,,armageddon--,,and ,,after             
,,by         ,w4,l4 ,,courtney1 ,m4,a41 
,,ll4,d4                  ,,london      
,,chapman  ,,hall1 ,,ltd4               
#aiad                   ,,dedicated     
,,with ,,all ,,humility ,,and           
,,admiration                   ,,to     
,,the ,,young ,,idealists ,,of ,,all    
,,countries  ,,who ,,will ,,not ,,allow 
,,the ,,dreams ,,of ,,their             
,,youth ,,to ,,be ,,tarnished ,,by ,,the
           ,,experiences ,,of ,,an      
,,outworn ,,age     ,,preface   ,i      
dedicate this little book to the young  
idealists of this and other countries1  
for several reasons4 ,they must1        
obviously1 be young1 because their older
 contemporaries1 with a large amount of 
experience of earlier conditions1 will  
hardly have the courage to deal with the
 novel data4 ,i take it that1 after the 
conclusion of the present war1 there    
will come an uneasy period of exhaustion
 and anxiety when we shall be told that 
those who hold military power in their  

hands are alone qualified to act as     
saviours of society4 ,that conclusion1  
as ,i understand the matter1 young      
idealists will strenuously oppose4 ,they
 will be quite aware that all the       
conservative elements will be against   
them2 they will appreciate also the     
eagerness with which a large number of  
people will point out that the safest   
way is to leave matters more or less    
alone1 and to allow the situation to be 
controlled by soldiers and diplomatists4
 ,of course there is obvious truth in   
the assertion that the immediate        
settlement of peace conditions must1 to 
a large extent1 be left in the hands of 
those who brought the war to a          
successful conclusion4 ,but the relief  
from pressing anxiety when this horrible
 strife is over1 and the feeling of     
gratitude to those who have delivered us
 must not be allowed to gild and        
consecrate1 as it were1 systems proved  
effete and policies which intelligent   
men recognise as bankrupt4 ,the moment  

of deliverance will be too unique and   
too splendid to be left in the hands of 
men who have grown1 if not cynical1 at  
all events a little weary of the        
notorious defects of humanity1 and who  
are1 perhaps naturally1 tempted to allow
 ,european progress to fall back into   
the old well-worn ruts4 ,it is the young
 men who must take the matter in hand1  
with their ardent hopes and their keen  
imagination1 and only so far as they    
believe in the possibility of a great   
amelioration will they have any chance  
of doing yeoman service for humanity4   
,the dawn of a new era must be plenarily
 accepted as a wonderful opportunity for
 reform4 ,if viewed in any other spirit1
 the splendours of the morning will soon
 give way before the obstinate clouds   
hanging on the horizon4 ,in some fashion
 or other it must be acknowledged that  
older methods of dealing with           
international affairs have been tried   
and found wanting4 ,it must be admitted 
that the ancient principles helped to   

bring about the tremendous catastrophe  
in which we are at present involved1 and
 that a thorough re-organisation is     
required if the new ,europe is to start 
under better auspices4 ,that is why ,i  
appeal to the younger idealists1 because
 they are not likely to be deterred by  
inveterate prejudices2 they will be only
 too eager to examine things with a     
fresh intelligence of their own4        
,somehow or other we must get rid of the
 absurd idea that the nations of ,europe
 are always on the look out to do each  
other an injury4 ,we have to establish  
the doctrines of ,right on a proper     
basis1 and dethrone that ugly phantom of
 ,might1 which is the object of ,potsdam
 worship4 ,international law must be    
built up with its proper sanctions2 and 
virtues1 which are ,christian and       
humane1 must find their proper place in 
the ordinary dealings of states with one
 another4 ,much clever dialectics will  
probably be employed in order to prove  
that idealistic dreams are vain4 ,young 

men will not be afraid of such          
arguments2 they will not be deterred by 
purely logical difficulties4 ,let us    
remember that this war has been waged in
 order to make war for the future       
impossible4 ,if that be the presiding   
idea of men's minds1 they will keep     
their reforming course steadily directed
 towards ideal ends1 patiently working  
for the reconstruction of ,europe and a 
better lot for humanity at large4  ,once
 more let me repeat that it is only     
young idealists who are sufficient for  
these things4 ,they may call themselves 
democrats1 or socialists1 or futurists1 
or merely reformers4 ,the name is       
unimportant3 the main point is that they
 must thoroughly examine their creed in 
the light of their finest hopes and     
aspirations4 ,they will not be the      
slaves of any formul1 and they will hold
 out their right hands to every         
man--whatever may be the label he puts  
on his theories--who is striving in     
single-minded devotion for a millennial 

peace4 ,the new era will have to be of a
 spiritual1 ethical type4 ,coarser forms
 of materialism1 whether in thought or  
life1 will have to be banished1 because 
the scales have at last dropped from our
 eyes1 and we intend to regard a human  
being no longer as a thing of luxury1 or
 wealth1 or greedy passions1 but as the 
possessor of a living soul4  ,w4,l4,c4  
,november #aj1 #aiad4         99        
99       99       99       99   ,i wish 
to acknowledge my obligation to ,mr4    
,h4,n4 ,brailsford's ,the ,war of ,steel
 and ,gold 7,bell74 ,i do not pretend to
 agree with all that ,mr4 ,brailsford   
says3 but ,i have found his book always 
interesting1 and sometimes inspiring4   
,,contents                              
,,page  ,,chapter ,i ,,problems ,,of    
,,the ,,future                          
#a  ,,chapter ,,ii ,,lessons ,,of ,,the 
,,past                               #cb
  ,,chapter ,,iii ,,some ,,suggested    
,,reforms                            #fc
     ,,armageddon--,,and ,,after        

,,chapter ,i  ,,problems ,,of ,,the     
,,future   ,the newspapers have lately  
been making large quotations from the   
poems of ,mr4 ,rudyard ,kipling4 ,they  
might1 if they had been so minded1 have 
laid under similar contribution the     
,revelation of ,st4 ,john the ,divine4  
,there1 too1 with all the imagery usual 
in ,apocalyptic literature1 is to be    
found a description of vague and        
confused fighting1 when most of the     
,kings of the earth come together to    
fight a last and desperate battle4 ,the 
,seven ,angels go forth1 each armed with
 a vial1 the first poisoning the earth1 
the second the sea1 the third the rivers
 and fountains of waters1 the fourth the
 sun4 ,then out of the mouth of the     
dragon1 of the beast1 and of the        
,antichrist come the lying spirits which
 persuade the ,kings of the earth to    
gather all the people for that great day
 of ,god ,almighty into a place called  
in the ,hebrew tongue ,armageddon4      
,translated into our language the       

account might very well serve for the   
modern assemblage of troops in which    
nearly all the kingdoms of the earth    
have to play their part1 with few1 and  
not very important1 exceptions4 ,it is  
almost absurd to speak of the events of 
the past three months as though they    
were merely incidents in a great and    
important campaign4 ,there is nothing in
 history like them so far as we are     
aware4 ,in the clash of the two great   
,european organisations--the ,triple    
,alliance and the ,triple ,entente--we  
have all those wild features of         
universal chaos which the writer of the 
,apocalypse saw with prophetic eye as   
ushering in the great day of the ,lord1 
and paving the way for a ,new ,heaven   
and a ,new ,earth4   ,a ,,colossal      
,,upheaval  ,it is a colossal upheaval4 
,but what sort of ,new ,heaven and ,new 
,earth is it likely to usher in8 ,this  
is a question which it is hardly too    
early to discuss1 for it makes a vast   
difference1 to us ,english in especial1 

if1 fighting for what we deem to be a   
just cause1 we can look forward to an   
issue in the long run beneficial to     
ourselves and the world4 ,we know the   
character of the desperate conflict     
which has yet to be accomplished before 
our eyes4 ,everything points to a long  
stern war1 which cannot be completed in 
a single campaign4 ,every one knows that
 ,lord ,kitchener is supposed to have   
prophesied a war of three years1 and we 
can hardly ignore the opinion of so good
 a judge4 ,if we ask why1 the obvious   
answer is that every nation engaged is  
not fighting for mere victory in battle1
 nor yet for extension of territory2 but
 for something more important than      
these4 ,they fight for the triumph of   
their respective ideas1 and it will make
 the greatest difference to ,europe and 
the world which of the ideas is         
eventually conqueror4 ,supposing the    
,german invasion of ,france ends in     
failure2 that1 clearly1 will not finish 
the war4 ,supposing even that ,berlin is

 taken by the ,russians1 we cannot      
affirm that so great an event will      
necessarily complete the campaign4 ,the 
whole of ,germany will have to be       
invaded and subdued1 and that is a      
process which will take a very long time
 even under the most favourable         
auspices4 ,or take the opposite         
hypothesis4 ,let us suppose that the    
,germans capture ,paris1 and manage by  
forced marches to defend their country  
against the ,muscovite incursion4 ,even 
so1 nothing is accomplished of a lasting
 character4 ,france will go on fighting 
as she did after #ahgj1 and we shall be 
found at her side4 ,or1 assuming the    
worst hypothesis of all1 that ,france   
lies prostrate under the heel of her    
,german conqueror1 does any one suppose 
that ,great ,britain will desist from   
fighting8 ,we know perfectly well that1 
with the aid of our ,fleet1 we shall    
still be in a position to defy the      
,german invader and make use of our     
enormous reserves to wear out even      

,teutonic obstinacy4 ,the great sign and
 seal of this battle to the death is the
 recent covenant entered into by the    
three members of the ,triple ,entente4#a
 ,they have declared in the most formal 
fashion1 over the signatures of their   
three representatives1 ,sir ,edward     
,grey1 ,m4 ,paul ,cambon1 and ,count    
,benckendorff1 that they will not make a
 separate peace1 that they will continue
 to act in unison1 and fight1 not as    
three nations1 but as one4 ,perhaps one 
of the least expected results of the    
present conjuncture is that the ,triple 
,entente1 which was supposed to possess 
less cohesive efficiency than the rival 
organisation1 has proved1 on the        
contrary1 the stronger of the two4 ,the 
,triple ,alliance is not true to its    
name4 ,italy1 the third and unwilling   
member1 still preserves her neutrality1 
and declares that her interests are not 
immediately involved4  #a ,subsequently 
joined by ,japan4   ,,never ,,again6    
,in order to attempt to discover the    

vast changes that are likely to come as 
a direct consequence of the present     
,armageddon1 it is necessary to refer in
 brief retrospect to some of the main   
causes and features of the great        
,european war4 ,meanwhile1 ,i think the 
general feeling amongst all thoughtful  
men is best expressed in the phrase1    
,never again4 ,never again must we have 
to face the possibility of such a       
world-wide catastrophe4 ,never again    
must it be possible for the pursuit of  
merely selfish interests to work such   
colossal havoc4 ,never again must we    
have war as the only solution of        
national differences4 ,never again must 
all the arts of peace be suspended while
 ,europe rings to the tramp of armed    
millions4 ,never again must spiritual1  
moral1 artistic culture be submerged    
under a wave of barbarism4 ,never again 
must the ,ruler of this ,universe be    
addressed as the ,god of battles4 ,never
 again shall a new ,wordsworth hail     
carnage as ,god's daughter4 ,the        

illogicality of it all is too patent4   
,that everything which we respect and   
revere in the way of science or thought1
 or culture1 or music1 or poetry1 or    
drama1 should be cast into the          
melting-pot to satisfy dynastic ambition
 is a thing too puerile as well as too  
appalling to be even considered4 ,and   
the horror of it all is something more  
than our nerves will stand4 ,the best   
brains and intellects of ,europe1 the   
brightest and most promising youths1 all
 the manhood everywhere in ,europe to be
 shrivelled and consumed in a holocaust 
like this--it is such a reign of the    
,devil and ,antichrist on earth that it 
must be banished in perpetuity if       
civilisation and progress are to endure4
 ,never again6   ,,unexpected ,,war     
,how did we get into such a stupid and  
appalling calamity8 ,let us think for a 
moment4 ,i do not suppose it would be   
wrong to say that no one ever expected  
war in our days4 ,take up any of the    
recent books4 ,with the exception of the

 fiery martial pamphlets of ,germany1   
the work of a von der ,goltz or a       
,treitschke1 or a ,bernhardi1 we shall  
find a general consensus of opinion that
 war on a large scale was impossible    
because too ruinous1 that the very size 
of the ,european armaments made war     
impracticable4 ,or else1 to take the    
extreme case of ,mr4 ,norman ,angell1   
the entanglements of modern finance were
 said to have put war out of count as an
 absurdity4 ,we were a little too hasty 
in our judgments4 ,it is clear that a   
single determined man1 if he is powerful
 enough1 may embroil ,europe4 ,however  
destructive modern armaments may be1 and
 however costly a campaign may prove1   
yet there are men who will face the cost
 and confront the wholesale destruction 
of life that modern warfare entails4    
,how pitiful it is1 how strange also1 to
 look back upon the solemn asseveration 
of the ,kaiser and the ,tsar1 not so    
many months ago 7,port ,baltic1 ,july   
#aiab71 that the division of ,europe    

into the two great confederations known 
as the ,triple ,alliance and the ,triple
 ,entente provided a safeguard against  
hostilities6 ,we were constantly assured
 that diplomats were working for a      
,balance of ,power1 such an equilibrium 
of rival forces that the total result   
would be stability and peace4           
,arbitration1 too1 was considered by    
many as the panacea1 to say nothing of  
the ,hague ,palace of ,peace4 ,and now  
we discover that nations may possibly   
refer to arbitration points of small    
importance in their quarrels1 but that  
the greater things which are supposed to
 touch national honour and the          
preservation of national life are       
tacitly1 if not formally1 exempted from 
the category of arbitrable disputes4    
,diplomacy1 ,arbitration1 ,palaces of   
,peace seem equally useless4            
,,proximate ,,and ,,ultimate ,,causes   
,in attempting to understand how ,europe
 has 7to use ,lord ,rosebery's phrase7  
rattled into barbarism in the           

uncompromising fashion which we see     
before our eyes1 we must distinguish    
between recent operative causes and     
those more slowly evolving antecedent   
conditions which play a considerable1   
though not necessarily an obvious part  
in the result4 ,recent operative causes 
are such things as the murder of the    
,archduke ,franz ,ferdinand at          
,serajevo1 the consequent ,austrian     
ultimatum to ,servia1 the hasty and     
intemperate action of the ,kaiser in    
forcing war1 and--from a more general   
point of view--the particular form of   
militarism prevalent in ,germany4       
,ulterior antecedent conditions are to  
be found in the changing history of     
,european ,states and their mutual      
relations in the last quarter of a      
century2 the ambition of ,germany to    
create an ,imperial fleet2 the ambition 
of ,germany to have a place in the sun  
and become a large colonial power2 the  
formation of a ,triple ,entente         
following on the formation of a ,triple 

,alliance2 the rivalry between ,teuton  
and ,slav2 and the mutations of         
diplomacy and ,real-politik4 ,it is not 
always possible to keep the two sets of 
causes1 the recent and the ulterior1    
separate1 for they naturally tend either
 to overlap or to interpenetrate one    
another4 ,german ,militarism1 for       
instance1 is only a specific form of the
 general ambition of ,germany1 and the  
,austrian desire to avenge herself on   
,servia is a part of her secular        
animosity towards ,slavdom and its      
protector1 ,russia4 ,nor yet1 when we   
are considering the present dbcle of    
civilisation1 need we interest ourselves
 overmuch in the immediate occasions and
 circumstances of the huge quarrel4 ,we 
want to know not how ,europe flared into
 war1 but why4 ,our object is so to     
understand the present imbroglio as to  
prevent1 if we can1 the possibility for 
the future of any similar world-wide    
catastrophe4   ,,european ,,dictators   
,let us fix our attention on one or two 

salient points4 ,europe has often been  
accustomed to watch with anxiety the    
rise of some potent arbiter of her      
destinies who seems to arrogate to      
himself a large personal dominion4      
,there was ,philip ,,ii4 ,there was     
,louis ,,xiv4 ,there was ,napoleon a    
hundred years ago4 ,then1 a mere shadow 
of his great ancestor1 there was        
,napoleon ,,iii4 ,then1 after the       
,franco-,german war1 there was          
,bismarck4 ,now it is ,kaiser ,wilhelm  
,,ii4 ,the emergence of some ambitious  
personality naturally makes ,europe     
suspicious and watchful1 and leads to   
the formation of leagues and            
confederations against him4 ,the only   
thing1 however1 which seems to have any 
power of real resistance to the         
potential tyrant is not the manoeuvring 
of diplomats1 but the steady growth of  
democracy in ,europe1 which1 in virtue  
of its character and principles1        
steadily objects to the despotism of any
 given individual1 and the arbitrary    

designs of a personal will4 ,we had     
hoped that the spread of democracies in 
all ,european nations would             
progressively render dynastic wars an   
impossibility4 ,the peoples would cry   
out1 we hoped1 against being butchered  
to make a holiday for any latter-day    
,csar4 ,but democracy is a slow growth1 
and exists in very varying degrees of   
strength in different parts of our      
continent4 ,evidently it has not yet    
discovered its own power4 ,we have sadly
 to recognise that its range of         
influence and the new spirit which it   
seeks to introduce into the world are as
 yet impotent against the personal      
ascendancy of a monarch and the old     
conceptions of high politics4 ,european 
democracy is still too vague1 too       
dispersed1 too unorganised1 to prevent  
the breaking out of a bloody            
international conflict4   ,,the         
,,personal ,,factor  ,europe then has   
still to reckon with the personal       
factor--with all its vagaries and its   

desolating ambitions4 ,let us see how   
this has worked in the case before us4  
,in #ahhh the present ,german ,emperor  
ascended the throne4 ,two years         
afterwards1 in ,march #ahij1 the ,pilot 
was dropped--,bismarck resigned4 ,the   
change was something more than a mere   
substitution of men like ,caprivi and   
,hohenlohe for the ,iron ,chancellor4   
,there was involved a radical alteration
 in policy4 ,the ,germany which was the 
ideal of ,bismarck's dreams was an      
exceedingly prosperous self-contained   
country1 which should flourish mainly   
because it developed its internal       
industries as well as paid attention to 
its agriculture1 and secured its        
somewhat perilous position in the centre
 of ,europe by skilful diplomatic means 
of sowing dissension amongst its        
neighbours4 ,thus ,bismarck discouraged 
colonial extensions4 ,he thought they   
might weaken ,germany4 ,on the other    
hand1 he encouraged ,french colonial    
policy1 because he thought it would     

divert the ,french from their           
preoccupation with the idea of revanche4
 ,he played1 more or less successfully1 
with ,england1 sometimes tempting her   
with plausible suggestions that she     
should join the ,teutonic ,empires on   
the ,continent1 sometimes thwarting her 
aims by sowing dissensions between her  
and her nearest neighbour1 ,france4 ,but
 there was one empire which1 certainly1 
,bismarck dreaded not so much because   
she was actually of much importance1 but
 because she might be4 ,that empire was 
,russia4 ,the last thing in the world   
,bismarck desired was precisely that    
approximation between ,france and       
,russia which ended in the strange      
phenomenon of an offensive and defensive
 alliance between a western republic and
 a semi-eastern despotic empire4        
,,kaiser ,,wilhelm  ,kaiser ,wilhelm    
,,ii had very different ideals for      
,germany1 and in many points he simply  
reversed the policy of ,bismarck4 ,he   
began to develop the ,german colonial   

empire1 and in order that it might be   
protected he did all in his power to    
encourage the formation of a large      
,german navy4 ,he even allowed himself  
to say that the future of ,germany was  
on the sea4 ,it was part of that        
peculiar form of personal autocracy     
which the ,kaiser introduced that he    
should from time to time invent phrases 
suggestive of different principles of   
his policy4 ,side by side with the      
assertion that ,germany's future was on 
the sea1 we have the phrases ,germany   
wants her place in the sun and that the 
drag of ,teutonic development is towards
 the ,east4 ,the reality and imminence  
of a yellow peril was another of his    
devices for stimulating the efforts of  
his countrymen4 ,thus the new policy was
 expansion1 evolution as a world-power1 
colonisation2 and each in turn brought  
him up against the older arrangement of 
,european ,powers4 ,his colonial policy1
 especially in ,africa1 led to          
collisions with both ,france and ,great 

,britain4 ,the building of the fleet1   
the ,kiel ,canal1 and other details of  
maritime policy naturally made ,england 
very suspicious1 while the steady drag  
towards the ,east rendered wholly       
unavoidable the conflict between        
,teutonism and the ,slav races4 ,germany
 looked1 undoubtedly1 towards ,asia     
,minor1 and for this reason made great  
advances to and many professions of     
friendship for the ,ottoman ,empire4    
,turkey1 indeed1 in several phrases was 
declared to be the natural ally of      
,germany in the ,near ,east4 ,and if we 
ask why1 the answer nowadays is obvious4
 ,not only was ,turkey to lend herself  
to the encouragement of ,german         
commercial enterprise in ,asia ,minor1  
but she was1 in the judgment of the     
,emperor1 the one power which could in  
time of trouble make herself especially 
obnoxious to ,great ,britain4 ,she could
 encourage revolt in ,egypt1 and still  
more1 through the influence of          
,mahommedanism1 stir up disaffection in 

,india4#b  #b ,turkey has now joined    
,germany4   ,,an ,,aggressive ,,policy  
,and now let us watch this policy in    
action in recent events4 ,in #ahig      
,germany demanded reparation from ,china
 for the recent murder of two ,german   
missionaries4 ,troops were landed at    
,kiao-chau ,bay1 a large pecuniary      
indemnity of about #ce1jjj was refused1 
and ,kiao-chau itself with the adjacent 
territory was ceded to ,germany4 ,that  
was a significant demonstration of the  
,emperor's determination to make his    
country a world-power1 so that1 as was  
stated afterwards1 nothing should occur 
in the whole world in which ,germany    
would not have her say4 ,meanwhile1 in  
,europe itself event after event        
occurred to prove the persistent        
character of ,german aggressiveness4 ,on
 ,march #ca1 #aije1 the ,german ,emperor
 landed at ,tangier1 in order to aid the
 ,sultan of ,morocco in his demand for a
 ,conference of the ,powers to check the
 military dispositions of ,france4 ,m4  

,delcass1 ,france's ,foreign ,minister1 
demurred to this proposal1 asserting    
that a ,conference was wholly           
unnecessary4 ,thereupon ,prince ,blow   
used menacing language1 and ,delcass    
resigned in ,june #aije4 ,the           
,conference of ,algeiras was held in    
,january #aijf1 in which ,austria proved
 herself a brilliant second to ,germany4
 ,two years afterwards1 in #aijh1 came  
still further proofs of ,germany's      
ambition4 ,austria annexed ,bosnia and  
,herzegovina4 ,russia immediately       
protested2 so did most of the other     
,great ,powers4 ,but ,germany at once   
took up the ,austrian cause1 and stood  
in shining armour side by side with her 
ally4 ,inasmuch as ,russia was1 in      
#aijh1 only just recovering from the    
effects of her disastrous war with      
,japan1 and was therefore in no         
condition to take the offensive1 the    
,triple ,alliance gained a distinct     
victory4 ,three years later occurred    
another striking event4 ,in ,july #aiaa 

the world was startled by the news that 
the ,german gunboat ,panther1 joined    
shortly afterwards by the cruiser       
,berlin1 had been sent to ,agadir4      
,clearly ,berlin intended to reopen the 
whole ,moroccan question1 and the       
tension between the ,powers was for some
 time acute4 ,nor did ,mr4 ,lloyd       
,george make it much better by a fiery  
speech at the ,mansion ,house on ,july  
#ba1 which considerably fluttered the   
,continental dovecots4 ,the immediate   
problem1 however1 was solved by the     
cession of about one hundred thousand   
square miles of territory in the ,congo 
basin by ,france to ,germany in         
compensation for ,german acquiescence in
 the ,french protectorate over ,morocco4
 ,i need not1 perhaps1 refer to other   
more recent events4 ,one point1 however1
 must not be omitted4 ,the issue of the 
,balkan wars in #aiab caused a distinct 
disappointment to both ,germany and     
,austria4 ,turkey's defeat lessened the 
importance of the ,ottoman ,empire as an

 ally4 ,austria had to curb her desires 
in the direction of ,salonica4 ,and the 
enemies who had prevented the           
realisation of wide ,teutonic schemes   
were ,servia and her protector1 ,russia4
 ,from this time onwards ,austria waited
 for an opportunity to avenge herself on
 ,servia1 while ,germany1 in close union
 with her ally1 began to study the      
situation in relation to the ,great     
,northern ,empire in an eminently       
bellicose spirit4   ,,militarism  ,now  
that we have the proper standpoint from 
which to watch the general tendency of  
events like these1 we can form some     
estimate of the nature of ,german       
ambition and the results of the personal
 ascendancy of the ,kaiser4 ,we speak   
vaguely of militarism4 ,fortunately1 we 
have a very valuable document to enable 
us to understand what precisely ,german 
militarism signifies4 ,general von      
,bernhardi's ,germany and the ,next ,war
 is one of the most interesting1 as well
 as most suggestive1 of books1 intended 

to illustrate the spirit of ,german     
ambition4 ,bernhardi writes like a      
soldier4 ,such philosophy as he         
possesses he has taken from ,nietzsche4 
,his applications of history come from  
,treitschke4 ,he has persuaded himself  
that the main object of human life is   
war1 and the higher the nation the more 
persistently must it pursue preparations
 for war4 ,hence the best men in the    
,state are the fighting men4 ,ethics and
 religion1 so far as they deprecate     
fighting and plead for peace1 are       
absolutely pernicious4 ,culture does not
 mean1 as we hoped and thought1 the best
 development of scientific and artistic 
enlightenment1 but merely an            
all-absorbing will-power1 an            
all-devouring ambition to be on the top 
and to crush every one else4 ,the       
assumption throughout is that the       
,german is the highest specimen of      
humanity4 ,germany is especially        
qualified to be the leader1 and the only
 way in which it can become the leader  

is to have such overwhelming military   
power that no one has any chance of     
resisting4 ,moreover1 all methods are   
justified in the sacred cause of ,german
 culture--duplicity1 violence1 the      
deliberate sowing of dissensions between
 possible rivals1 incitements of        
,asiatics to rise against ,europeans4   
,all means are to be adopted to win the 
ultimate great victory1 and1 of course1 
when the struggle comes there must be no
 misplaced leniency to any of the       
inferior races who interpose between    
,germany and her legitimate place in the
 sun4#c ,the ideal is almost too nave   
and too ferocious to be conceived by    
ordinary minds4 ,yet here it all stands 
in black and white4 ,according to       
,bernhardi's volume ,german militarism  
means at least two things4 ,first the   
suppression of every other nationality  
except the ,german2 second the          
suppression of the whole civilian       
element in the population under the heel
 of the ,german drill-sergeant4 ,is it  

any wonder that the recent war has been 
conducted by ,berlin with such appalling
 barbarism and ferocity8  #c ,germany   
and the ,next ,war1 by ,f4 von          
,bernhardi4 ,see especially ,chap4 ,v1  
,world-,power or ,downfall4 ,other works
 which may be consulted are ,professor  
,j4,a4 ,cramb's ,germany and ,england   
7esp4 pp4 #aaa-aab7 and ,professor      
,usher's ,pan-,germanism4   ,,the       
,,evils ,,of ,,autocracy  ,our inquiry  
so far has led to two conclusions4 ,we  
have discovered by bitter experience    
that a personal ascendancy1 such as the 
,german ,emperor wields1 is in the      
highest degree perilous to the interests
 of peace3 and that a militarism such as
 that which holds in its thrall the     
,german ,empire is an open menace to    
intellectual culture and to ,christian  
ethics4 ,but we must not suppose that   
these conclusions are only true so far  
as they apply to the ,teutonic race1 and
 that the same phenomena observed       
elsewhere are comparatively innocuous4  

,alas6 autocracy in any and every       
country seems to be inimical to the best
 and highest of social needs1 and       
militarism1 wherever found1 is the enemy
 of pacific social development4 ,let us 
take a few instances at haphazard of the
 danger of the personal factor in       
,european politics4 ,there is hardly a  
person to be found nowadays who defends 
the ,crimean war1 or indeed thinks that 
it was in any sense inevitable4 ,yet if 
there was one man more than another     
whose personal will brought it about1 it
 was--not ,lord ,aberdeen who ought to  
have been responsible--but ,lord        
,stratford de ,redcliffe4 ,the great    
,eltchi1 as he was called1 was our      
,ambassador at ,constantinople1 a man of
 uncommon strength of will1 which1 as is
 often the case with these powerful     
natures1 not infrequently degenerated   
into sheer obstinacy4 ,he had made up   
his mind that ,england was to support   
,turkey and fight with ,russia1 and     
inasmuch as ,louis ,napoleon1 for the   

sake of personal glory1 had similar     
opinions1 ,france as well as ,england   
was dragged into a costly and quite     
useless war4 ,napoleon ,,iii has already
 figured among those aspiring monarchs  
who wish to sit in the chair of ,europe4
 ,it was his personal will once more    
which sent the unhappy ,maximilian to   
his death in ,mexico1 and his personal  
jealousy of ,prussia which launched him 
in the fatal enterprise  ,berlin in     
#ahgj4 ,in the latter case we find      
another personal influence1 still more  
sinister--that of the ,empress ,eugnie1 
whose capricious ambition and           
interference in military matters        
directly led to the ruinous disaster of 
,sedan4 ,the ,french people1 who had to 
suffer1 discovered it too late4         
,quicquid delirant reges plectuntur     
,achivi4 ,or take another more recent   
instance4 ,who was responsible for the  
,russo-,japanese war8 ,not ,kuropatkin1 
assuredly1 nor yet the ,russian ,prime  
,minister1 but certain of the ,grand    

,dukes and probably the ,tsar himself1  
who were interested in the forests of   
the ,yalu district and had no mind to   
lose the money they had invested in a   
purely financial operation4 ,the truth  
is that modern ,europe has no room for  
prancing ,pro-consuls1 and no longer    
takes stock in autocrats4 ,they are1 or 
ought to be1 superannuated1 out of date4
 ,to use an expressive colloquialism    
they are a back number4 ,the progress of
 the world demands the development of   
peoples2 it has no use for medival      
monarchies like that of ,potsdam4 ,one  
of the things we ought to banish for    
ever is the horrible idea that whole    
nations can be massacred and            
civilisation indefinitely postponed to  
suit the individual caprice of a        
bragging and self-opinionated despot who
 calls himself ,god's elect4 ,now that  
we know the ruin he can cause1 let us   
fight shy of the ,superman1 and the     
whole range of ideas which he connotes4 
,,the ,,military ,,caste  ,militarism is

 another of our maladies4 ,here we must 
distinguish with some care4 ,a military 
spirit is one thing3 militarism is      
another4 ,it is probable that no nation 
is worthy to survive which does not     
possess a military spirit1 or1 in other 
words1 the instinct to defend itself and
 its liberties against an aggressor4 ,it
 is a virtue which is closely interfused
 with high moral                        
qualities--self-respect1 a proper pride1
 self-reliance--and is compatible with  
real modesty and sobriety of mind4 ,but 
militarism has nothing ethical about it4
 ,it is not courage1 but sheer pugnacity
 and quarrelsomeness1 and as exemplified
 in our modern history it means the     
dominion of a clique1 the reign of a few
 self-opinionated officials4 ,that these
 individuals should possess only a      
limited intelligence is almost          
inevitable4 ,existing for the purposes  
of war1 they naturally look at          
everything from an oblique and perverted
 point of view4 ,they regard nations1   

not as peaceful communities of citizens1
 but as material to be worked up into   
armies4 ,their assumption is that war1  
being an indelible feature in the       
history of our common humanity1 must be 
ceaselessly prepared for by the piling  
up of huge armaments and weapons of     
destruction4 ,their invariable motto is 
that if you wish for peace you must     
prepare for war--si vis pacem1 para     
bellum--a notoriously false apophthegm1 
because armaments are provocative1 not  
soothing1 and the man who is a          
swash-buckler invites attack4 ,it is    
needless to say that thousands of       
military men do not belong to this      
category3 no one dreads war so much as  
the man who knows what it means4 ,i am  
not speaking of individuals1 ,i am      
speaking of a particular caste1 military
 officials in the abstract1 if you like 
to put it so1 who1 because their        
business is war1 have not the slightest 
idea what the pacific social development
 of a people really means4 ,militarism  

is simply a one-sided1 partial point of 
view1 and to enforce that upon a nation 
is as though a man with a pronounced    
squint were to be accepted as a man of  
normal vision4 ,we have seen what it    
involves in ,germany4 ,in a less        
offensive form1 however1 it exists in   
most states1 and its root idea is       
usually that the civilian as such       
belongs to a lower order of humanity1   
and is not so important to the ,state as
 the officer who discharges vague and   
for the most part useless functions in  
the ,war ,office4#d ,it is a swollen1   
over-developed militarism that has got  
us into the present mess1 and one of our
 earliest concerns1 when the storm is   
over1 must be to put it into its proper 
place4 ,let him who uses the sword      
perish by the sword4  #d ,thus it was   
the ,military party in ,bulgaria which  
drove her to the disastrous second      
,balkan war1 and the ,military party in 
,austria which insisted on the ultimatum
 to ,servia4   ,,diplomacy  ,and ,i fear

 that there is another ancient piece of 
our international strategy which has    
been found wanting4 ,i approach with    
some hesitation the subject of          
diplomacy1 because it contains so many  
elements of value to a state1 and has   
given so many opportunities for active  
and original minds4 ,its worst feature  
is that its operations have to be       
conducted in secret3 its best is that it
 affords a fine exemplification of the  
way in which the history and fortunes of
 states are--to their                   
advantage--dependent upon the initiative
 of gifted and patriotic individuals4   
,but if we look back over the history of
 recent years1 we shall discover that   
diplomacy has not fulfilled its especial
 mission4 ,according to a well-known    
cynical dictum a diplomatist is a man   
who is paid to lie for his country4     
,and1 indeed1 it is one of the least    
gracious aspects of the diplomatic      
career that it seems necessarily to     
involve the use of a certain amount of  

chicanery and falsehood1 the object     
being to jockey opponents by means of   
skilful ruses into a position in which  
they find themselves at a disadvantage4 
,clearly1 however1 there are better aims
 than these for diplomacy--one aim in   
particular1 which is the preservation of
 peace4 ,a diplomat is supposed to have 
failed if the result of his work leads  
to war4 ,it is not his business to bring
 about war4 ,any king or prime minister 
or general can do that1 very often with 
conspicuous ease4 ,a diplomat is a      
skilful statesman versed in             
international politics1 who makes the   
best provision he can for the interests 
of his country1 carefully steering it   
away from those rocks of angry hostility
 on which possibly his good ship may    
founder4   ,,balance ,,of ,,power  ,now 
what has diplomacy done for us during   
the last few years8 ,it has formed      
certain understandings and alliances    
between different states2 it has tried  
to safeguard our position by creating   

sympathetic bonds with those nations who
 are allied to us in policy4 ,it has    
also attempted to produce that kind of  
,balance of ,power in ,europe which on  
its own showing makes for peace4 ,this  
,balance of ,power1 so often and so     
mysteriously alluded to by the          
diplomatic world1 has become a veritable
 fetish4 ,perhaps its supreme           
achievement was reached when two        
autocratic monarchs--the ,tsar of       
,russia and the ,german                 
,emperor--solemnly propounded a         
statement1 as we have seen1 at ,port    
,baltic that the ,balance of ,power1 as 
distributed between the ,triple         
,alliance and the ,triple ,entente1 had 
proved itself valuable in the interests 
of ,european peace4 ,that was only two  
years ago1 and the thing seems a mockery
 now4 ,if we examine precisely what is  
meant by a ,balance of ,power1 we shall 
see that it presupposes certain         
conditions of animosity and attempts to 
neutralise them by the exhibition of    

superior or1 at all events1 equivalent  
forces4 ,a ,balance of ,power in the    
continental system assumes1 for all     
practical purposes1 that the nations of 
,europe are ready to fly at each other's
 throats1 and that the only way to deter
 them is to make them realise how       
extremely perilous to themselves would  
be any such military enterprise4 ,can   
any one doubt that this is the real     
meaning of the phrase8 ,if we listen to 
the ,delphic oracles of diplomacy on    
this subject of the ,balance of ,power1 
we shall understand that in nine cases  
out of ten a man invoking this phrase   
means that he wants the ,balance of     
,power to be favourable to himself4 ,it 
is not so much an exact equipoise that  
he desires1 as a certain tendency of the
 scales to dip in his direction4 ,if    
,germany feels herself weak she not only
 associates ,austria and ,italy with    
herself1 but looks eastward to get the  
assistance of ,turkey1 or1 perhaps1     
attempts--as it so happens without any  

success--to create sympathy for herself 
in the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,if1
 on the other hand1 ,france feels       
herself in danger1 she not only forms an
 alliance with ,russia1 but also an     
entente with ,england and1 on the       
principle that the friends of one's     
friends ought to be accepted1 produces a
 further entente between ,england and   
,russia4 ,england1 on her part1 if for  
whatever reason she feels that she is   
liable to attack1 goes even so far as to
 make an alliance with an ,asiatic      
nation--,japan--in order to safeguard   
her ,asiatic interests in ,india4 ,thus1
 when diplomatists invoke the necessity 
of a ,balance of ,power1 they are really
 trying to work for a preponderance of  
power on their side4 ,it is inevitable  
that this should be so4 ,an exact       
,balance of ,power must result in a     
stalemate4   ,,change ,,of ,,policy     
,observe what has happened to ,great    
,britain during recent years4 ,when she 
was ruled by that extremely clear-headed

 though obstinate statesman1 ,lord      
,salisbury1 she remained1 at his advice1
 outside the circle of continental      
entanglements and rejoiced in what was  
known as a policy of ,splendid          
,isolation4 ,it was1 of course1 a       
selfish policy4 ,it rested on sound     
geographical grounds1 because1 making   
use of the fortunate accident that      
,great ,britain is an island1 it        
suggested that she could pursue her own 
commercial career and1 thanks to the    
,english ,channel1 let the whole of the 
rest of the world go hang4 ,such a      
position could not possibly last1 partly
 because ,great ,britain is not only an 
island1 but also an empire scattered    
over the seven seas2 partly because we  
could not remain alien from those social
 and economic interests which           
necessarily link our career with        
continental nations4 ,so we became part 
of the continental system1 and it became
 necessary for us to choose friends and 
partners and mark off other peoples as  

our enemies4 ,it might have been        
possible a certain number of years ago  
for us to join the ,triple ,alliance4   
,at one time ,prince ,blow seemed       
anxious that we should do so1 and ,mr4  
,chamberlain on our side was by no means
 unwilling4 ,but gradually we discovered
 that ,germany was intensely jealous of 
us as a colonial power and as a great   
sea-power1 and for this reason1 as well 
as for others1 we preferred to compose  
our ancient differences with ,france and
 promote an understanding between       
,english and ,french as the nearest of  
neighbours and the most convenient of   
allies4 ,observe1 however1 that every   
step in the process was a challenge1 and
 a challenge which the rival aimed at   
could not possibly ignore4 ,the         
conclusion of the ,french ,entente      
,cordiale in #aijd1 the launching of the
 ,dreadnought in #aijf1 the formation of
 the ,russian agreement in #aijg1 and   
certain changes which we made in our own
 army were obviously intended as        

warnings to ,germany that we were       
dangerous people to attack4#e ,germany  
naturally sought reprisals in her       
fashion1 and gradually ,europe was      
transformed into a huge armed camp1     
divided into two powerful organisations 
which necessarily watched each other    
with no friendly gaze4  #e ,see ,the    
,war of ,steel and ,gold1 by ,h4,n4     
,brailsford 7,bell7--opening chapter on 
,the ,balance of ,power4   ,,balance    
,,or ,,concert8  ,i do not say that the 
course of events could possibly have    
been altered4 ,when once we became part 
of the continental system1 it was       
necessary for us to choose between      
friends and enemies4 ,i only say that if
 diplomacy calls itself an agency for   
preventing war1 it cannot be said to be 
altogether successful4 ,its famous      
doctrine of a ,balance of ,power is in  
reality a mere phrase4 ,if one          
combination be represented as ,x and the
 other as ,y1 and ,x increases itself up
 to ,x#b1 it becomes necessary that ,y  

should similarly increase itself to     
,y#b1 a process which1 clearly1 does not
 make for peace4 ,i should imagine that 
the best of diplomatists are quite aware
 of this4 ,indeed1 there seems reason to
 suppose that ,sir ,edward ,grey1 owing 
to definite experience in the last two  
years1 not only discovered the          
uselessness of the principle of a       
,balance of ,power1 but did his best to 
substitute something entirely           
different--the ,concert of ,europe4 ,all
 the negotiations he conducted during   
and after the two ,balkan wars1 his     
constant effort to summon ,london       
,conferences and other things1 were     
intended to create a ,concert of        
,european ,powers1 discussing amongst   
themselves the best measures to secure  
the peace of the world4 ,alas6 the whole
 of the fabric was destroyed1 the fair  
prospects hopelessly clouded over1 by   
the intemperate ambition of the ,kaiser1
 who1 just because he believed that the 
,balance of ,power was favourable to    

himself1 that ,russia was unready1 that 
,france was involved in serious domestic
 trouble1 that ,england was on the brink
 of civil war1 set fire to the magazine 
and engineered the present colossal     
explosion4   ,,control ,,of ,,foreign   
,,policy  ,one cannot feel sure that    
diplomacy as hitherto recognised will be
 able1 or1 indeed1 ought to be able1 to 
survive the shock4 ,in this country1 as 
in others1 diplomacy has been considered
 a highly specialised science1 which can
 only be conducted by trained men and by
 methods of entire secrecy4 ,as a mere  
matter of fact1 ,england has far less   
control over her foreign policy than any
 of the continental ,powers4 ,in        
,germany foreign affairs come before the
 ,reichstag1 in ,france they are        
surveyed by the ,senate1 in ,america    
there is a special department of the    
,senate empowered to deal with foreign  
concerns4 ,in ,great ,britain there is  
nothing of the kind4 ,parliament has    
practically no control whatsoever over  

foreign affairs1 it is not even         
consulted in the formation of treaties  
and arrangements with other nations4    
,nor yet has the ,cabinet any real      
control1 because it must act together as
 a whole1 and a determined criticism of 
a foreign secretary means the           
resignation of the ,government4         
,fortunately1 our diplomacy has been    
left for the most part in very able     
hands4 ,nevertheless1 it is surely a    
paradox that the ,english people should 
know so little about foreign affairs as 
to be absolutely incapable of any       
control in questions that affect their  
life or death4 ,democracy1 though it is 
supposed to be incompetent to manage    
foreign relations1 could hardly have    
made a worse mess of it than the        
highly-trained ,chancelleries4 ,when the
 new ,europe arises out of the ashes of 
the old1 it is not very hazardous to    
prophesy that diplomacy1 with its secret
 methods1 its belief in phrases and     
abstract principles1 and its assumption 

of a special professional knowledge1    
will find the range of its powers and   
the sphere of its authority sensibly    
curtailed4     ,,chapter ,,ii  ,,lessons
 ,,of ,,the ,,past   ,the problems that 
lie before us in the reconstitution of  
,europe are so many and so various that 
we can only hope to take a few          
separately1 especially those which seem 
to throw most light on a possible       
future4 ,i have used the phrase         
reconstitution of ,europe1 because ,i do
 not know how otherwise to characterise 
the general trend of the ideas          
germinating in many men's minds as they 
survey the present crisis and its       
probable outcome4 ,europe will have to  
be reconstituted in more respects than  
one4 ,at the present moment1 or rather  
before the present war broke out1 it was
 governed by phrases and conceptions    
which had become superannuated4 ,an     
uneasy equipoise between the ,great     
,powers represented the highest         
culmination of our diplomatic efforts4  

,something must clearly be substituted  
for this uneasy equipoise4 ,it is not   
enough that after tremendous efforts the
 relative balance of forces between     
great states should1 on the whole1      
dissuade them from war4 ,as a matter of 
fact1 it has not done so4 ,the          
underlying conception has been that     
nations are so ardently bellicose that  
they require to be restrained from      
headlong conflicts by the doubtful and  
dangerous character of such military    
efforts as might be practicable4 ,hence 
,europe1 as divided into armed camps1   
represents one of the old-fashioned     
ideas that we want to abolish4 ,we wish 
to put in its stead something like a    
,concert of ,europe4 ,we have before our
 eyes a vague1 but inspiring vision not 
of tremendous and rival armaments1 but  
of a ,united ,states of ,europe1 each   
component element striving for the      
public weal1 and for further advances in
 general cultivation and welfare rather 
than commercial prosperity4 ,the last is

 a vital point1 for it does not require 
much knowledge of modern history to     
discover that the race for commercial   
advantage is exactly one of the reasons 
why ,europe is at war at the present    
moment4 ,a vast increase in the         
commercial prosperity of any one state  
means a frantic effort on the part of   
its rivals to pull down this advantage4 
,in some fashion1 therefore1 we have to 
substitute for endless competition the  
principle of co-operation1 national     
welfare being construed at the same time
 not in terms of overwhelming wealth1   
but of thorough sanity and health in the
 body corporate4   ,,naked ,,strength   
,all this sounds shadowy and abstruse   
until it is translated into something   
concrete and definite4 ,what is it we   
want to dispossess and banish from the  
,europe of to-day8 ,we have to find     
something to take the place of what is  
called militarism4 ,i dealt with the    
general features of militarism in my    
last essay2 ,i will therefore content   

myself with saying that militarism in   
,europe has meant two things above all4 
,first1 the worship of might1 as        
expressed in formidable armaments2 next1
 the corresponding worship of wealth to 
enable the burden of armaments to be    
borne with comparative ease4 ,the       
worship of naked strength involves      
several deductions4 ,right disappears1  
or rather is translated in terms of     
might4 ,international morality equally  
disappears4 ,individuals1 it is true1   
seek to be governed by the consciousness
 of universal moral laws4 ,but a nation1
 as such1 has no conscience1 and is not 
bound to recognise the supremacy of     
anything higher than itself4 ,morality1 
though it may bind the individual1 does 
not bind the ,state1 or1 as ,general von
 ,bernhardi has expressed it1 political 
morality differs from individual        
morality because there is no power above
 the ,state4 ,in similar fashion the    
worship of wealth carries numerous      
consequences with it1 which are well    

worthy of consideration4 ,but the main  
point1 so far as it affects my present  
argument1 is that it substitutes        
materialistic objects of endeavour for  
ethical and spiritual aims4 ,once more  
morality is defeated4 ,the ideal is not 
the supremacy of good1 but the supremacy
 of that range and sphere of material   
efficiency that is procurable by wealth4
   ,,public ,,right  ,let us try to be  
more concrete still1 and in this context
 let us turn to such definite statements
 as are available of the views          
entertained by our chief statesmen1     
politicians1 and leaders of public      
opinion4 ,i turn to the speech which    
,mr4 ,asquith delivered on ,friday      
evening1 ,september #be1 in ,dublin1 as 
part of the crusade which he and others 
are undertaking for the general         
enlightenment of the country4 ,i should 
like1 said ,mr4 ,asquith1 to ask your   
attention and that of my                
fellow-countrymen to the end which1 in  
this war1 we ought to keep in view4     

,forty-four years ago1 at the time of   
the war of #ahgj1 ,mr4 ,gladstone used  
these words4 ,he said3 ',the greatest   
triumph of our time will be the         
enthronement of the idea of public right
 as the governing idea of ,european     
politics4' ,nearly fifty years have     
passed4 ,little progress1 it seems1 has 
as yet been made towards that good and  
beneficent change1 but it seems to me to
 be now at this moment as good a        
definition as we can have of our        
,european policy--the idea of public    
right4 ,what does it mean when          
translated into concrete terms8 ,it     
means1 first and foremost1 the clearing 
of the ground by the definite           
repudiation of militarism as the        
governing factor in the relation of     
states and of the future moulding of the
 ,european world4 ,it means next that   
room must be found and kept for the     
independent existence and the free      
development of the smaller              
nationalities1 each with a corporate    

consciousness of its own4444 ,and it    
means1 finally1 or it ought to mean1    
perhaps1 by a slow and gradual process1 
the substitution for force1 for the     
clash of competing ambition1 for        
groupings and alliances1 of a real      
,european partnership based on the      
recognition of equal right and          
established and enforced by a common    
will4#f  ,much the same language has    
been used by ,sir ,edward ,grey and by  
,mr4 ,winston ,churchill4  #f ,the      
,times1 ,september #bf4   ,a ,,common   
,,will  ,observe that there are three   
points here4 ,in the first place--if ,i 
do not misapprehend ,mr4 ,asquith's     
drift--in working for the abolition of  
militarism1 we are working for a great  
diminution in those armaments which have
 become a nightmare to the modern world4
 ,the second point is that we have to   
help in every fashion small             
nationalities1 or1 in other words1 that 
we have to see that countries like      
,belgium1 ,holland1 ,switzerland1 the   

,scandinavian countries1 ,greece and the
 ,balkan ,states1 and1 perhaps1 more    
specially1 the ,slav nationalities shall
 have a free chance in ,europe1 shall   
have their place in the sun1 and not be 
browbeaten and raided and overwhelmed by
 their powerful neighbours4 ,and the    
third point1 perhaps more important than
 all1 is the creation of what ,mr4      
,asquith calls a ,european partnership  
based on the recognition of equal right 
and established and enforced by a common
 will4 ,we have to recognise that there 
is such a thing as public right2 that   
there is such a thing as international  
morality1 and that the ,united ,states  
of ,europe have to keep as their ideal  
the affirmation of this public right1   
and to enforce it by a common will4     
,that creation of a common will is at   
once the most difficult and the most    
imperative thing of all4 ,every one must
 be aware how difficult it is4 ,we know1
 for instance1 how the common law is    
enforced in any specified state1 because

 it has a sanction1 or1 in other words1 
because those who break it can be       
punished4 ,but the weakness for a long  
time past of international law1 from the
 time of ,grotius onwards1 is that it   
apparently has no real sanction4 ,how   
are we to punish an offending state8 ,it
 can only be done by the gradual        
development of a public conscience in   
,europe1 and by means of definite       
agreements so that the rest of the      
civilised world shall compel a          
recalcitrant member to abide by the     
common decrees4 ,if only this common    
will of ,europe ever came into          
existence1 we should have solved most1  
if not all1 our troubles4 ,but the      
question is3 ,how8   ,a ,,hundred       
,,years ,,ago  ,it may be depressing1   
but it certainly is an instructive      
lesson to go back just a hundred years  
ago1 when the condition of ,europe was  
in many respects similar to that which  
prevails now4 ,the problems that        
unrolled themselves before the nations  

afford useful points of comparison4 ,the
 great enemy was then ,napoleon and     
,france4 ,napoleon's views of empire    
were precisely of that universal        
predatory type which we have learnt to  
associate with the ,kaiser and the      
,german ,empire4 ,the autocratic rule of
 the single personal will was weighing  
heavily on nearly every quarter of the  
globe4 ,then came a time when the       
principle of nationality1 which         
,napoleon had everywhere defied1        
gradually grew in strength until it was 
able to shake off the yoke of the       
conqueror4 ,in ,germany1 and ,spain1 and
 ,italy the principle of nationality    
steadily grew1 while in ,england there  
had always been a steady opposition to  
the tyranny of ,napoleon on the precise 
ground that it interfered with the      
independent existence of nations4 ,the  
defeat of ,napoleon1 therefore1 was     
hailed by our forefathers a hundred     
years ago as the dawn of a new era4     
,four great ,powers--,great ,britain1   

,russia1 ,austria1 and ,prussia--had    
before them as their task the settlement
 of ,europe1 one of the noblest tasks   
that could possibly be assigned to those
 who1 having suffered under the old     
regime1 were desirous to secure peace   
and base it on just and equitable       
foundations4 ,there is thus an obvious  
parallelism between the conditions of   
affairs in #ahae and those which will1  
as we hope1 obtain if and when the      
,german tyrant is defeated and the      
nations of ,europe commence their solemn
 task of reconstituting ,europe4 ,of    
course1 we must not press the analogy   
too far4 ,the dawn of a new era might   
have been welcomed in #ahae1 but the    
proviso was always kept in the          
background that most of the older       
traditions should be preserved4         
,diplomacy was still inspired by its    
traditional watchwords4 ,above all1 the 
transformation so keenly and so vaguely 
desired was in the hands of sovereigns  
who were more anxious about their own   

interests than perhaps was consistent   
with the common weal4   ,,equilibrium   
,at first the four ,great ,powers       
proceeded very tentatively4 ,they wished
 to confine ,france--the dangerous      
element in ,europe--within her          
legitimate boundaries4 ,next1 they      
desired to arrange an equilibrium of    
,powers 7observe1 in passing1 the old   
doctrine of the ,balance of ,power7 so  
that no individual state should for the 
future be in a position to upset the    
general tranquillity4 ,revolutionary    
,france was to be held under by the     
re-establishment of its ancient dynasty4
 ,hence ,louis ,,xviii was to be        
restored4 ,the other object was to be   
obtained by a careful parcelling out of 
the various territories of ,europe1 on  
the basis1 so far as possible1 of old   
rights consecrated by treaties4 ,it is  
unnecessary to go into detail in this   
matter4 ,we may say summarily that      
,germany was reconstituted as a         
,confederation of ,sovereign ,states2   

,austria received the ,presidency of the
 ,federal ,diet2 in ,italy              
,lombardo-,venetia was erected into a   
kingdom under ,austrian hegemony1 while 
the ,low ,countries were annexed to the 
crown of ,holland so as to form1 under  
the title of the ,united ,netherlands1  
an efficient barrier against ,french    
aggression northwards4 ,it was          
troublesome to satisfy ,alexander ,i of 
,russia because of his ambition to      
secure for himself the kingdom of       
,poland4 ,indeed1 as we shall see       
presently1 the personality of ,alexander
 was a permanent stumbling-block to most
 of the projects of ,european statesmen4
 ,as a whole1 it cannot be denied that  
this particular period of history1      
between ,napoleon's abdication in #ahad 
and the meeting of the ,european        
,congress at ,verona in #ahhb1 presented
 a profoundly distressing picture of    
international egotism4 ,the ruin of     
their common enemy1 relieving the       
members of the ,european family from the

 necessity of maintaining concord1 also 
released their individual selfishnesses 
and their long-suppressed mutual        
jealousies4#g  #g ,see ,the             
,confederation of ,europe1 by ,walter   
,alison ,phillips 7,longmans71 esp4     
,chapters ,v and ,,vi4 ,cf4 also        
,political and ,literary ,essays1 by the
 ,earl of ,cromer1 #bnd series          
7,macmillan71 on ,the ,confederation of 
,europe4   ,,the ,,holy ,,alliance  ,the
 figure of ,alexander ,i dominates this 
epoch4 ,his character exhibits a very   
curious mixture of autocratic ambition  
and a mystical vein of sheer undiluted  
idealism4 ,probably it would be true to 
say that he began by being an idealist1 
and was forced by the pressure of events
 to adopt reactionary tactics4 ,perhaps 
also1 deeply embedded in the ,russian   
nature we generally find a certain      
unpracticalness and a tendency to       
mystical dreams1 far remote from the    
ordinary necessities of every day4 ,it  
was ,alexander's dream to found a ,union

 of ,europe1 and to consecrate its      
political by its spiritual aims4 ,he    
retained various nebulous thinkers      
around his throne2 he also derived much 
of his crusade from the inspiration of a
 woman--,baroness von ,krdener1 who is  
supposed to have owed her own conversion
 to the teaching of a pious cobbler4    
,even if we have to describe            
,alexander's dream as futile1 we cannot 
afford to dismiss it as wholly          
inoperative4 ,for it had as its fruit   
the so-called ,holy ,alliance1 which was
 in a sense the direct ancestor of the  
peace programmes of the ,hague1 and1    
through a different chain of ideas1 the 
,monroe ,doctrine of the ,united        
,states4 ,we are apt sometimes to       
confuse the ,holy ,alliance with the    
,grand ,alliance4 ,the second1 however1 
was a union of the four ,great ,powers1 
to which ,france was ultimately         
admitted4 ,the first was not an alliance
 at all1 hardly1 perhaps1 even a treaty4
 ,it was in its original conception a   

single-hearted attempt to arrange       
,europe on the principles of the        
,christian religion1 the various nations
 being regarded as brothers who ought to
 have proper brotherly affection for one
 another4 ,we know that1 eventually1 the
 ,holy ,alliance became an instrument of
 something like autocratic despotism1   
but in its essence it was so far from   
being reactionary that1 according to the
 ,emperor ,alexander1 it involved the   
grant of liberal constitutions by       
princes to their subjects4              
,,diplomatic ,,criticism  ,but just     
because it bound its signatories to act 
on certain vague principles for no      
well-defined ends1 it was bound to      
become the mockery of diplomatists      
trained in an older school4 ,metternich1
 for instance1 called it a loud sounding
 nothing2 ,castlereagh a piece of       
sublime mysticism and nonsense1 while   
,canning declared that for his part he  
wanted no more of ,areopagus and the    
like of that4 ,what happened on this    

occasion is what ordinarily happens with
 well-intentioned idealists who happen  
also to be amateur statesmen4 ,trying to
 regulate practical politics1 the ,holy 
,alliance was deflected from its        
original purpose because its chief      
author1 ,alexander ,i1 came under the   
influence of ,metternich and was        
frightened by revolutionary movements in
 ,italy and within his own dominions4   
,thus the instrument originally intended
 to preserve nationalities and secure   
the constitutional rights of people was 
converted into a weapon for the use of  
autocrats only anxious to preserve their
 own thrones4 ,nevertheless1 though it  
may have been a failure1 the ,holy      
,alliance did not leave itself without  
witness in the modern world4 ,it tried  
to regulate ordinary diplomacy in       
accordance with ethical and spiritual   
principles2 and the dreaming mind of its
 first founder was reproduced in that   
later descendant of his who initiated   
the ,hague propaganda of peace4         

,,failure  ,these things were written   
for our ensamples1 and we should be     
foolish indeed if we did not take stock 
of them with an anxious eye to the      
future4 ,the main and startling fact is 
that with every apparent desire for the 
re-establishment of ,europe on better   
lines1 ,europe1 as a matter of fact1    
drifted back into the old welter of     
conflicting nationalities1 while the    
very instrument of peace--the ,holy     
,alliance--was used by autocratic       
governments for the subjection of       
smaller nationalities and the           
destruction of popular freedom4 ,it is  
accordingly very necessary that we      
should study the conditions under which 
so startling a transformation took      
place4 ,even in ,england herself it     
cannot be said that the people were in  
any sense benefited by the conclusions  
of the war4 ,they had borne its burdens1
 but at its end found themselves        
hampered as before in the free          
development of a democracy4 ,meanwhile1 

,europe at large presented a spectacle  
of despotism tempered by occasional     
popular outbreaks1 while in the majority
 of cases the old fetters were riveted  
anew by cunning and by no means         
disinterested hands4   ,a ,,deceptive   
,,parallel  ,what we have to ask        
ourselves is whether the conditions a   
hundred years ago have any real         
similarity with those likely to obtain  
when ,europe begins anew to set its     
house in order4 ,to this1 fortunately1  
we can return a decided negative4 ,we   
have already shown that the general     
outlines present a certain similarity1  
but the parallelism is at most          
superficial1 and in many respects       
deceptive4 ,a despot has to be          
overthrown1 an end has to be put to a   
particular form of autocratic regime1   
and smaller states have to be protected 
against the exactions of their stronger 
neighbours--that is the extent of the   
analogy4 ,but it is to be hoped that we 
shall commence our labours under much   

better auspices4 ,the personal forces   
involved1 for instance1 are wholly      
different4 ,amongst those who took upon 
themselves to solve the problems of the 
time is to be found the widest possible 
divergence in character and aims4 ,on   
the one side we have a sheer mystic and 
idealist in the person of ,alexander ,i1
 with all kinds of visionary characters 
at his side--,la ,harpe1 who was his    
tutor1 a ,jacobin pure and simple1 and a
 fervent apostle of the teachings of    
,jean ,jacques ,rousseau2 ,czartoryski1 
a ,pole1 sincerely anxious for the      
regeneration of his kingdom2 and ,capo  
d',istria1 a champion of ,greek         
nationality4 ,to these we have to add   
the curious figure of the ,baroness von 
,krdener1 an admirable representative of
 the religious sickliness of the age4 ,i
 have immense things to say to him1 she 
said1 referring to the ,emperor1 the    
,lord alone can prepare his heart to    
receive them4 ,she had1 indeed1 many    
things to say to him1 but her influence 

was evanescent and his ,imperial heart  
was hardened eventually to quite        
different issues4   ,,metternich        
,absolutely at the other extreme was a  
man like ,metternich1 trained in the old
 school of politics1 wily with the      
wiliness of a practised diplomatic      
training1 naturally impatient of        
speculative dreamers1 thoroughly        
practical in the only sense in which he 
understood the term1 that is to say1    
determined to preserve ,austrian        
supremacy4 ,to a reactionary of this    
kind the ,holy ,alliance represented    
nothing but words4 ,he knew1 with the   
cynicism bred of long experience of     
mankind1 that the rivalries and         
jealousies between different states     
would prevent their union in any common 
purpose1 and in the long run the        
intensity with which he pursued his     
objects1 narrow and limited as it was1  
prevailed over the large and vague      
generosity of ,alexander's nature4 ,to  
the same type belonged both ,talleyrand 

and ,richelieu1 who concentrated        
themselves on the single task of winning
 back for ,france her older position in 
the ,european commonwealth--a laudable  
aim for patriots to espouse1 but one    
which was not likely to help the cause  
of the ,holy ,alliance4   ,,castlereagh 
,,and ,,canning  ,half-way between these
 two extremes of unpractical idealists  
and extremely practical but             
narrow-minded reactionaries come the    
,english statesmen1 ,castlereagh1       
,wellington1 and ,canning4 ,much        
injustice has been done to the first of 
these4 ,for many critics have been      
misled by ,byron's denunciation of      
,castlereagh1 just as others have spoken
 lightly of the stubborn conservatism of
 ,wellington1 or the easy and           
half-cynical insouciance of the author  
of the ,anti-,jacobin4 ,as a matter of  
fact1 ,castlereagh was by no means an   
opponent of the principles of the ,holy 
,alliance4 ,he joined with ,russia1     
,austria1 and ,prussia as a not         

unwilling member of the successive      
,congresses1 but both he and            
,wellington1 true to their national     
instincts1 sought to subordinate all    
proposals to the interests of ,great    
,britain1 and to confine discussions to 
immediate objects1 such as the          
limitation of ,french power and the     
suppression of dangerous revolutionary  
ideas4 ,they were not1 it is true1      
idealists in the sense in which         
,alexander ,i understood the term4 ,and 
yet1 on the whole1 both ,castlereagh and
 ,canning did more for the principle of 
nationality than any of the other       
diplomatists of the time4 ,the reason   
why ,canning broke with the ,holy       
,alliance1 after ,troppau1 ,laibach1 and
 ,verona1 was because he discerned      
something more than a tendency on the   
part of ,continental ,states to crush   
the free development of peoples1        
especially in reference to the          
,latin-,american ,states of ,south      
,america4 ,it is true that in these     

matters he and his successor were guided
 by a shrewd notion of ,british         
interest1 but it would be hardly just to
 blame them on this account4 ,you know  
my politics well enough1 wrote ,canning 
in #ahbb to the ,british ,ambassador in 
,st4 ,petersburg1 to know what ,i mean  
when ,i say that for ,europe ,i should  
be desirous now and then to read        
,england4 ,castlereagh was1 no doubt1   
more conciliatory than ,canning1 but he 
saw the fundamental difficulty of       
organising an international system and  
yet holding the balance between         
conflicting nations4 ,and thus we get to
 a result such as seems to have rejoiced
 the heart of ,canning1 when he said in 
#ahbc that the issue of ,verona has     
split the one and indivisible alliance  
into three parts as distinct as the     
constitutions of ,england1 ,france1 and 
,muscovy4 ,things are getting back1 he  
added1 to a wholesome state again4      
,every nation for itself and ,god for us
 all4 ,only bid your ,emperor           

7,alexander ,i7 be quiet1 for the time  
for ,areopagus and the like of that is  
gone by4#h  #h ,the ,confederation of   
,europe1 by ,w4,a4 ,phillips1 p4 #bhj4  
,,earthen ,,vessels  ,if1 then1 the     
ardent hopes of a regenerated ,europe in
 the early years of the nineteenth      
century failed1 the result was due in   
large measure to the fact that the      
business was committed to wrong hands4  
,the organs for working the change were 
for the most part autocratic monarchs   
and old-world diplomatists--the last    
people in the world likely to bring     
about a workable millennium4 ,a great   
crisis demands very careful             
manipulation4 ,cynicism must not be     
allowed to play any part in it4         
,traditional watchwords are not of much 
use4 ,theoretical idealism itself may   
turn out to be a most formidable        
stumbling-block4 ,yet no one can doubt  
that a solution of the problem1 whenever
 it is arrived at1 must come along the  
path of idealism4 ,long ago a man of the

 world was defined as a man who in every
 serious crisis is invariably wrong4 ,he
 is wrong because he applies            
old-fashioned experience to a novel     
situation--old wine in new bottles--and 
because he has no faith in generous     
aspirations1 having noted their         
continuous failure in the past4 ,yet1   
after all1 it is only faith which can   
move mountains1 and the ,holy ,alliance 
itself was not so much wrong in the     
principles to which it appealed as it   
was in the personages who signed it4 ,we
 have noticed already that1 like all    
other great ideas1 it did not wholly    
die4 ,the propaganda of peace1 however  
futile may be some of the discussions of
 pacifists1 is the heritage which even  
so wrong-headed a man as ,alexander ,i  
has left to the world4 ,the idea of     
arbitration between nations1 the        
solution of difficulties by arguments   
rather than by swords1 the power which  
democracies hold in their hands for     
guiding the future destinies of the     

world--all these in their various forms 
remain with us as legacies of that      
splendid1 though ineffective1 idealism  
which lay at the root of the ,holy      
,alliance4   ,,small ,,nationalities    
,and now after this digression1 which   
has been necessary to clear the ground1 
and also to suggest apt parallels1 let  
us return to what ,mr4 ,asquith said in 
,dublin on the ultimate objects of the  
present war4 ,he borrowed from ,mr4     
,gladstone the phrase the enthronement  
of the idea of public right as the      
governing idea of ,european politics1   
and in developing it as applicable to   
the present situation he pointed out    
that for us three definite objects are  
involved4 ,the first1 assented to by    
every publicist of the day1 apart from  
those educated in ,germany1 is the      
wholesale obliteration of the notion    
that states exist simply for the sake of
 going to war4 ,this kind of militarism1
 in all its different aspects1 will have
 to be abolished4 ,the next point brings

 us at once to the heart of some of the 
controversies raised in #ahae and       
onwards4 ,room1 said ,mr4               
,asquith--agreeing in this matter with  
,mr4 ,winston ,churchill--room must be  
found1 and kept1 for the independent    
existence and the free development of   
the smaller nationalities1 each with a  
corporate consciousness of its own4 ,now
 this is a plain issue which every one  
can understand4 ,not only did we go to  
war in order to help a small            
nationality--,belgium--but the very     
principle of nationality is one of the  
familiar phrases which have             
characterised ,british policy through   
the greater part of the nineteenth      
century4 ,our principle is to live and  
let live1 to allow smaller states to    
exist and thrive by the side of their   
large neighbours without undue          
interference on the part of the latter4 
,each distinct nationality is to have   
its voice1 at all events1 in the free   
direction of its own future4 ,and1 above

 all1 its present and future position   
must be determined not by the interests 
of the big ,powers1 but by a sort of    
plebiscite of the whole nationality4    
,,some ,,plain ,,issues  ,applying such 
principles to ,europe as it exists      
to-day1 and as it is likely to exist    
to-morrow1 we arrive at certain very    
definite conclusions4 ,the independence 
of ,belgium must be secured1 so also    
must the independence of ,holland and   
,denmark4 ,alsace and ,lorraine must1 if
 the inhabitants so wish1 be restored to
 ,france1 and there can be little doubt 
that ,alsace at all events will be only 
too glad to resume her old allegiance to
 the ,french nation4 ,the ,duchies of   
,schleswig-,holstein must also decide   
whether they would like to be reunited  
to ,denmark4 ,and we are already aware  
that the ,tsar has promised to give     
independence to the country of          
,poland--a point which forms a curious  
analogy with the same offer originally  
proposed by the ,tsar's ancestor1       

,alexander ,i4 ,of course1 these do not 
exhaust by any means the changes that   
must be forthcoming4 ,finland will have 
to be liberated2 those portions of      
,transylvania which are akin to         
,roumania must be allowed to gravitate  
towards their own stock4 ,italy must    
arrogate to herself--if she is wise     
enough to join her forces with those of 
the ,triple ,entente--those territories 
which come under the general title of   
unredeemed ,italy--the ,trentino and    
,trieste1 to say nothing of what ,italy 
claims on the ,adriatic littoral4       
,possibly the greatest changes of all   
will take place in reference to the     
,slavs4 ,servia and ,montenegro will    
clearly wish to incorporate in a great  
,slav kingdom a great many of their     
kinsmen who at present are held in      
uneasy subjection by ,austria4#i ,nor   
must we forget how these same principles
 apply to the ,teutonic ,states4 ,if the
 principle of nationality is to guide   
us1 we must preserve the ,german nation1

 even though we desire to reduce its    
dangerous elements to impotence4        
,prussia must remain the home of all    
those ,germans who accept the hegemony  
of ,berlin1 but it does not follow that 
the southern states of the ,german      
,empire--who have not been particularly 
fond of their northern                  
neighbours--should have to endure any   
longer the ,prussian yoke4 ,lastly1 the 
,german colonies can hardly be permitted
 to remain under the dominion of the    
,kaiser4#aj ,here are only a few of the 
changes which may metamorphose the face 
of ,europe as a direct result of        
enforcing the principle of              
nationalities4  #i ,the entrance of     
,turkey into the quarrel of course      
brings new factors into the ultimate    
settlement4  #aj ,cf4 ,who is           
,responsible8 by ,cloudesley ,brereton  
7,harrap71 ,chapter ,,iv1 ,the          
,settlement4   ,,european ,,partnership 
,but there is a further point to which  
,mr4 ,asquith referred1 one which is    

more important than anything else1      
because it represents the far-off ideal 
of ,european peace and the peace of the 
world4 ,we have got to substitute by a  
slow and gradual process1 said ,mr4     
,asquith1 instead of force1 instead of  
the clash of compelling ambition1       
instead of groupings and alliances1 a   
real ,european partnership1 based on the
 recognition of equal right and         
established and enforced by a common    
will4 ,there we have the whole crux of  
the situation1 and1 unfortunately1 we   
are forced to add1 its main difficulty4 
,for if we desire to summarise in a     
single sentence the rock on which       
,european negotiations from #ahae to    
#ahbi ultimately split1 it was the union
 of two such contradictory things as    
independent nationalities and an        
international committee or system of    
public law4 ,intrinsically the two ideas
 are opposed1 for one suggests absolute 
freedom1 and the other suggests control1
 superintendence1 interference4 ,if the 

one recognises the entire independence  
of a nationality within its own limits1 
the other seeks to enforce something of 
the nature of a ,european police to see 
that every nation does its duty4 ,it is 
true1 of course1 that this public will  
of ,europe must be incorporated in a    
kind of parliament1 to which the        
separate nations must send their        
representatives1 and that thus in a     
fashion each nation will have its proper
 say in any of the conclusions arrived  
at4 ,but here the difficulty starts anew
 owing to the relative size1 and        
therefore the relative importance of the
 different states constituting the      
union4 ,if all alike are given an       
equivalent vote1 it is rather hard on   
the big states1 which represent larger  
numbers and therefore control larger    
destinies4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we   
adopt the principle of proportional     
representation1 we may be pretty certain
 that the larger states will press      
somewhat heavily on the smaller4 ,for   

instance1 suppose that some state       
violates1 or threatens to violate1 the  
public law of the world4 ,in that case  
the ,universal ,union must1 of course1  
try to bring it to reason by peaceful   
means first1 but if that should fail1   
the only other alternative is by force  
of arms4 ,if once we admit the right of 
the world-organisation to coerce its    
recalcitrant members1 what becomes of   
the sovereign independence of nations8  
,that1 as we have said1 was the main    
difficulty confronting the ,european    
peace-maker of a hundred years ago1 and1
 however we may choose to regard it1 it 
remains a difficulty1 we will not say   
insuperable1 but at all events          
exceedingly formidable1 for the         
,european peace-makers of the twentieth 
century4 ,the antithesis is the old     
antithesis between order and progress2  
between coercion and independence2      
between the public voice1 or1 if we like
 to phrase it so1 the public conscience1
 and the arbitrariness and              

irresponsibility of individual units4   
,or we might put the problem in a still 
wider form4 ,a patriot is a man who     
believes intensely in the rights of his 
own nationality4 ,but if we have to form
 a ,united ,states of ,europe we shall  
have gradually to soften1 diminish1 or  
perhaps even destroy the narrower       
conceptions of patriotism4 ,the ultimate
 evolution of democracy in the various  
peoples means the mutual recognition of 
their common interests1 as against      
despotism and autocracy4 ,it is clear   
that such a process must gradually wipe 
out the distinction between the         
different peoples1 and substitute for   
particularism something of universal    
import4 ,in such a process what1 we ask 
once more1 becomes of the principle of  
nationality1 which is one of our        
immediate aims8 ,in point of fact1 it is
 obvious that1 from a strictly logical  
standpoint1 the will of ,europe1 or the 
public right of ,europe1 and the free   
independence of nationalities are       

antithetical terms1 and will continue to
 remain so1 however cunningly1 by a     
series of compromises1 we may conceal   
their essential divergence4 ,that is the
 real problem which confronts us quite  
as obstinately as it did our forefathers
 after the destruction of the           
,napoleonic power4 ,and it will have to 
be faced by all reformers1 whether they 
are pacifists or idealists1 on ethical  
or political grounds4   ,a ,,moral ,,for
 ,,pacifists  ,what is the outcome of   
the foregoing considerations8 ,the only 
moral at present which ,i am disposed to
 draw is one which may be addressed to  
pacifists in general1 and to all those  
who avail themselves of large and       
generous phrases1 such as the public    
will of ,europe1 or the common          
consciousness of civilised states4 ,the 
solution of the problem before us is not
 to be gained by the use of abstract    
terms1 but by very definite and concrete
 experience used in the most practical  
way to secure immediate reforms4 ,we    

demand1 for instance1 the creation of   
what is to all intents and purposes an  
international federal system applied to 
,europe at large4 ,now it is obvious    
that a federal system can be created    
amongst nations more or less at the same
 level of civilisation1 inspired by much
 the same ideals1 acknowledging the same
 end of their political and social      
activity4 ,but in what sense is this    
true of ,europe as we know it8 ,there is
 every kind of diversity between the    
constituent elements of the suggested   
federation4 ,there is no real uniformity
 of political institutions and ideals4  
,but in order that our object may be    
realised it is precisely this uniformity
 of political institutions and ideals   
amongst the nations which we require4   
,how is a public opinion formed in any  
given state8 ,it comes into being owing 
to a certain community of sentiments1   
opinions1 and prejudices1 and without   
such community it cannot develop4 ,the  
same thing holds true of international  

affairs4 ,if we desiderate the public   
voice of ,europe1 or the public         
conscience of ,europe1 ,europe must grow
 to be far more concordant than it is at
 present1 both in actual political      
institutions and in those inspiring     
ideals which form the life-blood of     
institutions4 ,how many states1 for     
instance1 recognise or put into practice
 a really representative system of      
government8   ,,compulsory ,,arbitration
  ,if we turn to the programme of the   
pacifists1 we shall be confronted by    
similar difficulties4 ,pacifism1 as     
such1 involves an appeal to all the     
democracies1 asking them to come into   
line1 as it were1 for the execution of  
certain definite projects intended to   
seek peace and ensure it4 ,the first    
stage of the peace movement is the      
general recognition of the principle of 
arbitration between states4 ,that first 
period has1 we may take it1 been already
 realised4 ,the second stage is the     
recognition of compulsory arbitration4  

,when1 in #aijg1 the second ,hague      
,conference was held1 this principle was
 supported by thirty-two different      
states1 representing more than a        
thousand million human beings4          
,something like three or four hundred   
millions remained not yet prepared to   
admit the principle in its entirety4 ,i 
may remark in passing that the verbal   
acceptance of a general principle is one
 thing1 the application1 as we have     
lately had much reason to discover1 is  
quite another4 ,we may recognise1       
however1 that this second stage of the  
pacifist programme has1 undoubtedly1    
made large advances4 ,but of course it  
must necessarily be followed by its     
consequence1 a third stage which shall  
ensure respect for1 and obedience to    
arbitration verdicts4 ,recalcitrant     
states will have to be coerced1 and the 
one thing that can coerce them is an    
international police administered by an 
international executive power4 ,that is 
to say1 we must have a parliament of    

parliaments1 a universal parliament1 the
 representatives of which must be       
selected by the different constituent   
members of the ,united ,states of       
,europe4 ,when this has been done1 and  
only when this has been done1 can we    
arrive at a fourth stage1 that of a     
general disarmament4 ,in the millennium 
that is to be it is only the            
international police which shall be     
allowed to use weapons of war in order  
to execute the decrees of the central   
parliament representing the common      
,european will4   ,,democratic          
,,unanimity  ,here we have all the old  
difficulties starting anew1 and         
especially the main one--democratic     
unanimity4 ,how far the democracies of  
the ,european ,commonwealth can work in 
unison is one of the problems which the 
future will have to solve4 ,at present  
they1 obviously1 do not do so4 ,the     
,social ,democrats of ,germany agreed to
 make war on the democrats of other     
countries4 ,old instincts were too      

strong for them4 ,for it must always be 
remembered that only so far as a        
cosmopolitan spirit takes the place of  
narrow national prejudices can we hope  
to reach the level of a common          
conscience1 or a common will of ,europe4
 ,and are we prepared to say that       
national prejudices ought to be         
obliterated and ignored8 ,the very      
principle of nationality forbids it4  ,i
 do not wish1 however1 to end on a note 
of pessimism4 ,the mistake of the       
pacifist has all along been the         
assumption that bellicose impulses have 
died away4 ,they have done nothing of   
the kind1 and are not likely to do so4  
,but1 happily1 all past experience in   
the world's history shows us that ideas 
in a real sense govern the world1 and   
that a logical difficulty is not        
necessarily a practical impossibility4  
,in this case1 as in others1 a noble and
 generous idea of ,european peace will  
gradually work its own fulfilment1 if we
 are not in too much of a hurry to force

 the pace1 or imagine that the ideal has
 been reached even before the           
preliminary foundations have been laid4 
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,some ,,suggested     
,,reforms   ,it is an obvious criticism 
on the considerations which have been   
occupying us in the preceding chapters  
that they are too purely theoretical to 
be of any value4 ,they are indeed       
speculative1 and1 perhaps1 from one     
point of view come under the edge of the
 usual condemnation of prophecy4        
,prophecy is1 of course1 if one of the  
most interesting1 also one of the most  
dangerous of human ingenuities1 and the 
usual fate of prophets is1 in nine cases
 out of ten1 to be proved wrong4        
,moreover1 it is possible that there may
 come an issue to the present war which 
would be by far the worst which the     
human mind can conceive4 ,it may end in 
a deadlock1 a stalemate1 an impasse1    
because the two opposing forces are so  
equal that neither side can get the     
better of the other4 ,if peace has to be

 made because of such a balance between 
the opposing forces as this1 it would be
 a calamity almost worse than the       
original war4 ,german militarism would  
still be unsubdued1 the ,kaiser's       
pretensions to universal sovereignty1   
although clipped1 would not be wiped    
out1 and we should find remaining in all
 the nations of the earth a sort of     
sullen resentment which could not       
possibly lead to anything else than a   
purely temporary truce4 ,the only       
logical object of war is to make war    
impossible1 and if merely an indecisive 
result were achieved in the present war1
 it would be as certain as anything     
human can be that a fresh war would soon
 arise4 ,at the present moment we       
confess that there is an ugly           
possibility of this kind1 and that it is
 one of the most formidable perils of   
future civilisation4   ,,an ,,ignoble   
,,pacification  ,it is so immensely     
important1 however1 that the cause of   
the ,allies should prevail not for their

 own sakes alone1 but for the sake of   
the world1 that it is difficult to      
imagine their consenting to an ignoble  
pacification4 ,the ,allies have signed  
an important document1 in order to prove
 their solidarity1 that no one of them  
will sign peace without the sanction of 
the other partners4 ,let us suppose that
 the rival armies have fought each other
 to a standstill2 let us suppose that   
,france is exhausted2 let us further    
suppose that the ,german troops1 by     
their mobility and their tactical skill1
 are able to hold the ,russians in the  
eastern sphere of war4 ,we can suppose  
all these things1 but what we cannot    
imagine even for a moment is that ,great
 ,britain--to confine ourselves only to 
our own case--will ever consent to stop 
until she has achieved her object4      
,america may strive to make the         
combatants desist from hostilities1     
partly because she is a great pacific   
power herself1 and partly because it is 
a practical object with her as a        

commercial nation to secure tranquil    
conditions4 ,yet1 even so1 there would  
be no answer to the question which most 
thoughtful minds would propound3 ,why   
did we go to war1 and what have we      
gained by the war8 ,if we went to war   
for large cosmic purposes1 then we      
cannot consent to a peace which leaves  
those ultimate purposes unfulfilled4 ,i 
think1 therefore1 we can put aside this 
extremely uncomfortable suggestion that 
the war may possibly end in a deadlock1 
because1 in the last resort1 ,great     
,britain1 with her fleet1 her sister    
dominions over the seas1 her colonies1  
and her eastern ally ,japan1 will       
always1 to use the familiar phrase1 have
 something up her sleeve1 even though   
continental nations should reach a pitch
 of absolute exhaustion4   ,a ,,new     
,,europe  ,it follows then that1 even if
 we admit the purely speculative        
character of our argument1 it is not    
only right and proper1 but absolutely   
necessary that we should prepare        

ourselves for something which we can    
really describe as a new ,europe4       
,thoughtful minds ought imaginatively to
 put themselves in the position of a    
spectator of a reconstituted world1 or  
rather of a world that waits to be      
reconstituted4 ,it is necessary that    
this should be done1 because so many    
older prejudices have to be swept away1 
so many novel conceptions have to be    
entertained4 ,let us take only a single 
example4 ,if we look back over history1 
we shall see that all the great nations 
have made themselves great by war4      
,there is a possible exception in the   
case of ,italy1 whose present greatness 
has flowed from loyal help rendered her 
by other kindred nations1 and by        
realising for herself certain large     
patriotic ideals entertained by great   
minds4 ,but for the majority of nations 
it is certainly true that they have     
fought their way into the ranks of      
supreme powers4 ,from this the deduction
 is easy that greatness depends on the  

possession of formidable military power4
 ,indeed1 all the arguments of those who
 are very anxious that we should not    
reduce our armaments is entirely based  
on this supposition4 ,the strong man    
armed keepeth his goods in peace2 his   
only fear is that a stronger man may    
come with better arms and take away his 
possessions4 ,now if the new ,europe    
dawns not indeed for those who are past 
middle age--for they will have died     
before its realisation--but for the     
younger generation for whose sake we are
 bearing the toil and burden of the day1
 the one thing which is absolutely      
necessary is that the index of greatness
 must no longer be found in armies and  
navies4 ,clearly it will take a long    
time for men to get used to this novel  
conception4 ,inveterate prejudices will 
stand in the way4 ,we shall be told over
 and over again that peace-lovers are no
 patriots2 that imperialism demands the 
possible sacrifice of our manhood to the
 exigencies of war2 and that the only   

class of men who are ever respected in  
this world are those who can fight4 ,and
 so1 even though we have had ocular     
demonstration of the appalling ruin     
which militarism can produce1 we may    
yet1 if we are not careful1 forget all  
our experience and drift back into      
notions which are not really separable  
from precisely those ideas which we are 
at present reprobating in the ,german   
nation4 ,the real test is this3 ,is1 or 
is not1 war a supreme evil8 ,it is no   
answer to this question to suggest that 
war educes many splendid qualities4 ,of 
course it does4 ,and so1 too1 does      
exploration of ,polar solitudes1 or even
 climbing ,alpine or ,himalayan heights4
 ,either war is a detestable solution of
 our difficulties1 or it is not4 ,if it 
is not1 then we have no right whatsoever
 to object to the ,prussian ideal4 ,but 
if it is1 let us call it by its proper  
name4 ,let us say that it is devil's    
work1 and have done with it4   ,,evil   
,,of ,,armaments  ,we are trying not    

only to understand what ,europe will be 
like if1 as we hope1 this war ends      
successfully for the ,allies1 but what  
sort of new ,europe it will be in the   
hands of the conquerors to frame4 ,those
 who come after us are to find in that  
new ,europe real possibilities of       
advance in all the higher kinds of      
civilisation4 ,not only are the various 
states to contain sane and healthy      
people who desire to live in peace with 
their neighbours1 but people who will   
desire to realise themselves in science1
 in philosophic thought1 in art1 in     
literature4 ,what is an indispensable   
condition for an evolution of this sort8
 ,it must be the absence of all         
uneasiness1 the growth of a serene      
confidence and trust1 the obliteration  
of envy1 jealousy1 and every kind of    
unreasonableness4 ,the cause1 above all 
others1 which has produced an opposite  
condition of things1 which has created  
the unfortunate ,europe in which we have
 hitherto had to live1 is the growth and

 extension of armaments4 ,the main      
factor1 then1 in our problem is the     
existence of such swollen armaments as  
have wasted the resources of every      
nation and embittered the minds of rival
 peoples4 ,how are we to meet this      
intolerable evil of armaments8          
,,absence ,,of ,,provocation  ,in the   
first place1 let us remark that on our  
supposition--the eventual victory of the
 ,allies--one of the great disturbing   
elements will have been put out of the  
field4 ,europe has hitherto been lulled 
into an uneasy and fractious sleep by   
the balance of two great organisations4 
,under the happiest hypothesis the      
,triple ,alliance and the ,triple       
,entente will have disappeared into the 
deep backward and abysm of time4 ,for   
all practical purposes there will be no 
,triple ,alliance1 and therefore no     
,triple ,entente to confront it4 ,with  
,austria wiped out of the map for all   
purposes of offence1 and ,germany       
restricted within modest dimensions1 the

 three powers of the ,triple            
,entente--,great ,britain1 ,france1 and 
,russia--can do what they like1 and as  
they are sworn friends and allies they  
can take their own steps undisturbed by 
fears of hostile combinations4 ,why     
should these three allies consent any   
further to keep up bloated armaments8   
,it is against their own interests and  
against the interests of the world4 ,so 
long as ,germany existed as a power and 
developed her own ambitions1 we were    
always on the edge of a catastrophe4    
,with the conquest of ,germany that     
nightmare will have gone4 ,and observe  
some of the consequences which must     
inevitably follow4 ,it was against the  
menace of ,germany that ,france had to  
pass her three years' law of military   
service3 in the absence of the ,german  
army ,france can reduce as she pleases  
her military establishment4 ,it was     
against the menace of a ,german fleet   
that we had to incur an outlay of       
millions of pounds3 in the absence of   

the ,german fleet we1 too1 can do what  
we please4 ,it is certain also that     
,russia1 so long as the deep-seated     
antagonism between ,teuton and ,slav    
remained1 was under strong compulsion to
 reform and reinforce her army4   ,,fear
 ,,of ,,russia  ,there may1 it is true1 
remain in some minds a certain fear     
about ,russia1 because it is difficult  
to dispel the old conception of a great 
despotic ,russian autocracy1 or1 if we  
like to say so1 a semi-eastern and      
half-barbarous power biding her time to 
push her conquests both towards the     
rising and the setting sun4 ,but many   
happy signs of quite a new spirit in    
,russia have helped to allay our fears4 
,it looks as if a reformed ,russia might
 arise1 with ideas of constitutionalism 
and liberty and a much truer conception 
of what the evolution of a state means4 
,at the very beginning of the war the   
,tsar issued a striking proclamation to 
the ,poles1 promising them a restoration
 of the national freedom which they had 

lost a century and a half previously4   
,this doubtless was a good stroke of    
policy1 but also it seemed something    
more--a proof of that benevolent        
idealism which belongs to the ,russian  
nature1 and of which the ,tsar himself  
has given many signs4 ,of the three     
nations who control the ,poles1 the     
,austrians have done most for their     
subjects3 at all events1 the ,poles     
under ,austrian control are supposed to 
be the most happy and contented4 ,then  
come the ,russian ,poles4 ,but the      
,poles under ,german government are the 
most miserable of all1 mainly because   
all ,german administration is so        
mechanical1 so hard1 in a real sense so 
inhuman4 ,but this determination of the 
,tsar to do some justice to the ,polish 
subjects is not the only sign of a newer
 spirit we have to deal with4 ,there was
 also a proclamation promising liberty  
to the ,jews--a very necessary piece of 
reform--and giving1 as an earnest of the
 good intentions of the ,government1    

commissions to ,jews in the army4       
,better than all other evidence is the  
extraordinary outburst of patriotic     
feeling in all sections of the ,russian 
people4 ,it looks as if this war has    
really united ,russia in a sense in     
which it has never been united before4  
,when we see voluntary service offered  
on the part of those who hitherto have  
felt themselves the victims of ,russian 
autocracy1 we may be pretty certain that
 even the reformers in the great        
northern kingdom have satisfied         
themselves that their long-deferred     
hopes may at length gain fulfilment4    
,nor ought we to forget that splendid   
act of reform which has abolished the   
,imperial monopoly of the sale of vodka4
 ,if by one stroke of the pen the ,tsar 
can sacrifice ninety-three millions of  
revenue in order that ,russia may be    
sober1 it is not very extravagant to    
hope that in virtue of the same kind of 
benevolent despotism ,russia may secure 
a liberal constitution and the ,russian 

people be set free4#aa  #aa ,see ,our   
,russian ,ally1 by ,sir ,donald         
,mackenzie ,wallace 7,macmillan74       
,,military ,,autocracy  ,the end of a   
great war1 however1 has one inevitable  
result1 that it leaves a military       
autocracy in supreme control of affairs4
 ,the armies which have won the various 
campaigns1 the generals who have led    
them1 the ,commanders-in-,chief who have
 carried out the successful strategy1   
these are naturally left with almost    
complete authority in their hands4      
,wellington1 for instance1 a hundred    
years ago1 held an extraordinarily      
strong position in deciding the fate of 
,europe4 ,and so1 too1 did the ,russian 
,tsar1 whose armies had done so much to 
destroy the legend of ,napoleonic       
invincibility4 ,similar conditions must 
be expected on the present occasion4    
,and1 perhaps1 the real use of          
diplomats1 if they are prudent and      
level-headed men1 is to control the     
ambitions of the military element1 to   

adopt a wider outlook1 to consider the  
ultimate consequences rather than the   
immediate effects of things4 ,it would  
indeed be a lamentable result if a war  
which was intended to destroy militarism
 in ,europe should end by setting up    
militarism in high places4              
,,limitation ,,of ,,armaments  ,thus we 
seem to see still more clearly than     
before that the size of armaments in    
,europe constitutes a fundamental       
problem with which we have to grapple4  
,every soldier1 as a matter of course1  
believes in military armaments1 and is  
inclined to exaggerate their social and 
not merely their offensive value4 ,those
 of us who are not soldiers1 but who are
 interested in the social and economic  
development of the nation1 know1 on the 
contrary1 that the most destructive and 
wasteful form of expenditure is that    
which is occupied with armaments grown  
so bloated that they go far to render   
the most pressing domestic reforms      
absolutely impossible4 ,how1 then1 can  

we limit the size of armaments8 ,what   
provision can we make to keep in check  
that desire to fortify itself1 to       
entrench itself in an absolutely        
commanding position1 which inherently   
belongs to the military mind8 ,in the   
case of both navies and armies something
 depends on geographical conditions1 and
 something on financial possibilities4  
,the first represents1 as it were1 the  
minimum required for safety2 the second 
the maximum burden which a state can    
endure without going into bankruptcy4#ab
 ,our own country1 we should say1       
requires fleets1 so far as geographical 
conditions are concerned1 for the       
protection of her shores1 and1 inasmuch 
as she is a scattered empire1 we must   
have our warships in all the ,seven     
,seas4 ,france1 in her turn1 requires a 
navy which shall protect her in the     
,mediterranean1 and especially render   
access easy to her ,north ,african      
possessions4 ,on the supposition that   
she is good friends with ,england1 she  

does not require ships in the ,north    
,sea or in the ,english ,channel1 while1
 vice versa1 ,england1 so long as       
,france is strong in the ,mediterranean1
 need only keep quite small detachments 
at ,gibraltar1 ,malta1 and elsewhere4   
,russia must have a fleet for the       
,baltic1 and also a fleet in the ,black 
,sea4 ,beyond that her requirements     
assuredly do not go4 ,italy's activities
 are mainly in the ,mediterranean4      
,under the supposition that she is      
conquered1 ,germany stands in some      
danger of losing her navy altogether4   
#ab ,brailsford's ,war of ,steel and    
,gold3 ,chap4 ,,ix4   ,,protection ,,of 
,,commerce  ,it is obvious1 therefore1  
that if we confine ourselves purely to  
geographical conditions1 and adhere to  
the principle that navies are required  
for the protection of coasts1 we can at 
once reduce1 within relatively small    
limits1 the building of armoured ships4 
,the reason why large navies have       
hitherto been necessary is because it   

has been assumed that they do not merely
 protect coasts1 but protect lines of   
commerce4 ,we have been told1 for       
instance1 that inasmuch as we cannot    
feed our own population1 and our        
national food comes to us from ,canada1 
,america1 the ,argentine1 ,russia1 and  
elsewhere1 we must possess a very large 
amount of cruisers to safeguard the     
ships that are conveying to us our daily
 bread4 ,if we ask why our ships must   
not only protect our shores1 but our    
merchandise--the latter being for the   
most part a commercial enterprise worked
 by individual companies--the answer    
turns on that much-discussed principle1 
the ,right of ,capture at ,sea1 which   
was debated at the last ,hague          
,conference1 and as a matter of fact    
stoutly defended both by ,germany and   
ourselves4 ,if we look at this          
doctrine--the supposed right that a     
power possesses to capture the          
merchandise of private individuals who  
belong to an enemy country in times of  

war--we shall perhaps feel some surprise
 that a principle which is not admitted 
in land warfare should still prevail at 
sea4 ,according to the more benevolent  
notions of conducting a campaign        
suggested1 and indeed enforced by ,hague
 ,conventions and such like1 an army has
 no right to steal the food of a country
 which it has invaded4 ,it must pay for 
what it takes4 ,well-conducted armies1  
as a matter of fact1 behave in this     
fashion3 the necessity of paying for    
what they take is very strictly enforced
 by responsible officers4 ,why1         
therefore1 at sea an opposite state of  
affairs should prevail is really not    
easy to understand4 ,most of the enemy's
 merchant ships which have been captured
 in the recent war belong to private    
individuals1 or private companies4 ,but 
they are taken1 subject to the decision 
of ,prize ,courts1 as part of the spoils
 of a successful maritime power4 ,i am  
aware that the question is an           
exceedingly controversial one1 and that 

,great ,britain has hitherto been very  
firm1 or1 perhaps1 ,i might be allowed  
to say1 obstinate in upholding the law  
of capture at sea4 ,but ,i also know    
that a great many competent lawyers and 
politicians do not believe in the       
validity of such a principle1 and would 
not be sorry to have it abolished4#ac   
,at all events1 it is clear enough that 
if it were abolished one of the main    
arguments for keeping up a strong navy  
would fall to the ground4 ,we should    
then require no patrol of cruisers in   
the ,atlantic1 in the ,pacific1 and in  
the ,mediterranean4 ,one thing at least 
is certain1 that if we can ever arrive  
at a time when a real ,concert of       
,europe prevails1 one of the first      
things which it must take in hand is a  
thorough examination of the extent of   
defensive force which a nation requires 
as a minimum for the preservation of its
 independence and liberty4  #ac ,notably
 ,lord ,loreburn1 in his ,capture at    
,sea 7,methuen74   ,,trade ,,in         

,,armaments  ,certainly one crying evil 
exists which ought to be dealt with     
promptly and effectively in accordance  
with the dictates of common sense as    
well as common morality4 ,i refer to the
 trade in armaments carried on by       
private companies1 whose only interest  
it is to foment1 or perhaps actually to 
produce1 war scares in order that       
munitions of war may be greedily        
purchased4 ,a notorious example is      
furnished by the great works at ,essen  
owned by ,krupp4 ,in the same position  
are the great ,french works at ,creusot1
 owned by ,schneider1 and those of our  
own ,english firms1 ,armstrongs1        
,vickers1 ,john ,brown1 and ,cammell    
,laird4 ,these are all successful       
concerns1 and the shareholders have     
reaped large profits4 ,i believe that at
 ,creusot the dividends have reached    
twenty per cent41 and ,armstrongs yield 
rarely less than ten per cent4 ,it is   
necessary to speak very plainly about   
industries of this kind1 because1       

however we like to phrase it1 they      
represent the realisation of private    
profit through the instruments of death 
and slaughter4 ,it would be bad enough  
if they remained purely private         
companies1 but they really represent the
 most solid public organisations in the 
world4 ,we know the intimate relations  
between ,krupp and the ,german          
,government1 and doubtless also between 
,messrs4 ,schneider and the ,french     
,government4 ,this sordid manufacture of
 the instruments of death constitutes a 
vast business1 with all kinds of        
ramifications1 and the main and deadly  
stigma on it is that it is bound to     
encourage and promote war4 ,let me quote
 some energetic sentences from ,mr4     
,h4,g4 ,wells on this point3 ,kings and 
,kaisers must cease to be commercial    
travellers of monstrous armament        
concerns4444 ,i do not need to argue1   
what is manifest1 what every ,german    
knows1 what every intelligent educated  
man in the world knows4 ,the ,krupp     

concern and the tawdry ,imperialism of  
,berlin are linked like thief and       
receiver2 the hands of the ,german      
princes are dirty with the trade4 ,all  
over the world statecraft and royalty   
have been approached and touched and    
tainted by these vast firms1 but it is  
in ,berlin that the corruption is       
centred1 it is from ,berlin that the    
intolerable pressure to arm and still to
 arm has come4#ad  ,what is the obvious 
cure for this state of things8 ,it      
stares us in the face4 ,governments     
alone should be allowed to manufacture  
weapons4 ,this ought not to be an       
industry left in private hands4 ,if a   
nation1 through its accredited          
representatives1 thinks it is necessary 
to arm itself1 it must keep in its own  
hands this lethal industry4 ,beyond the 
,government factories there clearly     
ought to be no making of weapons all    
over ,europe and the world4  #ad ,there 
are one or two pamphlets on this subject
 which are worth consulting1 especially 

,the ,war ,traders1 by ,g4,h4 ,perris   
7,national ,peace ,council1 ,st4        
,stephen's ,house1 ,westminster71 and   
,the ,war ,trust ,exposed1 by ,j4,f4    
,walton ,newbold 7the ,national ,leader 
,press1 ,manchester74 ,see also ,the    
,war of ,steel and ,gold1 by ,h4,n4     
,brailsford1 ,chapter ,,ii1 ,real       
,politics1 p4 #hi4 ,the sentences quoted
 from ,mr4 ,wells come from ,the ,war   
that will end ,war 7,f4 and ,c4         
,palmer71 p4 #ci4   ,,financial         
,,interests  ,it has already been       
remarked that the conditions which limit
 and control the size of armaments are  
partly geographical and partly          
financial1 and that while the former    
represent the minimum1 the latter stand 
for the maximum of protective force4 ,i 
need say nothing further about the      
geographical conditions4 ,every one who 
studies a map can see for himself what  
is required by a country anxious to     
protect its shores or its boundaries4   
,if we suppose that armaments are       

strictly limited to the needs of        
self-defence1 and if we further assume  
that in the new ,europe countries are   
not animated by the strongest dislikes  
against one another1 but are prepared to
 live and let live 7a tolerably large   
assumption1 ,i am aware71 we can readily
 imagine a steady process of curtailment
 in the absolutely necessary armament4  
,further1 if ,great ,britain gave up its
 doctrine of the ,right of ,capture at  
,sea 7and if ,great ,britain surrendered
 it1 we may be pretty sure that1 after  
,germany has been made powerless1 no    
other country would wish to retain it71 
the supposed necessity of protecting    
lines of commerce would disappear and a 
further reduction in cruisers would take
 place4 ,i cannot imagine that either   
,america or ,japan would wish to revive 
the ,right of ,capture theory if we     
ourselves had given it up4 ,and they are
 the most important maritime and        
commercial nations after ourselves4#ae  
,the financial conditions1 however1     

deserve study because they lead straight
 to the very heart of the modern        
bellicose tendencies4 ,in an obvious and
 superficial sense1 financial conditions
 represent the maximum in the provision 
of armaments1 because ultimately it     
becomes a question of how much a nation 
can afford to spend without going       
bankrupt or being fatally hampered in   
its expenditure on necessary social     
reforms4 ,this1 however1 is not perhaps 
the most significant point4 ,financial  
conditions act much more subtly than    
this4 ,why has it grown so imperative on
 states to have large armies or large   
navies1 or both8 ,because--so we have   
been told over and over again--diplomacy
 cannot speak with effect unless it is  
backed by power4 ,and what are the main 
occasions on which diplomacy has to     
speak effectively8 ,we should be        
inclined to answer off-hand that it must
 possess this stentorian power when     
there is any question about national    
honour--when the country for whom it    

speaks is insulted or bullied1 or       
defrauded of its just rights2 when      
treaties are torn up and disregarded2   
when its plighted word has been given   
and another nation acts as though no    
such pledge had been made2 when its     
territory is menaced with invasion and  
so forth4  #ae ,as a matter of fact1 the
 ,united ,states are opposed to the     
,capture at ,sea principle4             
,,protection ,,of ,,financiers  ,but    
these justifiable occasions do not      
exhaust the whole field4 ,sometimes     
diplomacy is brought to bear on much    
more doubtful issues4 ,it is used to    
support the concession-hunter1 and to   
coerce a relatively powerless nation to 
grant concessions4 ,it backs up a bank  
which has financed a company to build   
railroads or develop the internal       
resources of a country2 or to exploit   
mines or oil-fields1 or to do those     
thousand-and-one things which constitute
 what is called peaceful penetration4   
,think of the recent dealings with      

,turkey1#af and the international       
rivalry1 always suspicious and          
inflammatory1 which has practically     
divided up her ,asiatic dominions       
between ,european ,states--so that      
,armenia is to belong to ,russia1 ,syria
 to ,france1 ,arabia to ,great ,britain1
 and ,anatolia and ,i know not what     
besides to ,germany6 ,think of the      
competition for the carrying out of     
railways in ,asia ,minor and the        
constant friction as to which power has 
obtained1 by fair means or foul1 the    
greatest influence6 ,or let us remember 
the recent disputes as to the proper    
floating of a loan to ,china and the    
bickering about the ,five-,power ,group 
and the determination on the part of the
 last named that no one else should     
share the spoil6 ,or shall we transfer  
our attention to ,mexico1 where the     
severe struggle between the two rival   
,oil ,companies--the ,cowdray group and 
the ,american group--threw into the     
shade the quarrel between ,huerta and   

,carranza8 ,these are only a few        
instances taken at random to illustrate 
the dealings of modern finance4         
,relatively small harm would be done if 
financiers were allowed to fight out    
their own quarrels4 ,unfortunately1     
however1 diplomacy is brought in to     
support this side or that3 and          
ambassadors have to speak in severe     
terms if a ,chinese mandarin does not   
favour our so-called nationals1 or if   
corrupt ,turkish officials are not      
sufficiently squeezable to suit our     
patriotic purposes4 ,our armaments are  
big not merely to protect the nation's  
honour1 but to provide large dividends  
for speculative concerns held in private
 hands4  #af ,turkey has now thrown in  
her lot with ,germany4   ,,investing    
,,money ,,abroad  ,the truth is1 of     
course1 that the honourable name of     
commerce is now used to cover very      
different kinds of enterprise4 ,we used 
to export goods2 now we export cash4    
,wealthy men1 not being content with the

 sound1 but not magnificent interest on 
home securities1 take their money abroad
 and invest in extremely                
remunerative--though of course          
speculative--businesses in ,south       
,africa1 or ,south ,america1 concerned  
with rubber1 petroleum1 or whatnot4     
,often they subscribe to a foreign      
loan--in itself a perfectly legitimate  
and harmless operation1 but not harmless
 or legitimate if one of the conditions 
of the loan is that the country to which
 it is lent should purchase its         
artillery from ,essen or ,creusot1 or   
its battleships from our yards4 ,for    
that is precisely one of the ways in    
which the traffic in munitions of war   
goes on increasing and itself helps to  
bring about a conflagration4 ,financial 
enterprise is1 of course1 the life-blood
 of modern states4 ,but why should our  
army and navy be brought in to protect  
financiers8 ,let them take their own    
risks1 like every other man who pursues 
a hazardous path for his own private    

gain4 ,private investment in foreign    
securities does not increase the volume 
of a nation's commerce4 ,the individual 
may make a colossal fortune1 but the    
nation pays much too dearly for the     
enrichment of financiers if it allows   
itself to be dragged into war on account
 of their beaux yeux4   ,,ideal ,,aims  
,it is time to gather together in a     
summary fashion some of the             
considerations which have been presented
 to us in the course of our inquiry4 ,we
 have gone to war partly for direct1    
partly for indirect objects4 ,the direct
 objects are the protection of small    
nationalities1 the destruction of a     
particularly offensive kind of          
militarism in ,germany1 the securing of 
respect for treaties1 and the           
preservation of our own and ,european   
liberty4 ,but there are also indirect   
objects at which we have to aim1 and it 
is here1 of course1 that the speculative
 character of our inquiry is most       
clearly revealed4 ,apart from the       

preservation of the smaller             
nationalities1 ,mr4 ,asquith has himself
 told us that we should aim at the      
organisation of a ,public ,will of      
,europe1 a sort of ,collective          
,conscience which should act as a       
corrective of national defects and as a 
support of international morality4      
,nothing could well be more speculative 
or vague than this1 and we have already 
seen the kind of difficulties which     
surround the conception1 especially the 
conflict between a collective ,european 
constraint and an eager and energetic   
patriotism4 ,we must not1 however1 be   
deterred by the nebulous character of   
some of the ideals which are floating   
through our minds4 ,ideals are always   
nebulous1 and always resisted by the    
narrow sort of practical men who suggest
 that we are metaphysical dreamers      
unaware of the stern facts of life4     
,nevertheless1 the actual progress of   
the world depends on the visions of     
idealists1 and when the time comes for  

the reconstitution of ,europe on a new  
basis we must already have imaginatively
 thought out some of the ends towards   
which we are striving4 ,we must also be 
careful not to narrow our conceptions to
 the level of immediate needs--that is  
not the right way of any reform4 ,our   
conceptions must be as large and as wide
 and as philanthropical as imagination  
can make them2 otherwise ,europe will   
miss one of the greatest opportunities  
that it has ever had to deal with1 and  
we shall incur the bitterest of all     
disappointments--not to be awake when   
the dawn appears4   ,,greatness ,,of    
,,states  ,what1 then1 are some of those
 nebulous visions which come before the 
minds of eager idealists8 ,we have got  
to envisage for ourselves a new idea of 
what constitutes greatness in a state4  
,hitherto we have measured national     
greatness by military strength1 because 
most of the ,european nations have      
attained their present position through 
successful war4 ,so long as we cherish a

 notion like this1 so long shall we be  
under the heel of a grinding militarism4
 ,we have set out as crusaders to       
destroy ,prussian militarism1 and in    
pursuit of this quest we have invoked1  
as a matter of necessity1 the aid of our
 militarists4 ,but when their work is   
done1 all peoples who value freedom and 
independence will refuse to be under the
 heel of any military party4 ,to be     
great is not1 necessarily1 to be strong 
for war4 ,there are other qualities     
which ought to enter into the           
definition1 a high standard of          
civilisation and culture--not culture in
 the ,prussian sense1 but that which we 
understand by the term--the great       
development and extension of knowledge1 
room for the discoveries of science1    
quick susceptibility in the domain of   
art1 the organisation of literature--all
 these things are part and parcel of    
greatness1 as we want to understand it  
in the future4 ,it is precisely these   
things that militarism1 as such1 cares  

nothing for4 ,therefore1 if we are out  
for war against militarism1 the whole   
end and object of our endeavour must be 
by means of war to make war impossible4 
,hence it follows1 as a matter of       
course1 that the new ,europe must take  
very serious and energetic steps to     
diminish military establishments and to 
limit the size of armaments4 ,if once   
the new masters of ,europe understand   
the immense importance of reducing their
 military equipment1 they have it in    
their power to relieve nations of one of
 the greatest burdens which have ever   
checked the social and economic         
development of the world4 ,suggestions  
have already been made as to the        
reduction of armaments1 and1 although   
such schemes as have been set forward   
are1 in the truest sense1 speculative1  
it does not follow that they1 or        
something like them1 cannot hereafter be
 realised4 ,nor yet in our conception of
 greatness must we include another false
 idea of the past4 ,if a nation is not  

necessarily great because it is strong  
for war1 neither is it necessarily great
 because it contains a number of        
cosmopolitan financiers trying to       
exploit for their own purposes various  
undeveloped tracts of the world's       
surface4 ,these financiers are certainly
 not patriots because1 amongst other    
things1 they take particular care to    
invest in foreign securities1 the       
interest of home investments not being  
sufficient for their financial greed4   
,it will not be the least of the many   
benefits which may accrue to us after   
the end of this disastrous war if a     
vulgar and crude materialism1 based on  
the notion of wealth1 is dethroned from 
its present sovereignty over men's      
minds4 ,the more we study the courses of
 this world's history1 the more         
certainly do we discover that a love of 
money is the root of most of the evils  
which beset humanity4   ,,apostles ,,of 
,,the ,,new ,,era  ,as we survey the    
possible reforms which are to set up a  

new and better ,europe on the ruin of   
the old1 we naturally ask ourselves with
 some disquietude3 ,who are the         
personalities1 and what are the forces  
required for so tremendous a change8    
,who are sufficient for these things8   
,are kings likely to be saviours of     
society8 ,past experience hardly favours
 this suggestion4 ,will soldiers and    
great generals help us8 ,here1 again1 we
 may be pardoned for a very natural     
suspicion4 ,every one knows that a      
benevolent despotism has much to        
recommend it4 ,but1 unfortunately1 the  
benevolent are not usually despotic1 nor
 are despots as a rule benevolent4 ,can 
diplomatists help us8 ,not so far as    
they continue to mumble the watchwords  
of their ancient mystery3 they will have
 to learn a new set of formul1 or more  
likely1 perhaps1 they will find that    
ordinary people1 who have seen to what a
 pass diplomacy has brought us1 may work
 out for themselves some better system4 
,clearly the tasks of the future will   

depend on the co-operation of           
intelligent1 far-sighted philanthropic  
reformers in the various states of the  
world1 who will recognise that at       
critical periods of the world's history 
they must set to work with a new ardour 
to think out problems from the very     
beginning4 ,we want fresh and           
intelligent minds1 specially of the     
younger idealists1 keen1 ardent1 and    
energetic souls1 touched with the sacred
 fire1 erecting the fabric of humanity  
on a novel basis4 ,democracy will have a
 great deal to do in the new ,europe4   
,it1 too1 had better refurbish its old  
watchwords4 ,it has got to set itself   
patiently to the business of preventing 
future wars by the extension of its     
sympathies and its clear discernment of 
all that imperils its future development
 and progress4 ,above all1 it has got to
 solve that most difficult problem of   
creating a ,public ,will and a ,common  
,conscience in ,europe1 a conscience    
sensitive to the demands of a higher    

ethics1 and a will to enforce its       
decrees against obstructives and        
recalcitrants4 ,we do not see our way   
clear as yet1 it is true4 ,but we have a
 dim idea of the far-seen peaks towards 
which we must lift up our eyes4 ,it is  
the greatest enterprise which humanity  
has ever been called upon to face1 and1 
however difficult1 it is also the most  
splendid4   ,,printed ,,in ,,great      
,,britain ,,by ,,richard ,,clay  ,,sons1
 ,,limited1 ,,brunswick ,,st41          
,,stamford ,,st41 ,s4,e41 ,,and         
,,bungay1 ,,suffolk4