,,sophist  ,by ,plato   ,translated by  
,benjamin ,jowett     ,,introduction    
,,and ,,analysis4  ,the dramatic power  
of the dialogues of ,plato appears to   
diminish as the metaphysical interest of
 them increases 7compare ,introd4 to the
 ,philebus74 ,there are no descriptions 
of time1 place or persons1 in the       
,sophist and ,statesman1 but we are     
plunged at once into philosophical      
discussions2 the poetical charm has     
disappeared1 and those who have no taste
 for abstruse metaphysics will greatly  
prefer the earlier dialogues to the     
later ones4 ,plato is conscious of the  
change1 and in the ,statesman expressly 
accuses himself of a tediousness in the 
two dialogues1 which he ascribes to his 
desire of developing the dialectical    
method4 ,on the other hand1 the kindred 
spirit of ,hegel seemed to find in the  
,sophist the crown and summit of the    
,platonic philosophy--here is the place 
at which ,plato most nearly approaches  
to the ,hegelian identity of ,being and 

,not-being4 ,nor will the great         
importance of the two dialogues be      
doubted by any one who forms a          
conception of the state of mind and     
opinion which they are intended to meet4
 ,the sophisms of the day were          
undermining philosophy2 the denial of   
the existence of ,not-being1 and of the 
connexion of ideas1 was making truth and
 falsehood equally impossible4 ,it has  
been said that ,plato would have written
 differently1 if he had been acquainted 
with the ,organon of ,aristotle4 ,but   
could the ,organon of ,aristotle ever   
have been written unless the ,sophist   
and ,statesman had preceded8 ,the swarm 
of fallacies which arose in the infancy 
of mental science1 and which was born   
and bred in the decay of the            
pre-,socratic philosophies1 was not     
dispelled by ,aristotle1 but by         
,socrates and ,plato4 ,the summa genera 
of thought1 the nature of the           
proposition1 of definition1 of          
generalization1 of synthesis and        

analysis1 of division and               
cross-division1 are clearly described1  
and the processes of induction and      
deduction are constantly employed in the
 dialogues of ,plato4 ,the 'slippery'   
nature of comparison1 the danger of     
putting words in the place of things1   
the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto         
secundum1' and in a circle1 are         
frequently indicated by him4 ,to all    
these processes of truth and error1     
,aristotle1 in the next generation1 gave
 distinctness2 he brought them together 
in a separate science4 ,but he is not to
 be regarded as the original inventor of
 any of the great logical forms1 with   
the exception of the syllogism4  ,there 
is little worthy of remark in the       
characters of the ,sophist4 ,the most   
noticeable point is the final retirement
 of ,socrates from the field of         
argument1 and the substitution for him  
of an ,eleatic stranger1 who is         
described as a pupil of ,parmenides and 
,zeno1 and is supposed to have descended

 from a higher world in order to convict
 the ,socratic circle of error4 ,as in  
the ,timaeus1 ,plato seems to intimate  
by the withdrawal of ,socrates that he  
is passing beyond the limits of his     
teaching2 and in the ,sophist and       
,statesman1 as well as in the           
,parmenides1 he probably means to imply 
that he is making a closer approach to  
the schools of ,elea and ,megara4 ,he   
had much in common with them1 but he    
must first submit their ideas to        
criticism and revision4 ,he had once    
thought as he says1 speaking by the     
mouth of the ,eleatic1 that he          
understood their doctrine of ,not-being2
 but now he does not even comprehend the
 nature of ,being4 ,the friends of ideas
 7,soph47 are alluded to by him as      
distant acquaintances1 whom he          
criticizes ab extra2 we do not recognize
 at first sight that he is criticizing  
himself4 ,the character of the ,eleatic 
stranger is colourless2 he is to a      
certain extent the reflection of his    

father and master1 ,parmenides1 who is  
the protagonist in the dialogue which is
 called by his name4 ,theaetetus himself
 is not distinguished by the remarkable 
traits which are attributed to him in   
the preceding dialogue4 ,he is no longer
 under the spell of ,socrates1 or       
subject to the operation of his         
midwifery1 though the fiction of        
question and answer is still maintained1
 and the necessity of taking ,theaetetus
 along with him is several times        
insisted upon by his partner in the     
discussion4 ,there is a reminiscence of 
the old ,theaetetus in his remark that  
he will not tire of the argument1 and in
 his conviction1 which the ,eleatic     
thinks likely to be permanent1 that the 
course of events is governed by the will
 of ,god4 ,throughout the two dialogues 
,socrates continues a silent auditor1 in
 the ,statesman just reminding us of his
 presence1 at the commencement1 by a    
characteristic jest about the statesman 
and the philosopher1 and by an allusion 

to his namesake1 with whom on that      
ground he claims relationship1 as he had
 already claimed an affinity with       
,theaetetus1 grounded on the likeness of
 his ugly face4 ,but in neither         
dialogue1 any more than in the ,timaeus1
 does he offer any criticism on the     
views which are propounded by another4  
,the style1 though wanting in dramatic  
power1--in this respect resembling the  
,philebus and the ,laws1--is very clear 
and accurate1 and has several touches of
 humour and satire4 ,the language is    
less fanciful and imaginative than that 
of the earlier dialogues2 and there is  
more of bitterness1 as in the ,laws1    
though traces of a similar temper may   
also be observed in the description of  
the 'great brute' in the ,republic1 and 
in the contrast of the lawyer and       
philosopher in the ,theaetetus4 ,the    
following are characteristic passages3  
',the ancient philosophers1 of whom we  
may say1 without offence1 that they went
 on their way rather regardless of      

whether we understood them or not2' the 
picture of the materialists1 or         
earth-born giants1 'who grasped oaks and
 rocks in their hands1' and who must be 
improved before they can be reasoned    
with2 and the equally humourous         
delineation of the friends of ideas1 who
 defend themselves from a fastness in   
the invisible world2 or the comparison  
of the ,sophist to a painter or maker   
7compare ,republic71 and the hunt after 
him in the rich meadow-lands of youth   
and wealth2 or1 again1 the light and    
graceful touch with which the older     
philosophies are painted 7',ionian and  
,sicilian muses'71 the comparison of    
them to mythological tales1 and the fear
 of the ,eleatic that he will be counted
 a parricide if he ventures to lay hands
 on his father ,parmenides2 or1 once    
more1 the likening of the ,eleatic      
stranger to a god from heaven4--,all    
these passages1 notwithstanding the     
decline of the style1 retain the impress
 of the great master of language4 ,but  

the equably diffused grace is gone2     
instead of the endless variety of the   
early dialogues1 traces of the          
rhythmical monotonous cadence of the    
,laws begin to appear2 and already an   
approach is made to the technical       
language of ,aristotle1 in the frequent 
use of the words 'essence1' 'power1'    
'generation1' 'motion1' 'rest1'         
'action1' 'passion1' and the like4  ,the
 ,sophist1 like the ,phaedrus1 has a    
double character1 and unites two        
enquirers1 which are only in a somewhat 
forced manner connected with each other4
 ,the first is the search after the     
,sophist1 the second is the enquiry into
 the nature of ,not-being1 which        
occupies the middle part of the work4   
,for ',not-being' is the hole or        
division of the dialectical net in which
 the ,sophist has hidden himself4 ,he is
 the imaginary impersonation of false   
opinion4 ,yet he denies the possibility 
of false opinion2 for falsehood is that 
which is not1 and therefore has no      

existence4 ,at length the difficulty is 
solved2 the answer1 in the language of  
the ,republic1 appears 'tumbling out at 
our feet4' ,acknowledging that there is 
a communion of kinds with kinds1 and not
 merely one ,being or ,good having      
different names1 or several isolated    
ideas or classes incapable of communion1
 we discover ',not-being' to be the     
other of ',being4' ,transferring this to
 language and thought1 we have no       
difficulty in apprehending that a       
proposition may be false as well as     
true4 ,the ,sophist1 drawn out of the   
shelter which ,cynic and ,megarian      
paradoxes have temporarily afforded him1
 is proved to be a dissembler and       
juggler with words4  ,the chief points  
of interest in the dialogue are3 7,i7   
the character attributed to the         
,sophist3 7,,ii7 the dialectical method3
 7,,iii7 the nature of the puzzle about 
',not-being3' 7,,iv7 the battle of the  
philosophers3 7,v7 the relation of the  
,sophist to other dialogues4  ,i4 ,the  

,sophist in ,plato is the master of the 
art of illusion2 the charlatan1 the     
foreigner1 the prince of esprits-faux1  
the hireling who is not a teacher1 and  
who1 from whatever point of view he is  
regarded1 is the opposite of the true   
teacher4 ,he is the 'evil one1' the     
ideal representative of all that ,plato 
most disliked in the moral and          
intellectual tendencies of his own age2 
the adversary of the almost equally     
ideal ,socrates4 ,he seems to be always 
growing in the fancy of ,plato1 now     
boastful1 now eristic1 now clothing     
himself in rags of philosophy1 now more 
akin to the rhetorician or lawyer1 now  
haranguing1 now questioning1 until the  
final appearance in the ,politicus of   
his departing shadow in the disguise of 
a statesman4 ,we are not to suppose that
 ,plato intended by such a description  
to depict ,protagoras or ,gorgias1 or   
even ,thrasymachus1 who all turn out to 
be 'very good sort of people when we    
know them1' and all of them part on good

 terms with ,socrates4 ,but he is       
speaking of a being as imaginary as the 
wise man of the ,stoics1 and whose      
character varies in different dialogues4
 ,like mythology1 ,greek philosophy has 
a tendency to personify ideas4 ,and the 
,sophist is not merely a teacher of     
rhetoric for a fee of one or fifty      
drachmae 7,crat471 but an ideal of      
,plato's in which the falsehood of all  
mankind is reflected4  ,a milder tone is
 adopted towards the ,sophists in a     
well-known passage of the ,republic1    
where they are described as the         
followers rather than the leaders of the
 rest of mankind4 ,plato ridicules the  
notion that any individuals can corrupt 
youth to a degree worth speaking of in  
comparison with the greater influence of
 public opinion4 ,but there is no real  
inconsistency between this and other    
descriptions of the ,sophist which occur
 in the ,platonic writings4 ,for ,plato 
is not justifying the ,sophists in the  
passage just quoted1 but only           

representing their power to be          
contemptible2 they are to be despised   
rather than feared1 and are no worse    
than the rest of mankind4 ,but a teacher
 or statesman may be justly condemned1  
who is on a level with mankind when he  
ought to be above them4 ,there is       
another point of view in which this     
passage should also be considered4 ,the 
great enemy of ,plato is the world1 not 
exactly in the theological sense1 yet in
 one not wholly different--the world as 
the hater of truth and lover of         
appearance1 occupied in the pursuit of  
gain and pleasure rather than of        
knowledge1 banded together against the  
few good and wise men1 and devoid of    
true education4 ,this creature has many 
heads3 rhetoricians1 lawyers1 statesmen1
 poets1 sophists4 ,but the ,sophist is  
the ,proteus who takes the likeness of  
all of them2 all other deceivers have a 
piece of him in them4 ,and sometimes he 
is represented as the corrupter of the  
world2 and sometimes the world as the   

corrupter of him and of itself4  ,of    
late years the ,sophists have found an  
enthusiastic defender in the            
distinguished historian of ,greece4 ,he 
appears to maintain 7#a7 that the term  
',sophist' is not the name of a         
particular class1 and would have been   
applied indifferently to ,socrates and  
,plato1 as well as to ,gorgias and      
,protagoras2 7#b7 that the bad sense was
 imprinted on the word by the genius of 
,plato2 7#c7 that the principal         
,sophists were not the corrupters of    
youth 7for the ,athenian youth were no  
more corrupted in the age of            
,demosthenes than in the age of         
,pericles71 but honourable and estimable
 persons1 who supplied a training in    
literature which was generally wanted at
 the time4 ,we will briefly consider how
 far these statements appear to be      
justified by facts3 and1 #a1 about the  
meaning of the word there arises an     
interesting question3--  ,many words are
 used both in a general and a specific  

sense1 and the two senses are not always
 clearly distinguished4 ,sometimes the  
generic meaning has been narrowed to the
 specific1 while in other cases the     
specific meaning has been enlarged or   
altered4 ,examples of the former class  
are furnished by some ecclesiastical    
terms3 apostles1 prophets1 bishops1     
elders1 catholics4 ,examples of the     
latter class may also be found in a     
similar field3 jesuits1 puritans1       
methodists1 and the like4 ,sometimes the
 meaning is both narrowed and enlarged2 
and a good or bad sense will subsist    
side by side with a neutral one4 ,a     
curious effect is produced on the       
meaning of a word when the very term    
which is stigmatized by the world 7e4g4 
,methodists7 is adopted by the obnoxious
 or derided class2 this tends to define 
the meaning4 ,or1 again1 the opposite   
result is produced1 when the world      
refuses to allow some sect or body of   
men the possession of an honourable name
 which they have assumed1 or applies it 

to them only in mockery or irony4  ,the 
term ',sophist' is one of those words of
 which the meaning has been both        
contracted and enlarged4 ,passages may  
be quoted from ,herodotus and the       
tragedians1 in which the word is used in
 a neutral sense for a contriver or     
deviser or inventor1 without including  
any ethical idea of goodness or badness4
 ,poets as well as philosophers were    
called ,sophists in the fifth century   
before ,christ4 ,in ,plato himself the  
term is applied in the sense of a       
'master in art1' without any bad meaning
 attaching to it 7,symp42 ,meno74 ,in   
the later ,greek1 again1 'sophist' and  
'philosopher' became almost             
indistinguishable4 ,there was no        
reproach conveyed by the word2 the      
additional association1 if any1 was only
 that of rhetorician or teacher4        
,philosophy had become eclecticism and  
imitation3 in the decline of ,greek     
thought there was no original voice     
lifted up 'which reached to a thousand  

years because of the god4' ,hence the   
two words1 like the characters          
represented by them1 tended to pass into
 one another4 ,yet even here some       
differences appeared2 for the term      
',sophist' would hardly have been       
applied to the greater names1 such as   
,plotinus1 and would have been more     
often used of a professor of philosophy 
in general than of a maintainer of      
particular tenets4  ,but the real       
question is1 not whether the word       
',sophist' has all these senses1 but    
whether there is not also a specific bad
 sense in which the term is applied to  
certain contemporaries of ,socrates4    
,would an ,athenian1 as ,mr4 ,grote     
supposes1 in the fifth century before   
,christ1 have included ,socrates and    
,plato1 as well as ,gorgias and         
,protagoras1 under the specific class of
 ,sophists8 ,to this question we must   
answer1 ,no3 if ever the term is applied
 to ,socrates and ,plato1 either the    
application is made by an enemy out of  

mere spite1 or the sense in which it is 
used is neutral4 ,plato1 ,xenophon1     
,isocrates1 ,aristotle1 all give a bad  
import to the word2 and the ,sophists   
are regarded as a separate class in all 
of them4 ,and in later ,greek           
literature1 the distinction is quite    
marked between the succession of        
philosophers from ,thales to ,aristotle1
 and the ,sophists of the age of        
,socrates1 who appeared like meteors for
 a short time in different parts of     
,greece4 ,for the purposes of comedy1   
,socrates may have been identified with 
the ,sophists1 and he seems to complain 
of this in the ,apology4 ,but there is  
no reason to suppose that ,socrates1    
differing by so many outward marks1     
would really have been confounded in the
 mind of ,anytus1 or ,callicles1 or of  
any intelligent ,athenian1 with the     
splendid foreigners who from time to    
time visited ,athens1 or appeared at the
 ,olympic games4 ,the man of genius1 the
 great original thinker1 the            

disinterested seeker after truth1 the   
master of repartee whom no one ever     
defeated in an argument1 was separated1 
even in the mind of the vulgar          
,athenian1 by an 'interval which no     
geometry can express1' from the balancer
 of sentences1 the interpreter and      
reciter of the poets1 the divider of the
 meanings of words1 the teacher of      
rhetoric1 the professor of morals and   
manners4  #b4 ,the use of the term      
',sophist' in the dialogues of ,plato   
also shows that the bad sense was not   
affixed by his genius1 but already      
current4 ,when ,protagoras says1 ',i    
confess that ,i am a ,sophist1' he      
implies that the art which he professes 
has already a bad name2 and the words of
 the young ,hippocrates1 when with a    
blush upon his face which is just seen  
by the light of dawn he admits that he  
is going to be made 'a ,sophist1' would 
lose their point1 unless the term had   
been discredited4 ,there is nothing     
surprising in the ,sophists having an   

evil name2 that1 whether deserved or    
not1 was a natural consequence of their 
vocation4 ,that they were foreigners1   
that they made fortunes1 that they      
taught novelties1 that they excited the 
minds of youth1 are quite sufficient    
reasons to account for the opprobrium   
which attached to them4 ,the genius of  
,plato could not have stamped the word  
anew1 or have imparted the associations 
which occur in contemporary writers1    
such as ,xenophon and ,isocrates4       
,changes in the meaning of words can    
only be made with great difficulty1 and 
not unless they are supported by a      
strong current of popular feeling4      
,there is nothing improbable in         
supposing that ,plato may have extended 
and envenomed the meaning1 or that he   
may have done the ,sophists the same    
kind of disservice with posterity which 
,pascal did to the ,jesuits4 ,but the   
bad sense of the word was not and could 
not have been invented by him1 and is   
found in his earlier dialogues1 e4g4 the

 ,protagoras1 as well as in the later4  
#c4 ,there is no ground for disbelieving
 that the principal ,sophists1 ,gorgias1
 ,protagoras1 ,prodicus1 ,hippias1 were 
good and honourable men4 ,the notion    
that they were corrupters of the        
,athenian youth has no real foundation1 
and partly arises out of the use of the 
term ',sophist' in modern times4 ,the   
truth is1 that we know little about     
them2 and the witness of ,plato in their
 favour is probably not much more       
historical than his witness against     
them4 ,of that national decline of      
genius1 unity1 political force1 which   
has been sometimes described as the     
corruption of youth1 the ,sophists were 
one among many signs2--in these respects
 ,athens may have degenerated2 but1 as  
,mr4 ,grote remarks1 there is no reason 
to suspect any greater moral corruption 
in the age of ,demosthenes than in the  
age of ,pericles4 ,the ,athenian youth  
were not corrupted in this sense1 and   
therefore the ,sophists could not have  

corrupted them4 ,it is remarkable1 and  
may be fairly set down to their credit1 
that ,plato nowhere attributes to them  
that peculiar ,greek sympathy with      
youth1 which he ascribes to ,parmenides1
 and which was evidently common in the  
,socratic circle4 ,plato delights to    
exhibit them in a ludicrous point of    
view1 and to show them always rather at 
a disadvantage in the company of        
,socrates4 ,but he has no quarrel with  
their characters1 and does not deny that
 they are respectable men4  ,the        
,sophist1 in the dialogue which is      
called after him1 is exhibited in many  
different lights1 and appears and       
reappears in a variety of forms4 ,there 
is some want of the higher ,platonic art
 in the ,eleatic ,stranger eliciting his
 true character by a labourious process 
of enquiry1 when he had already admitted
 that he knew quite well the difference 
between the ,sophist and the            
,philosopher1 and had often heard the   
question discussed2--such an            

anticipation would hardly have occurred 
in the earlier dialogues4 ,but ,plato   
could not altogether give up his        
,socratic method1 of which another trace
 may be thought to be discerned in his  
adoption of a common instance before he 
proceeds to the greater matter in hand4 
,yet the example is also chosen in order
 to damage the 'hooker of men' as much  
as possible2 each step in the pedigree  
of the angler suggests some injurious   
reflection about the ,sophist4 ,they are
 both hunters after a living prey1      
nearly related to tyrants and thieves1  
and the ,sophist is the cousin of the   
parasite and flatterer4 ,the effect of  
this is heightened by the accidental    
manner in which the discovery is made1  
as the result of a scientific division4 
,his descent in another branch affords  
the opportunity of more 'unsavoury      
comparisons4' ,for he is a retail       
trader1 and his wares are either        
imported or home-made1 like those of    
other retail traders2 his art is thus   

deprived of the character of a liberal  
profession4 ,but the most distinguishing
 characteristic of him is1 that he is a 
disputant1 and higgles over an argument4
 ,a feature of the ,eristic here seems  
to blend with ,plato's usual description
 of the ,sophists1 who in the early     
dialogues1 and in the ,republic1 are    
frequently depicted as endeavouring to  
save themselves from disputing with     
,socrates by making long orations4 ,in  
this character he parts company from the
 vain and impertinent talker in private 
life1 who is a loser of money1 while he 
is a maker of it4  ,but there is another
 general division under which his art   
may be also supposed to fall1 and that  
is purification2 and from purification  
is descended education1 and the new     
principle of education is to interrogate
 men after the manner of ,socrates1 and 
make them teach themselves4 ,here again 
we catch a glimpse rather of a ,socratic
 or ,eristic than of a ,sophist in the  
ordinary sense of the term4 ,and ,plato 

does not on this ground reject the claim
 of the ,sophist to be the true         
philosopher4 ,one more feature of the   
,eristic rather than of the ,sophist is 
the tendency of the troublesome animal  
to run away into the darkness of        
,not-being4 ,upon the whole1 we detect  
in him a sort of hybrid or double       
nature1 of which1 except perhaps in the 
,euthydemus of ,plato1 we find no other 
trace in ,greek philosophy2 he combines 
the teacher of virtue with the ,eristic2
 while in his omniscience1 in his       
ignorance of himself1 in his arts of    
deception1 and in his lawyer-like habit 
of writing and speaking about all       
things1 he is still the antithesis of   
,socrates and of the true teacher4      
,,ii4 ,the question has been asked1     
whether the method of 'abscissio        
infinti1' by which the ,sophist is      
taken1 is a real and valuable logical   
process4 ,modern science feels that     
this1 like other processes of formal    
logic1 presents a very inadequate       

conception of the actual complex        
procedure of the mind by which          
scientific truth is detected and        
verified4 ,plato himself seems to be    
aware that mere division is an unsafe   
and uncertain weapon1 first1 in the     
,statesman1 when he says that we should 
divide in the middle1 for in that way we
 are more likely to attain species2     
secondly1 in the parallel precept of the
 ,philebus1 that we should not pass from
 the most general notions to infinity1  
but include all the intervening middle  
principles1 until1 as he also says in   
the ,statesman1 we arrive at the infima 
species2 thirdly1 in the ,phaedrus1 when
 he says that the dialectician will     
carve the limbs of truth without        
mangling them2 and once more in the     
,statesman1 if we cannot bisect species1
 we must carve them as well as we can4  
,no better image of nature or truth1 as 
an organic whole1 can be conceived than 
this4 ,so far is ,plato from supposing  
that mere division and subdivision of   

general notions will guide men into all 
truth4  ,plato does not really mean to  
say that the ,sophist or the ,statesman 
can be caught in this way4 ,but these   
divisions and subdivisions were         
favourite logical exercises of the age  
in which he lived2 and while indulging  
his dialectical fancy1 and making a     
contribution to logical method1 he      
delights also to transfix the ,eristic  
,sophist with weapons borrowed from his 
own armoury4 ,as we have already seen1  
the division gives him the opportunity  
of making the most damaging reflections 
on the ,sophist and all his kith and    
kin1 and to exhibit him in the most     
discreditable light4  ,nor need we      
seriously consider whether ,plato was   
right in assuming that an animal so     
various could not be confined within the
 limits of a single definition4 ,in the 
infancy of logic1 men sought only to    
obtain a definition of an unknown or    
uncertain term2 the after reflection    
scarcely occurred to them that the word 

might have several senses1 which shaded 
off into one another1 and were not      
capable of being comprehended in a      
single notion4 ,there is no trace of    
this reflection in ,plato4 ,but neither 
is there any reason to think1 even if   
the reflection had occurred to him1 that
 he would have been deterred from       
carrying on the war with weapons fair or
 unfair against the outlaw ,sophist4    
,,iii4 ,the puzzle about ',not-being'   
appears to us to be one of the most     
unreal difficulties of ancient          
philosophy4 ,we cannot understand the   
attitude of mind which could imagine    
that falsehood had no existence1 if     
reality was denied to ,not-being3 ,how  
could such a question arise at all1 much
 less become of serious importance8 ,the
 answer to this1 and to nearly all other
 difficulties of early ,greek           
philosophy1 is to be sought for in the  
history of ideas1 and the answer is only
 unsatisfactory because our knowledge is
 defective4 ,in the passage from the    

world of sense and imagination and      
common language to that of opinion and  
reflection the human mind was exposed to
 many dangers1 and often       ',found  
no end in wandering mazes lost4'  ,on   
the other hand1 the discovery of        
abstractions was the great source of all
 mental improvement in after ages4 ,it  
was the pushing aside of the old1 the   
revelation of the new4 ,but each one of 
the company of abstractions1 if we may  
speak in the metaphorical language of   
,plato1 became in turn the tyrant of the
 mind1 the dominant idea1 which would   
allow no other to have a share in the   
throne4 ,this is especially true of the 
,eleatic philosophy3 while the          
absoluteness of ,being was asserted in  
every form of language1 the sensible    
world and all the phenomena of          
experience were comprehended under      
,not-being4 ,nor was any difficulty or  
perplexity thus created1 so long as the 
mind1 lost in the contemplation of      
,being1 asked no more questions1 and    

never thought of applying the categories
 of ,being or ,not-being to mind or     
opinion or practical life4  ,but the    
negative as well as the positive idea   
had sunk deep into the intellect of man4
 ,the effect of the paradoxes of ,zeno  
extended far beyond the ,eleatic circle4
 ,and now an unforeseen consequence     
began to arise4 ,if the ,many were not1 
if all things were names of the ,one1   
and nothing could be predicated of any  
other thing1 how could truth be         
distinguished from falsehood8 ,the      
,eleatic philosopher would have replied 
that ,being is alone true4 ,but mankind 
had got beyond his barren abstractions3 
they were beginning to analyze1 to      
classify1 to define1 to ask what is the 
nature of knowledge1 opinion1 sensation4
 ,still less could they be content with 
the description which ,achilles gives in
 ,homer of the man whom his soul hates--
  os chi eteron men keuthe eni phresin1 
allo de eipe4  ,for their difficulty was
 not a practical but a metaphysical one2

 and their conception of falsehood was  
really impaired and weakened by a       
metaphysical illusion4  ,the strength of
 the illusion seems to lie in the       
alternative3 ,if we once admit the      
existence of ,being and ,not-being1 as  
two spheres which exclude each other1 no
 ,being or reality can be ascribed to   
,not-being1 and therefore not to        
falsehood1 which is the image or        
expression of ,not-being4 ,falsehood is 
wholly false2 and to speak of true      
falsehood1 as ,theaetetus does          
7,theaet471 is a contradiction in terms4
 ,the fallacy to us is ridiculous and   
transparent1--no better than those which
 ,plato satirizes in the ,euthydemus4   
,it is a confusion of falsehood and     
negation1 from which ,plato himself is  
not entirely free4 ,instead of saying1  
',this is not in accordance with facts1'
 ',this is proved by experience to be   
false1' and from such examples forming a
 general notion of falsehood1 the mind  
of the ,greek thinker was lost in the   

mazes of the ,eleatic philosophy4 ,and  
the greater importance which ,plato     
attributes to this fallacy1 compared    
with others1 is due to the influence    
which the ,eleatic philosophy exerted   
over him4 ,he sees clearly to a certain 
extent2 but he has not yet attained a   
complete mastery over the ideas of his  
predecessors--they are still ends to    
him1 and not mere instruments of        
thought4 ,they are too rough-hewn to be 
harmonized in a single structure1 and   
may be compared to rocks which project  
or overhang in some ancient city's      
walls4 ,there are many such imperfect   
syncretisms or eclecticisms in the      
history of philosophy4 ,a modern        
philosopher1 though emancipated from    
scholastic notions of essence or        
substance1 might still be seriously     
affected by the abstract idea of        
necessity2 or though accustomed1 like   
,bacon1 to criticize abstract notions1  
might not extend his criticism to the   
syllogism4  ,the saying or thinking the 

thing that is not1 would be the popular 
definition of falsehood or error4 ,if we
 were met by the ,sophist's objection1  
the reply would probably be an appeal to
 experience4 ,ten thousands1 as ,homer  
would say 7mala murioi71 tell falsehoods
 and fall into errors4 ,and this is     
,plato's reply1 both in the ,cratylus   
and ,sophist4 ',theaetetus is flying1'  
is a sentence in form quite as          
grammatical as ',theaetetus is sitting'2
 the difference between the two         
sentences is1 that the one is true and  
the other false4 ,but1 before making    
this appeal to common sense1 ,plato     
propounds for our consideration a theory
 of the nature of the negative4  ,the   
theory is1 that ,not-being is relation4 
,not-being is the other of ,being1 and  
has as many kinds as there are          
differences in ,being4 ,this doctrine is
 the simple converse of the famous      
proposition of ,spinoza1--not ',omnis   
determinatio est negatio1' but ',omnis  
negatio est determinatio'2--not1 ,all   

distinction is negation1 but1 ,all      
negation is distinction4 ,not-being is  
the unfolding or determining of ,being1 
and is a necessary element in all other 
things that are4 ,we should be careful  
to observe1 first1 that ,plato does not 
identify ,being with ,not-being2 he has 
no idea of progression by antagonism1 or
 of the ,hegelian vibration of moments3 
he would not have said with             
,heracleitus1 ',all things are and are  
not1 and become and become not4'        
,secondly1 he has lost sight altogether 
of the other sense of ,not-being1 as the
 negative of ,being2 although he again  
and again recognizes the validity of the
 law of contradiction4 ,thirdly1 he     
seems to confuse falsehood with         
negation4 ,nor is he quite consistent in
 regarding ,not-being as one class of   
,being1 and yet as coextensive with     
,being in general4 ,before analyzing    
further the topics thus suggested1 we   
will endeavour to trace the manner in   
which ,plato arrived at his conception  

of ,not-being4  ,in all the later       
dialogues of ,plato1 the idea of mind or
 intelligence becomes more and more     
prominent4 ,that idea which ,anaxagoras 
employed inconsistently in the          
construction of the world1 ,plato1 in   
the ,philebus1 the ,sophist1 and the    
,laws1 extends to all things1           
attributing to ,providence a care1      
infinitesimal as well as infinite1 of   
all creation4 ,the divine mind is the   
leading religious thought of the later  
works of ,plato4 ,the human mind is a   
sort of reflection of this1 having ideas
 of ,being1 ,sameness1 and the like4 ,at
 times they seem to be parted by a great
 gulf 7,parmenides72 at other times they
 have a common nature1 and the light of 
a common intelligence4  ,but this       
ever-growing idea of mind is really     
irreconcilable with the abstract        
,pantheism of the ,eleatics4 ,to the    
passionate language of ,parmenides1     
,plato replies in a strain equally      
passionate3--,what6 has not ,being mind8

 and is not ,being capable of being     
known8 and1 if this is admitted1 then   
capable of being affected or acted      
upon8--in motion1 then1 and yet not     
wholly incapable of rest4 ,already we   
have been compelled to attribute        
opposite determinations to ,being4 ,and 
the answer to the difficulty about      
,being may be equally the answer to the 
difficulty about ,not-being4  ,the      
answer is1 that in these and all other  
determinations of any notion we are     
attributing to it ',not-being4' ,we went
 in search of ,not-being and seemed to  
lose ,being1 and now in the hunt after  
,being we recover both4 ,not-being is a 
kind of ,being1 and in a sense          
co-extensive with ,being4 ,and there are
 as many divisions of ,not-being as of  
,being4 ,to every positive idea--'just1'
 'beautiful1' and the like1 there is a  
corresponding negative idea--'not-just1'
 'not-beautiful1' and the like4  ,a     
doubt may be raised whether this account
 of the negative is really the true one4

 ,the common logicians would say that   
the 'not-just1' 'not-beautiful1' are not
 really classes at all1 but are merged  
in one great class of the infinite or   
negative4 ,the conception of ,plato1 in 
the days before logic1 seems to be more 
correct than this4 ,for the word 'not'  
does not altogether annihilate the      
positive meaning of the word 'just'3 at 
least1 it does not prevent our looking  
for the 'not-just' in or about the same 
class in which we might expect to find  
the 'just4' ',not-just is               
not-honourable' is neither a false nor  
an unmeaning proposition4 ,the reason is
 that the negative proposition has      
really passed into an undefined         
positive4 ,to say that 'not-just' has no
 more meaning than                      
'not-honourable'--that is to say1 that  
the two cannot in any degree be         
distinguished1 is clearly repugnant to  
the common use of language4  ,the       
ordinary logic is also jealous of the   
explanation of negation as relation1    

because seeming to take away the        
principle of contradiction4 ,plato1 as  
far as we know1 is the first philosopher
 who distinctly enunciated this         
principle2 and though we need not       
suppose him to have been always         
consistent with himself1 there is no    
real inconsistency between his          
explanation of the negative and the     
principle of contradiction4 ,neither the
 ,platonic notion of the negative as the
 principle of difference1 nor the       
,hegelian identity of ,being and        
,not-being1 at all touch the principle  
of contradiction4 ,for what is asserted 
about ,being and ,not-,being only       
relates to our most abstract notions1   
and in no way interferes with the       
principle of contradiction employed in  
the concrete4 ,because ,not-being is    
identified with ,other1 or ,being with  
,not-being1 this does not make the      
proposition ',some have not eaten' any  
the less a contradiction of ',all have  
eaten4'  ,the explanation of the        

negative given by ,plato in the ,sophist
 is a true but partial one2 for the word
 'not1' besides the meaning of 'other1' 
may also imply 'opposition4' ,and       
difference or opposition may be either  
total or partial3 the not-beautiful may 
be other than the beautiful1 or in no   
relation to the beautiful1 or a specific
 class in various degrees opposed to the
 beautiful4 ,and the negative may be a  
negation of fact or of thought 7ou and  
me74 ,lastly1 there are certain ideas1  
such as 'beginning1' 'becoming1' 'the   
finite1' 'the abstract1' in which the   
negative cannot be separated from the   
positive1 and ',being' and ',not-being' 
are inextricably blended4  ,plato       
restricts the conception of ,not-being  
to difference4 ,man is a rational       
animal1 and is not--as many other things
 as are not included under this         
definition4 ,he is and is not1 and is   
because he is not4 ,besides the positive
 class to which he belongs1 there are   
endless negative classes to which he may

 be referred4 ,this is certainly        
intelligible1 but useless4 ,to refer a  
subject to a negative class is          
unmeaning1 unless the 'not' is a mere   
modification of the positive1 as in the 
example of 'not honourable' and         
'dishonourable'2 or unless the class is 
characterized by the absence rather than
 the presence of a particular quality4  
,nor is it easy to see how ,not-being   
any more than ,sameness or ,otherness is
 one of the classes of ,being4 ,they are
 aspects rather than classes of ,being4 
,not-being can only be included in      
,being1 as the denial of some particular
 class of ,being4 ,if we attempt to     
pursue such airy phantoms at all1 the   
,hegelian identity of ,being and        
,not-being is a more apt and            
intelligible expression of the same     
mental phenomenon4 ,for ,plato has not  
distinguished between the ,being which  
is prior to ,not-being1 and the ,being  
which is the negation of ,not-being     
7compare ,parm474  ,but he is not       

thinking of this when he says that      
,being comprehends ,not-being4 ,again1  
we should probably go back for the true 
explanation to the influence which the  
,eleatic philosophy exercised over him4 
,under ',not-being' the ,eleatic had    
included all the realities of the       
sensible world4 ,led by this association
 and by the common use of language1     
which has been already noticed1 we      
cannot be much surprised that ,plato    
should have made classes of ,not-being4 
,it is observable that he does not      
absolutely deny that there is an        
opposite of ,being4 ,he is inclined to  
leave the question1 merely remarking    
that the opposition1 if admissible at   
all1 is not expressed by the term       
',not-being4'  ,on the whole1 we must   
allow that the great service rendered by
 ,plato to metaphysics in the ,sophist1 
is not his explanation of ',not-being'  
as difference4 ,with this he certainly  
laid the ghost of ',not-being'2 and we  
may attribute to him in a measure the   

credit of anticipating ,spinoza and     
,hegel4 ,but his conception is not clear
 or consistent2 he does not recognize   
the different senses of the negative1   
and he confuses the different classes of
 ,not-being with the abstract notion4   
,as the ,pre-,socratic philosopher      
failed to distinguish between the       
universal and the true1 while he placed 
the particulars of sense under the false
 and apparent1 so ,plato appears to     
identify negation with falsehood1 or is 
unable to distinguish them4 ,the        
greatest service rendered by him to     
mental science is the recognition of the
 communion of classes1 which1 although  
based by him on his account of          
',not-being1' is independent of it4 ,he 
clearly saw that the isolation of ideas 
or classes is the annihilation of       
reasoning4 ,thus1 after wandering in    
many diverging paths1 we return to      
common sense4 ,and for this reason we   
may be inclined to do less than justice 
to ,plato1--because the truth which he  

attains by a real effort of thought is  
to us a familiar and unconscious truism1
 which no one would any longer think    
either of doubting or examining4  ,,iv4 
,the later dialogues of ,plato contain  
many references to contemporary         
philosophy4 ,both in the ,theaetetus and
 in the ,sophist he recognizes that he  
is in the midst of a fray2 a huge       
irregular battle everywhere surrounds   
him 7,theaet474 ,first1 there are the   
two great philosophies going back into  
cosmogony and poetry3 the philosophy of 
,heracleitus1 supposed to have a        
poetical origin in ,homer1 and that of  
the ,eleatics1 which in a similar spirit
 he conceives to be even older than     
,xenophanes 7compare ,protag474 ,still  
older were theories of two and three    
principles1 hot and cold1 moist and dry1
 which were ever marrying and being     
given in marriage3 in speaking of these1
 he is probably referring to ,pherecydes
 and the early ,ionians4 ,in the        
philosophy of motion there were         

different accounts of the relation of   
plurality and unity1 which were supposed
 to be joined and severed by love and   
hate1 some maintaining that this process
 was perpetually going on 7e4g4         
,heracleitus72 others 7e4g4 ,empedocles7
 that there was an alternation of them4 
,of the ,pythagoreans or of ,anaxagoras 
he makes no distinct mention4 ,his chief
 opponents are1 first1 ,eristics or     
,megarians2 secondly1 the ,materialists4
  ,the picture which he gives of both   
these latter schools is indistinct2 and 
he appears reluctant to mention the     
names of their teachers4 ,nor can we    
easily determine how much is to be      
assigned to the ,cynics1 how much to the
 ,megarians1 or whether the 'repellent  
,materialists' 7,theaet47 are ,cynics or
 ,atomists1 or represent some unknown   
phase of opinion at ,athens4 ,to the    
,cynics and ,antisthenes is commonly    
attributed1 on the authority of         
,aristotle1 the denial of predication1  
while the ,megarians are said to have   

been ,nominalists1 asserting the ,one   
,good under many names to be the true   
,being of ,zeno and the ,eleatics1 and1 
like ,zeno1 employing their negative    
dialectic in the refutation of          
opponents4 ,but the later ,megarians    
also denied predication2 and this tenet1
 which is attributed to all of them by  
,simplicius1 is certainly in accordance 
with their over-refining philosophy4    
,the 'tyros young and old1' of whom     
,plato speaks1 probably include both4   
,at any rate1 we shall be safer in      
accepting the general description of    
them which he has given1 and in not     
attempting to draw a precise line       
between them4  ,of these ,eristics1     
whether ,cynics or ,megarians1 several  
characteristics are found in ,plato3--  
#a4 ,they pursue verbal oppositions2 #b4
 they make reasoning impossible by their
 over-accuracy in the use of language2  
#c4 they deny predication2 #d4 they go  
from unity to plurality1 without passing
 through the intermediate stages2 #e4   

they refuse to attribute motion or power
 to ,being2 #f4 they are the enemies of 
sense2--whether they are the 'friends of
 ideas1' who carry on the polemic       
against sense1 is uncertain2 probably   
under this remarkable expression ,plato 
designates those who more nearly        
approached himself1 and may be          
criticizing an earlier form of his own  
doctrines4 ,we may observe 7#a7 that he 
professes only to give us a few opinions
 out of many which were at that time    
current in ,greece2 7#b7 that he nowhere
 alludes to the ethical teaching of the 
,cynics--unless the argument in the     
,protagoras1 that the virtues are one   
and not many1 may be supposed to contain
 a reference to their views1 as well as 
to those of ,socrates2 and unless they  
are the school alluded to in the        
,philebus1 which is described as 'being 
very skilful in physics1 and as         
maintaining pleasure to be the absence  
of pain4' ,that ,antisthenes wrote a    
book called ',physicus1' is hardly a    

sufficient reason for describing them as
 skilful in physics1 which appear to    
have been very alien to the tendency of 
the ,cynics4  ,the ,idealism of the     
fourth century before ,christ in        
,greece1 as in other ages and countries1
 seems to have provoked a reaction      
towards ,materialism4 ,the maintainers  
of this doctrine are described in the   
,theaetetus as obstinate persons who    
will believe in nothing which they      
cannot hold in their hands1 and in the  
,sophist as incapable of argument4 ,they
 are probably the same who are said in  
the ,tenth ,book of the ,laws to        
attribute the course of events to       
nature1 art1 and chance4 ,who they were1
 we have no means of determining except 
from ,plato's description of them4 ,his 
silence respecting the ,atomists might  
lead us to suppose that here we have a  
trace of them4 ,but the ,atomists were  
not ,materialists in the grosser sense  
of the term1 nor were they incapable of 
reasoning2 and ,plato would hardly have 

described a great genius like           
,democritus in the disdainful terms     
which he uses of the ,materialists4     
,upon the whole1 we must infer that the 
persons here spoken of are unknown to   
us1 like the many other writers and     
talkers at ,athens and elsewhere1 of    
whose endless activity of mind          
,aristotle in his ,metaphysics has      
preserved an anonymous memorial4  ,v4   
,the ,sophist is the sequel of the      
,theaetetus1 and is connected with the  
,parmenides by a direct allusion        
7compare ,introductions to ,theaetetus  
and ,parmenides74 ,in the ,theaetetus we
 sought to discover the nature of       
knowledge and false opinion4 ,but the   
nature of false opinion seemed          
impenetrable2 for we were unable to     
understand how there could be any       
reality in ,not-being4 ,in the ,sophist 
the question is taken up again2 the     
nature of ,not-being is detected1 and   
there is no longer any metaphysical     
impediment in the way of admitting the  

possibility of falsehood4 ,to the       
,parmenides1 the ,sophist stands in a   
less defined and more remote relation4  
,there human thought is in process of   
disorganization2 no absurdity or        
inconsistency is too great to be        
elicited from the analysis of the simple
 ideas of ,unity or ,being4 ,in the     
,sophist the same contradictions are    
pursued to a certain extent1 but only   
with a view to their resolution4 ,the   
aim of the dialogue is to show how the  
few elemental conceptions of the human  
mind admit of a natural connexion in    
thought and speech1 which ,megarian or  
other sophistry vainly attempts to deny4
  444  ,true to the appointment of the  
previous day1 ,theodorus and ,theaetetus
 meet ,socrates at the same spot1       
bringing with them an ,eleatic          
,stranger1 whom ,theodorus introduces as
 a true philosopher4 ,socrates1 half in 
jest1 half in earnest1 declares that he 
must be a god in disguise1 who1 as      
,homer would say1 has come to earth that

 he may visit the good and evil among   
men1 and detect the foolishness of      
,athenian wisdom4 ,at any rate he is a  
divine person1 one of a class who are   
hardly recognized on earth2 who appear  
in divers forms--now as statesmen1 now  
as sophists1 and are often deemed       
madmen4 ',philosopher1 statesman1       
sophist1' says ,socrates1 repeating the 
words--',i should like to ask our       
,eleatic friend what his countrymen     
think of them2 do they regard them as   
one1 or three8'  ,the ,stranger has been
 already asked the same question by     
,theodorus and ,theaetetus2 and he at   
once replies that they are thought to be
 three2 but to explain the difference   
fully would take time4 ,he is pressed to
 give this fuller explanation1 either in
 the form of a speech or of question and
 answer4 ,he prefers the latter1 and    
chooses as his respondent ,theaetetus1  
whom he already knows1 and who is       
recommended to him by ,socrates4  ,we   
are agreed1 he says1 about the name     

,sophist1 but we may not be equally     
agreed about his nature4 ,great subjects
 should be approached through familiar  
examples1 and1 considering that he is a 
creature not easily caught1 ,i think    
that1 before approaching him1 we should 
try our hand upon some more obvious     
animal1 who may be made the subject of  
logical experiment2 shall we say an     
angler8 ',very good4'  ,in the first    
place1 the angler is an artist2 and     
there are two kinds of art1--productive 
art1 which includes husbandry1          
manufactures1 imitations2 and           
acquisitive art1 which includes         
learning1 trading1 fighting1 hunting4   
,the angler's is an acquisitive art1 and
 acquisition may be effected either by  
exchange or by conquest2 in the latter  
case1 either by force or craft4         
,conquest by craft is called hunting1   
and of hunting there is one kind which  
pursues inanimate1 and another which    
pursues animate objects2 and animate    
objects may be either land animals or   

water animals1 and water animals either 
fly over the water or live in the water4
 ,the hunting of the last is called     
fishing2 and of fishing1 one kind uses  
enclosures1 catching the fish in nets   
and baskets1 and another kind strikes   
them either with spears by night or with
 barbed spears or barbed hooks by day2  
the barbed spears are impelled from     
above1 the barbed hooks are jerked into 
the head and lips of the fish1 which are
 then drawn from below upwards4 ,thus1  
by a series of divisions1 we have       
arrived at the definition of the        
angler's art4  ,and now by the help of  
this example we may proceed to bring to 
light the nature of the ,sophist4 ,like 
the angler1 he is an artist1 and the    
resemblance does not end here4 ,for they
 are both hunters1 and hunters of       
animals2 the one of water1 and the other
 of land animals4 ,but at this point    
they diverge1 the one going to the sea  
and the rivers1 and the other to the    
rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands1 

in which generous youth abide4 ,on land 
you may hunt tame animals1 or you may   
hunt wild animals4 ,and man is a tame   
animal1 and he may be hunted either by  
force or persuasion2--either by the     
pirate1 man-stealer1 soldier1 or by the 
lawyer1 orator1 talker4 ,the latter use 
persuasion1 and persuasion is either    
private or public4 ,of the private      
practitioners of the art1 some bring    
gifts to those whom they hunt3 these are
 lovers4 ,and others take hire2 and some
 of these flatter1 and in return are    
fed2 others profess to teach virtue and 
receive a round sum4 ,and who are these 
last8 ,tell me who8 ,have we not        
unearthed the ,sophist8  ,but he is a   
many-sided creature1 and may still be   
traced in another line of descent4 ,the 
acquisitive art had a branch of exchange
 as well as of hunting1 and exchange is 
either giving or selling2 and the seller
 is either a manufacturer or a merchant2
 and the merchant either retails or     
exports2 and the exporter may export    

either food for the body or food for the
 mind4 ,and of this trading in food for 
the mind1 one kind may be termed the art
 of display1 and another the art of     
selling learning2 and learning may be a 
learning of the arts or of virtue4 ,the 
seller of the arts may be called an     
art-seller2 the seller of virtue1 a     
,sophist4  ,again1 there is a third     
line1 in which a ,sophist may be traced4
 ,for is he less a ,sophist when1       
instead of exporting his wares to       
another country1 he stays at home1 and  
retails goods1 which he not only buys of
 others1 but manufactures himself8  ,or 
he may be descended from the acquisitive
 art in the combative line1 through the 
pugnacious1 the controversial1 the      
disputatious arts2 and he will be found 
at last in the eristic section of the   
latter1 and in that division of it which
 disputes in private for gain about the 
general principles of right and wrong4  
,and still there is a track of him which
 has not yet been followed out by us4   

,do not our household servants talk of  
sifting1 straining1 winnowing8 ,and they
 also speak of carding1 spinning1 and   
the like4 ,all these are processes of   
division2 and of division there are two 
kinds1--one in which like is divided    
from like1 and another in which the good
 is separated from the bad4 ,the latter 
of the two is termed purification2 and  
again1 of purification1 there are two   
sorts1--of animate bodies 7which may be 
internal or external71 and of inanimate4
 ,medicine and gymnastic are the        
internal purifications of the animate1  
and bathing the external2 and of the    
inanimate1 fulling and cleaning and     
other humble processes1 some of which   
have ludicrous names4 ,not that         
dialectic is a respecter of names or    
persons1 or a despiser of humble        
occupations2 nor does she think much of 
the greater or less benefits conferred  
by them4 ,for her aim is knowledge2 she 
wants to know how the arts are related  
to one another1 and would quite as soon 

learn the nature of hunting from the    
vermin-destroyer as from the general4   
,and she only desires to have a general 
name1 which shall distinguish           
purifications of the soul from          
purifications of the body4  ,now        
purification is the taking away of evil2
 and there are two kinds of evil in the 
soul1--the one answering to disease in  
the body1 and the other to deformity4   
,disease is the discord or war of       
opposite principles in the soul2 and    
deformity is the want of symmetry1 or   
failure in the attainment of a mark or  
measure4 ,the latter arises from        
ignorance1 and no one is voluntarily    
ignorant2 ignorance is only the         
aberration of the soul moving towards   
knowledge4 ,and as medicine cures the   
diseases and gymnastic the deformity of 
the body1 so correction cures the       
injustice1 and education 7which differs 
among the ,hellenes from mere           
instruction in the arts7 cures the      
ignorance of the soul4 ,again1 ignorance

 is twofold1 simple ignorance1 and      
ignorance having the conceit of         
knowledge4 ,and education is also       
twofold3 there is the old-fashioned     
moral training of our forefathers1 which
 was very troublesome and not very      
successful2 and another1 of a more      
subtle nature1 which proceeds upon a    
notion that all ignorance is            
involuntary4 ,the latter convicts a man 
out of his own mouth1 by pointing out to
 him his inconsistencies and            
contradictions2 and the consequence is  
that he quarrels with himself1 instead  
of quarrelling with his neighbours1 and 
is cured of prejudices and obstructions 
by a mode of treatment which is equally 
entertaining and effectual4 ,the        
physician of the soul is aware that his 
patient will receive no nourishment     
unless he has been cleaned out2 and the 
soul of the ,great ,king himself1 if he 
has not undergone this purification1 is 
unclean and impure4  ,and who are the   
ministers of the purification8 ,sophists

 ,i may not call them4 ,yet they bear   
about the same likeness to ,sophists as 
the dog1 who is the gentlest of animals1
 does to the wolf1 who is the fiercest4 
,comparisons are slippery things2 but   
for the present let us assume the       
resemblance of the two1 which may       
probably be disallowed hereafter4 ,and  
so1 from division comes purification2   
and from this1 mental purification2 and 
from mental purification1 instruction2  
and from instruction1 education2 and    
from education1 the nobly-descended art 
of ,sophistry1 which is engaged in the  
detection of conceit4 ,i do not however 
think that we have yet found the        
,sophist1 or that his will ultimately   
prove to be the desired art of          
education2 but neither do ,i think that 
he can long escape me1 for every way is 
blocked4 ,before we make the final      
assault1 let us take breath1 and reckon 
up the many forms which he has assumed3 
7#a7 he was the paid hunter of wealth   
and birth2 7#b7 he was the trader in the

 goods of the soul2 7#c7 he was the     
retailer of them2 7#d7 he was the       
manufacturer of his own learned wares2  
7#e7 he was the disputant2 and 7#f7 he  
was the purger away of                  
prejudices--although this latter point  
is admitted to be doubtful4  ,now1 there
 must surely be something wrong in the  
professor of any art having so many     
names and kinds of knowledge4 ,does not 
the very number of them imply that the  
nature of his art is not understood8    
,and that we may not be involved in the 
misunderstanding1 let us observe which  
of his characteristics is the most      
prominent4 ,above all things he is a    
disputant4 ,he will dispute and teach   
others to dispute about things visible  
and invisible--about man1 about the     
gods1 about politics1 about law1 about  
wrestling1 about all things4 ,but can he
 know all things8 ',he cannot4' ,how    
then can he dispute satisfactorily with 
any one who knows8 ',impossible4' ,then 
what is the trick of his art1 and why   

does he receive money from his admirers8
 ',because he is believed by them to    
know all things4' ,you mean to say that 
he seems to have a knowledge of them8   
',yes4'  ,suppose a person were to say1 
not that he would dispute about all     
things1 but that he would make all      
things1 you and me1 and all other       
creatures1 the earth and the heavens and
 the gods1 and would sell them all for a
 few pence--this would be a great jest2 
but not greater than if he said that he 
knew all things1 and could teach them in
 a short time1 and at a small cost4 ,for
 all imitation is a jest1 and the most  
graceful form of jest4 ,now the painter 
is a man who professes to make all      
things1 and children1 who see his       
pictures at a distance1 sometimes take  
them for realities3 and the ,sophist    
pretends to know all things1 and he1    
too1 can deceive young men1 who are     
still at a distance from the truth1 not 
through their eyes1 but through their   
ears1 by the mummery of words1 and      

induce them to believe him4 ,but as they
 grow older1 and come into contact with 
realities1 they learn by experience the 
futility of his pretensions4 ,the       
,sophist1 then1 has not real knowledge2 
he is only an imitator1 or image-maker4 
,and now1 having got him in a corner of 
the dialectical net1 let us divide and  
subdivide until we catch him4 ,of       
image-making there are two kinds1--the  
art of making likenesses1 and the art of
 making appearances4 ,the latter may be 
illustrated by sculpture and painting1  
which often use illusions1 and alter the
 proportions of figures1 in order to    
adapt their works to the eye4 ,and the  
,sophist also uses illusions1 and his   
imitations are apparent and not real4   
,but how can anything be an appearance  
only8 ,here arises a difficulty which   
has always beset the subject of         
appearances4 ,for the argument is       
asserting the existence of not-being4   
,and this is what the great ,parmenides 
was all his life denying in prose and   

also in verse4 ',you will never find1'  
he says1 'that not-being is4' ,and the  
words prove themselves6 ,not-being      
cannot be attributed to any being2 for  
how can any being be wholly abstracted  
from being8 ,again1 in every predication
 there is an attribution of singular or 
plural4 ,but number is the most real of 
all things1 and cannot be attributed to 
not-being4 ,therefore not-being cannot  
be predicated or expressed2 for how can 
we say 'is1' 'are not1' without number8 
,and now arises the greatest difficulty 
of all4 ,if not-being is inconceivable1 
how can not-being be refuted8 ,and am ,i
 not contradicting myself at this       
moment1 in speaking either in the       
singular or the plural of that to which 
,i deny both plurality and unity8 ,you1 
,theaetetus1 have the might of youth1   
and ,i conjure you to exert yourself1   
and1 if you can1 to find an expression  
for not-being which does not imply being
 and number4 ',but ,i cannot4' ,then the
 ,sophist must be left in his hole4 ,we 

may call him an image-maker if we       
please1 but he will only say1 ',and     
pray1 what is an image8' ,and we shall  
reply1 ',a reflection in the water1 or  
in a mirror'2 and he will say1 ',let us 
shut our eyes and open our minds2 what  
is the common notion of all images8' ',i
 should answer1 ,such another1 made in  
the likeness of the true4' ,real or not 
real8 ',not real2 at least1 not in a    
true sense4' ,and the real 'is1' and the
 not-real 'is not'8 ',yes4' ,then a     
likeness is really unreal1 and          
essentially not4 ,here is a pretty      
complication of being and not-being1 in 
which the many-headed ,sophist has      
entangled us4 ,he will at once point out
 that he is compelling us to contradict 
ourselves1 by affirming being of        
not-being4 ,i think that we must cease  
to look for him in the class of         
imitators4  ,but ought we to give him   
up8 ',i should say1 certainly not4'     
,then ,i fear that ,i must lay hands on 
my father ,parmenides2 but do not call  

me a parricide2 for there is no way out 
of the difficulty except to show that in
 some sense not-being is2 and if this is
 not admitted1 no one can speak of      
falsehood1 or false opinion1 or         
imitation1 without falling into a       
contradiction4 ,you observe how         
unwilling ,i am to undertake the task2  
for ,i know that ,i am exposing myself  
to the charge of inconsistency in       
asserting the being of not-being4 ,but  
if ,i am to make the attempt1 ,i think  
that ,i had better begin at the         
beginning4  ,lightly in the days of our 
youth1 ,parmenides and others told us   
tales about the origin of the universe3 
one spoke of three principles warring   
and at peace again1 marrying and        
begetting children2 another of two      
principles1 hot and cold1 dry and moist1
 which also formed relationships4 ,there
 were the ,eleatics in our part of the  
world1 saying that all things are one2  
whose doctrine begins with ,xenophanes1 
and is even older4 ,ionian1 and1 more   

recently1 ,sicilian muses speak of a one
 and many which are held together by    
enmity and friendship1 ever parting1    
ever meeting4 ,some of them do not      
insist on the perpetual strife1 but     
adopt a gentler strain1 and speak of    
alternation only4 ,whether they are     
right or not1 who can say8 ,but one     
thing we can say--that they went on     
their way without much caring whether we
 understood them or not4 ,for tell me1  
,theaetetus1 do you understand what they
 mean by their assertion of unity1 or by
 their combinations and separations of  
two or more principles8 ,i used to      
think1 when ,i was young1 that ,i knew  
all about not-being1 and now ,i am in   
great difficulties even about being4    
,let us proceed first to the examination
 of being4 ,turning to the dualist      
philosophers1 we say to them3 ,is being 
a third element besides hot and cold8 or
 do you identify one or both of the two 
elements with being8 ,at any rate1 you  
can hardly avoid resolving them into    

one4 ,let us next interrogate the       
patrons of the one4 ,to them we say3    
,are being and one two different names  
for the same thing8 ,but how can there  
be two names when there is nothing but  
one8 ,or you may identify them2 but then
 the name will be either the name of    
nothing or of itself1 i4e4 of a name4   
,again1 the notion of being is conceived
 of as a whole--in the words of         
,parmenides1 'like every way unto a     
rounded sphere4' ,and a whole has parts2
 but that which has parts is not one1   
for unity has no parts4 ,is being1 then1
 one1 because the parts of being are    
one1 or shall we say that being is not a
 whole8 ,in the former case1 one is made
 up of parts2 and in the latter there is
 still plurality1 viz4 being1 and a     
whole which is apart from being4 ,and   
being1 if not all things1 lacks         
something of the nature of being1 and   
becomes not-being4 ,nor can being ever  
have come into existence1 for nothing   
comes into existence except as a whole2 

nor can being have number1 for that     
which has number is a whole or sum of   
number4 ,these are a few of the         
difficulties which are accumulating one 
upon another in the consideration of    
being4  ,we may proceed now to the less 
exact sort of philosophers4 ,some of    
them drag down everything to earth1 and 
carry on a war like that of the giants1 
grasping rocks and oaks in their hands4 
,their adversaries defend themselves    
warily from an invisible world1 and     
reduce the substances of their opponents
 to the minutest fractions1 until they  
are lost in generation and flux4 ,the   
latter sort are civil people enough2 but
 the materialists are rude and ignorant 
of dialectics2 they must be taught how  
to argue before they can answer4 ,yet1  
for the sake of the argument1 we may    
assume them to be better than they are1 
and able to give an account of          
themselves4 ,they admit the existence of
 a mortal living creature1 which is a   
body containing a soul1 and to this they

 would not refuse to attribute          
qualities--wisdom1 folly1 justice and   
injustice4 ,the soul1 as they say1 has a
 kind of body1 but they do not like to  
assert of these qualities of the soul1  
either that they are corporeal1 or that 
they have no existence2 at this point   
they begin to make distinctions4 ',sons 
of earth1' we say to them1 'if both     
visible and invisible qualities exist1  
what is the common nature which is      
attributed to them by the term being or 
existence8' ,and1 as they are incapable 
of answering this question1 we may as   
well reply for them1 that being is the  
power of doing or suffering4 ,then we   
turn to the friends of ideas3 to them we
 say1 ',you distinguish becoming from   
being8' ',yes1' they will reply4 ',and  
in becoming you participate through the 
bodily senses1 and in being1 by thought 
and the mind8' ',yes4' ,and you mean by 
the word 'participation' a power of     
doing or suffering8 ,to this they       
answer--,i am acquainted with them1     

,theaetetus1 and know their ways better 
than you do--that being can neither do  
nor suffer1 though becoming may4 ,and we
 rejoin3 ,does not the soul know8 ,and  
is not 'being' known8 ,and are not      
'knowing' and 'being known' active and  
passive8 ,that which is known is        
affected by knowledge1 and therefore is 
in motion4 ,and1 indeed1 how can we     
imagine that perfect being is a mere    
everlasting form1 devoid of motion and  
soul8 for there can be no thought       
without soul1 nor can soul be devoid of 
motion4 ,but neither can thought or mind
 be devoid of some principle of rest or 
stability4 ,and as children say         
entreatingly1 ',give us both1' so the   
philosopher must include both the       
moveable and immoveable in his idea of  
being4 ,and yet1 alas6 he and we are in 
the same difficulty with which we       
reproached the dualists2 for motion and 
rest are contradictions--how then can   
they both exist8 ,does he who affirms   
this mean to say that motion is rest1 or

 rest motion8 ',no2 he means to assert  
the existence of some third thing1      
different from them both1 which neither 
rests nor moves4' ,but how can there be 
anything which neither rests nor moves8 
,here is a second difficulty about      
being1 quite as great as that about     
not-being4 ,and we may hope that any    
light which is thrown upon the one may  
extend to the other4  ,leaving them for 
the present1 let us enquire what we mean
 by giving many names to the same thing1
 e4g4 white1 good1 tall1 to man2 out of 
which tyros old and young derive such a 
feast of amusement4 ,their meagre minds 
refuse to predicate anything of         
anything2 they say that good is good1   
and man is man2 and that to affirm one  
of the other would be making the many   
one and the one many4 ,let us place them
 in a class with our previous opponents1
 and interrogate both of them at once4  
,shall we assume 7#a7 that being and    
rest and motion1 and all other things1  
are incommunicable with one another8 or 

7#b7 that they all have indiscriminate  
communion8 or 7#c7 that there is        
communion of some and not of others8    
,and we will consider the first         
hypothesis first of all4  7#a7 ,if we   
suppose the universal separation of     
kinds1 all theories alike are swept     
away2 the patrons of a single principle 
of rest or of motion1 or of a plurality 
of immutable ideas--all alike have the  
ground cut from under them2 and all     
creators of the universe by theories of 
composition and division1 whether out of
 or into a finite or infinite number of 
elemental forms1 in alternation or      
continuance1 share the same fate4 ,most 
ridiculous is the discomfiture which    
attends the opponents of predication1   
who1 like the ventriloquist ,eurycles1  
have the voice that answers them in     
their own breast4 ,for they cannot help 
using the words 'is1' 'apart1' 'from    
others1' and the like2 and their        
adversaries are thus saved the trouble  
of refuting them4 ,but 7#b7 if all      

things have communion with all things1  
motion will rest1 and rest will move2   
here is a reductio ad absurdum4 ,two out
 of the three hypotheses are thus seen  
to be false4 ,the third 7#c7 remains1   
which affirms that only certain things  
communicate with certain other things4  
,in the alphabet and the scale there are
 some letters and notes which combine   
with others1 and some which do not2 and 
the laws according to which they combine
 or are separated are known to the      
grammarian and musician4 ,and there is a
 science which teaches not only what    
notes and letters1 but what classes     
admit of combination with one another1  
and what not4 ,this is a noble science1 
on which we have stumbled unawares2 in  
seeking after the ,sophist we have found
 the philosopher4 ,he is the master who 
discerns one whole or form pervading a  
scattered multitude1 and many such      
wholes combined under a higher one1 and 
many entirely apart--he is the true     
dialectician4 ,like the ,sophist1 he is 

hard to recognize1 though for the       
opposite reasons2 the ,sophist runs away
 into the obscurity of not-being1 the   
philosopher is dark from excess of      
light4 ,and now1 leaving him1 we will   
return to our pursuit of the ,sophist4  
,agreeing in the truth of the third     
hypothesis1 that some things have       
communion and others not1 and that some 
may have communion with all1 let us     
examine the most important kinds which  
are capable of admixture2 and in this   
way we may perhaps find out a sense in  
which not-being may be affirmed to have 
being4 ,now the highest kinds are being1
 rest1 motion2 and of these1 rest and   
motion exclude each other1 but both of  
them are included in being2 and again1  
they are the same with themselves and   
the other of each other4 ,what is the   
meaning of these words1 'same' and      
'other'8 ,are there two more kinds to be
 added to the three others8 ,for        
sameness cannot be either rest or       
motion1 because predicated both of rest 

and motion2 nor yet being2 because if   
being were attributed to both of them we
 should attribute sameness to both of   
them4 ,nor can other be identified with 
being2 for then other1 which is         
relative1 would have the absoluteness of
 being4 ,therefore we must assume a     
fifth principle1 which is universal1 and
 runs through all things1 for each thing
 is other than all other things4 ,thus  
there are five principles3 7#a7 being1  
7#b7 motion1 which is not 7#c7 rest1 and
 because participating both in the same 
and other1 is and is not 7#d7 the same  
with itself1 and is and is not 7#e7     
other than the other4 ,and motion is not
 being1 but partakes of being1 and      
therefore is and is not in the most     
absolute sense4 ,thus we have discovered
 that not-being is the principle of the 
other which runs through all things1    
being not excepted4 ,and 'being' is one 
thing1 and 'not-being' includes and is  
all other things4 ,and not-being is not 
the opposite of being1 but only the     

other4 ,knowledge has many branches1 and
 the other or difference has as many1   
each of which is described by prefixing 
the word 'not' to some kind of          
knowledge4 ,the not-beautiful is as real
 as the beautiful1 the not-just as the  
just4 ,and the essence of the           
not-beautiful is to be separated from   
and opposed to a certain kind of        
existence which is termed beautiful4    
,and this opposition and negation is the
 not-being of which we are in search1   
and is one kind of being4 ,thus1 in     
spite of ,parmenides1 we have not only  
discovered the existence1 but also the  
nature of not-being--that nature we have
 found to be relation4 ,in the communion
 of different kinds1 being and other    
mutually interpenetrate2 other is1 but  
is other than being1 and other than each
 and all of the remaining kinds1 and    
therefore in an infinity of ways 'is    
not4' ,and the argument has shown that  
the pursuit of contradictions is        
childish and useless1 and the very      

opposite of that higher spirit which    
criticizes the words of another         
according to the natural meaning of     
them4 ,nothing can be more              
unphilosophical than the denial of all  
communion of kinds4 ,and we are         
fortunate in having established such a  
communion for another reason1 because in
 continuing the hunt after the ,sophist 
we have to examine the nature of        
discourse1 and there could be no        
discourse if there were no communion4   
,for the ,sophist1 although he can no   
longer deny the existence of not-being1 
may still affirm that not-being cannot  
enter into discourse1 and as he was     
arguing before that there could be no   
such thing as falsehood1 because there  
was no such thing as not-being1 he may  
continue to argue that there is no such 
thing as the art of image-making and    
phantastic1 because not-being has no    
place in language4 ,hence arises the    
necessity of examining speech1 opinion1 
and imagination4  ,and first concerning 

speech2 let us ask the same question    
about words which we have already       
answered about the kinds of being and   
the letters of the alphabet3 ,to what   
extent do they admit of combination8    
,some words have a meaning when         
combined1 and others have no meaning4   
,one class of words describes action1   
another class agents3 'walks1' 'runs1'  
'sleeps' are examples of the first2     
'stag1' 'horse1' 'lion' of the second4  
,but no combination of words can be     
formed without a verb and a noun1 e4g4  
',a man learns'2 the simplest sentence  
is composed of two words1 and one of    
these must be a subject4 ,for example1  
in the sentence1 ',theaetetus sits1'    
which is not very long1 ',theaetetus' is
 the subject1 and in the sentence       
',theaetetus flies1' ',theaetetus' is   
again the subject4 ,but the two         
sentences differ in quality1 for the    
first says of you that which is true1   
and the second says of you that which is
 not true1 or1 in other words1          

attributes to you things which are not  
as though they were4 ,here is false     
discourse in the shortest form4 ,and    
thus not only speech1 but thought and   
opinion and imagination are proved to be
 both true and false4 ,for thought is   
only the process of silent speech1 and  
opinion is only the silent assent or    
denial which follows this1 and          
imagination is only the expression of   
this in some form of sense4 ,all of them
 are akin to speech1 and therefore1 like
 speech1 admit of true and false4 ,and  
we have discovered false opinion1 which 
is an encouraging sign of our probable  
success in the rest of the enquiry4     
,then now let us return to our old      
division of likeness-making and         
phantastic4 ,when we were going to place
 the ,sophist in one of them1 a doubt   
arose whether there could be such a     
thing as an appearance1 because there   
was no such thing as falsehood4 ,at     
length falsehood has been discovered by 
us to exist1 and we have acknowledged   

that the ,sophist is to be found in the 
class of imitators4 ,all art was divided
 originally by us into two              
branches--productive and acquisitive4   
,and now we may divide both on a        
different principle into the creations  
or imitations which are of human1 and   
those which are of divine1 origin4 ,for 
we must admit that the world and        
ourselves and the animals did not come  
into existence by chance1 or the        
spontaneous working of nature1 but by   
divine reason and knowledge4 ,and there 
are not only divine creations but divine
 imitations1 such as apparitions and    
shadows and reflections1 which are      
equally the work of a divine mind4 ,and 
there are human creations and human     
imitations too1--there is the actual    
house and the drawing of it4 ,nor must  
we forget that image-making may be an   
imitation of realities or an imitation  
of appearances1 which last has been     
called by us phantastic4 ,and this      
phantastic may be again divided into    

imitation by the help of instruments and
 impersonations4 ,and the latter may be 
either dissembling or unconscious1      
either with or without knowledge4 ,a man
 cannot imitate you1 ,theaetetus1       
without knowing you1 but he can imitate 
the form of justice or virtue if he have
 a sentiment or opinion about them4 ,not
 being well provided with names1 the    
former ,i will venture to call the      
imitation of science1 and the latter the
 imitation of opinion4  ,the latter is  
our present concern1 for the ,sophist   
has no claims to science or knowledge4  
,now the imitator1 who has only opinion1
 may be either the simple imitator1 who 
thinks that he knows1 or the dissembler1
 who is conscious that he does not know1
 but disguises his ignorance4 ,and the  
last may be either a maker of long      
speeches1 or of shorter speeches which  
compel the person conversing to         
contradict himself4 ,the maker of longer
 speeches is the popular orator2 the    
maker of the shorter is the ,sophist1   

whose art may be traced as being the    
_/ contradictious      _/ dissembling   
_/ without knowledge      _/ human and  
not divine      _/ juggling with words  
_/ phantastic or unreal      _/ art of  
image-making4  444  ,in commenting on   
the dialogue in which ,plato most nearly
 approaches the great modern master of  
metaphysics there are several points    
which it will be useful to consider1    
such as the unity of opposites1 the     
conception of the ideas as causes1 and  
the relation of the ,platonic and       
,hegelian dialectic4  ,the unity of     
opposites was the crux of ancient       
thinkers in the age of ,plato3 ,how     
could one thing be or become another8   
,that substances have attributes was    
implied in common language2 that heat   
and cold1 day and night1 pass into one  
another was a matter of experience 'on a
 level with the cobbler's understanding'
 7,theat474 ,but how could philosophy   
explain the connexion of ideas1 how     
justify the passing of them into one    

another8 ,the abstractions of one1      
other1 being1 not-being1 rest1 motion1  
individual1 universal1 which successive 
generations of philosophers had recently
 discovered1 seemed to be beyond the    
reach of human thought1 like stars      
shining in a distant heaven4 ,they were 
the symbols of different schools of     
philosophy3 but in what relation did    
they stand to one another and to the    
world of sense8 ,it was hardly          
conceivable that one could be other1 or 
the same different4 ,yet without some   
reconciliation of these elementary ideas
 thought was impossible4 ,there was no  
distinction between truth and falsehood1
 between the ,sophist and the           
philosopher4 ,everything could be       
predicated of everything1 or nothing of 
anything4 ,to these difficulties ,plato 
finds what to us appears to be the      
answer of common sense--that ,not-being 
is the relative or other of ,being1 the 
defining and distinguishing principle1  
and that some ideas combine with others1

 but not all with all4 ,it is remarkable
 however that he offers this obvious    
reply only as the result of a long and  
tedious enquiry2 by a great effort he is
 able to look down as 'from a height' on
 the 'friends of the ideas' as well as  
on the pre-,socratic philosophies4 ,yet 
he is merely asserting principles which 
no one who could be made to understand  
them would deny4  ,the ,platonic unity  
of differences or opposites is the      
beginning of the modern view that all   
knowledge is of relations2 it also      
anticipates the doctrine of ,spinoza    
that all determination is negation4     
,plato takes or gives so much of either 
of these theories as was necessary or   
possible in the age in which he lived4  
,in the ,sophist1 as in the ,cratylus1  
he is opposed to the ,heracleitean flux 
and equally to the ,megarian and ,cynic 
denial of predication1 because he       
regards both of them as making knowledge
 impossible4 ,he does not assert that   
everything is and is not1 or that the   

same thing can be affected in the same  
and in opposite ways at the same time   
and in respect of the same part of      
itself4 ,the law of contradiction is as 
clearly laid down by him in the         
,republic1 as by ,aristotle in his      
,organon4 ,yet he is aware that in the  
negative there is also a positive       
element1 and that oppositions may be    
only differences4 ,and in the           
,parmenides he deduces the many from the
 one and ,not-being from ,being1 and yet
 shows that the many are included in the
 one1 and that ,not-being returns to    
,being4  ,in several of the later       
dialogues ,plato is occupied with the   
connexion of the sciences1 which in the 
,philebus he divides into two classes of
 pure and applied1 adding to them there 
as elsewhere 7,phaedr41 ,crat41         
,republic1 ,states47 a superintending   
science of dialectic4 ,this is the      
origin of ,aristotle's ,architectonic1  
which seems1 however1 to have passed    
into an imaginary science of essence1   

and no longer to retain any relation to 
other branches of knowledge4 ,of such a 
science1 whether described as           
'philosophia prima1' the science of     
ousia1 logic or metaphysics1            
philosophers have often dreamed4 ,but   
even now the time has not arrived when  
the anticipation of ,plato can be       
realized4 ,though many a thinker has    
framed a 'hierarchy of the sciences1' no
 one has as yet found the higher science
 which arrays them in harmonious order1 
giving to the organic and inorganic1 to 
the physical and moral1 their respective
 limits1 and showing how they all work  
together in the world and in man4       
,plato arranges in order the stages of  
knowledge and of existence4 ,they are   
the steps or grades by which he rises   
from sense and the shadows of sense to  
the idea of beauty and good4 ,mind is in
 motion as well as at rest 7,soph472 and
 may be described as a dialectical      
progress which passes from one limit or 
determination of thought to another and 

back again to the first4 ,this is the   
account of dialectic given by ,plato in 
the ,sixth ,book of the ,republic1 which
 regarded under another aspect is the   
mysticism of the ,symposium4 ,he does   
not deny the existence of objects of    
sense1 but according to him they only   
receive their true meaning when they are
 incorporated in a principle which is   
above them 7,republic74 ,in modern      
language they might be said to come     
first in the order of experience1 last  
in the order of nature and reason4 ,they
 are assumed1 as he is fond of          
repeating1 upon the condition that they 
shall give an account of themselves and 
that the truth of their existence shall 
be hereafter proved4 ,for philosophy    
must begin somewhere and may begin      
anywhere1--with outward objects1 with   
statements of opinion1 with abstract    
principles4 ,but objects of sense must  
lead us onward to the ideas or          
universals which are contained in them2 
the statements of opinion must be       

verified2 the abstract principles must  
be filled up and connected with one     
another4 ,in ,plato we find1 as we might
 expect1 the germs of many thoughts     
which have been further developed by the
 genius of ,spinoza and ,hegel4 ,but    
there is a difficulty in separating the 
germ from the flower1 or in drawing the 
line which divides ancient from modern  
philosophy4 ,many coincidences which    
occur in them are unconscious1 seeming  
to show a natural tendency in the human 
mind towards certain ideas and forms of 
thought4 ,and there are many            
speculations of ,plato which would have 
passed away unheeded1 and their meaning1
 like that of some hieroglyphic1 would  
have remained undeciphered1 unless two  
thousand years and more afterwards an   
interpreter had arisen of a kindred     
spirit and of the same intellectual     
family4 ,for example1 in the ,sophist   
,plato begins with the abstract and goes
 on to the concrete1 not in the lower   
sense of returning to outward objects1  

but to the ,hegelian concrete or unity  
of abstractions4 ,in the intervening    
period hardly any importance would have 
been attached to the question which is  
so full of meaning to ,plato and ,hegel4
  ,they differ however in their manner  
of regarding the question4 ,for ,plato  
is answering a difficulty2 he is seeking
 to justify the use of common language  
and of ordinary thought into which      
philosophy had introduced a principle of
 doubt and dissolution4 ,whereas ,hegel 
tries to go beyond common thought1 and  
to combine abstractions in a higher     
unity3 the ordinary mechanism of        
language and logic is carried by him    
into another region in which all        
oppositions are absorbed and all        
contradictions affirmed1 only that they 
may be done away with4 ,but ,plato1     
unlike ,hegel1 nowhere bases his system 
on the unity of opposites1 although in  
the ,parmenides he shows an ,hegelian   
subtlety in the analysis of one and     
,being4  ,it is difficult within the    

compass of a few pages to give even a   
faint outline of the ,hegelian          
dialectic4 ,no philosophy which is worth
 understanding can be understood in a   
moment2 common sense will not teach us  
metaphysics any more than mathematics4  
,if all sciences demand of us protracted
 study and attention1 the highest of all
 can hardly be matter of immediate      
intuition4 ,neither can we appreciate a 
great system without yielding a half    
assent to it--like flies we are caught  
in the spider's web2 and we can only    
judge of it truly when we place         
ourselves at a distance from it4 ,of all
 philosophies ,hegelianism is the most  
obscure3 and the difficulty inherent in 
the subject is increased by the use of a
 technical language4 ,the saying of     
,socrates respecting the writings of    
,heracleitus--',noble is that which ,i  
understand1 and that which ,i do not    
understand may be as noble2 but the     
strength of a ,delian diver is needed to
 swim through it'--expresses the feeling

 with which the reader rises from the   
perusal of ,hegel4 ,we may truly apply  
to him the words in which ,plato        
describes the ,pre-,socratic            
philosophers3 ',he went on his way      
rather regardless of whether we         
understood him or not'2 or1 as he is    
reported himself to have said of his own
 pupils3 ',there is only one of you who 
understands me1 and he does ,,not       
understand me4'  ,nevertheless the      
consideration of a few general aspects  
of the ,hegelian philosophy may help to 
dispel some errors and to awaken an     
interest about it4 7i7 ,it is an ideal  
philosophy which1 in popular            
phraseology1 maintains not matter but   
mind to be the truth of things1 and this
 not by a mere crude substitution of one
 word for another1 but by showing either
 of them to be the complement of the    
other4 ,both are creations of thought1  
and the difference in kind which seems  
to divide them may also be regarded as a
 difference of degree4 ,one is to the   

other as the real to the ideal1 and both
 may be conceived together under the    
higher form of the notion4 7ii7 ,under  
another aspect it views all the forms of
 sense and knowledge as stages of       
thought which have always existed       
implicitly and unconsciously1 and to    
which the mind of the world1 gradually  
disengaged from sense1 has become       
awakened4 ,the present has been the     
past4 ,the succession in time of human  
ideas is also the eternal 'now'2 it is  
historical and also a divine ideal4 ,the
 history of philosophy stripped of      
personality and of the other accidents  
of time and place is gathered up into   
philosophy1 and again philosophy clothed
 in circumstance expands into history4  
7iii7 ,whether regarded as present or   
past1 under the form of time or of      
eternity1 the spirit of dialectic is    
always moving onwards from one          
determination of thought to another1    
receiving each successive system of     
philosophy and subordinating it to that 

which follows--impelled by an           
irresistible necessity from one idea to 
another until the cycle of human thought
 and existence is complete4 ,it follows 
from this that all previous philosophies
 which are worthy of the name are not   
mere opinions or speculations1 but      
stages or moments of thought which have 
a necessary place in the world of mind4 
,they are no longer the last word of    
philosophy1 for another and another has 
succeeded them1 but they still live and 
are mighty2 in the language of the      
,greek poet1 ',there is a great ,god in 
them1 and he grows not old4' 7iv7 ,this 
vast ideal system is supposed to be     
based upon experience4 ,at each step it 
professes to carry with it the 'witness 
of eyes and ears' and of common sense1  
as well as the internal evidence of its 
own consistency2 it has a place for     
every science1 and affirms that no      
philosophy of a narrower type is capable
 of comprehending all true facts4  ,the 
,hegelian dialectic may be also         

described as a movement from the simple 
to the complex4 ,beginning with the     
generalizations of sense1 7#a7 passing  
through ideas of quality1 quantity1     
measure1 number1 and the like1 7#b7     
ascending from presentations1 that is   
pictorial forms of sense1 to            
representations in which the picture    
vanishes and the essence is detached in 
thought from the outward form1 7#c7     
combining the ,i and the not-,i1 or the 
subject and object1 the natural order of
 thought is at last found to include the
 leading ideas of the sciences and to   
arrange them in relation to one another4
 ,abstractions grow together and again  
become concrete in a new and higher     
sense4 ,they also admit of development  
from within their own spheres4          
,everywhere there is a movement of      
attraction and repulsion going on--an   
attraction or repulsion of ideas of     
which the physical phenomenon described 
under a similar name is a figure4       
,freedom and necessity1 mind and matter1

 the continuous and the discrete1 cause 
and effect1 are perpetually being       
severed from one another in thought1    
only to be perpetually reunited4 ,the   
finite and infinite1 the absolute and   
relative are not really opposed2 the    
finite and the negation of the finite   
are alike lost in a higher or positive  
infinity1 and the absolute is the sum or
 correlation of all relatives4 ,when    
this reconciliation of opposites is     
finally completed in all its stages1 the
 mind may come back again and review the
 things of sense1 the opinions of       
philosophers1 the strife of theology and
 politics1 without being disturbed by   
them4 ,whatever is1 if not the very     
best--and what is the best1 who can     
tell8--is1 at any rate1 historical and  
rational1 suitable to its own age1      
unsuitable to any other4 ,nor can any   
efforts of speculative thinkers or of   
soldiers and statesmen materially       
quicken the 'process of the suns4'      
,hegel was quite sensible how great     

would be the difficulty of presenting   
philosophy to mankind under the form of 
opposites4 ,most of us live in the      
one-sided truth which the understanding 
offers to us1 and if occasionally we    
come across difficulties like the       
time-honoured controversy of necessity  
and free-will1 or the ,eleatic puzzle of
 ,achilles and the tortoise1 we relegate
 some of them to the sphere of mystery1 
others to the book of riddles1 and go on
 our way rejoicing4 ,most men 7like     
,aristotle7 have been accustomed to     
regard a contradiction in terms as the  
end of strife2 to be told that          
contradiction is the life and mainspring
 of the intellectual world is indeed a  
paradox to them4 ,every abstraction is  
at first the enemy of every other1 yet  
they are linked together1 each with all1
 in the chain of ,being4 ,the struggle  
for existence is not confined to the    
animals1 but appears in the kingdom of  
thought4 ,the divisions which arise in  
thought between the physical and moral  

and between the moral and intellectual1 
and the like1 are deepened and widened  
by the formal logic which elevates the  
defects of the human faculties into     
,laws of ,thought2 they become a part of
 the mind which makes them and is also  
made up of them4 ,such distinctions     
become so familiar to us that we regard 
the thing signified by them as          
absolutely fixed and defined4 ,these are
 some of the illusions from which ,hegel
 delivers us by placing us above        
ourselves1 by teaching us to analyze the
 growth of 'what we are pleased to call 
our minds1' by reverting to a time when 
our present distinctions of thought and 
language had no existence4  ,of the     
great dislike and childish impatience of
 his system which would be aroused among
 his opponents1 he was fully aware1 and 
would often anticipate the jests which  
the rest of the world1 'in the          
superfluity of their wits1' were likely 
to make upon him4 ,men are annoyed at   
what puzzles them2 they think what they 

cannot easily understand to be full of  
danger4 ,many a sceptic has stood1 as he
 supposed1 firmly rooted in the         
categories of the understanding which   
,hegel resolves into their original     
nothingness4 ,for1 like ,plato1 he      
'leaves no stone unturned' in the       
intellectual world4 ,nor can we deny    
that he is unnecessarily difficult1 or  
that his own mind1 like that of all     
metaphysicians1 was too much under the  
dominion of his system and unable to see
 beyond3 or that the study of           
philosophy1 if made a serious business  
7compare ,republic71 involves grave     
results to the mind and life of the     
student4 ,for it may encumber him       
without enlightening his path2 and it   
may weaken his natural faculties of     
thought and expression without          
increasing his philosophical power4 ,the
 mind easily becomes entangled among    
abstractions1 and loses hold of facts4  
,the glass which is adapted to distant  
objects takes away the vision of what is

 near and present to us4  ,to ,hegel1 as
 to the ancient ,greek thinkers1        
philosophy was a religion1 a principle  
of life as well as of knowledge1 like   
the idea of good in the ,sixth ,book of 
the ,republic1 a cause as well as an    
effect1 the source of growth as well as 
of light4 ,in forms of thought which by 
most of us are regarded as mere         
categories1 he saw or thought that he   
saw a gradual revelation of the ,divine 
,being4 ,he would have been said by his 
opponents to have confused ,god with the
 history of philosophy1 and to have been
 incapable of distinguishing ideas from 
facts4 ,and certainly we can scarcely   
understand how a deep thinker like      
,hegel could have hoped to revive or    
supplant the old traditional faith by an
 unintelligible abstraction3 or how he  
could have imagined that philosophy     
consisted only or chiefly in the        
categories of logic4 ,for abstractions1 
though combined by him in the notion1   
seem to be never really concrete2 they  

are a metaphysical anatomy1 not a living
 and thinking substance4 ,though we are 
reminded by him again and again that we 
are gathering up the world in ideas1 we 
feel after all that we have not really  
spanned the gulf which separates        
phainomena from onta4  ,having in view  
some of these difficulties1 he          
seeks--and we may follow his example--to
 make the understanding of his system   
easier 7a7 by illustrations1 and 7b7 by 
pointing out the coincidence of the     
speculative idea and the historical     
order of thought4  7a7 ,if we ask how   
opposites can coexist1 we are told that 
many different qualities inhere in a    
flower or a tree or in any other        
concrete object1 and that any conception
 of space or matter or time involves the
 two contradictory attributes of        
divisibility and continuousness4 ,we may
 ponder over the thought of number1     
reminding ourselves that every unit both
 implies and denies the existence of    
every other1 and that the one is many--a

 sum of fractions1 and the many one--a  
sum of units4 ,we may be reminded that  
in nature there is a centripetal as well
 as a centrifugal force1 a regulator as 
well as a spring1 a law of attraction as
 well as of repulsion4 ,the way to the  
,west is the way also to the ,east2 the 
north pole of the magnet cannot be      
divided from the south pole2 two minus  
signs make a plus in ,arithmetic and    
,algebra4 ,again1 we may liken the      
successive layers of thought to the     
deposits of geological strata which were
 once fluid and are now solid1 which    
were at one time uppermost in the series
 and are now hidden in the earth2 or to 
the successive rinds or barks of trees  
which year by year pass inward2 or to   
the ripple of water which appears and   
reappears in an ever-widening circle4   
,or our attention may be drawn to ideas 
which the moment we analyze them involve
 a contradiction1 such as 'beginning' or
 'becoming1' or to the opposite poles1  
as they are sometimes termed1 of        

necessity and freedom1 of idea and fact4
 ,we may be told to observe that every  
negative is a positive1 that differences
 of kind are resolvable into differences
 of degree1 and that differences of     
degree may be heightened into           
differences of kind4 ,we may remember   
the common remark that there is much to 
be said on both sides of a question4 ,we
 may be recommended to look within and  
to explain how opposite ideas can       
coexist in our own minds2 and we may be 
told to imagine the minds of all mankind
 as one mind in which the true ideas of 
all ages and countries inhere4 ,in our  
conception of ,god in his relation to   
man or of any union of the divine and   
human nature1 a contradiction appears to
 be unavoidable4 ,is not the            
reconciliation of mind and body a       
necessity1 not only of speculation but  
of practical life8 ,reflections such as 
these will furnish the best preparation 
and give the right attitude of mind for 
understanding the ,hegelian philosophy4 

7b7 ,hegel's treatment of the early     
,greek thinkers affords the readiest    
illustration of his meaning in          
conceiving all philosophy under the form
 of opposites4 ,the first abstraction is
 to him the beginning of thought4       
,hitherto there had only existed a      
tumultuous chaos of mythological fancy1 
but when ,thales said ',all is water' a 
new era began to dawn upon the world4   
,man was seeking to grasp the universe  
under a single form which was at first  
simply a material element1 the most     
equable and colourless and universal    
which could be found4 ,but soon the     
human mind became dissatisfied with the 
emblem1 and after ringing the changes on
 one element after another1 demanded a  
more abstract and perfect conception1   
such as one or ,being1 which was        
absolutely at rest4 ,but the positive   
had its negative1 the conception of     
,being involved ,not-being1 the         
conception of one1 many1 the conception 
of a whole1 parts4 ,then the pendulum   

swung to the other side1 from rest to   
motion1 from ,xenophanes to             
,heracleitus4 ,the opposition of ,being 
and ,not-being projected into space     
became the atoms and void of ,leucippus 
and ,democritus4 ,until the ,atomists1  
the abstraction of the individual did   
not exist2 in the philosophy of         
,anaxagoras the idea of mind1 whether   
human or divine1 was beginning to be    
realized4 ,the pendulum gave another    
swing1 from the individual to the       
universal1 from the object to the       
subject4 ,the ,sophist first uttered the
 word ',man is the measure of all       
things1' which ,socrates presented in a 
new form as the study of ethics4 ,once  
more we return from mind to the object  
of mind1 which is knowledge1 and out of 
knowledge the various degrees or kinds  
of knowledge more or less abstract were 
gradually developed4 ,the threefold     
division of logic1 physic1 and ethics1  
foreshadowed in ,plato1 was finally     
established by ,aristotle and the       

,stoics4 ,thus1 according to ,hegel1 in 
the course of about two centuries by a  
process of antagonism and negation the  
leading thoughts of philosophy were     
evolved4  ,there is nothing like this   
progress of opposites in ,plato1 who in 
the ,symposium denies the possibility of
 reconciliation until the opposition has
 passed away4 ,in his own words1 there  
is an absurdity in supposing that       
'harmony is discord2 for in reality     
harmony consists of notes of a higher   
and lower pitch which disagreed once1   
but are now reconciled by the art of    
music' 7,symp474 ,he does indeed        
describe objects of sense as regarded by
 us sometimes from one point of view and
 sometimes from another4 ,as he says at 
the end of the ,fifth ,book of the      
,republic1 ',there is nothing light     
which is not heavy1 or great which is   
not small4' ,and he extends this        
relativity to the conceptions of just   
and good1 as well as to great and small4
 ,in like manner he acknowledges that   

the same number may be more or less in  
relation to other numbers without any   
increase or diminution 7,theat474 ,but  
the perplexity only arises out of the   
confusion of the human faculties2 the   
art of measuring shows us what is truly 
great and truly small4 ,though the just 
and good in particular instances may    
vary1 the ,,idea of good is eternal and 
unchangeable4 ,and the ,,idea of good is
 the source of knowledge and also of    
,being1 in which all the stages of sense
 and knowledge are gathered up and from 
being hypotheses become realities4      
,leaving the comparison with ,plato we  
may now consider the value of this      
invention of ,hegel4 ,there can be no   
question of the importance of showing   
that two contraries or contradictories  
may in certain cases be both true4 ,the 
silliness of the so-called laws of      
thought 7',all ,a  ,a1' or1 in the      
negative form1 ',nothing can at the same
 time be both ,a1 and not ,a'7 has been 
well exposed by ,hegel himself          

7,wallace's ,hegel71 who remarks that   
'the form of the maxim is virtually     
self-contradictory1 for a proposition   
implies a distinction between subject   
and predicate1 whereas the maxim of     
identity1 as it is called1 ,a  ,a1 does 
not fulfil what its form requires4 ,nor 
does any mind ever think or form        
conceptions in accordance with this law1
 nor does any existence conform to it4' 
,wisdom of this sort is well parodied in
 ,shakespeare 7,twelfth ,night1 ',clown3
 ,for as the old hermit of ,prague1 that
 never saw pen and ink1 very wittily    
said to a niece of ,king ,gorboduc1     
,that that is is444for what is that but 
that1 and is but is8'74 ,unless we are  
willing to admit that two               
contradictories may be true1 many       
questions which lie at the threshold of 
mathematics and of morals will be       
insoluble puzzles to us4  ,the influence
 of opposites is felt in practical life4
 ,the understanding sees one side of a  
question only--the common sense of      

mankind joins one of two parties in     
politics1 in religion1 in philosophy4   
,yet1 as everybody knows1 truth is not  
wholly the possession of either4 ,but   
the characters of men are one-sided and 
accept this or that aspect of the truth4
 ,the understanding is strong in a      
single abstract principle and with this 
lever moves mankind4 ,few attain to a   
balance of principles or recognize truly
 how in all human things there is a     
thesis and antithesis1 a law of action  
and of reaction4 ,in politics we require
 order as well as liberty1 and have to  
consider the proportions in which under 
given circumstances they may be safely  
combined4 ,in religion there is a       
tendency to lose sight of morality1 to  
separate goodness from the love of      
truth1 to worship ,god without          
attempting to know him4 ,in philosophy  
again there are two opposite principles1
 of immediate experience and of those   
general or a priori truths which are    
supposed to transcend experience4 ,but  

the common sense or common opinion of   
mankind is incapable of apprehending    
these opposite sides or views--men are  
determined by their natural bent to one 
or other of them2 they go straight on   
for a time in a single line1 and may be 
many things by turns but not at once4   
,hence the importance of familiarizing  
the mind with forms which will assist us
 in conceiving or expressing the complex
 or contrary aspects of life and nature4
 ,the danger is that they may be too    
much for us1 and obscure our            
appreciation of facts4 ,as the          
complexity of mechanics cannot be       
understood without mathematics1 so      
neither can the many-sidedness of the   
mental and moral world be truly         
apprehended without the assistance of   
new forms of thought4 ,one of these     
forms is the unity of opposites4        
,abstractions have a great power over   
us1 but they are apt to be partial and  
one-sided1 and only when modified by    
other abstractions do they make an      

approach to the truth4 ,many a man has  
become a fatalist because he has fallen 
under the dominion of a single idea4 ,he
 says to himself1 for example1 that he  
must be either free or necessary--he    
cannot be both4 ,thus in the ancient    
world whole schools of philosophy passed
 away in the vain attempt to solve the  
problem of the continuity or            
divisibility of matter4 ,and in         
comparatively modern times1 though in   
the spirit of an ancient philosopher1   
,bishop ,berkeley1 feeling a similar    
perplexity1 is inclined to deny the     
truth of infinitesimals in mathematics4 
,many difficulties arise in practical   
religion from the impossibility of      
conceiving body and mind at once and in 
adjusting their movements to one        
another4 ,there is a border ground      
between them which seems to belong to   
both2 and there is as much difficulty in
 conceiving the body without the soul as
 the soul without the body4 ,to the     
'either' and 'or' philosophy            

7',everything is either ,a or not ,a'7  
should at least be added the clause 'or 
neither1' 'or both4' ,the double form   
makes reflection easier and more        
conformable to experience1 and also more
 comprehensive4 ,but in order to avoid  
paradox and the danger of giving offence
 to the unmetaphysical part of mankind1 
we may speak of it as due to the        
imperfection of language or the         
limitation of human faculties4 ,it is   
nevertheless a discovery which1 in      
,platonic language1 may be termed a     
'most gracious aid to thought4'  ,the   
doctrine of opposite moments of thought 
or of progression by antagonism1 further
 assists us in framing a scheme or      
system of the sciences4 ,the negation of
 one gives birth to another of them4    
,the double notions are the joints which
 hold them together4 ,the simple is     
developed into the complex1 the complex 
returns again into the simple4          
,beginning with the highest notion of   
mind or thought1 we may descend by a    

series of negations to the first        
generalizations of sense4 ,or again we  
may begin with the simplest elements of 
sense and proceed upwards to the highest
 being or thought4 ,metaphysic is the   
negation or absorption of               
physiology--physiology of               
chemistry--chemistry of mechanical      
philosophy4 ,similarly in mechanics1    
when we can no further go we arrive at  
chemistry--when chemistry becomes       
organic we arrive at physiology3 when we
 pass from the outward and animal to the
 inward nature of man we arrive at moral
 and metaphysical philosophy4 ,these    
sciences have each of them their own    
methods and are pursued independently of
 one another4 ,but to the mind of the   
thinker they are all one--latent in one 
another--developed out of one another4  
,this method of opposites has supplied  
new instruments of thought for the      
solution of metaphysical problems1 and  
has thrown down many of the walls within
 which the human mind was confined4     

,formerly when philosophers arrived at  
the infinite and absolute1 they seemed  
to be lost in a region beyond human     
comprehension4 ,but ,hegel has shown    
that the absolute and infinite are no   
more true than the relative and finite1 
and that they must alike be negatived   
before we arrive at a true absolute or a
 true infinite4 ,the conceptions of the 
infinite and absolute as ordinarily     
understood are tiresome because they are
 unmeaning1 but there is no peculiar    
sanctity or mystery in them4 ,we might  
as well make an infinitesimal series of 
fractions or a perpetually recurring    
decimal the object of our worship4 ,they
 are the widest and also the thinnest of
 human ideas1 or1 in the language of    
logicians1 they have the greatest       
extension and the least comprehension4  
,of all words they may be truly said to 
be the most inflated with a false       
meaning4 ,they have been handed down    
from one philosopher to another until   
they have acquired a religious          

character4 ,they seem also to derive a  
sacredness from their association with  
the ,divine ,being4 ,yet they are the   
poorest of the predicates under which we
 describe him--signifying no more than  
this1 that he is not finite1 that he is 
not relative1 and tending to obscure his
 higher attributes of wisdom1 goodness1 
truth4  ,the system of ,hegel frees the 
mind from the dominion of abstract      
ideas4 ,we acknowledge his originality1 
and some of us delight to wander in the 
mazes of thought which he has opened to 
us4 ,for ,hegel has found admirers in   
,england and ,scotland when his         
popularity in ,germany has departed1 and
 he1 like the philosophers whom he      
criticizes1 is of the past4 ,no other   
thinker has ever dissected the human    
mind with equal patience and minuteness4
 ,he has lightened the burden of thought
 because he has shown us that the chains
 which we wear are of our own forging4  
,to be able to place ourselves not only 
above the opinions of men but above     

their modes of thinking1 is a great     
height of philosophy4 ,this dearly      
obtained freedom1 however1 we are not   
disposed to part with1 or to allow him  
to build up in a new form the 'beggarly 
elements' of scholastic logic which he  
has thrown down4 ,so far as they are    
aids to reflection and expression1 forms
 of thought are useful1 but no          
further3--we may easily have too many of
 them4  ,and when we are asked to       
believe the ,hegelian to be the sole or 
universal logic1 we naturally reply that
 there are other ways in which our ideas
 may be connected4 ,the triplets of     
,hegel1 the division into being1        
essence1 and notion1 are not the only or
 necessary modes in which the world of  
thought can be conceived4 ,there may be 
an evolution by degrees as well as by   
opposites4 ,the word 'continuity'       
suggests the possibility of resolving   
all differences into differences of     
quantity4 ,again1 the opposites         
themselves may vary from the least      

degree of diversity up to contradictory 
opposition4 ,they are not like numbers  
and figures1 always and everywhere of   
the same value4 ,and therefore the      
edifice which is constructed out of them
 has merely an imaginary symmetry1 and  
is really irregular and out of          
proportion4 ,the spirit of ,hegelian    
criticism should be applied to his own  
system1 and the terms ,being1           
,not-being1 existence1 essence1 notion1 
and the like challenged and defined4    
,for if ,hegel introduces a great many  
distinctions1 he obliterates a great    
many others by the help of the universal
 solvent 'is not1' which appears to be  
the simplest of negations1 and yet      
admits of several meanings4 ,neither are
 we able to follow him in the play of   
metaphysical fancy which conducts him   
from one determination of thought to    
another4 ,but we begin to suspect that  
this vast system is not ,god within us1 
or ,god immanent in the world1 and may  
be only the invention of an individual  

brain4 ,the 'beyond' is always coming   
back upon us however often we expel it4 
,we do not easily believe that we have  
within the compass of the mind the form 
of universal knowledge4 ,we rather      
incline to think that the method of     
knowledge is inseparable from actual    
knowledge1 and wait to see what new     
forms may be developed out of our       
increasing experience and observation of
 man and nature4 ,we are conscious of a 
,being who is without us as well as     
within us4 ,even if inclined to         
,pantheism we are unwilling to imagine  
that the meagre categories of the       
understanding1 however ingeniously      
arranged or displayed1 are the image of 
,god2--that what all religions were     
seeking after from the beginning was the
 ,hegelian philosophy which has been    
revealed in the latter days4 ,the great 
metaphysician1 like a prophet of old1   
was naturally inclined to believe that  
his own thoughts were divine realities4 
,we may almost say that whatever came   

into his head seemed to him to be a     
necessary truth4 ,he never appears to   
have criticized himself1 or to have     
subjected his own ideas to the process  
of analysis which he applies to every   
other philosopher4  ,hegel would have   
insisted that his philosophy should be  
accepted as a whole or not at all4 ,he  
would have urged that the parts derived 
their meaning from one another and from 
the whole4 ,he thought that he had      
supplied an outline large enough to     
contain all future knowledge1 and a     
method to which all future philosophies 
must conform4 ,his metaphysical genius  
is especially shown in the construction 
of the categories--a work which was only
 begun by ,kant1 and elaborated to the  
utmost by himself4 ,but is it really    
true that the part has no meaning when  
separated from the whole1 or that       
knowledge to be knowledge at all must be
 universal8 ,do all abstractions shine  
only by the reflected light of other    
abstractions8 ,may they not also find a 

nearer explanation in their relation to 
phenomena8 ,if many of them are         
correlatives they are not all so1 and   
the relations which subsist between them
 vary from a mere association up to a   
necessary connexion4 ,nor is it easy to 
determine how far the unknown element   
affects the known1 whether1 for example1
 new discoveries may not one day        
supersede our most elementary notions   
about nature4 ,to a certain extent all  
our knowledge is conditional upon what  
may be known in future ages of the      
world4 ,we must admit this hypothetical 
element1 which we cannot get rid of by  
an assumption that we have already      
discovered the method to which all      
philosophy must conform4 ,hegel is right
 in preferring the concrete to the      
abstract1 in setting actuality before   
possibility1 in excluding from the      
philosopher's vocabulary the word       
'inconceivable4' ,but he is too well    
satisfied with his own system ever to   
consider the effect of what is unknown  

on the element which is known4 ,to the  
,hegelian all things are plain and      
clear1 while he who is outside the      
charmed circle is in the mire of        
ignorance and 'logical impurity'3 he who
 is within is omniscient1 or at least   
has all the elements of knowledge under 
his hand4  ,hegelianism may be said to  
be a transcendental defence of the world
 as it is4 ,there is no room for        
aspiration and no need of any3 ',what is
 actual is rational1 what is rational is
 actual4' ,but a good man will not      
readily acquiesce in this aphorism4 ,he 
knows of course that all things proceed 
according to law whether for good or    
evil4 ,but when he sees the misery and  
ignorance of mankind he is convinced    
that without any interruption of the    
uniformity of nature the condition of   
the world may be indefinitely improved  
by human effort4 ,there is also an      
adaptation of persons to times and      
countries1 but this is very far from    
being the fulfilment of their higher    

natures4 ,the man of the seventeenth    
century is unfitted for the eighteenth1 
and the man of the eighteenth for the   
nineteenth1 and most of us would be out 
of place in the world of a hundred years
 hence4 ,but all higher minds are much  
more akin than they are different3      
genius is of all ages1 and there is     
perhaps more uniformity in excellence   
than in mediocrity4 ,the sublimer       
intelligences of mankind--,plato1       
,dante1 ,sir ,thomas ,more--meet in a   
higher sphere above the ordinary ways of
 men2 they understand one another from  
afar1 notwithstanding the interval which
 separates them4 ,they are 'the         
spectators of all time and of all       
existence2' their works live for ever2  
and there is nothing to prevent the     
force of their individuality breaking   
through the uniformity which surrounds  
them4 ,but such disturbers of the order 
of thought ,hegel is reluctant to       
acknowledge4  ,the doctrine of ,hegel   
will to many seem the expression of an  

indolent conservatism1 and will at any  
rate be made an excuse for it4 ,the mind
 of the patriot rebels when he is told  
that the worst tyranny and oppression   
has a natural fitness3 he cannot be     
persuaded1 for example1 that the        
conquest of ,prussia by ,napoleon ,i4   
was either natural or necessary1 or that
 any similar calamity befalling a nation
 should be a matter of indifference to  
the poet or philosopher4 ,we may need   
such a philosophy or religion to console
 us under evils which are irremediable1 
but we see that it is fatal to the      
higher life of man4 ,it seems to say to 
us1 ',the world is a vast system or     
machine which can be conceived under the
 forms of logic1 but in which no single 
man can do any great good or any great  
harm4 ,even if it were a thousand times 
worse than it is1 it could be arranged  
in categories and explained by          
philosophers4 ,and what more do we      
want8'  ,the philosophy of ,hegel       
appeals to an historical criterion3 the 

ideas of men have a succession in time  
as well as an order of thought4 ,but the
 assumption that there is a             
correspondence between the succession of
 ideas in history and the natural order 
of philosophy is hardly true even of the
 beginnings of thought4 ,and in later   
systems forms of thought are too        
numerous and complex to admit of our    
tracing in them a regular succession4   
,they seem also to be in part           
reflections of the past1 and it is      
difficult to separate in them what is   
original and what is borrowed4          
,doubtless they have a relation to one  
another--the transition from ,descartes 
to ,spinoza or from ,locke to ,berkeley 
is not a matter of chance1 but it can   
hardly be described as an alternation of
 opposites or figured to the mind by the
 vibrations of a pendulum4 ,even in     
,aristotle and ,plato1 rightly          
understood1 we cannot trace this law of 
action and reaction4 ,they are both     
idealists1 although to the one the idea 

is actual and immanent1--to the other   
only potential and transcendent1 as     
,hegel himself has pointed out          
7,wallace's ,hegel74 ,the true meaning  
of ,aristotle has been disguised from us
 by his own appeal to fact and the      
opinions of mankind in his more popular 
works1 and by the use made of his       
writings in the ,middle ,ages4 ,no book1
 except the ,scriptures1 has been so    
much read1 and so little understood4    
,the ,pre-,socratic philosophies are    
simpler1 and we may observe a progress  
in them2 but is there any regular       
succession8 ,the ideas of ,being1       
change1 number1 seem to have sprung up  
contemporaneously in different parts of 
,greece and we have no difficulty in    
constructing them out of one another--we
 can see that the union of ,being and   
,not-being gave birth to the idea of    
change or ,becoming and that one might  
be another aspect of ,being4 ,again1 the
 ,eleatics may be regarded as developing
 in one direction into the ,megarian    

school1 in the other into the ,atomists1
 but there is no necessary connexion    
between them4 ,nor is there any         
indication that the deficiency which was
 felt in one school was supplemented or 
compensated by another4 ,they were all  
efforts to supply the want which the    
,greeks began to feel at the beginning  
of the sixth century before             
,christ1--the want of abstract ideas4   
,nor must we forget the uncertainty of  
chronology2--if1 as ,aristotle says1    
there were ,atomists before ,leucippus1 
,eleatics before ,xenophanes1 and       
perhaps 'patrons of the flux' before    
,heracleitus1 ,hegel's order of thought 
in the history of philosophy would be as
 much disarranged as his order of       
religious thought by recent discoveries 
in the history of religion4  ,hegel is  
fond of repeating that all philosophies 
still live and that the earlier are     
preserved in the later2 they are        
refuted1 and they are not refuted1 by   
those who succeed them4 ,once they      

reigned supreme1 now they are           
subordinated to a power or idea greater 
or more comprehensive than their own4   
,the thoughts of ,socrates and ,plato   
and ,aristotle have certainly sunk deep 
into the mind of the world1 and have    
exercised an influence which will never 
pass away2 but can we say that they have
 the same meaning in modern and ancient 
philosophy8 ,some of them1 as for       
example the words ',being1' 'essence1'  
'matter1' 'form1' either have become    
obsolete1 or are used in new senses1    
whereas 'individual1' 'cause1' 'motive1'
 have acquired an exaggerated           
importance4 ,is the manner in which the 
logical determinations of thought1 or   
'categories' as they may be termed1 have
 been handed down to us1 really         
different from that in which other words
 have come down to us8 ,have they not   
been equally subject to accident1 and   
are they not often used by ,hegel       
himself in senses which would have been 
quite unintelligible to their original  

inventors--as for example1 when he      
speaks of the 'ground' of ,leibnitz     
7',everything has a sufficient ground'7 
as identical with his own doctrine of   
the 'notion' 7,wallace's ,hegel71 or the
 ',being and ,not-being' of ,heracleitus
 as the same with his own ',becoming'8  
,as the historical order of thought has 
been adapted to the logical1 so we have 
reason for suspecting that the ,hegelian
 logic has been in some degree adapted  
to the order of thought in history4     
,there is unfortunately no criterion to 
which either of them can be subjected1  
and not much forcing was required to    
bring either into near relations with   
the other4 ,we may fairly doubt whether 
the division of the first and second    
parts of logic in the ,hegelian system  
has not really arisen from a desire to  
make them accord with the first and     
second stages of the early ,greek       
philosophy4 ,is there any reason why the
 conception of measure in the first     
part1 which is formed by the union of   

quality and quantity1 should not have   
been equally placed in the second       
division of mediate or reflected ideas8 
,the more we analyze them the less exact
 does the coincidence of philosophy and 
the history of philosophy appear4 ,many 
terms which were used absolutely in the 
beginning of philosophy1 such as        
',being1' 'matter1' 'cause1' and the    
like1 became relative in the subsequent 
history of thought4 ,but ,hegel employs 
some of them absolutely1 some           
relatively1 seemingly without any       
principle and without any regard to     
their original significance4  ,the      
divisions of the ,hegelian logic bear a 
superficial resemblance to the divisions
 of the scholastic logic4 ,the first    
part answers to the term1 the second to 
the proposition1 the third to the       
syllogism4 ,these are the grades of     
thought under which we conceive the     
world1 first1 in the general terms of   
quality1 quantity1 measure2 secondly1   
under the relative forms of 'ground' and

 existence1 substance and accidents1 and
 the like2 thirdly in syllogistic forms 
of the individual mediated with the     
universal by the help of the particular4
 ,of syllogisms there are various       
kinds1--qualitative1 quantitative1      
inductive1 mechanical1                  
teleological1--which are developed out  
of one another4 ,but is there any       
meaning in reintroducing the forms of   
the old logic8 ,who ever thinks of the  
world as a syllogism8 ,what connexion is
 there between the proposition and our  
ideas of reciprocity1 cause and effect1 
and similar relations8 ,it is difficult 
enough to conceive all the powers of    
nature and mind gathered up in one4 ,the
 difficulty is greatly increased when   
the new is confused with the old1 and   
the common logic is the ,procrustes' bed
 into which they are forced4  ,the      
,hegelian philosophy claims1 as we have 
seen1 to be based upon experience3 it   
abrogates the distinction of a priori   
and a posteriori truth4 ,it also        

acknowledges that many differences of   
kind are resolvable into differences of 
degree4 ,it is familiar with the terms  
'evolution1' 'development1' and the     
like4 ,yet it can hardly be said to have
 considered the forms of thought which  
are best adapted for the expression of  
facts4 ,it has never applied the        
categories to experience2 it has not    
defined the differences in our ideas of 
opposition1 or development1 or cause and
 effect1 in the different sciences which
 make use of these terms4 ,it rests on a
 knowledge which is not the result of   
exact or serious enquiry1 but is        
floating in the air2 the mind has been  
imperceptibly informed of some of the   
methods required in the sciences4 ,hegel
 boasts that the movement of dialectic  
is at once necessary and spontaneous3 in
 reality it goes beyond experience and  
is unverified by it4 ,further1 the      
,hegelian philosophy1 while giving us   
the power of thinking a great deal more 
than we are able to fill up1 seems to be

 wanting in some determinations of      
thought which we require4 ,we cannot say
 that physical science1 which at present
 occupies so large a share of popular   
attention1 has been made easier or more 
intelligible by the distinctions of     
,hegel4 ,nor can we deny that he has    
sometimes interpreted physics by        
metaphysics1 and confused his own       
philosophical fancies with the laws of  
nature4 ,the very freedom of the        
movement is not without suspicion1      
seeming to imply a state of the human   
mind which has entirely lost sight of   
facts4 ,nor can the necessity which is  
attributed to it be very stringent1     
seeing that the successive categories or
 determinations of thought in different 
parts of his writings are arranged by   
the philosopher in different ways4 ,what
 is termed necessary evolution seems to 
be only the order in which a succession 
of ideas presented themselves to the    
mind of ,hegel at a particular time4    
,the nomenclature of ,hegel has been    

made by himself out of the language of  
common life4 ,he uses a few words only  
which are borrowed from his             
predecessors1 or from the ,greek        
philosophy1 and these generally in a    
sense peculiar to himself4 ,the first   
stage of his philosophy answers to the  
word 'is1' the second to the word 'has  
been1' the third to the words 'has been'
 and 'is' combined4 ,in other words1 the
 first sphere is immediate1 the second  
mediated by reflection1 the third or    
highest returns into the first1 and is  
both mediate and immediate4 ,as         
,luther's ,bible was written in the     
language of the common people1 so ,hegel
 seems to have thought that he gave his 
philosophy a truly ,german character by 
the use of idiomatic ,german words4 ,but
 it may be doubted whether the attempt  
has been successful4 ,first because such
 words as 'in sich seyn1' 'an sich      
seyn1' 'an und fur sich seyn1' though   
the simplest combinations of nouns and  
verbs1 require a difficult and elaborate

 explanation4 ,the simplicity of the    
words contrasts with the hardness of    
their meaning4 ,secondly1 the use of    
technical phraseology necessarily       
separates philosophy from general       
literature2 the student has to learn a  
new language of uncertain meaning which 
he with difficulty remembers4 ,no former
 philosopher had ever carried the use of
 technical terms to the same extent as  
,hegel4 ,the language of ,plato or even 
of ,aristotle is but slightly removed   
from that of common life1 and was       
introduced naturally by a series of     
thinkers3 the language of the scholastic
 logic has become technical to us1 but  
in the ,middle ,ages was the vernacular 
,latin of priests and students4 ,the    
higher spirit of philosophy1 the spirit 
of ,plato and ,socrates1 rebels against 
the ,hegelian use of language as        
mechanical and technical4  ,hegel is    
fond of etymologies and often seems to  
trifle with words4 ,he gives etymologies
 which are bad1 and never considers that

 the meaning of a word may have nothing 
to do with its derivation4 ,he lived    
before the days of ,comparative         
,philology or of ,comparative ,mythology
 and ,religion1 which would have opened 
a new world to him4 ,he makes no        
allowance for the element of chance     
either in language or thought2 and      
perhaps there is no greater defect in   
his system than the want of a sound     
theory of language4 ,he speaks as if    
thought1 instead of being identical with
 language1 was wholly independent of it4
 ,it is not the actual growth of the    
mind1 but the imaginary growth of the   
,hegelian system1 which is attractive to
 him4  ,neither are we able to say why  
of the common forms of thought some are 
rejected by him1 while others have an   
undue prominence given to them4 ,some of
 them1 such as 'ground' and 'existence1'
 have hardly any basis either in        
language or philosophy1 while others1   
such as 'cause' and 'effect1' are but   
slightly considered4 ,all abstractions  

are supposed by ,hegel to derive their  
meaning from one another4 ,this is true 
of some1 but not of all1 and in         
different degrees4 ,there is an         
explanation of abstractions by the      
phenomena which they represent1 as well 
as by their relation to other           
abstractions4 ,if the knowledge of all  
were necessary to the knowledge of any  
one of them1 the mind would sink under  
the load of thought4 ,again1 in every   
process of reflection we seem to require
 a standing ground1 and in the attempt  
to obtain a complete analysis we lose   
all fixedness4 ,if1 for example1 the    
mind is viewed as the complex of ideas1 
or the difference between things and    
persons denied1 such an analysis may be 
justified from the point of view of     
,hegel3 but we shall find that in the   
attempt to criticize thought we have    
lost the power of thinking1 and1 like   
the ,heracliteans of old1 have no words 
in which our meaning can be expressed4  
,such an analysis may be of value as a  

corrective of popular language or       
thought1 but should still allow us to   
retain the fundamental distinctions of  
philosophy4  ,in the ,hegelian system   
ideas supersede persons4 ,the world of  
thought1 though sometimes described as  
,spirit or ',geist1' is really          
impersonal4 ,the minds of men are to be 
regarded as one mind1 or more correctly 
as a succession of ideas4 ,any          
comprehensive view of the world must    
necessarily be general1 and there may be
 a use with a view to comprehensiveness 
in dropping individuals and their lives 
and actions4 ,in all things1 if we leave
 out details1 a certain degree of order 
begins to appear2 at any rate we can    
make an order which1 with a little      
exaggeration or disproportion in some of
 the parts1 will cover the whole field  
of philosophy4 ,but are we therefore    
justified in saying that ideas are the  
causes of the great movement of the     
world rather than the personalities     
which conceived them8 ,the great man is 

the expression of his time1 and there   
may be peculiar difficulties in his age 
which he cannot overcome4 ,he may be out
 of harmony with his circumstances1 too 
early or too late1 and then all his     
thoughts perish2 his genius passes away 
unknown4 ,but not therefore is he to be 
regarded as a mere waif or stray in     
human history1 any more than he is the  
mere creature or expression of the age  
in which he lives4 ,his ideas are       
inseparable from himself1 and would have
 been nothing without him4 ,through a   
thousand personal influences they have  
been brought home to the minds of       
others4 ,he starts from antecedents1 but
 he is great in proportion as he        
disengages himself from them or absorbs 
himself in them4 ,moreover the types of 
greatness differ2 while one man is the  
expression of the influences of his age1
 another is in antagonism to them4 ,one 
man is borne on the surface of the      
water2 another is carried forward by the
 current which flows beneath4 ,the      

character of an individual1 whether he  
be independent of circumstances or not1 
inspires others quite as much as his    
words4 ,what is the teaching of         
,socrates apart from his personal       
history1 or the doctrines of ,christ    
apart from the ,divine life in which    
they are embodied8 ,has not ,hegel      
himself delineated the greatness of the 
life of ,christ as consisting in his    
',schicksalslosigkeit' or independence  
of the destiny of his race8 ,do not     
persons become ideas1 and is there any  
distinction between them8 ,take away the
 five greatest legislators1 the five    
greatest warriors1 the five greatest    
poets1 the five greatest founders or    
teachers of a religion1 the five        
greatest philosophers1 the five greatest
 inventors1--where would have been all  
that we most value in knowledge or in   
life8 ,and can that be a true theory of 
the history of philosophy which1 in     
,hegel's own language1 'does not allow  
the individual to have his right'8      

,once more1 while we readily admit that 
the world is relative to the mind1 and  
the mind to the world1 and that we must 
suppose a common or correlative growth  
in them1 we shrink from saying that this
 complex nature can contain1 even in    
outline1 all the endless forms of ,being
 and knowledge4 ,are we not 'seeking the
 living among the dead' and dignifying a
 mere logical skeleton with the name of 
philosophy and almost of ,god8 ,when we 
look far away into the primeval sources 
of thought and belief1 do we suppose    
that the mere accident of our being the 
heirs of the ,greek philosophers can    
give us a right to set ourselves up as  
having the true and only standard of    
reason in the world8 ,or when we        
contemplate the infinite worlds in the  
expanse of heaven can we imagine that a 
few meagre categories derived from      
language and invented by the genius of  
one or two great thinkers contain the   
secret of the universe8 ,or1 having     
regard to the ages during which the     

human race may yet endure1 do we suppose
 that we can anticipate the proportions 
human knowledge may attain even within  
the short space of one or two thousand  
years8  ,again1 we have a difficulty in 
understanding how ideas can be causes1  
which to us seems to be as much a figure
 of speech as the old notion of a       
creator artist1 'who makes the world by 
the help of the demigods' 7,plato1      
,tim471 or with 'a golden pair of       
compasses' measures out the             
circumference of the universe 7,milton1 
,p4,l474 ,we can understand how the idea
 in the mind of an inventor is the cause
 of the work which is produced by it2   
and we can dimly imagine how this       
universal frame may be animated by a    
divine intelligence4 ,but we cannot     
conceive how all the thoughts of men    
that ever were1 which are themselves    
subject to so many external conditions  
of climate1 country1 and the like1 even 
if regarded as the single thought of a  
,divine ,being1 can be supposed to have 

made the world4 ,we appear to be only   
wrapping up ourselves in our own        
conceits--to be confusing cause and     
effect--to be losing the distinction    
between reflection and action1 between  
the human and divine4  ,these are some  
of the doubts and suspicions which arise
 in the mind of a student of ,hegel1    
when1 after living for a time within the
 charmed circle1 he removes to a little 
distance and looks back upon what he has
 learnt1 from the vantage-ground of     
history and experience4 ,the enthusiasm 
of his youth has passed away1 the       
authority of the master no longer       
retains a hold upon him4 ,but he does   
not regret the time spent in the study  
of him4 ,he finds that he has received  
from him a real enlargement of mind1 and
 much of the true spirit of philosophy1 
even when he has ceased to believe in   
him4 ,he returns again and again to his 
writings as to the recollections of a   
first love1 not undeserving of his      
admiration still4 ,perhaps if he were   

asked how he can admire without         
believing1 or what value he can         
attribute to what he knows to be        
erroneous1 he might answer in some such 
manner as the following3--  #a4 ,that in
 ,hegel he finds glimpses of the genius 
of the poet and of the common sense of  
the man of the world4 ,his system is not
 cast in a poetic form1 but neither has 
all this load of logic extinguished in  
him the feeling of poetry4 ,he is the   
true countryman of his contemporaries   
,goethe and ,schiller4 ,many fine       
expressions are scattered up and down in
 his writings1 as when he tells us that 
'the ,crusaders went to the ,sepulchre  
but found it empty4' ,he delights to    
find vestiges of his own philosophy in  
the older ,german mystics4 ,and though  
he can be scarcely said to have mixed   
much in the affairs of men1 for1 as his 
biographer tells us1 'he lived for      
thirty years in a single room1' yet he  
is far from being ignorant of the world4
 ,no one can read his writings without  

acquiring an insight into life4 ,he     
loves to touch with the spear of logic  
the follies and self-deceptions of      
mankind1 and make them appear in their  
natural form1 stripped of the disguises 
of language and custom4 ,he will not    
allow men to defend themselves by an    
appeal to one-sided or abstract         
principles4 ,in this age of reason any  
one can too easily find a reason for    
doing what he likes 7,wallace74 ,he is  
suspicious of a distinction which is    
often made between a person's character 
and his conduct4 ,his spirit is the     
opposite of that of ,jesuitism or       
casuistry 7,wallace74 ,he affords an    
example of a remark which has been often
 made1 that in order to know the world  
it is not necessary to have had a great 
experience of it4  #b4 ,hegel1 if not   
the greatest philosopher1 is certainly  
the greatest critic of philosophy who   
ever lived4 ,no one else has equally    
mastered the opinions of his            
predecessors or traced the connexion of 

them in the same manner4 ,no one has    
equally raised the human mind above the 
trivialities of the common logic and the
 unmeaningness of 'mere' abstractions1  
and above imaginary possibilities1      
which1 as he truly says1 have no place  
in philosophy4 ,no one has won so much  
for the kingdom of ideas4 ,whatever may 
be thought of his own system it will    
hardly be denied that he has overthrown 
,locke1 ,kant1 ,hume1 and the so-called 
philosophy of common sense4 ,he shows us
 that only by the study of metaphysics  
can we get rid of metaphysics1 and that 
those who are in theory most opposed to 
them are in fact most entirely and      
hopelessly enslaved by them3 ',die      
reinen ,physiker sind nur die ,thiere4' 
,the disciple of ,hegel will hardly     
become the slave of any other           
system-maker4 ,what ,bacon seems to     
promise him he will find realized in the
 great ,german thinker1 an emancipation 
nearly complete from the influences of  
the scholastic logic4  #c4 ,many of     

those who are least disposed to become  
the votaries of ,hegelianism            
nevertheless recognize in his system a  
new logic supplying a variety of        
instruments and methods hitherto        
unemployed4 ,we may not be able to agree
 with him in assimilating the natural   
order of human thought with the history 
of philosophy1 and still less in        
identifying both with the divine idea or
 nature4 ,but we may acknowledge that   
the great thinker has thrown a light on 
many parts of human knowledge1 and has  
solved many difficulties4 ,we cannot    
receive his doctrine of opposites as the
 last word of philosophy1 but still we  
may regard it as a very important       
contribution to logic4 ,we cannot affirm
 that words have no meaning when taken  
out of their connexion in the history of
 thought4 ,but we recognize that their  
meaning is to a great extent due to     
association1 and to their correlation   
with one another4 ,we see the advantage 
of viewing in the concrete what mankind 

regard only in the abstract4 ,there is  
much to be said for his faith or        
conviction1 that ,god is immanent in the
 world1--within the sphere of the human 
mind1 and not beyond it4 ,it was natural
 that he himself1 like a prophet of old1
 should regard the philosophy which he  
had invented as the voice of ,god in    
man4 ,but this by no means implies that 
he conceived himself as creating ,god in
 thought4 ,he was the servant of his own
 ideas and not the master of them4 ,the 
philosophy of history and the history of
 philosophy may be almost said to have  
been discovered by him4 ,he has done    
more to explain ,greek thought than all 
other writers put together4 ,many ideas 
of development1 evolution1 reciprocity1 
which have become the symbols of another
 school of thinkers may be traced to his
 speculations4 ,in the theology and     
philosophy of ,england as well as of    
,germany1 and also in the lighter       
literature of both countries1 there are 
always appearing 'fragments of the great

 banquet' of ,hegel4     ,,sophist      
,,persons ,,of ,,the ,,dialogue3        
,theodorus1 ,theaetetus1 ,socrates4 ,an 
,eleatic ,stranger1 whom ,theodorus and 
,theaetetus bring with them4 ,the       
younger ,socrates1 who is a silent      
auditor4   ,,theodorus3 ,here we are1   
,socrates1 true to our agreement of     
yesterday2 and we bring with us a       
stranger from ,elea1 who is a disciple  
of ,parmenides and ,zeno1 and a true    
philosopher4  ,,socrates3 ,is he not    
rather a god1 ,theodorus1 who comes to  
us in the disguise of a stranger8 ,for  
,homer says that all the gods1 and      
especially the god of strangers1 are    
companions of the meek and just1 and    
visit the good and evil among men4 ,and 
may not your companion be one of those  
higher powers1 a cross-examining deity1 
who has come to spy out our weakness in 
argument1 and to cross-examine us8      
,,theodorus3 ,nay1 ,socrates1 he is not 
one of the disputatious sort--he is too 
good for that4 ,and1 in my opinion1 he  

is not a god at all2 but divine he      
certainly is1 for this is a title which 
,i should give to all philosophers4     
,,socrates3 ,capital1 my friend6 and ,i 
may add that they are almost as hard to 
be discerned as the gods4 ,for the true 
philosophers1 and such as are not merely
 made up for the occasion1 appear in    
various forms unrecognized by the       
ignorance of men1 and they 'hover about 
cities1' as ,homer declares1 looking    
from above upon human life2 and some    
think nothing of them1 and others can   
never think enough2 and sometimes they  
appear as statesmen1 and sometimes as   
sophists2 and then1 again1 to many they 
seem to be no better than madmen4 ,i    
should like to ask our ,eleatic friend1 
if he would tell us1 what is thought    
about them in ,italy1 and to whom the   
terms are applied4  ,,theodorus3 ,what  
terms8  ,,socrates3 ,sophist1 statesman1
 philosopher4  ,,theodorus3 ,what is    
your difficulty about them1 and what    
made you ask8  ,,socrates3 ,i want to   

know whether by his countrymen they are 
regarded as one or two2 or do they1 as  
the names are three1 distinguish also   
three kinds1 and assign one to each     
name8  ,,theodorus3 ,i dare say that the
 ,stranger will not object to discuss   
the question4 ,what do you say1         
,stranger8  ,,stranger3 ,i am far from  
objecting1 ,theodorus1 nor have ,i any  
difficulty in replying that by us they  
are regarded as three4 ,but to define   
precisely the nature of each of them is 
by no means a slight or easy task4      
,,theodorus3 ,you have happened to      
light1 ,socrates1 almost on the very    
question which we were asking our friend
 before we came hither1 and he excused  
himself to us1 as he does now to you2   
although he admitted that the matter had
 been fully discussed1 and that he      
remembered the answer4  ,,socrates3     
,then do not1 ,stranger1 deny us the    
first favour which we ask of you3 ,i am 
sure that you will not1 and therefore ,i
 shall only beg of you to say whether   

you like and are accustomed to make a   
long oration on a subject which you want
 to explain to another1 or to proceed by
 the method of question and answer4 ,i  
remember hearing a very noble discussion
 in which ,parmenides employed the      
latter of the two methods1 when ,i was a
 young man1 and he was far advanced in  
years4 7,compare ,parm47  ,,stranger3 ,i
 prefer to talk with another when he    
responds pleasantly1 and is light in    
hand2 if not1 ,i would rather have my   
own say4  ,,socrates3 ,any one of the   
present company will respond kindly to  
you1 and you can choose whom you like of
 them2 ,i should recommend you to take a
 young person--,theaetetus1 for         
example--unless you have a preference   
for some one else4  ,,stranger3 ,i feel 
ashamed1 ,socrates1 being a new-comer   
into your society1 instead of talking a 
little and hearing others talk1 to be   
spinning out a long soliloquy or        
address1 as if ,i wanted to show off4   
,for the true answer will certainly be a

 very long one1 a great deal longer than
 might be expected from such a short and
 simple question4 ,at the same time1 ,i 
fear that ,i may seem rude and          
ungracious if ,i refuse your courteous  
request1 especially after what you have 
said4 ,for ,i certainly cannot object to
 your proposal1 that ,theaetetus should 
respond1 having already conversed with  
him myself1 and being recommended by you
 to take him4  ,,theaetetus3 ,but are   
you sure1 ,stranger1 that this will be  
quite so acceptable to the rest of the  
company as ,socrates imagines8          
,,stranger3 ,you hear them applauding1  
,theaetetus2 after that1 there is       
nothing more to be said4 ,well then1 ,i 
am to argue with you1 and if you tire of
 the argument1 you may complain of your 
friends and not of me4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i
 do not think that ,i shall tire1 and if
 ,i do1 ,i shall get my friend here1    
young ,socrates1 the namesake of the    
elder ,socrates1 to help2 he is about my
 own age1 and my partner at the         

gymnasium1 and is constantly accustomed 
to work with me4  ,,stranger3 ,very     
good2 you can decide about that for     
yourself as we proceed4 ,meanwhile you  
and ,i will begin together and enquire  
into the nature of the ,sophist1 first  
of the three3 ,i should like you to make
 out what he is and bring him to light  
in a discussion2 for at present we are  
only agreed about the name1 but of the  
thing to which we both apply the name   
possibly you have one notion and ,i     
another2 whereas we ought always to come
 to an understanding about the thing    
itself in terms of a definition1 and not
 merely about the name minus the        
definition4 ,now the tribe of ,sophists 
which we are investigating is not easily
 caught or defined2 and the world has   
long ago agreed1 that if great subjects 
are to be adequately treated1 they must 
be studied in the lesser and easier     
instances of them before we proceed to  
the greatest of all4 ,and as ,i know    
that the tribe of ,sophists is          

troublesome and hard to be caught1 ,i   
should recommend that we practise       
beforehand the method which is to be    
applied to him on some simple and       
smaller thing1 unless you can suggest a 
better way4  ,,theaetetus3 ,indeed ,i   
cannot4  ,,stranger3 ,then suppose that 
we work out some lesser example which   
will be a pattern of the greater8       
,,theaetetus3 ,good4  ,,stranger3 ,what 
is there which is well known and not    
great1 and is yet as susceptible of     
definition as any larger thing8 ,shall  
,i say an angler8 ,he is familiar to all
 of us1 and not a very interesting or   
important person4  ,,theaetetus3 ,he is 
not4  ,,stranger3 ,yet ,i suspect that  
he will furnish us with the sort of     
definition and line of enquiry which we 
want4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very good4        
,,stranger3 ,let us begin by asking     
whether he is a man having art or not   
having art1 but some other power4       
,,theaetetus3 ,he is clearly a man of   
art4  ,,stranger3 ,and of arts there are

 two kinds8  ,,theaetetus3 ,what are    
they8  ,,stranger3 ,there is            
agriculture1 and the tending of mortal  
creatures1 and the art of constructing  
or moulding vessels1 and there is the   
art of imitation--all these may be      
appropriately called by a single name4  
,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean8 ,and   
what is the name8  ,,stranger3 ,he who  
brings into existence something that did
 not exist before is said to be a       
producer1 and that which is brought into
 existence is said to be produced4      
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
all the arts which were just now        
mentioned are characterized by this     
power of producing8  ,,theaetetus3 ,they
 are4  ,,stranger3 ,then let us sum them
 up under the name of productive or     
creative art4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very good4
  ,,stranger3 ,next follows the whole   
class of learning and cognition2 then   
comes trade1 fighting1 hunting4 ,and    
since none of these produces anything1  
but is only engaged in conquering by    

word or deed1 or in preventing others   
from conquering1 things which exist and 
have been already produced--in each and 
all of these branches there appears to  
be an art which may be called           
acquisitive4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 that  
is the proper name4  ,,stranger3        
,seeing1 then1 that all arts are either 
acquisitive or creative1 in which class 
shall we place the art of the angler8   
,,theaetetus3 ,clearly in the           
acquisitive class4  ,,stranger3 ,and the
 acquisitive may be subdivided into two 
parts3 there is exchange1 which is      
voluntary and is effected by gifts1     
hire1 purchase2 and the other part of   
acquisitive1 which takes by force of    
word or deed1 may be termed conquest8   
,,theaetetus3 ,that is implied in what  
has been said4  ,,stranger3 ,and may not
 conquest be again subdivided8          
,,theaetetus3 ,how8  ,,stranger3 ,open  
force may be called fighting1 and secret
 force may have the general name of     
hunting8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4           

,,stranger3 ,and there is no reason why 
the art of hunting should not be further
 divided4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how would you 
make the division8  ,,stranger3 ,into   
the hunting of living and of lifeless   
prey4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 if both kinds
 exist4  ,,stranger3 ,of course they    
exist2 but the hunting after lifeless   
things having no special name1 except   
some sorts of diving1 and other small   
matters1 may be omitted2 the hunting    
after living things may be called animal
 hunting4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4          
,,stranger3 ,and animal hunting may be  
truly said to have two divisions1       
land-animal hunting1 which has many     
kinds and names1 and water-animal       
hunting1 or the hunting after animals   
who swim8  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4         
,,stranger3 ,and of swimming animals1   
one class lives on the wing and the     
other in the water8  ,,theaetetus3      
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,fowling is the
 general term under which the hunting of
 all birds is included4  ,,theaetetus3  

,true4  ,,stranger3 ,the hunting of     
animals who live in the water has the   
general name of fishing4  ,,theaetetus3 
,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and this sort of    
hunting may be further divided also into
 two principal kinds8  ,,theaetetus3    
,what are they8  ,,stranger3 ,there is  
one kind which takes them in nets1      
another which takes them by a blow4     
,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean1 and how
 do you distinguish them8  ,,stranger3  
,as to the first kind--all that         
surrounds and encloses anything to      
prevent egress1 may be rightly called an
 enclosure4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very true4  
,,stranger3 ,for which reason twig      
baskets1 casting-nets1 nooses1 creels1  
and the like may all be termed          
'enclosures'8  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4     
,,stranger3 ,and therefore this first   
kind of capture may be called by us     
capture with enclosures1 or something of
 that sort8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4        
,,stranger3 ,the other kind1 which is   
practised by a blow with hooks and      

three-pronged spears1 when summed up    
under one name1 may be called striking1 
unless you1 ,theaetetus1 can find some  
better name8  ,,theaetetus3 ,never mind 
the name--what you suggest will do very 
well4  ,,stranger3 ,there is one mode of
 striking1 which is done at night1 and  
by the light of a fire1 and is by the   
hunters themselves called firing1 or    
spearing by firelight4  ,,theaetetus3   
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and the fishing by 
day is called by the general name of    
barbing1 because the spears1 too1 are   
barbed at the point4  ,,theaetetus3     
,yes1 that is the term4  ,,stranger3 ,of
 this barb-fishing1 that which strikes  
the fish who is below from above is     
called spearing1 because this is the way
 in which the three-pronged spears are  
mostly used4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 it is 
often called so4  ,,stranger3 ,then now 
there is only one kind remaining4       
,,theaetetus3 ,what is that8            
,,stranger3 ,when a hook is used1 and   
the fish is not struck in any chance    

part of his body1 as he is with the     
spear1 but only about the head and      
mouth1 and is then drawn out from below 
upwards with reeds and rods3--,what is  
the right name of that mode of fishing1 
,theaetetus8  ,,theaetetus3 ,i suspect  
that we have now discovered the object  
of our search4  ,,stranger3 ,then now   
you and ,i have come to an understanding
 not only about the name of the angler's
 art1 but about the definition of the   
thing itself4 ,one half of all art was  
acquisitive--half of the acquisitive art
 was conquest or taking by force1 half  
of this was hunting1 and half of hunting
 was hunting animals1 half of this was  
hunting water animals--of this again1   
the under half was fishing1 half of     
fishing was striking2 a part of striking
 was fishing with a barb1 and one half  
of this again1 being the kind which     
strikes with a hook and draws the fish  
from below upwards1 is the art which we 
have been seeking1 and which from the   
nature of the operation is denoted      

angling or drawing up 7aspalieutike1    
anaspasthai74  ,,theaetetus3 ,the result
 has been quite satisfactorily brought  
out4  ,,stranger3 ,and now1 following   
this pattern1 let us endeavour to find  
out what a ,sophist is4  ,,theaetetus3  
,by all means4  ,,stranger3 ,the first  
question about the angler was1 whether  
he was a skilled artist or unskilled8   
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
shall we call our new friend unskilled1 
or a thorough master of his craft8      
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not unskilled1 
for his name1 as1 indeed1 you imply1    
must surely express his nature4         
,,stranger3 ,then he must be supposed to
 have some art4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what    
art8  ,,stranger3 ,by heaven1 they are  
cousins6 it never occurred to us4       
,,theaetetus3 ,who are cousins8         
,,stranger3 ,the angler and the         
,sophist4  ,,theaetetus3 ,in what way   
are they related8  ,,stranger3 ,they    
both appear to me to be hunters4        
,,theaetetus3 ,how the ,sophist8 ,of the

 other we have spoken4  ,,stranger3 ,you
 remember our division of hunting1 into 
hunting after swimming animals and land 
animals8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4           
,,stranger3 ,and you remember that we   
subdivided the swimming and left the    
land animals1 saying that there were    
many kinds of them8  ,,theaetetus3      
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,thus far1     
then1 the ,sophist and the angler1      
starting from the art of acquiring1 take
 the same road8  ,,theaetetus3 ,so it   
would appear4  ,,stranger3 ,their paths 
diverge when they reach the art of      
animal hunting2 the one going to the    
sea-shore1 and to the rivers and to the 
lakes1 and angling for the animals which
 are in them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very true4
  ,,stranger3 ,while the other goes to  
land and water of another sort--rivers  
of wealth and broad meadow-lands of     
generous youth2 and he also is intending
 to take the animals which are in them4 
,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean8        
,,stranger3 ,of hunting on land there   

are two principal divisions4            
,,theaetetus3 ,what are they8           
,,stranger3 ,one is the hunting of tame1
 and the other of wild animals4         
,,theaetetus3 ,but are tame animals ever
 hunted8  ,,stranger3 ,yes1 if you      
include man under tame animals4 ,but if 
you like you may say that there are no  
tame animals1 or that1 if there are1 man
 is not among them2 or you may say that 
man is a tame animal but is not         
hunted--you shall decide which of these 
alternatives you prefer4  ,,theaetetus3 
,i should say1 ,stranger1 that man is a 
tame animal1 and ,i admit that he is    
hunted4  ,,stranger3 ,then let us divide
 the hunting of tame animals into two   
parts4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how shall we make
 the division8  ,,stranger3 ,let us     
define piracy1 man-stealing1 tyranny1   
the whole military art1 by one name1 as 
hunting with violence4  ,,theaetetus3   
,very good4  ,,stranger3 ,but the art of
 the lawyer1 of the popular orator1 and 
the art of conversation may be called in

 one word the art of persuasion4        
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
of persuasion1 there may be said to be  
two kinds8  ,,theaetetus3 ,what are     
they8  ,,stranger3 ,one is private1 and 
the other public4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes2  
each of them forms a class4  ,,stranger3
 ,and of private hunting1 one sort      
receives hire1 and the other brings     
gifts4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i do not         
understand you4  ,,stranger3 ,you seem  
never to have observed the manner in    
which lovers hunt4  ,,theaetetus3 ,to   
what do you refer8  ,,stranger3 ,i mean 
that they lavish gifts on those whom    
they hunt in addition to other          
inducements4  ,,theaetetus3 ,most true4 
,,stranger3 ,let us admit this1 then1 to
 be the amatory art4  ,,theaetetus3     
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,but that sort 
of hireling whose conversation is       
pleasing and who baits his hook only    
with pleasure and exacts nothing but his
 maintenance in return1 we should all1  
if ,i am not mistaken1 describe as      

possessing flattery or an art of making 
things pleasant4  ,,theaetetus3         
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,and that sort1
 which professes to form acquaintances  
only for the sake of virtue1 and demands
 a reward in the shape of money1 may be 
fairly called by another name8          
,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure4  ,,stranger3 
,and what is the name8 ,will you tell   
me8  ,,theaetetus3 ,it is obvious       
enough2 for ,i believe that we have     
discovered the ,sophist3 which is1 as ,i
 conceive1 the proper name for the class
 described4  ,,stranger3 ,then now1     
,theaetetus1 his art may be traced as a 
branch of the appropriative1 acquisitive
 family--which hunts                    
animals1--living--land-- tame animals2  
which hunts man1--privately--for        
hire1--taking money in exchange--having 
the semblance of education2 and this is 
termed ,sophistry1 and is a hunt after  
young men of wealth and rank--such is   
the conclusion4  ,,theaetetus3 ,just so4
  ,,stranger3 ,let us take another      

branch of his genealogy2 for he is a    
professor of a great and many-sided art2
 and if we look back at what has        
preceded we see that he presents another
 aspect1 besides that of which we are   
speaking4  ,,theaetetus3 ,in what       
respect8  ,,stranger3 ,there were two   
sorts of acquisitive art2 the one       
concerned with hunting1 the other with  
exchange4  ,,theaetetus3 ,there were4   
,,stranger3 ,and of the art of exchange 
there are two divisions1 the one of     
giving1 and the other of selling4       
,,theaetetus3 ,let us assume that4      
,,stranger3 ,next1 we will suppose the  
art of selling to be divided into two   
parts4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how8  ,,stranger3
 ,there is one part which is            
distinguished as the sale of a man's own
 productions2 another1 which is the     
exchange of the works of others4        
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and is not that part of exchange which 
takes place in the city1 being about    
half of the whole1 termed retailing8    

,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
that which exchanges the goods of one   
city for those of another by selling and
 buying is the exchange of the merchant8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure4            
,,stranger3 ,and you are aware that this
 exchange of the merchant is of two     
kinds3 it is partly concerned with food 
for the use of the body1 and partly with
 the food of the soul which is bartered 
and received in exchange for money4     
,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean8        
,,stranger3 ,you want to know what is   
the meaning of food for the soul2 the   
other kind you surely understand4       
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,take  
music in general and painting and       
marionette playing and many other       
things1 which are purchased in one city1
 and carried away and sold in           
another--wares of the soul which are    
hawked about either for the sake of     
instruction or amusement2--may not he   
who takes them about and sells them be  
quite as truly called a merchant as he  

who sells meats and drinks8             
,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure he may4       
,,stranger3 ,and would you not call by  
the same name him who buys up knowledge 
and goes about from city to city        
exchanging his wares for money8         
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly ,i should4     
,,stranger3 ,of this merchandise of the 
soul1 may not one part be fairly termed 
the art of display8 ,and there is       
another part which is certainly not less
 ridiculous1 but being a trade in       
learning must be called by some name    
germane to the matter8  ,,theaetetus3   
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,the latter    
should have two names1--one descriptive 
of the sale of the knowledge of virtue1 
and the other of the sale of other kinds
 of knowledge4  ,,theaetetus3 ,of       
course4  ,,stranger3 ,the name of       
art-seller corresponds well enough to   
the latter2 but you must try and tell me
 the name of the other4  ,,theaetetus3  
,he must be the ,sophist1 whom we are   
seeking2 no other name can possibly be  

right4  ,,stranger3 ,no other2 and so   
this trader in virtue again turns out to
 be our friend the ,sophist1 whose art  
may now be traced from the art of       
acquisition through exchange1 trade1    
merchandise1 to a merchandise of the    
soul which is concerned with speech and 
the knowledge of virtue4  ,,theaetetus3 
,quite true4  ,,stranger3 ,and there may
 be a third reappearance of him2--for he
 may have settled down in a city1 and   
may fabricate as well as buy these same 
wares1 intending to live by selling     
them1 and he would still be called a    
,sophist8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4    
,,stranger3 ,then that part of the      
acquisitive art which exchanges1 and of 
exchange which either sells a man's own 
productions or retails those of others1 
as the case may be1 and in either way   
sells the knowledge of virtue1 you would
 again term ,sophistry8  ,,theaetetus3  
,i must1 if ,i am to keep pace with the 
argument4  ,,stranger3 ,let us consider 
once more whether there may not be yet  

another aspect of sophistry4            
,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8  ,,stranger3 
,in the acquisitive there was a         
subdivision of the combative or fighting
 art4  ,,theaetetus3 ,there was4        
,,stranger3 ,perhaps we had better      
divide it4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what shall be
 the divisions8  ,,stranger3 ,there     
shall be one division of the            
competitive1 and another of the         
pugnacious4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very good4  
,,stranger3 ,that part of the pugnacious
 which is a contest of bodily strength  
may be properly called by some such name
 as violent4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4      
,,stranger3 ,and when the war is one of 
words1 it may be termed controversy8    
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
controversy may be of two kinds4        
,,theaetetus3 ,what are they8           
,,stranger3 ,when long speeches are     
answered by long speeches1 and there is 
public discussion about the just and    
unjust1 that is forensic controversy4   
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   

there is a private sort of controversy1 
which is cut up into questions and      
answers1 and this is commonly called    
disputation8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 that  
is the name4  ,,stranger3 ,and of       
disputation1 that sort which is only a  
discussion about contracts1 and is      
carried on at random1 and without rules 
of art1 is recognized by the reasoning  
faculty to be a distinct class1 but has 
hitherto had no distinctive name1 and   
does not deserve to receive one from us4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,no2 for the different  
sorts of it are too minute and          
heterogeneous4  ,,stranger3 ,but that   
which proceeds by rules of art to       
dispute about justice and injustice in  
their own nature1 and about things in   
general1 we have been accustomed to call
 argumentation 7,eristic78              
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and of argumentation1 one sort wastes  
money1 and the other makes money4       
,,theaetetus3 ,very true4  ,,stranger3  
,suppose we try and give to each of     

these two classes a name4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,let us do so4  ,,stranger3 ,i should  
say that the habit which leads a man to 
neglect his own affairs for the pleasure
 of conversation1 of which the style is 
far from being agreeable to the majority
 of his hearers1 may be fairly termed   
loquacity3 such is my opinion4          
,,theaetetus3 ,that is the common name  
for it4  ,,stranger3 ,but now who the   
other is1 who makes money out of private
 disputation1 it is your turn to say4   
,,theaetetus3 ,there is only one true   
answer3 he is the wonderful ,sophist1 of
 whom we are in pursuit1 and who        
reappears again for the fourth time4    
,,stranger3 ,yes1 and with a fresh      
pedigree1 for he is the money-making    
species of the ,eristic1 disputatious1  
controversial1 pugnacious1 combative1   
acquisitive family1 as the argument has 
already proven4  ,,theaetetus3          
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,how true was  
the observation that he was a many-sided
 animal1 and not to be caught with one  

hand1 as they say6  ,,theaetetus3 ,then 
you must catch him with two4            
,,stranger3 ,yes1 we must1 if we can4   
,and therefore let us try another track 
in our pursuit of him3 ,you are aware   
that there are certain menial           
occupations which have names among      
servants8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 there are
 many such2 which of them do you mean8  
,,stranger3 ,i mean such as sifting1    
straining1 winnowing1 threshing4        
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and besides these there are a great    
many more1 such as carding1 spinning1   
adjusting the warp and the woof2 and    
thousands of similar expressions are    
used in the arts4  ,,theaetetus3 ,of    
what are they to be patterns1 and what  
are we going to do with them all8       
,,stranger3 ,i think that in all of     
these there is implied a notion of      
division4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4          
,,stranger3 ,then if1 as ,i was saying1 
there is one art which includes all of  
them1 ought not that art to have one    

name8  ,,theaetetus3 ,and what is the   
name of the art8  ,,stranger3 ,the art  
of discerning or discriminating4        
,,theaetetus3 ,very good4  ,,stranger3  
,think whether you cannot divide this4  
,,theaetetus3 ,i should have to think a 
long while4  ,,stranger3 ,in all the    
previously named processes either like  
has been separated from like or the     
better from the worse4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i
 see now what you mean4  ,,stranger3    
,there is no name for the first kind of 
separation2 of the second1 which throws 
away the worse and preserves the better1
 ,i do know a name4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what
 is it8  ,,stranger3 ,every discernment 
or discrimination of that kind1 as ,i   
have observed1 is called a purification4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 that is the usual 
expression4  ,,stranger3 ,and any one   
may see that purification is of two     
kinds4  ,,theaetetus3 ,perhaps so1 if he
 were allowed time to think2 but ,i do  
not see at this moment4  ,,stranger3    
,there are many purifications of bodies 

which may with propriety be comprehended
 under a single name4  ,,theaetetus3    
,what are they1 and what is their name8 
,,stranger3 ,there is the purification  
of living bodies in their inward and in 
their outward parts1 of which the former
 is duly effected by medicine and       
gymnastic1 the latter by the not very   
dignified art of the bath-man2 and there
 is the purification of inanimate       
substances--to this the arts of fulling 
and of furbishing in general attend in a
 number of minute particulars1 having a 
variety of names which are thought      
ridiculous4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very true4  
,,stranger3 ,there can be no doubt that 
they are thought ridiculous1            
,theaetetus2 but then the dialectical   
art never considers whether the benefit 
to be derived from the purge is greater 
or less than that to be derived from the
 sponge1 and has not more interest in   
the one than in the other2 her endeavour
 is to know what is and is not kindred  
in all arts1 with a view to the         

acquisition of intelligence2 and having 
this in view1 she honours them all      
alike1 and when she makes comparisons1  
she counts one of them not a whit more  
ridiculous than another2 nor does she   
esteem him who adduces as his example of
 hunting1 the general's art1 at all more
 decorous than another who cites that of
 the vermin-destroyer1 but only as the  
greater pretender of the two4 ,and as to
 your question concerning the name which
 was to comprehend all these arts of    
purification1 whether of animate or     
inanimate bodies1 the art of dialectic  
is in no wise particular about fine     
words1 if she may be only allowed to    
have a general name for all other       
purifications1 binding them up together 
and separating them off from the        
purification of the soul or intellect4  
,for this is the purification at which  
she wants to arrive1 and this we should 
understand to be her aim4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,yes1 ,i understand2 and ,i agree that 
there are two sorts of purification1 and

 that one of them is concerned with the 
soul1 and that there is another which is
 concerned with the body4  ,,stranger3  
,excellent2 and now listen to what ,i am
 going to say1 and try to divide further
 the first of the two4  ,,theaetetus3   
,whatever line of division you suggest1 
,i will endeavour to assist you4        
,,stranger3 ,do we admit that virtue is 
distinct from vice in the soul8         
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and purification was to leave the good 
and to cast out whatever is bad8        
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,then 
any taking away of evil from the soul   
may be properly called purification8    
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and in
 the soul there are two kinds of evil4  
,,theaetetus3 ,what are they8           
,,stranger3 ,the one may be compared to 
disease in the body1 the other to       
deformity4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i do not     
understand4  ,,stranger3 ,perhaps you   
have never reflected that disease and   
discord are the same4  ,,theaetetus3 ,to

 this1 again1 ,i know not what ,i should
 reply4  ,,stranger3 ,do you not        
conceive discord to be a dissolution of 
kindred elements1 originating in some   
disagreement8  ,,theaetetus3 ,just that4
  ,,stranger3 ,and is deformity anything
 but the want of measure1 which is      
always unsightly8  ,,theaetetus3        
,exactly4  ,,stranger3 ,and do we not   
see that opinion is opposed to desire1  
pleasure to anger1 reason to pain1 and  
that all these elements are opposed to  
one another in the souls of bad men8    
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and yet they must all be akin8         
,,theaetetus3 ,of course4  ,,stranger3  
,then we shall be right in calling vice 
a discord and disease of the soul8      
,,theaetetus3 ,most true4  ,,stranger3  
,and when things having motion1 and     
aiming at an appointed mark1 continually
 miss their aim and glance aside1 shall 
we say that this is the effect of       
symmetry among them1 or of the want of  
symmetry8  ,,theaetetus3 ,clearly of the

 want of symmetry4  ,,stranger3 ,but    
surely we know that no soul is          
voluntarily ignorant of anything8       
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not4           
,,stranger3 ,and what is ignorance but  
the aberration of a mind which is bent  
on truth1 and in which the process of   
understanding is perverted8             
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,then 
we are to regard an unintelligent soul  
as deformed and devoid of symmetry8     
,,theaetetus3 ,very true4  ,,stranger3  
,then there are these two kinds of evil 
in the soul--the one which is generally 
called vice1 and is obviously a disease 
of the soul444  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4     
,,stranger3 ,and there is the other1    
which they call ignorance1 and which1   
because existing only in the soul1 they 
will not allow to be vice4              
,,theaetetus3 ,i certainly admit what ,i
 at first disputed--that there are two  
kinds of vice in the soul1 and that we  
ought to consider cowardice1            
intemperance1 and injustice to be alike 

forms of disease in the soul1 and       
ignorance1 of which there are all sorts 
of varieties1 to be deformity4          
,,stranger3 ,and in the case of the body
 are there not two arts which have to do
 with the two bodily states8            
,,theaetetus3 ,what are they8           
,,stranger3 ,there is gymnastic1 which  
has to do with deformity1 and medicine1 
which has to do with disease4           
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
where there is insolence and injustice  
and cowardice1 is not chastisement the  
art which is most required8             
,,theaetetus3 ,that certainly appears to
 be the opinion of mankind4  ,,stranger3
 ,again1 of the various kinds of        
ignorance1 may not instruction be       
rightly said to be the remedy8          
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
of the art of instruction1 shall we say 
that there is one or many kinds8 ,at any
 rate there are two principal ones4     
,think4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i will4         
,,stranger3 ,i believe that ,i can see  

how we shall soonest arrive at the      
answer to this question4  ,,theaetetus3 
,how8  ,,stranger3 ,if we can discover a
 line which divides ignorance into two  
halves4 ,for a division of ignorance    
into two parts will certainly imply that
 the art of instruction is also twofold1
 answering to the two divisions of      
ignorance4  ,,theaetetus3 ,well1 and do 
you see what you are looking for8       
,,stranger3 ,i do seem to myself to see 
one very large and bad sort of ignorance
 which is quite separate1 and may be    
weighed in the scale against all other  
sorts of ignorance put together4        
,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8  ,,stranger3 
,when a person supposes that he knows1  
and does not know2 this appears to be   
the great source of all the errors of   
the intellect4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4    
,,stranger3 ,and this1 if ,i am not     
mistaken1 is the kind of ignorance which
 specially earns the title of stupidity4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3     
,what name1 then1 shall be given to the 

sort of instruction which gets rid of   
this8  ,,theaetetus3 ,the instruction   
which you mean1 ,stranger1 is1 ,i should
 imagine1 not the teaching of handicraft
 arts1 but what1 thanks to us1 has been 
termed education in this part the world4
  ,,stranger3 ,yes1 ,theaetetus1 and by 
nearly all ,hellenes4 ,but we have still
 to consider whether education admits of
 any further division4  ,,theaetetus3   
,we have4  ,,stranger3 ,i think that    
there is a point at which such a        
division is possible4  ,,theaetetus3    
,where8  ,,stranger3 ,of education1 one 
method appears to be rougher1 and       
another smoother4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how   
are we to distinguish the two8          
,,stranger3 ,there is the time-honoured 
mode which our fathers commonly         
practised towards their sons1 and which 
is still adopted by many--either of     
roughly reproving their errors1 or of   
gently advising them2 which varieties   
may be correctly included under the     
general term of admonition4             

,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,but  
whereas some appear to have arrived at  
the conclusion that all ignorance is    
involuntary1 and that no one who thinks 
himself wise is willing to learn any of 
those things in which he is conscious of
 his own cleverness1 and that the       
admonitory sort of instruction gives    
much trouble and does little good--     
,,theaetetus3 ,there they are quite     
right4  ,,stranger3 ,accordingly1 they  
set to work to eradicate the spirit of  
conceit in another way4  ,,theaetetus3  
,in what way8  ,,stranger3 ,they        
cross-examine a man's words1 when he    
thinks that he is saying something and  
is really saying nothing1 and easily    
convict him of inconsistencies in his   
opinions2 these they then collect by the
 dialectical process1 and placing them  
side by side1 show that they contradict 
one another about the same things1 in   
relation to the same things1 and in the 
same respect4 ,he1 seeing this1 is angry
 with himself1 and grows gentle towards 

others1 and thus is entirely delivered  
from great prejudices and harsh notions1
 in a way which is most amusing to the  
hearer1 and produces the most lasting   
good effect on the person who is the    
subject of the operation4 ,for as the   
physician considers that the body will  
receive no benefit from taking food     
until the internal obstacles have been  
removed1 so the purifier of the soul is 
conscious that his patient will receive 
no benefit from the application of      
knowledge until he is refuted1 and from 
refutation learns modesty2 he must be   
purged of his prejudices first and made 
to think that he knows only what he     
knows1 and no more4  ,,theaetetus3 ,that
 is certainly the best and wisest state 
of mind4  ,,stranger3 ,for all these    
reasons1 ,theaetetus1 we must admit that
 refutation is the greatest and chiefest
 of purifications1 and he who has not   
been refuted1 though he be the ,great   
,king himself1 is in an awful state of  
impurity2 he is uninstructed and        

deformed in those things in which he who
 would be truly blessed ought to be     
fairest and purest4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very
 true4  ,,stranger3 ,and who are the    
ministers of this art8 ,i am afraid to  
say the ,sophists4  ,,theaetetus3 ,why8 
,,stranger3 ,lest we should assign to   
them too high a prerogative4            
,,theaetetus3 ,yet the ,sophist has a   
certain likeness to our minister of     
purification4  ,,stranger3 ,yes1 the    
same sort of likeness which a wolf1 who 
is the fiercest of animals1 has to a    
dog1 who is the gentlest4 ,but he who   
would not be found tripping1 ought to be
 very careful in this matter of         
comparisons1 for they are most slippery 
things4 ,nevertheless1 let us assume    
that the ,sophists are the men4 ,i say  
this provisionally1 for ,i think that   
the line which divides them will be     
marked enough if proper care is taken4  
,,theaetetus3 ,likely enough4           
,,stranger3 ,let us grant1 then1 that   
from the discerning art comes           

purification1 and from purification let 
there be separated off a part which is  
concerned with the soul2 of this mental 
purification instruction is a portion1  
and of instruction education1 and of    
education1 that refutation of vain      
conceit which has been discovered in the
 present argument2 and let this be      
called by you and me the nobly-descended
 art of ,sophistry4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very
 well2 and yet1 considering the number  
of forms in which he has presented      
himself1 ,i begin to doubt how ,i can   
with any truth or confidence describe   
the real nature of the ,sophist4        
,,stranger3 ,you naturally feel         
perplexed2 and yet ,i think that he must
 be still more perplexed in his attempt 
to escape us1 for as the proverb says1  
when every way is blocked1 there is no  
escape2 now1 then1 is the time of all   
others to set upon him4  ,,theaetetus3  
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,first let us wait a
 moment and recover breath1 and while we
 are resting1 we may reckon up in how   

many forms he has appeared4 ,in the     
first place1 he was discovered to be a  
paid hunter after wealth and youth4     
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,in the
 second place1 he was a merchant in the 
goods of the soul4  ,,theaetetus3       
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,in the third  
place1 he has turned out to be a        
retailer of the same sort of wares4     
,,theaetetus3 ,yes2 and in the fourth   
place1 he himself manufactured the      
learned wares which he sold4            
,,stranger3 ,quite right2 ,i will try   
and remember the fifth myself4 ,he      
belonged to the fighting class1 and was 
further distinguished as a hero of      
debate1 who professed the eristic art4  
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,the  
sixth point was doubtful1 and yet we at 
last agreed that he was a purger of     
souls1 who cleared away notions         
obstructive to knowledge4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,very true4  ,,stranger3 ,do you not   
see that when the professor of any art  
has one name and many kinds of          

knowledge1 there must be something      
wrong8 ,the multiplicity of names which 
is applied to him shows that the common 
principle to which all these branches of
 knowledge are tending1 is not          
understood4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i should    
imagine this to be the case4            
,,stranger3 ,at any rate we will        
understand him1 and no indolence shall  
prevent us4 ,let us begin again1 then1  
and re-examine some of our statements   
concerning the ,sophist2 there was one  
thing which appeared to me especially   
characteristic of him4  ,,theaetetus3   
,to what are you referring8  ,,stranger3
 ,we were saying of him1 if ,i am not   
mistaken1 that he was a disputer8       
,,theaetetus3 ,we were4  ,,stranger3    
,and does he not also teach others the  
art of disputation8  ,,theaetetus3      
,certainly he does4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
about what does he profess that he      
teaches men to dispute8 ,to begin at the
 beginning--,does he make them able to  
dispute about divine things1 which are  

invisible to men in general8            
,,theaetetus3 ,at any rate1 he is said  
to do so4  ,,stranger3 ,and what do you 
say of the visible things in heaven and 
earth1 and the like8  ,,theaetetus3     
,certainly he disputes1 and teaches to  
dispute about them4  ,,stranger3 ,then1 
again1 in private conversation1 when any
 universal assertion is made about      
generation and essence1 we know that    
such persons are tremendous argufiers1  
and are able to impart their own skill  
to others4  ,,theaetetus3 ,undoubtedly4 
,,stranger3 ,and do they not profess to 
make men able to dispute about law and  
about politics in general8              
,,theaetetus3 ,why1 no one would have   
anything to say to them1 if they did not
 make these professions4  ,,stranger3   
,in all and every art1 what the         
craftsman ought to say in answer to any 
question is written down in a popular   
form1 and he who likes may learn4       
,,theaetetus3 ,i suppose that you are   
referring to the precepts of ,protagoras

 about wrestling and the other arts8    
,,stranger3 ,yes1 my friend1 and about a
 good many other things4 ,in a word1 is 
not the art of disputation a power of   
disputing about all things8             
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly2 there does not
 seem to be much which is left out4     
,,stranger3 ,but oh6 my dear youth1 do  
you suppose this possible8 for perhaps  
your young eyes may see things which to 
our duller sight do not appear4         
,,theaetetus3 ,to what are you alluding8
 ,i do not think that ,i understand your
 present question4  ,,stranger3 ,i ask  
whether anybody can understand all      
things4  ,,theaetetus3 ,happy would     
mankind be if such a thing were         
possible6  ,,socrates3 ,but how can any 
one who is ignorant dispute in a        
rational manner against him who knows8  
,,theaetetus3 ,he cannot4  ,,stranger3  
,then why has the sophistical art such a
 mysterious power8  ,,theaetetus3 ,to   
what do you refer8  ,,stranger3 ,how do 
the ,sophists make young men believe in 

their supreme and universal wisdom8 ,for
 if they neither disputed nor were      
thought to dispute rightly1 or being    
thought to do so were deemed no wiser   
for their controversial skill1 then1 to 
quote your own observation1 no one would
 give them money or be willing to learn 
their art4  ,,theaetetus3 ,they         
certainly would not4  ,,stranger3 ,but  
they are willing4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1  
they are4  ,,stranger3 ,yes1 and the    
reason1 as ,i should imagine1 is that   
they are supposed to have knowledge of  
those things about which they dispute8  
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and they dispute about all things8     
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
therefore1 to their disciples1 they     
appear to be all-wise8  ,,theaetetus3   
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,but they are  
not2 for that was shown to be           
impossible4  ,,theaetetus3 ,impossible1 
of course4  ,,stranger3 ,then the       
,sophist has been shown to have a sort  
of conjectural or apparent knowledge    

only of all things1 which is not the    
truth8  ,,theaetetus3 ,exactly2 no      
better description of him could be      
given4  ,,stranger3 ,let us now take an 
illustration1 which will still more     
clearly explain his nature4             
,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8  ,,stranger3 
,i will tell you1 and you shall answer  
me1 giving your very closest attention4 
,suppose that a person were to profess1 
not that he could speak or dispute1 but 
that he knew how to make and do all     
things1 by a single art4  ,,theaetetus3 
,all things8  ,,stranger3 ,i see that   
you do not understand the first word    
that ,i utter1 for you do not understand
 the meaning of 'all4'  ,,theaetetus3   
,no1 ,i do not4  ,,stranger3 ,under all 
things1 ,i include you and me1 and also 
animals and trees4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what 
do you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,suppose a    
person to say that he will make you and 
me1 and all creatures4  ,,theaetetus3   
,what would he mean by 'making'8 ,he    
cannot be a husbandman2--for you said   

that he is a maker of animals4          
,,stranger3 ,yes2 and ,i say that he is 
also the maker of the sea1 and the      
earth1 and the heavens1 and the gods1   
and of all other things2 and1 further1  
that he can make them in no time1 and   
sell them for a few pence4              
,,theaetetus3 ,that must be a jest4     
,,stranger3 ,and when a man says that he
 knows all things1 and can teach them to
 another at a small cost1 and in a short
 time1 is not that a jest8              
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and is there any more artistic or      
graceful form of jest than imitation8   
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not2 and       
imitation is a very comprehensive term1 
which includes under one class the most 
diverse sorts of things4  ,,stranger3   
,we know1 of course1 that he who        
professes by one art to make all things 
is really a painter1 and by the         
painter's art makes resemblances of real
 things which have the same name with   
them2 and he can deceive the less       

intelligent sort of young children1 to  
whom he shows his pictures at a         
distance1 into the belief that he has   
the absolute power of making whatever he
 likes4  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4      
,,stranger3 ,and may there not be       
supposed to be an imitative art of      
reasoning8 ,is it not possible to       
enchant the hearts of young men by words
 poured through their ears1 when they   
are still at a distance from the truth  
of facts1 by exhibiting to them         
fictitious arguments1 and making them   
think that they are true1 and that the  
speaker is the wisest of men in all     
things8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes2 why should 
there not be another such art8          
,,stranger3 ,but as time goes on1 and   
their hearers advance in years1 and come
 into closer contact with realities1 and
 have learnt by sad experience to see   
and feel the truth of things1 are not   
the greater part of them compelled to   
change many opinions which they formerly
 entertained1 so that the great appears 

small to them1 and the easy difficult1  
and all their dreamy speculations are   
overturned by the facts of life8        
,,theaetetus3 ,that is my view1 as far  
as ,i can judge1 although1 at my age1 ,i
 may be one of those who see things at a
 distance only4  ,,stranger3 ,and the   
wish of all of us1 who are your friends1
 is and always will be to bring you as  
near to the truth as we can without the 
sad reality4 ,and now ,i should like you
 to tell me1 whether the ,sophist is not
 visibly a magician and imitator of true
 being2 or are we still disposed to     
think that he may have a true knowledge 
of the various matters about which he   
disputes8  ,,theaetetus3 ,but how can   
he1 ,stranger8 ,is there any doubt1     
after what has been said1 that he is to 
be located in one of the divisions of   
children's play8  ,,stranger3 ,then we  
must place him in the class of magicians
 and mimics4  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly  
we must4  ,,stranger3 ,and now our      
business is not to let the animal out1  

for we have got him in a sort of        
dialectical net1 and there is one thing 
which he decidedly will not escape4     
,,theaetetus3 ,what is that8            
,,stranger3 ,the inference that he is a 
juggler4  ,,theaetetus3 ,precisely my   
own opinion of him4  ,,stranger3 ,then1 
clearly1 we ought as soon as possible to
 divide the image-making art1 and go    
down into the net1 and1 if the ,sophist 
does not run away from us1 to seize him 
according to orders and deliver him over
 to reason1 who is the lord of the hunt1
 and proclaim the capture of him2 and if
 he creeps into the recesses of the     
imitative art1 and secretes himself in  
one of them1 to divide again and follow 
him up until in some sub-section of     
imitation he is caught4 ,for our method 
of tackling each and all is one which   
neither he nor any other creature will  
ever escape in triumph4  ,,theaetetus3  
,well said2 and let us do as you        
propose4  ,,stranger3 ,well1 then1      
pursuing the same analytic method as    

before1 ,i think that ,i can discern two
 divisions of the imitative art1 but ,i 
am not as yet able to see in which of   
them the desired form is to be found4   
,,theaetetus3 ,will you tell me first   
what are the two divisions of which you 
are speaking8  ,,stranger3 ,one is the  
art of likeness-making2--generally a    
likeness of anything is made by         
producing a copy which is executed      
according to the proportions of the     
original1 similar in length and breadth 
and depth1 each thing receiving also its
 appropriate colour4  ,,theaetetus3 ,is 
not this always the aim of imitation8   
,,stranger3 ,not always2 in works either
 of sculpture or of painting1 which are 
of any magnitude1 there is a certain    
degree of deception2 for artists were to
 give the true proportions of their fair
 works1 the upper part1 which is farther
 off1 would appear to be out of         
proportion in comparison with the lower1
 which is nearer2 and so they give up   
the truth in their images and make only 

the proportions which appear to be      
beautiful1 disregarding the real ones4  
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,and that which being other is also     
like1 may we not fairly call a likeness 
or image8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4          
,,stranger3 ,and may we not1 as ,i did  
just now1 call that part of the         
imitative art which is concerned with   
making such images the art of           
likeness-making8  ,,theaetetus3 ,let    
that be the name4  ,,stranger3 ,and what
 shall we call those resemblances of the
 beautiful1 which appear such owing to  
the unfavourable position of the        
spectator1 whereas if a person had the  
power of getting a correct view of works
 of such magnitude1 they would appear   
not even like that to which they profess
 to be like8 ,may we not call these     
'appearances1' since they appear only   
and are not really like8  ,,theaetetus3 
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,there is a    
great deal of this kind of thing in     
painting1 and in all imitation4         

,,theaetetus3 ,of course4  ,,stranger3  
,and may we not fairly call the sort of 
art1 which produces an appearance and   
not an image1 phantastic art8           
,,theaetetus3 ,most fairly4  ,,stranger3
 ,these then are the two kinds of       
image-making--the art of making         
likenesses1 and phantastic or the art of
 making appearances8  ,,theaetetus3     
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,i was doubtful     
before in which of them ,i should place 
the ,sophist1 nor am ,i even now able to
 see clearly2 verily he is a wonderful  
and inscrutable creature4 ,and now in   
the cleverest manner he has got into an 
impossible place4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1  
he has4  ,,stranger3 ,do you speak      
advisedly1 or are you carried away at   
the moment by the habit of assenting    
into giving a hasty answer8             
,,theaetetus3 ,may ,i ask to what you   
are referring8  ,,stranger3 ,my dear    
friend1 we are engaged in a very        
difficult speculation--there can be no  
doubt of that2 for how a thing can      

appear and seem1 and not be1 or how a   
man can say a thing which is not true1  
has always been and still remains a very
 perplexing question4 ,can any one say  
or think that falsehood really exists1  
and avoid being caught in a             
contradiction8 ,indeed1 ,theaetetus1 the
 task is a difficult one4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,why8  ,,stranger3 ,he who says that   
falsehood exists has the audacity to    
assert the being of not-being2 for this 
is implied in the possibility of        
falsehood4 ,but1 my boy1 in the days    
when ,i was a boy1 the great ,parmenides
 protested against this doctrine1 and to
 the end of his life he continued to    
inculcate the same lesson--always       
repeating both in verse and out of      
verse3  ',keep your mind from this way  
of enquiry1 for never will you show that
 not-being is4'  ,such is his testimony1
 which is confirmed by the very         
expression when sifted a little4 ,would 
you object to begin with the            
consideration of the words themselves8  

,,theaetetus3 ,never mind about me2 ,i  
am only desirous that you should carry  
on the argument in the best way1 and    
that you should take me with you4       
,,stranger3 ,very good2 and now say1 do 
we venture to utter the forbidden word  
'not-being'8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly  
we do4  ,,stranger3 ,let us be serious  
then1 and consider the question neither 
in strife nor play3 suppose that one of 
the hearers of ,parmenides was asked1   
',to what is the term not-being to be   
applied8'--do you know what sort of     
object he would single out in reply1 and
 what answer he would make to the       
enquirer8  ,,theaetetus3 ,that is a     
difficult question1 and one not to be   
answered at all by a person like myself4
  ,,stranger3 ,there is at any rate no  
difficulty in seeing that the predicate 
'not-being' is not applicable to any    
being4  ,,theaetetus3 ,none1 certainly4 
,,stranger3 ,and if not to being1 then  
not to something4  ,,theaetetus3 ,of    
course not4  ,,stranger3 ,it is also    

plain1 that in speaking of something we 
speak of being1 for to speak of an      
abstract something naked and isolated   
from all being is impossible4           
,,theaetetus3 ,impossible4  ,,stranger3 
,you mean by assenting to imply that he 
who says something must say some one    
thing8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3
 ,some in the singular 7ti7 you would   
say is the sign of one1 some in the dual
 7tine7 of two1 some in the plural      
7tines7 of many8  ,,theaetetus3         
,exactly4  ,,stranger3 ,then he who says
 'not something' must say absolutely    
nothing4  ,,theaetetus3 ,most assuredly4
  ,,stranger3 ,and as we cannot admit   
that a man speaks and says nothing1 he  
who says 'not-being' does not speak at  
all4  ,,theaetetus3 ,the difficulty of  
the argument can no further go4         
,,stranger3 ,not yet1 my friend1 is the 
time for such a word2 for there still   
remains of all perplexities the first   
and greatest1 touching the very         
foundation of the matter4  ,,theaetetus3

 ,what do you mean8 ,do not be afraid to
 speak4  ,,stranger3 ,to that which is1 
may be attributed some other thing which
 is8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4         
,,stranger3 ,but can anything which is1 
be attributed to that which is not8     
,,theaetetus3 ,impossible4  ,,stranger3 
,and all number is to be reckoned among 
things which are8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1  
surely number1 if anything1 has a real  
existence4  ,,stranger3 ,then we must   
not attempt to attribute to not-being   
number either in the singular or plural8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,the argument implies   
that we should be wrong in doing so4    
,,stranger3 ,but how can a man either   
express in words or even conceive in    
thought things which are not or a thing 
which is not without number8            
,,theaetetus3 ,how indeed8  ,,stranger3 
,when we speak of things which are not1 
are we not attributing plurality to     
not-being8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4   
,,stranger3 ,but1 on the other hand1    
when we say 'what is not1' do we not    

attribute unity8  ,,theaetetus3         
,manifestly4  ,,stranger3 ,nevertheless1
 we maintain that you may not and ought 
not to attribute being to not-being8    
,,theaetetus3 ,most true4  ,,stranger3  
,do you see1 then1 that not-being in    
itself can neither be spoken1 uttered1  
or thought1 but that it is unthinkable1 
unutterable1 unspeakable1 indescribable8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4            
,,stranger3 ,but1 if so1 ,i was wrong in
 telling you just now that the          
difficulty which was coming is the      
greatest of all4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what6  
is there a greater still behind8        
,,stranger3 ,well1 ,i am surprised1     
after what has been said already1 that  
you do not see the difficulty in which  
he who would refute the notion of       
not-being is involved4 ,for he is       
compelled to contradict himself as soon 
as he makes the attempt4  ,,theaetetus3 
,what do you mean8 ,speak more clearly4 
,,stranger3 ,do not expect clearness    
from me4 ,for ,i1 who maintain that     

not-being has no part either in the one 
or many1 just now spoke and am still    
speaking of not-being as one2 for ,i say
 'not-being4' ,do you understand8       
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and a 
little while ago ,i said that not-being 
is unutterable1 unspeakable1            
indescribable3 do you follow8           
,,theaetetus3 ,i do after a fashion4    
,,stranger3 ,when ,i introduced the word
 'is1' did ,i not contradict what ,i    
said before8  ,,theaetetus3 ,clearly4   
,,stranger3 ,and in using the singular  
verb1 did ,i not speak of not-being as  
one8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3  
,and when ,i spoke of not-being as      
indescribable and unspeakable and       
unutterable1 in using each of these     
words in the singular1 did ,i not refer 
to not-being as one8  ,,theaetetus3     
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,and yet we say
 that1 strictly speaking1 it should not 
be defined as one or many1 and should   
not even be called 'it1' for the use of 
the word 'it' would imply a form of     

unity4  ,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4      
,,stranger3 ,how1 then1 can any one put 
any faith in me8 ,for now1 as always1 ,i
 am unequal to the refutation of        
not-being4 ,and therefore1 as ,i was    
saying1 do not look to me for the right 
way of speaking about not-being2 but    
come1 let us try the experiment with    
you4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean8  
,,stranger3 ,make a noble effort1 as    
becomes youth1 and endeavour with all   
your might to speak of not-being in a   
right manner1 without introducing into  
it either existence or unity or         
plurality4  ,,theaetetus3 ,it would be a
 strange boldness in me which would     
attempt the task when ,i see you thus   
discomfited4  ,,stranger3 ,say no more  
of ourselves2 but until we find some one
 or other who can speak of not-being    
without number1 we must acknowledge that
 the ,sophist is a clever rogue who will
 not be got out of his hole4            
,,theaetetus3 ,most true4  ,,stranger3  
,and if we say to him that he professes 

an art of making appearances1 he will   
grapple with us and retort our argument 
upon ourselves2 and when we call him an 
image-maker he will say1 ',pray what do 
you mean at all by an image8'--and ,i   
should like to know1 ,theaetetus1 how we
 can possibly answer the younker's      
question8  ,,theaetetus3 ,we shall      
doubtless tell him of the images which  
are reflected in water or in mirrors2   
also of sculptures1 pictures1 and other 
duplicates4  ,,stranger3 ,i see1        
,theaetetus1 that you have never made   
the acquaintance of the ,sophist4       
,,theaetetus3 ,why do you think so8     
,,stranger3 ,he will make believe to    
have his eyes shut1 or to have none4    
,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean8        
,,stranger3 ,when you tell him of       
something existing in a mirror1 or in   
sculpture1 and address him as though he 
had eyes1 he will laugh you to scorn1   
and will pretend that he knows nothing  
of mirrors and streams1 or of sight at  
all2 he will say that he is asking about

 an idea4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what can he   
mean8  ,,stranger3 ,the common notion   
pervading all these objects1 which you  
speak of as many1 and yet call by the   
single name of image1 as though it were 
the unity under which they were all     
included4 ,how will you maintain your   
ground against him8  ,,theaetetus3 ,how1
 ,stranger1 can ,i describe an image    
except as something fashioned in the    
likeness of the true8  ,,stranger3 ,and 
do you mean this something to be some   
other true thing1 or what do you mean8  
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not another    
true thing1 but only a resemblance4     
,,stranger3 ,and you mean by true that  
which really is8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4   
,,stranger3 ,and the not true is that   
which is the opposite of the true8      
,,theaetetus3 ,exactly4  ,,stranger3 ,a 
resemblance1 then1 is not really real1  
if1 as you say1 not true8  ,,theaetetus3
 ,nay1 but it is in a certain sense4    
,,stranger3 ,you mean to say1 not in a  
true sense8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes2 it is  

in reality only an image4  ,,stranger3  
,then what we call an image is in       
reality really unreal4  ,,theaetetus3   
,in what a strange complication of being
 and not-being we are involved6         
,,stranger3 ,strange6 ,i should think   
so4 ,see how1 by his reciprocation of   
opposites1 the many-headed ,sophist has 
compelled us1 quite against our will1 to
 admit the existence of not-being4      
,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 indeed1 ,i see4     
,,stranger3 ,the difficulty is how to   
define his art without falling into a   
contradiction4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how do   
you mean8 ,and where does the danger    
lie8  ,,stranger3 ,when we say that he  
deceives us with an illusion1 and that  
his art is illusory1 do we mean that our
 soul is led by his art to think        
falsely1 or what do we mean8            
,,theaetetus3 ,there is nothing else to 
be said4  ,,stranger3 ,again1 false     
opinion is that form of opinion which   
thinks the opposite of the truth3--,you 
would assent8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4

  ,,stranger3 ,you mean to say that     
false opinion thinks what is not8       
,,theaetetus3 ,of course4  ,,stranger3  
,does false opinion think that things   
which are not are not1 or that in a     
certain sense they are8  ,,theaetetus3  
,things that are not must be imagined to
 exist in a certain sense1 if any degree
 of falsehood is to be possible4        
,,stranger3 ,and does not false opinion 
also think that things which most       
certainly exist do not exist at all8    
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
here1 again1 is falsehood8              
,,theaetetus3 ,falsehood--yes4          
,,stranger3 ,and in like manner1 a false
 proposition will be deemed to be one   
which asserts the non-existence of      
things which are1 and the existence of  
things which are not4  ,,theaetetus3    
,there is no other way in which a false 
proposition can arise4  ,,stranger3     
,there is not2 but the ,sophist will    
deny these statements4 ,and indeed how  
can any rational man assent to them1    

when the very expressions which we have 
just used were before acknowledged by us
 to be unutterable1 unspeakable1        
indescribable1 unthinkable8 ,do you see 
his point1 ,theaetetus8  ,,theaetetus3  
,of course he will say that we are      
contradicting ourselves when we hazard  
the assertion1 that falsehood exists in 
opinion and in words2 for in maintaining
 this1 we are compelled over and over   
again to assert being of not-being1     
which we admitted just now to be an     
utter impossibility4  ,,stranger3 ,how  
well you remember6 ,and now it is high  
time to hold a consultation as to what  
we ought to do about the ,sophist2 for  
if we persist in looking for him in the 
class of false workers and magicians1   
you see that the handles for objection  
and the difficulties which will arise   
are very numerous and obvious4          
,,theaetetus3 ,they are indeed4         
,,stranger3 ,we have gone through but a 
very small portion of them1 and they are
 really infinite4  ,,theaetetus3 ,if    

that is the case1 we cannot possibly    
catch the ,sophist4  ,,stranger3 ,shall 
we then be so faint-hearted as to give  
him up8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not1  
,i should say1 if we can get the        
slightest hold upon him4  ,,stranger3   
,will you then forgive me1 and1 as your 
words imply1 not be altogether          
displeased if ,i flinch a little from   
the grasp of such a sturdy argument8    
,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure ,i will4      
,,stranger3 ,i have a yet more urgent   
request to make4  ,,theaetetus3 ,which  
is--8  ,,stranger3 ,that you will       
promise not to regard me as a parricide4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,and why8  ,,stranger3  
,because1 in self-defence1 ,i must test 
the philosophy of my father ,parmenides1
 and try to prove by main force that in 
a certain sense not-being is1 and that  
being1 on the other hand1 is not4       
,,theaetetus3 ,some attempt of the kind 
is clearly needed4  ,,stranger3 ,yes1 a 
blind man1 as they say1 might see that1 
and1 unless these questions are decided 

in one way or another1 no one when he   
speaks of false words1 or false opinion1
 or idols1 or images1 or imitations1 or 
appearances1 or about the arts which are
 concerned with them2 can avoid falling 
into ridiculous contradictions4         
,,theaetetus3 ,most true4  ,,stranger3  
,and therefore ,i must venture to lay   
hands on my father's argument2 for if ,i
 am to be over-scrupulous1 ,i shall have
 to give the matter up4  ,,theaetetus3  
,nothing in the world should ever induce
 us to do so4  ,,stranger3 ,i have a    
third little request which ,i wish to   
make4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8       
,,stranger3 ,you heard me say what ,i   
have always felt and still feel--that ,i
 have no heart for this argument8       
,,theaetetus3 ,i did4  ,,stranger3 ,i   
tremble at the thought of what ,i have  
said1 and expect that you will deem me  
mad1 when you hear of my sudden changes 
and shiftings2 let me therefore observe1
 that ,i am examining the question      
entirely out of regard for you4         

,,theaetetus3 ,there is no reason for   
you to fear that ,i shall impute any    
impropriety to you1 if you attempt this 
refutation and proof2 take heart1       
therefore1 and proceed4  ,,stranger3    
,and where shall ,i begin the perilous  
enterprise8 ,i think that the road which
 ,i must take is--  ,,theaetetus3       
,which8--,let me hear4  ,,stranger3 ,i  
think that we had better1 first of all1 
consider the points which at present are
 regarded as self-evident1 lest we may  
have fallen into some confusion1 and be 
too ready to assent to one another1     
fancying that we are quite clear about  
them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,say more          
distinctly what you mean4  ,,stranger3  
,i think that ,parmenides1 and all ever 
yet undertook to determine the number   
and nature of existences1 talked to us  
in rather a light and easy strain4      
,,theaetetus3 ,how8  ,,stranger3 ,as if 
we had been children1 to whom they      
repeated each his own mythus or         
story2--one said that there were three  

principles1 and that at one time there  
was war between certain of them2 and    
then again there was peace1 and they    
were married and begat children1 and    
brought them up2 and another spoke of   
two principles1--a moist and a dry1 or a
 hot and a cold1 and made them marry and
 cohabit4 ,the ,eleatics1 however1 in   
our part of the world1 say that all     
things are many in name1 but in nature  
one2 this is their mythus1 which goes   
back to ,xenophanes1 and is even older4 
,then there are ,ionian1 and in more    
recent times ,sicilian muses1 who have  
arrived at the conclusion that to unite 
the two principles is safer1 and to say 
that being is one and many1 and that    
these are held together by enmity and   
friendship1 ever parting1 ever meeting1 
as the severer ,muses assert1 while the 
gentler ones do not insist on the       
perpetual strife and peace1 but admit a 
relaxation and alternation of them2     
peace and unity sometimes prevailing    
under the sway of ,aphrodite1 and then  

again plurality and war1 by reason of a 
principle of strife4 ,whether any of    
them spoke the truth in all this is hard
 to determine2 besides1 antiquity and   
famous men should have reverence1 and   
not be liable to accusations so serious4
 ,yet one thing may be said of them     
without offence--  ,,theaetetus3 ,what  
thing8  ,,stranger3 ,that they went on  
their several ways disdaining to notice 
people like ourselves2 they did not care
 whether they took us with them1 or left
 us behind them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how do 
you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,i mean to say1  
that when they talk of one1 two1 or more
 elements1 which are or have become or  
are becoming1 or again of heat mingling 
with cold1 assuming in some other part  
of their works separations and          
mixtures1--tell me1 ,theaetetus1 do you 
understand what they mean by these      
expressions8 ,when ,i was a younger man1
 ,i used to fancy that ,i understood    
quite well what was meant by the term   
'not-being1' which is our present       

subject of dispute2 and now you see in  
what a fix we are about it4             
,,theaetetus3 ,i see4  ,,stranger3 ,and 
very likely we have been getting into   
the same perplexity about 'being1' and  
yet may fancy that when anybody utters  
the word1 we understand him quite       
easily1 although we do not know about   
not-being4 ,but we may be2 equally      
ignorant of both4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i dare
 say4  ,,stranger3 ,and the same may be 
said of all the terms just mentioned4   
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,the  
consideration of most of them may be    
deferred2 but we had better now discuss 
the chief captain and leader of them4   
,,theaetetus3 ,of what are you speaking8
 ,you clearly think that we must first  
investigate what people mean by the word
 'being4'  ,,stranger3 ,you follow close
 at my heels1 ,theaetetus4 ,for the     
right method1 ,i conceive1 will be to   
call into our presence the dualistic    
philosophers and to interrogate them4   
',come1' we will say1 ',ye1 who affirm  

that hot and cold or any other two      
principles are the universe1 what is    
this term which you apply to both of    
them1 and what do you mean when you say 
that both and each of them are8 ,how are
 we to understand the word are8 ,upon   
your view1 are we to suppose that there 
is a third principle over and above the 
other two1--three in all1 and not two8  
,for clearly you cannot say that one of 
the two principles is being1 and yet    
attribute being equally to both of them2
 for1 if you did1 whichever of the two  
is identified with being1 will          
comprehend the other2 and so they will  
be one and not two4'  ,,theaetetus3     
,very true4  ,,stranger3 ,but perhaps   
you mean to give the name of 'being' to 
both of them together8  ,,theaetetus3   
,quite likely4  ,,stranger3 ',then1     
friends1' we shall reply to them1 'the  
answer is plainly that the two will     
still be resolved into one4'            
,,theaetetus3 ,most true4  ,,stranger3  
',since1 then1 we are in a difficulty1  

please to tell us what you mean1 when   
you speak of being2 for there can be no 
doubt that you always from the first    
understood your own meaning1 whereas we 
once thought that we understood you1 but
 now we are in a great strait4 ,please  
to begin by explaining this matter to   
us1 and let us no longer fancy that we  
understand you1 when we entirely        
misunderstand you4' ,there will be no   
impropriety in our demanding an answer  
to this question1 either of the dualists
 or of the pluralists8  ,,theaetetus3   
,certainly not4  ,,stranger3 ,and what  
about the assertors of the oneness of   
the all--must we not endeavour to       
ascertain from them what they mean by   
'being'8  ,,theaetetus3 ,by all means4  
,,stranger3 ,then let them answer this  
question3 ,one1 you say1 alone is8      
',yes1' they will reply4  ,,theaetetus3 
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and there is       
something which you call 'being'8       
,,theaetetus3 ',yes4'  ,,stranger3 ,and 
is being the same as one1 and do you    

apply two names to the same thing8      
,,theaetetus3 ,what will be their       
answer1 ,stranger8  ,,stranger3 ,it is  
clear1 ,theaetetus1 that he who asserts 
the unity of being will find a          
difficulty in answering this or any     
other question4  ,,theaetetus3 ,why so8 
,,stranger3 ,to admit of two names1 and 
to affirm that there is nothing but     
unity1 is surely ridiculous8            
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and equally irrational to admit that a 
name is anything8  ,,theaetetus3 ,how   
so8  ,,stranger3 ,to distinguish the    
name from the thing1 implies duality4   
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
yet he who identifies the name with the 
thing will be compelled to say that it  
is the name of nothing1 or if he says   
that it is the name of something1 even  
then the name will only be the name of a
 name1 and of nothing else4             
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
the one will turn out to be only one of 
one1 and being absolute unity1 will     

represent a mere name4  ,,theaetetus3   
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,and would they
 say that the whole is other than the   
one that is1 or the same with it8       
,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure they would1   
and they actually say so4  ,,stranger3  
,if being is a whole1 as ,parmenides    
sings1--  ',every way like unto the     
fullness of a well-rounded sphere1      
,evenly balanced from the centre on     
every side1 ,and must needs be neither  
greater nor less in any way1 ,neither on
 this side nor on that--'  then being   
has a centre and extremes1 and1 having  
these1 must also have parts4            
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,yet  
that which has parts may have the       
attribute of unity in all the parts1 and
 in this way being all and a whole1 may 
be one8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4      
,,stranger3 ,but that of which this is  
the condition cannot be absolute unity8 
,,theaetetus3 ,why not8  ,,stranger3    
,because1 according to right reason1    
that which is truly one must be affirmed

 to be absolutely indivisible4          
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,but this indivisible1 if made up of    
many parts1 will contradict reason4     
,,theaetetus3 ,i understand4            
,,stranger3 ,shall we say that being is 
one and a whole1 because it has the     
attribute of unity8 ,or shall we say    
that being is not a whole at all8       
,,theaetetus3 ,that is a hard           
alternative to offer4  ,,stranger3 ,most
 true2 for being1 having in a certain   
sense the attribute of one1 is yet      
proved not to be the same as one1 and   
the all is therefore more than one4     
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
yet if being be not a whole1 through    
having the attribute of unity1 and there
 be such a thing as an absolute whole1  
being lacks something of its own nature8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3
 ,upon this view1 again1 being1 having a
 defect of being1 will become not-being8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3     
,and1 again1 the all becomes more than  

one1 for being and the whole will each  
have their separate nature4             
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,but if
 the whole does not exist at all1 all   
the previous difficulties remain the    
same1 and there will be the further     
difficulty1 that besides having no      
being1 being can never have come into   
being4  ,,theaetetus3 ,why so8          
,,stranger3 ,because that which comes   
into being always comes into being as a 
whole1 so that he who does not give     
whole a place among beings1 cannot speak
 either of essence or generation as     
existing4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 that     
certainly appears to be true4           
,,stranger3 ,again2 how can that which  
is not a whole have any quantity8 ,for  
that which is of a certain quantity must
 necessarily be the whole of that       
quantity4  ,,theaetetus3 ,exactly4      
,,stranger3 ,and there will be          
innumerable other points1 each of them  
causing infinite trouble to him who says
 that being is either one or two4       

,,theaetetus3 ,the difficulties which   
are dawning upon us prove this2 for one 
objection connects with another1 and    
they are always involving what has      
preceded in a greater and worse         
perplexity4  ,,stranger3 ,we are far    
from having exhausted the more exact    
thinkers who treat of being and         
not-being4 ,but let us be content to    
leave them1 and proceed to view those   
who speak less precisely2 and we shall  
find as the result of all1 that the     
nature of being is quite as difficult to
 comprehend as that of not-being4       
,,theaetetus3 ,then now we will go to   
the others4  ,,stranger3 ,there appears 
to be a sort of war of ,giants and ,gods
 going on amongst them2 they are        
fighting with one another about the     
nature of essence4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how  
is that8  ,,stranger3 ,some of them are 
dragging down all things from heaven and
 from the unseen to earth1 and they     
literally grasp in their hands rocks and
 oaks2 of these they lay hold1 and      

obstinately maintain1 that the things   
only which can be touched or handled    
have being or essence1 because they     
define being and body as one1 and if any
 one else says that what is not a body  
exists they altogether despise him1 and 
will hear of nothing but body4          
,,theaetetus3 ,i have often met with    
such men1 and terrible fellows they are4
  ,,stranger3 ,and that is the reason   
why their opponents cautiously defend   
themselves from above1 out of an unseen 
world1 mightily contending that true    
essence consists of certain intelligible
 and incorporeal ideas2 the bodies of   
the materialists1 which by them are     
maintained to be the very truth1 they   
break up into little bits by their      
arguments1 and affirm them to be1 not   
essence1 but generation and motion4     
,between the two armies1 ,theaetetus1   
there is always an endless conflict     
raging concerning these matters4        
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,let  
us ask each party in turn1 to give an   

account of that which they call essence4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,how shall we get it out
 of them8  ,,stranger3 ,with those who  
make being to consist in ideas1 there   
will be less difficulty1 for they are   
civil people enough2 but there will be  
very great difficulty1 or rather an     
absolute impossibility1 in getting an   
opinion out of those who drag everything
 down to matter4 ,shall ,i tell you what
 we must do8  ,,theaetetus3 ,what8      
,,stranger3 ,let us1 if we can1 really  
improve them2 but if this is not        
possible1 let us imagine them to be     
better than they are1 and more willing  
to answer in accordance with the rules  
of argument1 and then their opinion will
 be more worth having2 for that which   
better men acknowledge has more weight  
than that which is acknowledged by      
inferior men4 ,moreover we are no       
respecters of persons1 but seekers after
 truth4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very good4      
,,stranger3 ,then now1 on the           
supposition that they are improved1 let 

us ask them to state their views1 and do
 you interpret them4  ,,theaetetus3     
,agreed4  ,,stranger3 ,let them say     
whether they would admit that there is  
such a thing as a mortal animal4        
,,theaetetus3 ,of course they would4    
,,stranger3 ,and do they not acknowledge
 this to be a body having a soul8       
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly they do4       
,,stranger3 ,meaning to say that the    
soul is something which exists8         
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
do they not say that one soul is just1  
and another unjust1 and that one soul is
 wise1 and another foolish8             
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,and that the just and wise soul becomes
 just and wise by the possession of     
justice and wisdom1 and the opposite    
under opposite circumstances8           
,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 they do4            
,,stranger3 ,but surely that which may  
be present or may be absent will be     
admitted by them to exist8              
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  

,and1 allowing that justice1 wisdom1 the
 other virtues1 and their opposites     
exist1 as well as a soul in which they  
inhere1 do they affirm any of them to be
 visible and tangible1 or are they all  
invisible8  ,,theaetetus3 ,they would   
say that hardly any of them are visible4
  ,,stranger3 ,and would they say that  
they are corporeal8  ,,theaetetus3 ,they
 would distinguish3 the soul would be   
said by them to have a body2 but as to  
the other qualities of justice1 wisdom1 
and the like1 about which you asked1    
they would not venture either to deny   
their existence1 or to maintain that    
they were all corporeal4  ,,stranger3   
,verily1 ,theaetetus1 ,i perceive a     
great improvement in them2 the real     
aborigines1 children of the dragon's    
teeth1 would have been deterred by no   
shame at all1 but would have obstinately
 asserted that nothing is which they are
 not able to squeeze in their hands4    
,,theaetetus3 ,that is pretty much their
 notion4  ,,stranger3 ,let us push the  

question2 for if they will admit that   
any1 even the smallest particle of      
being1 is incorporeal1 it is enough2    
they must then say what that nature is  
which is common to both the corporeal   
and incorporeal1 and which they have in 
their mind's eye when they say of both  
of them that they 'are4' ,perhaps they  
may be in a difficulty2 and if this is  
the case1 there is a possibility that   
they may accept a notion of ours        
respecting the nature of being1 having  
nothing of their own to offer4          
,,theaetetus3 ,what is the notion8 ,tell
 me1 and we shall soon see4  ,,stranger3
 ,my notion would be1 that anything     
which possesses any sort of power to    
affect another1 or to be affected by    
another1 if only for a single moment1   
however trifling the cause and however  
slight the effect1 has real existence2  
and ,i hold that the definition of being
 is simply power4  ,,theaetetus3 ,they  
accept your suggestion1 having nothing  
better of their own to offer4           

,,stranger3 ,very good2 perhaps we1 as  
well as they1 may one day change our    
minds2 but1 for the present1 this may be
 regarded as the understanding which is 
established with them4  ,,theaetetus3   
,agreed4  ,,stranger3 ,let us now go to 
the friends of ideas2 of their opinions1
 too1 you shall be the interpreter4     
,,theaetetus3 ,i will4  ,,stranger3 ,to 
them we say--,you would distinguish     
essence from generation8  ,,theaetetus3 
',yes1' they reply4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
you would allow that we participate in  
generation with the body1 and through   
perception1 but we participate with the 
soul through thought in true essence2   
and essence you would affirm to be      
always the same and immutable1 whereas  
generation or becoming varies8          
,,theaetetus3 ,yes2 that is what we     
should affirm4  ,,stranger3 ,well1 fair 
sirs1 we say to them1 what is this      
participation1 which you assert of both8
 ,do you agree with our recent          
definition8  ,,theaetetus3 ,what        

definition8  ,,stranger3 ,we said that  
being was an active or passive energy1  
arising out of a certain power which    
proceeds from elements meeting with one 
another4 ,perhaps your ears1            
,theaetetus1 may fail to catch their    
answer1 which ,i recognize because ,i   
have been accustomed to hear it4        
,,theaetetus3 ,and what is their answer8
  ,,stranger3 ,they deny the truth of   
what we were just now saying to the     
aborigines about existence4             
,,theaetetus3 ,what was that8           
,,stranger3 ,any power of doing or      
suffering in a degree however slight was
 held by us to be a sufficient          
definition of being8  ,,theaetetus3     
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,they deny this1 and
 say that the power of doing or         
suffering is confined to becoming1 and  
that neither power is applicable to     
being4  ,,theaetetus3 ,and is there not 
some truth in what they say8            
,,stranger3 ,yes2 but our reply will be1
 that we want to ascertain from them    

more distinctly1 whether they further   
admit that the soul knows1 and that     
being or essence is known4              
,,theaetetus3 ,there can be no doubt    
that they say so4  ,,stranger3 ,and is  
knowing and being known doing or        
suffering1 or both1 or is the one doing 
and the other suffering1 or has neither 
any share in either8  ,,theaetetus3     
,clearly1 neither has any share in      
either2 for if they say anything else1  
they will contradict themselves4        
,,stranger3 ,i understand2 but they will
 allow that if to know is active1 then1 
of course1 to be known is passive4 ,and 
on this view being1 in so far as it is  
known1 is acted upon by knowledge1 and  
is therefore in motion2 for that which  
is in a state of rest cannot be acted   
upon1 as we affirm4  ,,theaetetus3      
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and1 ,o heavens1   
can we ever be made to believe that     
motion and life and soul and mind are   
not present with perfect being8 ,can we 
imagine that being is devoid of life and

 mind1 and exists in awful unmeaningness
 an everlasting fixture8  ,,theaetetus3 
,that would be a dreadful thing to      
admit1 ,stranger4  ,,stranger3 ,but     
shall we say that has mind and not life8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,how is that possible8  
,,stranger3 ,or shall we say that both  
inhere in perfect being1 but that it has
 no soul which contains them8           
,,theaetetus3 ,and in what other way can
 it contain them8  ,,stranger3 ,or that 
being has mind and life and soul1 but   
although endowed with soul remains      
absolutely unmoved8  ,,theaetetus3 ,all 
three suppositions appear to me to be   
irrational4  ,,stranger3 ,under being1  
then1 we must include motion1 and that  
which is moved4  ,,theaetetus3          
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,then1         
,theaetetus1 our inference is1 that if  
there is no motion1 neither is there any
 mind anywhere1 or about anything or    
belonging to any one4  ,,theaetetus3    
,quite true4  ,,stranger3 ,and yet this 
equally follows1 if we grant that all   

things are in motion--upon this view too
 mind has no existence4  ,,theaetetus3  
,how so8  ,,stranger3 ,do you think that
 sameness of condition and mode and     
subject could ever exist without a      
principle of rest8  ,,theaetetus3       
,certainly not4  ,,stranger3 ,can you   
see how without them mind could exist1  
or come into existence anywhere8        
,,theaetetus3 ,no4  ,,stranger3 ,and    
surely contend we must in every possible
 way against him who would annihilate   
knowledge and reason and mind1 and yet  
ventures to speak confidently about     
anything4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 with all 
our might4  ,,stranger3 ,then the       
philosopher1 who has the truest         
reverence for these qualities1 cannot   
possibly accept the notion of those who 
say that the whole is at rest1 either as
 unity or in many forms3 and he will be 
utterly deaf to those who assert        
universal motion4 ,as children say      
entreatingly ',give us both1' so he will
 include both the moveable and          

immoveable in his definition of being   
and all4  ,,theaetetus3 ,most true4     
,,stranger3 ,and now1 do we seem to have
 gained a fair notion of being8         
,,theaetetus3 ,yes truly4  ,,stranger3  
,alas1 ,theaetetus1 methinks that we are
 now only beginning to see the real     
difficulty of the enquiry into the      
nature of it4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what do   
you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,o my friend1 do 
you not see that nothing can exceed our 
ignorance1 and yet we fancy that we are 
saying something good8  ,,theaetetus3 ,i
 certainly thought that we were2 and ,i 
do not at all understand how we never   
found out our desperate case4           
,,stranger3 ,reflect3 after having made 
these admissions1 may we not be justly  
asked the same questions which we       
ourselves were asking of those who said 
that all was hot and cold8              
,,theaetetus3 ,what were they8 ,will you
 recall them to my mind8  ,,stranger3   
,to be sure ,i will1 and ,i will remind 
you of them1 by putting the same        

questions to you which ,i did to them1  
and then we shall get on4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,would you not say 
that rest and motion are in the most    
entire opposition to one another8       
,,theaetetus3 ,of course4  ,,stranger3  
,and yet you would say that both and    
either of them equally are8             
,,theaetetus3 ,i should4  ,,stranger3   
,and when you admit that both or either 
of them are1 do you mean to say that    
both or either of them are in motion8   
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not4           
,,stranger3 ,or do you wish to imply    
that they are both at rest1 when you say
 that they are8  ,,theaetetus3 ,of      
course not4  ,,stranger3 ,then you      
conceive of being as some third and     
distinct nature1 under which rest and   
motion are alike included2 and1         
observing that they both participate in 
being1 you declare that they are4       
,,theaetetus3 ,truly we seem to have an 
intimation that being is some third     
thing1 when we say that rest and motion 

are4  ,,stranger3 ,then being is not the
 combination of rest and motion1 but    
something different from them4          
,,theaetetus3 ,so it would appear4      
,,stranger3 ,being1 then1 according to  
its own nature1 is neither in motion nor
 at rest4  ,,theaetetus3 ,that is very  
much the truth4  ,,stranger3 ,where1    
then1 is a man to look for help who     
would have any clear or fixed notion of 
being in his mind8  ,,theaetetus3       
,where1 indeed8  ,,stranger3 ,i scarcely
 think that he can look anywhere2 for   
that which is not in motion must be at  
rest1 and again1 that which is not at   
rest must be in motion2 but being is    
placed outside of both these classes4   
,is this possible8  ,,theaetetus3       
,utterly impossible4  ,,stranger3 ,here1
 then1 is another thing which we ought  
to bear in mind4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what8  
,,stranger3 ,when we were asked to what 
we were to assign the appellation of    
not-being1 we were in the greatest      
difficulty3--do you remember8           

,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure4  ,,stranger3 
,and are we not now in as great a       
difficulty about being8  ,,theaetetus3  
,i should say1 ,stranger1 that we are in
 one which is1 if possible1 even        
greater4  ,,stranger3 ,then let us      
acknowledge the difficulty2 and as being
 and not-being are involved in the same 
perplexity1 there is hope that when the 
one appears more or less distinctly1 the
 other will equally appear2 and if we   
are able to see neither1 there may still
 be a chance of steering our way in     
between them1 without any great         
discredit4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very good4   
,,stranger3 ,let us enquire1 then1 how  
we come to predicate many names of the  
same thing4  ,,theaetetus3 ,give an     
example4  ,,stranger3 ,i mean that we   
speak of man1 for example1 under many   
names--that we attribute to him colours 
and forms and magnitudes and virtues and
 vices1 in all of which instances and in
 ten thousand others we not only speak  
of him as a man1 but also as good1 and  

having numberless other attributes1 and 
in the same way anything else which we  
originally supposed to be one is        
described by us as many1 and under many 
names4  ,,theaetetus3 ,that is true4    
,,stranger3 ,and thus we provide a rich 
feast for tyros1 whether young or old2  
for there is nothing easier than to     
argue that the one cannot be many1 or   
the many one2 and great is their delight
 in denying that a man is good2 for man1
 they insist1 is man and good is good4  
,i dare say that you have met with      
persons who take an interest in such    
matters--they are often elderly men1    
whose meagre sense is thrown into       
amazement by these discoveries of       
theirs1 which they believe to be the    
height of wisdom4  ,,theaetetus3        
,certainly1 ,i have4  ,,stranger3 ,then1
 not to exclude any one who has ever    
speculated at all upon the nature of    
being1 let us put our questions to them 
as well as to our former friends4       
,,theaetetus3 ,what questions8          

,,stranger3 ,shall we refuse to         
attribute being to motion and rest1 or  
anything to anything1 and assume that   
they do not mingle1 and are incapable of
 participating in one another8 ,or shall
 we gather all into one class of things 
communicable with one another8 ,or are  
some things communicable and others     
not8--,which of these alternatives1     
,theaetetus1 will they prefer8          
,,theaetetus3 ,i have nothing to answer 
on their behalf4 ,suppose that you take 
all these hypotheses in turn1 and see   
what are the consequences which follow  
from each of them4  ,,stranger3 ,very   
good1 and first let us assume them to   
say that nothing is capable of          
participating in anything else in any   
respect2 in that case rest and motion   
cannot participate in being at all4     
,,theaetetus3 ,they cannot4  ,,stranger3
 ,but would either of them be if not    
participating in being8  ,,theaetetus3  
,no4  ,,stranger3 ,then by this         
admission everything is instantly       

overturned1 as well the doctrine of     
universal motion as of universal rest1  
and also the doctrine of those who      
distribute being into immutable and     
everlasting kinds2 for all these add on 
a notion of being1 some affirming that  
things 'are' truly in motion1 and others
 that they 'are' truly at rest4         
,,theaetetus3 ,just so4  ,,stranger3    
,again1 those who would at one time     
compound1 and at another resolve all    
things1 whether making them into one and
 out of one creating infinity1 or       
dividing them into finite elements1 and 
forming compounds out of these2 whether 
they suppose the processes of creation  
to be successive or continuous1 would be
 talking nonsense in all this if there  
were no admixture4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4
  ,,stranger3 ,most ridiculous of all   
will the men themselves be who want to  
carry out the argument and yet forbid us
 to call anything1 because participating
 in some affection from another1 by the 
name of that other4  ,,theaetetus3 ,why 

so8  ,,stranger3 ,why1 because they are 
compelled to use the words 'to be1'     
'apart1' 'from others1' 'in itself1' and
 ten thousand more1 which they cannot   
give up1 but must make the connecting   
links of discourse2 and therefore they  
do not require to be refuted by others1 
but their enemy1 as the saying is1      
inhabits the same house with them2 they 
are always carrying about with them an  
adversary1 like the wonderful           
ventriloquist1 ,eurycles1 who out of    
their own bellies audibly contradicts   
them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,precisely so2 a   
very true and exact illustration4       
,,stranger3 ,and now1 if we suppose that
 all things have the power of communion 
with one another--what will follow8     
,,theaetetus3 ,even ,i can solve that   
riddle4  ,,stranger3 ,how8              
,,theaetetus3 ,why1 because motion      
itself would be at rest1 and rest again 
in motion1 if they could be attributed  
to one another4  ,,stranger3 ,but this  
is utterly impossible4  ,,theaetetus3   

,of course4  ,,stranger3 ,then only the 
third hypothesis remains4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,for1 surely1      
either all things have communion with   
all2 or nothing with any other thing2 or
 some things communicate with some      
things and others not4  ,,theaetetus3   
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,and two out of
 these three suppositions have been     
found to be impossible4  ,,theaetetus3  
,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,every one then1 who 
desires to answer truly1 will adopt the 
third and remaining hypothesis of the   
communion of some with some4            
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,this communion of some with some may be
 illustrated by the case of letters2 for
 some letters do not fit each other1    
while others do4  ,,theaetetus3 ,of     
course4  ,,stranger3 ,and the vowels1   
especially1 are a sort of bond which    
pervades all the other letters1 so that 
without a vowel one consonant cannot be 
joined to another4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4
  ,,stranger3 ,but does every one know  

what letters will unite with what8 ,or  
is art required in order to do so8      
,,theaetetus3 ,art is required4         
,,stranger3 ,what art8  ,,theaetetus3   
,the art of grammar4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
is not this also true of sounds high and
 low8--,is not he who has the art to    
know what sounds mingle1 a musician1 and
 he who is ignorant1 not a musician8    
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and we
 shall find this to be generally true of
 art or the absence of art4             
,,theaetetus3 ,of course4  ,,stranger3  
,and as classes are admitted by us in   
like manner to be some of them capable  
and others incapable of intermixture1   
must not he who would rightly show what 
kinds will unite and what will not1     
proceed by the help of science in the   
path of argument8 ,and will he not ask  
if the connecting links are universal1  
and so capable of intermixture with all 
things2 and again1 in divisions1 whether
 there are not other universal classes1 
which make them possible8  ,,theaetetus3

 ,to be sure he will require science1   
and1 if ,i am not mistaken1 the very    
greatest of all sciences4  ,,stranger3  
,how are we to call it8 ,by ,zeus1 have 
we not lighted unwittingly upon our free
 and noble science1 and in looking for  
the ,sophist have we not entertained the
 philosopher unawares8  ,,theaetetus3   
,what do you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,should 
we not say that the division according  
to classes1 which neither makes the same
 other1 nor makes other the same1 is the
 business of the dialectical science8   
,,theaetetus3 ,that is what we should   
say4  ,,stranger3 ,then1 surely1 he who 
can divide rightly is able to see       
clearly one form pervading a scattered  
multitude1 and many different forms     
contained under one higher form2 and    
again1 one form knit together into a    
single whole and pervading many such    
wholes1 and many forms1 existing only in
 separation and isolation4 ,this is the 
knowledge of classes which determines   
where they can have communion with one  

another and where not4  ,,theaetetus3   
,quite true4  ,,stranger3 ,and the art  
of dialectic would be attributed by you 
only to the philosopher pure and true8  
,,theaetetus3 ,who but he can be worthy8
  ,,stranger3 ,in this region we shall  
always discover the philosopher1 if we  
look for him2 like the ,sophist1 he is  
not easily discovered1 but for a        
different reason4  ,,theaetetus3 ,for   
what reason8  ,,stranger3 ,because the  
,sophist runs away into the darkness of 
not-being1 in which he has learned by   
habit to feel about1 and cannot be      
discovered because of the darkness of   
the place4 ,is not that true8           
,,theaetetus3 ,it seems to be so4       
,,stranger3 ,and the philosopher1 always
 holding converse through reason with   
the idea of being1 is also dark from    
excess of light2 for the souls of the   
many have no eye which can endure the   
vision of the divine4  ,,theaetetus3    
,yes2 that seems to be quite as true as 
the other4  ,,stranger3 ,well1 the      

philosopher may hereafter be more fully 
considered by us1 if we are disposed2   
but the ,sophist must clearly not be    
allowed to escape until we have had a   
good look at him4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very  
good4  ,,stranger3 ,since1 then1 we are 
agreed that some classes have a         
communion with one another1 and others  
not1 and some have communion with a few 
and others with many1 and that there is 
no reason why some should not have      
universal communion with all1 let us now
 pursue the enquiry1 as the argument    
suggests1 not in relation to all ideas1 
lest the multitude of them should       
confuse us1 but let us select a few of  
those which are reckoned to be the      
principal ones1 and consider their      
several natures and their capacity of   
communion with one another1 in order    
that if we are not able to apprehend    
with perfect clearness the notions of   
being and not-being1 we may at least not
 fall short in the consideration of     
them1 so far as they come within the    

scope of the present enquiry1 if        
peradventure we may be allowed to assert
 the reality of not-being1 and yet      
escape unscathed4  ,,theaetetus3 ,we    
must do so4  ,,stranger3 ,the most      
important of all the genera are those   
which we were just now mentioning--being
 and rest and motion4  ,,theaetetus3    
,yes1 by far4  ,,stranger3 ,and two of  
these are1 as we affirm1 incapable of   
communion with one another4             
,,theaetetus3 ,quite incapable4         
,,stranger3 ,whereas being surely has   
communion with both of them1 for both of
 them are8  ,,theaetetus3 ,of course4   
,,stranger3 ,that makes up three of     
them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure4       
,,stranger3 ,and each of them is other  
than the remaining two1 but the same    
with itself4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4      
,,stranger3 ,but then1 what is the      
meaning of these two words1 'same' and  
'other'8 ,are they two new kinds other  
than the three1 and yet always of       
necessity intermingling with them1 and  

are we to have five kinds instead of    
three2 or when we speak of the same and 
other1 are we unconsciously speaking of 
one of the three first kinds8           
,,theaetetus3 ,very likely we are4      
,,stranger3 ,but1 surely1 motion and    
rest are neither the other nor the same4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,how is that8           
,,stranger3 ,whatever we attribute to   
motion and rest in common1 cannot be    
either of them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,why not8
  ,,stranger3 ,because motion would be  
at rest and rest in motion1 for either  
of them1 being predicated of both1 will 
compel the other to change into the     
opposite of its own nature1 because     
partaking of its opposite4              
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,yet they surely both partake of the    
same and of the other8  ,,theaetetus3   
,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,then we must not    
assert that motion1 any more than rest1 
is either the same or the other4        
,,theaetetus3 ,no2 we must not4         
,,stranger3 ,but are we to conceive that

 being and the same are identical8      
,,theaetetus3 ,possibly4  ,,stranger3   
,but if they are identical1 then again  
in saying that motion and rest have     
being1 we should also be saying that    
they are the same4  ,,theaetetus3 ,which
 surely cannot be4  ,,stranger3 ,then   
being and the same cannot be one4       
,,theaetetus3 ,scarcely4  ,,stranger3   
,then we may suppose the same to be a   
fourth class1 which is now to be added  
to the three others4  ,,theaetetus3     
,quite true4  ,,stranger3 ,and shall we 
call the other a fifth class8 ,or should
 we consider being and other to be two  
names of the same class8  ,,theaetetus3 
,very likely4  ,,stranger3 ,but you     
would agree1 if ,i am not mistaken1 that
 existences are relative as well as     
absolute8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4    
,,stranger3 ,and the other is always    
relative to other8  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4
  ,,stranger3 ,but this would not be the
 case unless being and the other        
entirely differed2 for1 if the other1   

like being1 were absolute as well as    
relative1 then there would have been a  
kind of other which was not other than  
other4 ,and now we find that what is    
other must of necessity be what it is in
 relation to some other4  ,,theaetetus3 
,that is the true state of the case4    
,,stranger3 ,then we must admit the     
other as the fifth of our selected      
classes4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4           
,,stranger3 ,and the fifth class        
pervades all classes1 for they all      
differ from one another1 not by reason  
of their own nature1 but because they   
partake of the idea of the other4       
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,then let us now put the case with      
reference to each of the five4          
,,theaetetus3 ,how8  ,,stranger3 ,first 
there is motion1 which we affirm to be  
absolutely 'other' than rest3 what else 
can we say8  ,,theaetetus3 ,it is so4   
,,stranger3 ,and therefore is not rest4 
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not4           
,,stranger3 ,and yet is1 because        

partaking of being4  ,,theaetetus3      
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,again1 motion is   
other than the same8  ,,theaetetus3     
,just so4  ,,stranger3 ,and is therefore
 not the same4  ,,theaetetus3 ,it is    
not4  ,,stranger3 ,yet1 surely1 motion  
is the same1 because all things partake 
of the same4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very true4 
,,stranger3 ,then we must admit1 and not
 object to say1 that motion is the same 
and is not the same1 for we do not apply
 the terms 'same' and 'not the same1' in
 the same sense2 but we call it the     
'same1' in relation to itself1 because  
partaking of the same2 and not the same1
 because having communion with the      
other1 it is thereby severed from the   
same1 and has become not that but other1
 and is therefore rightly spoken of as  
'not the same4'  ,,theaetetus3 ,to be   
sure4  ,,stranger3 ,and if absolute     
motion in any point of view partook of  
rest1 there would be no absurdity in    
calling motion stationary4              
,,theaetetus3 ,quite right1--that is1 on

 the supposition that some classes      
mingle with one another1 and others not4
  ,,stranger3 ,that such a communion of 
kinds is according to nature1 we had    
already proved before we arrived at this
 part of our discussion4  ,,theaetetus3 
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,let us        
proceed1 then4 ,may we not say that     
motion is other than the other1 having  
been also proved by us to be other than 
the same and other than rest8           
,,theaetetus3 ,that is certain4         
,,stranger3 ,then1 according to this    
view1 motion is other and also not      
other8  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4            
,,stranger3 ,what is the next step8     
,shall we say that motion is other than 
the three and not other than the        
fourth1--for we agreed that there are   
five classes about and in the sphere of 
which we proposed to make enquiry8      
,,theaetetus3 ,surely we cannot admit   
that the number is less than it appeared
 to be just now4  ,,stranger3 ,then we  
may without fear contend that motion is 

other than being8  ,,theaetetus3        
,without the least fear4  ,,stranger3   
,the plain result is that motion1 since 
it partakes of being1 really is and also
 is not8  ,,theaetetus3 ,nothing can be 
plainer4  ,,stranger3 ,then not-being   
necessarily exists in the case of motion
 and of every class2 for the nature of  
the other entering into them all1 makes 
each of them other than being1 and so   
non-existent2 and therefore of all of   
them1 in like manner1 we may truly say  
that they are not2 and again1 inasmuch  
as they partake of being1 that they are 
and are existent4  ,,theaetetus3 ,so we 
may assume4  ,,stranger3 ,every class1  
then1 has plurality of being and        
infinity of not-being4  ,,theaetetus3   
,so we must infer4  ,,stranger3 ,and    
being itself may be said to be other    
than the other kinds4  ,,theaetetus3    
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,then we may   
infer that being is not1 in respect of  
as many other things as there are2 for  
not-being these it is itself one1 and is

 not the other things1 which are        
infinite in number4  ,,theaetetus3 ,that
 is not far from the truth4  ,,stranger3
 ,and we must not quarrel with this     
result1 since it is of the nature of    
classes to have communion with one      
another2 and if any one denies our      
present statement viz41 that being is   
not1 etc41 let him first argue with our 
former conclusion i4e41 respecting the  
communion of ideas1 and then he may     
proceed to argue with what follows4     
,,theaetetus3 ,nothing can be fairer4   
,,stranger3 ,let me ask you to consider 
a further question4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what
 question8  ,,stranger3 ,when we speak  
of not-being1 we speak1 ,i suppose1 not 
of something opposed to being1 but only 
different4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what do you  
mean8  ,,stranger3 ,when we speak of    
something as not great1 does the        
expression seem to you to imply what is 
little any more than what is equal8     
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly not4           
,,stranger3 ,the negative particles1 ou 

and me1 when prefixed to words1 do not  
imply opposition1 but only difference   
from the words1 or more correctly from  
the things represented by the words1    
which follow them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,quite
 true4  ,,stranger3 ,there is another   
point to be considered1 if you do not   
object4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8     
,,stranger3 ,the nature of the other    
appears to me to be divided into        
fractions like knowledge4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,how so8  ,,stranger3 ,knowledge1 like 
the other1 is one2 and yet the various  
parts of knowledge have each of them    
their own particular name1 and hence    
there are many arts and kinds of        
knowledge4  ,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  
,,stranger3 ,and is not the case the    
same with the parts of the other1 which 
is also one8  ,,theaetetus3 ,very       
likely2 but will you tell me how8       
,,stranger3 ,there is some part of the  
other which is opposed to the beautiful8
  ,,theaetetus3 ,there is4  ,,stranger3 
,shall we say that this has or has not a

 name8  ,,theaetetus3 ,it has2 for      
whatever we call not-beautiful is other 
than the beautiful1 not than something  
else4  ,,stranger3 ,and now tell me     
another thing4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what8    
,,stranger3 ,is the not-beautiful       
anything but this--an existence parted  
off from a certain kind of existence1   
and again from another point of view    
opposed to an existing something8       
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,then 
the not-beautiful turns out to be the   
opposition of being to being8           
,,theaetetus3 ,very true4  ,,stranger3  
,but upon this view1 is the beautiful a 
more real and the not-beautiful a less  
real existence8  ,,theaetetus3 ,not at  
all4  ,,stranger3 ,and the not-great may
 be said to exist1 equally with the     
great8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3
 ,and1 in the same way1 the just must be
 placed in the same category with the   
not-just--the one cannot be said to have
 any more existence than the other4     
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,the  

same may be said of other things2 seeing
 that the nature of the other has a real
 existence1 the parts of this nature    
must equally be supposed to exist4      
,,theaetetus3 ,of course4  ,,stranger3  
,then1 as would appear1 the opposition  
of a part of the other1 and of a part of
 being1 to one another1 is1 if ,i may   
venture to say so1 as truly essence as  
being itself1 and implies not the       
opposite of being1 but only what is     
other than being4  ,,theaetetus3 ,beyond
 question4  ,,stranger3 ,what then shall
 we call it8  ,,theaetetus3 ,clearly1   
not-being2 and this is the very nature  
for which the ,sophist compelled us to  
search4  ,,stranger3 ,and has not this1 
as you were saying1 as real an existence
 as any other class8 ,may ,i not say    
with confidence that not-being has an   
assured existence1 and a nature of its  
own8 ,just as the great was found to be 
great and the beautiful beautiful1 and  
the not-great not-great1 and the        
not-beautiful not-beautiful1 in the same

 manner not-being has been found to be  
and is not-being1 and is to be reckoned 
one among the many classes of being4 ,do
 you1 ,theaetetus1 still feel any doubt 
of this8  ,,theaetetus3 ,none whatever4 
,,stranger3 ,do you observe that our    
scepticism has carried us beyond the    
range of ,parmenides' prohibition8      
,,theaetetus3 ,in what8  ,,stranger3 ,we
 have advanced to a further point1 and  
shown him more than he forbad us to     
investigate4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how is     
that8  ,,stranger3 ,why1 because he     
says--  ',not-being never is1 and do    
thou keep thy thoughts from this way of 
enquiry4'  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 he says  
so4  ,,stranger3 ,whereas1 we have not  
only proved that things which are not   
are1 but we have shown what form of     
being not-being is2 for we have shown   
that the nature of the other is1 and is 
distributed over all things in their    
relations to one another1 and whatever  
part of the other is contrasted with    
being1 this is precisely what we have   

ventured to call not-being4             
,,theaetetus3 ,and surely1 ,stranger1 we
 were quite right4  ,,stranger3 ,let not
 any one say1 then1 that while affirming
 the opposition of not-being to being1  
we still assert the being of not-being2 
for as to whether there is an opposite  
of being1 to that enquiry we have long  
said good-bye--it may or may not be1 and
 may or may not be capable of           
definition4 ,but as touching our present
 account of not-being1 let a man either 
convince us of error1 or1 so long as he 
cannot1 he too must say1 as we are      
saying1 that there is a communion of    
classes1 and that being1 and difference 
or other1 traverse all things and       
mutually interpenetrate1 so that the    
other partakes of being1 and by reason  
of this participation is1 and yet is not
 that of which it partakes1 but other1  
and being other than being1 it is       
clearly a necessity that not-being      
should be4 ,and again1 being1 through   
partaking of the other1 becomes a class 

other than the remaining classes1 and   
being other than all of them1 is not    
each one of them1 and is not all the    
rest1 so that undoubtedly there are     
thousands upon thousands of cases in    
which being is not1 and all other       
things1 whether regarded individually or
 collectively1 in many respects are1 and
 in many respects are not4              
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
he who is sceptical of this             
contradiction1 must think how he can    
find something better to say2 or if he  
sees a puzzle1 and his pleasure is to   
drag words this way and that1 the       
argument will prove to him1 that he is  
not making a worthy use of his          
faculties2 for there is no charm in such
 puzzles1 and there is no difficulty in 
detecting them2 but we can tell him of  
something else the pursuit of which is  
noble and also difficult4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,what is it8  ,,stranger3 ,a thing of  
which ,i have already spoken2--letting  
alone these puzzles as involving no     

difficulty1 he should be able to follow 
and criticize in detail every argument1 
and when a man says that the same is in 
a manner other1 or that other is the    
same1 to understand and refute him from 
his own point of view1 and in the same  
respect in which he asserts either of   
these affections4 ,but to show that     
somehow and in some sense the same is   
other1 or the other same1 or the great  
small1 or the like unlike2 and to       
delight in always bringing forward such 
contradictions1 is no real refutation1  
but is clearly the new-born babe of some
 one who is only beginning to approach  
the problem of being4  ,,theaetetus3 ,to
 be sure4  ,,stranger3 ,for certainly1  
my friend1 the attempt to separate all  
existences from one another is a        
barbarism and utterly unworthy of an    
educated or philosophical mind4         
,,theaetetus3 ,why so8  ,,stranger3 ,the
 attempt at universal separation is the 
final annihilation of all reasoning2 for
 only by the union of conceptions with  

one another do we attain to discourse of
 reason4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4          
,,stranger3 ,and1 observe that we were  
only just in time in making a resistance
 to such separatists1 and compelling    
them to admit that one thing mingles    
with another4  ,,theaetetus3 ,why so8   
,,stranger3 ,why1 that we might be able 
to assert discourse to be a kind of     
being2 for if we could not1 the worst of
 all consequences would follow2 we      
should have no philosophy4 ,moreover1   
the necessity for determining the nature
 of discourse presses upon us at this   
moment2 if utterly deprived of it1 we   
could no more hold discourse2 and       
deprived of it we should be if we       
admitted that there was no admixture of 
natures at all4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very    
true4 ,but ,i do not understand why at  
this moment we must determine the nature
 of discourse4  ,,stranger3 ,perhaps you
 will see more clearly by the help of   
the following explanation4              
,,theaetetus3 ,what explanation8        

,,stranger3 ,not-being has been         
acknowledged by us to be one among many 
classes diffused over all being4        
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
thence arises the question1 whether     
not-being mingles with opinion and      
language4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how so8       
,,stranger3 ,if not-being has no part in
 the proposition1 then all things must  
be true2 but if not-being has a part1   
then false opinion and false speech are 
possible1 for to think or to say what is
 not--is falsehood1 which thus arises in
 the region of thought and in speech4   
,,theaetetus3 ,that is quite true4      
,,stranger3 ,and where there is         
falsehood surely there must be deceit4  
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and if
 there is deceit1 then all things must  
be full of idols and images and fancies4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,to be sure4            
,,stranger3 ,into that region the       
,sophist1 as we said1 made his escape1  
and1 when he had got there1 denied the  
very possibility of falsehood2 no one1  

he argued1 either conceived or uttered  
falsehood1 inasmuch as not-being did not
 in any way partake of being4           
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
now1 not-being has been shown to partake
 of being1 and therefore he will not    
continue fighting in this direction1 but
 he will probably say that some ideas   
partake of not-being1 and some not1 and 
that language and opinion are of the    
non-partaking class2 and he will still  
fight to the death against the existence
 of the image-making and phantastic art1
 in which we have placed him1 because1  
as he will say1 opinion and language do 
not partake of not-being1 and unless    
this participation exists1 there can be 
no such thing as falsehood4 ,and1 with  
the view of meeting this evasion1 we    
must begin by enquiring into the nature 
of language1 opinion1 and imagination1  
in order that when we find them we may  
find also that they have communion with 
not-being1 and1 having made out the     
connexion of them1 may thus prove that  

falsehood exists2 and therein we will   
imprison the ,sophist1 if he deserves   
it1 or1 if not1 we will let him go again
 and look for him in another class4     
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly1 ,stranger1    
there appears to be truth in what was   
said about the ,sophist at first1 that  
he was of a class not easily caught1 for
 he seems to have abundance of defences1
 which he throws up1 and which must     
every one of them be stormed before we  
can reach the man himself4 ,and even    
now1 we have with difficulty got through
 his first defence1 which is the        
not-being of not-being1 and lo6 here is 
another2 for we have still to show that 
falsehood exists in the sphere of       
language and opinion1 and there will be 
another and another line of defence     
without end4  ,,stranger3 ,any one1     
,theaetetus1 who is able to advance even
 a little ought to be of good cheer1 for
 what would he who is dispirited at a   
little progress do1 if he were making   
none at all1 or even undergoing a       

repulse8 ,such a faint heart1 as the    
proverb says1 will never take a city3   
but now that we have succeeded thus far1
 the citadel is ours1 and what remains  
is easier4  ,,theaetetus3 ,very true4   
,,stranger3 ,then1 as ,i was saying1 let
 us first of all obtain a conception of 
language and opinion1 in order that we  
may have clearer grounds for            
determining1 whether not-being has any  
concern with them1 or whether they are  
both always true1 and neither of them   
ever false4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4       
,,stranger3 ,then1 now1 let us speak of 
names1 as before we were speaking of    
ideas and letters2 for that is the      
direction in which the answer may be    
expected4  ,,theaetetus3 ,and what is   
the question at issue about names8      
,,stranger3 ,the question at issue is   
whether all names may be connected with 
one another1 or none1 or only some of   
them4  ,,theaetetus3 ,clearly the last  
is true4  ,,stranger3 ,i understand you 
to say that words which have a meaning  

when in sequence may be connected1 but  
that words which have no meaning when in
 sequence cannot be connected8          
,,theaetetus3 ,what are you saying8     
,,stranger3 ,what ,i thought that you   
intended when you gave your assent2 for 
there are two sorts of intimation of    
being which are given by the voice4     
,,theaetetus3 ,what are they8           
,,stranger3 ,one of them is called      
nouns1 and the other verbs4             
,,theaetetus3 ,describe them4           
,,stranger3 ,that which denotes action  
we call a verb4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4   
,,stranger3 ,and the other1 which is an 
articulate mark set on those who do the 
actions1 we call a noun4  ,,theaetetus3 
,quite true4  ,,stranger3 ,a succession 
of nouns only is not a sentence1 any    
more than of verbs without nouns4       
,,theaetetus3 ,i do not understand you4 
,,stranger3 ,i see that when you gave   
your assent you had something else in   
your mind4 ,but what ,i intended to say 
was1 that a mere succession of nouns or 

of verbs is not discourse4              
,,theaetetus3 ,what do you mean8        
,,stranger3 ,i mean that words like     
'walks1' 'runs1' 'sleeps1' or any other 
words which denote action1 however many 
of them you string together1 do not make
 discourse4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how can     
they8  ,,stranger3 ,or1 again1 when you 
say 'lion1' 'stag1' 'horse1' or any     
other words which denote agents--neither
 in this way of stringing words together
 do you attain to discourse2 for there  
is no expression of action or inaction1 
or of the existence of existence or     
non-existence indicated by the sounds1  
until verbs are mingled with nouns2 then
 the words fit1 and the smallest        
combination of them forms language1 and 
is the simplest and least form of       
discourse4  ,,theaetetus3 ,again ,i ask1
 ,what do you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,when  
any one says ',a man learns1' should you
 not call this the simplest and least of
 sentences8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4        
,,stranger3 ,yes1 for he now arrives at 

the point of giving an intimation about 
something which is1 or is becoming1 or  
has become1 or will be4 ,and he not only
 names1 but he does something1 by       
connecting verbs with nouns2 and        
therefore we say that he discourses1 and
 to this connexion of words we give the 
name of discourse4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4
  ,,stranger3 ,and as there are some    
things which fit one another1 and other 
things which do not fit1 so there are   
some vocal signs which do1 and others   
which do not1 combine and form          
discourse4  ,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  
,,stranger3 ,there is another small     
matter4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8     
,,stranger3 ,a sentence must and cannot 
help having a subject4  ,,theaetetus3   
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and must be of a   
certain quality4  ,,theaetetus3         
,certainly4  ,,stranger3 ,and now let us
 mind what we are about4  ,,theaetetus3 
,we must do so4  ,,stranger3 ,i will    
repeat a sentence to you in which a     
thing and an action are combined1 by the

 help of a noun and a verb2 and you     
shall tell me of whom the sentence      
speaks4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i will1 to the  
best of my power4  ,,stranger3          
',theaetetus sits'--not a very long     
sentence4  ,,theaetetus3 ,not very4     
,,stranger3 ,of whom does the sentence  
speak1 and who is the subject8 that is  
what you have to tell4  ,,theaetetus3   
,of me2 ,i am the subject4  ,,stranger3 
,or this sentence1 again--              
,,theaetetus3 ,what sentence8           
,,stranger3 ',theaetetus1 with whom ,i  
am now speaking1 is flying4'            
,,theaetetus3 ,that also is a sentence  
which will be admitted by every one to  
speak of me1 and to apply to me4        
,,stranger3 ,we agreed that every       
sentence must necessarily have a certain
 quality4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4          
,,stranger3 ,and what is the quality of 
each of these two sentences8            
,,theaetetus3 ,the one1 as ,i imagine1  
is false1 and the other true4           
,,stranger3 ,the true says what is true 

about you8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4         
,,stranger3 ,and the false says what is 
other than true8  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4   
,,stranger3 ,and therefore speaks of    
things which are not as if they were8   
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
say that things are real of you which   
are not2 for1 as we were saying1 in     
regard to each thing or person1 there is
 much that is and much that is not4     
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,the second of the two sentences which  
related to you was first of all an      
example of the shortest form consistent 
with our definition4  ,,theaetetus3     
,yes1 this was implied in recent        
admission4  ,,stranger3 ,and1 in the    
second place1 it related to a subject8  
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,who   
must be you1 and can be nobody else8    
,,theaetetus3 ,unquestionably4          
,,stranger3 ,and it would be no sentence
 at all if there were no subject1 for1  
as we proved1 a sentence which has no   
subject is impossible4  ,,theaetetus3   

,quite true4  ,,stranger3 ,when other1  
then1 is asserted of you as the same1   
and not-being as being1 such a          
combination of nouns and verbs is really
 and truly false discourse4             
,,theaetetus3 ,most true4  ,,stranger3  
,and therefore thought1 opinion1 and    
imagination are now proved to exist in  
our minds both as true and false4       
,,theaetetus3 ,how so8  ,,stranger3 ,you
 will know better if you first gain a   
knowledge of what they are1 and in what 
they severally differ from one another4 
,,theaetetus3 ,give me the knowledge    
which you would wish me to gain4        
,,stranger3 ,are not thought and speech 
the same1 with this exception1 that what
 is called thought is the unuttered     
conversation of the soul with herself8  
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,but the stream of thought which flows  
through the lips and is audible is      
called speech8  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4    
,,stranger3 ,and we know that there     
exists in speech444  ,,theaetetus3 ,what

 exists8  ,,stranger3 ,affirmation4     
,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 we know it4         
,,stranger3 ,when the affirmation or    
denial takes ,place in silence and in   
the mind only1 have you any other name  
by which to call it but opinion8        
,,theaetetus3 ,there can be no other    
name4  ,,stranger3 ,and when opinion is 
presented1 not simply1 but in some form 
of sense1 would you not call it         
imagination8  ,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4 
,,stranger3 ,and seeing that language is
 true and false1 and that thought is the
 conversation of the soul with herself1 
and opinion is the end of thinking1 and 
imagination or phantasy is the union of 
sense and opinion1 the inference is that
 some of them1 since they are akin to   
language1 should have an element of     
falsehood as well as of truth8          
,,theaetetus3 ,certainly4  ,,stranger3  
,do you perceive1 then1 that false      
opinion and speech have been discovered 
sooner than we expected8--,for just now 
we seemed to be undertaking a task which

 would never be accomplished4           
,,theaetetus3 ,i perceive4  ,,stranger3 
,then let us not be discouraged about   
the future2 but now having made this    
discovery1 let us go back to our        
previous classification4  ,,theaetetus3 
,what classification8  ,,stranger3 ,we  
divided image-making into two sorts2 the
 one likeness-making1 the other         
imaginative or phantastic4              
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
we said that we were uncertain in which 
we should place the ,sophist4           
,,theaetetus3 ,we did say so4           
,,stranger3 ,and our heads began to go  
round more and more when it was asserted
 that there is no such thing as an image
 or idol or appearance1 because in no   
manner or time or place can there ever  
be such a thing as falsehood4           
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
now1 since there has been shown to be   
false speech and false opinion1 there   
may be imitations of real existences1   
and out of this condition of the mind an

 art of deception may arise4            
,,theaetetus3 ,quite possible4          
,,stranger3 ,and we have already        
admitted1 in what preceded1 that the    
,sophist was lurking in one of the      
divisions of the likeness-making art8   
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,let   
us1 then1 renew the attempt1 and in     
dividing any class1 always take the part
 to the right1 holding fast to that     
which holds the ,sophist1 until we have 
stripped him of all his common          
properties1 and reached his difference  
or peculiar4 ,then we may exhibit him in
 his true nature1 first to ourselves and
 then to kindred dialectical spirits4   
,,theaetetus3 ,very good4  ,,stranger3  
,you may remember that all art was      
originally divided by us into creative  
and acquisitive4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4   
,,stranger3 ,and the ,sophist was       
flitting before us in the acquisitive   
class1 in the subdivisions of hunting1  
contests1 merchandize1 and the like4    
,,theaetetus3 ,very true4  ,,stranger3  

,but now that the imitative art has     
enclosed him1 it is clear that we must  
begin by dividing the art of creation2  
for imitation is a kind of creation--of 
images1 however1 as we affirm1 and not  
of real things4  ,,theaetetus3 ,quite   
true4  ,,stranger3 ,in the first place1 
there are two kinds of creation4        
,,theaetetus3 ,what are they8           
,,stranger3 ,one of them is human and   
the other divine4  ,,theaetetus3 ,i do  
not follow4  ,,stranger3 ,every power1  
as you may remember our saying          
originally1 which causes things to      
exist1 not previously existing1 was     
defined by us as creative4              
,,theaetetus3 ,i remember4  ,,stranger3 
,looking1 now1 at the world and all the 
animals and plants1 at things which grow
 upon the earth from seeds and roots1 as
 well as at inanimate substances which  
are formed within the earth1 fusile or  
non-fusile1 shall we say that they come 
into existence--not having existed      
previously--by the creation of ,god1 or 

shall we agree with vulgar opinion about
 them8  ,,theaetetus3 ,what is it8      
,,stranger3 ,the opinion that nature    
brings them into being from some        
spontaneous and unintelligent cause4 ,or
 shall we say that they are created by a
 divine reason and a knowledge which    
comes from ,god8  ,,theaetetus3 ,i dare 
say that1 owing to my youth1 ,i may     
often waver in my view1 but now when ,i 
look at you and see that you incline to 
refer them to ,god1 ,i defer to your    
authority4  ,,stranger3 ,nobly said1    
,theaetetus1 and if ,i thought that you 
were one of those who would hereafter   
change your mind1 ,i would have gently  
argued with you1 and forced you to      
assent2 but as ,i perceive that you will
 come of yourself and without any       
argument of mine1 to that belief which1 
as you say1 attracts you1 ,i will not   
forestall the work of time4 ,let me     
suppose1 then1 that things which are    
said to be made by nature are the work  
of divine art1 and that things which are

 made by man out of these are works of  
human art4 ,and so there are two kinds  
of making and production1 the one human 
and the other divine4  ,,theaetetus3    
,true4  ,,stranger3 ,then1 now1         
subdivide each of the two sections which
 we have already4  ,,theaetetus3 ,how do
 you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,i mean to say  
that you should make a vertical division
 of production or invention1 as you have
 already made a lateral one4            
,,theaetetus3 ,i have done so4          
,,stranger3 ,then1 now1 there are in all
 four parts or segments--two of them    
have reference to us and are human1 and 
two of them have reference to the gods  
and are divine4  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4   
,,stranger3 ,and1 again1 in the division
 which was supposed to be made in the   
other way1 one part in each subdivision 
is the making of the things themselves1 
but the two remaining parts may be      
called the making of likenesses2 and so 
the productive art is again divided into
 two parts4  ,,theaetetus3 ,tell me the 

divisions once more4  ,,stranger3 ,i    
suppose that we1 and the other animals1 
and the elements out of which things are
 made--fire1 water1 and the like--are   
known by us to be each and all the      
creation and work of ,god4              
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,and  
there are images of them1 which are not 
them1 but which correspond to them2 and 
these are also the creation of a        
wonderful skill4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what   
are they8  ,,stranger3 ,the appearances 
which spring up of themselves in sleep  
or by day1 such as a shadow when        
darkness arises in a fire1 or the       
reflection which is produced when the   
light in bright and smooth objects meets
 on their surface with an external      
light1 and creates a perception the     
opposite of our ordinary sight4         
,,theaetetus3 ,yes2 and the images as   
well as the creation are equally the    
work of a divine hand4  ,,stranger3 ,and
 what shall we say of human art8 ,do we 
not make one house by the art of        

building1 and another by the art of     
drawing1 which is a sort of dream       
created by man for those who are awake8 
,,theaetetus3 ,quite true4  ,,stranger3 
,and other products of human creation   
are also twofold and go in pairs2 there 
is the thing1 with which the art of     
making the thing is concerned1 and the  
image1 with which imitation is          
concerned4  ,,theaetetus3 ,now ,i begin 
to understand1 and am ready to          
acknowledge that there are two kinds of 
production1 and each of them twofold2 in
 the lateral division there is both a   
divine and a human production2 in the   
vertical there are realities and a      
creation of a kind of similitudes4      
,,stranger3 ,and let us not forget that 
of the imitative class the one part was 
to have been likeness-making1 and the   
other phantastic1 if it could be shown  
that falsehood is a reality and belongs 
to the class of real being4             
,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3 ,and   
this appeared to be the case2 and       

therefore now1 without hesitation1 we   
shall number the different kinds as two4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3     
,then1 now1 let us again divide the     
phantastic art4  ,,theaetetus3 ,where   
shall we make the division8  ,,stranger3
 ,there is one kind which is produced by
 an instrument1 and another in which the
 creator of the appearance is himself   
the instrument4  ,,theaetetus3 ,what do 
you mean8  ,,stranger3 ,when any one    
makes himself appear like another in his
 figure or his voice1 imitation is the  
name for this part of the phantastic    
art4  ,,theaetetus3 ,yes4  ,,stranger3  
,let this1 then1 be named the art of    
mimicry1 and this the province assigned 
to it2 as for the other division1 we are
 weary and will give that up1 leaving to
 some one else the duty of making the   
class and giving it a suitable name4    
,,theaetetus3 ,let us do as you         
say--assign a sphere to the one and     
leave the other4  ,,stranger3 ,there is 
a further distinction1 ,theaetetus1     

which is worthy of our consideration1   
and for a reason which ,i will tell you4
  ,,theaetetus3 ,let me hear4           
,,stranger3 ,there are some who imitate1
 knowing what they imitate1 and some who
 do not know4 ,and what line of         
distinction can there possibly be       
greater than that which divides         
ignorance from knowledge8  ,,theaetetus3
 ,there can be no greater4  ,,stranger3 
,was not the sort of imitation of which 
we spoke just now the imitation of those
 who know8 ,for he who would imitate you
 would surely know you and your figure8 
,,theaetetus3 ,naturally4  ,,stranger3  
,and what would you say of the figure or
 form of justice or of virtue in        
general8 ,are we not well aware that    
many1 having no knowledge of either1 but
 only a sort of opinion1 do their best  
to show that this opinion is really     
entertained by them1 by expressing it1  
as far as they can1 in word and deed8   
,,theaetetus3 ,yes1 that is very common4
  ,,stranger3 ,and do they always fail  

in their attempt to be thought just1    
when they are not8 ,or is not the very  
opposite true8  ,,theaetetus3 ,the very 
opposite4  ,,stranger3 ,such a one1     
then1 should be described as an         
imitator--to be distinguished from the  
other1 as he who is ignorant is         
distinguished from him who knows8       
,,theaetetus3 ,true4  ,,stranger3 ,can  
we find a suitable name for each of     
them8 ,this is clearly not an easy task2
 for among the ancients there was some  
confusion of ideas1 which prevented them
 from attempting to divide genera into  
species2 wherefore there is no great    
abundance of names4 ,yet1 for the sake  
of distinctness1 ,i will make bold to   
call the imitation which coexists with  
opinion1 the imitation of               
appearance--that which coexists with    
science1 a scientific or learned        
imitation4  ,,theaetetus3 ,granted4     
,,stranger3 ,the former is our present  
concern1 for the ,sophist was classed   
with imitators indeed1 but not among    

those who have knowledge4  ,,theaetetus3
 ,very true4  ,,stranger3 ,let us1 then1
 examine our imitator of appearance1 and
 see whether he is sound1 like a piece  
of iron1 or whether there is still some 
crack in him4  ,,theaetetus3 ,let us    
examine him4  ,,stranger3 ,indeed there 
is a very considerable crack2 for if you
 look1 you find that one of the two     
classes of imitators is a simple        
creature1 who thinks that he knows that 
which he only fancies2 the other sort   
has knocked about among arguments1 until
 he suspects and fears that he is       
ignorant of that which to the many he   
pretends to know4  ,,theaetetus3 ,there 
are certainly the two kinds which you   
describe4  ,,stranger3 ,shall we regard 
one as the simple imitator--the other as
 the dissembling or ironical imitator8  
,,theaetetus3 ,very good4  ,,stranger3  
,and shall we further speak of this     
latter class as having one or two       
divisions8  ,,theaetetus3 ,answer       
yourself4  ,,stranger3 ,upon            

consideration1 then1 there appear to me 
to be two2 there is the dissembler1 who 
harangues a multitude in public in a    
long speech1 and the dissembler1 who in 
private and in short speeches compels   
the person who is conversing with him to
 contradict himself4  ,,theaetetus3     
,what you say is most true4  ,,stranger3
 ,and who is the maker of the longer    
speeches8 ,is he the statesman or the   
popular orator8  ,,theaetetus3 ,the     
latter4  ,,stranger3 ,and what shall we 
call the other8 ,is he the philosopher  
or the ,sophist8  ,,theaetetus3 ,the    
philosopher he cannot be1 for upon our  
view he is ignorant2 but since he is an 
imitator of the wise he will have a name
 which is formed by an adaptation of the
 word sophos4 ,what shall we name him8  
,i am pretty sure that ,i cannot be     
mistaken in terming him the true and    
very ,sophist4  ,,stranger3 ,shall we   
bind up his name as we did before1      
making a chain from one end of his      
genealogy to the other8  ,,theaetetus3  

,by all means4  ,,stranger3 ,he1 then1  
who traces the pedigree of his art as   
follows--who1 belonging to the conscious
 or dissembling section of the art of   
causing self-contradiction1 is an       
imitator of appearance1 and is separated
 from the class of phantastic which is a
 branch of image-making into that       
further division of creation1 the       
juggling of words1 a creation human1 and
 not divine--any one who affirms the    
real ,sophist to be of this blood and   
lineage will say the very truth4        
,,theaetetus3 ,undoubtedly4