,the lower sciences1 including  
the mathematical1 are akin to opinion   
rather than to reason1 and are placed   
together in the fourth class of goods4  
,the relation in which they stand to    
dialectic is obscure in the ,republic1  
and is not cleared up in the ,philebus4 
,v4 ,thus far we have only attained to  
the vestibule or ante-chamber of the    
good2 for there is a good exceeding     
knowledge1 exceeding essence1 which1    
like ,glaucon in the ,republic1 we find 

a difficulty in apprehending4 ,this good
 is now to be exhibited to us under     
various aspects and gradations4 ,the    
relative dignity of pleasure and        
knowledge has been determined2 but they 
have not yet received their exact       
position in the scale of goods4 ,some   
difficulties occur to us in the         
enumeration3 ,first1 how are we to      
distinguish the first from the second   
class of goods1 or the second from the  
third8 ,secondly1 why is there no       
mention of the supreme mind8 ,thirdly1  
the nature of the fourth class4         
,fourthly1 the meaning of the allusion  
to a sixth class1 which is not further  
investigated4  7,i7 ,plato seems to     
proceed in his table of goods1 from the 
more abstract to the less abstract2 from
 the subjective to the objective2 until 
at the lower end of the scale we fairly 
descend into the region of human action 
and feeling4 ,to him1 the greater the   
abstraction the greater the truth1 and  
he is always tending to see abstractions

 within abstractions2 which1 like the   
ideas in the ,parmenides1 are always    
appearing one behind another4 ,hence we 
find a difficulty in following him into 
the sphere of thought which he is       
seeking to attain4 ,first in his scale  
of goods he places measure1 in which he 
finds the eternal nature3 this would be 
more naturally expressed in modern      
language as eternal law1 and seems to be
 akin both to the finite and to the mind
 or cause1 which were two of the        
elements in the former table4 ,like the 
supreme nature in the ,timaeus1 like the
 ideal beauty in the ,symposium or the  
,phaedrus1 or like the ideal good in the
 ,republic1 this is the absolute and    
unapproachable being4 ,but this being is
 manifested in symmetry and beauty      
everywhere1 in the order of nature and  
of mind1 in the relations of men to one 
another4 ,for the word 'measure' he now 
substitutes the word 'symmetry1' as if  
intending to express measure conceived  
as relation4 ,he then proceeds to regard

 the good no longer in an objective     
form1 but as the human reason seeking to
 attain truth by the aid of dialectic2  
such at least we naturally infer to be  
his meaning1 when we consider that both 
here and in the ,republic the sphere of 
nous or mind is assigned to dialectic4  
7#b7 ,it is remarkable 7see above7 that 
this personal conception of mind is     
confined to the human mind1 and not     
extended to the divine4 7#c7 ,if we may 
be allowed to interpret one dialogue of 
,plato by another1 the sciences of      
figure and number are probably classed  
with the arts and true opinions1 because
 they proceed from hypotheses 7compare  
,republic74 7#d7 ,the sixth class1 if a 
sixth class is to be added1 is playfully
 set aside by a quotation from ,orpheus3
 ,plato means to say that a sixth class1
 if there be such a class1 is not worth 
considering1 because pleasure1 having   
only gained the fifth place in the scale
 of goods1 is already out of the        
running4  ,,vi4 ,we may now endeavour to

 ascertain the relation of the ,philebus
 to the other dialogues4 ,here ,plato   
shows the same indifference to his own  
doctrine of ,ideas which he has already 
manifested in the ,parmenides and the   
,sophist4 ,the principle of the one and 
many of which he here speaks1 is        
illustrated by examples in the ,sophist 
and ,statesman4 ,notwithstanding the    
differences of style1 many resemblances 
may be noticed between the ,philebus and
 ,gorgias4 ,the theory of the           
simultaneousness of pleasure and pain is
 common to both of them 7,phil4 ,gorg472
 there is also a common tendency in them
 to take up arms against pleasure1      
although the view of the ,philebus1     
which is probably the later of the two  
dialogues1 is the more moderate4 ,there 
seems to be an allusion to the passage  
in the ,gorgias1 in which ,socrates     
dilates on the pleasures of itching and 
scratching4 ,nor is there any real      
discrepancy in the manner in which      
,gorgias and his art are spoken of in   

the two dialogues4 ,for ,socrates is far
 from implying that the art of rhetoric 
has a real sphere of practical          
usefulness3 he only means that the      
refutation of the claims of ,gorgias is 
not necessary for his present purpose4  
,he is saying in effect3 ',admit1 if you
 please1 that rhetoric is the greatest  
and usefullest of sciences3--this does  
not prove that dialectic is not the     
purest and most exact4' ,from the       
,sophist and ,statesman we know that his
 hostility towards the sophists and     
rhetoricians was not mitigated in later 
life2 although both in the ,statesman   
and ,laws he admits of a higher use of  
rhetoric4  ,reasons have been already   
given for assigning a late date to the  
,philebus4 ,that the date is probably   
later than that of the ,republic1 may be
 further argued on the following        
grounds3--#a4 ,the general resemblance  
to the later dialogues and to the ,laws3
 #b4 ,the more complete account of the  
nature of good and pleasure3 #c4 ,the   

distinction between perception1 memory1 
recollection1 and opinion which         
indicates a great progress in           
psychology2 also between understanding  
and imagination1 which is described     
under the figure of the scribe and the  
painter4 ,a superficial notion may arise
 that ,plato probably wrote shorter     
dialogues1 such as the ,philebus1 the   
,sophist1 and the ,statesman1 as studies
 or preparations for longer ones4 ,this 
view may be natural2 but on further     
reflection is seen to be fallacious1    
because these three dialogues are found 
to make an advance upon the metaphysical
 conceptions of the ,republic4 ,and we  
can more easily suppose that ,plato     
composed shorter writings after longer  
ones1 than suppose that he lost hold of 
further points of view which he had once
 attained4  ,it is more easy to find    
traces of the ,pythagoreans1 ,eleatics1 
,megarians1 ,cynics1 ,cyrenaics and of  
the ideas of ,anaxagoras1 in the        
,philebus1 than to say how much is due  

to each of them4 ,had we fuller records 
of those old philosophers1 we should    
probably find ,plato in the midst of the
 fray attempting to combine ,eleatic and
 ,pythagorean doctrines1 and seeking to 
find a truth beyond either ,being or    
number2 setting up his own concrete     
conception of good against the abstract 
practical good of the ,cynics1 or the   
abstract intellectual good of the       
,megarians1 and his own idea of         
classification against the denial of    
plurality in unity which is also        
attributed to them2 warring against the 
,eristics as destructive of truth1 as he
 had formerly fought against the        
,sophists2 taking up a middle position  
between the ,cynics and ,cyrenaics in   
his doctrine of pleasure2 asserting with
 more consistency than ,anaxagoras the  
existence of an intelligent mind and    
cause4 ,of the ,heracliteans1 whom he is
 said by ,aristotle to have cultivated  
in his youth1 he speaks in the          
,philebus1 as in the ,theaetetus and    

,cratylus1 with irony and contempt4 ,but
 we have not the knowledge which would  
enable us to pursue further the line of 
reflection here indicated2 nor can we   
expect to find perfect clearness or     
order in the first efforts of mankind to
 understand the working of their own    
minds4 ,the ideas which they are        
attempting to analyse1 they are also in 
process of creating2 the abstract       
universals of which they are seeking to 
adjust the relations have been already  
excluded by them from the category of   
relation4  444  ,the ,philebus1 like the
 ,cratylus1 is supposed to be the       
continuation of a previous discussion4  
,an argument respecting the comparative 
claims of pleasure and wisdom to rank as
 the chief good has been already carried
 on between ,philebus and ,socrates4    
,the argument is now transferred to     
,protarchus1 the son of ,callias1 a     
noble ,athenian youth1 sprung from a    
family which had spent 'a world of      
money' on the ,sophists 7compare ,apol42

 ,crat42 ,protag474 ,philebus1 who      
appears to be the teacher1 or elder     
friend1 and perhaps the lover1 of       
,protarchus1 takes no further part in   
the discussion beyond asserting in the  
strongest manner his adherence1 under   
all circumstances1 to the cause of      
pleasure4  ,socrates suggests that they 
shall have a first and second palm of   
victory4 ,for there may be a good higher
 than either pleasure or wisdom1 and    
then neither of them will gain the first
 prize1 but whichever of the two is more
 akin to this higher good will have a   
right to the second4 ,they agree1 and   
,socrates opens the game by enlarging on
 the diversity and opposition which     
exists among pleasures4 ,for there are  
pleasures of all kinds1 good and bad1   
wise and foolish--pleasures of the      
temperate as well as of the intemperate4
 ,protarchus replies that although      
pleasures may be opposed in so far as   
they spring from opposite sources1      
nevertheless as pleasures they are      

alike4 ,yes1 retorts ,socrates1 pleasure
 is like pleasure1 as figure is like    
figure and colour like colour2 yet we   
all know that there is great variety    
among figures and colours4 ,protarchus  
does not see the drift of this remark2  
and ,socrates proceeds to ask how he can
 have a right to attribute a new        
predicate 7i4e4 'good'7 to pleasures in 
general1 when he cannot deny that they  
are different8 ,what common property in 
all of them does he mean to indicate by 
the term 'good'8 ,if he continues to    
assert that there is some trivial sense 
in which pleasure is one1 ,socrates may 
retort by saying that knowledge is one1 
but the result will be that such merely 
verbal and trivial conceptions1 whether 
of knowledge or pleasure1 will spoil the
 discussion1 and will prove the         
incapacity of the two disputants4 ,in   
order to avoid this danger1 he proposes 
that they shall beat a retreat1 and1    
before they proceed1 come to an         
understanding about the 'high argument' 

of the one and the many4  ,protarchus   
agrees to the proposal1 but he is under 
the impression that ,socrates means to  
discuss the common question--how a      
sensible object can be one1 and yet have
 opposite attributes1 such as 'great'   
and 'small1' 'light' and 'heavy1' or how
 there can be many members in one body1 
and the like wonders4 ,socrates has long
 ceased to see any wonder in these      
phenomena2 his difficulties begin with  
the application of number to abstract   
unities 7e4g4'man1' 'good'7 and with the
 attempt to divide them4 ,for have these
 unities of idea any real existence8    
,how1 if imperishable1 can they enter   
into the world of generation8 ,how1 as  
units1 can they be divided and dispersed
 among different objects8 ,or do they   
exist in their entirety in each object8 
,these difficulties are but imperfectly 
answered by ,socrates in what follows4  
,we speak of a one and many1 which is   
ever flowing in and out of all things1  
concerning which a young man often runs 

wild in his first metaphysical          
enthusiasm1 talking about analysis and  
synthesis to his father and mother and  
the neighbours1 hardly sparing even his 
dog4 ,this 'one in many' is a revelation
 of the order of the world1 which some  
,prometheus first made known to our     
ancestors2 and they1 who were better men
 and nearer the gods than we are1 have  
handed it down to us4 ,to know how to   
proceed by regular steps from one to    
many1 and from many to one1 is just what
 makes the difference between eristic   
and dialectic4 ,and the right way of    
proceeding is to look for one idea or   
class in all things1 and when you have  
found one to look for more than one1 and
 for all that there are1 and when you   
have found them all and regularly       
divided a particular field of knowledge 
into classes1 you may leave the further 
consideration of individuals4 ,but you  
must not pass at once either from unity 
to infinity1 or from infinity to unity4 
,in music1 for example1 you may begin   

with the most general notion1 but this  
alone will not make you a musician3 you 
must know also the number and nature of 
the intervals1 and the systems which are
 framed out of them1 and the rhythms of 
the dance which correspond to them4 ,and
 when you have a similar knowledge of   
any other subject1 you may be said to   
know that subject4 ,in speech again     
there are infinite varieties of sound1  
and some one who was a wise man1 or more
 than man1 comprehended them all in the 
classes of mutes1 vowels1 and           
semivowels1 and gave to each of them a  
name1 and assigned them to the art of   
grammar4  ',but whither1 ,socrates1 are 
you going8 ,and what has this to do with
 the comparative eligibility of pleasure
 and wisdom3' ,socrates replies1 that   
before we can adjust their respective   
claims1 we want to know the number and  
kinds of both of them4 ,what are they8  
,he is requested to answer the question 
himself4 ,that he will1 if he may be    
allowed to make one or two preliminary  

remarks4 ,in the first place he has a   
dreamy recollection of hearing that     
neither pleasure nor knowledge is the   
highest good1 for the good should be    
perfect and sufficient4 ,but is the life
 of pleasure perfect and sufficient1    
when deprived of memory1 consciousness1 
anticipation8 ,is not this the life of  
an oyster8 ,or is the life of mind      
sufficient1 if devoid of any particle of
 pleasure8 ,must not the union of the   
two be higher and more eligible than    
either separately8 ,and is not the      
element which makes this mixed life     
eligible more akin to mind than to      
pleasure8 ,thus pleasure is rejected and
 mind is rejected4 ,and yet there may be
 a life of mind1 not human but divine1  
which conquers still4  ,but1 if we are  
to pursue this argument further1 we     
shall require some new weapons2 and by  
this1 ,i mean a new classification of   
existence4 7#a7 ,there is a finite      
element of existence1 and 7#b7 an       
infinite1 and 7#c7 the union of the two1

 and 7#d7 the cause of the union4 ,more 
may be added if they are wanted1 but at 
present we can do without them4 ,and    
first of the infinite or                
indefinite3--,that is the class which is
 denoted by the terms more or less1 and 
is always in a state of comparison4 ,all
 words or ideas to which the words      
'gently1' 'extremely1' and other        
comparative expressions are applied1    
fall under this class4 ,the infinite    
would be no longer infinite1 if limited 
or reduced to measure by number and     
quantity4 ,the opposite class is the    
limited or finite1 and includes all     
things which have number and quantity4  
,and there is a third class of          
generation into essence by the union of 
the finite and infinite1 in which the   
finite gives law to the infinite2--under
 this are comprehended health1 strength1
 temperate seasons1 harmony1 beauty1 and
 the like4 ,the goddess of beauty saw   
the universal wantonness of all things1 
and gave law and order to be the        

salvation of the soul4 ,but no effect   
can be generated without a cause1 and   
therefore there must be a fourth class1 
which is the cause of generation2 for   
the cause or agent is not the same as   
the patient or effect4  ,and now1 having
 obtained our classes1 we may determine 
in which our conqueror life is to be    
placed3 ,clearly in the third or mixed  
class1 in which the finite gives law to 
the infinite4 ,and in which is pleasure 
to find a place8 ,as clearly in the     
infinite or indefinite1 which alone1 as 
,protarchus thinks 7who seems to confuse
 the infinite with the superlative71    
gives to pleasure the character of the  
absolute good4 ,yes1 retorts ,socrates1 
and also to pain the character of       
absolute evil4 ,and therefore the       
infinite cannot be that which imparts to
 pleasure the nature of the good4 ,but  
where shall we place mind8 ,that is a   
very serious and awful question1 which  
may be prefaced by another4 ,is mind or 
chance the lord of the universe8 ,all   

philosophers will say the first1 and    
yet1 perhaps1 they may be only          
magnifying themselves4 ,and for this    
reason ,i should like to consider the   
matter a little more deeply1 even though
 some lovers of disorder in the world   
should ridicule my attempt4  ,now the   
elements earth1 air1 fire1 water1 exist 
in us1 and they exist in the cosmos2 but
 they are purer and fairer in the cosmos
 than they are in us1 and they come to  
us from thence4 ,and as we have a soul  
as well as a body1 in like manner the   
elements of the finite1 the infinite1   
the union of the two1 and the cause1 are
 found to exist in us4 ,and if they1    
like the elements1 exist in us1 and the 
three first exist in the world1 must not
 the fourth or cause which is the       
noblest of them1 exist in the world8    
,and this cause is wisdom or mind1 the  
royal mind of ,zeus1 who is the king of 
all1 as there are other gods who have   
other noble attributes4 ,observe how    
well this agrees with the testimony of  

men of old1 who affirmed mind to be the 
ruler of the universe4 ,and remember    
that mind belongs to the class which we 
term the cause1 and pleasure to the     
infinite or indefinite class4 ,we will  
examine the place and origin of both4   
,what is the origin of pleasure8 ,her   
natural seat is the mixed class1 in     
which health and harmony were placed4   
,pain is the violation1 and pleasure the
 restoration of limit4 ,there is a      
natural union of finite and infinite1   
which in hunger1 thirst1 heat1 cold1 is 
impaired--this is painful1 but the      
return to nature1 in which the elements 
are restored to their normal            
proportions1 is pleasant4 ,here is our  
first class of pleasures4 ,and another  
class of pleasures and pains are hopes  
and fears2 these are in the mind only4  
,and inasmuch as the pleasures are      
unalloyed by pains and the pains by     
pleasures1 the examination of them may  
show us whether all pleasure is to be   
desired1 or whether this entire         

desirableness is not rather the         
attribute of another class4 ,but if     
pleasures and pains consist in the      
violation and restoration of limit1 may 
there not be a neutral state1 in which  
there is neither dissolution nor        
restoration8 ,that is a further         
question1 and admitting1 as we must1 the
 possibility of such a state1 there     
seems to be no reason why the life of   
wisdom should not exist in this neutral 
state1 which is1 moreover1 the state of 
the gods1 who cannot1 without indecency1
 be supposed to feel either joy or      
sorrow4  ,the second class of pleasures 
involves memory4 ,there are affections  
which are extinguished before they reach
 the soul1 and of these there is no     
consciousness1 and therefore no memory4 
,and there are affections which the body
 and soul feel together1 and this       
feeling is termed consciousness4 ,and   
memory is the preservation of           
consciousness1 and reminiscence is the  
recovery of consciousness4 ,now the     

memory of pleasure1 when a man is in    
pain1 is the memory of the opposite of  
his actual bodily state1 and is         
therefore not in the body1 but in the   
mind4 ,and there may be an intermediate 
state1 in which a person is balanced    
between pleasure and pain2 in his body  
there is want which is a cause of pain1 
but in his mind a sure hope of          
replenishment1 which is pleasant4 7,but 
if the hope be converted into despair1  
he has two pains and not a balance of   
pain and pleasure47 ,another question is
 raised3 ,may not pleasures1 like       
opinions1 be true and false8 ,in the    
sense of being real1 both must be       
admitted to be true3 nor can we deny    
that to both of them qualities may be   
attributed2 for pleasures as well as    
opinions may be described as good or    
bad4 ,and though we do not all of us    
allow that there are true and false     
pleasures1 we all acknowledge that there
 are some pleasures associated with     
right opinion1 and others with falsehood

 and ignorance4 ,let us endeavour to    
analyze the nature of this association4 
,opinion is based on perception1 which  
may be correct or mistaken4 ,you may see
 a figure at a distance1 and say first  
of all1 ',this is a man1' and then say1 
',no1 this is an image made by the      
shepherds4' ,and you may affirm this in 
a proposition to your companion1 or make
 the remark mentally to yourself4       
,whether the words are actually spoken  
or not1 on such occasions there is a    
scribe within who registers them1 and a 
painter who paints the images of the    
things which the scribe has written down
 in the soul1--at least that is my own  
notion of the process2 and the words and
 images which are inscribed by them may 
be either true or false2 and they may   
represent either past1 present1 or      
future4 ,and1 representing the future1  
they must also represent the pleasures  
and pains of anticipation--the visions  
of gold and other fancies which are     
never wanting in the mind of man4 ,now  

these hopes1 as they are termed1 are    
propositions1 which are sometimes true1 
and sometimes false2 for the good1 who  
are the friends of the gods1 see true   
pictures of the future1 and the bad     
false ones4 ,and as there may be opinion
 about things which are not1 were not1  
and will not be1 which is opinion still1
 so there may be pleasure about things  
which are not1 were not1 and will not   
be1 which is pleasure still1--that is to
 say1 false pleasure2 and only when     
false1 can pleasure1 like opinion1 be   
vicious4 ,against this conclusion       
,protarchus reclaims4  ,leaving his     
denial for the present1 ,socrates       
proceeds to show that some pleasures are
 false from another point of view4 ,in  
desire1 as we admitted1 the body is     
divided from the soul1 and hence        
pleasures and pains are often           
simultaneous4 ,and we further admitted  
that both of them belonged to the       
infinite class4 ,how1 then1 can we      
compare them8 ,are we not liable1 or    

rather certain1 as in the case of sight1
 to be deceived by distance and         
relation8 ,in this case the pleasures   
and pains are not false because based   
upon false opinion1 but are themselves  
false4 ,and there is another illusion3  
pain has often been said by us to arise 
out of the derangement--pleasure out of 
the restoration--of our nature4 ,but in 
passing from one to the other1 do we not
 experience neutral states1 which       
although they appear pleasureable or    
painful are really neither8 ,for even if
 we admit1 with the wise man whom       
,protarchus loves 7and only a wise man  
could have ever entertained such a      
notion71 that all things are in a       
perpetual flux1 still these changes are 
often unconscious1 and devoid either of 
pleasure or pain4 ,we assume1 then1 that
 there are three states--pleasureable1  
painful1 neutral2 we may embellish a    
little by calling them gold1 silver1 and
 that which is neither4  ,but there are 
certain natural philosophers who will   

not admit a third state4 ,their         
instinctive dislike to pleasure leads   
them to affirm that pleasure is only the
 absence of pain4 ,they are noble       
fellows1 and1 although we do not agree  
with them1 we may use them as diviners  
who will indicate to us the right track4
 ,they will say1 that the nature of     
anything is best known from the         
examination of extreme cases1 e4g4 the  
nature of hardness from the examination 
of the hardest things2 and that the     
nature of pleasure will be best         
understood from an examination of the   
most intense pleasures4 ,now these are  
the pleasures of the body1 not of the   
mind2 the pleasures of disease and not  
of health1 the pleasures of the         
intemperate and not of the temperate4 ,i
 am speaking1 not of the frequency or   
continuance1 but only of the intensity  
of such pleasures1 and this is given    
them by contrast with the pain or       
sickness of body which precedes them4   
,their morbid nature is illustrated by  

the lesser instances of itching and     
scratching1 respecting which ,i swear   
that ,i cannot tell whether they are a  
pleasure or a pain4 7#a7 ,some of these 
arise out of a transition from one state
 of the body to another1 as from cold to
 hot2 7#b7 others are caused by the     
contrast of an internal pain and an     
external pleasure in the body3 sometimes
 the feeling of pain predominates1 as in
 itching and tingling1 when they are    
relieved by scratching2 sometimes the   
feeling of pleasure3 or the pleasure    
which they give may be quite            
overpowering1 and is then accompanied by
 all sorts of unutterable feelings which
 have a death of delights in them4 ,but 
there are also mixed pleasures which are
 in the mind only4 ,for are not love and
 sorrow as well as anger 'sweeter than  
honey1' and also full of pain8 ,is there
 not a mixture of feelings in the       
spectator of tragedy8 and of comedy     
also8 ',i do not understand that last4' 
,well1 then1 with the view of lighting  

up the obscurity of these mixed         
feelings1 let me ask whether envy is    
painful4 ',yes4' ,and yet the envious   
man finds something pleasing in the     
misfortunes of others8 ',true4' ,and    
ignorance is a misfortune8 ',certainly4'
 ,and one form of ignorance is          
self-conceit--a man may fancy himself   
richer1 fairer1 better1 wiser than he   
is8 ',yes4' ,and he who thus deceives   
himself may be strong or weak8 ',he     
may4' ,and if he is strong we fear him1 
and if he is weak we laugh at him1 which
 is a pleasure1 and yet we envy him1    
which is a pain8 ,these mixed feelings  
are the rationale of tragedy and comedy1
 and equally the rationale of the       
greater drama of human life4 7,there    
appears to be some confusion in this    
passage4 ,there is no difficulty in     
seeing that in comedy1 as in tragedy1   
the spectator may view the performance  
with mixed feelings of pain as well as  
of pleasure2 nor is there any difficulty
 in understanding that envy is a mixed  

feeling1 which rejoices not without pain
 at the misfortunes of others1 and      
laughs at their ignorance of themselves4
 ,but ,plato seems to think further that
 he has explained the feeling of the    
spectator in comedy sufficiently by a   
theory which only applies to comedy in  
so far as in comedy we laugh at the     
conceit or weakness of others4 ,he has  
certainly given a very partial          
explanation of the ridiculous47 ,having 
shown how sorrow1 anger1 envy are       
feelings of a mixed nature1 ,i will     
reserve the consideration of the        
remainder for another occasion4  ,next  
follow the unmixed pleasures2 which1    
unlike the philosophers of whom ,i was  
speaking1 ,i believe to be real4 ,these 
unmixed pleasures are3 7#a7 ,the        
pleasures derived from beauty of form1  
colour1 sound1 smell1 which are         
absolutely pure2 and in general those   
which are unalloyed with pain3 7#b7 ,the
 pleasures derived from the acquisition 
of knowledge1 which in themselves are   

pure1 but may be attended by an         
accidental pain of forgetting2 this1    
however1 arises from a subsequent act of
 reflection1 of which we need take no   
account4 ,at the same time1 we admit    
that the latter pleasures are the       
property of a very few4 ,to these pure  
and unmixed pleasures we ascribe        
measure1 whereas all others belong to   
the class of the infinite1 and are      
liable to every species of excess4 ,and 
here several questions arise for        
consideration3--,what is the meaning of 
pure and impure1 of moderate and        
immoderate8 ,we may answer the question 
by an illustration3 ,purity of white    
paint consists in the clearness or      
quality of the white1 and this is       
distinct from the quantity or amount of 
white paint2 a little pure white is     
fairer than a great deal which is       
impure4 ,but there is another           
question3--,pleasure is affirmed by     
ingenious philosophers to be a          
generation2 they say that there are two 

natures--one self-existent1 the other   
dependent2 the one noble and majestic1  
the other failing in both these         
qualities4 ',i do not understand4'      
,there are lovers and there are loves4  
',yes1 ,i know1 but what is the         
application8' ,the argument is in play1 
and desires to intimate that there are  
relatives and there are absolutes1 and  
that the relative is for the sake of the
 absolute2 and generation is for the    
sake of essence4 ,under relatives ,i    
class all things done with a view to    
generation2 and essence is of the class 
of good4 ,but if essence is of the class
 of good1 generation must be of some    
other class2 and our friends1 who affirm
 that pleasure is a generation1 would   
laugh at the notion that pleasure is a  
good2 and at that other notion1 that    
pleasure is produced by generation1     
which is only the alternative of        
destruction4 ,who would prefer such an  
alternation to the equable life of pure 
thought8 ,here is one absurdity1 and not

 the only one1 to which the friends of  
pleasure are reduced4 ,for is there not 
also an absurdity in affirming that good
 is of the soul only2 or in declaring   
that the best of men1 if he be in pain1 
is bad8  ,and now1 from the             
consideration of pleasure1 we pass to   
that of knowledge4 ,let us reflect that 
there are two kinds of knowledge--the   
one creative or productive1 and the     
other educational and philosophical4 ,of
 the creative arts1 there is one part   
purer or more akin to knowledge than the
 other4 ,there is an element of         
guess-work and an element of number and 
measure in them4 ,in music1 for example1
 especially in flute-playing1 the       
conjectural element prevails2 while in  
carpentering there is more application  
of rule and measure4 ,of the creative   
arts1 then1 we may make two classes--the
 less exact and the more exact4 ,and the
 exacter part of all of them is really  
arithmetic and mensuration4 ,but        
arithmetic and mensuration again may be 

subdivided with reference either to     
their use in the concrete1 or to their  
nature in the abstract--as they are     
regarded popularly in building and      
binding1 or theoretically by            
philosophers4 ,and1 borrowing the       
analogy of pleasure1 we may say that the
 philosophical use of them is purer than
 the other4 ,thus we have two arts of   
arithmetic1 and two of mensuration4 ,and
 truest of all in the estimation of     
every rational man is dialectic1 or the 
science of being1 which will forget and 
disown us1 if we forget and disown her4 
',but1 ,socrates1 ,i have heard ,gorgias
 say that rhetoric is the greatest and  
usefullest of arts2 and ,i should not   
like to quarrel either with him or you4'
 ,neither is there any inconsistency1   
,protarchus1 with his statement in what 
,i am now saying2 for ,i am not         
maintaining that dialectic is the       
greatest or usefullest1 but only that   
she is the truest of arts2 my remark is 
not quantitative but qualitative1 and   

refers not to the advantage or          
repetition of either1 but to the degree 
of truth which they attain--here        
,gorgias will not care to compete2 this 
is what we affirm to be possessed in the
 highest degree by dialectic4 ,and do   
not let us appeal to ,gorgias or        
,philebus or ,socrates1 but ask1 on     
behalf of the argument1 what are the    
highest truths which the soul has the   
power of attaining4 ,and is not this the
 science which has a firmer grasp of    
them than any other8 ,for the arts      
generally are only occupied with matters
 of opinion1 and with the production and
 action and passion of this sensible    
world4 ,but the highest truth is that   
which is eternal and unchangeable4 ,and 
reason and wisdom are concerned with the
 eternal2 and these are the very        
claimants1 if not for the first1 at     
least for the second place1 whom ,i     
propose as rivals to pleasure4  ,and    
now1 having the materials1 we may       
proceed to mix them--first              

recapitulating the question at issue4   
,philebus affirmed pleasure to be the   
good1 and assumed them to be one nature2
 ,i affirmed that they were two natures1
 and declared that knowledge was more   
akin to the good than pleasure4 ,i said 
that the two together were more eligible
 than either taken singly2 and to this  
we adhere4 ,reason intimates1 as at     
first1 that we should seek the good not 
in the unmixed life1 but in the mixed4  
,the cup is ready1 waiting to be        
mingled1 and here are two fountains1 one
 of honey1 the other of pure water1 out 
of which to make the fairest possible   
mixture4 ,there are pure and impure     
pleasures--pure and impure sciences4    
,let us consider the sections of each   
which have the most of purity and truth2
 to admit them all indiscriminately     
would be dangerous4 ,first we will take 
the pure sciences2 but shall we mingle  
the impure--the art which uses the false
 rule and the false measure8 ,that we   
must1 if we are any of us to find our   

way home2 man cannot live upon pure     
mathematics alone4 ,and must ,i include 
music1 which is admitted to be          
guess-work8 ',yes1 you must1 if human   
life is to have any humanity4' ,well1   
then1 ,i will open the door and let them
 all in2 they shall mingle in an        
,homeric 'meeting of the waters4' ,and  
now we turn to the pleasures2 shall ,i  
admit them8 ',admit first of all the    
pure pleasures2 secondly1 the           
necessary4' ,and what shall we say about
 the rest8 ,first1 ask the              
pleasures--they will be too happy to    
dwell with wisdom4 ,secondly1 ask the   
arts and sciences--they reply that the  
excesses of intemperance are the ruin of
 them2 and that they would rather only  
have the pleasures of health and        
temperance1 which are the handmaidens of
 virtue4 ,but still we want truth8 ,that
 is now added2 and so the argument is   
complete1 and may be compared to an     
incorporeal law1 which is to hold fair  
rule over a living body4 ,and now we are

 at the vestibule of the good1 in which 
there are three chief elements--truth1  
symmetry1 and beauty4 ,these will be the
 criterion of the comparative claims of 
pleasure and wisdom4  ,which has the    
greater share of truth8 ,surely wisdom2 
for pleasure is the veriest impostor in 
the world1 and the perjuries of lovers  
have passed into a proverb4  ,which of  
symmetry8 ,wisdom again2 for nothing is 
more immoderate than pleasure4  ,which  
of beauty8 ,once more1 wisdom2 for      
pleasure is often unseemly1 and the     
greatest pleasures are put out of sight4
  ,not pleasure1 then1 ranks first in   
the scale of good1 but measure1 and     
eternal harmony4  ,second comes the     
symmetrical and beautiful and perfect4  
,third1 mind and wisdom4  ,fourth1      
sciences and arts and true opinions4    
,fifth1 painless pleasures4  ,of a sixth
 class1 ,i have no more to say4 ,thus1  
pleasure and mind may both renounce the 
claim to the first place4 ,but mind is  
ten thousand times nearer to the chief  

good than pleasure4 ,pleasure ranks     
fifth and not first1 even though all the
 animals in the world assert the        
contrary4  444  ,from the days of       
,aristippus and ,epicurus to our own    
times the nature of pleasure has        
occupied the attention of philosophers4 
',is pleasure an evil8 a good8 the only 
good8' are the simple forms which the   
enquiry assumed among the ,socratic     
schools4 ,but at an early stage of the  
controversy another question was asked3 
',do pleasures differ in kind8 and are  
some bad1 some good1 and some neither   
bad nor good8' ,there are bodily and    
there are mental pleasures1 which were  
at first confused but afterwards        
distinguished4 ,a distinction was also  
made between necessary and unnecessary  
pleasures2 and again between pleasures  
which had or had not corresponding      
pains4 ,the ancient philosophers were   
fond of asking1 in the language of their
 age1 ',is pleasure a becoming only1 and
 therefore transient and relative1 or do

 some pleasures partake of truth and    
,being8' ,to these ancient speculations 
the moderns have added a further        
question3--',whose pleasure8 ,the       
pleasure of yourself1 or of your        
neighbour1--of the individual1 or of the
 world8' ,this little addition has      
changed the whole aspect of the         
discussion3 the same word is now        
supposed to include two principles as   
widely different as benevolence and     
self-love4 ,some modern writers have    
also distinguished between pleasure the 
test1 and pleasure the motive of        
actions4 ,for the universal test of     
right actions 7how ,i know them7 may not
 always be the highest or best motive of
 them 7why ,i do them74  ,socrates1 as  
we learn from the ,memorabilia of       
,xenophon1 first drew attention to the  
consequences of actions4 ,mankind were  
said by him to act rightly when they    
knew what they were doing1 or1 in the   
language of the ,gorgias1 'did what they
 would4' ,he seems to have been the     

first who maintained that the good was  
the useful 7,mem474 ,in his eagerness   
for generalization1 seeking1 as         
,aristotle says1 for the universal in   
,ethics 7,metaph471 he took the most    
obvious intellectual aspect of human    
action which occurred to him4 ,he meant 
to emphasize1 not pleasure1 but the     
calculation of pleasure2 neither is he  
arguing that pleasure is the chief good1
 but that we should have a principle of 
choice4 ,he did not intend to oppose    
'the useful' to some higher conception1 
such as the ,platonic ideal1 but to     
chance and caprice4 ,the ,platonic      
,socrates pursues the same vein of      
thought in the ,protagoras1 where he    
argues against the so-called sophist    
that pleasure and pain are the final    
standards and motives of good and evil1 
and that the salvation of human life    
depends upon a right estimate of        
pleasures greater or less when seen near
 and at a distance4 ,the testimony of   
,xenophon is thus confirmed by that of  

,plato1 and we are therefore justified  
in calling ,socrates the first          
utilitarian2 as indeed there is no side 
or aspect of philosophy which may not   
with reason be ascribed to him--he is   
,cynic and ,cyrenaic1 ,platonist and    
,aristotelian in one4 ,but in the       
,phaedo the ,socratic has already passed
 into a more ideal point of view2 and   
he1 or rather ,plato speaking in his    
person1 expressly repudiates the notion 
that the exchange of a less pleasure for
 a greater can be an exchange of virtue4
 ,such virtue is the virtue of ordinary 
men who live in the world of appearance2
 they are temperate only that they may  
enjoy the pleasures of intemperance1 and
 courageous from fear of danger4        
,whereas the philosopher is seeking     
after wisdom and not after pleasure1    
whether near or distant3 he is the      
mystic1 the initiated1 who has learnt to
 despise the body and is yearning all   
his life long for a truth which will    
hereafter be revealed to him4 ,in the   

,republic the pleasures of knowledge are
 affirmed to be superior to other       
pleasures1 because the philosopher so   
estimates them2 and he alone has had    
experience of both kinds4 7,compare a   
similar argument urged by one of the    
latest defenders of ,utilitarianism1    
,mill's ,utilitarianism74 ,in the       
,philebus1 ,plato1 although he regards  
the enemies of pleasure with            
complacency1 still further modifies the 
transcendentalism of the ,phaedo4 ,for  
he is compelled to confess1 rather      
reluctantly1 perhaps1 that some         
pleasures1 i4e4 those which have no     
antecedent pains1 claim a place in the  
scale of goods4  ,there have been many  
reasons why not only ,plato but mankind 
in general have been unwilling to       
acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief 
good4' ,either they have heard a voice  
calling to them out of another world2 or
 the life and example of some great     
teacher has cast their thoughts of right
 and wrong in another mould2 or the word

 'pleasure' has been associated in their
 mind with merely animal enjoyment4     
,they could not believe that what they  
were always striving to overcome1 and   
the power or principle in them which    
overcame1 were of the same nature4 ,the 
pleasure of doing good to others and of 
bodily self-indulgence1 the pleasures of
 intellect and the pleasures of sense1  
are so different3--,why then should they
 be called by a common name8 ,or1 if the
 equivocal or metaphorical use of the   
word is justified by custom 7like the   
use of other words which at first       
referred only to the body1 and then by a
 figure have been transferred to the    
mind71 still1 why should we make an     
ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral
 philosophy8 ,to the higher thinker the 
,utilitarian or hedonist mode of        
speaking has been at variance with      
religion and with any higher conception 
both of politics and of morals4 ,it has 
not satisfied their imagination2 it has 
offended their taste4 ,to elevate       

pleasure1 'the most fleeting of all     
things1' into a general idea seems to   
such men a contradiction4 ,they do not  
desire to bring down their theory to the
 level of their practice4 ,the          
simplicity of the 'greatest happiness'  
principle has been acceptable to        
philosophers1 but the better part of the
 world has been slow to receive it4     
,before proceeding1 we may make a few   
admissions which will narrow the field  
of dispute2 and we may as well leave    
behind a few prejudices1 which          
intelligent opponents of ,utilitarianism
 have by this time 'agreed to discard'4 
,we admit that ,utility is coextensive  
with right1 and that no action can be   
right which does not tend to the        
happiness of mankind2 we acknowledge    
that a large class of actions are made  
right or wrong by their consequences    
only2 we say further that mankind are   
not too mindful1 but that they are far  
too regardless of consequences1 and that
 they need to have the doctrine of      

utility habitually inculcated on them4  
,we recognize the value of a principle  
which can supply a connecting link      
between ,ethics and ,politics1 and under
 which all human actions are or may be  
included4 ,the desire to promote        
happiness is no mean preference of      
expediency to right1 but one of the     
highest and noblest motives by which    
human nature can be animated4 ,neither  
in referring actions to the test of     
utility have we to make a laborious     
calculation1 any more than in trying    
them by other standards of morals4 ,for 
long ago they have been classified      
sufficiently for all practical purposes 
by the thinker1 by the legislator1 by   
the opinion of the world4 ,whatever may 
be the hypothesis on which they are     
explained1 or which in doubtful cases   
may be applied to the regulation of     
them1 we are very rarely1 if ever1      
called upon at the moment of performing 
them to determine their effect upon the 
happiness of mankind4  ,there is a      

theory which has been contrasted with   
,utility by ,paley and others--the      
theory of a moral sense3 ,are our ideas 
of right and wrong innate or derived    
from experience8 ,this1 perhaps1 is     
another of those speculations which     
intelligent men might 'agree to         
discard4' ,for it has been worn         
threadbare2 and either alternative is   
equally consistent with a transcendental
 or with an eudaemonistic system of     
ethics1 with a greatest happiness       
principle or with ,kant's law of duty4  
,yet to avoid misconception1 what       
appears to be the truth about the origin
 of our moral ideas may be shortly      
summed up as follows3--,to each of us   
individually our moral ideas come first 
of all in childhood through the medium  
of education1 from parents and teachers1
 assisted by the unconscious influence  
of language2 they are impressed upon a  
mind which at first is like a waxen     
tablet1 adapted to receive them2 but    
they soon become fixed or set1 and in   

after life are strengthened1 or perhaps 
weakened by the force of public opinion4
 ,they may be corrected and enlarged by 
experience1 they may be reasoned about1 
they may be brought home to us by the   
circumstances of our lives1 they may be 
intensified by imagination1 by          
reflection1 by a course of action likely
 to confirm them4 ,under the influence  
of religious feeling or by an effort of 
thought1 any one beginning with the     
ordinary rules of morality may create   
out of them for himself ideals of       
holiness and virtue4 ,they slumber in   
the minds of most men1 yet in all of us 
there remains some tincture of          
affection1 some desire of good1 some    
sense of truth1 some fear of the law4   
,of some such state or process each     
individual is conscious in himself1 and 
if he compares his own experience with  
that of others he will find the witness 
of their consciences to coincide with   
that of his own4 ,all of us have entered
 into an inheritance which we have the  

power of appropriating and making use   
of4 ,no great effort of mind is required
 on our part2 we learn morals1 as we    
learn to talk1 instinctively1 from      
conversing with others1 in an           
enlightened age1 in a civilized country1
 in a good home4 ,a well-educated child 
of ten years old already knows the      
essentials of morals3 ',thou shalt not  
steal1' 'thou shalt speak the truth1'   
'thou shalt love thy parents1' 'thou    
shalt fear ,god4' ,what more does he    
want8  ,but whence comes this common    
inheritance or stock of moral ideas8    
,their beginning1 like all other        
beginnings of human things1 is obscure1 
and is the least important part of them4
 ,imagine1 if you will1 that ,society   
originated in the herding of brutes1 in 
their parental instincts1 in their rude 
attempts at self-preservation3--,man is 
not man in that he resembles1 but in    
that he differs from them4 ,we must pass
 into another cycle of existence1 before
 we can discover in him by any evidence 

accessible to us even the germs of our  
moral ideas4 ,in the history of the     
world1 which viewed from within is the  
history of the human mind1 they have    
been slowly created by religion1 by     
poetry1 by law1 having their foundation 
in the natural affections and in the    
necessity of some degree of truth and   
justice in a social state2 they have    
been deepened and enlarged by the       
efforts of great thinkers who have      
idealized and connected them--by the    
lives of saints and prophets who have   
taught and exemplified them4 ,the       
schools of ancient philosophy which seem
 so far from us--,socrates1 ,plato1     
,aristotle1 the ,stoics1 the            
,epicureans1 and a few modern teachers1 
such as ,kant and ,bentham1 have each of
 them supplied 'moments' of thought to  
the world4 ,the life of ,christ has     
embodied a divine love1 wisdom1         
patience1 reasonableness4 ,for his      
image1 however imperfectly handed down  
to us1 the modern world has received a  

standard more perfect in idea than the  
societies of ancient times1 but also    
further removed from practice4 ,for     
there is certainly a greater interval   
between the theory and practice of      
,christians than between the theory and 
practice of the ,greeks and ,romans2 the
 ideal is more above us1 and the        
aspiration after good has often lent a  
strange power to evil4 ,and sometimes1  
as at the ,reformation1 or ,french      
,revolution1 when the upper classes of a
 so-called ,christian country have      
become corrupted by priestcraft1 by     
casuistry1 by licentiousness1 by        
despotism1 the lower have risen up and  
re-asserted the natural sense of        
religion and right4  ,we may further    
remark that our moral ideas1 as the     
world grows older1 perhaps as we grow   
older ourselves1 unless they have been  
undermined in us by false philosophy or 
the practice of mental analysis1 or     
infected by the corruption of society or
 by some moral disorder in the          

individual1 are constantly assuming a   
more natural and necessary character4   
,the habit of the mind1 the opinion of  
the world1 familiarizes them to us2 and 
they take more and more the form of     
immediate intuition4 ,the moral sense   
comes last and not first in the order of
 their development1 and is the instinct 
which we have inherited or acquired1 not
 the nobler effort of reflection which  
created them and which keeps them alive4
 ,we do not stop to reason about common 
honesty4 ,whenever we are not blinded by
 self-deceit1 as for example in judging 
the actions of others1 we have no       
hesitation in determining what is right 
and wrong4 ,the principles of morality1 
when not at variance with some desire or
 worldly interest of our own1 or with   
the opinion of the public1 are hardly   
perceived by us2 but in the conflict of 
reason and passion they assert their    
authority and are not overcome without  
remorse4  ,such is a brief outline of   
the history of our moral ideas4 ,we have

 to distinguish1 first of all1 the      
manner in which they have grown up in   
the world from the manner in which they 
have been communicated to each of us4   
,we may represent them to ourselves as  
flowing out of the boundless ocean of   
language and thought in little rills1   
which convey them to the heart and brain
 of each individual4 ,but neither must  
we confound the theories or aspects of  
morality with the origin of our moral   
ideas4 ,these are not the roots or      
'origines' of morals1 but the latest    
efforts of reflection1 the lights in    
which the whole moral world has been    
regarded by different thinkers and      
successive generations of men4 ,if we   
ask3 ,which of these many theories is   
the true one8 we may answer3 ,all of    
them--moral sense1 innate ideas1 a      
priori1 a posteriori notions1 the       
philosophy of experience1 the philosophy
 of intuition--all of them have added   
something to our conception of ,ethics2 
no one of them is the whole truth4 ,but 

to decide how far our ideas of morality 
are derived from one source or another2 
to determine what history1 what         
philosophy has contributed to them2 to  
distinguish the original1 simple        
elements from the manifold and complex  
applications of them1 would be a long   
enquiry too far removed from the        
question which we are now pursuing4     
,bearing in mind the distinction which  
we have been seeking to establish       
between our earliest and our most mature
 ideas of morality1 we may now proceed  
to state the theory of ,utility1 not    
exactly in the words1 but in the spirit 
of one of its ablest and most moderate  
supporters 7,mill's                     
,utilitarianism73--',that which alone   
makes actions either right or desirable 
is their utility1 or tendency to promote
 the happiness of mankind1 or1 in other 
words1 to increase the sum of pleasure  
in the world4 ,but all pleasures are not
 the same3 they differ in quality as    
well as in quantity1 and the pleasure   

which is superior in quality is         
incommensurable with the inferior4      
,neither is the pleasure or happiness1  
which we seek1 our own pleasure1 but    
that of others1--of our family1 of our  
country1 of mankind4 ,the desire of     
this1 and even the sacrifice of our own 
interest to that of other men1 may      
become a passion to a rightly educated  
nature4 ,the ,utilitarian finds a place 
in his system for this virtue and for   
every other4'  ,good or happiness or    
pleasure is thus regarded as the true   
and only end of human life4 ,to this all
 our desires will be found to tend1 and 
in accordance with this all the virtues1
 including justice1 may be explained4   
,admitting that men rest for a time in  
inferior ends1 and do not cast their    
eyes beyond them1 these ends are really 
dependent on the greater end of         
happiness1 and would not be pursued1    
unless in general they had been found to
 lead to it4 ,the existence of such an  
end is proved1 as in ,aristotle's time1 

so in our own1 by the universal fact    
that men desire it4 ,the obligation to  
promote it is based upon the social     
nature of man2 this sense of duty is    
shared by all of us in some degree1 and 
is capable of being greatly fostered and
 strengthened4 ,so far from being       
inconsistent with religion1 the greatest
 happiness principle is in the highest  
degree agreeable to it4 ,for what can be
 more reasonable than that ,god should  
will the happiness of all his creatures8
 and in working out their happiness we  
may be said to be 'working together with
 him4' ,nor is it inconceivable that a  
new enthusiasm of the future1 far       
stronger than any old religion1 may be  
based upon such a conception4  ,but then
 for the familiar phrase of the         
'greatest happiness principle1' it seems
 as if we ought now to read 'the noblest
 happiness principle1' 'the happiness of
 others principle'--the principle not of
 the greatest1 but of the highest       
pleasure1 pursued with no more regard to

 our own immediate interest than is     
required by the law of                  
self-preservation4 ,transfer the thought
 of happiness to another life1 dropping 
the external circumstances which form so
 large a part of our idea of happiness  
in this1 and the meaning of the word    
becomes indistinguishable from holiness1
 harmony1 wisdom1 love4 ,by the slight  
addition 'of others1' all the           
associations of the word are altered2 we
 seem to have passed over from one      
theory of morals to the opposite4 ,for  
allowing that the happiness of others is
 reflected on ourselves1 and also that  
every man must live before he can do    
good to others1 still the last          
limitation is a very trifling exception1
 and the happiness of another is very   
far from compensating for the loss of   
our own4 ,according to ,mr4 ,mill1 he   
would best carry out the principle of   
utility who sacrificed his own pleasure 
most to that of his fellow-men4 ,but if 
so1 ,hobbes and ,butler1 ,shaftesbury   

and ,hume1 are not so far apart as they 
and their followers imagine4 ,the       
thought of self and the thought of      
others are alike superseded in the more 
general notion of the happiness of      
mankind at large4 ,but in this composite
 good1 until society becomes perfected1 
the friend of man himself has generally 
the least share1 and may be a great     
sufferer4  ,and now what objection have 
we to urge against a system of moral    
philosophy so beneficent1 so            
enlightened1 so ideal1 and at the same  
time so practical1--so ,christian1 as we
 may say without exaggeration1--and     
which has the further advantage of      
resting morality on a principle         
intelligible to all capacities8 ,have we
 not found that which ,socrates and     
,plato 'grew old in seeking'8 ,are we   
not desirous of happiness1 at any rate  
for ourselves and our friends1 if not   
for all mankind8 ,if1 as is natural1 we 
begin by thinking of ourselves first1 we
 are easily led on to think of others2  

for we cannot help acknowledging that   
what is right for us is the right and   
inheritance of others4 ,we feel the     
advantage of an abstract principle wide 
enough and strong enough to override all
 the particularisms of mankind2 which   
acknowledges a universal good1 truth1   
right2 which is capable of inspiring men
 like a passion1 and is the symbol of a 
cause for which they are ready to       
contend to their life's end4  ,and if we
 test this principle by the lives of its
 professors1 it would certainly appear  
inferior to none as a rule of action4   
,from the days of ,eudoxus 7,arist4     
,ethics7 and ,epicurus to our own1 the  
votaries of pleasure have gained belief 
for their principles by their practice4 
,two of the noblest and most            
disinterested men who have lived in this
 century1 ,bentham and ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1   
whose lives were a long devotion to the 
service of their fellows1 have been     
among the most enthusiastic supporters  
of utility2 while among their           

contemporaries1 some who were of a more 
mystical turn of mind1 have ended rather
 in aspiration than in action1 and have 
been found unequal to the duties of     
life4 ,looking back on them now that    
they are removed from the scene1 we feel
 that mankind has been the better for   
them4 ,the world was against them while 
they lived2 but this is rather a reason 
for admiring than for depreciating them4
 ,nor can any one doubt that the        
influence of their philosophy on        
politics--especially on foreign         
politics1 on law1 on social life1 has   
been upon the whole beneficial4         
,nevertheless1 they will never have     
justice done to them1 for they do not   
agree either with the better feeling of 
the multitude or with the idealism of   
more refined thinkers4 ,without         
,bentham1 a great word in the history of
 philosophy would have remained         
unspoken4 ,yet to this day it is rare to
 hear his name received with any mark of
 respect such as would be freely granted

 to the ambiguous memory of some father 
of the ,church4 ,the odium which        
attached to him when alive has not been 
removed by his death4 ,for he shocked   
his contemporaries by egotism and want  
of taste2 and this generation which has 
reaped the benefit of his labours has   
inherited the feeling of the last4 ,he  
was before his own age1 and is hardly   
remembered in this4  ,while             
acknowledging the benefits which the    
greatest happiness principle has        
conferred upon mankind1 the time appears
 to have arrived1 not for denying its   
claims1 but for criticizing them and    
comparing them with other principles    
which equally claim to lie at the       
foundation of ethics4 ,any one who adds 
a general principle to knowledge has    
been a benefactor to the world4 ,but    
there is a danger that1 in his first    
enthusiasm1 he may not recognize the    
proportions or limitations to which his 
truth is subjected2 he does not see how 
far he has given birth to a truism1 or  

how that which is a truth to him is a   
truism to the rest of the world2 or may 
degenerate in the next generation4 ,he  
believes that to be the whole which is  
only a part1--to be the necessary       
foundation which is really only a       
valuable aspect of the truth4 ,the      
systems of all philosophers require the 
criticism of 'the morrow1' when the heat
 of imagination which forged them has   
cooled1 and they are seen in the        
temperate light of day4 ,all of them    
have contributed to enrich the mind of  
the civilized world2 none of them occupy
 that supreme or exclusive place which  
their authors would have assigned to    
them4  ,we may preface the criticism    
with a few preliminary remarks3--  ,mr4 
,mill1 ,mr4 ,austin1 and others1 in     
their eagerness to maintain the doctrine
 of utility1 are fond of repeating that 
we are in a lamentable state of         
uncertainty about morals4 ,while other  
branches of knowledge have made         
extraordinary progress1 in moral        

philosophy we are supposed by them to be
 no better than children1 and with few  
exceptions--that is to say1 ,bentham and
 his followers--to be no further        
advanced than men were in the age of    
,socrates and ,plato1 who1 in their     
turn1 are deemed to be as backward in   
ethics as they necessarily were in      
physics4 ,but this1 though often        
asserted1 is recanted almost in a breath
 by the same writers who speak thus     
depreciatingly of our modern ethical    
philosophy4 ,for they are the first to  
acknowledge that we have not now to     
begin classifying actions under the head
 of utility2 they would not deny that   
about the general conceptions of morals 
there is a practical agreement4 ,there  
is no more doubt that falsehood is wrong
 than that a stone falls to the ground1 
although the first does not admit of the
 same ocular proof as the second4 ,there
 is no greater uncertainty about the    
duty of obedience to parents and to the 
law of the land than about the          

properties of triangles4 ,unless we are 
looking for a new moral world which has 
no marrying and giving in marriage1     
there is no greater disagreement in     
theory about the right relations of the 
sexes than about the composition of     
water4 ,these and a few other simple    
principles1 as they have endless        
applications in practice1 so also may be
 developed in theory into counsels of   
perfection4  ,to what then is to be     
attributed this opinion which has been  
often entertained about the uncertainty 
of morals8 ,chiefly to this1--that      
philosophers have not always            
distinguished the theoretical and the   
casuistical uncertainty of morals from  
the practical certainty4 ,there is an   
uncertainty about details1--whether1 for
 example1 under given circumstances such
 and such a moral principle is to be    
enforced1 or whether in some cases there
 may not be a conflict of duties3 these 
are the exceptions to the ordinary rules
 of morality1 important1 indeed1 but not

 extending to the one thousandth or one 
ten-thousandth part of human actions4   
,this is the domain of casuistry4       
,secondly1 the aspects under which the  
most general principles of morals may be
 presented to us are many and various4  
,the mind of man has been more than     
usually active in thinking about man4   
,the conceptions of harmony1 happiness1 
right1 freedom1 benevolence1 self-love1 
have all of them seemed to some         
philosopher or other the truest and most
 comprehensive expression of morality4  
,there is no difference1 or at any rate 
no great difference1 of opinion about   
the right and wrong of actions1 but only
 about the general notion which         
furnishes the best explanation or gives 
the most comprehensive view of them4    
,this1 in the language of ,kant1 is the 
sphere of the metaphysic of ethics4 ,but
 these two uncertainties at either end1 
en tois malista katholou and en tois    
kath ekasta1 leave space enough for an  
intermediate principle which is         

practically certain4  ,the rule of human
 life is not dependent on the theories  
of philosophers3 we know what our duties
 are for the most part before we        
speculate about them4 ,and the use of   
speculation is not to teach us what we  
already know1 but to inspire in our     
minds an interest about morals in       
general1 to strengthen our conception of
 the virtues by showing that they       
confirm one another1 to prove to us1 as 
,socrates would have said1 that they are
 not many1 but one4 ,there is the same  
kind of pleasure and use in reducing    
morals1 as in reducing physics1 to a few
 very simple truths4 ,and not           
unfrequently the more general principle 
may correct prejudices and              
misconceptions1 and enable us to regard 
our fellow-men in a larger and more     
generous spirit4  ,the two qualities    
which seem to be most required in first 
principles of ethics are1 7#a7 that they
 should afford a real explanation of the
 facts1 7#b7 that they should inspire   

the mind1--should harmonize1 strengthen1
 settle us4 ,we can hardly estimate the 
influence which a simple principle such 
as ',act so as to promote the happiness 
of mankind1' or ',act so that the rule  
on which thou actest may be adopted as a
 law by all rational beings1' may       
exercise on the mind of an individual4  
,they will often seem to open a new     
world to him1 like the religious        
conceptions of faith or the spirit of   
,god4 ,the difficulties of ethics       
disappear when we do not suffer         
ourselves to be distracted between      
different points of view4 ,but to       
maintain their hold on us1 the general  
principles must also be psychologically 
true--they must agree with our          
experience1 they must accord with the   
habits of our minds4  ,when we are told 
that actions are right or wrong only in 
so far as they tend towards happiness1  
we naturally ask what is meant by       
'happiness4' ,for the term in the common
 use of language is only to a certain   

extent commensurate with moral good and 
evil4 ,we should hardly say that a good 
man could be utterly miserable 7,arist4 
,ethics71 or place a bad man in the     
first rank of happiness4 ,but yet1 from 
various circumstances1 the measure of a 
man's happiness may be out of all       
proportion to his desert4 ,and if we    
insist on calling the good man alone    
happy1 we shall be using the term in    
some new and transcendental sense1 as   
synonymous with well-being4 ,we have    
already seen that happiness includes the
 happiness of others as well as our own2
 we must now comprehend unconscious as  
well as conscious happiness under the   
same word4 ,there is no harm in this    
extension of the meaning1 but a word    
which admits of such an extension can   
hardly be made the basis of a           
philosophical system4 ,the exactness    
which is required in philosophy will not
 allow us to comprehend under the same  
term two ideas so different as the      
subjective feeling of pleasure or       

happiness and the objective reality of a
 state which receives our moral         
approval4  ,like ,protarchus in the     
,philebus1 we can give no answer to the 
question1 ',what is that common quality 
which in all states of human life we    
call happiness8 which includes the lower
 and the higher kind of happiness1 and  
is the aim of the noblest1 as well as of
 the meanest of mankind8' ,if we say    
',not pleasure1 not virtue1 not wisdom1 
nor yet any quality which we can        
abstract from these'--what then8 ,after 
seeming to hover for a time on the verge
 of a great truth1 we have gained only a
 truism4  ,let us ask the question in   
another form4 ,what is that which       
constitutes happiness1 over and above   
the several ingredients of health1      
wealth1 pleasure1 virtue1 knowledge1    
which are included under it8 ,perhaps we
 answer1 ',the subjective feeling of    
them4' ,but this is very far from being 
coextensive with right4 ,or we may reply
 that happiness is the whole of which   

the above-mentioned are the parts4      
,still the question recurs1 ',in what   
does the whole differ from all the      
parts8' ,and if we are unable to        
distinguish them1 happiness will be the 
mere aggregate of the goods of life4    
,again1 while admitting that in all     
right action there is an element of     
happiness1 we cannot help seeing that   
the utilitarian theory supplies a much  
easier explanation of some virtues than 
of others4 ,of many patriotic or        
benevolent actions we can give a        
straightforward account by their        
tendency to promote happiness4 ,for the 
explanation of justice1 on the other    
hand1 we have to go a long way round4   
,no man is indignant with a thief       
because he has not promoted the greatest
 happiness of the greatest number1 but  
because he has done him a wrong4 ,there 
is an immeasurable interval between a   
crime against property or life1 and the 
omission of an act of charity or        
benevolence4 ,yet of this interval the  

utilitarian theory takes no cognizance4 
,the greatest happiness principle       
strengthens our sense of positive duties
 towards others1 but weakens our        
recognition of their rights4 ,to promote
 in every way possible the happiness of 
others may be a counsel of perfection1  
but hardly seems to offer any ground for
 a theory of obligation4 ,for admitting 
that our ideas of obligation are partly 
derived from religion and custom1 yet   
they seem also to contain other         
essential elements which cannot be      
explained by the tendency of actions to 
promote happiness4 ,whence comes the    
necessity of them8 ,why are some actions
 rather than others which equally tend  
to the happiness of mankind imposed upon
 us with the authority of law8 ',you    
ought' and 'you had better' are         
fundamental distinctions in human       
thought2 and having such distinctions1  
why should we seek to efface and        
unsettle them8  ,bentham and ,mr4 ,mill 
are earnest in maintaining that         

happiness includes the happiness of     
others as well as of ourselves4 ,but    
what two notions can be more opposed in 
many cases than these8 ,granting that in
 a perfect state of the world my own    
happiness and that of all other men     
would coincide1 in the imperfect state  
they often diverge1 and ,i cannot truly 
bridge over the difficulty by saying    
that men will always find pleasure in   
sacrificing themselves or in suffering  
for others4 ,upon the greatest happiness
 principle it is admitted that ,i am to 
have a share1 and in consistency ,i     
should pursue my own happiness as       
impartially as that of my neighbour4    
,but who can decide what proportion     
should be mine and what his1 except on  
the principle that ,i am most likely to 
be deceived in my own favour1 and had   
therefore better give the larger share1 
if not all1 to him8  ,further1 it is    
admitted that utility and right         
coincide1 not in particular instances1  
but in classes of actions4 ,but is it   

not distracting to the conscience of a  
man to be told that in the particular   
case they are opposed8 ,happiness is    
said to be the ground of moral          
obligation1 yet he must not do what     
clearly conduces to his own happiness if
 it is at variance with the good of the 
whole4 ,nay1 further1 he will be taught 
that when utility and right are in      
apparent conflict any amount of utility 
does not alter by a hair's-breadth the  
morality of actions1 which cannot be    
allowed to deviate from established law 
or usage2 and that the non-detection of 
an immoral act1 say of telling a lie1   
which may often make the greatest       
difference in the consequences1 not only
 to himself1 but to all the world1 makes
 none whatever in the act itself4       
,again1 if we are concerned not with    
particular actions but with classes of  
actions1 is the tendency of actions to  
happiness a principle upon which we can 
classify them8 ,there is a universal law
 which imperatively declares certain    

acts to be right or wrong3--can there be
 any universality in the law which      
measures actions by their tendencies    
towards happiness8 ,for an act which is 
the cause of happiness to one person may
 be the cause of unhappiness to another2
 or an act which if performed by one    
person may increase the happiness of    
mankind may have the opposite effect if 
performed by another4 ,right can never  
be wrong1 or wrong right1 that there are
 no actions which tend to the happiness 
of mankind which may not under other    
circumstances tend to their unhappiness4
 ,unless we say not only that all right 
actions tend to happiness1 but that they
 tend to happiness in the same degree in
 which they are right 7and in that case 
the word 'right' is plainer71 we weaken 
the absoluteness of our moral standard2 
we reduce differences in kind to        
differences in degree2 we obliterate the
 stamp which the authority of ages has  
set upon vice and crime4  ,once more3   
turning from theory to practice we feel 

the importance of retaining the received
 distinctions of morality4 ,words such  
as truth1 justice1 honesty1 virtue1     
love1 have a simple meaning2 they have  
become sacred to us1--'the word of ,god'
 written on the human heart3 to no other
 words can the same associations be     
attached4 ,we cannot explain them       
adequately on principles of utility2 in 
attempting to do so we rob them of their
 true character4 ,we give them a meaning
 often paradoxical and distorted1 and   
generally weaker than their             
signification in common language4 ,and  
as words influence men's thoughts1 we   
fear that the hold of morality may also 
be weakened1 and the sense of duty      
impaired1 if virtue and vice are        
explained only as the qualities which do
 or do not contribute to the pleasure of
 the world4 ,in that very expression we 
seem to detect a false ring1 for        
pleasure is individual not universal2 we
 speak of eternal and immutable justice1
 but not of eternal and immutable       

pleasure2 nor by any refinement can we  
avoid some taint of bodily sense        
adhering to the meaning of the word4    
,again3 the higher the view which men   
take of life1 the more they lose sight  
of their own pleasure or interest4 ,true
 religion is not working for a reward   
only1 but is ready to work equally      
without a reward4 ,it is not 'doing the 
will of ,god for the sake of eternal    
happiness1' but doing the will of ,god  
because it is best1 whether rewarded or 
unrewarded4 ,and this applies to others 
as well as to ourselves4 ,for he who    
sacrifices himself for the good of      
others1 does not sacrifice himself that 
they may be saved from the persecution  
which he endures for their sakes1 but   
rather that they in their turn may be   
able to undergo similar sufferings1 and 
like him stand fast in the truth4 ,to   
promote their happiness is not his first
 object1 but to elevate their moral     
nature4 ,both in his own case and that  
of others there may be happiness in the 

distance1 but if there were no happiness
 he would equally act as he does4 ,we   
are speaking of the highest and noblest 
natures2 and a passing thought naturally
 arises in our minds1 ',whether that can
 be the first principle of morals which 
is hardly regarded in their own case by 
the greatest benefactors of mankind8'   
,the admissions that pleasures differ in
 kind1 and that actions are already     
classified2 the acknowledgment that     
happiness includes the happiness of     
others1 as well as of ourselves2 the    
confusion 7not made by ,aristotle7      
between conscious and unconscious       
happiness1 or between happiness the     
energy and happiness the result of the  
energy1 introduce uncertainty and       
inconsistency into the whole enquiry4   
,we reason readily and cheerfully from a
 greatest happiness principle4 ,but we  
find that utilitarians do not agree     
among themselves about the meaning of   
the word4 ,still less can they impart to
 others a common conception or          

conviction of the nature of happiness4  
,the meaning of the word is always      
insensibly slipping away from us1 into  
pleasure1 out of pleasure1 now appearing
 as the motive1 now as the test of      
actions1 and sometimes varying in       
successive sentences4 ,and as in a      
mathematical demonstration an error in  
the original number disturbs the whole  
calculation which follows1 this         
fundamental uncertainty about the word  
vitiates all the applications of it4    
,must we not admit that a notion so     
uncertain in meaning1 so void of        
content1 so at variance with common     
language and opinion1 does not comply   
adequately with either of our two       
requirements8 ,it can neither strike the
 imaginative faculty1 nor give an       
explanation of phenomena which is in    
accordance with our individual          
experience4 ,it is indefinite2 it       
supplies only a partial account of human
 actions3 it is one among many theories 
of philosophers4 ,it may be compared    

with other notions1 such as the chief   
good of ,plato1 which may be best       
expressed to us under the form of a     
harmony1 or with ,kant's obedience to   
law1 which may be summed up under the   
word 'duty1' or with the ,stoical       
',follow nature1' and seems to have no  
advantage over them4 ,all of these      
present a certain aspect of moral truth4
 ,none of them are1 or indeed profess to
 be1 the only principle of morals4  ,and
 this brings us to speak of the most    
serious objection to the utilitarian    
system--its exclusiveness4 ,there is no 
place for ,kant or ,hegel1 for ,plato   
and ,aristotle alongside of it4 ,they do
 not reject the greatest happiness      
principle1 but it rejects them4 ,now the
 phenomena of moral action differ1 and  
some are best explained upon one        
principle and some upon another3 the    
virtue of justice seems to be naturally 
connected with one theory of morals1 the
 virtues of temperance and benevolence  
with another4 ,the characters of men    

also differ2 and some are more attracted
 by one aspect of the truth1 some by    
another4 ,the firm stoical nature will  
conceive virtue under the conception of 
law1 the philanthropist under that of   
doing good1 the quietist under that of  
resignation1 the enthusiast under that  
of faith or love4 ,the upright man of   
the world will desire above all things  
that morality should be plain and fixed1
 and should use language in its ordinary
 sense4 ,persons of an imaginative      
temperament will generally be           
dissatisfied with the words 'utility' or
 'pleasure'3 their principle of right is
 of a far higher character--what or     
where to be found they cannot always    
distinctly tell2--deduced from the laws 
of human nature1 says one2 resting on   
the will of ,god1 says another2 based   
upon some transcendental idea which     
animates more worlds than one1 says a   
third3       on nomoi prokeintai        
upsipodes1 ouranian      di aithera     
teknothentes4  ,to satisfy an           

imaginative nature in any degree1 the   
doctrine of utility must be so          
transfigured that it becomes altogether 
different and loses all simplicity4     
,but why1 since there are different     
characters among men1 should we not     
allow them to envisage morality         
accordingly1 and be thankful to the     
great men who have provided for all of  
us modes and instruments of thought8    
,would the world have been better if    
there had been no ,stoics or ,kantists1 
no ,platonists or ,cartesians8 ,no more 
than if the other pole of moral         
philosophy had been excluded4 ,all men  
have principles which are above their   
practice2 they admit premises which1 if 
carried to their conclusions1 are a     
sufficient basis of morals4 ,in         
asserting liberty of speculation we are 
not encouraging individuals to make     
right or wrong for themselves1 but only 
conceding that they may choose the form 
under which they prefer to contemplate  
them4 ,nor do we say that one of these  

aspects is as true and good as another2 
but that they all of them1 if they are  
not mere sophisms and illusions1 define 
and bring into relief some part of the  
truth which would have been obscure     
without their light4 ,why should we     
endeavour to bind all men within the    
limits of a single metaphysical         
conception8 ,the necessary imperfection 
of language seems to require that we    
should view the same truth under more   
than one aspect4  ,we are living in the 
second age of utilitarianism1 when the  
charm of novelty and the fervour of the 
first disciples has passed away4 ,the   
doctrine is no longer stated in the     
forcible paradoxical manner of ,bentham1
 but has to be adapted to meet          
objections2 its corners are rubbed off1 
and the meaning of its most             
characteristic expressions is softened4 
,the array of the enemy melts away when 
we approach him4 ,the greatest happiness
 of the greatest number was a great     
original idea when enunciated by        

,bentham1 which leavened a generation   
and has left its mark on thought and    
civilization in all succeeding times4   
,his grasp of it had the intensity of   
genius4 ,in the spirit of an ancient    
philosopher he would have denied that   
pleasures differed in kind1 or that by  
happiness he meant anything but         
pleasure4 ,he would perhaps have        
revolted us by his thoroughness4 ,the   
'guardianship of his doctrine' has      
passed into other hands2 and now we seem
 to see its weak points1 its            
ambiguities1 its want of exactness while
 assuming the highest exactness1 its    
one-sidedness1 its paradoxical          
explanation of several of the virtues4  
,no philosophy has ever stood this      
criticism of the next generation1 though
 the founders of all of them have       
imagined that they were built upon a    
rock4 ,and the utilitarian system1 like 
others1 has yielded to the inevitable   
analysis4 ,even in the opinion of 'her  
admirers she has been terribly damaged' 

7,phil471 and is no longer the only     
moral philosophy1 but one among many    
which have contributed in various       
degrees to the intellectual progress of 
mankind4  ,but because the utilitarian  
philosophy can no longer claim 'the     
prize1' we must not refuse to           
acknowledge the great benefits conferred
 by it on the world4 ,all philosophies  
are refuted in their turn1 says the     
sceptic1 and he looks forward to all    
future systems sharing the fate of the  
past4 ,all philosophies remain1 says the
 thinker2 they have done a great work in
 their own day1 and they supply         
posterity with aspects of the truth and 
with instruments of thought4 ,though    
they may be shorn of their glory1 they  
retain their place in the organism of   
knowledge4  ,and still there remain many
 rules of morals which are better       
explained and more forcibly inculcated  
on the principle of utility than on any 
other4 ,the question ,will such and such
 an action promote the happiness of     

myself1 my family1 my country1 the      
world8 may check the rising feeling of  
pride or honour which would cause a     
quarrel1 an estrangement1 a war4 ',how  
can ,i contribute to the greatest       
happiness of others8' is another form of
 the question which will be more        
attractive to the minds of many than a  
deduction of the duty of benevolence    
from a priori principles4 ,in politics  
especially hardly any other argument can
 be allowed to have weight except the   
happiness of a people4 ,all parties     
alike profess to aim at this1 which     
though often used only as the disguise  
of self-interest has a great and real   
influence on the minds of statesmen4 ,in
 religion1 again1 nothing can more tend 
to mitigate superstition than the belief
 that the good of man is also the will  
of ,god4 ,this is an easy test to which 
the prejudices and superstitions of men 
may be brought3--whatever does not tend 
to the good of men is not of ,god4 ,and 
the ideal of the greatest happiness of  

mankind1 especially if believed to be   
the will of ,god1 when compared with the
 actual fact1 will be one of the        
strongest motives to do good to others4 
,on the other hand1 when the temptation 
is to speak falsely1 to be dishonest or 
unjust1 or in any way to interfere with 
the rights of others1 the argument that 
these actions regarded as a class will  
not conduce to the happiness of mankind1
 though true enough1 seems to have less 
force than the feeling which is already 
implanted in the mind by conscience and 
authority4 ,to resolve this feeling into
 the greatest happiness principle takes 
away from its sacred and authoritative  
character4 ,the martyr will not go to   
the stake in order that he may promote  
the happiness of mankind1 but for the   
sake of the truth3 neither will the     
soldier advance to the cannon's mouth   
merely because he believes military     
discipline to be for the good of        
mankind4 ,it is better for him to know  
that he will be shot1 that he will be   

disgraced1 if he runs away--he has no   
need to look beyond military honour1    
patriotism1 ',england expects every man 
to do his duty4' ,these are stronger    
motives than the greatest happiness of  
the greatest number1 which is the thesis
 of a philosopher1 not the watchword of 
an army4 ,for in human actions men do   
not always require broad principles2    
duties often come home to us more when  
they are limited and defined1 and       
sanctioned by custom and public opinion4
  ,lastly1 if we turn to the history of 
ethics1 we shall find that our moral    
ideas have originated not in utility but
 in religion1 in law1 in conceptions of 
nature1 of an ideal good1 and the like4 
,and many may be inclined to think that 
this conclusively disproves the claim of
 utility to be the basis of morals4 ,but
 the utilitarian will fairly reply 7see 
above7 that we must distinguish the     
origin of ethics from the principles of 
them--the historical germ from the later
 growth of reflection4 ,and he may also 

truly add that for two thousand years   
and more1 utility1 if not the           
originating1 has been the great         
corrective principle in law1 in         
politics1 in religion1 leading men to   
ask how evil may be diminished and good 
increased--by what course of policy the 
public interest may be promoted1 and to 
understand that ,god wills the          
happiness1 not of some of his creatures 
and in this world only1 but of all of   
them and in every stage of their        
existence4  ',what is the place of      
happiness or utility in a system of     
moral philosophy8' is analogous to the  
question asked in the ,philebus1 ',what 
rank does pleasure hold in the scale of 
goods8' ,admitting the greatest         
happiness principle to be true and      
valuable1 and the necessary foundation  
of that part of morals which relates to 
the consequences of actions1 we still   
have to consider whether this or some   
other general notion is the highest     
principle of human life4 ,we may try    

them in this comparison by three        
tests--definiteness1 comprehensiveness1 
and motive power4  ,there are three     
subjective principles of                
morals1--sympathy1 benevolence1         
self-love4 ,but sympathy seems to rest  
morality on feelings which differ widely
 even in good men2 benevolence and      
self-love torture one half of our       
virtuous actions into the likeness of   
the other4 ,the greatest happiness      
principle1 which includes both1 has the 
advantage over all these in             
comprehensiveness1 but the advantage is 
purchased at the expense of             
definiteness4  ,again1 there are the    
legal and political principles of       
morals--freedom1 equality1 rights of    
persons2 ',every man to count for one   
and no man for more than one1' ',every  
man equal in the eye of the law and of  
the legislator4' ,there is also the     
other sort of political morality1 which 
if not beginning with ',might is right1'
 at any rate seeks to deduce our ideas  

of justice from the necessities of the  
state and of society4 ,according to this
 view the greatest good of men is       
obedience to law3 the best human        
government is a rational despotism1 and 
the best idea which we can form of a    
divine being is that of a despot acting 
not wholly without regard to law and    
order4 ,to such a view the present mixed
 state of the world1 not wholly evil or 
wholly good1 is supposed to be a        
witness4 ,more we might desire to have1 
but are not permitted4 ,though a human  
tyrant would be intolerable1 a divine   
tyrant is a very tolerable governor of  
the universe4 ,this is the doctrine of  
,thrasymachus adapted to the public     
opinion of modern times4  ,there is yet 
a third view which combines the         
two3--freedom is obedience to the law1  
and the greatest order is also the      
greatest freedom2 ',act so that thy     
action may be the law of every          
intelligent being4' ,this view is noble 
and elevating2 but it seems to err1 like

 other transcendental principles of     
ethics1 in being too abstract4 ,for     
there is the same difficulty in         
connecting the idea of duty with        
particular duties as in bridging the    
gulf between phainomena and onta2 and   
when1 as in the system of ,kant1 this   
universal idea or law is held to be     
independent of space and time1 such a   
mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning4 
,once more there are the religious      
principles of morals3--the will of ,god 
revealed in ,scripture and in nature4   
,no philosophy has supplied a sanction  
equal in authority to this1 or a motive 
equal in strength to the belief in      
another life4 ,yet about these too we   
must ask ,what will of ,god8 how        
revealed to us1 and by what proofs8     
,religion1 like happiness1 is a word    
which has great influence apart from any
 consideration of its content3 it may be
 for great good or for great evil4 ,but 
true religion is the synthesis of       
religion and morality1 beginning with   

divine perfection in which all human    
perfection is embodied4 ,it moves among 
ideas of holiness1 justice1 love1       
wisdom1 truth2 these are to ,god1 in    
whom they are personified1 what the     
,platonic ideas are to the idea of good4
 ,it is the consciousness of the will of
 ,god that all men should be as he is4  
,it lives in this world and is known to 
us only through the phenomena of this   
world1 but it extends to worlds beyond4 
,ordinary religion which is alloyed with
 motives of this world may easily be in 
excess1 may be fanatical1 may be        
interested1 may be the mask of ambition1
 may be perverted in a thousand ways4   
,but of that religion which combines the
 will of ,god with our highest ideas of 
truth and right there can never be too  
much4 ,this impossibility of excess is  
the note of divine moderation4  ,so     
then1 having briefly passed in review   
the various principles of moral         
philosophy1 we may now arrange our goods
 in order1 though1 like the reader of   

the ,philebus1 we have a difficulty in  
distinguishing the different aspects of 
them from one another1 or defining the  
point at which the human passes into the
 divine4  ,first1 the eternal will of   
,god in this world and in               
another1--justice1 holiness1 wisdom1    
love1 without succession of acts 7ouch e
 genesis prosestin71 which is known to  
us in part only1 and reverenced by us as
 divine perfection4  ,secondly1 human   
perfection1 or the fulfilment of the    
will of ,god in this world1 and         
co-operation with his laws revealed to  
us by reason and experience1 in nature1 
history1 and in our own minds4          
,thirdly1 the elements of human         
perfection1--virtue1 knowledge1 and     
right opinion4  ,fourthly1 the external 
conditions of perfection1--health and   
the goods of life4  ,fifthly1 beauty and
 happiness1--the inward enjoyment of    
that which is best and fairest in this  
world and in the human soul4  444  ,the 
,philebus is probably the latest in time

 of the writings of ,plato with the     
exception of the ,laws4 ,we have in it  
therefore the last development of his   
philosophy4 ,the extreme and one-sided  
doctrines of the ,cynics and ,cyrenaics 
are included in a larger whole2 the     
relations of pleasure and knowledge to  
each other and to the good are          
authoritatively determined2 the ,eleatic
 ,being and the ,heraclitean ,flux no   
longer divide the empire of thought2 the
 ,mind of ,anaxagoras has become the    
,mind of ,god and of the ,world4 ,the   
great distinction between pure and      
applied science for the first time has a
 place in philosophy2 the natural claim 
of dialectic to be the ,queen of the    
,sciences is once more affirmed4 ,this  
latter is the bond of union which       
pervades the whole or nearly the whole  
of the ,platonic writings4 ,and here as 
in several other dialogues 7,phaedrus1  
,republic1 etc47 it is presented to us  
in a manner playful yet also serious1   
and sometimes as if the thought of it   

were too great for human utterance and  
came down from heaven direct4 ,it is the
 organization of knowledge wonderful to 
think of at a time when knowledge itself
 could hardly be said to exist4 ,it is  
this more than any other element which  
distinguishes ,plato1 not only from the 
presocratic philosophers1 but from      
,socrates himself4  ,we have not yet    
reached the confines of ,aristotle1 but 
we make a somewhat nearer approach to   
him in the ,philebus than in the earlier
 ,platonic writings4 ,the germs of logic
 are beginning to appear1 but they are  
not collected into a whole1 or made a   
separate science or system4 ,many       
thinkers of many different schools have 
to be interposed between the ,parmenides
 or ,philebus of ,plato1 and the        
,physics or ,metaphysics of ,aristotle4 
,it is this interval upon which we have 
to fix our minds if we would rightly    
understand the character of the         
transition from one to the other4 ,plato
 and ,aristotle do not dovetail into one

 another2 nor does the one begin where  
the other ends2 there is a gulf between 
them not to be measured by time1 which  
in the fragmentary state of our         
knowledge it is impossible to bridge    
over4 ,it follows that the one cannot be
 interpreted by the other4 ,at any rate1
 it is not ,plato who is to be          
interpreted by ,aristotle1 but          
,aristotle by ,plato4 ,of all philosophy
 and of all art the true understanding  
is to be sought not in the afterthoughts
 of posterity1 but in the elements out  
of which they have arisen4 ,for the     
previous stage is a tendency towards the
 ideal at which they are aiming2 the    
later is a declination or deviation from
 them1 or even a perversion of them4 ,no
 man's thoughts were ever so well       
expressed by his disciples as by        
himself4  ,but although ,plato in the   
,philebus does not come into any close  
connexion with ,aristotle1 he is now a  
long way from himself and from the      
beginnings of his own philosophy4 ,at   

the time of his death he left his system
 still incomplete2 or he may be more    
truly said to have had no system1 but to
 have lived in the successive stages or 
moments of metaphysical thought which   
presented themselves from time to time4 
,the earlier discussions about universal
 ideas and definitions seem to have died
 away2 the correlation of ideas has     
taken their place4 ,the flowers of      
rhetoric and poetry have lost their     
freshness and charm2 and a technical    
language has begun to supersede and     
overgrow them4 ,but the power of        
thinking tends to increase with age1 and
 the experience of life to widen and    
deepen4 ,the good is summed up under    
categories which are not summa genera1  
but heads or gradations of thought4 ,the
 question of pleasure and the relation  
of bodily pleasures to mental1 which is 
hardly treated of elsewhere in ,plato1  
is here analysed with great subtlety4   
,the mean or measure is now made the    
first principle of good4 ,some of these 

questions reappear in ,aristotle1 as    
does also the distinction between       
metaphysics and mathematics4 ,but there 
are many things in ,plato which have    
been lost in ,aristotle2 and many things
 in ,aristotle not to be found in       
,plato4 ,the most remarkable deficiency 
in ,aristotle is the disappearance of   
the ,platonic dialectic1 which in the   
,aristotelian school is only used in a  
comparatively unimportant and trivial   
sense4 ,the most remarkable additions   
are the invention of the ,syllogism1 the
 conception of happiness as the         
foundation of morals1 the reference of  
human actions to the standard of the    
better mind of the world1 or of the one 
'sensible man' or 'superior person4'    
,his conception of ousia1 or essence1 is
 not an advance upon ,plato1 but a      
return to the poor and meagre           
abstractions of the ,eleatic philosophy4
 ,the dry attempt to reduce the         
presocratic philosophy by his own rather
 arbitrary standard of the four causes1 

contrasts unfavourably with ,plato's    
general discussion of the same subject  
7,sophist74 ,to attempt further to sum  
up the differences between the two great
 philosophers would be out of place     
here4 ,any real discussion of their     
relation to one another must be preceded
 by an examination into the nature and  
character of the ,aristotelian writings 
and the form in which they have come    
down to us4 ,this enquiry is not really 
separable from an investigation of      
,theophrastus as well as ,aristotle and 
of the remains of other schools of      
philosophy as well as of the            
,peripatetics4 ,but1 without entering on
 this wide field1 even a superficial    
consideration of the logical and        
metaphysical works which pass under the 
name of ,aristotle1 whether we suppose  
them to have come directly from his hand
 or to be the tradition of his school1  
is sufficient to show how great was the 
mental activity which prevailed in the  
latter half of the fourth century       

,b4,c42 what eddies and whirlpools of   
controversies were surging in the chaos 
of thought1 what transformations of the 
old philosophies were taking place      
everywhere1 what eclecticisms and       
syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms
 were affecting the mind of ,hellas4    
,the decline of philosophy during this  
period is no less remarkable than the   
loss of freedom2 and the two are not    
unconnected with each other4 ,but of the
 multitudinous sea of opinions which    
were current in the age of ,aristotle we
 have no exact account4 ,we know of them
 from allusions only4 ,and we cannot    
with advantage fill up the void of our  
knowledge by conjecture3 we can only    
make allowance for our ignorance4       
,there are several passages in the      
,philebus which are very characteristic 
of ,plato1 and which we shall do well to
 consider not only in their connexion1  
but apart from their connexion as       
inspired sayings or oracles which       
receive their full interpretation only  

from the history of philosophy in later 
ages4 ,the more serious attacks on      
traditional beliefs which are often     
veiled under an unusual simplicity or   
irony are of this kind4 ,such1 for      
example1 is the excessive and more than 
human awe which ,socrates expresses     
about the names of the gods1 which may  
be not unaptly compared with the        
importance attached by mankind to       
theological terms in other ages2 for    
this also may be comprehended under the 
satire of ,socrates4 ,let us observe the
 religious and intellectual enthusiasm  
which shines forth in the following1    
',the power and faculty of loving the   
truth1 and of doing all things for the  
sake of the truth'3 or1 again1 the      
singular acknowledgment which may be    
regarded as the anticipation of a new   
logic1 that ',in going to war for mind  
,i must have weapons of a different make
 from those which ,i used before1       
although some of the old ones may do    
again4' ,let us pause awhile to reflect 

on a sentence which is full of meaning  
to reformers of religion or to the      
original thinker of all ages3 ',shall we
 then agree with them of old time1 and  
merely reassert the notions of others   
without risk to ourselves2 or shall we  
venture also to share in the risk and   
bear the reproach which will await us'3 
i4e4 if we assert mind to be the author 
of nature4 ,let us note the remarkable  
words1 ',that in the divine nature of   
,zeus there is the soul and mind of a   
,king1 because there is in him the power
 of the cause1' a saying in which       
theology and philosophy are blended and 
reconciled2 not omitting to observe the 
deep insight into human nature which is 
shown by the repetition of the same     
thought ',all philosophers are agreed   
that mind is the king of heaven and     
earth' with the ironical addition1 'in  
this way truly they magnify themselves4'
 ,nor let us pass unheeded the          
indignation felt by the generous youth  
at the 'blasphemy' of those who say that

 ,chaos and ,chance ,medley created the 
world2 or the significance of the words 
'those who said of old time that mind   
rules the universe'2 or the pregnant    
observation that 'we are not always     
conscious of what we are doing or of    
what happens to us1' a chance expression
 to which if philosophers had attended  
they would have escaped many errors in  
psychology4 ,we may contrast the        
contempt which is poured upon the verbal
 difficulty of the one and many1 and the
 seriousness with the unity of opposites
 is regarded from the higher point of   
view of abstract ideas3 or compare the  
simple manner in which the question of  
cause and effect and their mutual       
dependence is regarded by ,plato 7to    
which modern science has returned in    
,mill and ,bacon71 and the cumbrous     
fourfold division of causes in the      
,physics and ,metaphysics of ,aristotle1
 for which it has puzzled the world to  
find a use in so many centuries4 ,when  
we consider the backwardness of         

knowledge in the age of ,plato1 the     
boldness with which he looks forward    
into the distance1 the many questions of
 modern philosophy which are anticipated
 in his writings1 may we not truly      
describe him in his own words as a      
'spectator of all time and of all       
existence'8     ,,philebus   ,,persons  
,,of ,,the ,,dialogue3 ,socrates1       
,protarchus1 ,philebus4   ,,socrates3   
,observe1 ,protarchus1 the nature of the
 position which you are now going to    
take from ,philebus1 and what the other 
position is which ,i maintain1 and      
which1 if you do not approve of it1 is  
to be controverted by you4 ,shall you   
and ,i sum up the two sides8            
,,protarchus3 ,by all means4            
,,socrates3 ,philebus was saying that   
enjoyment and pleasure and delight1 and 
the class of feelings akin to them1 are 
a good to every living being1 whereas ,i
 contend1 that not these1 but wisdom and
 intelligence and memory1 and their     
kindred1 right opinion and true         

reasoning1 are better and more desirable
 than pleasure for all who are able to  
partake of them1 and that to all such   
who are or ever will be they are the    
most advantageous of all things4 ,have  
,i not given1 ,philebus1 a fair         
statement of the two sides of the       
argument8  ,,philebus3 ,nothing could be
 fairer1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,and do
 you1 ,protarchus1 accept the position  
which is assigned to you8  ,,protarchus3
 ,i cannot do otherwise1 since our      
excellent ,philebus has left the field4 
,,socrates3 ,surely the truth about     
these matters ought1 by all means1 to be
 ascertained4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4
  ,,socrates3 ,shall we further agree-- 
,,protarchus3 ,to what8  ,,socrates3    
,that you and ,i must now try to        
indicate some state and disposition of  
the soul1 which has the property of     
making all men happy4  ,,protarchus3    
,yes1 by all means4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
you say that pleasure1 and ,i say that  
wisdom1 is such a state8  ,,protarchus3 

,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and what if there  
be a third state1 which is better than  
either8 ,then both of us are            
vanquished--are we not8 ,but if this    
life1 which really has the power of     
making men happy1 turn out to be more   
akin to pleasure than to wisdom1 the    
life of pleasure may still have the     
advantage over the life of wisdom4      
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,or   
suppose that the better life is more    
nearly allied to wisdom1 then wisdom    
conquers1 and pleasure is defeated2--do 
you agree8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4   
,,socrates3 ,and what do you say1       
,philebus8  ,,philebus3 ,i say1 and     
shall always say1 that pleasure is      
easily the conqueror2 but you must      
decide for yourself1 ,protarchus4       
,,protarchus3 ,you1 ,philebus1 have     
handed over the argument to me1 and have
 no longer a voice in the matter8       
,,philebus3 ,true enough4 ,nevertheless 
,i would clear myself and deliver my    
soul of you2 and ,i call the goddess    

herself to witness that ,i now do so4   
,,protarchus3 ,you may appeal to us2 we 
too will be the witnesses of your words4
 ,and now1 ,socrates1 whether ,philebus 
is pleased or displeased1 we will       
proceed with the argument4  ,,socrates3 
,then let us begin with the goddess     
herself1 of whom ,philebus says that she
 is called ,aphrodite1 but that her real
 name is ,pleasure4  ,,protarchus3 ,very
 good4  ,,socrates3 ,the awe which ,i   
always feel1 ,protarchus1 about the     
names of the gods is more than human--it
 exceeds all other fears4 ,and now ,i   
would not sin against ,aphrodite by     
naming her amiss2 let her be called what
 she pleases4 ,but ,pleasure ,i know to 
be manifold1 and with her1 as ,i was    
just now saying1 we must begin1 and     
consider what her nature is4 ,she has   
one name1 and therefore you would       
imagine that she is one2 and yet surely 
she takes the most varied and even      
unlike forms4 ,for do we not say that   
the intemperate has pleasure1 and that  

the temperate has pleasure in his very  
temperance1--that the fool is pleased   
when he is full of foolish fancies and  
hopes1 and that the wise man has        
pleasure in his wisdom8 and how foolish 
would any one be who affirmed that all  
these opposite pleasures are severally  
alike6  ,,protarchus3 ,why1 ,socrates1  
they are opposed in so far as they      
spring from opposite sources1 but they  
are not in themselves opposite4 ,for    
must not pleasure be of all things most 
absolutely like pleasure1--that is1 like
 itself8  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 my good     
friend1 just as colour is like          
colour2--in so far as colours are       
colours1 there is no difference between 
them2 and yet we all know that black is 
not only unlike1 but even absolutely    
opposed to white3 or again1 as figure is
 like figure1 for all figures are       
comprehended under one class2 and yet   
particular figures may be absolutely    
opposed to one another1 and there is an 
infinite diversity of them4 ,and we     

might find similar examples in many     
other things2 therefore do not rely upon
 this argument1 which would go to prove 
the unity of the most extreme opposites4
 ,and ,i suspect that we shall find a   
similar opposition among pleasures4     
,,protarchus3 ,very likely2 but how will
 this invalidate the argument8          
,,socrates3 ,why1 ,i shall reply1 that  
dissimilar as they are1 you apply to    
them a new predicate1 for you say that  
all pleasant things are good2 now       
although no one can argue that pleasure 
is not pleasure1 he may argue1 as we are
 doing1 that pleasures are oftener bad  
than good2 but you call them all good1  
and at the same time are compelled1 if  
you are pressed1 to acknowledge that    
they are unlike4 ,and so you must tell  
us what is the identical quality        
existing alike in good and bad          
pleasures1 which makes you designate all
 of them as good4  ,,protarchus3 ,what  
do you mean1 ,socrates8 ,do you think   
that any one who asserts pleasure to be 

the good1 will tolerate the notion that 
some pleasures are good and others bad8 
,,socrates3 ,and yet you will           
acknowledge that they are different from
 one another1 and sometimes opposed8    
,,protarchus3 ,not in so far as they are
 pleasures4  ,,socrates3 ,that is a     
return to the old position1 ,protarchus1
 and so we are to say 7are we87 that    
there is no difference in pleasures1 but
 that they are all alike2 and the       
examples which have just been cited do  
not pierce our dull minds1 but we go on 
arguing all the same1 like the weakest  
and most inexperienced reasoners8       
7,probably corrupt47  ,,protarchus3     
,what do you mean8  ,,socrates3 ,why1 ,i
 mean to say1 that in self-defence ,i   
may1 if ,i like1 follow your example1   
and assert boldly that the two things   
most unlike are most absolutely alike2  
and the result will be that you and ,i  
will prove ourselves to be very tyros in
 the art of disputing2 and the argument 
will be blown away and lost4 ,suppose   

that we put back1 and return to the old 
position2 then perhaps we may come to an
 understanding with one another4        
,,protarchus3 ,how do you mean8         
,,socrates3 ,shall ,i1 ,protarchus1 have
 my own question asked of me by you8    
,,protarchus3 ,what question8           
,,socrates3 ,ask me whether wisdom and  
science and mind1 and those other       
qualities which ,i1 when asked by you at
 first what is the nature of the good1  
affirmed to be good1 are not in the same
 case with the pleasures of which you   
spoke4  ,,protarchus3 ,what do you mean8
  ,,socrates3 ,the sciences are a       
numerous class1 and will be found to    
present great differences4 ,but even    
admitting that1 like the pleasures1 they
 are opposite as well as different1     
should ,i be worthy of the name of      
dialectician if1 in order to avoid this 
difficulty1 ,i were to say 7as you are  
saying of pleasure7 that there is no    
difference between one science and      
another2--would not the argument founder

 and disappear like an idle tale1       
although we might ourselves escape      
drowning by clinging to a fallacy8      
,,protarchus3 ,may none of this befal   
us1 except the deliverance6 ,yet ,i like
 the even-handed justice which is       
applied to both our arguments4 ,let us  
assume1 then1 that there are many and   
diverse pleasures1 and many and         
different sciences4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
let us have no concealment1 ,protarchus1
 of the differences between my good and 
yours2 but let us bring them to the     
light in the hope that1 in the process  
of testing them1 they may show whether  
pleasure is to be called the good1 or   
wisdom1 or some third quality2 for      
surely we are not now simply contending 
in order that my view or that yours may 
prevail1 but ,i presume that we ought   
both of us to be fighting for the truth4
  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly we ought4    
,,socrates3 ,then let us have a more    
definite understanding and establish the
 principle on which the argument rests4 

,,protarchus3 ,what principle8          
,,socrates3 ,a principle about which all
 men are always in a difficulty1 and    
some men sometimes against their will4  
,,protarchus3 ,speak plainer4           
,,socrates3 ,the principle which has    
just turned up1 which is a marvel of    
nature2 for that one should be many or  
many one1 are wonderful propositions2   
and he who affirms either is very open  
to attack4  ,,protarchus3 ,do you mean1 
when a person says that ,i1 ,protarchus1
 am by nature one and also many1        
dividing the single 'me' into many      
'me's1' and even opposing them as great 
and small1 light and heavy1 and in ten  
thousand other ways8  ,,socrates3       
,those1 ,protarchus1 are the common and 
acknowledged paradoxes about the one and
 many1 which ,i may say that everybody  
has by this time agreed to dismiss as   
childish and obvious and detrimental to 
the true course of thought2 and no more 
favour is shown to that other puzzle1 in
 which a person proves the members and  

parts of anything to be divided1 and    
then confessing that they are all one1  
says laughingly in disproof of his own  
words3 ,why1 here is a miracle1 the one 
is many and infinite1 and the many are  
only one4  ,,protarchus3 ,but what1     
,socrates1 are those other marvels      
connected with this subject which1 as   
you imply1 have not yet become common   
and acknowledged8  ,,socrates3 ,when1 my
 boy1 the one does not belong to the    
class of things that are born and       
perish1 as in the instances which we    
were giving1 for in those cases1 and    
when unity is of this concrete nature1  
there is1 as ,i was saying1 a universal 
consent that no refutation is needed2   
but when the assertion is made that man 
is one1 or ox is one1 or beauty one1 or 
the good one1 then the interest which   
attaches to these and similar unities   
and the attempt which is made to divide 
them gives birth to a controversy4      
,,protarchus3 ,of what nature8          
,,socrates3 ,in the first place1 as to  

whether these unities have a real       
existence2 and then how each individual 
unity1 being always the same1 and       
incapable either of generation or of    
destruction1 but retaining a permanent  
individuality1 can be conceived either  
as dispersed and multiplied in the      
infinity of the world of generation1 or 
as still entire and yet divided from    
itself1 which latter would seem to be   
the greatest impossibility of all1 for  
how can one and the same thing be at the
 same time in one and in many things8   
,these1 ,protarchus1 are the real       
difficulties1 and this is the one and   
many to which they relate2 they are the 
source of great perplexity if ill       
decided1 and the right determination of 
them is very helpful4  ,,protarchus3    
,then1 ,socrates1 let us begin by       
clearing up these questions4            
,,socrates3 ,that is what ,i should     
wish4  ,,protarchus3 ,and ,i am sure    
that all my other friends will be glad  
to hear them discussed2 ,philebus1      

fortunately for us1 is not disposed to  
move1 and we had better not stir him up 
with questions4  ,,socrates3 ,good2 and 
where shall we begin this great and     
multifarious battle1 in which such      
various points are at issue8 ,shall we  
begin thus8  ,,protarchus3 ,how8        
,,socrates3 ,we say that the one and    
many become identified by thought1 and  
that now1 as in time past1 they run     
about together1 in and out of every word
 which is uttered1 and that this union  
of them will never cease1 and is not now
 beginning1 but is1 as ,i believe1 an   
everlasting quality of thought itself1  
which never grows old4 ,any young man1  
when he first tastes these subtleties1  
is delighted1 and fancies that he has   
found a treasure of wisdom2 in the first
 enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no     
stone1 or rather no thought unturned1   
now rolling up the many into the one1   
and kneading them together1 now         
unfolding and dividing them2 he puzzles 
himself first and above all1 and then he

 proceeds to puzzle his neighbours1     
whether they are older or younger1 or of
 his own age--that makes no difference2 
neither father nor mother does he spare2
 no human being who has ears is safe    
from him1 hardly even his dog1 and a    
barbarian would have no chance of       
escaping him1 if an interpreter could   
only be found4  ,,protarchus3           
,considering1 ,socrates1 how many we    
are1 and that all of us are young men1  
is there not a danger that we and       
,philebus may all set upon you1 if you  
abuse us8 ,we understand what you mean2 
but is there no charm by which we may   
dispel all this confusion1 no more      
excellent way of arriving at the truth8 
,if there is1 we hope that you will     
guide us into that way1 and we will do  
our best to follow1 for the enquiry in  
which we are engaged1 ,socrates1 is not 
unimportant4  ,,socrates3 ,the reverse  
of unimportant1 my boys1 as ,philebus   
calls you1 and there neither is nor ever
 will be a better than my own favourite 

way1 which has nevertheless already     
often deserted me and left me helpless  
in the hour of need4  ,,protarchus3     
,tell us what that is4  ,,socrates3 ,one
 which may be easily pointed out1 but is
 by no means easy of application2 it is 
the parent of all the discoveries in the
 arts4  ,,protarchus3 ,tell us what it  
is4  ,,socrates3 ,a gift of heaven1     
which1 as ,i conceive1 the gods tossed  
among men by the hands of a new         
,prometheus1 and therewith a blaze of   
light2 and the ancients1 who were our   
betters and nearer the gods than we are1
 handed down the tradition1 that        
whatever things are said to be are      
composed of one and many1 and have the  
finite and infinite implanted in them3  
seeing1 then1 that such is the order of 
the world1 we too ought in every enquiry
 to begin by laying down one idea of    
that which is the subject of enquiry2   
this unity we shall find in everything4 
,having found it1 we may next proceed to
 look for two1 if there be two1 or1 if  

not1 then for three or some other       
number1 subdividing each of these units1
 until at last the unity with which we  
began is seen not only to be one and    
many and infinite1 but also a definite  
number2 the infinite must not be        
suffered to approach the many until the 
entire number of the species            
intermediate between unity and infinity 
has been discovered1--then1 and not till
 then1 we may rest from division1 and   
without further troubling ourselves     
about the endless individuals may allow 
them to drop into infinity4 ,this1 as ,i
 was saying1 is the way of considering  
and learning and teaching one another1  
which the gods have handed down to us4  
,but the wise men of our time are either
 too quick or too slow in conceiving    
plurality in unity4 ,having no method1  
they make their one and many anyhow1 and
 from unity pass at once to infinity2   
the intermediate steps never occur to   
them4 ,and this1 ,i repeat1 is what     
makes the difference between the mere   

art of disputation and true dialectic4  
,,protarchus3 ,i think that ,i partly   
understand you ,socrates1 but ,i should 
like to have a clearer notion of what   
you are saying4  ,,socrates3 ,i may     
illustrate my meaning by the letters of 
the alphabet1 ,protarchus1 which you    
were made to learn as a child4          
,,protarchus3 ,how do they afford an    
illustration8  ,,socrates3 ,the sound   
which passes through the lips whether of
 an individual or of all men is one and 
yet infinite4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4
  ,,socrates3 ,and yet not by knowing   
either that sound is one or that sound  
is infinite are we perfect in the art of
 speech1 but the knowledge of the number
 and nature of sounds is what makes a   
man a grammarian4  ,,protarchus3 ,very  
true4  ,,socrates3 ,and the knowledge   
which makes a man a musician is of the  
same kind4  ,,protarchus3 ,how so8      
,,socrates3 ,sound is one in music as   
well as in grammar8  ,,protarchus3      
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and there is a

 higher note and a lower note1 and a    
note of equal pitch3--may we affirm so  
much8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 
,but you would not be a real musician if
 this was all that you knew2 though if  
you did not know this you would know    
almost nothing of music4  ,,protarchus3 
,nothing4  ,,socrates3 ,but when you    
have learned what sounds are high and   
what low1 and the number and nature of  
the intervals and their limits or       
proportions1 and the systems compounded 
out of them1 which our fathers          
discovered1 and have handed down to us  
who are their descendants under the name
 of harmonies2 and the affections       
corresponding to them in the movements  
of the human body1 which when measured  
by numbers ought1 as they say1 to be    
called rhythms and measures2 and they   
tell us that the same principle should  
be applied to every one and many2--when1
 ,i say1 you have learned all this1     
then1 my dear friend1 you are perfect2  
and you may be said to understand any   

other subject1 when you have a similar  
grasp of it4 ,but the infinity of kinds 
and the infinity of individuals which   
there is in each of them1 when not      
classified1 creates in every one of us a
 state of infinite ignorance2 and he who
 never looks for number in anything1    
will not himself be looked for in the   
number of famous men4  ,,protarchus3 ,i 
think that what ,socrates is now saying 
is excellent1 ,philebus4  ,,philebus3 ,i
 think so too1 but how do his words bear
 upon us and upon the argument8         
,,socrates3 ,philebus is right in asking
 that question of us1 ,protarchus4      
,,protarchus3 ,indeed he is1 and you    
must answer him4  ,,socrates3 ,i will2  
but you must let me make one little     
remark first about these matters2 ,i was
 saying1 that he who begins with any    
individual unity1 should proceed from   
that1 not to infinity1 but to a definite
 number1 and now ,i say conversely1 that
 he who has to begin with infinity      
should not jump to unity1 but he should 

look about for some number representing 
a certain quantity1 and thus out of all 
end in one4 ,and now let us return for  
an illustration of our principle to the 
case of letters4  ,,protarchus3 ,what do
 you mean8  ,,socrates3 ,some god or    
divine man1 who in the ,egyptian legend 
is said to have been ,theuth1 observing 
that the human voice was infinite1 first
 distinguished in this infinity a       
certain number of vowels1 and then other
 letters which had sound1 but were not  
pure vowels 7i4e41 the semivowels72     
these too exist in a definite number2   
and lastly1 he distinguished a third    
class of letters which we now call      
mutes1 without voice and without sound1 
and divided these1 and likewise the two 
other classes of vowels and semivowels1 
into the individual sounds1 and told the
 number of them1 and gave to each and   
all of them the name of letters2 and    
observing that none of us could learn   
any one of them and not learn them all1 
and in consideration of this common bond

 which in a manner united them1 he      
assigned to them all a single art1 and  
this he called the art of grammar or    
letters4  ,,philebus3 ,the illustration1
 ,protarchus1 has assisted me in        
understanding the original statement1   
but ,i still feel the defect of which ,i
 just now complained4  ,,socrates3 ,are 
you going to ask1 ,philebus1 what this  
has to do with the argument8            
,,philebus3 ,yes1 that is a question    
which ,protarchus and ,i have been long 
asking4  ,,socrates3 ,assuredly you have
 already arrived at the answer to the   
question which1 as you say1 you have    
been so long asking8  ,,philebus3 ,how  
so8  ,,socrates3 ,did we not begin by   
enquiring into the comparative          
eligibility of pleasure and wisdom8     
,,philebus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3    
,and we maintain that they are each of  
them one8  ,,philebus3 ,true4           
,,socrates3 ,and the precise question to
 which the previous discussion desires  
an answer is1 how they are one and also 

many 7i4e41 how they have one genus and 
many species71 and are not at once      
infinite1 and what number of species is 
to be assigned to either of them before 
they pass into infinity 7i4e4 into the  
infinite number of individuals74        
,,protarchus3 ,that is a very serious   
question1 ,philebus1 to which ,socrates 
has ingeniously brought us round1 and   
please to consider which of us shall    
answer him2 there may be something      
ridiculous in my being unable to answer1
 and therefore imposing the task upon   
you1 when ,i have undertaken the whole  
charge of the argument1 but if neither  
of us were able to answer1 the result   
methinks would be still more ridiculous4
 ,let us consider1 then1 what we are to 
do3--,socrates1 if ,i understood him    
rightly1 is asking whether there are not
 kinds of pleasure1 and what is the     
number and nature of them1 and the same 
of wisdom4  ,,socrates3 ,most true1 ,o  
son of ,callias2 and the previous       
argument showed that if we are not able 

to tell the kinds of everything that has
 unity1 likeness1 sameness1 or their    
opposites1 none of us will be of the    
smallest use in any enquiry4            
,,protarchus3 ,that seems to be very    
near the truth1 ,socrates4 ,happy would 
the wise man be if he knew all things1  
and the next best thing for him is that 
he should know himself4 ,why do ,i say  
so at this moment8 ,i will tell you4    
,you1 ,socrates1 have granted us this   
opportunity of conversing with you1 and 
are ready to assist us in determining   
what is the best of human goods4 ,for   
when ,philebus said that pleasure and   
delight and enjoyment and the like were 
the chief good1 you answered--,no1 not  
those1 but another class of goods2 and  
we are constantly reminding ourselves of
 what you said1 and very properly1 in   
order that we may not forget to examine 
and compare the two4 ,and these goods1  
which in your opinion are to be         
designated as superior to pleasure1 and 
are the true objects of pursuit1 are    

mind and knowledge and understanding and
 art1 and the like4 ,there was a dispute
 about which were the best1 and we      
playfully threatened that you should not
 be allowed to go home until the        
question was settled2 and you agreed1   
and placed yourself at our disposal4    
,and now1 as children say1 what has been
 fairly given cannot be taken back2     
cease then to fight against us in this  
way4  ,,socrates3 ,in what way8         
,,philebus3 ,do not perplex us1 and keep
 asking questions of us to which we have
 not as yet any sufficient answer to    
give2 let us not imagine that a general 
puzzling of us all is to be the end of  
our discussion1 but if we are unable to 
answer1 do you answer1 as you have      
promised4 ,consider1 then1 whether you  
will divide pleasure and knowledge      
according to their kinds2 or you may let
 the matter drop1 if you are able and   
willing to find some other mode of      
clearing up our controversy4            
,,socrates3 ,if you say that1 ,i have   

nothing to apprehend1 for the words 'if 
you are willing' dispel all my fear2    
and1 moreover1 a god seems to have      
recalled something to my mind4          
,,philebus3 ,what is that8  ,,socrates3 
,i remember to have heard long ago      
certain discussions about pleasure and  
wisdom1 whether awake or in a dream ,i  
cannot tell2 they were to the effect    
that neither the one nor the other of   
them was the good1 but some third thing1
 which was different from them1 and     
better than either4 ,if this be clearly 
established1 then pleasure will lose the
 victory1 for the good will cease to be 
identified with her3--,am ,i not right8 
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
there will cease to be any need of      
distinguishing the kinds of pleasures1  
as ,i am inclined to think1 but this    
will appear more clearly as we proceed4 
,,protarchus3 ,capital1 ,socrates2 pray 
go on as you propose4  ,,socrates3 ,but1
 let us first agree on some little      
points4  ,,protarchus3 ,what are they8  

,,socrates3 ,is the good perfect or     
imperfect8  ,,protarchus3 ,the most     
perfect1 ,socrates1 of all things4      
,,socrates3 ,and is the good sufficient8
  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 certainly1 and in 
a degree surpassing all other things4   
,,socrates3 ,and no one can deny that   
all percipient beings desire and hunt   
after good1 and are eager to catch and  
have the good about them1 and care not  
for the attainment of anything which is 
not accompanied by good4  ,,protarchus3 
,that is undeniable4  ,,socrates3 ,now  
let us part off the life of pleasure    
from the life of wisdom1 and pass them  
in review4  ,,protarchus3 ,how do you   
mean8  ,,socrates3 ,let there be no     
wisdom in the life of pleasure1 nor any 
pleasure in the life of wisdom1 for if  
either of them is the chief good1 it    
cannot be supposed to want anything1 but
 if either is shown to want anything1   
then it cannot really be the chief good4
  ,,protarchus3 ,impossible4            
,,socrates3 ,and will you help us to    

test these two lives8  ,,protarchus3    
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,then answer4  
,,protarchus3 ,ask4  ,,socrates3 ,would 
you choose1 ,protarchus1 to live all    
your life long in the enjoyment of the  
greatest pleasures8  ,,protarchus3      
,certainly ,i should4  ,,socrates3      
,would you consider that there was still
 anything wanting to you if you had     
perfect pleasure8  ,,protarchus3        
,certainly not4  ,,socrates3 ,reflect2  
would you not want wisdom and           
intelligence and forethought1 and       
similar qualities8 would you not at any 
rate want sight8  ,,protarchus3 ,why    
should ,i8 ,having pleasure ,i should   
have all things4  ,,socrates3 ,living   
thus1 you would always throughout your  
life enjoy the greatest pleasures8      
,,protarchus3 ,i should4  ,,socrates3   
,but if you had neither mind1 nor       
memory1 nor knowledge1 nor true opinion1
 you would in the first place be utterly
 ignorant of whether you were pleased or
 not1 because you would be entirely     

devoid of intelligence4  ,,protarchus3  
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and similarly1
 if you had no memory you would not     
recollect that you had ever been        
pleased1 nor would the slightest        
recollection of the pleasure which you  
feel at any moment remain with you2 and 
if you had no true opinion you would not
 think that you were pleased when you   
were2 and if you had no power of        
calculation you would not be able to    
calculate on future pleasure1 and your  
life would be the life1 not of a man1   
but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus4'    
,could this be otherwise8  ,,protarchus3
 ,no4  ,,socrates3 ,but is such a life  
eligible8  ,,protarchus3 ,i cannot      
answer you1 ,socrates2 the argument has 
taken away from me the power of speech4 
,,socrates3 ,we must keep up our        
spirits2--let us now take the life of   
mind and examine it in turn4            
,,protarchus3 ,and what is this life of 
mind8  ,,socrates3 ,i want to know      
whether any one of us would consent to  

live1 having wisdom and mind and        
knowledge and memory of all things1 but 
having no sense of pleasure or pain1 and
 wholly unaffected by these and the like
 feelings8  ,,protarchus3 ,neither life1
 ,socrates1 appears eligible to me1 nor 
is likely1 as ,i should imagine1 to be  
chosen by any one else4  ,,socrates3    
,what would you say1 ,protarchus1 to    
both of these in one1 or to one that was
 made out of the union of the two8      
,,protarchus3 ,out of the union1 that   
is1 of pleasure with mind and wisdom8   
,,socrates3 ,yes1 that is the life which
 ,i mean4  ,,protarchus3 ,there can be  
no difference of opinion2 not some but  
all would surely choose this third      
rather than either of the other two1 and
 in addition to them4  ,,socrates3 ,but 
do you see the consequence8             
,,protarchus3 ,to be sure ,i do4 ,the   
consequence is1 that two out of the     
three lives which have been proposed are
 neither sufficient nor eligible for man
 or for animal4  ,,socrates3 ,then now  

there can be no doubt that neither of   
them has the good1 for the one which had
 would certainly have been sufficient   
and perfect and eligible for every      
living creature or thing that was able  
to live such a life2 and if any of us   
had chosen any other1 he would have     
chosen contrary to the nature of the    
truly eligible1 and not of his own free 
will1 but either through ignorance or   
from some unhappy necessity4            
,,protarchus3 ,certainly that seems to  
be true4  ,,socrates3 ,and now have ,i  
not sufficiently shown that ,philebus'  
goddess is not to be regarded as        
identical with the good8  ,,philebus3   
,neither is your 'mind' the good1       
,socrates1 for that will be open to the 
same objections4  ,,socrates3 ,perhaps1 
,philebus1 you may be right in saying so
 of my 'mind'2 but of the true1 which is
 also the divine mind1 far otherwise4   
,however1 ,i will not at present claim  
the first place for mind as against the 
mixed life2 but we must come to some    

understanding about the second place4   
,for you might affirm pleasure and ,i   
mind to be the cause of the mixed life2 
and in that case although neither of    
them would be the good1 one of them     
might be imagined to be the cause of the
 good4 ,and ,i might proceed further to 
argue in opposition to ,philebus1 that  
the element which makes this mixed life 
eligible and good1 is more akin and more
 similar to mind than to pleasure4 ,and 
if this is true1 pleasure cannot be     
truly said to share either in the first 
or second place1 and does not1 if ,i may
 trust my own mind1 attain even to the  
third4  ,,protarchus3 ,truly1 ,socrates1
 pleasure appears to me to have had a   
fall2 in fighting for the palm1 she has 
been smitten by the argument1 and is    
laid low4 ,i must say that mind would   
have fallen too1 and may therefore be   
thought to show discretion in not       
putting forward a similar claim4 ,and if
 pleasure were deprived not only of the 
first but of the second place1 she would

 be terribly damaged in the eyes of her 
admirers1 for not even to them would she
 still appear as fair as before4        
,,socrates3 ,well1 but had we not better
 leave her now1 and not pain her by     
applying the crucial test1 and finally  
detecting her8  ,,protarchus3 ,nonsense1
 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,why8 because  
,i said that we had better not pain     
pleasure1 which is an impossibility8    
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 and more than that1 
because you do not seem to be aware that
 none of us will let you go home until  
you have finished the argument4         
,,socrates3 ,heavens6 ,protarchus1 that 
will be a tedious business1 and just at 
present not at all an easy one4 ,for in 
going to war in the cause of mind1 who  
is aspiring to the second prize1 ,i     
ought to have weapons of another make   
from those which ,i used before2 some1  
however1 of the old ones may do again4  
,and must ,i then finish the argument8  
,,protarchus3 ,of course you must4      
,,socrates3 ,let us be very careful in  

laying the foundation4  ,,protarchus3   
,what do you mean8  ,,socrates3 ,let us 
divide all existing things into two1 or 
rather1 if you do not object1 into three
 classes4  ,,protarchus3 ,upon what     
principle would you make the division8  
,,socrates3 ,let us take some of our    
newly-found notions4  ,,protarchus3     
,which of them8  ,,socrates3 ,were we   
not saying that ,god revealed a finite  
element of existence1 and also an       
infinite8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4    
,,socrates3 ,let us assume these two    
principles1 and also a third1 which is  
compounded out of them2 but ,i fear that
 ,i am ridiculously clumsy at these     
processes of division and enumeration4  
,,protarchus3 ,what do you mean1 my good
 friend8  ,,socrates3 ,i say that a     
fourth class is still wanted4           
,,protarchus3 ,what will that be8       
,,socrates3 ,find the cause of the third
 or compound1 and add this as a fourth  
class to the three others4              
,,protarchus3 ,and would you like to    

have a fifth class or cause of          
resolution as well as a cause of        
composition8  ,,socrates3 ,not1 ,i      
think1 at present2 but if ,i want a     
fifth at some future time you shall     
allow me to have it4  ,,protarchus3     
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,let us begin  
with the first three2 and as we find two
 out of the three greatly divided and   
dispersed1 let us endeavour to reunite  
them1 and see how in each of them there 
is a one and many4  ,,protarchus3 ,if   
you would explain to me a little more   
about them1 perhaps ,i might be able to 
follow you4  ,,socrates3 ,well1 the two 
classes are the same which ,i mentioned 
before1 one the finite1 and the other   
the infinite2 ,i will first show that   
the infinite is in a certain sense many1
 and the finite may be hereafter        
discussed4  ,,protarchus3 ,i agree4     
,,socrates3 ,and now consider well2 for 
the question to which ,i invite your    
attention is difficult and controverted4
 ,when you speak of hotter and colder1  

can you conceive any limit in those     
qualities8 ,does not the more and less1 
which dwells in their very nature1      
prevent their having any end8 for if    
they had an end1 the more and less would
 themselves have an end4  ,,protarchus3 
,that is most true4  ,,socrates3 ,ever1 
as we say1 into the hotter and the      
colder there enters a more and a less4  
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,then1 
says the argument1 there is never any   
end of them1 and being endless they must
 also be infinite4  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 
,socrates1 that is exceedingly true4    
,,socrates3 ,yes1 my dear ,protarchus1  
and your answer reminds me that such an 
expression as 'exceedingly1' which you  
have just uttered1 and also the term    
'gently1' have the same significance as 
more or less2 for whenever they occur   
they do not allow of the existence of   
quantity--they are always introducing   
degrees into actions1 instituting a     
comparison of a more or a less excessive
 or a more or a less gentle1 and at each

 creation of more or less1 quantity     
disappears4 ,for1 as ,i was just now    
saying1 if quantity and measure did not 
disappear1 but were allowed to intrude  
in the sphere of more and less and the  
other comparatives1 these last would be 
driven out of their own domain4 ,when   
definite quantity is once admitted1     
there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a  
'colder' 7for these are always          
progressing1 and are never in one stay72
 but definite quantity is at rest1 and  
has ceased to progress4 ,which proves   
that comparatives1 such as the hotter   
and the colder1 are to be ranked in the 
class of the infinite4  ,,protarchus3   
,your remark certainly has the look of  
truth1 ,socrates2 but these subjects1 as
 you were saying1 are difficult to      
follow at first4 ,i think however1 that 
if ,i could hear the argument repeated  
by you once or twice1 there would be a  
substantial agreement between us4       
,,socrates3 ,yes1 and ,i will try to    
meet your wish2 but1 as ,i would rather 

not waste time in the enumeration of    
endless particulars1 let me know whether
 ,i may not assume as a note of the     
infinite--  ,,protarchus3 ,what8        
,,socrates3 ,i want to know whether such
 things as appear to us to admit of more
 or less1 or are denoted by the words   
'exceedingly1' 'gently1' 'extremely1'   
and the like1 may not be referred to the
 class of the infinite1 which is their  
unity1 for1 as was asserted in the      
previous argument1 all things that were 
divided and dispersed should be brought 
together1 and have the mark or seal of  
some one nature1 if possible1 set upon  
them--do you remember8  ,,protarchus3   
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and all things which
 do not admit of more or less1 but admit
 their opposites1 that is to say1 first 
of all1 equality1 and the equal1 or     
again1 the double1 or any other ratio of
 number and measure--all these may1 ,i  
think1 be rightly reckoned by us in the 
class of the limited or finite2 what do 
you say8  ,,protarchus3 ,excellent1     

,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,and now what   
nature shall we ascribe to the third or 
compound kind8  ,,protarchus3 ,you1 ,i  
think1 will have to tell me that4       
,,socrates3 ,rather ,god will tell you1 
if there be any ,god who will listen to 
my prayers4  ,,protarchus3 ,offer up a  
prayer1 then1 and think4  ,,socrates3 ,i
 am thinking1 ,protarchus1 and ,i       
believe that some ,god has befriended   
us4  ,,protarchus3 ,what do you mean1   
and what proof have you to offer of what
 you are saying8  ,,socrates3 ,i will   
tell you1 and do you listen to my words4
  ,,protarchus3 ,proceed4  ,,socrates3  
,were we not speaking just now of hotter
 and colder8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4      
,,socrates3 ,add to them drier1 wetter1 
more1 less1 swifter1 slower1 greater1   
smaller1 and all that in the preceding  
argument we placed under the unity of   
more and less4  ,,protarchus3 ,in the   
class of the infinite1 you mean8        
,,socrates3 ,yes2 and now mingle this   
with the other4  ,,protarchus3 ,what is 

the other4  ,,socrates3 ,the class of   
the finite which we ought to have       
brought together as we did the infinite2
 but1 perhaps1 it will come to the same 
thing if we do so now2--when the two are
 combined1 a third will appear4         
,,protarchus3 ,what do you mean by the  
class of the finite8  ,,socrates3 ,the  
class of the equal and the double1 and  
any class which puts an end to          
difference and opposition1 and by       
introducing number creates harmony and  
proportion among the different elements4
  ,,protarchus3 ,i understand2 you seem 
to me to mean that the various          
opposites1 when you mingle with them the
 class of the finite1 takes certain     
forms4  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 that is my    
meaning4  ,,protarchus3 ,proceed4       
,,socrates3 ,does not the right         
participation in the finite give        
health--in disease1 for instance8       
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and whereas the high and low1 the swift
 and the slow are infinite or unlimited1

 does not the addition of the principles
 aforesaid introduce a limit1 and       
perfect the whole frame of music8       
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 certainly4          
,,socrates3 ,or1 again1 when cold and   
heat prevail1 does not the introduction 
of them take away excess and            
indefiniteness1 and infuse moderation   
and harmony8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4 
,,socrates3 ,and from a like admixture  
of the finite and infinite come the     
seasons1 and all the delights of life8  
,,protarchus3 ,most true4  ,,socrates3  
,i omit ten thousand other things1 such 
as beauty and health and strength1 and  
the many beauties and high perfections  
of the soul3 ,o my beautiful ,philebus1 
the goddess1 methinks1 seeing the       
universal wantonness and wickedness of  
all things1 and that there was in them  
no limit to pleasures and               
self-indulgence1 devised the limit of   
law and order1 whereby1 as you say1     
,philebus1 she torments1 or as ,i       
maintain1 delivers the soul4--,what     

think you1 ,protarchus8  ,,protarchus3  
,her ways are much to my mind1          
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,you will       
observe that ,i have spoken of three    
classes8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 ,i think  
that ,i understand you3 you mean to say 
that the infinite is one class1 and that
 the finite is a second class of        
existences2 but what you would make the 
third ,i am not so certain4  ,,socrates3
 ,that is because the amazing variety of
 the third class is too much for you1 my
 dear friend2 but there was not this    
difficulty with the infinite1 which also
 comprehended many classes1 for all of  
them were sealed with the note of more  
and less1 and therefore appeared one4   
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
the finite or limit had not many        
divisions1 and we readily acknowledged  
it to be by nature one8  ,,protarchus3  
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 indeed2 and    
when ,i speak of the third class1       
understand me to mean any offspring of  
these1 being a birth into true being1   

effected by the measure which the limit 
introduces4  ,,protarchus3 ,i           
understand4  ,,socrates3 ,still there   
was1 as we said1 a fourth class to be   
investigated1 and you must assist in the
 investigation2 for does not everything 
which comes into being1 of necessity    
come into being through a cause8        
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 certainly2 for how  
can there be anything which has no      
cause8  ,,socrates3 ,and is not the     
agent the same as the cause in all      
except name2 the agent and the cause may
 be rightly called one8  ,,protarchus3  
,very true4  ,,socrates3 ,and the same  
may be said of the patient1 or effect2  
we shall find that they too differ1 as  
,i was saying1 only in name--shall we   
not8  ,,protarchus3 ,we shall4          
,,socrates3 ,the agent or cause always  
naturally leads1 and the patient or     
effect naturally follows it8            
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,then the cause and what is subordinate 
to it in generation are not the same1   

but different8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4    
,,socrates3 ,did not the things which   
were generated1 and the things out of   
which they were generated1 furnish all  
the three classes8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,and the creator or cause of
 them has been satisfactorily proven to 
be distinct from them1--and may         
therefore be called a fourth principle8 
,,protarchus3 ,so let us call it4       
,,socrates3 ,quite right2 but now1      
having distinguished the four1 ,i think 
that we had better refresh our memories 
by recapitulating each of them in order4
  ,,protarchus3 ,by all means4          
,,socrates3 ,then the first ,i will call
 the infinite or unlimited1 and the     
second the finite or limited2 then      
follows the third1 an essence compound  
and generated2 and ,i do not think that 
,i shall be far wrong in speaking of the
 cause of mixture and generation as the 
fourth4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly not4  
,,socrates3 ,and now what is the next   
question1 and how came we hither8 ,were 

we not enquiring whether the second     
place belonged to pleasure or wisdom8   
,,protarchus3 ,we were4  ,,socrates3    
,and now1 having determined these       
points1 shall we not be better able to  
decide about the first and second place1
 which was the original subject of      
dispute8  ,,protarchus3 ,i dare say4    
,,socrates3 ,we said1 if you remember1  
that the mixed life of pleasure and     
wisdom was the conqueror--did we not8   
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
we see what is the place and nature of  
this life and to what class it is to be 
assigned8  ,,protarchus3 ,beyond a      
doubt4  ,,socrates3 ,this is evidently  
comprehended in the third or mixed      
class2 which is not composed of any two 
particular ingredients1 but of all the  
elements of infinity1 bound down by the 
finite1 and may therefore be truly said 
to comprehend the conqueror life4       
,,protarchus3 ,most true4  ,,socrates3  
,and what shall we say1 ,philebus1 of   
your life which is all sweetness2 and in

 which of the aforesaid classes is that 
to be placed8 ,perhaps you will allow me
 to ask you a question before you       
answer8  ,,philebus3 ,let me hear4      
,,socrates3 ,have pleasure and pain a   
limit1 or do they belong to the class   
which admits of more and less8          
,,philebus3 ,they belong to the class   
which admits of more1 ,socrates2 for    
pleasure would not be perfectly good if 
she were not infinite in quantity and   
degree4  ,,socrates3 ,nor would pain1   
,philebus1 be perfectly evil4 ,and      
therefore the infinite cannot be that   
element which imparts to pleasure some  
degree of good4 ,but now--admitting1 if 
you like1 that pleasure is of the nature
 of the infinite--in which of the       
aforesaid classes1 ,o ,protarchus and   
,philebus1 can we without irreverence   
place wisdom and knowledge and mind8    
,and let us be careful1 for ,i think    
that the danger will be very serious if 
we err on this point4  ,,philebus3 ,you 
magnify1 ,socrates1 the importance of   

your favourite god4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
you1 my friend1 are also magnifying your
 favourite goddess2 but still ,i must   
beg you to answer the question4         
,,protarchus3 ,socrates is quite right1 
,philebus1 and we must submit to him4   
,,philebus3 ,and did not you1           
,protarchus1 propose to answer in my    
place8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly ,i did2
 but ,i am now in a great strait1 and ,i
 must entreat you1 ,socrates1 to be our 
spokesman1 and then we shall not say    
anything wrong or disrespectful of your 
favourite4  ,,socrates3 ,i must obey    
you1 ,protarchus2 nor is the task which 
you impose a difficult one2 but did ,i  
really1 as ,philebus implies1 disconcert
 you with my playful solemnity1 when ,i 
asked the question to what class mind   
and knowledge belong8  ,,protarchus3    
,you did1 indeed1 ,socrates4            
,,socrates3 ,yet the answer is easy1    
since all philosophers assert with one  
voice that mind is the king of heaven   
and earth--in reality they are          

magnifying themselves4 ,and perhaps they
 are right4 ,but still ,i should like to
 consider the class of mind1 if you do  
not object1 a little more fully4        
,,philebus3 ,take your own course1      
,socrates1 and never mind length2 we    
shall not tire of you4  ,,socrates3     
,very good2 let us begin then1          
,protarchus1 by asking a question4      
,,protarchus3 ,what question8           
,,socrates3 ,whether all this which they
 call the universe is left to the       
guidance of unreason and chance medley1 
or1 on the contrary1 as our fathers have
 declared1 ordered and governed by a    
marvellous intelligence and wisdom4     
,,protarchus3 ,wide asunder are the two 
assertions1 illustrious ,socrates1 for  
that which you were just now saying to  
me appears to be blasphemy2 but the     
other assertion1 that mind orders all   
things1 is worthy of the aspect of the  
world1 and of the sun1 and of the moon1 
and of the stars and of the whole circle
 of the heavens2 and never will ,i say  

or think otherwise4  ,,socrates3 ,shall 
we then agree with them of old time in  
maintaining this doctrine1--not merely  
reasserting the notions of others1      
without risk to ourselves1--but shall we
 share in the danger1 and take our part 
of the reproach which will await us1    
when an ingenious individual declares   
that all is disorder8  ,,protarchus3    
,that would certainly be my wish4       
,,socrates3 ,then now please to consider
 the next stage of the argument4        
,,protarchus3 ,let me hear4  ,,socrates3
 ,we see that the elements which enter  
into the nature of the bodies of all    
animals1 fire1 water1 air1 and1 as the  
storm-tossed sailor cries1 'land' 7i4e41
 earth71 reappear in the constitution of
 the world4  ,,protarchus3 ,the proverb 
may be applied to us2 for truly the     
storm gathers over us1 and we are at our
 wit's end4  ,,socrates3 ,there is      
something to be remarked about each of  
these elements4  ,,protarchus3 ,what is 
it8  ,,socrates3 ,only a small fraction 

of any one of them exists in us1 and    
that of a mean sort1 and not in any way 
pure1 or having any power worthy of its 
nature4 ,one instance will prove this of
 all of them2 there is fire within us1  
and in the universe4  ,,protarchus3     
,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and is not our fire
 small and weak and mean8 ,but the fire 
in the universe is wonderful in quantity
 and beauty1 and in every power that    
fire has4  ,,protarchus3 ,most true4    
,,socrates3 ,and is the fire in the     
universe nourished and generated and    
ruled by the fire in us1 or is the fire 
in you and me1 and in other animals1    
dependent on the universal fire8        
,,protarchus3 ,that is a question which 
does not deserve an answer4  ,,socrates3
 ,right2 and you would say the same1 if 
,i am not mistaken1 of the earth which  
is in animals and the earth which is in 
the universe1 and you would give a      
similar reply about all the other       
elements8  ,,protarchus3 ,why1 how could
 any man who gave any other be deemed in

 his senses8  ,,socrates3 ,i do not     
think that he could--but now go on to   
the next step4 ,when we saw those       
elements of which we have been speaking 
gathered up in one1 did we not call them
 a body8  ,,protarchus3 ,we did4        
,,socrates3 ,and the same may be said of
 the cosmos1 which for the same reason  
may be considered to be a body1 because 
made up of the same elements4           
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,but is our body nourished wholly by    
this body1 or is this body nourished by 
our body1 thence deriving and having the
 qualities of which we were just now    
speaking8  ,,protarchus3 ,that again1   
,socrates1 is a question which does not 
deserve to be asked4  ,,socrates3 ,well1
 tell me1 is this question worth asking8
  ,,protarchus3 ,what question8         
,,socrates3 ,may our body be said to    
have a soul8  ,,protarchus3 ,clearly4   
,,socrates3 ,and whence comes that soul1
 my dear ,protarchus1 unless the body of
 the universe1 which contains elements  

like those in our bodies but in every   
way fairer1 had also a soul8 ,can there 
be another source8  ,,protarchus3       
,clearly1 ,socrates1 that is the only   
source4  ,,socrates3 ,why1 yes1         
,protarchus2 for surely we cannot       
imagine that of the four classes1 the   
finite1 the infinite1 the composition of
 the two1 and the cause1 the fourth1    
which enters into all things1 giving to 
our bodies souls1 and the art of        
self-management1 and of healing disease1
 and operating in other ways to heal and
 organize1 having too all the attributes
 of wisdom2--we cannot1 ,i say1 imagine 
that whereas the self-same elements     
exist1 both in the entire heaven and in 
great provinces of the heaven1 only     
fairer and purer1 this last should not  
also in that higher sphere have designed
 the noblest and fairest things8        
,,protarchus3 ,such a supposition is    
quite unreasonable4  ,,socrates3 ,then  
if this be denied1 should we not be wise
 in adopting the other view and         

maintaining that there is in the        
universe a mighty infinite and an       
adequate limit1 of which we have often  
spoken1 as well as a presiding cause of 
no mean power1 which orders and arranges
 years and seasons and months1 and may  
be justly called wisdom and mind8       
,,protarchus3 ,most justly4  ,,socrates3
 ,and wisdom and mind cannot exist      
without soul8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly 
not4  ,,socrates3 ,and in the divine    
nature of ,zeus would you not say that  
there is the soul and mind of a king1   
because there is in him the power of the
 cause8 ,and other gods have other      
attributes1 by which they are pleased to
 be called4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4  
,,socrates3 ,do not then suppose that   
these words are rashly spoken by us1 ,o 
,protarchus1 for they are in harmony    
with the testimony of those who said of 
old time that mind rules the universe4  
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
they furnish an answer to my enquiry2   
for they imply that mind is the parent  

of that class of the four which we      
called the cause of all2 and ,i think   
that you now have my answer4            
,,protarchus3 ,i have indeed1 and yet ,i
 did not observe that you had answered4 
,,socrates3 ,a jest is sometimes        
refreshing1 ,protarchus1 when it        
interrupts earnest4  ,,protarchus3 ,very
 true4  ,,socrates3 ,i think1 friend1   
that we have now pretty clearly set     
forth the class to which mind belongs   
and what is the power of mind4          
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
the class to which pleasure belongs has 
also been long ago discovered8          
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
let us remember1 too1 of both of them1  
7#a7 that mind was akin to the cause and
 of this family2 and 7#b7 that pleasure 
is infinite and belongs to the class    
which neither has1 nor ever will have in
 itself1 a beginning1 middle1 or end of 
its own4  ,,protarchus3 ,i shall be sure
 to remember4  ,,socrates3 ,we must next
 examine what is their place and under  

what conditions they are generated4 ,and
 we will begin with pleasure1 since her 
class was first examined2 and yet       
pleasure cannot be rightly tested apart 
from pain4  ,,protarchus3 ,if this is   
the road1 let us take it4  ,,socrates3  
,i wonder whether you would agree with  
me about the origin of pleasure and     
pain4  ,,protarchus3 ,what do you mean8 
,,socrates3 ,i mean to say that their   
natural seat is in the mixed class4     
,,protarchus3 ,and would you tell me    
again1 sweet ,socrates1 which of the    
aforesaid classes is the mixed one8     
,,socrates3 ,i will1 my fine fellow1 to 
the best of my ability4  ,,protarchus3  
,very good4  ,,socrates3 ,let us then   
understand the mixed class to be that   
which we placed third in the list of    
four4  ,,protarchus3 ,that which        
followed the infinite and the finite2   
and in which you ranked health1 and1 if 
,i am not mistaken1 harmony4            
,,socrates3 ,capital2 and now will you  
please to give me your best attention8  

,,protarchus3 ,proceed2 ,i am attending4
  ,,socrates3 ,i say that when the      
harmony in animals is dissolved1 there  
is also a dissolution of nature and a   
generation of pain4  ,,protarchus3 ,that
 is very probable4  ,,socrates3 ,and the
 restoration of harmony and return to   
nature is the source of pleasure1 if ,i 
may be allowed to speak in the fewest   
and shortest words about matters of the 
greatest moment4  ,,protarchus3 ,i      
believe that you are right1 ,socrates2  
but will you try to be a little plainer8
  ,,socrates3 ,do not obvious and       
every-day phenomena furnish the simplest
 illustration8  ,,protarchus3 ,what     
phenomena do you mean8  ,,socrates3     
,hunger1 for example1 is a dissolution  
and a pain4  ,,protarchus3 ,true4       
,,socrates3 ,whereas eating is a        
replenishment and a pleasure8           
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,thirst
 again is a destruction and a pain1 but 
the effect of moisture replenishing the 
dry place is a pleasure3 once more1 the 

unnatural separation and dissolution    
caused by heat is painful1 and the      
natural restoration and refrigeration is
 pleasant4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4   
,,socrates3 ,and the unnatural freezing 
of the moisture in an animal is pain1   
and the natural process of resolution   
and return of the elements to their     
original state is pleasure4 ,and would  
not the general proposition seem to you 
to hold1 that the destroying of the     
natural union of the finite and         
infinite1 which1 as ,i was observing    
before1 make up the class of living     
beings1 is pain1 and that the process of
 return of all things to their own      
nature is pleasure8  ,,protarchus3      
,granted2 what you say has a general    
truth4  ,,socrates3 ,here then is one   
kind of pleasures and pains originating 
severally in the two processes which we 
have described8  ,,protarchus3 ,good4   
,,socrates3 ,let us next assume that in 
the soul herself there is an antecedent 
hope of pleasure which is sweet and     

refreshing1 and an expectation of pain1 
fearful and anxious4  ,,protarchus3     
,yes2 this is another class of pleasures
 and pains1 which is of the soul only1  
apart from the body1 and is produced by 
expectation4  ,,socrates3 ,right2 for in
 the analysis of these1 pure1 as ,i     
suppose them to be1 the pleasures being 
unalloyed with pain and the pains with  
pleasure1 methinks that we shall see    
clearly whether the whole class of      
pleasure is to be desired1 or whether   
this quality of entire desirableness is 
not rather to be attributed to another  
of the classes which have been          
mentioned2 and whether pleasure and     
pain1 like heat and cold1 and other     
things of the same kind1 are not        
sometimes to be desired and sometimes   
not to be desired1 as being not in      
themselves good1 but only sometimes and 
in some instances admitting of the      
nature of good4  ,,protarchus3 ,you say 
most truly that this is the track which 
the investigation should pursue4        

,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 assuming that  
pain ensues on the dissolution1 and     
pleasure on the restoration of the      
harmony1 let us now ask what will be the
 condition of animated beings who are   
neither in process of restoration nor of
 dissolution4 ,and mind what you say3 ,i
 ask whether any animal who is in that  
condition can possibly have any feeling 
of pleasure or pain1 great or small8    
,,protarchus3 ,certainly not4           
,,socrates3 ,then here we have a third  
state1 over and above that of pleasure  
and of pain8  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4 
,,socrates3 ,and do not forget that     
there is such a state2 it will make a   
great difference in our judgment of     
pleasure1 whether we remember this or   
not4 ,and ,i should like to say a few   
words about it4  ,,protarchus3 ,what    
have you to say8  ,,socrates3 ,why1 you 
know that if a man chooses the life of  
wisdom1 there is no reason why he should
 not live in this neutral state4        
,,protarchus3 ,you mean that he may live

 neither rejoicing nor sorrowing8       
,,socrates3 ,yes2 and if ,i remember    
rightly1 when the lives were compared1  
no degree of pleasure1 whether great or 
small1 was thought to be necessary to   
him who chose the life of thought and   
wisdom4  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 certainly1 
we said so4  ,,socrates3 ,then he will  
live without pleasure2 and who knows    
whether this may not be the most divine 
of all lives8  ,,protarchus3 ,if so1 the
 gods1 at any rate1 cannot be supposed  
to have either joy or sorrow4           
,,socrates3 ,certainly not--there would 
be a great impropriety in the assumption
 of either alternative4 ,but whether the
 gods are or are not indifferent to     
pleasure is a point which may be        
considered hereafter if in any way      
relevant to the argument1 and whatever  
is the conclusion we will place it to   
the account of mind in her contest for  
the second place1 should she have to    
resign the first4  ,,protarchus3 ,just  
so4  ,,socrates3 ,the other class of    

pleasures1 which as we were saying is   
purely mental1 is entirely derived from 
memory4  ,,protarchus3 ,what do you     
mean8  ,,socrates3 ,i must first of all 
analyze memory1 or rather perception    
which is prior to memory1 if the subject
 of our discussion is ever to be        
properly cleared up4  ,,protarchus3 ,how
 will you proceed8  ,,socrates3 ,let us 
imagine affections of the body which are
 extinguished before they reach the     
soul1 and leave her unaffected2 and     
again1 other affections which vibrate   
through both soul and body1 and impart a
 shock to both and to each of them4     
,,protarchus3 ,granted4  ,,socrates3    
,and the soul may be truly said to be   
oblivious of the first but not of the   
second8  ,,protarchus3 ,quite true4     
,,socrates3 ,when ,i say oblivious1 do  
not suppose that ,i mean forgetfulness  
in a literal sense2 for forgetfulness is
 the exit of memory1 which in this case 
has not yet entered2 and to speak of the
 loss of that which is not yet in       

existence1 and never has been1 is a     
contradiction2 do you see8              
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,then  
just be so good as to change the terms4 
,,protarchus3 ,how shall ,i change them8
  ,,socrates3 ,instead of the oblivion  
of the soul1 when you are describing the
 state in which she is unaffected by the
 shocks of the body1 say                
unconsciousness4  ,,protarchus3 ,i see4 
,,socrates3 ,and the union or communion 
of soul and body in one feeling and     
motion would be properly called         
consciousness8  ,,protarchus3 ,most     
true4  ,,socrates3 ,then now we know the
 meaning of the word8  ,,protarchus3    
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and memory may1 ,i  
think1 be rightly described as the      
preservation of consciousness8          
,,protarchus3 ,right4  ,,socrates3 ,but 
do we not distinguish memory from       
recollection8  ,,protarchus3 ,i think   
so4  ,,socrates3 ,and do we not mean by 
recollection the power which the soul   
has of recovering1 when by herself1 some

 feeling which she experienced when in  
company with the body8  ,,protarchus3   
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and when she  
recovers of herself the lost            
recollection of some consciousness or   
knowledge1 the recovery is termed       
recollection and reminiscence8          
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,there is a reason why ,i say all this4 
,,protarchus3 ,what is it8  ,,socrates3 
,i want to attain the plainest possible 
notion of pleasure and desire1 as they  
exist in the mind only1 apart from the  
body2 and the previous analysis helps to
 show the nature of both4  ,,protarchus3
 ,then now1 ,socrates1 let us proceed to
 the next point4  ,,socrates3 ,there are
 certainly many things to be considered 
in discussing the generation and whole  
complexion of pleasure4 ,at the outset  
we must determine the nature and seat of
 desire4  ,,protarchus3 ,ay2 let us     
enquire into that1 for we shall lose    
nothing4  ,,socrates3 ,nay1 ,protarchus1
 we shall surely lose the puzzle if we  

find the answer4  ,,protarchus3 ,a fair 
retort2 but let us proceed4  ,,socrates3
 ,did we not place hunger1 thirst1 and  
the like1 in the class of desires8      
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and yet they are very different2 what  
common nature have we in view when we   
call them by a single name8             
,,protarchus3 ,by heavens1 ,socrates1   
that is a question which is not easily  
answered2 but it must be answered4      
,,socrates3 ,then let us go back to our 
examples4  ,,protarchus3 ,where shall we
 begin8  ,,socrates3 ,do we mean        
anything when we say 'a man thirsts'8   
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,we    
mean to say that he 'is empty'8         
,,protarchus3 ,of course4  ,,socrates3  
,and is not thirst desire8              
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 of drink4           
,,socrates3 ,would you say of drink1 or 
of replenishment with drink8            
,,protarchus3 ,i should say1 of         
replenishment with drink4  ,,socrates3  
,then he who is empty desires1 as would 

appear1 the opposite of what he         
experiences2 for he is empty and desires
 to be full8  ,,protarchus3 ,clearly so4
  ,,socrates3 ,but how can a man who is 
empty for the first time1 attain either 
by perception or memory to any          
apprehension of replenishment1 of which 
he has no present or past experience8   
,,protarchus3 ,impossible4  ,,socrates3 
,and yet he who desires1 surely desires 
something8  ,,protarchus3 ,of course4   
,,socrates3 ,he does not desire that    
which he experiences1 for he experiences
 thirst1 and thirst is emptiness2 but he
 desires replenishment8  ,,protarchus3  
,true4  ,,socrates3 ,then there must be 
something in the thirsty man which in   
some way apprehends replenishment8      
,,protarchus3 ,there must4  ,,socrates3 
,and that cannot be the body1 for the   
body is supposed to be emptied8         
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,the   
only remaining alternative is that the  
soul apprehends the replenishment by the
 help of memory2 as is obvious1 for what

 other way can there be8  ,,protarchus3 
,i cannot imagine any other4            
,,socrates3 ,but do you see the         
consequence8  ,,protarchus3 ,what is it8
  ,,socrates3 ,that there is no such    
thing as desire of the body4            
,,protarchus3 ,why so8  ,,socrates3     
,why1 because the argument shows that   
the endeavour of every animal is to the 
reverse of his bodily state4            
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
the impulse which leads him to the      
opposite of what he is experiencing     
proves that he has a memory of the      
opposite state4  ,,protarchus3 ,true4   
,,socrates3 ,and the argument1 having   
proved that memory attracts us towards  
the objects of desire1 proves also that 
the impulses and the desires and the    
moving principle in every living being  
have their origin in the soul4          
,,protarchus3 ,most true4  ,,socrates3  
,the argument will not allow that our   
body either hungers or thirsts or has   
any similar experience4  ,,protarchus3  

,quite right4  ,,socrates3 ,let me make 
a further observation2 the argument     
appears to me to imply that there is a  
kind of life which consists in these    
affections4  ,,protarchus3 ,of what     
affections1 and of what kind of life1   
are you speaking8  ,,socrates3 ,i am    
speaking of being emptied and           
replenished1 and of all that relates to 
the preservation and destruction of     
living beings1 as well as of the pain   
which is felt in one of these states and
 of the pleasure which succeeds to it4  
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
what would you say of the intermediate  
state8  ,,protarchus3 ,what do you mean 
by 'intermediate'8  ,,socrates3 ,i mean 
when a person is in actual suffering and
 yet remembers past pleasures which1 if 
they would only return1 would relieve   
him2 but as yet he has them not4 ,may we
 not say of him1 that he is in an       
intermediate state8  ,,protarchus3      
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,would you say 
that he was wholly pained or wholly     

pleased8  ,,protarchus3 ,nay1 ,i should 
say that he has two pains2 in his body  
there is the actual experience of pain1 
and in his soul longing and expectation4
  ,,socrates3 ,what do you mean1        
,protarchus1 by the two pains8 ,may not 
a man who is empty have at one time a   
sure hope of being filled1 and at other 
times be quite in despair8              
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,and has he not the pleasure of memory  
when he is hoping to be filled1 and yet 
in that he is empty is he not at the    
same time in pain8  ,,protarchus3       
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,then man and  
the other animals have at the same time 
both pleasure and pain8  ,,protarchus3  
,i suppose so4  ,,socrates3 ,but when a 
man is empty and has no hope of being   
filled1 there will be the double        
experience of pain4 ,you observed this  
and inferred that the double experience 
was the single case possible4           
,,protarchus3 ,quite true1 ,socrates4   
,,socrates3 ,shall the enquiry into     

these states of feeling be made the     
occasion of raising a question8         
,,protarchus3 ,what question8           
,,socrates3 ,whether we ought to say    
that the pleasures and pains of which we
 are speaking are true or false8 or some
 true and some false8  ,,protarchus3    
,but how1 ,socrates1 can there be false 
pleasures and pains8  ,,socrates3 ,and  
how1 ,protarchus1 can there be true and 
false fears1 or true and false          
expectations1 or true and false         
opinions8  ,,protarchus3 ,i grant that  
opinions may be true or false1 but not  
pleasures4  ,,socrates3 ,what do you    
mean8 ,i am afraid that we are raising a
 very serious enquiry4  ,,protarchus3   
,there ,i agree4  ,,socrates3 ,and yet1 
my boy1 for you are one of ,philebus'   
boys1 the point to be considered1 is1   
whether the enquiry is relevant to the  
argument4  ,,protarchus3 ,surely4       
,,socrates3 ,no tedious and irrelevant  
discussion can be allowed2 what is said 
should be pertinent4  ,,protarchus3     

,right4  ,,socrates3 ,i am always       
wondering at the question which has now 
been raised4  ,,protarchus3 ,how so8    
,,socrates3 ,do you deny that some      
pleasures are false1 and others true8   
,,protarchus3 ,to be sure ,i do4        
,,socrates3 ,would you say that no one  
ever seemed to rejoice and yet did not  
rejoice1 or seemed to feel pain and yet 
did not feel pain1 sleeping or waking1  
mad or lunatic8  ,,protarchus3 ,so we   
have always held1 ,socrates4            
,,socrates3 ,but were you right8 ,shall 
we enquire into the truth of your       
opinion8  ,,protarchus3 ,i think that we
 should4  ,,socrates3 ,let us then put  
into more precise terms the question    
which has arisen about pleasure and     
opinion4 ,is there such a thing as      
opinion8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,and such a thing as        
pleasure8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,and an opinion must be of  
something8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4        
,,socrates3 ,and a man must be pleased  

by something8  ,,protarchus3 ,quite     
correct4  ,,socrates3 ,and whether the  
opinion be right or wrong1 makes no     
difference2 it will still be an opinion8
  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3
 ,and he who is pleased1 whether he is  
rightly pleased or not1 will always have
 a real feeling of pleasure8            
,,protarchus3 ,yes2 that is also quite  
true4  ,,socrates3 ,then1 how can       
opinion be both true and false1 and     
pleasure true only1 although pleasure   
and opinion are both equally real8      
,,protarchus3 ,yes2 that is the         
question4  ,,socrates3 ,you mean that   
opinion admits of truth and falsehood1  
and hence becomes not merely opinion1   
but opinion of a certain quality2 and   
this is what you think should be        
examined8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,and further1 even if we    
admit the existence of qualities in     
other objects1 may not pleasure and pain
 be simple and devoid of quality8       
,,protarchus3 ,clearly4  ,,socrates3    

,but there is no difficulty in seeing   
that pleasure and pain as well as       
opinion have qualities1 for they are    
great or small1 and have various degrees
 of intensity2 as was indeed said long  
ago by us4  ,,protarchus3 ,quite true4  
,,socrates3 ,and if badness attaches to 
any of them1 ,protarchus1 then we should
 speak of a bad opinion or of a bad     
pleasure8  ,,protarchus3 ,quite true1   
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,and if         
rightness attaches to any of them1      
should we not speak of a right opinion  
or right pleasure2 and in like manner of
 the reverse of rightness8              
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and if the thing opined be erroneous1  
might we not say that the opinion1 being
 erroneous1 is not right or rightly     
opined8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4      
,,socrates3 ,and if we see a pleasure or
 pain which errs in respect of its      
object1 shall we call that right or     
good1 or by any honourable name8        
,,protarchus3 ,not if the pleasure is   

mistaken2 how could we8  ,,socrates3    
,and surely pleasure often appears to   
accompany an opinion which is not true1 
but false8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly it 
does2 and in that case1 ,socrates1 as we
 were saying1 the opinion is false1 but 
no one could call the actual pleasure   
false4  ,,socrates3 ,how eagerly1       
,protarchus1 do you rush to the defence 
of pleasure6  ,,protarchus3 ,nay1       
,socrates1 ,i only repeat what ,i hear4 
,,socrates3 ,and is there no difference1
 my friend1 between that pleasure which 
is associated with right opinion and    
knowledge1 and that which is often found
 in all of us associated with falsehood 
and ignorance8  ,,protarchus3 ,there    
must be a very great difference1 between
 them4  ,,socrates3 ,then1 now let us   
proceed to contemplate this difference4 
,,protarchus3 ,lead1 and ,i will follow4
  ,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 my view is-- 
,,protarchus3 ,what is it8  ,,socrates3 
,we agree--do we not8--that there is    
such a thing as false1 and also such a  

thing as true opinion8  ,,protarchus3   
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and pleasure and    
pain1 as ,i was just now saying1 are    
often consequent upon these--upon true  
and false opinion1 ,i mean4             
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,and do not opinion and the endeavour to
 form an opinion always spring from     
memory and perception8  ,,protarchus3   
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,might we      
imagine the process to be something of  
this nature8  ,,protarchus3 ,of what    
nature8  ,,socrates3 ,an object may be  
often seen at a distance not very       
clearly1 and the seer may want to       
determine what it is which he sees4     
,,protarchus3 ,very likely4  ,,socrates3
 ,soon he begins to interrogate himself4
  ,,protarchus3 ,in what manner8        
,,socrates3 ,he asks himself--',what is 
that which appears to be standing by the
 rock under the tree8' ,this is the     
question which he may be supposed to put
 to himself when he sees such an        
appearance4  ,,protarchus3 ,true4       

,,socrates3 ,to which he may guess the  
right answer1 saying as if in a whisper 
to himself--',it is a man4'             
,,protarchus3 ,very good4  ,,socrates3  
,or again1 he may be misled1 and then he
 will say--',no1 it is a figure made by 
the shepherds4'  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,and if he has a companion1 
he repeats his thought to him in        
articulate sounds1 and what was before  
an opinion1 has now become a            
proposition4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4 
,,socrates3 ,but if he be walking alone 
when these thoughts occur to him1 he may
 not unfrequently keep them in his mind 
for a considerable time4  ,,protarchus3 
,very true4  ,,socrates3 ,well1 now1 ,i 
wonder whether you would agree in my    
explanation of this phenomenon4         
,,protarchus3 ,what is your explanation8
  ,,socrates3 ,i think that the soul at 
such times is like a book4              
,,protarchus3 ,how so8  ,,socrates3     
,memory and perception meet1 and they   
and their attendant feelings seem to    

almost to write down words in the soul1 
and when the inscribing feeling writes  
truly1 then true opinion and true       
propositions which are the expressions  
of opinion come into our souls--but when
 the scribe within us writes falsely1   
the result is false4  ,,protarchus3 ,i  
quite assent and agree to your          
statement4  ,,socrates3 ,i must bespeak 
your favour also for another artist1 who
 is busy at the same time in the        
chambers of the soul4  ,,protarchus3    
,who is he8  ,,socrates3 ,the painter1  
who1 after the scribe has done his work1
 draws images in the soul of the things 
which he has described4  ,,protarchus3  
,but when and how does he do this8      
,,socrates3 ,when a man1 besides        
receiving from sight or some other sense
 certain opinions or statements1 sees in
 his mind the images of the subjects of 
them2--is not this a very common mental 
phenomenon8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  
,,socrates3 ,and the images answering to
 true opinions and words are true1 and  

to false opinions and words false2 are  
they not8  ,,protarchus3 ,they are4     
,,socrates3 ,if we are right so far1    
there arises a further question4        
,,protarchus3 ,what is it8  ,,socrates3 
,whether we experience the feeling of   
which ,i am speaking only in relation to
 the present and the past1 or in        
relation to the future also8            
,,protarchus3 ,i should say in relation 
to all times alike4  ,,socrates3 ,have  
not purely mental pleasures and pains   
been described already as in some cases 
anticipations of the bodily ones2 from  
which we may infer that anticipatory    
pleasures and pains have to do with the 
future8  ,,protarchus3 ,most true4      
,,socrates3 ,and do all those writings  
and paintings which1 as we were saying a
 little while ago1 are produced in us1  
relate to the past and present only1 and
 not to the future8  ,,protarchus3 ,to  
the future1 very much4  ,,socrates3     
,when you say1 ',very much1' you mean to
 imply that all these representations   

are hopes about the future1 and that    
mankind are filled with hopes in every  
stage of existence8  ,,protarchus3      
,exactly4  ,,socrates3 ,answer me       
another question4  ,,protarchus3 ,what  
question8  ,,socrates3 ,a just and pious
 and good man is the friend of the gods2
 is he not8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly he
 is4  ,,socrates3 ,and the unjust and   
utterly bad man is the reverse8         
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
all men1 as we were saying just now1 are
 always filled with hopes8              
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and these hopes1 as they are termed1   
are propositions which exist in the     
minds of each of us8  ,,protarchus3     
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and the fancies of  
hope are also pictured in us2 a man may 
often have a vision of a heap of gold1  
and pleasures ensuing1 and in the       
picture there may be a likeness of      
himself mightily rejoicing over his good
 fortune4  ,,protarchus3 ,true4         
,,socrates3 ,and may we not say that the

 good1 being friends of the gods1 have  
generally true pictures presented to    
them1 and the bad false pictures8       
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,the bad1 too1 have pleasures painted in
 their fancy as well as the good2 but ,i
 presume that they are false pleasures4 
,,protarchus3 ,they are4  ,,socrates3   
,the bad then commonly delight in false 
pleasures1 and the good in true         
pleasures8  ,,protarchus3 ,doubtless4   
,,socrates3 ,then upon this view there  
are false pleasures in the souls of men 
which are a ludicrous imitation of the  
true1 and there are pains of a similar  
character8  ,,protarchus3 ,there are4   
,,socrates3 ,and did we not allow that a
 man who had an opinion at all had a    
real opinion1 but often about things    
which had no existence either in the    
past1 present1 or future8  ,,protarchus3
 ,quite true4  ,,socrates3 ,and this was
 the source of false opinion and        
opining2 am ,i not right8  ,,protarchus3
 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and must we not    

attribute to pleasure and pain a similar
 real but illusory character8           
,,protarchus3 ,how do you mean8         
,,socrates3 ,i mean to say that a man   
must be admitted to have real pleasure  
who is pleased with anything or anyhow2 
and he may be pleased about things which
 neither have nor have ever had any real
 existence1 and1 more often than not1   
are never likely to exist4              
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 that     
again is undeniable4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
may not the same be said about fear and 
anger and the like2 are they not often  
false8  ,,protarchus3 ,quite so4        
,,socrates3 ,and can opinions be good or
 bad except in as far as they are true  
or false8  ,,protarchus3 ,in no other   
way4  ,,socrates3 ,nor can pleasures be 
conceived to be bad except in so far as 
they are false4  ,,protarchus3 ,nay1    
,socrates1 that is the very opposite of 
truth2 for no one would call pleasures  
and pains bad because they are false1   
but by reason of some other great       

corruption to which they are liable4    
,,socrates3 ,well1 of pleasures which   
are corrupt and caused by corruption we 
will hereafter speak1 if we care to     
continue the enquiry2 for the present ,i
 would rather show by another argument  
that there are many false pleasures     
existing or coming into existence in us1
 because this may assist our final      
decision4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true2    
that is to say1 if there are such       
pleasures4  ,,socrates3 ,i think that   
there are1 ,protarchus2 but this is an  
opinion which should be well assured1   
and not rest upon a mere assertion4     
,,protarchus3 ,very good4  ,,socrates3  
,then now1 like wrestlers1 let us       
approach and grasp this new argument4   
,,protarchus3 ,proceed4  ,,socrates3 ,we
 were maintaining a little while since1 
that when desires1 as they are termed1  
exist in us1 then the body has separate 
feelings apart from the soul--do you    
remember8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 ,i       
remember that you said so4  ,,socrates3 

,and the soul was supposed to desire the
 opposite of the bodily state1 while the
 body was the source of any pleasure or 
pain which was experienced4             
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,then 
now you may infer what happens in such  
cases4  ,,protarchus3 ,what am ,i to    
infer8  ,,socrates3 ,that in such cases 
pleasures and pains come simultaneously2
 and there is a juxtaposition of the    
opposite sensations which correspond to 
them1 as has been already shown4        
,,protarchus3 ,clearly4  ,,socrates3    
,and there is another point to which we 
have agreed4  ,,protarchus3 ,what is it8
  ,,socrates3 ,that pleasure and pain   
both admit of more and less1 and that   
they are of the class of infinites4     
,,protarchus3 ,certainly1 we said so4   
,,socrates3 ,but how can we rightly     
judge of them8  ,,protarchus3 ,how can  
we8  ,,socrates3 ,is it our intention to
 judge of their comparative importance  
and intensity1 measuring pleasure       
against pain1 and pain against pain1 and

 pleasure against pleasure8             
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 such is our         
intention1 and we shall judge of them   
accordingly4  ,,socrates3 ,well1 take   
the case of sight4 ,does not the        
nearness or distance of magnitudes      
obscure their true proportions1 and make
 us opine falsely2 and do we not find   
the same illusion happening in the case 
of pleasures and pains8  ,,protarchus3  
,yes1 ,socrates1 and in a degree far    
greater4  ,,socrates3 ,then what we are 
now saying is the opposite of what we   
were saying before4  ,,protarchus3 ,what
 was that8  ,,socrates3 ,then the       
opinions were true and false1 and       
infected the pleasures and pains with   
their own falsity4  ,,protarchus3 ,very 
true4  ,,socrates3 ,but now it is the   
pleasures which are said to be true and 
false because they are seen at various  
distances1 and subjected to comparison2 
the pleasures appear to be greater and  
more vehement when placed side by side  
with the pains1 and the pains when      

placed side by side with the pleasures4 
,,protarchus3 ,certainly1 and for the   
reason which you mention4  ,,socrates3  
,and suppose you part off from pleasures
 and pains the element which makes them 
appear to be greater or less than they  
really are3 you will acknowledge that   
this element is illusory1 and you will  
never say that the corresponding excess 
or defect of pleasure or pain is real or
 true4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly not4   
,,socrates3 ,next let us see whether in 
another direction we may not find       
pleasures and pains existing and        
appearing in living beings1 which are   
still more false than these4            
,,protarchus3 ,what are they1 and how   
shall we find them8  ,,socrates3 ,if ,i 
am not mistaken1 ,i have often repeated 
that pains and aches and suffering and  
uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a  
corruption of nature caused by          
concretions1 and dissolutions1 and      
repletions1 and evacuations1 and also by
 growth and decay8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 

that has been often said4  ,,socrates3  
,and we have also agreed that the       
restoration of the natural state is     
pleasure8  ,,protarchus3 ,right4        
,,socrates3 ,but now let us suppose an  
interval of time at which the body      
experiences none of these changes4      
,,protarchus3 ,when can that be1        
,socrates8  ,,socrates3 ,your question1 
,protarchus1 does not help the argument4
  ,,protarchus3 ,why not1 ,socrates8    
,,socrates3 ,because it does not prevent
 me from repeating mine4  ,,protarchus3 
,and what was that8  ,,socrates3 ,why1  
,protarchus1 admitting that there is no 
such interval1 ,i may ask what would be 
the necessary consequence if there were8
  ,,protarchus3 ,you mean1 what would   
happen if the body were not changed     
either for good or bad8  ,,socrates3    
,yes4  ,,protarchus3 ,why then1         
,socrates1 ,i should suppose that there 
would be neither pleasure nor pain4     
,,socrates3 ,very good2 but still1 if ,i
 am not mistaken1 you do assert that we 

must always be experiencing one of them2
 that is what the wise tell us2 for1 say
 they1 all things are ever flowing up   
and down4  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 and their
 words are of no mean authority4        
,,socrates3 ,of course1 for they are no 
mean authorities themselves2 and ,i     
should like to avoid the brunt of their 
argument4 ,shall ,i tell you how ,i mean
 to escape from them8 ,and you shall be 
the partner of my flight4  ,,protarchus3
 ,how8  ,,socrates3 ,to them we will    
say3 ',good2 but are we1 or living      
things in general1 always conscious of  
what happens to us--for example1 of our 
growth1 or the like8 ,are we not1 on the
 contrary1 almost wholly unconscious of 
this and similar phenomena8' ,you must  
answer for them4  ,,protarchus3 ,the    
latter alternative is the true one4     
,,socrates3 ,then we were not right in  
saying1 just now1 that motions going up 
and down cause pleasures and pains8     
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,a    
better and more unexceptionable way of  

speaking will be--  ,,protarchus3 ,what8
  ,,socrates3 ,if we say that the great 
changes produce pleasures and pains1 but
 that the moderate and lesser ones do   
neither4  ,,protarchus3 ,that1          
,socrates1 is the more correct mode of  
speaking4  ,,socrates3 ,but if this be  
true1 the life to which ,i was just now 
referring again appears4  ,,protarchus3 
,what life8  ,,socrates3 ,the life which
 we affirmed to be devoid either of pain
 or of joy4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4  
,,socrates3 ,we may assume then that    
there are three lives1 one pleasant1 one
 painful1 and the third which is        
neither2 what say you8  ,,protarchus3 ,i
 should say as you do that there are    
three of them4  ,,socrates3 ,but if so1 
the negation of pain will not be the    
same with pleasure4  ,,protarchus3      
,certainly not4  ,,socrates3 ,then when 
you hear a person saying1 that always to
 live without pain is the pleasantest of
 all things1 what would you understand  
him to mean by that statement8          

,,protarchus3 ,i think that by pleasure 
he must mean the negative of pain4      
,,socrates3 ,let us take any three      
things2 or suppose that we embellish a  
little and call the first gold1 the     
second silver1 and there shall be a     
third which is neither4  ,,protarchus3  
,very good4  ,,socrates3 ,now1 can that 
which is neither be either gold or      
silver8  ,,protarchus3 ,impossible4     
,,socrates3 ,no more can that neutral or
 middle life be rightly or reasonably   
spoken or thought of as pleasant or     
painful4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly not4 
,,socrates3 ,and yet1 my friend1 there  
are1 as we know1 persons who say and    
think so4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4    
,,socrates3 ,and do they think that they
 have pleasure when they are free from  
pain8  ,,protarchus3 ,they say so4      
,,socrates3 ,and they must think or they
 would not say that they have pleasure4 
,,protarchus3 ,i suppose not4           
,,socrates3 ,and yet if pleasure and the
 negation of pain are of distinct       

natures1 they are wrong4  ,,protarchus3 
,but they are undoubtedly of distinct   
natures4  ,,socrates3 ,then shall we    
take the view that they are three1 as we
 were just now saying1 or that they are 
two only--the one being a state of pain1
 which is an evil1 and the other a      
cessation of pain1 which is of itself a 
good1 and is called pleasant8           
,,protarchus3 ,but why1 ,socrates1 do we
 ask the question at all8 ,i do not see 
the reason4  ,,socrates3 ,you1          
,protarchus1 have clearly never heard of
 certain enemies of our friend          
,philebus4  ,,protarchus3 ,and who may  
they be8  ,,socrates3 ,certain persons  
who are reputed to be masters in natural
 philosophy1 who deny the very existence
 of pleasure4  ,,protarchus3 ,indeed6   
,,socrates3 ,they say that what the     
school of ,philebus calls pleasures are 
all of them only avoidances of pain4    
,,protarchus3 ,and would you1 ,socrates1
 have us agree with them8  ,,socrates3  
,why1 no1 ,i would rather use them as a 

sort of diviners1 who divine the truth1 
not by rules of art1 but by an          
instinctive repugnance and extreme      
detestation which a noble nature has of 
the power of pleasure1 in which they    
think that there is nothing sound1 and  
her seductive influence is declared by  
them to be witchcraft1 and not pleasure4
 ,this is the use which you may make of 
them4 ,and when you have considered the 
various grounds of their dislike1 you   
shall hear from me what ,i deem to be   
true pleasures4 ,having thus examined   
the nature of pleasure from both points 
of view1 we will bring her up for       
judgment4  ,,protarchus3 ,well said4    
,,socrates3 ,then let us enter into an  
alliance with these philosophers and    
follow in the track of their dislike4 ,i
 imagine that they would say something  
of this sort2 they would begin at the   
beginning1 and ask whether1 if we wanted
 to know the nature of any quality1 such
 as hardness1 we should be more likely  
to discover it by looking at the hardest

 things1 rather than at the least hard8 
,you1 ,protarchus1 shall answer these   
severe gentlemen as you answer me4      
,,protarchus3 ,by all means1 and ,i     
reply to them1 that you should look at  
the greatest instances4  ,,socrates3    
,then if we want to see the true nature 
of pleasures as a class1 we should not  
look at the most diluted pleasures1 but 
at the most extreme and most vehement8  
,,protarchus3 ,in that every one will   
agree4  ,,socrates3 ,and the obvious    
instances of the greatest pleasures1 as 
we have often said1 are the pleasures of
 the body8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4   
,,socrates3 ,and are they felt by us to 
be or become greater1 when we are sick  
or when we are in health8 ,and here we  
must be careful in our answer1 or we    
shall come to grief4  ,,protarchus3 ,how
 will that be8  ,,socrates3 ,why1       
because we might be tempted to answer1  
',when we are in health4'  ,,protarchus3
 ,yes1 that is the natural answer4      
,,socrates3 ,well1 but are not those    

pleasures the greatest of which mankind 
have the greatest desires8              
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
do not people who are in a fever1 or any
 similar illness1 feel cold or thirst or
 other bodily affections more intensely8
 ,am ,i not right in saying that they   
have a deeper want and greater pleasure 
in the satisfaction of their want8      
,,protarchus3 ,that is obvious as soon  
as it is said4  ,,socrates3 ,well1 then1
 shall we not be right in saying1 that  
if a person would wish to see the       
greatest pleasures he ought to go and   
look1 not at health1 but at disease8    
,and here you must distinguish3--do not 
imagine that ,i mean to ask whether     
those who are very ill have more        
pleasures than those who are well1 but  
understand that ,i am speaking of the   
magnitude of pleasure2 ,i want to know  
where pleasures are found to be most    
intense4 ,for1 as ,i say1 we have to    
discover what is pleasure1 and what they
 mean by pleasure who deny her very     

existence4  ,,protarchus3 ,i think ,i   
follow you4  ,,socrates3 ,you will soon 
have a better opportunity of showing    
whether you do or not1 ,protarchus4     
,answer now1 and tell me whether you    
see1 ,i will not say more1 but more     
intense and excessive pleasures in      
wantonness than in temperance8 ,reflect 
before you speak4  ,,protarchus3 ,i     
understand you1 and see that there is a 
great difference between them2 the      
temperate are restrained by the wise    
man's aphorism of ',never too much1'    
which is their rule1 but excess of      
pleasure possessing the minds of fools  
and wantons becomes madness and makes   
them shout with delight4  ,,socrates3   
,very good1 and if this be true1 then   
the greatest pleasures and pains will   
clearly be found in some vicious state  
of soul and body1 and not in a virtuous 
state4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4       
,,socrates3 ,and ought we not to select 
some of these for examination1 and see  
what makes them the greatest8           

,,protarchus3 ,to be sure we ought4     
,,socrates3 ,take the case of the       
pleasures which arise out of certain    
disorders4  ,,protarchus3 ,what         
disorders8  ,,socrates3 ,the pleasures  
of unseemly disorders1 which our severe 
friends utterly detest4  ,,protarchus3  
,what pleasures8  ,,socrates3 ,such1 for
 example1 as the relief of itching and  
other ailments by scratching1 which is  
the only remedy required4 ,for what in  
,heaven's name is the feeling to be     
called which is thus produced in        
us8--,pleasure or pain8  ,,protarchus3  
,a villainous mixture of some kind1     
,socrates1 ,i should say4  ,,socrates3  
,i did not introduce the argument1 ,o   
,protarchus1 with any personal reference
 to ,philebus1 but because1 without the 
consideration of these and similar      
pleasures1 we shall not be able to      
determine the point at issue4           
,,protarchus3 ,then we had better       
proceed to analyze this family of       
pleasures4  ,,socrates3 ,you mean the   

pleasures which are mingled with pain8  
,,protarchus3 ,exactly4  ,,socrates3    
,there are some mixtures which are of   
the body1 and only in the body1 and     
others which are of the soul1 and only  
in the soul2 while there are other      
mixtures of pleasures with pains1 common
 both to soul and body1 which in their  
composite state are called sometimes    
pleasures and sometimes pains4          
,,protarchus3 ,how is that8  ,,socrates3
 ,whenever1 in the restoration or in the
 derangement of nature1 a man           
experiences two opposite feelings2 for  
example1 when he is cold and is growing 
warm1 or again1 when he is hot and is   
becoming cool1 and he wants to have the 
one and be rid of the other2--the sweet 
has a bitter1 as the common saying is1  
and both together fasten upon him and   
create irritation and in time drive him 
to distraction4  ,,protarchus3 ,that    
description is very true to nature4     
,,socrates3 ,and in these sorts of      
mixtures the pleasures and pains are    

sometimes equal1 and sometimes one or   
other of them predominates8             
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,of   
cases in which the pain exceeds the     
pleasure1 an example is afforded by     
itching1 of which we were just now      
speaking1 and by the tingling which we  
feel when the boiling and fiery element 
is within1 and the rubbing and motion   
only relieves the surface1 and does not 
reach the parts affected2 then if you   
put them to the fire1 and as a last     
resort apply cold to them1 you may often
 produce the most intense pleasure or   
pain in the inner parts1 which contrasts
 and mingles with the pain or pleasure1 
as the case may be1 of the outer parts2 
and this is due to the forcible         
separation of what is united1 or to the 
union of what is separated1 and to the  
juxtaposition of pleasure and pain4     
,,protarchus3 ,quite so4  ,,socrates3   
,sometimes the element of pleasure      
prevails in a man1 and the slight       
undercurrent of pain makes him tingle1  

and causes a gentle irritation2 or      
again1 the excessive infusion of        
pleasure creates an excitement in       
him1--he even leaps for joy1 he assumes 
all sorts of attitudes1 he changes all  
manner of colours1 he gasps for breath1 
and is quite amazed1 and utters the most
 irrational exclamations4  ,,protarchus3
 ,yes1 indeed4  ,,socrates3 ,he will say
 of himself1 and others will say of him1
 that he is dying with these delights2  
and the more dissipated and             
good-for-nothing he is1 the more        
vehemently he pursues them in every way2
 of all pleasures he declares them to be
 the greatest2 and he reckons him who   
lives in the most constant enjoyment of 
them to be the happiest of mankind4     
,,protarchus3 ,that1 ,socrates1 is a    
very true description of the opinions of
 the majority about pleasures4          
,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,protarchus1 quite    
true of the mixed pleasures1 which arise
 out of the communion of external and   
internal sensations in the body2 there  

are also cases in which the mind        
contributes an opposite element to the  
body1 whether of pleasure or pain1 and  
the two unite and form one mixture4     
,concerning these ,i have already       
remarked1 that when a man is empty he   
desires to be full1 and has pleasure in 
hope and pain in vacuity4 ,but now ,i   
must further add what ,i omitted before1
 that in all these and similar emotions 
in which body and mind are opposed 7and 
they are innumerable71 pleasure and pain
 coalesce in one4  ,,protarchus3 ,i     
believe that to be quite true4          
,,socrates3 ,there still remains one    
other sort of admixture of pleasures and
 pains4  ,,protarchus3 ,what is that8   
,,socrates3 ,the union which1 as we were
 saying1 the mind often experiences of  
purely mental feelings4  ,,protarchus3  
,what do you mean8  ,,socrates3 ,why1 do
 we not speak of anger1 fear1 desire1   
sorrow1 love1 emulation1 envy1 and the  
like1 as pains which belong to the soul 
only8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 

,and shall we not find them also full of
 the most wonderful pleasures8 need ,i  
remind you of the anger  ',which stirs  
even a wise man to violence1 ,and is    
sweeter than honey and the honeycomb8'  
,and you remember how pleasures mingle  
with pains in lamentation and           
bereavement8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 there 
is a natural connexion between them4    
,,socrates3 ,and you remember also how  
at the sight of tragedies the spectators
 smile through their tears8             
,,protarchus3 ,certainly ,i do4         
,,socrates3 ,and are you aware that even
 at a comedy the soul experiences a     
mixed feeling of pain and pleasure8     
,,protarchus3 ,i do not quite understand
 you4  ,,socrates3 ,i admit1            
,protarchus1 that there is some         
difficulty in recognizing this mixture  
of feelings at a comedy4  ,,protarchus3 
,there is1 ,i think4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
the greater the obscurity of the case   
the more desirable is the examination of
 it1 because the difficulty in detecting

 other cases of mixed pleasures and     
pains will be less4  ,,protarchus3      
,proceed4  ,,socrates3 ,i have just     
mentioned envy2 would you not call that 
a pain of the soul8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4
  ,,socrates3 ,and yet the envious man  
finds something in the misfortunes of   
his neighbours at which he is pleased8  
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and ignorance1 and what is termed      
clownishness1 are surely an evil8       
,,protarchus3 ,to be sure4  ,,socrates3 
,from these considerations learn to know
 the nature of the ridiculous4          
,,protarchus3 ,explain4  ,,socrates3    
,the ridiculous is in short the specific
 name which is used to describe the     
vicious form of a certain habit2 and of 
vice in general it is that kind which is
 most at variance with the inscription  
at ,delphi4  ,,protarchus3 ,you mean1   
,socrates1 ',know thyself4'  ,,socrates3
 ,i do2 and the opposite would be1      
',know not thyself4'  ,,protarchus3     
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and now1 ,o   

,protarchus1 try to divide this into    
three4  ,,protarchus3 ,indeed ,i am     
afraid that ,i cannot4  ,,socrates3 ,do 
you mean to say that ,i must make the   
division for you8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1  
and what is more1 ,i beg that you will4 
,,socrates3 ,are there not three ways in
 which ignorance of self may be shown8  
,,protarchus3 ,what are they8           
,,socrates3 ,in the first place1 about  
money2 the ignorant may fancy himself   
richer than he is4  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 
that is a very common error4            
,,socrates3 ,and still more often he    
will fancy that he is taller or fairer  
than he is1 or that he has some other   
advantage of person which he really has 
not4  ,,protarchus3 ,of course4         
,,socrates3 ,and yet surely by far the  
greatest number err about the goods of  
the mind2 they imagine themselves to be 
much better men than they are4          
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 that is by far the  
commonest delusion4  ,,socrates3 ,and of
 all the virtues1 is not wisdom the one 

which the mass of mankind are always    
claiming1 and which most arouses in them
 a spirit of contention and lying       
conceit of wisdom8  ,,protarchus3       
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and may not   
all this be truly called an evil        
condition8  ,,protarchus3 ,very evil4   
,,socrates3 ,but we must pursue the     
division a step further1 ,protarchus1 if
 we would see in envy of the childish   
sort a singular mixture of pleasure and 
pain4  ,,protarchus3 ,how can we make   
the further division which you suggest8 
,,socrates3 ,all who are silly enough to
 entertain this lying conceit of        
themselves may of course be divided1    
like the rest of mankind1 into two      
classes--one having power and might2 and
 the other the reverse4  ,,protarchus3  
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,let this1     
then1 be the principle of division2     
those of them who are weak and unable to
 revenge themselves1 when they are      
laughed at1 may be truly called         
ridiculous1 but those who can defend    

themselves may be more truly described  
as strong and formidable2 for ignorance 
in the powerful is hateful and horrible1
 because hurtful to others both in      
reality and in fiction1 but powerless   
ignorance may be reckoned1 and in truth 
is1 ridiculous4  ,,protarchus3 ,that is 
very true1 but ,i do not as yet see     
where is the admixture of pleasures and 
pains4  ,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 let us 
examine the nature of envy4             
,,protarchus3 ,proceed4  ,,socrates3 ,is
 not envy an unrighteous pleasure1 and  
also an unrighteous pain8  ,,protarchus3
 ,most true4  ,,socrates3 ,there is     
nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at
 the misfortunes of enemies8            
,,protarchus3 ,certainly not4           
,,socrates3 ,but to feel joy instead of 
sorrow at the sight of our friends'     
misfortunes--is not that wrong8         
,,protarchus3 ,undoubtedly4  ,,socrates3
 ,did we not say that ignorance was     
always an evil8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4   
,,socrates3 ,and the three kinds of vain

 conceit in our friends which we        
enumerated--the vain conceit of beauty1 
of wisdom1 and of wealth1 are ridiculous
 if they are weak1 and detestable when  
they are powerful3 ,may we not say1 as  
,i was saying before1 that our friends  
who are in this state of mind1 when     
harmless to others1 are simply          
ridiculous8  ,,protarchus3 ,they are    
ridiculous4  ,,socrates3 ,and do we not 
acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to 
be a misfortune8  ,,protarchus3         
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and do we feel
 pain or pleasure in laughing at it8    
,,protarchus3 ,clearly we feel pleasure4
  ,,socrates3 ,and was not envy the     
source of this pleasure which we feel at
 the misfortunes of friends8            
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,then the argument shows that when we   
laugh at the folly of our friends1      
pleasure1 in mingling with envy1 mingles
 with pain1 for envy has been           
acknowledged by us to be mental pain1   
and laughter is pleasant2 and so we envy

 and laugh at the same instant4         
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
the argument implies that there are     
combinations of pleasure and pain in    
lamentations1 and in tragedy and comedy1
 not only on the stage1 but on the      
greater stage of human life2 and so in  
endless other cases4  ,,protarchus3 ,i  
do not see how any one can deny what you
 say1 ,socrates1 however eager he may be
 to assert the opposite opinion4        
,,socrates3 ,i mentioned anger1 desire1 
sorrow1 fear1 love1 emulation1 envy1 and
 similar emotions1 as examples in which 
we should find a mixture of the two     
elements so often named2 did ,i not8    
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,we may
 observe that our conclusions hitherto  
have had reference only to sorrow and   
envy and anger4  ,,protarchus3 ,i see4  
,,socrates3 ,then many other cases still
 remain8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4     
,,socrates3 ,and why do you suppose me  
to have pointed out to you the admixture
 which takes place in comedy8 ,why but  

to convince you that there was no       
difficulty in showing the mixed nature  
of fear and love and similar affections2
 and ,i thought that when ,i had given  
you the illustration1 you would have let
 me off1 and have acknowledged as a     
general truth that the body without the 
soul1 and the soul without the body1 as 
well as the two united1 are susceptible 
of all sorts of admixtures of pleasures 
and pains2 and so further discussion    
would have been unnecessary4 ,and now ,i
 want to know whether ,i may depart2 or 
will you keep me here until midnight8 ,i
 fancy that ,i may obtain my release    
without many words2--if ,i promise that 
to-morrow ,i will give you an account of
 all these cases4 ,but at present ,i    
would rather sail in another direction1 
and go to other matters which remain to 
be settled1 before the judgment can be  
given which ,philebus demands4          
,,protarchus3 ,very good1 ,socrates2 in 
what remains take your own course4      
,,socrates3 ,then after the mixed       

pleasures the unmixed should have their 
turn2 this is the natural and necessary 
order4  ,,protarchus3 ,excellent4       
,,socrates3 ,these1 in turn1 then1 ,i   
will now endeavour to indicate2 for with
 the maintainers of the opinion that all
 pleasures are a cessation of pain1 ,i  
do not agree1 but1 as ,i was saying1 ,i 
use them as witnesses1 that there are   
pleasures which seem only and are not1  
and there are others again which have   
great power and appear in many forms1   
yet are intermingled with pains1 and are
 partly alleviations of agony and       
distress1 both of body and mind4        
,,protarchus3 ,then what pleasures1     
,socrates1 should we be right in        
conceiving to be true8  ,,socrates3     
,true pleasures are those which are     
given by beauty of colour and form1 and 
most of those which arise from smells2  
those of sound1 again1 and in general   
those of which the want is painless and 
unconscious1 and of which the fruition  
is palpable to sense and pleasant and   

unalloyed with pain4  ,,protarchus3     
,once more1 ,socrates1 ,i must ask what 
you mean4  ,,socrates3 ,my meaning is   
certainly not obvious1 and ,i will      
endeavour to be plainer4 ,i do not mean 
by beauty of form such beauty as that of
 animals or pictures1 which the many    
would suppose to be my meaning2 but1    
says the argument1 understand me to mean
 straight lines and circles1 and the    
plane or solid figures which are formed 
out of them by turning-lathes and rulers
 and measurers of angles2 for these ,i  
affirm to be not only relatively        
beautiful1 like other things1 but they  
are eternally and absolutely beautiful1 
and they have peculiar pleasures1 quite 
unlike the pleasures of scratching4 ,and
 there are colours which are of the same
 character1 and have similar pleasures2 
now do you understand my meaning8       
,,protarchus3 ,i am trying to           
understand1 ,socrates1 and ,i hope that 
you will try to make your meaning       
clearer4  ,,socrates3 ,when sounds are  

smooth and clear1 and have a single pure
 tone1 then ,i mean to say that they are
 not relatively but absolutely          
beautiful1 and have natural pleasures   
associated with them4  ,,protarchus3    
,yes1 there are such pleasures4         
,,socrates3 ,the pleasures of smell are 
of a less ethereal sort1 but they have  
no necessary admixture of pain2 and all 
pleasures1 however and wherever         
experienced1 which are unattended by    
pains1 ,i assign to an analogous class4 
,here then are two kinds of pleasures4  
,,protarchus3 ,i understand4            
,,socrates3 ,to these may be added the  
pleasures of knowledge1 if no hunger of 
knowledge and no pain caused by such    
hunger precede them4  ,,protarchus3 ,and
 this is the case4  ,,socrates3 ,well1  
but if a man who is full of knowledge   
loses his knowledge1 are there not pains
 of forgetting8  ,,protarchus3 ,not     
necessarily1 but there may be times of  
reflection1 when he feels grief at the  
loss of his knowledge4  ,,socrates3     

,yes1 my friend1 but at present we are  
enumerating only the natural            
perceptions1 and have nothing to do with
 reflection4  ,,protarchus3 ,in that    
case you are right in saying that the   
loss of knowledge is not attended with  
pain4  ,,socrates3 ,these pleasures of  
knowledge1 then1 are unmixed with pain2 
and they are not the pleasures of the   
many but of a very few4  ,,protarchus3  
,quite true4  ,,socrates3 ,and now1     
having fairly separated the pure        
pleasures and those which may be rightly
 termed impure1 let us further add to   
our description of them1 that the       
pleasures which are in excess have no   
measure1 but that those which are not in
 excess have measure2 the great1 the    
excessive1 whether more or less         
frequent1 we shall be right in referring
 to the class of the infinite1 and of   
the more and less1 which pours through  
body and soul alike2 and the others we  
shall refer to the class which has      
measure4  ,,protarchus3 ,quite right1   

,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,still there is 
something more to be considered about   
pleasures4  ,,protarchus3 ,what is it8  
,,socrates3 ,when you speak of purity   
and clearness1 or of excess1 abundance1 
greatness and sufficiency1 in what      
relation do these terms stand to truth8 
,,protarchus3 ,why do you ask1          
,socrates8  ,,socrates3 ,because1       
,protarchus1 ,i should wish to test     
pleasure and knowledge in every possible
 way1 in order that if there be a pure  
and impure element in either of them1 ,i
 may present the pure element for       
judgment1 and then they will be more    
easily judged of by you and by me and by
 all of us4  ,,protarchus3 ,most true4  
,,socrates3 ,let us investigate all the 
pure kinds2 first selecting for         
consideration a single instance4        
,,protarchus3 ,what instance shall we   
select8  ,,socrates3 ,suppose that we   
first of all take whiteness4            
,,protarchus3 ,very good4  ,,socrates3  
,how can there be purity in whiteness1  

and what purity8 ,is that purest which  
is greatest or most in quantity1 or that
 which is most unadulterated and freest 
from any admixture of other colours8    
,,protarchus3 ,clearly that which is    
most unadulterated4  ,,socrates3 ,true1 
,protarchus2 and so the purest white1   
and not the greatest or largest in      
quantity1 is to be deemed truest and    
most beautiful8  ,,protarchus3 ,right4  
,,socrates3 ,and we shall be quite right
 in saying that a little pure white is  
whiter and fairer and truer than a great
 deal that is mixed4  ,,protarchus3     
,perfectly right4  ,,socrates3 ,there is
 no need of adducing many similar       
examples in illustration of the argument
 about pleasure2 one such is sufficient 
to prove to us that a small pleasure or 
a small amount of pleasure1 if pure or  
unalloyed with pain1 is always          
pleasanter and truer and fairer than a  
great pleasure or a great amount of     
pleasure of another kind4  ,,protarchus3
 ,assuredly2 and the instance you have  

given is quite sufficient4  ,,socrates3 
,but what do you say of another         
question3--have we not heard that       
pleasure is always a generation1 and has
 no true being8 ,do not certain         
ingenious philosophers teach this       
doctrine1 and ought not we to be        
grateful to them8  ,,protarchus3 ,what  
do they mean8  ,,socrates3 ,i will      
explain to you1 my dear ,protarchus1    
what they mean1 by putting a question4  
,,protarchus3 ,ask1 and ,i will answer4 
,,socrates3 ,i assume that there are two
 natures1 one self-existent1 and the    
other ever in want of something4        
,,protarchus3 ,what manner of natures   
are they8  ,,socrates3 ,the one majestic
 ever1 the other inferior4              
,,protarchus3 ,you speak riddles4       
,,socrates3 ,you have seen loves good   
and fair1 and also brave lovers of them4
  ,,protarchus3 ,i should think so4     
,,socrates3 ,search the universe for two
 terms which are like these two and are 
present everywhere4  ,,protarchus3 ,yet 

a third time ,i must say1 ,be a little  
plainer1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,there 
is no difficulty1 ,protarchus2 the      
argument is only in play1 and insinuates
 that some things are for the sake of   
something else 7relatives71 and that    
other things are the ends to which the  
former class subserve 7absolutes74      
,,protarchus3 ,your many repetitions    
make me slow to understand4  ,,socrates3
 ,as the argument proceeds1 my boy1 ,i  
dare say that the meaning will become   
clearer4  ,,protarchus3 ,very likely4   
,,socrates3 ,here are two new           
principles4  ,,protarchus3 ,what are    
they8  ,,socrates3 ,one is the          
generation of all things1 and the other 
is essence4  ,,protarchus3 ,i readily   
accept from you both generation and     
essence4  ,,socrates3 ,very right2 and  
would you say that generation is for the
 sake of essence1 or essence for the    
sake of generation8  ,,protarchus3 ,you 
want to know whether that which is      
called essence is1 properly speaking1   

for the sake of generation8  ,,socrates3
 ,yes4  ,,protarchus3 ,by the gods1 ,i  
wish that you would repeat your         
question4  ,,socrates3 ,i mean1 ,o my   
,protarchus1 to ask whether you would   
tell me that ship-building is for the   
sake of ships1 or ships for the sake of 
ship-building8 and in all similar cases 
,i should ask the same question4        
,,protarchus3 ,why do you not answer    
yourself1 ,socrates8  ,,socrates3 ,i    
have no objection1 but you must take    
your part4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4   
,,socrates3 ,my answer is1 that all     
things instrumental1 remedial1 material1
 are given to us with a view to         
generation1 and that each generation is 
relative to1 or for the sake of1 some   
being or essence1 and that the whole of 
generation is relative to the whole of  
essence4  ,,protarchus3 ,assuredly4     
,,socrates3 ,then pleasure1 being a     
generation1 must surely be for the sake 
of some essence8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4  
,,socrates3 ,and that for the sake of   

which something else is done must be    
placed in the class of good1 and that   
which is done for the sake of something 
else1 in some other class1 my good      
friend4  ,,protarchus3 ,most certainly4 
,,socrates3 ,then pleasure1 being a     
generation1 will be rightly placed in   
some other class than that of good8     
,,protarchus3 ,quite right4  ,,socrates3
 ,then1 as ,i said at first1 we ought to
 be very grateful to him who first      
pointed out that pleasure was a         
generation only1 and had no true being  
at all2 for he is clearly one who laughs
 at the notion of pleasure being a good4
  ,,protarchus3 ,assuredly4  ,,socrates3
 ,and he would surely laugh also at     
those who make generation their highest 
end4  ,,protarchus3 ,of whom are you    
speaking1 and what do they mean8        
,,socrates3 ,i am speaking of those who 
when they are cured of hunger or thirst 
or any other defect by some process of  
generation are delighted at the process 
as if it were pleasure2 and they say    

that they would not wish to live without
 these and other feelings of a like kind
 which might be mentioned4              
,,protarchus3 ,that is certainly what   
they appear to think4  ,,socrates3 ,and 
is not destruction universally admitted 
to be the opposite of generation8       
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,then he who chooses thus1 would choose 
generation and destruction rather than  
that third sort of life1 in which1 as we
 were saying1 was neither pleasure nor  
pain1 but only the purest possible      
thought4  ,,protarchus3 ,he who would   
make us believe pleasure to be a good is
 involved in great absurdities1         
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,great1 indeed2 
and there is yet another of them4       
,,protarchus3 ,what is it8  ,,socrates3 
,is there not an absurdity in arguing   
that there is nothing good or noble in  
the body1 or in anything else1 but that 
good is in the soul only1 and that the  
only good of the soul is pleasure2 and  
that courage or temperance or           

understanding1 or any other good of the 
soul1 is not really a good8--and is     
there not yet a further absurdity in our
 being compelled to say that he who has 
a feeling of pain and not of pleasure is
 bad at the time when he is suffering   
pain1 even though he be the best of men2
 and again1 that he who has a feeling of
 pleasure1 in so far as he is pleased at
 the time when he is pleased1 in that   
degree excels in virtue8  ,,protarchus3 
,nothing1 ,socrates1 can be more        
irrational than all this4  ,,socrates3  
,and now1 having subjected pleasure to  
every sort of test1 let us not appear to
 be too sparing of mind and knowledge3  
let us ring their metal bravely1 and see
 if there be unsoundness in any part1   
until we have found out what in them is 
of the purest nature2 and then the      
truest elements both of pleasure and    
knowledge may be brought up for         
judgment4  ,,protarchus3 ,right4        
,,socrates3 ,knowledge has two          
parts1--the one productive1 and the     

other educational8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4
  ,,socrates3 ,and in the productive or 
handicraft arts1 is not one part more   
akin to knowledge1 and the other less2  
and may not the one part be regarded as 
the pure1 and the other as the impure8  
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,let us separate the superior or        
dominant elements in each of them4      
,,protarchus3 ,what are they1 and how do
 you separate them8  ,,socrates3 ,i mean
 to say1 that if arithmetic1            
mensuration1 and weighing be taken away 
from any art1 that which remains will   
not be much4  ,,protarchus3 ,not much1  
certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,the rest will  
be only conjecture1 and the better use  
of the senses which is given by         
experience and practice1 in addition to 
a certain power of guessing1 which is   
commonly called art1 and is perfected by
 attention and pains4  ,,protarchus3    
,nothing more1 assuredly4  ,,socrates3  
,music1 for instance1 is full of this   
empiricism2 for sounds are harmonized1  

not by measure1 but by skilful          
conjecture2 the music of the flute is   
always trying to guess the pitch of each
 vibrating note1 and is therefore mixed 
up with much that is doubtful and has   
little which is certain4  ,,protarchus3 
,most true4  ,,socrates3 ,and the same  
will be found to hold good of medicine  
and husbandry and piloting and          
generalship4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4 
,,socrates3 ,the art of the builder1 on 
the other hand1 which uses a number of  
measures and instruments1 attains by    
their help to a greater degree of       
accuracy than the other arts4           
,,protarchus3 ,how is that8  ,,socrates3
 ,in ship-building and house-building1  
and in other branches of the art of     
carpentering1 the builder has his rule1 
lathe1 compass1 line1 and a most        
ingenious machine for straightening     
wood4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true1        
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,then now let us
 divide the arts of which we were       
speaking into two kinds1--the arts      

which1 like music1 are less exact in    
their results1 and those which1 like    
carpentering1 are more exact4           
,,protarchus3 ,let us make that         
division4  ,,socrates3 ,of the latter   
class1 the most exact of all are those  
which we just now spoke of as primary4  
,,protarchus3 ,i see that you mean      
arithmetic1 and the kindred arts of     
weighing and measuring4  ,,socrates3    
,certainly1 ,protarchus2 but are not    
these also distinguishable into two     
kinds8  ,,protarchus3 ,what are the two 
kinds8  ,,socrates3 ,in the first place1
 arithmetic is of two kinds1 one of     
which is popular1 and the other         
philosophical4  ,,protarchus3 ,how would
 you distinguish them8  ,,socrates3     
,there is a wide difference between     
them1 ,protarchus2 some arithmeticians  
reckon unequal units2 as for example1   
two armies1 two oxen1 two very large    
things or two very small things4 ,the   
party who are opposed to them insist    
that every unit in ten thousand must be 

the same as every other unit4           
,,protarchus3 ,undoubtedly there is1 as 
you say1 a great difference among the   
votaries of the science2 and there may  
be reasonably supposed to be two sorts  
of arithmetic4  ,,socrates3 ,and when we
 compare the art of mensuration which is
 used in building with philosophical    
geometry1 or the art of computation     
which is used in trading with exact     
calculation1 shall we say of either of  
the pairs that it is one or two8        
,,protarchus3 ,on the analogy of what   
has preceded1 ,i should be of opinion   
that they were severally two4           
,,socrates3 ,right2 but do you          
understand why ,i have discussed the    
subject8  ,,protarchus3 ,i think so1 but
 ,i should like to be told by you4      
,,socrates3 ,the argument has all along 
been seeking a parallel to pleasure1 and
 true to that original design1 has gone 
on to ask whether one sort of knowledge 
is purer than another1 as one pleasure  
is purer than another4  ,,protarchus3   

,clearly2 that was the intention4       
,,socrates3 ,and has not the argument in
 what has preceded1 already shown that  
the arts have different provinces1 and  
vary in their degrees of certainty8     
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,and just now did not the argument first
 designate a particular art by a common 
term1 thus making us believe in the     
unity of that art2 and then again1 as if
 speaking of two different things1      
proceed to enquire whether the art as   
pursed by philosophers1 or as pursued by
 non-philosophers1 has more of certainty
 and purity8  ,,protarchus3 ,that is the
 very question which the argument is    
asking4  ,,socrates3 ,and how1          
,protarchus1 shall we answer the        
enquiry8  ,,protarchus3 ,o ,socrates1 we
 have reached a point at which the      
difference of clearness in different    
kinds of knowledge is enormous4         
,,socrates3 ,then the answer will be the
 easier4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly2 and 
let us say in reply1 that those arts    

into which arithmetic and mensuration   
enter1 far surpass all others2 and that 
of these the arts or sciences which are 
animated by the pure philosophic impulse
 are infinitely superior in accuracy and
 truth4  ,,socrates3 ,then this is your 
judgment2 and this is the answer which1 
upon your authority1 we will give to all
 masters of the art of                  
misinterpretation8  ,,protarchus3 ,what 
answer8  ,,socrates3 ,that there are two
 arts of arithmetic1 and two of         
mensuration2 and also several other arts
 which in like manner have this double  
nature1 and yet only one name4          
,,protarchus3 ,let us boldly return this
 answer to the masters of whom you      
speak1 ,socrates1 and hope for good     
luck4  ,,socrates3 ,we have explained   
what we term the most exact arts or     
sciences4  ,,protarchus3 ,very good4    
,,socrates3 ,and yet1 ,protarchus1      
dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us1
 if we do not award to her the first    
place4  ,,protarchus3 ,and pray1 what is

 dialectic8  ,,socrates3 ,clearly the   
science which has to do with all that   
knowledge of which we are now speaking2 
for ,i am sure that all men who have a  
grain of intelligence will admit that   
the knowledge which has to do with being
 and reality1 and sameness and          
unchangeableness1 is by far the truest  
of all4 ,but how would you decide this  
question1 ,protarchus8  ,,protarchus3 ,i
 have often heard ,gorgias maintain1    
,socrates1 that the art of persuasion   
far surpassed every other2 this1 as he  
says1 is by far the best of them all1   
for to it all things submit1 not by     
compulsion1 but of their own free will4 
,now1 ,i should not like to quarrel     
either with you or with him4            
,,socrates3 ,you mean to say that you   
would like to desert1 if you were not   
ashamed8  ,,protarchus3 ,as you please4 
,,socrates3 ,may ,i not have led you    
into a misapprehension8  ,,protarchus3  
,how8  ,,socrates3 ,dear ,protarchus1 ,i
 never asked which was the greatest or  

best or usefullest of arts or sciences1 
but which had clearness and accuracy1   
and the greatest amount of truth1       
however humble and little useful an art4
 ,and as for ,gorgias1 if you do not    
deny that his art has the advantage in  
usefulness to mankind1 he will not      
quarrel with you for saying that the    
study of which ,i am speaking is        
superior in this particular of essential
 truth2 as in the comparison of white   
colours1 a little whiteness1 if that    
little be only pure1 was said to be     
superior in truth to a great mass which 
is impure4 ,and now let us give our best
 attention and consider well1 not the   
comparative use or reputation of the    
sciences1 but the power or faculty1 if  
there be such1 which the soul has of    
loving the truth1 and of doing all      
things for the sake of it2 let us search
 into the pure element of mind and      
intelligence1 and then we shall be able 
to say whether the science of which ,i  
have been speaking is most likely to    

possess the faculty1 or whether there be
 some other which has higher claims4    
,,protarchus3 ,well1 ,i have been       
considering1 and ,i can hardly think    
that any other science or art has a     
firmer grasp of the truth than this4    
,,socrates3 ,do you say so because you  
observe that the arts in general and    
those engaged in them make use of       
opinion1 and are resolutely engaged in  
the investigation of matters of opinion8
 ,even he who supposes himself to be    
occupied with nature is really occupied 
with the things of this world1 how      
created1 how acting or acted upon4 ,is  
not this the sort of enquiry in which   
his life is spent8  ,,protarchus3 ,true4
  ,,socrates3 ,he is labouring1 not     
after eternal being1 but about things   
which are becoming1 or which will or    
have become4  ,,protarchus3 ,very true4 
,,socrates3 ,and can we say that any of 
these things which neither are nor have 
been nor will be unchangeable1 when     
judged by the strict rule of truth ever 

become certain8  ,,protarchus3          
,impossible4  ,,socrates3 ,how can      
anything fixed be concerned with that   
which has no fixedness8  ,,protarchus3  
,how indeed8  ,,socrates3 ,then mind and
 science when employed about such       
changing things do not attain the       
highest truth8  ,,protarchus3 ,i should 
imagine not4  ,,socrates3 ,and now let  
us bid farewell1 a long farewell1 to you
 or me or ,philebus or ,gorgias1 and    
urge on behalf of the argument a single 
point4  ,,protarchus3 ,what point8      
,,socrates3 ,let us say that the stable 
and pure and true and unalloyed has to  
do with the things which are eternal and
 unchangeable and unmixed1 or if not1 at
 any rate what is most akin to them has2
 and that all other things are to be    
placed in a second or inferior class4   
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,and of the names expressing cognition1 
ought not the fairest to be given to the
 fairest things8  ,,protarchus3 ,that is
 natural4  ,,socrates3 ,and are not mind

 and wisdom the names which are to be   
honoured most8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes4     
,,socrates3 ,and these names may be said
 to have their truest and most exact    
application when the mind is engaged in 
the contemplation of true being8        
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and these were the names which ,i      
adduced of the rivals of pleasure8      
,,protarchus3 ,very true1 ,socrates4    
,,socrates3 ,in the next place1 as to   
the mixture1 here are the ingredients1  
pleasure and wisdom1 and we may be      
compared to artists who have their      
materials ready to their hands4         
,,protarchus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
now we must begin to mix them8          
,,protarchus3 ,by all means4            
,,socrates3 ,but had we not better have 
a preliminary word and refresh our      
memories8  ,,protarchus3 ,of what8      
,,socrates3 ,of that which ,i have      
already mentioned4 ,well says the       
proverb1 that we ought to repeat twice  
and even thrice that which is good4     

,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,well then1 by ,zeus1 let us proceed1   
and ,i will make what ,i believe to be a
 fair summary of the argument4          
,,protarchus3 ,let me hear4  ,,socrates3
 ,philebus says that pleasure is the    
true end of all living beings1 at which 
all ought to aim1 and moreover that it  
is the chief good of all1 and that the  
two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are     
correctly given to one thing and one    
nature2 ,socrates1 on the other hand1   
begins by denying this1 and further     
says1 that in nature as in name they are
 two1 and that wisdom partakes more than
 pleasure of the good4 ,is not and was  
not this what we were saying1           
,protarchus8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4 
,,socrates3 ,and is there not and was   
there not a further point which was     
conceded between us8  ,,protarchus3     
,what was it8  ,,socrates3 ,that the    
good differs from all other things4     
,,protarchus3 ,in what respect8         
,,socrates3 ,in that the being who      

possesses good always everywhere and in 
all things has the most perfect         
sufficiency1 and is never in need of    
anything else4  ,,protarchus3 ,exactly4 
,,socrates3 ,and did we not endeavour to
 make an imaginary separation of wisdom 
and pleasure1 assigning to each a       
distinct life1 so that pleasure was     
wholly excluded from wisdom1 and wisdom 
in like manner had no part whatever in  
pleasure8  ,,protarchus3 ,we did4       
,,socrates3 ,and did we think that      
either of them alone would be           
sufficient8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly   
not4  ,,socrates3 ,and if we erred in   
any point1 then let any one who will1   
take up the enquiry again and set us    
right2 and assuming memory and wisdom   
and knowledge and true opinion to belong
 to the same class1 let him consider    
whether he would desire to possess or   
acquire1--,i will not say pleasure1     
however abundant or intense1 if he has  
no real perception that he is pleased1  
nor any consciousness of what he feels1 

nor any recollection1 however momentary1
 of the feeling1--but would he desire to
 have anything at all1 if these         
faculties were wanting to him8 ,and     
about wisdom ,i ask the same question2  
can you conceive that any one would     
choose to have all wisdom absolutely    
devoid of pleasure1 rather than with a  
certain degree of pleasure1 or all      
pleasure devoid of wisdom1 rather than  
with a certain degree of wisdom8        
,,protarchus3 ,certainly not1 ,socrates2
 but why repeat such questions any more8
  ,,socrates3 ,then the perfect and     
universally eligible and entirely good  
cannot possibly be either of them8      
,,protarchus3 ,impossible4  ,,socrates3 
,then now we must ascertain the nature  
of the good more or less accurately1 in 
order1 as we were saying1 that the      
second place may be duly assigned4      
,,protarchus3 ,right4  ,,socrates3 ,have
 we not found a road which leads towards
 the good8  ,,protarchus3 ,what road8   
,,socrates3 ,supposing that a man had to

 be found1 and you could discover in    
what house he lived1 would not that be a
 great step towards the discovery of the
 man himself8  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4
  ,,socrates3 ,and now reason intimates 
to us1 as at our first beginning1 that  
we should seek the good1 not in the     
unmixed life but in the mixed4          
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,there
 is greater hope of finding that which  
we are seeking in the life which is well
 mixed than in that which is not8       
,,protarchus3 ,far greater4  ,,socrates3
 ,then now let us mingle1 ,protarchus1  
at the same time offering up a prayer to
 ,dionysus or ,hephaestus1 or whoever is
 the god who presides over the ceremony 
of mingling4  ,,protarchus3 ,by all     
means4  ,,socrates3 ,are not we the     
cup-bearers8 and here are two fountains 
which are flowing at our side3 one1     
which is pleasure1 may be likened to a  
fountain of honey2 the other1 wisdom1 a 
sober draught in which no wine mingles1 
is of water unpleasant but healthful2   

out of these we must seek to make the   
fairest of all possible mixtures4       
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,tell me first2--should we be most      
likely to succeed if we mingled every   
sort of pleasure with every sort of     
wisdom8  ,,protarchus3 ,perhaps we      
might4  ,,socrates3 ,but ,i should be   
afraid of the risk1 and ,i think that ,i
 can show a safer plan4  ,,protarchus3  
,what is it8  ,,socrates3 ,one pleasure 
was supposed by us to be truer than     
another1 and one art to be more exact   
than another4  ,,protarchus3 ,certainly4
  ,,socrates3 ,there was also supposed  
to be a difference in sciences2 some of 
them regarding only the transient and   
perishing1 and others the permanent and 
imperishable and everlasting and        
immutable2 and when judged by the       
standard of truth1 the latter1 as we    
thought1 were truer than the former4    
,,protarchus3 ,very good and right4     
,,socrates3 ,if1 then1 we were to begin 
by mingling the sections of each class  

which have the most of truth1 will not  
the union suffice to give us the        
loveliest of lives1 or shall we still   
want some elements of another kind8     
,,protarchus3 ,i think that we ought to 
do what you suggest4  ,,socrates3 ,let  
us suppose a man who understands        
justice1 and has reason as well as      
understanding about the true nature of  
this and of all other things4           
,,protarchus3 ,we will suppose such a   
man4  ,,socrates3 ,will he have enough  
of knowledge if he is acquainted only   
with the divine circle and sphere1 and  
knows nothing of our human spheres and  
circles1 but uses only divine circles   
and measures in the building of a house8
  ,,protarchus3 ,the knowledge which is 
only superhuman1 ,socrates1 is          
ridiculous in man4  ,,socrates3 ,what do
 you mean8 ,do you mean that you are to 
throw into the cup and mingle the impure
 and uncertain art which uses the false 
measure and the false circle8           
,,protarchus3 ,yes1 we must1 if any of  

us is ever to find his way home4        
,,socrates3 ,and am ,i to include music1
 which1 as ,i was saying just now1 is   
full of guesswork and imitation1 and is 
wanting in purity8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes1 
,i think that you must1 if human life is
 to be a life at all4  ,,socrates3      
,well1 then1 suppose that ,i give way1  
and1 like a doorkeeper who is pushed and
 overborne by the mob1 ,i open the door 
wide1 and let knowledge of every sort   
stream in1 and the pure mingle with the 
impure8  ,,protarchus3 ,i do not know1  
,socrates1 that any great harm would    
come of having them all1 if only you    
have the first sort4  ,,socrates3 ,well1
 then1 shall ,i let them all flow into  
what ,homer poetically terms 'a meeting 
of the waters'8  ,,protarchus3 ,by all  
means4  ,,socrates3 ,there--,i have let 
them in1 and now ,i must return to the  
fountain of pleasure4 ,for we were not  
permitted to begin by mingling in a     
single stream the true portions of both 
according to our original intention2 but

 the love of all knowledge constrained  
us to let all the sciences flow in      
together before the pleasures4          
,,protarchus3 ,quite true4  ,,socrates3 
,and now the time has come for us to    
consider about the pleasures also1      
whether we shall in like manner let them
 go all at once1 or at first only the   
true ones4  ,,protarchus3 ,it will be by
 far the safer course to let flow the   
true ones first4  ,,socrates3 ,let them 
flow1 then2 and now1 if there are any   
necessary pleasures1 as there were arts 
and sciences necessary1 must we not     
mingle them8  ,,protarchus3 ,yes2 the   
necessary pleasures should certainly be 
allowed to mingle4  ,,socrates3 ,the    
knowledge of the arts has been admitted 
to be innocent and useful always2 and if
 we say of pleasures in like manner that
 all of them are good and innocent for  
all of us at all times1 we must let them
 all mingle8  ,,protarchus3 ,what shall 
we say about them1 and what course shall
 we take8  ,,socrates3 ,do not ask me1  

,protarchus2 but ask the daughters of   
pleasure and wisdom to answer for       
themselves4  ,,protarchus3 ,how8        
,,socrates3 ,tell us1 ,o beloved--shall 
we call you pleasures or by some other  
name8--would you rather live with or    
without wisdom8 ,i am of opinion that   
they would certainly answer as follows3 
,,protarchus3 ,how8  ,,socrates3 ,they  
would answer1 as we said before1 that   
for any single class to be left by      
itself pure and isolated is not good1   
nor altogether possible2 and that if we 
are to make comparisons of one class    
with another and choose1 there is no    
better companion than knowledge of      
things in general1 and likewise the     
perfect knowledge1 if that may be1 of   
ourselves in every respect4             
,,protarchus3 ,and our answer will      
be3--,in that ye have spoken well4      
,,socrates3 ,very true4 ,and now let us 
go back and interrogate wisdom and mind3
 ,would you like to have any pleasures  
in the mixture8 ,and they will          

reply3--',what pleasures do you mean8'  
,,protarchus3 ,likely enough4           
,,socrates3 ,and we shall take up our   
parable and say3 ,do you wish to have   
the greatest and most vehement pleasures
 for your companions in addition to the 
true ones8 ',why1 ,socrates1' they will 
say1 'how can we8 seeing that they are  
the source of ten thousand hindrances to
 us2 they trouble the souls of men1     
which are our habitation1 with their    
madness2 they prevent us from coming to 
the birth1 and are commonly the ruin of 
the children which are born to us1      
causing them to be forgotten and        
unheeded2 but the true and pure         
pleasures1 of which you spoke1 know to  
be of our family1 and also those        
pleasures which accompany health and    
temperance1 and which every ,virtue1    
like a goddess1 has in her train to     
follow her about wherever she           
goes1--mingle these and not the others2 
there would be great want of sense in   
any one who desires to see a fair and   

perfect mixture1 and to find in it what 
is the highest good in man and in the   
universe1 and to divine what is the true
 form of good--there would be great want
 of sense in his allowing the pleasures1
 which are always in the company of     
folly and vice1 to mingle with mind in  
the cup4'--,is not this a very rational 
and suitable reply1 which mind has made1
 both on her own behalf1 as well as on  
the behalf of memory and true opinion8  
,,protarchus3 ,most certainly4          
,,socrates3 ,and still there must be    
something more added1 which is a        
necessary ingredient in every mixture4  
,,protarchus3 ,what is that8            
,,socrates3 ,unless truth enter into the
 composition1 nothing can truly be      
created or subsist4  ,,protarchus3      
,impossible4  ,,socrates3 ,quite        
impossible2 and now you and ,philebus   
must tell me whether anything is still  
wanting in the mixture1 for to my way of
 thinking the argument is now completed1
 and may be compared to an incorporeal  

law1 which is going to hold fair rule   
over a living body4  ,,protarchus3 ,i   
agree with you1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3 
,and may we not say with reason that we 
are now at the vestibule of the         
habitation of the good8  ,,protarchus3  
,i think that we are4  ,,socrates3      
,what1 then1 is there in the mixture    
which is most precious1 and which is the
 principal cause why such a state is    
universally beloved by all8 ,when we    
have discovered it1 we will proceed to  
ask whether this omnipresent nature is  
more akin to pleasure or to mind4       
,,protarchus3 ,quite right2 in that way 
we shall be better able to judge4       
,,socrates3 ,and there is no difficulty 
in seeing the cause which renders any   
mixture either of the highest value or  
of none at all4  ,,protarchus3 ,what do 
you mean8  ,,socrates3 ,every man knows 
it4  ,,protarchus3 ,what8  ,,socrates3  
,he knows that any want of measure and  
symmetry in any mixture whatever must   
always of necessity be fatal1 both to   

the elements and to the mixture1 which  
is then not a mixture1 but only a       
confused medley which brings confusion  
on the possessor of it4  ,,protarchus3  
,most true4  ,,socrates3 ,and now the   
power of the good has retired into the  
region of the beautiful2 for measure and
 symmetry are beauty and virtue all the 
world over4  ,,protarchus3 ,true4       
,,socrates3 ,also we said that truth was
 to form an element in the mixture4     
,,protarchus3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,then1 if we are not able to hunt the   
good with one idea only1 with three we  
may catch our prey2 ,beauty1 ,symmetry1 
,truth are the three1 and these taken   
together we may regard as the single    
cause of the mixture1 and the mixture as
 being good by reason of the infusion of
 them4  ,,protarchus3 ,quite right4     
,,socrates3 ,and now1 ,protarchus1 any  
man could decide well enough whether    
pleasure or wisdom is more akin to the  
highest good1 and more honourable among 
gods and men4  ,,protarchus3 ,clearly1  

and yet perhaps the argument had better 
be pursued to the end4  ,,socrates3 ,we 
must take each of them separately in    
their relation to pleasure and mind1 and
 pronounce upon them2 for we ought to   
see to which of the two they are        
severally most akin4  ,,protarchus3 ,you
 are speaking of beauty1 truth1 and     
measure8  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,protarchus1
 take truth first1 and1 after passing in
 review mind1 truth1 pleasure1 pause    
awhile and make answer to yourself--as  
to whether pleasure or mind is more akin
 to truth4  ,,protarchus3 ,there is no  
need to pause1 for the difference       
between them is palpable2 pleasure is   
the veriest impostor in the world2 and  
it is said that in the pleasures of     
love1 which appear to be the greatest1  
perjury is excused by the gods2 for     
pleasures1 like children1 have not the  
least particle of reason in them2       
whereas mind is either the same as      
truth1 or the most like truth1 and the  
truest4  ,,socrates3 ,shall we next     

consider measure1 in like manner1 and   
ask whether pleasure has more of this   
than wisdom1 or wisdom than pleasure8   
,,protarchus3 ,here is another question 
which may be easily answered2 for ,i    
imagine that nothing can ever be more   
immoderate than the transports of       
pleasure1 or more in conformity with    
measure than mind and knowledge4        
,,socrates3 ,very good2 but there still 
remains the third test3 ,has mind a     
greater share of beauty than pleasure1  
and is mind or pleasure the fairer of   
the two8  ,,protarchus3 ,no one1        
,socrates1 either awake or dreaming1    
ever saw or imagined mind or wisdom to  
be in aught unseemly1 at any time1 past1
 present1 or future4  ,,socrates3       
,right4  ,,protarchus3 ,but when we see 
some one indulging in pleasures1 perhaps
 in the greatest of pleasures1 the      
ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the 
action makes us ashamed2 and so we put  
them out of sight1 and consign them to  
darkness1 under the idea that they ought

 not to meet the eye of day4            
,,socrates3 ,then1 ,protarchus1 you will
 proclaim everywhere1 by word of mouth  
to this company1 and by messengers      
bearing the tidings far and wide1 that  
pleasure is not the first of            
possessions1 nor yet the second1 but    
that in measure1 and the mean1 and the  
suitable1 and the like1 the eternal     
nature has been found4  ,,protarchus3   
,yes1 that seems to be the result of    
what has been now said4  ,,socrates3 ,in
 the second class is contained the      
symmetrical and beautiful and perfect or
 sufficient1 and all which are of that  
family4  ,,protarchus3 ,true4           
,,socrates3 ,and if you reckon in the   
third class mind and wisdom1 you will   
not be far wrong1 if ,i divine aright4  
,,protarchus3 ,i dare say4  ,,socrates3 
,and would you not put in the fourth    
class the goods which we were affirming 
to appertain specially to the           
soul--sciences and arts and true        
opinions as we called them8 ,these come 

after the third class1 and form the     
fourth1 as they are certainly more akin 
to good than pleasure is4  ,,protarchus3
 ,surely4  ,,socrates3 ,the fifth class 
are the pleasures which were defined by 
us as painless1 being the pure pleasures
 of the soul herself1 as we termed them1
 which accompany1 some the sciences1 and
 some the senses4  ,,protarchus3        
,perhaps4  ,,socrates3 ,and now1 as     
,orpheus says1       ',with the sixth   
generation cease the glory of my song4' 
,here1 at the sixth award1 let us make  
an end2 all that remains is to set the  
crown on our discourse4  ,,protarchus3  
,true4  ,,socrates3 ,then let us sum up 
and reassert what has been said1 thus   
offering the third libation to the      
saviour ,zeus4  ,,protarchus3 ,how8     
,,socrates3 ,philebus affirmed that     
pleasure was always and absolutely the  
good4  ,,protarchus3 ,i understand2 this
 third libation1 ,socrates1 of which you
 spoke1 meant a recapitulation4         
,,socrates3 ,yes1 but listen to the     

sequel2 convinced of what ,i have just  
been saying1 and feeling indignant at   
the doctrine1 which is maintained1 not  
by ,philebus only1 but by thousands of  
others1 ,i affirmed that mind was far   
better and far more excellent1 as an    
element of human life1 than pleasure4   
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,but1 
suspecting that there were other things 
which were also better1 ,i went on to   
say that if there was anything better   
than either1 then ,i would claim the    
second place for mind over pleasure1 and
 pleasure would lose the second place as
 well as the first4  ,,protarchus3 ,you 
did4  ,,socrates3 ,nothing could be more
 satisfactorily shown than the          
unsatisfactory nature of both of them4  
,,protarchus3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3  
,the claims both of pleasure and mind to
 be the absolute good have been entirely
 disproven in this argument1 because    
they are both wanting in                
self-sufficiency and also in adequacy   
and perfection4  ,,protarchus3 ,most    

true4  ,,socrates3 ,but1 though they    
must both resign in favour of another1  
mind is ten thousand times nearer and   
more akin to the nature of the conqueror
 than pleasure4  ,,protarchus3          
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and1 according
 to the judgment which has now been     
given1 pleasure will rank fifth4        
,,protarchus3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,but  
not first2 no1 not even if all the oxen 
and horses and animals in the world by  
their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her 
to be so2--although the many trusting in
 them1 as diviners trust in birds1      
determine that pleasures make up the    
good of life1 and deem the lusts of     
animals to be better witnesses than the 
inspirations of divine philosophy4      
,,protarchus3 ,and now1 ,socrates1 we   
tell you that the truth of what you have
 been saying is approved by the judgment
 of all of us4  ,,socrates3 ,and will   
you let me go8  ,,protarchus3 ,there is 
a little which yet remains1 and ,i will 
remind you of it1 for ,i am sure that   

you will not be the first to go away    
from an argument4