,theodicy ,essays on the ,goodness of ,god the ,freedom of ,man and the ,origin of ,evil ,g4,w4 ,,leibniz ,edited with an ,introduction by ,austin ,farrer1 ,fellow of ,trinity ,college1 ,oxford ,translated by ,e4,m4 ,huggard from ,c4,j4 ,gerhardt's ,edition of the ,collected ,philosophical ,works1 #ahge-ij ,open ,logo ,court ,la ,salle1 ,illinois #facja 99 99 99 99 99 ,logo ,,open ,,court and the above logo are registered in the ,u4,s4 ,patent ,trademark ,office4 ,published #aihe by ,open ,court ,publishing ,company1 ,peru1 ,illinois #faced4 ,this edition first published #aiea by ,routledge ,kegan ,paul ,limited1 ,london4 ,second printing #aihh ,third printing #aiij ,fourth printing #aiic ,fifth printing #aiif ,printed and bound in the ,united ,states of ,america4 ,,library ,,of ,,congress ,,cataloging-,,in-,,publication ,,data ,leibniz1 ,gottfried ,wilhelm1 ,freiherr von1 #afdf-agaf4 ,theodicy3 essays on the goodness of ,god1 the freedom of man1 and the origin of evil4 ,translation of3 ,essais de ,thodice4 ,includes index4 #a4 ,theodicy--,early works to #ahjj4 ,i4 ,title4 ,b#beij4;,e#e #aihe #bca'4h #he-hhcc ,,isbn ,o-#hgedh-dcg-i #e 99 99 99 99 99 ,,contents 99 99 99 99 99 ,,editor',s ,,introduction page #g ,,preface #di ,,preliminary ,,dissertation ,,on ,,the ,,conformity ,,of ,,faith ,,with #gc ,,reason ,,essays ,,on ,,the ,,justice ,,of ,,god ,,and ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,man ,,in ,,the #abc1 #ahb1 #bgf ,,origin ,,of ,,evil1 ,,in ,,three ,,parts ,,appendices ,,summary ,,of ,,the ,,controversy1 ,,reduced ,,to ,,formal ,,arguments #cgg ,,excursus ,,on ,,theodicy1 #cib #chi ,,reflexions ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,that ,,mr4 ,,hobbes ,,published ,,in #cic ,,english ,,on ',,freedom1 ,,necessity ,,and ,,chance' ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,book ,,concerning ',,the ,,origin ,,of ,,evil'1 #dje ,,published ,,recently ,,in ,,london ,,causa ,,dei ,,asserta #ddc ,,index #dde #g 99 99 99 99 99 ,,editor',s ,,introduction 99 99 99 99 99 ,i ,leibniz was above all things a metaphysician4 ,that does not mean that his head was in the clouds1 or that the particular sciences lacked interest for him4 ,not at all--he felt a lively concern for theological debate1 he was a mathematician of the first rank1 he made original contributions to physics1 he gave a realistic attention to moral psychology4 ,but he was incapable of looking at the objects of any special enquiry without seeing them as aspects or parts of one intelligible universe4 ,he strove constantly after system1 and the instrument on which his effort relied was the speculative reason4 ,he embodied in an extreme form the spirit of his age4 ,nothing could be less like the spirit of ours4 ,to many people now alive metaphysics means a body of wild and meaningless assertions resting on spurious argument4 ,a professor of metaphysics may nowadays be held to deal handsomely with the duties of his chair if he is prepared to handle metaphysical statements at all1 though it be only for the purpose of getting rid of them1 by showing them up as confused forms of something else4 ,a chair in metaphysical philosophy becomes analogous to a chair in tropical diseases3 what is taught from it is not the propagation but the cure4 ,confidence in metaphysical construction has ebbed and flowed through philosophical history2 periods of speculation have been followed by periods of criticism4 ,the tide will flow again1 but it has not turned yet1 and #h such metaphysicians as survive scarcely venture further than to argue a case for the possibility of their art4 ,it would be an embarrassing task to open an approach to ,leibnitian metaphysics from the present metaphysical position1 if there is a present position4 ,if we want an agreed starting-point1 it will have to be historical4 ,the historical importance of ,leibniz's ideas is anyhow unmistakable4 ,if metaphysical thinking is nonsensical1 its empire over the human imagination must still be confessed2 if it is as chimerical a science as alchemy1 it is no less fertile in by-products of importance4 ,and if we are to consider ,leibniz historically1 we cannot do better than take up his ,theodicy1 for two reasons4 ,it was the only one of his main philosophical works to be published in his lifetime1 so that it was a principal means of his direct influence2 the ,leibniz his own age knew was the ,leibniz of the ,theodicy4 ,then in the second place1 the ,theodicy itself is peculiarly rich in historical material4 ,it reflects the world of men and books which ,leibniz knew2 it expresses the theological setting of metaphysical speculation which still predominated in the first years of the eighteenth century4 ,leibniz is remembered for his philosophy2 he was not a professional philosopher4 ,he was offered academic chairs1 but he declined them4 ,he was a gentleman1 a person of means1 librarian to a reigning prince1 and frequently employed in state affairs of trust and importance4 ,the librarian might at any moment become the political secretary1 and offer his own contributions to policy4 ,leibniz was for the greater part of his active life the learned and confidential servant of the ,house of ,brunswick2 when the ,duke had nothing better to do with him1 he set him to research into ducal history4 ,if ,leibniz had a profession in literature1 it was history rather than philosophy4 ,he was even more closely bound to the interests of his prince than ,john ,locke was to those of the ,prince of ,orange4 ,the ,houses of ,orange and of ,brunswick were on the same side in the principal contest which divided ,europe1 the battle between ,louis ,,xiv and his enemies4 ,it was a turning-point of the struggle when the ,prince of ,orange supplanted ,louis's ,stuart friends on the ,english throne4 ,it was a continuation of the same movement1 when ,leibniz's master1 ,george ,i1 succeeded to the same throne1 and frustrated the restoration of the ,stuart heir4 ,locke returned to ,england in the wake of the ,prince of ,orange1 and became the #i representative thinker of the rgime4 ,leibniz wished to come to the ,english court of ,george ,i1 but was unkindly ordered to attend to the duties of his librarianship4 ,so he remained in ,hanover4 ,he was then an old man1 and before the tide of favour had turned1 he died4 ,posterity has reckoned ,locke and ,leibniz the heads of rival sects1 but politically they were on the same side4 ,as against ,louis's political absolutism and enforced religious uniformity1 both championed religious toleration and the freedom of the mind4 ,their theological liberalism was political prudence2 it was not necessarily for that reason the less personally sincere4 ,they had too much wisdom to meet bigotry with bigotry1 or set ,protestant intolerance against ,catholic absolutism4 ,but they had too much sympathy with the spirit of ,europe to react into free thinking or to make a frontal attack on revealed truth4 ,they took their stand on a fundamental ,christian theism1 the common religion of all good men2 they repudiated the negative enormities of ,hobbes and ,spinoza4 ,the ,christian was to hold a position covered by three lines of defences4 ,the base line was to be the substance of ,christian theism and of ,christian morals1 and it was to be held by the forces of sheer reason1 without aid from scriptural revelation4 ,the middle line was laid down by the general sense of ,scripture1 and the defence of it was this4 ',scriptural doctrine is reconcilable with the findings of sheer reason1 but it goes beyond them4 ,we believe the ,scriptures1 because they are authenticated by marks of supernatural intervention in the circumstances of their origin4 ,we believe them1 but reason controls our interpretation of them4' ,there remained the most forward and the most hazardous line3 the special positions which a ,church1 a sect1 or an individual might found upon the scriptural revelation4 ,a prudent man would not hold his advance positions in the same force or defend them with the same obstinacy as either of the lines behind them4 ,he could argue for them1 but he could not require assent to them4 ,one cannot help feeling1 indeed1 the readiness of these writers to fall back1 not only from the front line to the middle line1 but from the middle line itself to the base line4 ,leibniz1 for example1 writes with perfect seriousness and decency about the ,christian scheme of redemption1 but it hardly looks like being for him a crucial deliverance from perdition4 ,it is not the intervention of ,mercy1 by which alone ,he possesses himself of #aj us3 it is one of the ways in which supreme ,benevolence carries out a cosmic policy2 and ,god's benevolence is known by pure reason1 and apart from ,christian revelation4 ,in one politically important particular the theological attitude of ,leibniz differed from that of ,locke4 ,both stood for toleration and for the minimizing of the differences between the sects4 ,this was a serious enough matter in ,england1 but it was an even more serious matter in ,germany4 ,for ,germany was divided between ,catholics and ,protestants2 effective toleration must embrace them both4 ,english toleration might indulge a harmless ,catholic minority1 while rejecting the ,catholic rgime as the embodiment of intolerance4 ,but this was not practical politics on the ,continent2 you must tolerate ,catholicism on an equal footing1 and come to terms with ,catholic rgimes4 ,leibniz was not going to damn the ,pope with true ,protestant fervour4 ,it was his consistent aim to show that his theological principles were as serviceable to ,catholic thinkers as to the doctors of his own church4 ,on some points1 indeed1 he found his most solid support from ,catholics2 in other places there are hints of a joint ,catholic-,lutheran front against ,calvinism4 ,but on the whole ,leibniz's writings suggest that the important decisions cut across all the ,churches1 and not between them4 ,leibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery'1 not only by the religious divisions of ,germany1 but 7at one stage7 by the political weakness of the ,german ,protestant ,states4 ,at the point of ,louis ,,xiv's highest success1 the ,protestant princes had no hope but in ,catholic ,austria1 and ,austria was distracted by ,turkish pressure in the rear4 ,leibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade4 ,could not the ,christian princes sink their differences and unite against the infidel8 ,and could not the ,christian alliance be cemented by theological agreement8 ,hence ,leibniz's famous negotiation with ,bossuet for a basis of ,catholic-,lutheran concord4 ,it was plainly destined to fail2 and it was bound to recoil upon its author4 ,how could he be a true ,protestant who treated the differences with the ,catholics as non-essentials8 ,how could he have touched pitch and taken no defilement8 ,leibniz was generally admired1 but he was not widely trusted4 ,as a mere politician1 he may be judged to have over-reached himself4 ,it has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that ,leibniz#aa the politician and ,leibniz the theologian were one and the same person2 not at all to suggest that his rational theology was just political expediency4 ,we may apply to him a parody of his own doctrine1 the pre-established harmony between nature and grace4 ,everything happens as though ,leibniz were a liberal politician1 and his theology expressed his politics4 ,yes1 but equally1 everything happens as though ,leibniz were a philosophical theologian1 and his politics expressed his theology4 ,his appreciation of ,catholic speculation was natural and sincere2 his dogmatic ancestry is to be looked for in ,thomism and ,catholic humanism as much as anywhere4 ,above all1 he had himself a liberal and generous mind4 ,it gave him pleasure to appreciate good wherever he could see it1 and to discover a soul of truth in every opinion4 ,from the moment when ,leibniz became aware of himself as an independent thinker1 he was the man of a doctrine4 ,sometimes he called it 'my principles'1 sometimes 'the new system'1 sometimes 'pre-established harmony'4 ,it could be quite briefly expressed2 he was always ready to oblige his friends with a summary statement1 either in a letter or an enclosed memorandum1 and several such have come down to us4 ,the doctrine may have been in ,leibniz's view simple1 but it was applicable to every department of human speculation or enquiry4 ,it provided a new alphabet of philosophical ideas1 and everything in heaven and earth could be expressed in it2 not only could be1 but ought to be1 and ,leibniz showed tireless energy in working out restatements of standing problems4 ,as a man with an idea1 with a philosophical nostrum1 ,leibniz may be compared to ,bishop ,berkeley4 ,there was never any more doubt that ,leibniz was a ,leibnitian than that ,berkeley was a ,berkeleian4 ,but there is no comparison between the two men in the width of their range4 ,about many things ,berkeley never took the trouble to ,berkeleianize4 ,to take the most surprising instance of his neglect--he assured the world that his whole doctrine pointed to1 and hung upon1 theology4 ,but what sort of a theology8 ,he scarcely took the first steps in the formulation of it4 ,he preferred to keep on defending and explaining his esse est percipi4 ,with ,leibniz it is wholly different2 he carries his new torch into every corner1 to illuminate the dark questions4 ,the wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to its inventor as a rich surprise4 ,the reflective historian will find it less#ab surprising1 for he will suspect that the applications were in view from the start4 ,what was ,leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed upon him8 ,what was he not thinking of8 ,he had a many-sided mind4 ,if the origins of the principle were complex1 little wonder that its applications were manifold4 ,every expositor of ,leibniz who does not wish to be endlessly tedious must concentrate attention on one aspect of ,leibniz's principle1 and one source of its origin4 ,we will here give an account of the matter which1 we trust1 will go most directly to the heart of it1 but we will make no claims to sufficient interpretation of ,leibniz's thought-processes4 ,leibniz1 then1 like all the philosophers of the seventeenth century1 was reforming scholasticism in the light of a new physical science4 ,the science was mathematical in its form1 mechanistical in its doctrine1 and unanswerable in its evidence--it got results4 ,but it was metaphysically intractable1 and the doctrines of infinite and finite substance which it generated furnish a gallery of metaphysical grotesques2 unless we are to except ,leibniz2 his system is1 if nothing else1 a miracle of ingenuity1 and there are moments when we are in danger of believing it4 ,it is a natural mistake for the student of seventeenth-century thought to underestimate the tenacity of scholastic ,aristotelianism4 ,descartes1 we all know1 was reared in it1 but then ,descartes overthrew it2 and he had done his work and died by the time that ,leibniz was of an age to philosophize at all4 ,we expect to see ,leibniz starting on his shoulders and climbing on from there4 ,we are disappointed4 ,leibniz himself tells us that he was raised in the scholastic teaching4 ,his acquaintance with ,descartes's opinions was second-hand1 and they were retailed to him only that they might be derided4 ,he agreed1 like an amiable youth1 with his preceptors4 ,the next phase of his development gave him a direct knowledge of ,cartesian writings1 and of other modern books beside1 such as those of the atomist ,gassendi4 ,he was delighted with what he read1 because of its fertility in the field of physics and mathematics2 and for a short time he was an enthusiastic modern4 ,but presently he became dissatisfied4 ,the new systems did not go far enough1 they were still scientifically inadequate4 ,at the same time they went too far1 and carried metaphysical paradox beyond the limits of human credulity4 #ac ,there is no mystery about ,leibniz's scientific objections to the new philosophers4 ,if he condemned them here1 it was on the basis of scientific thought and observation4 ,descartes's formulation of the laws of motion could1 for example1 be refuted by physical experiment2 and if his general view of physical nature was bound up with it1 then so much the worse for the ,cartesian philosophy4 ,but whence came ,leibniz's more strictly metaphysical objections8 ,where had he learned that standard of metaphysical adequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new metaphysicians8 ,his own disciples might be satisfied to reply1 that he learnt it from ,reason herself2 but the answer will not pass with us4 ,leibniz reasoned1 indeed1 but he did not reason from nowhere1 nor would he have got anywhere if he had4 ,his conception of metaphysical reason was what his early scholastic training had made it4 ,there are certain absurd opinions which we are sure we have been taught1 although1 when put to it1 we find it hard to name the teacher4 ,among them is something of this sort4 ',leibniz was a scholarly and sympathetic thinker4 ,he had more sense of history than his contemporaries1 and he was instinctively eclectic4 ,he believed he could learn something from each of his great predecessors4 ,we see him reaching back to cull a notion from ,plato or from ,aristotle2 he even found something of use in the scholastics4 ,in particular1 he picked out the ,aristotelian entelechy to stop a gap in the philosophy of his own age4' ,what this form of statement ignores is that ,leibniz was a scholastic3 a scholastic endeavouring1 like ,descartes before him1 to revolutionize scholasticism4 ,the word 'entelechy' was1 indeed1 a piece of antiquity which ,leibniz revived1 but the thing for which it stood was the most familiar of current scholastic conceptions4 ',entelechy' means active principle of wholeness or completion in an individual thing4 ,scholasticism was content to talk about it under the name of 'substantial form' or 'formal cause'4 ,but the scholastic interpretation of the idea was hopelessly discredited by the new science1 and the scholastic terms shared the discredit of scholastic doctrine4 ,leibniz wanted a term with a more general sound4 ',there is an ,x'1 he wanted to say1 'which scholasticism has defined as substantial form1 but ,i am going to give a new definition of it4' ,entelechy was a useful name for ,x1 the more so as it had the authority of ,aristotle1 the master of scholasticism4 ,under the name of entelechy ,leibniz was upholding the soul of #ad scholastic doctrine1 while retrenching the limbs and outward flourishes4 ,the doctrine of substantial form which he learnt in his youth had had something in it2 he could not settle down in the principles of ,descartes or of ,gassendi1 because both ignored this vital something4 ,since the requirements of a new science would not allow a return to sheer scholasticism1 it was necessary to find a fresh philosophy1 in which entelechy and mechanism might be accommodated side by side4 ,if one had asked any 'modern' of the seventeenth century to name the 'ancient' doctrine he most abominated1 he would most likely have replied1 ',substantial form'4 ,let us recall what was rejected under this name1 and why4 ,the medieval account of physical nature had been dominated by what we may call common-sense biology4 ,biology1 indeed1 is the science of the living1 and the medievals were no more inclined than we are to endow all physical bodies with life4 ,what they did do was to take living bodies as typical1 and to treat other bodies as imperfectly analogous to them4 ,such an approach was a priori reasonable enough4 ,for we may be expected to know best the physical being closest to our own2 and we1 at any rate1 are alive4 ,why not argue from the better known to the less known1 from the nearer to the more remote1 interpreting other things by the formula of our own being1 and allowing whatever discount is necessary for their degree of unlikeness to us8 ,common-sense biology reasons as follows4 ,in a living body there is a certain pattern of organized parts1 a certain rhythm of successive motions1 and a certain range of characteristic activities4 ,the pattern1 the sheer anatomy1 is basic2 but it cannot long continue to exist 7outside a refrigerator7 without accompanying vital rhythms in heart1 respiration and digestion4 ,nor do these perform their parts without the intermittent support of variable but still characteristic activities3 dogs not only breathe and digest1 they run about1 hunt their food1 look for mates1 bark at cats1 and so on4 ,the anatomical pattern1 the vital rhythm1 and the characteristic acts together express dogginess2 they reveal the specific form of the dog4 ,they reveal it2 exactly what the specific form consisted in was the subject of much medieval speculation4 ,it need not concern us here4 ,taking the form of the species for granted1 common-sense biology proceeds to ask how it comes to be in a given instance1 say in the dog ,toby4 #ae ,before this dog was born or thought of1 his form or species was displayed in each of his parents4 ,and now it looks as though the form of dog had detached itself from them through the generative act1 and set up anew on its own account4 ,how does it do that8 ,by getting hold of some materials in which to express itself4 ,at first it takes them from the body of the mother1 afterwards it collects them from a wider environment1 and what the dog eats becomes the dog4 ,what1 then1 is the relation of the assimilated materials to the dog-form which assimilates them8 ,before assimilation1 they have their own form4 ,before the dog eats the leg of mutton1 it has the form given to it by its place in the body of a sheep4 ,what happens to the mutton8 ,is it without remainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog8 ,it loses all its distinctively sheep-like characteristicsm but there may be some more basically material characteristics which it preserves4 ,they underlay the structure of the mutton1 and they continue to underlie the structure of the dog's flesh which supplants it4 ,whatever these characteristics may be1 let us call them common material characteristics1 and let us say that they belong to or compose a common material nature4 ,the common material nature has its own way of existing1 and perhaps its own principles of physical action4 ,we may suppose that we know much or that we know little about it4 ,this one thing at least we know1 that it is capable of becoming alternatively either mutton or dog's flesh4 ,it is not essential to it to be mutton1 or mutton it would always be2 nor dog's flesh1 or it would always be dog's flesh4 ,it is capable of becoming either1 according as it is captured by one or other system of formal organization4 ,so the voters who are to go to the polls are1 by their common nature1 ,englishmen2 they are essentially neither ,socialist curs nor ,conservative sheep1 but intrinsically capable of becoming either1 if they become captured by either system of party organization4 ,according to this way of thinking1 there is a certain looseness about the relation of the common material nature to the higher forms of organization capable of capturing it4 ,considered in itself alone1 it is perhaps to be seen as governed by absolutely determined laws of its own4 ,it is heavy1 then it will fall unless obstructed2 it is solid1 then it will resist intrusions4 ,but considered as material for organization by higher forms1 it is indeterminate4 ,it acts in one sort of way under the persuasion of the sheep-form1 and in another sort of way under the persuasion of the #af dog-form1 and we cannot tell how it will act until we know which form is going to capture it4 ,no amount of study bestowed on the common material nature will enable us to judge how it will behave under the persuasion of the higher organizing form4 ,the only way to discover that is to examine the higher form itself4 ,every form1 then1 will really be the object of a distinct science4 ,the form of the sheep and the form of the dog have much in common1 but that merely happens to be so2 we cannot depend upon it1 or risk inferences from sheep to dog3 we must examine each in itself2 we shall really need a science of probatology about sheep1 and cynology about dogs4 ,again1 the common material nature has its own principles of being and action1 so it will need a science of itself1 which we may call hylology4 ,each of these sciences is mistress in her own province2 but how many there are1 and how puzzlingly they overlap6 ,so long as we remain within the province of a single science1 we may be able to think rigorously1 everything will be 'tight'4 ,but as soon as we consider border-issues between one province and another1 farewell to exactitude3 everything will be 'loose'4 ,we can think out hylology till we are blue in the face1 but we shall never discover anything about the entry of material elements into higher organizations1 or how they behave when they get there4 ,we may form perfect definitions and descriptions of the form of the dog as such1 and still derive no rules for telling what elements of matter will enter into the body of a given dog or how they will be placed when they do4 ,all we can be sure of is1 that the dog-form will keep itself going in1 and by means of1 the material it embodies--unless the dog dies4 ,but what happens to the matter in the body of the dog is 'accidental' to the nature of the matter2 and the use of this matter1 rather than of some other equally suitable1 is accidental to the nature of the dog4 ,no account of material events can dispense with accidental relations altogether4 ,we must at least recognize that there are accidental relations between particular things4 ,accident in the sense of brute fact had to be acknowledged even by the tidiest and most dogmatic atomism of the last century4 ,that atomism must allow it to be accidental1 in this sense1 that the space surrounding any given atom was occupied by other atoms in a given manner4 ,it belonged neither to the nature of space to be occupied by just those atoms in just those places1 nor to the nature of the atoms to be #ag distributed just like that over space2 and so in a certain sense the environment of any atom was an accidental environment4 ,that is1 the particular arrangement of the environment was accidental4 ,the nature of the environment was not accidental at all4 ,it was proper to the nature of the atom to be in interaction with other atoms over a spatial field1 and it never encountered in the fellow-denizens of space any other nature but its own4 ,it was not subject to the accident of meeting strange natures1 nor of becoming suddenly subject to strange or unequal laws of interaction4 ,all interactions1 being with its own kind1 were reciprocal and obedient to a single set of calculable laws4 ,but the medieval philosophy had asserted accidental relations between distinct sorts of natures1 the form of living dog and the form of dead matter1 for example4 ,no one could know a priori what effect an accidental relation would produce1 and all accidental relations between different pairs of natures were different3 at the most there was analogy between them4 ,every different nature had to be separately observed1 and when you had observed them all1 you could still simply write an inventory of them1 you could not hope to rationalize your body of knowledge4 ,let us narrow the field and consider what this doctrine allows us to know about the wood of a certain kind of tree4 ,we shall begin by observing the impressions it makes on our several senses1 and we shall attribute to it a substantial form such as naturally to give rise to these impressions1 without1 perhaps1 being so rash as to claim a knowledge of what this substantial form is4 ,still we do not know what its capacities of physical action and passion may be4 ,we shall find them out by observing it in relation to different 'natures'4 ,it turns out to be combustible by fire1 resistant to water1 tractable to the carpenter's tools1 intractable to his digestive organs1 harmless to ostriches1 nourishing to wood-beetles4 ,each of these capacities of the wood is distinct2 we cannot relate them intelligibly to one another1 nor deduce them from the assumed fundamental 'woodiness'4 ,we can now see why 'substantial forms' were the btes noires of the seventeenth-century philosophers4 ,it was because they turned nature into an unmanageable jungle1 in which trees1 bushes1 and parasites of a thousand kinds wildly interlaced4 ,there was nothing for it1 if science was to proceed1 but to clear the ground and replant with spruce in rows3 to postulate a single uniform nature1 of which there should be a single science4 ,now neither probatology nor cynology could hope to be #ah universal--the world is not all sheep nor all dog3 it would have to be hylology2 for the world is1 in its spatial aspect1 all material4 ,let us say1 then1 that there is one uniform material nature of things1 and that everything else consists in the arrangements of the basic material nature2 as the show of towers and mountains in the sunset results simply from an arrangement of vapours4 ,and let us suppose that the interactions of the parts of matter are all like those which we can observe in dead manipulable bodies--in mechanism1 in fact4 ,such was the postulate of the new philosophers1 and it yielded them results4 ,it yielded them results1 and that was highly gratifying4 ,but what1 meanwhile1 had happened to those palpable facts of common experience from which the whole philosophy of substantial forms had taken its rise8 ,is the wholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly operations of its parts8 ,is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm is8 ,is the life of a living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a going watch1 except in degree of complication and subtlety of contrivance8 ,and if an animal's body1 say my own1 is simply an agglomerate of minute interacting material units1 and its wholeness is merely accidental and apparent1 how is my conscious mind to be adjusted to it8 ,for my consciousness appears to identify itself with that whole vital pattern which used to be called the substantial form4 ,we are now told that the pattern is nothing real or active1 but the mere accidental resultant of distinct interacting forces3 it does no work1 it exercises no influence or control1 it is nothing4 ,how then can it be the vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul8 ,it cannot4 ,then is my soul homeless8 ,or is it to be identified with the activity and fortunes of a single atomic constituent of my body1 a single cog in the animal clockwork8 ,if so1 how irrational6 ,for the soul does not experience itself as the soul of one minute part1 but as the soul of the body4 ,such questions rose thick and fast in the minds of the seventeenth-century philosophers4 ,it will cause us no great surprise that ,leibniz should have quickly felt that the ,formal ,principle of ,aristotle and of the ,scholastic philosophy must be by hook or by crook reintroduced--not as the detested substantial form1 but under a name by which it might hope to smell more sweet1 entelechy4 ,nothing so tellingly revealed the difficulties of the new philosophy in#ai dealing with living bodies as the insufficiency of the solutions ,descartes had proposed4 ,he had boldly declared the unity of animal life to be purely mechanical1 and denied that brutes had souls at all1 or any sensation4 ,he had to admit soul in man1 but he still denied the substantial unity of the human body4 ,it was put together like a watch1 it was many things1 not one3 if ,descartes had lived in our time1 he would have been delighted to compare it with a telephone system1 the nerves taking the place of the wires1 and being so arranged that all currents of 'animal spirit' flowing in them converged upon a single unit1 a gland at the base of the brain4 ,in this unit1 or in the convergence of all the motions upon it1 the 'unity' of the body virtually consisted2 and the soul was incarnate1 not in the plurality of members 7for how could it1 being one1 indwell many things871 but in the single gland4 ,even so1 the relation between the soul and the gland was absolutely unintelligible1 as ,descartes disarmingly confessed4 ,incarnation was all very well in the old philosophy3 those who had allowed the interaction of disparate natures throughout the physical world need find no particular difficulty about the special case of it provided by incarnation4 ,why should not a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise be dead matter as to 'indwell' it8 ,but the very principle of the new philosophy disallowed the interaction of disparate natures1 because such an interaction did not allow of exact formulation1 it was a 'loose' and not a 'tight' relation4 ,from a purely practical point of view the much derided pineal gland theory would serve4 ,if we could be content to view ,descartes as a man who wanted to make the world safe for physical science1 then there would be a good deal to be said for his doctrine4 ,in the old philosophy exact science had been frustrated by the hypothesis of loose relations all over the field of nature4 ,descartes had cleared them from as much of the field as science was then in a position to investigate2 he allowed only one such relation to subsist1 the one which experience appeared unmistakably to force upon us--that between our own mind and its bodily vehicle4 ,he had exorcized the spirits from the rest of nature2 and though there was a spirit here which could not be exorcized1 the philosophic conjurer had nevertheless confined it and its unaccountable pranks within a minutely narrow magic circle3 all mind could do was to turn the one tiny switch at the centre of its #bj animal telephone system4 ,it could create no energy--it could merely redirect the currents actually flowing4 ,practically this might do1 but speculatively it was most disturbing4 ,for if the 'loose relation' had to be admitted in one instance1 it was admitted in principle2 and one could not get rid of the suspicion that it would turn up elsewhere1 and that the banishment of it from every other field represented a convenient pragmatic postulate rather than a solid metaphysical truth4 ,moreover1 the correlation of the unitary soul with the unitary gland might do justice to a mechanistical philosophy1 but it did not do justice to the soul's own consciousness of itself4 ,the soul's consciousness is the 'idea' or 'representation' of the life of the whole body1 certainly not of the life of the pineal gland nor1 as the unreflective nowadays would say1 of the brain4 ,i am not conscious in1 or of1 my brain except when ,i have a headache2 consciousness is in my eyes and finger-tips and so on4 ,it is physically true1 no doubt1 that consciousness in and of my finger-tips is not possible without the functioning of my brain2 but that is a poor reason for locating the consciousness in the brain4 ,the filament of the electric bulb will not be incandescent apart from the functioning of the dynamo2 but that is a poor reason for saying that the incandescence is in the dynamo4 ,certainly the area of representation in our mind is not simply equivalent to the area of our body4 ,but in so far as the confines of mental representation part company with the confines of the body1 it is not that they may contract and fall back upon the pineal gland1 but that they may expand and advance over the surrounding world4 ,the mind does not represent its own body merely1 it represents the world in so far as the world affects that body or is physically reproduced in it4 ,the mind has no observable natural relation to the pineal gland4 ,it has only two natural relations3 to its body as a whole and to its effective environment4 ,what ,descartes had really done was to pretend that the soul was related to the pineal gland as it is in fact related to its whole body2 and then that it was related to the bodily members as in fact it is related to outer environment4 ,the members became an inner environment1 known only in so far as they affected the pineal gland2 just as the outer environment in its turn was to be known only in so far as it affected the members4 #ba ,this doctrine of a double environment was wholly artificial4 ,it was forced on ,descartes by the requirements of mechanistical science3 if the members were simply a plurality of things1 they must really be parts of environment2 the body which the soul indwelt must be a body2 presumably1 then1 the pineal gland4 ,an untenable compromise1 surely1 between admitting and denying the reality of the soul's incarnation4 ,what1 then1 was to be done8 ,descartes's rivals and successors attempted several solutions1 which it would be too long to examine here4 ,they dissatisfied ,leibniz and they have certainly no less dissatisfied posterity4 ,it will be enough for us here to consider what ,leibniz did4 ,he admitted1 to begin with1 the psychological fact4 ,the unity of consciousness is the representation of a plurality--the plurality of the members1 and through them the plurality of the world4 ,here1 surely1 was the very principle the new philosophy needed for the reconciliation of substantial unity with mechanical plurality of parts4 ,for it is directly evident to us that consciousness focuses the plurality of environing things in a unity of representation4 ,this is no philosophical theory1 it is a simple fact4 ,our body1 then1 as a physical system is a mechanical plurality2 as focused in consciousness it is a unity of 'idea'4 ,very well3 but we have not got far yet4 ,for the old difficulty still remains--it is purely arbitrary1 after all1 that a unitary consciousness should be attached to1 and represent1 a mechanical collection of things which happen to interact in a sort of pattern4 ,if there is a consciousness attached to human bodies1 then why not to systems of clockwork8 ,if the body is represented as unity1 it must surely be because it is unity1 as the old philosophy had held4 ,but how can we reintroduce unity into the body without reintroducing substantial form1 and destroying the mechanistical plurality which the new science demanded8 ,it is at this point that ,leibniz produces the speculative postulate of his system4 ,why not reverse the relation1 and make the members represent the mind as the mind represents the members8 ,for then the unity of person represented in the mind will become something actual in the members also4 ,representation appears to common sense to be a one-way sort of traffic4 ,if my mind represents my bodily members1 something happens to my mind1 for it becomes a representation of such members in such a state2 but nothing happens to the members by their being so represented in the mind4 ,the #bb mental representation obeys the bodily facts2 the bodily facts do not obey the mental representation4 ,it seems nonsense to say that my members obey my mind because they are mirrored in it4 ,and yet my members do obey my mind1 or at least common sense supposes so4 ,sometimes my mind1 instead of representing the state my members are in1 represents a state which it intends that they shall be in1 for example1 that my hand should go through the motion of writing these words4 ,and my hand obeys2 its action becomes the moving diagram of my thought1 my thought is represented or expressed in the manual act4 ,here the relation of mind and members appears to be reversed3 instead of its representing them1 they represent it4 ,with this representation it is the opposite of what it was with the other4 ,by the members' being represented in the mind1 something happened to the mind1 and nothing to the members2 by the mind's being represented in the members something happens to the members and nothing to the mind4 ,why should not we take this seriously8 ,why not allow that there is two-way traffic--by one relation the mind represents the members1 by another the members represent the mind8 ,but then again1 how can we take it seriously8 ,for representation1 in the required sense1 is a mental act2 brute matter can represent nothing1 only mind can represent4 ,and the members are brute matter4 ,but are they8 ,how do we know that8 ,by brute matter we understand extended lumps of stuff1 interacting with one another mechanically1 as do1 for example1 two cogs in a piece of clockwork4 ,but this is a large-scale view4 ,the cogs are themselves composed of interrelated parts and those parts of others1 and so on ad infinitum4 ,who knows what the ultimate constituents really are8 ,the 'modern' philosophers1 certainly1 have proposed no hypothesis about them which even looks like making sense4 ,they have supposed that the apparently inert lumps1 the cogs1 are composed of parts themselves equally inert1 and that by subdivision we shall still reach nothing but the inert4 ,but this supposition is in flat contradiction with what physical theory demands4 ,we have to allow the reality of force in physics4 ,now the force which large-scale bodies display may easily be the block-effect of activity in their minute real constituents4 ,if not1 where does it come from8 ,let it be supposed1 then1 that these minute real constituents are active because they are alive1 because they are minds2 for indeed we have no notion of activity other than the perception we have #bc of our own4 ,we have no notion of it except as something mental4 ,on the hypothesis that the constituents of active body are also mental1 this limitation in our conception of activity need cause us neither sorrow nor surprise4 ,the mind-units which make up body will not of course be developed and fully conscious minds like yours or mine1 and it is only for want of a better word that we call them minds at all4 ,they will be mere unselfconscious representations of their physical environment1 as it might be seen from the physical point to which they belong by a human mind paying no attention at all to its own seeing4 ,how many of these rudimentary 'minds' will there be in my body8 ,as many as you like--as many as it is possible there should be--say an infinite number and have done with it4 ,we may now observe how this hypothesis introduces real formal unity without prejudicing mechanical plurality4 ,each of the mind-units in my body is itself and substantially distinct4 ,but since each1 in its own way and according to its own position1 represents the superior and more developed mind which ,i call 'me'1 they will order themselves according to a common form4 ,the order is real1 not accidental3 it is like the order of troops on a parade-ground4 ,each man is a distinct active unit1 but each is really expressing by his action the mind of the officer in command4 ,he is expressing no less his relation to the other men in the ranks--to obey the officer is to keep in step with them4 ,so the metaphysical units of the body1 being all minds1 represent one another as well as the dominant mind3 one another co-ordinately1 the dominant mind subordinately4 ,but if the metaphysically real units of the body are of the nature of mind1 then the mind is a mind among minds1 a spirit-atom among spirit-atoms4 ,what then constitutes its superiority or dominance1 and makes it a mind par excellence8 ,well1 what constitutes the officer an officer8 ,two things3 a more developed mentality and the fact of being obeyed4 ,in military life these two factors are not always perfectly proportioned to one another1 but in the order of ,leibniz's universe they are4 ,a fuller power to represent the universe is necessarily combined with dominance over an organized troop of members2 for the mind knows the universe only in so far as the universe is expressed in its body4 ,that is what the #bd finitude of the mind means4 ,only an infinite mind appreciates the whole plurality of things in themselves2 a finite mind perceives them in so far as mirrored in the physical being of an organized body of members4 ,the more adequate the mirror1 the more adequate the representation3 the more highly organized the body1 the more developed the mind4 ,the developed mind has an elaborate body2 but the least developed mind has still some body1 or it would lack any mirror whatever through which to represent the world4 ,this means1 in effect1 that ,leibniz's system is not an unmitigated spiritual atomism4 ,for though the spiritual atoms1 or monads1 are the ultimate constituents out of which nature is composed1 they stand composed together from the beginning in a minimal order which cannot be broken up4 ,each monad1 if it is to be anything at all1 must be a continuing finite representation of the universe1 and to be that it must have a body1 that is to say1 it must have other monads in a permanent relation of mutual correspondence with it4 ,and if you said to ,leibniz1 ',but surely any physical body can be broken up1 and this must mean the dissolution of the organic relation between its monadical constituents1' he would take refuge in the infinitesimal4 ,the wonders revealed by that new miracle1 the microscope1 suggested what the intrinsic divisibility of space itself suggests--whatever organization is broken up1 there will still be a minute organization within each of the fragments which remains unbroken--and so ad infinitum4 ,you will never come down to loose monads1 monads out of all organization4 ,you will never disembody the monads1 and so remove their representative power2 you will only reduce their bodies and so impoverish their representative power4 ,in this sense no animal dies and no animal is generated4 ,death is the reduction and generation the enrichment of some existing monad's body2 and1 by being that1 is the enrichment or the reduction of the monad's mental life4 ',but1' our common sense protests1 'it is too great a strain on our credulity to make the real nature of things so utterly different from what sense and science make of them4 ,if the real universe is what you say it is1 why do our minds represent it to us as they do8' ,the philosopher's answer is1 ',because they represent it4 ,according to the truth of things1 each monad is simply its own mental life1 its own world-view1 its own thoughts and desires4 ,to know things as they are would be simultaneously to live over1 as though from within and by a miracle of sympathy1 the #be biographies of an infinite number of distinct monads4 ,this is absolutely impossible4 ,our senses represent the coexistent families of monads in the gross1 and therefore conventionally2 what is in fact the mutual representation of monads in ordered systems1 is represented as the mechanical interaction of spatially extended and material parts4' ,this does not mean that science is overthrown4 ,the physical world-view is in terms of the convention of representation1 but it is not1 for all that1 illusory4 ,it can1 ideally1 be made as true as it is capable of being4 ,there is no reason whatever for confusing the 'well-grounded seemings' of the apparent physical world with the fantastic seemings of dream and hallucination4 ,so far the argument seems to draw whatever cogency it has from the simplicity and naturalness of the notion of representation4 ,the nature of idea1 it is assumed1 is to represent plurality in a unified view4 ,if idea did not represent1 it would not be idea4 ,and since there is idea 7for our minds at least exist and are made up of idea7 there is representation4 ,it belongs to idea to represent1 and since the whole world has now been interpreted as a system of mutually representing ideations1 or ideators1 it might seem that all their mutual relations are perfectly natural1 a harmony of agreement which could not be other than it is4 ,but if so1 why does ,leibniz keep saying that the harmony is pre-established1 by special and infinitely elaborate divine decrees8 ,leibniz himself says that the very nature of representation excludes interaction4 ,by representing environment a mind does not do anything to environment1 that is plain4 ,but it is no less plain that environment does nothing to it1 either4 ,the act of representing is simply the act of the mind2 it represents in view of environment1 of course1 but not under the causal influence of environment4 ,representation is a business carried on by the mind on its own account1 and in virtue of its innate power to represent4 ,very well2 but does this consideration really drive us into theology8 ,is not ,leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy1 that of incompletely stated alternatives8 ',either finite beings interact or else they do not directly condition one another4 ,monads do not interact1 therefore they do not directly condition one another4 ,how then explain the actual conformity of their mutual representation1 without recourse to divine fore-ordaining8' ,it seems sufficient to introduce a further alternative in the first line of the argument1 and we are rid of the theology4 ,things may condition the #bf action of a further thing1 without acting upon it4 ,it acts of itself1 but it acts in view of what they are4 ,we are tempted to conclude that ,leibniz has introduced the ,deus ex machina with the fatal facility of his age4 ',where a little further meditation on the characters in the play would furnish a natural dnouement1 he swings divine intervention on to the scene by wires from the ceiling4 ,it is easy for us to reconstruct for him the end of the piece without recourse to stage-machines4' ,is it8 ,no1 ,i fear it is not4 ,there is really no avoiding the pre-established harmony4 ,and so we shall discover1 if we pursue our train of reflexion a little further4 ,it is natural1 we were saying1 than an idea should represent an environment2 indeed1 it is the representation of one4 ,given no environment to represent1 it would be empty1 a mere capacity for representation4 ,then every idea or ideator1 taken merely in itself1 is an empty capacity4 ,but of what is the environment of each made up8 ,according to the ,leibnitian theory1 of further ideas or ideators3 of empty capacities1 therefore4 ,then no idea will either be anything in itself1 or find anything in its neighbours to represent4 ,an unhappy predicament1 like that of a literary clique in which all the members are adepts at discussing one another's ideas--only that unfortunately none of them are provided with any2 or like the shaky economics of the fabled ,irish village where they all lived by taking in one another's washing4 ,it is useless1 then1 to conceive representations as simply coming into existence in response to environment1 and modelling themselves on environment4 ,they must all mutually reflect environment or they would not be representations2 but they must also exist as themselves and in their own right or there would be no environment for them mutually to represent4 ,since the world is infinitely various1 each representor must have its own distinct character or nature1 as our minds have3 that is to say1 it must represent in its own individual way2 and all these endlessly various representations must be so constituted as to form a mutually reflecting harmony4 ,considered as a representation1 each monadical existence simply reflects the universe after its own manner4 ,but considered as something to be represented by the others1 it is a self-existent mental life1 or world of ideas4 ,now when we are considering the fact of representation1 that which is to be represented comes first and the representation follows upon it4 ,thus in considering the ,leibnitian universe1 we must begin with the#bg monads as self-existent mental lives1 or worlds of ideas2 their representation of one another comes second4 ,nothing surely1 then1 but omnipotent creative wisdom could have pre-established between so many distinct given mental worlds that harmony which constitutes their mutual representation4 ,our common-sense pluralistic thinking escapes from the need of the pre-established harmony by distinguishing what we are from what we do4 ,let the world be made up of a plurality of agents in a 'loose' order1 with room to manoeuvre and to adjust themselves to one another4 ,then1 by good luck or good management1 through friction and disaster1 by trial and error1 by accident or invention1 they may work out for themselves a harmony of action4 ,there is no need for divine preordaining here4 ,but on ,leibniz's view what the monads do is to represent1 and what they are is representation2 there is no ultimate distinction between what they are and what they do3 all that they do belongs to what they are4 ,the whole system of action in each monad1 which fits with such infinite complexity the system of action in each other monad1 is precisely the existence of that monad1 and apart from it the monad is not4 ,the monads do not achieve a harmony1 they are a harmony1 and therefore they are pre-established in harmony4 ,leibniz denied that he invoked ,god to intervene in nature1 or that there was anything arbitrary or artificial about his physical theology4 ,he was simply analysing nature and finding it to be a system of mutual representation2 he was analysing mutual representation and finding it to be of its nature intrinsically pre-established1 and therefore ,god-dependent4 ,he was not adding anything to mutual representation1 he was just showing what it necessarily contained or implied4 ,at least he was doing nothing worse than recognized scholastic practice4 ,scholastic ,aristotelianism explained all natural causality as response to stimulus1 and then had to postulate a stimulus which stimulated without being stimulated1 and this was ,god4 ,apart from this supreme and first stimulus nothing would in fact be moving4 ,the ,aristotelians claimed simply to be analysing the nature of physical motion as they perceived it1 and to find the necessity of perpetually applied divine stimulation implicit in it4 ,no violence was thereby done to the system of physical motion nor was anything brought in from without to patch it up2 it was simply found to be of its own #bh nature ,god-dependent4 ,it seems as though the reproachful description ',deus ex machina' should be reserved for more arbitrary expedients than ,aristotle's or ,leibniz's1 say for the occasionalist theory4 ,occasionalism appeared to introduce ,god that he might make physical matter do what it had no natural tendency to do1 viz4 to obey the volitions of finite mind4 ,ideas1 on the other hand1 have a natural tendency to represent one another1 for to be an idea is to be a representation2 ,god is not introduced by ,leibniz to make them correspond1 he is introduced to work a system in which they shall correspond4 ,this may not be ,deus-ex-machina philosophy1 but it is physical theology2 that is to say1 it treats divine action as one factor among the factors which together constitute the working of the natural system4 ,and this appears to be perhaps unscientific1 certainly blasphemous3 ,god's action cannot be a factor among factors2 the ,creator works through and in all creaturely action equally2 we can never say ',this is the creature1 and that is ,god' of distinguishable causalities in the natural world4 ,the creature is1 in its creaturely action1 self-sufficient3 but because a creature1 insufficient to itself throughout1 and sustained by its ,creator both in existence and in action4 ,the only acceptable argument for theism is that which corresponds to the religious consciousness1 and builds upon the insufficiency of finite existence throughout1 because it is finite4 ,all arguments to ,god's existence from a particular gap in our account of the world of finites are to be rejected4 ,they do not indicate ,god1 they indicate the failure of our power to analyse the world-order4 ,when ,leibniz discovered that his system of mutual representations needed to be pre-established1 he ought to have seen that he had come up a cul-de-sac and backed out2 he ought not to have said1 ',with the help of ,god ,i will leap over the wall4' ,if we condemn ,leibniz for writing physical theology1 we condemn not him but his age4 ,no contemporary practice was any better1 and much of it a good deal worse1 as ,leibniz liked somewhat complacently to point out4 ,and because he comes to theology through physical theology1 that does not mean that all his theology was physical theology and as such to be written off4 ,on the contrary1 ,leibniz is led to wrestle with many problems which beset any philosophical theism of the ,christian type4 ,this is particularly so#bi in the ,theodicy1 as its many citations of theologians suggest4 ,his discussions never lack ingenuity1 and the system of creation and providence in which they result has much of that luminous serenity which colours the best works of the ,age of ,reason4 ,every theistic philosopher is bound1 with whatever cautions1 to conceive ,god by the analogy of the human mind4 ,when ,leibniz declares the harmony of monads to be pre-established by ,god1 he is invoking the image of intelligent human pre-arrangement4 ,nor is he content simply to leave it at that3 he endeavours as well as he may to conceive the sort of act by which ,god pre-arranges2 and this involves the detailed adaptation for theological purposes of ,leibnitian doctrine about the human mind4 ,the human mind1 as we have seen1 is the mind predominant in a certain system of 'minds'1 viz4 in those which constitute the members of the human body4 ,if we call it predominant1 we mean that its system of ideas is more developed than theirs1 so that there are more points in which each of them conforms to it than in which it conforms to any one of them4 ,the conception of a divine pre-establishing mind will be analogous4 ,it will be the conception of a mind absolutely dominant1 to whose ideas1 that is to say1 the whole system simply corresponds1 without any reciprocating correspondence on his side4 ,in a certain sense this is to make ,god the ',mind of the ,world'2 and yet the associations of the phrase are misleading4 ,it suggests that the world is an organism or body in which the divine mind is incarnate1 and on which he relies for his representations4 ,but that is nonsense2 the world is not a body1 nor is it organic to ,god4 ,absolute dominance involves absolute transcendence3 if everything in the world without remainder simply obeys the divine thoughts1 that is only another way of saying that the world is the creature of ,god2 the whole system is pre-established by him who is absolute ,being and perfectly independent of the world4 ,of createdness1 or pre-establishedness1 there is no more to be said3 we can think of it as nothing but the pure or absolute case of subjection to dominant mind4 ,it is no use asking further how ,god's thoughts are obeyed in the existence and action of things4 ,what we can and must enquire into further1 is the nature of the divine thoughts which are thus obeyed4 ,they must be understood to be volitions or decrees4 ,there are indeed two ways in which things obey the divine thought1 and correspondingly two sorts of divine thoughts that they obey4 ,in so far as created things conform to #cj the mere universal principles of reason1 they obey a reasonableness which is an inherent characteristic of the divine mind itself4 ,if ,god wills the existence of any creature1 that creature's existence must observe the limits prescribed by eternal reason3 it cannot1 for example1 both have and lack a certain characteristic in the same sense and at the same time2 nor can it contain two parts and two parts which are not also countable as one part and three parts4 ,finite things1 if they exist at all1 must thus conform to the reasonableness of the divine nature1 but what the divine reasonableness thus prescribes is highly general3 we can deduce from it only certain laws which any finite things must obey1 we can never deduce from it which finite things there are to be1 nor indeed that there are to be any4 ,finite things are particular and individual3 each of them might have been other than it is or1 to speak more properly1 instead of any one of them there might have existed something else2 it was1 according to the mere principles of eternal reason1 equally possible4 ,but if so1 the whole universe1 being made up of things each of which might be otherwise1 might as a whole be otherwise4 ,therefore the divine thoughts which it obeys by existing have the nature of choices or decrees4 ,what material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of the infinite mind making choices or decrees8 ,if we use such language of ,god1 we are using language which has its first and natural application to ourselves4 ,we all of us choose1 and those of us who are in authority make decrees4 ,what is to choose8 ,it involves a real freedom in the mind4 ,a finite mind1 let us remember1 is nothing but a self-operating succession of perceptions1 ideas1 or representations4 ,with regard to some of our ideas we have no freedom1 those1 for example1 which represent to us our body4 ,we think of them as constituting our given substance4 ,they are sheer datum for us1 and so are those reflexions of our environment which they mediate to us4 ,they make up a closely packed and confused mass2 they persevere in their being with an obstinate innate force1 the spiritual counterpart of the force which we have to recognize in things as physically interpreted4 ,being real spiritual force1 it is quasi-voluntary1 and indeed do we not love our own existence and1 in a sense1 will it in all its necessary circumstances8 ,but if we can be said to will to be ourselves and to enact with native force what our body and its environment makes us1 we are #ca merely willing to conform to the conditions of our existence2 we are making no choice4 ,when1 however1 we think freely or perform deliberate acts1 there is not only force but choice in our activity4 ,choice between what8 ,between alternative possibilities arising out of our situation4 ,and choice in virtue of what8 ,in virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative as seemingly better4 ,can we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of ,god's creative decrees8 ,we will take the second point in it first3 our choice is in virtue of the appeal of the seeming best4 ,surely the only corrective necessary in applying this to ,god is the omission of the word 'seeming'4 ,his choice is in virtue of the appeal of the simply best4 ,the other point causes more trouble4 ,we choose between possibilities which arise for us out of our situation in the system of the existing world4 ,but as the world does not exist before ,god's creative choices1 he is in no world-situation1 and no alternative possibilities can arise out of it1 between which he should have to choose4 ,but if ,god does not choose between intrinsic possibilities of some kind1 his choice becomes something absolutely meaningless to us--it is not a choice at all1 it is an arbitrary and unintelligible fiat4 ,leibniz's solution is this3 what are mere possibilities of thought for us are possibilities of action for ,god4 ,for a human subject1 possibilities of action are limited to what arises out of his actual situation1 but possibilities for thought are not so limited4 ,i can conceive a world different in many respects from this world1 in which1 for example1 vegetables should be gifted with thought and speech2 but ,i can do nothing towards bringing it about4 ,my imaginary world is practically impossible but speculatively possible1 in the sense that it contradicts no single principle of necessary and immutable reason4 ,i1 indeed1 can explore only a very little way into the region of sheer speculative possibility2 ,god does not explore it1 he simply possesses it all3 the whole region of the possible is but a part of the content of his infinite mind4 ,so among all possible creatures he chooses the best and creates it4 ,but the whole realm of the possible is an actual infinity of ideas4 ,out of the consideration of an infinity of ideas1 how can ,god arrive at a choice8 ,why not8 ,his mind is not1 of course1 discursive2 he does not successively turn over the leaves of an infinite book of sample worlds1 for then he would never come to the end of it4 ,embracing infinite possibility in #cb the single act of his mind1 he settles his will with intuitive immediacy upon the best4 ,the inferior1 the monstrous1 the absurd is not a wilderness through which he painfully threads his way1 it is that from which he immediately turns2 his wisdom is his elimination of it4 ,but in so applying the scheme of choice to ,god's act1 have we not invalidated its application to our own8 ,for if ,god has chosen the whole form and fabric of the world1 he has chosen everything in it1 including the choices we shall make4 ,and if our choices have already been chosen for us by ,god1 it would seem to follow that they are not real open choices on our part at all1 but are pre-determined4 ,and if they are pre-determined1 it would seem that they are not really even choices1 for a determined choice is not a choice4 ,but if we do not ourselves exercise real choice in any degree1 then we have no clue to what any choice would be3 and if so1 we have no power of conceiving divine choice1 either2 and so the whole argument cuts its own throat4 ,there are two possible lines of escape from this predicament4 ,one is to define human choice in such a sense that it allows of pre-determination without ceasing to be choice2 and this is ,leibniz's method1 and it can be studied at length in the ,theodicy4 ,he certainly makes the very best he can of it1 and it hardly seems that any of those contemporaries whose views he criticizes was in a position to answer him4 ,the alternative method is to make the most of the negative element involved in all theology4 ,after all1 we do not positively or adequately understand the nature of infinite creative will4 ,perhaps it is precisely the transcendent glory of divine freedom to be able to work infallibly through free instruments4 ,but so mystical a paradox is not the sort of thing we can expect to appeal to a late-seventeenth-century philosopher4 ,one criticism of ,leibniz's argument we cannot refrain from making4 ,he allows himself too easy a triumph when he says that the only alternative to a choice determined by a prevailing inclination towards one proposal is a choice of mere caprice4 ,there is a sort of choice ,leibniz never so much as considers and which appears at least to fall quite outside his categories1 and that is the sort of choice exercised in artistic creativity4 ,in such choice we freely feel after the shaping of a scheme1 we do not arbitrate simply between shaped and given possible schemes4 ,and perhaps some such element enters into all our choices1 since our life is to some extent #cc freely designed by ourselves4 ,if so1 our minds are even more akin to the divine mind than ,leibniz realized4 ,for the sort of choice we are now referring to seems to be an intuitive turning away from an infinite1 or at least indefinite1 range of less attractive possibility4 ,and such is the nature of the divine creative choice4 ,the consequence of such a line of speculation would be1 that the divine mind designs more through us1 and less simply for us1 than ,leibniz allowed3 the 'harmony' into which we enter would be no longer simply 'pre-established'4 ,leibniz1 in fact1 could have nothing to do with such a suggestion1 and he would have found it easy to be ironical about it if his contemporaries had proposed it4 ,,ii ,leibniz wrote two books2 a considerable number of articles in learned periodicals2 and an enormous number of unpublished notes1 papers and letters1 preserved in the archives of the ,electors of ,hanover not because of the philosophical significance of some of them1 but because of the political importance of most of them4 ,from among this great mass various excerpts of philosophical interest have been made by successive editors of ,leibniz's works4 ,it may be that the most profound understanding of his mind is to be derived from some of these pieces1 but if we wish to consider the public history of ,leibniz1 we may set them aside4 ,of the two books1 one was published1 and the other never was4 ,the ,new ,essays remained in ,leibniz's desk1 the ,theodicy saw the light4 ,and so1 to his own and the succeeding generation1 ,leibniz was known as the author of the ,theodicy4 ,the articles in journals form the immediate background to the two books4 ,in #afif ,leibniz heard that a ,french translation of ,locke's ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding was being prepared at ,amsterdam4 ,he wrote some polite comments on ,locke's great work1 and published them4 ,he also sent them to ,locke1 hoping that ,locke would write a reply1 and that ,leibniz's reflexions and ,locke's reply might be appended to the projected ,french translation4 ,but ,locke set ,leibniz's comments aside4 ,leibniz1 not to be defeated1 set to work upon the ,new ,essays1 in which the whole substance of ,locke's book is systematically discussed in dialogue4 ,the ,new ,essays were written in #agjc4 ,but meanwhile a painful dispute had broken out between ,leibniz #cd and the disciples of ,locke and ,newton1 in which the ,english1 and perhaps ,newton himself1 were much to blame1 and ,leibniz thought it impolitic to publish his book4 ,it was not issued until long after his death1 in the middle of the century4 ,the discussion with ,locke was a failure3 ,locke would not play1 and the book in which the whole controversy was to be systematized never appeared4 ,the discussion with ,bayle1 on the other hand1 was a model of what a discussion should be4 ,bayle played up tirelessly1 and was never embarrassingly profound2 he provided just the sort of objections most useful for drawing forth illuminating expositions2 he was as good as a fictitious character in a philosophical dialogue4 ,and the book in which the controversy was systematized duly appeared with great clat4 ,here is the history of the controversy4 ,in #afie ,leibniz was forty-nine years old4 ,he had just emerged from a period of close employment under his prince's commands1 and he thought fit to try his metaphysical principles upon the polite world and see what would come of it4 ,he therefore published an article in the ,journal des ,savants under the title3 ',new ,system of ,nature and of the ,communication of ,substances1 as well as of the ,union between ,soul and ,body'4 ,in the same year ,foucher published an article in the ,journal controverting ,leibniz2 and in the next year ,leibniz replied with an ',explanation'4 ,a second explanation in the same year appeared in ,basnage's ,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants1 in answer to reflexions by the editor4 ,m4 ,pierre ,bayle had all these articles before him when he inserted a note on ,leibniz's doctrine in his article on ',rorarius'1 in the first edition of his ,historical and ,critical ,dictionary4 ,the point of connexion between ,rorarius and ,leibniz was no more than this1 that both held views about the souls of beasts4 ,pierre ,bayle was the son of a ,calvinist pastor1 early converted to ,catholicism1 but recovered to his old faith after a short time4 ,he held academic employments in ,switzerland and ,holland2 he promoted and edited the ,nouvelles de la ,rpublique des ,lettres1 and he produced that extraordinary work the ,historical and ,critical ,dictionary4 ,the notices it contains of authors and thinkers are little more than pegs upon which ,bayle could hang his philosophical reflexions4 ,he could write an intelligent discussion on any opinion2 what he could not do was to reconcile the points of view from which he felt impelled to write upon this author and that4#ce ,his was not a systematic mind4 ,so far as he had a philosophical opinion1 he was a ,cartesian2 in theology he was an orthodox ,calvinist4 ,he could not reconcile his theology with his ,cartesianism and he did not try to4 ,he made a merit of the oppositions of faith to reason and reason to itself1 so that he could throw himself upon a meritorious and voluntary faith4 ,there is nothing original in this position4 ,it was characteristic of decadent scholasticism1 it squared with ,luther's exaggerations about the impotence of reason in fallen man1 and ,pascal had given his own highly personal twist to it4 ,bayle has been hailed as a forerunner of ,voltairean scepticism4 ,it would be truer to say that a ,voltairean sceptic could read ,bayle's discussions in his own sense and for his own purposes if he wished4 ,but ,bayle was not a sceptic4 ,it is hard to say what he was2 his whole position as between faith and reason is hopelessly confused4 ,he was a scholar1 a wit1 and a philosophical sparring-partner of so perfectly convenient a kind that if we had not evidence of his historical reality1 we might have suspected ,leibniz of inventing him4 ,in the first edition of his ,dictionary1 under the article ',rorarius'1 ,bayle gave a very fair account of ,leibniz's doctrine concerning the souls of animals1 as it could be collected from his article in the ,journal des ,savants1 #bg ,june #afie4 ,he then proceeded to comment upon it in the following terms3 ',there are some things in ,mr4 ,leibniz's hypothesis that are liable to some difficulties1 though they show the great extent of his genius4 ,he will have it1 for example1 that the soul of a dog acts independently of outward bodies2 that it stands upon its own bottom1 by a perfect spontaneity with respect to itself1 and yet with a perfect conformity to outward things4444 ,that its internal perceptions arise from its original constitution1 that is to say1 the representative constitution 7capable of expressing beings outside itself in relation to its organs7 which was bestowed upon it from the time of its creation1 and makes its individual character 7,journal des ,savants1 #d ,july #afie74 ,from whence it results that it would feel hunger and thirst at such and such an hour1 though there were not any one body in the universe1 and though nothing should exist but ,god and that soul4 ,he has explained 7,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants1 ,feb4 #afif7 his thought by the example of two pendulums that should perfectly agree3 that is1 he supposes that according to the particular laws which put the soul upon action1 it must feel hunger at such an hour2 #cf and that according to the particular laws which direct the motion of matter1 the body which is united to that soul must be modified at that same hour as it is modified when the soul is hungry4 ,i will forbear preferring this system to that of occasional causes till the learned author has perfected it4 ,i cannot apprehend the connexion of internal and spontaneous actions which would have this effect1 that the soul of a dog would feel pain immediately after having felt joy1 though it were alone in the universe4 ,i understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure to pain when1 being very hungry and eating a piece of bread1 he is suddenly struck with a cudgel4 ,but ,i cannot apprehend that his soul should be so framed that at the very moment of his being beaten he should feel pain though he were not beaten1 and though he should continue to eat bread without any trouble or hindrance4 ,nor do ,i see how the spontaneity of that soul should be consistent with the sense of pain1 and in general with any unpleasing perceptions4 ',besides1 the reason why this learned man does not like the ,cartesian system seems to me to be a false supposition2 for it cannot be said that the system of occasional causes brings in ,god acting by a miracle 7ibid471 ,deum ex machina1 in the mutual dependency of the body and soul3 for since ,god does only intervene according to general laws1 he cannot be said to act in an extraordinary manner4 ,does the internal and active virtue communicated to the forms of bodies according to ,m4 ,leibniz know the train of actions which it is to produce8 ,by no means2 for we know by experience that we are ignorant whether we shall have such and such perceptions in an hour's time4 ,it were therefore necessary that the forms should be directed by some internal principle in the production of their acts4 ,but this would be ,deus ex machina1 as much as in the system of occasional causes4 ,in fine1 as he supposes with great reason that all souls are simple and indivisible1 it cannot be apprehended how they can be compared with a pendulum1 that is1 how by their original constitution they can diversify their operations by using the spontaneous activity bestowed upon them by their ,creator4 ,it may clearly be conceived that a simple being will always act in a uniform manner1 if no external cause hinders it4 ,if it were composed of several pieces1 as a machine1 it would act different ways1 because the peculiar activity of each piece might change every moment the progress of others2 but how will you find in a simple substance the #cg cause of a change of operation8' ,leibniz published a reply to ,bayle in the ,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants for ,july #afih4 ,as in all his references to ,bayle1 he is studiously polite and repays compliment for compliment4 ,the following are perhaps the principal points of his answer4 #a4 ,on the example of the dog3 7a7 ,how should it of itself change its sentiment1 since everything left to itself continues in the state in which it is8 ,because the state may be a state of change1 as in a moving body which1 unless hindered1 continues to move4 ,and such is the nature of simple substances--they continue to evolve steadily4 7b7 ,would it really feel as though beaten if it were not beaten1 since ,leibniz says that the action of every substance takes place as though nothing existed but ,god and itself8 ,leibniz replies that his remark refers to the causality behind an action1 not to the reasons for it4 ,the spontaneous action of the dog1 which leads to the feeling of pain1 is only decreed to be what it is1 for the reason that the dog is part of a world of mutually reflecting substances1 a world which also includes the cudgel4 7c7 ,why should the dog ever be displeased spontaneously8 ,leibniz distinguishes the spontaneous from the voluntary3 many things occur in the mind1 of itself1 but not chosen by it4 #b4 ,on ,cartesianism and miracle3 ,cartesianism in the form of occasionalism does involve miracle1 for though ,god is said by it to act according to laws in conforming body and mind to one another1 he thereby causes them to act beyond their natural capacities4 #c4 ,on the problem1 how can the simple act otherwise than uniformly8 ,leibniz distinguishes3 some uniform action is monotonous1 but some is not4 ,a point moves uniformly in describing a parabola1 for it constantly fulfils the formula of the curve4 ,but it does not move monotonously1 for the curve constantly varies4 ,such is the uniformity of the action of simple substances4 ,bayle read this reply1 and was pleased but not satisfied with it4 ,in the second edition of the dictionary1 under the same article ',rorarius'1 he added the following note3 ',i declare first of all that ,i am very glad ,i have proposed some small difficulties against the system of that great philosopher1 since they #ch have occasioned some answers whereby that subject has been made clearer to me1 and which have given me a more distinct notion of what is most to be admired in it4 ,i look now upon that new system as an important conquest1 which enlarges the bounds of philosophy4 ,we had only two hypotheses1 that of the ,schools and that of the ,cartesians3 the one was a way of influence of the body upon the soul and of the soul upon the body2 the other was a way of assistance or occasional causality4 ,but here is a new acquisition1 a new hypothesis1 which may be called1 as ,fr4 ,lami styles it1 a way of pre-established harmony4 ,we are beholden for it to ,m4 ,leibniz1 and it is impossible to conceive anything that gives us a nobler idea of the power and wisdom of the ,author of all things4 ,this1 together with the advantage of setting aside all notions of a miraculous conduct1 would engage me to prefer this new system to that of the ,cartesians1 if ,i could conceive any possibility in the way of pre-established harmony4 ',i desire the reader to take notice that though ,i confess that this way removes all notions of a miraculous conduct1 yet ,i do not retract what ,i have said formerly1 that the system of occasional causes does not bring in ,god acting miraculously4 7,see ,m4 ,leibniz's article in ,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants1 ,july #afih47 ,i am as much persuaded as ever ,i was that an action cannot be said to be miraculous1 unless ,god produces it as an exception to the general laws2 and that everything of which he is immediately the author according to those laws is distinct from a miracle properly so called4 ,but being willing to cut off from this dispute as many things as ,i possibly can1 ,i consent it should be said that the surest way of removing all notions that include a miracle is to suppose that all created substances are actively the immediate causes of the effects of nature4 ,i will therefore lay aside what ,i might reply to that part of ,m4 ,leibniz's answer4 ',i will also omit all objections which are not more contrary to his opinion than to that of some other philosophers4 ,i will not therefore propose the difficulties that may be raised against the supposition that a creature can receive from ,god the power of moving itself4 ,they are strong and almost unanswerable1 but ,m4 ,leibniz's system does not lie more open to them than that of the ,aristotelians2 nay1 ,i do not know whether the ,cartesians would presume to say that ,god cannot communicate to our souls a power of acting4 ,if they say so1 how can they own that ,adam sinned8 ,and if they dare not#ci say so they weaken the arguments whereby they endeavour to prove that matter is not capable of any activity4 ,nor do ,i believe that it is more difficult for ,m4 ,leibniz than for the ,cartesians or other philosophers1 to free himself from the objection of a fatal mechanism which destroys human liberty4 ,wherefore1 waiving this1 ,i shall only speak of what is peculiar to the system of the pre-established harmony4 ',i4 ,my first observation shall be1 that it raises the power and wisdom of the divine art above everything that can be conceived4 ,fancy to yourself a ship which1 without having any sense or knowledge1 and without being directed by any created or uncreated being1 has the power of moving itself so seasonably as to have always the wind favourable1 to avoid currents and rocks1 to cast anchor where it ought to be done1 and to retire into a harbour precisely when it is necessary4 ,suppose such a ship sails in that manner for several years successively1 being always turned and situated as it ought to be1 according to the several changes of the air and the different situations of seas and lands2 you will acknowledge that ,god1 notwithstanding his infinite power1 cannot communicate such a faculty to a ship2 or rather you will say that the nature of a ship is not capable of receiving it from ,god4 ,and yet what ,m4 ,leibniz supposes about the machine of a human body is more admirable and more surprising than all this4 ,let us apply his system concerning the union of the soul with the body to the person of ,julius ,caesar4 ',,ii4 ,we must say according to this system that the body of ,julius ,caesar did so exercise its moving faculty that from its birth to its death it went through continual changes which did most exactly answer the perpetual changes of a certain soul which it did not know and which made no impression on it4 ,we must say that the rule according to which that faculty of ,caesar's body performed such actions was such1 that he would have gone to the ,senate upon such a day and at such an hour1 that he would have spoken there such and such words1 etc41 though ,god had willed to annihilate his soul the next day after it was created4 ,we must say that this moving power did change and modify itself exactly according to the volubility of the thoughts of that ambitious man1 and that it was affected precisely in a certain manner rather than in another1 because the soul of ,caesar passed from a certain thought to another4 ,can a blind power modify itself so exactly by virtue of an impression communicated thirty or forty years #dj before and never renewed since1 but left to itself1 without ever knowing what it is to do8 ,is not this much more incomprehensible than the navigation ,i spoke of in the foregoing paragraph8 ',,iii4 ,the difficulty will be greater still1 if it be considered that the human machine contains an almost infinite number of organs1 and that it is continually exposed to the shock of the bodies that surround it1#a and which by an innumerable variety of shakings produce in it a thousand sorts of modifications4 ,how is it possible to conceive that this pre-established harmony should never be disordered1 but go on still during the longest life of a man1 notwithstanding the infinite varieties of the reciprocal action of so many organs upon one another1 which are surrounded on all sides with infinite corpuscles1 sometimes hot and sometimes cold1 sometimes dry and sometimes moist1 and always acting1 and pricking the nerves a thousand different ways8 ,suppose that the multiplicity of organs and of external agents be a necessary instrument of the almost infinite variety of changes in a human body3 will that variety have the exactness here required8 ,will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes with the changes of the soul8 ,this seems to be altogether impossible4 #a ',according to ,m4 ,leibniz what is active in every substance ought to be reduced to a true unity4 ,since therefore the body of every man is composed of several substances1 each of them ought to have a principle of action really distinct from the principle of each of the others4 ,he will have the action of every principle to be spontaneous4 ,now this must vary the effects ad infinitum1 and confound them4 ,for the impression of the neighbouring bodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of every one of them4' ',,iv4 ,it is in vain to have recourse to the power of ,god1 in order to maintain that brutes are mere machines2 it is in vain to say that ,god was able to make machines so artfully contrived that the voice of a man1 the reflected light of an object1 etc41 will strike them exactly where it is necessary1 that they may move in a given manner4 ,this supposition is rejected by everybody except some ,cartesians2 and no ,cartesian would admit it if it were to be extended to man2 that is1 if anyone were to assert that ,god was able to form such bodies as would mechanically do whatever we see other men do4 ,by denying this we do not pretend to limit the power and knowledge of ,god3 we only mean that the nature of things does not permit that the faculties imparted to a creature should not be necessarily confined within certain bounds4 ,the actions of creatures must be #da necessarily proportioned to their essential state1 and performed according to the character belonging to each machine2 for according to the maxim of the philosophers1 whatever is received is proportionate to the capacity of the subject that receives it4 ,we may therefore reject ,m4 ,leibniz's hypothesis as being impossible1 since it is liable to greater difficulties than that of the ,cartesians1 which makes beasts to be mere machines4 ,it puts a perpetual harmony between two beings1 which do not act one upon another2 whereas if servants were mere machines1 and should punctually obey their masters' command1 it could not be said that they do it without a real action of their masters upon them2 for their masters would speak words and make signs which would really shake and move the organs of the servants4 ',v4 ,now let us consider the soul of ,julius ,caesar1 and we shall find the thing more impossible still4 ,that soul was in the world without being exposed to the influence of any spirit4 ,the power it received from ,god was the only principle of the actions it produced at every moment3 and if those actions were different one from another1 it was not because some of them were produced by the united influence of some springs which did not contribute to the production of others1 for the soul of man is simple1 indivisible and immaterial4 ,m4 ,leibniz owns it2 and if he did not acknowledge it1 but if1 on the contrary1 he should suppose with most philosophers and some of the most excellent metaphysicians of our age 7,mr4 ,locke1 for instance7 that a compound of several material parts placed and disposed in a certain manner1 is capable of thinking1 his hypothesis would appear to be on that very ground absolutely impossible1 and ,i could refute it several other ways2 which ,i need not mention since he acknowledges the immateriality of our soul and builds upon it4 ',let us return to the soul of ,julius ,caesar1 and call it an immaterial automaton 7,m4 ,leibniz's own phrase71 and compare it with an atom of ,epicurus2 ,i mean an atom surrounded with a vacuum on all sides1 and which will never meet any other atom4 ,this is a very just comparison3 for this atom1 on the one hand1 has a natural power of moving itself and exerts it without any assistance1 and without being retarded or hindered by anything3 and1 on the other hand1 the soul of ,caesar is a spirit which has received the faculty of producing thoughts1 and exerts it without the influence #db of any other spirit or of any body4 ,it is neither assisted nor thwarted by anything whatsoever4 ,if you consult the common notions and the ideas of order1 you will find that this atom can never stop1 and that having been in motion in the foregoing moment1 it will continue in it at the present moment and in all the moments that shall follow1 and that it will always move in the same manner4 ,this is the consequence of an axiom approved by ,m4 ,leibniz3 since a thing does always remain in the same state wherein it happens to be1 unless it receives some alteration from some other thing 444 we conclude1 says he1 not only that a body which is at rest will always be at rest1 but that a body in motion will always keep that motion or change1 that is1 the same swiftness and the same direction1 unless something happens to hinder it4 7,m4 ,leibniz1 ibid47 ',everyone clearly sees that this atom1 whether it moves by an innate power1 as ,democritus and ,epicurus would have it1 or by a power received from the ,creator1 will always move in the same line equally and after a uniform manner1 without ever turning or going back4 ,epicurus was laughed at1 when he invented the motion of declination2 it was a needless supposition1 which he wanted in order to get out of the labyrinth of a fatal necessity2 and he could give no reason for this new part of his system4 ,it was inconsistent with the clearest notions of our minds3 for it is evident that an atom which describes a straight line for the space of two days cannot turn away at the beginning of a third1 unless it meets with some obstacle1 or has a mind all of a sudden to go out of its road1 or contains some spring which begins to play at that very moment4 ,the first of these reasons cannot be admitted in a vacuum4 ,the second is impossible1 since an atom has not the faculty of thinking4 ,and the third is likewise impossible in a corpuscle that is a perfect unity4 ,i must make some use of all this4 ',,vi4 ,caesar's soul is a being to which unity belongs in a strict sense4 ,the faculty of producing thoughts is a property of its nature 7so ,m4 ,leibniz71 which it has received from ,god1 both as to possession and exercise4 ,if the first thought it produces is a sense of pleasure1 there is no reason why the second should not likewise be a sense of pleasure2 for when the total cause of an effect remains the same1 the effect cannot be altered4 ,now this soul1 at the second moment of its existence1 does not receive a new faculty of thinking2 it only preserves the faculty it had at the first moment1 and it is as independent of the concourse of any other cause at the second #dc moment as it was at the first4 ,it must therefore produce again at the second moment the same thought it had produced just before4 ,if it be objected that it ought to be in a state of change1 and that it would not be in such a state1 in the case that ,i have supposed2 ,i answer that its change will be like the change of the atom2 for an atom which continually moves in the same line acquires a new situation at every moment1 but it is like the preceding situation4 ,a soul may therefore continue in its state of change1 if it does but produce a new thought like the preceding4 ',but suppose it to be not confined within such narrow bounds2 it must be granted at least that its going from one thought to another implies some reason of affinity4 ,if ,i suppose that in a certain moment the soul of ,caesar sees a tree with leaves and blossoms1 ,i can conceive that it does immediately desire to see one that has only leaves1 and then one that has only blossoms1 and that it will thus successively produce several images arising from one another2 but one cannot conceive the odd change of thoughts1 which have no affinity with1 but are even contrary to1 one another1 and which are so common in men's souls4 ,one cannot apprehend how ,god could place in the soul of ,julius ,caesar the principle of what ,i am going to say4 ,he was without doubt pricked with a pin more than once1 when he was sucking2 and therefore according to ,m4 ,leibniz's hypothesis which ,i am here considering1 his soul must have produced in itself a sense of pain immediately after the pleasant sensations of the sweetness of the milk1 which it had enjoyed for the space of two or three minutes4 ,by what springs was it determined to interrupt its pleasures and to give itself all of a sudden a sense of pain1 without receiving any intimation of preparing itself to change1 and without any new alteration in its substance8 ,if you run over the life of that ,roman emperor1 every page will afford you matter for a stronger objection than this is4 ',,vii4 ,the thing would be less incomprehensible if it were supposed that the soul of man is not one spirit but rather a multitude of spirits1 each of which has its functions1 that begin and end precisely as the changes made in a human body require4 ,by virtue of this supposition it should be said that something analogous to a great number of wheels and springs1 or of matters that ferment1 disposed according to the changes of our machine1 awakens or lulls asleep for a certain time the action of each of those spirits4 ,but then the soul of man would be no longer a single substance#dd but an ens per aggregationem1 a collection and heap of substances just like all material beings4 ,we are here in quest of a single being1 which produces in itself sometimes joy1 sometimes pain1 etc41 and not of many beings1 one of which produces hope1 another despair1 etc4 ',in these observations ,i have merely cleared and unfolded those which ,m4 ,leibniz has done me the honour to examine3 and now ,i shall make some reflexions upon his answers4 ',,viii4 ,he says 7ibid41 p4 #ccb7 that the law of the change which happens in the substance of the animal transports him from pleasure to pain at the very moment that a solution of continuity is made in his body2 because the law of the indivisible substance of that animal is to represent what is done in his body as we experience it1 and even to represent in some manner1 and with respect to that body1 whatever is done in the world4 ,these words are a very good explication of the grounds of this system2 they are1 as it were1 the unfolding and key of it2 but at the same time they are the very things at which the objections of those who take this system to be impossible are levelled4 ,the law ,m4 ,leibniz speaks of supposes a decree of ,god1 and shows wherein this system agrees with that of occasional causes4 ,those two systems agree in this point1 that there are laws according to which the soul of man is to represent what is done in the body of man1 as we experience it4 ,but they disagree as to the manner of executing those laws4 ,the ,cartesians say that ,god executes them2 ,m4 ,leibniz will have it1 that the soul itself does it2 which appears to me impossible1 because the soul has not the necessary instruments for such an execution4 ,now however infinite the power and knowledge of ,god be1 he cannot perform with a machine deprived of a certain piece1 what requires the concourse of such a piece4 ,he must supply that defect2 but then the effect would be produced by him and not by the machine4 ,i shall show that the soul has not the instruments requisite for the divine law we speak of1 and in order to do it ,i shall make use of a comparison4 ',fancy to yourself an animal created by ,god and designed to sing continually4 ,it will always sing1 that is most certain2 but if ,god designs him a certain tablature1 he must necessarily either put it before his eyes or imprint it upon his memory or dispose his muscles in such a manner that according to the laws of mechanism one certain note will always come after another1 agreeably to the order of the tablature4 ,without this one cannot apprehend that the animal can always follow the whole set of the notes #de appointed him by ,god4 ,let us apply this to man's soul4 ,m4 ,leibniz will have it that it has received not only the power of producing thoughts continually1 but also the faculty of following always a certain set of thoughts1 which answers the continual changes that happen in the machine of the body4 ,this set of thoughts is like the tablature prescribed to the singing animal above mentioned4 ,can the soul change its perceptions or modifications at every moment according to such a set of thoughts1 without knowing the series of the notes1 and actually thinking upon them8 ,but experience teaches us that it knows nothing of it4 ,were it not at least necessary that in default of such a knowledge1 there should be in the soul a set of particular instruments1 each of which would be a necessary cause of such and such a thought8 ,must they not be so placed and disposed as to operate precisely one after another1 according to the correspondence pre-established between the changes of the body and the thoughts of the soul8 but it is most certain that an immaterial simple and indivisible substance cannot be made up of such an innumerable multitude of particular instruments placed one before another1 according to the order of the tablature in question4 ,it is not therefore possible that a human soul should execute that law4 ',m4 ,leibniz supposes that the soul does not distinctly know its future perceptions1 but that it perceives them confusedly1 and that there are in each substance traces of whatever hath happened1 or shall happen to it3 but that an infinite multitude of perceptions hinders us from distinguishing them4 ,the present state of each substance is a natural consequence of its preceding state4 ,the soul1 though never so simple1 has always a sentiment composed of several perceptions at one time3 which answers our end as well as though it were composed of pieces1 like a machine4 ,for each foregoing perception has an influence on those that follow agreeably to a law of order1 which is in perceptions as well as in motions444,the perceptions that are together in one and the same soul at the same time1 including an infinite multitude of little and indistinguishable sentiments that are to be unfolded1 we need not wonder at the infinite variety of what is to result from it in time4 ,this is only a consequence of the representative nature of the soul1 which is1 to express what happens and what will happen in its body1 by the connexion and correspondence of all the parts of the world4 ,i have but little to say in answer to this3 ,i shall only observe that this supposition when sufficiently cleared is the right way of solving all the difficulties4 ,m4 ,leibniz1 through the #df penetration of his great genius1 has very well conceived the extent and strength of this objection1 and what remedy ought to be applied to the main inconveniency4 ,i do not doubt but that he will smooth the rough parts of his system1 and teach us some excellent things about the nature of spirits4 ,nobody can travel more usefully or more safely than he in the intellectual world4 ,i hope that his curious explanations will remove all the impossibilities which ,i have hitherto found in his system1 and that he will solidly remove my difficulties1 as well as those of ,father ,lami4 ,and these hopes made me say before1 without designing to pass a compliment upon that learned man1 that his system ought to be looked upon as an important conquest4 ',he will not be much embarrassed by this1 viz4 that whereas according to the supposition of the ,cartesians there is but one general law for the union of spirits and bodies1 he will have it that ,god gives a particular law to each spirit2 from whence it seems to result that the primitive constitution of each spirit is specifically different from all others4 ,do not the ,thomists say1 that there are as many species as individuals in angelic nature8' ,leibniz acknowledged ,bayle's note in a further reply1 which is written as though for publication4 ,it was communicated to ,bayle1 but it was not in fact published4 ,it is dated #agjb4 ,it may be found in the standard collections of ,leibniz's philosophical works4 ,it reads almost like a sketch for the ,theodicy4 ,the principal point developed by ,leibniz is the richness of content which1 according to him1 is to be found in each 'simple substance'4 ,its simplicity is more like the infinitely rich simplicity of the divine ,being1 than like the simplicity of the atom of ,epicurus1 with which ,bayle had chosen to compare it4 ,it contains a condensation in confused idea of the whole universe3 and its essence is from the first defined by the part it is to play in the total harmony4 ,as to the musical score 7'tablature of notes'7 which the individual soul plays from1 in order to perform its ordained part in the universal harmony1 this 'score' is to be found in the confused or implicit ideas at any moment present1 from which an omniscient observer could always deduce what is to happen next4 ,to the objection ',but the created soul is not an omniscient observer1 and if it cannot read the score1 the score is useless to it'1#dg ,leibniz replies by affirming that much spontaneous action arises from subjective and yet unperceived reasons1 as we are all perfectly aware1 once we attend to the relevant facts4 ,all he claims to be doing is to generalize this observation4 ,all events whatsoever arise from the 'interpretation of the score' by monads1 but very little of this 'interpretation' is in the least conscious4 ,leibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the article ',rorarius' to other articles of ,bayle's dictionary1 and touches the question of the origin of evil1 and other matters which receive their fuller treatment in the ,theodicy4 ,in the same year ,leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to ,bayle himself1 offering further explanations of disputed points4 ,he concluded it with a paragraph of some personal interest1 comparing himself the historian-philosopher with ,bayle the philosophic lexicographer1 and revealing by the way his attitude to philosophy1 science and history3 ',we have good reason to admire1 ,sir1 the way in which your striking reflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by your boundless researches into matters of fact4 ,i too am not always able to excuse myself from discussions of the sort1 and have even been obliged to descend to questions of genealogy1 which would be still more trifling1 were it not that the interests of ,states frequently depend upon them4 ,i have worked much on the history of ,germany in so far as it bears upon these countries1 a study which has furnished me with some observations belonging to general history4 ,so ,i have learnt not to neglect the knowledge of sheer facts4 ,but if the choice were open to me1 ,i should prefer natural history to political1 and the customs and laws ,god has established in nature1 to what is observed among mankind4' ,leibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages in ,bayle's works which interested him1 and writing a systematic answer to them4 ,before he had leisure to finish the task1 ,bayle died4 ,the work nevertheless appeared in #agaj as the ,essays in ,theodicy4 #di 99 99 99 99 99 ,,preface 99 99 99 99 99 ,it has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward forms for the expression of their religion3 sound piety1 that is to say1 light and virtue1 has never been the portion of the many4 ,one should not wonder at this1 nothing is so much in accord with human weakness4 ,we are impressed by what is outward1 while the inner essence of things requires consideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give4 ,as true piety consists in principles and practice1 the outward forms of religion imitate these1 and are of two kinds3 the one kind consists in ceremonial practices1 and the other in the formularies of belief4 ,ceremonies resemble virtuous actions1 and formularies are like shadows of the truth and approach1 more or less1 the true light4 ,all these outward forms would be commendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate to maintain and to express that which they imitate--if religious ceremonies1 ecclesiastical discipline1 the rules of communities1 human laws were always like a hedge round the divine law1 to withdraw us from any approach to vice1 to inure us to the good and to make us familiar with virtue4 ,that was the aim of ,moses and of other good lawgivers1 of the wise men who founded religious orders1 and above all of ,jesus ,christ1 divine founder of the purest and most enlightened religion4 ,it is just the same with the formularies of belief3 they would be valid provided there were nothing #ej in them inconsistent with truth unto salvation1 even though the full truth concerned were not there4 ,but it happens only too often that religion is choked in ceremonial1 and that the divine light is obscured by the opinions of men4 ,the pagans1 who inhabited the earth before ,christianity was founded1 had only one kind of outward form3 they had ceremonies in their worship1 but they had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing up formularies for their dogmatic theology4 ,they knew not whether their gods were real persons or symbols of the forces of ,nature1 as the sun1 the planets1 the elements4 ,their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmas but in certain secret observances1 whence the profane1 namely those who were not initiated1 were excluded4 ,these observances were very often ridiculous and absurd1 and it was necessary to conceal them in order to guard them against contempt4 ,the pagans had their superstitions3 they boasted of miracles1 everything with them was full of oracles1 auguries1 portents1 divinations2 the priests invented signs of the anger or of the goodness of the gods1 whose interpreters they claimed to be4 ,this tended to sway minds through fear and hope concerning human events2 but the great future of another life was scarce envisaged2 one did not trouble to impart to men true notions of ,god and of the soul4 ,of all ancient peoples1 it appears that the ,hebrews alone had public dogmas for their religion4 ,abraham and ,moses established the belief in one ,god1 source of all good1 author of all things4 ,the ,hebrews speak of him in a manner worthy of the ,supreme ,substance2 and one wonders at seeing the inhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened than the rest of the human race4 ,peradventure the wise men of other nations have sometimes said the same1 but they have not had the good fortune to find a sufficient following and to convert the dogma into law4 ,nevertheless ,moses had not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the immortality of souls3 it was consistent with his ideas1 it was taught by oral tradition2 but it was not proclaimed for popular acceptance until ,jesus ,christ lifted the veil1 and1 without having force in his hand1 taught with all the force of a lawgiver that immortal souls pass into another life1 wherein they shall receive the wages of their deeds4 ,moses had already expressed the beautiful conceptions of the greatness and the goodness of ,god1 whereto many civilized peoples to-day assent2 but ,jesus ,christ demonstrated fully #ea the results of these ideas1 proclaiming that divine goodness and justice are shown forth to perfection in ,god's designs for the souls of men4 ,i refrain from considering here the other points of the ,christian doctrine1 and ,i will show only how ,jesus ,christ brought about the conversion of natural religion into law1 and gained for it the authority of a public dogma4 ,he alone did that which so many philosophers had endeavoured in vain to do2 and ,christians having at last gained the upper hand in the ,roman ,empire1 the master of the greater part of the known earth1 the religion of the wise men became that of the nations4 ,later also ,mahomet showed no divergence from the great dogmas of natural theology3 his followers spread them abroad even among the most remote races of ,asia and of ,africa1 whither ,christianity had not been carried2 and they abolished in many countries heathen superstitions which were contrary to the true doctrine of the unity of ,god and the immortality of souls4 ,it is clear that ,jesus ,christ1 completing what ,moses had begun1 wished that the ,divinity should be the object not only of our fear and veneration but also of our love and devotion4 ,thus he made men happy by anticipation1 and gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity4 ,for there is nothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love4 ,love is that mental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections of the object of our love1 and there is nothing more perfect than ,god1 nor any greater delight than in him4 ,to love him it suffices to contemplate his perfections1 a thing easy indeed1 because we find the ideas of these within ourselves4 ,the perfections of ,god are those of our souls1 but he possesses them in boundless measure2 he is an ,ocean1 whereof to us only drops have been granted2 there is in us some power1 some knowledge1 some goodness1 but in ,god they are all in their entirety4 ,order1 proportions1 harmony delight us2 painting and music are samples of these3 ,god is all order2 he always keeps truth of proportions1 he makes universal harmony2 all beauty is an effusion of his rays4 ,it follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist in the love of ,god1 but a love so enlightened that its fervour is attended by insight4 ,this kind of love begets that pleasure in good actions which gives relief to virtue1 and1 relating all to ,god as to the centre1 transports the human to the divine4 ,for in doing one's duty1 in obeying reason1 one #eb carries out the orders of ,supreme ,reason4 ,one directs all one's intentions to the common good1 which is no other than the glory of ,god4 ,thus one finds that there is no greater individual interest than to espouse that of the community1 and one gains satisfaction for oneself by taking pleasure in the acquisition of true benefits for men4 ,whether one succeeds therein or not1 one is content with what comes to pass1 being once resigned to the will of ,god and knowing that what he wills is best4 ,but before he declares his will by the event one endeavours to find it out by doing that which appears most in accord with his commands4 ,when we are in this state of mind1 we are not disheartened by ill success1 we regret only our faults2 and the ungrateful ways of men cause no relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition4 ,our charity is humble and full of moderation1 it presumes not to domineer2 attentive alike to our own faults and to the talents of others1 we are inclined to criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of others4 ,we must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man4 ,there is no piety where there is not charity2 and without being kindly and beneficent one cannot show sincere religion4 ,good disposition1 favourable upbringing1 association with pious and virtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious condition for our souls2 but most securely are they grounded therein by good principles4 ,i have already said that insight must be joined to fervour1 that the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting of our will4 ,the practices of virtue1 as well as those of vice1 may be the effect of a mere habit1 one may acquire a taste for them2 but when virtue is reasonable1 when it is related to ,god1 who is the supreme reason of things1 it is founded on knowledge4 ,one cannot love ,god without knowing his perfections1 and this knowledge contains the principles of true piety4 ,the purpose of religion should be to imprint these principles upon our souls3 but in some strange way it has happened all too often that men1 that teachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose4 ,contrary to the intention of our divine ,master1 devotion has been reduced to ceremonies and doctrine has been cumbered with formulae4 ,all too often these ceremonies have not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of virtue1 and the formulae sometimes have not been lucid4 ,can one believe it8 ,some ,christians have imagined that they could be devout without loving their neighbour1#ec and pious without loving ,god2 or else people have thought that they could love their neighbour without serving him and could love ,god without knowing him4 ,many centuries have passed without recognition of this defect by the people at large2 and there are still great traces of the reign of darkness4 ,there are divers persons who speak much of piety1 of devotion1 of religion1 who are even busied with the teaching of such things1 and who yet prove to be by no means versed in the divine perfections4 ,they ill understand the goodness and the justice of the ,sovereign of the universe2 they imagine a ,god who deserves neither to be imitated nor to be loved4 ,this indeed seemed to me dangerous in its effect1 since it is of serious moment that the very source of piety should be preserved from infection4 ,the old errors of those who arraigned the ,divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have been renewed sometimes in our own days3 people have pleaded the irresistible power of ,god when it was a question rather of presenting his supreme goodness2 and they have assumed a despotic power when they should rather have conceived of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom4 ,i have observed that these opinions1 apt to do harm1 rested especially on confused notions which had been formed concerning freedom1 necessity and destiny2 and ,i have taken up my pen more than once on such an occasion to give explanations on these important matters4 ,but finally ,i have been compelled to gather up my thoughts on all these connected questions1 and to impart them to the public4 ,it is this that ,i have undertaken in the ,essays which ,i offer here1 on the ,goodness of ,god1 the ,freedom of ,man1 and the ,origin of ,evil4 ,there are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes astray3 one concerns the great question of the ,free and the ,necessary1 above all in the production and the origin of ,evil2 the other consists in the discussion of continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be the elements thereof1 and where the consideration of the infinite must enter in4 ,the first perplexes almost all the human race1 the other exercises philosophers only4 ,i shall have perchance at another time an opportunity to declare myself on the second1 and to point out that1 for lack of a true conception of the nature of substance and matter1 people have taken up false positions leading to insurmountable difficulties1 difficulties which should properly be applied to the overthrow of these very positions4 ,but if the #ed knowledge of continuity is important for speculative enquiry1 that of necessity is none the less so for practical application2 and it1 together with the questions therewith connected1 to wit1 the freedom of man and the justice of ,god1 forms the object of this treatise4 ,men have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which the ancients called the ',lazy ,reason'1 because it tended towards doing nothing1 or at least towards being careful for nothing and only following inclination for the pleasure of the moment4 ,for1 they said1 if the future is necessary1 that which must happen will happen1 whatever ,i may do4 ,now the future 7so they said7 is necessary1 whether because the ,divinity foresees everything1 and even pre-establishes it by the control of all things in the universe2 or because everything happens of necessity1 through the concatenation of causes2 or finally1 through the very nature of truth1 which is determinate in the assertions that can be made on future events1 as it is in all assertions1 since the assertion must always be true or false in itself1 even though we know not always which it is4 ,and all these reasons for determination which appear different converge finally like lines upon one and the same centre2 for there is a truth in the future event which is predetermined by the causes1 and ,god pre-establishes it in establishing the causes4 ,the false conception of necessity1 being applied in practice1 has given rise to what ,i call ,fatum ,mahometanum1 fate after the ,turkish fashion1 because it is said of the ,turks that they do not shun danger or even abandon places infected with plague1 owing to their use of such reasoning as that just recorded4 ,for what is called ,fatum ,stoicum was not so black as it is painted3 it did not divert men from the care of their affairs1 but it tended to give them tranquillity in regard to events1 through the consideration of necessity1 which renders our anxieties and our vexations needless4 ,in which respect these philosophers were not far removed from the teaching of our ,lord1 who deprecates these anxieties in regard to the morrow1 comparing them with the needless trouble a man would give himself in labouring to increase his stature4 ,it is true that the teachings of the ,stoics 7and perhaps also of some famous philosophers of our time71 confining themselves to this alleged necessity1 can only impart a forced patience2 whereas our ,lord inspires thoughts more sublime1 and even instructs us in the means of gaining contentment by assuring us that since ,god1 being altogether good and #ee wise1 has care for everything1 even so far as not to neglect one hair of our head1 our confidence in him ought to be entire4 ,and thus we should see1 if we were capable of understanding him1 that it is not even possible to wish for anything better 7as much in general as for ourselves7 than what he does4 ,it is as if one said to men3 ,do your duty and be content with that which shall come of it1 not only because you cannot resist divine providence1 or the nature of things 7which may suffice for tranquillity1 but not for contentment71 but also because you have to do with a good master4 ,and that is what may be called ,fatum ,christianum4 ,nevertheless it happens that most men1 and even ,christians1 introduce into their dealings some mixture of fate after the ,turkish fashion1 although they do not sufficiently acknowledge it4 ,it is true that they are not inactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest hopes present themselves2 for they will not fail to abandon a house that is about to fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their path2 and they will burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half uncovered1 without waiting for fate to finish dislodging it4 ,but when the good or the evil is remote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little to our taste1 the lazy reason seems to us to be valid4 ,for example1 when it is a question of preserving one's health and even one's life by good diet1 people to whom one gives advice thereupon very often answer that our days are numbered and that it avails nothing to try to struggle against that which ,god destines for us4 ,but these same persons run to even the most absurd remedies when the evil they had neglected draws near4 ,one reasons in somewhat the same way when the question for consideration is somewhat thorny1 as for instance when one asks oneself1 quod vitae sectabor iter8 what profession one must choose2 when it is a question of a marriage being arranged1 of a war being undertaken1 of a battle being fought2 for in these cases many will be inclined to evade the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to fate or to inclination1 as if reason should not be employed except in easy cases4 ,one will then all too often reason in the ,turkish fashion 7although this way is wrongly termed trusting in providence1 a thing that in reality occurs only when one has done one's duty7 and one will employ the lazy reason1 derived from the idea of inevitable fate1 to relieve oneself of the need to reason properly4 ,one will thus overlook the fact that if this #ef argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid1 it would always hold good1 whether the consideration were easy or not4 ,this laziness is to some extent the source of the superstitious practices of fortune-tellers1 which meet with just such credulity as men show towards the philosopher's stone1 because they would fain have short cuts to the attainment of happiness without trouble4 ,i do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because they have been happy before1 as if there were something permanent therein4 ,their argument from the past to the future has just as slight a foundation as the principles of astrology and of other kinds of divination4 ,they overlook the fact that there is usually an ebb and flow in fortune1 una marea1 as ,italians playing basset are wont to call it4 ,with regard to this they make their own particular observations1 which ,i would1 nevertheless1 counsel none to trust too much4 ,yet this confidence that people have in their fortune serves often to give courage to men1 and above all to soldiers1 and causes them to have indeed that good fortune they ascribe to themselves4 ,even so do predictions often cause that to happen which has been foretold1 as it is supposed that the opinion the ,mahometans hold on fate makes them resolute4 ,thus even errors have their use at times1 but generally as providing a remedy for other errors3 and truth is unquestionably better4 ,but it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate to employ it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism4 ,i have often heard it said by smart young persons1 who wished to play the freethinker1 that it is useless to preach virtue1 to censure vice1 to create hopes of reward and fears of punishment1 since it may be said of the book of destiny1 that what is written is written1 and that our behaviour can change nothing therein4 ,thus1 they would say1 it were best to follow one's inclination1 dwelling only upon such things as may content us in the present4 ,they did not reflect upon the strange consequences of this argument1 which would prove too much1 since it would prove 7for instance7 that one should take a pleasant beverage even though one knows it is poisoned4 ,for the same reason 7if it were valid7 ,i could say3 if it is written in the records of the ,parcae that poison will kill me now or will do me harm1 this will happen even though ,i were not to take this beverage2 and if this is not written1 it will not happen even though ,i should take this same beverage2 consequently ,i shall be able to follow with impunity my inclination to #eg take what is pleasing1 however injurious it may be2 the result of which reasoning is an obvious absurdity4 ,this objection disconcerted them a little1 but they always reverted to their argument1 phrased in different ways1 until they were brought to understand where the fault of the sophism lies4 ,it is untrue that the event happens whatever one may do3 it will happen because one does what leads thereto2 and if the event is written beforehand1 the cause that will make it happen is written also4 ,thus the connexion of effects and causes1 so far from establishing the doctrine of a necessity detrimental to conduct1 serves to overthrow it4 ,yet1 without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism1 one may envisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable necessity1 considering that it would destroy the freedom of the will1 so essential to the morality of action3 for justice and injustice1 praise and blame1 punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions1 and nobody will be under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from doing what is absolutely necessary4 ,without any intention of abusing this consideration in order to favour irregularity1 one will nevertheless not escape embarrassment sometimes1 when it comes to a question of judging the actions of others1 or rather of answering objections1 amongst which there are some even concerned with the actions of ,god1 whereof ,i will speak presently4 ,and as an insuperable necessity would open the door to impiety1 whether through the impunity one could thence infer or the hopelessness of any attempt to resist a torrent that sweeps everything along with it1 it is important to note the different degrees of necessity1 and to show that there are some which cannot do harm1 as there are others which cannot be admitted without giving rise to evil consequences4 ,some go even further3 not content with using the pretext of necessity to prove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill1 they have the hardihood to make the ,divinity accessary to their licentious way of life1 and they imitate the pagans of old1 who ascribed to the gods the cause of their crimes1 as if a divinity drove them to do evil4 ,the philosophy of ,christians1 which recognizes better than that of the ancients the dependence of things upon the first ,author and his co-operation with all the actions of creatures1 appears to have increased this difficulty4 ,some able men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all action to #eh creatures1 and ,m4 ,bayle1 who tended a little towards this extraordinary opinion1 made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two principles1 or two gods1 the one good1 the other evil1 as if this dogma were a better solution to the difficulties over the origin of evil4 ,yet again he acknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the oneness of the ,principle is incontestably founded on a priori reasons2 but he wishes to infer that our ,reason is confounded and cannot meet her own objections1 and that one should disregard them and hold fast the revealed dogmas1 which teach us the existence of one ,god altogether good1 altogether powerful and altogether wise4 ,but many readers1 convinced of the irrefutable nature of his objections and believing them to be at least as strong as the proofs for the truth of religion1 would draw dangerous conclusions4 ,even though there were no co-operation by ,god in evil actions1 one could not help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and that1 being able to prevent them through his omnipotence1 he yet permits them4 ,this is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather chosen to deny to ,god any knowledge of the detail of things and1 above all1 of future events1 than to admit what they believed repellent to his goodness4 ,the ,socinians and ,conrad ,vorstius lean towards that side2 and ,thomas ,bonartes1 an ,english ,jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but exceedingly learned1 who wrote a book ,de ,concordia ,scientiae cum ,fide1 of which ,i will speak later1 appears to hint at this also4 ,they are doubtless much mistaken2 but others are not less so who1 convinced that nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of ,god1 ascribe to him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest and the best of all beings that one would say these authors have indeed renounced the dogma which recognizes ,god's justice and goodness4 ,they thought that1 being supreme ,master of the universe1 he could without any detriment to his holiness cause sins to be committed1 simply at his will and pleasure1 or in order that he might have the pleasure of punishing2 and even that he could take pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent people without doing any injustice1 because no one has the right or the power to control his actions4 ,some even have gone so far as to say that ,god acts thus indeed2 and on the plea that we are as nothing in comparison with him1 they liken us to earthworms which men crush without heeding as they walk1 or in general to animals that are not of our species and which we do not #ei scruple to ill-treat4 ,i believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled by these ideas1 because they have not sufficient knowledge of their consequences4 ,they do not see that1 properly speaking1 ,god's justice is thus overthrown4 ,for what idea shall we form of such a justice as has only will for its rule1 that is to say1 where the will is not guided by the rules of good and even tends directly towards evil8 ,unless it be the idea contained in that tyrannical definition by ,thrasymachus in ,plato1 which designated as just that which pleases the stronger4 ,such indeed is the position taken up1 albeit unwittingly1 by those who rest all obligation upon constraint1 and in consequence take power as the gauge of right4 ,but one will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit to make men good and charitable through the imitation of ,god4 ,for one will reflect that a ,god who would take pleasure in the misfortune of others cannot be distinguished from the evil principle of the ,manichaeans1 assuming that this principle had become sole master of the universe2 and that in consequence one must attribute to the true ,god sentiments that render him worthy to be called the good ,principle4 ,happily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer among theologians4 ,nevertheless some astute persons1 who are pleased to make difficulties1 revive them3 they seek to increase our perplexity by uniting the controversies aroused by ,christian theology to the disputes of philosophy4 ,philosophers have considered the questions of necessity1 of freedom and of the origin of evil2 theologians have added thereto those of original sin1 of grace and of predestination4 ,the original corruption of the human race1 coming from the first sin1 appears to us to have imposed a natural necessity to sin without the succour of divine grace3 but necessity being incompatible with punishment1 it will be inferred that a sufficient grace ought to have been given to all men2 which does not seem to be in conformity with experience4 ,but the difficulty is great1 above all1 in relation to ,god's dispositions for the salvation of men4 ,there are few saved or chosen2 therefore the choice of many is not ,god's decreed will4 ,and since it is admitted that those whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest1 and are not even fundamentally less evil1 the goodness which they have coming only from the gift of ,god1 the difficulty is increased4 ,where is1 then1 his justice #fj 7people will say71 or at the least1 where is his goodness8 ,partiality1 or respect of persons1 goes against justice1 and he who without cause sets bounds to his goodness cannot have it in sufficient measure4 ,it is true that those who are not chosen are lost by their own fault3 they lack good will or living faith2 but it rested with ,god alone to grant it them4 ,we know that besides inward grace there are usually outward circumstances which distinguish men1 and that training1 conversation1 example often correct or corrupt natural disposition4 ,now that ,god should call forth circumstances favourable to some and abandon others to experiences which contribute to their misfortune1 will not that give us cause for astonishment8 ,and it is not enough 7so it seems7 to say with some that inward grace is universal and equal for all4 ,for these same authors are obliged to resort to the exclamations of ,st4 ,paul1 and to say3 ',o the depth6' when they consider how men are distinguished by what we may call outward graces1 that is1 by graces appearing in the diversity of circumstances which ,god calls forth1 whereof men are not the masters1 and which have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that concerns their salvation4 ,nor will it help us to say with ,st4 ,augustine that1 all men being involved in the damnation caused by the sin of ,adam1 ,god might have left them all in their misery2 and that thus his goodness alone induces him to deliver some of them4 ,for not only is it strange that the sin of another should condemn anyone1 but there still remains the question why ,god does not deliver all--why he delivers the lesser number and why some in preference to others4 ,he is in truth their master1 but he is a good and just master2 his power is absolute1 but his wisdom permits not that he exercise that power in an arbitrary and despotic way1 which would be tyrannous indeed4 ,moreover1 the fall of the first man having happened only with ,god's permission1 and ,god having resolved to permit it only when once he had considered its consequences1 which are the corruption of the mass of the human race and the choice of a small number of elect1 with the abandonment of all the rest1 it is useless to conceal the difficulty by limiting one's view to the mass already corrupt4 ,one must1 in spite of oneself1 go back to the knowledge of the consequences of the first sin1 preceding the decree whereby ,god permitted it1 and whereby he permitted simultaneously that #fa the damned should be involved in the mass of perdition and should not be delivered3 for ,god and the sage make no resolve without considering its consequences4 ,i hope to remove all these difficulties4 ,i will point out that absolute necessity1 which is called also logical and metaphysical and sometimes geometrical1 and which would alone be formidable in this connexion1 does not exist in free actions1 and that thus freedom is exempt not only from constraint but also from real necessity4 ,i will show that ,god himself1 although he always chooses the best1 does not act by an absolute necessity1 and that the laws of nature laid down by ,god1 founded upon the fitness of things1 keep the mean between geometrical truths1 absolutely necessary1 and arbitrary decrees2 which ,m4 ,bayle and other modern philosophers have not sufficiently understood4 ,further ,i will show that there is an indifference in freedom1 because there is no absolute necessity for one course or the other2 but yet that there is never an indifference of perfect equipoise4 ,and ,i will demonstrate that there is in free actions a perfect spontaneity beyond all that has been conceived hitherto4 ,finally ,i will make it plain that the hypothetical and the moral necessity which subsist in free actions are open to no objection1 and that the ',lazy ,reason' is a pure sophism4 ,likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to ,god1 ,i offer a vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness1 his justice and his goodness than his greatness1 his power and his independence4 ,i show how it is possible for everything to depend upon ,god1 for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures1 even1 if you will1 to create these creatures continually1 and nevertheless not to be the author of sin4 ,here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature of evil should be understood4 ,much more than that1 ,i explain how evil has a source other than the will of ,god1 and that one is right therefore to say of moral evil that ,god wills it not1 but simply permits it4 ,most important of all1 however1 ,i show that it has been possible for ,god to permit sin and misery1 and even to co-operate therein and promote it1 without detriment to his holiness and his supreme goodness3 although1 generally speaking1 he could have avoided all these evils4 ,concerning grace and predestination1 ,i justify the most debatable assertions1 as for instance3 that we are converted only through the #fb prevenient grace of ,god and that we cannot do good except with his aid2 that ,god wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those whose will is evil2 that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they wish to use it2 that1 ,jesus ,christ being the source and the centre of election1 ,god destined the elect for salvation1 because he foresaw that they would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of ,jesus ,christ4 ,yet it is true that this reason for election is not the final reason1 and that this very pre-vision is still a consequence of ,god's anterior decree4 ,faith likewise is a gift of ,god1 who has predestinated the faith of the elect1 for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses grace and circumstance in accordance with ,god's supreme wisdom4 ,now1 as one of the most gifted men of our time1 whose eloquence was as great as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition1 had applied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all the difficulties on this subject which ,i have just touched in general1 ,i found a fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in detail4 ,i acknowledge that ,m4 ,bayle 7for it is easy to see that ,i speak of him7 has on his side all the advantages except that of the root of the matter1 but ,i hope that truth 7which he acknowledges himself to be on our side7 by its very plainness1 and provided it be fittingly set forth1 will prevail over all the ornaments of eloquence and erudition4 ,my hope for success therein is all the greater because it is the cause of ,god ,i plead1 and because one of the maxims here upheld states that ,god's help is never lacking for those that lack not good will4 ,the author of this discourse believes that he has given proof of this good will in the attention he has brought to bear upon this subject4 ,he has meditated upon it since his youth2 he has conferred with some of the foremost men of the time2 and he has schooled himself by the reading of good authors4 ,and the success which ,god has given him 7according to the opinion of sundry competent judges7 in certain other profound meditations1 of which some have much influence on this subject1 gives him peradventure some right to claim the attention of readers who love truth and are fitted to search after it4 ,the author had1 moreover1 particular and weighty reasons inducing him to take pen in hand for discussion of this subject4 ,conversations which he had concerning the same with literary and court personages1 in ,germany and in ,france1 and especially with one of the greatest and most accomplished #fc of princesses1 have repeatedly prompted him to this course4 ,he had had the honour of expressing his opinions to this ,princess upon divers passages of the admirable ,dictionary of ,m4 ,bayle1 wherein religion and reason appear as adversaries1 and where ,m4 ,bayle wishes to silence reason after having made it speak too loud3 which he calls the triumph of faith4 ,the present author declared there and then that he was of a different opinion1 but that he was nevertheless well pleased that a man of such great genius had brought about an occasion for going deeply into these subjects1 subjects as important as they are difficult4 ,he admitted having examined them also for some long time already1 and having sometimes been minded to publish upon this matter some reflexions whose chief aim should be such knowledge of ,god as is needed to awaken piety and to foster virtue4 ,this ,princess exhorted and urged him to carry out his long-cherished intention1 and some friends added their persuasions4 ,he was all the more tempted to accede to their requests since he had reason to hope that in the sequel to his investigation ,m4 ,bayle's genius would greatly aid him to give the subject such illumination as it might receive with his support4 ,but divers obstacles intervened1 and the death of the incomparable ,queen was not the least4 ,it happened1 however1 that ,m4 ,bayle was attacked by excellent men who set themselves to examine the same subject2 he answered them fully and always ingeniously4 ,i followed their dispute1 and was even on the point of being involved therein4 ,this is how it came about4 ,i had published a new system1 which seemed well adapted to explain the union of the soul and the body3 it met with considerable applause even from those who were not in agreement with it1 and certain competent persons testified that they had already been of my opinion1 without having reached so distinct an explanation1 before they saw what ,i had written on the matter4 ,m4 ,bayle examined it in his ,historical and ,critical ,dictionary1 article ',rorarius'4 ,he thought that my expositions were worthy of further development2 he drew attention to their usefulness in various connexions1 and he laid stress upon what might still cause difficulty4 ,i could not but reply in a suitable way to expressions so civil and to reflexions so instructive as his4 ,in order to turn them to greater account1 ,i published some elucidations in the ,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants1 ,july #afih4 ,m4 ,bayle replied to them in the second edition of his ,dictionary4 ,i sent#fd him a rejoinder which has not yet been published2 ,i know not whether he ever made a further reply4 ,meanwhile it happened that ,m4 le ,clerc had inserted in his ,select ,library an extract from the ,intellectual ,system of the late ,mr4 ,cudworth1 and had explained therein certain 'plastic natures' which this admirable author applied to the formation of animals4 ,m4 ,bayle believed 7see the continuation of ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet1 ch4 #ba1 art4 #aa7 that1 these natures being without cognition1 in establishing them one weakened the argument which proves1 through the marvellous formation of things1 that the universe must have an intelligent ,cause4 ,m4 le ,clerc replied 7#dth art4 of the #eth vol4 of his ,select ,library7 that these natures required to be directed by divine wisdom4 ,m4 ,bayle insisted 7#gth article of the ,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants1 ,august #agjd7 that direction alone was not sufficient for a cause devoid of cognition1 unless one took the cause to be a mere instrument of ,god1 in which case direction would be needless4 ,my system was touched upon in passing2 and that gave me an opportunity to send a short essay to the illustrious author of the ,histoire des ,ouvrages des ,savants1 which he inserted in the month of ,may #agje1 art4 #i4 ,in this ,i endeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is sufficient to produce the organic bodies of animals1 without any need of other plastic natures1 provided there be added thereto the preformation already completely organic in the seeds of the bodies that come into existence1 contained in those of the bodies whence they spring1 right back to the primary seeds4 ,this could only proceed from the ,author of things1 infinitely powerful and infinitely wise1 who1 creating all in the beginning in due order1 had pre-established there all order and artifice that was to be4 ,there is no chaos in the inward nature of things1 and there is organism everywhere in a matter whose disposition proceeds from ,god4 ,more and more of it would come to light if we pressed closer our examination of the anatomy of bodies2 and we should continue to observe it even if we could go on to infinity1 like ,nature1 and make subdivision as continuous in our knowledge as ,nature has made it in fact4 ,in order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals1 ,i made use of a ,pre-established ,harmony1 that is to say1 of the same means ,i had used to explain another marvel1 namely the correspondence of soul with body1 #fe wherein ,i proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the principles ,i had employed4 ,it seems that this reminded ,m4 ,bayle of my system of accounting for this correspondence1 which he had examined formerly4 ,he declared 7in chapter #ahj of his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #abec7 that he did not believe ,god could give to matter or to any other cause the faculty of becoming organic without communicating to it the idea and the knowledge of organic nature4 ,also he was not yet disposed to believe that ,god1 with all his power over ,nature and with all the foreknowledge which he has of the contingencies that may arrive1 could have so disposed things that by the laws of mechanics alone a vessel 7for instance7 should go to its port of destination without being steered during its passage by some intelligent guide4 ,i was surprised to see that limits were placed on the power of ,god1 without the adduction of any proof and without indication that there was any contradiction to be feared on the side of the object or any imperfection on ,god's side4 ,whereas ,i had shown before in my ,rejoinder that even men often produce through automata something like the movements that come from reason1 and that even a finite mind 7but one far above ours7 could accomplish what ,m4 ,bayle thinks impossible to the ,divinity4 ,moreover1 as ,god orders all things at once beforehand1 the accuracy of the path of this vessel would be no more strange than that of a fuse passing along a cord in fireworks1 since the whole disposition of things preserves a perfect harmony between them by means of their influence one upon the other4 ,this declaration of ,m4 ,bayle pledged me to an answer4 ,i therefore purposed to point out to him1 that unless it be said that ,god forms organic bodies himself by a perpetual miracle1 or that he has entrusted this care to intelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine1 we must hold the opinion that ,god preformed things in such sort that new organisms are only a mechanical consequence of a preceding organic constitution4 ,even so do butterflies come out of silkworms1 an instance where ,m4 ,swammerdam has shown that there is nothing but development4 ,and ,i would have added that nothing is better qualified than the preformation of plants and of animals to confirm my ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony between the soul and the body4 ,for in this the body is prompted by its original constitution to carry out with the help of external things all that it does in accordance with the will of the soul4 ,so the seeds by their original constitution #ff carry out naturally the intentions of ,god1 by an artifice greater still than that which causes our body to perform everything in conformity with our will4 ,and since ,m4 ,bayle himself deems with reason that there is more artifice in the organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in the world or in the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable1 it follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul is as intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals4 ,for this opinion 7which appears to me true7 states in effect that the wisdom of ,god has so made ,nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to form animals2 ,i explain this opinion and throw more light upon the possibility of it through the system of preformation4 ,whereafter there will be no cause for surprise that ,god has so made the body that by virtue of its own laws it can carry out the intentions of the reasoning soul3 for all that the reasoning soul can demand of the body is less difficult than the organization which ,god has demanded of the seeds4 ,m4 ,bayle says 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #ahb1 p4 #abid7 that it is only very recently there have been people who have understood that the formation of living bodies cannot be a natural process4 ,this he could say also 7in accordance with his principles7 of the communication between the soul and the body1 since ,god effects this whole communication in the system of occasional causes to which this author subscribes4 ,but ,i admit the supernatural here only in the beginning of things1 in respect of the first formation of animals or in respect of the original constitution of pre-established harmony between the soul and the body4 ,once that has come to pass1 ,i hold that the formation of animals and the relation between the soul and the body are something as natural now as the other most ordinary operations of ,nature4 ,a close parallel is afforded by people's ordinary thinking about the instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes4 ,one recognizes reason there not in the brutes but in him who created them4 ,i am1 then1 of the general opinion in this respect2 but ,i hope that my explanation will have added clearness and lucidity1 and even a more ample range1 to that opinion4 ,now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new difficulties of ,m4 ,bayle1 ,i purposed at the same time to communicate to him the ideas which ,i had had for some time already1 on the difficulties put forward by him#fg in opposition to those who endeavour to reconcile reason with faith in regard to the existence of evil4 ,indeed1 there are perhaps few persons who have toiled more than ,i in this matter4 ,hardly had ,i gained some tolerable understanding of ,latin writings when ,i had an opportunity of turning over books in a library4 ,i flitted from book to book1 and since subjects for meditation pleased me as much as histories and fables1 ,i was charmed by the work of ,laurentius ,valla against ,boethius and by that of ,luther against ,erasmus1 although ,i was well aware that they had need of some mitigation4 ,i did not omit books of controversy1 and amongst other writings of this nature the records of the ,montbliard ,conversation1 which had revived the dispute1 appeared to me instructive4 ,nor did ,i neglect the teachings of our theologians3 and the study of their opponents1 far from disturbing me1 served to strengthen me in the moderate opinions of the ,churches of the ,augsburg ,confession4 ,i had opportunity on my journeys to confer with some excellent men of different parties1 for instance with ,bishop ,peter von ,wallenburg1 ,suffragan of ,mainz1 with ,herr ,johann ,ludwig ,fabricius1 premier theologian of ,heidelberg1 and finally with the celebrated ,m4 ,arnauld4 ,to him ,i even tendered a ,latin ,dialogue of my own composition upon this subject1 about the year #afgc1 wherein already ,i laid it down that ,god1 having chosen the most perfect of all possible worlds1 had been prompted by his wisdom to permit the evil which was bound up with it1 but which still did not prevent this world from being1 all things considered1 the best that could be chosen4 ,i have also since read many and various good authors on these subjects1 and ,i have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledge that seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the idea of supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in ,god4 ,i have not neglected to examine the most rigorous authors1 who have extended furthest the doctrine of the necessity of things1 as for instance ,hobbes and ,spinoza1 of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not only in his ,physical ,elements and elsewhere1 but also in a special book against ,bishop ,bramhall4 ,and ,spinoza insists more or less 7like an ancient ,peripatetic philosopher named ,strato7 that all has come from the first cause or from primitive ,nature by a blind and geometrical necessity1 with complete absence of capacity for choice1 for goodness and for understanding in this first source of things4 #fh ,i have found the means1 so it seems to me1 of demonstrating the contrary in a way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence of the matter4 ,for having made new discoveries on the nature of active force and the laws of motion1 ,i have shown that they have no geometrical necessity1 as ,spinoza appears to have believed they had4 ,neither1 as ,i have made plain1 are they purely arbitrary1 even though this be the opinion of ,m4 ,bayle and of some modern philosophers3 but they are dependent upon the fitness of things as ,i have already pointed out above1 or upon that which ,i call the 'principle of the best'4 ,moreover one recognizes therein1 as in every other thing1 the marks of the first substance1 whose productions bear the stamp of a supreme wisdom and make the most perfect of harmonies4 ,i have shown also that this harmony connects both the future with the past and the present with the absent4 ,the first kind of connexion unites times1 and the other places4 ,this second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body1 and in general in the communication of true substances with one another and with material phenomena4 ,but the first takes place in the preformation of organic bodies1 or rather of all bodies1 since there is organism everywhere1 although all masses do not compose organic bodies4 ,so a pond may very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies1 although it is not itself an animal or organic body1 but only a mass that contains them4 ,thus ,i had endeavoured to build upon such foundations1 established in a conclusive manner1 a complete body of the main articles of knowledge that reason pure and simple can impart to us1 a body whereof all the parts were properly connected and capable of meeting the most important difficulties of the ancients and the moderns4 ,i had also in consequence formed for myself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the cooperation of ,god4 ,this system appeared to me to be such as would in no wise offend reason and faith2 and ,i desired to submit it to the scrutiny of ,m4 ,bayle1 as well as of those who are in controversy with him4 ,now he has departed from us1 and such a loss is no small one1 a writer whose learning and acumen few have equalled4 ,but since the subject is under consideration and men of talent are still occupied with it1 while the public also follows it attentively1 ,i take this to be a fitting moment for the publication of certain of my ideas4 ,it will perhaps be well to add the observation1 before finishing this preface1 that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon the #fi body or of the body upon the soul1 that is1 an influence causing the one to disturb the laws of the other1 ,i by no means deny the union of the one with the other which forms of them a suppositum2 but this union is something metaphysical1 which changes nothing in the phenomena4 ,this is what ,i have already said in reply to the objection raised against me1 in the ,mmoires de ,trvoux1 by the ,reverend ,father de ,tournemine1 whose wit and learning are of no ordinary mould4 ,and for this reason one may say also in a metaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and the body upon the soul4 ,moreover1 it is true that the soul is the ,entelechy or the active principle1 whereas the corporeal alone or the mere material contains only the passive4 ,consequently the principle of action is in the soul1 as ,i have explained more than once in the ,leipzig ,journal4 ,more especially does this appear in my answer to the late ,herr ,sturm1 philosopher and mathematician of ,altorf1 where ,i have even demonstrated that1 if bodies contained only the passive1 their different conditions would be indistinguishable4 ,also ,i take this opportunity to say that1 having heard of some objections made by the gifted author of the book on ,self-knowledge1 in that same book1 to my ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony1 ,i sent a reply to ,paris1 showing that he has attributed to me opinions ,i am far from holding4 ,on another matter recently ,i met with like treatment at the hands of an anonymous ,doctor of the ,sorbonne4 ,and these misconceptions would have become plain to the reader at the outset if my own words1 which were being taken in evidence1 had been quoted4 ,this tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of others leads me to observe also1 that when ,i said somewhere that man helps himself in conversion through the succour of grace1 ,i mean only that he derives advantage from it through the cessation of the resistance overcome1 but without any cooperation on his part3 just as there is no co-operation in ice when it is broken4 ,for conversion is purely the work of ,god's grace1 wherein man co-operates only by resisting it2 but human resistance is more or less great according to the persons and the occasions4 ,circumstances also contribute more or less to our attention and to the motions that arise in the soul2 and the co-operation of all these things1 together with the strength of the impression and the condition of the will1 determines the operation of grace1 although not rendering it necessary4 ,i have expounded sufficiently elsewhere that in relation to matters of salvation #gj unregenerate man is to be considered as dead2 and ,i greatly approve the manner wherein the theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession declare themselves on this subject4 ,yet this corruption of unregenerate man is1 it must be added1 no hindrance to his possession of true moral virtues and his performance of good actions in his civic life1 actions which spring from a good principle1 without any evil intention and without mixture of actual sin4 ,wherein ,i hope ,i shall be forgiven1 if ,i have dared to diverge from the opinion of ,st4 ,augustine3 he was doubtless a great man1 of admirable intelligence1 but inclined sometimes1 as it seems1 to exaggerate things1 above all in the heat of his controversies4 ,i greatly esteem some persons who profess to be disciples of ,st4 ,augustine1 amongst others the ,reverend ,father ,qunel1 a worthy successor of the great ,arnauld in the pursuit of controversies that have embroiled them with the most famous of ,societies4 ,but ,i have found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuous merit 7of whom there are doubtless some here in both parties7 there is right on both sides1 although in different points1 and it is rather in the matter of defence than attack1 although the natural malevolence of the human heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader than defence4 ,i hope that the ,reverend ,father ,ptolemei1 who does his ,society credit and is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous ,bellarmine1 will give us1 concerning all of that1 some explanations worthy of his acumen and his knowledge1 and ,i even dare to add1 his moderation4 ,and one must believe that among the theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession there will arise some new ,chemnitz or some new ,callixtus2 even as one is justified in thinking that men like ,usserius or ,daill will again appear among the ,reformed1 and that all will work more and more to remove the misconceptions wherewith this matter is charged4 ,for the rest ,i shall be well pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read the objections with the answers ,i have given thereto1 formulated in the small treatise ,i have placed at the end of the work by way of summary4 ,i have endeavoured to forestall some new objections4 ,i have explained1 for instance1 why ,i have taken the antecedent and consequent will as preliminary and final1 after the example of ,thomas1 of ,scotus and others2 how it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of all the saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned1 despite #ga that there are more of the latter2 how1 in saying that evil has been permitted as a conditio sine qua non of good1 ,i mean not according to the principle of necessity1 but according to the principle of the fitness of things4 ,furthermore ,i show that the predetermination ,i admit is such as always to predispose1 but never to necessitate1 and that ,god will not refuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use of that which they had4 ,other elucidations besides ,i have endeavoured to give on some difficulties which have been put before me of late4 ,i have1 moreover1 followed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that ,i should add two appendices3 the one treats of the controversy carried on between ,mr4 ,hobbes and ,bishop ,bramhall touching ,freedom and ,necessity1 the other of the learned work on ,the ,origin of ,evil1 published a short time ago in ,england4 ,finally ,i have endeavoured in all things to consider edification3 and if ,i have conceded something to curiosity1 it is because ,i thought it necessary to relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause discouragement4 ,it is with that in view that ,i have introduced into this dissertation the pleasing chimera of a certain astronomical theology1 having no ground for apprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming that to tell it and refute it is the same thing4 ,fiction for fiction1 instead of imagining that the planets were suns1 one might conceive that they were masses melted in the sun and thrown out1 and that would destroy the foundation of this hypothetical theology4 ,the ancient error of the two principles1 which the ,orientals distinguished by the names ,oromasdes and ,arimanius1 caused me to explain a conjecture on the primitive history of peoples4 ,it appears indeed probable that these were the names of two great contemporary princes1 the one monarch of a part of upper ,asia1 where there have since been others of this name1 the other king of the ,scythian ,celts who made incursions into the states of the former1 and who was also named amongst the divinities of ,germania4 ,it seems1 indeed1 that ,zoroaster used the names of these princes as symbols of the invisible powers which their exploits made them resemble in the ideas of ,asiatics4 ,yet elsewhere1 according to the accounts of ,arab authors1 who in this might well be better informed than the ,greeks1 it appears from detailed records of ancient oriental history1 that this ,zerdust or ,zoroaster1 whom they make contemporary with the great ,darius1 did not look upon these two principles as completely primitive and #gb independent1 but as dependent upon one supreme and single principle4 ,they relate that he believed1 in conformity with the cosmogony of ,moses1 that ,god1 who is without an equal1 created all and separated the light from the darkness2 that the light conformed with his original design1 but that the darkness came as a consequence1 even as the shadow follows the body1 and that this is nothing but privation4 ,such a thesis would clear this ancient author of the errors the ,greeks imputed to him4 ,his great learning caused the ,orientals to compare him with the ,mercury or ,hermes of the ,egyptians and ,greeks2 just as the northern peoples compared their ,wodan or ,odin to this same ,mercury4 ,that is why ,mercredi 7,wednesday71 or the day of ,mercury1 was called ,wodansdag by the northern peoples1 but day of ,zerdust by the ,asiatics1 since it is named ,zarschamba or ,dsearschambe by the ,turks and the ,persians1 ,zerda by the ,hungarians from the north-east1 and ,sreda by the ,slavs from the heart of ,great ,russia1 as far as the ,wends of the ,luneburg region1 the ,slavs having learnt the name also from the ,orientals4 ,these observations will perhaps not be displeasing to the curious4 ,and ,i flatter myself that the small dialogue ending the ,essays written to oppose ,m4 ,bayle will give some satisfaction to those who are well pleased to see difficult but important truths set forth in an easy and familiar way4 ,i have written in a foreign language at the risk of making many errors in it1 because that language has been recently used by others in treating of my subject1 and because it is more generally read by those whom one would wish to benefit by this small work4 ,it is to be hoped that the language errors will be pardoned3 they are to be attributed not only to the printer and the copyist1 but also to the haste of the author1 who has been much distracted from his task4 ,if1 moreover1 any error has crept into the ideas expressed1 the author will be the first to correct it1 once he has been better informed3 he has given elsewhere such indications of his love of truth that he hopes this declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase4 #gc 99 99 99 99 99 ,,preliminary ,,dissertation ,,on ,,the ,,conformity ,,of ,,faith ,,with ,,reason 99 99 99 99 99 #a4 ,i begin with the preliminary question of the conformity of faith with reason1 and the use of philosophy in theology1 because it has much influence on the main subject of my treatise1 and because ,m4 ,bayle introduces it everywhere4 ,i assume that two truths cannot contradict each other2 that the object of faith is the truth ,god has revealed in an extraordinary way2 and that reason is the linking together of truths1 but especially 7when it is compared with faith7 of those whereto the human mind can attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith4 ,this definition of reason 7that is to say of strict and true reason7 has surprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in a vague sense4 ,they gave me the answer that they had never heard of any such explanation of it3 the truth is that they have never conferred with people who expressed themselves clearly on these subjects4 ,they have confessed to me1 nevertheless1 that one could not find fault with reason1 understood in the sense which ,i gave to it4 ,it is in the same sense that sometimes reason is contrasted with experience4 ,reason1 since it consists in the linking together of truths1 is entitled to connect also those wherewith experience has furnished it1 in order thence to draw mixed conclusions2 but reason pure and simple1 as distinct from experience1 only has to do with truths independent of the senses4 ,and one may compare faith with experience1 since faith 7in respect of the motives that give it justification7 depends #gd upon the experience of those who have seen the miracles whereon revelation is founded1 and upon the trustworthy tradition which has handed them down to us1 whether through the ,scriptures or by the account of those who have preserved them4 ,it is rather as we rely upon the experience of those who have seen ,china and on the credibility of their account when we give credence to the wonders that are told us of that distant country4 ,yet ,i would also take into account the inward motion of the ,holy ,spirit1 who takes possession of souls and persuades them and prompts them to good1 that is1 to faith and to charity1 without always having need of motives4 #b4 ,now the truths of reason are of two kinds3 the one kind is of those called the ',eternal ,verities'1 which are altogether necessary1 so that the opposite implies contradiction4 ,such are the truths whose necessity is logical1 metaphysical or geometrical1 which one cannot deny without being led into absurdities4 ,there are others which may be called positive1 because they are the laws which it has pleased ,god to give to ,nature1 or because they depend upon those4 ,we learn them either by experience1 that is1 a posteriori1 or by reason and a priori1 that is1 by considerations of the fitness of things which have caused their choice4 ,this fitness of things has also its rules and reasons1 but it is the free choice of ,god1 and not a geometrical necessity1 which causes preference for what is fitting and brings it into existence4 ,thus one may say that physical necessity is founded on moral necessity1 that is1 on the wise one's choice which is worthy of his wisdom2 and that both of these ought to be distinguished from geometrical necessity4 ,it is this physical necessity that makes order in ,nature and lies in the rules of motion and in some other general laws which it pleased ,god to lay down for things when he gave them being4 ,it is therefore true that ,god gave such laws not without reason1 for he chooses nothing from caprice and as though by chance or in pure indifference2 but the general reasons of good and of order1 which have prompted him to the choice1 may be overcome in some cases by stronger reasons of a superior order4 #c4 ,thus it is made clear that ,god can exempt creatures from the laws he has prescribed for them1 and produce in them that which their nature does not bear by performing a miracle4 ,when they have risen to perfections and faculties nobler than those whereto they can by their nature attain1 the ,schoolmen call this faculty an ',obediential ,power'1 that is to say1 a #ge power which the thing acquires by obeying the command of him who can give that which the thing has not4 ,the ,schoolmen1 however1 usually give instances of this power which to me appear impossible3 they maintain1 for example1 that ,god can give the creature the faculty to create4 ,it may be that there are miracles which ,god performs through the ministry of angels1 where the laws of ,nature are not violated1 any more than when men assist ,nature by art1 the skill of angels differing from ours only by degree of perfection4 ,nevertheless it still remains true that the laws of ,nature are subject to be dispensed from by the ,law-giver2 whereas the eternal verities1 as for instance those of geometry1 admit no dispensation1 and faith cannot contradict them4 ,thus it is that there cannot be any invincible objection to truth4 ,for if it is a question of proof which is founded upon principles or incontestable facts and formed by a linking together of eternal verities1 the conclusion is certain and essential1 and that which is contrary to it must be false2 otherwise two contradictories might be true at the same time4 ,if the objection is not conclusive1 it can only form a probable argument1 which has no force against faith1 since it is agreed that the ,mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances4 ,now ,m4 ,bayle declares1 in his posthumous ,reply to ,m4 le ,clerc1 that he does not claim that there are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith3 and as a result all these insuperable difficulties1 these so-called wars between reason and faith1 vanish away4 ,hi motus animorum atque haec discrimina tanta1 ,pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt4 #d4 ,protestant theologians as well as those of the ,roman confession admit the maxims which ,i have just laid down1 when they handle the matter with attention2 and all that is said against reason has no force save against a kind of counterfeit reason1 corrupted and deluded by false appearances4 ,it is the same with our notions of the justice and the goodness of ,god1 which are spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any idea nor any definition of their nature4 ,but in that case we should have no ground for ascribing these attributes to him1 or lauding him for them4 ,his goodness and his justice as well as his wisdom differ from ours only because they are infinitely more perfect4 ,thus the simple notions1 the necessary truths and the conclusive results of philosophy cannot be contrary to revelation4 ,and when some #gf philosophical maxims are rejected in theology1 the reason is that they are considered to have only a physical or moral necessity1 which speaks only of that which takes place usually1 and is consequently founded on appearances1 but which may be withheld if ,god so pleases4 #e4 ,it seems1 according to what ,i have just said1 that there is often some confusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy and theology1 or faith and reason3 they confuse the terms 'explain'1 'comprehend'1 'prove'1 'uphold'4 ,and ,i find that ,m4 ,bayle1 shrewd as he is1 is not always free from this confusion4 ,mysteries may be explained sufficiently to justify belief in them2 but one cannot comprehend them1 nor give understanding of how they come to pass4 ,thus even in natural philosophy we explain up to a certain point sundry perceptible qualities1 but in an imperfect manner1 for we do not comprehend them4 ,nor is it possible for us1 either1 to prove ,mysteries by reason2 for all that which can be proved a priori1 or by pure reason1 can be comprehended4 ,all that remains for us then1 after having believed in the ,mysteries by reason of the proofs of the truth of religion 7which are called 'motives of credibility'7 is to be able to uphold them against objections4 ,without that our belief in them would have no firm foundation2 for all that which can be refuted in a sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false4 ,and such proofs of the truth of religion as can give only a moral certainty would be balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an absolute certainty1 provided they were convincing and altogether conclusive4 ,this little might suffice me to remove the difficulties concerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if one had not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons4 ,but as the subject is important and it has fallen into a state of confusion1 it will be well to take it in greater detail4 #f4 ,the question of the conformity of faith with reason has always been a great problem4 ,in the primitive ,church the ablest ,christian authors adapted themselves to the ideas of the ,platonists1 which were the most acceptable to them1 and were at that time most generally in favour4 ,little by little ,aristotle took the place of ,plato1 when the taste for systems began to prevail1 and when theology itself became more systematic1 owing to the decisions of the ,general ,councils1 which provided precise and positive formularies4 ,st4 ,augustine1 ,boethius and ,cassiodorus in the ,west1 and #gg ,st4 ,john of ,damascus in the ,east contributed most towards reducing theology to scientific form1 not to mention ,bede1 ,alcuin1 ,st4 ,anselm and some other theologians versed in philosophy4 ,finally came the ,schoolmen4 ,the leisure of the cloisters giving full scope for speculation1 which was assisted by ,aristotle's philosophy translated from the ,arabic1 there was formed at last a compound of theology and philosophy wherein most of the questions arose from the trouble that was taken to reconcile faith with reason4 ,but this had not met with the full success hoped for1 because theology had been much corrupted by the unhappiness of the times1 by ignorance and obstinacy4 ,moreover1 philosophy1 in addition to its own faults1 which were very great1 found itself burdened with those of theology1 which in its turn was suffering from association with a philosophy that was very obscure and very imperfect4 ,one must confess1 notwithstanding1 with the incomparable ,grotius1 that there is sometimes gold hidden under the rubbish of the monks' barbarous ,latin4 ,i have therefore oft-times wished that a man of talent1 whose office had necessitated his learning the language of the ,schoolmen1 had chosen to extract thence whatever is of worth1 and that another ,petau or ,thomasius had done in respect of the ,schoolmen what these two learned men have done in respect of the ,fathers4 ,it would be a very curious work1 and very important for ecclesiastical history1 and it would continue the ,history of ,dogmas up to the time of the ,revival of ,letters 7owing to which the aspect of things has changed7 and even beyond that point4 ,for sundry dogmas1 such as those of physical predetermination1 of mediate knowledge1 philosophical sin1 objective precisions1 and many other dogmas in speculative theology and even in the practical theology of cases of conscience1 came into currency even after the ,council of ,trent4 #g4 ,a little before these changes1 and before the great schism in the ,west that still endures1 there was in ,italy a sect of philosophers which disputed this conformity of faith with reason which ,i maintain4 ,they were dubbed ',averroists' because they were adherents of a famous ,arab author1 who was called the ,commentator by pre-eminence1 and who appeared to be the one of all his race that penetrated furthest into ,aristotle's meaning4 ,this ,commentator1 extending what ,greek expositors had already taught1 maintained that according to ,aristotle1 and even according to reason 7and at that time the two were considered almost identical7 there was no case for the #gh immortality of the soul4 ,here is his reasoning4 ,the human kind is eternal1 according to ,aristotle1 therefore if individual souls die not1 one must resort to the metempsychosis rejected by that philosopher4 ,or1 if there are always new souls1 one must admit the infinity of these souls existing from all eternity2 but actual infinity is impossible1 according to the doctrine of the same ,aristotle4 ,therefore it is a necessary conclusion that the souls1 that is1 the forms of organic bodies1 must perish with the bodies1 or at least this must happen to the passive understanding that belongs to each one individually4 ,thus there will only remain the active understanding common to all men1 which according to ,aristotle comes from outside1 and which must work wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed2 even as the wind produces a kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organ pipes4 #h4 ,nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof4 ,it is not true that ,aristotle refuted metempsychosis1 or that he proved the eternity of the human kind2 and after all1 it is quite untrue that an actual infinity is impossible4 ,yet this proof passed as irresistible amongst ,aristotelians1 and induced in them the belief that there was a certain sublunary intelligence and that our active intellect was produced by participation in it4 ,but others who adhered less to ,aristotle went so far as to advocate a universal soul forming the ocean of all individual souls1 and believed this universal soul alone capable of subsisting1 whilst individual souls are born and die4 ,according to this opinion the souls of animals are born by being separated like drops from their ocean1 when they find a body which they can animate2 and they die by being reunited to the ocean of souls when the body is destroyed1 as streams are lost in the sea4 ,many even went so far as to believe that ,god is that universal soul1 although others thought that this soul was subordinate and created4 ,this bad doctrine is very ancient and apt to dazzle the common herd4 ,it is expressed in these beautiful lines of ,vergil 7,aen41 ,,vi1 v4 #gbd73 ,principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes1 ,lucentemque globum ,lunae ,titaniaque astra1 ,spiritus intus alit1 totamque infusa per artus ,mens agitat molem1 et magno se corpore miscet4 ,inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum4 #gi ,and again elsewhere 7,georg41 ,,iv1 v4 #bba73 ,deum namque ire per omnes ,terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum3 ,hinc pecudes1 armenta1 viros1 genus omne ferarum1 ,quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas4 ,scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri4 #i4 ,plato's ,soul of the ,world has been taken in this sense by some1 but there is more indication that the ,stoics succumbed to that universal soul which swallows all the rest4 ,those who are of this opinion might be called ',monopsychites'1 since according to them there is in reality only one soul that subsists4 ,m4 ,bernier observes that this is an opinion almost universally accepted amongst scholars in ,persia and in the ,states of the ,grand ,mogul2 it appears even that it has gained a footing with the ,cabalists and with the mystics4 ,a certain ,german of ,swabian birth1 converted to ,judaism some years ago1 who taught under the name ,moses ,germanus1 having adopted the dogmas of ,spinoza1 believed that ,spinoza revived the ancient ,cabala of the ,hebrews4 ,and a learned man who confuted this proselyte ,jew appears to be of the same opinion4 ,it is known that ,spinoza recognizes only substance in the world1 whereof individual souls are but transient modifications4 ,valentin ,weigel1 ,pastor of ,zschopau in ,saxony1 a man of wit1 even of excessive wit1 although people would have it that he was a visionary1 was perhaps to some extent of that opinion2 as was also a man known as ,johann ,angelus ,silesius1 author of certain quite pleasing little devotional verses in ,german1 in the form of epigrams1 which have just been reprinted4 ,in general1 the mystics' doctrine of deification was liable to such a sinister interpretation4 ,gerson already has written opposing ,ruysbroek1 a mystical writer1 whose intention was evidently good and whose expressions are excusable4 ,but it would be better to write in a manner that has no need of excuses3 although ,i confess that oft-times expressions which are extravagant1 and as it were poetical1 have greater force to move and to persuade than correct forms of statement4 #aj4 ,the annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right1 carried to great lengths by the ,quietists1 might equally well be veiled irreligion in certain minds1 as is related1 for example1 concerning the ,quietism of ,fo1 originator of a great ,chinese sect4 ,after having preached his religion #hj for forty years1 when he felt death was approaching1 he declared to his disciples that he had hidden the truth from them under the veil of metaphors1 and that all reduced itself to ,nothingness1 which he said was the first source of all things4 ,that was still worse1 so it would seem1 than the opinion of the ,averroists4 ,both of these doctrines are indefensible and even extravagant2 nevertheless some moderns have made no difficulty about adopting this one and universal ,soul that engulfs the rest4 ,it has met with only too much applause amongst the so-called freethinkers1 and ,m4 de ,preissac1 a soldier and man of wit1 who dabbled in philosophy1 at one time aired it publicly in his discourses4 ,the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony is the one best qualified to cure this evil4 ,for it shows that there are of necessity substances which are simple and without extension1 scattered throughout all ,nature2 that these substances must subsist independently of every other except ,god2 and that they are never wholly separated from organic body4 ,those who believe that souls capable of feeling but incapable of reason are mortal1 or who maintain that none but reasoning souls can have feeling1 offer a handle to the ,monopsychites4 ,for it will ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing2 and once the admission has been made that that which is capable of feeling can die1 it is difficult to found upon reason a proof of the immortality of our souls4 #aa4 ,i have made this short digression because it appeared to me seasonable at a time when there is only too much tendency to overthrow natural religion to its very foundations4 ,i return then to the ,averroists1 who were persuaded that their dogma was proved conclusively in accordance with reason4 ,as a result they declared that man's soul is1 according to philosophy1 mortal1 while they protested their acquiescence in ,christian theology1 which declares the soul's immortality4 ,but this distinction was held suspect1 and this divorce between faith and reason was vehemently rejected by the prelates and the doctors of that time1 and condemned in the last ,lateran ,council under ,leo ,x4 ,on that occasion also1 scholars were urged to work for the removal of the difficulties that appeared to set theology and philosophy at variance4 ,the doctrine of their incompatibility continued to hold its ground incognito4 ,pomponazzi was suspected of it1 although he declared himself otherwise2 and that very sect of the ,averroists survived as a school4 ,it is thought that ,caesar ,cremoninus1 #ha a philosopher famous in his time1 was one of its mainstays4 ,andreas ,cisalpinus1 a physician 7and an author of merit who came nearest after ,michael ,servetus to the discovery of the circulation of the blood71 was accused by ,nicolas ,taurel 7in a book entitled ,alpes ,caesae7 of belonging to these anti-religious ,peripatetics4 ,traces of this doctrine are found also in the ,circulus ,pisanus ,claudii ,berigardi1 an author of ,french nationality who migrated to ,italy and taught philosophy at ,pisa3 but especially the writings and the letters of ,gabriel ,naud1 as well as the ,naudaeana1 show that ,averroism still lived on when this learned physician was in ,italy4 ,corpuscular philosophy1 introduced shortly after1 appears to have extinguished this excessively ,peripatetic sect1 or perhaps to have been intermixed with its teaching4 ,it may be indeed that there have been ,atomists who would be inclined to teach dogmas like those of the ,averroists1 if circumstances so permitted3 but this abuse cannot harm such good as there is in ,corpuscular philosophy1 which can very well be combined with all that is sound in ,plato and in ,aristotle1 and bring them both into harmony with true theology4 #ab4 ,the ,reformers1 and especially ,luther1 as ,i have already observed1 spoke sometimes as if they rejected philosophy1 and deemed it inimical to faith4 ,but1 properly speaking1 ,luther understood by philosophy only that which is in conformity with the ordinary course of ,nature1 or perhaps even philosophy as it was taught in the schools4 ,thus for example he says that it is impossible in philosophy1 that is1 in the order of ,nature1 that the word be made flesh2 and he goes so far as to maintain that what is true in natural philosophy might be false in ethics4 ,aristotle was the object of his anger2 and so far back as the year #aeaf he contemplated the purging of philosophy1 when he perhaps had as yet no thoughts of reforming the ,church4 ,but at last he curbed his vehemence and in the ,apology for the ,augsburg ,confession allowed a favourable mention of ,aristotle and his ,ethics4 ,melanchthon1 a man of sound and moderate ideas1 made little systems from the several parts of philosophy1 adapted to the truths of revelation and useful in civic life1 which deserve to be read even now4 ,after him1 ,pierre de la ,rame entered the lists4 ,his philosophy was much in favour3 the sect of the ,ramists was powerful in ,germany1 gaining many adherents among the ,protestants1 and even concerning itself with theology1 until the revival of ,corpuscular philosophy1 which caused that of ,rame to fall into #hb oblivion and weakened the authority of the ,peripatetics4 #ac4 ,meanwhile sundry ,protestant theologians1 deviating as far as they could from ,scholastic philosophy1 which prevailed in the opposite party1 went so far as to despise philosophy itself1 which to them was suspect4 ,the controversy blazed up finally owing to the rancour of ,daniel ,hoffmann4 ,he was an able theologian1 who had previously gained a reputation at the ,conference of ,quedlinburg1 when ,tilemann ,heshusius and he had supported ,duke ,julius of ,brunswick in his refusal to accept the ,formula of ,concord4 ,for some reason or other ,dr4 ,hoffmann flew into a passion with philosophy1 instead of being content to find fault with the wrong uses made thereof by philosophers4 ,he was1 however1 aiming at the famous ,caselius1 a man esteemed by the princes and scholars of his time2 and ,henry ,julius1 ,duke of ,brunswick 7son of ,julius1 founder of the ,university71 having taken the trouble himself to investigate the matter1 condemned the theologian4 ,there have been some small disputes of the kind since1 but it has always been found that they were misunderstandings4 ,paul ,slevogt1 a famous ,professor at ,jena in ,thuringia1 whose still extant treatises prove how well versed he was in ,scholastic philosophy1 as also in ,hebrew literature1 had published in his youth under the title of ,pervigilium a little book 'de dissidio ,theologi et ,philosophi in utriusque principiis fundato'1 bearing on the question whether ,god is accidentally the cause of sin4 ,but it was easy to see that his aim was to demonstrate that theologians sometimes misuse philosophical terms4 #ad4 ,to come now to the events of my own time1 ,i remember that when in #afff ,louis ,meyer1 a physician of ,amsterdam1 published anonymously the book entitled ,philosophia ,scripturae ,interpres 7by many persons wrongly attributed to ,spinoza1 his friend7 the theologians of ,holland bestirred themselves1 and their written attacks upon this book gave rise to great disputes among them4 ,divers of them held the opinion that the ,cartesians1 in confuting the anonymous philosopher1 had conceded too much to philosophy4 ,jean de ,labadie 7before he had seceded from the ,reformed ,church1 his pretext being some abuses which he said had crept into public observance and which he considered intolerable7 attacked the book by ,herr von ,wollzogen1 and called it pernicious4 ,on the other hand ,herr ,vogelsang1 ,herr van der ,weye and some other anti-,cocceans also assailed the same #hc book with much acrimony4 ,but the accused won his case in a ,synod4 ,afterwards in ,holland people spoke of 'rational' and 'non-rational' theologians1 a party distinction often mentioned by ,m4 ,bayle1 who finally declared himself against the former4 ,but there is no indication that any precise rules have yet been defined which the rival parties accept or reject with regard to the use of reason in the interpretation of ,holy ,scripture4 #ae4 ,a like dispute has threatened of late to disturb the peace in the ,churches of the ,augsburg ,confession4 ,some ,masters of ,arts in the ,university of ,leipzig gave private lessons at their homes1 to students who sought them out in order to learn what is called ',sacra ,philologia'1 according to the practice of this university and of some others where this kind of study is not restricted to the ,faculty of ,theology4 ,these masters pressed the study of the ,holy ,scriptures and the practice of piety further than their fellows had been wont to do4 ,it is alleged that they had carried certain things to excess1 and aroused suspicions of certain doctrinal innovations4 ,this caused them to be dubbed ',pietists'1 as though they were a new sect2 and this name is one which has since caused a great stir in ,germany4 ,it has been applied somehow or other to those whom one suspected1 or pretended to suspect1 of fanaticism1 or even of hypocrisy1 concealed under some semblance of reform4 ,now some of the students attending these masters had become conspicuous for behaviour which gave general offence1 and amongst other things for their scorn of philosophy1 even1 so it was said1 burning their notebooks4 ,in consequence the belief arose that their masters rejected philosophy3 but they justified themselves very well2 nor could they be convicted either of this error or of the heresies that were being imputed to them4 #af4 ,the question of the use of philosophy in theology was debated much amongst ,christians1 and difficulty was experienced over settling the limits of its use when it came to detailed consideration4 ,the ,mysteries of the ,trinity1 of the ,incarnation and of the ,holy ,communion gave most occasion for dispute4 ,the new ,photinians1 disputing the first two ,mysteries1 made use of certain philosophic maxims which ,andreas ,kessler1 a theologian of the ,augsburg ,confession1 summarized in the various treatises that he published on the parts of the ,socinian philosophy4 ,but as to their metaphysics1 one might instruct oneself better therein by reading the #hd work of ,christopher ,stegmann the ,socinian4 ,it is not yet in print2 but ,i saw it in my youth and it has been recently again in my hands4 #ag4 ,calovius and ,scherzer1 authors well versed in ,scholastic philosophy1 and sundry other able theologians answered the ,socinians at great length1 and often with success3 for they would not content themselves with the general and somewhat cavalier answers that were commonly used against that sect4 ,the drift of such answers was3 that their maxims were good in philosophy and not in theology2 that it was the fault of heterogeneousness called ,greek3 metbasis eis llo gnos to apply those maxims to a matter transcending reason2 and that philosophy should be treated as a servant and not a mistress in relation to theology1 according to the title of the book by a ,scot named ,robert ,baronius1 ,philosophia ,theologiae ancillans4 ,in fine1 philosophy was a ,hagar beside ,sara and must be driven from the house with her ,ishmael when she was refractory4 ,there is something good in these answers3 but one might abuse them1 and set natural truths and truths of revelation at variance4 ,scholars therefore applied themselves to distinguishing between what is necessary and indispensable in natural or philosophic truths and that which is not so4 #ah4 ,the two ,protestant parties are tolerably in agreement when it is a question of making war on the ,socinians2 and as the philosophy of these sectaries is not of the most exact1 in most cases the attack succeeded in reducing it4 ,but the ,protestants themselves had dissensions on the matter of the ,eucharistic ,sacrament4 ,a section of those who are called ,reformed 7namely those who on that point follow rather ,zwingli than ,calvin7 seemed to reduce the participation in the body of ,jesus ,christ in the ,holy ,communion to a mere figurative representation1 employing the maxim of the philosophers which states that a body can only be in one place at a time4 ,contrariwise the ,evangelicals 7who name themselves thus in a particular sense to distinguish themselves from the ,reformed71 being more attached to the literal sense of ,scripture1 opined with ,luther that this participation was real1 and that here there lay a supernatural ,mystery4 ,they reject1 in truth1 the dogma of ,transubstantiation1 which they believe to be without foundation in the ,text2 neither do they approve that of ,consubstantiation or of ,impanation1 which one could only impute to them if one were ill-informed on their opinion4 ,for they admit no inclusion of the body #he of ,jesus ,christ in the bread1 nor do they even require any union of the one with the other3 but they demand at least a concomitance1 so that these two substances be received both at the same time4 ,they believe that the ordinary sense of the words of ,jesus ,christ on an occasion so important as that which concerned the expression of his last wishes ought to be preserved4 ,thus in order to show that this sense is free from all absurdity which could make it repugnant to us1 they maintain that the philosophic maxim restricting the existence of1 and partaking in1 bodies to one place alone is simply a consequence of the ordinary course of ,nature4 ,they make that no obstacle to the presence1 in the ordinary sense of the word1 of the body of our ,saviour in such form as may be in keeping with the most glorified body4 ,they do not resort to a vague diffusion of ubiquity1 which would disperse the body and leave it nowhere in particular2 nor do they admit the multiple-reduplication theory of some ,schoolmen1 as if to say one and the same body could be at the same time seated here and standing elsewhere4 ,in fine1 they so express themselves that many consider the opinion of ,calvin1 authorized by sundry confessions of faith from the ,churches that have accepted his teaching1 to be not so far removed from the ,augsburg ,confession as one might think3 for he affirmed a partaking in the substance4 ,the divergence rests perhaps only upon the fact that ,calvin demands true faith in addition to the oral reception of the symbols1 and consequently excludes the unworthy4 #ai4 ,thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation can be supported 7without resorting to the strange opinions of some ,schoolmen7 by a properly understood analogy between immediate operation and presence4 ,many philosophers have deemed that1 even in the order of ,nature1 a body may operate from a distance immediately on many remote bodies at the same time4 ,so do they believe1 all the more1 that nothing can prevent divine ,omnipotence from causing one body to be present in many bodies together1 since the transition from immediate operation to presence is but slight1 the one perhaps depending upon the other4 ,it is true that modern philosophers for some time now have denied the immediate natural operation of one body upon another remote from it1 and ,i confess that ,i am of their opinion4 ,meanwhile remote operation has just been revived in ,england by the admirable ,mr4 ,newton1 who maintains that it is the nature of bodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another1 in proportion#hf to the mass of each one1 and the rays of attraction it receives4 ,accordingly the famous ,mr4 ,locke1 in his answer to ,bishop ,stillingfleet1 declares that having seen ,mr4 ,newton's book he retracts what he himself said1 following the opinion of the moderns1 in his ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 to wit1 that a body cannot operate immediately upon another except by touching it upon its surface and driving it by its motion4 ,he acknowledges that ,god can put properties into matter which cause it to operate from a distance4 ,thus the theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession claim that ,god may ordain not only that a body operate immediately on divers bodies remote from one another1 but that it even exist in their neighbourhood and be received by them in a way with which distances of place and dimensions of space have nothing to do4 ,although this effect transcends the forces of ,nature1 they do not think it possible to show that it surpasses the power of the ,author of ,nature4 ,for him it is easy to annul the laws that he has given or to dispense with them as seems good to him1 in the same way as he was able to make iron float upon water and to stay the operation of fire upon the human body4 #bj4 ,i found in comparing the ,rationale ,theologicum of ,nicolaus ,vedelius with the refutation by ,johann ,musaeus that these two authors1 of whom one died while a ,professor at ,franecker after having taught at ,geneva and the other finally became the foremost theologian at ,jena1 are more or less in agreement on the principal rules for the use of reason1 but that it is in the application of these rules they disagree4 ,for they both agree that revelation cannot be contrary to the truths whose necessity is called by philosophers 'logical' or 'metaphysical'1 that is to say1 whose opposite implies contradiction4 ,they both admit also that revelation will be able to combat maxims whose necessity is called 'physical' and is founded only upon the laws that the will of ,god has prescribed for ,nature4 ,thus the question whether the presence of one and the same body in divers places is possible in the supernatural order only touches the application of the rule2 and in order to decide this question conclusively by reason1 one must needs explain exactly wherein the essence of body consists4 ,even the ,reformed disagree thereon amongst themselves2 the ,cartesians confine it to extension1 but their adversaries oppose that2 and ,i think ,i have even observed that ,gisbertus ,votius1 a famous theologian of ,utrecht1 #hg doubted the alleged impossibility of plurality of locations4 #ba4 ,furthermore1 although the two ,protestant parties agree that one must distinguish these two necessities which ,i have just indicated1 namely metaphysical necessity and physical necessity1 and that the first excludes exceptions even in the case of ,mysteries1 they are not yet sufficiently agreed upon the rules of interpretation1 which serve to determine in what cases it is permitted to desert the letter of ,scripture when one is not certain that it is contrary to strictly universal truths4 ,it is agreed that there are cases where one must reject a literal interpretation that is not absolutely impossible1 when it is otherwise unsuitable4 ,for instance1 all commentators agree that when our ,lord said that ,herod was a fox he meant it metaphorically2 and one must accept that1 unless one imagine with some fanatics that for the time the words of our ,lord lasted ,herod was actually changed into a fox4 ,but it is not the same with the texts on which ,mysteries are founded1 where the theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession deem that one must keep to the literal sense4 ,since1 moreover1 this discussion belongs to the art of interpretation and not to that which is the proper sphere of logic1 we will not here enter thereon1 especially as it has nothing in common with the disputes that have arisen recently upon the conformity of faith with reason4 #bb4 ,theologians of all parties1 ,i believe 7fanatics alone excepted71 agree at least that no article of faith must imply contradiction or contravene proofs as exact as those of mathematics1 where the opposite of the conclusion can be reduced ad absurdum1 that is1 to contradiction4 ,st4 ,athanasius with good reason made sport of the preposterous ideas of some writers of his time1 who maintained that ,god had suffered without any suffering4 ',passus est impassibiliter4 ,o ludicram doctrinam aedificantem simul et demolientem6' ,it follows thence that certain writers have been too ready to grant that the ,holy ,trinity is contrary to that great principle which states that two things which are the same as a third are also the same as each other3 that is to say1 if ,a is the same as ,b1 and if ,c is the same as ,b1 then ,a and ,c must also be the same as each other4 ,for this principle is a direct consequence of that of contradiction1 and forms the basis of all logic2 and if it ceases1 we can no longer reason with certainty4 ,thus when one says that the ,father is ,god1 that the ,son is ,god and that the ,holy ,spirit is ,god1 and that nevertheless there is only #hh one ,god1 although these three ,persons differ from one another1 one must consider that this word ,god has not the same sense at the beginning as at the end of this statement4 ,indeed it signifies now the ,divine ,substance and now a ,person of the ,godhead4 ,in general1 one must take care never to abandon the necessary and eternal truths for the sake of upholding ,mysteries1 lest the enemies of religion seize upon such an occasion for decrying both religion and ,mysteries4 #bc4 ,the distinction which is generally drawn between that which is above reason and that which is against reason is tolerably in accord with the distinction which has just been made between the two kinds of necessity4 ,for what is contrary to reason is contrary to the absolutely certain and inevitable truths2 and what is above reason is in opposition only to what one is wont to experience or to understand4 ,that is why ,i am surprised that there are people of intelligence who dispute this distinction1 and that ,m4 ,bayle should be of this number4 ,the distinction is assuredly very well founded4 ,a truth is above reason when our mind 7or even every created mind7 cannot comprehend it4 ,such is1 as it seems to me1 the ,holy ,trinity2 such are the miracles reserved for ,god alone1 as for instance ,creation2 such is the choice of the order of the universe1 which depends upon universal harmony1 and upon the clear knowledge of an infinity of things at once4 ,but a truth can never be contrary to reason1 and once a dogma has been disputed and refuted by reason1 instead of its being incomprehensible1 one may say that nothing is easier to understand1 nor more obvious1 than its absurdity4 ,for ,i observed at the beginning that by ,,reason here ,i do not mean the opinions and discourses of men1 nor even the habit they have formed of judging things according to the usual course of ,nature1 but rather the inviolable linking together of truths4 #bd4 ,i must come now to the great question which ,m4 ,bayle brought up recently1 to wit1 whether a truth1 and especially a truth of faith1 can prove to be subject to irrefutable objections4 ,this excellent author appears to answer with a bold affirmative3 he quotes theologians of repute in his party1 and even in the ,church of ,rome1 who appear to say the same as he affirms2 and he cites philosophers who have believed that there are even philosophical truths whose champions cannot answer the objections that are brought up against them4 ,he believes that the theological doctrine of #hi predestination is of this nature1 and in philosophy that of the composition of the ,continuum4 ,these are1 indeed1 the two labyrinths which have ever exercised theologians and philosophers4 ,libertus ,fromondus1 a theologian of ,louvain 7a great friend of ,jansenius1 whose posthumous book entitled ,augustinus he in fact published71 who also wrote a book entitled explicitly ,labyrinthus de ,compositione ,continui1 experienced in full measure the difficulties inherent in both doctrines2 and the renowned ,ochino admirably presented what he calls 'the labyrinths of predestination'4 #be4 ,but these writers have not denied the possibility of finding thread in the labyrinth2 they have recognized the difficulty1 but they have surely not turned difficulty into sheer impossibility4 ,as for me1 ,i confess that ,i cannot agree with those who maintain that a truth can admit of irrefutable objections3 for is an objection anything but an argument whose conclusion contradicts our thesis8 ,and is not an irrefutable argument a demonstration8 ,and how can one know the certainty of demonstrations except by examining the argument in detail1 the form and the matter1 in order to see if the form is good1 and then if each premiss is either admitted or proved by another argument of like force1 until one is able to make do with admitted premisses alone8 ,now if there is such an objection against our thesis we must say that the falsity of this thesis is demonstrated1 and that it is impossible for us to have reasons sufficient to prove it2 otherwise two contradictories would be true at once4 ,one must always yield to proofs1 whether they be proposed in positive form or advanced in the shape of objections4 ,and it is wrong and fruitless to try to weaken opponents' proofs1 under the pretext that they are only objections1 since the opponent can play the same game and can reverse the denominations1 exalting his arguments by naming them 'proofs' and sinking ours under the blighting title of 'objections'4 #bf4 ,it is another question whether we are always obliged to examine the objections we may have to face1 and to retain some doubt in respect of our own opinion1 or what is called formido oppositi1 until this examination has been made4 ,i would venture to say no1 for otherwise one would never attain to certainty and our conclusion would be always provisional4 ,i believe that able geometricians will scarce be troubled by the objections of ,joseph ,scaliger against ,archimedes1 or by those of ,mr4 ,hobbes #ij against ,euclid2 but that is because they have fully understood and are sure of the proofs4 ,nevertheless it is sometimes well to show oneself ready to examine certain objections4 ,on the one hand it may serve to rescue people from their error1 while on the other we ourselves may profit by it2 for specious fallacies often contain some useful solution and bring about the removal of considerable difficulties4 ,that is why ,i have always liked ingenious objections made against my own opinions1 and ,i have never examined them without profit3 witness those which ,m4 ,bayle formerly made against my ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony1 not to mention those which ,m4 ,arnauld1 ,m4 l',abb ,foucher and ,father ,lami1 ,o4,s4,b41 made to me on the same subject4 ,but to return to the principal question1 ,i conclude from reasons ,i have just set forth that when an objection is put forward against some truth1 it is always possible to answer it satisfactorily4 #bg4 ,it may be also that ,m4 ,bayle does not mean 'insoluble objections' in the sense that ,i have just explained4 ,i observe that he varies1 at least in his expressions3 for in his posthumous ,reply to ,m4 le ,clerc he does not admit that one can bring demonstrations against the truths of faith4 ,it appears therefore that he takes the objections to be insoluble only in respect of our present degree of enlightenment2 and in this ,reply1 p4 #ce1 he even does not despair of the possibility that one day a solution hitherto unknown may be found by someone4 ,concerning that more will be said later4 ,i hold an opinion1 however1 that will perchance cause surprise1 namely that this solution has been discovered entire1 and is not even particularly difficult4 ,indeed a mediocre intelligence capable of sufficient care1 and using correctly the rules of common logic1 is in a position to answer the most embarrassing objection made against truth1 when the objection is only taken from reason1 and when it is claimed to be a 'demonstration'4 ,whatever scorn the generality of moderns have to-day for the logic of ,aristotle1 one must acknowledge that it teaches infallible ways of resisting error in these conjunctures4 ,for one has only to examine the argument according to the rules and it will always be possible to see whether it is lacking in form or whether there are premisses such as are not yet proved by a good argument4 #bh4 ,it is quite another matter when there is only a question of probabilities1 for the art of judging from probable reasons is not yet well established2 so that our logic in this connexion is still very #ia imperfect1 and to this very day we have little beyond the art of judging from demonstrations4 ,but this art is sufficient here3 for when it is a question of opposing reason to an article of our faith1 one is not disturbed by objections that only attain probability4 ,everyone agrees that appearances are against ,mysteries1 and that they are by no means probable when regarded only from the standpoint of reason2 but it suffices that they have in them nothing of absurdity4 ,thus demonstrations are required if they are to be refuted4 #bi4 ,and doubtless we are so to understand it when ,holy ,scripture warns us that the wisdom of ,god is foolishness before men1 and when ,st4 ,paul observed that the ,gospel of ,jesus ,christ is foolishness unto the ,greeks1 as well as unto the ,jews a stumbling-block4 ,for1 after all1 one truth cannot contradict another1 and the light of reason is no less a gift of ,god than that of revelation4 ,also it is a matter of no difficulty among theologians who are expert in their profession1 that the motives of credibility justify1 once for all1 the authority of ,holy ,scripture before the tribunal of reason1 so that reason in consequence gives way before it1 as before a new light1 and sacrifices thereto all its probabilities4 ,it is more or less as if a new president sent by the prince must show his letters patent in the assembly where he is afterwards to preside4 ,that is the tendency of sundry good books that we have on the truth of religion1 such as those of ,augustinus ,steuchus1 of ,du ,plessis-,mornay or of ,grotius3 for the true religion must needs have marks that the false religions have not1 else would ,zoroaster1 ,brahma1 ,somonacodom and ,mahomet be as worthy of belief as ,moses and ,jesus ,christ4 ,nevertheless divine faith itself1 when it is kindled in the soul1 is something more than an opinion1 and depends not upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth2 it advances beyond the intellect1 and takes possession of the will and of the heart1 to make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of ,god commands4 ,then we have no further need to think of reasons or to pause over the difficulties of argument which the mind may anticipate4 #cj4 ,thus what we have just said of human reason1 which is extolled and decried by turns1 and often without rule or measure1 may show our lack of exactitude and how much we are accessary to our own errors4 ,nothing would be so easy to terminate as these disputes on the rights of faith and of reason if men would make use of the commonest rules of logic and reason#ib with even a modicum of attention4 ,instead of that1 they become involved in oblique and ambiguous phrases1 which give them a fine field for declamation1 to make the most of their wit and their learning4 ,it would seem1 indeed1 that they have no wish to see the naked truth1 peradventure because they fear that it may be more disagreeable than error3 for they know not the beauty of the ,author of all things1 who is the source of truth4 #ca4 ,this negligence is a general defect of humanity1 and one not to be laid to the charge of any particular person4 ,abundamus dulcibus vitiis1 as ,quintilian said of the style of ,seneca1 and we take pleasure in going astray4 ,exactitude incommodes us and rules we regard as puerilities4 ,thus it is that common logic 7although it is more or less sufficient for the examination of arguments that tend towards certainty7 is relegated to schoolboys2 and there is not even a thought for a kind of logic which should determine the balance between probabilities1 and would be so necessary in deliberations of importance4 ,so true is it that our mistakes for the most part come from scorn or lack of the art of thinking3 for nothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass beyond necessary arguments4 ,the most excellent philosophers of our time1 such as the authors of ,the ,art of ,thinking1 of ,the ,search for ,truth and of the ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 have been very far from indicating to us the true means fitted to assist the faculty whose business it is to make us weigh the probabilities of the true and the false3 not to mention the art of discovery1 in which success is still more difficult of attainment1 and whereof we have nothing beyond very imperfect samples in mathematics4 #cb4 ,one thing which might have contributed most towards ,m4 ,bayle's belief that the difficulties of reason in opposition to faith cannot be obviated is that he seems to demand that ,god be justified in some such manner as that commonly used for pleading the cause of a man accused before his judge4 ,but he has not remembered that in the tribunals of men1 which cannot always penetrate to the truth1 one is often compelled to be guided by signs and probabilities1 and above all by presumptions or prejudices2 whereas it is agreed1 as we have already observed1 that ,mysteries are not probable4 ,for instance1 ,m4 ,bayle will not have it that one can justify the goodness of ,god in the permission of sin1 because probability would be against a man that should happen to be in circumstances comparable in our eyes to #ic this permission4 ,god foresees that ,eve will be deceived by the serpent if he places her in the circumstances wherein she later found herself2 and nevertheless he placed her there4 ,now if a father or a guardian did the same in regard to his child or his ward1 if a friend did so in regard to a young person whose behaviour was his concern1 the judge would not be satisfied by the excuses of an advocate who said that the man only permitted the evil1 without doing it or willing it3 he would rather take this permission as a sign of ill intention1 and would regard it as a sin of omission1 which would render the one convicted thereof accessary in another's sin of commission4 #cc4 ,but it must be borne in mind that when one has foreseen the evil and has not prevented it although it seems as if one could have done so with ease1 and one has even done things that have facilitated it1 it does not follow on that account necessarily that one is accessary thereto4 ,it is only a very strong presumption1 such as commonly replaces truth in human affairs1 but which would be destroyed by an exact consideration of the facts1 supposing we were capable of that in relation to ,god4 ,for amongst lawyers that is called 'presumption' which must provisionally pass for truth in case the contrary is not proved2 and it says more than 'conjecture'1 although the ,dictionary of the ,academy has not sifted the difference4 ,now there is every reason to conclude unquestionably that one would find through this consideration1 if only it were attainable1 that reasons most just1 and stronger than those which appear contrary to them1 have compelled the ,all-,wise to permit the evil1 and even to do things which have facilitated it4 ,of this some instances will be given later4 #cd4 ,it is none too easy1 ,i confess1 for a father1 a guardian1 a friend to have such reasons in the case under consideration4 ,yet the thing is not absolutely impossible1 and a skilled writer of fiction might perchance find an extraordinary case that would even justify a man in the circumstances ,i have just indicated4 ,but in reference to ,god there is no need to suppose or to establish particular reasons such as may have induced him to permit the evil2 general reasons suffice4 ,one knows that he takes care of the whole universe1 whereof all the parts are connected2 and one must thence infer that he has had innumerable considerations whose result made him deem it inadvisable to prevent certain evils4 #ce4 ,it should even be concluded that there must have been great or #id rather invincible reasons which prompted the divine ,wisdom to the permission of the evil that surprises us1 from the mere fact that this permission has occurred3 for nothing can come from ,god that is not altogether consistent with goodness1 justice and holiness4 ,thus we can judge by the event 7or a posteriori7 that the permission was indispensable1 although it be not possible for us to show this 7a priori7 by the detailed reasons that ,god can have had therefor2 as it is not necessary either that we show this to justify him4 ,m4 ,bayle himself aptly says concerning that 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #afe1 p4 #ajfg73 ,sin made its way into the world2 ,god therefore was able to permit it without detriment to his perfections2 ab actu ad potentiam valet consequentia4 ,in ,god this conclusion holds good3 he did this1 therefore he did it well4 ,it is not1 then1 that we have no notion of justice in general fit to be applied also to ,god's justice2 nor is it that ,god's justice has other rules than the justice known of men1 but that the case in question is quite different from those which are common among men4 ,universal right is the same for ,god and for men2 but the question of fact is quite different in their case and his4 #cf4 ,we may even assume or pretend 7as ,i have already observed7 that there is something similar among men to this circumstance in ,god's actions4 ,a man might give such great and strong proofs of his virtue and his holiness that all the most apparent reasons one could put forward against him to charge him with an alleged crime1 for instance a larceny or murder1 would deserve to be rejected as the calumnies of false witnesses or as an extraordinary play of chance which sometimes throws suspicion on the most innocent4 ,thus in a case where every other would run the risk of being condemned or put to the torture 7according to the laws of the country71 this man would be absolved by his judges unanimously4 ,now in this case1 which indeed is rare1 but which is not impossible1 one might say in a sense 7sano sensu7 that there is a conflict between reason and faith1 and that the rules of law are other in respect of this person than they are in respect of the remainder of mankind4 ,but that1 when explained1 will signify only that appearances of reason here give way before the faith that is due to the word and the integrity of this great and holy man1 and that he is privileged above other men2 not indeed as if there were one law for others and another for him1 nor as if one had no understanding of what justice is in relation to him4 ,it is rather because the rules of universal justice do not find here #ie the application that they receive elsewhere1 or because they favour him instead of accusing him1 since there are in this personage qualities so admirable1 that by virtue of a good logic of probabilities one should place more faith in his word than in that of many others4 #cg4 ,since it is permitted here to imagine possible cases1 may one not suppose this incomparable man to be the ,adept or the ,possessor of 'that blessed ,stone ,able to enrich all earthly ,kings alone' and that he spends every day prodigious sums in order to feed and to rescue from distress countless numbers of poor men8 ,be there never so many witnesses or appearances of every kind tending to prove that this great benefactor of the human race has just committed some larceny1 is it not true that the whole earth would make mock of the accusation1 however specious it might be8 ,now ,god is infinitely above the goodness and the power of this man1 and consequently there are no reasons at all1 however apparent they be1 that can hold good against faith1 that is1 against the assurance or the confidence in ,god wherewith we can and ought to say that ,god has done all things well4 ,the objections are therefore not insoluble4 ,they only involve prejudices and probabilities1 which are1 however1 overthrown by reasons incomparably stronger4 ,one must not say either that what we call justice is nothing in relation to ,god1 that he is the absolute ,master of all things even to the point of being able to condemn the innocent without violating his justice1 or finally that justice is something arbitrary where he is concerned4 ,those are rash and dangerous expressions1 whereunto some have been led astray to the discredit of the attributes of ,god4 ,for if such were the case there would be no reason for praising his goodness and his justice3 rather would it be as if the most wicked spirit1 the ,prince of evil genii1 the evil principle of the ,manichaeans1 were the sole master of the universe1 just as ,i observed before4 ,what means would there be of distinguishing the true ,god from the false ,god of ,zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of an arbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for anything whatever8 #ch4 ,it is therefore more than evident that nothing compels us to commit ourselves to a doctrine so strange1 since it suffices to say that we #if have not enough knowledge of the facts when there is a question of answering probabilities which appear to throw doubt upon the justice and the goodness of ,god1 and which would vanish away if the facts were well known to us4 ,we need neither renounce reason in order to listen to faith nor blind ourselves in order to see clearly1 as ,queen ,christine used to say3 it is enough to reject ordinary appearances when they are contrary to ,mysteries2 and this is not contrary to reason1 since even in natural things we are very often undeceived about appearances either by experience or by superior reasons4 ,all that has been set down here in advance1 only with the object of showing more plainly wherein the fault of the objections and the abuse of reason consists in the present case1 where the claim is made that reason has greatest force against faith3 we shall come afterwards to a more exact discussion of that which concerns the origin of evil and the permission of sin with its consequences4 #ci4 ,for now1 it will be well to continue our examination of the important question of the use of reason in theology1 and to make reflexions upon what ,m4 ,bayle has said thereon in divers passages of his works4 ,as he paid particular attention in his ,historical and ,critical ,dictionary to expounding the objections of the ,manichaeans and those of the ,pyrrhonians1 and as this procedure had been criticized by some persons zealous for religion1 he placed a dissertation at the end of the second edition of this ,dictionary1 which aimed at showing1 by examples1 by authorities and by reasons1 the innocence and usefulness of his course of action4 ,i am persuaded 7as ,i have said above7 that the specious objections one can urge against truth are very useful1 and that they serve to confirm and to illumine it1 giving opportunity to intelligent persons to find new openings or to turn the old to better account4 ,but ,m4 ,bayle seeks therein a usefulness quite the reverse of this3 it would be that of displaying the power of faith by showing that the truths it teaches cannot sustain the attacks of reason and that it nevertheless holds its own in the heart of the faithful4 ,m4 ,nicole seems to call that 'the triumph of ,god's authority over human reason'1 in the words of his quoted by ,m4 ,bayle in the third volume of his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7ch4 #agg1 p4 #abj74 ,but since reason is a gift of ,god1 even as faith is1 contention between them would cause ,god to contend against ,god2 and if the objections of reason against any article of faith are insoluble1 then it must be said that this alleged article will be false and not revealed3 this will be #ig a chimera of the human mind1 and the triumph of this faith will be capable of comparison with bonfires lighted after a defeat4 ,such is the doctrine of the damnation of unbaptized children1 which ,m4 ,nicole would have us assume to be a consequence of original sin2 such would be the eternal damnation of adults lacking the light that is necessary for the attainment of salvation4 #dj4 ,yet everyone need not enter into theological discussions2 and persons whose condition allows not of exact researches should be content with instruction on faith1 without being disturbed by the objections2 and if some exceeding great difficulty should happen to strike them1 it is permitted to them to avert the mind from it1 offering to ,god a sacrifice of their curiosity3 for when one is assured of a truth one has no need to listen to the objections4 ,as there are many people whose faith is rather small and shallow to withstand such dangerous tests1 ,i think one must not present them with that which might be poisonous for them2 or1 if one cannot hide from them what is only too public1 the antidote must be added to it2 that is to say1 one must try to add the answer to the objection1 certainly not withhold it as unobtainable4 #da4 ,the passages from the excellent theologians who speak of this triumph of faith can and should receive a meaning appropriate to the principles ,i have just affirmed4 ,there appear in some objects of faith two great qualities capable of making it triumph over reason1 the one is incomprehensibility1 the other is the lack of probability4 ,but one must beware of adding thereto the third quality whereof ,m4 ,bayle speaks1 and of saying that what one believes is indefensible3 for that would be to cause reason in its turn to triumph in a manner that would destroy faith4 ,incomprehensibility does not prevent us from believing even natural truths4 ,for instance 7as ,i have already pointed out7 we do not comprehend the nature of odours and savours1 and yet we are persuaded1 by a kind of faith which we owe to the evidence of the senses1 that these perceptible qualities are founded upon the nature of things and that they are not illusions4 #db4 ,there are also things contrary to appearances1 which we admit when they are sufficiently verified4 ,there is a little romance of ,spanish origin1 whose title states that one must not always believe what one sees4 ,what was there more specious than the lie of the false ,martin ,guerre1 who was acknowledged as the true ,martin by the true ,martin's wife and #ih relatives1 and caused the judges and the relatives to waver for a long time even after the arrival of the other8 ,nevertheless the truth was known in the end4 ,it is the same with faith4 ,i have already observed that all one can oppose to the goodness and the justice of ,god is nothing but appearances1 which would be strong against a man1 but which are nullified when they are applied to ,god and when they are weighed against the proofs that assure us of the infinite perfection of his attributes4 ,thus faith triumphs over false reasons by means of sound and superior reasons that have made us embrace it2 but it would not triumph if the contrary opinion had for it reasons as strong as or even stronger than those which form the foundation of faith1 that is1 if there were invincible and conclusive objections against faith4 #dc4 ,it is well also to observe here that what ,m4 ,bayle calls a 'triumph of faith' is in part a triumph of demonstrative reason against apparent and deceptive reasons which are improperly set against the demonstrations4 ,for it must be taken into consideration that the objections of the ,manichaeans are hardly less contrary to natural theology than to revealed theology4 ,and supposing one surrendered to them ,holy ,scripture1 original sin1 the grace of ,god in ,jesus ,christ1 the pains of hell and the other articles of our religion1 one would not even so be delivered from their objections3 for one cannot deny that there is in the world physical evil 7that is1 suffering7 and moral evil 7that is1 crime7 and even that physical evil is not always distributed here on earth according to the proportion of moral evil1 as it seems that justice demands4 ,there remains1 then1 this question of natural theology1 how a sole ,principle1 all-good1 all-wise and all-powerful1 has been able to admit evil1 and especially to permit sin1 and how it could resolve to make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy8 #dd4 ,now we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a sole ,principle of all things1 entirely good and wise4 ,reason teaches us this by infallible proofs2 and in consequence all the objections taken from the course of things1 in which we observe imperfections1 are only based on false appearances4 ,for1 if we were capable of understanding the universal harmony1 we should see that what we are tempted to find fault with is connected with the plan most worthy of being chosen2 in a word1 we should see1 and should not believe only1 that what ,god has done is the best4 ,i call 'seeing' here what one knows a priori by the causes2 and #ii 'believing' what one only judges by the effects1 even though the one be as certainly known as the other4 ,and one can apply here too the saying of ,st4 ,paul 7#b ,cor4 v4 #g71 that we walk by faith and not by sight4 ,for the infinite wisdom of ,god being known to us1 we conclude that the evils we experience had to be permitted1 and this we conclude from the effect or a posteriori1 that is to say1 because they exist4 ,it is what ,m4 ,bayle acknowledges2 and he ought to content himself with that1 and not claim that one must put an end to the false appearances which are contrary thereto4 ,it is as if one asked that there should be no more dreams or optical illusions4 #de4 ,and it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in ,god1 who gives us insight into his infinite goodness and prepares us for his love1 in spite of the appearances of harshness that may repel us1 are an admirable exercise for the virtues of ,christian theology1 when the divine grace in ,jesus ,christ arouses these motions within us4 ,that is what ,luther aptly observed in opposition to ,erasmus1 saying that it is love in the highest degree to love him who to flesh and blood appears so unlovable1 so harsh toward the unfortunate and so ready to condemn1 and to condemn for evils in which he appears to be the cause or accessary1 at least in the eyes of those who allow themselves to be dazzled by false reasons4 ,one may therefore say that the triumph of true reason illumined by divine grace is at the same time the triumph of faith and love4 #df4 ,m4 ,bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise3 he declares himself against reason1 when he might have been content to censure its abuse4 ,he quotes the words of ,cotta in ,cicero1 where he goes so far as to say that if reason were a gift of the gods providence would be to blame for having given it1 since it tends to our harm4 ,m4 ,bayle also thinks that human reason is a source of destruction and not of edification 7,historical and ,critical ,dictionary1 p4 #bjbf1 col4 #b71 that it is a runner who knows not where to stop1 and who1 like another ,penelope1 herself destroys her own work4 ,destruit1 aedificat1 mutat quadrata rotundis4 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #gbe74 ,but he takes pains especially to pile up many authorities one upon the other1 in order to show that theologians of all parties reject the use of reason just as he does1 and that they call attention to such gleams of reason as oppose religion only that they may sacrifice them to faith by a mere #ajj repudiation1 answering nothing but the conclusion of the argument that is brought against them4 ,he begins with the ,new ,testament4 ,jesus ,christ was content to say3 ',follow ,me' 7,luke v4 #bg2 ix4 #ei74 ,the ,apostles said3 ',believe1 and thou shalt be saved' 7,acts xvi4 #c74 ,st4 ,paul acknowledges that his 'doctrine is obscure' 7#a ,cor4 xiii4 #ab71 that 'one can comprehend nothing therein' unless ,god impart a spiritual discernment1 and without that it only passes for foolishness 7#a ,cor4 ii4 #ad74 ,he exhorts the faithful 'to beware of philosophy' 7,col4 ii4 #h7 and to avoid disputations in that science1 which had caused many persons to lose faith4 #dg4 ,as for the ,fathers of the ,church1 ,m4 ,bayle refers us to the collection of passages from them against the use of philosophy and of reason which ,m4 de ,launoy made 7,de ,varia ,aristotelis ,fortuna1 cap4 #b7 and especially to the passages from ,st4 ,augustine collected by ,m4 ,arnauld 7against ,mallet71 which state3 that the judgements of ,god are inscrutable2 that they are not any the less just for that they are unknown to us2 that it is a deep abyss1 which one cannot fathom without running the risk of falling down the precipice2 that one cannot without temerity try to elucidate that which ,god willed to keep hidden2 that his will cannot but be just2 that many men1 having tried to explain this incomprehensible depth1 have fallen into vain imaginations and opinions full of error and bewilderment4 #dh4 ,the ,schoolmen have spoken in like manner4 ,m4 ,bayle quotes a beautiful passage from ,cardinal ,cajetan 7,part ,i1 ,summ41 qu4 #bb1 art4 #d7 to this effect3 ',our mind'1 he says1 'rests not upon the evidence of known truth but upon the impenetrable depth of hidden truth4 ,and as ,st4 ,gregory says3 ,he who believes touching the ,divinity only that which he can gauge with his mind belittles the idea of ,god4 ,yet ,i do not surmise that it is necessary to deny any of the things which we know1 or which we see as appertaining to the immutability1 the actuality1 the certainty1 the universality1 etc41 of ,god3 but ,i think that there is here some secret1 either in regard to the relation which exists between ,god and the event1 or in respect of what connects the event itself with his prevision4 ,thus1 reflecting that the understanding of our soul is the eye of the owl1 ,i find the soul's repose only in ignorance4 ,for it is better both for the ,catholic ,faith and for ,philosophic ,faith to confess our blindness1 than to affirm as evident what does not afford our mind the contentment which self-evidence gives4 ,i do not accuse of presumption1 on that account1 all the learned men who #aja stammeringly have endeavoured to suggest1 as far as in them lay1 the immobility and the sovereign and eternal efficacy of the understanding1 of the will and of the power of ,god1 through the infallibility of divine election and divine relation to all events4 ,nothing of all that interferes with my surmise that there is some depth which is hidden from us4' ,this passage of ,cajetan is all the more notable since he was an author competent to reach the heart of the matter4 #di4 ,luther's book against ,erasmus is full of vigorous comments hostile to those who desire to submit revealed truths to the tribunal of our reason4 ,calvin often speaks in the same tone1 against the inquisitive daring of those who seek to penetrate into the counsels of ,god4 ,he declares in his treatise on predestination that ,god had just causes for damning some men1 but causes unknown to us4 ,finally ,m4 ,bayle quotes sundry modern writers who have spoken to the same effect 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #afa et seq474 #ej4 ,but all these expressions and innumerable others like them do not prove that the objections opposed to faith are so insoluble as ,m4 ,bayle supposes4 ,it is true that the counsels of ,god are inscrutable1 but there is no invincible objection which tends to the conclusion that they are unjust4 ,what appears injustice on the part of ,god1 and foolishness in our faith1 only appears so4 ,the famous passage of ,tertullian 7,de ,carne ,christi71 'mortuus est ,dei filius1 credibile est1 quia ineptum est2 et sepultus revixit1 certum est1 quia impossibile'1 is a sally that can only be meant to concern appearances of absurdity4 ,there are others like them in ,luther's book on ,freewill in ,bondage1 as when he says 7ch4 #agd73 ',si placet tibi ,deus indignos coronans1 non debet displicere immeritos damnans4' ,which being reduced to more temperate phrasing1 means3 ,if you approve that ,god give eternal glory to those who are not better than the rest1 you should not disapprove that he abandon those who are not worse than the rest4 ,and to judge that he speaks only of appearances of injustice1 one only has to weigh these words of the same author taken from the same book3 ',in all the rest'1 he says1 'we recognize in ,god a supreme majesty2 there is only justice that we dare to question3 and we will not believe provisionally tantisper that he is just1 albeit he has promised us that the time shall come when his glory being revealed all men shall see clearly that he has been and that he is just4' #ajb #ea4 ,it will be found also that when the ,fathers entered into a discussion they did not simply reject reason4 ,and1 in disputations with the pagans1 they endeavour usually to show how paganism is contrary to reason1 and how the ,christian religion has the better of it on that side also4 ,origen showed ,celsus how reasonable ,christianity is and why1 notwithstanding1 the majority of ,christians should believe without examination4 ,celsus had jeered at the behaviour of ,christians1 'who1 willing'1 he said1 'neither to listen to your reasons nor to give you any for what they believe1 are content to say to you3 ,examine not1 only believe1 or3 ,your faith will save you2 and they hold this as a maxim1 that the wisdom of the world is an evil4' #eb4 ,origen gives the answer of a wise man1 and in conformity with the principles we have established in the matter4 ,for reason1 far from being contrary to ,christianity1 serves as a foundation for this religion1 and will bring about its acceptance by those who can achieve the examination of it4 ,but1 as few people are capable of this1 the heavenly gift of plain faith tending towards good suffices for men in general4 ',if it were possible'1 he says1 'for all men1 neglecting the affairs of life1 to apply themselves to study and meditation1 one need seek no other way to make them accept the ,christian religion4 ,for1 to say nothing likely to offend anyone' 7he insinuates that the pagan religion is absurd1 but he will not say so explicitly71 'there will be found therein no less exactitude than elsewhere1 whether in the discussion of its dogmas1 or in the elucidation of the enigmatical expressions of its prophets1 or in the interpretation of the parables of its gospels and of countless other things happening or ordained symbolically4 ,but since neither the necessities of life nor the infirmities of men permit of this application to study1 save for a very small number of persons1 what means could one find more qualified to benefit everyone else in the world than those ,jesus ,christ wished to be used for the conversion of the nations8 ,and ,i would fain ask with regard to the great number of those who believe1 and who thereby have withdrawn themselves from the quagmire of vices wherein before they were plunged1 which would be the better3 to have thus changed one's morals and reformed one's life1 believing without examination that there are punishments for sin and rewards for good actions2 or to have waited for one's conversion until one not only believed but had examined with care the foundations of these dogmas8 ,it is certain that1 were this method to be followed1 few#ajc indeed would reach that point whither they are led by their plain and simple faith1 but the majority would remain in their corruption4' #ec4 ,m4 ,bayle 7in his explanation concerning the objections of the ,manichaeans1 placed at the end of the second edition of the ,dictionary7 takes those words where ,origen points out that religion can stand the test of having her dogmas discussed1 as if it were not meant in relation to philosophy1 but only in relation to the accuracy wherewith the authority and the true meaning of ,holy ,scripture is established4 ,but there is nothing to indicate this restriction4 ,origen wrote against a philosopher whom such a restriction would not have suited4 ,and it appears that this ,father wished to point out that among ,christians there was no less exactitude than among the ,stoics and some other philosophers1 who established their doctrine as much by reason as by authorities1 as1 for example1 ,chrysippus did1 who found his philosophy even in the symbols of pagan antiquity4 #ed4 ,celsus brings up still another objection to the ,christians1 in the same place4 ',if they withdraw'1 he says1 'regularly into their ,examine not1 only believe1 they must tell me at least what are the things they wish me to believe4' ,therein he is doubtless right1 and that tells against those who would say that ,god is good and just1 and who yet would maintain that we have no notion of goodness and of justice when we attribute these perfections to him4 ,but one must not always demand what ,i call 'adequate notions'1 involving nothing that is not explained1 since even perceptible qualities1 like heat1 light1 sweetness1 cannot give us such notions4 ,thus we agreed that ,mysteries should receive an explanation1 but this explanation is imperfect4 ,it suffices for us to have some analogical understanding of a ,mystery such as the ,trinity and the ,incarnation1 to the end that in accepting them we pronounce not words altogether devoid of meaning3 but it is not necessary that the explanation go as far as we would wish1 that is1 to the extent of comprehension and to the how4 #ee4 ,it appears strange therefore that ,m4 ,bayle rejects the tribunal of common notions 7in the third volume of his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 pp4 #ajfb and #aadj7 as if one should not consult the idea of goodness in answering the ,manichaeans2 whereas he had declared himself quite differently in his ,dictionary4 ,of necessity there must be agreement upon the meaning of good and bad1 amongst those who are in dispute#ajd over the question whether there is only one principle1 altogether good1 or whether there are two1 the one good and the other bad4 ,we understand something by union when we are told of the union of one body with another or of a substance with its accident1 of a subject with its adjunct1 of the place with the moving body1 of the act with the potency2 we also mean something when we speak of the union of the soul with the body to make thereof one single person4 ,for albeit ,i do not hold that the soul changes the laws of the body1 or that the body changes the laws of the soul1 and ,i have introduced the ,pre-established ,harmony to avoid this derangement1 ,i nevertheless admit a true union between the soul and the body1 which makes thereof a suppositum4 ,this union belongs to the metaphysical1 whereas a union of influence would belong to the physical4 ,but when we speak of the union of the ,word of ,god with human nature we should be content with an analogical knowledge1 such as the comparison of the union of the soul with the body is capable of giving us4 ,we should1 moreover1 be content to say that the ,incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the ,creator and the creature2 and further we should not want to go4 #ef4 ,it is the same with the other ,mysteries1 where moderate minds will ever find an explanation sufficient for belief1 but never such as would be necessary for understanding4 ,a certain what it is 7,greek3 ti esti7 is enough for us1 but the how 7,greek3 ps7 is beyond us1 and is not necessary for us4 ,one may say concerning the explanations of ,mysteries which are given out here and there1 what the ,queen of ,sweden inscribed upon a medal concerning the crown she had abandoned1 ',non mi bisogna1 e non mi basta4' ,nor have we any need either 7as ,i have already observed7 to prove the ,mysteries a priori1 or to give a reason for them2 it suffices us that the thing is thus 7,greek3 to hoti7 even though we know not the why 7,greek3 to dioti71 which ,god has reserved for himself4 ,these lines1 written on that theme by ,joseph ,scaliger1 are beautiful and renowned3 ,ne curiosus quaere causas omnium1 ,quaecumque libris vis ,prophetarum indidit ,afflata caelo1 plena veraci ,deo3 ,nec operta sacri supparo silentii ,irrumpere aude1 sed pudenter praeteri4 ,page #aje ,nescire velle1 quae ,magister optimus ,docere non vult1 erudita inscitia est4 ,m4 ,bayle1 who quotes them 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #ajee71 holds the likely opinion that ,scaliger made them upon the disputes between ,arminius and ,gomarus4 ,i think ,m4 ,bayle repeated them from memory1 for he put sacrata instead of afflata4 ,but it is apparently the printer's fault that prudenter stands in place of pudenter 7that is1 modestly7 which the metre requires4 #eg4 ,nothing can be more judicious than the warning these lines contain2 and ,m4 ,bayle is right in saying 7p4 #gbi7 that those who claim that the behaviour of ,god with respect to sin and the consequences of sin contains nothing but what they can account for1 deliver themselves up to the mercy of their adversary4 ,but he is not right in combining here two very different things1 'to account for a thing'1 and 'to uphold it against objections'2 as he does when he presently adds3 ',they are obliged to follow him their adversary everywhere whither he shall wish to lead them1 and it would be to retire ignominiously and ask for quarter1 if they were to admit that our intelligence is too weak to remove completely all the objections advanced by a philosopher4' #eh4 ,it seems here that1 according to ,m4 ,bayle1 'accounting for' comes short of 'answering objections'1 since he threatens one who should undertake the first with the resulting obligation to pass on to the second4 ,but it is quite the opposite3 he who maintains a thesis 7the respondens7 is not bound to account for it1 but he is bound to meet the objections of an opponent4 ,a defendant in law is not bound 7as a general rule7 to prove his right or to produce his title to possession2 but he is obliged to reply to the arguments of the plaintiff4 ,i have marvelled many times that a writer so precise and so shrewd as ,m4 ,bayle so often here confuses things where so much difference exists as between these three acts of reason3 to comprehend1 to prove1 and to answer objections2 as if when it is a question of the use of reason in theology one term were as good as another4 ,thus he says in his posthumous ,conversations1 p4 #gc3 ',there is no principle which ,m4 ,bayle has more often inculcated than this1 that the incomprehensibility of a dogma and the insolubility of the objections that oppose it provide no legitimate reason for rejecting it4' ,this is true as regards the incomprehensibility1 but it is not the same with the insolubility4 ,and it is indeed just as if one said that an invincible reason against a #ajf thesis was not a legitimate reason for rejecting it4 ,for what other legitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find1 if an invincible opposing argument is not such an one8 ,and what means shall one have thereafter of demonstrating the falsity1 and even the absurdity1 of any opinion8 #ei4 ,it is well to observe also that he who proves a thing a priori accounts for it through the efficient cause2 and whosoever can thus account for it in a precise and adequate manner is also in a position to comprehend the thing4 ,therefore it was that the ,scholastic theologians had already censured ,raymond ,lully for having undertaken to demonstrate the ,trinity by philosophy4 ,this so-called demonstration is to be found in his ,works2 and ,bartholomaeus ,keckermann1 a writer renowned in the ,reformed party1 having made an attempt of just the same kind upon the same ,mystery1 has been no less censured for it by some modern theologians4 ,therefore censure will fall upon those who shall wish to account for this ,mystery and make it comprehensible1 but praise will be given to those who shall toil to uphold it against the objections of adversaries4 #fj4 ,i have said already that theologians usually distinguish between what is above reason and what is against reason4 ,they place above reason that which one cannot comprehend and which one cannot account for4 ,but against reason will be all opinion that is opposed by invincible reasons1 or the contrary of which can be proved in a precise and sound manner4 ,they avow1 therefore1 that the ,mysteries are above reason1 but they do not admit that they are contrary to it4 ,the ,english author of a book which is ingenious1 but has met with disapproval1 entitled ,christianity not ,mysterious1 wished to combat this distinction2 but it does not seem to me that he has at all weakened it4 ,m4 ,bayle also is not quite satisfied with this accepted distinction4 ,this is what he says on the matter 7vol4 ,,iii of the ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #aeh74 ,firstly 7p4 #iih7 he distinguishes1 together with ,m4 ,saurin1 between these two theses3 the one1 all the dogmas of ,christianity are in conformity with reason2 the other1 human reason knows that they are in conformity with reason4 ,he affirms the first and denies the second4 ,i am of the same opinion1 if in saying 'that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that it is possible to account for it or to explain its how by reason2 for ,god could doubtless do so1 and we cannot4 ,but ,i think that one must affirm both theses if by #ajg 'knowing that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that we can demonstrate1 if need be1 that there is no contradiction between this dogma and reason1 repudiating the objections of those who maintain that this dogma is an absurdity4 #fa4 ,m4 ,bayle explains himself here in a manner not at all convincing4 ,he acknowledges fully that our ,mysteries are in accordance with the supreme and universal reason that is in the divine understanding1 or with reason in general2 yet he denies that they are in accordance with that part of reason which man employs to judge things4 ,but this portion of reason which we possess is a gift of ,god1 and consists in the natural light that has remained with us in the midst of corruption2 thus it is in accordance with the whole1 and it differs from that which is in ,god only as a drop of water differs from the ocean or rather as the finite from the infinite4 ,therefore ,mysteries may transcend it1 but they cannot be contrary to it4 ,one cannot be contrary to one part without being contrary to the whole4 ,that which contradicts a proposition of ,euclid is contrary to the ,elements of ,euclid4 ,that which in us is contrary to the ,mysteries is not reason nor is it the natural light or the linking together of truths2 it is corruption1 or error1 or prejudice1 or darkness4 #fb4 ,m4 ,bayle 7p4 #ajjb7 is not satisfied with the opinion of ,josua ,stegman and of ,m4 ,turretin1 ,protestant theologians who teach that the ,mysteries are contrary only to corrupt reason4 ,he asks1 mockingly1 whether by right reason is meant perchance that of an orthodox theologian and by corrupt reason that of an heretic2 and he urges the objection that the evidence of the ,mystery of the ,trinity was no greater in the soul of ,luther than in the soul of ,socinius4 ,but as ,m4 ,descartes has well observed1 good sense is distributed to all3 thus one must believe that both the orthodox and heretics are endowed therewith4 ,right reason is a linking together of truths1 corrupt reason is mixed with prejudices and passions4 ,and in order to discriminate between the two1 one need but proceed in good order1 admit no thesis without proof1 and admit no proof unless it be in proper form1 according to the commonest rules of logic4 ,one needs neither any other criterion nor other arbitrator in questions of reason4 ,it is only through lack of this consideration that a handle has been given to the sceptics1 and that even in theology ,franois ,vron and some others1 who #ajh exacerbated the dispute with the ,protestants1 even to the point of dishonesty1 plunged headlong into scepticism in order to prove the necessity of accepting an infallible external judge4 ,their course meets with no approval from the most expert1 even in their own party3 ,calixtus and ,daill derided it as it deserved1 and ,bellarmine argued quite otherwise4 #fc4 ,now let us come to what ,m4 ,bayle says 7p4 #iii7 on the distinction we are concerned with4 ',it seems to me'1 he says1 'that an ambiguity has crept into the celebrated distinction drawn between things that are above reason and things that are against reason4 ,the ,mysteries of the ,gospel are above reason1 so it is usually said1 but they are not contrary to reason4 ,i think that the same sense is not given to the word reason in the first part of this axiom as in the second3 by the first is understood rather the reason of man1 or reason in concreto and by the second reason in general1 or reason in abstracto4 ,for supposing that it is understood always as reason in general or the supreme reason1 the universal reason that is in ,god1 it is equally true that the ,mysteries of the ,gospels are not above reason and that they are not against reason4 ,but if in both parts of the axiom human reason is meant1 ,i do not clearly see the soundness of the distinction3 for the most orthodox confess that we know not how our ,mysteries can conform to the maxims of philosophy4 ,it seems to us1 therefore1 that they are not in conformity with our reason4 ,now that which appears to us not to be in conformity with our reason appears contrary to our reason1 just as that which appears to us not in conformity with truth appears contrary to truth4 ,thus why should not one say1 equally1 that the ,mysteries are against our feeble reason1 and that they are above our feeble reason8' ,i answer1 as ,i have done already1 that 'reason' here is the linking together of the truths that we know by the light of nature1 and in this sense the axiom is true and without any ambiguity4 ,the ,mysteries transcend our reason1 since they contain truths that are not comprised in this sequence2 but they are not contrary to our reason1 and they do not contradict any of the truths whereto this sequence can lead us4 ,accordingly there is no question here of the universal reason that is in ,god1 but of our reason4 ,as for the question whether we know the ,mysteries to conform with our reason1 ,i answer that at least we never know of any non-conformity or any opposition between the ,mysteries and reason4 ,moreover1 we can always abolish such alleged #aji opposition1 and so1 if this can be called reconciling or harmonizing faith with reason1 or recognizing the conformity between them1 it must be said that we can recognize this conformity and this harmony4 ,but if the conformity consists in a reasonable explanation of the how1 we cannot recognize it4 #fd4 ,m4 ,bayle makes one more ingenious objection1 which he draws from the example of the sense of sight4 ',when a square tower'1 he says1 'from a distance appears to us round1 our eyes testify very clearly not only that they perceive nothing square in this tower1 but also that they discover there a round shape1 incompatible with the square shape4 ,one may therefore say that the truth which is the square shape is not only above1 but even against1 the witness of our feeble sight4' ,it must be admitted that this observation is correct1 and although it be true that the appearance of roundness comes simply from the effacement of the angles1 which distance causes to disappear1 it is true1 notwithstanding1 that the round and the square are opposites4 ,therefore my answer to this objection is that the representation of the senses1 even when they do all that in them lies1 is often contrary to the truth2 but it is not the same with the faculty of reasoning1 when it does its duty1 since a strictly reasoned argument is nothing but a linking together of truths4 ,and as for the sense of sight in particular1 it is well to consider that there are yet other false appearances which come not from the 'feebleness of our eyes' nor from the loss of visibility brought about by distance1 but from the very nature of vision1 however perfect it be4 ,it is thus1 for instance1 that the circle seen sideways is changed into that kind of oval which among geometricians is known as an ellipse1 and sometimes even into a parabola or a hyperbola1 or actually into a straight line1 witness the ring of ,saturn4 #fe4 ,the external senses1 properly speaking1 do not deceive us4 ,it is our inner sense which often makes us go too fast4 ,that occurs also in brute beasts1 as when a dog barks at his reflexion in the mirror3 for beasts have consecutions of perception which resemble reasoning1 and which occur also in the inner sense of men1 when their actions have only an empirical quality4 ,but beasts do nothing which compels us to believe that they have what deserves to be properly called a reasoning sense1 as ,i have shown elsewhere4 ,now when the understanding uses and follows the false decision of the inner sense 7as when the famous ,galileo thought that ,saturn had#aaj two handles7 it is deceived by the judgement it makes upon the effect of appearances1 and it infers from them more than they imply4 ,for the appearances of the senses do not promise us absolutely the truth of things1 any more than dreams do4 ,it is we who deceive ourselves by the use we make of them1 that is1 by our consecutions4 ,indeed we allow ourselves to be deluded by probable arguments1 and we are inclined to think that phenomena such as we have found linked together often are so always4 ,thus1 as it happens usually that that which appears without angles has none1 we readily believe it to be always thus4 ,such an error is pardonable1 and sometimes inevitable1 when it is necessary to act promptly and choose that which appearances recommend2 but when we have the leisure and the time to collect our thoughts1 we are in fault if we take for certain that which is not so4 ,it is therefore true that appearances are often contrary to truth1 but our reasoning never is when it proceeds strictly in accordance with the rules of the art of reasoning4 ,if by reason one meant generally the faculty of reasoning whether well or ill1 ,i confess that it might deceive us1 and does indeed deceive us1 and the appearances of our understanding are often as deceptive as those of the senses3 but here it is a question of the linking together of truths and of objections in due form1 and in this sense it is impossible for reason to deceive us4 #ff4 ,thus it may be seen from all ,i have just said that ,m4 ,bayle carries too far the being above reason1 as if it included the insoluble nature of objections3 for according to him 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #acj1 p4 #fea7 'once a dogma is above reason1 philosophy can neither explain it nor comprehend it1 nor meet the difficulties that are urged against it'4 ,i agree with regard to comprehension1 but ,i have already shown that the ,mysteries receive a necessary verbal explanation1 to the end that the terms employed be not sine mente soni1 words signifying nothing4 ,i have shown also that it is necessary for one to be capable of answering the objections1 and that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis4 #fg4 ,he adduces the authority of theologians1 who appear to recognize the insoluble nature of the objections against the ,mysteries4 ,luther is one of the chief of these2 but ,i have already replied1 in #ab1 to the passage where he seems to say that philosophy contradicts theology4 ,there is another passage 7,de ,servo ,arbitrio1 ch4 #bdf7 where he says that the apparent injustice of ,god is proved by arguments taken from the #aaa adversity of good people and the prosperity of the wicked1 an argument irresistible both for all reason and for natural intelligence 7',argumentis talibus traducta1 quibus nulla ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere'74 ,but soon afterwards he shows that he means it only of those who know nothing of the life to come1 since he adds that an expression in the ,gospel dissipates this difficulty1 teaching us that there is another life1 where that which has not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive its due4 ,the objection is then far from being insuperable1 and even without the aid of the ,gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer4 ,there is also quoted 7,reply1 vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #feb7 a passage from ,martin ,chemnitz1 criticized by ,vedelius and defended by ,johann ,musaeus1 where this famous theologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of ,god which are not only above reason but also against reason4 ,but this passage must be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in accordance with the order of ,nature1 as ,musaeus also interprets it4 #fh4 ,it is true nevertheless that ,m4 ,bayle finds some authorities who are more favourable to him1 ,m4 ,descartes being one of the chief4 ,this great man says positively 7,part ,i of his ,principles1 art4 #da7 'that we shall have not the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the difficulty' 7which one may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will with the order of the eternal providence of ,god7 'if we observe that our thought is finite1 and that the ,knowledge and the ,omnipotence of ,god1 whereby he has not only known from all eternity all that which is or which can be1 but also has willed it1 is infinite4 ,we have therefore quite enough intelligence to recognize clearly and distinctly that this knowledge and this power are in ,god2 but we have not enough so to comprehend their scope that we can know how they leave the actions of men entirely free and undetermined4 ,yet the ,power and the ,knowledge of ,god must not prevent us from believing that we have a free will2 for we should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we are inwardly conscious1 and which we know by experience to be within us1 simply because we do not comprehend some other thing which we know to be incomprehensible in its nature4' #fi4 ,this passage from ,m4 ,descartes1 followed by his adherents 7who rarely think of doubting what he asserts71 has always appeared strange to me4 ,not content with saying that1 as for him1 he sees no way of reconciling #aab the two dogmas1 he puts the whole human race1 and even all rational creatures1 in the same case4 ,yet could he have been unaware that there is no possibility of an insuperable objection against truth8 ,for such an objection could only be a necessary linking together of other truths whose result would be contrary to the truth that one maintains2 and consequently there would be contradiction between the truths1 which would be an utter absurdity4 ,moreover1 albeit our mind is finite and cannot comprehend the infinite1 of the infinite nevertheless it has proofs whose strength or weakness it comprehends2 why then should it not have the same comprehension in regard to the objections8 ,and since the power and the wisdom of ,god are infinite and comprehend everything1 there is no pretext for doubting their scope4 ,further1 ,m4 ,descartes demands a freedom which is not needed1 by his insistence that the actions of the will of man are altogether undetermined1 a thing which never happens4 ,finally1 ,m4 ,bayle himself maintains that this experience or this inward sense of our independence1 upon which ,m4 ,descartes founds the proof of our freedom1 does not prove it3 for from the fact that we are not conscious of the causes whereon we depend1 it does not follow1 according to ,m4 ,bayle1 that we are independent4 ,but that is something we will speak of in its proper place4 #gj4 ,it seems that ,m4 ,descartes confesses also1 in a passage of his ,principles1 that it is impossible to find an answer to the difficulties on the division of matter to infinity1 which he nevertheless recognizes as actual4 ,arriaga and other ,schoolmen make well-nigh the same confession3 but if they took the trouble to give to the objections the form these ought to have1 they would see that there are faults in the reasoning1 and sometimes false assumptions which cause confusion4 ,here is an example4 ,a man of parts one day brought up to me an objection in the following form3 ,let the straight line ,,ba be cut in two equal parts at the point ,c1 and the part ,,ca at the point ,d1 and the part ,,da at the point ,e1 and so on to infinity2 all the halves1 ,,bc1 ,,cd1 ,,de1 etc41 together make the whole ,,ba2 therefore there must be a last half1 since the straight line ,,ba finishes at ,a4 ,but this last half is absurd3 for since it is a line1 it will be possible again to cut it in two4 ,therefore division to infinity cannot be admitted4 ,but ,i pointed out to him that one is not justified in the inference that there must be a last half1 although there be a last point ,a1 for this last point belongs to all the halves of its side4 ,and my friend acknowledged it #aac himself when he endeavoured to prove this deduction by a formal argument2 on the contrary1 just because the division goes on to infinity1 there is no last half4 ,and although the straight line ,,ab be finite1 it does not follow that the process of dividing it has any final end4 ,the same confusion arises with the series of numbers going on to infinity4 ,one imagines a final end1 a number that is infinite1 or infinitely small2 but that is all simple fiction4 ,every number is finite and specific2 every line is so likewise1 and the infinite or infinitely small signify only magnitudes that one may take as great or as small as one wishes1 to show that an error is smaller than that which has been specified1 that is to say1 that there is no error2 or else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a magnitude at its vanishing point or its beginning1 conceived after the pattern of magnitudes already actualized4 #ga4 ,it will1 however1 be well to consider the argument that ,m4 ,bayle puts forward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason opposes to the ,mysteries4 ,it is in his comment on the ,manichaeans 7p4 #cadj of the second edition of his ,dictionary74 ',it is enough for me'1 he says1 'that it be unanimously acknowledged that the ,mysteries of the ,gospel are above reason4 ,for thence comes the necessary conclusion that it is impossible to settle the difficulties raised by the philosophers1 and in consequence that a dispute where only the light of ,nature is followed will always end unfavourably for the theologians1 and that they will see themselves forced to give way and to take refuge in the canon of the supernatural light4' ,i am surprised that ,m4 ,bayle speaks in such general terms1 since he has acknowledged himself that the light of ,nature is against the ,manichaeans1 and for the oneness of the ,principle1 and that the goodness of ,god is proved incontrovertibly by reason4 ,yet this is how he continues3 #gb4 ',it is evident that reason can never attain to that which is above it4 ,now if it could supply answers to the objections which are opposed to the dogma of the ,trinity and that of hypostatic union1 it would attain to those two ,mysteries1 it would have them in subjection and submit them to the strictest examination by comparison with its first principles1 or with the aphorisms that spring from common notions1 and proceed until finally it had drawn the conclusion that they are in accordance with natural light4 ,it would therefore do what exceeds its powers1 it would soar above its #aad confines1 and that is a formal contradiction4 ,one must therefore say that it cannot provide answers to its own objections1 and that thus they remain victorious1 so long as one does not have recourse to the authority of ,god and to the necessity of subjugating one's understanding to the obedience of faith4' ,i do not find that there is any force in this reasoning4 ,we can attain to that which is above us not by penetrating it but by maintaining it2 as we can attain to the sky by sight1 and not by touch4 ,nor is it necessary that1 in order to answer the objections which are made against the ,mysteries1 one should have them in subjection to oneself1 and submit them to examination by comparison with the first principles that spring from common notions4 ,for if he who answers the objections had to go so far1 he who proposes the objections needs must do it first4 ,it is the part of the objection to open up the subject1 and it is enough for him who answers to say ,yes or ,no4 ,he is not obliged to counter with a distinction3 it will do1 in case of need1 if he denies the universality of some proposition in the objection or criticizes its form1 and one may do both these things without penetrating beyond the objection4 ,when someone offers me a proof which he maintains is invincible1 ,i can keep silence while ,i compel him merely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward1 and such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful4 ,for the purpose of doubting only1 ,i need not at all probe to the heart of the matter2 on the contrary1 the more ignorant ,i am the more shall ,i be justified in doubting4 ,m4 ,bayle continues thus3 #gc4 ',let us endeavour to clarify that4 ,if some doctrines are above reason they are beyond its reach1 it cannot attain to them2 if it cannot attain to them1 it cannot comprehend them4' 7,he could have begun here with the 'comprehend'1 saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is above it47 ',if it cannot comprehend them1 it can find in them no idea' 7,non valet consequentia3 for1 to 'comprehend' something1 it is not enough that one have some ideas thereof2 one must have all the ideas of everything that goes to make it up1 and all these ideas must be clear1 distinct1 adequate4 ,there are a thousand objects in ,nature in which we understand something1 but which we do not therefore necessarily comprehend4 ,we have some ideas on the rays of light1 we demonstrate upon them up to a certain point2 but there ever remains something which makes us confess that we do not yet comprehend the whole nature of light47 'nor any principle such#aae as may give rise to a solution2' 7,why should not evident principles be found mingled with obscure and confused knowledge87 'and consequently the objections that reason has made will remain unanswered2' 7,by no means2 the difficulty is rather on the side of the opposer4 ,it is for him to seek an evident principle such as may give rise to some objection2 and the more obscure the subject1 the more trouble he will have in finding such a principle4 ,moreover1 when he has found it he will have still more trouble in demonstrating an opposition between the principle and the ,mystery3 for1 if it happened that the ,mystery was evidently contrary to an evident principle1 it would not be an obscure ,mystery1 it would be a manifest absurdity47 'or what is the same thing1 answer will be made with some distinction as obscure as the very thesis that will have been attacked4' 7,one can do without distinctions1 if need be1 by denying either some premiss or some conclusion2 and when one is doubtful of the meaning of some term used by the opposer one may demand of him its definition4 ,thus the defender has no need to incommode himself when it is a question of answering an adversary who claims that he is offering us an invincible proof4 ,but even supposing that the defender1 perchance being kindly disposed1 or for the sake of brevity1 or because he feels himself strong enough1 should himself vouchsafe to show the ambiguity concealed in the objection1 and to remove it by making some distinction1 this distinction need not of necessity lead to anything clearer than the first thesis1 since the defender is not obliged to elucidate the ,mystery itself47 #gd4 ',now it is certain'1 so ,m4 ,bayle continues1 'that an objection which is founded on distinct notions remains equally victorious1 whether you give to it no answer1 or you make an answer where none can comprehend anything4 ,can the contest be equal between a man who alleges in objection to you that which you and he very clearly conceive1 and you1 who can only defend yourself by answers wherein neither of you understands anything8' 7,it is not enough that the objection be founded on quite distinct notions1 it is necessary also that one apply it in contradiction of the thesis4 ,and when ,i answer someone by denying some premiss1 in order to compel him to prove it1 or some conclusion1 to compel him to put it in good form1 it cannot be said that ,i answer nothing or that ,i answer nothing intelligible4 ,for as it is the doubtful premiss of the adversary that ,i deny1 my denial will be #aaf as intelligible as his affirmation4 ,finally1 when ,i am so obliging as to explain myself by means of some distinction1 it suffices that the terms ,i employ have some meaning1 as in the ,mystery itself4 ,thus something in my answer will be comprehended3 but one need not of necessity comprehend all that it involves2 otherwise one would comprehend the ,mystery also47 #ge4 ,m4 ,bayle continues thus3 ',every philosophical dispute assumes that the disputant parties agree on certain definitions' 7,this would be desirable1 but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches such a point1 if the necessity arises47 'and that they admit the rules of ,syllogisms1 and the signs for the recognition of bad arguments4 ,after that everything lies in the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms mediately or immediately to the principles one is agreed upon' 7which is done by means of the syllogisms of him who makes objections72 'whether the premisses of a proof 7advanced by the opposer7 'are true2 whether the conclusion is properly drawn2 whether a four-term ,syllogism has been employed2 whether some aphorism of the chapter de oppositis or de sophisticis elenchis1 etc41 has not been violated4' 7,it is enough1 putting it briefly1 to deny some premiss or some conclusion1 or finally to explain or get explained some ambiguous term47 ',one comes off victorious either by showing that the subject of dispute has no connexion with the principles which had been agreed upon' 7that is to say1 by showing that the objection proves nothing1 and then the defender wins the case71 'or by reducing the defender to absurdity' 7when all the premisses and all the conclusions are well proved74 ',now one can reduce him to that point either by showing him that the conclusions of his thesis are yes and no at once1 or by constraining him to say only intelligible things in answer4' 7,this last embarrassment he can always avoid1 because he has no need to advance new theses47 ',the aim in disputes of this kind is to throw light upon obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence4' 7,it is the aim of the opposer1 for he wishes to demonstrate that the ,mystery is false2 but this cannot here be the aim of the defender1 for in admitting ,mystery he agrees that one cannot demonstrate it47 ',this leads to the opinion that during the course of the proceedings victory sides more or less with the defender or with the opposer1 according to whether there is more or less clarity in the propositions of the one than in the propositions of the other4' 7,that #aag is speaking as if the defender and the opposer were equally unprotected2 but the defender is like a besieged commander1 covered by his defence works1 and it is for the attacker to destroy them4 ,the defender has no need here of self-evidence1 and he seeks it not3 but it is for the opposer to find it against him1 and to break through with his batteries in order that the defender may be no longer protected47 #gf4 ',finally1 it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers are such that one comprehends nothing in them1' 7,it is a very equivocal sign of victory3 for then one must needs ask the audience if they comprehend anything in what has been said1 and often their opinions would be divided4 ,the order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in due form and to answer them by denying or making a distinction47 'and who confesses that they are incomprehensible4' 7,it is permitted to him who maintains the truth of a ,mystery to confess that this mystery is incomprehensible2 and if this confession were sufficient for declaring him vanquished there would be no need of objection4 ,it will be possible for a truth to be incomprehensible1 but never so far as to justify the statement that one comprehends nothing at all therein4 ,it would be in that case what the ancient ,schools called ,scindapsus or ,blityri 7,clem4 ,alex41 ,stromateis1 #h71 that is1 words devoid of meaning47 ',he is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding victory2 and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has covered himself1 and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his antagonists1 he is believed to be utterly defeated1 and is compared to an army which1 having lost the battle1 steals away from the pursuit of the victor only under cover of night4' 7,matching allegory with allegory1 ,i will say that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains protected by his entrenchments2 and if he risks some sortie beyond his need1 it is permitted to him to withdraw within his fort1 without being open to blame for that47 #gg4 ,i was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where ,m4 ,bayle has put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements in support of his opinion3 and ,i hope that ,i have shown clearly how this excellent man has been misled4 ,that happens all too easily to the ablest and shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit without exercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very foundations of their systems4 ,the details we have entered into here will serve as #aah answer to some other arguments upon the subject which are dispersed through the works of ,m4 ,bayle1 as for instance when he says in his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #acc1 p4 #fhe73 ',to prove that one has brought reason and religion into harmony one must show not only that one has philosophic maxims favourable to our faith1 but also that the particular maxims cast up against us as not being consistent with our ,catechism are in reality consistent with it in a clearly conceived way4' ,i do not see that one has need of all that1 unless one aspire to press reasoning as far as the how of the ,mystery4 ,when one is content to uphold its truth1 without attempting to render it comprehensible1 one has no need to resort to philosophic maxims1 general or particular1 for the proof2 and when another brings up some philosophic maxims against us1 it is not for us to prove clearly and distinctly that these maxims are consistent with our dogma1 but it is for our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto4 #gh4 ,m4 ,bayle continues thus in the same passage3 ',for this result we need an answer as clearly evident as the objection4' ,i have already shown that it is obtained when one denies the premisses1 but that for the rest it is not necessary for him who maintains the truth of the ,mystery always to advance evident propositions1 since the principal thesis concerning the ,mystery itself is not evident4 ,he adds further3 ',if we must make reply and rejoinder1 we must never rest in our positions1 nor claim that we have accomplished our design1 so long as our opponent shall make answer with things as evident as our reasons can be4' ,but it is not for the defender to adduce reasons2 it is enough for him to answer those of his opponent4 #gi4 ,finally the author draws the conclusion3 ',if it were claimed that1 on making an evident objection1 a man has to be satisfied with an answer which we can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to us1 that would be unfair4' ,he repeats this in the posthumous ,dialogues1 against ,m4 ,jacquelot1 p4 #fi4 ,i am not of this opinion4 ,if the objection were completely evident1 it would triumph1 and the thesis would be overthrown4 ,but when the objection is only founded on appearances or on instances of the most frequent occurrence1 and when he who makes it desires to draw from it a universal and certain conclusion1 he who upholds the ,mystery may answer with the instance of a bare possibility4 ,for such an instance #aai suffices to show that what one wished to infer from the premisses1 is neither certain nor general2 and it suffices for him who upholds the ,mystery to maintain that it is possible1 without having to maintain that it is probable4 ,for1 as ,i have often said1 it is agreed that the ,mysteries are against appearances4 ,he who upholds the ,mystery need not even adduce such an instance2 and should he adduce it1 it were indeed a work of supererogation1 or else an instrument of greater confusion to the adversary4 #hj4 ,there are passages of ,m4 ,bayle in the posthumous reply that he made to ,m4 ,jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny4 ',m4 ,bayle' 7according to pp4 #cf1 #cg7 'constantly asserts in his ,dictionary1 whenever the subject allows1 that our reason is more capable of refuting and destroying than of proving and building2 that there is scarcely any philosophical or theological matter in respect of which it does not create great difficulties4 ,thus'1 he says1 'if one desired to follow it in a disputatious spirit1 as far as it can go1 one would often be reduced to a state of troublesome perplexity2 and in fine1 there are doctrines certainly true1 which it disputes with insoluble objections4' ,i think that what is said here in reproach of reason is to its advantage4 ,when it overthrows some thesis1 it builds up the opposing thesis4 ,and when it seems to be overthrowing the two opposing theses at the same time1 it is then that it promises us something profound1 provided that we follow it as far as it can go1 not in a disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search out and discover the truth1 which will always be recompensed with a great measure of success4 #ha4 ,m4 ,bayle continues3 'that one must then ridicule these objections1 recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind4' ,and ,i think1 on the other hand1 that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human mind1 which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things4 ,these are new openings and1 as it were1 rays of the dawn which promises us a greater light3 ,i mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural theology4 ,but when these objections are made against revealed faith it is enough that one be able to repel them1 provided that one do so in a submissive and zealous spirit1 with intent to sustain and exalt the glory of ,god4 ,and when we succeed in respect of his justice1 we shall likewise be impressed by his greatness and charmed by his goodness1 which will show themselves through the clouds of a seeming reason that is deceived by outward #abj appearances1 in proportion as the mind is elevated by true reason to that which to us is invisible1 but none the less sure4 #hb4 ',thus' 7to continue with ,m4 ,bayle7 'reason will be compelled to lay down its arms1 and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith1 which it can and ought to do1 in virtue of some of its most incontestable maxims4 ,thus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts nevertheless in accordance with that which it is1 that is to say1 in reason4' ,but one must know 'that such maxims of reason as must be renounced in this case are only those which make us judge by appearances or according to the ordinary course of things4' ,this reason enjoins upon us even in philosophical subjects1 when there are invincible proofs to the contrary4 ,it is thus that1 being made confident by demonstrations of the goodness and the justice of ,god1 we disregard the appearances of harshness and injustice which we see in this small portion of his ,kingdom that is exposed to our gaze4 ,hitherto we have been illumined by the light of ,nature and by that of grace1 but not yet by that of glory4 ,here on earth we see apparent injustice1 and we believe and even know the truth of the hidden justice of ,god2 but we shall see that justice when at last the ,sun of ,justice shall show himself as he is4 #hc4 ,it is certain that ,m4 ,bayle can only be understood as meaning those ostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities2 for he acknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith4 ,in these posthumous ,dialogues he complains 7p4 #gc1 against ,m4 ,jacquelot7 of being accused of the belief that our ,mysteries are in reality against reason1 and 7p4 #i1 against ,m4 le ,clerc7 of the assertion made that he who acknowledges that a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections acknowledges also by a necessary consequence the falsity of this doctrine4 ,nevertheless one would be justified in the assertion if the irrefutability were more than an outward appearance4 #hd4 ,it may be1 therefore1 that having long contended thus against ,m4 ,bayle on the matter of the use of reason ,i shall find after all that his opinions were not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions1 which have provided matter for our considerations1 have led one to believe4 ,it is true that frequently he appears to deny absolutely that one can ever answer the objections of reason against faith1 and that he asserts the necessity of comprehending1 in order to achieve such an end1 how the ,mystery comes #aba to be or exists4 ,yet there are passages where he becomes milder1 and contents himself with saying that the answers to these objections are unknown to him4 ,here is a very precise passage1 taken from the excursus on the ,manichaeans1 which is found at the end of the second edition of his ,dictionary3 ',for the greater satisfaction of the most punctilious readers1 ,i desire to declare here' 7he says1 p4 #cadh7 'that wherever the statement is to be met with in my ,dictionary that such and such arguments are irrefutable ,i do not wish it to be taken that they are so in actuality4 ,i mean naught else than that they appear to me irrefutable4 ,that is of no consequence3 each one will be able to imagine1 if he pleases1 that if ,i deem thus of a matter it is owing to my lack of acumen4' ,i do not imagine such a thing2 his great acumen is too well known to me3 but ,i think that1 after having applied his whole mind to magnifying the objections1 he had not enough attention left over for the purpose of answering them4 #he4 ,m4 ,bayle confesses1 moreover1 in his posthumous work against ,m4 le ,clerc1 that the objections against faith have not the force of proofs4 ,it is therefore ad hominem only1 or rather ad homines1 that is1 in relation to the existing state of the human race1 that he deems these objections irrefutable and the subject unexplainable4 ,there is even a passage where he implies that he despairs not of the possibility that the answer or the explanation may be found1 and even in our time4 ,for here is what he says in his posthumous ,reply to ,m4 le ,clerc 7p4 #ce73 ',m4 ,bayle dared to hope that his toil would put on their mettle some of those great men of genius who create new systems1 and that they could discover a solution hitherto unknown4' ,it seems that by this 'solution' he means such an explanation of ,mystery as would penetrate to the how3 but that is not necessary for replying to the objections4 #hf4 ,many have undertaken to render this how comprehensible1 and to prove the possibility of ,mysteries4 ,a certain writer named ,thomas ,bonartes ,nordtanus ,anglus1 in his ,concordia ,scientiae cum ,fide1 claimed to do so4 ,this work seemed to me ingenious and learned1 but crabbed and involved1 and it even contains indefensible opinions4 ,i learned from the ,apologia ,cyriacorum of the ,dominican ,father ,vincent ,baron that that book was censured in ,rome1 that the author was a ,jesuit1 and that he suffered for having published it4 ,the ,reverend ,father des ,bosses1 who now teaches ,theology in the ,jesuit ,college of ,hildesheim1 and who has combined #abb rare erudition with great acumen1 which he displays in philosophy and theology1 has informed me that the real name of ,bonartes was ,thomas ,barton1 and that after leaving the ,society he retired to ,ireland1 where the manner of his death brought about a favourable verdict on his last opinions4 ,i pity the men of talent who bring trouble upon themselves by their toil and their zeal4 ,something of like nature happened in time past to ,pierre ,abelard1 to ,gilbert de la ,porree1 to ,john ,wyclif1 and in our day to the ,englishman ,thomas ,albius1 as well as to some others who plunged too far into the explanation of the ,mysteries4 #hg4 ,st4 ,augustine1 however 7as well as ,m4 ,bayle71 does not despair of the possibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth2 but this ,father believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a peculiar grace3 ',est aliqua causa fortassis occultior1 quae melioribus sanctioribusque reservatur1 illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum' 7in ,de ,genesi ad ,literam1 lib4 #aa1 c4 #d74 ,luther reserves the knowledge of the ,mystery of ,election for the academy of heaven 7lib4 ,de ,servo ,arbitrio1 c4 #agd73 ',illic ,deus gratiam et misericordiam spargit in indignos1 his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos2 utrobique nimius et iniquus apud homines1 sed justus et verax apud se ipsum4 ,nam quomodo hoc justum sit ut indignos coronet1 incomprehensibile est modo1 videbimus autem1 cum illuc venerimus1 ubi jam non credetur1 sed revelata facie videbitur4 ,ita quomodo hoc justum sit1 ut immeritos damnet1 incomprehensibile est modo1 creditur tamen1 donec revelabitur filius hominis4' ,it is to be hoped that ,m4 ,bayle now finds himself surrounded by that light which is lacking to us here below1 since there is reason to suppose that he was not lacking in good will4 ,,virgil ,candidus insueti miratur limen ,olympi1 ,sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera ,daphnis4 ,,lucan 444,illic postquam se lumine vero ,implevit1 stellasque vagas miratur et astra ,fixa polis1 vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret ,nostra dies4 #abc 99 99 99 99 99 ,,essays ,,on ,,the ,,justice ,,of ,,god ,,and ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,man ,,in ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,evil 99 99 99 99 99 ,,part ,,one #a4 ,having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to place reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it1 we shall see how they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the light of nature and the light of revelation teach us of ,god and of man in relation to evil4 ,the difficulties are distinguishable into two classes4 ,the one kind springs from man's freedom1 which appears incompatible with the divine nature2 and nevertheless freedom is deemed necessary1 in order that man may be deemed guilty and open to punishment4 ,the other kind concerns the conduct of ,god1 and seems to make him participate too much in the existence of evil1 even though man be free and participate also therein4 ,and this conduct appears contrary to the goodness1 the holiness and the justice of ,god1 since ,god co-operates in evil as well physical as moral1 and co-operates in each of them both morally and physically2 and since it seems that these evils are manifested in the order of nature as well as in that of grace1 and in the future and eternal life as well as1 nay1 more than1 in this transitory life4 #b4 ,to present these difficulties in brief1 it must be observed that freedom is opposed1 to all appearance1 by determination or certainty of any kind whatever2 and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers states that the truth of contingent futurities is determined4 ,the foreknowledge of#abd ,god renders all the future certain and determined1 but his providence and his foreordinance1 whereon foreknowledge itself appears founded1 do much more3 for ,god is not as a man1 able to look upon events with unconcern and to suspend his judgement1 since nothing exists save as a result of the decrees of his will and through the action of his power4 ,and even though one leave out of account the co-operation of ,god1 all is perfectly connected in the order of things1 since nothing can come to pass unless there be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect1 this taking place no less in voluntary than in all other actions4 ,according to which it appears that man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does1 and in consequence that he deserves therefor neither recompense nor chastisement3 thus is the morality of actions destroyed and all justice1 divine and human1 shaken4 #c4 ,but even though one should grant to man this freedom wherewith he arrays himself to his own hurt1 the conduct of ,god could not but provide matter for a criticism supported by the presumptuous ignorance of men1 who would wish to exculpate themselves wholly or in part at the expense of ,god4 ,it is objected that all the reality and what is termed the substance of the act in sin itself is a production of ,god1 since all creatures and all their actions derive from him that reality they have4 ,whence one could infer not only that he is the physical cause of sin1 but also that he is its moral cause1 since he acts with perfect freedom and does nothing without a complete knowledge of the thing and the consequences that it may have4 ,nor is it enough to say that ,god has made for himself a law to co-operate with the wills or resolutions of man1 whether we express ourselves in terms of the common opinion or in terms of the system of occasional causes4 ,not only will it be found strange that he should have made such a law for himself1 of whose results he was not ignorant1 but the principal difficulty is that it seems the evil will itself cannot exist without co-operation1 and even without some predetermination1 on his part1 which contributes towards begetting this will in man or in some other rational creature4 ,for an action is not1 for being evil1 the less dependent on ,god4 ,whence one will come at last to the conclusion that ,god does all1 the good and the evil1 indifferently2 unless one pretend with the ,manichaeans that there are two principles1 the one good and the other evil4 ,moreover1 according to the general opinion of theologians and philosophers1 conservation being a #abe perpetual creation1 it will be said that man is perpetually created corrupt and erring4 ,there are1 furthermore1 modern ,cartesians who claim that ,god is the sole agent1 of whom created beings are only the purely passive organs2 and ,m4 ,bayle builds not a little upon that idea4 #d4 ,but even granting that ,god should co-operate in actions only with a general co-operation1 or even not at all1 at least in those that are bad1 it suffices1 so it is said1 to inculpate him and to render him the moral cause that nothing comes to pass without his permission4 ,to say nothing of the fall of the angels1 he knows all that which will come to pass1 if1 having created man1 he places him in such and such circumstances2 and he places him there notwithstanding4 ,man is exposed to a temptation to which it is known that he will succumb1 thereby causing an infinitude of frightful evils1 by which the whole human race will be infected and brought as it were into a necessity of sinning1 a state which is named 'original sin'4 ,thus the world will be brought into a strange confusion1 by this means death and diseases being introduced1 with a thousand other misfortunes and miseries that in general afflict the good and the bad2 wickedness will even hold sway and virtue will be oppressed on earth1 so that it will scarce appear that a providence governs affairs4 ,but it is much worse when one considers the life to come1 since but a small number of men will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally4 ,furthermore these men destined for salvation will have been withdrawn from the corrupt mass through an unreasoning election1 whether it be said that ,god in choosing them has had regard to their future actions1 to their faith or to their works1 or one claim that he has been pleased to give them these good qualities and these actions because he has predestined them to salvation4 ,for though it be said in the most lenient system that ,god wished to save all men1 and though in the other systems commonly accepted it be granted1 that he has made his ,son take human nature upon him to expiate their sins1 so that all they who shall believe in him with a lively and final faith shall be saved1 it still remains true that this lively faith is a gift of ,god2 that we are dead to all good works2 that even our will itself must be aroused by a prevenient grace1 and that ,god gives us the power to will and to do4 ,and whether that be done through a grace efficacious of itself1 that is to say1 through a divine inward motion which wholly determines our #abf will to the good that it does2 or whether there be only a sufficient grace1 but such as does not fail to attain its end1 and to become efficacious in the inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placed by ,god3 one must return to the same conclusion that ,god is the final reason of salvation1 of grace1 of faith and of election in ,jesus ,christ4 ,and be the election the cause or the result of ,god's design to give faith1 it still remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he pleases1 without any discernible reason for his choice1 which falls upon but few men4 #e4 ,so it is a terrible judgement that ,god1 giving his only ,son for the whole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation of men1 yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil his enemy1 who torments them eternally and makes them curse their ,creator1 though they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness1 his justice and his other perfections4 ,and this outcome inspires all the more horror1 as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all eternity is ,god's having exposed their parents to a temptation that he knew they would not resist2 as this sin is inherent and imputed to men before their will has participated in it2 as this hereditary vice impels their will to commit actual sins2 and as countless men1 in childhood or maturity1 that have never heard or have not heard enough of ,jesus ,christ1 ,saviour of the human race1 die before receiving the necessary succour for their withdrawal from this abyss of sin4 ,these men too are condemned to be for ever rebellious against ,god and plunged in the most horrible miseries1 with the wickedest of all creatures1 though in essence they have not been more wicked than others1 and several among them have perchance been less guilty than some of that little number of elect1 who were saved by a grace without reason1 and who thereby enjoy an eternal felicity which they had not deserved4 ,such in brief are the difficulties touched upon by sundry persons2 but ,m4 ,bayle was one who insisted on them the most1 as will appear subsequently when we examine his passages4 ,i think that now ,i have recorded the main essence of these difficulties3 but ,i have deemed it fitting to refrain from some expressions and exaggerations which might have caused offence1 while not rendering the objections any stronger4 #f4 ,let us now turn the medal and let us also point out what can be said in answer to those objections2 and here a course of explanation through #abg fuller dissertation will be necessary3 for many difficulties can be opened up in few words1 but for their discussion one must dilate upon them4 ,our end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent ,god to them as an absolute prince employing a despotic power1 unfitted to be loved and unworthy of being loved4 ,these notions are the more evil in relation to ,god inasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him but also to love him above all things3 and that cannot come about unless there be knowledge of his perfections capable of arousing the love which he deserves1 and which makes the felicity of those that love him4 ,feeling ourselves animated by a zeal such as cannot fail to please him1 we have cause to hope that he will enlighten us1 and that he will himself aid us in the execution of a project undertaken for his glory and for the good of men4 ,a cause so good gives confidence3 if there are plausible appearances against us there are proofs on our side1 and ,i would dare to say to an adversary3 ,aspice1 quam mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum4 #g4 ,god is the first reason of things3 for such things as are bounded1 as all that which we see and experience1 are contingent and have nothing in them to render their existence necessary1 it being plain that time1 space and matter1 united and uniform in themselves and indifferent to everything1 might have received entirely other motions and shapes1 and in another order4 ,therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of the world1 which is the whole assemblage of contingent things1 and seek it in the substance which carries with it the reason for its existence1 and which in consequence is necessary and eternal4 ,moreover1 this cause must be intelligent3 for this existing world being contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible1 and holding1 so to say1 equal claim to existence with it1 the cause of the world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible worlds in order to fix upon one of them4 ,this regard or relation of an existent substance to simple possibilities can be nothing other than the understanding which has the ideas of them1 while to fix upon one of them can be nothing other than the act of the will which chooses4 ,it is the power of this substance that renders its will efficacious4 ,power relates to being1 wisdom or understanding to truth1 and will to good4 ,and this intelligent cause ought to be infinite in all ways1 and absolutely perfect in power1 in wisdom and in goodness1 since it relates to all that which is possible4 #abh ,furthermore1 since all is connected together1 there is no ground for admitting more than one4 ,its understanding is the source of essences1 and its will is the origin of existences4 ,there in few words is the proof of one only ,god with his perfections1 and through him of the origin of things4 #h4 ,now this supreme wisdom1 united to a goodness that is no less infinite1 cannot but have chosen the best4 ,for as a lesser evil is a kind of good1 even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good2 and there would be something to correct in the actions of ,god if it were possible to do better4 ,as in mathematics1 when there is no maximum nor minimum1 in short nothing distinguished1 everything is done equally1 or when that is not possible nothing at all is done3 so it may be said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom1 which is no less orderly than mathematics1 that if there were not the best 7optimum7 among all possible worlds1 ,god would not have produced any4 ,i call ',world' the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things1 lest it be said that several worlds could have existed in different times and different places4 ,for they must needs be reckoned all together as one world or1 if you will1 as one ,universe4 ,and even though one should fill all times and all places1 it still remains true that one might have filled them in innumerable ways1 and that there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which ,god must needs have chosen the best1 since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason4 #i4 ,some adversary not being able to answer this argument will perchance answer the conclusion by a counter-argument1 saying that the world could have been without sin and without sufferings2 but ,i deny that then it would have been better4 ,for it must be known that all things are connected in each one of the possible worlds3 the universe1 whatever it may be1 is all of one piece1 like an ocean3 the least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever1 even though this effect become less perceptible in proportion to the distance4 ,therein ,god has ordered all things beforehand once for all1 having foreseen prayers1 good and bad actions1 and all the rest2 and each thing as an idea has contributed1 before its existence1 to the resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things2 so that nothing can be changed in the universe 7any more than in a number7 save its essence or1 if you will1 save its numerical individuality4 ,thus1 if the smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it1 it #abi would no longer be this world2 which1 with nothing omitted and all allowance made1 was found the best by the ,creator who chose it4 #aj4 ,it is true that one may imagine possible worlds without sin and without unhappiness1 and one could make some like ,utopian or ,sevarambian romances3 but these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in goodness4 ,i cannot show you this in detail4 ,for can ,i know and can ,i present infinities to you and compare them together8 ,but you must judge with me ab effectu1 since ,god has chosen this world as it is4 ,we know1 moreover1 that often an evil brings forth a good whereto one would not have attained without that evil4 ,often indeed two evils have made one great good3 ,et si fata volunt1 bina venena juvant4 ,even so two liquids sometimes produce a solid1 witness the spirit of wine and spirit of urine mixed by ,van ,helmont2 or so do two cold and dark bodies produce a great fire1 witness an acid solution and an aromatic oil combined by ,herr ,hoffmann4 ,a general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake which brings about the winning of a great battle2 and do they not sing on the eve of ,easter1 in the churches of the ,roman rite3 ,o certe necessarium ,adae peccatum1 quod ,christi morte deletum est6 ,o felix culpa1 quae talem ac tantum meruit habere ,redemptorem6 #aa4 ,the illustrious prelates of the ,gallican church who wrote to ,pope ,innocent ,,xii against ,cardinal ,sfondrati's book on predestination1 being of the principles of ,st4 ,augustine1 have said things well fitted to elucidate this great point4 ,the cardinal appears to prefer even to the ,kingdom of ,heaven the state of children dying without baptism1 because sin is the greatest of evils1 and they have died innocent of all actual sin4 ,more will be said of that below4 ,the prelates have observed that this opinion is ill founded4 ,the apostle1 they say 7,rom4 iii4 #h71 is right to disapprove of the doing of evil that good may come1 but one cannot disapprove that ,god1 through his exceeding power1 derive from the permitting of sins greater goods than such as occurred before the sins4 ,it is not that we ought to take pleasure in sin1 ,god forbid6 but that we believe the same apostle when he says 7,rom4 v4 #bj7 that where sin abounded1 grace did much more #acj abound2 and we remember that we have gained ,jesus ,christ himself by reason of sin4 ,thus we see that the opinion of these prelates tends to maintain that a sequence of things where sin enters in may have been and has been1 in effect1 better than another sequence without sin4 #ab4 ,use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of the senses when these are mingled with that which borders on pain1 to prove that there is something of like nature in intellectual pleasures4 ,a little acid1 sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar2 shadows enhance colours2 and even a dissonance in the right place gives relief to harmony4 ,we wish to be terrified by rope-dancers on the point of falling and we wish that tragedies shall well-nigh cause us to weep4 ,do men relish health enough1 or thank ,god enough for it1 without having ever been sick8 ,and is it not most often necessary that a little evil render the good more discernible1 that is to say1 greater8 #ac4 ,but it will be said that evils are great and many in number in comparison with the good3 that is erroneous4 ,it is only want of attention that diminishes our good1 and this attention must be given to us through some admixture of evils4 ,if we were usually sick and seldom in good health1 we should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we should be less sensible of our evils4 ,but is it not better1 notwithstanding1 that health should be usual and sickness the exception8 ,let us then by our reflexion supply what is lacking in our perception1 in order to make the good of health more discernible4 ,had we not the knowledge of the life to come1 ,i believe there would be few persons who1 being at the point of death1 were not content to take up life again1 on condition of passing through the same amount of good and evil1 provided always that it were not the same kind3 one would be content with variety1 without requiring a better condition than that wherein one had been4 #ad4 ,when one considers also the fragility of the human body1 one looks in wonder at the wisdom and the goodness of the ,author of ,nature1 who has made the body so enduring and its condition so tolerable4 ,that has often made me say that ,i am not astonished men are sometimes sick1 but that ,i am astonished they are sick so little and not always4 ,this also ought to make us the more esteem the divine contrivance of the mechanism of animals1 whose ,author has made machines so fragile and so subject to corruption#aca and yet so capable of maintaining themselves3 for it is ,nature which cures us rather than medicine4 ,now this very fragility is a consequence of the nature of things1 unless we are to will that this kind of creature1 reasoning and clothed in flesh and bones1 be not in the world4 ,but that1 to all appearance1 would be a defect which some philosophers of old would have called vacuum formarum1 a gap in the order of species4 #ae4 ,those whose humour it is to be well satisfied with ,nature and with fortune and not to complain about them1 even though they should not be the best endowed1 appear to me preferable to the other sort2 for besides that these complaints are ill founded1 it is in effect murmuring against the orders of providence4 ,one must not readily be among the malcontents in the ,state where one is1 and one must not be so at all in the city of ,god1 wherein one can only wrongfully be of their number4 ,the books of human misery1 such as that of ,pope ,innocent ,,iii1 to me seem not of the most serviceable3 evils are doubled by being given an attention that ought to be averted from them1 to be turned towards the good which by far preponderates4 ,even less do ,i approve books such as that of ,abb ,esprit1 ,on the ,falsity of ,human ,virtues1 of which we have lately been given a summary3 for such a book serves to turn everything wrong side out1 and cause men to be such as it represents them4 #af4 ,it must be confessed1 however1 that there are disorders in this life1 which appear especially in the prosperity of sundry evil men and in the misfortune of many good people4 ,there is a ,german proverb which even grants the advantage to the evil ones1 as if they were commonly the most fortunate3 ,je krmmer ,holz1 je bessre ,krcke3 ,je rger ,schalck1 je grsser ,glcke4 ,and it were to be desired that this saying of ,horace should be true in our eyes3 ,raro antecedentem scelestum ,deseruit pede poena claudo4 ,yet it often comes to pass also1 though this perchance not the most often1 #acb ,that in the world's eyes ,heaven is justified1 and that one may say with ,claudian3 ,abstulit hunc tandem ,rufini poena tumultum1 ,absolvitque deos444 #ag4 ,but even though that should not happen here1 the remedy is all prepared in the other life3 religion and reason itself teach us that1 and we must not murmur against a respite which the supreme wisdom has thought fit to grant to men for repentance4 ,yet there objections multiply on another side1 when one considers salvation and damnation3 for it appears strange that1 even in the great future of eternity1 evil should have the advantage over good1 under the supreme authority of him who is the sovereign good1 since there will be many that are called and few that are chosen or are saved4 ,it is true that one sees from some lines of ,prudentius 7,hymn4 ante ,somnum71 ,idem tamen benignus ,ultor retundit iram1 ,paucosque non piorum ,patitur perire in aevum1 that divers men believed in his time that the number of those wicked enough to be damned would be very small4 ,to some indeed it seems that men believed at that time in a sphere between ,hell and ,paradise2 that this same ,prudentius speaks as if he were satisfied with this sphere2 that ,st4 ,gregory of ,nyssa also inclines in that direction1 and that ,st4 ,jerome leans towards the opinion according whereunto all ,christians would finally be taken into grace4 ,a saying of ,st4 ,paul which he himself gives out as mysterious1 stating that all ,israel will be saved1 has provided much food for reflexion4 ,sundry pious persons1 learned also1 but daring1 have revived the opinion of ,origen1 who maintains that good will predominate in due time1 in all and everywhere1 and that all rational creatures1 even the bad angels1 will become at last holy and blessed4 ,the book of the eternal ,gospel1 published lately in ,german and supported by a great and learned work entitled ,greek3 ',apokatstasis pntn1 has caused much stir over this great paradox4 ,m4 le ,clerc also has ingeniously pleaded the cause of the ,origenists1 but without declaring himself for them4 #acc #ah4 ,there is a man of wit who1 pushing my principle of harmony even to arbitrary suppositions that ,i in no wise approve1 has created for himself a theology well-nigh astronomical4 ,he believes that the present confusion in this world below began when the ,presiding ,angel of the globe of the earth1 which was still a sun 7that is1 a star that was fixed and luminous of itself7 committed a sin with some lesser angels of his department1 perhaps rising inopportunely against an angel of a greater sun2 that simultaneously1 by the ,pre-established ,harmony of the ,realms of ,nature and of ,grace1 and consequently by natural causes occurring at the appointed time1 our globe was covered with stains1 rendered opaque and driven from its place2 which has made it become a wandering star or planet1 that is1 a ,satellite of another sun1 and even perhaps of that one whose superiority its angel refused to recognize2 and that therein consists the fall of ,lucifer4 ,now the chief of the bad angels1 who in ,holy ,scripture is named the prince1 and even the god of this world1 being1 with the angels of his train1 envious of that rational animal which walks on the surface of this globe1 and which ,god has set up there perhaps to compensate himself for their fall1 strives to render it accessary in their crimes and a participator in their misfortunes4 ,whereupon ,jesus ,christ came to save men4 ,he is the eternal ,son of ,god1 even as he is his only ,son2 but 7according to some ancient ,christians1 and according to the author of this hypothesis7 having taken upon him at first1 from the beginning of things1 the most excellent nature among created beings1 to bring them all to perfection1 he set himself amongst them3 and this is the second filiation1 whereby he is the first-born of all creatures4 ,this is he whom the ,cabalists called ,adam ,kadmon4 ,haply he had planted his tabernacle in that great sun which illumines us2 but he came at last into this globe where we are1 he was born of the ,virgin1 and took human nature upon him to save mankind from the hands of their enemy and his4 ,and when the time of judgement shall draw near1 when the present face of our globe shall be about to perish1 he will return to it in visible form1 thence to withdraw the good1 transplanting them1 it may be1 into the sun1 and to punish here the wicked with the demons that have allured them2 then the globe of the earth will begin to burn and will be perhaps a comet4 ,this fire will last for aeons upon aeons4 ,the tail of the comet is intended by the smoke which will rise incessantly1 according to the ,apocalypse1 and this fire will be hell1 or the second#acd death whereof ,holy ,scripture speaks4 ,but at last hell will render up its dead1 death itself will be destroyed2 reason and peace will begin to hold sway again in the spirits that had been perverted2 they will be sensible of their error1 they will adore their ,creator1 and will even begin to love him all the more for seeing the greatness of the abyss whence they emerge4 ,simultaneously 7by virtue of the harmonic parallelism of the ,realms of ,nature and of ,grace7 this long and great conflagration will have purged the earth's globe of its stains4 ,it will become again a sun2 its ,presiding ,angel will resume his place with the angels of his train2 humans that were damned shall be with them numbered amongst the good angels2 this chief of our globe shall render homage to the ,messiah1 chief of created beings4 ,the glory of this angel reconciled shall be greater than it was before his fall4 ,inque ,deos iterum factorum lege receptus ,aureus aeternum noster regnabit ,apollo4 ,the vision seemed to me pleasing1 and worthy of a follower of ,origen3 but we have no need of such hypothesis or fictions1 where ,wit plays a greater part than ,revelation1 and which even ,reason cannot turn to account4 ,for it does not appear that there is one principal place in the known universe deserving in preference to the rest to be the seat of the eldest of created beings2 and the sun of our system at least is not it4 #ai4 ,holding then to the established doctrine that the number of men damned eternally will be incomparably greater than that of the saved1 we must say that the evil could not but seem to be almost as nothing in comparison with the good1 when one contemplates the true vastness of the city of ,god4 ,coelius ,secundus ,curio wrote a little book1 ,de ,amplitudine ,regni ,coelestis1 which was reprinted not long since2 but he is indeed far from having apprehended the compass of the kingdom of heaven4 ,the ancients had puny ideas on the works of ,god1 and ,st4 ,augustine1 for want of knowing modern discoveries1 was at a loss when there was question of explaining the prevalence of evil4 ,it seemed to the ancients that there was only one earth inhabited1 and even of that men held the antipodes in dread3 the remainder of the world was1 according to them1 a few shining globes and a few crystalline spheres4 ,to-day1 whatever bounds are given or not given to the universe1 it must be acknowledged that there is an infinite number of globes1 as great as and greater than ours1 which have as much right as#ace it to hold rational inhabitants1 though it follows not at all that they are human4 ,it is only one planet1 that is to say one of the six principal satellites of our sun2 and as all fixed stars are suns also1 we see how small a thing our earth is in relation to visible things1 since it is only an appendix of one amongst them4 ,it may be that all suns are peopled only by blessed creatures1 and nothing constrains us to think that many are damned1 for few instances or few samples suffice to show the advantage which good extracts from evil4 ,moreover1 since there is no reason for the belief that there are stars everywhere1 is it not possible that there may be a great space beyond the region of the stars8 ,whether it be the ,empyrean ,heaven1 or not1 this immense space encircling all this region may in any case be filled with happiness and glory4 ,it can be imagined as like the ,ocean1 whither flow the rivers of all blessed creatures1 when they shall have reached their perfection in the system of the stars4 ,what will become of the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants8 ,will it not be something incomparably less than a physical point1 since our earth is as a point in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars8 ,thus since the proportion of that part of the universe which we know is almost lost in nothingness compared with that which is unknown1 and which we yet have cause to assume1 and since all the evils that may be raised in objection before us are in this near nothingness1 haply it may be that all evils are almost nothingness in comparison with the good things which are in the universe4 #bj4 ,but it is necessary also to meet the more speculative and metaphysical difficulties which have been mentioned1 and which concern the cause of evil4 ,the question is asked first of all1 whence does evil come8 ,si ,deus est1 unde malum8 ,si non est1 unde bonum8 ,the ancients attributed the cause of evil to matter1 which they believed uncreate and independent of ,god3 but we1 who derive all being from ,god1 where shall we find the source of evil8 ,the answer is1 that it must be sought in the ideal nature of the creature1 in so far as this nature is contained in the eternal verities which are in the understanding of ,god1 independently of his will4 ,for we must consider that there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin1 because the creature is limited in its essence2 whence ensues that it cannot know all1 and that it can deceive itself and commit other errors4 ,plato said in ,timaeus that the world originated in #acf ,understanding united to ,necessity4 ,others have united ,god and ,nature4 ,this can be given a reasonable meaning4 ,god will be the ,understanding2 and the ,necessity1 that is1 the essential nature of things1 will be the object of the understanding1 in so far as this object consists in the eternal verities4 ,but this object is inward and abides in the divine understanding4 ,and therein is found not only the primitive form of good1 but also the origin of evil3 the ,region of the ,eternal ,verities must be substituted for matter when we are concerned with seeking out the source of things4 ,this region is the ideal cause of evil 7as it were7 as well as of good3 but1 properly speaking1 the formal character of evil has no efficient cause1 for it consists in privation1 as we shall see1 namely1 in that which the efficient cause does not bring about4 ,that is why the ,schoolmen are wont to call the cause of evil deficient4 #ba4 ,evil may be taken metaphysically1 physically and morally4 ,metaphysical evil consists in mere imperfection1 physical evil in suffering1 and moral evil in sin4 ,now although physical evil and moral evil be not necessary1 it is enough that by virtue of the eternal verities they be possible4 ,and as this vast ,region of ,verities contains all possibilities it is necessary that there be an infinitude of possible worlds1 that evil enter into divers of them1 and that even the best of all contain a measure thereof4 ,thus has ,god been induced to permit evil4 #bb4 ,but someone will say to me3 why speak you to us of 'permitting'8 ,is it not ,god that doeth the evil and that willeth it8 ,here it will be necessary to explain what 'permission' is1 so that it may be seen how this term is not employed without reason4 ,but before that one must explain the nature of will1 which has its own degrees4 ,taking it in the general sense1 one may say that will consists in the inclination to do something in proportion to the good it contains4 ,this will is called antecedent when it is detached1 and considers each good separately in the capacity of a good4 ,in this sense it may be said that ,god tends to all good1 as good1 ad perfectionem simpliciter simplicem1 to speak like the ,schoolmen1 and that by an antecedent will4 ,he is earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save all men1 to exclude sin1 and to prevent damnation4 ,it may even be said that this will is efficacious of itself 7per se71 that is1 in such sort that the effect would ensue if there were not some stronger reason to prevent it3 for this will does not pass into final exercise 7ad summum conatum71 else it would never fail to produce its full effect1 ,god being the #acg master of all things4 ,success entire and infallible belongs only to the consequent will1 as it is called4 ,this it is which is complete2 and in regard to it this rule obtains1 that one never fails to do what one wills1 when one has the power4 ,now this consequent will1 final and decisive1 results from the conflict of all the antecedent wills1 of those which tend towards good1 even as of those which repel evil2 and from the concurrence of all these particular wills comes the total will4 ,so in mechanics compound movement results from all the tendencies that concur in one and the same moving body1 and satisfies each one equally1 in so far as it is possible to do all at one time4 ,it is as if the moving body took equal account of these tendencies1 as ,i once showed in one of the ,paris ,journals 7#g ,sept4 #afic71 when giving the general law of the compositions of movement4 ,in this sense also it may be said that the antecedent will is efficacious in a sense and even effective with success4 #bc4 ,thence it follows that ,god wills antecedently the good and consequently the best4 ,and as for evil1 ,god wills moral evil not at all1 and physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely4 ,thus it is that there is no absolute predestination to damnation2 and one may say of physical evil1 that ,god wills it often as a penalty owing to guilt1 and often also as a means to an end1 that is1 to prevent greater evils or to obtain greater good4 ,the penalty serves also for amendment and example4 ,evil often serves to make us savour good the more2 sometimes too it contributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it1 as the seed that one sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can germinate3 this is a beautiful similitude1 which ,jesus ,christ himself used4 #bd4 ,concerning sin or moral evil1 although it happens very often that it may serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil1 it is not this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or a legitimate object of a created will4 ,it must only be admitted or permitted in so far as it is considered to be a certain consequence of an indispensable duty3 as for instance if a man who was determined not to permit another's sin were to fail of his own duty1 or as if an officer on guard at an important post were to leave it1 especially in time of danger1 in order to prevent a quarrel in the town between two soldiers of the garrison who wanted to kill each other4 #be4 ,the rule which states1 non esse facienda mala1 ut eveniant bona1 and which even forbids the permission of a moral evil with the end of #ach obtaining a physical good1 far from being violated1 is here proved1 and its source and its reason are demonstrated4 ,one will not approve the action of a queen who1 under the pretext of saving the ,state1 commits or even permits a crime4 ,the crime is certain and the evil for the ,state is open to question4 ,moreover1 this manner of giving sanction to crimes1 if it were accepted1 would be worse than a disruption of some one country1 which is liable enough to happen in any case1 and would perchance happen all the more by reason of such means chosen to prevent it4 ,but in relation to ,god nothing is open to question1 nothing can be opposed to the rule of the best1 which suffers neither exception nor dispensation4 ,it is in this sense that ,god permits sin3 for he would fail in what he owes to himself1 in what he owes to his wisdom1 his goodness1 his perfection1 if he followed not the grand result of all his tendencies to good1 and if he chose not that which is absolutely the best1 notwithstanding the evil of guilt1 which is involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal verities4 ,hence the conclusion that ,god wills all good in himself antecedently1 that he wills the best consequently as an end1 that he wills what is indifferent1 and physical evil1 sometimes as a means1 but that he will only permit moral evil as the sine quo non or as a hypothetical necessity which connects it with the best4 ,therefore the consequent will of ,god1 which has sin for its object1 is only permissive4 #bf4 ,it is again well to consider that moral evil is an evil so great only because it is a source of physical evils1 a source existing in one of the most powerful of creatures1 who is also most capable of causing those evils4 ,for an evil will is in its department what the evil principle of the ,manichaeans would be in the universe2 and reason1 which is an image of the ,divinity1 provides for evil souls great means of causing much evil4 ,one single ,caligula1 one ,nero1 has caused more evil than an earthquake4 ,an evil man takes pleasure in causing suffering and destruction1 and for that there are only too many opportunities4 ,but ,god being inclined to produce as much good as possible1 and having all the knowledge and all the power necessary for that1 it is impossible that in him there be fault1 or guilt1 or sin2 and when he permits sin1 it is wisdom1 it is virtue4 #bg4 ,it is indeed beyond question that we must refrain from preventing the sin of others when we cannot prevent their sin without sinning ourselves4 ,but someone will perhaps bring up the objection that it is ,god himself#aci who acts and who effects all that is real in the sin of the creature4 ,this objection leads us to consider the physical co-operation of ,god with the creature1 after we have examined the moral co-operation1 which was the more perplexing4 ,some have believed1 with the celebrated ,durand de ,saint-,pourain and ,cardinal ,aureolus1 the famous ,schoolman1 that the co-operation of ,god with the creature 7,i mean the physical cooperation7 is only general and mediate1 and that ,god creates substances and gives them the force they need2 and that thereafter he leaves them to themselves1 and does naught but conserve them1 without aiding them in their actions4 ,this opinion has been refuted by the greater number of ,scholastic theologians1 and it appears that in the past it met with disapproval in the writings of ,pelagius4 ,nevertheless a ,capuchin named ,louis ,pereir of ,dole1 about the year #afcj1 wrote a book expressly to revive it1 at least in relation to free actions4 ,some moderns incline thereto1 and ,m4 ,bernier supports it in a little book on freedom and freewill4 ,but one cannot say in relation to ,god what 'to conserve' is1 without reverting to the general opinion4 ,also it must be taken into account that the action of ,god in conserving should have some reference to that which is conserved1 according to what it is and to the state wherein it is2 thus his action cannot be general or indeterminate4 ,these generalities are abstractions not to be found in the truth of individual things1 and the conservation of a man standing is different from the conservation of a man seated4 ,this would not be so if conservation consisted only in the act of preventing and warding off some foreign cause which could destroy that which one wishes to conserve2 as often happens when men conserve something4 ,but apart from the fact that we are obliged ourselves sometimes to maintain that which we conserve1 we must bear in mind that conservation by ,god consists in the perpetual immediate influence which the dependence of creatures demands4 ,this dependence attaches not only to the substance but also to the action1 and one can perhaps not explain it better than by saying1 with theologians and philosophers in general1 that it is a continued creation4 #bh4 ,the objection will be made that ,god therefore now creates man a sinner1 he that in the beginning created him innocent4 ,but here it must be said1 with regard to the moral aspect1 that ,god being supremely wise cannot fail to observe certain laws1 and to act according to the rules1 as well #adj physical as moral1 that wisdom has made him choose4 ,and the same reason that has made him create man innocent1 but liable to fall1 makes him re-create man when he falls2 for ,god's knowledge causes the future to be for him as the present1 and prevents him from rescinding the resolutions made4 #bi4 ,as for physical co-operation1 here one must consider the truth which has made already so much stir in the ,schools since ,st4 ,augustine declared it1 that evil is a privation of being1 whereas the action of ,god tends to the positive4 ,this answer is accounted a quibble1 and even something chimerical in the minds of many people4 ,but here is an instance somewhat similar1 which will serve to disabuse them4 #cj4 ,the celebrated ,kepler and ,m4 ,descartes 7in his letters7 after him have spoken of the 'natural inertia of bodies'2 and it is something which may be regarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original limitation of creatures1 to show that privation constitutes the formal character of the imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as well as in its actions4 ,let us suppose that the current of one and the same river carried along with it various boats1 which differ among themselves only in the cargo1 some being laden with wood1 others with stone1 and some more1 the others less4 ,that being so1 it will come about that the boats most heavily laden will go more slowly than the others1 provided it be assumed that the wind or the oar1 or some other similar means1 assist them not at all4 ,it is not1 properly speaking1 weight which is the cause of this retardation1 since the boats are going down and not upwards2 but it is the same cause which also increases the weight in bodies that have greater density1 which are1 that is to say1 less porous and more charged with matter that is proper to them3 for the matter which passes through the pores1 not receiving the same movement1 must not be taken into account4 ,it is therefore matter itself which originally is inclined to slowness or privation of speed2 not indeed of itself to lessen this speed1 having once received it1 since that would be action1 but to moderate by its receptivity the effect of the impression when it is to receive it4 ,consequently1 since more matter is moved by the same force of the current when the boat is more laden1 it is necessary that it go more slowly2 and experiments on the impact of bodies1 as well as reason1 show that twice as much force #ada must be employed to give equal speed to a body of the same matter but of twice the size4 ,but that indeed would not be necessary if the matter were absolutely indifferent to repose and to movement1 and if it had not this natural inertia whereof we have just spoken to give it a kind of repugnance to being moved4 ,let us now compare the force which the current exercises on boats1 and communicates to them1 with the action of ,god1 who produces and conserves whatever is positive in creatures1 and gives them perfection1 being and force3 let us compare1 ,i say1 the inertia of matter with the natural imperfection of creatures1 and the slowness of the laden boat with the defects to be found in the qualities and the action of the creature2 and we shall find that there is nothing so just as this comparison4 ,the current is the cause of the boat's movement1 but not of its retardation2 ,god is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature1 but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause of the defects there are in its action4 ,thus the ,platonists1 ,st4 ,augustine and the ,schoolmen were right to say that ,god is the cause of the material element of evil which lies in the positive1 and not of the formal element1 which lies in privation4 ,even so one may say that the current is the cause of the material element of the retardation1 but not of the formal3 that is1 it is the cause of the boat's speed without being the cause of the limits to this speed4 ,and ,god is no more the cause of sin than the river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat4 ,force also in relation to matter is as the spirit in relation to the flesh2 the spirit is willing and the flesh is weak1 and spirits act444 quantum non noxia corpora tardant4 #ca4 ,there is1 then1 a wholly similar relation between such and such an action of ,god1 and such and such a passion or reception of the creature1 which in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion to its 'receptivity'1 such is the term used4 ,and when it is said that the creature depends upon ,god in so far as it exists and in so far as it acts1 and even that conservation is a continual creation1 this is true in that ,god gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in it is positive1 good and perfect1 every perfect gift coming from the ,father of lights4 ,the imperfections1 on the other hand1 and the defects in operations spring from the original limitation that the creature could not but #adb receive with the first beginning of its being1 through the ideal reasons which restrict it4 ,for ,god could not give the creature all without making of it a ,god2 therefore there must needs be different degrees in the perfection of things1 and limitations also of every kind4 #cb4 ,this consideration will serve also to satisfy some modern philosophers who go so far as to say that ,god is the only agent4 ,it is true that ,god is the only one whose action is pure and without admixture of what is termed 'to suffer'3 but that does not preclude the creature's participation in actions1 since the action of the creature is a modification of the substance1 flowing naturally from it and containing a variation not only in the perfections that ,god has communicated to the creature1 but also in the limitations that the creature1 being what it is1 brings with it4 ,thus we see that there is an actual distinction between the substance and its modification or accidents1 contrary to the opinion of some moderns and in particular of the late ,duke of ,buckingham1 who spoke of that in a little ,discourse on ,religion recently reprinted4 ,evil is therefore like darkness1 and not only ignorance but also error and malice consist formally in a certain kind of privation4 ,here is an example of error which we have already employed4 ,i see a tower which from a distance appears round although it is square4 ,the thought that the tower is what it appears to be flows naturally from that which ,i see2 and when ,i dwell on this thought it is an affirmation1 it is a false judgement2 but if ,i pursue the examination1 if some reflexion causes me to perceive that appearances deceive me1 lo and behold1 ,i abandon my error4 ,to abide in a certain place1 or not to go further1 not to espy some landmark1 these are privations4 #cc4 ,it is the same in respect of malice or ill will4 ,the will tends towards good in general1 it must strive after the perfection that befits us1 and the supreme perfection is in ,god4 ,all pleasures have within themselves some feeling of perfection4 ,but when one is limited to the pleasures of the senses1 or to other pleasures to the detriment of greater good1 as of health1 of virtue1 of union with ,god1 of felicity1 it is in this privation of a further aspiration that the defect consists4 ,in general perfection is positive1 it is an absolute reality2 defect is privative1 it comes from limitation and tends towards new privations4 ,this saying is therefore as true as it is ancient3 bonum ex causa integra1 malum ex quolibet defectu2 as also that which states3 malum causam habet non efficientem1 sed #adc deficientem4 ,and ,i hope that the meaning of these axioms will be better apprehended after what ,i have just said4 #cd4 ,the physical co-operation of ,god and of creatures with the will contributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom4 ,i am of opinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity4 ,aristotle has already observed that there are two things in freedom1 to wit1 spontaneity and choice1 and therein lies our mastery over our actions4 ,when we act freely we are not being forced1 as would happen if we were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom2 and we are not prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate1 as would happen if we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment4 ,there is contingency in a thousand actions of ,nature2 but when there is no judgement in him who acts there is no freedom4 ,and if we had judgement not accompanied by any inclination to act1 our soul would be an understanding without will4 #ce4 ,it is not to be imagined1 however1 that our freedom consists in an indetermination or an indifference of equipoise1 as if one must needs be inclined equally to the side of yes and of no and in the direction of different courses1 when there are several of them to take4 ,this equipoise in all directions is impossible3 for if we were equally inclined towards the courses ,a1 ,b and ,c1 we could not be equally inclined towards ,a and towards not ,a4 ,this equipoise is also absolutely contrary to experience1 and in scrutinizing oneself one will find that there has always been some cause or reason inclining us towards the course taken1 although very often we be not aware of that which prompts us3 just in the same way one is hardly aware why1 on issuing from a door1 one has placed the right foot before the left or the left before the right4 #cf4 ,but let us pass to the difficulties4 ,philosophers agree to-day that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate1 that is to say that contingent futurities are future1 or that they will be1 that they will happen3 for it is as sure that the future will be1 as it is sure that the past has been4 ,it was true already a hundred years ago that ,i should write to-day1 as it will be true after a hundred years that ,i have written4 ,thus the contingent is not1 because it is future1 any the less contingent2 and determination1 which would be called certainty if it were known1 is not incompatible with contingency4 ,often the certain and the determinate are taken as one thing1 because a determinate truth is capable of being #add known3 thus it may be said that determination is an objective certainty4 #cg4 ,this determination comes from the very nature of truth1 and cannot injure freedom3 but there are other determinations taken from elsewhere1 and in the first place from the foreknowledge of ,god1 which many have held to be contrary to freedom4 ,they say that what is foreseen cannot fail to exist1 and they say so truly2 but it follows not that what is foreseen is necessary1 for necessary truth is that whereof the contrary is impossible or implies contradiction4 ,now this truth which states that ,i shall write tomorrow is not of that nature1 it is not necessary4 ,yet supposing that ,god foresees it1 it is necessary that it come to pass2 that is1 the consequence is necessary1 namely1 that it exist1 since it has been foreseen2 for ,god is infallible4 ,this is what is termed a hypothetical necessity4 ,but our concern is not this necessity3 it is an absolute necessity that is required1 to be able to say that an action is necessary1 that it is not contingent1 that it is not the effect of a free choice4 ,besides it is very easily seen that foreknowledge in itself adds nothing to the determination of the truth of contingent futurities1 save that this determination is known3 and this does not augment the determination or the 'futurition' 7as it is termed7 of these events1 that whereon we agreed at the outset4 #ch4 ,this answer is doubtless very correct4 ,it is agreed that foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate2 truth is foreseen because it is determinate1 because it is true2 but it is not true because it is foreseen3 and therein the knowledge of the future has nothing that is not also in the knowledge of the past or of the present4 ,but here is what an opponent will be able to say3 ,i grant you that foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate1 but it is the cause of the foreknowledge that makes it so4 ,for it needs must be that the foreknowledge of ,god have its foundation in the nature of things1 and this foundation1 making the truth predeterminate1 will prevent it from being contingent and free4 #ci4 ,it is this difficulty that has caused two parties to spring up1 one of the predeterminators1 the other of the supporters of mediate knowledge4 ,the ,dominicans and the ,augustinians are for predetermination1 the ,franciscans and the modern ,jesuits on the other hand are for mediate knowledge4 ,these two parties appeared towards the middle of the sixteenth century and a little later4 ,molina himself1 who is perhaps one of the #ade first1 with ,fonseca1 to have systematized this point1 and from whom the others derived their name of ,molinists1 says in the book that he wrote on the reconciliation of freewill with grace1 about the year #aegj1 that the ,spanish doctors 7he means principally the ,thomists71 who had been writing then for twenty years1 finding no other way to explain how ,god could have a certain knowledge of contingent futurities1 had introduced predetermination as being necessary to free actions4 #dj4 ,as for himself1 he thought to have found another way4 ,he considers that there are three objects of divine knowledge1 the possibles1 the actual events and the conditional events that would happen in consequence of a certain condition if it were translated into action4 ,the knowledge of possibilities is what is called the 'knowledge of mere intelligence'2 that of events occurring actually in the progress of the universe is called the 'knowledge of intuition'4 ,and as there is a kind of mean between the merely possible and the pure and absolute event1 to wit1 the conditional event1 it can be said also1 according to ,molina1 that there is a mediate knowledge between that of intuition and that of intelligence4 ,instance is given of the famous example of ,david asking the divine oracle whether the inhabitants of the town of ,keilah1 where he designed to shut himself in1 would deliver him to ,saul1 supposing that ,saul should besiege the town4 ,god answered yes2 whereupon ,david took a different course4 ,now some advocates of this mediate knowledge are of opinion that ,god1 foreseeing what men would do of their own accord1 supposing they were placed in such and such circumstances1 and knowing that they would make ill use of their free will1 decrees to refuse them grace and favourable circumstances4 ,and he may justly so decree1 since in any case these circumstances and these aids would not have served them aught4 ,but ,molina contents himself with finding therein generally a reason for the decrees of ,god1 founded on what the free creature would do in such and such circumstances4 #da4 ,i will not enter into all the detail of this controversy2 it will suffice for me to give one instance4 ,certain older writers1 not acceptable to ,st4 ,augustine and his first disciples1 appear to have had ideas somewhat approaching those of ,molina4 ,the ,thomists and those who call themselves disciples of ,st4 ,augustine 7but whom their opponents call ,jansenists7 combat this doctrine on philosophical and theological grounds4 ,some #adf maintain that mediate knowledge must be included in the knowledge of mere intelligence4 ,but the principal objection is aimed at the foundation of this knowledge4 ,for what foundation can ,god have for seeing what the people of ,keilah would do8 ,a simple contingent and free act has nothing in itself to yield a principle of certainty1 unless one look upon it as predetermined by the decrees of ,god1 and by the causes that are dependent upon them4 ,consequently the difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist also in conditional free actions1 that is to say1 ,god will know them only under the condition of their causes and of his decrees1 which are the first causes of things3 and it will not be possible to separate such actions from those causes so as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent of the knowledge of its causes4 ,therefore all must of necessity be traced back to the predetermination of ,god's decrees1 and this mediate knowledge 7so it will be said7 will offer no remedy4 ,the theologians who profess to be adherents of ,st4 ,augustine claim also that the system of the ,molinists would discover the source of ,god's grace in the good qualities of man1 and this they deem an infringement of ,god's honour and contrary to ,st4 ,paul's teaching4 #db4 ,it would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies and rejoinders coming from one side and the other1 and it will suffice for me to explain how ,i conceive that there is truth on both sides4 ,for this result ,i resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds1 represented in the region of eternal verities1 that is1 in the object of the divine intelligence1 where all conditional futurities must be comprised4 ,for the case of the siege of ,keilah forms part of a possible world1 which differs from ours only in all that is connected with this hypothesis1 and the idea of this possible world represents that which would happen in this case4 ,thus we have a principle for the certain knowledge of contingent futurities1 whether they happen actually or must happen in a certain case4 ,for in the region of the possibles they are represented as they are1 namely1 as free contingencies4 ,therefore neither the foreknowledge of contingent futurities nor the foundation for the certainty of this foreknowledge should cause us perplexity or seem to prejudice freedom4 ,and though it were true and possible that contingent futurities consisting in free actions of reasonable creatures were entirely independent of the decrees of ,god and of external causes1 there would #adg still be means of foreseeing them2 for ,god would see them as they are in the region of the possibles1 before he decrees to admit them into existence4 #dc4 ,but if the foreknowledge of ,god has nothing to do with the dependence or independence of our free actions1 it is not so with the foreordinance of ,god1 his decrees1 and the sequence of causes which1 as ,i believe1 always contribute to the determination of the will4 ,and if ,i am for the ,molinists in the first point1 ,i am for the predeterminators in the second1 provided always that predetermination be taken as not necessitating4 ,in a word1 ,i am of opinion that the will is always more inclined towards the course it adopts1 but that it is never bound by the necessity to adopt it4 ,that it will adopt this course is certain1 but it is not necessary4 ,the case corresponds to that of the famous saying1 ,astra inclinant1 non necessitant1 although here the similarity is not complete4 ,for the event towards which the stars tend 7to speak with the common herd1 as if there were some foundation for astrology7 does not always come to pass1 whereas the course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to be adopted4 ,moreover the stars would form only a part of the inclinations that co-operate in the event1 but when one speaks of the greater inclination of the will1 one speaks of the result of all the inclinations4 ,it is almost as we have spoken above of the consequent will in ,god1 which results from all the antecedent wills4 #dd4 ,nevertheless1 objective certainty or determination does not bring about the necessity of the determinate truth4 ,all philosophers acknowledge this1 asserting that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate1 and that nevertheless they remain contingent4 ,the thing indeed would imply no contradiction in itself if the effect did not follow2 and therein lies contingency4 ,the better to understand this point1 we must take into account that there are two great principles of our arguments4 ,the one is the principle of contradiction1 stating that of two contradictory propositions the one is true1 the other false2 the other principle is that of the determinant reason3 it states that nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least a reason determining it1 that is1 something to give an a priori reason why it is existent rather than non-existent1 and in this wise rather than in any other4 ,this great principle holds for all events1 and a contrary instance will never be supplied3 and although more often than not we are insufficiently #adh acquainted with these determinant reasons1 we perceive nevertheless that there are such4 ,were it not for this great principle we could never prove the existence of ,god1 and we should lose an infinitude of very just and very profitable arguments whereof it is the foundation2 moreover1 it suffers no exception1 for otherwise its force would be weakened4 ,besides1 nothing is so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full of exceptions4 ,that fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system ,i approve1 where everything happens in accordance with general rules that at most are mutually restrictive4 #de4 ,we must therefore not imagine with some ,schoolmen1 whose ideas tend towards the chimerical1 that free contingent futurities have the privilege of exemption from this general rule of the nature of things4 ,there is always a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice1 and for the maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this reason should incline without necessitating4 ,that is also the opinion of all the ancients1 of ,plato1 of ,aristotle1 of ,st4 ,augustine4 ,the will is never prompted to action save by the representation of the good1 which prevails over the opposite representations4 ,this is admitted even in relation to ,god1 the good angels and the souls in bliss3 and it is acknowledged that they are none the less free in consequence of that4 ,god fails not to choose the best1 but he is not constrained so to do3 nay1 more1 there is no necessity in the object of ,god's choice1 for another sequence of things is equally possible4 ,for that very reason the choice is free and independent of necessity1 because it is made between several possibles1 and the will is determined only by the preponderating goodness of the object4 ,this is therefore not a defect where ,god and the saints are concerned3 on the contrary1 it would be a great defect1 or rather a manifest absurdity1 were it otherwise1 even in men here on earth1 and if they were capable of acting without any inclining reason4 ,of such absurdity no example will ever be found2 and even supposing one takes a certain course out of caprice1 to demonstrate one's freedom1 the pleasure or advantage one thinks to find in this conceit is one of the reasons tending towards it4 #df4 ,there is therefore a freedom of contingency or1 in a way1 of indifference1 provided that by 'indifference' is understood that nothing necessitates us to one course or the other2 but there is never any indifference of equipoise1 that is1 where all is completely even on #adi both sides1 without any inclination towards either4 ,innumerable great and small movements1 internal and external1 co-operate with us1 for the most part unperceived by us4 ,and ,i have already said that when one leaves a room there are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot first1 without pausing to reflect4 ,for there is not everywhere a slave1 as in ,trimalchio's house in ,petronius1 to cry to us3 the right foot first4 ,all that we have just said agrees entirely also with the maxims of the philosophers1 who teach that a cause cannot act without having a disposition towards action4 ,it is this disposition which contains a predetermination1 whether the doer have received it from without1 or have had it in consequence of his own antecedent character4 #dg4 ,thus we have no need to resort1 in company with some new ,thomists1 to a new immediate predetermination by ,god1 such as may cause the free creature to abandon his indifference1 and to a decree of ,god for predetermining the creature1 making it possible for ,god to know what the creature will do3 for it suffices that the creature be predetermined by its preceding state1 which inclines it to one course more than to the other4 ,moreover1 all these connexions of the actions of the creature and of all creatures were represented in the divine understanding1 and known to ,god through the knowledge of mere intelligence1 before he had decreed to give them existence4 ,thus we see that1 in order to account for the foreknowledge of ,god1 one may dispense with both the mediate knowledge of the ,molinists and the predetermination which a ,baez or an ,alvarez 7writers otherwise of great profundity7 have taught4 #dh4 ,by this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the ,molinists were much embarrassed4 ,they were asked not only how it was possible to know in what direction a cause absolutely indeterminate would be determined1 but also how it was possible that there should finally result therefrom a determination for which there is no source3 to say with ,molina that it is the privilege of the free cause is to say nothing1 but simply to grant that cause the privilege of being chimerical4 ,it is pleasing to see their harassed efforts to emerge from a labyrinth whence there is absolutely no means of egress4 ,some teach that the will1 before it is determined formally1 must be determined virtually1 in order to emerge from its state of equipoise2 and ,father ,louis of ,dole1 in his book on the ,co-operation of ,god1 quotes ,molinists who attempt to take refuge in this expedient3 #aej for they are compelled to acknowledge that the cause must needs be disposed to act4 ,but they gain nothing1 they only defer the difficulty3 for they will still be asked how the free cause comes to be determined virtually4 ,they will therefore never extricate themselves without acknowledging that there is a predetermination in the preceding state of the free creature1 which inclines it to be determined4 #di4 ,in consequence of this1 the case also of ,buridan's ass between two meadows1 impelled equally towards both of them1 is a fiction that cannot occur in the universe1 in the order of ,nature1 although ,m4 ,bayle be of another opinion4 ,it is true that1 if the case were possible1 one must say that the ass would starve himself to death3 but fundamentally the question deals in the impossible1 unless it be that ,god bring the thing about expressly4 ,for the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn through the middle of the ass1 which is cut vertically through its length1 so that all is equal and alike on both sides1 in the manner wherein an ellipse1 and every plane figure of the number of those ,i term 'ambidexter'1 can be thus halved1 by any straight line passing through its centre4 ,neither the parts of the universe nor the viscera of the animal are alike nor are they evenly placed on both sides of this vertical plane4 ,there will therefore always be many things in the ass and outside the ass1 although they be not apparent to us1 which will determine him to go on one side rather than the other4 ,and although man is free1 and the ass is not1 nevertheless for the same reason it must be true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoise between two courses is impossible4 ,furthermore it is true that an angel1 or ,god certainly1 could always account for the course man has adopted1 by assigning a cause or a predisposing reason which has actually induced him to adopt it3 yet this reason would often be complex and incomprehensible to ourselves1 because the concatenation of causes linked together is very long4 #ej4 ,hence it is that the reason ,m4 ,descartes has advanced to prove the independence of our free actions1 by what he terms an intense inward sensation1 has no force4 ,we cannot properly speaking be sensible of our independence1 and we are not aware always of the causes1 often imperceptible1 whereon our resolution depends4 ,it is as though the magnetic needle took pleasure in turning towards the north3 for it would think that it was turning independently of any other cause1 not being aware of the imperceptible movements of the magnetic matter4 ,nevertheless we shall #aea see later in what sense it is quite true that the human soul is altogether its own natural principle in relation to its actions1 dependent upon itself and independent of all other creatures4 #ea4 ,as for volition itself1 to say that it is an object of free will is incorrect4 ,we will to act1 strictly speaking1 and we do not will to will2 else we could still say that we will to have the will to will1 and that would go on to infinity4 ,besides1 we do not always follow the latest judgement of practical understanding when we resolve to will2 but we always follow1 in our willing1 the result of all the inclinations that come from the direction both of reasons and passions1 and this often happens without an express judgement of the understanding4 #eb4 ,all is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man1 as everywhere else1 and the human soul is a kind of spiritual automaton1 although contingent actions in general and free action in particular are not on that account necessary with an absolute necessity1 which would be truly incompatible with contingency4 ,thus neither futurition in itself1 certain as it is1 nor the infallible prevision of ,god1 nor the predetermination either of causes or of ,god's decrees destroys this contingency and this freedom4 ,that is acknowledged in respect of futurition and prevision1 as has already been set forth4 ,since1 moreover1 ,god's decree consists solely in the resolution he forms1 after having compared all possible worlds1 to choose that one which is the best1 and bring it into existence together with all that this world contains1 by means of the all-powerful word ,fiat1 it is plain to see that this decree changes nothing in the constitution of things3 ,god leaves them just as they were in the state of mere possibility1 that is1 changing nothing either in their essence or nature1 or even in their accidents1 which are represented perfectly already in the idea of this possible world4 ,thus that which is contingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of ,god than under his prevision4 #ec4 ,but could ,god himself 7it will be said7 then change nothing in the world8 ,assuredly he could not now change it1 without derogation to his wisdom1 since he has foreseen the existence of this world and of what it contains1 and since1 likewise1 he has formed this resolution to bring it into existence3 for he cannot be mistaken nor repent1 and it did not behove him to from an imperfect resolution applying to one part and not the #aeb whole4 ,thus1 all being ordered from the beginning1 it is only because of this hypothetical necessity1 recognized by everyone1 that after ,god's prevision or after his resolution nothing can be changed3 and yet the events in themselves remain contingent4 ,for 7setting aside this supposition of the futurition of the thing and of the prevision or of the resolution of ,god1 a supposition which already lays it down as a fact that the thing will happen1 and in accordance with which one must say1 ',unumquodque1 quando est1 oportet esse1 aut unumquodque1 siquidem erit1 oportet futurum esse'71 the event has nothing in it to render it necessary and to suggest that no other thing might have happened in its stead4 ,and as for the connexion between causes and effects1 it only inclined1 without necessitating1 the free agency1 as ,i have just explained2 thus it does not produce even a hypothetical necessity1 save in conjunction with something from outside1 to wit1 this very maxim1 that the prevailing inclination always triumphs4 #ed4 ,it will be said also that1 if all is ordered1 ,god cannot then perform miracles4 ,but one must bear in mind that the miracles which happen in the world were also enfolded and represented as possible in this same world considered in the state of mere possibility2 and ,god1 who has since performed them1 when he chose this world had even then decreed to perform them4 ,again the objection will be made that vows and prayers1 merits and demerits1 good and bad actions avail nothing1 since nothing can be changed4 ,this objection causes most perplexity to people in general1 and yet it is purely a sophism4 ,these prayers1 these vows1 these good or bad actions that occur to-day were already before ,god when he formed the resolution to order things4 ,those things which happen in this existing world were represented1 with their effects and their consequences1 in the idea of this same world1 while it was still possible only2 they were represented therein1 attracting ,god's grace whether natural or supernatural1 requiring punishments or rewards1 just as it has happened actually in this world since ,god chose it4 ,the prayer or the good action were even then an ideal cause or condition1 that is1 an inclining reason able to contribute to the grace of ,god1 or to the reward1 as it now does in reality4 ,since1 moreover1 all is wisely connected together in the world1 it is clear that ,god1 foreseeing that which would happen freely1 ordered all other things on that basis beforehand1 or 7what is the same7 he chose that possible world in #aec which everything was ordered in this fashion4 #ee4 ,this consideration demolishes at the same time what the ancients called the ',lazy ,sophism' 7,greek3 logos argos7 which ended in a decision to do nothing3 for 7people would say7 if what ,i ask is to happen it will happen even though ,i should do nothing2 and if it is not to happen it will never happen1 no matter what trouble ,i take to achieve it4 ,this necessity1 supposedly existent in events1 and detached from their causes1 might be termed ,fatum ,mahometanum1 as ,i have already observed above1 because a similar line of reasoning1 so it is said1 causes the ,turks not to shun places ravaged by plague4 ,but the answer is quite ready3 the effect being certain1 the cause that shall produce it is certain also2 and if the effect comes about it will be by virtue of a proportionate cause4 ,thus your laziness perchance will bring it about that you will obtain naught of what you desire1 and that you will fall into those misfortunes which you would by acting with care have avoided4 ,we see1 therefore1 that the connexion of causes with effects1 far from causing an unendurable fatality1 provides rather a means of obviating it4 ,there is a ,german proverb which says that death will ever have a cause2 and nothing is so true4 ,you will die on that day 7let us presume it is so1 and that ,god foresees it73 yes1 without doubt2 but it will be because you will do what shall lead you thither4 ,it is likewise with the chastisements of ,god1 which also depend upon their causes4 ,and it will be apposite in this connexion to quote this famous passage from ,st4 ,ambrose 7in cap4 ,i ,lucae71 ',novit ,dominus mutare sententiam1 si tu noveris mutare delictum'1 which is not to be understood as of reprobation1 but of denunciation1 such as that which ,jonah dealt out for ,god to the ,ninevites4 ,this common saying3 ',si non es praedestinatus1 fac ut praedestineris'1 must not be taken literally1 its true sense being that he who has doubts of his predestination need only do what is required for him to obtain it by the grace of ,god4 ,the sophism which ends in a decision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful sometimes to induce certain people to face danger fearlessly4 ,it has been applied in particular to ,turkish soldiers3 but it seems that hashish is a more important factor than this sophism1 not to mention the fact that this resolute spirit in the ,turks has greatly belied itself in our days4 #ef4 ,a learned physician of ,holland named ,johan van ,beverwyck took the trouble to write ,de ,termino ,vitae and to collect sundry answers1 #aed letters and discourses of some learned men of his time on this subject4 ,this collection has been printed1 and it is astonishing to see there how often people are misled1 and how they have confused a problem which1 properly speaking1 is the easiest in the world4 ,after that it is no wonder that there are very many doubts which the human race cannot abandon4 ,the truth is that people love to lose themselves1 and this is a kind of ramble of the mind1 which is unwilling to subject itself to attention1 to order1 to rules4 ,it seems as though we are so accustomed to games and jesting that we play the fool even in the most serious occupations1 and when we least think to do so4 #eg4 ,i fear that in the recent dispute between the theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession1 ,de ,termino ,paenitentiae ,peremptorio1 which has called forth so many treatises in ,germany1 some misunderstanding1 though of a different nature1 has slipped in4 ,the terms prescribed by the laws are amongst lawyers known as fatalia4 ,it may be said1 in a sense1 that the peremptory term1 prescribed to man for his repentance and amendment1 is certain in the sight of ,god1 with whom all is certain4 ,god knows when a sinner will be so hardened that thereafter nothing can be done for him3 not indeed that it would be impossible for him to do penance or that sufficient grace needs must be refused to him after a certain term1 a grace that never fails2 but because there will be a time whereafter he will no more approach the ways of salvation4 ,but we never have certain marks for recognizing this term1 and we are never justified in considering a man utterly abandoned3 that would be to pass a rash judgement4 ,it were better always to have room for hope2 and this is an occasion1 with a thousand others1 where our ignorance is beneficial4 ,prudens futuri temporis exitum ,caliginosa nocte premit ,deus4 #eh4 ,the whole future is doubtless determined3 but since we know not what it is1 nor what is foreseen or resolved1 we must do our duty1 according to the reason that ,god has given us and according to the rules that he has prescribed for us2 and thereafter we must have a quiet mind1 and leave to ,god himself the care for the outcome4 ,for he will never fail to do that which shall be the best1 not only in general but also in particular1 for those who have true confidence in him1 that is1 a confidence composed #aee of true piety1 a lively faith and fervent charity1 by virtue of which we will1 as far as in us lies1 neglect nothing appertaining to our duty and his service4 ,it is true that we cannot 'render service' to him1 for he has need of nothing3 but it is 'serving him'1 in our parlance1 when we strive to carry out his presumptive will1 co-operating in the good as it is known to us1 wherever we can contribute thereto4 ,for we must always presume that ,god is prompted towards the good we know1 until the event shows us that he had stronger reasons1 although perhaps unknown to us1 which have made him subordinate this good that we sought to some other greater good of his own designing1 which he has not failed or will not fail to effect4 #ei4 ,i have just shown how the action of the will depends upon its causes2 that there is nothing so appropriate to human nature as this dependence of our actions2 and that otherwise one would slip into a preposterous and unendurable fatality1 namely into the ,fatum ,mahometanum1 which is the worst of all because it overthrows foresight and good counsel4 ,it is well to show1 notwithstanding1 how this dependence of voluntary actions does not fundamentally preclude the existence within us of a wonderful spontaneity1 which in a certain sense makes the soul in its resolves independent of the physical influence of all other creatures4 ,this spontaneity1 hitherto little recognized1 which exalts our command over our actions to the highest pitch1 is a consequence of the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony1 of which ,i must give some explanation here4 ,the ,scholastic philosophers believed that there was a reciprocal physical influence between body and soul3 but since it has been recognized that thought and dimensional mass have no mutual connexion1 and that they are creatures differing toto genere1 many moderns have acknowledged that there is no physical communication between soul and body1 despite the metaphysical communication always subsisting1 which causes soul and body to compose one and the same suppositum1 or what is called a person4 ,this physical communication1 if there were such1 would cause the soul to change the degree of speed and the directional line of some motions that are in the body1 and vice versa the body to change the sequence of the thoughts that are in the soul4 ,but this effect cannot be inferred from any notion conceived in the body and in the soul2 though nothing be better known to us than the soul1 since it is inmost to us1 that is to say inmost to itself4 #aef #fj4 ,m4 ,descartes wished to compromise and to make a part of the body's action dependent upon the soul4 ,he believed in the existence of a rule of ,nature to the effect1 according to him1 that the same quantity of movement is conserved in bodies4 ,he deemed it not possible that the influence of the soul should violate this law of bodies1 but he believed that the soul notwithstanding might have power to change the direction of the movements that are made in the body2 much as a rider1 though giving no force to the horse he mounts1 nevertheless controls it by guiding that force in any direction he pleases4 ,but as that is done by means of the bridle1 the bit1 the spurs and other material aids1 it is conceivable how that can be2 there are1 however1 no instruments such as the soul may employ for this result1 nothing indeed either in the soul or in the body1 that is1 either in thought or in the mass1 which may serve to explain this change of the one by the other4 ,in a word1 that the soul should change the quantity of force and that it should change the line of direction1 both these things are equally inexplicable4 #fa4 ,moreover1 two important truths on this subject have been discovered since ,m4 ,descartes' day4 ,the first is that the quantity of absolute force which is in fact conserved is different from the quantity of movement1 as ,i have demonstrated elsewhere4 ,the second discovery is that the same direction is still conserved in all bodies together that are assumed as interacting1 in whatever way they come into collision4 ,if this rule had been known to ,m4 ,descartes1 he would have taken the direction of bodies to be as independent of the soul as their force2 and ,i believe that that would have led direct to the ,hypothesis of ,pre-established ,harmony1 whither these same rules have led me4 ,for apart from the fact that the physical influence of one of these substances on the other is inexplicable1 ,i recognized that without a complete derangement of the laws of ,nature the soul could not act physically upon the body4 ,and ,i did not believe that one could here listen to philosophers1 competent in other respects1 who produce a ,god1 as it were1 ex machina1 to bring about the final solution of the piece1 maintaining that ,god exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the soul pleases1 and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires4 ,for this system1 which is called that of occasional causes 7because it teaches that ,god acts on the body at the instance of the soul1 and vice versa71 besides introducing perpetual miracles to establish communication #aeg between these two substances1 does not obviate the derangement of the natural laws obtaining in each of these same substances1 which1 in the general opinion1 their mutual influence would cause4 #fb4 ,being on other considerations already convinced of the principle of ,harmony in general1 ,i was in consequence convinced likewise of the preformation and the ,pre-established ,harmony of all things amongst themselves1 of that between nature and grace1 between the decrees of ,god and our actions foreseen1 between all parts of matter1 and even between the future and the past1 the whole in conformity with the sovereign wisdom of ,god1 whose works are the most harmonious it is possible to conceive4 ,thus ,i could not fail to arrive at the system which declares that ,god created the soul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and represent to itself successively that which takes place within the body1 and the body also in such a fashion that it must do of itself that which the soul ordains4 ,consequently the laws that connect the thoughts of the soul in the order of final causes and in accordance with the evolution of perceptions must produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions of bodies on our organs2 and likewise the laws of movements in the body1 which follow one another in the order of efficient causes1 meet and so harmonize with the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced to act at the time when the soul wills it4 #fc4 ,far from its being prejudicial1 nothing can be more favourable to freedom than that system4 ,and ,m4 ,jacquelot has demonstrated well in his book on the ,conformity of ,faith with ,reason1 that it is just as if he who knows all that ,i shall order a servant to do the whole day long on the morrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant1 to carry out to-morrow at the right moment all that ,i should order2 and yet that would not prevent me from ordering freely all that ,i should please1 although the action of the automaton that would serve me would not be in the least free4 #fd4 ,moreover1 since all that passes in the soul depends1 according to this system1 only upon the soul1 and its subsequent state is derived only from it and from its present state1 how can one give it a greater independence8 ,it is true that there still remains some imperfection in the constitution of the soul4 ,all that happens to the soul depends upon it1 but depends not always upon its will2 that were too much4 ,nor are such#aeh happenings even recognized always by its understanding or perceived with distinctness4 ,for there is in the soul not only an order of distinct perceptions1 forming its dominion1 but also a series of confused perceptions or passions1 forming its bondage3 and there is no need for astonishment at that2 the soul would be a ,divinity if it had none but distinct perceptions4 ,it has nevertheless some power over these confused perceptions also1 even if in an indirect manner4 ,for although it cannot change its passions forthwith1 it can work from afar towards that end with enough success1 and endue itself with new passions and even habits4 ,it even has a like power over the more distinct perceptions1 being able to endue itself indirectly with opinions and intentions1 and to hinder itself from having this one or that1 and stay or hasten its judgement4 ,for we can seek means beforehand to arrest ourselves1 when occasion arises1 on the sliding step of a rash judgement2 we can find some incident to justify postponement of our resolution even at the moment when the matter appears ready to be judged4 ,although our opinion and our act of willing be not directly objects of our will 7as ,i have already observed71 one sometimes1 takes measures nevertheless1 to will and even to believe in due time1 that which one does not will1 or believe1 now4 ,so great is the profundity of the spirit of man4 #fe4 ,and now1 to bring to a conclusion this question of spontaneity1 it must be said that1 on a rigorous definition1 the soul has within it the principle of all its actions1 and even of all its passions1 and that the same is true in all the simple substances scattered throughout ,nature1 although there be freedom only in those that are intelligent4 ,in the popular sense notwithstanding1 speaking in accordance with appearances1 we must say that the soul depends in some way upon the body and upon the impressions of the senses3 much as we speak with ,ptolemy and ,tycho in everyday converse1 and think with ,copernicus1 when it is a question of the rising and the setting of the sun4 #ff4 ,one may however give a true and philosophic sense to this mutual dependence which we suppose between the soul and the body4 ,it is that the one of these two substances depends upon the other ideally1 in so far as the reason of that which is done in the one can be furnished by that which is in the other4 ,this had already happened when ,god ordered beforehand the harmony that there would be between them4 ,even so would that #aei automaton1 that should fulfil the servant's function1 depend upon me ideally1 in virtue of the knowledge of him who1 foreseeing my future orders1 would have rendered it capable of serving me at the right moment all through the morrow4 ,the knowledge of my future intentions would have actuated this great craftsman1 who would accordingly have fashioned the automaton3 my influence would be objective1 and his physical4 ,for in so far as the soul has perfection and distinct thoughts1 ,god has accommodated the body to the soul1 and has arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its orders4 ,and in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its perceptions are confused1 ,god has accommodated the soul to the body1 in such sort that the soul is swayed by the passions arising out of corporeal representations4 ,this produces the same effect and the same appearance as if the one depended immediately upon the other1 and by the agency of a physical influence4 ,properly speaking1 it is by its confused thoughts that the soul represents the bodies which encompass it4 ,the same thing must apply to all that we understand by the actions of simple substances one upon another4 ,for each one is assumed to act upon the other in proportion to its perfection1 although this be only ideally1 and in the reasons of things1 as ,god in the beginning ordered one substance to accord with another in proportion to the perfection or imperfection that there is in each4 7,withal action and passion are always reciprocal in creatures1 because one part of the reasons which serve to explain clearly what is done1 and which have served to bring it into existence1 is in the one of these substances1 and another part of these reasons is in the other1 perfections and imperfections being always mingled and shared47 ,thus it is we attribute action to the one1 and passion to the other4 #fg4 ,but after all1 whatsoever dependence be conceived in voluntary actions1 and even though there were an absolute and mathematical necessity 7which there is not7 it would not follow that there would not be a sufficient degree of freedom to render rewards and punishments just and reasonable4 ,it is true that generally we speak as though the necessity of the action put an end to all merit and all demerit1 all justification for praise and blame1 for reward and punishment3 but it must be admitted that this conclusion is not entirely correct4 ,i am very far from sharing the opinions of ,bradwardine1 ,wyclif1 ,hobbes and ,spinoza1 who advocate1 so it seems1#afj this entirely mathematical necessity1 which ,i think ,i have adequately refuted1 and perhaps more clearly than is customary4 ,yet one must always bear testimony to the truth and not impute to a dogma anything that does not result from it4 ,moreover1 these arguments prove too much1 since they would prove just as much against hypothetical necessity1 and would justify the lazy sophism4 ,for the absolute necessity of the sequence of causes would in this matter add nothing to the infallible certainty of a hypothetical necessity4 #fh4 ,in the first place1 therefore1 it must be agreed that it is permitted to kill a madman when one cannot by other means defend oneself4 ,it will be granted also that it is permitted1 and often even necessary1 to destroy venomous or very noxious animals1 although they be not so by their own fault4 #fi4 ,secondly1 one inflicts punishments upon a beast1 despite its lack of reason and freedom1 when one deems that this may serve to correct it3 thus one punishes dogs and horses1 and indeed with much success4 ,rewards serve us no less in the managing of animals3 when an animal is hungry1 the food that is given to him causes him to do what otherwise would never be obtained from him4 #gj4 ,thirdly1 one would inflict even on beasts capital punishments 7where it is no longer a question of correcting the beast that is punished7 if this punishment could serve as an example1 or inspire terror in others1 to make them cease from evil doing4 ,rorarius1 in his book on reason in beasts1 says that in ,africa they crucified lions1 in order to drive away other lions from the towns and frequented places1 and that he had observed in passing through the province of ,jlich that they hanged wolves there in order to ensure greater safety for the sheepfolds4 ,there are people in the villages also who nail birds of prey to the doors of houses1 with the idea that other birds of the same kind will then not so readily appear4 ,these measures would always be justified if they were of any avail4 #ga4 ,then1 in the fourth place1 since experience proves that the fear of chastisements and the hope of rewards serves to make men abstain from evil and strive to do good1 one would have good reason to avail oneself of such1 even though men were acting under necessity1 whatever the necessity might be4 ,the objection will be raised that if good or evil is necessary it is useless to avail oneself of means to obtain it or to hinder it3 but the answer has already been given above in the passage combating the lazy #afa sophism4 ,if good or evil were a necessity without these means1 then such means would be unavailing2 but it is not so4 ,these goods and evils come only with the aid of these means1 and if these results were necessary the means would be a part of the causes rendering them necessary1 since experience teaches us that often fear or hope hinders evil or advances good4 ,this objection1 then1 differs hardly at all from the lazy sophism1 which we raise against the certainty as well as the necessity of future events4 ,thus one may say that these objections are directed equally against hypothetical necessity and absolute necessity1 and that they prove as much against the one as against the other1 that is to say1 nothing at all4 #gb4 ,there was a great dispute between ,bishop ,bramhall and ,mr4 ,hobbes1 which began when they were both in ,paris1 and which was continued after their return to ,england2 all the parts of it are to be found collected in a quarto volume published in ,london in the year #afef4 ,they are all in ,english1 and have not been translated as far as ,i know1 nor inserted in the ,collection of ,works in ,latin by ,mr4 ,hobbes4 ,i had already read these writings1 and have obtained them again since4 ,and ,i had observed at the outset that he had not at all proved the absolute necessity of all things1 but had shown sufficiently that necessity would not overthrow all the rules of divine or human justice1 and would not prevent altogether the exercise of this virtue4 #gc4 ,there is1 however1 a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards and of punishments which appear not so applicable to those who should act by an absolute necessity1 supposing such necessity existed4 ,it is that kind of justice which has for its goal neither improvement nor example1 nor even redress of the evil4 ,this justice has its foundation only in the fitness of things1 which demands a certain satisfaction for the expiation of an evil action4 ,the ,socinians1 ,hobbes and some others do not admit this punitive justice1 which properly speaking is avenging justice4 ,god reserves it for himself in many cases2 but he does not fail to grant it to those who are entitled to govern others1 and he exercises it through their agency1 provided that they act under the influence of reason and not of passion4 ,the ,socinians believe it to be without foundation1 but it always has some foundation in that fitness of things which gives satisfaction not only to the injured but also to the wise who see it2 even as a beautiful piece of music1 or again a good piece of architecture1 satisfies cultivated #afb minds4 ,and the wise lawgiver having threatened1 and having1 so to speak1 promised a chastisement1 it befits his consistency not to leave the action completely unpunished1 even though the punishment would no longer avail to correct anyone4 ,but even though he should have promised nothing1 it is enough that there is a fitness of things which could have prompted him to make this promise1 since the wise man likewise promises only that which is fitting4 ,and one may even say that there is here a certain compensation of the mind1 which would be scandalized by disorder if the chastisement did not contribute towards restoring order4 ,one can also consult what ,grotius wrote against the ,socinians1 of the satisfaction of ,jesus ,christ1 and the answer of ,crellius thereto4 #gd4 ,thus it is that the pains of the damned continue1 even when they no longer serve to turn them away from evil1 and that likewise the rewards of the blessed continue1 even when they no longer serve for strengthening them in good4 ,one may say nevertheless that the damned ever bring upon themselves new pains through new sins1 and that the blessed ever bring upon themselves new joys by new progress in goodness3 for both are founded on the principle of the fitness of things1 which has seen to it that affairs were so ordered that the evil action must bring upon itself a chastisement4 ,there is good reason to believe1 following the parallelism of the two realms1 that of final causes and that of efficient causes1 that ,god has established in the universe a connexion between punishment or reward and bad or good action1 in accordance wherewith the first should always be attracted by the second1 and virtue and vice obtain their reward and their punishment in consequence of the natural sequence of things1 which contains still another kind of pre-established harmony than that which appears in the communication between the soul and the body4 ,for1 in a word1 all that ,god does1 as ,i have said already1 is harmonious to perfection4 ,perhaps then this principle of the fitness of things would no longer apply to beings acting without true freedom or exemption from absolute necessity2 and in that case corrective justice alone would be administered1 and not punitive justice4 ,that is the opinion of the famous ,conringius1 in a dissertation he published on what is just4 ,and indeed1 the reasons ,pomponazzi employed in his book on fate1 to prove the usefulness of chastisements and rewards1 even though all should come about in our actions by a fatal necessity1#afc concern only amendment and not satisfaction1 ,greek3 kolasin ou timrian4 ,moreover1 it is only for the sake of outward appearances that one destroys animals accessary to certain crimes1 as one razes the houses of rebels1 that is1 to inspire terror4 ,thus it is an act of corrective justice1 wherein punitive justice has no part at all4 #ge4 ,but we will not amuse ourselves now by discussing a question more curious than necessary1 since we have shown sufficiently that there is no such necessity in voluntary actions4 ,nevertheless it was well to show that imperfect freedom alone1 that is1 freedom which is exempt only from constraint1 would suffice as foundation for chastisements and rewards of the kind conducive to the avoidance of evil1 and to amendment4 ,one sees also from this that some persons of intelligence1 who persuade themselves that everything is necessary1 are wrong in saying that none must be praised or blamed1 rewarded or punished4 ,apparently they say so only to exercise their wit3 the pretext is that all being necessary nothing would be in our power4 ,but this pretext is ill founded3 necessary actions would be still in our power1 at least in so far as we could perform them or omit them1 when the hope or the fear of praise or blame1 of pleasure or pain prompted our will thereto1 whether they prompted it of necessity1 or in prompting it they left spontaneity1 contingency and freedom all alike unimpaired4 ,thus praise and blame1 rewards and punishments would preserve always a large part of their use1 even though there were a true necessity in our actions4 ,we can praise and blame also natural good and bad qualities1 where the will has no part--in a horse1 in a diamond1 in a man2 and he who said of ,cato of ,utica that he acted virtuously through the goodness of his nature1 and that it was impossible for him to behave otherwise1 thought to praise him the more4 #gf4 ,the difficulties which ,i have endeavoured up to now to remove have been almost all common to natural and revealed theology4 ,now it will be necessary to come to a question of revealed theology1 concerning the election or the reprobation of men1 with the dispensation or use of divine grace in connexion with these acts of the mercy or the justice of ,god4 ,but when ,i answered the preceding objections1 ,i opened up a way to meet those that remain4 ,this confirms the observation ,i made thereon 7,preliminary ,dissertation1 #dc7 that there is rather a conflict between the true #afd reasons of natural theology and the false reasons of human appearances1 than between revealed faith and reason4 ,for on this subject scarcely any difficulty arises that is new1 and not deriving its origin from those which can be placed in the way of the truths discerned by reason4 #gg4 ,now as theologians of all parties are divided among themselves on this subject of predestination and grace1 and often give different answers to the same objections1 according to their various principles1 one cannot avoid touching on the differences which prevail among them4 ,one may say in general that some look upon ,god more metaphysically and others more morally3 and it has already been stated on other occasions that the ,counter-,remonstrants took the first course and the ,remonstrants the second4 ,but to act rightly we must affirm alike on one side the independence of ,god and the dependence of creatures1 and on the other side the justice and goodness of ,god1 which makes him dependent upon himself1 his will upon his understanding or his wisdom4 #gh4 ,some gifted and well-intentioned authors1 desiring to show the force of the reasons advocated by the two principal parties1 in order to persuade them to a mutual tolerance1 deem that the whole controversy is reduced to this essential point1 namely3 ,what was ,god's principal aim in making his decrees with regard to man8 ,did he make them solely in order to show forth his glory by manifesting his attributes1 and forming1 to that end1 the great plan of creation and providence8 ,or has he had regard rather to the voluntary movements of intelligent substances which he designed to create1 considering what they would will and do in the different circumstances and situations wherein he might place them1 so as to form a fitting resolve thereupon8 ,it appears to me that the two answers to this great question thus given as opposites to one another are easy to reconcile1 and that in consequence the two parties would be agreed in principle1 without any need of tolerance1 if all were reduced to this point4 ,in truth ,god1 in designing to create the world1 purposed solely to manifest and communicate his perfections in the way that was most efficacious1 and most worthy of his greatness1 his wisdom and his goodness4 ,but that very purpose pledged him to consider all the actions of creatures while still in the state of pure possibility1 that he might form the most fitting plan4 ,he is like a great architect whose aim in view is the satisfaction or the glory of having#afe built a beautiful palace1 and who considers all that is to enter into this construction3 the form and the materials1 the place1 the situation1 the means1 the workmen1 the expense1 before he forms a complete resolve4 ,for a wise person in laying his plans cannot separate the end from the means2 he does not contemplate any end without knowing if there are means of attaining thereto4 #gi4 ,i know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine that1 ,god being the absolute master of all things1 one can thence infer that everything outside him is indifferent to him1 that he considers himself alone1 without concern for others1 and that thus he has made some happy and others unhappy without any cause1 without choice1 without reason4 ,but to teach so about ,god were to deprive him of wisdom and of goodness4 ,we need only observe that he considers himself and neglects nothing of what he owes to himself1 to conclude that he considers his creatures also1 and that he uses them in the manner most consistent with order4 ,for the more a great and good prince is mindful of his glory1 the more he will think of making his subjects happy1 even though he were the most absolute of all monarchs1 and though his subjects were slaves from birth1 bondsmen 7in lawyers' parlance71 people entirely in subjection to arbitrary power4 ,calvin himself and some others of the greatest defenders of the absolute decree rightly maintained that ,god had great and just reasons for his election and the dispensation of his grace1 although these reasons be unknown to us in detail3 and we must judge charitably that the most rigid predestinators have too much reason and too much piety to depart from this opinion4 #hj4 ,there will therefore be no argument for debate on that point 7as ,i hope7 with people who are at all reasonable4 ,but there will always be argument among those who are called ,universalists and ,particularists1 according to what they teach of the grace and the will of ,god4 ,yet ,i am somewhat inclined to believe that the heated dispute between them on the will of ,god to save all men1 and on that which depends upon it 7when one keeps separate the doctrine de ,auxiliis1 or of the assistance of grace71 rests rather in expressions than in things4 ,for it is sufficient to consider that ,god1 as well as every wise and beneficent mind1 is inclined towards all possible good1 and that this inclination is proportionate to the excellence of the good4 ,moreover1 this results 7if we take the #aff matter precisely and in itself7 from an 'antecedent will'1 as it is termed1 which1 however1 is not always followed by its complete effect1 because this wise mind must have many other inclinations besides4 ,thus it is the result of all the inclinations together that makes his will complete and decretory1 as ,i have already explained4 ,one may therefore very well say with ancient writers that ,god wills to save all men according to his antecedent will1 but not according to his consequent will1 which never fails to be followed by its effect4 ,and if those who deny this universal will do not allow that the antecedent inclination be called a will1 they are only troubling themselves about a question of name4 #ha4 ,but there is a question more serious in regard to predestination to eternal life and to all other destination by ,god1 to wit1 whether this destination is absolute or respective4 ,there is destination to good and destination to evil2 and as evil is moral or physical1 theologians of all parties agree that there is no destination to moral evil1 that is to say1 that none is destined to sin4 ,as for the greatest physical evil1 which is damnation1 one can distinguish between destination and predestination3 for predestination appears to contain within itself an absolute destination1 which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil actions of those whom it concerns4 ,thus one may say that the reprobate are destined to be condemned1 because they are known to be impenitent4 ,but it cannot so well be said that the reprobate are predestined to damnation3 for there is no absolute reprobation1 its foundation being final foreseen impenitence4 #hb4 ,it is true that there are writers who maintain that ,god1 wishing to manifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy of him1 but unknown to us1 chose the elect1 and in consequence rejected the damned1 prior to all thought of sin1 even of ,adam1 that after this resolve he thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise these two virtues1 and that he has bestowed grace in ,jesus ,christ to some in order to save them1 while he has refused it to others in order to be able to punish them4 ,hence these writers are named ',supralapsarians'1 because the decree to punish precedes1 according to them1 the knowledge of the future existence of sin4 ,but the opinion most common to-day amongst those who are called ,reformed1 and one that is favoured by the ,synod of ,dordrecht1 is that of the ',infralapsarians'1 corresponding somewhat to the conception of ,st4 ,augustine4 ,for he asserts that ,god having resolved to permit the #afg sin of ,adam and the corruption of the human race1 for reasons just but hidden1 his mercy made him choose some of the corrupt mass to be freely saved by the merit of ,jesus ,christ1 and his justice made him resolve to punish the others by the damnation that they deserved4 ,that is why1 with the ,schoolmen1 only the saved were called ,praedestinati and the damned were called ,praesciti4 ,it must be admitted that some ,infralapsarians and others speak sometimes of predestination to damnation1 following the example of ,fulgentius and of ,st4 ,augustine himself3 but that signifies the same as destination to them1 and it avails nothing to wrangle about words4 ,that pretext1 notwithstanding1 was in time past used for maltreating that ,godescalc who caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century1 and who took the name of ,fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author4 #hc4 ,as for the destination of the elect to eternal life1 the ,protestants1 as well as those of the ,roman ,church1 dispute much among themselves as to whether election is absolute or is founded on the prevision of final living faith4 ,those who are called ,evangelicals1 that is1 those of the ,augsburg ,confession1 hold the latter opinion3 they believe that one need not go into the hidden causes of election while one may find a manifest cause of it shown in ,holy ,scripture1 which is faith in ,jesus ,christ2 and it appears to them that the prevision of the cause is also the cause of the prevision of the effect4 ,those who are called ,reformed are of a different opinion3 they admit that salvation comes from faith in ,jesus ,christ1 but they observe that often the cause anterior to the effect in execution is posterior in intention1 as when the cause is the means and the effect is the end4 ,thus the question is1 whether faith or salvation is anterior in the intention of ,god1 that is1 whether ,god's design is rather to save man than to make him a believer4 #hd4 ,hence we see that the question between the ,supralapsarians and the ,infralapsarians in part1 and again between them and the ,evangelicals1 comes back to a right conception of the order that is in ,god's decrees4 ,perhaps one might put an end to this dispute at once by saying that1 properly speaking1 all the decrees of ,god that are here concerned are simultaneous1 not only in respect of time1 as everyone agrees1 but also in signo rationis1 or in the order of nature4 ,and indeed1 the ,formula of ,concord1 building upon some passages of ,st4 ,augustine1 comprised in the same #afh ,decree of ,election salvation and the means that conduce to it4 ,to demonstrate this synchronism of destinations or of decrees with which we are concerned1 we must revert to the expedient that ,i have employed more than once1 which states that ,god1 before decreeing anything1 considered among other possible sequences of things that one which he afterwards approved4 ,in the idea of this is represented how the first parents sin and corrupt their posterity2 how ,jesus ,christ redeems the human race2 how some1 aided by such and such graces1 attain to final faith and to salvation2 and how others1 with or without such or other graces1 do not attain thereto1 continue in sin1 and are damned4 ,god grants his sanction to this sequence only after having entered into all its detail1 and thus pronounces nothing final as to those who shall be saved or damned without having pondered upon everything and compared it with other possible sequences4 ,thus ,god's pronouncement concerns the whole sequence at the same time2 he simply decrees its existence4 ,in order to save other men1 or in a different way1 he must needs choose an altogether different sequence1 seeing that all is connected in each sequence4 ,in this conception of the matter1 which is that most worthy of the ,all-wise1 all whose actions are connected together to the highest possible degree1 there would be only one total decree1 which is to create such a world4 ,this total decree comprises equally all the particular decrees1 without setting one of them before or after another4 ,yet one may say also that each particular act of antecedent will entering into the total result has its value and order1 in proportion to the good whereto this act inclines4 ,but these acts of antecedent will are not called decrees1 since they are not yet inevitable1 the outcome depending upon the total result4 ,according to this conception of things1 all the difficulties that can here be made amount to the same as those ,i have already stated and removed in my inquiry concerning the origin of evil4 #he4 ,there remains only one important matter of discussion1 which has its peculiar difficulties4 ,it is that of the dispensation of the means and circumstances contributing to salvation and to damnation4 ,this comprises amongst others the subject of the ,aids of ,grace 7de auxiliis gratiae71 on which ,rome 7since the ,congregation de ,auxiliis under ,clement ,,viii1 when a debate took place between the ,dominicans and the ,jesuits7 does not readily permit books to be published4 ,everyone must agree that ,god is #afi altogether good and just1 that his goodness makes him contribute the least possible to that which can render men guilty1 and the most possible to that which serves to save them 7possible1 ,i say1 subject to the general order of things72 that his justice prevents him from condemning innocent men1 and from leaving good actions without reward2 and that he even keeps an exact proportion in punishments and rewards4 ,nevertheless1 this idea that one should have of the goodness and the justice of ,god does not appear enough in what we know of his actions with regard to the salvation and the damnation of men3 and it is that which makes difficulties concerning sin and its remedies4 #hf4 ,the first difficulty is how the soul could be infected with original sin1 which is the root of actual sins1 without injustice on ,god's part in exposing the soul thereto4 ,this difficulty has given rise to three opinions on the origin of the soul itself4 ,the first is that of the pre-existence of human souls in another world or in another life1 where they had sinned and on that account had been condemned to this prison of the human body1 an opinion of the ,platonists which is attributed to ,origen and which even to-day finds adherents4 ,henry ,more1 an ,english scholar1 advocated something like this dogma in a book written with that express purpose4 ,some of those who affirm this pre-existence have gone as far as metempsychosis4 ,the younger van ,helmont held this opinion1 and the ingenious author of some metaphysical ,meditations1 published in #afgh under the name of ,william ,wander1 appears to have some leaning towards it4 ,the second opinion is that of ,traduction1 as if the soul of children were engendered 7per traducem7 from the soul or souls of those from whom the body is engendered4 ,st4 ,augustine inclined to this judgement the better to explain original sin4 ,this doctrine is taught also by most of the theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession4 ,nevertheless it is not completely established among them1 since the ,universities of ,jena and ,helmstedt1 and others besides1 have long been opposed to it4 ,the third opinion1 and that most widely accepted to-day1 is that of ,creation3 it is taught in the majority of the ,christian ,schools1 but it is fraught with the greatest difficulty in respect of original sin4 #hg4 ,into this controversy of theologians on the origin of the human soul has entered the philosophic dispute on the origin of forms4 ,aristotle and scholastic philosophy after him called ,form that which is a #agj principle of action and is found in that which acts4 ,this inward principle is either substantial1 being then termed ',soul'1 when it is in an organic body1 or accidental1 and customarily termed ',quality'4 ,the same philosopher gave to the soul the generic name of ',entelechy' or ,act4 ,this word ',entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the ,greek word signifying 'perfect'1 and hence the celebrated ,ermolao ,barbaro expressed it literally in ,latin by perfectihabia3 for ,act is a realization of potency4 ,and he had no need to consult the ,devil1 as men say he did1 in order to learn that4 ,now the ,philosopher of ,stagira supposes that there are two kinds of ,act1 the permanent act and the successive act4 ,the permanent or lasting act is nothing but the ,substantial or ,accidental ,form3 the substantial form 7as for example the soul7 is altogether permanent1 at least according to my judgement1 and the accidental is only so for a time4 ,but the altogether momentary act1 whose nature is transitory1 consists in action itself4 ,i have shown elsewhere that the notion of ,entelechy is not altogether to be scorned1 and that1 being permanent1 it carries with it not only a mere faculty for action1 but also that which is called 'force'1 'effort'1 'conatus'1 from which action itself must follow if nothing prevents it4 ,faculty is only an attribute1 or rather sometimes a mode2 but force1 when it is not an ingredient of substance itself 7that is1 force which is not primitive but derivative71 is a quality1 which is distinct and separable from substance4 ,i have shown also how one may suppose that the soul is a primitive force which is modified and varied by derivative forces or qualities1 and exercised in actions4 #hh4 ,now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the question of the origin of substantial forms4 ,for to say that the compound of form and matter is produced and that the form is only comproduced means nothing4 ,the common opinion was that forms were derived from the potency of matter1 this being called ,eduction4 ,that also meant in fact nothing1 but it was explained in a sense by a comparison with shapes3 for that of a statue is produced only by removal of the superfluous marble4 ,this comparison might be valid if form consisted in a mere limitation1 as in the case of shape4 ,some have thought that forms were sent from heaven1 and even created expressly1 when bodies were produced4 ,julius ,scaliger hinted that it was possible that forms were rather derived from the active potency of the efficient cause 7that is to say1 either from that of ,god in the #aga case of ,creation or from that of other forms in the case of generation71 than from the passive potency of matter4 ,and that1 in the case of generation1 meant a return to traduction4 ,daniel ,sennert1 a famous doctor and physicist at ,wittenberg1 cherished this opinion1 particularly in relation to animate bodies which are multiplied through seed4 ,a certain ,julius ,caesar della ,galla1 an ,italian living in the ,low ,countries1 and a doctor of ,groningen named ,johan ,freitag wrote with much vehemence in opposition to ,sennert4 ,johann ,sperling1 a professor at ,wittenberg1 made a defence of his master1 and finally came into conflict with ,johann ,zeisold1 a professor at ,jena1 who upheld the belief that the human soul is created4 #hi4 ,but traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a question of finding the origin of the soul4 ,it is not the same with accidental forms1 since they are only modifications of the substance1 and their origin may be explained by eduction1 that is1 by variation of limitations1 in the same way as the origin of shapes4 ,but it is quite another matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance1 whose beginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain4 ,sennert and ,sperling did not venture to admit the subsistence and the indestructibility of the souls of beasts or of other primitive forms1 although they allowed that they were indivisible and immaterial4 ,but the fact is that they confused indestructibility with immortality1 whereby is understood in the case of man that not only the soul but also the personality subsists4 ,in saying that the soul of man is immortal one implies the subsistence of what makes the identity of the person1 something which retains its moral qualities1 conserving the consciousness1 or the reflective inward feeling1 of what it is3 thus it is rendered susceptible to chastisement or reward4 ,but this conservation of personality does not occur in the souls of beasts3 that is why ,i prefer to say that they are imperishable rather than to call them immortal4 ,yet this misapprehension appears to have been the cause of a great inconsistency in the doctrine of the ,thomists and of other good philosophers3 they recognized the immateriality or indivisibility of all souls1 without being willing to admit their indestructibility1 greatly to the prejudice of the immortality of the human soul4 ,john ,scot1 that is1 the ,scotsman 7which formerly signified ,hibernian or ,erigena71 a famous writer of the time of ,louis the ,debonair and of his sons1 was for the conservation of all souls3 and ,i see not why there should be less #agb objection to making the atoms of ,epicurus or of ,gassendi endure1 than to affirming the subsistence of all truly simple and indivisible substances1 which are the sole and true atoms of ,nature4 ,and ,pythagoras was right in saying generally1 as ,ovid makes him say3 ,morte carent animae4 #ij4 ,now as ,i like maxims which hold good and admit of the fewest exceptions possible1 here is what has appeared to me most reasonable in every sense on this important question4 ,i consider that souls and simple substances altogether cannot begin except by creation1 or end except by annihilation4 ,moreover1 as the formation of organic animate bodies appears explicable in the order of nature only when one assumes a preformation already organic1 ,i have thence inferred that what we call generation of an animal is only a transformation and augmentation4 ,thus1 since the same body was already furnished with organs1 it is to be supposed that it was already animate1 and that it had the same soul3 so ,i assume vice versa1 from the conservation of the soul when once it is created1 that the animal is also conserved1 and that apparent death is only an envelopment1 there being no likelihood that in the order of nature souls exist entirely separated from all body1 or that what does not begin naturally can cease through natural forces4 #ia4 ,considering that so admirable an order and rules so general are established in regard to animals1 it does not appear reasonable that man should be completely excluded from that order1 and that everything in relation to his soul should come about in him by miracle4 ,besides ,i have pointed out repeatedly that it is of the essence of ,god's wisdom that all should be harmonious in his works1 and that nature should be parallel with grace4 ,it is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be human souls1 like those of other species1 have been in the seed1 and in the progenitors as far back as ,adam1 and have consequently existed since the beginning of things1 always in a kind of organic body4 ,on this point it seems that ,m4 ,swammerdam1 ,father ,malebranche1 ,m4 ,bayle1 ,mr4 ,pitcairne1 ,m4 ,hartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion4 ,this doctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations of ,m4 ,leeuwenhoek and other good observers4 ,but it also for divers reasons appears likely to me that they existed then as sentient or animal #agc souls only1 endowed with perception and feeling1 and devoid of reason4 ,further ,i believe that they remained in this state up to the time of the generation of the man to whom they were to belong1 but that then they received reason1 whether there be a natural means of raising a sentient soul to the degree of a reasoning soul 7a thing ,i find it difficult to imagine7 or whether ,god may have given reason to this soul through some special operation1 or 7if you will7 by a kind of transcreation4 ,this latter is easier to admit1 inasmuch as revelation teaches much about other forms of immediate operation by ,god upon our souls4 ,this explanation appears to remove the obstacles that beset this matter in philosophy or theology4 ,for the difficulty of the origin of forms thus disappears completely2 and besides it is much more appropriate to divine justice to give the soul1 already corrupted physically or on the animal side by the sin of ,adam1 a new perfection which is reason1 than to put a reasoning soul1 by creation or otherwise1 in a body wherein it is to be corrupted morally4 #ib4 ,now the soul being once under the domination of sin1 and ready to commit sin in actual fact as soon as the man is fit to exercise reason1 a new question arises1 to wit3 whether this tendency in a man who has not been regenerated by baptism suffices to damn him1 even though he should never come to commit sin1 as may happen1 and happens often1 whether he die before reaching years of discretion or he become dull of sense before he has made use of his reason4 ,st4 ,gregory of ,nazianzos is supposed to have denied this 7,orat4 de ,baptismo72 but ,st4 ,augustine is for the affirmative1 and maintains that original sin of itself is sufficient to earn the flames of hell1 although this opinion is1 to say the least1 very harsh4 ,when ,i speak here of damnation or of hell1 ,i mean pains1 and not mere deprivation of supreme felicity2 ,i mean poenam sensus1 non damni4 ,gregory of ,rimini1 ,general of the ,augustinians1 with a few others followed ,st4 ,augustine in opposition to the accepted opinion of the ,schools of his time1 and for that reason he was called the torturer of children1 tortor infantum4 ,the ,schoolmen1 instead of sending them into the flames of hell1 have assigned to them a special ,limbo1 where they do not suffer1 and are only punished by privation of the beatific vision4 ,the ,revelations of ,st4 ,birgitta 7as they are called71 much esteemed in ,rome1 also uphold this dogma4 ,salmeron and ,molina1 and before them ,ambrose ,catharin and #agd others1 grant them a certain natural bliss2 and ,cardinal ,sfondrati1 a man of learning and piety1 who approves this1 latterly went so far as to prefer in a sense their state1 which is the state of happy innocence1 to that of a sinner saved1 as we may see in his ,nodus ,praedestinationis ,solutus4 ,that1 however1 seems to go too far4 ,certainly a soul truly enlightened would not wish to sin1 even though it could by this means obtain all imaginable pleasures4 ,but the case of choosing between sin and true bliss is simply chimerical1 and it is better to obtain bliss 7even after repentance7 than to be deprived of it for ever4 #ic4 ,many prelates and theologians of ,france who are well pleased to differ from ,molina1 and to join with ,st4 ,augustine1 seem to incline towards the opinion of this great doctor1 who condemns to eternal flames children that die in the age of innocence before having received baptism4 ,this is what appears from the letter mentioned above1 written by five distinguished prelates of ,france to ,pope ,innocent ,,xii1 against that posthumous book by ,cardinal ,sfondrati4 ,but therein they did not venture to condemn the doctrine of the purely privative punishment of children dying without baptism1 seeing it approved by the venerable ,thomas ,aquinas1 and by other great men4 ,i do not speak of those who are called on one side ,jansenists and on the other disciples of ,st4 ,augustine1 for they declare themselves entirely and firmly for the opinion of this ,father4 ,but it must be confessed that this opinion has not sufficient foundation either in reason or in ,scripture1 and that it is outrageously harsh4 ,m4 ,nicole makes rather a poor apology for it in his book on the ,unity of the ,church1 written to oppose ,m4 ,jurieu1 although ,m4 ,bayle takes his side in chapter #agh of the ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii4 ,m4 ,nicole makes use of this pretext1 that there are also other dogmas in the ,christian religion which appear harsh4 ,on the one hand1 however1 that does not lead to the conclusion that these instances of harshness may be multiplied without proof2 and on the other we must take into account that the other dogmas mentioned by ,m4 ,nicole1 namely original sin and eternity of punishment1 are only harsh and unjust to outward appearance1 while the damnation of children dying without actual sin and without regeneration would in truth be harsh1 since it would be in effect the damning of innocents4 ,for that reason ,i believe that the party which advocates this opinion will never altogether have the upper hand in the ,roman ,church itself4 ,evangelical#age theologians are accustomed to speak with fair moderation on this question1 and to surrender these souls to the judgement and the clemency of their ,creator4 ,nor do we know all the wonderful ways that ,god may choose to employ for the illumination of souls4 #id4 ,one may say that those who condemn for original sin alone1 and who consequently condemn children dying unbaptized or outside the ,covenant1 fall1 in a sense1 without being aware of it1 into a certain attitude to man's inclination and ,god's foreknowledge which they disapprove in others4 ,they will not have it that ,god should refuse his grace to those whose resistance to it he foresees1 nor that this expectation and this tendency should cause the damnation of these persons3 and yet they claim that the tendency which constitutes original sin1 and in which ,god foresees that the child will sin as soon as he shall reach years of discretion1 suffices to damn this child beforehand4 ,those who maintain the one and reject the other do not preserve enough uniformity and connexion in their dogmas4 #ie4 ,there is scarcely less difficulty in the matter of those who reach years of discretion and plunge into sin1 following the inclination of corrupt nature1 if they receive not the succour of the grace necessary for them to stop on the edge of the precipice1 or to drag themselves from the abyss wherein they have fallen4 ,for it seems hard to damn them eternally for having done that which they had no power to prevent themselves from doing4 ,those that damn even children1 who are without discretion1 trouble themselves even less about adults1 and one would say that they have become callous through the very expectation of seeing people suffer4 ,but it is not the same with other theologians1 and ,i would be rather on the side of those who grant to all men a grace sufficient to draw them away from evil1 provided they have a sufficient tendency to profit by this succour1 and not to reject it voluntarily4 ,the objection is made that there has been and still is a countless multitude of men1 among civilized peoples and among barbarians1 who have never had this knowledge of ,god and of ,jesus ,christ which is necessary for those who would tread the wonted paths to salvation4 ,but without excusing them on the plea of a sin purely philosophical1 and without stopping at a mere penalty of privation1 things for which there is no opportunity of discussion here1 one may doubt the fact3 for how do we know whether they do not receive ordinary or extraordinary succour of #agf kinds unknown to us8 ,this maxim1 ,quod facienti1 quod in se est1 non denegatur gratia necessaria1 appears to me to have eternal truth4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 ,archbishop ,bradwardine and others have hinted that1 in regard to this1 something comes to pass of which we are not aware4 7,thom4 quest4 ,,xiv1 ,de ,veritate1 artic4 ,,xi1 ad ,i et alibi4 ,bradwardine1 ,de ,causa ,dei1 non procul ab initio47 ,and sundry theologians of great authority in the ,roman ,church itself have taught that a sincere act of the love of ,god above all things1 when the grace of ,jesus ,christ arouses it1 suffices for salvation4 ,father ,francis ,xavier answered the ,japanese that if their ancestors had used well their natural light ,god would have given them the grace necessary for salvation2 and the ,bishop of ,geneva1 ,francis of ,sales1 gives full approval to this answer 7,book #d1 ,on the ,love of ,god1 ch4 #e74 #if4 ,this ,i pointed out some time ago to the excellent ,m ,plisson1 to show him that the ,roman ,church1 going further than the ,protestants1 does not damn utterly those who are outside its communion1 and even outside ,christianity1 by using as its only criterion explicit faith4 ,nor did he refute it1 properly speaking1 in the very kind answer he gave me1 and which he published in the fourth part of his ,reflexions1 also doing me the honour of adding to it my letter4 ,i offered him then for consideration what a famous ,portuguese theologian1 by name ,jacques ,payva ,andradius1 envoy to the ,council of ,trent1 wrote concerning this1 in opposition to ,chemnitz1 during this same ,council4 ,and now1 without citing many other authors of eminence1 ,i will content myself with naming ,father ,friedrich ,spee1 the ,jesuit1 one of the most excellent in his ,society1 who also held this common opinion upon the efficacy of the love of ,god1 as is apparent in the preface to the admirable book which he wrote in ,germany on the ,christian virtues4 ,he speaks of this observation as of a highly important secret of piety1 and expatiates with great clearness upon the power of divine love to blot out sin1 even without the intervention of the ,sacraments of the ,catholic ,church1 provided one scorn them not1 for that would not at all be compatible with this love4 ,and a very great personage1 whose character was one of the most lofty to be found in the ,roman ,church1 was the first to make me acquainted with it4 ,father ,spee was of a noble family of ,westphalia 7it may be said in passing7 and he died in the odour of sanctity1 according to the testimony of him who published this book in ,cologne with the #agg approval of the ,superiors4 #ig4 ,the memory of this excellent man ought to be still precious to persons of knowledge and good sense1 because he is the author of the book entitled3 ,cautio ,criminalis circa ,processus contra ,sagas1 which has caused much stir1 and has been translated into several languages4 ,i learnt from the ,grand ,elector of ,mainz1 ,johann ,philipp von ,schonborn1 uncle of ,his ,highness the present ,elector1 who walks gloriously in the footsteps of that worthy predecessor1 the story that follows4 ,that ,father was in ,franconia when there was a frenzy there for burning alleged sorcerers4 ,he accompanied even to the pyre many of them1 all of whom he recognized as being innocent1 from their confessions and the researches that he had made thereon4 ,therefore in spite of the danger incurred at that time by one telling the truth in this matter1 he resolved to compile this work1 without however naming himself4 ,it bore great fruit and on this matter converted that ,elector1 at that time still a simple canon and afterwards ,bishop of ,wrzburg1 finally also ,archbishop of ,mainz1 who1 as soon as he came to power1 put an end to these burnings4 ,therein he was followed by the ,dukes of ,brunswick1 and finally by the majority of the other princes and states of ,germany4 #ih4 ,this digression appeared to me to be seasonable1 because that writer deserves to be more widely known4 ,returning now to the subject ,i make a further observation4 ,supposing that to-day a knowledge of ,jesus ,christ according to the flesh is absolutely necessary to salvation1 as indeed it is safest to teach1 it will be possible to say that ,god will give that knowledge to all those who do1 humanly speaking1 that which in them lies1 even though ,god must needs give it by a miracle4 ,moreover1 we cannot know what passes in souls at the point of death2 and if sundry learned and serious theologians claim that children receive in baptism a kind of faith1 although they do not remember it afterwards when they are questioned about it1 why should one maintain that nothing of a like nature1 or even more definite1 could come about in the dying1 whom we cannot interrogate after their death8 ,thus there are countless paths open to ,god1 giving him means of satisfying his justice and his goodness3 and the only thing one may allege against this is that we know not what way he employs2 which is far from being a valid objection4 #agh #ii4 ,let us pass on to those who lack not power to amend1 but good will4 ,they are doubtless not to be excused2 but there always remains a great difficulty concerning ,god1 since it rested with him to give them this same good will4 ,he is the master of wills1 the hearts of kings and those of all other men are in his hand4 ,holy ,scripture goes so far as to say that ,god at times hardened the wicked in order to display his power by punishing them4 ,this hardening is not to be taken as meaning that ,god inspires men with a kind of anti-grace1 that is1 a kind of repugnance to good1 or even an inclination towards evil1 just as the grace that he gives is an inclination towards good4 ,it is rather that ,god1 having considered the sequence of things that he established1 found it fitting1 for superior reasons1 to permit that ,pharaoh1 for example1 should be in such circumstances as should increase his wickedness1 and divine wisdom willed to derive a good from this evil4 #ajj4 ,thus it all often comes down to circumstances1 which form a part of the combination of things4 ,there are countless examples of small circumstances serving to convert or to pervert4 ,nothing is more widely known than the ,tolle1 lege 7,take and read7 cry which ,st4 ,augustine heard in a neighbouring house1 when he was pondering on what side he should take among the ,christians divided into sects1 and saying to himself1 ,quod vitae sectabor iter8 ,this brought him to open at random the book of the ,holy ,scriptures which he had before him1 and to read what came before his eyes3 and these were words which finally induced him to give up ,manichaeism4 ,the good ,steno1 a ,dane1 who was titular ,bishop of ,titianopolis1 ,vicar ,apostolic 7as they say7 of ,hanover and the region around1 when there was a ,duke ,regent of his religion1 told us that something of that kind had happened to him4 ,he was a great anatomist and deeply versed in natural science2 but he unfortunately gave up research therein1 and from being a great physicist he became a mediocre theologian4 ,he would almost listen to nothing more about the marvels of ,nature1 and an express order from the ,pope in virtute sanctae obedientiae was needed to extract from him the observations ,m4 ,thvenot asked of him4 ,he told us then that what had greatly helped towards inducing him to place himself on the side of the ,roman ,church had been the voice of a lady in ,florence1 who had cried out to him from a window3 ',go not on#agi the side where you are about to go1 sir1 go on the other side4' ',that voice struck me1' he told us1 'because ,i was just meditating upon religion4' ,this lady knew that he was seeking a man in the house where she was1 and1 when she saw him making his way to the other house1 wished to point out where his friend's room was4 #aja4 ,father ,john ,davidius1 the ,jesuit1 wrote a book entitled ,veridicus ,christianus1 which is like a kind of ,bibliomancy1 where one takes passages at random1 after the pattern of the ,tolle1 lege of ,st4 ,augustine1 and it is like a devotional game4 ,but the chances to which1 in spite of ourselves1 we are subject1 play only too large a part in what brings salvation to men1 or removes it from them4 ,let us imagine twin ,polish children1 the one taken by the ,tartars1 sold to the ,turks1 brought to apostasy1 plunged in impiety1 dying in despair2 the other saved by some chance1 falling then into good hands to be educated properly1 permeated by the soundest truths of religion1 exercised in the virtues that it commends to us1 dying with all the feelings of a good ,christian4 ,one will lament the misfortune of the former1 prevented perhaps by a slight circumstance from being saved like his brother1 and one will marvel that this slight chance should have decided his fate for eternity4 #ajb4 ,someone will perchance say that ,god foresaw by mediate knowledge that the former would have been wicked and damned even if he had remained in ,poland4 ,there are perhaps conjunctures wherein something of the kind takes place4 ,but will it therefore be said that this is a general rule1 and that not one of those who were damned amongst the pagans would have been saved if he had been amongst ,christians8 ,would that not be to contradict our ,lord1 who said that ,tyre and ,sidon would have profited better by his preaching1 if they had had the good fortune to hear it1 than ,capernaum8 #ajc4 ,but were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge against all appearances1 this knowledge still implies that ,god considers what a man would do in such and such circumstances2 and it always remains true that ,god could have placed him in other circumstances more favourable1 and given him inward or outward succour capable of vanquishing the most abysmal wickedness existing in any soul4 ,i shall be told that ,god is not bound to do so1 but that is not enough2 it must be added that greater reasons prevent him from making all his goodness felt by all4 ,thus there must #ahj needs be choice2 but ,i do not think one must seek the reason altogether in the good or bad nature of men4 ,for if with some people one assume that ,god1 choosing the plan which produces the most good1 but which involves sin and damnation1 has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures in order to make them objects of his grace1 this grace would not sufficiently appear to be a free gift4 ,accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kind of inborn merit1 and this assumption seems remote from the principles of ,st4 ,paul1 and even from those of ,supreme ,reason4 #ajd4 ,it is true that there are reasons for ,god's choice1 and the consideration of the object1 that is1 the nature of man1 must needs enter therein2 but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rule such as we are capable of conceiving1 and such as may flatter the pride of men4 ,some famous theologians believe that ,god offers more grace1 and in a more favourable way1 to those whose resistance he foresees will be less1 and that he abandons the rest to their self-will4 ,we may readily suppose that this is often the case1 and this expedient1 among those which make man distinguishable by anything favourable in his nature1 is the farthest removed from ,pelagianism4 ,but ,i would not venture1 notwithstanding1 to make of it a universal rule4 ,moreover1 that we may not have cause to vaunt ourselves1 it is necessary that we be ignorant of the reasons for ,god's choice4 ,those reasons are too diverse to become known to us2 and it may be that ,god at times shows the power of his grace by overcoming the most obstinate resistance1 to the end that none may have cause either to despair or to be puffed up4 ,st4 ,paul1 as it would seem1 had this in mind when he offered himself as an example4 ,god1 he said1 has had mercy upon me1 to give a great example of his patience4 #aje4 ,it may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad1 and consequently incapable of being distinguished the one from the other through their good or less bad natural qualities2 but they are not bad all in the same way3 for there is an inherent individual difference between souls1 as the ,pre-established ,harmony proves4 ,some are more or less inclined towards a particular good or a particular evil1 or towards their opposites1 all in accordance with their natural dispositions4 ,but since the general plan of the universe1 chosen by ,god for superior reasons1 causes men to be in different circumstances1 those who meet with such as are more #aha favourable to their nature will become more readily the least wicked1 the most virtuous1 the most happy2 yet it will be always by aid of the influence of that inward grace which ,god unites with the circumstances4 ,sometimes it even comes to pass1 in the progress of human life1 that a more excellent nature succeeds less1 for lack of cultivation or opportunities4 ,one may say that men are chosen and ranged not so much according to their excellence as according to their conformity with ,god's plan4 ,even so it may occur that a stone of lesser quality is made use of in a building or in a group because it proves to be the particular one for filling a certain gap4 #ajf4 ,but1 in fine1 all these attempts to find reasons1 where there is no need to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses1 serve only to make clear to us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of ,god4 ,all the disadvantages we see1 all the obstacles we meet with1 all the difficulties one may raise for oneself1 are no hindrance to a belief founded on reason1 even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof1 as has been shown and will later become more apparent1 that there is nothing so exalted as the wisdom of ,god1 nothing so just as his judgements1 nothing so pure as his holiness1 and nothing more vast than his goodness4 #ahb 99 99 99 99 99 ,,essays ,,on ,,the ,,justice ,,of ,,god ,,and ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,man ,,in ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,evil 99 99 99 99 99 ,,part ,,two #ajg4 ,hitherto ,i have devoted myself to giving a full and clear exposition of this whole subject3 and although ,i have not yet spoken of ,m4 ,bayle's objections in particular1 ,i have endeavoured to anticipate them1 and to suggest ways of answering them4 ,but as ,i have taken upon myself the task of meeting them in detail1 not only because there will perhaps still be passages calling for elucidation1 but also because his arguments are usually full of wit and erudition1 and serve to throw greater light on this controversy1 it will be well to give an account of the chief objections that are dispersed through his works1 and to add my answers4 ,at the beginning ,i observed 'that ,god co-operates in moral evil1 and in physical evil1 and in each of them both morally and physically2 and that man co-operates therein also morally and physically in a free and active way1 becoming in consequence subject to blame and punishment'4 ,i have shown also that each point has its own difficulty2 but the greatest of these lies in maintaining that ,god co-operates morally in moral evil1 that is1 in sin1 without being the originator of the sin1 and even without being accessary thereto4 #ajh4 ,he does this by permitting it justly1 and by directing it wisely towards the good1 as ,i have shown in a manner that appears tolerably intelligible4 ,but as it is here principally that ,m4 ,bayle undertakes #ahc to discomfit those who maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannot be harmonized with reason1 it is also here especially ,i must show that my dogmas are fortified 7to make use of his own allegory7 with a rampart1 even of reasons1 which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries4 ,he has ranged them against me in chapter #add of his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #hab71 where he includes the theological doctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen philosophic maxims1 like so many large cannon capable of breaching my rampart4 ,let us begin with the theological propositions4 #aji4 ,i4 ',god1' he says1 'the ,being eternal and necessary1 infinitely good1 holy1 wise and powerful1 possesses from all eternity a glory and a bliss that can never either increase or diminish4' ,this proposition of ,m4 ,bayle's is no less philosophical than theological4 ,to say that ,god possesses a 'glory' when he is alone1 that depends upon the meaning of the term4 ,one may say1 with some1 that glory is the satisfaction one finds in being aware of one's own perfections2 and in this sense ,god possesses it always4 ,but when glory signifies that others become aware of these perfections1 one may say that ,god acquires it only when he reveals himself to intelligent creatures2 even though it be true that ,god thereby gains no new good1 and it is rather the rational creatures who thence derive advantage1 when they apprehend aright the glory of ,god4 #aaj4 ,,ii4 ',he resolved freely upon the production of creatures1 and he chose from among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it pleased him to choose1 to give them existence1 and to compose the universe of them1 while he left all the rest in nothingness4' ,this proposition is also1 just like the preceding one1 in close conformity with that part of philosophy which is called natural theology4 ,one must dwell a little on what is said here1 that he chose the possible beings 'whom it pleased him to choose'4 ,for it must be borne in mind that when ,i say1 'that pleases me'1 it is as though ,i were saying1 ',i find it good'4 ,thus it is the ideal goodness of the object which pleases1 and which makes me choose it among many others which do not please or which please less1 that is to say1 which contain less of that goodness which moves me4 ,now it is only the genuinely good that is capable of pleasing ,god3 and consequently that which pleases ,god most1 and which meets his choice1 is the best4 #ahd #aaa4 ,,iii4 ',human nature having been among the ,beings that he willed to produce1 he created a man and a woman1 and granted them amongst other favours free will1 so that they had the power to obey him2 but he threatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gave them to abstain from a certain fruit4' ,this proposition is in part revealed1 and should be admitted without difficulty1 provided that free will be understood properly1 according to the explanation ,i have given4 #aab4 ,,iv4 ',they ate thereof nevertheless1 and thenceforth they were condemned1 they and all their posterity1 to the miseries of this life1 to temporal death and eternal damnation1 and made subject to such a tendency to sin that they abandoned themselves thereto endlessly and without ceasing4' ,there is reason to suppose that the forbidden action by itself entailed these evil results in accordance with a natural effect1 and that it was for that very reason1 and not by a purely arbitrary decree1 that ,god had forbidden it3 much as one forbids knives to children4 ,the famous ,fludde or de ,fluctibus1 an ,englishman1 once wrote a book ,de ,vita1 ,morte et ,resurrectione under the name of ,r4 ,otreb1 wherein he maintained that the fruit of the forbidden tree was a poison3 but we cannot enter into this detail4 ,it suffices that ,god forbade a harmful thing2 one must not therefore suppose that ,god acted here simply in the character of a legislator who enacts a purely positive law1 or of a judge who imposes and inflicts a punishment by an order of his will1 without any connexion between the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment4 ,and it is not necessary to suppose that ,god in justifiable annoyance deliberately put a corruption in the soul and the body of man1 by an extraordinary action1 in order to punish him3 much as the ,athenians gave hemlock-juice to their criminals4 ,m4 ,bayle takes the matter thus3 he speaks as if the original corruption had been put in the soul of the first man by an order and operation of ,god4 ,it is that which calls forth his objection 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #agh1 p4 #abah7 'that reason would not commend the monarch who1 in order to chastise a rebel1 condemned him and his descendants to have a tendency towards rebellion'4 ,but this chastisement happens naturally to the wicked1 without any ordinance of a legislator1 and they become addicted to evil4 ,if drunkards begot children inclined to the same vice1 by a natural consequence of what takes place in bodies1 that would be a punishment of their progenitors1 but it would #ahe not be a penalty of law4 ,there is something comparable to this in the consequences of the first man's sin4 ,for the contemplation of divine wisdom leads us to believe that the realm of nature serves that of grace2 and that ,god as an ,architect has done all in a manner befitting ,god considered as a ,monarch4 ,we do not sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit1 or that of the action1 or its effects1 to judge of the details of this matter3 nevertheless we must do ,god justice so far as to believe that it comprised something other than what painters depict for us4 #aac4 ,v4 ',it has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very few men from this condemnation2 and1 leaving them exposed during this life to the corruption of sin and misery1 he has given them aids which enable them to obtain the never-ending bliss of paradise4' ,many in the past have doubted1 as ,i have already observed1 whether the number of the damned is so great as is generally supposed2 and it appears that they believed in the existence of some intermediate state between eternal damnation and perfect bliss4 ,but we have no need of these opinions1 and it is enough to keep to the ideas accepted in the ,church4 ,in this connexion it is well to observe that this proposition of ,m4 ,bayle's is conceived in accordance with the principles of sufficient grace1 given to all men1 and sufficing them provided that they have good will4 ,although ,m4 ,bayle holds the opposite opinion1 he wished 7as he states in the margin7 to avoid the terms that would not agree with a system of decrees subsequent to the prevision of contingent events4 #aad4 ,,vi4 ',he foresaw from eternity all that which should happen1 he ordered all things and placed them each one in its own place1 and he guides and controls them continually1 according to his pleasure4 ,thus nothing is done without his permission or against his will1 and he can prevent1 as seems good to him1 as much and as often as seems good to him1 all that does not please him1 and in consequence sin1 which is the thing in the world that most offends him and that he most detests2 and he can produce in each human soul all the thoughts that he approves4' ,this thesis is also purely philosophic1 that is1 recognizable by the light of natural reason4 ,it is opportune also1 as one has dwelt in thesis ,,ii on that which pleases1 to dwell here upon that which seems good1 that is1 upon that which ,god finds good to do4 ,he can avoid or put away as 'seems good to him' all 'that does not please him'4 ,nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects of his aversion1 such as certain evils1 and especially sin1 which his #ahf antecedent will repelled1 could only have been rejected by his consequent or decretory will1 in so far as it was prompted by the rule of the best1 which the ,all-wise must choose after having taken all into account4 ,when one says 'that sin offends ,god most1 and that he detests it most'1 these are human ways of speaking4 ,god cannot1 properly speaking1 be offended1 that is1 injured1 disturbed1 disquieted or angered2 and he detests nothing of that which exists1 in the sense that to detest something is to look upon it with abomination and in a way that causes us disgust1 that greatly pains and distresses us2 for ,god cannot suffer either vexation1 or grief or discomfort2 he is always altogether content and at ease4 ,yet these expressions in their true sense are justified4 ,the supreme goodness of ,god causes his antecedent will to repel all evil1 but moral evil more than any other3 it only admits evil at all for irresistible superior reasons1 and with great correctives which repair its ill effects to good advantage4 ,it is true also that ,god could produce in each human soul all the thoughts that he approves3 but this would be to act by miracles1 more than his most perfectly conceived plan admits4 #aae4 ,,vii4 ',he offers grace to people that he knows are destined not to accept it1 and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more criminal than they would be if he had not offered them that grace2 he assures them that it is his ardent wish that they accept it1 and he does not give them the grace which he knows they would accept4' ,it is true that these people become more criminal through their refusal than if one had offered them nothing1 and that ,god knows this4 ,yet it is better to permit their crime than to act in a way which would render ,god himself blameworthy1 and provide the criminals with some justification for the complaint that it was not possible for them to do better1 even though they had or might have wished it4 ,god desires that they receive such grace from him as they are fit to receive1 and that they accept it2 and he desires to give them in particular that grace whose acceptance by them he foresees3 but it is always by a will antecedent1 detached or particular1 which cannot always be carried out in the general plan of things4 ,this thesis also is among the number of those which philosophy establishes no less than revelation1 like three others of the seven that we have just stated here1 the third1 fourth and fifth being the only ones where revelation is necessary4 #ahg #aaf4 ,here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which ,m4 ,bayle opposes to the seven theological propositions4 ,i4 ',as the infinitely perfect ,being finds in himself a glory and a bliss that can never either diminish or increase1 his goodness alone has determined him to create this universe3 neither the ambition to be praised1 nor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss and his glory1 has had any part therein4' ,this maxim is very good3 praises of ,god do him no service1 but they are of service to the men who praise him1 and he desired their good4 ,nevertheless1 when one says that goodness alone determined ,god to create this universe1 it is well to add that his ,,goodness prompted him antecedently to create and to produce all possible good2 but that his ,,wisdom made the choice and caused him to select the best consequently2 and finally that his ,,power gave him the means to carry out actually the great design which he had formed4 #aag4 ,,ii4 ',the goodness of the infinitely perfect ,being is infinite1 and would not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater than this4 ,this characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his other perfections1 to love of virtue1 hatred of vice1 etc41 they must be the greatest one can imagine4 7,see ,m4 ,jurieu in the first three sections of the ,judgement on ,methods1 where he argues constantly upon this principle1 as upon a primary notion4 ,see also in ,wittich1 ,de ,providentia ,dei1 n4 #ab1 these words of ,st4 ,augustine1 lib4 ,i1 ,de ,doctrina ,christiana1 c4 #g3 ,cum cogitatur ,deus1 ita cogitatur1 ut aliquid1 quo nihil melius sit atque sublimius4 ,et paulo post3 ,nec quisquam inveniri potest1 qui hoc ,deum credat esse1 quo melius aliquid est47' ,this maxim is altogether to my liking1 and ,i draw from it this conclusion1 that ,god does the very best possible3 otherwise the exercise of his goodness would be restricted1 and that would be restricting his goodness itself1 if it did not prompt him to the best1 if he were lacking in good will4 ,or again it would be restricting his wisdom and his power1 if he lacked the knowledge necessary for discerning the best and for finding the means to obtain it1 or if he lacked the strength necessary for employing these means4 ,there is1 however1 ambiguity in the assertion that love of virtue and hatred of vice are infinite in ,god3 if that were absolutely and unreservedly true1 in practice there would be no vice in the world4 ,but although each one of ,god's perfections is infinite in itself1 it is exercised only in proportion to the object and as the nature of things prompts it4 ,thus love of the best in the whole carries the day over #ahh all other individual inclinations or hatreds2 it is the only impulse whose very exercise is absolutely infinite1 nothing having power to prevent ,god from declaring himself for the best2 and some vice being combined with the best possible plan1 ,god permits it4 #aah4 ,,iii4 ',an infinite goodness having guided the ,creator in the production of the world1 all the characteristics of knowledge1 skill1 power and greatness that are displayed in his work are destined for the happiness of intelligent creatures4 ,he wished to show forth his perfections only to the end that creatures of this kind should find their felicity in the knowledge1 the admiration and the love of the ,supreme ,being4' ,this maxim appears to me not sufficiently exact4 ,i grant that the happiness of intelligent creatures is the principal part of ,god's design1 for they are most like him2 but nevertheless ,i do not see how one can prove that to be his sole aim4 ,it is true that the realm of nature must serve the realm of grace3 but1 since all is connected in ,god's great design1 we must believe that the realm of grace is also in some way adapted to that of nature1 so that nature preserves the utmost order and beauty1 to render the combination of the two the most perfect that can be4 ,and there is no reason to suppose that ,god1 for the sake of some lessening of moral evil1 would reverse the whole order of nature4 ,each perfection or imperfection in the creature has its value1 but there is none that has an infinite value4 ,thus the moral or physical good and evil of rational creatures does not infinitely exceed the good and evil which is simply metaphysical1 namely that which lies in the perfection of the other creatures2 and yet one would be bound to say this if the present maxim were strictly true4 ,when ,god justified to the ,prophet ,jonah the pardon that he had granted to the inhabitants of ,nineveh1 he even touched upon the interest of the beasts who would have been involved in the ruin of this great city4 ,no substance is absolutely contemptible or absolutely precious before ,god4 ,and the abuse or the exaggerated extension of the present maxim appears to be in part the source of the difficulties that ,m4 ,bayle puts forward4 ,it is certain that ,god sets greater store by a man than a lion2 nevertheless it can hardly be said with certainty that ,god prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lion-kind4 ,even should that be so1 it would by no means follow that the interest of a certain number of men would prevail over the #ahi consideration of a general disorder diffused through an infinite number of creatures4 ,this opinion would be a remnant of the old and somewhat discredited maxim1 that all is made solely for man4 #aai4 ,,iv4 ',the benefits he imparts to the creatures that are capable of felicity tend only to their happiness4 ,he therefore does not permit that these should serve to make them unhappy1 and1 if the wrong use that they made of them were capable of destroying them1 he would give them sure means of always using them well4 ,otherwise they would not be true benefits1 and his goodness would be smaller than that we can conceive of in another benefactor4 7,i mean1 in a ,cause that united with its gifts the sure skill to make good use of them47' ,there already is the abuse or the ill effect of the preceding maxim4 ,it is not strictly true 7though it appear plausible7 that the benefits ,god imparts to the creatures who are capable of felicity tend solely to their happiness4 ,all is connected in ,nature2 and if a skilled artisan1 an engineer1 an architect1 a wise politician often makes one and the same thing serve several ends1 if he makes a double hit with a single throw1 when that can be done conveniently1 one may say that ,god1 whose wisdom and power are perfect1 does so always4 ,that is husbanding the ground1 the time1 the place1 the material1 which make up as it were his outlay4 ,thus ,god has more than one purpose in his projects4 ,the felicity of all rational creatures is one of the aims he has in view2 but it is not his whole aim1 nor even his final aim4 ,therefore it happens that the unhappiness of some of these creatures may come about by concomitance1 and as a result of other greater goods3 this ,i have already explained1 and ,m4 ,bayle has to some extent acknowledged it4 ,the goods as such1 considered in themselves1 are the object of the antecedent will of ,god4 ,god will produce as much reason and knowledge in the universe as his plan can admit4 ,one can conceive of a mean between an antecedent will altogether pure and primitive1 and a consequent and final will4 ,the primitive antecedent will has as its object each good and each evil in itself1 detached from all combination1 and tends to advance the good and prevent the evil4 ,the mediate will relates to combinations1 as when one attaches a good to an evil3 then the will will have some tendency towards this combination when the good exceeds the evil therein4 ,but the final and decisive will results from consideration of all the goods and all the evils that enter into our deliberation1 it results from a total combination4 ,this shows#aij that a mediate will1 although it may in a sense pass as consequent in relation to a pure and primitive antecedent will1 must be considered antecedent in relation to the final and decretory will4 ,god gives reason to the human race2 misfortunes arise thence by concomitance4 ,his pure antecedent will tends towards giving reason1 as a great good1 and preventing the evils in question4 ,but when it is a question of the evils that accompany this gift which ,god has made to us of reason1 the compound1 made up of the combination of reason and of these evils1 will be the object of a mediate will of ,god1 which will tend towards producing or preventing this compound1 according as the good or the evil prevails therein4 ,but even though it should prove that reason did more harm than good to men 7which1 however1 ,i do not admit71 whereupon the mediate will of ,god would discard it with all its concomitants1 it might still be the case that it was more in accordance with the perfection of the universe to give reason to men1 notwithstanding all the evil consequences which it might have with reference to them4 ,consequently1 the final will or the decree of ,god1 resulting from all the considerations he can have1 would be to give it to them4 ,and1 far from being subject to blame for this1 he would be blameworthy if he did not so4 ,thus the evil1 or the mixture of goods and evils wherein the evil prevails1 happens only by concomitance1 because it is connected with greater goods that are outside this mixture4 ,this mixture1 therefore1 or this compound1 is not to be conceived as a grace or as a gift from ,god to us2 but the good that is found mingled therein will nevertheless be good4 ,such is ,god's gift of reason to those who make ill use thereof4 ,it is always a good in itself2 but the combination of this good with the evils that proceed from its abuse is not a good with regard to those who in consequence thereof become unhappy4 ,yet it comes to be by concomitance1 because it serves a greater good in relation to the universe4 ,and it is doubtless that which prompted ,god to give reason to those who have made it an instrument of their unhappiness4 ,or1 to put it more precisely1 in accordance with my system ,god1 having found among the possible beings some rational creatures who misuse their reason1 gave existence to those who are included in the best possible plan of the universe4 ,thus nothing prevents us from admitting that ,god grants goods which turn into evil by the fault of men1 this often happening to men in just punishment of the misuse they had made of ,god's grace4 ,aloysius #aia ,novarinus wrote a book ,de ,occultis ,dei ,beneficiis3 one could write one ,de ,occultis ,dei ,poenis4 ,this saying of ,claudian would be in place here with regard to some persons3 ,tolluntur in altum1 ,ut lapsu graviore ruant4 ,but to say that ,god should not give a good which he knows an evil will will abuse1 when the general plan of things demands that he give it2 or again to say that he should give certain means for preventing it1 contrary to this same general order3 that is to wish 7as ,i have observed already7 that ,god himself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from being so4 ,to object1 as people do here1 that the goodness of ,god would be smaller than that of another benefactor who would give a more useful gift1 is to overlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not measured by a single benefit4 ,it may well be that a gift from a private person is greater than one from a prince1 but the gifts of this private person all taken together will be much inferior to the prince's gifts all together4 ,thus one can esteem fittingly the good things done by ,god only when one considers their whole extent by relating them to the entire universe4 ,moreover1 one may say that the gifts given in the expectation that they will harm are the gifts of an enemy1 ,greek3 hechthrn dra adra1 ,hostibus eveniant talia dona meis4 ,but that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives them1 as there was in that ,eutrapelus of whom ,horace speaks1 who did good to people in order to give them the means of destroying themselves4 ,his design was evil1 but ,god's design cannot be better than it is4 ,must ,god spoil his system1 must there be less beauty1 perfection and reason in the universe1 because there are people who misuse reason8 ,the common sayings are in place here3 ,abusus non tollit usum2 there is scandalum datum et scandalum acceptum4 #abj4 ,v4 ',a maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent gifts upon his enemies1 when he knows that they will make thereof a use that will destroy them4 ,it therefore does not beseem the infinitely good ,being to give to creatures a free will1 whereof1 as he knows for certain1 they would make a use that would render them unhappy4 ,therefore if he gives them free will he combines with it the art of using it always opportunely1 and permits not that they neglect the practice of this art in any #aib conjuncture2 and if there were no sure means of determining the good use of this free will1 he would rather take from them this faculty1 than allow it to be the cause of their unhappiness4 ,that is the more manifest1 as free will is a grace which he has given them of his own choice and without their asking for it2 so that he would be more answerable for the unhappiness it would bring upon them than if he had only granted it in response to their importunate prayers4' ,what was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to be repeated here1 and is sufficient to counter the present maxim4 ,moreover1 the author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as the third1 stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole aim of ,god4 ,if that were so1 perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would ever occur1 even by concomitance4 ,god would have chosen a sequence of possibles where all these evils would be excluded4 ,but ,god would fail in what is due to the universe1 that is1 in what he owes to himself4 ,if there were only spirits they would be without the required connexion1 without the order of time and place4 ,this order demands matter1 movement and its laws2 to adjust these to spirits in the best possible way means to return to our world4 ,when one looks at things only in the mass1 one imagines to be practicable a thousand things that cannot properly take place4 ,to wish that ,god should not give free will to rational creatures is to wish that there be none of these creatures2 and to wish that ,god should prevent them from misusing it is to wish that there be none but these creatures alone1 together with what was made for them only4 ,if ,god had none but these creatures in view1 he would doubtless prevent them from destroying themselves4 ,one may say in a sense1 however1 that ,god has given to these creatures the art of always making good use of their free will1 for the natural light of reason is this art4 ,but it would be necessary always to have the will to do good1 and often creatures lack the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have2 often they even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give a good will4 ,of this ,i have already spoken more than once4 ,this fault must be admitted1 and one must even acknowledge that ,god would perhaps have been able to exempt creatures from that fault1 since there is nothing to prevent1 so it seems1 the existence of some whose nature it would be always to have good will4 ,but ,i reply that it is not necessary1 and that it was not feasible for all rational creatures to have so great a perfection1#aic and such as would bring them so close to the ,divinity4 ,it may even be that that can only be made possible by a special divine grace4 ,but in this case1 would it be proper for ,god to grant it to all1 that is1 always to act miraculously in respect of all rational creatures8 ,nothing would be less rational than these perpetual miracles4 ,there are degrees among creatures3 the general order requires it4 ,and it appears quite consistent with the order of divine government that the great privilege of strengthening in the good should be granted more easily to those who had a good will when they were in a more imperfect state1 in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage1 in ,ecclesia militante1 in statu viatorum4 ,the good angels themselves were not created incapable of sin4 ,nevertheless ,i would not dare to assert that there are no blessed creatures born1 or such as are sinless and holy by their nature4 ,there are perhaps people who give this privilege to the ,blessed ,virgin1 since1 moreover1 the ,roman ,church to-day places her above the angels4 ,but it suffices us that the universe is very great and very varied3 to wish to limit it is to have little knowledge thereof4 ',but'1 ,m4 ,bayle goes on1 ',god has given free will to creatures capable of sinning1 without their having asked him for this grace4 ,and he who gave such a gift would be more answerable for the unhappiness that it brought upon those who made use of it1 than if he had granted it only in response to their importunate prayers4' ,but importunity in prayers makes no difference to ,god2 he knows better than we what we need1 and he only grants what serves the interest of the whole4 ,it seems that ,m4 ,bayle here makes free will consist in the faculty for sinning2 yet he acknowledges elsewhere that ,god and the ,saints are free1 without having this faculty4 ,however that may be1 ,i have already shown fully that ,god1 doing what his wisdom and his goodness combined ordain1 is not answerable for the evil that he permits4 ,even men1 when they do their duty1 are not answerable for consequences1 whether they foresee them or not4 #aba4 ,,vi4 ',it is as sure a means of taking a man's life to give him a silk cord that one knows certainly he will make use of freely to strangle himself1 as to plant a few dagger thrusts in his body4 ,one desires his death not less when one makes use of the first way1 than when one employs the second3 it even seems as though one desires it with a more malicious intention1 since one tends to leave to him the whole trouble and the whole blame of his destruction4' #aid ,those who write treatises on ,duties 7,de ,officiis7 as1 for instance1 ,cicero1 ,st4 ,ambrose1 ,grotius1 ,opalenius1 ,sharrok1 ,rachelius1 ,pufendorf1 as well as the ,casuists1 teach that there are cases where one is not obliged to return to its owner a thing deposited3 for example1 one will not give back a dagger when one knows that he who has deposited it is about to stab someone4 ,let us pretend that ,i have in my hands the fatal draught that ,meleager's mother will make use of to kill him2 the magic javelin that ,cephalus will unwittingly employ to kill his ,procris2 the horses of ,theseus that will tear to pieces ,hippolytus1 his son3 these things are demanded back from me1 and ,i am right in refusing them1 knowing the use that will be made of them4 ,but how will it be if a competent judge orders me to restore them1 when ,i cannot prove to him what ,i know of the evil consequences that restitution will have1 ,apollo perchance having given to me1 as to ,cassandra1 the gift of prophecy under the condition that ,i shall not be believed8 ,i should then be compelled to make restitution1 having no alternative other than my own destruction3 thus ,i cannot escape from contributing towards the evil4 ,another comparison3 ,jupiter promises ,semele1 the ,sun ,phaeton1 ,cupid ,psyche to grant whatever favour the other shall ask4 ,they swear by the ,styx1 ,di cujus jurare timent et fallere ,numen4 ,one would gladly stop1 but too late1 the request half heard1 ,voluit ,deus ora loquentis ,opprimere2 exierat jam vox properata sub auras4 ,one would gladly draw back after the request was made1 making vain remonstrances2 but they press you1 they say to you3 ',do you make oaths that you will not keep8' ,the law of the ,styx is inviolable1 one must needs submit to it2 if one has erred in making the oath1 one would err more in not keeping it2 the promise must be fulfilled1 however harmful it may be to him who exacts it4 ,it would be ruinous to you if you did not fulfil it4 ,it seems as though the moral of these fables implies that a supreme necessity may constrain one to comply with evil4 ,god1 in truth1 knows no other judge that can compel him to give what may turn to evil1 he is not like ,jupiter who fears the ,styx4 ,but his own wisdom is the greatest judge that he can find1 there is no appeal from its judgements3 they are the decrees of destiny4 ,the eternal verities1 objects of his wisdom1 are more #aie inviolable than the ,styx4 ,these laws and this judge do not constrain3 they are stronger1 for they persuade4 ,wisdom only shows ,god the best possible exercise of his goodness3 after that1 the evil that occurs is an inevitable result of the best4 ,i will add something stronger3 ,to permit the evil1 as ,god permits it1 is the greatest goodness4 ,si mala sustulerat1 non erat ille bonus4 ,one would need to have a bent towards perversity to say after this that it is more malicious to leave to someone the whole trouble and the whole blame of his destruction4 ,when ,god does leave it to a man1 it has belonged to him since before his existence2 it was already in the idea of him as still merely possible1 before the decree of ,god which makes him to exist4 ,can one1 then1 leave it or give it to another8 ,there is the whole matter4 #abb4 ,,vii4 ',a true benefactor gives promptly1 and does not wait to give until those he loves have suffered long miseries from the privation of what he could have imparted to them at first very easily1 and without causing any inconvenience to himself4 ,if the limitation of his forces does not permit him to do good without inflicting pain or some other inconvenience1 he acquiesces in this1 but only regretfully1 and he never employs this way of rendering service when he can render it without mingling any kind of evil in his favours4 ,if the profit one could derive from the evils he inflicted could spring as easily from an unalloyed good as from those evils1 he would take the straight road of unalloyed good1 and not the indirect road that would lead from the evil to the good4 ,if he showers riches and honours1 it is not to the end that those who have enjoyed them1 when they come to lose them1 should be all the more deeply afflicted in proportion to their previous experience of pleasure1 and that thus they should become more unhappy than the persons who have always been deprived of these advantages4 ,a malicious being would shower good things at such a price upon the people for whom he had the most hatred4' 7,compare this passage of ,aristotle1 ,rhetor41 #a4 #b1 c4 #bc1 p4 m4 #ddf3 ,greek3 hoion ei doi an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipsi2 hothen kai tout' eirtai1 ,greek3 pollois ho daimn ou kat' eunoian phern ,greek3 ,megala didsin eutychmat'1 all' hina ,greek3 tas symphoras labsin epiphanesteras4 #aif ,id est3 ,veluti si quis alicui aliquid det1 ut 7postea7 hoc 7ipsi7 erepto 7ipsum7 afficiat dolore4 ,unde etiam illud est dictum3 ,bona magna multis non amicus dat ,deus1 ,insigniore ut rursus his privet malo47 ,all these objections depend almost on the same sophism2 they change and mutilate the fact1 they only half record things3 ,god has care for men1 he loves the human race1 he wishes it well1 nothing so true4 ,yet he allows men to fall1 he often allows them to perish1 he gives them goods that tend towards their destruction2 and when he makes someone happy1 it is after many sufferings3 where is his affection1 where is his goodness or again where is his power8 ,vain objections1 which suppress the main point1 which ignore the fact that it is of ,god one speaks4 ,it is as though one were speaking of a mother1 a guardian1 a tutor1 whose well-nigh only care is concerned with the upbringing1 the preservation1 the happiness of the person in question1 and who neglect their duty4 ,god takes care of the universe1 he neglects nothing1 he chooses what is best on the whole4 ,if in spite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy1 it behoved him to be so4 ,god 7so they say7 could have given happiness to all1 he could have given it promptly and easily1 and without causing himself any inconvenience1 for he can do all4 ,but should he8 ,since he does not so1 it is a sign that he had to act altogether differently4 ,if we infer from this either that ,god only regretfully1 and owing to lack of power1 fails to make men happy and to give the good first of all and without admixture of evil1 or else that he lacks the good will to give it unreservedly and for good and all1 then we are comparing our true ,god with the ,god of ,herodotus1 full of envy1 or with the demon of the poet whose iambics ,aristotle quotes1 and ,i have just translated into ,latin1 who gives good things in order that he may cause more affliction by taking them away4 ,that would be trifling with ,god in perpetual anthropomorphisms1 representing him as a man who must give himself up completely to one particular business1 whose goodness must be chiefly exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us1 and who lacks either aptitude or good will4 ,god is not lacking therein1 he could do the good that we would desire2 he even wishes it1 taking it separately1 but he must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed to it4 ,moreover1 one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually #aig one attains salvation only through many sufferings1 and by bearing the cross of ,jesus ,christ4 ,these evils serve to make the elect imitators of their master1 and to increase their happiness4 #abc4 ,,viii4 ',the greatest and the most substantial glory that he who is the master of others can gain is to maintain amongst them virtue1 order1 peace1 contentment of mind4 ,the glory that he would derive from their unhappiness can be nothing but a false glory4' ,if we knew the city of ,god just as it is1 we should see that it is the most perfect state which can be devised2 that virtue and happiness reign there1 as far as is possible1 in accordance with the laws of the best2 that sin and unhappiness 7whose entire exclusion from the nature of things reasons of the supreme order did not permit71 are well-nigh nothing there in comparison with the good1 and even are of service for greater good4 ,now since these evils were to exist1 there must needs be some appointed to be subject to them1 and we are those people4 ,if it were others1 would there not be the same appearance of evil8 ,or rather1 would not these others be those known as ,we8 ,when ,god derives some glory from the evil through having made it serve a greater good1 it was proper that he should derive that glory4 ,it is not therefore a false glory1 as would be that of a prince who overthrew his state in order to have the honour of setting it up again4 #abd4 ,,ix4 ',the way whereby that master can give proof of greatest love for virtue is to cause it1 if he can1 to be always practised without any mixture of vice4 ,if it is easy for him to procure for his subjects this advantage1 and nevertheless he permits vice to raise its head1 save that he punishes it finally after having long tolerated it1 his affection for virtue is not the greatest one can conceive2 it is therefore not infinite4' ,i am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims1 and already ,i am weary of refuting1 and making the same answer always4 ,m4 ,bayle multiplies unnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas4 ,if things connected together may be separated1 the parts from their whole1 the human kind from the universe1 ,god's attributes the one from the other1 power from wisdom1 it may be said that ,god can cause virtue to be in the world without any mixture of vice1 and even that he can do so easily4 ,but1 since he has permitted vice1 it must be that that order of the universe which was found preferable to every other plan required it4 ,one must believe that it is not permitted to do otherwise1 since it is not #aih possible to do better4 ,it is a hypothetical necessity1 a moral necessity1 which1 far from being contrary to freedom1 is the effect of its choice4 ,quae rationi contraria sunt1 ea nec fieri a ,sapiente posse credendum est4 ,the objection is made here1 that ,god's affection for virtue is therefore not the greatest which can be conceived1 that it is not infinite4 ,to that an answer has already been given on the second maxim1 in the assertion that ,god's affection for any created thing whatsoever is proportionate to the value of the thing4 ,virtue is the noblest quality of created things1 but it is not the only good quality of creatures4 ,there are innumerable others which attract the inclination of ,god3 from all these inclinations there results the most possible good1 and it turns out that if there were only virtue1 if there were only rational creatures1 there would be less good4 ,midas proved to be less rich when he had only gold4 ,and besides1 wisdom must vary4 ,to multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity1 and poverty too4 ,to have a thousand well-bound ,vergils in one's library1 always to sing the airs from the opera of ,cadmus and ,hermione1 to break all the china in order only to have cups of gold1 to have only diamond buttons1 to eat nothing but partridges1 to drink only ,hungarian or ,shiraz wine--would one call that reason8 ,nature had need of animals1 plants1 inanimate bodies2 there are in these creatures1 devoid of reason1 marvels which serve for exercise of the reason4 ,what would an intelligent creature do if there were no unintelligent things8 ,what would it think of1 if there were neither movement1 nor matter1 nor sense8 ,if it had only distinct thoughts it would be a ,god1 its wisdom would be without bounds3 that is one of the results of my meditations4 ,as soon as there is a mixture of confused thoughts1 there is sense1 there is matter4 ,for these confused thoughts come from the relation of all things one to the other by way of duration and extent4 ,thus it is that in my philosophy there is no rational creature without some organic body1 and there is no created spirit entirely detached from matter4 ,but these organic bodies vary no less in perfection than the spirits to which they belong4 ,therefore1 since ,god's wisdom must have a world of bodies1 a world of substances capable of perception and incapable of reason2 since1 in short1 it was necessary to choose from all the things possible what produced the best effect together1 and since vice entered in by this door1 ,god would not have been altogether good1 altogether wise if he had excluded it4 #aii #abe4 ,x4 ',the way to evince the greatest hatred for vice is not indeed to allow it to prevail for a long time and then chastise it1 but to crush it before its birth1 that is1 prevent it from showing itself anywhere4 ,a king1 for example1 who put his finances in such good order that no malversation was ever committed1 would thus display more hatred for the wrong done by factionaries than if1 after having suffered them to batten on the blood of the people1 he had them hanged4' ,it is always the same song1 it is anthropomorphism pure and simple4 ,a king should generally have nothing so much at heart as to keep his subjects free from oppression4 ,one of his greatest interests is to bring good order into his finances4 ,nevertheless there are times when he is obliged to tolerate vice and disorders4 ,he has a great war on his hands1 he is in a state of exhaustion1 he has no choice of generals1 it is necessary to humour those he has1 those possessed of great authority with the soldiers3 a ,braccio1 a ,sforza1 a ,wallenstein4 ,he lacks money for the most pressing needs1 it is necessary to turn to great financiers1 who have an established credit1 and he must at the same time connive at their malversations4 ,it is true that this unfortunate necessity arises most often from previous errors4 ,it is not the same with ,god3 he has need of no man1 he commits no error1 he always does the best4 ,one cannot even wish that things may go better1 when one understands them3 and it would be a vice in the ,author of things if he wished to change anything whatsoever in them1 if he wished to exclude the vice that was found there4 ,is this ,state with perfect government1 where good is willed and performed as far as it is possible1 where evil even serves the greatest good1 comparable with the ,state of a prince whose affairs are in ruin and who escapes as best he can8 ,or with that of a prince who encourages oppression in order to punish it1 and who delights to see the little men with begging bowls and the great on scaffolds8 #abf4 ,,xi4 ',a ruler devoted to the interests of virtue1 and to the good of his subjects1 takes the utmost care to ensure that they never disobey his laws2 and if he must needs chastise them for their disobedience1 he sees to it that the penalty cures them of the inclination to evil1 and restores in their soul a strong and constant tendency towards good3 so far is he from any desire that the penalty for the error should incline them more and more towards evil4' #bjj ,to make men better1 ,god does all that is due1 and even all that can be done on his side without detriment to what is due4 ,the most usual aim of punishment is amendment2 but it is not the sole aim1 nor that which ,god always intends4 ,i have said a word on that above4 ,original sin1 which disposes men towards evil1 is not merely a penalty for the first sin2 it is a natural consequence thereof4 ,on that too a word has been said1 in the course of an observation on the fourth theological proposition4 ,it is like drunkenness1 which is a penalty for excess in drinking and is at the same time a natural consequence that easily leads to new sins4 #abg4 ,,xii4 ',to permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care whether it be committed or not1 or is even to wish that it be committed4' ,by no means4 ,how many times do men permit evils which they could prevent if they turned all their efforts in that direction8 ,but other more important cares prevent them from doing so4 ,one will rarely resolve upon adjusting irregularities in the coinage while one is involved in a great war4 ,and the action of an ,english ,parliament in this direction a little before the ,peace of ,ryswyck will be rather praised than imitated4 ,can one conclude from this that the ,state has no anxiety about this irregularity1 or even that it desires it8 ,god has a far stronger reason1 and one far more worthy of him1 for tolerating evils4 ,not only does he derive from them greater goods1 but he finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that are possible3 so that it would be a fault not to permit them4 #abh4 ,,xiii4 ',it is a very great fault in those who govern1 if they do not care whether there be disorder in their ,states or not4 ,the fault is still greater if they wish and even desire disorder there4 ,if by hidden and indirect1 but infallible1 ways they stirred up a sedition in their ,states to bring them to the brink of ruin1 in order to gain for themselves the glory of showing that they have the courage and the prudence necessary for saving a great kingdom on the point of perishing1 they would be most deserving of condemnation4 ,but if they stirred up this sedition because there were no other means than that1 of averting the total ruin of their subjects and of strengthening on new foundations1 and for several centuries1 the happiness of nations1 one must needs lament the unfortunate necessity 7see above1 pp4 #adf1 #adg1 what has been said of the force of#bja necessity7 to which they were reduced1 and praise them for the use that they made thereof4' ,this maxim1 with divers others set forth here1 is not applicable to the government of ,god4 ,not to mention the fact that it is only the disorders of a very small part of his kingdom which are brought up in objection1 it is untrue that he has no anxiety about evils1 that he desires them1 that he brings them into being1 to have the glory of allaying them4 ,god wills order and good2 but it happens sometimes that what is disorder in the part is order in the whole4 ,i have already stated this legal axiom3 ,incivile est nisi tota lege inspecta judicare4 ,the permission of evils comes from a kind of moral necessity3 ,god is constrained to this by his wisdom and by his goodness2 this necessity is happy1 whereas that of the prince spoken of in the maxim is unhappy4 ,his ,state is one of the most corrupt2 and the government of ,god is the best ,state possible4 #abi4 ,,xiv4 ',the permission of a certain evil is only excusable when one cannot remedy it without introducing a greater evil2 but it cannot be excusable in those who have in hand a remedy more efficacious against this evil1 and against all the other evils that could spring from the suppression of this one4' ,the maxim is true1 but it cannot be brought forward against the government of ,god4 ,supreme reason constrains him to permit the evil4 ,if ,god chose what would not be the best absolutely and in all1 that would be a greater evil than all the individual evils which he could prevent by this means4 ,this wrong choice would destroy his wisdom and his goodness4 #acj4 ,,xv4 ',the ,being infinitely powerful1 ,creator of matter and of spirits1 makes whatever he wills of this matter and these spirits4 ,there is no situation or shape that he cannot communicate to spirits4 ,if he then permitted a physical or a moral evil1 this would not be for the reason that otherwise some other still greater physical or moral evil would be altogether inevitable4 ,none of those reasons for the mixture of good and evil which are founded on the limitation of the forces of benefactors can apply to him4' ,it is true that ,god makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills2 but he is like a good sculptor1 who will make from his block of marble only that which he judges to be the best1 and who judges well4 ,god makes of matter the most excellent of all possible machines2 he makes of spirits the most excellent of all governments conceivable2 and over and above all that1 he establishes for their union the most perfect of all harmonies1 #bjb according to the system ,i have proposed4 ,now since physical evil and moral evil occur in this perfect work1 one must conclude 7contrary to ,m4 ,bayle's assurance here7 that otherwise a still greater evil would have been altogether inevitable4 ,this great evil would be that ,god would have chosen ill if he had chosen otherwise than he has chosen4 ,it is true that ,god is infinitely powerful2 but his power is indeterminate1 goodness and wisdom combined determine him to produce the best4 ,m4 ,bayle makes elsewhere an objection which is peculiar to him1 which he derives from the opinions of the modern ,cartesians4 ,they say that ,god could have given to souls what thoughts he would1 without making them depend upon any relation to the body3 by this means souls would be spared a great number of evils which only spring from derangement of the body4 ,more will be said of this later2 now it is sufficient to bear in mind that ,god cannot establish a system ill-connected and full of dissonances4 ,it is to some extent the nature of souls to represent bodies4 #aca4 ,,xvi4 ',one is just as much the cause of an event when one brings it about in moral ways1 as when one brings it about in physical ways4 ,a ,minister of ,state1 who1 without going out of his study1 and simply by utilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction1 overthrew all their plots1 would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction1 no less than if he destroyed it by a surprise attack4' ,i have nothing to say against this maxim4 ,evil is always attributed to moral causes1 and not always to physical causes4 ,here ,i observe simply that if ,i could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin myself1 ,i should be justified in permitting it1 and ,i should not be accessary thereto1 or its moral cause4 ,in ,god1 every fault would represent a sin2 it would be even more than sin1 for it would destroy ,divinity4 ,and it would be a great fault in him not to choose the best4 ,i have said so many times4 ,he would then prevent sin by something worse than all sins4 #acb4 ,,xvii4 ',it is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause1 or employ a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to be determined4 ,if ,i imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not to ignite when fire touches it1 and if ,i know for certain that it will be disposed to ignite at eight o'clock in the morning1 ,i shall be just as much the cause of its effects if ,i apply the fire to it at that hour1 as ,i should be in assuming1 as is the case1 that it is a necessary cause4 #bjc ,for where ,i am concerned it would no longer be a free cause4 ,i should be catching it at the moment when ,i knew it to be necessitated by its own choice4 ,it is impossible for a being to be free or indifferent with regard to that to which it is already determined1 and at the time when it is determined thereto4 ,all that which exists exists of necessity while it exists4 ,greek3 ,to einai to on hotan i1 kai to m einai hotan m i1 anank4 ,necesse est id quod est1 quando est1 esse2 et id quod non est1 quando non est1 non esse3 ,arist41 ,de ,interpret41 cap4 #i4 ,the ,nominalists have adopted this maxim of ,aristotle4 ,scotus and sundry other ,schoolmen appear to reject it1 but fundamentally their distinctions come to the same thing4 ,see the ,jesuits of ,coimbra on this passage from ,aristotle1 p4 #chj et seq47' ,this maxim may pass also2 ,i would wish only to change something in the phraseology4 ,i would not take 'free' and 'indifferent' for one and the same thing1 and would not place 'free' and 'determined' in antithesis4 ,one is never altogether indifferent with an indifference of equipoise2 one is always more inclined and consequently more determined on one side than on another3 but one is never necessitated to the choice that one makes4 ,i mean here a necessity absolute and metaphysical2 for it must be admitted that ,god1 that wisdom1 is prompted to the best by a moral necessity4 ,it must be admitted also that one is necessitated to the choice by a hypothetical necessity1 when one actually makes the choice2 and even before one is necessitated thereto by the very truth of the futurition1 since one will do it4 ,these hypothetical necessities do no harm4 ,i have spoken sufficiently on this point already4 #acc4 ,,xviii4 ',when a whole great people has become guilty of rebellion1 it is not showing clemency to pardon the hundred thousandth part1 and to kill all the rest1 not excepting even babes and sucklings4' ,it seems to be assumed here that there are a hundred thousand times more damned than saved1 and that children dying unbaptized are included among the former4 ,both these points are disputed1 and especially the damnation of these children4 ,i have spoken of this above4 ,m4 ,bayle urges the same objection elsewhere 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #agh1 p4 #abbc73 ',we see clearly'1 he says1 'that the ,sovereign who wishes to exercise both justice and clemency when a city has revolted must be content with the punishment of a small number of mutineers1 and #bjd pardon all the rest4 ,for if the number of those who are chastised is as a thousand to one1 in comparison with those whom he freely pardons1 he cannot be accounted mild1 but1 on the contrary1 cruel4 ,he would assuredly be accounted an abominable tyrant if he chose punishments of long duration1 and if he eschewed bloodshed only because he was convinced that men would prefer death to a miserable life2 and if1 finally1 the desire to take revenge were more responsible for his severities than the desire to turn to the service of the common weal the penalty that he would inflict on almost all the rebels4 ,criminals who are executed are considered to expiate their crimes so completely by the loss of their life1 that the public requires nothing more1 and is indignant when executioners are clumsy4 ,these would be stoned if they were known deliberately to give repeated strokes of the axe2 and the judges who are present at the execution would not be immune from danger if they were thought to take pleasure in this evil sport of the executioners1 and to have surreptitiously urged them to practise it4' 7,note that this is not to be understood as strictly universal4 ,there are cases where the people approve of the slow killing of certain criminals1 as when ,francis ,i thus put to death some persons accused of heresy after the notorious ,placards of #aecd4 ,no pity was shown to ,ravaillac1 who was tortured in divers horrible ways4 ,see the ,french ,mercury1 vol4 ,i1 fol4 m41 #dee et seq4 ,see also ,pierre ,matthieu in his ,history of the ,death of ,henry ,,iv2 and do not forget what he says on page m4 #ii concerning the discussion by the judges with regard to the torture of this parricide47 ',finally it is an exceptionally notorious fact that ,rulers who should be guided by ,st4 ,paul1 ,i mean who should condemn to the extreme penalty all those whom he condemns to eternal death1 would be accounted enemies of the human kind and destroyers of their communities4 ,it is incontestable that their laws1 far from being fitted1 in accordance with the aim of legislators1 to uphold society1 would be its complete ruin4 7,apply here these words of ,pliny the ,younger1 ,epist41 #bb1 lib4 #h3 ,mandemus memoriae quod vir mitissimus1 et ob hoc quoque maximus1 ,thrasea crebro dicere solebat1 ,qui vitia odit1 homines odit47' ,he adds that it was said of the laws of ,draco1 an ,athenian lawgiver1 that they had not been written with ink1 but with blood1 because they punished all sins with the extreme penalty1 and because damnation is a penalty even worse than death4 ,but it must be borne in mind that damnation is a consequence of sin4 ,thus ,i #bje once answered a friend1 who raised as an objection the disproportion existing between an eternal punishment and a limited crime1 that there is no injustice when the continuation of the punishment is only a result of the continuation of the sin4 ,i will speak further on this point later4 ,as for the number of the damned1 even though it should be incomparably greater among men than the number of the saved1 that would not preclude the possibility that in the universe the happy creatures infinitely outnumber those who are unhappy4 ,such examples as that of a prince who punishes only the leaders of rebels or of a general who has a regiment decimated1 are of no importance here4 ,self-interest compels the prince and the general to pardon the guilty1 even though they should remain wicked4 ,god only pardons those who become better3 he can distinguish them2 and this severity is more consistent with perfect justice4 ,but if anyone asks why ,god gives not to all the grace of conversion1 the question is of a different nature1 having no relation to the present maxim4 ,i have already answered it in a sense1 not in order to find ,god's reasons1 but to show that he cannot lack such1 and that there are no opposing reasons of any validity4 ,moreover1 we know that sometimes whole cities are destroyed and the inhabitants put to the sword1 to inspire terror in the rest4 ,that may serve to shorten a great war or a rebellion1 and would mean a saving of blood through the shedding of it3 there is no decimation there4 ,we cannot assert1 indeed1 that the wicked of our globe are punished so severely in order to intimidate the inhabitants of the other globes and to make them better4 ,yet an abundance of reasons in the universal harmony which are unknown to us1 because we know not sufficiently the extent of the city of ,god1 nor the form of the general republic of spirits1 nor even the whole architecture of bodies1 may produce the same effect4 #acd4 ,,xix4 ',those physicians who chose1 among many remedies capable of curing a sick man1 whereof divers were such as they well knew he would take with enjoyment1 precisely that one which they knew he would refuse to take1 would vainly urge and pray him not to refuse it2 we should still have just cause for thinking that they had no desire to cure him3 for if they wished to do so1 they would choose for him among those good medicines one which they knew he would willingly swallow4 ,if1 moreover1 they knew that rejection of the remedy they offered him would augment his sickness to#bjf the point of making it fatal1 one could not help saying that1 despite all their exhortations1 they must certainly be desirous of the sick man's death4' ,god wishes to save all men3 that means that he would save them if men themselves did not prevent it1 and did not refuse to receive his grace2 and he is not bound or prompted by reason always to overcome their evil will4 ,he does so sometimes nevertheless1 when superior reasons allow of it1 and when his consequent and decretory will1 which results from all his reasons1 makes him resolve upon the election of a certain number of men4 ,he gives aids to all for their conversion and for perseverance1 and these aids suffice in those who have good will1 but they do not always suffice to give good will4 ,men obtain this good will either through particular aids or through circumstances which cause the success of the general aids4 ,god cannot refrain from offering other remedies which he knows men will reject1 bringing upon themselves all the greater guilt3 but shall one wish that ,god be unjust in order that man may be less criminal8 ,moreover1 the grace that does not serve the one may serve the other1 and indeed always serves the totality of ,god's plan1 which is the best possible in conception4 ,shall ,god not give the rain1 because there are low-lying places which will be thereby incommoded8 ,shall the sun not shine as much as it should for the world in general1 because there are places which will be too much dried up in consequence8 ,in short1 all these comparisons1 spoken of in these maxims that ,m4 ,bayle has just given1 of a physician1 a benefactor1 a minister of ,state1 a prince1 are exceedingly lame1 because it is well known what their duties are and what can and ought to be the object of their cares3 they have scarce more than the one affair1 and they often fail therein through negligence or malice4 ,god's object has in it something infinite1 his cares embrace the universe3 what we know thereof is almost nothing1 and we desire to gauge his wisdom and his goodness by our knowledge4 ,what temerity1 or rather what absurdity6 ,the objections are on false assumptions2 it is senseless to pass judgement on the point of law when one does not know the matter of fact4 ,to say with ,st4 ,paul1 ,o altitudo divitiarum et sapientiae1 is not renouncing reason1 it is rather employing the reasons that we know1 for they teach us that immensity of ,god whereof the ,apostle speaks4 ,but therein we confess our ignorance of the facts1 and we acknowledge1 moreover1 before we see it1 that ,god does all the best #bjg possible1 in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his actions4 ,it is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests of this1 when we see something entire1 some whole complete in itself1 and isolated1 so to speak1 among the works of ,god4 ,such a whole1 shaped as it were by the hand of ,god1 is a plant1 an animal1 a man4 ,we cannot wonder enough at the beauty and the contrivance of its structure4 ,but when we see some broken bone1 some piece of animal's flesh1 some sprig of a plant1 there appears to be nothing but confusion1 unless an excellent anatomist observe it3 and even he would recognize nothing therein if he had not before seen like pieces attached to their whole4 ,it is the same with the government of ,god3 that which we have been able to see hitherto is not a large enough piece for recognition of the beauty and the order of the whole4 ,thus the very nature of things implies that this order in the ,divine ,city1 which we see not yet here on earth1 should be an object of our faith1 of our hope1 of our confidence in ,god4 ,if there are any who think otherwise1 so much the worse for them1 they are malcontents in the ,state of the greatest and the best of all monarchs2 and they are wrong not to take advantage of the examples he has given them of his wisdom and his infinite goodness1 whereby he reveals himself as being not only wonderful1 but also worthy of love beyond all things4 #ace4 ,i hope it will be found that nothing of what is comprised in the nineteen maxims of ,m4 ,bayle1 which we have just considered1 has been left without a necessary answer4 ,it is likely that1 having often before meditated on this subject1 he will have put there all his strongest convictions touching the moral cause of moral evil4 ,there are1 however1 still sundry passages here and there in his works which it will be well not to pass over in silence4 ,very often he exaggerates the difficulty which he assumes with regard to freeing ,god from the imputation of sin4 ,he observes 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #afa1 p4 #ajbd7 that ,molina1 if he reconciled free will with foreknowledge1 did not reconcile the goodness and the holiness of ,god with sin4 ,he praises the sincerity of those who bluntly declare 7as he claims ,piscator did7 that everything is to be traced back to the will of ,god1 and who maintain that ,god could not but be just1 even though he were the author of sin1 even though he condemned innocence4 ,and on the other side1 or in other passages1 he seems to show more approval of the opinions of those who preserve ,god's goodness at #bjh the expense of his greatness1 as ,plutarch does in his book against the ,stoics4 ',it was more reasonable'1 he says1 'to say' 7with the ,epicureans7 'that innumerable parts' 7or atoms flying about at haphazard through an infinite space7 'by their force prevailed over the weakness of ,jupiter and1 in spite of him and against his nature and will1 did many bad and irrational things1 than to agree that there is neither confusion nor wickedness but he is the author thereof4' ,what may be said for both these parties1 ,stoics and ,epicureans1 appears to have led ,m4 ,bayle to the ,greek3 epechein of the ,pyrrhonians1 the suspension of his judgement in respect of reason1 so long as faith is set apart2 and to that he professes sincere submission4 #acf4 ,pursuing his arguments1 however1 he has gone as far as attempting almost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of ,manes1 a ,persian heretic of the third century after ,christ1 or of a certain ,paul1 chief of the ,manichaeans in ,armenia in the seventh century1 from whom they were named ,paulicians4 ,all these heretics renewed what an ancient philosopher of ,upper ,asia1 known under the name of ,zoroaster1 had taught1 so it is said1 of two intelligent principles of all things1 the one good1 the other bad1 a dogma that had perhaps come from the ,indians4 ,among them numbers of people still cling to their error1 one that is exceedingly prone to overtake human ignorance and superstition1 since very many barbarous peoples1 even in ,america1 have been deluded by it1 without having had need of philosophy4 ,the ,slavs 7according to ,helmold7 had their ,zernebog or black ,god4 ,the ,greeks and ,romans1 wise as they seem to be1 had a ,vejovis or ,anti-,jupiter1 otherwise called ,pluto1 and numerous other maleficent divinities4 ,the ,goddess ,nemesis took pleasure in abasing those who were too fortunate2 and ,herodotus in some passages hints at his belief that all ,divinity is envious2 which1 however1 is not in harmony with the doctrine of the two principles4 #acg4 ,plutarch1 in his treatise ,on ,isis and ,osiris1 knows of no writer more ancient than ,zoroaster the magician1 as he calls him1 that is likely to have taught the two principles4 ,trogus or ,justin makes him a ,king of the ,bactrians1 who was conquered by ,ninus or ,semiramis2 he attributes to him the knowledge of astronomy and the invention of magic4 ,but this magic was apparently the religion of the fire-worshippers3 and it appears that he looked upon light and heat as the good principle1 while he added the #bji evil1 that is to say1 opacity1 darkness1 cold4 ,pliny cites the testimony of a certain ,hermippus1 an interpreter of ,zoroaster's books1 according to whom ,zoroaster was a disciple in the art of magic to one named ,azonacus2 unless indeed this be a corruption of ,oromases1 of whom ,i shall speak presently1 and whom ,plato in the ,alcibiades names as the father of ,zoroaster4 ,modern ,orientals give the name ,zerdust to him whom the ,greeks named ,zoroaster2 he is regarded as corresponding to ,mercury1 because with some nations ,wednesday 7mercredi7 takes its name from him4 ,it is difficult to disentangle the story of ,zoroaster and know exactly when he lived4 ,suidas puts him five hundred years before the taking of ,troy4 ,some ,ancients cited by ,pliny and ,plutarch took it to be ten times as far back4 ,but ,xanthus the ,lydian 7in the preface to ,diogenes ,laertius7 put him only six hundred years before the expedition of ,xerxes4 ,plato declares in the same passage1 as ,m4 ,bayle observes1 that the magic of ,zoroaster was nothing but the study of religion4 ,mr4 ,hyde in his book on the religion of the ancient ,persians tries to justify this magic1 and to clear it not only of the crime of impiety but also of idolatry4 ,fire-worship prevailed among the ,persians and the ,chaldaeans also2 it is thought that ,abraham left it when he departed from ,ur of the ,chaldees4 ,mithras was the sun and he was also the ,god of the ,persians2 and according to ,ovid's account horses were offered in sacrifice to him1 ,placat equo ,persis radiis ,hyperiona cinctum1 ,ne detur celeri victima tarda ,deo4 ,but ,mr4 ,hyde believes that they only made use of the sun and fire in their worship as symbols of the ,divinity4 ,it may be necessary to distinguish1 as elsewhere1 between the ,wise and the ,multitude4 ,there are in the splendid ruins of ,persepolis or of ,tschelminaar 7which means forty columns7 sculptured representations of their ceremonies4 ,an ambassador of ,holland had had them sketched at very great cost by a painter1 who had devoted a considerable time to the task3 but by some chance or other these sketches fell into the hands of a well-known traveller1 ,m4 ,chardin1 according to what he tells us himself4 ,it would be a pity if they were lost4 ,these ruins are one of the most ancient and most beautiful monuments of the earth2 and in this respect ,i wonder at such lack of curiosity in a century so curious as ours4 #baj #ach4 ,the ancient ,greeks and the modern ,orientals agree in saying that ,zoroaster called the good ,god ,oromazes1 or rather ,oromasdes1 and the evil ,god ,arimanius4 ,when ,i pondered on the fact that great princes of ,upper ,asia had the name of ,hormisdas and that ,irminius or ,herminius was the name of a god or ancient hero of the ,scythian ,celts1 that is1 of the ,germani1 it occurred to me that this ,arimanius or ,irminius might have been a great conqueror of very ancient time coming from the west1 just as ,genghis ,khan and ,tamburlaine were later1 coming from the east4 ,arimanius would therefore have come from the north-west1 that is1 from ,germania and ,sarmatia1 through the territory of the ,alani and ,massagetae1 to raid the dominions of one ,ormisdas1 a great king in ,upper ,asia1 just as other ,scythians did in the days of ,cyaxares1 ,king of the ,medes1 according to the account given by ,herodotus4 ,the monarch governing civilized peoples1 and working to defend them against the barbarians1 would have gone down to posterity1 amongst the same peoples1 as the good god2 but the chief of these devastators will have become the symbol of the evil principle3 that is altogether reasonable4 ,it appears from this same mythology that these two princes contended for long1 but that neither of them was victorious4 ,thus they both held their own1 just as the two principles shared the empire of the world according to the hypothesis attributed to ,zoroaster4 #aci4 ,it remains to be proved that an ancient god or hero of the ,germani was called ,herman1 ,arimanius or ,irminius4 ,tacitus relates that the three tribes which composed ,germania1 the ,ingaevones1 the ,istaevones and the ,herminones or ,hermiones1 were thus named from the three sons of ,mannus4 ,whether that be true or not1 he wished in any case to indicate that there was a hero named ,herminius1 from whom he was told the ,herminones were named4 ,herminones1 ,hermenner1 ,hermunduri all mean the same1 that is1 ,soldiers4 ,even in the ,dark ,ages ,arimanni were viri militares1 and there is feudum ,arimandiae in ,lombard law4 #adj4 ,i have shown elsewhere that apparently the name of one part of ,germania was given to the whole1 and that from these ,herminones or ,hermunduri all the ,teutonic peoples were named ,hermanni or ,germani4 ,the difference between these two words is only in the force of the aspiration3 there is the same difference of initial letter between the ,germani of the ,latins and ,hermanos of the ,spaniards1 or in the ,gammarus of the ,latins and the ,hummer 7that is1 marine crayfish7 of the ,low ,germans4 #baa ,besides it is very usual for one part of a nation to give the name to the whole3 so all the ,germani were called ,alemanni by the ,french1 and yet this1 according to the old nomenclature1 only applied to the ,suabians and the ,swiss4 ,although ,tacitus did not actually know the origin of the name of the ,germani1 he said something which supports my opinion1 when he observed that it was a name which inspired terror1 taken or given ob metum4 ,in fact it signifies a warrior3 ,heer1 ,hari is army1 whence comes ,hariban1 or 'call to ,haro'1 that is1 a general order to be with the army1 since corrupted into ,arrireban4 ,thus ,hariman or ,ariman1 ,german ,guerre-man1 is a soldier4 ,for as ,hari1 ,heer means army1 so ,wehr signifies arms1 ,wehren to fight1 to make war1 the word ,guerre1 ,guerra coming doubtless from the same source4 ,i have already spoken of the feudum ,arimandiae3 not only did ,herminones or ,germani signify the same1 but also that ancient ,herman1 so-called son of ,mannus1 appears to have been given this name as being pre-eminently a warrior4 #ada4 ,now it is not the passage in ,tacitus only which indicates for us this god or hero3 we cannot doubt the existence of one of this name among these peoples1 since ,charlemagne found and destroyed near the ,weser the column called ,irminsule1 erected in honour of this god4 ,and that combined with the passage in ,tacitus leaves us with the conclusion that it was not that famous ,arminius who was an enemy of the ,romans1 but a much greater and more ancient hero1 that this cult concerned4 ,arminius bore the same name as those who are called ,hermann to-day4 ,arminius was not great enough1 nor fortunate enough1 nor well enough known throughout ,germania to attain to the honour of a public cult1 even at the hands of remote tribes1 like the ,saxons1 who came long after him into the country of the ,cherusci4 ,and our ,arminius1 taken by the ,asiatics for the evil ,god1 provides ample confirmation of my opinion4 ,for in these matters conjectures confirm one another without any logical circle1 when their foundations tend towards one and the same end4 #adb4 ,it is not beyond belief that the ,hermes 7that is1 ,mercury7 of the ,greeks is the same ,herminius or ,arimanius4 ,he may have been an inventor or promoter of the arts and of a slightly more civilized life among his own people and in the countries where he held supremacy1 while amongst his enemies he was looked upon as the author of confusion4 ,who knows but that he may have penetrated even into ,egypt1 like the ,scythians who in #bab pursuit of ,sesostris came nearly so far4 ,theut1 ,menes and ,hermes were known and revered in ,egypt4 ,they might have been ,tuiscon1 his son ,mannus and ,herman1 son of ,mannus1 according to the genealogy of ,tacitus4 ,menes is held to be the most ancient king of the ,egyptians2 ',theut' was with them a name for ,mercury4 ,at least ,theut or ,tuiscon1 from whom ,tacitus derives the descent of the ,germani1 and from whom the ,teutons1 ,tuitsche 7that is1 ,germani7 even to-day have their name1 is the same as that ,teutates who according to ,lucan was worshipped by the ,gauls1 and whom ,caesar took pro ,dite ,patre1 for ,pluto1 because of the resemblance between his ,latin name and that of ,teut or ,thiet1 ,titan1 ,theodon2 this in ancient times signified men1 people1 and also an excellent man 7like the word 'baron'71 in short1 a prince4 ,there are authorities for all these significations3 but one must not delay over this point4 ,herr ,otto ,sperling1 who is well known for various learned writings1 but has many more in readiness to appear1 in a special dissertation has treated the question of this ,teutates1 ,god of the ,celts4 ,some observations which ,i imparted to him on that subject have been published1 with his reply1 in the ,literary ,news of the ,baltic ,sea4 ,he interprets this passage from ,lucan somewhat otherwise than ,i do3 ,teutates1 pollensque feris altaribus ,hesus1 ,et ,tamaris ,scythicae non mitior ara ,dianae4 ,hesus was1 it appears1 the ,god of ,war1 who was called ,ares by the ,greeks and ,erich by the ancient ,germani1 whence still remains ,erichtag1 ,tuesday4 ,the letters ,r and ,s1 which are produced by the same organ1 are easily interchanged1 for instance3 ,moor and ,moos1 ,geren and ,gesen1 ,er war and ,er was1 ,fer1 ,hierro1 ,eiron1 ,eisen4 ,likewise ,papisius1 ,valesius1 ,fusius1 instead of ,papirius1 ,valerius1 ,furius1 with the ancient ,romans4 ,as for ,taramis or perhaps ,taranis1 one knows that ,taran was the thunder1 or the ,god of ,thunder1 with the ancient ,celts1 called ,thor by the ,germani of the north2 whence the ,english have preserved the name ',thursday'1 jeudi1 diem ,jovis4 ,and the passage from ,lucan means that the altar of ,taran1 ,god of the ,celts1 was not less cruel than that of ,diana in ,tauris3 ,taranis aram non mitiorem ara ,dianae ,scythicae fuisse4 #adc4 ,it is also not impossible that there was a time when the western #bac or ,celtic princes made themselves masters of ,greece1 of ,egypt and a good part of ,asia1 and that their cult remained in those countries4 ,when one considers with what rapidity the ,huns1 the ,saracens and the ,tartars gained possession of a great part of our continent one will be the less surprised at this2 and it is confirmed by the great number of words in the ,greek and ,german tongues which correspond so closely4 ,callimachus1 in a hymn in honour of ,apollo1 seems to imply that the ,celts who attacked the ,temple at ,delphi1 under their ,brennus1 or chief1 were descendants of the ancient ,titans and ,giants who made war on ,jupiter and the other gods1 that is to say1 on the ,princes of ,asia and of ,greece4 ,it may be that ,jupiter is himself descended from the ,titans or ,theodons1 that is1 from the earlier ,celto-,scythian princes2 and the material collected by the late ,abb de la ,charmoye in his ,celtic ,origins conforms to that possibility4 ,yet there are opinions on other matters in this work by this learned writer which to me do not appear probable1 especially when he excludes the ,germani from the number of the ,celts1 not having recalled sufficiently the facts given by ancient writers and not being sufficiently aware of the relation between the ancient ,gallic and ,germanic tongues4 ,now the so-called ,giants1 who wished to scale the heavens1 were new ,celts who followed the path of their ancestors2 and ,jupiter1 although of their kindred1 as it were1 was constrained to resist them4 ,just so did the ,visigoths established in ,gallic territory resist1 together with the ,romans1 other peoples of ,germania and ,scythia1 who succeeded them under ,attila their leader1 he being at that time in control of the ,scythian1 ,sarmatic and ,germanic tribes from the frontiers of ,persia up to the ,rhine4 ,but the pleasure one feels when one thinks to find in the mythologies of the gods some trace of the old history of fabulous times has perhaps carried me too far1 and ,i know not whether ,i shall have been any more successful than ,goropius ,becanus1 ,schrieckius1 ,herr ,rudbeck and the ,abbe de la ,charmoye4 #add4 ,let us return to ,zoroaster1 who led us to ,oromasdes and ,arimanius1 the sources of good and evil1 and let us assume that he looked upon them as two eternal principles opposed to each other1 although there is reason to doubt this assumption4 ,it is thought that ,marcion1 disciple of ,cerdon1 was of this opinion before ,manes4 ,m4 ,bayle acknowledges that these men used lamentable arguments2 but he thinks that they did not sufficiently #bad recognize their advantages or know how to apply their principal instrument1 which was the difficulty over the origin of evil4 ,he believes that an able man on their side would have thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox1 and it seems as though he himself1 failing any other1 wished to undertake a task so unnecessary in the opinion of many people4 ',all the hypotheses' 7he says1 ,dictionary1 v41 ',marcion'1 p4 #bjci7 'that ,christians have established parry but poorly the blows aimed at them3 they all triumph when they act on the offensive2 but they lose their whole advantage when they have to sustain the attack4' ,he confesses that the ',dualists' 7as with ,mr4 ,hyde he calls them71 that is1 the champions of two principles1 would soon have been routed by a priori reasons1 taken from the nature of ,god2 but he thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the a posteriori reasons1 which are taken from the existence of evil4 #ade4 ,he treats of the matter with abundant detail in his ,dictionary1 article ',manichaeans'1 p4 #bjbe1 which we must examine a little1 in order to throw greater light upon this subject3 ',the surest and clearest ideas of order teach us'1 he says1 'that a ,being who exists through himself1 who is necessary1 who is eternal1 must be single1 infinite1 all powerful1 and endowed with all kinds of perfections4' ,this argument deserves to have been developed more completely4 ',now it is necessary to see'1 he goes on1 'if the phenomena of nature can be conveniently explained by the hypothesis of one single principle4' ,i have explained it sufficiently by showing that there are cases where some disorder in the part is necessary for producing the greatest order in the whole4 ,but it appears that ,m4 ,bayle asks a little too much3 he wishes for a detailed exposition of how evil is connected with the best possible scheme for the universe4 ,that would be a complete explanation of the phenomena3 but ,i do not undertake to give it2 nor am ,i bound to do so1 for there is no obligation to do that which is impossible for us in our existing state4 ,it is sufficient for me to point out that there is nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil with what is the best on the whole4 ,this incomplete explanation1 leaving something to be discovered in the life to come1 is sufficient for answering the objections1 though not for a comprehension of the matter4 #adf4 ',the heavens and all the rest of the universe'1 adds ,m4 ,bayle1 'preach the glory1 the power1 the oneness of ,god4' ,thence the conclusion #bae should have been drawn that this is the case 7as ,i have already observed above7 because there is seen in these objects something entire and isolated1 so to speak4 ,every time we see such a work of ,god1 we find it so perfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the beauty thereof3 but when we do not see an entire work1 when we only look upon scraps and fragments1 it is no wonder if the good order is not evident there4 ,our planetary system composes such an isolated work1 which is complete also when it is taken by itself2 each plant1 each animal1 each man furnishes one such work1 to a certain point of perfection3 one recognizes therein the wonderful contrivance of the author4 ,but the human kind1 so far as it is known to us1 is only a fragment1 only a small portion of the ,city of ,god or of the republic of ,spirits1 which has an extent too great for us1 and whereof we know too little1 to be able to observe the wonderful order therein4 ',man alone1' says ,m4 ,bayle1 'that masterpiece of his ,creator among things visible1 man alone1 ,i say1 gives rise to great objections with regard to the oneness of ,god4' ,claudian made the same observation1 unburdening his heart in these well-known lines3 ,saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem1 etc4 ,but the harmony existing in all the rest allows of a strong presumption that it would exist also in the government of men1 and generally in that of ,spirits1 if the whole were known to us4 ,one must judge the works of ,god as wisely as ,socrates judged those of ,heraclitus in these words3 ,what ,i have understood thereof pleases me2 ,i think that the rest would please me no less if ,i understood it4 #adg4 ,here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in that which concerns man4 ,it is that ,god1 in giving him intelligence1 has presented him with an image of the ,divinity4 ,he leaves him to himself1 in a sense1 in his small department1 ut ,spartam quam nactus est ornet4 ,he enters there only in a secret way1 for he supplies being1 force1 life1 reason1 without showing himself4 ,it is there that free will plays its game3 and ,god makes game 7so to speak7 of these little ,gods that he has thought good to produce1 as we make game of children who follow pursuits which we secretly encourage or hinder according as it pleases us4 ,thus man is there like a little god in his own world or ,microcosm1 which he governs #baf after his own fashion3 he sometimes performs wonders therein1 and his art often imitates nature4 ,jupiter in parvo cum cerneret aethera vitro1 ,risit et ad ,superos talia dicta dedit3 ,huccine mortalis progressa potentia1 ,divi8 ,jam meus in fragili luditur orbe labor4 ,jura poli rerumque fidem legesque ,deorum ,cuncta ,syracusius transtulit arte ,senex4 ,quid falso insontem tonitru ,salmonea miror8 ,aemula ,naturae est parva reperta manus4 ,but he also commits great errors1 because he abandons himself to the passions1 and because ,god abandons him to his own way4 ,god punishes him also for such errors1 now like a father or tutor1 training or chastising children1 now like a just judge1 punishing those who forsake him3 and evil comes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their small worlds come into collision4 ,man finds himself the worse for this1 in proportion to his fault2 but ,god1 by a wonderful art1 turns all the errors of these little worlds to the greater adornment of his great world4 ,it is as in those devices of perspective1 where certain beautiful designs look like mere confusion until one restores them to the right angle of vision or one views them by means of a certain glass or mirror4 ,it is by placing and using them properly that one makes them serve as adornment for a room4 ,thus the apparent deformities of our little worlds combine to become beauties in the great world1 and have nothing in them which is opposed to the oneness of an infinitely perfect universal principle3 on the contrary1 they increase our wonder at the wisdom of him who makes evil serve the greater good4 #adh4 ,m4 ,bayle continues3 'that man is wicked and miserable2 that there are everywhere prisons and hospitals2 that history is simply a collection of the crimes and calamities of the human race4' ,i think that there is exaggeration in that3 there is incomparably more good than evil in the life of men1 as there are incomparably more houses than prisons4 ,with regard to virtue and vice1 a certain mediocrity prevails4 ,machiavelli has already observed that there are few very wicked and very good men1 and that this causes the failure of many great enterprises4 ,i find it a great fault in historians that they keep their mind on the evil more than on the #bag good4 ,the chief end of history1 as also of poetry1 should be to teach prudence and virtue by examples1 and then to display vice in such a way as to create aversion to it and to prompt men to avoid it1 or serve towards that end4 #adi4 ,m4 ,bayle avows3 'that one finds everywhere both moral good and physical good1 some examples of virtue1 some examples of happiness1 and that this is what makes the difficulty4 ,for if there were only wicked and unhappy people'1 he says1 'there would be no need to resort to the hypothesis of the two principles4' ,i wonder that this admirable man could have evinced so great an inclination towards this opinion of the two principles2 and ,i am surprised at his not having taken into account that this romance of human life1 which makes the universal history of the human race1 lay fully devised in the divine understanding1 with innumerable others1 and that the will of ,god only decreed its existence because this sequence of events was to be most in keeping with the rest of things1 to bring forth the best result4 ,and these apparent faults in the whole world1 these spots on a ,sun whereof ours is but a ray1 rather enhance its beauty than diminish it1 contributing towards that end by obtaining a greater good4 ,there are in truth two principles1 but they are both in ,god1 to wit1 his understanding and his will4 ,the understanding furnishes the principle of evil1 without being sullied by it1 without being evil2 it represents natures as they exist in the eternal verities2 it contains within it the reason wherefore evil is permitted3 but the will tends only towards good4 ,let us add a third principle1 namely power2 it precedes even understanding and will1 but it operates as the one displays it and as the other requires it4 #aej4 ,some 7like ,campanella7 have called these three perfections of ,god the three primordialities4 ,many have even believed that there was therein a secret connexion with the ,holy ,trinity3 that power relates to the ,father1 that is1 to the source of ,divinity1 wisdom to the ,eternal ,word1 which is called logos by the most sublime of the ,evangelists1 and will or ,love to the ,holy ,spirit4 ,well-nigh all the expressions or comparisons derived from the nature of the intelligent substance tend that way4 #aea4 ,it seems to me that if ,m4 ,bayle had taken into account what ,i have just said of the principles of things1 he would have answered his own questions1 or at the least he would not have continued to ask1 as he does in these which follow3 ',if man is the work of a single principle #bah supremely good1 supremely holy1 supremely powerful1 can he be subject to diseases1 to cold1 heat1 hunger1 thirst1 pain1 grief8 ,can he have so many evil tendencies8 ,can he commit so many crimes8 ,can supreme goodness produce an unhappy creature8 ,shall not supreme power1 united to an infinite goodness1 shower blessings upon its work1 and shall it not banish all that might offend or grieve8' ,prudentius in his ,hamartigenia presented the same difficulty3 ,si non vult ,deus esse malum1 cur non vetat8 inquit4 ,non refert auctor fuerit1 factorve malorum4 ,anne opera in vitium sceleris pulcherrima verti1 ,cum possit prohibere1 sinat2 quod si velit omnes ,innocuos agere ,omnipotens1 ne sancta voluntas ,degeneret1 facto nec se manus inquinet ullo8 ,condidit ergo malum ,dominus1 quod spectat ab alto1 ,et patitur fierique probat1 tanquam ipse crearit4 ,ipse creavit enim1 quod si discludere possit1 ,non abolet1 longoque sinit grassarier usu4 ,but ,i have already answered that sufficiently4 ,man is himself the source of his evils3 just as he is1 he was in the divine idea4 ,god1 prompted by essential reasons of wisdom1 decreed that he should pass into existence just as he is4 ,m4 ,bayle would perchance have perceived this origin of evil in the form in which ,i demonstrate it here1 if he had herein combined the wisdom of ,god with his power1 his goodness and his holiness4 ,i will add1 in passing1 that his holiness is nothing other than the highest degree of goodness1 just as the crime which is its opposite is the worst of all evil4 #aeb4 ,m4 ,bayle places the ,greek philosopher ,melissus1 champion of the oneness of the first principle 7and perhaps even of the oneness of substance7 in conflict with ,zoroaster1 as with the first originator of duality4 ,zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of ,melissus is more consistent with order and a priori reasons1 but he denies its conformity with experience and a posteriori reasons4 ',i surpass you'1 he said1 'in the explanation of phenomena1 which is the principal mark of a good system4' ,but1 in my opinion1 it is not a very good explanation of a phenomenon to assign to it an ad hoc principle3 to evil1 a principium maleficum1 to cold1 a primum frigidum2 there is nothing so easy and nothing so dull4 ,it is well-nigh as if someone were to say that the #bai ,peripatetics surpass the new mathematicians in the explanation of the phenomena of the stars1 by giving them ad hoc intelligences to guide them4 ,according to that1 it is quite easy to conceive why the planets make their way with such precision2 whereas there is need of much geometry and reflexion to understand how from the gravity of the planets1 which bears them towards the sun1 combined with some whirlwind which carries them along1 or with their own motive force1 can spring the elliptic movement of ,kepler1 which satisfies appearances so well4 ,a man incapable of relishing deep speculations will at first applaud the ,peripatetics and will treat our mathematicians as dreamers4 ,some old ,galenist will do the same with regard to the faculties of the ,schoolmen3 he will admit a chylific1 a chymific and a sanguific1 and he will assign one of these ad hoc to each operation2 he will think he has worked wonders1 and will laugh at what he will call the chimeras of the moderns1 who claim to explain through mechanical structure what passes in the body of an animal4 #aec4 ,the explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle1 per principium maleficum1 is of the same nature4 ,evil needs no such explanation1 any more than do cold and darkness3 there is neither primum frigidum nor principle of darkness4 ,evil itself comes only from privation2 the positive enters therein only by concomitance1 as the active enters by concomitance into cold4 ,we see that water in freezing is capable of breaking a gun-barrel wherein it is confined2 and yet cold is a certain privation of force1 it only comes from the diminution of a movement which separates the particles of fluids4 ,when this separating motion becomes weakened in the water by the cold1 the particles of compressed air concealed in the water collect2 and1 becoming larger1 they become more capable of acting outwards through their buoyancy4 ,the resistance which the surfaces of the proportions of air meet in the water1 and which opposes the force exerted by these portions towards dilation1 is far less1 and consequently the effect of the air greater1 in large air-bubbles than in small1 even though these small bubbles combined should form as great a mass as the large4 ,for the resistances1 that is1 the surfaces1 increase by the square1 and the forces1 that is1 the contents or the volumes of the spheres of compressed air1 increase by the cube1 of their diameters4 ,thus it is by accident that privation involves action and force4 ,i have already shown how privation is enough to cause error and malice1 and #bbj how ,god is prompted to permit them1 despite that there be no malignity in him4 ,evil comes from privation2 the positive and action spring from it by accident1 as force springs from cold4 #aed4 ,the statement that ,m4 ,bayle attributes to the ,paulicians1 p4 #bcbc1 is not conclusive1 to wit1 that free will must come from two principles1 to the end that it may have power to turn towards good and towards evil3 for1 being simple in itself1 it should rather have come from a neutral principle if this argument held good4 ,but free will tends towards good1 and if it meets with evil it is by accident1 for the reason that this evil is concealed beneath the good1 and masked1 as it were4 ,these words which ,ovid ascribes to ,medea1 ,video meliora proboque1 ,deteriora sequor1 imply that the morally good is mastered by the agreeably good1 which makes more impression on souls when they are disturbed by the passions4 #aee4 ,furthermore1 ,m4 ,bayle himself supplies ,melissus with a good answer2 but a little later he disputes it4 ,here are his words1 p4 #bjbe3 ',if ,melissus consults the notions of order1 he will answer that man was not wicked when ,god made him2 he will say that man received from ,god a happy state1 but that not having followed the light of conscience1 which in accordance with the intention of its author should have guided him along the path of virtue1 he has become wicked1 and has deserved that ,god the supremely good should make him feel the effects of his anger4 ,it is therefore not ,god who is the cause of moral evil3 but he is the cause of physical evil1 that is1 of the punishment of moral evil4 ,and this punishment1 far from being incompatible with the supremely good principle1 of necessity emanates from that one of its attributes1 ,i mean its justice1 which is not less essential to it than its goodness4 ,this answer1 the most reasonable that ,melissus can give1 is fundamentally good and sound1 but it may be disputed by something more specious and more dazzling4 ,for indeed ,zoroaster objects that the infinitely good principle ought to have created man not only without actual evil1 but also without the inclination towards evil2 that ,god1 having foreseen sin with all its consequences1 ought to have prevented it2 that he ought to have impelled man to moral good1 and not to have allowed him any force for tending towards crime4' ,that is quite easy to say1 but it is not practicable if one follows the principles #bba of order3 it could not have been accomplished without perpetual miracles4 ,ignorance1 error and malice follow one another naturally in animals made as we are3 should this species1 then1 have been missing in the universe8 ,i have no doubt but that it is too important there1 despite all its weaknesses1 for ,god to have consented to its abolition4 #aef4 ,m4 ,bayle1 in the article entitled ',paulicians' inserted by him in his ,dictionary1 follows up the pronouncements he made in the article on the ,manichaeans4 ,according to him 7p4 #bccj1 lit4 ,h7 the orthodox seem to admit two first principles1 in making the devil the originator of sin4 ,m4 ,becker1 a former minister of ,amsterdam1 author of the book entitled ,the ,world ,bewitched1 has made use of this idea in order to demonstrate that one should not assign such power and authority to the ,devil as would allow of his comparison with ,god4 ,therein he is right3 but he pushes the conclusions too far4 ,and the author of the book entitled ,greek3 ,apokatastasis ,pantn believes that if the ,devil had never been vanquished and despoiled1 if he had always kept his prey1 if the title of invincible had belonged to him1 that would have done injury to the glory of ,god4 ,but it is a poor advantage to keep those whom one has led astray in order to share their punishment for ever4 ,and as for the cause of evil1 it is true that the ,devil is the author of sin4 ,but the origin of sin comes from farther away1 its source is in the original imperfection of creatures3 that renders them capable of sinning1 and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which cause this power to evince itself in action4 #aeg4 ,the devils were angels like the rest before their fall1 and it is thought that their leader was one of the chief among angels2 but ,scripture is not explicit enough on that point4 ,the passage of the ,apocalypse that speaks of the struggle with the ,dragon1 as of a vision1 leaves much in doubt1 and does not sufficiently develop a subject which by the other sacred writers is hardly mentioned4 ,it is not in place here to enter into this discussion1 and one must still admit that the common opinion agrees best with the sacred text4 ,m4 ,bayle examines some replies of ,st4 ,basil1 of ,lactantius and others on the origin of evil4 ,as1 however1 they are concerned with physical evil1 ,i postpone discussion thereof1 and ,i will proceed with the examination of the difficulties over the moral cause of moral evil1 which arise in several passages of the works of our gifted author4 #bbb #aeh4 ,he disputes the permission of this evil1 he would wish one to admit that ,god wills it4 ,he quotes these words of ,calvin 7on ,genesis1 ch4 #c73 ',the ears of some are offended when one says that ,god willed it4 ,but ,i ask you1 what else is the permission of him who is entitled to forbid1 or rather who has the thing in his own hands1 but an act of will8' ,m4 ,bayle explains these words of ,calvin1 and those which precede them1 as if he admitted that ,god willed the fall of ,adam1 not in so far as it was a crime1 but under some other conception that is unknown to us4 ,he quotes casuists who are somewhat lax1 who say that a son can desire the death of his father1 not in so far as it is an evil for himself but in so far as it is a good for his heirs 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #adg1 p4 #hej74 ,it seems to me that ,calvin only says that ,god willed man's fall for some reason unknown to us4 ,in the main1 when it is a question of a decisive will1 that is1 of a decree1 these distinctions are useless3 one wills the action with all its qualities1 if it is true that one wills it4 ,but when it is a crime1 ,god can only will the permission of it3 the crime is neither an end nor a means1 it is only a conditio sine qua non2 thus it is not the object of a direct will1 as ,i have already demonstrated above4 ,god cannot prevent it without acting against what he owes to himself1 without doing something that would be worse than the crime of man1 without violating the rule of the best2 and that would be to destroy divinity1 as ,i have already observed4 ,god is therefore bound by a moral necessity1 which is in himself1 to permit moral evil in creatures4 ,there is precisely the case wherein the will of a wise mind is only permissive4 ,i have already said this3 he is bound to permit the crime of others when he cannot prevent it without himself failing in that which he owes to himself4 #aei4 ',but among all these infinite combinations'1 says ,m4 ,bayle 7p4 #hec71 'it pleased ,god to choose one wherein ,adam was to sin1 and by his decree he made it1 in preference to all the others1 the plan that should come to pass4' ,very good2 that is speaking my language2 so long as one applies it to the combinations which compose the whole universe4 ',you will therefore never make us understand'1 he adds1 'how ,god did not will that ,eve and ,adam should sin1 since he rejected all the combinations wherein they would not have sinned4' ,but the thing is in general very easy to understand1 from all that ,i have just said4 ,this combination that makes the whole universe is the best2 ,god therefore could not refrain from choosing it without #bbc incurring a lapse1 and rather than incur such1 a thing altogether inappropriate to him1 he permits the lapse or the sin of man which is involved in this combination4 #afj4 ,m4 ,jacquelot1 with other able men1 does not differ in opinion from me1 when for example he says1 p4 #ahf of his treatise on the ,conformity of ,faith with ,reason3 ',those who are puzzled by these difficulties seem to be too limited in their outlook1 and to wish to reduce all ,god's designs to their own interests4 ,when ,god formed the universe1 his whole prospect was himself and his own glory1 so that if we had knowledge of all creatures1 of their diverse combinations and of their different relations1 we should understand without difficulty that the universe corresponds perfectly to the infinite wisdom of the ,almighty4' ,he says elsewhere 7p4 #bcb73 ',supposing the impossible1 that ,god could not prevent the wrong use of free will without destroying it1 it will be agreed that since his wisdom and his glory determined him to form free creatures this powerful reason must have prevailed over the grievous consequences which their freedom might have4' ,i have endeavoured to develop this still further through the reason of the best and the moral necessity which led ,god to make this choice1 despite the sin of some creatures which is involved therein4 ,i think that ,i have cut down to the root of the difficulty2 nevertheless ,i am well pleased1 for the sake of throwing more light on the matter1 to apply my principle of solution to the peculiar difficulties of ,m4 ,bayle4 #afa4 ,here is one1 set forth in these terms 7ch4 #adh1 p4 #hef73 ',would it in a prince be a mark of his kindness3 #a4 ,to give to a hundred messengers as much money as is needed for a journey of two hundred leagues8 #b4 ,to promise a recompense to all those who should finish the journey without having borrowed anything1 and to threaten with imprisonment all those whom their money should not have sufficed8 #c4 ,to make choice of a hundred persons1 of whom he would know for certain that there were but two who should earn the recompense1 the ninety-eight others being destined to find on the way either a mistress or a gamester or some other thing which would make them incur expenses1 and which he would himself have been at pains to dispose in certain places along their path8 #d4 ,to imprison actually ninety-eight of these messengers on the moment of their return8 ,is it not abundantly evident that he would have no kindness for them1 and that on the contrary he would intend for them1 not the proposed recompense1 but prison8 #bbd ,they would deserve it1 certainly2 but he who had wished them to deserve it and placed them in the sure way towards deserving it1 should he be worthy of being called kind1 on the pretext that he had recompensed the two others8' ,it would doubtless not be on that account that he earned the title of 'kind'4 ,yet other circumstances may contribute1 which would avail to render him worthy of praise for having employed this artifice in order to know those people1 and to make trial of them2 just as ,gideon made use of some extraordinary means of choosing the most valiant and the least squeamish among his soldiers4 ,and even if the prince were to know already the disposition of all these messengers1 may he not put them to this test in order to make them known also to the others8 ,even though these reasons be not applicable to ,god1 they make it clear1 nevertheless1 that an action like that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached from the circumstances indicating its cause4 ,all the more must one deem that ,god has acted well1 and that we should see this if we fully knew of all that he has done4 #afb4 ,m4 ,descartes1 in a letter to the ,princess ,elizabeth 7vol4 #a1 letter #aj7 has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom with the omnipotence of ,god4 ',he imagines a monarch who has forbidden duels1 and who1 knowing for certain that two noblemen1 if they meet1 will fight1 takes sure steps to bring about their meeting4 ,they meet indeed1 they fight3 their disobedience of the law is an effect of their free will1 they are punishable4 ,what a king can do in such a case 7he adds7 concerning some free actions of his subjects1 ,god1 who has infinite foreknowledge and power1 certainly does concerning all those of men4 ,before he sent us into this world he knew exactly what all the tendencies of our will would be3 he has endued us therewith1 he also has disposed all other things that are outside us1 to cause such and such objects to present themselves to our senses at such and such a time4 ,he knew that as a result of this our free will would determine us toward some particular thing1 and he has willed it thus2 but he has not for that willed to constrain our free will thereto4 ,in this king one may distinguish two different degrees of will1 the one whereby he willed that these noblemen should fight1 since he brought about their meeting1 and the other whereby he did not will it1 since he forbade duels4 ,even so theologians distinguish in ,god an absolute and independent will1 whereby he wills that all things be done just as they are done1 #bbe and another which is relative1 and which concerns the merit or demerit of men1 whereby he wills that his ,laws be obeyed' 7,descartes1 letter #aj of vol4 #a1 pp4 #ea1 #eb4 ,compare with that the quotation made by ,m4 ,arnauld1 vol4 #b1 p4 #bhh et seqq4 of his ,reflexions on the ,system of ,malebranche1 from ,thomas ,aquinas1 on the antecedent and consequent will of ,god74 #afc4 ,here is ,m4 ,bayle's reply to that 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #aed1 p4 #idc73 ',this great philosopher is much mistaken1 it seems to me4 ,there would not be in this monarch any degree of will1 either small or great1 that these two noblemen should obey the law1 and not fight4 ,he would will entirely and solely that they should fight4 ,that would not exculpate them1 they would only follow their passion1 they would be unaware that they conformed to the will of their sovereign3 but he would be in truth the moral cause of their encounter1 and he would not more entirely wish it supposing he were to inspire them with the desire or to give them the order for it4 ,imagine to yourself two princes each of whom wishes his eldest son to poison himself4 ,one employs constraint1 the other contents himself with secretly causing a grief that he knows will be sufficient to induce his son to poison himself4 ,will you be doubtful whether the will of the latter is less complete than the will of the former8 ,m4 ,descartes is therefore assuming an unreal fact and does not at all solve the difficulty4' #afd4 ,one must confess that ,m4 ,descartes speaks somewhat crudely of the will of ,god in regard to evil in saying not only that ,god knew that our free will would determine us toward some particular thing1 but also that he also wished it1 albeit he did not will to constrain the will thereto4 ,he speaks no less harshly in the eighth letter of the same volume1 saying that not the slightest thought enters into the mind of a man which ,god does not will1 and has not willed from all eternity1 to enter there4 ,calvin never said anything harsher2 and all that can only be excused if it is to be understood of a permissive will4 ,m4 ,descartes' solution amounts to the distinction between the will expressed in the sign and the will expressive of the good pleasure 7inter voluntatem signi et beneplaciti7 which the moderns have taken from the ,schoolmen as regards the terms1 but to which they have given a meaning not usual among the ancients4 ,it is true that ,god may command something and yet not will that it be done1 as when he commanded ,abraham to sacrifice his son3 he willed the obedience1 and he did not will the action4 ,but when ,god commands the virtuous action and #bbf forbids the sin1 he wills indeed that which he ordains1 but it is only by an antecedent will1 as ,i have explained more than once4 #afe4 ,m4 ,descartes' comparison is therefore not satisfactory2 but it may be made so4 ,one must make some change in the facts1 inventing some reason to oblige the prince to cause or permit the two enemies to meet4 ,they must1 for instance1 be together in the army or in other obligatory functions1 a circumstance the prince himself cannot hinder without endangering his ,state4 ,for example1 the absence of either of them might be responsible for the disappearance of innumerable persons of his party from the army or cause grumbling among the soldiers and give rise to some great disturbance4 ,in this case1 therefore1 one may say that the prince does not will the duel3 he knows of it1 but he permits it notwithstanding1 for he prefers permitting the sin of others to committing one himself4 ,thus this corrected comparison may serve1 provided that one observe the difference between ,god and the prince4 ,the prince is forced into this permission by his powerlessness2 a more powerful monarch would have no need of all these considerations2 but ,god1 who has power to do all that is possible1 only permits sin because it is absolutely impossible to anyone at all to do better4 ,the prince's action is peradventure not free from sorrow and regret4 ,this regret is due to his imperfection1 of which he is sensible2 therein lies displeasure4 ,god is incapable of such a feeling and finds1 moreover1 no cause therefor2 he is infinitely conscious of his own perfection1 and it may even be said that the imperfection in creatures taken individually changes for him into perfection in relation to the whole1 and that it is an added glory for the ,creator4 ,what more can one wish1 when one possesses a boundless wisdom and when one is as powerful as one is wise2 when one can do all and when one has the best8 #aff4 ,having once understood these things1 we are hardened sufficiently1 so it seems to me1 against the strongest and most spirited objections4 ,i have not concealed them3 but there are some we shall merely touch upon1 because they are too odious4 ,the ,remonstrants and ,m4 ,bayle 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aeb1 end page #iai7 quote ,st4 ,augustine1 saying1 'crudelem esse misericordiam velle aliquem miserum esse ut eius miserearis'3 in the same sense is cited ,seneca ,de ,benef41 ,l4 #f1 c4 #cf1 #cg4 ,i confess that one would have some reason to urge that against those who believed that ,god has no other cause for permitting sin than the #bbg design to have something wherewith to exercise punitive justice against the majority of men1 and his mercy towards a small number of elect4 ,but it must be considered that ,god had reasons for his permission of sin1 more worthy of him and more profound in relation to us4 ,someone has dared to compare ,god's course of action with that of a ,caligula1 who has his edicts written in so small a hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is not possible to read them2 with that of a mother who neglects her daughter's honour in order to attain her own selfish ends2 with that of ,queen ,catherine de ,medicis1 who is said to have abetted the love-affairs of her ladies in order to learn of the intrigues of the great2 and even with that of ,tiberius1 who arranged1 through the extraordinary services of the executioner1 that the law forbidding the subjection of a virgin to capital punishment should no longer apply to the case of ,sejanus's daughter4 ,this last comparison was proposed by ,peter ,bertius1 then an ,armenian1 but finally a member of the ,roman communion4 ,and a scandalous comparison has been made between ,god and ,tiberius1 which is related at length by ,andreas ,caroli in his ,memorabilia ,ecclesiastica of the last century1 as ,m4 ,bayle observes4 ,bertius used it against the ,gomarists4 ,i think that arguments of this kind are only valid against those who maintain that justice is an arbitrary thing in relation to ,god2 or that he has a despotic power which can go so far as being able to condemn innocents2 or1 in short1 that good is not the motive of his actions4 #afg4 ,at that same time an ingenious satire was composed against the ,gomarists1 entitled ,fur praedestinatus1 de gepredestineerdedief1 wherein there is introduced a thief condemned to be hanged1 who attributes to ,god all the evil he has done2 who believes himself predestined to salvation notwithstanding his wicked actions2 who imagines that this belief is sufficient for him1 and who defeats by arguments ad hominem a ,counter-remonstrant minister called to prepare him for death3 but this thief is finally converted by an old pastor who had been dismissed for his ,arminianism1 whom the gaoler1 in pity for the criminal and for the weakness of the minister1 had brought to him secretly4 ,replies were made to this lampoon1 but replies to satires never please as much as the satires themselves4 ,m4 ,bayle 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aed1 p4 #ich7 says that this book was printed in ,england in the #bbh time of ,cromwell1 and he appears not to have been informed that it was only a translation of the much older original ,flemish4 ,he adds that ,dr4 ,george ,kendal wrote a confutation of it at ,oxford in the year #afeg1 under the title of ,fur pro ,tribunali1 and that the dialogue is there inserted4 ,this dialogue presupposes1 contrary to the truth1 that the ,counter-remonstrants make ,god the cause of evil1 and teach a kind of predestination in the ,mahometan manner according to which it does not matter whether one does good or evil1 and the assumption that one is predestined assures the fact4 ,they by no means go so far4 ,nevertheless it is true that there are among them some ,supralapsarians and others who find it hard to declare themselves in clear terms upon the justice of ,god and the principles of piety and morals in man4 ,for they imagine despotism in ,god1 and demand that man be convinced1 without reason1 of the absolute certainty of his election1 a course that is liable to have dangerous consequences4 ,but all those who acknowledge that ,god produces the best plan1 having chosen it from among all possible ideas of the universe2 that he there finds man inclined by the original imperfection of creatures to misuse his free will and to plunge into misery2 that ,god prevents the sin and the misery in so far as the perfection of the universe1 which is an emanation from his1 may permit it3 those1 ,i say1 show forth more clearly that ,god's intention is the one most right and holy in the world2 that the creature alone is guilty1 that his original limitation or imperfection is the source of his wickedness1 that his evil will is the sole cause of his misery2 that one cannot be destined to salvation without also being destined to the holiness of the children of ,god1 and that all hope of election one can have can only be founded upon the good will infused into one's heart by the grace of ,god4 #afh4 ,metaphysical considerations also are brought up against my explanation of the moral cause of moral evil2 but they will trouble me less since ,i have dismissed the objections derived from moral reasons1 which were more impressive4 ,these metaphysical considerations concern the nature of the possible and of the necessary2 they go against my fundamental assumption that ,god has chosen the best of all possible worlds4 ,there are philosophers who have maintained that there is nothing possible except that which actually happens4 ,these are those same people who thought or could have thought that all is necessary unconditionally4 ,some were of this #bbi opinion because they admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause of the existence of things3 and it is these ,i have most reason for opposing4 ,but there are others who are mistaken only because they misuse terms4 ,they confuse moral necessity with metaphysical necessity3 they imagine that since ,god cannot help acting for the best he is thus deprived of freedom1 and things are endued with that necessity which philosophers and theologians endeavour to avoid4 ,with these writers my dispute is only one of words1 provided they admit in very deed that ,god chooses and does the best4 ,but there are others who go further1 they think that ,god could have done better4 ,this is an opinion which must be rejected3 for although it does not altogether deprive ,god of wisdom and goodness1 as do the advocates of blind necessity1 it sets bounds thereto1 thus derogating from ,god's supreme perfection4 #afi4 ,the question of the possibility of things that do not happen has already been examined by the ancients4 ,it appears that ,epicurus1 to preserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity1 maintained1 after ,aristotle1 that contingent futurities were not susceptible of determinate truth4 ,for if it was true yesterday that ,i should write to-day1 it could therefore not fail to happen1 it was already necessary2 and1 for the same reason1 it was from all eternity4 ,thus all that which happens is necessary1 and it is impossible for anything different to come to pass4 ,but since that is not so it would follow1 according to him1 that contingent futurities have no determinate truth4 ,to uphold this opinion1 ,epicurus went so far as to deny the first and the greatest principle of the truths of reason1 he denied that every assertion was either true or false4 ,here is the way they confounded him3 ',you deny that it was true yesterday that ,i should write to-day2 it was therefore false4' ,the good man1 not being able to admit this conclusion1 was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false4 ,after that1 he needs no refutation1 and ,chrysippus might have spared himself the trouble he took to prove the great principle of contradictories1 following the account by ,cicero in his book ,de ,fato3 ',contendit omnes nervos ,chrysippus ut persuadeat omne ,greek3 ,axima aut verum esse aut falsum4 ,ut enim ,epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit1 concedendum sit1 fato fieri quaecunque fiant2 si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit1 esse id etiam certum2 si certum1 etiam necessarium2 ita et necessitatem et fatum confirmari putat2 sic ,chrysippus metuit ne non1 si non obtinuerit omne#bcj quod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum1 omnia fato fieri possint ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum4' ,m4 ,bayle observes 7,dictionary1 article ',epicurus'1 let4 ,t1 p4 #aada7 'that neither of these two great philosophers ,epicurus and ,chrysippus understood that the truth of this maxim1 every proposition is true or false1 is independent of what is called fatum3 it could not therefore serve as proof of the existence of the fatum1 as ,chrysippus maintained and as ,epicurus feared4 ,chrysippus could not have conceded1 without damaging his own position1 that there are propositions which are neither true nor false4 ,but he gained nothing by asserting the contrary3 for1 whether there be free causes or not1 it is equally true that this proposition1 ,the ,grand ,mogul will go hunting to-morrow1 is true or false4 ,men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of ,tiresias3 ,all that ,i shall say will happen or not1 for great ,apollo confers on me the faculty of prophesying4 ,if1 assuming the impossible1 there were no ,god1 it would yet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world should predict would happen or would not happen4 ,that is what neither ,chrysippus nor ,epicurus has taken into consideration4' ,cicero1 lib4 ,i1 ,de ,nat4 ,deorum1 with regard to the evasions of the ,epicureans expressed the sound opinion 7as ,m4 ,bayle observes towards the end of the same page7 that it would be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's opponent1 than to have recourse to such answers4 ,yet we shall see that ,m4 ,bayle himself confused the certain with the necessary1 when he maintained that the choice of the best rendered things necessary4 #agj4 ,let us come now to the possibility of things that do not happen1 and ,i will give the very words of ,m4 ,bayle1 albeit they are somewhat discursive4 ,this is what he says on the matter in his ,dictionary 7article ',chrysippus'1 let4 ,s1 p4 #ibi73 ',the celebrated dispute on things possible and things impossible owed its origin to the doctrine of the ,stoics concerning fate4 ,the question was to know whether1 among the things which have never been and never will be1 there are some possible2 or whether all that is not1 all that has never been1 all that will never be1 was impossible4 ,a famous dialectician of the ,megaric ,sect1 named ,diodorus1 gave a negative answer to the first of these two questions and an affirmative to the second2 but ,chrysippus vehemently opposed him4 ,here are two passages of ,cicero 7epist4 #d1 lib4 #i1 ,ad ,familiar473 ,greek3 peri dynatn me scito ,greek3 kata ,diodron krinein4 ,quapropter si venturus es1 scito #bca necesse esse te venire4 ,sin autem non es1 ,greek3 tn adynatn est te venire4 ,nunc vide utra te ,greek3 krisis magis delectet1 ,greek3 ,chrysippeia ne1 an haec2 quam noster ,diodorus a ,stoic who for a long time had lived in ,cicero's house non concoquebat4 ,this is quoted from a letter that ,cicero wrote to ,varro4 ,he sets forth more comprehensively the whole state of the question1 in the little book ,de ,fato4 ,i am going to quote a few pieces 7,cic41 ,de ,fato1 p4 m4 #fe73 ,vigila1 ,chrysippe1 ne tuam causam1 in qua tibi cum ,diodoro valente ,dialectico magna luctatio est1 deseras 444 omne ergo quod falsum dicitur in futuro1 id fieri non potest4 ,at hoc1 ,chrysippe1 minime vis1 maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum ,diodoro certamen est4 ,ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit1 quod aut sit verum1 aut futurum sit verum2 et quicquid futurum sit1 id dicit fieri necesse esse2 et quicquid non sit futurum1 id negat fieri posse4 ,tu etiam quae non sint futura1 posse fieri dicis1 ut frangi hanc gemmam1 etiamsi id nunquam futurum sit3 neque necesse fuisse ,cypselum regnare ,corinthi1 quamquam id millesimo ante anno ,apollinis ,oraculo editum esset4444 ,placet ,diodoro1 id solum fieri posse1 quod aut verum sit1 aut verum futurum sit3 qui locus attingit hanc quaestionem1 nihil fieri1 quod non necesse fuerit2 et quicquid fieri possit1 id aut esse jam1 aut futurum esse3 nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse quae futura sunt1 quam ea quae facta sunt3 sed in factis immutabilitatem apparere2 in futuris quibusdam1 quia non apparent1 ne inesse quidem videri3 ut in eo qui mortifero morbo urgeatur1 verum sit1 hic morietur hoc morbo3 at hoc idem si vere dicatur in eo1 in quo tanta vis morbi non appareat1 nihilominus futurum sit4 ,ita fit ut commutatio ex vero in falsum1 ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri possit4 ,cicero makes it clear enough that ,chrysippus often found himself in difficulties in this dispute1 and that is no matter for astonishment3 for the course he had chosen was not bound up with his dogma of fate1 and1 if he had known how1 or had dared1 to reason consistently1 he would readily have adopted the whole hypothesis of ,diodorus4 ,we have seen already that the freedom he assigned to the soul1 and his comparison of the cylinder1 did not preclude the possibility that in reality all the acts of the human will were unavoidable consequences of fate4 ,hence it follows that everything which does not happen is impossible1 and that there is nothing possible but that which actually comes to pass4 ,plutarch 7,de ,stoicor4 ,repugn41 pp4 #ajec1 #ajed7 discomfits him completely1 on that point as well as on the dispute #bcb with ,diodorus1 and maintains that his opinion on possibility is altogether contrary to the doctrine of fatum4 ,observe that the most eminent ,stoics had written on this matter without following the same path4 ,arrian 7in ,epict41 lib4 #b1 c4 #bi1 p4 m4 #aff7 named four of them1 who are ,chrysippus1 ,cleanthes1 ,archidemus and ,antipater4 ,he evinces great scorn for this dispute2 and ,m4 ,menage need not have cited him as a writer who had spoken in commendation of the work of ,chrysippus ,greek3 peri dynatn 7citatur honorifice apud ,arrianum1 ,menag4 in ,laert41 ,i1 #g1 #cda7 for assuredly these words1 ,greek3 gegraphe de kai ,chrysippos thaumasts1 etc41 de his rebus mira scripsit ,chrysippus1 etc41 are not in that connexion a eulogy4 ,that is shown by the passages immediately before and after it4 ,dionysius of ,halicarnassus 7,de ,collocat4 ,verbor41 c4 #ag1 p4 m4 #aa7 mentions two treatises by ,chrysippus1 wherein1 under a title that promised something different1 much of the logicians' territory had been explored4 ,the work was entitled ,greek3 peri ts syntaxes tn tou logou mern1 de partium orationis collocatione1 and treated only of propositions true and false1 possible and impossible1 contingent and equivocal1 etc41 matter that our ,schoolmen have pounded down and reduced to its essence4 ,take note that ,chrysippus recognized that past things were necessarily true1 which ,cleanthes had not been willing to admit4 7,arrian1 ubi supra1 p4 m4 #afe47 ,greek3 ,ou pan de parellythos althes anankaion esti1 kathaper hoi peri ,kleanthn pheresthai dokousi4 ,non omne praeteritum ex necessitate verum est1 ut illi qui ,cleanthem sequuntur sentiunt4 ,we have already seen 7p4 #efb1 col4 #b7 that ,ablard is alleged to have taught a doctrine which resembles that of ,diodorus4 ,i think that the ,stoics pledged themselves to give a wider range to possible things than to future things1 for the purpose of mitigating the odious and frightful conclusions which were drawn from their dogma of fatality4' ,it is sufficiently evident that ,cicero when writing to ,varro the words that have just been quoted 7lib4 #i1 ,ep4 #d1 ,ad ,familiar47 had not enough comprehension of the effect of ,diodorus's opinion1 since he found it preferable4 ,he presents tolerably well in his book ,de ,fato the opinions of those writers1 but it is a pity that he has not always added the reasons which they employed4 ,plutarch in his treatise on the contradictions of the ,stoics and ,m4 ,bayle are both surprised that ,chrysippus was not of the same opinion as ,diodorus1 since he favours fatality4 ,but ,chrysippus and even his master ,cleanthes were on that point more reasonable than is supposed4 #bcc ,that will be seen as we proceed4 ,it is open to question whether the past is more necessary than the future4 ,cleanthes held the opinion that it is4 ,the objection is raised that it is necessary ex hypothesi for the future to happen1 as it is necessary ex hypothesi for the past to have happened4 ,but there is this difference1 that it is not possible to act on the past state1 that would be a contradiction2 but it is possible to produce some effect on the future4 ,yet the hypothetical necessity of both is the same3 the one cannot be changed1 the other will not be2 and once that is past1 it will not be possible for it to be changed either4 #aga4 ,the famous ,pierre ,ablard expressed an opinion resembling that of ,diodorus in the statement that ,god can do only that which he does4 ,it was the third of the fourteen propositions taken from his works which were censured at the ,council of ,sens4 ,it had been taken from the third book of his ,introduction to ,theology1 where he treats especially of the power of ,god4 ,the reason he gave for his statement was that ,god can do only that which he wills4 ,now ,god cannot will to do anything other than that which he does1 because1 of necessity1 he must will whatever is fitting4 ,hence it follows that all that which he does not1 is not fitting1 that he cannot will to do it1 and consequently that he cannot do it4 ,ablard admits himself that this opinion is peculiar to him1 that hardly anyone shares in it1 that it seems contrary to the doctrine of the saints and to reason and derogatory to the greatness of ,god4 ,it appears that this author was a little too much inclined to speak and to think differently from others3 for in reality this was only a dispute about words3 he was changing the use of terms4 ,power and will are different faculties1 whose objects also are different2 it is confusing them to say that ,god can do only that which he wills4 ,on the contrary1 among various possibles1 he wills only that which he finds the best4 ,for all possibles are regarded as objects of power1 but actual and existing things are regarded as the objects of his decretory will4 ,ablard himself acknowledged it4 ,he raises this objection for himself3 a reprobate can be saved2 but he can only be saved if ,god saves him4 ,god can therefore save him1 and consequently do something that he does not4 ,ablard answers that it may indeed be said that this man can be saved in respect of the possibility of human nature1 which is capable of salvation3 but that it may not be said that ,god can save him in respect of ,god himself1 because it is impossible that ,god should do that which he#bcd must not do4 ,but ,ablard admits that it may very well be said in a sense1 speaking absolutely and setting aside the assumption of reprobation1 that such an one who is reprobate can be saved1 and that thus often that which ,god does not can be done4 ,he could therefore have spoken like the rest1 who mean nothing different when they say that ,god can save this man1 and that he can do that which he does not4 #agb4 ,the so-called necessity of ,wyclif1 which was condemned by the ,council of ,constance1 seems to arise simply from this same misunderstanding4 ,i think that men of talent do wrong to truth and to themselves when1 without reason1 they bring into use new and displeasing expressions4 ,in our own time the celebrated ,mr4 ,hobbes supported this same opinion1 that what does not happen is impossible4 ,he proves it by the statement that all the conditions requisite for a thing that shall not exist 7omnia rei non futurae requisita7 are never found together1 and that the thing cannot exist otherwise4 ,but who does not see that that only proves a hypothetical impossibility8 ,it is true that a thing cannot exist when a requisite condition for it is lacking4 ,but as we claim to be able to say that the thing can exist although it does not exist1 we claim in the same way to be able to say that the requisite conditions can exist although they do not exist4 ,thus ,mr4 ,hobbes's argument leaves the matter where it is4 ,the opinion which was held concerning ,mr4 ,hobbes1 that he taught an absolute necessity of all things1 brought upon him much discredit1 and would have done him harm even had it been his only error4 #agc4 ,spinoza went further3 he appears to have explicitly taught a blind necessity1 having denied to the ,author of ,things understanding and will1 and assuming that good and perfection relate to us only1 and not to him4 ,it is true that ,spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat obscure3 for he grants ,god thought1 after having divested him of understanding1 cogitationem1 non intellectum concedit ,deo4 ,there are even passages where he relents on the question of necessity4 ,nevertheless1 as far as one can understand him1 he acknowledges no goodness in ,god1 properly speaking1 and he teaches that all things exist through the necessity of the divine nature1 without any act of choice by ,god4 ,we will not waste time here in refuting an opinion so bad1 and indeed so inexplicable4 ,my own opinion is founded on the nature of the possibles1 that is1 of things that imply #bce no contradiction4 ,i do not think that a ,spinozist will say that all the romances one can imagine exist actually now1 or have existed1 or will still exist in some place in the universe4 ,yet one cannot deny that romances such as those of ,mademoiselle de ,scudry1 or as ,octavia1 are possible4 ,let us therefore bring up against him these words of ,m4 ,bayle1 which please me well1 on page #cij1 ',it is to-day'1 he says1 'a great embarrassment for the ,spinozists to see that1 according to their hypothesis1 it was as impossible from all eternity that ,spinoza1 for instance1 should not die at ,the ,hague1 as it is impossible for two and two to make six4 ,they are well aware that it is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine1 and a conclusion which disheartens1 affrights1 and stirs the mind to revolt1 because of the absurdity it involves1 diametrically opposed to common sense4 ,they are not well pleased that one should know they are subverting a maxim so universal and so evident as this one3 ,all that which implies contradiction is impossible1 and all that which implies no contradiction is possible4' #agd4 ,one may say of ,m4 ,bayle1 'ubi bene1 nemo melius'1 although one cannot say of him what was said of ,origen1 'ubi male1 nemo pejus'4 ,i will only add that what has just been indicated as a maxim is in fact the definition of the possible and the impossible4 ,m4 ,bayle1 however1 adds here towards the end a remark which somewhat spoils his eminently reasonable statement4 ',now what contradiction would there be if ,spinoza had died in ,leyden8 ,would ,nature then have been less perfect1 less wise1 less powerful8' ,he confuses here what is impossible because it implies contradiction with what cannot happen because it is not meet to be chosen4 ,it is true that there would have been no contradiction in the supposition that ,spinoza died in ,leyden and not at ,the ,hague2 there would have been nothing so possible3 the matter was therefore indifferent in respect of the power of ,god4 ,but one must not suppose that any event1 however small it be1 can be regarded as indifferent in respect of his wisdom and his goodness4 ,jesus ,christ has said divinely well that everything is numbered1 even to the hairs of our head4 ,thus the wisdom of ,god did not permit that this event whereof ,m4 ,bayle speaks should happen otherwise than it happened1 not as if by itself it would have been more deserving of choice1 but on account of its connexion with that entire sequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference4 ,to say that what has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of ,god1 and#bcf thence to infer that it is therefore not necessary1 is to make a false assumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion4 ,it is confusing what is necessary by moral necessity1 that is1 according to the principle of ,wisdom and ,goodness1 with what is so by metaphysical and brute necessity1 which occurs when the contrary implies contradiction4 ,spinoza1 moreover1 sought a metaphysical necessity in events4 ,he did not think that ,god was determined by his goodness and by his perfection 7which this author treated as chimeras in relation to the universe71 but by the necessity of his nature2 just as the semicircle is bound to enclose only right angles1 without either knowing or willing this4 ,for ,euclid demonstrated that all angles enclosed between two straight lines drawn from the extremities of the diameter towards a point on the circumference of the circle are of necessity right angles1 and that the contrary implies contradiction4 #age4 ,there are people who have gone to the other extreme3 under the pretext of freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they wished to regard it as altogether indifferent1 with an indifference of equipoise4 ,they did not take into account that just as metaphysical necessity is preposterous in relation to ,god's actions ad extra1 so moral necessity is worthy of him4 ,it is a happy necessity which obliges wisdom to do good1 whereas indifference with regard to good and evil would indicate a lack of goodness or of wisdom4 ,and besides1 the indifference which would keep the will in a perfect equipoise would itself be a chimera1 as has been already shown3 it would offend against the great principle of the determinant reason4 #agf4 ,those who believe that ,god established good and evil by an arbitrary decree are adopting that strange idea of mere indifference1 and other absurdities still stranger4 ,they deprive ,god of the designation good3 for what cause could one have to praise him for what he does1 if in doing something quite different he would have done equally well8 ,and ,i have very often been surprised that divers ,supralapsarian theologians1 as for instance ,samuel ,rutherford1 a ,professor of ,theology in ,scotland1 who wrote when the controversies with the ,remonstrants were at their height1 could have been deluded by so strange an idea4 ,rutherford 7in his ,exercitationes ,apologeticae pro ,gratia7 says positively that nothing is unjust or morally bad in ,god's eyes before he has forbidden it3 thus without this prohibition it would be a matter of indifference whether one murdered or saved a #bcg man1 loved ,god or hated him1 praised or blasphemed him4 ,nothing is so unreasonable as that4 ,one may teach that ,god established good and evil by a positive law1 or one may assert that there was something good and just before his decree1 but that he is not required to conform to it1 and that nothing prevents him from acting unjustly and from perhaps condemning innocence3 but it all comes to the same thing1 offering almost equal dishonour to ,god4 ,for if justice was established arbitrarily and without any cause1 if ,god came upon it by a kind of hazard1 as when one draws lots1 his goodness and his wisdom are not manifested in it1 and there is nothing at all to attach him to it4 ,if it is by a purely arbitrary decree1 without any reason1 that he has established or created what we call justice and goodness1 then he can annul them or change their nature4 ,thus one would have no reason to assume that he will observe them always1 as it would be possible to say he will observe them on the assumption that they are founded on reasons4 ,the same would hold good more or less if his justice were different from ours1 if 7for example7 it were written in his code that it is just to make the innocent eternally unhappy4 ,according to these principles also1 nothing would compel ,god to keep his word or would assure us of its fulfilment4 ,for why should the law of justice1 which states that reasonable promises must be kept1 be more inviolable for him than any other laws8 #agg4 ,all these three dogmas1 albeit a little different from one another1 namely1 7#a7 that the nature of justice is arbitrary1 7#b7 that it is fixed1 but it is not certain that ,god will observe it1 and finally 7#c7 that the justice we know is not that which he observes1 destroy the confidence in ,god that gives us tranquillity1 and the love of ,god that makes our happiness4 ,there is nothing to prevent such a ,god from behaving as a tyrant and an enemy of honest folk1 and from taking pleasure in that which we call evil4 ,why should he not1 then1 just as well be the evil principle of the ,manichaeans as the single good principle of the orthodox8 ,at least he would be neutral and1 as it were1 suspended between the two1 or even sometimes the one and sometimes the other4 ,that would be as if someone were to say that ,oromasdes and ,arimanius reign in turns1 according to which of the two is the stronger or the more adroit4 ,it is like the saying of a certain ,moghul woman4 ,she1 so it seems1 having heard it said that formerly under ,genghis ,khan and his successors her nation had had dominion over most #bch of the ,north and ,east1 told the ,muscovites recently1 when ,m4 ,isbrand went to ,china on behalf of the ,czar1 through the country of those ,tartars1 that the god of the ,moghuls had been driven from ,heaven1 but that one day he would take his own place again4 ,the true ,god is always the same3 natural religion itself demands that he be essentially as good and wise as he is powerful4 ,it is scarcely more contrary to reason and piety to say that ,god acts without cognition1 than to maintain that he has cognition which does not find the eternal rules of goodness and of justice among its objects1 or again to say that he has a will such as heeds not these rules4 #agh4 ,some theologians who have written of ,god's right over creatures appear to have conceded to him an unrestricted right1 an arbitrary and despotic power4 ,they thought that would be placing divinity on the most exalted level that may be imagined for it1 and that it would abase the creature before the ,creator to such an extent that the ,creator is bound by no laws of any kind with respect to the creature4 ,there are passages from ,twiss1 ,rutherford and some other ,supralapsarians which imply that ,god cannot sin whatever he may do1 because he is subject to no law4 ,m4 ,bayle himself considers that this doctrine is monstrous and contrary to the holiness of ,god 7,dictionary1 v4 ',paulicians'1 p4 #bccb in initio72 but ,i suppose that the intention of some of these writers was less bad than it seems to be4 ,apparently they meant by the term right1 ,greek3 anypeuthynian1 a state wherein one is responsible to none for one's actions4 ,but they will not have denied that ,god owes to himself what goodness and justice demand of him4 ,on that matter one may see ,m4 ,amyraut's ,apology for ,calvin3 it is true that ,calvin appears orthodox on this subject1 and that he is by no means one of the extreme ,supralapsarians4 #agi4 ,thus1 when ,m4 ,bayle says somewhere that ,st4 ,paul extricates himself from predestination only through the consideration of ,god's absolute right1 and the incomprehensibility of his ways1 it is implied that1 if one understood them1 one would find them consistent with justice1 ,god not being able to use his power otherwise4 ,st4 ,paul himself says that it is a depth1 but a depth of wisdom 7altitudo sapientiae71 and justice is included in the goodness of the ,all-wise4 ,i find that ,m4 ,bayle speaks very well elsewhere on the application of our notions of goodness to the actions of ,god 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #ha1 p4 #aci73 ',one must not assert here'1 he says1 'that the goodness of the #bci infinite ,being is not subject to the same rules as the goodness of the creature4 ,for if there is in ,god an attribute that can be called goodness1 the marks of goodness in general must apply to him4 ,now when we reduce goodness to the most general abstraction1 we find therein the will to do good4 ,divide and subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please this general goodness1 into infinite goodness1 finite goodness1 kingly goodness1 goodness of a father1 goodness of a husband1 goodness of a master1 you will find in each1 as an inseparable attribute1 the will to do good4' #ahj4 ,i find also that ,m4 ,bayle combats admirably the opinion of those who assert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary choice of ,god2 who suppose1 moreover1 that if ,god had been determined by the goodness of things themselves to act1 he would be entirely subjected to necessity in his actions1 a state incompatible with freedom4 ,that is confusing metaphysical necessity with moral necessity4 ,here is what ,m4 ,bayle says in objection to this error 7,reply1 ch4 #hi1 p4 #bjc73 ',the consequence of this doctrine will be1 that before ,god resolved upon creating the world he saw nothing better in virtue than in vice1 and that his ideas did not show him that virtue was more worthy of his love than vice4 ,that leaves no distinction between natural right and positive right2 there will no longer be anything unalterable or inevitable in morals2 it will have been just as possible for ,god to command people to be vicious as to command them to be virtuous2 and one will have no certainty that the moral laws will not one day be abrogated1 as the ceremonial laws of the ,jews were4 ,this1 in a word1 leads us straight to the belief that ,god was the free author1 not only of goodness and of virtue1 but also of truth and of the essence of things4 ,that is what certain of the ,cartesians assert1 and ,i confess that their opinion 7see the ,continuation of ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet1 p4 #eed7 might be of some avail in certain circumstances4 ,yet it is open to dispute for so many reasons1 and subject to consequences so troublesome 7see chapter #aeb of the same ,continuation7 that there are scarcely any extremes it were not better to suffer rather than plunge into that one4 ,it opens the door to the most exaggerated ,pyrrhonism3 for it leads to the assertion that this proposition1 three and three make six1 is only true where and during the time when it pleases ,god2 that it is perhaps false in some parts of the universe2 and that perhaps it will be so among men in the coming year4#bdj ,all that depends on the free will of ,god could have been limited to certain places and certain times1 like the ,judaic ceremonies4 ,this conclusion will be extended to all the laws of the ,decalogue1 if the actions they command are in their nature divested of all goodness to the same degree as the actions they forbid4' #aha4 ,to say that ,god1 having resolved to create man just as he is1 could not but have required of him piety1 sobriety1 justice and chastity1 because it is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or disturbing his work can please him1 that is to revert in effect to the common opinion4 ,virtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or prevent the imperfection of those who are virtuous1 or even of those who have to do with them4 ,and they have that power by their nature and by the nature of rational creatures1 before ,god decrees to create them4 ,to hold a different opinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of proportion and harmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because they occur in music only when one has resolved to sing or to play some instrument4 ,but that is exactly what is meant by being essential to good music3 for those rules belong to it already in the ideal state1 even when none yet thinks of singing1 since it is known that they must of necessity belong to it as soon as one shall sing4 ,in the same way virtues belong to the ideal state of the rational creature before ,god decrees to create it2 and it is for that very reason we maintain that virtues are good by their nature4 #ahb4 ,m4 ,bayle has inserted a special chapter in his ,continuation of ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet 7it is chapter #aeb7 where he shows 'that the ,christian ,doctors teach that there are things which are just antecedently to ,god's decrees'4 ,some theologians of the ,augsburg ,confession censured some of the ,reformed who appeared to be of a different opinion2 and this error was regarded as if it were a consequence of the absolute decree1 which doctrine seems to exempt the will of ,god from any kind of reason1 ubi stat pro ratione voluntas4 ,but1 as ,i have observed already on various occasions1 ,calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of ,god are in conformity with justice and wisdom1 although the reasons that might prove this conformity in detail are unknown to us4 ,thus1 according to him1 the rules of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of ,god4 ,m4 ,bayle1 in the same place1 quotes a passage from the celebrated ,m4 ,turretin which draws a distinction between natural divine laws and positive #bda divine laws4 ,moral laws are of the first kind and ceremonial of the second4 ,samuel ,desmarests1 a celebrated theologian formerly at ,groningen1 and ,herr ,strinesius1 who is still at ,frankfort on the ,oder1 advocated this same distinction2 and ,i think that it is the opinion most widely accepted even among the ,reformed4 ,thomas ,aquinas and all the ,thomists were of the same opinion1 with the bulk of the ,schoolmen and the theologians of the ,roman ,church4 ,the ,casuists also held to that idea3 ,i count ,grotius among the most eminent of them1 and he was followed in this point by his commentators4 ,herr ,pufendorf appeared to be of a different opinion1 which he insisted on maintaining in the face of censure from some theologians2 but he need not be taken into account1 not having advanced far enough in subjects of this kind4 ,he makes a vigorous protest against the absolute decree1 in his ,fecialis divinus1 and yet he approves what is worst in the opinions of the champions of this decree1 and without which this decree 7as others of the ,reformed explain7 becomes endurable4 ,aristotle was very orthodox on this matter of justice1 and the ,schoolmen followed him3 they distinguish1 just as ,cicero and the ,jurists do1 between perpetual right1 which is binding on all and everywhere1 and positive right1 which is only for certain times and certain peoples4 ,i once read with enjoyment the ,euthyphro of ,plato1 who makes ,socrates uphold the truth on that point1 and ,m4 ,bayle has called attention to the same passage4 #ahc4 ,m4 ,bayle himself upholds this truth with considerable force in a certain passage1 which it will be well to quote here in its entirety1 long as it is 7vol4 ,,ii of the ,continuation of ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet1 ch4 #aeb1 p4 #gga seqq473 ',according to the teaching of countless writers of importance'1 he says1 'there is in nature and in the essence of certain things a moral good or evil that precedes the divine decree4 ,they prove this doctrine principally through the frightful consequences that attend the opposite dogma4 ,thus from the proposition that to do wrong to no man would be a good action1 not in itself but by an arbitrary dispensation of ,god's will1 it would follow that ,god could have given to man a law directly opposed at all points to the commandments of the ,decalogue4 ,that is horrifying4 ,but here is a more direct proof1 one derived from metaphysics4 ,one thing is certain1 that the existence of ,god is not an effect of his will4 ,he exists not because he wills his existence1 but through the #bdb necessity of his infinite nature4 ,his power and his knowledge exist through the same necessity4 ,he is all-powerful1 he knows all things1 not because he wills it thus1 but because these are attributes necessarily identified with him4 ,the dominion of his will relates only to the exercise of his power1 he gives effect outside himself only to that which he wills1 and he leaves all the rest in the state of mere possibility4 ,thence it comes that this dominion extends only over the existence of creatures1 and not over their essential being4 ,god was able to create matter1 a man1 a circle1 or leave them in nothingness1 but he was not able to produce them without giving them their essential properties4 ,he had of necessity to make man a rational animal and to give the round shape to a circle1 since1 according to his eternal ideas1 independent of the free decrees of his will1 the essence of man lay in the properties of being animal and rational1 and since the essence of the circle lay in having a circumference equally distant from the centre as to all its parts4 ,this is what has caused the ,christian philosophers to acknowledge that the essences of things are eternal1 and that there are propositions of eternal truth2 consequently that the essences of things and the truth of the first principles are immutable4 ,that is to be understood not only of theoretical but also of practical first principles1 and of all the propositions that contain the true definition of creatures4 ,these essences and these truths emanate from the same necessity of nature as the knowledge of ,god4 ,since therefore it is by the nature of things that ,god exists1 that he is all-powerful1 and that he has perfect knowledge of all things1 it is also by the nature of things that matter1 the triangle1 man and certain actions of man1 etc41 have such and such properties essentially4 ,god saw from all eternity and in all necessity the essential relations of numbers1 and the identity of the subject and predicate in the propositions that contain the essence of each thing4 ,he saw likewise that the term just is included in these propositions3 to esteem what is estimable1 be grateful to one's benefactor1 fulfil the conditions of a contract1 and so on1 with many others relating to morals4 ,one is therefore justified in saying that the precepts of natural law assume the reasonableness and justice of that which is enjoined1 and that it would be man's duty to practise what they contain even though ,god should have been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in that respect4 ,pray observe that in going back with our visionary thoughts to that ideal moment when ,god has yet decreed nothing1 we find in the #bdc ideas of ,god the principles of morals under terms that imply an obligation4 ,we understand these maxims as certain1 and derived from the eternal and immutable order3 it beseems the rational creature to conform to reason2 a rational creature conforming to reason is to be commended1 but not conforming thereto is blameworthy4 ,you would not dare to deny that these truths impose upon man a duty in relation to all acts which are in conformity with strict reason1 such as these3 one must esteem all that is estimable2 render good for good2 do wrong to no man2 honour one's father2 render to every man that which is his due1 etc4 ,now since by the very nature of things1 and before the divine laws1 the truths of morality impose upon man certain duties1 ,thomas ,aquinas and ,grotius were justified in saying that if there were no ,god we should nevertheless be obliged to conform to natural law4 ,others have said that even supposing all rational beings in existence were to perish1 true propositions would remain true4 ,cajetan maintained that if he remained alone in the universe1 all other things without any exception having been destroyed1 the knowledge that he had of the nature of a rose would nevertheless subsist4' #ahd4 ,the late ,jacob ,thomasius1 a celebrated ,professor at ,leipzig1 made the apt observation in his elucidations of the philosophic rules of ,daniel ,stahl1 a ,jena professor1 that it is not advisable to go altogether beyond ,god1 and that one must not say1 with some ,scotists1 that the eternal verities would exist even though there were no understanding1 not even that of ,god4 ,for it is1 in my judgement1 the divine understanding which gives reality to the eternal verities1 albeit ,god's will have no part therein4 ,all reality must be founded on something existent4 ,it is true that an atheist may be a geometrician3 but if there were no ,god1 geometry would have no object4 ,and without ,god1 not only would there be nothing existent1 but there would be nothing possible4 ,that1 however1 does not hinder those who do not see the connexion of all things one with another and with ,god from being able to understand certain sciences1 without knowing their first source1 which is in ,god4 ,aristotle1 although he also scarcely knew that source1 nevertheless said something of the same kind which was very apposite4 ,he acknowledged that the principles of individual forms of knowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives the reason for them2 and this superior knowledge must have being1 and consequently ,god1 the#bdd source of being1 for its object4 ,herr ,dreier of ,knigsberg has aptly observed that the true metaphysics which ,aristotle sought1 and which he called ,greek3 tn ztoumenn1 his desideratum1 was theology4 #ahe4 ,yet the same ,m4 ,bayle1 who says so much that is admirable in order to prove that the rules of goodness and justice1 and the eternal verities in general1 exist by their nature1 and not by an arbitrary choice of ,god1 has spoken very hesitatingly about them in another passage 7,continuation of ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet1 vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 #aad1 towards the end74 ,after having given an account of the opinion of ,m4 ,descartes and a section of his followers1 who maintain that ,god is the free cause of truths and of essences1 he adds 7p4 #eed73 ',i have done all that ,i could to gain true understanding of this dogma and to find the solution of the difficulties surrounding it4 ,i confess to you quite simply that ,i still cannot properly fathom it4 ,that does not discourage me2 ,i suppose1 as other philosophers in other cases have supposed1 that time will unfold the meaning of this noble paradox4 ,i wish that ,father ,malebranche had thought fit to defend it1 but he took other measures4' ,is it possible that the enjoyment of doubt can have such influence upon a gifted man as to make him wish and hope for the power to believe that two contradictories never exist together for the sole reason that ,god forbade them to1 and1 moreover1 that ,god could have issued them an order to ensure that they always walked together8 ,there is indeed a noble paradox6 ,father ,malebranche showed great wisdom in taking other measures4 #ahf4 ,i cannot even imagine that ,m4 ,descartes can have been quite seriously of this opinion1 although he had adherents who found this easy to believe1 and would in all simplicity follow him where he only made pretence to go4 ,it was apparently one of his tricks1 one of his philosophic feints3 he prepared for himself some loophole1 as when for instance he discovered a trick for denying the movement of the earth1 while he was a ,copernican in the strictest sense4 ,i suspect that he had in mind here another extraordinary manner of speaking1 of his own invention1 which was to say that affirmations and negations1 and acts of inner judgement in general1 are operations of the will4 ,through this artifice the eternal verities1 which until the time of ,descartes had been named an object of the divine understanding1 suddenly became an object of ,god's will4 ,now the acts of his will are free1 therefore ,god is the free cause of the verities4 ,that #bde is the outcome of the matter4 ,spectatum admissi4 ,a slight change in the meaning of terms has caused all this commotion4 ,but if the affirmations of necessary truths were actions of the will of the most perfect mind1 these actions would be anything but free1 for there is nothing to choose4 ,it seems that ,m4 ,descartes did not declare himself sufficiently on the nature of freedom1 and that his conception of it was somewhat unusual3 for he extended it so far that he even held the affirmations of necessary truths to be free in ,god4 ,that was preserving only the name of freedom4 #ahg4 ,m4 ,bayle1 who with others conceives this to be a freedom of indifference1 that ,god had had to establish 7for instance7 the truths of numbers1 and to ordain that three times three made nine1 whereas he could have commanded them to make ten1 imagines in this strange opinion1 supposing it were possible to defend it1 some kind of advantage gained against the ,stratonists4 ,strato was one of the leaders of the ,school of ,aristotle1 and the successor of ,theophrastus2 he maintained 7according to ,cicero's account7 that this world had been formed such as it is by ,nature or by a necessary cause devoid of cognition4 ,i admit that that might be so1 if ,god had so preformed matter as to cause such an effect by the laws of motion alone4 ,but without ,god there would not even have been any reason for existence1 and still less for any particular existence of things3 thus ,strato's system is not to be feared4 #ahh4 ,nevertheless ,m4 ,bayle is in difficulties over this3 he will not admit plastic natures devoid of cognition1 which ,mr4 ,cudworth and others had introduced1 for fear that the modern ,stratonists1 that is1 the ,spinozists1 take advantage of it4 ,this has involved him in disputes with ,m4 le ,clerc4 ,under the influence of this error1 that a non-intelligent cause can produce nothing where contrivance appears1 he is far from conceding to me that preformation which produces naturally the organs of animals1 and the system of a harmony pre-established by ,god in bodies1 to make them respond in accordance with their own laws to the thoughts and the wills of souls4 ,but it ought to have been taken into account that this non-intelligent cause1 which produces such beautiful things in the grains and seeds of plants and animals1 and effects the actions of bodies as the will ordains them1 was formed by the hand of ,god3 and ,god is infinitely more skilful than a watchmaker1 who himself makes machines and automata that are #bdf capable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessed intelligence4 #ahi4 ,now to come to ,m4 ,bayle's apprehensions concerning the ,stratonists1 in case one should admit truths that are not dependent upon the will of ,god3 he seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us of the perfect regularity of the eternal verities4 ,since this regularity springs only from the nature and necessity of things1 without being directed by any cognition1 ,m4 ,bayle fears that one might with ,strato thence infer that the world also could have become regular through a blind necessity4 ,but it is easy to answer that4 ,in the region of the eternal verities are found all the possibles1 and consequently the regular as well as the irregular3 there must be a reason accounting for the preference for order and regularity1 and this reason can only be found in understanding4 ,moreover these very truths can have no existence without an understanding to take cognizance of them2 for they would not exist if there were no divine understanding wherein they are realized1 so to speak4 ,hence ,strato does not attain his end1 which is to exclude cognition from that which enters into the origin of things4 #aij4 ,the difficulty that ,m4 ,bayle has imagined in connexion with ,strato seems a little too subtle and far-fetched4 ,that is termed3 timere1 ubi non est timor4 ,he makes another difficulty1 which has just as slight a foundation1 namely1 that ,god would be subjected to a kind of fatum4 ,here are his words 7p4 #eee73 ',if they are propositions of eternal truth1 which are such by their nature and not by ,god's institution1 if they are not true by a free decree of his will1 but if on the contrary he has recognized them as true of necessity1 because such was their nature1 there is a kind of fatum to which he is subjected2 there is an absolutely insurmountable natural necessity4 ,thence comes also the result that the divine understanding in the infinity of its ideas has always and at the outset hit upon their perfect conformity with their objects1 without the guidance of any cognition2 for it would be a contradiction to say that any exemplary cause had served as a plan for the acts of ,god's understanding4 ,one would never that way find eternal ideas or any first intelligence4 ,one must say1 then1 that a nature which exists of necessity always finds its way1 without any need for it to be shown4 ,how then shall we overcome the obstinacy of a ,stratonist8' #aia4 ,but again it is easy to answer4 ,this so-called fatum1 which #bdg binds even the ,divinity1 is nothing but ,god's own nature1 his own understanding1 which furnishes the rules for his wisdom and his goodness2 it is a happy necessity1 without which he would be neither good nor wise4 ,is it to be desired that ,god should not be bound to be perfect and happy8 ,is our condition1 which renders us liable to fail1 worth envying8 ,and should we not be well pleased to exchange it for sinlessness1 if that depended upon us8 ,one must be indeed weary of life to desire the freedom to destroy oneself and to pity the ,divinity for not having that freedom4 ,m4 ,bayle himself reasons thus elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an extravagant freedom which they assume in the will1 when they would make the will independent of reason4 #aib4 ,moreover1 ,m4 ,bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in the infinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect conformity with their objects1 without the guidance of any cognition'4 ,this objection is null and void4 ,every distinct idea is1 through its distinctness1 in conformity with its object1 and in ,god there are distinct ideas only4 ,at first1 moreover1 the object exists nowhere2 but when it comes into existence1 it will be formed according to this idea4 ,besides1 ,m4 ,bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no need of time for seeing the connexion of things4 ,all trains of reasoning are in ,god in a transcendent form1 and they preserve an order amongst them in his understanding1 as well as in ours3 but with him it is only an order and a priority of nature1 whereas with us there is a priority of time4 ,it is therefore not to be wondered at that he who penetrates all things at one stroke should always strike true at the outset2 and it must not be said that he succeeds without the guidance of any cognition4 ,on the contrary1 it is because his knowledge is perfect that his voluntary actions are also perfect4 #aic4 ,up to now ,i have shown that the ,will of ,god is not independent of the rules of ,wisdom1 although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one should have been constrained to argue about it1 and to do battle for a truth so great and so well established4 ,but it is hardly less surprising that there should be people who believe that ,god only half observes these rules1 and does not choose the best1 although his wisdom causes him to recognize it2 and1 in a word1 that there should be writers who hold that ,god could have done better4 ,that is more or less the error of the famous ,alfonso1 ,king of ,castile1 who was elected ,king of the ,romans by #bdh certain ,electors1 and originated the astronomical tables that bear his name4 ,this prince is reported to have said that if ,god in making the world had consulted him he would have given ,god good advice4 ,apparently the ,ptolemaic system1 which prevailed at that time1 was displeasing to him4 ,he believed therefore that something better planned could have been made1 and he was right4 ,but if he had known the system of ,copernicus1 with the discoveries of ,kepler1 now extended by knowledge of the gravity of the planets1 he would indeed have confessed that the contrivance of the true system is marvellous4 ,we see1 therefore1 that here the question concerned the more or less only2 ,alfonso maintained that better could have been done1 and his opinion was censured by everyone4 #aid4 ,yet philosophers and theologians dare to support dogmatically such a belief2 and ,i have many times wondered that gifted and pious persons should have been capable of setting bounds to the goodness and the perfection of ,god4 ,for to assert that he knows what is best1 that he can do it and that he does it not1 is to avow that it rested with his will only to make the world better than it is2 but that is what one calls lacking goodness4 ,it is acting against that axiom already quoted3 ,minus bonum habet rationem mali4 ,if some adduce experience to prove that ,god could have done better1 they set themselves up as ridiculous critics of his works4 ,to such will be given the answer given to all those who criticize ,god's course of action1 and who from this same assumption1 that is1 the alleged defects of the world1 would infer that there is an evil ,god1 or at least a ,god neutral between good and evil4 ,and if we hold the same opinion as ,king ,alfonso1 we shall1 ,i say1 receive this answer3 ,you have known the world only since the day before yesterday1 you see scarce farther than your nose1 and you carp at the world4 ,wait until you know more of the world and consider therein especially the parts which present a complete whole 7as do organic bodies72 and you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending all imagination4 ,let us thence draw conclusions as to the wisdom and the goodness of the author of things1 even in things that we know not4 ,we find in the universe some things which are not pleasing to us2 but let us be aware that it is not made for us alone4 ,it is nevertheless made for us if we are wise3 it will serve us if we use it for our service2 we shall be happy in it if we wish to be4 #bdi #aie4 ,someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best1 because there is no perfect creature1 and that it is always possible to produce one which would be more perfect4 ,i answer that what can be said of a creature or of a particular substance1 which can always be surpassed by another1 is not to be applied to the universe1 which1 since it must extend through all future eternity1 is an infinity4 ,moreover1 there is an infinite number of creatures in the smallest particle of matter1 because of the actual division of the continuum to infinity4 ,and infinity1 that is to say1 the accumulation of an infinite number of substances1 is1 properly speaking1 not a whole any more than the infinite number itself1 whereof one cannot say whether it is even or uneven4 ,that is just what serves to confute those who make of the world a ,god1 or who think of ,god as the ,soul of the world2 for the world or the universe cannot be regarded as an animal or as a substance4 #aif4 ,it is therefore not a question of a creature1 but of the universe2 and the adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible universe may be better than the other1 to infinity2 but there he would be mistaken1 and it is that which he cannot prove4 ,if this opinion were true1 it would follow that ,god had not produced any universe at all3 for he is incapable of acting without reason1 and that would be even acting against reason4 ,it is as if one were to suppose that ,god had decreed to make a material sphere1 with no reason for making it of any particular size4 ,this decree would be useless1 it would carry with it that which would prevent its effect4 ,it would be quite another matter if ,god decreed to draw from a given point one straight line to another given straight line1 without any determination of the angle1 either in the decree or in its circumstances4 ,for in this case the determination would spring from the nature of the thing1 the line would be perpendicular1 and the angle would be right1 since that is all that is determined and distinguishable4 ,it is thus one must think of the creation of the best of all possible universes1 all the more since ,god not only decrees to create a universe1 but decrees also to create the best of all4 ,for ,god decrees nothing without knowledge1 and he makes no separate decrees1 which would be nothing but antecedent acts of will3 and these we have sufficiently explained1 distinguishing them from genuine decrees4 #aig4 ,m4 ,diroys1 whom ,i knew in ,rome1 theologian to ,cardinal d',estres1 wrote a book entitled ,proofs and ,assumptions in ,favour of the #bej ,christian ,religion1 published in ,paris in the year #afhc4 ,m4 ,bayle 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #afe1 p4 #ajeh7 recounts this objection brought up by ,m4 ,diroys3 ',there is one more difficulty'1 he says1 'which it is no less important to meet than those given earlier1 since it causes more trouble to those who judge goods and evils by considerations founded on the purest and most lofty maxims4 ,this is that ,god being the supreme wisdom and goodness1 it seems to them that he ought to do all things as wise and virtuous persons would wish them to be done1 following the rules of wisdom and of goodness which ,god has imprinted in them1 and as they would be obliged themselves to do these things if they depended upon them4 ,thus1 seeing that the affairs of the world do not go so well as1 in their opinion1 they might go1 and as they would go if they interfered themselves1 they conclude that ,god1 who is infinitely better and wiser than they1 or rather wisdom and goodness itself1 does not concern himself with these affairs4' #aih4 ,m4 ,diroys makes some apt remarks concerning this1 which ,i will not repeat1 since ,i have sufficiently answered the objection in more than one passage1 and that has been the chief end of all my discourse4 ,but he makes one assertion with which ,i cannot agree4 ,he claims that the objection proves too much4 ,one must again quote his own words with ,m4 ,bayle1 p4 #ajei3 ',if it does not behove the supreme ,wisdom and ,goodness to fail to do what is best and most perfect1 it follows that all ,beings are eternally1 immutably and essentially as perfect and as good as they can be1 since nothing can change except by passing either from a state less good to a better1 or from a better to a less good4 ,now that cannot happen if it does not behove ,god to fail to do that which is best and most perfect1 when he can do it4 ,it will therefore be necessary that all beings be eternally and essentially filled with a knowledge and a virtue as perfect as ,god can give them4 ,now all that which is eternally and essentially as perfect as ,god can make it proceeds essentially from him2 in a word1 is eternally and essentially good as he is1 and consequently it is ,god1 as he is4 ,that is the bearing of this maxim1 that it is repugnant to supreme justice and goodness not to make things as good and perfect as they can be4 ,for it is essential to essential wisdom and goodness to banish all that is repugnant to it altogether4 ,one must therefore assert as a primary truth concerning the conduct of ,god in relation to creatures that there is nothing repugnant to this goodness and this wisdom in making things less perfect than #bea they could be1 or in permitting the goods that it has produced either completely to cease to be or to change and deteriorate4 ,for it causes no offence to ,god that there should be other ,beings than he1 that is beings who can be not what they are1 and do not what they do or do what they do not4' #aii4 ,m4 ,bayle calls this answer paltry1 but ,i find his counter-objection involved4 ,m4 ,bayle will have those who are for the two principles to take their stand chiefly on the assumption of the supreme freedom of ,god3 for if he were compelled to produce all that which he can1 he would produce also sins and sorrows4 ,thus the ,dualists could from the existence of evil conclude nothing contrary to the oneness of the principle1 if this principle were as much inclined to evil as to good4 ,there ,m4 ,bayle carries the notion of freedom too far3 for even though ,god be supremely free1 it does not follow that he maintains an indifference of equipoise3 and even though he be inclined to act1 it does not follow that he is compelled by this inclination to produce all that which he can4 ,he will produce only that which he wills1 for his inclination prompts him to good4 ,i admit the supreme freedom of ,god1 but ,i do not confuse it with indifference of equipoise1 as if he could act without reason4 ,m4 ,diroys therefore imagines that the ,dualists1 in their insistence that the single good principle produce no evil1 ask too much2 for by the same reason1 according to ,m4 ,diroys1 they ought also to ask that he should produce the greatest good1 the less good being a kind of evil4 ,i hold that the ,dualists are wrong in respect of the first point1 and that they would be right in respect of the second1 where ,m4 ,diroys blames them without cause2 or rather that one can reconcile the evil1 or the less good1 in some parts with the best in the whole4 ,if the ,dualists demanded that ,god should do the best1 they would not be demanding too much4 ,they are mistaken rather in claiming that the best in the whole should be free from evil in the parts1 and that therefore what ,god has made is not the best4 #bjj4 ,but ,m4 ,diroys maintains that if ,god always produces the best he will produce other ,gods2 otherwise each substance that he produced would not be the best nor the most perfect4 ,but he is mistaken1 through not taking into account the order and connexion of things4 ,if each substance taken separately were perfect1 all would be alike2 which is neither fitting nor possible4 ,if they were ,gods1 it would not have been possible to #beb produce them4 ,the best system of things will therefore not contain ,gods2 it will always be a system of bodies 7that is1 things arranged according to time and place7 and of souls which represent and are aware of bodies1 and in accordance with which bodies are in great measure directed4 ,so1 as the design of a building may be the best of all in respect of its purpose1 of expense and of circumstances2 and as an arrangement of some figured representations of bodies which is given to you may be the best that one can find1 it is easy to imagine likewise that a structure of the universe may be the best of all1 without becoming a god4 ,the connexion and order of things brings it about that the body of every animal and of every plant is composed of other animals and of other plants1 or of other living and organic beings2 consequently there is subordination1 and one body1 one substance serves the other3 thus their perfection cannot be equal4 #bja4 ,m4 ,bayle thinks 7p4 #ajfc7 that ,m4 ,diroys has confused two different propositions4 ,according to the one1 ,god must do all things as wise and virtuous persons would wish that they should be done1 by the rules of wisdom and of goodness that ,god has imprinted in them1 and as they would be obliged themselves to do them if those things depended upon them4 ,the other is that it is not consistent with supreme wisdom and goodness to fail to do what is best and most perfect4 ,m4 ,diroys 7in ,m4 ,bayle's opinion7 sets up the first proposition as an objection for himself1 and replies to the second4 ,but therein he is justified1 as it seems to me4 ,for these two propositions are connected1 the second is a result of the first3 to do less good than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness4 ,to be the best1 and to be desired by those who are most virtuous and wise1 comes to the same thing4 ,and it may be said that1 if we could understand the structure and the economy of the universe1 we should find that it is made and directed as the wisest and most virtuous could wish it1 since ,god cannot fail to do thus4 ,this necessity nevertheless is only of a moral nature3 and ,i admit that if ,god were forced by a metaphysical necessity to produce that which he makes1 he would produce all the possibles1 or nothing2 and in this sense ,m4 ,bayle's conclusion would be fully correct4 ,but as all the possibles are not compatible together in one and the same world-sequence1 for that very reason all the possibles cannot be produced1 and it must be said that ,god is not forced1 metaphysically speaking1 #bec into the creation of this world4 ,one may say that as soon as ,god has decreed to create something there is a struggle between all the possibles1 all of them laying claim to existence1 and that those which1 being united1 produce most reality1 most perfection1 most significance carry the day4 ,it is true that all this struggle can only be ideal1 that is to say1 it can only be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding1 which cannot fail to act in the most perfect way1 and consequently to choose the best4 ,yet ,god is bound by a moral necessity1 to make things in such a manner that there can be nothing better3 otherwise not only would others have cause to criticize what he makes1 but1 more than that1 he would not himself be satisfied with his work1 he would blame himself for its imperfection2 and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the divine nature4 ,this perpetual sense of his own fault or imperfection would be to him an inevitable source of grief1 as ,m4 ,bayle says on another occasion 7p4#iec74 #bjb4 ,m4 ,diroys' argument contains a false assumption1 in his statement that nothing can change except by passing from a state less good to a better or from a better to a less good2 and that thus1 if ,god makes the best1 what he has produced cannot be changed3 it would be an eternal substance1 a god4 ,but ,i do not see why a thing cannot change its kind in relation to good or evil1 without changing its degree4 ,in the transition from enjoyment of music to enjoyment of painting1 or vice versa from the pleasure of the eyes to that of the ears1 the degree of enjoyment may remain the same1 the latter gaining no advantage over the former save that of novelty4 ,if the quadrature of the circle should come to pass or 7what is the same thing7 the circulature of the square1 that is1 if the circle were changed into a square of the same size1 or the square into a circle1 it would be difficult to say1 on the whole1 without having regard to some special use1 whether one would have gained or lost4 ,thus the best may be changed into another which neither yields to it nor surpasses it3 but there will always be an order among them1 and that the best order possible4 ,taking the whole sequence of things1 the best has no equal2 but one part of the sequence may be equalled by another part of the same sequence4 ,besides it might be said that the whole sequence of things to infinity may be the best possible1 although what exists all through the universe in each portion of time be not the best4 ,it might be therefore that the universe became even #bed better and better1 if the nature of things were such that it was not permitted to attain to the best all at once4 ,but these are problems of which it is hard for us to judge4 #bjc4 ,m4 ,bayle says 7p4 #ajfd7 that the question whether ,god could have made things more perfect than he made them is also very difficult1 and that the reasons for and against are very strong4 ,but it is1 so it seems to me1 as if one were to question whether ,god's actions are consistent with the most perfect wisdom and the greatest goodness4 ,it is a very strange thing1 that by changing the terms a little one throws doubt upon what is1 if properly understood1 as clear as anything can be4 ,the reasons to the contrary have no force1 being founded only on the semblance of defects2 and ,m4 ,bayle's objection1 which tends to prove that the law of the best would impose upon ,god a true metaphysical necessity1 is only an illusion that springs from the misuse of terms4 ,m4 ,bayle formerly held a different opinion1 when he commended that of ,father ,malebranche1 which was akin to mine on this subject4 ,but ,m4 ,arnauld having written in opposition to ,father ,malebranche1 ,m4 ,bayle altered his opinion2 and ,i suppose that his tendency towards doubt1 which increased in him with the years1 was conducive to that result4 ,m4 ,arnauld was doubtless a great man1 and his authority has great weight3 he made sundry good observations in his writings against ,father ,malebranche1 but he was not justified in contesting those of his statements that were akin to mine on the rule of the best4 #bjd4 ,the excellent author of ,the ,search for ,truth1 having passed from philosophy to theology1 published finally an admirable treatise on ,nature and ,grace4 ,here he showed in his way 7as ,m4 ,bayle explained in his ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet1 ch4 #bcd7 that the events which spring from the enforcement of general laws are not the object of a particular will of ,god4 ,it is true that when one wills a thing one wills also in a sense everything that is necessarily attached to it1 and in consequence ,god cannot will general laws without also willing in a sense all the particular effects that must of necessity be derived from them4 ,but it is always true that these particular events are not willed for their own sake1 and that is what is meant by the expression that they are not willed by a particular and direct will4 ,there is no doubt that when ,god resolved to act outside himself1 he made choice of a manner of action which should be worthy #bee of the supremely perfect ,being1 that is1 which should be infinitely simple and uniform1 but yet of an infinite productivity4 ,one may even suppose that this manner of action by general acts of will appeared to him preferable--although there must thence result some superfluous events 7and even bad if they are taken separately1 that is my own addition7--to another manner more composed and more regular2 such is ,father ,malebranche's opinion4 ,nothing is more appropriate than this assumption 7according to the opinion of ,m4 ,bayle1 when he wrote his ,divers ,thoughts on the ,comet7 to solve a thousand difficulties which are brought up against divine providence3 ',to ask ,god'1 he says1 'why he has made things which serve to render men more wicked1 that would be to ask why ,god has carried out his plan 7which can only be of infinite beauty7 by the simplest and most uniform methods1 and why1 by a complexity of decrees that would unceasingly cut across one another1 he has not prevented the wrong use of man's free will4' ,he adds 'that miracles being particular acts of will must have an end worthy of ,god'4 #bje4 ,on these foundations he makes some good reflexions 7ch4 #bca7 concerning the injustice of those who complain of the prosperity of the wicked4 ',i shall have no scruples'1 he says1 'about saying that all those who are surprised at the prosperity of the wicked have pondered very little upon the nature of ,god1 and that they have reduced the obligations of a cause which directs all things1 to the scope of a providence altogether subordinate2 and that is small-minded4 ,what then6 ,should ,god1 after having made free causes and necessary causes1 in a mixture infinitely well fitted to show forth the wonders of his infinite wisdom1 have established laws consistent with the nature of free causes1 but so lacking in firmness that the slightest trouble that came upon a man would overthrow them entirely1 to the ruin of human freedom8 ,a mere city governor will become an object of ridicule if he changes his regulations and orders as often as someone is pleased to murmur against him4 ,and shall ,god1 whose laws concern a good so universal that all of the world that is visible to us perchance enters into it as no more than a trifling accessary1 be bound to depart from his laws1 because they to-day displease the one and to-morrow the other8 ,or again because a superstitious person1 deeming wrongly that a monstrosity presages something deadly1 proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice8 ,or because a good soul1 who yet does not value virtue highly enough to #bef believe that to have none is punishment enough in itself1 is shocked that a wicked man should become rich and enjoy vigorous health8 ,can one form any falser notions of a universal providence8 ,everyone agrees that this law of nature1 the strong prevails over the weak1 has been very wisely laid down1 and that it would be absurd to maintain that when a stone falls on a fragile vase which is the delight of its owner1 ,god should depart from this law in order to spare that owner vexation4 ,should one then not confess that it is just as absurd to maintain that ,god must depart from the same law to prevent a wicked man from growing rich at the expense of a good man8 ,the more the wicked man sets himself above the promptings of conscience and of honour1 the more does he exceed the good man in strength1 so that if he comes to grips with the good man he must1 according to the course of nature1 ruin him4 ,if1 moreover1 they are both engaged in the business of finance1 the wicked man must1 according to the same course of nature1 grow richer than the good man1 just as a fierce fire consumes more wood than a fire of straw4 ,those who would wish sickness for a wicked man are sometimes as unfair as those who would wish that a stone falling on a glass should not break it3 for his organs being arranged as they are1 neither the food that he takes nor the air that he breathes can1 according to natural laws1 be detrimental to his health4 ,therefore those who complain about his health complain of ,god's failure to violate the laws which he has established4 ,and in this they are all the more unfair because1 through combinations and concatenations which were in the power of ,god alone1 it happens often enough that the course of nature brings about the punishment of sin4' #bjf4 ,it is a thousand pities that ,m4 ,bayle so soon quitted the way he had so auspiciously begun1 of reasoning on behalf of providence3 for his work would have been fruitful1 and in saying fine things he would have said good things as well4 ,i agree with ,father ,malebranche that ,god does things in the way most worthy of him4 ,but ,i go a little further than he1 with regard to 'general and particular acts of will'4 ,as ,god can do nothing without reasons1 even when he acts miraculously1 it follows that he has no will about individual events but what results from some general truth or will4 ,thus ,i would say that ,god never has a particular will such as this ,father implies1 that is to say1 a particular primitive will4 #beg #bjg4 ,i think even that miracles have nothing to distinguish them from other events in this regard3 for reasons of an order superior to that of ,nature prompt ,god to perform them4 ,thus ,i would not say1 with this ,father1 that ,god departs from general laws whenever order requires it3 he departs from one law only for another law more applicable1 and what order requires cannot fail to be in conformity with the rule of order1 which is one of the general laws4 ,the distinguishing mark of miracles 7taken in the strictest sense7 is that they cannot be accounted for by the natures of created things4 ,that is why1 should ,god make a general law causing bodies to be attracted the one to the other1 he could only achieve its operation by perpetual miracles4 ,and likewise1 if ,god willed that the organs of human bodies should conform to the will of the soul1 according to the system of occasional causes1 this law also would come into operation only through perpetual miracles4 #bjh4 ,thus one must suppose that1 among the general rules which are not absolutely necessary1 ,god chooses those which are the most natural1 which it is easiest to explain1 and which also are of greatest service for the explanation of other things4 ,that is doubtless the conclusion most excellent and most pleasing2 and even though the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony were not necessary otherwise1 because it banishes superfluous miracles1 ,god would have chosen it as being the most harmonious4 ,the ways of ,god are those most simple and uniform3 for he chooses rules that least restrict one another4 ,they are also the most productive in proportion to the simplicity of ways and means4 ,it is as if one said that a certain house was the best that could have been constructed at a certain cost4 ,one may1 indeed1 reduce these two conditions1 simplicity and productivity1 to a single advantage1 which is to produce as much perfection as is possible3 thus ,father ,malebranche's system in this point amounts to the same as mine4 ,even if the effect were assumed to be greater1 but the process less simple1 ,i think one might say that1 when all is said and done1 the effect itself would be less great1 taking into account not only the final effect but also the mediate effect4 ,for the wisest mind so acts1 as far as it is possible1 that the means are also in a sense ends1 that is1 they are desirable not only on account of what they do1 but on account of what they are4 ,the more intricate processes take up too much ground1 too much space1 too much place1 too much time that might have been better employed4 #beh #bji4 ,now since everything resolves itself into this greatest perfection1 we return to my law of the best4 ,for perfection includes not only the moral good and the physical good of intelligent creatures1 but also the good which is purely metaphysical1 and concerns also creatures devoid of reason4 ,it follows that the evil that is in rational creatures happens only by concomitance1 not by antecedent will but by a consequent will1 as being involved in the best possible plan2 and the metaphysical good which includes everything makes it necessary sometimes to admit physical evil and moral evil1 as ,i have already explained more than once4 ,it so happens that the ancient ,stoics were not far removed from this system4 ,m4 ,bayle remarked upon this himself in his ,dictionary in the article on ',chrysippus'1 rem4 ,t4 ,it is of importance to give his own words1 in order sometimes to face him with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentiments that he had formerly pronounced3 ',chrysippus'1 he says 7p4 #icj71 'in his work on ,providence examined amongst other questions this one3 ,did the nature of things1 or the providence that made the world and the human kind1 make also the diseases to which men are subject8 ,he answers that the chief design of ,nature was not to make them sickly1 that would not be in keeping with the cause of all good2 but ,nature1 in preparing and producing many great things excellently ordered and of great usefulness1 found that some drawbacks came as a result1 and thus these were not in conformity with the original design and purpose2 they came about as a sequel to the work1 they existed only as consequences4 ,for the formation of the human body1 ,chrysippus said1 the finest idea as well as the very utility of the work demanded that the head should be composed of a tissue of thin1 fine bones2 but because of that it was bound to have the disadvantage of not being able to resist blows4 ,nature made health1 and at the same time it was necessary by a kind of concomitance that the source of diseases should be opened up4 ,the same thing applies with regard to virtue2 the direct action of ,nature1 which brought it forth1 produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices4 ,i have not translated literally1 for which reason ,i give here the actual ,latin of ,aulus ,gellius1 for the benefit of those who understand that language 7,aul4 ,gellius1 lib4 #f1 cap4 #a73 ,idem ,chrysippus in eod4 lib4 7quarto1 ,greek3 peri pronoias7 tractat consideratque1 dignumque esse id quaeri putat1 ,greek3 ei hai tn anthrpn nosoi kata physin gignontai4 ,id est1 naturane ipsa rerum1 vel providentia quae compagem hanc mundi et #bei genus hominum fecit1 morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum1 quas patiuntur homines1 fecerit4 ,existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium1 ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios4 ,nunquam enim hoc convenisse naturae auctori parentique rerum omnium bonarum4 ,sed quum multa1 inquit1 atque magna gigneret1 pareretque aptissima et utilissima1 alia quoque simul agnata sunt incommoda iis ipsis1 quae faciebat1 cohaerentia3 eaque non per naturam1 sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit1 quod ipse appellat ,greek3 kata parakolouthsin4 ,sicut1 inquit1 quum corpora hominum natura fingeret1 ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis postulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret4 ,sed hanc utilitatem rei majoris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est1 ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque parvis fragile4 ,proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt1 dum salus paritur4 ,sic ,hercle1 inquit1 dum virtus hominibus per consilium naturae gignitur1 vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam nata sunt4 ,i do not think that a pagan could have said anything more reasonable1 considering his ignorance of the first man's fall1 the knowledge of which has only reached us through revelation1 and which indeed is the true cause of our miseries4 ,if we had sundry like extracts from the works of ,chrysippus1 or rather if we had his works1 we should have a more favourable idea than we have of the beauty of his genius4' #baj4 ,let us now see the reverse of the medal in the altered ,m4 ,bayle4 ,after having quoted in his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aee1 p4 #ifb7 these words of ,m4 ,jacquelot1 which are much to my liking3 ',to change the order of the universe is something of infinitely greater consequence than the prosperity of a good man1' he adds3 ',this thought has something dazzling about it3 ,father ,malebranche has placed it in the best possible light2 and he has persuaded some of his readers that a system which is simple and very productive is more consistent with ,god's wisdom than a system more composite and less productive in proportion1 but more capable of averting irregularities4 ,m4 ,bayle was one of those who believed that ,father ,malebranche in that way gave a wonderful solution4' 7,it is ,m4 ,bayle himself speaking47 ',but it is almost impossible to be satisfied with it after having read ,m4 ,arnauld's books against this system1 and after having contemplated the vast and boundless idea of the supremely #bfj perfect ,being4 ,this idea shows us that nothing is easier for ,god than to follow a plan which is simple1 productive1 regular and opportune for all creatures simultaneously4' #baa4 ,while ,i was in ,france ,i showed to ,m4 ,arnauld a dialogue ,i had composed in ,latin on the cause of evil and the justice of ,god2 it was not only before his disputes with ,father ,malebranche1 but even before the book on ,the ,search for ,truth appeared4 ,that principle which ,i uphold here1 namely that sin had been permitted because it had been involved in the best plan for the universe1 was already applied there2 and ,m4 ,arnauld did not seem to be startled by it4 ,but the slight contentions which he has since had with ,father ,malebranche have given him cause to examine this subject with closer attention1 and to be more severe in his judgement thereof4 ,yet ,i am not altogether pleased with ,m4 ,bayle's manner of expression here on this subject1 and ,i am not of the opinion 'that a more composite and less productive plan might be more capable of averting irregularities'4 ,rules are the expression of general will3 the more one observes rules1 the more regularity there is2 simplicity and productivity are the aim of rules4 ,i shall be met with the objection that a uniform system will be free from irregularities4 ,i answer that it would be an irregularity to be too uniform1 that would offend against the rules of harmony4 ,et citharoedus ,ridetur chorda qui semper oberrat eadem4 ,i believe therefore that ,god can follow a simple1 productive1 regular plan2 but ,i do not believe that the best and the most regular is always opportune for all creatures simultaneously2 and ,i judge a posteriori1 for the plan chosen by ,god is not so4 ,i have1 however1 also shown this a priori in examples taken from mathematics1 and ,i will presently give another here4 ,an ,origenist who maintains that all rational creatures become happy in the end will be still easier to satisfy4 ,he will say1 in imitation of ,st4 ,paul's saying about the sufferings of this life1 that those which are finite are not worthy to be compared with eternal bliss4 #bab4 ,what is deceptive in this subject1 as ,i have already observed1 is that one feels an inclination to believe that what is the best in the whole is also the best possible in each part4 ,one reasons thus in geometry1 when it is a question de maximis et minimis4 ,if the road from ,a to ,b that one proposes to take is the shortest possible1 and if this road passes by ,c1 then the road from ,a to ,c1 part of the first1 must also be the shortest possible4 ,but the inference from quantity to quality is not always#bfa right1 any more than that which is drawn from equals to similars4 ,for equals are those whose quantity is the same1 and similars are those not differing according to qualities4 ,the late ,herr ,sturm1 a famous mathematician in ,altorf1 while in ,holland in his youth published there a small book under the title of ,euclides ,catholicus4 ,here he endeavoured to give exact and general rules in subjects not mathematical1 being encouraged in the task by the late ,herr ,erhard ,weigel1 who had been his tutor4 ,in this book he transfers to similars what ,euclid had said of equals1 and he formulates this axiom3 ,si similibus addas similia1 tota sunt similia4 ,but so many limitations were necessary to justify this new rule1 that it would have been better1 in my opinion1 to enounce it at the outset with a reservation1 by saying1 ,si similibus similia addas similiter1 tota sunt similia4 ,moreover1 geometricians often require non tantum similia1 sed et similiter posita4 #bac4 ,this difference between quantity and quality appears also in our case4 ,the part of the shortest way between two extreme points is also the shortest way between the extreme points of this part2 but the part of the best ,whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of this part4 ,for the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful1 since it can be extracted from the whole1 or marked out within the whole1 in an irregular manner4 ,if goodness and beauty always lay in something absolute and uniform1 such as extension1 matter1 gold1 water1 and other bodies assumed to be homogeneous or similar1 one must say that the part of the good and the beautiful would be beautiful and good like the whole1 since it would always have resemblance to the whole3 but this is not the case in things that have mutual relations4 ,an example taken from geometry will be appropriate to explain my idea4 #bad4 ,there is a kind of geometry which ,herr ,jung of ,hamburg1 one of the most admirable men of his time1 called 'empiric'4 ,it makes use of conclusive experiments and proves various propositions of ,euclid1 but especially those which concern the equality of two figures1 by cutting the one in pieces1 and putting the pieces together again to make the other4 ,in this manner1 by cutting carefully in parts the squares on the two sides of the right-angled triangle1 and arranging these parts carefully1 one makes from them the square on the hypotenuse2 that is demonstrating empirically the #dgth proposition of the first book of ,euclid4 ,now supposing that some of these pieces taken from the two smaller squares are lost1 something#bfb will be lacking in the large square that is to be formed from them2 and this defective combination1 far from pleasing1 will be disagreeably ugly4 ,if then the pieces that remained1 composing the faulty combination1 were taken separately without any regard to the large square to whose formation they ought to contribute1 one would group them together quite differently to make a tolerably good combination4 ,but as soon as the lost pieces are retrieved and the gap in the faulty combination is filled1 there will ensue a beautiful and regular thing1 the complete large square3 this perfect combination will be far more beautiful than the tolerably good combination which had been made from the pieces one had not mislaid alone4 ,the perfect combination corresponds to the universe in its entirety1 and the faulty combination that is a part of the perfect one corresponds to some part of the universe1 where we find defects which the ,author of things has allowed1 because otherwise1 if he had wished to re-shape this faulty part and make thereof a tolerably good combination1 the whole would not then have been so beautiful4 ,for the parts of the faulty combination1 grouped better to make a tolerably good combination1 could not have been used properly to form the whole and perfect combination4 ,thomas ,aquinas had an inkling of these things when he said3 ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet1 negligere aliquem defectum bonitatis in parte1 ut faciat augmentum bonitatis in toto 7,thom41 ,contra ,gentiles1 lib4 #b1 c4 #ga74 ,thomas ,gatacre1 in his ,notes on the book of ,marcus ,aurelius 7lib4 #e1 cap4 #h1 with ,m4 ,bayle71 cites also passages from authors who say that the evil of the parts is often the good of the whole4 #bae4 ,let us return to ,m4 ,bayle's illustrations4 ,he imagines a prince 7p4 #ifc7 who is having a city built1 and who1 in bad taste1 aims rather at airs of magnificence therein1 and a bold and unusual style of architecture1 than at the provision of conveniences of all kinds for the inhabitants4 ,but if this prince has true magnanimity he will prefer the convenient to the magnificent architecture4 ,that is ,m4 ,bayle's judgement4 ,i consider1 however1 that there are cases where one will justifiably prefer beauty of construction in a palace to the convenience of a few domestics4 ,but ,i admit that the construction would be bad1 however beautiful it might be1 if it were a cause of diseases to the inhabitants2 provided it was possible to make one that would be better1 taking into account beauty1 convenience and health all together4 ,it may be1 indeed1 that one cannot have all these#bfc advantages at once4 ,thus1 supposing one wished to build on the northern and more bracing side of the mountain1 if the castle were then bound to be of an unendurable construction1 one would prefer to make it face southward4 #baf4 ,m4 ,bayle raises the further objection1 that it is true that our legislators can never invent regulations such as are convenient for all individuals1 ',nulla lex satis commoda omnibus est2 id modo quaeritur1 si majori parti et in summam prodest4 7,cato apud ,livium1 ,l4 #cd1 circa init47' ,but the reason is that the limited condition of their knowledge compels them to cling to laws which1 when all is taken into account1 are more advantageous than harmful4 ,nothing of all that can apply to ,god1 who is as infinite in power and understanding as in goodness and true greatness4 ,i answer that since ,god chooses the best possible1 one cannot tax him with any limitation of his perfections2 and in the universe not only does the good exceed the evil1 but also the evil serves to augment the good4 #bag4 ,he observes also that the ,stoics derived a blasphemy from this principle1 saying that evils must be endured with patience1 or that they were necessary1 not only to the well-being and completeness of the universe1 but also to the felicity1 perfection and conservation of ,god1 who directs it4 ,the ,emperor ,marcus ,aurelius gave expression to that in the eighth chapter of the fifth book of his ,meditations4 ',duplici ratione'1 he says1 'diligas oportet1 quidquid evenerit tibi2 altera quod tibi natum et tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est2 altera quod universi gubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo permansionis ipsius procurandae 7,greek3 ts euodias kai ts synteleias kai ts symmons auts7 ex parte causa est4' ,this precept is not the most reasonable of those stated by that great emperor4 ,a diligas oportet 7,greek3 stergein chr7 is of no avail2 a thing does not become pleasing just because it is necessary1 and because it is destined for or attached to someone3 and what for me would be an evil would not cease to be such because it would be my master's good1 unless this good reflected back on me4 ,one good thing among others in the universe is that the general good becomes in reality the individual good of those who love the ,author of all good4 ,but the principal error of this emperor and of the ,stoics was their assumption that the good of the universe must please ,god himself1 because they imagined ,god as the soul of the world4 ,this error has nothing in common with my dogma1 #bfd according to which ,god is ,intelligentia extramundana1 as ,martianus ,capella calls him1 or rather supramundana4 ,further1 he acts to do good1 and not to receive it4 ,melius est dare quam accipere2 his bliss is ever perfect and can receive no increase1 either from within or from without4 #bah4 ,i come now to the principal objection ,m4 ,bayle1 after ,m4 ,arnauld1 brings up against me4 ,it is complicated3 they maintain that ,god would be under compulsion1 that he would act of necessity1 if he were bound to create the best2 or at least that he would have been lacking in power if he could not have found a better expedient for excluding sins and other evils4 ,that is in effect denying that this universe is the best1 and that ,god is bound to insist upon the best4 ,i have met this objection adequately in more than one passage3 ,i have proved that ,god cannot fail to produce the best2 and from that assumption it follows that the evils we experience could not have been reasonably excluded from the universe1 since they are there4 ,let us see1 however1 what these two excellent men bring up1 or rather let us see what ,m4 ,bayle's objection is1 for he professes to have profited by the arguments of ,m4 ,arnauld4 #bai4 ',would it be possible'1 he says1 ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aeh1 p4 #hij1 'that a nature whose goodness1 holiness1 wisdom1 knowledge and power are infinite1 who loves virtue supremely1 and hates vice supremely1 as our clear and distinct idea of him shows us1 and as well-nigh every page of ,scripture assures us1 could have found in virtue no means fitting and suited for his ends8 ,would it be possible that vice alone had offered him this means8 ,one would have thought on the contrary that nothing beseemed this nature more than to establish virtue in his work to the exclusion of all vice4' ,m4 ,bayle here exaggerates things4 ,i agree that some vice was connected with the best plan of the universe1 but ,i do not agree with him that ,god could not find in virtue any means suited for his ends4 ,this objection would have been valid if there were no virtue1 if vice took its place everywhere4 ,he will say it suffices that vice prevails and that virtue is trifling in comparison4 ,but ,i am far from agreeing with him there1 and ,i think that in reality1 properly speaking1 there is incomparably more moral good than moral evil in rational creatures2 and of these we have knowledge of but few4 #bbj4 ,this evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be4 ,it#bfe is only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become somewhat misanthropic through misfortunes1 like ,lucian's ,timon1 who find wickedness everywhere1 and who poison the best actions by the interpretations they give to them4 ,i speak of those who do it in all seriousness1 to draw thence evil conclusions1 by which their conduct is tainted2 for there are some who only do it to show off their own acumen4 ,people have found that fault in ,tacitus1 and that again is the criticism ,m4 ,descartes 7in one of his letters7 makes of ,mr4 ,hobbes's book ,de ,cive1 of which only a few copies had at that time been printed for distribution among friends1 but to which some notes by the author were added in the second edition which we have4 ,for although ,m4 ,descartes acknowledges that this book is by a man of talent1 he observes therein some very dangerous principles and maxims1 in the assumption there made that all men are wicked1 or the provision of them with motives for being so4 ,the late ,herr ,jacob ,thomasius said in his admirable ,tables of ,practical ,philosophy that the ,greek3 prton pseudos1 the primary cause of errors in this book by ,mr4 ,hobbes1 was that he took statum legalem pro naturali1 that is to say that the corrupt state served him as a gauge and rule1 whereas it is the state most befitting human nature which ,aristotle had had in view4 ,for according to ,aristotle1 that is termed natural which conforms most closely to the perfection of the nature of the thing2 but ,mr4 ,hobbes applies the term natural state to that which has least art1 perhaps not taking into account that human nature in its perfection carries art with it4 ,but the question of name1 that is to say1 of what may be called natural1 would not be of great importance were it not that ,aristotle and ,hobbes fastened upon it the notion of natural right1 each one following his own signification4 ,i have said here already that ,i found in the book on the ,falsity of human ,virtues the same defect as ,m4 ,descartes found in ,mr4 ,hobbes's ,de ,cive4 #bba4 ,but even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind1 as it is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect1 it by no means follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in the universe3 one should rather believe the opposite1 because the ,city of ,god must be the most perfect of all possible states1 since it was formed and is perpetually governed by the greatest and best of all ,monarchs4 ,this answer confirms the observation ,i made earlier1 when speaking of the conformity of faith with reason1 namely1 that one of the greatest sources of fallacy#bff in the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the real4 ,and here by the apparent ,i mean not simply such as would result from an exact discussion of facts1 but that which has been derived from the small extent of our experiences4 ,it would be senseless to try to bring up appearances so imperfect1 and having such slight foundation1 in opposition to the proofs of reason and the revelations of faith4 #bbb4 ,finally1 ,i have already observed that love of virtue and hatred of vice1 which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and to prevent the existence of vice1 are only antecedent acts of will1 such as is the will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them from misery4 ,these acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all the antecedent will of ,god taken together1 whose result forms the consequent will1 or the decree to create the best4 ,through this decree it is that love for virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures1 which is undefined in itself and goes as far as is possible1 receives some slight limitations1 on account of the heed that must be paid to good in general4 ,thus one must understand that ,god loves virtue supremely and hates vice supremely1 and that nevertheless some vice is to be permitted4 #bbc4 ,m4 ,arnauld and ,m4 ,bayle appear to maintain that this method of explaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for the universe1 one such as may not be surpassed by any other1 sets a limit to ,god's power4 ',have you considered'1 says ,m4 ,arnauld to ,father ,malebranche 7in his ,reflexions on the ,new ,system of ,nature and ,grace1 vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #che71 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to subvert the first article of the creed1 whereby we make profession of believing in ,god the ,father ,almighty8' ,he had said already 7p4 #cfb73 ',can one maintain1 without trying to blind oneself1 that a course of action which could not fail to have this grievous result1 namely1 that the majority of men perish1 bears the stamp of ,god's goodness more than a different course of action1 which would have caused1 if ,god had followed it1 the salvation of all men8' ,and1 as ,m4 ,jacquelot does not differ from the principles ,i have just laid down1 ,m4 ,bayle raises like objections in his case 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aea1 p4 #ijj73 ',if one adopts such explanations'1 he says1 'one sees oneself constrained to renounce the most obvious notions on the nature of the supremely perfect ,being4 ,these teach us that all things not implying contradiction are possible for him1 #bfg that consequently it is possible for him to save people whom he does not save3 for what contradiction would result supposing the number of the elect were greater than it is8 ,they teach us besides that1 since he is supremely happy1 he has no will which he cannot carry out4 ,how1 then1 shall we understand that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so8 ,we sought some light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparing the idea of ,god with the state of the human kind1 and lo6 we are given elucidations that cast us into darkness more dense4' #bbd4 ,all these obstacles vanish before the exposition ,i have just given4 ,i agree with ,m4 ,bayle's principle1 and it is also mine1 that everything implying no contradiction is possible4 ,but as for me1 holding as ,i do that ,god did the best that was possible1 or that he could not have done better than he has done1 deeming also that to pass any other judgement upon his work in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or his wisdom1 ,i must say that to make something which surpasses in goodness the best itself1 that indeed would imply contradiction4 ,that would be as if someone maintained that ,god could draw from one point to another a line shorter than the straight line1 and accused those who deny this of subverting the article of faith whereby we believe in ,god the ,father ,almighty4 #bbe4 ,the infinity of possibles1 however great it may be1 is no greater than that of the wisdom of ,god1 who knows all possibles4 ,one may even say that if this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively1 since the objects of the understanding cannot go beyond the possible1 which in a sense is alone intelligible1 it exceeds them intensively1 by reason of the infinitely infinite combinations it makes thereof1 and its many deliberations concerning them4 ,the wisdom of ,god1 not content with embracing all the possibles1 penetrates them1 compares them1 weighs them one against the other1 to estimate their degrees of perfection or imperfection1 the strong and the weak1 the good and the evil4 ,it goes even beyond the finite combinations1 it makes of them an infinity of infinites1 that is to say1 an infinity of possible sequences of the universe1 each of which contains an infinity of creatures4 ,by this means the divine ,wisdom distributes all the possibles it had already contemplated separately1 into so many universal systems which it further compares the one with the other4 ,the result of all these comparisons and deliberations is the choice of the best from among all these possible systems1 which wisdom makes in #bfh order to satisfy goodness completely2 and such is precisely the plan of the universe as it is4 ,moreover1 all these operations of the divine understanding1 although they have among them an order and a priority of nature1 always take place together1 no priority of time existing among them4 #bbf4 ,the careful consideration of these things will1 ,i hope1 induce a different idea of the greatness of the divine perfections1 and especially of the wisdom and goodness of ,god1 from any that can exist in the minds of those who make ,god act at random1 without cause or reason4 ,and ,i do not see how they could avoid falling into an opinion so strange1 unless they acknowledged that there are reasons for ,god's choice1 and that these reasons are derived from his goodness3 whence it follows of necessity that what was chosen had the advantage of goodness over what was not chosen1 and consequently that it is the best of all the possibles4 ,the best cannot be surpassed in goodness1 and it is no restriction of the power of ,god to say that he cannot do the impossible4 ,is it possible1 said ,m4 ,bayle1 that there is no better plan than that one which ,god carried out8 ,one answers that it is very possible and indeed necessary1 namely that there is none3 otherwise ,god would have preferred it4 #bbg4 ,it seems to me that ,i have proved sufficiently that among all the possible plans of the universe there is one better than all the rest1 and that ,god has not failed to choose it4 ,but ,m4 ,bayle claims to infer thence that ,god is therefore not free4 ,this is how he speaks on that question 7ubi supra1 ch4 #aea1 p4 #hii73 ',i thought to argue with a man who assumed as ,i do that the goodness and the power of ,god are infinite1 as well as his wisdom2 and now ,i see that in reality this man assumes that ,god's goodness and power are enclosed within rather narrow bounds4' ,as to that1 the objection has already been met3 ,i set no bounds to ,god's power1 since ,i recognize that it extends ad maximum1 ad omnia1 to all that implies no contradiction2 and ,i set none to his goodness1 since it attains to the best1 ad optimum4 ,but ,m4 ,bayle goes on3 ',there is therefore no freedom in ,god2 he is compelled by his wisdom to create1 and then to create precisely such a work1 and finally to create it precisely in such ways4 ,these are three servitudes which form a more than ,stoic fatum1 and which render impossible all that is not within their sphere4 ,it seems that1 according to this system1 ,god could have said1 even before shaping his decrees3 ,i #bfi cannot save such and such a man1 nor condemn such and such another1 quippe vetor fatis1 my wisdom permits it not4' #bbh4 ,i answer that it is goodness which prompts ,god to create with the purpose of communicating himself2 and this same goodness combined with wisdom prompts him to create the best3 a best that includes the whole sequence1 the effect and the process4 ,it prompts him thereto without compelling him1 for it does not render impossible that which it does not cause him to choose4 ,to call that fatum is taking it in a good sense1 which is not contrary to freedom3 fatum comes from fari1 to speak1 to pronounce2 it signifies a judgement1 a decree of ,god1 the award of his wisdom4 ,to say that one cannot do a thing1 simply because one does not will it1 is to misuse terms4 ,the wise mind wills only the good3 is it then a servitude when the will acts in accordance with wisdom8 ,and can one be less a slave than to act by one's own choice in accordance with the most perfect reason8 ,aristotle used to say that that man is in a natural servitude 7natura servus7 who lacks guidance1 who has need of being directed4 ,slavery comes from without1 it leads to that which offends1 and especially to that which offends with reason3 the force of others and our own passions enslave us4 ,god is never moved by anything outside himself1 nor is he subject to inward passions1 and he is never led to that which can cause him offence4 ,it appears1 therefore1 that ,m4 ,bayle gives odious names to the best things in the world1 and turns our ideas upside-down1 applying the term slavery to the state of the greatest and most perfect freedom4 #bbi4 ,he had also said not long before 7ch4 #aea1 p4 #hia73 ',if virtue1 or any other good at all1 had been as appropriate as vice for the ,creator's ends1 vice would not have been given preference2 it must therefore have been the only means that the ,creator could have used2 it was therefore employed purely of necessity4 ,as therefore he loves his glory1 not with a freedom of indifference1 but by necessity1 he must by necessity love all the means without which he could not manifest his glory4 ,now if vice1 as vice1 was the only means of attaining to this end1 it will follow that ,god of necessity loves vice as vice1 a thought which can only inspire us with horror2 and he has revealed quite the contrary to us4' ,he observes at the same time that certain doctors among the ,supralapsarians 7like ,rutherford1 for example7 denied that ,god wills sin as sin1 whilst they admitted #bgj that he wills sin permissively in so far as it is punishable and pardonable4 ,but he urges in objection1 that an action is only punishable and pardonable in so far as it is vicious4 #bcj4 ,m4 ,bayle makes a false assumption in these words that we have just read1 and draws from them false conclusions4 ,it is not true that ,god loves his glory by necessity1 if thereby it is understood that he is led by necessity to acquire his glory through his creatures4 ,for if that were so1 he would acquire his glory always and everywhere4 ,the decree to create is free3 ,god is prompted to all good2 the good1 and even the best1 inclines him to act2 but it does not compel him1 for his choice creates no impossibility in that which is distinct from the best2 it causes no implication of contradiction in that which ,god refrains from doing4 ,there is therefore in ,god a freedom that is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity4 ,i mean this in respect of metaphysical necessity2 for it is a moral necessity that the wisest should be bound to choose the best4 ,it is the same with the means which ,god chooses to attain his glory4 ,and as for vice1 it has been shown in preceding pages that it is not an object of ,god's decree as means1 but as conditio sine qua non1 and that for that reason alone it is permitted4 ,one is even less justified in saying that vice is the only means2 it would be at most one of the means1 but one of the least among innumerable others4 #bca4 ',another frightful consequence1' ,m4 ,bayle goes on1 'the fatality of all things1 ensues3 ,god will not have been free to arrange events in a different way1 since the means he chose to show forth his glory was the only means befitting his wisdom4' ,this so-called fatality or necessity is only moral1 as ,i have just shown3 it does not affect freedom2 on the contrary1 it assumes the best use thereof2 it does not render impossible the objects set aside by ,god's choice4 ',what1 then1 will become'1 he adds1 'of man's free will8 ,will there not have been necessity and fatality for ,adam to sin8 ,for if he had not sinned1 he would have overthrown the sole plan that ,god had of necessity created4' ,that is again a misuse of terms4 ,adam sinning freely was seen of ,god among the ideas of the possibles1 and ,god decreed to admit him into existence as he saw him4 ,this decree does not change the nature of the objects3 it does not render necessary that which was contingent in itself1 or impossible that which was possible4 #bga #bcb4 ,m4 ,bayle goes on 7p4 #hib73 ',the subtle ,scotus asserts with much discernment that if ,god had no freedom of indifference no creature could have this kind of freedom4' ,i agree provided it is not meant as an indifference of equipoise1 where there is no reason inclining more to one side than the other4 ,m4 ,bayle acknowledges 7farther on in chapter #afh1 p4 #aaaa7 that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient inclinations and pleasures4 ,it suffices therefore that there be no metaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free1 that is to say1 it suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible4 #bcc4 ,he goes on again in the said chapter #aeg1 p4 #hic3 ',if ,god is not determined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness1 but by the interests of his glory1 which he loves by necessity1 and which is the only thing he loves1 for it is not different from his substance2 and if the love that he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory through the most fitting means1 and if the fall of man was this same means1 it is evident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that the obedience of ,eve and ,adam to ,god's commands was impossible4' ,still the same error4 ,the love that ,god bears to himself is essential to him1 but the love for his glory1 or the will to acquire his glory1 is not so by any means3 the love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actions without2 they were free2 and since there were possible plans whereby the first parents should not sin1 their sin was therefore not necessary4 ,finally1 ,i say in effect what ,m4 ,bayle acknowledges here1 'that ,god resolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness'2 and ,i add that this same motion prompted him to the best4 #bcd4 ,the same answer holds good against this statement of ,m4 ,bayle's 7ch4 #afe1 p4 #ajga73 ',the means most appropriate for attaining an end is of necessity one alone' 7that is very well said1 at least for the cases where ,god has chosen74 ',therefore if ,god was prompted irresistibly to employ this means1 he employed it by necessity4' 7,he was certainly prompted thereto1 he was determined1 or rather he determined himself thereto3 but that which is certain is not always necessary1 or altogether irresistible2 the thing might have gone otherwise1 but that did not happen1 and with good reason4 ,god chose between different courses all possible3 thus1 metaphysically speaking1 he could have chosen or done what was not the best2 but he could not morally speaking have done so4 ,let us make use of a comparison #bgb from geometry4 ,the best way from one point to another 7leaving out of account obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium7 is one alone3 it is that one which passes by the shortest line1 which is the straight line4 ,yet there are innumerable ways from one point to another4 ,there is therefore no necessity which binds me to go by the straight line2 but as soon as ,i choose the best1 ,i am determined to go that way1 although this is only a moral necessity in the wise4 ,that is why the following conclusions fail47 ',therefore he could only do that which he did4 ,therefore that which has not happened or will never happen is absolutely impossible4' 7,these conclusions fail1 ,i say3 for since there are many things which have never happened and never will happen1 and which nevertheless are clearly conceivable1 and imply no contradiction1 how can one say they are altogether impossible8 ,m4 ,bayle has refuted that himself in a passage opposing the ,spinozists1 which ,i have already quoted here1 and he has frequently acknowledged that there is nothing impossible except that which implies contradiction3 now he changes style and terminology47 ',therefore ,adam's perseverance in innocence was always impossible2 therefore his fall was altogether inevitable1 and even antecedently to ,god's decree1 for it implied contradiction that ,god should be able to will a thing opposed to his wisdom3 it is1 after all1 the same thing to say1 that it is impossible for ,god1 as to say1 ,god could do it1 if he so willed1 but he cannot will it4' 7,it is misusing terms in a sense to say here3 one can will1 one will will2 'can' here concerns the actions that one does will4 ,nevertheless it implies no contradiction that ,god should will--directly or permissively--a thing not implying contradiction1 and in this sense it is permitted to say that ,god can will it47 #bce4 ,in a word1 when one speaks of the possibility of a thing it is not a question of the causes that can bring about or prevent its actual existence3 otherwise one would change the nature of the terms1 and render useless the distinction between the possible and the actual4 ,this ,abelard did1 and ,wyclif appears to have done after him1 in consequence of which they fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions4 ,that is why1 when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary1 and brings in the consideration of what ,god wills or chooses1 one alters the issue4 ,for ,god chooses among the possibles1 and for that very reason he chooses #bgc freely1 and is not compelled2 there would be neither choice nor freedom if there were but one course possible4 #bcf4 ,one must also answer ,m4 ,bayle's syllogisms1 so as to neglect none of the objections of a man so gifted3 they occur in ,chapter #aea of his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #ijj1 #ija74 ,,first ,,syllogism ',god can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has for his wisdom4 ',now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which ,god has for his wisdom4 ',therefore ,god cannot will the salvation of all men4' ,the major is self-evident1 for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is necessary4 ,but the minor cannot be accepted1 for1 albeit ,god loves his wisdom of necessity1 the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot but be free1 and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do not cease to be possible4 ,moreover1 his wisdom has prompted him to will the salvation of all men1 but not by a consequent and decretory will4 ,yet this consequent will1 being only a result of free antecedent acts of will1 cannot fail to be free also4 ,,second ,,syllogism ',the work most worthy of ,god's wisdom involves amongst other things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men4 ',now ,god wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom4 ',he wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men4' ,the major holds good1 but the minor ,i deny4 ,the decrees of ,god are always free1 even though ,god be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie in the intention towards good3 for to be morally compelled by wisdom1 to be bound by the consideration of good1 is to be free2 it is not compulsion in the metaphysical sense4 ,and metaphysical necessity alone1 as ,i have observed so many times1 is opposed to freedom4 #bch4 ,i shall not examine the syllogisms that ,m4 ,bayle urges in objection in the following chapter 7,ch4 #aeb71 against the system of the ,supralapsarians1 and particularly against the oration made by ,theodore de ,bze at the #bgd ,conference of ,montbliard in the year #aehf4 ,this conference also only served to increase the acrimony of the parties4 ',god created the ,world to his glory3 his glory is not known 7according to ,bze71 if his mercy and his justice are not declared2 for this cause simply by his grace he decreed for some men life eternal1 and for others by a just judgement eternal damnation4 ,mercy presupposes misery1 justice presupposes guilt4' 7,he might have added that misery also supposes guilt47 ',nevertheless ,god being good1 indeed goodness itself1 he created man good and righteous1 but unstable1 and capable of sinning of his own free will4 ,man did not fall at random or rashly1 or through causes ordained by some other ,god1 as the ,manichaeans hold1 but by the providence of ,god2 in such a way notwithstanding1 that ,god was not involved in the fault1 inasmuch as man was not constrained to sin4' #bci4 ,this system is not of the best conceived3 it is not well fitted to show forth the wisdom1 the goodness and the justice of ,god2 and happily it is almost abandoned to-day4 ,if there were not other more profound reasons capable of inducing ,god to permit guilt1 the source of misery1 there would be neither guilt nor misery in the world1 for the reasons alleged here do not suffice4 ,he would declare his mercy better in preventing misery1 and he would declare his justice better in preventing guilt1 in advancing virtue1 in recompensing it4 ,besides1 one does not see how he who not only causes a man to be capable of falling1 but who so disposes circumstances that they contribute towards causing his fall1 is not culpable1 if there are no other reasons compelling him thereto4 ,but when one considers that ,god1 altogether good and wise1 must have produced all the virtue1 goodness1 happiness whereof the best plan of the universe is capable1 and that often an evil in some parts may serve the greater good of the whole1 one readily concludes that ,god may have given room for unhappiness1 and even permitted guilt1 as he has done1 without deserving to be blamed4 ,it is the only remedy that supplies what all systems lack1 however they arrange the decrees4 ,these thoughts have already been favoured by ,st4 ,augustine1 and one may say of ,eve what the poet said of the hand of ,mucius ,scaevola3 ,si non errasset1 fecerat illa minus4 #bdj4 ,i find that the famous ,english prelate who wrote an ingenious book on the origin of evil1 some passages of which were disputed by ,m4 ,bayle #bge in the second volume of his ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 while disagreeing with some of the opinions that ,i have upheld here and appearing to resort sometimes to a despotic power1 as if the will of ,god did not follow the rules of wisdom in relation to good or evil1 but decreed arbitrarily that such and such a thing must be considered good or evil2 and as if even the will of the creature1 in so far as it is free1 did not choose because the object appears good to him1 but by a purely arbitrary determination1 independent of the representation of the object2 this bishop1 ,i say1 in other passages nevertheless says things which seem more in favour of my doctrine than of what appears contrary thereto in his own4 ,he says that what an infinitely wise and free cause has chosen is better than what it has not chosen4 ,is not that recognizing that goodness is the object and the reason of his choice8 ,in this sense one will here aptly say3 ,sic placuit superis2 quaerere plura1 nefas4 #bgf 99 99 99 99 99 ,,essays ,,on ,,the ,,justice ,,of ,,god ,,and ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,man ,,in ,,the ,,origin ,,of ,,evil 99 99 99 99 99 ,,part ,,three #bda4 ,now at last ,i have disposed of the cause of moral evil2 physical evil1 that is1 sorrows1 sufferings1 miseries1 will be less troublesome to explain1 since these are results of moral evil4 ,poena est malum passionis1 quod infligitur ob malum actionis1 according to ,grotius4 ,one suffers because one has acted2 one suffers evil because one does evil4 ,nostrorum causa malorum ,nos sumus4 ,it is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others2 but when one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a certainty that these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness4 ,the question of physical evil1 that is1 of the origin of sufferings1 has difficulties in common with that of the origin of metaphysical evil1 examples whereof are furnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the universe4 ,but one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are part of order2 and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general laws1 as ,father ,malebranche sometimes argues1 but also that these very monstrosities are in the rules1 and are in conformity with general acts of will1 though we be not capable of discerning this conformity4 ,it is #bgg just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics which issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom of them3 that is why ,i have already in this work observed that according to my principles all individual events1 without exception1 are consequences of general acts of will4 #bdb4 ,it should be no cause for astonishment that ,i endeavour to elucidate these things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics1 where everything proceeds in order1 and where it is possible to fathom them by a close contemplation which grants us an enjoyment1 so to speak1 of the vision of the ideas of ,god4 ,one may propose a succession or series of numbers perfectly irregular to all appearance1 where the numbers increase and diminish variably without the emergence of any order2 and yet he who knows the key to the formula1 and who understands the origin and the structure of this succession of numbers1 will be able to give a rule which1 being properly understood1 will show that the series is perfectly regular1 and that it even has excellent properties4 ,one may make this still more evident in lines4 ,a line may have twists and turns1 ups and downs1 points of reflexion and points of inflexion1 interruptions and other variations1 so that one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein1 especially when taking into account only a portion of the line2 and yet it may be that one can give its equation and construction1 wherein a geometrician would find the reason and the fittingness of all these so-called irregularities4 ,that is how we must look upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other so-called defects in the universe4 #bdc4 ,in this sense one may apply that fine adage of ,st4 ,bernard 7,ep4 #bgf1 ,ad ,eugen41 ,,iii73 ',ordinatissimum est1 minus interdum ordinate fieri aliquid4' ,it belongs to the great order that there should be some small disorder4 ,one may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in the whole1 and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness of those who walk in the ways of order4 #bdd4 ,when ,i mention monstrosities ,i include numerous other apparent defects besides4 ,we are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface of our globe2 we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred fathoms4 ,that which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the effect of some great upheavals4 ,it seems that this globe was once on fire1 and that the rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are scoria remaining from a great fusion4 ,in their entrails are found metal and mineral #bgh products1 which closely resemble those emanating from our furnaces3 and the entire sea may be a kind of oleum per deliquium1 just as tartaric oil forms in a damp place4 ,for when the earth's surface cooled after the great conflagration the moisture that the fire had driven into the air fell back upon the earth1 washed its surface and dissolved and absorbed the solid salt that was left in the cinders1 finally filling up this great cavity in the surface of our globe1 to form the ocean filled with salt water4 #bde4 ,but1 after the fire1 one must conclude that earth and water made ravages no less4 ,it may be that the crust formed by the cooling1 having below it great cavities1 fell in1 so that we live only on ruins1 as among others ,thomas ,burnet1 ,chaplain to the late ,king of ,great ,britain1 aptly observed4 ,sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits1 whereof traces and remains are found which show that the sea was in places that to-day are most remote from it4 ,but these upheavals ceased at last1 and the globe assumed the shape that we see4 ,moses hints at these changes in few words3 the separation of light from darkness indicates the melting caused by the fire2 and the separation of the moist from the dry marks the effects of inundations4 ,but who does not see that these disorders have served to bring things to the point where they now are1 that we owe to them our riches and our comforts1 and that through their agency this globe became fit for cultivation by us4 ,these disorders passed into order4 ,the disorders1 real or apparent1 that we see from afar are sunspots and comets2 but we do not know what uses they supply1 nor the rules prevailing therein4 ,time was when the planets were held to be wandering stars3 now their motion is found to be regular4 ,peradventure it is the same with the comets3 posterity will know4 #bdf4 ,one does not include among the disorders inequality of conditions1 and ,m4 ,jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have everything equally perfect1 why rocks are not crowned with leaves and flowers8 why ants are not peacocks8 ,and if there must needs be equality everywhere1 the poor man would serve notice of appeal against the rich1 the servant against the master4 ,the pipes of an organ must not be of equal size4 ,m4 ,bayle will say that there is a difference between a privation of good and a disorder2 between a disorder in inanimate things1 which is purely metaphysical1 and a disorder in rational creatures1 which is composed of crime and #bgi sufferings4 ,he is right in making a distinction between them1 and ,i am right in combining them4 ,god does not neglect inanimate things3 they do not feel1 but ,god feels for them4 ,he does not neglect animals3 they have not intelligence1 but ,god has it for them4 ,he would reproach himself for the slightest actual defect there were in the universe1 even though it were perceived of none4 #bdg4 ,it seems ,m4 ,bayle does not approve any comparison between the disorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble the peace and happiness of rational creatures2 nor would he agree to our justifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must be taken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion4 ,one might thence conclude1 according to him 7posthumous ,reply to ,m4 ,jacquelot1 p4 #ahc71 'that ,god created the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture and mechanics1 whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no part in the construction of this great work4 ,this ,god would pride himself only on skill2 he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather than suffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws require4' ,m4 ,bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been informed on the system of general harmony which ,i assume1 which states that the realm of efficient causes and that of final causes are parallel to each other2 that ,god has no less the quality of the best monarch than that of the greatest architect2 that matter is so disposed that the laws of motion serve as the best guidance for spirits2 and that consequently it will prove that he has attained the utmost good possible1 provided one reckon the metaphysical1 physical and moral goods together4 #bdh4 ,but 7,m4 ,bayle will say7 ,god having power to avert innumerable evils by one small miracle1 why did he not employ it8 ,he gives so much extraordinary help to fallen men2 but slight help of such a kind given to ,eve would have prevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the serpent ineffective4 ,i have sufficiently met objections of this sort with this general answer1 that ,god ought not to make choice of another universe since he has chosen the best1 and has only made use of the miracles necessary thereto4 ,i had answered ,m4 ,bayle that miracles change the natural order of the universe4 ,he replies1 that that is an illusion1 and that the miracle of the wedding at ,cana 7for instance7 made no change in the air of the room1 except that instead of receiving into its pores some corpuscles of water1 it #bhj received corpuscles of wine4 ,but one must bear in mind that once the best plan of things has been chosen nothing can be changed therein4 #bdi4 ,as for miracles 7concerning which ,i have already said something in this work71 they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind3 there are many1 to all appearances1 which ,god brings about through the ministry of invisible substances1 such as the angels1 as ,father ,malebranche also believes4 ,these angels or these substances act according to the ordinary laws of their nature1 being combined with bodies more rarefied and more vigorous than those we have at our command4 ,and such miracles are only so by comparison1 and in relation to us2 just as our works would be considered miraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking upon them4 ,the changing of water into wine might be a miracle of this kind4 ,but the ,creation1 the ,incarnation and some other actions of ,god exceed all the power of creatures and are truly miracles1 or indeed ,mysteries4 ,if1 nevertheless1 the changing of water into wine at ,cana was a miracle of the highest kind1 ,god would have thereby changed the whole course of the universe1 because of the connexion of bodies2 or else he would have been bound to prevent this connexion miraculously also1 and cause the bodies not concerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had happened4 ,after the miracle was over1 it would have been necessary to restore all things in those very bodies concerned to the state they would have reached without the miracle3 whereafter all would have returned to its original course4 ,thus this miracle demanded more than at first appears4 #bej4 ,as for physical evil in creatures1 to wit their sufferings1 ,m4 ,bayle contends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means of particular reasons the course of action pursued by ,god in regard to this4 ,here ,i set aside the sufferings of animals1 and ,i see that ,m4 ,bayle insists chiefly on those of men1 perhaps because he thinks that brute beasts have no feeling4 ,it is on account of the injustice there would be in the sufferings of beasts that divers ,cartesians wished to prove that they are only machines1 quoniam sub ,deo justo nemo innocens miser est3 it is impossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy under such a master as ,god4 ,the principle is good1 but ,i do not think it warrants the inference that beasts have no feeling1 because ,i think that1 properly speaking1 perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is not accompanied #bha by reflexion4 ,it is the same with happiness3 without reflexion there is none4 ,o fortunatos nimium1 sua qui bona norint6 ,one cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals2 but it seems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they are in man3 for animals1 since they do not reflect1 are susceptible neither to the grief that accompanies pain1 nor to the joy that accompanies pleasure4 ,men are sometimes in a state approaching that of the beasts1 when they act almost on instinct alone and simply on the impressions made by the experience of the senses3 and1 in this state1 their pleasures and their pains are very slight4 #bea4 ,but let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures4 ,it is with regard to them that ,m4 ,bayle discusses this question3 whether there is more physical evil than physical good in the world8 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 #ge47 ,to settle it aright1 one must explain wherein these goods and evils lie4 ,we are agreed that physical evil is simply displeasure and under that heading ,i include pain1 grief1 and every other kind of discomfort4 ,but does physical good lie solely in pleasure8 ,m4 ,bayle appears to be of this opinion2 but ,i consider that it lies also in a middle state1 such as that of health4 ,one is well enough when one has no ill2 it is a degree of wisdom to have no folly3 ,sapientia prima est1 ,stultitia caruisse4 ,in the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice be blamed3 ,si non culpabor1 sat mihi laudis erit4 ,that being the case1 all the sensations not unpleasing to us1 all the exercises of our powers that do not incommode us1 and whose prevention would incommode us1 are physical goods1 even when they cause us no pleasure2 for privation of them is a physical evil4 ,besides we only perceive the good of health1 and other like goods1 when we are deprived of them4 ,on those terms ,i would dare to maintain that even in this life goods exceed evils1 that our comforts exceed our discomforts1 and that ,m4 ,descartes was justified in writing 7vol4 ,i1 ,letter #i7 'that natural reason teaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'4 #bhb #beb4 ,it must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess would be a very great evil4 ,there are some which ,hippocrates compared to the falling sickness1 and ,scioppius doubtless only made pretence of envying the sparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and far from playful work4 ,highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and impair the niceness of a delicate sense2 and in general bodily pleasures are a kind of expenditure of the spirit1 though they be made good in some better than in others4 #bec4 ,as proof1 however1 that the evil exceeds the good is quoted the instance of ,m4 de la ,motte le ,vayer 7,letter #acd71 who would not have been willing to return to the world1 supposing he had had to play the same part as providence had already assigned to him4 ,but ,i have already said that ,i think one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the thread of ,fate if a new part were promised to us1 even though it should not be better than the first4 ,thus from ,m4 de la ,motte le ,vayer's saying it does not follow that he would not have wished for the part he had already played1 provided it had been new1 as ,m4 ,bayle seems to take it4 #bed4 ,the pleasures of the mind are the purest1 and of greatest service in making joy endure4 ,cardan1 when already an old man1 was so content with his state that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it for the state of the richest of young men who at the same time was ignorant4 ,m4 de la ,motte le ,vayer quotes the saying himself without criticizing it4 ,knowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived by those who have not tasted them4 ,i do not mean a mere knowledge of facts without that of reasons1 but knowledge like that of ,cardan1 who with all his faults was a great man1 and would have been incomparable without those faults4 ,felix1 qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas6 ,ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum ,subjecit pedibus4 ,it is no small thing to be content with ,god and with the universe1 not to fear what destiny has in store for us1 nor to complain of what befalls us4 ,acquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage1 quite other than that the ,stoics and the ,epicureans derived from their philosophy4 ,there is as much difference between true morality and theirs as there is #bhc between joy and patience3 for their tranquillity was founded only on necessity1 while ours must rest upon the perfection and beauty of things1 upon our own happiness4 #bee4 ,what1 then1 shall we say of bodily sufferings8 ,may they not be sufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity8 ,aristotle assents2 the ,stoics were of a different opinion1 and even the ,epicureans likewise4 ,m4 ,descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers2 he says in the letter just quoted3 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the most overwhelming sufferings one may always be content1 if only one knows how to exercise reason'4 ,m4 ,bayle says concerning this 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aeg1 p4 #iia7 'that it is saying nothing1 that it is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation hardly anyone understands'4 ,i hold that the thing is not impossible1 and that men could attain it by dint of meditation and practice4 ,for apart from the true martyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise from on high1 there have been counterfeits who imitated them4 ,that ,spanish slave who killed the ,carthaginian governor in order to avenge his master and who evinced great joy in his deed1 even in the greatest tortures1 may shame the philosophers4 ,why should not one go as far as he8 ,one may say of an advantage1 as of a disadvantage3 ,cuivis potest accidere1 quod cuiquam potest4 #bef4 ,but even to-day entire tribes1 such as the ,hurons1 the ,iroquois1 the ,galibis and other peoples of ,america teach us a great lesson on this matter3 one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity and well-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies1 who roast them over a slow fire and eat them by slices4 ,if such people could retain their physical superiority and their courage1 and combine them with our acquirements1 they would surpass us in every way1 ,extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis4 ,they would be1 in comparison with us1 as a giant to a dwarf1 a mountain to a hill3 ,quantus ,eryx1 et quantus ,athos1 gaudetque nivali ,vertice se attollens pater ,apenninus ad auras4 #bhd #beg4 ,all that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind in these savages1 who persist obstinately in the strangest point of honour1 might be acquired in our case by training1 by well-seasoned mortifications1 by an overmastering joy founded on reason1 by great practice in preserving a certain presence of mind in the midst of the distractions and impressions most liable to disturb it4 ,something of this kind is related of the ancient ,assassins1 subjects and pupils of the ,old ,man or rather the ,seigneur 7,senior7 of the ,mountain4 ,such a school 7for a better purpose7 would be good for missionaries who would wish to return to ,japan4 ,the ,gymnosophists of the ancient ,indians had perhaps something resembling this1 and that ,calanus1 who provided for ,alexander the ,great the spectacle of his burning alive1 had doubtless been encouraged by the great examples of his masters and trained by great sufferings not to fear pain4 ,the wives of these same ,indians1 who even to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of their husbands1 seem still to keep something of the courage of those ancient philosophers of their country4 ,i do not expect that there should straightway be founded a religious order whose purpose would be to exalt man to that high pitch of perfection3 such people would be too much above the rest1 and too formidable for the authorities4 ,as it rarely happens that people are exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would be needed1 one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of our usual comforts1 albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby4 #beh4 ,nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great remedy is a proof that the good already exceeds the evil4 ,euripides also said3 ,greek3 plei ta chrsta tn kakn einai brotois4 ,mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis4 ,homer and divers other poets were of another mind1 and men in general agree with them4 ,the reason for this is that the evil arouses our attention rather than the good3 but this same reason proves that the evil is more rare4 ,one must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of ,pliny1 who would have it that ,nature is a stepmother1 and who maintains that man is the most unhappy and most vain of all creatures4 ,these two epithets do not agree3 one is not so very unhappy1 when one is full of oneself4 ,it is #bhe true that men hold human nature only too much in contempt1 apparently because they see no other creatures capable of arousing their emulation2 but they have all too much self-esteem1 and individually are but too easily satisfied4 ,i therefore agree with ,meric ,casaubon1 who in his notes on the ,xenophanes of ,diogenes ,laertius praises exceedingly the admirable sentiments of ,euripides1 going so far as to credit him with having said things quae spirant ,greek3 theopneuston pectus4 ,seneca 7,lib4 #d1 c4 #e1 ,de ,benefic47 speaks eloquently of the blessings ,nature has heaped upon us4 ,m4 ,bayle in his ,dictionary1 article ',xenophanes'1 brings up sundry authorities against this1 and among others that of the poet ,diphilus in the ,collections of ,stobaeus1 whose ,greek might be thus expressed in ,latin3 ,fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens1 ,infundit uno terna pro bono mala4 #bei4 ,m4 ,bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of guilt1 or of moral evil among men1 the case would soon be terminated to the advantage of ,pliny1 and ,euripides would lose his action4 ,to that ,i am not opposed2 our vices doubtless exceed our virtues1 and this is the effect of original sin4 ,it is nevertheless true that also on that point men in general exaggerate things1 and that even some theologians disparage man so much that they wrong the providence of the ,author of mankind4 ,that is why ,i am not in favour of those who thought to do great honour to our religion by saying that the virtues of the pagans were only splendida peccata1 splendid vices4 ,it is a sally of ,st4 ,augustine's which has no foundation in holy ,scripture1 and which offends reason4 ,but here we are only discussing a physical good and evil1 and one must compare in detail the prosperities and the adversities of this life4 ,m4 ,bayle would wish almost to set aside the consideration of health2 he likens it to the rarefied bodies1 which are scarcely felt1 like air1 for example2 but he likens pain to the bodies that have much density and much weight in slight volume4 ,but pain itself makes us aware of the importance of health when we are bereft of it4 ,i have already observed that excess of physical pleasures would be a real evil1 and the matter ought not to be otherwise2 it is too important for the spirit to be free4 ,lactantius 7,divin4 ,instit41 lib4 #c1 cap4 #ah7 had said that men are so squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill1 as if it swallowed up all the goods they have enjoyed4 ,m4 ,bayle says1 concerning this1 that the very fact that men have this feeling warrants the #bhf judgement that they are in evil case1 since it is feeling which measures the extent of good or evil4 ,but ,i answer that present feeling is anything rather than the true measure of good and evil past and future4 ,i grant that one is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions2 but that does not exclude a previous state of well-being1 nor imply that1 everything reckoned in and all allowance made1 the good does not exceed the evil4 #bfj4 ,i do not wonder that the pagans1 dissatisfied with their gods1 made complaints against ,prometheus and ,epimetheus for having forged so weak an animal as man4 ,nor do ,i wonder that they acclaimed the fable of old ,silenus1 foster-father of ,bacchus1 who was seized by ,king ,midas1 and as the price of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim that the first and the greatest of goods was not to be born1 and the second1 to depart from this life with dispatch 7,cic41 ,tuscul41 lib4 #a74 ,plato believed that souls had been in a happier state1 and many of the ancients1 amongst others ,cicero in his ,consolation 7according to the account of ,lactantius71 believed that for their sins they were confined in bodies as in a prison4 ,they rendered thus a reason for our ills1 and asserted their prejudices against human life3 for there is no such thing as a beautiful prison4 ,but quite apart from the consideration that1 even according to these same pagans1 the evils of this life would be counterbalanced and exceeded by the goods of past and future lives1 ,i make bold to say that we shall find1 upon unbiassed scrutiny of the facts1 that taking all in all human life is in general tolerable4 ,and adding thereto the motives of religion1 we shall be content with the order ,god has set therein4 ,moreover1 for a better judgement of our goods and our evils1 it will be well to read ,cardan1 ,de ,utilitate ex ,adversis ,capienda1 and ,novarini1 ,de ,occultis ,dei ,beneficiis4 #bfa4 ,m4 ,bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great1 who are thought to be the most fortunate3 the constant experience of the fair aspect of their condition renders them unaware of good1 but greatly aware of evil4 ,someone will say3 so much the worse for them2 if they know not how to enjoy the advantages of nature and fortune1 is that the fault of either8 ,there are nevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom1 who know how to profit by the favours ,god has shown them1 who are easily consoled for their misfortunes1 and who even turn their own faults to account4 ,m4 ,bayle #bhg pays no heed to that3 he prefers to listen to ,pliny1 who thinks that ,augustus1 one of the princes most favoured by fortune1 experienced at least as much evil as good4 ,i admit that he found great causes of trouble in his family and that remorse for having crushed the ,republic may have tormented him2 but ,i think that he was too wise to grieve over the former1 and that ,maecenas apparently made him understand that ,rome had need of a master4 ,had not ,augustus been converted on this point1 ,vergil would never have said of a lost soul3 ,vendidit hic auro patriam ,dominumque potentem ,imposuit1 fixit leges pretio atque refixit4 ,augustus would have thought that he and ,caesar were alluded to in these lines1 which speak of a master given to a free state4 ,but there is every indication that he applied it just as little to his dominion1 which he regarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for public evils1 as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used of the kings censured in ,m4 de ,cambray's ,telemachus4 ,each one considers himself within his rights4 ,tacitus1 an unbiassed writer1 justifies ,augustus in two words1 at the beginning of his ,annals4 ,but ,augustus was better able than anyone to judge of his good fortune4 ,he appears to have died content1 as may be inferred from a proof he gave of contentedness with his life3 for in dying he repeated to his friends a line in ,greek1 which has the signification of that ,plaudite that was wont to be spoken at the conclusion of a well-acted play4 ,suetonius quotes it3 ,greek3 ,dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypsate4 #bfb4 ,but even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human kind more evil than good1 it is enough where ,god is concerned that there is incomparably more good than evil in the universe4 ,rabbi ,maimonides 7whose merit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is the first of the ,rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense7 also gave wise judgement on this question of the predominance of good over evil in the world4 ,here is what he says in his ,doctor ,perplexorum 7cap4 #ab1 p4 #c73 ',there arise often in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts which persuade them there is more evil than good in the world3 and one often finds in the poems and songs of the pagans that it is as it were a miracle when something good comes to pass1 whereas evils are usual and constant4 ,this error has #bhh taken hold not of the common herd only1 those very persons who wish to be considered wise have been beguiled thereby4 ,a celebrated writer named ,alrasi1 in his ,sepher ,elohuth1 or ,theosophy1 amongst other absurdities has stated that there are more evils than goods1 and that upon comparison of the recreations and the pleasures man enjoys in times of tranquillity with the pains1 the torments1 the troubles1 faults1 cares1 griefs and afflictions whereby he is overwhelmed our life would prove to be a great evil1 and an actual penalty inflicted upon us to punish us4' ,maimonides adds that the cause of their extravagant error is their supposition that ,nature was made for them only1 and that they hold of no account what is separate from their person2 whence they infer that when something unpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe4 #bfc4 ,m4 ,bayle says that this observation of ,maimonides is not to the point1 because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good4 ,but1 upon consideration of the ,rabbi's words1 ,i find that the question he formulates is general1 and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one particular motive derived from the evils of the human race1 as if all had been made for man2 and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke also of good and evil in general4 ,maimonides is right in saying that if one took into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil1 even though it prevailed among men1 need not on that account occur among the angels1 nor among the heavenly bodies1 nor among the elements and inanimate compounds1 nor among many kinds of animals4 ,i have shown elsewhere that in supposing that the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved 7a supposition which is nevertheless not altogether certain7 one might admit that there is more evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us4 ,but ,i pointed out that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good than evil1 both moral and physical1 in rational creatures in general1 nor prevents the city of ,god1 which contains all creatures1 from being the most perfect state4 ,so also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil which is in all substances1 whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence1 and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good1 one must say that the universe1 such as it actually is1 must be the best of all systems4 #bhi #bfd4 ,moreover1 ,m4 ,bayle will not have it that our transgression should have anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings4 ,he is right when it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings2 but the case is not the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to ,god1 this indeed being the principal cause of ,m4 ,bayle's difficulties when he places reason or experience in opposition to religion4 ,i know that he is wont to say that it is of no avail to resort to our free will1 since his objections tend also to prove that the misuse of free will must no less be laid to the account of ,god1 who has permitted it and who has co-operated therein4 ,he states it as a maxim that for one difficulty more or less one must not abandon a system4 ,this he advances especially in favour of the methods of the strict and the dogma of the ,supralapsarians4 ,for he supposes that one can subscribe to their opinion1 although he leaves all the difficulties in their entirety1 because the other systems1 albeit they put an end to some of the difficulties1 cannot meet them all4 ,i hold that the true system ,i have expounded satisfies all4 ,nevertheless1 even were that not so1 ,i confess that ,i cannot relish this maxim of ,m4 ,bayle's1 and ,i should prefer a system which would remove a great portion of the difficulties1 to one which would meet none of them4 ,and the consideration of the wickedness of men1 which brings upon them well-nigh all their misfortunes1 shows at least that they have no right to complain4 ,no justice need trouble itself over the origin of a scoundrel's wickedness when it is only a question of punishing him3 it is quite another matter when it is a question of prevention4 ,one knows well that disposition1 upbringing1 conversation1 and often chance itself1 have much share in that origin3 is the man any the less deserving of punishment8 #bfe4 ,i confess that there still remains another difficulty4 ,if ,god is not bound to account to the wicked for their wickedness1 it seems as if he owes to himself1 and to those who honour him and love him1 justification for his course of action with regard to the permission of vice and crime4 ,but ,god has already given that satisfaction1 as far as it is needed here on earth3 by granting us the light of reason he has bestowed upon us the means whereby we may meet all difficulties4 ,i hope that ,i have made it plain in this discourse1 and have elucidated the matter in the preceding portion of these ,essays1 almost as far as it can be done through general arguments4 ,thereafter1 the permission of sin being justified1 the other evils #bij that are a consequence thereof present no further difficulty4 ,thus also ,i am justified in restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account for the evil of punishment1 as ,holy ,scripture does1 and likewise well-nigh all the ,fathers of the ,church and the ,preachers4 ,and1 to the end that none may say that is only good per la predica1 it is enough to consider that1 after the solutions ,i have given1 nothing must seem more right or more exact than this method4 ,for ,god1 having found already among things possible1 before his actual decrees1 man misusing his freedom and bringing upon himself his misfortune1 yet could not avoid admitting him into existence1 because the general plan required this4 ,wherefore it will no longer be necessary to say with ,m4 ,jurieu that one must dogmatize like ,st4 ,augustine and preach like ,pelagius4 #bff4 ,this method1 deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of guilt1 cannot be open to censure1 and serves especially to account for the greatest physical evil1 which is damnation4 ,ernst ,sonner1 sometime ,professor of ,philosophy at ,altorf 7a university established in the territory of the free city of ,nuremberg71 who was considered an excellent ,aristotelian1 but was finally recognized as being secretly a ,socinian1 had composed a little discourse entitled3 ,demonstration against the ,eternity of ,punishment4 ,it was founded on this somewhat trite principle1 that there is no proportion between an infinite punishment and a finite guilt4 ,it was conveyed to me1 printed 7so it seemed7 in ,holland2 and ,i replied that there was one thing to be considered which had escaped the late ,herr ,sonner3 namely that it was enough to say that the duration of the guilt caused the duration of the penalty4 ,since the damned remained wicked they could not be withdrawn from their misery2 and thus one need not1 in order to justify the continuation of their sufferings1 assume that sin has become of infinite weight through the infinite nature of the object offended1 who is ,god4 ,this thesis ,i had not explored enough to pass judgement thereon4 ,i know that the general opinion of the ,schoolmen1 according to the ,master of the ,sentences1 is that in the other life there is neither merit nor demerit2 but ,i do not think that1 taken literally1 it can pass for an article of faith4 ,herr ,fecht1 a famous theologian at ,rostock1 well refuted that in his book on ,the ,state of the ,damned4 ,it is quite wrong1 he says 7 #ei72 ,god cannot change his nature2 justice is essential to him2 death has closed the door of grace1 but not that of justice4 #bia #bfg4 ,i have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for the duration of the pains of the damned as ,i have just done4 ,johann ,gerhard1 a famous theologian of the ,augsburg ,confession 7in ,locis ,theol41 loco de ,inferno1 #fj71 brings forward amongst other arguments that the damned have still an evil will and lack the grace that could render it good4 ,zacharias ,ursinus1 a theologian of ,heidelberg1 who follows ,calvin1 having formulated this question 7in his treatise ,de ,fide7 why sin merits an eternal punishment1 advances first the common reason1 that the person offended is infinite1 and then also this second reason1 quod non cessante peccato non potest cessare poena4 ,and the ,jesuit ,father ,drexler says in his book entitled ,nicetas1 or ,incontinence ,overcome 7book #b1 ch4 #aa1 #i73 ',nec mirum damnatos semper torqueri1 continue blasphemant1 et sic quasi semper peccant1 semper ergo plectuntur4' ,he declares and approves the same reason in his work on ,eternity 7book #b1 ch4 #ae7 saying3 ',sunt qui dicant1 nec displicet responsum3 scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant1 ideo semper puniuntur4' ,and he indicates thereby that this opinion is very common among learned men in the ,roman ,church4 ,he alleges1 it is true1 another more subtle reason1 derived from ,pope ,gregory the ,great 7lib4 #d1 ,dial4 c4 #dd71 that the damned are punished eternally because ,god foresaw by a kind of mediate knowledge that they would always have sinned if they had always lived upon earth4 ,but it is a hypothesis very much open to question4 ,herr ,fecht quotes also various eminent ,protestant theologians for ,herr ,gerhard's opinion1 although he mentions also some who think differently4 #bfh4 ,m4 ,bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages from two able theologians of his party1 which have some reference to these statements of mine4 ,m4 ,jurieu in his book on the ,unity of the ,church1 in opposition to that written by ,m4 ,nicole on the same subject1 gives the opinion 7p4 #cgi7 'that reason tells us that a creature which cannot cease to be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'4 ,m4 ,jacquelot in his book on ,the ,conformity of ,faith with ,reason 7p4 #bbj7 is of opinion 'that the damned must remain eternally deprived of the glory of the blessed1 and that this deprivation might well be the origin and the cause of all their pains1 through the reflexions these unhappy creatures make upon their crimes which have deprived them of an eternal bliss4 ,one knows what burning regrets1 what pain envy causes to those who see themselves deprived of a good1 of a notable honour which had been offered to them1 and which #bib they rejected1 especially when they see others invested with it4' ,this position is a little different from that of ,m4 ,jurieu1 but both agree in this sentiment1 that the damned are themselves the cause of the continuation of their torments4 ,m4 le ,clerc's ,origenist does not entirely differ from this opinion when he says in the ,select ,library 7vol4 #g1 p4 #cda73 ',god1 who foresaw that man would fall1 does not condemn him on that account1 but only because1 although he has the power to recover himself1 he yet does not do so1 that is1 he freely retains his evil ways to the end of his life4' ,if he carries this reasoning on beyond this life1 he will ascribe the continuation of the pains of the wicked to the continuation of their guilt4 #bfi4 ,m4 ,bayle says 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #age1 p4 #aahh7 'that this dogma of the ,origenist is heretical1 in that it teaches that damnation is not founded simply on sin1 but on voluntary impenitence'3 but is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of sin8 ,i would not simply say1 however1 that it is because man1 having the power to recover himself1 does not2 and would wish to add that it is because man does not take advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to recover himself4 ,but after this life1 though one assume that the succour ceases1 there is always in the man who sins1 even when he is damned1 a freedom which renders him culpable1 and a power1 albeit remote1 of recovering himself1 even though it should never pass into action4 ,and there is no reason why one may not say that this degree of freedom1 exempt from necessity1 but not exempt from certainty1 remains in the damned as well as in the blessed4 ,moreover1 the damned have no need of a succour that is needed in this life1 for they know only too well what one must believe here4 #bgj4 ,the illustrious prelate of the ,anglican ,church who published recently a book on the origin of evil1 concerning which ,m4 ,bayle made some observations in the second volume of his ,reply1 speaks with much subtlety about the pains of the damned4 ,this prelate's opinion is presented 7according to the author of the ,nouvelles de la ,rpublique des ,lettres1 ,june #agjc7 as if he made 'of the damned just so many madmen who will feel their miseries acutely1 but who will nevertheless congratulate themselves on their own behaviour1 and who will rather choose to be1 and to be that which they are1 than not to be at all4 ,they will love their state1 unhappy as it will be1 even as angry people1 lovers1 the ambitious1 the #bic envious take pleasure in the very things that only augment their misery4 ,furthermore the ungodly will have so accustomed their mind to wrong judgements that they will henceforth never make any other kind1 and will perpetually pass from one error into another4 ,they will not be able to refrain from desiring perpetually things whose enjoyment will be denied them1 and1 being deprived of which1 they will fall into inconceivable despair1 while experience can never make them wiser for the future4 ,for by their own fault they will have altogether corrupted their understanding1 and will have rendered it incapable of passing a sound judgement on any matter4' #bga4 ,the ancients already imagined that the ,devil dwells remote from ,god voluntarily1 in the midst of his torments1 and that he is unwilling to redeem himself by an act of submission4 ,they invented a tale that an anchorite in a vision received a promise from ,god that he would receive into grace the ,prince of the bad angels if he would acknowledge his fault2 but that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a strange manner4 ,at the least1 the theologians usually agree that the devils and the damned hate ,god and blaspheme him2 and such a state cannot but be followed by continuation of misery4 ,concerning that1 one may read the learned treatise of ,herr ,fecht on the ,state of the ,damned4 #bgb4 ,there were times when the belief was held that it was not impossible for a lost soul to be delivered4 ,the story told of ,pope ,gregory the ,great is well known1 how by his prayers he had withdrawn from hell the soul of the ,emperor ,trajan1 whose goodness was so renowned that to new emperors the wish was offered that they should surpass ,augustus in good fortune and ,trajan in goodness4 ,it was this that won for the latter the pity of the ,holy ,father4 ,god acceded to his prayers 7it is said71 but he forbade him to make the like prayers in future4 ,according to this fable1 the prayers of ,st4 ,gregory had the force of the remedies of ,aesculapius1 who recalled ,hippolytus from ,hades2 and1 if he had continued to make such prayers1 ,god would have waxed wroth1 like ,jupiter in ,vergil3 ,at pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris ,mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae1 ,ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis ,fulmine ,phoebigenam ,stygias detrusit ad undas4 #bid ,godescalc1 a monk of the ninth century1 who set at variance the theologians of his day1 and even those of our day1 maintained that the reprobate should pray ,god to render their pains more bearable2 but one is never justified in believing oneself reprobate so long as one is alive4 ,the passage in the ,mass for the dead is more reasonable3 it asks for the abatement of the torments of the damned1 and1 according to the hypothesis that ,i have just stated1 one must wish for them meliorem mentem4 ,origen having applied the passage from ,psalm lxxvii1 verse #aj3 ,god will not forget to be gracious1 neither will he shut up his loving-kindness in displeasure1 ,st4 ,augustine replies 7,enchirid41 c4 #aab7 that it is possible that the pains of the damned last eternally1 and that they may nevertheless be mitigated4 ,if the text implied that1 the abatement would1 as regards its duration1 go on to infinity2 and yet that abatement would1 as regards its extent1 have a non plus ultra4 ,even so there are asymptote figures in geometry where an infinite length makes only a finite progress in breadth4 ,if the parable of the wicked rich man represented the state of a definitely lost soul1 the hypothesis which makes these souls so mad and so wicked would be groundless4 ,but the charity towards his brothers attributed to him in the parable does not seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness which is ascribed to the damned4 ,st4 ,gregory the ,great 7,,ix ,mor41 #ci7 thinks that the rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his3 but it seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with the disposition of a perfectly wicked will4 ,bonaventura1 on the ,master of the ,sentences1 says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see everyone damned2 but since that was not to be1 he desired the salvation of his brothers rather than that of the rest4 ,this reply is by no means sound4 ,on the contrary1 the mission of ,lazarus that he desired would have served to save many people2 and he who takes so much pleasure in the damnation of others that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire that damnation for some more than others2 but1 generally speaking1 he will have no inclination to gain salvation for anyone4 ,however that may be1 one must admit that all this detail is problematical1 ,god having revealed to us all that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of misfortunes1 and not what is needed for our understanding thereof4 #bgc4 ,now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the misuse of free will1 and to evil will1 in order to account for other evils1 #bie since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough justified1 the ordinary system of the theologians meets with justification at the same time4 ,now we can seek with confidence the origin of evil in the freedom of creatures4 ,the first wickedness is well known to us1 it is that of the ,devil and his angels3 the ,devil sinneth from the beginning1 and for this purpose the ,son of ,god was manifested1 that he might destroy the works of the ,devil 7#a ,john iii4 #h74 ,the ,devil is the father of wickedness1 he was a murderer from the beginning1 and abode not in the truth 7,john viii4 #dd74 ,and therefore ,god spared not the angels that sinned1 but cast them down to ,hell1 and delivered them into chains of darkness1 to be reserved unto judgement 7#b ,pet4 ii4 #d74 ,and the angels which kept not their own habitation1 he hath reserved in eternal 7that is to say everlasting7 chains under darkness unto the judgement of the great day 7,jude i4 #f74 ,whence it is easy to observe that one of these two letters must have been seen by the author of the other4 #bgd4 ,it seems as if the author of the ,apocalypse wished to throw light upon what the other canonical writers had left obscure3 he gives us an account of a battle that took place in ,heaven4 ,michael and his angels fought against the ,dragon1 and the ,dragon fought and his angels4 ',but they prevailed not1 neither was their place found any more in heaven4 ,and the great ,dragon was cast out1 that old serpent1 called the ,devil1 and ,satan1 which deceiveth the whole world3 and he was cast out into the earth1 and his angels were cast out with him' 7,rev4 xii4 #g1 #h1 #i74 ,for although this account is placed after the flight of the woman into the wilderness1 and it may have been intended to indicate thereby some revulsion favourable to the ,church1 it appears as though the author's design was to show simultaneously the old fall of the first enemy and a new fall of a new enemy4 #bge4 ,lying or wickedness springs from the ,devil's own nature1 ,greek3 ek tn idin from his will1 because it was written in the book of the eternal verities1 which contains the things possible before any decree of ,god1 that this creature would freely turn toward evil if it were created4 ,it is the same with ,eve and ,adam2 they sinned freely1 albeit the ,devil tempted them4 ,god gives the wicked over to a reprobate mind 7,rom4 i4 #bh71 abandoning them to themselves and denying them a grace which he owes them not1 and indeed ought to deny to them4 #bgf4 ,it is said in the ,scriptures that ,god hardeneth 7,exod4 iv4 #ba and#bif vii4 #c2 ,isa4 lxiii4 #ag72 that ,god sendeth a lying spirit 7#a ,kings xxii4 #bc72 strong delusion that they should believe a lie 7#b ,thess4 ii4 #aa72 that he deceived the prophet 7,ezek4 xiv4 #i72 that he commanded ,shimei to curse 7#b ,sam xvi4 #aj72 that the children of ,eli hearkened not unto the voice of their father1 because the ,lord would slay them 7#a ,sam4 ii4 #be72 that the ,lord took away ,job's substance1 even although that was done through the malice of brigands 7,job i4 #ba72 that he raised up ,pharaoh1 to show his power in him 7,exod4 ix4 #ai2 ,rom4 ix4 #ag7 that he is like a potter who maketh a vessel unto dishonour 7,rom4 ix4 #ba72 that he hideth the truth from the wise and prudent 7,matt4 xi4 #be72 that he speaketh in parables unto them that are without1 that seeing they may see and not perceive1 and hearing they may hear and not understand1 lest at any time they might be converted1 and their sins might be forgiven them 7,mark iv4 #ab2 ,luke viii4 #aj72 that ,jesus was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of ,god 7,acts ii4 #bc72 that ,pontius ,pilate and ,herod with the ,gentiles and the people of ,israel did that which the hand and the counsel of ,god had determined before to be done 7,acts iv4 #bg1 #bh72 that it was of the ,lord to harden the hearts of the enemy1 that they should come against ,israel in battle1 that he might destroy them utterly1 and that they might have no favour 7,joshua xi4 #bj72 that the ,lord mingled a perverse spirit in the midst of ,egypt1 and caused it to err in all its works1 like a drunken man 7,isa4 xix4 #ad72 that ,rehoboam hearkened not unto the word of the people1 for the cause was from the ,lord 7#a ,kings xii4 #ae72 that he turned the hearts of the ,egyptians to hate his people 7,ps4 cv4 #be74 ,but all these and other like expressions suggest only that the things ,god has done are used as occasion for ignorance1 error1 malice and evil deeds1 and contribute thereto1 ,god indeed foreseeing this1 and intending to use it for his ends1 since superior reasons of perfect wisdom have determined him to permit these evils1 and even to co-operate therein4 ',sed non sineret bonus fieri male1 nisi omnipotens etiam de malo posset facere bene'1 in ,st4 ,augustine's words4 ,but this has been expounded more fully in the preceding part4 #bgg4 ,god made man in his image 7,gen4 i4 #bf72 he made him upright 7,eccles4 vii4 #bi74 ,but also he made him free4 ,man has behaved badly1 he has fallen2 but there remains still a certain freedom after the fall4 ,moses said as from ,god3 ',i call heaven and earth to record this day against you1 that ,i have set before you life and death1 blessing and cursing2 therefore #big choose life' 7,deut4 xxx4 #ai74 ',thus saith the ,lord3 ,behold1 ,i set before you the way of life1 and the way of death' 7,jer4 xxi4 #h74 ,he has left man in the power of his counsel1 giving him his ordinances and his commandments4 ',if thou wilt1 thou shalt keep the commandments' 7or they shall keep thee74 ',he hath set before thee fire and water1 to stretch forth thine hand to whichever thou wilt' 7,sirach xv4 #ad1 #ae1 #af74 ,fallen and unregenerate man is under the domination of sin and of ,satan1 because it pleases him so to be2 he is a voluntary slave through his evil lust4 ,thus it is that free will and will in bondage are one and the same thing4 #bgh4 ',let no man say1 ,i am tempted of ,god'2 'but every man is tempted1 when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' 7,jas4 i4 #ac1 #ad74 ,and ,satan contributes thereto4 ,he 'blindeth the minds of them which believe not' 7#b ,cor4 iv4 #d74 ,but man is delivered up to the ,devil by his covetous desire3 the pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him4 ,plato has said so already1 and ,cicero repeats it3 ',plato voluptatem dicebat escam malorum4' ,grace sets over against it a greater pleasure1 as ,st4 ,augustine observed4 ,all pleasure is a feeling of some perfection2 one loves an object in proportion as one feels its perfections2 nothing surpasses the divine perfections4 ,whence it follows that charity and love of ,god give the greatest pleasure that can be conceived1 in that proportion in which one is penetrated by these feelings1 which are not common among men1 busied and taken up as men are with the objects that are concerned with their passions4 #bgi4 ,now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do not necessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin1 it must likewise be said that we are not aided invincibly2 and1 however efficacious divine grace may be1 there is justification for saying that one can resist it4 ,but when it indeed proves victorious1 it is certain and infallible beforehand that one will yield to its allurements1 whether it have its strength of itself or whether it find a way to triumph through the congruity of circumstances4 ,thus one must always distinguish between the infallible and the necessary4 #bhj4 ,the system of those who call themselves ,disciples of ,st4 ,augustine is not far removed from this1 provided one exclude certain obnoxious things1 whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves4 ,in the expressions ,i find that it is principally the use of terms like #bih 'necessary' or 'contingent'1 'possible' or 'impossible'1 which sometimes gives a handle and causes much ado4 ,that is why1 as ,herr ,lscher the younger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the ,paroxysms of the ,absolute ,decree1 ,luther desired1 in his book ,on the ,will in ,bondage1 to find a word more fitting for that which he wished to express than the word necessity4 ,speaking generally1 it appears more reasonable and more fitting to say that obedience to ,god's precepts is always possible1 even for the unregenerate2 that the grace of ,god is always resistible1 even in those most holy1 and that freedom is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity1 although it be never without infallible certainty or without inclining determination4 #bha4 ,nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would be permitted to say1 in certain conjunctures1 that the power to do good is often lacking1 even in the just2 that sins are often necessary1 even in the regenerate2 that it is impossible sometimes for one not to sin2 that grace is irresistible2 that freedom is not exempt from necessity4 ,but these expressions are less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances that prevail about us to-day4 ,they are also in general more open to misuse2 and moreover they savour somewhat of the speech of the people1 where terms are employed with great latitude4 ,there are1 however1 circumstances which render them acceptable and even serviceable4 ,it is the case that sacred and orthodox writers1 and even the holy ,scriptures1 have made use of expressions on both sides1 and no real contradiction has arisen1 any more than between ,st4 ,paul and ,st4 ,james1 or any error on either side that might be attributable to the ambiguity of the terms4 ,one is so well accustomed to these various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say precisely which sense is the more ordinary and the more natural1 and even that more intended by the author 7quis sensus magis naturalis1 obvius1 intentus74 ,for the same writer has different aims in different passages1 and the same ways of speaking are more or less accepted or acceptable before or after the decision of some great man or of some authority that one respects and follows4 ,as a result of this one may well authorize or ban1 as opportunity arises and at certain times1 certain expressions2 but it makes no difference to the sense1 or to the content of faith1 if sufficient explanations of the terms are not added4 #bhb4 ,it is therefore only necessary to understand fully some distinctions1 such as that ,i have very often urged between the necessary and the #bii certain1 and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity4 ,it is the same with possibility and impossibility1 since the event whose opposite is possible is contingent1 even as that whose opposite is impossible is necessary4 ,a distinction is rightly drawn also between a proximate potency and a remote potency2 and1 according to these different senses1 one says now that a thing may be and now that it may not be4 ,it may be said in a certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed should not sin2 that the devils and the damned should sin2 that ,god himself should choose the best2 that man should follow the course which after all attracts him most4 ,but this necessity is not opposed to contingency2 it is not of the kind called logical1 geometrical or metaphysical1 whose opposite implies contradiction4 ,m4 ,nicole has made use somewhere of a comparison which is not amiss4 ,it is considered impossible that a wise and serious magistrate1 who has not taken leave of his senses1 should publicly commit some outrageous action1 as it would be1 for instance1 to run about the streets naked in order to make people laugh4 ,it is the same1 in a sense1 with the blessed2 they are still less capable of sinning1 and the necessity that forbids them to sin is of the same kind4 ,finally ,i also hold that 'will' is a term as equivocal as potency and necessity4 ,for ,i have already observed that those who employ this axiom1 that one does not fail to do what one wills when one can1 and who thence infer that ,god therefore does not will the salvation of all1 imply a decretory will4 ,only in that sense can one support this proposition1 that wisdom never wills what it knows to be among the things that shall not happen4 ,on the other hand1 one may say1 taking will in a sense more general and more in conformity with customary use1 that the wise will is inclined antecedently to all good1 although it decrees finally to do that which is most fitting4 ,thus one would be very wrong to deny to ,god the serious and strong inclination to save all men1 which ,holy ,scripture attributes to him2 or even to attribute to him an original distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number of persons1 odium antecedaneum4 ,one should rather maintain that the wise mind tends towards all good1 as good1 in proportion to his knowledge and his power1 but that he only produces the best that can be achieved4 ,those who admit that1 and yet deny to ,god the antecedent will to save all men1 are wrong only in their misuse of the term1 provided that they acknowledge1 besides1 that ,god gives to all help sufficient to enable them to win #cjj salvation if only they have the will to avail themselves thereof4 #bhc4 ,in the dogmas themselves held by the ,disciples of ,st4 ,augustine ,i cannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children1 nor in general damnation resulting from original sin alone4 ,nor can ,i believe that ,god condemns those who are without the necessary light4 ,one may believe1 with many theologians1 that men receive more aid than we are aware of1 were it only when they are at the point of death4 ,it does not appear necessary either that all those who are saved should always be saved through a grace efficacious of itself1 independently of circumstances4 ,also ,i consider it unnecessary to say that all the virtues of the pagans were false or that all their actions were sins2 though it be true that what does not spring from faith1 or from the uprightness of the soul before ,god1 is infected with sin1 at least virtually4 ,finally ,i hold that ,god cannot act as if at random by an absolutely absolute decree1 or by a will independent of reasonable motives4 ,and ,i am persuaded that he is always actuated1 in the dispensation of his grace1 by reasons wherein the nature of the objects participates4 ,otherwise he would not act in accordance with wisdom4 ,i grant nevertheless that these reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good or the less evil natural qualities of men1 as if ,god gave his grace only according to these good qualities4 ,yet ,i hold1 as ,i have explained already here1 that these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other circumstances1 since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme wisdom4 #bhd4 ,save for these points1 and some few others1 where ,st4 ,augustine appears obscure or even repellent1 it seems as though one can conform to his system4 ,he states that from the substance of ,god only a ,god can proceed1 and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness 7,augustine ,de ,lib4 ,arb41 lib4 #a1 c4 #b74 ,that is what makes the creature imperfect1 faulty and corruptible 7,de ,genesi ad ,lit41 c4 #ae1 ,contra ,epistolam ,manichaei1 c4 #cf74 ,evil comes not from nature1 but from evil will 7,augustine1 in the whole book ,on the ,nature of ,good74 ,god can command nothing that would be impossible4 ',firmissime creditur ,deum justum et bonum impossibilia non potuisse praecipere' 7,lib4 de ,nat4 et ,grat41 c4 #dc1 p4 #fi74 ,nemo peccat in eo1 quod caveri non potest 7lib4 #c1 ,de ,lib4 ,arb41 c4 #af1 #ag1 lib4 #a ,retract4 c4 #aa1 #ac1 #ae74 ,under a just ,god1 none can be unhappy who deserves not so to be1 'neque sub ,deo justo miser esse #cja quisquam1 nisi mereatur1 potest' 7lib4 #a1 c4 #ci74 ,free will cannot carry out ,god's commands without the aid of grace 7,ep4 ad ,hilar4 ,caesaraugustan474 ,we know that grace is not given according to deserts 7,ep4 #ajf1 #ajg1 #abj74 ,man in the state of innocence had the aid necessary to enable him to do good if he wished2 but the wish depended on free will1 'habebat adjutorium1 per quod posset1 et sine quo non vellet1 sed non adjutorium quo vellet' 7,lib4 de ,corrept41 c4 #aa et c4 #aj1 #ab74 ,god let angels and men try what they could do by their free will1 and after that what his grace and his justice could achieve 7ibid41 c4 #aj1 #aa1 #ab74 ,sin turned man away from ,god1 to turn him towards creatures 7lib4 #a1 qu4 #b1 ,ad ,simplicium74 ,to take pleasure in sinning is the freedom of a slave 7,enchirid41 c4 #ajc74 ',liberum arbitrium usque adeo in peccatore non periit1 ut per illud peccent maxime omnes1 qui cum delectatione peccant' 7lib4 #a1 ,ad ,bonifac41 c4 #b1 #c74 #bhe4 ,god said to ,moses3 ',i will be gracious to whom ,i will be gracious1 and will shew mercy on whom ,i will shew mercy' 7,exod4 xxxiii4 #ai74 ',so then it is not of him that willeth1 nor of him that runneth1 but of ,god that sheweth mercy' 7,rom4 ix4 #ae1 #af74 ,that does not prevent all those who have good will1 and who persevere therein1 from being saved4 ,but ,god gives them the willing and the doing4 ',therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy1 and whom he will he hardeneth' 7,rom4 ix4 #ah74 ,and yet the same ,apostle says that ,god willeth that all men should be saved1 and come to the knowledge of the truth2 which ,i would not interpret in accordance with some passages of ,st4 ,augustine1 as if it signified that no men are saved except those whose salvation he wills1 or as if he would save non singulos generum1 sed genera singulorum4 ,but ,i would rather say that there is none whose salvation he willeth not1 in so far as this is permitted by greater reasons4 ,for these bring it about that ,god only saves those who accept the faith he has offered to them and who surrender themselves thereto by the grace he has given them1 in accordance with what was consistent with the plan of his works in its entirety1 than which none can be better conceived4 #bhf4 ,as for predestination to salvation1 it includes also1 according to ,st4 ,augustine1 the ordinance of the means that shall lead to salvation4 ',praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est1 quam praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum ,dei1 quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur' 7,lib4 de ,persev41 c4 #ad74 ,he does not then understand it there as an #cjb absolute decree2 he maintains that there is a grace which is not rejected by any hardened heart1 because it is given in order to remove especially the hardness of hearts 7,lib4 de ,praedest41 c4 #h2 ,lib4 de ,grat41 c4 #ac1 #ad74 ,i do not find1 however1 that ,st4 ,augustine conveys sufficiently that this grace1 which subdues the heart1 is always efficacious of itself4 ,and one might perhaps have asserted without offence to him that the same degree of inward grace is victorious in the one1 where it is aided by outward circumstances1 but not in the other4 #bhg4 ,will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good1 and follows the sense which prevails4 ',si utrumque tantundem diligimus1 nihil horum dabimus4 ,item3 ,quod amplius nos delectat1 secundum id operemur necesse est' 7in c4 #e1 ,ad ,gal474 ,i have explained already how1 despite all that1 we have indeed a great power over our will4 ,st4 ,augustine takes it somewhat differently1 and in a way that does not go far1 when he says that nothing is so much within our power as the action of our will4 ,and he gives a reason which is almost tautological3 for 7he says7 this action is ready at the moment when we will4 ',nihil tam in nostra potestate est1 quam ipsa voluntas1 ea enim mox ut volumus praesto est' 7lib4 #c1 ,de ,lib4 ,arb41 c4 #c2 lib4 #e1 ,de ,civ4 ,dei1 c4 #aj74 ,but that only means that we will when we will1 and not that we will that which we wish to will4 ,there is more reason for saying with him3 'aut voluntas non est1 aut libera dicenda est' 7d4 #a1 #c1 c4 #c72 and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly1 or certainly1 does not prevent it from being free4 ',perquam absurdum est1 ut ideo dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem libertatem nostram1 quod beati esse volumus1 quia id omnino nolle non possumus1 nescio qua bona constrictione naturae4 ,nec dicere audemus ideo ,deum non voluntatem libertatem1 sed necessitatem habere justitiae1 quia non potest velle peccare4 ,certe ,deus ipse numquid quia peccare non potest1 ideo liberum arbitrium habere negandus est8' 7,de ,nat4 et ,grat41 c4 #df1 #dg1 #dh1 #di74 ,he also says aptly1 that ,god gives the first good impulse1 but that afterwards man acts also4 ',aguntur ut agant1 non ut ipsi nihil agant' 7,de ,corrept41 c4 #b74 #bhh4 ,i have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil of guilt1 and consequently of the evil of punishment2 although it is true that the original imperfection of creatures1 which is already presented in the eternal ideas1 is the first and most remote cause4 ,m4 ,bayle #cjc nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will2 he will not have the cause of evil ascribed to it4 ,one must listen to his objections1 but first it will be well to throw further light on the nature of freedom4 ,i have shown that freedom1 according to the definition required in the schools of theology1 consists in intelligence1 which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation1 in spontaneity1 whereby we determine1 and in contingency1 that is1 in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity4 ,intelligence is1 as it were1 the soul of freedom1 and the rest is as its body and foundation4 ,the free substance is self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding1 which inclines it without compelling it3 and all the conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words4 ,it is nevertheless well to point out that the imperfection present in our knowledge and our spontaneity1 and the infallible determination that is involved in our contingency1 destroy neither freedom nor contingency4 #bhi4 ,our knowledge is of two kinds1 distinct or confused4 ,distinct knowledge1 or intelligence1 occurs in the actual use of reason2 but the senses supply us with confused thoughts4 ,and we may say that we are immune from bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge1 but that we are the slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are confused4 ,in this sense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were to be desired1 and we may say with ,st4 ,augustine that being subject to sin we have the freedom of a slave4 ,yet a slave1 slave as he is1 nevertheless has freedom to choose according to the state wherein he is1 although more often than not he is under the stern necessity of choosing between two evils1 because a superior force prevents him from attaining the goods whereto he aspires4 ,that which in a slave is effected by bonds and constraint in us is effected by passions1 whose violence is sweet1 but none the less pernicious4 ,in truth we will only that which pleases us3 but unhappily what pleases us now is often a real evil1 which would displease us if we had the eyes of the understanding open4 ,nevertheless that evil state of the slave1 which is also our own1 does not prevent us1 any more than him1 from making a free choice of that which pleases us most1 in the state to which we are reduced1 in proportion to our present strength and knowledge4 #bij4 ,as for spontaneity1 it belongs to us in so far as we have within us the source of our actions1 as ,aristotle rightly conceived4 ,the #cjd impressions of external things often1 indeed1 divert us from our path1 and it was commonly believed that1 at least in this respect1 some of the sources of our actions were outside ourselves4 ,i admit that one is bound to speak thus1 adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression1 as one may1 in a certain sense1 without doing violence to truth4 ,but when it is a question of expressing oneself accurately ,i maintain that our spontaneity suffers no exception and that external things have no physical influence upon us1 ,i mean in the strictly philosophical sense4 #bia4 ,for better understanding of this point1 one must know that true spontaneity is common to us and all simple substances1 and that in the intelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions4 ,that cannot be better explained than by the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony1 which ,i indeed propounded some years ago4 ,there ,i pointed out that by nature every simple substance has perception1 and that its individuality consists in the perpetual law which brings about the sequence of perceptions that are assigned to it1 springing naturally from one another1 to represent the body that is allotted to it1 and through its instrumentality the entire universe1 in accordance with the point of view proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive any physical influence from the body4 ,even so the body also for its part adapts itself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws1 and consequently only obeys it according to the promptings of these laws4 ,whence it follows that the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity1 so that it depends only upon ,god and upon itself in its actions4 #bib4 ,as this system was not known formerly1 other ways were sought for emerging from this labyrinth1 and the ,cartesians themselves were in difficulties over the subject of free will4 ,they were no longer satisfied by the 'faculties' of the ,schoolmen1 and they considered that all the actions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without1 according to the impressions of the senses1 and that1 ultimately1 all is controlled in the universe by the providence of ,god4 ,thence arose naturally the objection that there is therefore no freedom4 ,to that ,m4 ,descartes replied that we are assured of ,god's providence by reason2 but that we are likewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within ourselves2 and that we must believe in both1 even though we see not how it is possible to reconcile them4 #cje #bic4 ,that was cutting the ,gordian knot1 and answering the conclusion of an argument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary argument4 ,which procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical disputes4 ,notwithstanding1 most of the ,cartesians contented themselves with this1 albeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their assertion1 as ,m4 ,bayle has clearly shown4 ,m4 ,regis 7,philos41 vol4 #a1 ,metaph41 book #b1 part #b1 c4 #bb7 thus paraphrases ,m4 ,descartes' doctrine3 ',most philosophers'1 he says1 'have fallen into error4 ,some1 not being able to understand the relation existing between free actions and the providence of ,god1 have denied that ,god was the first efficient cause of free will3 but that is sacrilegious4 ,the others1 not being able to apprehend the relation between ,god's efficacy and free actions1 have denied that man was endowed with freedom3 and that is a blasphemy4 ,the mean to be found between these two extremes is to say' 7id4 ibid41 p4 #dhe7 'that1 even though we were not able to understand all the relations existing between freedom and ,god's providence1 we should nevertheless be bound to acknowledge that we are free and dependent upon ,god4 ,for both these truths are equally known1 the one through experience1 and the other through reason2 and prudence forbids one to abandon truths whereof one is assured1 under the pretext that one cannot apprehend all the relations existing between them and other truths well known4' #bid4 ,m4 ,bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin1 'that these expressions of ,m4 ,regis fail to point out that we are aware of relations between man's actions and ,god's providence1 such as appear to us to be incompatible with our freedom4' ,he adds that these expressions are over-circumspect1 weakening the statement of the problem4 ',authors assume'1 he says1 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of enlightenment2 whereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from the enlightenment which we have1 and cannot reconcile' 7in ,m4 ,bayle's opinion7 'with our ,mysteries4' ,that is exactly what ,i said at the beginning of this work1 that if the ,mysteries were irreconcilable with reason1 and if there were unanswerable objections1 far from finding the mystery incomprehensible1 we should comprehend that it was false4 ,it is true that here there is no question of a mystery1 but only of natural religion4 #bie4 ,this is how ,m4 ,bayle combats those inward experiences1 whereon #cjf the ,cartesians make freedom rest3 but he begins by reflexions with which ,i cannot agree4 ',those who do not make profound examination'1 he says 7,dictionary1 art4 ',helen4'1 lit4 ,greek3 ,,td71 'of that which passes within them easily persuade themselves that they are free1 and that1 if their will prompts them to evil1 it is their fault1 it is through a choice whereof they are the masters4 ,those who judge otherwise are persons who have studied with care the springs and the circumstances of their actions1 and who have thought over the progress of their soul's impulses4 ,those persons usually have doubts about their free will1 and even come to persuade themselves that their reason and mind are slaves1 without power to resist the force that carries them along where they would not go4 ,it was principally persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of their evil deeds4' #bif4 ,these words remind me of those of ,chancellor ,bacon1 who says that a little philosophy inclineth us away from ,god1 but that depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to him4 ,it is the same with those who reflect upon their actions3 it appears to them at first that all we do is only impulsion from others1 and that all we apprehend comes from without through the senses1 and is traced upon the void of our mind tanquam in tabula rasa4 ,but more profound meditation shows us that all 7even perceptions and passions7 comes to us from our own inner being1 with complete spontaneity4 #big4 ,yet ,m4 ,bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying the blame upon the gods4 ,medea in ,ovid speaks thus3 ,frustra1 ,medea1 repugnas1 ,nescio quid ,deus obstat1 ait4 ,and a little later ,ovid makes her add3 ,sed trahit invitam nova vis1 aliudque ,cupido1 ,mens aliud suadet2 video meliora proboque1 ,deteriora sequor4 ,but one could set against that a passage from ,vergil1 who makes ,nisus say with far more reason3 ,di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt1 ,euryale1 an sua cuique ,deus fit dira cupido8 #bih4 ,herr ,wittich seems to have thought that in reality our independence is only apparent4 ,for in his ,diss4 de providentia ,dei actuali 7n4 #fa7 #cjg he makes free will consist in our being inclined towards the objects that present themselves to our soul for affirmation or denial1 love or hate1 in such a way that we do not feel we are being determined by any outward force4 ,he adds that it is when ,god himself causes our volitions that we act with most freedom2 and that the more efficacious and powerful ,god's action is upon us1 the more we are masters of our actions4 ',quia enim ,deus operatur ipsum velle1 quo efficacius operatur1 eo magis volumus2 quod autem1 cum volumus1 facimus1 id maxime habemus in nostra potestate4' ,it is true that when ,god causes a volition in us he causes a free action4 ,but it seems to me that the question here is not of the universal cause or of that production of our will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created effect1 whose positive elements are actually created continually through ,god's co-operation1 like all other absolute reality of things4 ,we are concerned here with the reasons for willing1 and the means ,god uses when he gives us a good will or permits us to have an evil will4 ,it is always we who produce it1 good or evil1 for it is our action3 but there are always reasons that make us act1 without impairing either our spontaneity or our freedom4 ,grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to making will operate through fitting motives1 such as would be an attention1 a dic cur hic1 a prevenient pleasure4 ,and it is quite evident that that does not interfere with freedom1 any more than could a friend who gives counsel and furnishes motives4 ,thus ,herr ,wittich has not supplied an answer to the question1 any more than ,m4 ,bayle1 and recourse to ,god is of no avail here4 #bii4 ,but let me give another much more reasonable passage from the same ,m4 ,bayle1 where he disputes with greater force the so-called lively sense of freedom1 which according to the ,cartesians is a proof of freedom4 ,his words are indeed full of wit1 and worthy of consideration1 and occur in the ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #adj1 p4 #gfa seqq474 ,here they are3 ',by the clear and distinct sense we have of our existence we do not discern whether we exist through ourselves or derive our being from another4 ,we discern that only by reflexion1 that is1 through meditation upon our powerlessness in the matter of conserving ourselves as much as we would1 and of freeing ourselves from dependence upon the beings that surround us1 etc4 ,it is indeed certain that the pagans 7the same must be said of the ,socinians1 since they deny the creation7 never attained#cjh to the knowledge of that true dogma that we were created from nothing1 and that we are derived from nothingness at every moment of our continuance4 ,they therefore thought erroneously that all substances in the universe exist of themselves and can never be reduced to nothing1 and that thus they depend upon no other thing save in respect of their modifications1 which are liable to be destroyed by the action of an external cause4 ,does not this error spring from the fact that we are unconscious of the creative action which conserves us1 and that we are only conscious of our existence8 ,that we are conscious of it1 ,i say1 in such a way that we should for ever remain ignorant of the cause of our being if other knowledge did not aid us8 ,let us say also1 that the clear and distinct sense we have of the acts of our will cannot make us discern whether we give them ourselves to ourselves or receive them from that same cause which gives us existence4 ,we must have recourse to reflexion or to meditation in order to effect this discrimination4 ,now ,i assert that one can never by purely philosophical meditations arrive at an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of our volitions3 for every person who makes due investigation will recognize clearly1 that if we were only passive subjects with regard to will we should have the same sensations of experience as we have when we think that we are free4 ,assume1 for the sake of argument1 that ,god so ordered the laws of the union between soul and body that all the modalities of the soul1 without a single exception1 are of necessity linked together with the interposition of the modalities of the brain4 ,you will then understand that nothing will happen to us except that of which we are conscious3 there will be in our soul the same sequence of thoughts from the perception of objects of the senses1 which is its first step1 up to the most definite volitions1 which are its final step4 ,there will be in this sequence the consciousness of ideas1 that of affirmations1 that of irresolutions1 that of velleities and that of volitions4 ,for whether the act of willing be impressed upon us by an external cause or we bring it about ourselves1 it will be equally true that we will1 and that we feel that we will4 ,moreover1 as this external cause can blend as much pleasure as it will with the volition which it impresses upon us1 we shall be able to feel at times that the acts of our will please us infinitely1 and that they lead us according to the bent of our strongest inclinations4 ,we shall feel no constraint2 you know the maxim3 voluntas non potest cogi4 ,do#cji you not clearly understand that a weather-vane1 always having communicated to it simultaneously 7in such a way1 however1 that priority of nature or1 if one will1 a real momentary priority1 should attach to the desire for motion7 movement towards a certain point on the horizon1 and the wish to turn in that direction1 would be persuaded that it moved of itself to fulfil the desires which it conceived8 ,i assume that it would not know that there were winds1 or that an external cause changed everything simultaneously1 both its situation and its desires4 ,that is the state we are in by our nature3 we know not whether an invisible cause makes us pass sufficiently from one thought to another4 ,it is therefore natural that men are persuaded that they determine their own acts4 ,but it remains to be discovered whether they are mistaken in that1 as in countless other things they affirm by a kind of instinct and without having made use of philosophic meditation4 ,since therefore there are two hypotheses as to what takes place in man3 the one that he is only a passive subject1 the other that he has active virtues1 one cannot in reason prefer the second to the first1 so long as one can only adduce proofs of feeling4 ,for we should feel with an equal force that we wish this or that1 whether all our volitions were imprinted upon our soul by an exterior and invisible cause1 or we formed them ourselves4' #cjj4 ,there are here excellent arguments1 which are valid against the usual systems2 but they fail in respect of the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony1 which takes us further than we were able to go formerly4 ,m4 ,bayle asserts1 for instance1 'that by purely philosophical meditations one can never attain to an established certainty that we are the efficient cause of our volitions'4 ,but this is a point which ,i do not concede to him3 for the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond a doubt that in the course of nature each substance is the sole cause of all its actions1 and that it is free of all physical influence from every other substance1 save the customary co-operation of ,god4 ,and this system shows that our spontaneity is real1 and not only apparent1 as ,herr ,wittich believed it to be4 ,m4 ,bayle asserts also on the same reasons 7ch4 #agj1 p4 #aacb7 that if there were a fatum ,astrologicum this would not destroy freedom2 and ,i would concede that to him1 if freedom consisted only in an apparent spontaneity4 #cja4 ,the spontaneity of our actions can therefore no longer be questioned2 and ,aristotle has defined it well1 saying that an action is #caj spontaneous when its source is in him who acts4 ',spontaneum est1 cujus principium est in agente4' ,thus it is that our actions and our wills depend entirely upon us4 ,it is true that we are not directly the masters of our will1 although we be its cause2 for we do not choose volitions1 as we choose our actions by our volitions4 ,yet we have a certain power also over our will1 because we can contribute indirectly towards willing another time that which we would fain will now1 as ,i have here already shown3 that1 however1 is no velleity1 properly speaking4 ,there also we have a mastery1 individual and even perceptible1 over our actions and our wills1 resulting from a combination of spontaneity with intelligence4 #cjb4 ,up to this point ,i have expounded the two conditions of freedom mentioned by ,aristotle1 that is1 spontaneity and intelligence1 which are found united in us in deliberation1 whereas beasts lack the second condition4 ,but the ,schoolmen demand yet a third1 which they call indifference4 ,and indeed one must admit it1 if indifference signifies as much as 'contingency'2 for ,i have already said here that freedom must exclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical necessity4 ,but1 as ,i have declared more than once1 this indifference1 this contingency1 this non-necessity1 if ,i may venture so to speak1 which is a characteristic attribute of freedom1 does not prevent one from having stronger inclinations towards the course one chooses2 nor does it by any means require that one be absolutely and equally indifferent towards the two opposing courses4 #cjc4 ,i therefore admit indifference only in the one sense1 implying the same as contingency1 or non-necessity4 ,but1 as ,i have declared more than once1 ,i do not admit an indifference of equipoise1 and ,i do not think that one ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent4 ,such a choice would be1 as it were1 mere chance1 without determining reason1 whether apparent or hidden4 ,but such a chance1 such an absolute and actual fortuity1 is a chimera which never occurs in nature4 ,all wise men are agreed that chance is only an apparent thing1 like fortune3 only ignorance of causes gives rise to it4 ,but if there were such a vague indifference1 or rather if we were to choose without having anything to prompt us to the choice1 chance would then be something actual1 resembling what1 according to ,epicurus1 took place in that little deviation of the atoms1 occurring without cause or reason4 ,epicurus had introduced it in order to evade necessity1 and#caa ,cicero with good reason ridiculed it4 #cjd4 ,this deviation had a final cause in the mind of ,epicurus1 his aim being to free us from fate2 but it can have no efficient cause in the nature of things1 it is one of the most impossible of chimeras4 ,m4 ,bayle himself refutes it admirably1 as we shall see presently4 ,and yet it is surprising that he appears to admit elsewhere himself something of like nature with this supposed deviation3 here is what he says1 when speaking of ,buridan's ass 7,dictionary1 art4 ',buridan'1 lit4 #ac73 ',those who advocate free will properly so called admit in man a power of determining1 either to the right hand or the left1 even when the motives are perfectly uniform on the side of each of the two opposing objects4 ,for they maintain that our soul can say1 without having any reason other than that of using its freedom3 ,i prefer this to that1 although ,i see nothing more worthy of my choice in the one than the other4' #cje4 ,all those who admit a free will properly so called will not for that reason concede to ,m4 ,bayle this determination springing from an indeterminate cause4 ,st4 ,augustine and the ,thomists believe that all is determined4 ,and one sees that their opponents resort also to the circumstances which contribute to our choice4 ,experience by no means approves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise2 and one can employ here the argument that ,m4 ,bayle himself employed against the ,cartesians' manner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence4 ,for although ,i do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me choose between two apparently uniform courses1 there will always be some impression1 however imperceptible1 that determines us4 ,the mere desire to make use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying1 or determining us to the choice of one course or the other4 #cjf4 ,m4 ,bayle goes on3 ',there are at the very least two ways whereby man can extricate himself from the snares of equipoise4 ,one1 which ,i have already mentioned1 is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing fancy that he is master in his own house1 and that he does not depend upon objects4' ,this way is blocked3 for all that one might wish to play master in one's own house1 that has no determining effect1 nor does it favour one course more than the other4 ,m4 ,bayle goes on3 ',he would make this ,act3 ,i will prefer this to that1 because it pleases me to behave thus4' ,but #cab these words1 'because it pleases me'1 'because such is my pleasure'1 imply already a leaning towards 'the object that pleases'4 #cjg4 ,there is therefore no justification for continuing thus3 ',and so that which determined him would not be taken from the object2 the motive would be derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections1 or of their natural faculties4 ,the other way is that of the lot or chance3 the short straw would decide4' ,this way has an outlet1 but it does not reach the goal3 it would alter the issue1 for in such a case it is not man who decides4 ,or again if one maintains that it is still the man who decides by lot1 man himself is no longer in equipoise1 because the lot is not1 and the man has attached himself to it4 ,there are always reasons in ,nature which cause that which happens by chance or through the lot4 ,i am somewhat surprised that a mind so shrewd as ,m4 ,bayle's could have allowed itself to be so misled on this point4 ,i have set out elsewhere the true rejoinder to the ,buridan sophism3 it is that the case of perfect equipoise is impossible1 since the universe can never be halved1 so as to make all impressions equivalent on both sides4 #cjh4 ,let us see what ,m4 ,bayle himself says elsewhere against the chimerical or absolutely undefined indifference4 ,cicero had said 7in his book ,de ,fato7 that ,carneades had found something more subtle than the deviation of atoms1 attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely undefined indifference to the voluntary motions of souls1 because these motions have no need of an external cause1 coming as they do from our nature4 ,but ,m4 ,bayle 7,dictionary1 art4 ',epicurus'1 p4 #aadc7 aptly replies that all that which springs from the nature of a thing is determined3 thus determination always remains1 and ,carneades' evasion is of no avail4 #cji4 ,he shows elsewhere 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #ij1 l4 #b1 p4 #bbi7 'that a freedom far removed from this so-called equipoise is incomparably more beneficial4 ,i mean'1 he says1 'a freedom such as may always follow the judgements of the mind1 and such as cannot resist objects clearly recognized as good4 ,i know of no people who do not agree that truth clearly recognized necessitates' 7determines rather1 unless one speak of a moral necessity7 'the assent of the soul2 experience teaches us that4 ,in the schools they teach constantly that as the true is the object of #cac the understanding1 so the good is the object of the will4 ,so likewise they teach that as the understanding can never affirm anything save that which is shown to it under the semblance of truth1 the will can never love anything which to it does not appear to be good4 ,one never believes the false as such1 and one never loves evil as evil4 ,there is in the understanding a natural determination towards the true in general1 and towards each individual truth clearly recognized4 ,there is in the will a natural determination towards good in general2 whence many philosophers conclude that from the moment when individual goods are clearly recognized by us we are of necessity compelled to love them4 ,the understanding suspends its actions only when its objects show themselves obscurely1 so that there is cause for doubt as to whether they are false or true4 ,that leads many persons to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoise only when the soul is uncertain whether the object presented to it is a good with regard to it2 but that also1 the moment the soul decides in the affirmative1 it of necessity clings to that object until other judgements of the mind determine it otherwise4 ,those who expound freedom in this fashion think to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or demerit4 ,for they assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a free attention of the soul in examining the objects1 comparing them together1 and discriminating between them4 ,i must not forget that there are very learned men' 7such as ,bellarmine1 lib4 #c1 ,de ,gratia et ,libero ,arbitrio1 c4 #h1 et #i1 and ,cameron1 in ,responsione ad ,epistolam ,viri ,docti1 id est ,episcopii7 'who maintain with very cogent reasons that the will always of necessity follows the last practical act of the understanding4' #caj4 ,one must make some observations on this discourse4 ,a very clear recognition of the best determines the will2 but it does not necessitate it1 properly speaking4 ,one must always distinguish between the necessary and the certain or infallible1 as ,i have already observed more than once1 and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral necessity4 ,i think also that it is only ,god's will which always follows the judgements of the understanding3 all intelligent creatures are subject to some passions1 or to perceptions at least1 that are not composed entirely of what ,i call adequate ideas4 ,and although in the blessed these passions always tend towards the true good1 by virtue of the laws of ,nature and the system of things pre-established in relation to them1 yet this does not always #cad happen in such a way that they have a perfect knowledge of that good4 ,it is the same with them as with us1 who do not always understand the reason for our instincts4 ,the angels and the blessed are created beings1 even as we are1 in whom there is always some confused perception mingled with distinct knowledge4 ,suarez said something similar concerning them4 ,he thinks 7,treatise on ,prayer1 book ,i1 ch4 #aa7 that ,god has so ordered things beforehand that their prayers1 when they are made with a full will1 always succeed3 that is an example of a pre-established harmony4 ,as for us1 in addition to the judgement of the understanding1 of which we have an express knowledge1 there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the senses1 and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations1 of which we are not always aware4 ,these movements often thwart the judgement of the practical understanding4 #caa4 ,as for the parallel between the relation of the understanding to the true and that of the will to the good1 one must know that a clear and distinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the affirmation of this truth3 thus the understanding is necessitated in that direction4 ,but whatever perception one may have of the good1 the effort to act in accordance with the judgement1 which in my opinion forms the essence of the will1 is distinct from it4 ,thus1 since there is need of time to raise this effort to its climax1 it may be suspended1 and even changed1 by a new perception or inclination which passes athwart it1 which diverts the mind from it1 and which even causes it sometimes to make a contrary judgement4 ,hence it comes that our soul has so many means of resisting the truth which it knows1 and that the passage from mind to heart is so long4 ,especially is this so when the understanding to a great extent proceeds only by faint thoughts1 which have only slight power to affect1 as ,i have explained elsewhere4 ,thus the connexion between judgement and will is not so necessary as one might think4 #cab4 ,m4 ,bayle goes on to say1 with truth 7p4 #bba73 ',indeed1 it cannot be a fault in man's soul that it has no freedom of indifference as regards good in general4 ,it would be rather a disorder1 an inordinate imperfection1 if one could say truthfully3 ,it is all one to me whether ,i am happy or unhappy2 ,i have no more determination to love the good than to hate it2 ,i can do both equally4 ,now if it is a praiseworthy and advantageous quality to be determinate as regards good in general1 it cannot be a fault if #cae one is necessitated as regards each individual good recognized plainly as for our good4 ,it seems even as though it were a necessary conclusion1 that if the soul has no freedom of indifference as regards good in general1 it also has none in respect of particular goods which after due examination it judges to be goods in relation to it4 ,what should we think of a soul which1 having formed that judgement1 had1 and prided itself on having1 the power not to love these goods1 and even to hate them1 and which said3 ,i recognize clearly that these are goods for me1 ,i have all the enlightenment necessary on that point2 nevertheless ,i will not love them1 ,i will hate them2 my decision is made1 ,i act upon it2 it is not that any reason' 7that is1 any other reason than that which is founded upon ',such is my good pleasure'7 'urges me thereto1 but it pleases me so to behave3 what should we think1 ,i say1 of such a soul8 ,should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappy than if it had not this freedom of indifference8 #cac4 ',not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final acts of the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the soul1 but it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along that road than along the road of indifference4 ,it will suffice to enlighten his mind upon his true interests1 and straightway his will will comply with the judgements that reason shall have pronounced4 ,but if he has a freedom independent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly recognized1 he will be the most intractable of all animals1 and it will never be possible to rely upon making him choose the right course4 ,all the counsels1 all the arguments in the world may prove unavailing2 you will give him explanations1 you will convince his mind1 and yet his will will play the haughty madam and remain motionless as a rock4 ,vergil1 ,aen41 lib4 #f1 v4 #dgj3 ,non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur1 ,quam si dura silex1 aut stet ,marpesia cautes4 ,a caprice1 an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of all kinds2 it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good1 it will please her to hate it4 ,do you consider such a faculty1 sir1 to be the richest present ,god can have made to man1 and the sole instrument of our happiness8 ,is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity8 ,is there cause for boasting in being able to say3 ,i have scorned all the judgements of #caf my reason1 and ,i have followed an altogether different path1 simply from considerations of my own good pleasure8 ,with what regrets would one not be torn1 in that case1 if the determination made had an ill result8 ,such a freedom would therefore be more harmful than profitable to men1 because the understanding would not present all the goodness of the objects clearly enough to deprive the will of the power of rejection4 ,it would be therefore infinitely better for man to be always of necessity determined by the judgement of the understanding1 than to permit the will to suspend its action4 ,for by this means it would achieve its aim with greater ease and certainty4' #cad4 ,upon this discourse ,i make the further observation1 that it is very true that a freedom of indifference1 undefined and without any determining reason1 would be as harmful1 and even objectionable1 as it is impracticable and chimerical4 ,the man who wished to behave thus1 or at the least appear to be acting without due cause1 would most certainly be looked upon as irrational4 ,but it is very true also that the thing is impossible1 when it is taken strictly in accordance with the assumption4 ,as soon as one tries to give an example of it one misses one's aim and stumbles upon the case of a man who1 while he does not come to a decision without cause1 does so rather under the influence of inclination or passion than of judgement4 ,as soon as one says3 ',i scorn the judgements of my reason simply from considerations of my own good pleasure1 it pleases me to behave thus'1 it is as if one were to say3 ,i prefer my inclination to my interest1 my pleasure to my profit4 #cae4 ,even so some capricious man1 fancying that it is ignominious for him to follow the advice of his friends or his servants1 might prefer the satisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from their counsel4 ,it may happen1 however1 that in a matter of small moment a wise man acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwart another who tries to restrain him or direct him1 or that he may disconcert those who watch his steps4 ,it is even well at times to imitate ,brutus by concealing one's wit1 and even to feign madness1 as ,david did before the ,king of the ,philistines4 #caf4 ,m4 ,bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of showing that to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a great imperfection4 ,he observes 7p4 #bbe7 that1 even according to the #cag ,molinists1 'the understanding which does its ,,duty well indicates that which is ,,the ,,best'4 ,he introduces ,god 7ch4 #ia1 p4 #bbg7 saying to our first parents in the ,garden of ,eden3 ',i have given you my knowledge1 the faculty of judging things1 and full power to dispose your wills4 ,i shall give you instructions and orders2 but the free will that ,i have bestowed upon you is of such a nature that you have equal power 7according to circumstances7 to obey me and to disobey me4 ,you will be tempted3 if you make a good use of your freedom you will be happy2 and if you use it ill you will be unhappy4 ,it is for you to see if you wish to ask of me1 as a new grace1 either that ,i permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so1 or that ,i prevent you from doing so4 ,consider carefully1 ,i give you four and twenty hours4 ,do you not clearly understand' 7adds ,m4 ,bayle7 'that their reason1 which had not yet been obscured by sin1 would have made them conclude that they must ask ,god1 as the crowning point of the favours wherewith he had honoured them1 not to permit them to destroy themselves by an ill use of their powers8 ,and must one not admit that if ,adam1 through wrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings1 had refused a divine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness1 he would have been the prototype of all such as ,phaeton and ,icarus8 ,he would have been well-nigh as ungodly as the ,ajax of ,sophocles1 who wished to conquer without the aid of the gods1 and who said that the most craven would put their enemies to flight with such aid4' #cag4 ,m4 ,bayle also shows 7ch4 #hj7 that one congratulates oneself no less1 or even takes more credit to oneself1 for having been aided from above1 than for owing one's happiness to one's own choice4 ,and if one does well through having preferred a tumultuous instinct1 which arose suddenly1 to reasons maturely considered1 one feels an extraordinary joy in this2 for one assumes that either ,god1 or our ,guardian ,angel1 or something or other which one pictures to oneself under the vague name of good luck has impelled us thereto4 ,indeed1 ,sulla and ,caesar boasted more of their good luck than of their prudence4 ,the pagans1 and particularly the poets 7,homer especially71 determined their heroes' acts by divine promptings4 ,the hero of the ,aeneid proceeds only under the direction of a ,god4 ,it was very great praise offered to the ,emperors if one said that they were victorious both through their troops and through their gods whom they lent to #cah their generals3 ',te copias1 te consilium et tuos praebente ,divos1' said ,horace4 ,the generals fought under the auspices of the ,emperors1 as if trusting to the ,emperor's good luck1 for subordinate officers had no rights regarding the auspices4 ,one takes credit to oneself for being a favourite of heaven1 one rates oneself more highly for the possession of good fortune than of talent4 ,there are no people that think themselves more fortunate than the mystics1 who imagine that they keep still while ,god acts within them4 #cah4 ',on the other hand'1 ,m4 ,bayle adds 7ch4 #hc71 'a ,stoic philosopher1 who attaches to everything an inevitable necessity1 is as susceptible as another man to the pleasure of having chosen well4 ,and every man of sense will find that1 far from taking pleasure in the thought of having deliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable course1 one feels incredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one is so firmly rooted in the love of virtue that without the slightest resistance one would repel a temptation4 ,a man to whom is suggested the doing of a deed contrary to his duty1 his honour and his conscience1 who answers forthwith that he is incapable of such a crime1 and who is certainly not capable of it1 is far more contented with himself than if he asked for time to consider it1 and were for some hours in a state of indecision as to which course to take4 ,one is on many occasions regretful over not being able to make up one's mind between two courses1 and one would be well pleased that the counsel of a good friend1 or some succour from above1 should impel us to make a good choice4' ,all that demonstrates for us the advantage a determinate judgement has over that vague indifference which leaves us in uncertainty4 ,but indeed ,i have proved sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep us in doubt1 and have thus given the reason why ,god is never in doubt4 ,the nearer one comes to him1 the more perfect is freedom1 and the more it is determined by the good and by reason4 ,the character of ,cato1 of whom ,velleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable action1 will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of wavering4 #cai4 ,i have been well pleased to present and to support these arguments of ,m4 ,bayle against vague indifference1 as much for the elucidation of the subject as to confront him with himself1 and to demonstrate that he ought therefore not to complain of the alleged necessity imposed upon ,god1 #cai of choosing the best way that is possible4 ,for either ,god will act through a vague indifference and at random1 or again he will act on caprice or through some other passion1 or finally he must act through a prevailing inclination of reason which prompts him to the best4 ,but passions1 which come from the confused perception of an apparent good1 cannot occur in ,god2 and vague indifference is something chimerical4 ,it is therefore only the strongest reason that can regulate ,god's choice4 ,it is an imperfection in our freedom that makes us capable of choosing evil instead of good1 a greater evil instead of the lesser evil1 the lesser good instead of the greater good4 ,that arises from the appearances of good and evil1 which deceive us2 whereas ,god is always prompted to the true and the greatest good1 that is1 to the absolutely true good1 which he cannot fail to know4 #cbj4 ,this false idea of freedom1 conceived by those who1 not content with exempting it1 ,i do not say from constraint1 but from necessity itself1 would also exempt it from certainty and determination1 that is1 from reason and perfection1 nevertheless pleased some ,schoolmen1 people who often become entangled in their own subtleties1 and take the straw of terms for the grain of things4 ,they assume some chimerical notion1 whence they think to derive some use1 and which they endeavour to maintain by quibblings4 ,complete indifference is of this nature3 to concede it to the will is to grant it a privilege of the kind that some ,cartesians and some mystics find in the divine nature1 of being able to do the impossible1 to produce absurdities1 to cause two contradictory propositions to be true simultaneously4 ,to claim that a determination comes from a complete indifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturally from nothing4 ,let it be assumed that ,god does not give this determination3 it has accordingly no fountainhead in the soul1 nor in the body1 nor in circumstances1 since all is assumed to be indeterminate2 and yet there it is1 appearing and existing without preparation1 nothing making ready for it1 no angel1 not even ,god himself1 being able to see or to show how it exists4 ,that would be not only the emergence of something from nothing1 but its emergence thence of itself4 ,this doctrine introduces something as preposterous as the theory already mentioned1 of the deviation of atoms1 whereby ,epicurus asserted that one of these small bodies1 going in a straight line1 would turn aside all at once from its path1 without any#cbj reason1 simply because the will so commands4 ,take note moreover that he resorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of complete indifference1 a chimerical notion which appears to be of very ancient origin2 and one may with good reason say3 ,chimaera ,chimaeram parit4 #cba4 ,this is the way ,signor ,marchetti has expressed it in his admirable translation of ,lucretius into ,italian verse1 which has not yet been published 7,book #b73 ,m ch'i principii poi non corran punto ,della lor dritta via1 chi veder puote8 ,s finalmente ogni lor moto sempre ,insieme s'aggruppa1 e dall' antico ,sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce2 ,ne tracciando i primi semi1 fanno ,di moto un tal principio1 il qual poi rompa ,i decreti del fato1 acci non segua ,l'una causa dell' altra in infinito2 ,onde han questa1 dich' io1 del fato sciolta ,libera volunt1 per cui ciascuno ,va dove pi l'agrada8 ,i moti ancora ,si declinan sovente1 e non in tempo ,certo1 ne certa region1 m solo ,quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio2 ,poiche senz' alcun dubbio queste cose ,d sol principio il voler proprio1 e quindi ,van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti4 ,it is comical that a man like ,epicurus1 after having discarded the gods and all incorporeal substances1 could have supposed that the will1 which he himself takes as composed of atoms1 could have had control over the atoms1 and diverted them from their path1 without its being possible for one to say how4 #cbb4 ,carneades1 not going so far back as to the atoms1 claimed to find at once in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague indifference1 assuming as reason for the thing just that for which ,epicurus sought a reason4 ,carneades gained nothing thereby1 except that he more easily deceived careless people1 in transferring the absurdity from one subject1 where it is somewhat too evident1 to another subject where it is easier to confuse matters1 that is to say1 from the body to the soul4 ,for most philosophers had not very distinct notions of the nature of the soul4 #cba ,epicurus1 who composed it of atoms1 was at least right in seeking the origin of its determination in that which he believed to be the origin of the soul itself4 ,that is why ,cicero and ,m4 ,bayle were wrong to find so much fault with him1 and to be indulgent towards1 and even praise1 ,carneades1 who is no less irrational4 ,i do not understand how ,m4 ,bayle1 who was so clear-sighted1 was thus satisfied by a disguised absurdity1 even to the extent of calling it the greatest effort the human mind can make on this matter4 ,it is as if the soul1 which is the seat of reason1 were more capable than the body of acting without being determined by some reason or cause1 internal or external2 or as if the great principle which states that nothing comes to pass without cause only related to the body4 #cbc4 ,it is true that the ,form or the ,soul has this advantage over matter1 that it is the source of action1 having within itself the principle of motion or of change1 in a word1 ,greek3 to autokinton1 as ,plato calls it2 whereas matter is simply passive1 and has need of being impelled to act1 agitur1 ut agat4 ,but if the soul is active of itself 7as it indeed is71 for that very reason it is not of itself absolutely indifferent to the action1 like matter1 and it must find in itself a ground of determination4 ,according to the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony the soul finds in itself1 and in its ideal nature anterior to existence1 the reasons for its determinations1 adjusted to all that shall surround it4 ,that way it was determined from all eternity in its state of mere possibility to act freely1 as it does1 when it attains to existence4 #cbd4 ,m4 ,bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference 7such as must be admitted7 does not exclude inclinations and does not demand equipoise4 ,he demonstrates amply enough 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 ch4 #aci1 p4 #gdh seqq47 that the soul may be compared to a balance1 where reasons and inclinations take the place of weights4 ,according to him1 one can explain what passes in our resolutions by the hypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest when the weights of its two pans are equal1 and which always inclines either to one side or the other according to which of the pans is the more heavily laden4 ,a new reason makes a heavier weight1 a new idea shines more brightly than the old2 the fear of a heavy penalty prevails over some pleasure2 when two passions dispute the ground1 it is always the stronger which gains the mastery1 unless the other be assisted by reason or by some other #cbb contributing passion4 ,when one flings away merchandise in order to save oneself1 the action1 which the ,schoolmen call mixed1 is voluntary and free2 and yet love of life indubitably prevails over love of possessions4 ,grief arises from remembrance of lost possessions1 and one has all the greater difficulty in making one's resolve1 the nearer the approach to even weight in the opposing reasons1 as also we see that the balance is determined more promptly when there is a great difference between the weights4 #cbe4 ,nevertheless1 as very often there are divers courses to choose from1 one might1 instead of the balance1 compare the soul with a force which puts forth effort on various sides simultaneously1 but which acts only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance4 ,for instance1 air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will break it in order to escape4 ,it puts forth effort at every part1 but finally flings itself upon the weakest4 ,thus do the inclinations of the soul extend over all the goods that present themselves3 they are antecedent acts of will2 but the consequent will1 which is their result1 is determined in the direction of that which touches most closely4 #cbf4 ,this ascendancy of inclinations1 however1 does not prevent man from being master in his own domain1 provided that he knows how to make use of his power4 ,his dominion is that of reason3 he has only to prepare himself in good time to resist the passions1 and he will be capable of checking the vehemence of the most furious4 ,let us assume that ,augustus1 about to give orders for putting to death ,fabius ,maximus1 acts1 as is his wont1 upon the advice a philosopher had given him1 to recite the ,greek alphabet before doing anything in the first heat of his anger3 this reflexion will be capable of saving the life of ,fabius and the glory of ,augustus4 ,but without some fortunate reflexion1 which one owes sometimes to a special divine mercy1 or without some skill acquired beforehand1 like that of ,augustus1 calculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time and place1 passion will prevail over reason4 ,the driver is master over the horses if he controls them as he should1 and as he can2 but there are occasions when he becomes negligent1 and then for a time he will have to let go the reins3 ,fertur equis auriga1 nec audit currus habenas4 #cbg4 ,one must admit that there is always within us enough power over #cbc our will1 but we do not always bethink ourselves of employing it4 ,that shows1 as ,i have observed more than once1 that the power of the soul over its inclinations is a control which can only be exercised in an indirect manner1 almost as ,bellarmine would have had the ,popes exercise rights over the temporal power of kings4 ,in truth1 the external actions that do not exceed our powers depend absolutely upon our will2 but our volitions depend upon our will only through certain artful twists which give us means of suspending our resolutions1 or of changing them4 ,we are masters in our own house1 not as ,god is in the world1 he having but to speak1 but as a wise prince is in his dominions or as a good father of a family is in his home4 ,m4 ,bayle sometimes takes the matter differently1 as though we must have1 in order to boast of a free will1 an absolute power over ourselves1 independent of reasons and of means4 ,but even ,god has not such a power1 and must not have in this sense1 in relation to his will3 he cannot change his nature1 nor act otherwise than according to method2 and how could man transform himself all of a sudden8 ,i have already said ,god's dominion1 the dominion of wisdom1 is that of reason4 ,it is only ,god1 however1 who always wills what is most to be desired1 and consequently he has no need of the power to change his will4 #cbh4 ,if the soul is mistress in its own house 7says ,m4 ,bayle1 p4 #gec7 it has only to will1 and straightway that vexation and pain which is attendant upon victory over the passions will vanish away4 ,for this effect it would suffice1 in his opinion1 to give oneself indifference to the objects of the passions 7p4 #geh74 ,why1 then1 do men not give themselves this indifference 7he says71 if they are masters in their own house8 ,but this objection is exactly as if ,i were to ask why a father of a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof8 ,he can acquire some1 but through skill1 and not1 as in the age of the fairies1 or of ,king ,midas1 through a mere command of the will or by his touch4 ,it would not suffice to be master in one's own house2 one must be master of all things in order to give oneself all that one wishes2 for one does not find everything in one's own house4 ,working thus upon oneself1 one must do as in working upon something else2 one must have knowledge of the constitution and the qualities of one's object1 and adapt one's operations thereto4 ,it is therefore not in a moment and by a mere act of the will that one corrects oneself1 and that one acquires a better will4 #cbd #cbi4 ,nevertheless it is well to observe that the vexations and pains attendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into pleasure1 through the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of the force of their mind1 and of the divine grace4 ,ascetics and true mystics can speak of this from experience2 and even a true philosopher can say something thereof4 ,one can attain to that happy state1 and it is one of the principal means the soul can use to strengthen its dominion4 #ccj4 ,if the ,scotists and the ,molinists appear to favour vague indifference 7appear1 ,i say1 for ,i doubt whether they do so in reality1 once they have learnt to know it71 the ,thomists and the disciples of ,augustine are for predetermination4 ,for one must have either the one or the other4 ,thomas ,aquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on sound principles1 and the subtle ,scotus1 seeking to contradict him1 often obscures matters instead of throwing light upon them4 ,the ,thomists as a general rule follow their master1 and do not admit that the soul makes its resolve without the existence of some predetermination which contributes thereto4 ,but the predetermination of the new ,thomists is not perhaps exactly that which one needs4 ,durand de ,saint-,pourain1 who often enough formed a party of his own1 and who opposed the idea of the special co-operation of ,god1 was nevertheless in favour of a certain predetermination4 ,he believed that ,god saw in the state of the soul1 and of its surroundings1 the reason for his determinations4 #cca4 ,the ancient ,stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the ,thomists4 ,they were at the same time in favour of determination and against necessity1 although they have been accused of attaching necessity to everything4 ,cicero says in his book ,de ,fato that ,democritus1 ,heraclitus1 ,empedocles and ,aristotle believed that fate implied necessity2 that others were opposed to that 7he means perhaps ,epicurus and the ,academicians72 and that ,chrysippus sought a middle course4 ,i think that ,cicero is mistaken as regards ,aristotle1 who fully recognized contingency and freedom1 and went even too far1 saying 7inadvertently1 as ,i think7 that propositions on contingent futurities had no determinate truth2 on which point he was justifiably abandoned by most of the ,schoolmen4 ,even ,cleanthes1 the teacher of ,chrysippus1 although he upheld the determinate truth of future events1 denied their necessity4 ,had the ,schoolmen1 so fully convinced of this #cbe determination of contingent futurities 7as were for instance the ,fathers of ,coimbra1 authors of a famous ,course of ,philosophy71 seen the connexion between things in the form wherein the ,system of ,general ,harmony proclaims it1 they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty1 or determination of futurition1 without admitting a predetermination of the thing in its causes and in its reasons4 #ccb4 ,cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken by ,chrysippus2 but ,justus ,lipsius observed1 in his ,stoic ,philosophy1 that the passage from ,cicero was mutilated1 and that ,aulus ,gellius has preserved for us the whole argument of the ,stoic philosopher 7,noct4 ,att41 lib4 #f1 c4 #b74 ,here it is in epitome4 ,fate is the inevitable and eternal connexion of all events4 ,against this is urged in objection1 that it follows that the acts of the will would be necessary1 and that criminals1 being coerced into evil1 should not be punished4 ,chrysippus answers that evil springs from the original constitution of souls1 which forms part of the destined sequence2 that souls which are of a good natural disposition offer stronger resistance to the impressions of external causes2 but that those whose natural defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves to be perverted4 ,next he distinguishes 7according to ,cicero7 between principal causes and accessary causes1 and uses the comparison of a cylinder1 whose rotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape1 whereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation4 ,nevertheless it has need of impulsion1 even as the soul needs to be acted upon by the objects of the senses1 and receives this impression according to its own constitution4 #ccc4 ,cicero considers that ,chrysippus becomes so confused that1 whether he will or no1 he confirms the necessity of fate4 ,m4 ,bayle is almost of the same opinion 7,dictionary1 art4 ',chrysippus'1 lit4 ,h74 ,he says that this philosopher does not get out of the bog1 since the cylinder is regular or uneven according to what the craftsman has made it2 and thus ,god1 providence1 fate will be the causes of evil in such a way as to render it necessary4 ,justus ,lipsius answers that1 according to the ,stoics1 evil came from matter4 ,that is 7to my mind7 as if he had said that the stone on which the craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and too irregular to produce a good cylinder4 ,m4 ,bayle cites against ,chrysippus the fragments of ,onomaus and ,diogenianus that ,eusebius has preserved for us in the ,praeparatio#cbf ,evangelica 7lib4 #f1 c4 #g1 #h72 and above all he relies upon ,plutarch's refutation in his book against the ,stoics1 quoted art4 ',paulicians'1 lit4 ,g4 ,but this refutation does not amount to very much4 ,plutarch maintains that it would be better to deny power to ,god than to impute to him the permission of evils2 and he will not admit that evil may serve a greater good4 ,i have already shown1 on the contrary1 that ,god cannot but be all-powerful1 even though he can do no better than produce the best1 which includes the permission of evil4 ,moreover1 ,i have pointed out repeatedly that what is to the disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve the perfection of the whole4 #ccd4 ,chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect1 not only in his fourth book on ,providence1 as given by ,aulus ,gellius 7lib4 #f1 c4 #a7 where he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice 7a reason which is not sufficient here71 but still better when he applies the comparison of a stage play1 in his second book on ,nature 7as ,plutarch quotes it himself74 ,there he says that there are sometimes portions in a comedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend grace to the whole poem4 ,he calls these portions epigrams or inscriptions4 ,we have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the ancient comedy for full understanding of this passage from ,chrysippus2 but since ,plutarch assents to the fact1 there is reason to believe that this comparison was not a poor one4 ,plutarch replies in the first place that the world is not like a play to provide entertainment4 ,but that is a poor answer3 the comparison lies in this point alone1 that one bad part may make the whole better4 ,he replies secondly that this bad passage is only a small part of the comedy1 whereas human life swarms with evils4 ,this reply is of no value either3 for he ought to have taken into account that what we know is also a very small part of the universe4 #cce4 ,but let us return to the cylinder of ,chrysippus4 ,he is right in saying that vice springs from the original constitution of some minds4 ,he was met with the objection that ,god formed them1 and he could only reply by pointing to the imperfection of matter1 which did not permit ,god to do better4 ,this reply is of no value1 for matter in itself is indifferent to all forms1 and ,god made it4 ,evil springs rather from the ,forms themselves in their detached state1 that is1 from the ideas that ,god has not produced by an act of his will1 any more than he thus produced numbers and #cbg figures1 and all possible essences which one must regard as eternal and necessary2 for they are in the ideal region of the possibles1 that is1 in the divine understanding4 ,god is therefore not the author of essences in so far as they are only possibilities4 ,but there is nothing actual to which he has not decreed and given existence2 and he has permitted evil because it is involved in the best plan existing in the region of possibles1 a plan which supreme wisdom could not fail to choose4 ,this notion satisfies at once the wisdom1 the power and the goodness of ,god1 and yet leaves a way open for the entrance of evil4 ,god gives perfection to creatures in so far as it is possible in the universe4 ,one gives a turn to the cylinder1 but any roughness in its shape restricts the swiftness of its motion4 ,this comparison made by ,chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine1 which was taken from a laden boat that is carried along by the river current1 its pace becoming slower as the load grows heavier4 ,these comparisons tend towards the same end2 and that shows that if we were sufficiently informed concerning the opinions of ancient philosophers1 we should find therein more reason than is supposed4 #ccf4 ,m4 ,bayle himself commends the passage from ,chrysippus 7art4 ',chrysippus'1 lit4 ,t7 that ,aulus ,gellius quotes in the same place1 where this philosopher maintains that evil has come by concomitance4 ,that also is made clear by my system4 ,for ,i have demonstrated that the evil which ,god permitted was not an object of his will1 as an end or a means1 but simply as a condition1 since it had to be involved in the best4 ,yet one must confess that the cylinder of ,chrysippus does not answer the objection of necessity4 ,he ought to have added1 in the first place1 that it is by the free choice of ,god that some of the possibles exist2 secondly1 that rational creatures act freely also1 in accordance with their original nature1 which existed already in the eternal ideas2 and lastly1 that the motive power of good inclines the will without compelling it4 #ccg4 ,the advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt exists to an eminent degree in ,god4 ,that must be understood in so far as it is genuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no imperfection4 ,for to be able to make a mistake and go astray is a disadvantage1 and to have control over the passions is in truth an advantage1 but one that presupposes an imperfection1 namely passion itself1 of which ,god is #cbh incapable4 ,scotus was justified in saying that if ,god were not free and exempt from necessity1 no creature would be so4 ,but ,god is incapable of being indeterminate in anything whatsoever3 he cannot be ignorant1 he cannot doubt1 he cannot suspend his judgement2 his will is always decided1 and it can only be decided by the best4 ,god can never have a primitive particular will1 that is1 independent of laws or general acts of will2 such a thing would be unreasonable4 ,he cannot determine upon ,adam1 ,peter1 ,judas or any individual without the existence of a reason for this determination2 and this reason leads of necessity to some general enunciation4 ,the wise mind always acts according to principles2 always according to rules1 and never according to exceptions1 save when the rules come into collision through opposing tendencies1 where the strongest carries the day3 or else1 either they will stop one another or some third course will emerge as a result4 ,in all these cases one rule serves as an exception to the other1 and there are never any original exceptions with one who always acts in a regular way4 #cch4 ,if there are people who believe that election and reprobation are accomplished on ,god's part by a despotic absolute power1 not only without any apparent reason but actually without any reason1 even a concealed one1 they maintain an opinion that destroys alike the nature of things and the divine perfections4 ,such an absolutely absolute decree 7so to speak7 would be without doubt insupportable4 ,but ,luther and ,calvin were far from such a belief3 the former hopes that the life to come will make us comprehend the just reasons of ,god's choice2 and the latter protests explicitly that these reasons are just and holy1 although they be unknown to us4 ,i have already in that connexion quoted ,calvin's treatise on predestination1 and here are the actual words3 ',god before the fall of ,adam had reflected upon what he had to do1 and that for causes concealed from us4444 ,it is evident therefore that he had just causes for the reprobation of some of mankind1 but causes to us ,,unknown4' #cci4 ,this truth1 that all ,god does is reasonable and cannot be better done1 strikes at the outset every man of good sense1 and extorts1 so to speak1 his approbation4 ,and yet the most subtle of philosophers have a fatal propensity for offending sometimes without observing it1 during the course and in the heat of disputes1 against the first principles of good sense1 when these are shrouded in terms that disguise them4 ,we have here #cbi already seen how the excellent ,m4 ,bayle1 with all his shrewdness1 has nevertheless combated this principle which ,i have just indicated1 and which is a sure consequence of the supreme perfection of ,god4 ,he thought to defend in that way the cause of ,god and to exempt him from an imaginary necessity1 by leaving him the freedom to choose from among various goods the least4 ,i have already spoken of ,m4 ,diroys and others who have also been deluded by this strange opinion1 one that is far too commonly accepted4 ,those who uphold it do not observe that it implies a wish to preserve for1 or rather bestow upon1 ,god a false freedom1 which is the freedom to act unreasonably4 ,that is rendering his works subject to correction1 and making it impossible for us to say or even to hope that anything reasonable can be said upon the permission of evil4 #cdj4 ,this error has much impaired ,m4 ,bayle's arguments1 and has barred his way of escape from many perplexities4 ,that appears again in relation to the laws of the realm of ,nature3 he believes them to be arbitrary and indifferent1 and he objects that ,god could better have attained his end in the realm of grace if he had not clung to these laws1 if he had more often dispensed with their observance1 or even if he had made others4 ,he believed this especially with regard to the law of the union between the soul and the body4 ,for he is persuaded1 with the modern ,cartesians1 that the ideas of the perceptible qualities that ,god gives 7according to them7 to the soul1 occasioned by movements of the body1 have nothing representing these movements or resembling them4 ,accordingly it was a purely arbitrary act on ,god's part to give us the ideas of heat1 cold1 light and other qualities which we experience1 rather than to give us quite different ideas occasioned in the same way4 ,i have often wondered that people so talented should have been capable of relishing notions so unphilosophic and so contrary to the fundamental maxims of reason4 ,for nothing gives clearer indication of the imperfection of a philosophy than the necessity experienced by the philosopher to confess that something comes to pass1 in accordance with his system1 for which there is no reason4 ,that applies to the idea of ,epicurus on the deviation of atoms4 ,whether it be ,god or ,nature that operates1 the operation will always have its reasons4 ,in the operations of ,nature1 these reasons will depend either upon necessary truths or upon the laws that ,god has found the most reasonable2 and in the operations of ,god1 they will depend upon the choice of the supreme #ccj reason which causes them to act4 #cda4 ,m4 ,regis1 a famous ,cartesian1 had asserted in his ',metaphysics' 7part #b1 book #b1 c4 #bi7 that the faculties ,god has given to men are the most excellent that they were capable of in conformity with the general order of nature4 ',considering only'1 he says1 'the power of ,god and the nature of man by themselves1 it is very easy to conceive that ,god could have made man more perfect3 but if one will consider man1 not in himself and separately from all other creatures1 but as a member of the universe and a portion which is subject to the general laws of motions1 one will be bound to acknowledge that man is as perfect as he could have been4' ,he adds 'that we cannot conceive that ,god could have employed any other means more appropriate than pain for the conservation of our bodies'4 ,m4 ,regis is right in a general way in saying that ,god cannot do better than he has done in relation to all4 ,and although there be apparently in some places in the universe rational animals more perfect than man1 one may say that ,god was right to create every kind of species1 some more perfect than others4 ,it is perhaps not impossible that there be somewhere a species of animals much resembling man and more perfect than we are4 ,it may be even that the human race will attain in time to a greater perfection than that which we can now envisage4 ,thus the laws of motions do not prevent man from being more perfect3 but the place ,god has assigned to man in space and in time limits the perfections he was able to receive4 #cdb4 ,i also doubt1 with ,m4 ,bayle1 whether pain be necessary in order to warn men of peril4 ,but this writer goes too far 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 #gg1 p4 #ajd73 he seems to think that a feeling of pleasure could have the same effect1 and that1 in order to prevent a child from going too near the fire1 ,god could give him ideas of pleasure in proportion to the distance he kept from it4 ,this expedient does not appear very practicable with regard to all evils1 unless a miracle were involved4 ,it is more natural that what if it were too near would cause an evil should cause some foreboding of evil when it is a little less near4 ,yet ,i admit that it is possible such a foreboding will be something less than pain1 and usually this is the case4 ,thus it indeed appears that pain is not necessary for causing one to shun present peril2 it is wont rather to serve as a penalty for having actually plunged into evil1 and a warning against #cca further lapse4 ,there are also many painful evils the avoidance whereof rests not with us4 ,as a dissolution of the continuity of our body is a consequence of many accidents that may happen to us1 it was natural that this imperfection of the body should be represented by some sense of imperfection in the soul4 ,nevertheless ,i would not guarantee that there were no animals in the universe whose structure was cunning enough to cause a sense of indifference as accompaniment to this dissolution of continuity1 as for instance when a gangrenous limb is cut off2 or even a sense of pleasure1 as if one were only scratching oneself4 ,for the imperfection that attends the dissolution of the body might lead to the sense of a greater perfection1 which was suspended or checked by the continuity which is now broken3 and in this respect the body would be as it were a prison4 #cdc4 ,there is also nothing to preclude the existence in the universe of animals resembling that one which ,cyrano de ,bergerac encountered in the sun4 ,the body of this animal being a sort of fluid composed of innumerable small animals1 that were capable of ranging themselves in accordance with the desires of the great animal1 by this means it transformed itself in a moment1 just as it pleased2 and the dissolution of continuity caused it no more hurt than the stroke of an oar can cause to the sea4 ,but1 after all1 these animals are not men1 they are not in our globe or in our present century2 and ,god's plan ensured that there should not be lacking here on earth a rational animal clothed in flesh and bones1 whose structure involves susceptibility to pain4 #cdd4 ,but ,m4 ,bayle further opposes this on another principle1 one which ,i have already mentioned4 ,it seems that he thinks the ideas which the soul conceives in relation to the feelings of the body are arbitrary4 ,thus ,god might have caused the dissolution of continuity to give us pleasure4 ,he even maintains that the laws of motion are entirely arbitrary4 ',i would wish to know'1 he says 7vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #aff1 p4 #ajhj71 'whether ,god established by an act of his freedom of indifference general laws on the communication of movements1 and the particular laws on the union of the human soul with an organic body8 ,in this case1 he could have established quite different laws1 and adopted a system whose results involved neither moral evil nor physical evil4 ,but if the answer is given that ,god was constrained by supreme wisdom to establish the laws that he has established1 there we have neither more nor less than the ,fatum of #ccb the ,stoics4 ,wisdom will have marked out a way for ,god1 the abandonment whereof will have been as impossible to him as his own self-destruction4' ,this objection has been sufficiently overthrown3 it is only a moral necessity2 and it is always a happy necessity to be bound to act in accordance with the rules of perfect wisdom4 #cde4 ,moreover1 it appears to me that the reason for the belief held by many that the laws of motion are arbitrary comes from the fact that few people have properly examined them4 ,it is known now that ,m4 ,descartes was much mistaken in his statement of them4 ,i have proved conclusively that conservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur1 but ,i consider that the same quantity of force is conserved1 whether absolute or directive and respective1 whether total or partial4 ,my principles1 which carry this subject as far as it can go1 have not yet been published in full2 but ,i have communicated them to friends competent to judge of them1 who have approved them1 and have converted some other persons of acknowledged erudition and ability4 ,i discovered at the same time that the laws of motion actually existing in ,nature1 and confirmed by experiments1 are not in reality absolutely demonstrable1 as a geometrical proposition would be2 but neither is it necessary that they be so4 ,they do not spring entirely from the principle of necessity1 but rather from the principle of perfection and order2 they are an effect of the choice and the wisdom of ,god4 ,i can demonstrate these laws in divers ways1 but must always assume something that is not of an absolutely geometrical necessity4 ,thus these admirable laws are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being1 as opposed to the system of absolute and brute necessity1 advocated by ,strato or ,spinoza4 #cdf4 ,i have found that one may account for these laws by assuming that the effect is always equal in force to its cause1 or1 which amounts to the same thing1 that the same force is conserved always3 but this axiom of higher philosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically4 ,one may again apply other principles of like nature1 for instance the principle that action is always equal to reaction1 one which assumes in things a distaste for external change1 and cannot be derived either from extension or impenetrability2 and that other principle1 that a simple movement has the same properties as those which might belong to a compound movement such as would produce #ccc the same phenomena of locomotion4 ,these assumptions are very plausible1 and are successful as an explanation of the laws of motion3 nothing is so appropriate1 all the more since they are in accord with each other4 ,but there is to be found in them no absolute necessity1 such as may compel us to admit them1 in the way one is compelled to admit the rules of logic1 of arithmetic and geometry4 #cdg4 ,it seems1 when one considers the indifference of matter to motion and to rest1 that the largest body at rest could be carried along without any resistance by the smallest body in motion1 in which case there would be action without reaction and an effect greater than its cause4 ,there is also no necessity to say of the motion of a ball which runs freely on an even1 horizontal plane1 with a certain degree of speed1 termed ,a1 that this motion must have the properties of that motion which it would have if it were going with lesser speed in a boat1 itself moving in the same direction with the residue of the speed1 to ensure that the ball1 seen from the bank1 advance with the same degree ,a4 ,for1 although the same appearance of speed and of direction results through this medium of the boat1 it is not because it is the same thing4 ,nevertheless it happens that the effects of the collision of the balls in the boat1 the motion in each one separately combined with that of the boat giving the appearance of that which goes on outside the boat1 also give the appearance of the effects that these same balls colliding would have outside the boat4 ,all that is admirable1 but one does not see its absolute necessity4 ,a movement on the two sides of the right-angled triangle composes a movement on the hypotenuse2 but it does not follow that a ball moving on the hypotenuse must produce the effect of two balls of its own size moving on the two sides3 yet that is true4 ,nothing is so appropriate as this result1 and ,god has chosen the laws that produce it3 but one sees no geometrical necessity therein4 ,yet it is this very lack of necessity which enhances the beauty of the laws that ,god has chosen1 wherein divers admirable axioms exist in conjunction1 and it is impossible for one to say which of them is the primary4 #cdh4 ,i have also shown that therein is observed that excellent law of continuity1 which ,i have perhaps been the first to state1 and which is a kind of touchstone whose test the rules of ,m4 ,descartes1 of ,father ,fabry1 ,father ,pardies1 ,father de ,malebranche and others cannot pass4 ,in virtue of this law1 one must be able to regard rest as a movement vanishing #ccd after having continually diminished1 and likewise equality as an inequality that vanishes also1 as would happen through the continual diminution of the greater of two unequal bodies1 while the smaller retains its size4 ,as a consequence of this consideration1 the general rule for unequal bodies1 or bodies in motion1 must apply also to equal bodies or to bodies one of which is at rest1 as to a particular case of the rule4 ,this does result in the true laws of motion1 and does not result in certain laws invented by ,m4 ,descartes and by some other men of talent1 which already on that score alone prove to be ill-concerted1 so that one may predict that experiment will not favour them4 #cdi4 ,these considerations make it plain that the laws of ,nature regulating movements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely arbitrary4 ,the middle course to be taken is that they are a choice of the most perfect wisdom4 ,and this great example of the laws of motion shows with the utmost clarity how much difference there is between these three cases1 to wit1 firstly an absolute necessity1 metaphysical or geometrical1 which may be called blind1 and which does not depend upon any but efficient causes2 in the second place1 a moral necessity1 which comes from the free choice of wisdom in relation to final causes2 and finally in the third place1 something absolutely arbitrary1 depending upon an indifference of equipoise1 which is imagined1 but which cannot exist1 where there is no sufficient reason either in the efficient or in the final cause4 ,consequently one must conclude how mistaken it is to confuse either that which is absolutely necessary with that which is determined by the reason of the best1 or the freedom that is determined by reason with a vague indifference4 #cej4 ,this also settles ,m4 ,bayle's difficulty1 for he fears that1 if ,god is always determinate1 ,nature could dispense with him and bring about that same effect which is attributed to him1 through the necessity of the order of things4 ,that would be true if the laws of motion for instance1 and all the rest1 had their source in a geometrical necessity of efficient causes2 but in the last analysis one is obliged to resort to something depending upon final causes and upon what is fitting4 ,this also utterly destroys the most plausible reasoning of the ,naturalists4 ,dr4 ,johann ,joachim ,becher1 a ,german physician1 well known for his books on chemistry1 had composed a prayer which looked like getting him into trouble4 ,it began3 ',o sancta#cce mater natura1 aeterne rerum ordo'4 ,and it ended by saying that this ,nature must forgive him his errors1 since she herself was their cause4 ,but the nature of things1 if taken as without intelligence and without choice1 has in it nothing sufficiently determinant4 ,herr ,becher did not sufficiently take into account that the ,author of things 7natura naturans7 must be good and wise1 and that we can be evil without complicity on his part in our acts of wickedness4 ,when a wicked man exists1 ,god must have found in the region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of that sequence of things1 the choice of which was demanded by the greatest perfection of the universe1 and in which errors and sins are not only punished but even repaired to greater advantage1 so that they contribute to the greatest good4 #cea4 ,m4 ,bayle1 however1 has extended the free choice of ,god a little too far4 ,speaking of the ,peripatetic ,strato 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #ahj1 p4 #abci71 who asserted that everything had been brought forth by the necessity of a nature devoid of intelligence1 he maintains that this philosopher1 on being asked why a tree has not the power to form bones and veins1 might have asked in his turn3 ,why has matter precisely three dimensions8 why should not two have sufficed for it8 why has it not four8 ',if one had answered that there can be neither more nor less than three dimensions he would have demanded the cause of this impossibility4' ,these words lead one to believe that ,m4 ,bayle suspected that the number of the dimensions of matter depended upon ,god's choice1 even as it depended upon him to cause or not to cause trees to produce animals4 ,indeed1 how do we know whether there are not planetary globes or earths situated in some more remote place in the universe where the fable of the ,barnacle-geese of ,scotland 7birds that were said to be born of trees7 proves true1 and even whether there are not countries where one could say3 444 populos umbrosa creavit ,fraxinus1 et foeta viridis puer excidit alno8 ,but with the dimensions of matter it is not thus3 the ternary number is determined for it not by the reason of the best1 but by a geometrical necessity1 because the geometricians have been able to prove that there are only three straight lines perpendicular to one another which can intersect at one and the same point4 ,nothing more appropriate could have been #ccf chosen to show the difference there is between the moral necessity that accounts for the choice of wisdom and the brute necessity of ,strato and the adherents of ,spinoza1 who deny to ,god understanding and will1 than a consideration of the difference existing between the reason for the laws of motion and the reason for the ternary number of the dimensions3 for the first lies in the choice of the best and the second in a geometrical and blind necessity4 #ceb4 ,having spoken of the laws of bodies1 that is1 of the rules of motion1 let us come to the laws of the union between body and soul1 where ,m4 ,bayle believes that he finds again some vague indifference1 something absolutely arbitrary4 ,here is the way he speaks of it in his ,reply 7vol4 ,,ii1 ch4 #hd1 p4 #afc73 ',it is a puzzling question whether bodies have some natural property of doing harm or good to man's soul4 ,if one answers yes1 one plunges into an insane labyrinth3 for1 as man's soul is an immaterial substance1 one will be bound to say that the local movement of certain bodies is an efficient cause of the thoughts in a mind1 a statement contrary to the most obvious notions that philosophy imparts to us4 ,if one answers no1 one will be constrained to admit that the influence of our organs upon our thoughts depends neither upon the internal qualities of matter1 nor upon the laws of motion1 but upon an arbitrary institution of the creator4 ,one must then admit that it depended altogether upon ,god's freedom to combine particular thoughts of our soul with particular modifications of our body1 even when he had once established all the laws for the action of bodies one upon another4 ,whence it results that there is in the universe no portion of matter which by its proximity can harm us1 save when ,god wills it2 and consequently1 that the earth is as capable as any other place of being the abode of the happy man4444 ,in short it is evident that there is no need1 in order to prevent the wrong choices of freedom1 to transport man outside the earth4 ,god could do on earth with regard to all the acts of the will what he does in respect of the good works of the predestined when he settles their outcome1 whether by efficacious or by sufficient grace3 and that grace1 without in any way impairing freedom1 is always followed by the assent of the soul4 ,it would be as easy for him on earth as in heaven to bring about the determination of our souls to a good choice4' #cec4 ,i agree with ,m4 ,bayle that ,god could have so ordered bodies and #ccg souls on this globe of earth1 whether by ways of nature or by extraordinary graces1 that it would have been a perpetual paradise and a foretaste of the celestial state of the blessed4 ,there is no reason why there should not be worlds happier than ours2 but ,god had good reasons for willing that ours should be such as it is4 ,nevertheless1 in order to prove that a better state would have been possible here1 ,m4 ,bayle had no need to resort to the system of occasional causes3 it abounds in miracles and in hypotheses for which their very originators confess there is no justification2 and these are two defects such as will most of all estrange a system from true philosophy4 ,it is a cause for surprise1 in the first place1 that ,m4 ,bayle did not bethink himself of the ,system of ,pre-established ,harmony which he had examined before1 and which for this matter was so opportune4 ,but as in this system all is connected and harmonious1 all following from reasons and nothing being left incomplete or exposed to the rash discretion of perfect indifference1 it seems that it was not pleasing to ,m4 ,bayle3 for he was here somewhat biassed in favour of such indifference1 which1 notwithstanding1 he contested so strongly on other occasions4 ,he was much given to passing from one extreme to the other1 not with an ill intention or against his own conviction1 but because there was as yet nothing settled in his mind on the question concerned4 ,he contented himself with whatever suited him for frustrating the opponent he had in mind1 his aim being only to perplex philosophers1 and show the weakness of our reason2 and never1 in my opinion1 did either ,arcesilaus or ,carneades argue for and against with more eloquence and more wit4 ,but1 after all1 one must not doubt for the sake of doubting3 doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth4 ,that is what ,i often said to the late ,abb ,foucher1 a few specimens of whose work prove that he designed to do with regard to the ,academicians what ,lipsius and ,scioppius had done for the ,stoics1 and ,m4 ,gassendi for ,epicurus1 and what ,m4 ,dacier has so well begun for ,plato4 ,it must not be possible for us to offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in the celebrated ,casaubon's answer to those who1 in showing him the hall of the ,sorbonne1 told him that debate had been carried on there for some centuries4 ,what conclusions have been reached8 he said to them4 #ced4 ,m4 ,bayle goes on 7p4 #aff73 ',it is true that since the laws of motion were instituted in such forms as we see now in the world1 it is an inevitable necessity that a hammer striking a nut should break it1 and#cch that a stone falling on a man's foot should cause some bruise or some derangement of its parts4 ,but that is all that can follow the action of this stone upon the human body4 ,if you want it in addition to cause a feeling of pain1 then one must assume the institution of a code other than that one which regulates the action and reaction of bodies one upon another2 one must1 ,i say1 have recourse to the particular system of the laws of union between the soul and certain bodies4 ,now as this system is not of necessity connected with the other1 the indifference of ,god does not cease in relation to the one immediately upon his choice of the other4 ,he therefore combined these two systems with a complete freedom1 like two things which did not follow naturally the one from the other4 ,thus it is by an arbitrary institution he has ordained that wounds in the body should cause pain in the soul which is united to this body4 ,it therefore only rested with him to have chosen another system of union between soul and body3 he was therefore able to choose one in accordance wherewith wounds only evoke the idea of the remedy and an intense but agreeable desire to apply it4 ,he was able to arrange that all bodies which were on the point of breaking a man's head or piercing his heart should evoke a lively sense of danger1 and that this sense should cause the body to remove itself promptly out of reach of the blow4 ,all that would have come to pass without miracles1 since there would have been general laws on this subject4 ,the system which we know by experience teaches us that the determination of the movement of certain bodies changes in pursuance of our desires4 ,it was therefore possible for a combination to be effected between our desires and the movement of certain bodies1 whereby the nutritive juices were so modified that the good arrangement of our organs was never affected4' #cee4 ,it is evident that ,m4 ,bayle believes that everything accomplished through general laws is accomplished without miracles4 ,but ,i have shown sufficiently that if the law is not founded on reasons and does not serve to explain the event through the nature of things1 it can only be put into execution by a miracle4 ,if1 for example1 ,god had ordained that bodies must have a circular motion1 he would have needed perpetual miracles1 or the ministry of angels1 to put this order into execution3 for that is contrary to the nature of motion1 whereby the body naturally abandons the circular line to continue in the tangent straight line if nothing holds it #cci back4 ,therefore it is not enough for ,god to ordain simply that a wound should excite an agreeable sensation3 natural means must be found for that purpose4 ,the real means whereby ,god causes the soul to be conscious of what happens in the body have their origin in the nature of the soul1 which represents the bodies1 and is so made beforehand that the representations which are to spring up one from another within it1 by a natural sequence of thoughts1 correspond to the changes in the body4 #cef4 ,the representation has a natural relation to that which is to be represented4 ,if ,god should have the round shape of a body represented by the idea of a square1 that would be an unsuitable representation3 for there would be angles or projections in the representation1 while all would be even and smooth in the original4 ,the representation often suppresses something in the objects when it is imperfect2 but it can add nothing3 that would render it1 not more than perfect1 but false4 ,moreover1 the suppression is never complete in our perceptions1 and there is in the representation1 confused as it is1 more than we see there4 ,thus there is reason for supposing that the ideas of heat1 cold1 colours1 etc41 also only represent the small movements carried out in the organs1 when one is conscious of these qualities1 although the multiplicity and the diminutive character of these movements prevents their clear representation4 ,almost in the same way it happens that we do not distinguish the blue and the yellow which play their part in the representation as well as in the composition of the green1 when the microscope shows that what appears to be green is composed of yellow and blue parts4 #ceg4 ,it is true that the same thing may be represented in different ways2 but there must always be an exact relation between the representation and the thing1 and consequently between the different representations of one and the same thing4 ,the projections in perspective of the conic sections of the circle show that one and the same circle may be represented by an ellipse1 a parabola and a hyperbola1 and even by another circle1 a straight line and a point4 ,nothing appears so different nor so dissimilar as these figures2 and yet there is an exact relation between each point and every other point4 ,thus one must allow that each soul represents the universe to itself according to its point of view1 and through a relation which is peculiar to it2 but a perfect harmony always subsists therein4 ,god1 if he wished to effect representation of the dissolution of continuity of #cdj the body by an agreeable sensation in the soul1 would not have neglected to ensure that this very dissolution should serve some perfection in the body1 by giving it some new relief1 as when one is freed of some burden or loosed from some bond4 ,but organic bodies of such kinds1 although possible1 do not exist upon our globe1 which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that ,god may have put to use elsewhere4 ,nevertheless it is enough that1 due allowance being made for the place our world holds in the universe1 nothing can be done for it better than what ,god does4 ,he makes the best possible use of the laws of nature which he has established and 7as ,m4 ,regis also acknowledged in the same passage7 'the laws that ,god has established in nature are the most excellent it is possible to conceive'4 #ceh4 ,i will add to that the remark from the ,journal des ,savants of the #afth ,march #agje1 which ,m4 ,bayle has inserted in chapter #afb of the ,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial 7vol4 ,,iii1 p4 #ajcj74 ,the matter in question is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on the ,origin of ,evil1 to which ,i have already referred here4 ,it is stated3 'that the general solution in respect of physical evil which this book gives is that the universe must be regarded as a work composed of various pieces which form a whole2 that1 according to the laws established in nature1 some parts cannot be better unless others become worse1 whence would result a system less perfect as a whole4 ,this principle'1 the writer goes on1 'is good2 but if nothing is added to it1 it does not appear sufficient4 ,why has ,god established laws that give rise to so many difficulties8 philosophers who are somewhat precise will say4 ,could he not have established others of a kind not subject to any defects8 ,and to cut the matter short1 how comes it that he has prescribed laws for himself8 ,why does he not act without general laws1 in accordance with all his power and all his goodness8 ,the writer has not carried the difficulty as far as that4 ,by disentangling his ideas one might indeed possibly find means of solving the difficulty1 but there is no development of the subject in his work4' #cei4 ,i suppose that the gifted author of this extract1 when he thought the difficulty could be solved1 had in mind something akin to my principles on this matter4 ,if he had vouchsafed to declare himself in this passage1 he would to all appearance have replied1 like ,m4 ,regis1 that the laws ,god established were the most excellent that could be established4 ,he would have acknowledged1 at the same time1 that ,god could not have refrained#cda from establishing laws and following rules1 because laws and rules are what makes order and beauty2 that to act without rules would be to act without reason2 and that because ,god called into action all his goodness the exercise of his omnipotence was consistent with the laws of wisdom1 to secure as much good as was possible of attainment4 ,finally1 he would have said1 the existence of certain particular disadvantages which strike us is a sure indication that the best plan did not permit of their avoidance1 and that they assist in the achievement of the total good1 an argument wherewith ,m4 ,bayle in more than one place expresses agreement4 #cfj4 ,now that ,i have proved sufficiently that everything comes to pass according to determinate reasons1 there cannot be any more difficulty over these principles of ,god's foreknowledge4 ,although these determinations do not compel1 they cannot but be certain1 and they foreshadow what shall happen4 ,it is true that ,god sees all at once the whole sequence of this universe1 when he chooses it1 and that thus he has no need of the connexion of effects and causes in order to foresee these effects4 ,but since his wisdom causes him to choose a sequence in perfect connexion1 he cannot but see one part of the sequence in the other4 ,it is one of the rules of my system of general harmony1 that the present is big with the future1 and that he who sees all sees in that which is that which shall be4 ,what is more1 ,i have proved conclusively that ,god sees in each portion of the universe the whole universe1 owing to the perfect connexion of things4 ,he is infinitely more discerning than ,pythagoras1 who judged the height of ,hercules by the size of his footprint4 ,there must therefore be no doubt that effects follow their causes determinately1 in spite of contingency and even of freedom1 which nevertheless exist together with certainty or determination4 #cfa4 ,durand de ,saint-,pourain1 among others1 has indicated this clearly in saying that contingent futurities are seen determinately in their causes1 and that ,god1 who knows all1 seeing all that shall have power to tempt or repel the will1 will see therein the course it shall take4 ,i could cite many other authors who have said the same thing1 and reason does not allow the possibility of thinking otherwise4 ,m4 ,jacquelot implies also 7,conformity of ,faith with ,reason1 p4 #cah et seqq471 as ,m4 ,bayle observes 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #adb1 p4 #gif71 that the dispositions of the human heart and those of circumstances acquaint ,god unerringly with the choice that man shall make4 ,m4 ,bayle #cdb adds that some ,molinists say the same1 and refers us to those who are quoted in the ,suavis ,concordia of ,pierre de ,s4 ,joseph1 the ,feuillant 7pp4 #egi1 #ehj74 #cfb4 ,those who have confused this determination with necessity have fabricated monsters in order to fight them4 ,to avoid a reasonable thing which they had disguised under a hideous shape1 they have fallen into great absurdities4 ,for fear of being obliged to admit an imaginary necessity1 or at least one different from that in question1 they have admitted something which happens without the existence of any cause or reason for it4 ,this amounts to the same as the absurd deviation of atoms1 which according to ,epicurus happened without any cause4 ,cicero1 in his book on ,divination1 saw clearly that if the cause could produce an effect towards which it was entirely indifferent there would be a true chance1 a genuine luck1 an actual fortuitous case1 that is1 one which would be so not merely in relation to us and our ignorance1 according to which one may say3 ,sed ,te ,nos facimus1 ,fortuna1 ,deam1 caeloque locamus1 but even in relation to ,god and to the nature of things4 ,consequently it would be impossible to foresee events by judging of the future by the past4 ,he adds fittingly in the same passage3 ',qui potest provideri1 quicquam futurum esse1 quod neque causam habet ullam1 neque notam cur futurum sit8' and soon after3 ',nihil est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae1 quam fortuna2 ut mihi ne in ,deum quidem cadere videatur1 ut sciat quid casu et fortuito futurum sit4 ,si enim scit1 certe illud eveniet3 sin certe eveniet1 nulla fortuna est4' ,if the future is certain1 there is no such thing as luck4 ,but he wrongly adds3 ',est autum fortuna2 rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est4' ,there is luck1 therefore future events cannot be foreseen4 ,he ought rather to have concluded that1 events being predetermined and foreseen1 there is no luck4 ,but he was then speaking against the ,stoics1 in the character of an ,academician4 #cfc4 ,the ,stoics already derived from the decrees of ,god the prevision of events4 ,for1 as ,cicero says in the same book3 ',sequitur porro nihil ,deos ignorare1 quod omnia ab iis sint constituta4' ,and1 according to my system1 ,god1 having seen the possible world that he desired to create1 foresaw#cdc everything therein4 ,thus one may say that the divine knowledge of vision differs from the knowledge of simple intelligence only in that it adds to the latter the acquaintance with the actual decree to choose this sequence of things which simple intelligence had already presented1 but only as possible2 and this decree now makes the present universe4 #cfd4 ,thus the ,socinians cannot be excused for denying to ,god the certain knowledge of future events1 and above all of the future resolves of a free creature4 ,for even though they had supposed that there is a freedom of complete indifference1 so that the will can choose without cause1 and that thus this effect could not be seen in its cause 7which is a great absurdity71 they ought always to take into account that ,god was able to foresee this event in the idea of the possible world that he resolved to create4 ,but the idea which they have of ,god is unworthy of the ,author of things1 and is not commensurate with the skill and wit which the writers of this party often display in certain particular discussions4 ,the author of the ,reflexion on the ,picture of ,socinianism was not altogether mistaken in saying that the ,god of the ,socinians would be ignorant and powerless1 like the ,god of ,epicurus1 every day confounded by events and living from one day to the next1 if he only knows by conjecture what the will of men is to be4 #cfe4 ,the whole difficulty here has therefore only come from a wrong idea of contingency and of freedom1 which was thought to have need of a complete indifference or equipoise1 an imaginary thing1 of which neither a notion nor an example exists1 nor ever can exist4 ,apparently ,m4 ,descartes had been imbued with the idea in his youth1 at the ,college of la ,flche4 ,that caused him to say 7part ,i of his ,principles1 art4 #da73 ',our thought is finite1 and the knowledge and omnipotence of ,god1 whereby he has not only known from all eternity everything that is1 or that can be1 but also has willed it1 is infinite4 ,thus we have enough intelligence to recognize clearly and distinctly that this power and this knowledge are in ,god2 but we have not enough so to comprehend their extent that we can know how they leave the actions of men entirely free and indeterminate4' ,the continuation has already been quoted above4 ',entirely free'1 that is right2 but one spoils everything by adding 'entirely indeterminate'4 ,one has no need of infinite knowledge in order to see that the foreknowledge and the providence of ,god allow freedom to our actions1 since ,god has foreseen those actions in #cdd his ideas1 just as they are1 that is1 free4 ,laurentius ,valla indeed1 in his ,dialogue against ,boethius 7which ,i will presently quote in epitome7 ably undertakes to reconcile freedom with foreknowledge1 but does not venture to hope that he can reconcile it with providence4 ,yet there is no more difficulty in the one than the other1 because the decree to give existence to this action no more changes its nature than does one's mere consciousness thereof4 ,but there is no knowledge1 however infinite it be1 which can reconcile the knowledge and providence of ,god with actions of an indeterminate cause1 that is to say1 with a chimerical and impossible being4 ,the actions of the will are determined in two ways1 by the foreknowledge or providence of ,god1 and also by the dispositions of the particular immediate cause1 which lie in the inclinations of the soul4 ,m4 ,descartes followed the ,thomists on this point2 but he wrote with his usual circumspection1 so as not to come into conflict with some other theologians4 #cff4 ,m4 ,bayle relates 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #adb1 p4 #hjd7 that ,father ,gibieuf of the ,oratory published a ,latin treatise on the freedom of ,god and of the creature1 in the year #afci2 that he was met with protests1 and was shown a collection of seventy contradictions taken from the first book of his work2 and that1 twenty years after1 ,father ,annat1 ,confessor to the ,king of ,france1 reproached him in his book ,de ,incoacta ,libertate 7ed4 ,rome1 #afed1 in #dto471 for the silence he still maintained4 ,who would not think 7adds ,m4 ,bayle71 after the uproar of the de ,auxiliis ,congregations1 that the ,thomists taught things touching the nature of free will which were entirely opposed to the opinion of the ,jesuits8 ,when1 however1 one considers the passages that ,father ,annat quoted from the works of the ,thomists 7in a pamphlet entitled3 ,jansenius a ,thomistis1 gratiae per se ipsam efficacis defensoribus1 condemnatus1 printed in ,paris in the year #afed in #dto47 one can in reality only see verbal controversies between the two sects4 ,the grace efficacious of itself1 according to the one side1 leaves to free will quite as much power of resistance as the congruent grace of the others4 ,m4 ,bayle thinks one can say almost as much of ,jansenius himself4 ,he was 7so he says7 an able man1 of a methodical mind and of great assiduity4 ,he worked for twenty-two years at his ,augustinus4 ,one of his aims was to refute the ,jesuits on the dogma of free will2 yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he rejects or adopts freedom of indifference4 ,from his work innumerable passages #cde are quoted for and against this opinion1 as ,father ,annat has himself shown in the work that has just been mentioned1 ,de ,incoacta ,libertate4 ,so easy is it to render this subject obscure1 as ,m4 ,bayle says at the conclusion of this discourse4 ,as for ,father ,gibieuf1 it must be admitted that he often alters the meaning of his terms1 and that consequently he does not answer the question in the main1 albeit he often writes with good sense4 #cfg4 ,indeed1 confusion springs1 more often than not1 from ambiguity in terms1 and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas about them4 ,that gives rise to these eternal1 and usually mistaken1 contentions on necessity and contingency1 on the possible and the impossible4 ,but provided that it is understood that necessity and possibility1 taken metaphysically and strictly1 depend solely upon this question1 whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it implies contradiction or not2 and that one takes into account that contingency is consistent with the inclinations1 or reasons which contribute towards causing determination by the will2 provided also that one knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination or certainty1 between metaphysical necessity1 which admits of no choice1 presenting only one single object as possible1 and moral necessity1 which constrains the wisest to choose the best2 finally1 provided that one is rid of the chimera of complete indifference1 which can only be found in the books of philosophers1 and on paper 7for they cannot even conceive the notion in their heads1 or prove its reality by an example in things7 one will easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy ,daedalus was the human mind4 ,that labyrinth has caused infinite confusion1 as much with the ancients as with those of later times1 even so far as to lead men into the absurd error of the ,lazy ,sophism1 which closely resembles fate after the ,turkish fashion4 ,i do not wonder if in reality the ,thomists and the ,jesuits1 and even the ,molinists and the ,jansenists1 agree together on this matter more than is supposed4 ,a ,thomist and even a wise ,jansenist will content himself with certain determination1 without going on to necessity3 and if someone goes so far1 the error mayhap will lie only in the word4 ,a wise ,molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to necessity1 but such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinations4 #cfh4 ,these difficulties1 however1 have greatly impressed ,m4 ,bayle1 who#cdf was more inclined to dwell on them than to solve them1 although he might perhaps have had better success than anyone if he had thought fit to turn his mind in that direction4 ,here is what he says of them in his ,dictionary1 art4 ',jansenius'1 lit4 ,g1 p4 #afbf3 ',someone has said that the subject of ,grace is an ocean which has neither shore nor bottom4 ,perhaps he would have spoken more correctly if he had compared it to the ,strait of ,messina1 where one is always in danger of striking one reef while endeavouring to avoid another4 ,dextrum ,scylla latus1 laevum implacata ,charybdis ,obsidet4 ,everything comes back in the end to this3 ,did ,adam sin freely8 ,if you answer yes1 then you will be told1 his fall was not foreseen4 ,if you answer no1 then you will be told1 he is not guilty4 ,you may write a hundred volumes against the one or the other of these conclusions1 and yet you will confess1 either that the infallible prevision of a contingent event is a mystery impossible to conceive1 or that the way in which a creature which acts without freedom sins nevertheless is altogether incomprehensible4' #cfi4 ,either ,i am greatly mistaken or these two alleged incomprehensibilities are ended altogether by my solutions4 ,would to ,god it were as easy to answer the question how to cure fevers1 and how to avoid the perils of two chronic sicknesses that may originate1 the one from not curing the fever1 the other from curing it wrongly4 ,when one asserts that a free event cannot be foreseen1 one is confusing freedom with indetermination1 or with indifference that is complete and in equipoise2 and when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent man from being guilty1 one means a freedom exempt1 not from determination or from certainty1 but from necessity and from constraint4 ,this shows that the dilemma is not well expressed1 and that there is a wide passage between the two perilous reefs4 ,one will reply1 therefore1 that ,adam sinned freely1 and that ,god saw him sinning in the possible state of ,adam1 which became actual in accordance with the decree of the divine permission4 ,it is true that ,adam was determined to sin in consequence of certain prevailing inclinations3 but this determination destroys neither contingency nor freedom4 ,moreover1 the certain determination to sin which exists in man does not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning 7speaking generally7 or1 since he does sin1 prevent him from being guilty and deserving #cdg punishment4 ,this is more especially so since the punishment may be of service to him or others1 to contribute towards determining them another time not to sin4 ,there is besides punitive justice1 which goes beyond compensation and amendment1 and wherein also there is nothing liable to be shaken by the certain determination of the contingent resolutions of the will4 ,it may be said1 on the contrary1 that the penalties and rewards would be to some extent unavailing1 and would fail in one of their aims1 that of amendment1 if they could not contribute towards determining the will to do better another time4 #cgj4 ,m4 ,bayle continues3 ',where freedom is concerned there are only two courses to take3 one is to say that all the causes distinct from the soul1 and co-operating with it1 leave it the power to act or not to act2 the other is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot forbear to do so4 ,the first course is that taken by the ,molinists1 the other is that of the ,thomists and ,jansenists and the ,protestants of the ,geneva ,confession4 ,yet the ,thomists have clamorously maintained that they were not ,jansenists2 and the latter have maintained with equal warmth that where freedom was concerned they were not ,calvinists4 ,on the other hand1 the ,molinists have maintained that ,st4 ,augustine did not teach ,jansenism4 ,thus the one side not wishing to admit that they were in conformity with people who were considered heretics1 and the other side not wishing to admit that they were in opposition to a learned saint whose opinions were always considered orthodox1 have both performed a hundred feats of contortion1 etc4' #cga4 ,the two courses which ,m4 ,bayle distinguishes here do not exclude a third course1 according to which the determination of the soul does not come solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the soul1 but also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations which mingle with the impressions of the senses1 strengthening or weakening them4 ,now all the internal and external causes taken together bring it about that the soul is determined certainly1 but not of necessity3 for no contradiction would be implied if the soul were to be determined differently1 it being possible for the will to be inclined1 but not possible for it to be compelled by necessity4 ,i will not venture upon a discussion of the difference existing between the ,jansenists and the ,reformed on this matter4 ,they are not perhaps always fully in accord #cdh with themselves as regards things1 or as regards expressions1 on a matter where one often loses one's way in bewildering subtleties4 ,father ,theophile ,raynaud1 in his book entitled ,calvinismus ,religio ,bestiarum1 wished to strike at the ,dominicans1 without naming them4 ,on the other hand1 those who professed to be followers of ,st4 ,augustine reproached the ,molinists with ,pelagianism or at the least semi-,pelagianism4 ,things were carried to excess at times by both sides1 whether in their defence of a vague indifference and the granting of too much to man1 or in their teaching determinationem ad unum secundum qualitatem actus licet non quoad ejus substantiam1 that is to say1 a determination to evil in the non-regenerate1 as if they did nothing but sin4 ,after all1 ,i think one must not reproach any but the adherents of ,hobbes and ,spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency2 for they think that that which happens is alone possible1 and must happen by a brute geometrical necessity4 ,hobbes made everything material and subjected it to mathematical laws alone2 ,spinoza also divested ,god of intelligence and choice1 leaving him a blind power1 whence all emanates of necessity4 ,the theologians of the two ,protestant parties are equally zealous in refuting an unendurable necessity4 ,although those who follow the ,synod of ,dordrecht teach sometimes that it suffices for freedom to be exempt from constraint1 it seems that the necessity they leave in it is only hypothetical1 or rather that which is more appropriately termed certainty and infallibility4 ,thus it results that very often the difficulties only lie in the terms4 ,i say as much with regard to the ,jansenists1 although ,i do not wish to make excuse for those people in everything4 #cgb4 ,with the ,hebrew ,cabalists1 ,malcuth or the ,kingdom1 the last of the ,sephiroth1 signified that ,god controls everything irresistibly1 but gently and without violence1 so that man thinks he is following his own will while he carries out ,god's4 ,they said that ,adam's sin had been truncatio ,malcuth a caeteris plantis1 that is to say1 that ,adam had cut back the last of the ,sephiroth1 by making a dominion for himself within ,god's dominion1 and by assuming for himself a freedom independent of ,god1 but that his fall had taught him that he could not subsist of himself1 and that men must needs be redeemed by the ,messiah4 ,this doctrine may receive a good interpretation4 ,but ,spinoza1 who was versed in the ,cabala of the writers of his race1 and who says 7,tractatus ,politicus1 c4 #b1 n4 #f7 that men1 conceiving of freedom as they do1 establish a dominion within ,god's dominion1 has #cdi gone too far4 ,the dominion of ,god is with ,spinoza nothing but the dominion of necessity1 and of a blind necessity 7as with ,strato71 whereby everything emanates from the divine nature1 while no choice is left to ,god1 and man's choice does not exempt him from necessity4 ,he adds that men1 in order to establish what is termed ,imperium in ,imperio1 supposed that their soul was a direct creation of ,god1 something which could not be produced by natural causes1 furthermore that it had an absolute power of determination1 a state of things contrary to experience4 ,spinoza is right in opposing an absolute power of determination1 that is1 one without any grounds2 it does not belong even to ,god4 ,but he is wrong in thinking that a soul1 that a simple substance1 can be produced naturally4 ,it seems1 indeed1 that the soul to him was only a transient modification2 and when he pretends to make it lasting1 and even perpetual1 he substitutes for it the idea of the body1 which is purely a notion and not a real and actual thing4 #cgc4 ,the story ,m4 ,bayle relates of ,johan ,bredenburg1 a citizen of ,rotterdam 7,dictionary1 art4 ',spinoza'1 lit4 ,h1 p4 #bggd7 is curious4 ,he published a book against ,spinoza1 entitled3 ,enervatio ,tractatus ,theologico-politici1 una cum demonstratione geometrico ordine disposita1 ,naturam non esse ,deum1 cujus effati contrario praedictus ,tractatus unice innititur4 ,one was surprised to see that a man who did not follow the profession of letters1 and who had but slight education 7having written his book in ,flemish1 and had it translated into ,latin71 had been able to penetrate with such subtlety all the principles of ,spinoza1 and succeed in overthrowing them1 after having reduced them by a candid analysis to a state wherein they could appear in their full force4 ,i have been told 7adds ,m4 ,bayle7 that this writer after copious reflexion upon his answer1 and upon the principle of his opponent1 finally found that this principle could be reduced to the form of a demonstration4 ,he undertook therefore to prove that there is no cause of all things other than a nature which exists necessarily1 and which acts according to an immutable1 inevitable and irrevocable necessity4 ,he examined the whole system of the geometricians1 and after having constructed his demonstration he scrutinized it from every imaginable angle1 he endeavoured to find its weak spot and was never able to discover any means of destroying it1 or even of weakening it4 ,that caused him real distress3 he groaned over it and begged the most talented of his #cej friends to help him in searching out the defects of this demonstration4 ,for all that1 he was not well pleased that copies of the book were made4 ,franz ,cuper1 a ,socinian 7who had written ,arcana ,atheismi ,revelata against ,spinoza1 ,rotterdam1 #afgf1 in #dto471 having obtained a copy1 published it just as it was1 that is1 in ,flemish1 with some reflexions1 and accused the author of being an atheist4 ,the accused made his defence in the same tongue4 ,orobio1 a very able ,jewish physician 7that one who was refuted by ,m4 ,limbourg1 and who replied1 so ,i have heard say1 in a work posthumously circulated1 but unpublished71 brought out a book opposing ,bredenburg's demonstration1 entitled3 ,certamen ,philosophicum ,propugnatae ,veritatis ,divinae ac ,naturalis1 adversus ,j4,b4 principia1 ,amsterdam1 #afhd4 ,m4 ,aubert de ,vers also wrote in opposition to him the same year under the name of ,latinus ,serbattus ,sartensis4 ,bredenburg protested that he was convinced of free will and of religion1 and that he wished he might be shown a possibility of refuting his own demonstration4 #cgd4 ,i would desire to see this alleged demonstration1 and to know whether it tended to prove that primitive ,nature1 which produces all1 acts without choice and without knowledge4 ,in this case1 ,i admit that his proof was ,spinozistic and dangerous4 ,but if he meant perhaps that the divine nature is determined toward that which it produces1 by its choice and through the motive of the best1 there was no need for him to grieve about this so-called immutable1 inevitable1 irrevocable necessity4 ,it is only moral1 it is a happy necessity2 and instead of destroying religion it shows divine perfection to the best advantage4 #cge4 ,i take this opportunity to add that ,m4 ,bayle quotes 7p4 #bggc7 the opinion of those who believe that the book entitled ,lucii ,antistii ,constantis de ,jure ,ecclesiasticorum ,liber ,singularis1 published in #affe1 is by ,spinoza4 ,but ,i have reason for doubting this1 despite that ,m4 ,colerus1 who has passed on to me an account he wrote of the life of that famous ,jew1 is also of that opinion4 ,the initial letters ,l4,a4,c4 lead me to believe that the author of this book was ,m4 de la ,cour or ,van den ,hoof1 famous for works on the ,interest of ,holland1 ,political ,equipoise1 and numerous other books that he published 7some of them under the signature ,v4,d4,h47 attacking the power of the ,governor of ,holland1 which was at that time considered a danger to the ,republic2 for the memory of ,prince ,william the ,second's attempt upon the city of ,amsterdam was still quite fresh4#cea ,most of the ecclesiastics of ,holland were on the side of this prince's son1 who was then a minor1 and they suspected ,m4 de ,witt and what was called the ,lowenstein faction of favouring the ,arminians1 the ,cartesians1 and other sects that were feared still more1 endeavouring to rouse the populace against them1 and not without success1 as the event proved4 ,it was thus very natural that ,m4 de la ,cour should publish this book4 ,it is true that people seldom keep to the happy mean in works published to further party interests4 ,i will say in passing that a ,french version of the ,interest of ,holland by ,m4 de la ,cour has just been published1 under the deceptive title of ,mmoires de ,m4 le ,grand-,pensionnaire de ,witt2 as if the thoughts of a private individual1 who was1 to be sure1 of de ,witt's party1 and a man of talent1 but who had not enough acquaintance with public affairs or enough ability to write as that great ,minister of ,state might have written1 could pass for the production of one of the first men of his time4 #cgf4 ,i saw ,m4 de la ,cour as well as ,spinoza on my return from ,france by way of ,england and ,holland1 and ,i learnt from them a few good anecdotes on the affairs of that time4 ,m4 ,bayle says1 p4 #bggj1 that ,spinoza studied ,latin under a physician named ,franz van den ,ende4 ,he tells at the same time1 on the authority of ,sebastian ,kortholt 7who refers to it in the preface to the second edition of the book by his late father1 ,de ,tribus ,impostoribus1 ,herberto ,l4 ,b4 de ,cherbury1 ,hobbio et ,spinoza7 that a girl instructed ,spinoza in ,latin1 and that she afterwards married ,m4 ,kerkering1 who was her pupil at the same time as ,spinoza4 ,in connexion with that ,i note that this young lady was a daughter of ,m4 van den ,ende1 and that she assisted her father in the work of teaching4 ,van den ,ende1 who was also called ,a4 ,finibus1 later went to ,paris1 and there kept a boarding-school in the ,faubourg ,st4 ,antoine4 ,he was considered excellent as an instructor1 and he told me1 when ,i called upon him there1 that he would wager that his audiences would always pay attention to his words4 ,he had with him as well at that time a young girl who also spoke ,latin1 and worked upon geometrical demonstrations4 ,he had insinuated himself into ,m4 ,arnauld's good graces1 and the ,jesuits began to be jealous of his reputation4 ,but he disappeared shortly afterwards1 having been mixed up in the ,chevalier de ,rohan's conspiracy4 #cgg4 ,i think ,i have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge nor the providence of ,god can impair either his justice or his goodness1 #ceb or our freedom4 ,there remains only the difficulty arising from ,god's co-operation with the actions of the creature1 which seems to concern more closely both his goodness1 in relation to our evil actions1 and our freedom1 in relation to good actions as well as to others4 ,m4 ,bayle has brought out this also with his usual acuteness4 ,i will endeavour to throw light upon the difficulties he puts forward1 and then ,i shall be in a position to conclude this work4 ,i have already proved that the co-operation of ,god consists in giving us continually all that is real in us and in our actions1 in so far as it involves perfection2 but that all that is limited and imperfect therein is a consequence of the previous limitations which are originally in the creature4 ,since1 moreover1 every action of the creature is a change of its modifications1 it is obvious that action arises in the creature in relation to the limitations or negations which it has within itself1 and which are diversified by this change4 #cgh4 ,i have already pointed out more than once in this work that evil is a consequence of privation1 and ,i think that ,i have explained that intelligibly enough4 ,st4 ,augustine has already put forward this idea1 and ,st4 ,basil said something of the same kind in his ,hexameron1 ,homil4 #b1 'that vice is not a living and animate substance1 but an affection of the soul contrary to virtue1 which arises from one's abandoning the good2 and there is therefore no need to look for an original evil'4 ,m4 ,bayle1 quoting this passage in his ,dictionary 7art4 ',paulicians'1 lit4 ,d1 p4 #bcbe7 commends a remark by ,herr ,pfanner 7whom he calls a ,german theologian1 but he is a jurist by profession1 ,counsellor to the ,dukes of ,saxony71 who censures ,st4 ,basil for not being willing to admit that ,god is the author of physical evil4 ,doubtless ,god is its author1 when the moral evil is assumed to be already in existence2 but speaking generally1 one might assert that ,god permitted physical evil by implication1 in permitting moral evil which is its source4 ,it appears that the ,stoics knew also how slender is the entity of evil4 ,these words of ,epictetus are an indication3 ',sicut aberrandi causa meta non ponitur1 sic nec natura mali in mundo existit4' #cgi4 ,there was therefore no need to have recourse to a principle of evil1 as ,st4 ,basil aptly observes4 ,nor is it necessary either to seek the origin of evil in matter4 ,those who believed that there was a chaos before ,god laid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder4 ,it was an opinion which ,plato introduced into his ,timaeus4 ,aristotle found fault with him for that 7in his third book on ,heaven1 ch4 #b7 because1 #cec according to this doctrine1 disorder would be original and natural1 and order would have been introduced against nature4 ,this ,anaxagoras avoided by making matter remain at rest until it was stirred by ,god2 and ,aristotle in the same passage commends him for it4 ,according to ,plutarch 7,de ,iside et ,osiride1 and ,tr4 de ,animae ,procreatione ex ,timaeo7 ,plato recognized in matter a certain maleficent soul or force1 rebellious against ,god3 it was an actual blemish1 an obstacle to ,god's plans4 ,the ,stoics also believed that matter was the source of defects1 as ,justus ,lipsius showed in the first book of the ,physiology of the ,stoics4 #chj4 ,aristotle was right in rejecting chaos3 but it is not always easy to disentangle the conceptions of ,plato1 and such a task would be still less easy in respect of some ancient authors whose works are lost4 ,kepler1 one of the most excellent of modern mathematicians1 recognized a species of imperfection in matter1 even when there is no irregular motion3 he calls it its 'natural inertia'1 which gives it a resistance to motion1 whereby a greater mass receives less speed from one and the same force4 ,there is soundness in this observation1 and ,i have used it to advantage in this work1 in order to have a comparison such as should illustrate how the original imperfection of the creatures sets bounds to the action of the ,creator1 which tends towards good4 ,but as matter is itself of ,god's creation1 it only furnishes a comparison and an example1 and cannot be the very source of evil and of imperfection4 ,i have already shown that this source lies in the forms or ideas of the possibles1 for it must be eternal1 and matter is not so4 ,now since ,god made all positive reality that is not eternal1 he would have made the source of evil1 if that did not rather lie in the possibility of things or forms1 that which alone ,god did not make1 since he is not the author of his own understanding4 #cha4 ,yet even though the source of evil lies in the possible forms1 anterior to the acts of ,god's will1 it is nevertheless true that ,god co-operates in evil in the actual performance of introducing these forms into matter3 and this is what causes the difficulty in question here4 ,durand de ,saint-,pourain1 ,cardinal ,aureolus1 ,nicolas ,taurel1 ,father ,louis de ,dole1 ,m4 ,bernier and some others1 speaking of this co-operation1 would have it only general1 for fear of impairing the freedom of man and the holiness of ,god4 ,they seem to maintain that ,god1 having given to creatures the power to act1 contents himself with conserving this power4 ,on the #ced other hand1 ,m4 ,bayle1 according to some modern writers1 carries the cooperation of ,god too far3 he seems to fear lest the creature be not sufficiently dependent upon ,god4 ,he goes so far as to deny action to creatures2 he does not even acknowledge any real distinction between accident and substance4 #chb4 ,he places great reliance especially on that doctrine accepted of the ,schoolmen1 that conservation is a continued creation4 ,the conclusion to be drawn from this doctrine would seem to be that the creature never exists1 that it is ever newborn and ever dying1 like time1 movement and other transient beings4 ,plato believed this of material and tangible things1 saying that they are in a perpetual flux1 semper fluunt1 nunquam sunt4 ,but of immaterial substances he judged quite differently1 regarding them alone as real3 nor was he in that altogether mistaken4 ,yet continued creation applies to all creatures without distinction4 ,sundry good philosophers have been opposed to this dogma1 and ,m4 ,bayle tells that ,david de ,rodon1 a philosopher renowned among those of the ,french who have adhered to ,geneva1 deliberately refuted it4 ,the ,arminians also do not approve of it2 they are not much in favour of these metaphysical subtleties4 ,i will say nothing of the ,socinians1 who relish them even less4 #chc4 ,for a proper enquiry as to whether conservation is a continued creation1 it would be necessary to consider the reasons whereon this dogma is founded4 ,the ,cartesians1 after the example of their master1 employ in order to prove it a principle which is not conclusive enough4 ,they say that 'the moments of time having no necessary connexion with one another1 it does not follow that because ,i am at this moment ,i shall exist at the moment which shall follow1 if the same cause which gives me being for this moment does not also give it to me for the instant following4' ,the author of the ,reflexion on the ,picture of ,socinianism has made use of this argument1 and ,m4 ,bayle 7perhaps the author of this same ,reflexion7 quotes it 7,reply to the ,questions of a ,provincial1 vol4 ,,iii1 ch4 #ada1 p4 #gga74 ,one may answer that in fact it does not follow of necessity that1 because ,i am1 ,i shall be2 but this follows naturally1 nevertheless1 that is1 of itself1 per se1 if nothing prevents it4 ,it is the distinction that can be drawn between the essential and the natural4 ,for the same movement endures naturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it1 because the reason which makes it cease at this instant1 if it is no new reason1 #cee would have already made it cease sooner4 #chd4 ,the late ,herr ,erhard ,weigel1 a celebrated mathematician and philosopher at ,jena1 well known for his ,analysis ,euclidea1 his mathematical philosophy1 some neat mechanical inventions1 and finally the trouble he took to induce the ,protestant princes of the ,empire to undertake the last reform of the ,almanac1 whose success1 notwithstanding1 he did not witness2 ,herr ,weigel1 ,i say1 communicated to his friends a certain demonstration of the existence of ,god1 which indeed amounted to this idea of continued creation4 ,as he was wont to draw parallels between reckoning and reasoning--witness his ,arithmetical ,ethics 7rechenschaftliche ,sittenlehre7--he said that the foundation of the demonstration was this beginning of the ,pythagorean ,table1 once one is one4 ,these repeated unities were the moments of the existence of things1 each one of them depending upon ,god1 who resuscitates1 as it were1 all things outside himself at each moment3 falling away as they do at each moment1 they must ever have one who shall resuscitate them1 and that cannot be any other than ,god4 ,but there would be need of a more exact proof if that is to be called a demonstration4 ,it would be necessary to prove that the creature always emerges from nothingness and relapses thither forthwith4 ,in particular it must be shown that the privilege of enduring more than a moment by its nature belongs to the necessary being alone4 ,the difficulties on the composition of the continuum enter also into this matter4 ,this dogma appears to resolve time into moments1 whereas others regard moments and points as mere modalities of the continuum1 that is1 as extremities of the parts that can be assigned to it1 and not as constituent parts4 ,but this is not the place for entering into that labyrinth4 #che4 ,what can be said for certain on the present subject is that the creature depends continually upon divine operation1 and that it depends upon that no less after the time of its beginning than when it first begins4 ,this dependence implies that it would not continue to exist if ,god did not continue to act2 in short1 that this action of ,god is free4 ,for if it were a necessary emanation1 like that of the properties of the circle1 which issue from its essence1 it must then be said that ,god in the beginning produced the creature by necessity2 or else it must be shown how1 in creating it once1 he imposed upon himself the necessity of conserving it4 ,now there is no reason why this conserving action should not be #cef called production1 and even creation1 if one will3 for the dependence being as great afterwards as at the beginning1 the extrinsic designation of being new or not does not change the nature of that action4 #chf4 ,let us then admit in such a sense that conservation is a continued creation1 and let us see what ,m4 ,bayle seems to infer thence 7p4 #gga7 after the author of the ,reflexion on the ,picture of ,socinianism1 in opposition to ,m4 ,jurieu4 ',it seems to me'1 this writer says1 'that one must conclude that ,god does all1 and that in all creation there are no first or second or even occasional causes1 as can be easily proved4 ,at this moment when ,i speak1 ,i am such as ,i am1 with all my circumstances1 with such thought1 such action1 whether ,i sit or stand1 that if ,god creates me in this moment such as ,i am1 as one must of necessity say in this system1 he creates me with such thought1 such action1 such movement and such determination4 ,one cannot say that ,god creates me in the first place1 and that once ,i am created he produces with me my movements and my determinations4 ,that is indefensible for two reasons4 ,the first is1 that when ,god creates me or conserves me at this instant1 he does not conserve me as a being without form1 like a species1 or another of the ,universals of ,logic4 ,i am an individual2 he creates me and conserves me as such1 and as being all that ,i am in this instant1 with all my attendant circumstances4 ,the second reason is that if ,god creates me in this instant1 and one says that afterwards he produces with me my actions1 it will be necessary to imagine another instant for action3 for before acting one must exist4 ,now that would be two instants where we only assume one4 ,it is therefore certain in this hypothesis that creatures have neither more connexion nor more relation with their actions than they had with their production at the first moment of the first creation4' ,the author of this ,reflexion draws thence very harsh conclusions which one can picture to oneself2 and he testifies at the end that one would be deeply indebted to any man that should teach those who approve this system how to extricate themselves from these frightful absurdities4 #chg4 ,m4 ,bayle carries this still further4 ',you know'1 he says 7p4 #gge71 'that it is demonstrated in the ,scholastic writings' 7he cites ,arriaga1 ,disp4 #i1 ,phys41 sect4 #f et praesertim1 sub-sect4 #c7 'that the creature cannot be either the total cause or the partial cause of its conservation3 for if it were1 it would exist before existing1 which is #ceg contradictory4 ,you know that the argument proceeds like this3 that which conserves itself acts2 now that which acts exists1 and nothing can act before it has attained complete existence2 therefore1 if a creature conserved itself1 it would act before being4 ,this argument is not founded upon probabilities1 but upon the first principles of ,metaphysics1 non entis nulla sunt accidentia1 operari sequitur esse1 axioms as clear as daylight4 ,let us go further4 ,if creatures co-operated with ,god 7here is meant an active cooperation1 and not co-operation by a passive instrument7 to conserve themselves they would act before being3 that has been demonstrated4 ,now if they co-operated with ,god for the production of any other thing1 they would also act before being2 it is therefore as impossible for them to co-operate with ,god for the production of any other thing 7such as local movement1 an affirmation1 volition1 entities actually distinct from their substance1 so it is asserted7 as for their own conservation4 ,since their conservation is a continued creation1 and since all human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot co-operate with ,god at the first moment of their existence1 either to produce themselves or to give themselves any modality1 since that would be to act before being 7observe that ,thomas ,aquinas and sundry other ,schoolmen teach that if the angels had sinned at the first moment of their creation ,god would be the author of the sin3 see the ,feuillant ,pierre de ,st4 ,joseph1 p4 #cah1 et seqq41 of the ,suavis ,concordia ,humanae ,libertatis2 it is a sign that they acknowledge that at the first instant the creature cannot act in anything whatsoever71 it follows manifestly that they cannot co-operate with ,god in any one of the subsequent moments1 either to produce themselves or to produce any other thing4 ,if they could co-operate therein at the second moment of their existence1 nothing would prevent their being able to cooperate at the first moment4' #chh4 ,this is the way it will be necessary to answer these arguments4 ,let us assume that the creature is produced anew at each instant2 let us grant also that the instant excludes all priority of time1 being indivisible2 but let us point out that it does not exclude priority of nature1 or what is called anteriority in signo rationis1 and that this is sufficient4 ,the production1 or action whereby ,god produces1 is anterior by nature to the existence of the creature that is produced2 the creature taken in itself1 with its nature and its necessary properties1 is anterior to its accidental affections and to its actions2 and yet all these things are in being #ceh in the same moment4 ,god produces the creature in conformity with the exigency of the preceding instants1 according to the laws of his wisdom2 and the creature operates in conformity with that nature which ,god conveys to it in creating it always4 ,the limitations and imperfections arise therein through the nature of the subject1 which sets bounds to ,god's production2 this is the consequence of the original imperfection of creatures4 ,vice and crime1 on the other hand1 arise there through the free inward operation of the creature1 in so far as this can occur within the instant1 repetition afterwards rendering it discernible4 #chi4 ,this anteriority of nature is a commonplace in philosophy3 thus one says that the decrees of ,god have an order among themselves4 ,when one ascribes to ,god 7and rightly so7 understanding of the arguments and conclusions of creatures1 in such sort that all their demonstrations and syllogisms are known to him1 and are found in him in a transcendent way1 one sees that there is in the propositions or truths a natural order2 but there is no order of time or interval1 to cause him to advance in knowledge and pass from the premisses to the conclusion4 #cij4 ,i find in the arguments that have just been quoted nothing which these reflexions fail to satisfy4 ,when ,god produces the thing he produces it as an individual and not as a universal of logic 7,i admit72 but he produces its essence before its accidents1 its nature before its operations1 following the priority of their nature1 and in signo anteriore rationis4 ,thus one sees how the creature can be the true cause of the sin1 while conservation by ,god does not prevent the sin2 ,god disposes in accordance with the preceding state of the same creature1 in order to follow the laws of his wisdom notwithstanding the sin1 which in the first place will be produced by the creature4 ,but it is true that ,god would not in the beginning have created the soul in a state wherein it would have sinned from the first moment1 as the ,schoolmen have justly observed3 for there is nothing in the laws of his wisdom that could have induced him so to do4 #cia4 ,this law of wisdom brings it about also that ,god reproduces the same substance1 the same soul4 ,such was the answer that could have been given by the ,abb whom ,m4 ,bayle introduces in his ,dictionary 7art4 ',pyrrhon4' lit4 ,b1 p4 #bdcb74 ,this wisdom effects the connexion of things4 ,i concede therefore that the creature does not co-operate with ,god to conserve #cei himself 7in the sense in which ,i have just explained conservation74 ,but ,i see nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation with ,god for the production of any other thing3 and especially might this concern its inward operation1 as in the case of a thought or a volition1 things really distinct from the substance4 #cib4 ,but there ,i am once more at grips with ,m4 ,bayle4 ,he maintains that there are no such accidents distinct from the substance4 ',the reasons'1 he says1 'which our modern philosophers have employed to demonstrate that the accidents are not beings in reality distinct from the substance are not mere difficulties2 they are arguments which overwhelm one1 and which cannot be refuted4 ,take the trouble'1 he adds1 'to look for them in the writings of ,father ,maignan1 or ,father ,malebranche or ,m4 ,calli' 7,professor of ,philosophy at ,caen7 'or in the ,accidentia profligata of ,father ,saguens1 disciple of ,father ,maignan1 the extract from which is to be found in the ,nouvelles de la ,rpublique des ,lettres1 ,june #agjb4 ,or if you wish one author only to suffice you1 choose ,dom ,franois ,lami1 a ,benedictine monk1 and one of the strongest ,cartesians to be found in ,france4 ,you will find among his ,philosophical ,letters1 printed at ,trvoux in #agjc1 that one wherein by the geometricians' method he demonstrates that ,god is the sole true cause of all that which is real4 ,i would wish to see all these books2 and as for this last proposition1 it may be true in a very good sense3 ,god is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities1 or of perfections4 ,causae secundae agunt in virtute primae4 ,but when one comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may say that the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is limited2 otherwise ,god would be the cause of sin1 and even the sole cause4 #cic4 ,it is well to beware1 moreover1 lest in confusing substances with accidents1 in depriving created substances of action1 one fall into ,spinozism1 which is an exaggerated ,cartesianism4 ,that which does not act does not merit the name of substance4 ,if the accidents are not distinct from the substances2 if the created substance is a successive being1 like movement2 if it does not endure beyond a moment1 and does not remain the same 7during some stated portion of time7 any more than its accidents2 if it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number3 why shall one not say1 with ,spinoza1 that ,god is the only substance1 and #cfj that creatures are only accidents or modifications8 ,hitherto it has been supposed that the substance remains1 and that the accidents change2 and ,i think one ought still to abide by this ancient doctrine1 for the arguments ,i remember having read do not prove the contrary1 and prove more than is needed4 #cid4 ',one of the absurdities'1 says ,m4 ,bayle 7p4 #ggi71 'that arise from the so-called distinction which is alleged to exist between substances and their accidents is that creatures1 if they produce the accidents1 would possess a power of creation and annihilation4 ,accordingly one could not perform the slightest action without creating an innumerable number of real beings1 and without reducing to nothingness an endless multitude of them4 ,merely by moving the tongue to cry out or to eat1 one creates as many accidents as there are movements of the parts of the tongue1 and one destroys as many accidents as there are parts of that which one eats1 which lose their form1 which become chyle1 blood1 etc4' ,this argument is only a kind of bugbear4 ,what harm would be done1 supposing that an infinity of movements1 an infinity of figures spring up and disappear at every moment in the universe1 and even in each part of the universe8 ,it can be demonstrated1 moreover1 that that must be so4 #cie4 ,as for the so-called creation of the accidents1 who does not see that one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape1 to form a square or a column1 or some other parade-ground figure1 by the movement of the soldiers who are drilling2 or again to fashion a statue by removing a few pieces from a block of marble2 or to make some figure in relief1 by changing1 decreasing or increasing a piece of wax8 ,the production of modifications has never been called creation1 and it is an abuse of terms to scare the world thus4 ,god produces substances from nothing1 and the substances produce accidents by the changes of their limits4 #cif4 ,as for the souls or substantial forms1 ,m4 ,bayle is right in adding3 'that there is nothing more inconvenient for those who admit substantial forms than the objection which is made that they could not be produced save by an actual creation1 and that the ,schoolmen are pitiable in their endeavours to answer this4' ,but there is nothing more convenient for me and for my system than this same objection4 ,for ,i maintain that all the ,souls1 ,entelechies or primitive forces1 substantial forms1 simple substances1 or ,monads1 whatever name one may apply to them1 can neither spring up #cfa naturally nor perish4 ,and the qualities or derivative forces1 or what are called accidental forms1 ,i take to be modifications of the primitive ,entelechy1 even as shapes are modifications of matter4 ,that is why these modifications are perpetually changing1 while the simple substance remains4 #cig4 ,i have shown already 7part ,i1 #hf seqq47 that souls cannot spring up naturally1 or be derived from one another1 and that it is necessary that ours either be created or be pre-existent4 ,i have even pointed out a certain middle way between a creation and an entire pre-existence4 ,i find it appropriate to say that the soul preexisting in the seeds from the beginning of things was only sentient1 but that it was elevated to the superior degree1 which is that of reason1 when the man to whom this soul should belong was conceived1 and when the organic body1 always accompanying this soul from the beginning1 but under many changes1 was determined for forming the human body4 ,i considered also that one might attribute this elevation of the sentient soul 7which makes it reach a more sublime degree of being1 namely reason7 to the extraordinary operation of ,god4 ,nevertheless it will be well to add that ,i would dispense with miracles in the generating of man1 as in that of the other animals4 ,it will be possible to explain that1 if one imagines that in this great number of souls and of animals1 or at least of living organic bodies which are in the seeds1 those souls alone which are destined to attain one day to human nature contain the reason that shall appear therein one day1 and the organic bodies of these souls alone are preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human shape1 while the other small animals or seminal living beings1 in which no such thing is pre-established1 are essentially different from them and possessed only of an inferior nature4 ,this production is a kind of traduction1 but more manageable than that kind which is commonly taught3 it does not derive the soul from a soul1 but only the animate from an animate1 and it avoids the repeated miracles of a new creation1 which would cause a new and pure soul to enter a body that must corrupt it4 #cih4 ,i am1 however1 of the same opinion as ,father ,malebranche1 that1 in general1 creation properly understood is not so difficult to admit as might be supposed1 and that it is in a sense involved in the notion of the dependence of creatures4 ',how stupid and ridiculous are the ,philosophers6' 7he exclaims1 in his ,christian ,meditations1 #i1 ,no4 #c74 ',they assume that ,creation is impossible1 because they cannot conceive how ,god's power #cfb is great enough to make something from nothing4 ,but can they any better conceive how the power of ,god is capable of stirring a straw8' ,he adds1 again with great truth 7,no4 #e71 ',if matter were uncreate1 ,god could not move it or form anything from it4 ,for ,god cannot move matter1 or arrange it wisely1 if he does not know it4 ,now ,god cannot know it1 if he does not give it being3 he can derive his knowledge only from himself4 ,nothing can act on him or enlighten him4' #cii4 ,m4 ,bayle1 not content with saying that we are created continually1 insists also on this other doctrine which he would fain derive thence3 that our soul cannot act4 ,this is the way he speaks on that matter 7ch4 #ada1 p4 #gfe73 ',he has too much acquaintance with ,cartesianism' 7it is of an able opponent he is speaking7 'not to know with what force it has been maintained in our day that there is no creature capable of producing motion1 and that our soul is a purely passive subject in relation to sensations and ideas1 and feelings of pain and of pleasure1 etc4 ,if this has not been carried as far as the volitions1 that is on account of the existence of revealed truths2 otherwise the acts of the will would have been found as passive as those of the understanding4 ,the same reasons which prove that our soul does not form our ideas1 and does not stir our organs1 would prove also that it cannot form our acts of love and our volitions1 etc' ,he might add3 our vicious actions1 our crimes4 #djj4 ,the force of these proofs1 which he praises1 must not be so great as he thinks1 for if it were they would prove too much4 ,they would make ,god the author of sin4 ,i admit that the soul cannot stir the organs by a physical influence2 for ,i think that the body must have been so formed beforehand that it would do in time and place that which responds to the volitions of the soul1 although it be true nevertheless that the soul is the principle of the operation4 ,but if it be said that the soul does not produce its thoughts1 its sensations1 its feelings of pain and of pleasure1 that is something for which ,i see no reason4 ,in my system every simple substance 7that is1 every true substance7 must be the true immediate cause of all its actions and inward passions2 and1 speaking strictly in a metaphysical sense1 it has none other than those which it produces4 ,those who hold a different opinion1 and who make ,god the sole agent1 are needlessly becoming involved in expressions whence they will only with difficulty extricate themselves without offence against religion2 #cfc moreover1 they unquestionably offend against reason4 #dja4 ,here is1 however1 the foundation of ,m4 ,bayle's argument4 ,he says that we do not do that of which we know not the way it is done4 ,but it is a principle which ,i do not concede to him4 ,let us listen to his dissertation 7p4 #gfg seqq473 ',it is an astonishing thing that almost all philosophers 7with the exception of those who expounded ,aristotle1 and who admitted a universal intelligence distinct from our soul1 and cause of our perceptions3 see in the ,historical and ,critical ,dictionary1 ,note ,e of the article ,averroes7 have shared the popular belief that we form our ideas actively4 ,yet where is the man who knows not on the one hand that he is in absolute ignorance as to how ideas are made1 and on the other hand1 that he could not sew two stitches if he were ignorant of how to sew8 ,is the sewing of two stitches in itself a work more difficult than the painting in one's mind of a rose1 the very first time one's eyes rest upon it1 and although one has never learnt this kind of painting8 ,does it not appear on the contrary that this mental portrait is in itself a work more difficult than tracing on canvas the shape of a flower1 a thing we cannot do without having learnt it8 ,we are all convinced that a key would be of no use to us for opening a chest if we were ignorant as to how to use the key1 and yet we imagine that our soul is the efficient cause of the movement of our arms1 despite that it knows neither where the nerves are which must be used for this movement1 nor whence to obtain the animal spirits that are to flow into these nerves4 ,we have the experience every day that the ideas we would fain recall do not come1 and that they appear of themselves when we are no longer thinking of them4 ,if that does not prevent us from thinking that we are their efficient cause1 what reliance shall one place on the proof of feeling1 which to ,m4 ,jacquelot appears so conclusive8 ,does our authority over our ideas more often fall short than our authority over our volitions8 ,if we were to count up carefully1 we should find in the course of our life more velleities than volitions1 that is1 more evidences of the servitude of our will than of its dominion4 ,how many times does one and the same man not experience an inability to do a certain act of will 7for example1 an act of love for a man who had just injured him2 an act of scorn for a fine sonnet that he had composed2 an act of hatred for a mistress2 an act of approval of an absurd epigram4 ,take note that ,i speak only of inward acts1 #cfd expressed by an ,i will1 such as ,i will scorn1 approve1 etc47 even if there were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith1 and he ardently desired to gain these hundred pistoles1 and he were fired with the ambition to convince himself by an experimental proof that he is master in his own domain8 #djb4 ',to put together in few words the whole force of what ,i have just said to you1 ,i will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply into things1 that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the effect1 and be aware also of the way in which it must be produced4 ,that is not necessary when one is only the instrument of the cause1 or only the passive subject of its action2 but one cannot conceive of it as not necessary to a true agent4 ,now if we examine ourselves well we shall be strongly convinced1 7#a7 that1 independently of experience1 our soul is just as little aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is2 7#b7 that after a long experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions are formed than it was before having willed anything4 ,what is one to conclude from that1 save that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of its volitions1 any more than of its ideas1 and of the motion of the spirits which cause our arms to move8 7,take note that no pretence is made of deciding the point here absolutely1 it is only being considered in relation to the principles of the objection47' #djc4 ,that is indeed a strange way of reasoning6 ,what necessity is there for one always to be aware how that which is done is done8 ,are salts1 metals1 plants1 animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate bodies aware how that which they do is done1 and need they be aware8 ,must a drop of oil or of fat understand geometry in order to become round on the surface of water8 ,sewing stitches is another matter3 one acts for an end1 one must be aware of the means4 ,but we do not form our ideas because we will to do so1 they form themselves within us1 they form themselves through us1 not in consequence of our will1 but in accordance with our nature and that of things4 ,the foetus forms itself in the animal1 and a thousand other wonders of nature are produced by a certain instinct that ,god has placed there1 that is by virtue of divine preformation1 which has made these admirable automata1 adapted to produce mechanically such beautiful effects4 ,even so it is easy to believe that the soul is a spiritual automaton still more admirable1 and that it is through divine preformation that it produces these beautiful ideas1 wherein our will has no part and to which our #cfe art cannot attain4 ,the operation of spiritual automata1 that is of souls1 is not mechanical1 but it contains in the highest degree all that is beautiful in mechanism4 ,the movements which are developed in bodies are concentrated in the soul by representation as in an ideal world1 which expresses the laws of the actual world and their consequences1 but with this difference from the perfect ideal world which is in ,god1 that most of the perceptions in the other substances are only confused4 ,for it is plain that every simple substance embraces the whole universe in its confused perceptions or sensations1 and that the succession of these perceptions is regulated by the particular nature of this substance1 but in a manner which always expresses all the nature in the universe2 and every present perception leads to a new perception1 just as every movement that it represents leads to another movement4 ,but it is impossible that the soul can know clearly its whole nature1 and perceive how this innumerable number of small perceptions1 piled up or rather concentrated together1 shapes itself there3 to that end it must needs know completely the whole universe which is embraced by them1 that is1 it must needs be a ,god4 #djd4 ,as regards velleities1 they are only a very imperfect kind of conditional will4 ,i would1 if ,i could3 liberet si liceret2 and in the case of a velleity1 we do not will1 properly speaking1 to will1 but to be able4 ,that explains why there are none in ,god2 and they must not be confused with antecedent will4 ,i have explained sufficiently elsewhere that our control over volitions can be exercised only indirectly1 and that one would be unhappy if one were sufficiently master in one's own domain to be able to will without cause1 without rhyme or reason4 ,to complain of not having such a control would be to argue like ,pliny1 who carps at the power of ,god because ,god cannot destroy himself4 #dje4 ,i intended to finish here after having met 7as it seems to me7 all the objections of ,m4 ,bayle on this matter that ,i could find in his works4 ,but remembering ,laurentius ,valla's ,dialogue on ,free ,will1 in opposition to ,boethius1 which ,i have already mentioned1 ,i thought it would be opportune to quote it in abstract1 retaining the dialogue form1 and then to continue from where it ends1 keeping up the fiction it initiated2 and that less with the purpose of enlivening the subject1 than in order to explain myself towards the end of my dissertation as clearly as ,i can1 and in a way #cff most likely to be generally understood4 ,this ,dialogue of ,valla and his books on ,pleasure and the ,true ,good make it plain that he was no less a philosopher than a humanist4 ,these four books were opposed to the four books on the ,consolation of ,philosophy by ,boethius1 and the ,dialogue to the fifth book4 ,a certain ,spaniard named ,antonio ,glarea requests of him elucidation on the difficulty of free will1 whereof little is known as it is worthy to be known1 for upon it depend justice and injustice1 punishment and reward in this life and in the life to come4 ,laurentius ,valla answers him that we must console ourselves for an ignorance which we share with the whole world1 just as one consoles oneself for not having the wings of birds4 #djf4 ,,antonio--,i know that you can give me those wings1 like another ,daedalus1 so that ,i may emerge from the prison of ignorance1 and rise to the very region of truth1 which is the homeland of souls4 ,the books that ,i have seen have not satisfied me1 not even the famous ,boethius1 who meets with general approval4 ,i know not whether he fully understood himself what he says of ,god's understanding1 and of eternity superior to time2 and ,i ask for your opinion on his way of reconciling foreknowledge with freedom4 ,,laurent--,i am fearful of giving offence to many people1 if ,i confute this great man2 yet ,i will give preference over this fear to the consideration ,i have for the entreaties of a friend1 provided that you make me a promise4 ,,ant4--,what8 ,,laur4--,it is1 that when you have dined with me you do not ask me to give you supper1 that is to say1 ,i desire that you be content with the answer to the question you have put to me1 and do not put a further question4 #djg4 ,,ant4--,i promise you4 ,here is the heart of the difficulty4 ,if ,god foresaw the treason of ,judas1 it was necessary that he should betray1 it was impossible for him not to betray4 ,there is no obligation to do the impossible4 ,he therefore did not sin1 he did not deserve to be punished4 ,that destroys justice and religion1 and the fear of ,god4 ,,laur4--,god foresaw sin2 but he did not compel man to commit it2 sin is voluntary4 ,,ant4--,that will was necessary1 since it was foreseen4 ,,laur4--,if my knowledge does not cause things past or present to exist1 neither will my foreknowledge cause future things to exist4 #djh4 ,,ant4--,that comparison is deceptive3 neither the present nor the past can be changed1 they are already necessary2 but the future1 movable in itself1 becomes fixed and necessary through foreknowledge4 ,let us #cfg pretend that a god of the heathen boasts of knowing the future3 ,i will ask him if he knows which foot ,i shall put foremost1 then ,i will do the opposite of that which he shall have foretold4 ,,laur4--,this ,god knows what you are about to do4 ,,ant4--,how does he know it1 since ,i will do the opposite of what he shall have said1 and ,i suppose that he will say what he thinks8 ,,laur4--,your supposition is false3 ,god will not answer you2 or again1 if he were to answer you1 the veneration you would have for him would make you hasten to do what he had said2 his prediction would be to you an order4 ,but we have changed the question4 ,we are not concerned with what ,god will foretell but with what he foresees4 ,let us therefore return to foreknowledge1 and distinguish between the necessary and the certain4 ,it is not impossible for what is foreseen not to happen2 but it is infallibly sure that it will happen4 ,i can become a ,soldier or ,priest1 but ,i shall not become one4 #dji4 ,,ant4--,here ,i have you firmly held4 ,the philosophers' rule maintains that all that which is possible can be considered as existing4 ,but if that which you affirm to be possible1 namely an event different from what has been foreseen1 actually happened1 ,god would have been mistaken4 ,,laur4--,the rules of the philosophers are not oracles for me4 ,this one in particular is not correct4 ,two contradictories are often both possible4 ,can they also both exist8 ,but1 for your further enlightenment1 let us pretend that ,sextus ,tarquinius1 coming to ,delphi to consult the ,oracle of ,apollo1 receives the answer3 ,exul inopsque cades irata pulsus ab urbe4 ,a beggared outcast of the city's rage1 ,beside a foreign shore cut short thy age4 ,the young man will complain3 ,i have brought you a royal gift1 ,o ,apollo1 and you proclaim for me a lot so unhappy8 ,apollo will say to him3 ,your gift is pleasing to me1 and ,i will do that which you ask of me1 ,i will tell you what will happen4 ,i know the future1 but ,i do not bring it about4 ,go make your complaint to ,jupiter and the ,parcae4 ,sextus would be ridiculous if he continued thereafter to complain about ,apollo4 ,is not that true8 ,,ant4--,he will say3 ,i thank you1 ,o holy ,apollo1 for not having repaid me with silence1 for having revealed to me the ,truth4 ,but whence comes it that ,jupiter is so cruel towards me1 that he prepares so hard a fate for an#cfh innocent man1 for a devout worshipper of the ,gods8 ,,laur4--,you innocent8 ,apollo will say4 ,know that you will be proud1 that you will commit adulteries1 that you will be a traitor to your country4 ,could ,sextus reply3 ,it is you who are the cause1 ,o ,apollo2 you compel me to do it1 by foreseeing it8 ,,ant4--,i admit that he would have taken leave of his senses if he were to make this reply4 ,,laur4--,therefore neither can the traitor ,judas complain of ,god's foreknowledge4 ,and there is the answer to your question4 #daj4 ,,ant4--,you have satisfied me beyond my hopes1 you have done what ,boethius was not able to do3 ,i shall be beholden to you all my life long4 ,,laur4--,yet let us carry our tale a little further4 ,sextus will say3 ,no1 ,apollo1 ,i will not do what you say4 ,,ant4--,what6 the ,god will say1 do you mean then that ,i am a liar8 ,i repeat to you once more1 you will do all that ,i have just said4 ,,laur4--,sextus1 mayhap1 would pray the ,gods to alter fate1 to give him a better heart4 ,,ant4--,he would receive the answer3 ,desine fata ,deum flecti sperare precando4 ,he cannot cause divine foreknowledge to lie4 ,but what then will ,sextus say8 ,will he not break forth into complaints against the ,gods8 ,will he not say8 ,what8 ,i am then not free8 ,it is not in my power to follow virtue8 ,,laur4--,apollo will say to him perhaps3 ,know1 my poor ,sextus1 that the ,gods make each one as he is4 ,jupiter made the wolf ravening1 the hare timid1 the ass stupid1 and the lion courageous4 ,he gave you a soul that is wicked and irreclaimable2 you will act in conformity with your natural disposition1 and ,jupiter will treat you as your actions shall deserve2 he has sworn it by the ,styx4 #daa4 ,,ant4--,i confess to you1 it seems to me that ,apollo in excusing himself accuses ,jupiter more than he accuses ,sextus1 and ,sextus would answer him3 ,jupiter therefore condemns in me his own crime2 it is he who is the only guilty one4 ,he could have made me altogether different3 but1 made as ,i am1 ,i must act as he has willed4 ,why then does he punish me8 ,could ,i have resisted his will8 ,,laur4--,i confess that ,i am brought to a pause here as you are4 ,i have made the ,gods appear on the scene1 ,apollo and ,jupiter1 to make you distinguish between divine foreknowledge and providence4 ,i have shown that ,apollo and foreknowledge do not impair freedom2 but ,i cannot satisfy you on the decrees of ,jupiter's will1 that is to say1 on the orders of providence4 ,,ant4--,you have dragged me out of one abyss1 and you #cfi plunge me back into another and greater abyss4 ,,laur4--,remember our contract3 ,i have given you dinner1 and you ask me to give you supper also4 #dab4 ,,ant4--,now ,i discover your cunning3 ,you have caught me1 this is not an honest contract4 ,,laur4--,what would you have me do8 ,i have given you wine and meats from my home produce1 such as my small estate can provide2 as for nectar and ambrosia1 you will ask the ,gods for them3 that divine nurture is not found among men4 ,let us hearken to ,st4 ,paul1 that chosen vessel who was carried even to the third heaven1 who heard there unutterable words3 he will answer you with the comparison of the potter1 with the incomprehensibility of the ways of ,god1 and wonder at the depth of his wisdom4 ,nevertheless it is well to observe that one does not ask why ,god foresees the thing1 for that is understood1 it is because it will be3 but one asks why he ordains thus1 why he hardens such an one1 why he has compassion on another4 ,we do not know the reasons which he may have for this2 but since he is very good and very wise that is enough to make us deem that his reasons are good4 ,as he is just also1 it follows that his decrees and his operation do not destroy our freedom4 ,some men have sought some reason therein4 ,they have said that we are made from a corrupt and impure mass1 indeed of mud4 ,but ,adam and the ,angels were made of silver and gold1 and they sinned notwithstanding4 ,one sometimes becomes hardened again after regeneration4 ,we must therefore seek another cause for evil1 and ,i doubt whether even the ,angels are aware of it2 yet they cease not to be happy and to praise ,god4 ,boethius hearkened more to the answer of philosophy than to that of ,st4 ,paul2 that was the cause of his failure4 ,let us believe in ,jesus ,christ1 he is the virtue and the wisdom of ,god3 he teaches us that ,god willeth the salvation of all1 that he willeth not the death of the sinner4 ,let us therefore put our trust in the divine mercy1 and let us not by our vanity and our malice disqualify ourselves to receive it4 #dac4 ,this dialogue of ,valla's is excellent1 even though one must take exception to some points in it3 but its chief defect is that it cuts the knot and that it seems to condemn providence under the name of ,jupiter1 making him almost the author of sin4 ,let us therefore carry the little fable still further4 ,sextus1 quitting ,apollo and ,delphi1 seeks out ,jupiter at ,dodona4 ,he makes sacrifices and then he exhibits his complaints4 ,why have you condemned me1 ,o great ,god1 to be wicked and unhappy8 ,change #cgj my lot and my heart1 or acknowledge your error4 ,jupiter answers him3 ,if you will renounce ,rome1 the ,parcae shall spin for you different fates1 you shall become wise1 you shall be happy4 ,,sextus--,why must ,i renounce the hope of a crown8 ,can ,i not come to be a good king8 ,,jupiter--,no1 ,sextus2 ,i know better what is needful for you4 ,if you go to ,rome1 you are lost4 ,sextus1 not being able to resolve upon so great a sacrifice1 went forth from the temple1 and abandoned himself to his fate4 ,theodorus1 the ,high ,priest1 who had been present at the dialogue between ,god and ,sextus1 addressed these words to ,jupiter3 ,your wisdom is to be revered1 ,o great ,ruler of the ,gods4 ,you have convinced this man of his error2 he must henceforth impute his unhappiness to his evil will2 he has not a word to say4 ,but your faithful worshippers are astonished2 they would fain wonder at your goodness as well as at your greatness3 it rested with you to give him a different will4 ,,jupiter--,go to my daughter ,pallas1 she will inform you what ,i was bound to do4 #dad4 ,theodorus journeyed to ,athens3 he was bidden to lie down to sleep in the temple of the ,goddess4 ,dreaming1 he found himself transported into an unknown country4 ,there stood a palace of unimaginable splendour and prodigious size4 ,the ,goddess ,pallas appeared at the gate1 surrounded by rays of dazzling majesty4 ,qualisque videri ,coelicolis et quanta solet4 ,she touched the face of ,theodorus with an olive-branch1 which she was holding in her hand4 ,and lo6 he had become able to confront the divine radiancy of the daughter of ,jupiter1 and of all that she should show him4 ,jupiter who loves you 7she said to him7 has commended you to me to be instructed4 ,you see here the palace of the fates1 where ,i keep watch and ward4 ,here are representations not only of that which happens but also of all that which is possible4 ,jupiter1 having surveyed them before the beginning of the existing world1 classified the possibilities into worlds1 and chose the best of all4 ,he comes sometimes to visit these places1 to enjoy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of renewing his own choice1 which cannot fail to please him4 ,i have only to speak1 and we shall see a whole world that my father might have produced1 wherein will be represented anything that can be asked of him2 and in this way one may know also what would happen if any particular possibility should attain unto #cga existence4 ,and whenever the conditions are not determinate enough1 there will be as many such worlds differing from one another as one shall wish1 which will answer differently the same question1 in as many ways as possible4 ,you learnt geometry in your youth1 like all well-instructed ,greeks4 ,you know therefore that when the conditions of a required point do not sufficiently determine it1 and there is an infinite number of them1 they all fall into what the geometricians call a locus1 and this locus at least 7which is often a line7 will be determinate4 ,thus you can picture to yourself an ordered succession of worlds1 which shall contain each and every one the case that is in question1 and shall vary its circumstances and its consequences4 ,but if you put a case that differs from the actual world only in one single definite thing and in its results1 a certain one of those determinate worlds will answer you4 ,these worlds are all here1 that is1 in ideas4 ,i will show you some1 wherein shall be found1 not absolutely the same ,sextus as you have seen 7that is not possible1 he carries with him always that which he shall be7 but several ,sextuses resembling him1 possessing all that you know already of the true ,sextus1 but not all that is already in him imperceptibly1 nor in consequence all that shall yet happen to him4 ,you will find in one world a very happy and noble ,sextus1 in another a ,sextus content with a mediocre state1 a ,sextus1 indeed1 of every kind and endless diversity of forms4 #dae4 ,thereupon the ,goddess led ,theodorus into one of the halls of the palace3 when he was within1 it was no longer a hall1 it was a world1 ,solemque suum1 sua sidera norat4 ,at the command of ,pallas there came within view ,dodona with the temple of ,jupiter1 and ,sextus issuing thence2 he could be heard saying that he would obey the ,god4 ,and lo6 he goes to a city lying between two seas1 resembling ,corinth4 ,he buys there a small garden2 cultivating it1 he finds a treasure2 he becomes a rich man1 enjoying affection and esteem2 he dies at a great age1 beloved of the whole city4 ,theodorus saw the whole life of ,sextus as at one glance1 and as in a stage presentation4 ,there was a great volume of writings in this hall3 ,theodorus could not refrain from asking what that meant4 ,it is the history of this world which we are now visiting1 the ,goddess told him2 it is the book of its fates4 ,you have seen a number #cgb on the forehead of ,sextus4 ,look in this book for the place which it indicates4 ,theodorus looked for it1 and found there the history of ,sextus in a form more ample than the outline he had seen4 ,put your finger on any line you please1 ,pallas said to him1 and you will see represented actually in all its detail that which the line broadly indicates4 ,he obeyed1 and he saw coming into view all the characteristics of a portion of the life of that ,sextus4 ,they passed into another hall1 and lo6 another world1 another ,sextus4 who1 issuing from the temple1 and having resolved to obey ,jupiter1 goes to ,thrace4 ,there he marries the daughter of the king1 who had no other children2 he succeeds him1 and he is adored by his subjects4 ,they went into other rooms1 and always they saw new scenes4 #daf4 ,the halls rose in a pyramid1 becoming even more beautiful as one mounted towards the apex1 and representing more beautiful worlds4 ,finally they reached the highest one which completed the pyramid1 and which was the most beautiful of all3 for the pyramid had a beginning1 but one could not see its end2 it had an apex1 but no base2 it went on increasing to infinity4 ,that is 7as the ,goddess explained7 because amongst an endless number of possible worlds there is the best of all1 else would ,god not have determined to create any2 but there is not any one which has not also less perfect worlds below it3 that is why the pyramid goes on descending to infinity4 ,theodorus1 entering this highest hall1 became entranced in ecstasy2 he had to receive succour from the ,goddess1 a drop of a divine liquid placed on his tongue restored him2 he was beside himself for joy4 ,we are in the real true world 7said the ,goddess7 and you are at the source of happiness4 ,behold what ,jupiter makes ready for you1 if you continue to serve him faithfully4 ,here is ,sextus as he is1 and as he will be in reality4 ,he issues from the temple in a rage1 he scorns the counsel of the ,gods4 ,you see him going to ,rome1 bringing confusion everywhere1 violating the wife of his friend4 ,there he is driven out with his father1 beaten1 unhappy4 ,if ,jupiter had placed here a ,sextus happy at ,corinth or ,king in ,thrace1 it would be no longer this world4 ,and nevertheless he could not have failed to choose this world1 which surpasses in perfection all the others1 and which forms the apex of the pyramid4 ,else would ,jupiter have renounced his wisdom1 he would have banished me1 me his daughter4 ,you see that my father did not make ,sextus wicked2 he was so from all #cgc eternity1 he was so always and freely4 ,my father only granted him the existence which his wisdom could not refuse to the world where he is included3 he made him pass from the region of the possible to that of the actual beings4 ,the crime of ,sextus serves for great things3 it renders ,rome free2 thence will arise a great empire1 which will show noble examples to mankind4 ,but that is nothing in comparison with the worth of this whole world1 at whose beauty you will marvel1 when1 after a happy passage from this mortal state to another and better one1 the ,gods shall have fitted you to know it4 #dag4 ,at this moment ,theodorus wakes up1 he gives thanks to the ,goddess1 he owns the justice of ,jupiter4 ,his spirit pervaded by what he has seen and heard1 he carries on the office of ,high ,priest1 with all the zeal of a true servant of his ,god1 and with all the joy whereof a mortal is capable4 ,it seems to me that this continuation of the tale may elucidate the difficulty which ,valla did not wish to treat4 ,if ,apollo has represented aright ,god's knowledge of vision 7that which concerns beings in existence71 ,i hope that ,pallas will have not discreditably filled the role of what is called knowledge of simple intelligence 7that which embraces all that is possible71 wherein at last the source of things must be sought4 #cgg 99 99 99 99 99 ,,appendices ,,summary ,,of ,,the ,,controversy ,,reduced ,,to ,,formal ,,arguments 99 99 99 99 99 ,some persons of discernment have wished me to make this addition4 ,i have the more readily deferred to their opinion1 because of the opportunity thereby gained for meeting certain difficulties1 and for making observations on certain matters which were not treated in sufficient detail in the work itself4 ,,objection ,i ,whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power1 or knowledge1 or goodness4 ,god did not choose the best course in creating this world4 ,therefore ,god was lacking in power1 or knowledge1 or goodness4 ,,answer ,i deny the minor1 that is to say1 the second premiss of this syllogism1 and the opponent proves it by this ,,prosyllogism ,whoever makes things in which there is evil1 and which could have been made without any evil1 or need not have been made at all1 does not choose the best course4 ,god made a world wherein there is evil2 a world1 ,i say1 which could have been made without any evil or which need not have been made at all4 #cgh ,therefore ,god did not choose the best course4 ,,answer ,i admit the minor of this prosyllogism3 for one must confess that there is evil in this world which ,god has made1 and that it would have been possible to make a world without evil or even not to create any world1 since its creation depended upon the free will of ,god4 ,but ,i deny the major1 that is1 the first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism1 and ,i might content myself with asking for its proof4 ,in order1 however1 to give a clearer exposition of the matter1 ,i would justify this denial by pointing out that the best course is not always that one which tends towards avoiding evil1 since it is possible that the evil may be accompanied by a greater good4 ,for example1 the general of an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a state of affairs without wound and without victory4 ,i have proved this in further detail in this work by pointing out1 through instances taken from mathematics and elsewhere1 that an imperfection in the part may be required for a greater perfection in the whole4 ,i have followed therein the opinion of ,st4 ,augustine1 who said a hundred times that ,god permitted evil in order to derive from it a good1 that is to say1 a greater good2 and ,thomas ,aquinas says 7in libr4 #b1 ,sent4 ,dist4 #cb1 qu4 #a1 art4 #a7 that the permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe4 ,i have shown that among older writers the fall of ,adam was termed felix culpa1 a fortunate sin1 because it had been expiated with immense benefit by the incarnation of the ,son of ,god3 for he gave to the universe something more noble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created beings4 ,for the better understanding of the matter ,i added1 following the example of many good authors1 that it was consistent with order and the general good for ,god to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity to exercise their freedom1 even when he foresaw that they would turn to evil3 for ,god could easily correct the evil1 and it was not fitting that in order to prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way4 ,it will therefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world with evil may be better than a world without evil4 ,but ,i have gone still further in the work1 and have even shown that this universe must be indeed better than every other possible universe4 #cgi ,,objection ,,ii ,if there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures1 there is more evil than good in all ,god's work4 ,now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures4 ,therefore there is more evil than good in all ,god's work4 ,,answer ,i deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism4 ,as for the major1 ,i do not admit it because this supposed inference from the part to the whole1 from intelligent creatures to all creatures1 assumes tacitly and without proof that creatures devoid of reason cannot be compared or taken into account with those that have reason4 ,but why might not the surplus of good in the non-intelligent creatures that fill the world compensate for and even exceed incomparably the surplus of evil in rational creatures8 ,it is true that the value of the latter is greater2 but by way of compensation the others are incomparably greater in number2 and it may be that the proportion of number and quantity surpasses that of value and quality4 ,the minor also ,i cannot admit1 namely1 that there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures4 ,one need not even agree that there is more evil than good in the human kind4 ,for it is possible1 and even a very reasonable thing1 that the glory and the perfection of the blessed may be incomparably greater than the misery and imperfection of the damned1 and that here the excellence of the total good in the smaller number may exceed the total evil which is in the greater number4 ,the blessed draw near to divinity through a divine ,mediator1 so far as can belong to these created beings1 and make such progress in good as is impossible for the damned to make in evil1 even though they should approach as nearly as may be the nature of demons4 ,god is infinite1 and the ,devil is finite2 good can and does go on ad infinitum1 whereas evil has its bounds4 ,it may be therefore1 and it is probable1 that there happens in the comparison between the blessed and the damned the opposite of what ,i said could happen in the comparison between the happy and the unhappy1 namely that in the latter the proportion of degrees surpasses that of numbers1 while in the comparison between intelligent and non-intelligent the proportion of numbers is greater than that of values4 ,one is justified in assuming that a thing may be so as long as one does not prove that it is impossible1 and indeed what is here #chj put forward goes beyond assumption4 ,but secondly1 even should one admit that there is more evil than good in the human kind1 one still has every reason for not admitting that there is more evil than good in all intelligent creatures4 ,for there is an inconceivable number of ,spirits1 and perhaps of other rational creatures besides3 and an opponent cannot prove that in the whole ,city of ,god1 composed as much of ,spirits as of rational animals without number and of endless different kinds1 the evil exceeds the good4 ,although one need not1 in order to answer an objection1 prove that a thing is1 when its mere possibility suffices1 ,i have nevertheless shown in this present work that it is a result of the supreme perfection of the ,sovereign of the ,universe that the kingdom of ,god should be the most perfect of all states or governments possible1 and that in consequence what little evil there is should be required to provide the full measure of the vast good existing there4 ,,objection ,,iii ,if it is always impossible not to sin1 it is always unjust to punish4 ,now it is always impossible not to sin1 or rather all sin is necessary4 ,therefore it is always unjust to punish4 ,the minor of this is proved as follows4 ,,first ,,prosyllogism ,everything predetermined is necessary4 ,every event is predetermined4 ,therefore every event 7and consequently sin also7 is necessary4 ,again this second minor is proved thus4 ,,second ,,prosyllogism ,that which is future1 that which is foreseen1 that which is involved in causes is predetermined4 ,every event is of this kind4 ,therefore every event is predetermined4 ,,answer ,i admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism1 which is the minor of the first2 but ,i shall deny the major of the first #cha prosyllogism1 namely that everything predetermined is necessary2 taking 'necessity'1 say the necessity to sin1 or the impossibility of not sinning1 or of not doing some action1 in the sense relevant to the argument1 that is1 as a necessity essential and absolute1 which destroys the morality of action and the justice of punishment4 ,if anyone meant a different necessity or impossibility 7that is1 a necessity only moral or hypothetical1 which will be explained presently7 it is plain that we would deny him the major stated in the objection4 ,we might content ourselves with this answer1 and demand the proof of the proposition denied3 but ,i am well pleased to justify my manner of procedure in the present work1 in order to make the matter clear and to throw more light on this whole subject1 by explaining the necessity that must be rejected and the determination that must be allowed4 ,the truth is that the necessity contrary to morality1 which must be avoided and which would render punishment unjust1 is an insuperable necessity1 which would render all opposition unavailing1 even though one should wish with all one's heart to avoid the necessary action1 and though one should make all possible efforts to that end4 ,now it is plain that this is not applicable to voluntary actions1 since one would not do them if one did not so desire4 ,thus their prevision and predetermination is not absolute1 but it presupposes will3 if it is certain that one will do them1 it is no less certain that one will will to do them4 ,these voluntary actions and their results will not happen whatever one may do and whether one will them or not2 but they will happen because one will do1 and because one will will to do1 that which leads to them4 ,that is involved in prevision and predetermination1 and forms the reason thereof4 ,the necessity of such events is called conditional or hypothetical1 or again necessity of consequence1 because it presupposes the will and the other requisites4 ,but the necessity which destroys morality1 and renders punishment unjust and reward unavailing1 is found in the things that will be whatever one may do and whatever one may will to do3 in a word1 it exists in that which is essential4 ,this it is which is called an absolute necessity4 ,thus it avails nothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to ordain interdicts or commandments1 to propose penalties or prizes1 to blame or to praise2 it will come to pass no more and no less4 ,in voluntary actions1 on the contrary1 and in what depends upon them1 precepts1 armed with power to#chb punish and to reward1 very often serve1 and are included in the order of causes that make action exist4 ,thus it comes about that not only pains and effort but also prayers are effective1 ,god having had even these prayers in mind before he ordered things1 and having made due allowance for them4 ,that is why the precept ,ora et labora 7,pray and work7 remains intact4 ,thus not only those who 7under the empty pretext of the necessity of events7 maintain that one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs1 but also those who argue against prayers1 fall into that which the ancients even in their time called 'the ,lazy ,sophism'4 ,so the predetermination of events by their causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of destroying it1 and the causes incline the will without necessitating it4 ,for this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a necessitation4 ,it is certain 7to him who knows all7 that the effect will follow this inclination2 but this effect does not follow thence by a consequence which is necessary1 that is1 whose contrary implies contradiction2 and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will is determined1 without the presence of necessity4 ,suppose that one has the greatest possible passion 7for example1 a great thirst71 you will admit that the soul can find some reason for resisting it1 even if it were only that of displaying its power4 ,thus though one may never have complete indifference of equipoise1 and there is always a predominance of inclination for the course adopted1 that predominance does not render absolutely necessary the resolution taken4 ,,objection ,,iv ,whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so1 but rather contributes to it1 although he be fully apprised of it1 is accessary thereto4 ,god can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures2 but he does not so1 and he rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the opportunities he causes1 although he is fully cognizant of it4 ,therefore1 etc4 ,,answer ,i deny the major of this syllogism4 ,it may be that one can prevent the sin1 but that one ought not to do so1 because one could not do so without committing a sin oneself1 or 7when ,god is concerned7 without acting unreasonably4 ,i have given instances of that1 and have applied them to#chc ,god himself4 ,it may be also that one contributes to the evil1 and that one even opens the way to it sometimes1 in doing things one is bound to do4 ,and when one does one's duty1 or 7speaking of ,god7 when1 after full consideration1 one does that which reason demands1 one is not responsible for events1 even when one foresees them4 ,one does not will these evils2 but one is willing to permit them for a greater good1 which one cannot in reason help preferring to other considerations4 ,this is a consequent will1 resulting from acts of antecedent will1 in which one wills the good4 ,i know that some persons1 in speaking of the antecedent and consequent will of ,god1 have meant by the antecedent that which wills that all men be saved1 and by the consequent that which wills1 in consequence of persistent sin1 that there be some damned1 damnation being a result of sin4 ,but these are only examples of a more general notion1 and one may say with the same reason1 that ,god wills by his antecedent will that men sin not1 and that by his consequent or final and decretory will 7which is always followed by its effect7 he wills to permit that they sin1 this permission being a result of superior reasons4 ,one has indeed justification for saying1 in general1 that the antecedent will of ,god tends towards the production of good and the prevention of evil1 each taken in itself1 and as it were detached 7particulariter et secundum quid3 ,thom41 ,i1 qu4 #ai1 art4 #f7 according to the measure of the degree of each good or of each evil4 ,likewise one may say that the consequent1 or final and total1 divine will tends towards the production of as many goods as can be put together1 whose combination thereby becomes determined1 and involves also the permission of some evils and the exclusion of some goods1 as the best possible plan of the universe demands4 ,arminius1 in his ,antiperkinsus1 explained very well that the will of ,god can be called consequent not only in relation to the action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding1 but also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will4 ,but it is enough to consider the passage cited from ,thomas ,aquinas1 and that from ,scotus 7,i1 dist4 #df1 qu4 #aa71 to see that they make this distinction as ,i have made it here4 ,nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of the terms1 let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will1 and 'final' or 'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will4 ,for ,i do not wish to wrangle about words4 #chd ,,objection ,v ,whoever produces all that is real in a thing is its cause4 ,god produces all that is real in sin4 ,therefore ,god is the cause of sin4 ,,answer ,i might content myself with denying the major or the minor1 because the term 'real' admits of interpretations capable of rendering these propositions false4 ,but in order to give a better explanation ,i will make a distinction4 ',real' either signifies that which is positive only1 or else it includes also privative beings3 in the first case1 ,i deny the major and ,i admit the minor2 in the second case1 ,i do the opposite4 ,i might have confined myself to that2 but ,i was willing to go further1 in order to account for this distinction4 ,i have therefore been well pleased to point out that every purely positive or absolute reality is a perfection1 and that every imperfection comes from limitation1 that is1 from the privative3 for to limit is to withhold extension1 or the more beyond4 ,now ,god is the cause of all perfections1 and consequently of all realities1 when they are regarded as purely positive4 ,but limitations or privations result from the original imperfection of creatures which restricts their receptivity4 ,it is as with a laden boat1 which the river carries along more slowly or less slowly in proportion to the weight that it bears3 thus the speed comes from the river1 but the retardation which restricts this speed comes from the load4 ,also ,i have shown in the present work how the creature1 in causing sin1 is a deficient cause2 how errors and evil inclinations spring from privation2 and how privation is efficacious accidentally4 ,and ,i have justified the opinion of ,st4 ,augustine 7lib4 ,i1 ,ad4 ,simpl41 qu4 #b7 who explains 7for example7 how ,god hardens the soul1 not in giving it something evil1 but because the effect of the good he imprints is restricted by the resistance of the soul1 and by the circumstances contributing to this resistance1 so that he does not give it all the good that would overcome its evil4 ',nec 7inquit7 ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior1 sed tantum quo fit melior non erogatur4' ,but if ,god had willed to do more here he must needs have produced either fresh natures in his creatures or fresh miracles to change their natures1 and this the best plan did not allow4 ,it is just as if the current of the river must needs be more rapid than its slope permits or the boats themselves be less laden1 if they #che had to be impelled at a greater speed4 ,so the limitation or original imperfection of creatures brings it about that even the best plan of the universe cannot admit more good1 and cannot be exempted from certain evils1 these1 however1 being only of such a kind as may tend towards a greater good4 ,there are some disorders in the parts which wonderfully enhance the beauty of the whole1 just as certain dissonances1 appropriately used1 render harmony more beautiful4 ,but that depends upon the answer which ,i have already given to the first objection4 ,,objection ,,vi ,whoever punishes those who have done as well as it was in their power to do is unjust4 ,god does so4 ,therefore1 etc4 ,,answer ,i deny the minor of this argument4 ,and ,i believe that ,god always gives sufficient aid and grace to those who have good will1 that is to say1 who do not reject this grace by a fresh sin4 ,thus ,i do not admit the damnation of children dying unbaptized or outside the ,church1 or the damnation of adult persons who have acted according to the light that ,god has given them4 ,and ,i believe that1 if anyone has followed the light he had1 he will undoubtedly receive thereof in greater measure as he has need1 even as the late ,herr ,hulsemann1 who was celebrated as a profound theologian at ,leipzig1 has somewhere observed2 and if such a man had failed to receive light during his life1 he would receive it at least in the hour of death4 ,,objection ,,vii ,whoever gives only to some1 and not to all1 the means of producing effectively in them good will and final saving faith has not enough goodness4 ,god does so4 ,therefore1 etc4 ,,answer ,i deny the major4 ,it is true that ,god could overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart1 and indeed he sometimes does so1 #chf whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can greatly influence souls2 but he does not always do so4 ,whence comes this distinction1 someone will say1 and wherefore does his goodness appear to be restricted8 ,the truth is that it would not have been in order always to act in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things1 as ,i have observed already in answering the first objection4 ,the reasons for this connexion1 whereby the one is placed in more favourable circumstances than the other1 are hidden in the depths of ,god's wisdom3 they depend upon the universal harmony4 ,the best plan of the universe1 which ,god could not fail to choose1 required this4 ,one concludes thus from the event itself2 since ,god made the universe1 it was not possible to do better4 ,such management1 far from being contrary to goodness1 has rather been prompted by supreme goodness itself4 ,this objection with its solution might have been inferred from what was said with regard to the first objection2 but it seemed advisable to touch upon it separately4 ,,objection ,,viii ,whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free4 ,god cannot fail to choose the best4 ,therefore ,god is not free4 ,,answer ,i deny the major of this argument4 ,rather is it true freedom1 and the most perfect1 to be able to make the best use of one's free will1 and always to exercise this power1 without being turned aside either by outward force or by inward passions1 whereof the one enslaves our bodies and the other our souls4 ,there is nothing less servile and more befitting the highest degree of freedom than to be always led towards the good1 and always by one's own inclination1 without any constraint and without any displeasure4 ,and to object that ,god therefore had need of external things is only a sophism4 ,he creates them freely3 but when he had set before him an end1 that of exercising his goodness1 his wisdom determined him to choose the means most appropriate for obtaining this end4 ,to call that a need is to take the term in a sense not usual1 which clears it of all imperfection1 somewhat as one does when speaking of the wrath of ,god4 ,seneca says somewhere1 that ,god commanded only once1 but that he obeys#chg always1 because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself3 semel jussit1 semper paret4 ,but he had better have said1 that ,god always commands and that he is always obeyed3 for in willing he always follows the tendency of his own nature1 and all other things always follow his will4 ,and as this will is always the same one cannot say that he obeys that will only which he formerly had4 ,nevertheless1 although his will is always indefectible and always tends towards the best1 the evil or the lesser good which he rejects will still be possible in itself4 ,otherwise the necessity of good would be geometrical 7so to speak7 or metaphysical1 and altogether absolute2 the contingency of things would be destroyed1 and there would be no choice4 ,but necessity of this kind1 which does not destroy the possibility of the contrary1 has the name by analogy only3 it becomes effective not through the mere essence of things1 but through that which is outside them and above them1 that is1 through the will of ,god4 ,this necessity is called moral1 because for the wise what is necessary and what is owing are equivalent things2 and when it is always followed by its effect1 as it indeed is in the perfectly wise1 that is1 in ,god1 one can say that it is a happy necessity4 ,the more nearly creatures approach this1 the closer do they come to perfect felicity4 ,moreover1 necessity of this kind is not the necessity one endeavours to avoid1 and which destroys morality1 reward and commendation4 ,for that which it brings to pass does not happen whatever one may do and whatever one may will1 but because one desires it4 ,a will to which it is natural to choose well deserves most to be commended2 and it carries with it its own reward1 which is supreme happiness4 ,and as this constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to him who possesses it1 it is also the best and the most desirable from the point of view of the creatures who are all dependent upon ,god4 ,if the will of ,god had not as its rule the principle of the best1 it would tend towards evil1 which would be worst of all2 or else it would be indifferent somehow to good and to evil1 and guided by chance4 ,but a will that would always drift along at random would scarcely be any better for the government of the universe than the fortuitous concourse of corpuscles1 without the existence of divinity4 ,and even though ,god should abandon himself to chance only in some cases1 and in a certain way 7as he would if he did not always tend entirely towards the best1 and if he were capable of preferring a lesser good to a greater good1 that is1 an evil to a good1 since that which #chh prevents a greater good is an evil7 he would be no less imperfect than the object of his choice4 ,then he would not deserve absolute trust2 he would act without reason in such a case1 and the government of the universe would be like certain games equally divided between reason and luck4 ,this all proves that this objection which is made against the choice of the best perverts the notions of free and necessary1 and represents the best to us actually as evil3 but that is either malicious or absurd4 #chi 99 99 99 99 99 ,,excursus ,,on ,,theodicy #cib published by the author in ,mmoires de ,trvoux ,july #agab 99 99 99 99 99 ,february #agab ,i said in my essays1 #cib1 that ,i wished to see the demonstrations mentioned by ,m4 ,bayle and contained in the sixth letter printed at ,trvoux in #agjc4 ,father des ,bosses has shown me this letter1 in which the writer essays to demonstrate by the geometrical method that ,god is the sole true cause of all that is real4 ,my perusal of it has confirmed me in the opinion which ,i indicated in the same passage1 namely1 that this proposition can be true in a very good sense1 ,god being the only cause of pure and absolute realities1 or perfections2 but when one includes limitations or privations under the name of realities one can say that second causes co-operate in the production of what is limited1 and that otherwise ,god would be the cause of sin1 and even its sole cause4 ,and ,i am somewhat inclined to think that the gifted author of the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me1 although he seems to include all modalities among the realities of which he declares ,god to be the sole cause4 ,for in actual fact ,i think he will not admit that ,god is the cause and the author of sin4 ,indeed1 he explains himself in a manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant real action to creatures4 ,for in the proof of the eighth corollary of his second proposition these words occur3 ',the natural motion of the soul1 although determinate in itself1 is indeterminate in respect of its objects4 ,for it is love of good in general4 ,it is through the ideas of good appearing #cij in individual objects that this motion becomes individual and determinate in relation to those objects4 ,and thus as the mind has the power of varying its own ideas it can also change the determinations of its love4 ,and for that purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the power of ,god or oppose his action4 ,these determinations of motion towards individual objects are not invincible4 ,it is this noninvincibility which causes the mind to be free and capable of changing them2 but after all the mind makes these changes only through the motion which ,god gives to it and conserves for it4' ,in my own style ,i would have said that the perfection which is in the action of the creature comes from ,god1 but that the limitations to be found there are a consequence of the original limitation and the preceding limitations that occurred in the creature4 ,further1 this is so not only in minds but also in all other substances1 which thereby are causes co-operating in the change which comes to pass in themselves2 for this determination of which the author speaks is nothing but a limitation4 ,now if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of the letter1 one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its assertions1 in accordance with the interpretation one may make of them4 ,if by 'reality' one means only perfections or positive realities1 ,god is the only true cause2 but if that which involves limitations is included under the realities1 one will deny a considerable portion of the theses1 and the author himself will have shown us the example4 ,it is in order to render the matter more comprehensible that ,i used in the ,essays the example of a laden boat1 which1 the more laden it is1 is the more slowly carried along by the stream4 ,there one sees clearly that the stream is the cause of what is positive in this motion1 of the perfection1 the force1 the speed of the boat1 but that the load is the cause of the restriction of this force1 and that it brings about the retardation4 ,it is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical method to metaphysical matters4 ,but it must be admitted that hitherto success has seldom been attained3 and ,m4 ,descartes himself1 with all that very great skill which one cannot deny in him1 never perhaps had less success than when he essayed to do this in one of his answers to objections4 ,for in mathematics it is easier to succeed1 because numbers1 figures and calculations make good the defects concealed in words2 but in metaphysics1 where one is deprived of this aid 7at least in ordinary #cia argumentation71 the strictness employed in the form of the argument and in the exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this lack4 ,but in neither argument nor definition is that strictness here to be seen4 ,the author of the letter1 who undoubtedly displays much ardour and penetration1 sometimes goes a little too far1 as when he claims to prove that there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion1 according to the fifth corollary of the second proposition4 ,he asserts that the will of ,god is no less positive in rest than in motion1 and that it is not less invincible4 ,be it so1 but does it follow that there is as much reality and force in each of the two8 ,i do not see this conclusion1 and with the same argument one would prove that there is as much force in a strong motion as in a weak motion4 ,god in willing rest wills that the body be at the place ,a1 where it was immediately before1 and for that it suffices that there be no reason to prompt ,god to the change4 ,but when ,god wills that afterwards the body be at the place ,b1 there must needs be a new reason1 of such a kind as to determine ,god to will that it be in ,b and not in ,c or in any other place1 and that it be there more or less promptly4 ,it is upon these reasons1 the volitions of ,god1 that we must assess the force and the reality existent in things4 ,the author speaks much of the will of ,god1 but he does not speak much in this letter of the reasons which prompt ,god to will1 and upon which all depends4 ,and these reasons are taken from the objects4 ,i observe first1 indeed1 with regard to the second corollary of the first proposition1 that it is very true1 but that it is not very well proven4 ,the writer affirms that if ,god only ceased to will the existence of a being1 that being would no longer exist2 and here is the proof given word for word3 ',demonstration4 ,that which exists only by the will of ,god no longer exists once that will has ceased4' 7,but that is what must be proved4 ,the writer endeavours to prove it by adding37 ',remove the cause1 you remove the effect4' 7,this maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which are stated at the beginning4 ,but unhappily this axiom may be reckoned among those rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions47 ',now by the preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being exists save by the will of ,god4 ,therefore1 etc4' ,there is ambiguity in this expression1 that nothing exists save by the will of ,god4 ,if one means that things #cib begin to exist only through this will1 one is justified in referring to the preceding propositions2 but if one means that the existence of things is at all times a consequence of the will of ,god1 one assumes more or less what is in question4 ,therefore it was necessary to prove first that the existence of things depends upon the will of ,god1 and that it is not only a mere effect of that will1 but a dependence1 in proportion to the perfection which things contain2 and once that is assumed1 they will depend upon ,god's will no less afterwards than at the beginning4 ,that is the way ,i have taken the matter in my ,essays4 ,nevertheless ,i recognize that the letter upon which ,i have just made observations is admirable and well deserving of perusal1 and that it contains noble and true sentiments1 provided it be taken in the sense ,i have just indicated4 ,and arguments in this form may serve as an introduction to meditations somewhat more advanced4 #cic 99 99 99 99 99 ,,reflexions ,,on ,,the ,,work ,,that ,,mr4 ,,hobbes ,,published ,,in ,,english ,,on ',,freedom1 ,,necessity ,,and ,,chance' 99 99 99 99 99 #a4 ,as the question of ,necessity and ,freedom1 with other questions depending thereon1 was at one time debated between the famous ,mr4 ,hobbes and ,dr4 ,john ,bramhall1 ,bishop of ,derry1 in books published by each of them1 ,i have deemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them 7although ,i have already mentioned them more than once72 and this all the more since these writings of ,mr4 ,hobbes have hitherto only appeared in ,english1 and since the works of this author usually contain something good and ingenious4 ,the ,bishop of ,derry and ,mr4 ,hobbes1 having met in ,paris at the house of the ,marquis1 afterwards ,duke1 of ,newcastle in the year #afdf1 entered into a discussion on this subject4 ,the dispute was conducted with extreme restraint2 but the bishop shortly afterwards sent a note to ,my ,lord ,newcastle1 desiring him to induce ,mr4 ,hobbes to answer it4 ,he answered2 but at the same time he expressed a wish that his answer should not be published1 because he believed it possible for ill-instructed persons to abuse dogmas such as his1 however true they might be4 ,it so happened1 however1 that ,mr4 ,hobbes himself passed it to a ,french friend1 and allowed a young ,englishman to translate it into ,french for the benefit of this friend4 ,this young man kept a copy of the ,english original1 and published it later in ,england without the author's knowledge4 ,thus the bishop was obliged to reply to it1 and ,mr4 ,hobbes to make a rejoinder1 and to #cid publish all the pieces together in a book of #cdh pages printed in ,london in the year #afef1 in #dto41 entitled1 ,questions concerning ,freedom1 ,necessity and ,chance1 elucidated and discussed between ,doctor ,bramhall1 ,bishop of ,derry1 and ,thomas ,hobbes of ,malmesbury4 ,there is a later edition1 of the year #afhd1 in a work entitled ,hobbes's ,tripos1 where are to be found his book on human nature1 his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on freedom and necessity2 but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply1 nor the author's rejoinder4 ,mr4 ,hobbes argues on this subject with his usual wit and subtlety2 but it is a pity that in both the one and the other we stumble upon petty tricks1 such as arise in excitement over the game4 ,the bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly4 ,mr4 ,hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other1 and manifests rather too much scorn for theology1 and for the terminology of the ,schoolmen1 which is apparently favoured by the bishop4 #b4 ,one must confess that there is something strange and indefensible in the opinions of ,mr4 ,hobbes4 ,he maintains that doctrines touching the divinity depend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign1 and that ,god is no more the cause of the good than of the bad actions of creatures4 ,he maintains that all that which ,god does is just1 because there is none above him with power to punish and constrain him4 ,yet he speaks sometimes as if what is said about ,god were only compliments1 that is to say expressions proper for paying him honour1 but not for knowing him4 ,he testifies also that it seems to him that the pains of the wicked must end in their destruction3 this opinion closely approaches that of the ,socinians1 but it seems that ,mr4 ,hobbes goes much further4 ,his philosophy1 which asserts that bodies alone are substances1 hardly appears favourable to the providence of ,god and the immortality of the soul4 ,on other subjects nevertheless he says very reasonable things4 ,he shows clearly that nothing comes about by chance1 or rather that chance only signifies the ignorance of causes that produce the effect1 and that for each effect there must be a concurrence of all the sufficient conditions anterior to the event1 not one of which1 manifestly1 can be lacking when the event is to follow1 because they are conditions3 the event1 moreover1 does not fail to follow when these conditions exist all together1 because they are sufficient conditions4 ,all which amounts to the same as ,i have said so many times1 that everything comes to pass as a result of determining reasons1 the knowledge #cie whereof1 if we had it1 would make us know at the same time why the thing has happened and why it did not go otherwise4 #c4 ,but this author's humour1 which prompts him to paradoxes and makes him seek to contradict others1 has made him draw out exaggerated and odious conclusions and expressions1 as if everything happened through an absolute necessity4 ,the ,bishop of ,derry1 on the other hand1 has aptly observed in the answer to article #ce1 page #cbg1 that there results only a hypothetical necessity1 such as we all grant to events in relation to the foreknowledge of ,god1 while ,mr4 ,hobbes maintains that even divine foreknowledge alone would be sufficient to establish an absolute necessity of events4 ,this was also the opinion of ,wyclif1 and even of ,luther1 when he wrote ,de ,servo ,arbitrio2 or at least they spoke so4 ,but it is sufficiently acknowledged to-day that this kind of necessity which is termed hypothetical1 and springs from foreknowledge or from other anterior reasons1 has nothing in it to arouse one's alarm3 whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing were necessary of itself1 in such a way that the contrary implied contradiction4 ,mr4 ,hobbes refuses to listen to anything about a moral necessity either1 on the ground that everything really happens through physical causes4 ,but one is nevertheless justified in making a great difference between the necessity which constrains the wise to do good1 and which is termed moral1 existing even in relation to ,god1 and that blind necessity whereby according to ,epicurus1 ,strato1 ,spinoza1 and perhaps ,mr4 ,hobbes1 things exist without intelligence and without choice1 and consequently without ,god4 ,indeed1 there would according to them be no need of ,god1 since in consequence of this necessity all would have existence through its own essence1 just as necessarily as two and three make five4 ,and this necessity is absolute1 because everything it carries with it must happen1 whatever one may do2 whereas what happens by a hypothetical necessity happens as a result of the supposition that this or that has been foreseen or resolved1 or done beforehand2 and moral necessity contains an obligation imposed by reason1 which is always followed by its effect in the wise4 ,this kind of necessity is happy and desirable1 when one is prompted by good reasons to act as one does2 but necessity blind and absolute would subvert piety and morality4 #d4 ,there is more reason in ,mr4 ,hobbes's discourse when he admits that #cif our actions are in our power1 so that we do that which we will when we have the power to do it1 and when there is no hindrance4 ,he asserts notwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power that we can give ourselves1 without difficulty and according to our good pleasure1 inclinations and wills which we might desire4 ,the bishop does not appear to have taken notice of this reflexion1 which ,mr4 ,hobbes also does not develop enough4 ,the truth is that we have some power also over our volitions1 but obliquely1 and not absolutely and indifferently4 ,this has been explained in some passages of this work4 ,finally ,mr4 ,hobbes shows1 like others before him1 that the certainty of events1 and necessity itself1 if there were any in the way our actions depend upon causes1 would not prevent us from employing deliberations1 exhortations1 blame and praise1 punishments and rewards3 for these are of service and prompt men to produce actions or to refrain from them4 ,thus1 if human actions were necessary1 they would be so through these means4 ,but the truth is1 that since these actions are not necessary absolutely whatever one may do1 these means contribute only to render the actions determinate and certain1 as they are indeed2 for their nature shows that they are not subject to an absolute necessity4 ,he gives also a good enough notion of freedom1 in so far as it is taken in a general sense1 common to intelligent and non-intelligent substances3 he states that a thing is deemed free when the power which it has is not impeded by an external thing4 ,thus the water that is dammed by a dyke has the power to spread1 but not the freedom4 ,on the other hand1 it has not the power to rise above the dyke1 although nothing would prevent it then from spreading1 and although nothing from outside prevents it from rising so high4 ,to that end it would be necessary that the water itself should come from a higher point or that the water-level should be raised by an increased flow4 ,thus a prisoner lacks the freedom1 while a sick man lacks the power1 to go his way4 #e4 ,there is in ,mr4 ,hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed points1 which ,i will give here1 adding some expression of opinion4 ,on one side 7he says7 the assertion is made1 7#a7 'that it is not in the present power of man to choose for himself the will that he should have'4 ,that is well said1 especially in relation to present will3 men choose the objects through will1 but they do not choose their present wills1 which spring from reasons and dispositions4 ,it is true1 however1 that one can seek new #cig reasons for oneself1 and with time give oneself new dispositions2 and by this means one can also obtain for oneself a will which one had not and could not have given oneself forthwith4 ,it is 7to use the comparison ,mr4 ,hobbes himself uses7 as with hunger or with thirst4 ,at the present it does not rest with my will to be hungry or not2 but it rests with my will to eat or not to eat2 yet1 for the time to come1 it rests with me to be hungry1 or to prevent myself from being so at such and such an hour of day1 by eating beforehand4 ,in this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will4 ,even though ,mr4 ,hobbes states in his reply 7,no4 #ad1 p4 #ach7 that it is the manner of laws to say1 you must do or you must not do this1 but that there is no law saying1 you must will1 or you must not will it1 yet it is clear that he is mistaken in regard to the ,law of ,god1 which says non concupisces1 thou shalt not covet2 it is true that this prohibition does not concern the first motions1 which are involuntary4 ,it is asserted 7#b7 ',that hazard' 7chance in ,english1 casus in ,latin7 'produces nothing'1 that is1 that nothing is produced without cause or reason4 ,very right1 ,i admit it1 if one thereby intends a real hazard4 ,for fortune and hazard are only appearances1 which spring from ignorance of causes or from disregard of them4 7#c7 ',that all events have their necessary causes4' ,wrong3 they have their determining causes1 whereby one can account for them2 but these are not necessary causes4 ,the contrary might have happened1 without implying contradiction4 7#d7 ',that the will of ,god makes the necessity of all things4' ,wrong3 the will of ,god produces only contingent things1 which could have gone differently1 since time1 space and matter are indifferent with regard to all kinds of shape and movement4 #f4 ,on the other side 7according to ,mr4 ,hobbes7 it is asserted1 7#a7 ',that man is free' 7absolutely7 not only 'to choose what he wills to do1 but also to choose what he wills to will4' ,that is ill said3 one is not absolute master of one's will1 to change it forthwith1 without making use of some means or skill for that purpose4 7#b7 ',when man wills a good action1 the will of ,god co-operates with his1 otherwise not4' ,that is well said1 provided one means that ,god does not will evil actions1 although he wills to permit them1 to prevent the occurrence of something which would be worse than these sins4 7#c7 ',that the will can choose whether it wills to will or not4' ,wrong1 with regard to present volition4 7#d7 ',that things happen without necessity by chance4' ,wrong3 what happens without necessity #cih does not because of that happen by chance1 that is to say1 without causes and reasons4 7#e7 ',notwithstanding that ,god may foresee that an event will happen1 it is not necessary that it happen1 since ,god foresees things1 not as futurities and as in their causes1 but as present4' ,that begins well1 and finishes ill4 ,one is justified in admitting the necessity of the consequence1 but one has no reason to resort to the question how the future is present to ,god3 for the necessity of the consequence does not prevent the event or consequent from being contingent in itself4 #g4 ,our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by ,arminius had been favoured in ,england by ,archbishop ,laud and by the ,court1 and important ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that party1 this contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to meet in their exile in ,paris at the house of ,lord ,newcastle1 and to enter into a discussion4 ,i would not approve all the measures of ,archbishop ,laud1 who had merit and perhaps also good will1 but who appears to have goaded the ,presbyterians excessively4 ,nevertheless one may say that the revolutions1 as much in the ,low ,countries as in ,great ,britain1 in part arose from the extreme intolerance of the strict party4 ,one may say also that the defenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the others1 having oppressed their opponents in ,holland with the authority of ,prince ,maurice and having fomented the revolts in ,england against ,king ,charles ,i4 ,but these are the faults of men1 and not of dogmas4 ,their opponents do not spare them either1 witness the severity used in ,saxony against ,nicolas ,krell and the proceedings of the ,jesuits against the ,bishop of ,ypres's party4 #h4 ,mr4 ,hobbes observes1 after ,aristotle1 that there are two sources for proofs3 reason and authority4 ,as for reason1 he says that he admits the reasons derived from the attributes of ,god1 which he calls argumentative1 and the notions whereof are conceivable2 but he maintains that there are others wherein one conceives nothing1 and which are only expressions by which we aspire to honour ,god4 ,but ,i do not see how one can honour ,god by expressions that have no meaning4 ,it may be that with ,mr4 ,hobbes1 as with ,spinoza1 wisdom1 goodness1 justice are only fictions in relation to ,god and the universe1 since the prime cause1 according to them1 acts through the necessity of its power1 and not by the choice of its wisdom4 ,that is #cii an opinion whose falsity ,i have sufficiently proved4 ,it appears that ,mr4 ,hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough1 for fear of causing offence to people2 on which point he is to be commended4 ,it was also on that account1 as he says himself1 that he had desired that what had passed between the bishop and him in ,paris should not be published4 ,he adds that it is not good to say that an action which ,god does not will happens1 since that is to say in effect that ,god is lacking in power4 ,but he adds also at the same time that it is not good either to say the opposite1 and to attribute to ,god that he wills the evil2 because that is not seemly1 and would appear to accuse ,god of lack of goodness4 ,he believes1 therefore1 that in these matters telling the truth is not advisable4 ,he would be right if the truth were in the paradoxical opinions that he maintains4 ,for indeed it appears that according to the opinion of this writer ,god has no goodness1 or rather that that which he calls ,god is nothing but the blind nature of the mass of material things1 which acts according to mathematical laws1 following an absolute necessity1 as the atoms do in the system of ,epicurus4 ,if ,god were as the great are sometimes here on earth1 it would not be fitting to utter all the truths concerning him4 ,but ,god is not as a man1 whose designs and actions often must be concealed2 rather it is always permissible and reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of ,god1 because they are always glorious and worthy of praise4 ,thus it is always right to utter truths concerning the divinity2 one need not anyhow refrain from fear of giving offence4 ,and ,i have explained1 so it seems to me1 in a way which satisfies reason1 and does not wound piety1 how it is to be understood that ,god's will takes effect1 and concurs with sin1 without compromising his wisdom and his goodness4 #i4 ,as to the authorities derived from ,holy ,scripture1 ,mr4 ,hobbes divides them into three kinds2 some1 he says1 are for me1 the second kind are neutral1 and the third seem to be for my opponent4 ,the passages which he thinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to ,god the cause of our will4 ,thus ,gen4 xlv4 #e1 where ,joseph says to his brethren1 ',be not grieved1 nor angry with yourselves1 that you sold me hither3 for ,god did send me before you to preserve life'2 and verse #h1 'it was not you that sent me hither1 but ,god4' ,and ,god said 7,exod4 vii4 #c71 ',i will harden ,pharaoh's heart4' ,and ,moses said 7,deut4 ii4 #cj71 ',but ,sihon ,king of #djj ,heshbon would not let us pass by him3 for the ,lord thy ,god hardened his spirit1 and made his heart obstinate1 that he might deliver him into thy hand4' ,and ,david said of ,shimei 7#b ,sam4 xvi4 #aj71 ',let him curse1 because the ,lord hath said unto him3 ,curse ,david4 ,who shall then say1 wherefore hast thou done so8' ,and 7#a ,kings xii4 #ae71 ',the ,king ,rehoboam hearkened not unto the people2 for the cause was from the ,lord4' ,job xii4 #af3 ',the deceived and the deceiver are his4' v4 #ag3 ',he maketh the judges fools'2 v4 #bd3 ',he taketh away the heart of the chief of the people of the earth1 and causeth them to wander in a wilderness'2 v4 #be3 ',he maketh them to stagger like a drunken man4' ,god said of the ,king of ,assyria 7,isa4 x4 #f71 ',against the people will ,i give him a charge1 to take the spoil1 and to take the prey1 and to tread them down like the mire of the streets4' ,and ,jeremiah said 7,jer4 x4 #bc71 ',o ,lord1 ,i know that the way of man is not in himself3 it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps4' ,and ,god said 7,ezek4 iii4 #bj71 ',when a righteous man doth turn from his righteousness1 and commit iniquity1 and ,i lay a stumbling-block before him1 he shall die4' ,and the ,saviour said 7,john vi4 #dd71 ',no man can come to me1 except the ,father which hath sent me draw him4' ,and ,st4 ,peter 7,acts ii4 #bc71 ',jesus having been delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of ,god1 ye have taken4' ,and ,acts iv4 #bg1 #bh1 ',both ,herod and ,pontius ,pilate1 with the ,gentiles and the people of ,israel1 were gathered together1 for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done4' ,and ,st4 ,paul 7,rom4 ix4 #af71 ',it is not of him that willeth1 nor of him that runneth1 but of ,god that showeth mercy4' ,and v4 #ah3 ',therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy1 and whom he will he hardeneth'2 v4 #ai3 ',thou wilt say then unto me1 why doth he yet find fault8 ,for who hath resisted his will8'2 v4 #bj3 ',nay but1 ,o man1 who art thou that repliest against ,god8 ,shall the thing formed say to him that formed it1 why hast thou made me thus8' ,and #a ,cor4 iv4 #g3 ',for who maketh thee to differ from another8 and what hast thou that thou didst not receive8' ,and #a ,cor4 xii4 #f3 ',there are diversities of operations1 but it is the same ,god which worketh all in all4' ,and ,eph4 ii4 #aj3 ',we are his workmanship1 created in ,christ ,jesus unto good works1 which ,god hath before ordained that we should walk in them4' ,and ,phil4 ii4 #ac3 ',it is ,god which worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure4' ,one may add to these passages all those which make ,god the author of all grace and of all good #dja inclinations1 and all those which say that we are as dead in sin4 #aj4 ,here now are the neutral passages1 according to ,mr4 ,hobbes4 ,these are those where ,holy ,scripture says that man has the choice to act if he wills1 or not to act if he wills not4 ,for example ,deut4 xxx4 #ai3 ',i call heaven and earth to record this day against you1 that ,i have set before you life and death1 blessing and cursing3 therefore choose life1 that both thou and thy seed may live4' ,and ,joshua xxiv4 #ae3 ',choose you this day whom ye will serve4' ,and ,god said to ,gad the prophet 7#b ,sam4 xxiv4 #ab71 ',go and say unto ,david3 ,thus saith the ,lord1 ,i offer thee three things2 choose thee one of them1 that ,i may do it unto thee4' ,and ,isa4 vii4 #af3 ',until the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good4' ,finally the passages which ,mr4 ,hobbes acknowledges to be apparently contrary to his opinion are all those where it is indicated that the will of man is not in conformity with that of ,god4 ,thus ,isa4 v4 #d3 ',what could have been done more to my vineyard1 that ,i have not done in it8 ,wherefore1 when ,i looked that it should bring forth grapes1 brought it forth wild grapes8' ,and ,jer4 xix4 #e3 ',they have built also the high places of ,baal1 to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings unto ,baal2 which ,i commanded not1 nor spake it1 neither came it into my mind4' ,and ,hos4 xiii4 #i3 ',o ,israel1 thou hast destroyed thyself2 but in me is thine help4' ,and ,i ,tim4 ii4 #d3 ',god will have all men to be saved1 and to come unto the knowledge of the truth4' ,he avows that he could quote very many other passages1 such as those which indicate that ,god willeth not iniquity1 that he willeth the salvation of the sinner1 and generally all those which declare that ,god commands good and forbids evil4 #aa4 ,mr4 ,hobbes makes answer to these passages that ,god does not always will that which he commands1 as for example when he commanded ,abraham to sacrifice his son1 and that ,god's revealed will is not always his full will or his decree1 as when he revealed to ,jonah that ,nineveh would perish in forty days4 ,he adds also1 that when it is said that ,god wills the salvation of all1 that means simply that ,god commands that all do that which is necessary for salvation2 when1 moreover1 the ,scripture says that ,god wills not sin1 that means that he wills to punish it4 ,and as for the rest1 ,mr4 ,hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among men4 ,but one will answer him that it would be to ,god's discredit that his revealed will #djb should be opposed to his real will3 that what he bade ,jonah say to the ,ninevites was rather a threat than a prediction1 and that thus the condition of impenitence was implied therein2 moreover the ,ninevites took it in this sense4 ,one will say also1 that it is quite true that ,god in commanding ,abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience1 but did not will action1 which he prevented after having obtained obedience2 for that was not an action deserving in itself to be willed4 ,and it is not the same in the case of actions where he exerts his will positively1 and which are in fact worthy to be the object of his will4 ,of such are piety1 charity and every virtuous action that ,god commands2 of such is omission of sin1 a thing more alien to divine perfection than any other4 ,it is therefore incomparably better to explain the will of ,god as ,i have explained it in this work4 ,thus ,i shall say that ,god1 by virtue of his supreme goodness1 has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce1 or to see and cause to be produced1 all good and every laudable action1 and to prevent1 or to see and cause to fail1 all evil and every bad action4 ,but he is determined by this same goodness1 united to an infinite wisdom1 and by the very concourse of all the previous and particular inclinations towards each good1 and towards the preventing of each evil1 to produce the best possible design of things4 ,this is his final and decretory will4 ,and this design of the best being of such a nature that the good must be enhanced therein1 as light is enhanced by shade1 by some evil which is incomparably less than this good1 ,god could not have excluded this evil1 nor introduced certain goods that were excluded from this plan1 without wronging his supreme perfection4 ,so for that reason one must say that he permitted the sins of others1 because otherwise he would have himself performed an action worse than all the sin of creatures4 #ab4 ,i find that the ,bishop of ,derry is at least justified in saying1 article ,,xv1 in his ,reply1 p4 #aec1 that the opinion of his opponents is contrary to piety1 when they ascribe all to ,god's power only1 and that ,mr4 ,hobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign of the power of him whom one honours3 for one may also1 and one must1 acknowledge and honour wisdom1 goodness1 justice and other perfections4 ,magnos facile laudamus1 bonos libenter4 ,this opinion1 which despoils ,god of all goodness and of all true justice1 which represents him as a ,tyrant1 wielding an absolute power1 independent of all right and of all equity1 and #djc creating millions of creatures to be eternally unhappy1 and this without any other aim than that of displaying his power1 this opinion1 ,i say1 is capable of rendering men very evil2 and if it were accepted no other ,devil would be needed in the world to set men at variance among themselves and with ,god2 as the ,serpent did in making ,eve believe that ,god1 when he forbade her the fruit of the tree1 did not will her good4 ,mr4 ,hobbes endeavours to parry this thrust in his ,rejoinder 7p4 #afj7 by saying that goodness is a part of the power of ,god1 that is to say1 the power of making himself worthy of love4 ,but that is an abuse of terms by an evasion1 and confounds things that must be kept distinct4 ,after all1 if ,god does not intend the good of intelligent creatures1 if he has no other principles of justice than his power alone1 which makes him produce either arbitrarily that which chance presents to him1 or by necessity all that which is possible1 without the intervention of choice founded on good1 how can he make himself worthy of love8 ,it is therefore the doctrine either of blind power or of arbitrary power1 which destroys piety3 for the one destroys the intelligent principle or the providence of ,god1 the other attributes to him actions which are appropriate to the evil principle4 ,justice in ,god1 says ,mr4 ,hobbes 7p4 #afa71 is nothing but the power he has1 which he exercises in distributing blessings and afflictions4 ,this definition surprises me3 it is not the power to distribute them1 but the will to distribute them reasonably1 that is1 goodness guided by wisdom1 which makes the justice of ,god4 ,but1 says he1 justice is not in ,god as in a man1 who is only just through the observance of laws made by his superior4 ,mr4 ,hobbes is mistaken also in that1 as well as ,herr ,pufendorf1 who followed him4 ,justice does not depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors1 but on the eternal rules of wisdom and of goodness1 in men as well as in ,god4 ,mr4 ,hobbes asserts in the same passage that the wisdom which is attributed to ,god does not lie in a logical consideration of the relation of means to ends1 but in an incomprehensible attribute1 attributed to an incomprehensible nature to honour it4 ,it seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something attributed to an indescribable something1 and even a chimerical quality given to a chimerical substance1 to intimidate and to deceive the nations through the worship which they render to it4 ,after all1 it is difficult for ,mr4 ,hobbes to have a different opinion of ,god and of wisdom1 since he admits only material substances4 ,if ,mr4 ,hobbes were still alive1 ,i would beware of ascribing to him opinions which might do him injury2 but it #djd is difficult to exempt him from this4 ,he may have changed his mind subsequently1 for he attained to a great age2 thus ,i hope that his errors may not have been deleterious to him4 ,but as they might be so to others1 it is expedient to give warnings to those who shall read the writings of one who otherwise is of great merit1 and from whom one may profit in many ways4 ,it is true that ,god does not reason1 properly speaking1 using time as we do1 to pass from one truth to the other3 but as he understands at one and the same time all the truths and all their connexions1 he knows all the conclusions1 and he contains in the highest degree within himself all the reasonings that we can develop4 ,and just because of that his wisdom is perfect4 #dje 99 99 99 99 99 ,,observations ,,on ,,the ,,book ,,concerning ',,the ,,origin ,,of ,,evil' ,,published ,,recently ,,in ,,london 99 99 99 99 99 #a4 ,it is a pity that ,m4 ,bayle should have seen only the reviews of this admirable work1 which are to be found in the journals4 ,if he had read it himself and examined it properly1 he would have provided us with a good opportunity of throwing light on many difficulties1 which spring again and again like the head of the hydra1 in a matter where it is easy to become confused when one has not seen the whole system or does not take the trouble to reason according to a strict plan4 ,for strictness of reasoning performs in subjects that transcend imagination the same function as figures do in geometry3 there must always be something capable of fixing our attention and forming a connexion between our thoughts4 ,that is why when this ,latin book1 so learned and so elegant of style1 printed originally in ,london and then reprinted in ,bremen1 fell into my hands1 ,i judged that the seriousness of the matter and the author's merit required an attention which readers might fairly expect of me1 since we are agreed only in regard to half of the subject4 ,indeed1 as the work contains five chapters1 and the fifth with the appendix equals the rest in size1 ,i have observed that the first four1 where it is a question of evil in general and of physical evil in particular1 are in harmony with my principles 7save for a few individual passages71 and that they sometimes even develop with force and eloquence some points ,i had treated but slightly because ,m4 ,bayle #djf had not placed emphasis upon them4 ,but the fifth chapter1 with its sections 7of which some are equal to entire chapters7 speaking of freedom and of the moral evil dependent upon it1 is constructed upon principles opposed to mine1 and often1 indeed1 to those of ,m4 ,bayle2 that is1 if it were possible to credit him with any fixed principles4 ,for this fifth chapter tends to show 7if that were possible7 that true freedom depends upon an indifference of equipoise1 vague1 complete and absolute2 so that1 until the will has determined itself1 there would be no reason for its determination1 either in him who chooses or in the object2 and one would not choose what pleases1 but in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be pleasing4 #b4 ,this principle of choice without cause or reason1 of a choice1 ,i say1 divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness1 is regarded by many as the great privilege of ,god and of intelligent substances1 and as the source of their freedom1 their satisfaction1 their morality and their good or evil4 ,the fantasy of a power to declare one's independence1 not only of inclination1 but of reason itself within and of good and evil without1 is sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it to be the most excellent thing in the world4 ,nevertheless it is only a hollow fantasy1 a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one boasts4 ,what is asserted is impossible1 but if it came to pass it would be harmful4 ,this fantastic character might be attributed to some ,don ,juan in a ,st4 ,peter's ,feast1 and a man of romantic disposition might even affect the outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it in reality4 ,but in ,nature there will never be any choice to which one is not prompted by the previous representation of good or evil1 by inclinations or by reasons3 and ,i have always challenged the supporters of this absolute indifference to show an example thereof4 ,nevertheless if ,i call fantastic this choice whereto one is determined by nothing1 ,i am far from calling visionaries the supporters of that hypothesis1 especially our gifted author4 ,the ,peripatetics teach some beliefs of this nature2 but it would be the greatest injustice in the world to be ready to despise on that account an ,occam1 a ,suisset1 a ,cesalpino1 a ,conringius1 men who still advocated certain scholastic opinions which have been improved upon to-day4 #c4 ,one of these opinions1 revived1 however1 and introduced by #djg degenerate scholasticism1 and in the ,age of ,chimeras1 is vague indifference of choice1 or real chance1 assumed in our souls2 as if nothing gave us any inclination unless we perceived it distinctly1 and as if an effect could be without causes1 when these causes are imperceptible4 ,it is much as some have denied the existence of insensible corpuscles because they do not see them4 ,modern philosophers have improved upon the opinions of the ,schoolmen by showing that1 according to the laws of corporeal nature1 a body can only be set in motion by the movement of another body propelling it4 ,even so we must believe that our souls 7by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature7 can only be moved by some reason of good or evil3 and this even when no distinct knowledge can be extracted from our mental state1 on account of a concourse of innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and now sad1 or again of some other humour1 and cause us to like one thing more than another without its being possible to say why4 ,plato1 ,aristotle and even ,thomas ,aquinas1 ,durand and other ,schoolmen of the sounder sort reason on that question like the generality of men1 and as unprejudiced people always have reasoned4 ,they assume that freedom lies in the use of reason and the inclinations1 which cause the choice or rejection of objects4 ,but finally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their alembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything whatsoever1 which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties4 ,but the notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest difficulties1 by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which makes us always assume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause or reason4 ,as the ,schoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle1 admitting certain prime occult qualities1 one need not wonder if this fiction of vague indifference met with applause amongst them1 and if even most worthy men have been imbued therewith4 ,our author1 who is otherwise rid of many of the errors of the ordinary ,schoolmen1 is still deluded by this fiction3 but he is without doubt one of the most skilful of those who have supported it4 ,si ,pergama dextra ,defendi possent1 etiam hac defensa fuissent4 ,he gives it the best possible turn1 and only shows it on its good side4 ,he knows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their advantages1 #djh transferring all these to vague indifference3 only through this indifference is one active1 resisting the passions1 taking pleasure in one's choice1 or being happy2 it appears indeed that one would be miserable if some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright4 ,our author had said admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural evils3 he only had to apply the same principles to moral evil2 indeed1 he believes himself that moral evil becomes an evil through the physical evils that it causes or tends to cause4 ,but somehow or other he thinks that it would be a degradation of ,god and men if they were to be made subject to reason2 that thus they would all be rendered passive to it and would no longer be satisfied with themselves2 in short that men would have nothing wherewith to oppose the misfortunes that come to them from without1 if they had not within them this admirable privilege of rendering things good or tolerable by choosing them1 and of changing all into gold by the touch of this wondrous faculty4 #d4 ,we will examine it in closer detail presently2 but it will be well to profit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature of things and on natural evils1 particularly since there are some points in which we shall be able to go a little further3 by this means also we shall gain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system4 ,the first chapter contains the principles4 ,the writer calls substance a being the idea of which does not involve the existence of another4 ,i do not know if there are any such among created beings1 by reason of the connexion existing between all things2 and the example of a wax torch is not the example of a substance1 any more than that of a swarm of bees would be4 ,but one may take the terms in an extended sense4 ,he observes aptly that after all the changes of matter and after all the qualities of which it may be divested1 there remain extension1 mobility1 divisibility and resistance4 ,he explains also the nature of notions1 and leaves it to be understood that universals indicate only the resemblances which exist between individuals2 that we understand by ideas only that which is known through an immediate sensation1 and that the rest is known to us only through relations with these ideas4 ,but when he admits that we have no idea of ,god1 of spirit1 of substance1 he does not appear to have observed sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of substance and of spirit in our apperception of ourselves1 and that the idea of ,god is found in#dji the idea of ourselves through a suppression of the limits of our perfections1 as extension taken in an absolute sense is comprised in the idea of a globe4 ,he is right also in asserting that our simple ideas at least are innate1 and in rejecting the ,tabula rasa of ,aristotle and of ,mr4 ,locke4 ,but ,i cannot agree with him that our ideas have scarce any more relation to things than words uttered into the air or writings traced upon paper have to our ideas1 and that the bearing of our sensations is arbitrary and ex instituto1 like the signification of words4 ,i have already indicated elsewhere why ,i am not in agreement with our ,cartesians on that point4 #e4 ,for the purpose of advancing to the first ,cause1 the author seeks a criterion1 a distinguishing mark of truth2 and he finds it in the force whereby our inward assertions1 when they are evident1 compel the understanding to give them its consent4 ,it is by such a process1 he says1 that we credit the senses4 ,he points out that the distinguishing mark in the ,cartesian scheme1 to wit1 a clear and distinct perception1 has need of a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct1 and that the congruity or non-congruity of ideas 7or rather of terms1 as one spoke formerly7 may still be deceptive1 because there are congruities real and apparent4 ,he appears to recognize even that the inward force which constrains us to give our assent is still a matter for caution1 and may come from deep-rooted prejudices4 ,that is why he confesses that he who should furnish another criterion would have found something very advantageous to the human race4 ,i have endeavoured to explain this criterion in a little ,discourse on ,truth and ,ideas1 published in #afhd2 and although ,i do not boast of having given therein a new discovery ,i hope that ,i have expounded things which were only confusedly recognized4 ,i distinguish between truths of fact and truths of reason4 ,truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths of reason1 and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us1 such as ,st4 ,augustine and ,m4 ,descartes very promptly acknowledged to be indubitable2 that is to say1 we cannot doubt that we think1 nor indeed that we think this thing or that4 ,but in order to judge whether our inward notions have any reality in things1 and to pass from thoughts to objects1 my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our perceptions are firmly connected among themselves and with others that we have had1 in such fashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and other truths of #daj reason4 ,in this case one must regard them as real2 and ,i think that it is the only means of distinguishing them from imaginations1 dreams and visions4 ,thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized only through the connexion of phenomena4 ,the criterion of the truths of reason1 or those which spring from conceptions1 is found in an exact use of the rules of logic4 ,as for ideas or notions1 ,i call real all those the possibility of which is certain2 and the definitions which do not mark this possibility are only nominal4 ,geometricians well versed in analysis are aware what difference there is in this respect between several properties by which some line or figure might be defined4 ,our gifted author has not gone so far1 perhaps2 one may see1 however1 from the account ,i have given of him already1 and from what follows1 that he is by no means lacking in profundity or reflexion4 #f4 ,thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion1 matter and space spring from themselves2 and to that end he considers whether it is possible to conceive that they do not exist4 ,he remarks upon this privilege of ,god1 that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be admitted that he exists of necessity4 ,this is a corollary to a remark which ,i made in the little discourse mentioned above1 namely that as soon as one admits that ,god is possible1 one must admit that he exists of necessity4 ,now1 as soon as one admits that ,god exists1 one admits that he is possible4 ,therefore as soon as one admits that ,god exists1 one must admit that he exists of necessity4 ,now this privilege does not belong to the three things of which we have just spoken4 ,the author believes also especially concerning motion1 that it is not sufficient to say1 with ,mr4 ,hobbes1 that the present movement comes from an anterior movement1 and this one again from another1 and so on to infinity4 ,for1 however far back you may go1 you will not be one whit nearer to finding the reason which causes the presence of motion in matter4 ,therefore this reason must be outside the sequence2 and even if there were an eternal motion1 it would require an eternal motive power4 ,so the rays of the sun1 even though they were eternal with the sun1 would nevertheless have their eternal cause in the sun4 ,i am well pleased to recount these arguments of our gifted author1 that it may be seen how important1 according to him1 is the principle of sufficient reason4 ,for1 if it is permitted to admit something for which it is acknowledged there is no reason1 it will be easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument1 by #daa saying that it is not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the existence of motion4 ,i will not enter into the discussion of the reality and the eternity of space1 for fear of straying too far from our subject4 ,it is enough to state that the author believes that space can be annihilated by the divine power1 but in entirety and not in portions1 and that we could exist alone with ,god even if there were neither space nor matter1 since we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the existence of external things4 ,he also puts forward the consideration that in the sensations of sounds1 of odours and of savours the idea of space is not included4 ,but whatever the opinion formed as to space1 it suffices that there is a ,god1 the cause of matter and of motion1 and in short of all things4 ,the author believes that we can reason about ,god1 as one born blind would reason about light4 ,but ,i hold that there is something more in us1 for our light is a ray from ,god's light4 ,after having spoken of some attributes of ,god1 the author acknowledges that ,god acts for an end1 which is the communication of his goodness1 and that his works are ordered aright4 ,finally he concludes this chapter very properly1 by saying that ,god in creating the world was at pains to give it the greatest harmony amongst things1 the greatest comfort of beings endowed with reason1 and the greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite power1 wisdom and goodness combined could produce4 ,he adds that1 if some evil has remained notwithstanding1 one must believe that these infinite divine perfections could not have 7,i would rather say ought not to have7 taken it away4 #g4 ,chapter ,,ii anatomizes evil1 dividing it as we do into metaphysical1 physical and moral4 ,metaphysical evil consists in imperfections1 physical evil in suffering and other like troubles1 and moral evil in sin4 ,all these evils exist in ,god's work2 ,lucretius thence inferred that there is no providence1 and he denied that the world can be an effect of divinity3 ,naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam2 because there are so many faults in the nature of things1 quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa4 ,others have admitted two principles1 the one good1 the other evil4 ,there have also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable1 and among these our author appears to have had ,m4 ,bayle in mind4 ,he hopes to #dab show in his work that it is not a ,gordian knot1 which needs to be cut2 and he says rightly that the power1 the wisdom and the goodness of ,god would not be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils had been banished4 ,he begins with the evil of imperfection in ,chapter ,,iii and observes1 as ,st4 ,augustine does1 that creatures are imperfect1 since they are derived from nothingness1 whereas ,god producing a perfect substance from his own essence would have made thereof a ,god4 ,this gives him occasion for making a little digression against the ,socinians4 ,but someone will say1 why did not ,god refrain from producing things1 rather than make imperfect things8 ,the author answers appositely that the abundance of the goodness of ,god is the cause4 ,he wished to communicate himself at the expense of a certain fastidiousness which we assume in ,god1 imagining that imperfections offend him4 ,thus he preferred that there should be the imperfect rather than nothing4 ,but one might have added that ,god has produced indeed the most perfect whole that was possible1 one wherewith he had full cause for satisfaction1 the imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfection in the whole4 ,also the observation is made soon afterwards1 that certain things might have been made better1 but not without other new and perhaps greater disadvantages4 ,this perhaps could have been omitted3 for the author also states as a certainty1 and rightly so1 at the end of the chapter1 that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the best2 and thus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier1 that imperfect things will be added to those more perfect1 so long as they do not preclude the existence of the more perfect in as great a number as possible4 ,thus bodies were created as well as spirits1 since the one does not offer any obstacle to the other2 and the creation of matter was not unworthy of the great ,god1 as some heretics of old believed1 attributing this work to a certain ,demogorgon4 #h4 ,let us now proceed to physical evil1 which is treated of in ,chapter ,,iv4 ,our famous author1 having observed that metaphysical evil1 or imperfection1 springs from nothingness1 concludes that physical evil1 or discomfort1 springs from matter1 or rather from its movement2 for without movement matter would be useless4 ,moreover there must be contrariety in these movements2 otherwise1 if all went together in the same direction1 there would be neither variety nor generation4 ,but the movements that cause #dac generations cause also corruptions1 since from the variety of movements comes concussion between bodies1 by which they are often dissipated and destroyed4 ,the ,author of ,nature however1 in order to render bodies more enduring1 distributed them into systems1 those which we know being composed of luminous and opaque balls1 in a manner so excellent and so fitting for the display of that which they contain1 and for arousing wonder thereat1 that we can conceive of nothing more beautiful4 ,but the crowning point of the work was the construction of animals1 to the end that everywhere there should be creatures capable of cognition1 ,ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba4 ,our sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether have their denizens as well as the water and the earth4 ,but supposing that there were places without animals1 these places might have uses necessary for other places which are inhabited4 ,so for example the mountains1 which render the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes desert and barren1 are of use for the production of rivers and of winds2 and we have no cause to complain of sands and marshes1 since there are so many places still remaining to be cultivated4 ,moreover1 it must not be supposed that all is made for man alone3 and the author is persuaded that there are not only pure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature akin to these spirits1 that is1 animals whose souls are united to an ethereal and incorruptible matter4 ,but it is not the same with animals whose body is terrestrial1 composed of tubes and fluids which circulate therein1 and whose motion is terminated by the breaking of the vessels4 ,thence the author is led to believe that the immortality granted to ,adam1 if he had been obedient1 would not have been an effect of his nature1 but of the grace of ,god4 #i4 ,now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals that they should have indications causing them to recognize a present danger1 and giving them the inclination to avoid it4 ,that is why what is about to cause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may force the animal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of this discomfort1 and of forestalling a greater evil4 ,the dread of death helps also to cause its avoidance3 for it if were not so ugly and if the dissolution of continuity were not so painful1 very often animals would take no precautions against perishing1 or allowing the parts of their #dad body to perish1 and the strongest would have difficulty in subsisting for a whole day4 ,god has also given hunger and thirst to animals1 to compel them to feed and maintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which disappears imperceptibly4 ,these appetites are of use also to prompt them to work1 in order to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution1 and which may avail to invigorate them4 ,it was even found necessary by the ,author of things that one animal very often should serve as food for another4 ,this hardly renders the victim more unhappy1 since death caused by diseases is generally just as painful as a violent death1 if not more so2 and animals subject to being preyed upon by others1 having neither foresight nor anxiety for the future1 have a life no less tranquil when they are not in danger4 ,it is the same with inundations1 earthquakes1 thunderbolts and other disorders1 which brute beasts do not fear1 and which men have ordinarily no cause to fear1 since there are few that suffer thereby4 #aj4 ,the ,author of ,nature has compensated for these evils and others1 which happen only seldom1 with a thousand advantages that are ordinary and constant4 ,hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the taking of nourishment4 ,moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the animal's powers2 and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite way1 restoring the forces through repose4 ,but one of the pleasures most intense is that which prompts animals to propagation4 ,god1 having taken care to ensure that the species should be immortal1 since the individual cannot be so here on earth1 also willed that animals should have a great tenderness for their little ones1 even to the point of endangering themselves for their preservation4 ,from pain and from sensual pleasure spring fear1 cupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily serviceable1 although it may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn towards ill3 one must say as much of poisons1 epidemic diseases and other hurtful things1 namely that these are indispensable consequences of a well-conceived system4 ,as for ignorance and errors1 it must be taken into account that the most perfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much1 and that knowledge is wont to be proportionate to needs4 ,nevertheless it is necessary that one be exposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen1 and accidents of such kinds are inevitable4 ,one must often be mistaken in one's judgement1 because it is not always permitted to suspend it long enough for exact #dae consideration4 ,these disadvantages are inseparable from the system of things3 for things must very often resemble one another in a certain situation1 the one being taken for the other4 ,but the inevitable errors are not the most usual1 nor the most pernicious4 ,those which cause us the most harm are wont to arise through our fault2 and consequently one would be wrong to make natural evils a pretext for taking one's own life1 since one finds that those who have done so have generally been prompted to such action by voluntary evils4 #aa4 ,after all1 one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken come accidentally from good causes2 and there is reason to infer concerning all we do not know1 from all we do know1 that one could not have done away with them without falling into greater troubles4 ,for the better understanding of this the author counsels us to picture the world as a great building4 ,there must be not only apartments1 halls1 galleries1 gardens1 grottoes1 but also the kitchen1 the cellar1 the poultry-yard1 stables1 drainage4 ,thus it would not have been proper to make only suns in the world1 or to make an earth all of gold and of diamonds1 but not habitable4 ,if man had been all eye or all ear1 he would not have been fitted for feeding himself4 ,if ,god had made him without passions1 he would have made him stupid2 and if he had wished to make man free from error he would have had to deprive him of senses1 or give him powers of sensation through some other means than organs1 that is to say1 there would not have been any man4 ,our learned author remarks here upon an idea which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate1 namely that wild beasts1 poisonous plants and other natures that are injurious to us have been armed against us by sin4 ,but as he argues here only in accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what ,revelation can teach4 ,he believes1 however1 that ,adam would have been exempted from natural evils 7if he had been obedient7 only by virtue of divine grace and of a covenant made with ,god1 and that ,moses expressly indicates only about seven effects of the first sin4 ,these effects are3 #a4 ,the revocation of the gracious gift of immortality4 #b4 ,the sterility of the earth1 which was no longer to be fertile of itself1 save in evil or useless herbs4 #c4 ,the rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance4 #d4 ,the subjection of the woman to the will of the husband4 #daf #e4 ,the pains of childbirth4 #f4 ,the enmity between man and the serpent4 #g4 ,the banishment of man from the place of delight wherein ,god had placed him4 ,but our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity of matter1 especially since the withdrawal of grace4 ,moreover1 it seems to him that after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to us1 and that it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the tree of life has become inaccessible to us4 ,on one point or another one might have something to say in objection1 but the body of the discourse by our author on the origin of evils is full of good and sound reflexions1 which ,i have judged it advisable to turn to advantage4 ,now ,i must pass on to the subject of our controversy1 that is1 the explanation of the nature of freedom4 #ab4 ,the learned author of this work on the origin of evil1 proposing to explain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter1 which makes up half of the whole book1 considers that it is altogether different from that of physical evil1 which lies in the inevitable imperfection of creatures4 ,for1 as we shall see presently1 it appears to him that moral evil comes rather from that which he calls a perfection1 which the creature has in common1 according to him1 with the ,creator1 that is to say1 in the power of choosing without any motive and without any final or impelling cause4 ,it is a very great paradox to assert that the greatest imperfection1 namely sin1 springs from perfection itself4 ,but it is no less a paradox to present as a perfection the thing which is the least reasonable in the world1 the advantage whereof would consist in being privileged against reason4 ,and that1 after all1 rather than pointing out the source of the evil1 would be to contend that it has none4 ,for if the will makes its resolve without the existence of anything1 either in the person who chooses or in the object which is chosen1 to prompt it to the choice1 there will be neither cause nor reason for this election2 and as moral evil consists in the wrong choice1 that is admitting that moral evil has no source at all4 ,thus in the rules of good metaphysics there would have to be no moral evil in ,nature2 and also for the same reason there would be no moral good either1 and all morality would be destroyed4 ,but we must listen to our gifted author1 from whom the subtlety of an opinion maintained by famous philosophers among the ,schoolmen1 and the adornments that he has added thereto himself by his#dag wit and his eloquence1 have hidden the great disadvantages contained therein4 ,in setting forth the position reached in the controversy1 he divides the writers into two parties4 ,the one sort1 he says1 are content to say that the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint2 and the other sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity4 ,but this exposition does not suffice1 unless one distinguish the necessity that is absolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moral necessity1 as ,i have already explained in many places4 #ac4 ,the first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of choice4 ,the author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who believe that the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding1 or by anterior inclinations of the desires1 to resolve upon the course that it adopts4 ,but he confuses these authors with those who assert that the will is prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity1 and who maintain that the person who wills has no power over his volitions3 that is1 he confuses a ,thomist with a ,spinozist4 ,he makes use of the admissions and the odious declarations of ,mr4 ,hobbes and his like1 to lay them to the charge of those who are infinitely far removed from them1 and who take great care to refute them4 ,he lays these things to their charge because they believe1 as ,mr4 ,hobbes believes1 like everyone else 7save for some doctors who are enveloped in their own subtleties71 that the will is moved by the representation of good and evil4 ,thence he imputes to them the opinion that there is therefore no such thing as contingency1 and that all is connected by an absolute necessity4 ,that is a very speedy manner of reasoning2 yet he adds also1 that properly speaking there will be no evil will1 since if there were1 all one could object to therein would be the evil which it can cause4 ,that1 he says1 is different from the common notion1 since the world censures the wicked not because they do harm1 but because they do harm without necessity4 ,he holds also that the wicked would be only unfortunate and by no means culpable2 that there would be no difference between physical evil and moral evil1 since man himself would not be the true cause of an action which he could not avoid2 that evil-doers would not be either blamed or maltreated because they deserve it1 but because that action may serve to turn people away from evil2 again1 for this reason only one would find fault with a rogue1 but not with a sick man1 that reproaches and #dah threats can correct the one1 and cannot cure the other4 ,and further1 according to this doctrine1 chastisements would have no object save the prevention of future evil1 without which the mere consideration of the evil already done would not be sufficient for punishment4 ,likewise gratitude would have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit1 without which the mere consideration of the past benefit would not furnish a sufficient reason4 ,finally the author thinks that if this doctrine1 which derives the resolution of the will from the representation of good and evil1 were true1 one must despair of human felicity1 since it would not be in our power1 and would depend upon things which are outside us4 ,now as there is no ground for hoping that things from outside will order themselves and agree together in accordance with our wishes1 there will always lack something to us1 and there will always be something too much4 ,all these conclusions hold1 according to him1 against those also who think that the will makes its resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding1 an opinion which1 as he considers1 strips the will of its right and renders the soul quite passive4 ,this accusation is also directed against countless serious writers1 of accepted authority1 who are here placed in the same class with ,mr4 ,hobbes and ,spinoza1 and with some other discredited authors1 whose doctrine is considered odious and insupportable4 ,as for me1 ,i do not require the will always to follow the judgement of the understanding1 because ,i distinguish this judgement from the motives that spring from insensible perceptions and inclinations4 ,but ,i hold that the will always follows the most advantageous representation1 whether distinct or confused1 of the good or the evil resulting from reasons1 passions and inclinations1 although it may also find motives for suspending its judgement4 ,but it is always upon motives that it acts4 #ad4 ,it will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion before proceeding to establish that of our author4 ,the misapprehension of my opponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is necessary absolutely1 whose contrary implies contradiction1 with a consequence which is founded only upon truths of fitness1 and nevertheless has its effect4 ,to put it otherwise1 there is a confusion between what depends upon the principle of contradiction1 which makes necessary and indispensable truths1 and what depends upon the principle of the sufficient reason1 which #dai applies also to contingent truths4 ,i have already elsewhere stated this proposition1 which is one of the most important in philosophy1 pointing out that there are two great principles1 namely1 that of identicals or of contradiction1 which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one is true and the other false1 and that of the sufficient reason1 which states that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding4 ,both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent truths2 and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason should not exist4 ,for one may say in a sense that these two principles are contained in the definition of the true and the false4 ,nevertheless1 when in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending upon truths whose contrary implies contradiction1 one may say that it is absolutely necessary4 ,but when1 while pressing the analysis to the furthest extent1 one can never attain to such elements of the given truth1 one must say that it is contingent1 and that it originates from a prevailing reason which inclines without necessitating4 ,once that is granted1 it is seen how we can say with sundry famous philosophers and theologians1 that the thinking substance is prompted to its resolution by the prevailing representation of good or of evil1 and this certainly and infallibly1 but not necessarily1 that is1 by reasons which incline it without necessitating it4 ,that is why contingent futurities1 foreseen both in themselves and through their reasons1 remain contingent4 ,god was led infallibly by his wisdom and by his goodness to create the world through his power1 and to give it the best possible form2 but he was not led thereto of necessity1 and the whole took place without any diminution of his perfect and supreme wisdom4 ,and ,i do not know if it would be easy1 apart from the reflexions we have just entertained1 to untie the ,gordian knot of contingency and freedom4 #ae4 ,this explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted opponent4 ,in the first place1 it is seen that contingency exists together with freedom4 ,secondly1 evil wills are evil not only because they do harm1 but also because they are a source of harmful things1 or of physical evils1 a wicked spirit being1 in the sphere of its activity1 what the evil principle of the ,manichaeans would be in the universe4 ,moreover1 the author has observed 7ch4 #d1 sect4 #d1 #h7 that divine wisdom has usually forbidden actions which would cause discomforts1 that is to say1 physical evils4#dbj ,it is agreed that he who causes evil by necessity is not culpable4 ,but there is neither legislator nor lawyer who by this necessity means the force of the considerations of good or evil1 real or apparent1 that have prompted man to do ill3 else anyone stealing a great sum of money or killing a powerful man in order to attain to high office would be less deserving of punishment than one who should steal a few halfpence for a mug of beer or wantonly kill his neighbour's dog1 since these latter were tempted less4 ,but it is quite the opposite in the administration of justice which is authorized in the world3 for the greater is the temptation to sin1 the more does it need to be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement4 ,besides1 the greater the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer1 the more will it be found that the wickedness has been deliberate1 and the more readily will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment4 ,thus a too artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called stellionate1 and a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very foundations of our security in written documents4 ,but one will have greater indulgence for a great passion1 because it is nearer to madness4 ,the ,romans punished with the utmost severity the priests of the ,god ,apis1 when these had prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who loved her to distraction1 making him pass as their god2 while it was found enough to send the lover into exile4 ,but if someone had done evil deeds without apparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge would be tempted to take him for a madman1 especially if it proved that he was given to committing such extravagances often3 this might tend towards reduction of the penalty1 rather than supplying the true grounds of wickedness and punishment4 ,so far removed are the principles of our opponents from the practice of the tribunals and from the general opinion of men4 #af4 ,thirdly1 the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will still remain1 although there be this in common between them1 that they have their reasons and causes4 ,and why manufacture new difficulties for oneself concerning the origin of moral evil1 since the principle followed in the solution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to account for voluntary evils8 ,that is to say1 it suffices to show that one could not have prevented men from being prone to errors1 without changing the #dba constitution of the best of systems or without employing miracles at every turn4 ,it is true that sin makes up a large portion of human wretchedness1 and even the largest2 but that does not prevent one from being able to say that men are wicked and deserving of punishment3 else one must needs say that the actual sins of the non-regenerate are excusable1 because they spring from the first cause of our wretchedness1 which is original sin4 ,fourthly1 to say that the soul becomes passive and that man is not the true cause of sin1 if he is prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects1 as our author asserts in many passages1 and particularly ch4 #e1 sect4 #a1 sub-sect4 #c1 #ah1 is to create for oneself new senses for terms4 ,when the ancients spoke of that which is ,greek3 eph' hmin1 or when we speak of that which depends upon us1 of spontaneity1 of the inward principle of our actions1 we do not exclude the representation of external things2 for these representations are in our souls1 they are a portion of the modifications of this active principle which is within us4 ,no agent is capable of acting without being predisposed to what the action demands2 and the reasons or inclinations derived from good or evil are the dispositions that enable the soul to decide between various courses4 ,one will have it that the will is alone active and supreme1 and one is wont to imagine it to be like a queen seated on her throne1 whose minister of state is the understanding1 while the passions are her courtiers or favourite ladies1 who by their influence often prevail over the counsel of her ministers4 ,one will have it that the understanding speaks only at this queen's order2 that she can vacillate between the arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the favourites1 even rejecting both1 making them keep silence or speak1 and giving them audience or not as seems good to her4 ,but it is a personification or mythology somewhat ill-conceived4 ,if the will is to judge1 or take cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the understanding or the senses offer it1 it will need another understanding in itself1 to understand what it is offered4 ,the truth is that the soul1 or the thinking substance1 understands the reasons and feels the inclinations1 and decides according to the predominance of the representations modifying its active force1 in order to shape the action4 ,i have no need here to apply my system of ,pre-established ,harmony1 which shows our independence to the best advantage and frees us from the physical influence of objects4 ,for what ,i have just said is sufficient to answer the objection4 ,our #dbb author1 even though he admits with people in general this physical influence of objects upon us1 observes nevertheless with much perspicacity that the body or the objects of the senses do not even give us our ideas1 much less the active force of our soul1 and that they serve only to draw out that which is within us4 ,this is much in the spirit of ,m4 ,descartes' belief that the soul1 not being able to give force to the body1 gives it at least some direction4 ,it is a mean between one side and the other1 between physical influence and ,pre-established ,harmony4 #ag4 ,fifthly1 the objection is made that1 according to my opinion1 sin would neither be censured nor punished because of its deserts1 but because the censure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another time2 whereas men demand something more1 namely1 satisfaction for the crime1 even though it should serve neither for amendment nor for example4 ,so do men with reason demand that true gratitude should come from a true recognition of the past benefit1 and not from the interested aim of extorting a fresh benefit4 ,this objection contains noble and sound considerations1 but it does not strike at me4 ,i require a man to be virtuous1 grateful1 just1 not only from the motive of interest1 of hope or of fear1 but also of the pleasure that he should find in good actions3 else one has not yet reached the degree of virtue that one must endeavour to attain4 ,that is what one means by saying that justice and virtue must be loved for their own sake2 and it is also what ,i explained in justifying 'disinterested love'1 shortly before the opening of the controversy which caused so much stir4 ,likewise ,i consider that wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure1 as when a highwayman1 after having killed men because they resist1 or because he fears their vengeance1 finally grows cruel and takes pleasure in killing them1 and even in making them suffer beforehand4 ,such a degree of wickedness is taken to be diabolical1 even though the man affected with it finds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his homicides than he had when he killed simply under the influence of hope or of fear4 ,i have also observed in answering the difficulties of ,m4 ,bayle that1 according to the celebrated ,conringius1 justice which punishes by means of medicinal penalties1 so to speak1 that is1 in order to correct the criminal or at least to provide an example for others1 might exist in the opinion of those who do away with the freedom that is exempt from necessity4 ,true #dbc retributive justice1 on the other hand1 going beyond the medicinal1 assumes something more1 namely1 intelligence and freedom in him who sins1 because the harmony of things demands a satisfaction1 or evil in the form of suffering1 to make the mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil whereto it has consented4 ,mr4 ,hobbes also1 who does away with freedom1 has rejected retributive justice1 as do the ,socinians1 drawing on themselves the condemnation of our theologians2 although the writers of the ,socinian party are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom4 #ah4 ,sixthly1 the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for felicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good and evil4 ,but this objection seems to me completely null and void1 and ,i think it would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever put upon it4 ,moreover1 the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a most astounding nature3 it is that our felicity depends upon external things1 if it is true that it depends upon the representation of good or evil4 ,it is therefore not in our own power1 so it is said1 for we have no ground for hoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our pleasure4 ,this argument is halting from every aspect4 ,there is no force in the inference3 one might grant the conclusion3 the argument may be retorted upon the author4 ,let us begin with the retort1 which is easy4 ,for are men any happier or more independent of the accidents of fortune upon this argument1 or because they are credited with the advantage of choosing without reason8 ,have they less bodily suffering8 ,have they less tendency toward true or apparent goods1 less fear of true or imaginary evils8 ,are they any less enslaved by sensual pleasure1 by ambition1 by avarice8 less apprehensive8 less envious8 ,yes1 our gifted author will say2 ,i will prove it by a method of counting or assessment4 ,i would rather he had proved it by experience2 but let us see this proof by counting4 ,suppose that by my choice1 which enables me to give goodness-for-me to that which ,i choose1 ,i give to the object chosen six degrees of goodness1 when previously there were two degrees of evil in my condition2 ,i shall become happy all at once1 and with perfect ease1 for ,i should have four degrees surplus1 or net good4 ,doubtless that is all very well2 but unfortunately it is impossible4 ,for what possibility is there of giving these six degrees of goodness to the object8 ,to that end we must needs have the power to change our taste1 or the things1 as we please4 ,that would be almost as if ,i could say to #dbd lead1 ,thou shalt be gold1 and make it so2 to the pebble1 ,thou shalt be diamond2 or at the least1 ,thou shalt look like it4 ,or it would be like the common explanation of the ,mosaical passage which seems to say that the desert manna assumed any taste the ,israelites desired to give to it4 ,they only had to say to their homerful1 ,thou shalt be a capon1 thou shalt be a partridge4 ,but if ,i am free to give these six degrees of goodness to the object1 am ,i not permitted to give it more goodness8 ,i think that ,i am4 ,but if that is so1 why shall we not give to the object all the goodness conceivable8 ,why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four carats of goodness8 ,by this means behold us completely happy1 despite the accidents of fortune2 it may blow1 hail or snow1 and we shall not mind3 by means of this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against fortuitous events4 ,the author agrees 7in this first section of the fifth chapter1 sub-sect4 #c1 #ab7 that this power overcomes all the natural appetites and cannot be overcome by any of them2 and he regards it 7 #bj1 #ba1 #bb7 as the soundest foundation for happiness4 ,indeed1 since there is nothing capable of limiting a power so indeterminate as that of choosing without any reason1 and of giving goodness to the object through the choice1 either this goodness must exceed infinitely that which the natural appetites seek in objects1 these appetites and objects being limited while this power is independent or at the least this goodness1 given by the will to the chosen object1 must be arbitrary and of such a kind as the will desires4 ,for whence would one derive the reason for limits if the object is possible1 if it is within reach of him who wills1 and if the will can give it the goodness it desires to give1 independently of reality and of appearances8 ,it seems to me that may suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious1 which contains something of a fairy-tale kind1 optantis ista sunt1 non invenientis4 ,it therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction cannot render us more immune from evils4 ,and we shall see presently that when men place themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they do so through other desires1 which always have their foundation in the representation of good and evil4 ,i said also 'that one might grant the conclusion of the argument'1 which states that our happiness does not depend absolutely upon ourselves1 at least in the present state of human life3 for who would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand accidents which human prudence cannot evade8 ,how1 for example1 can ,i #dbe avoid being swallowed up1 together with a town where ,i take up my abode1 by an earthquake1 if such is the order of things8 ,but finally ,i can also deny the inference in the argument1 which states that if the will is only actuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not depend upon ourselves4 ,the inference would be valid if there were no ,god1 if everything were ruled by brute causes2 but ,god's ordinance is that for the attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous4 ,thus1 if the soul follows reason and the orders that ,god has given it1 it is assured of its happiness1 even though one may not find a sufficiency thereof in this life4 #ai4 ,having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of my hypothesis1 our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own4 ,he believes that it alone is capable of saving our freedom1 that all our felicity rests therein1 that it increases our goods and lessens our evils1 and that an agent possessing this power is so much the more complete4 ,these advantages have almost all been already disproved4 ,we have shown that for the securing of our freedom it is enough that the representations of goods and of evils1 and other inward or outward dispositions1 should incline us without constraining us4 ,moreover one does not see how pure indifference can contribute to felicity2 on the contrary1 the more indifferent one is1 the more insensitive and the less capable of enjoying what is good will one prove to be4 ,besides the hypothesis proves too much4 ,for if an indifferent power could give itself the consciousness of good it could also give itself the most perfect happiness1 as has been already shown4 ,and it is manifest that there is nothing which would set limits to that power1 since limits would withdraw it from its pure indifference1 whence1 so our author alleges1 it only emerges of itself1 or rather wherein it has never been4 ,finally one does not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies3 on the contrary1 there is nothing more imperfect2 it would render knowledge and goodness futile1 and would reduce everything to chance1 with no rules1 and no measures that could be taken4 ,there are1 however1 still some advantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed4 ,he considers then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which our actions can be imputed1 since otherwise we should be under the compulsion of external objects2 likewise that by this power alone can one ascribe to oneself the merit of one's own felicity1 and feel pleased with #dbf oneself4 ,but the exact opposite is the case3 for when one happens upon the action through an absolutely indifferent movement1 and not as a result of one's good or bad qualities1 is it not just as though one were to happen upon it blindly by chance or hazard8 ,why then should one boast of a good action1 or why should one be censured for an evil one1 if the thanks or blame redounds to fortune or hazard8 ,i think that one is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one's good qualities1 and the more culpable in proportion as one has been impelled to it by one's evil qualities4 ,to attempt to assess actions without weighing the qualities whence they spring is to talk at random and to put an imaginary indefinable something in the place of causes4 ,thus1 if this chance or this indefinable something were the cause of our actions1 to the exclusion of our natural or acquired qualities1 of our inclinations1 of our habits1 it would not be possible to set one's hopes upon anything depending upon the resolve of others1 since it would not be possible to fix something indefinite1 or to conjecture into what roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant indifference will drive the vessel of the will4 #bj4 ,but setting aside advantages and disadvantages1 let us see how our learned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so much good4 ,he imagines that it is only ,god and the free creatures who are active in the true sense1 and that in order to be active one must be determined by oneself only4 ,now that which is determined by itself must not be determined by objects1 and consequently the free substance1 in so far as it is free1 must be indifferent with regard to objects1 and emerge from this indifference only by its own choice1 which shall render the object pleasing to it4 ,but almost all the stages of this argument have their stumbling-blocks4 ,not only the free creatures1 but also all the other substances and natures composed of substances1 are active4 ,beasts are not free1 and yet all the same they have active souls1 unless one assume1 with the ,cartesians1 that they are mere machines4 ,moreover1 it is not necessary that in order to be active one should be determined only by oneself1 since a thing may receive direction without receiving force4 ,so it is that the horse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered by the helm2 and ,m4 ,descartes' belief was that our body1 having force in itself1 receives only some direction from the soul4 ,thus an active thing may receive from outside some determination or direction1 capable of changing that #dbg direction which it would take of itself4 ,finally1 even though an active substance is determined only by itself1 it does not follow that it is not moved by objects3 for it is the representation of the object within it which contributes towards the determination4 ,now the representation does not come from without1 and consequently there is complete spontaneity4 ,objects do not act upon intelligent substances as efficient and physical causes1 but as final and moral causes4 ,when ,god acts in accordance with his wisdom1 he is guided by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects1 but which have no reality outside him before their actual creation4 ,thus this kind of spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of the substance1 nor to the spontaneity of its action4 ,finally1 even though free power were not determined by the objects1 it can never be indifferent to the action when it is on the point of acting1 since the action must have its origin in a disposition to act3 otherwise one will do anything from anything1 quidvis ex quovis1 and there will be nothing too absurd for us to imagine4 ,but this disposition will have already broken the charm of mere indifference1 and if the soul gives itself this disposition there must needs be another predisposition for this act of giving it4 ,consequently1 however far back one may go1 one will never meet with a mere indifference in the soul towards the actions which it is to perform4 ,it is true that these dispositions incline it without constraining it4 ,they relate usually to the objects2 but there are some1 notwithstanding1 which arise variously a subjecto or from the soul itself1 and which bring it about that one object is more acceptable than the other1 or that the same is more acceptable at one time than at another4 #ba4 ,our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true1 and he undertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in ,god1 and even that it must be attributed to him of necessity4 ,for 7he says7 nothing is to ,god either good or bad in creatures4 ,he has no natural appetite1 to be satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him4 ,he is therefore absolutely indifferent to all external things1 since by them he can neither be helped nor hindered2 and he must determine himself and create as it were an appetite in making his choice4 ,and having once chosen1 he will wish to abide by his choice1 just as if he had been prompted thereto by a natural inclination4 ,thus will the divine will be the cause of goodness in beings4 ,that is to say1 there will be goodness in the objects1 not by their #dbh nature1 but by the will of ,god3 whereas if that will be excluded neither good nor evil can exist in things4 ,it is difficult to imagine how writers of merit could have been misled by so strange an opinion1 for the reason which appears to be advanced here has not the slightest force4 ,it seems to me as though an attempt is being made to justify this opinion by the consideration that all creatures have their whole being from ,god1 so that they cannot act upon him or determine him4 ,but this is clearly an instance of self-deception4 ,when we say that an intelligent substance is actuated by the goodness of its object1 we do not assert that this object is necessarily a being existing outside the substance1 and it is enough for us that it be conceivable3 for its representation acts in the substance1 or rather the substance acts upon itself1 in so far as it is disposed and influenced by this representation4 ,with ,god1 it is plain that his understanding contains the ideas of all possible things1 and that is how everything is in him in a transcendent manner4 ,these ideas represent to him the good and evil1 the perfection and imperfection1 the order and disorder1 the congruity and incongruity of possibles2 and his superabundant goodness makes him choose the most advantageous4 ,god therefore determines himself by himself2 his will acts by virtue of his goodness1 but it is particularized and directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom4 ,and since his understanding is perfect1 since his thoughts are always clear1 his inclinations always good1 he never fails to do the best2 whereas we may be deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness4 ,but how is it possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas before the operation of ,god's will8 ,does the will of ,god form the ideas which are in his understanding8 ,i dare not ascribe to our learned author so strange a sentiment1 which would confuse understanding and will1 and would subvert the current use of our notions4 ,now if ideas are independent of will1 the perfection or imperfection which is represented in them will be independent also4 ,indeed1 is it by the will of ,god1 for example1 or is it not rather by the nature of numbers1 that certain numbers allow more than others of various exact divisions8 that some are more fitted than others for forming battalions1 composing polygons and other regular figures8 that the number six has the advantage of being the least of all the numbers that are called perfect8 that in a plane six equal circles may touch a seventh8 that of all equal bodies1 the sphere has the least surface8 that #dbi certain lines are incommensurable1 and consequently ill-adapted for harmony8 ,do we not see that all these advantages or disadvantages spring from the idea of the thing1 and that the contrary would imply contradiction8 ,can it be thought that the pain and discomfort of sentient creatures1 and above all the happiness and unhappiness of intelligent substances1 are a matter of indifference to ,god8 ,and what shall be said of his justice8 ,is it also something arbitrary1 and would he have acted wisely and justly if he had resolved to condemn the innocent8 ,i know that there have been writers so ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous and so liable to overthrow religion4 ,but ,i am assured that our illustrious author is far from holding it4 ,nevertheless1 it seems as though this hypothesis tends in that direction1 if there is nothing in objects save what is indifferent to the divine will before its choice4 ,it is true that ,god has need of nothing2 but the author has himself shown clearly that ,god's goodness1 and not his need1 prompted him to produce creatures4 ,there was therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution2 and1 as ,i have said so many times1 it was neither by chance nor without cause1 nor even by necessity1 that ,god created this world1 but rather as a result of his inclination1 which always prompts him to the best4 ,thus it is surprising that our author should assert here 7ch4 #e1 sect4 #a1 sub-sect4 #d1 #e7 that there is no reason which could have induced ,god1 absolutely perfect and happy in himself1 to create anything outside him1 although1 according to the author's previous declarations 7ch4 #a1 sect4 #c1 #h1 #i71 ,god acts for an end1 and his aim is to communicate his goodness4 ,it was therefore not altogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create or not create1 and creation is notwithstanding a free act4 ,nor was it a matter of indifference to him either1 whether he should create one world rather than another2 a perpetual chaos1 or a completely ordered system4 ,thus the qualities of objects1 included in their ideas1 formed the reason for ,god's choice4 #bb4 ,our author1 having already spoken so admirably about the beauty and fittingness of the works of ,god1 has tried to search out phrases that would reconcile them with his hypothesis1 which appears to deprive ,god of all consideration for the good or the advantage of creatures4 ,the indifference of ,god prevails 7he says7 only in his first elections1 but as soon as ,god has chosen something he has virtually chosen1 at the same time1 all #dcj that which is of necessity connected therewith4 ,there were innumerable possible men equally perfect3 the election of some from among them is purely arbitrary 7in the judgement of our author74 ,but ,god1 once having chosen them1 could not have willed in them anything contrary to human nature4 ,up to this point the author's words are consistent with his hypothesis2 but those that follow go further4 ,he advances the proposition that when ,god resolved to produce certain creatures he resolved at the same time1 by virtue of his infinite goodness1 to give them every possible advantage4 ,nothing1 indeed1 could be so reasonable1 but also nothing could be so contrary to the hypothesis he has put forward1 and he does right to overthrow it1 rather than prolong the existence of anything so charged with incongruities incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of ,god4 ,here is the way to see plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just been said4 ,the first question will be3 ,will ,god create something or not1 and wherefore8 ,the author has answered that he will create something in order to communicate his goodness4 ,it is therefore no matter of indifference to him whether he shall create or not4 ,next the question is asked3 ,will ,god create such and such a thing1 and wherefore8 ,one must needs answer 7to speak consistently7 that the same goodness makes him choose the best1 and indeed the author falls back on that subsequently4 ,but1 following his own hypothesis1 he answers that ,god will create such a thing1 but that there is no wherefore1 because ,god is absolutely indifferent towards creatures1 who have their goodness only from his choice4 ,it is true that our author varies somewhat on this point1 for he says here 7ch4 #e1 sect4 #e1 sub-sect4 #d1 #ab7 that ,god is indifferent to the choice between men of equal perfection1 or between equally perfect kinds of rational creatures4 ,thus1 according to this form of expression1 he would choose rather the more perfect kind3 and as kinds that are of equal perfection harmonize more or less with others1 ,god will choose those that agree best together2 there will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference1 and the author thus comes back to my principles4 ,but let us speak1 as he speaks1 in accordance with his hypothesis1 and let us assume with him that ,god chooses certain creatures even though he be absolutely indifferent towards them4 ,he will then just as soon choose creatures that are irregular1 ill-shapen1 mischievous1 unhappy1 chaos everlasting1 monsters everywhere1 #dca scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth1 devils filling the whole universe1 all this rather than excellent systems1 shapely forms1 upright persons1 good angels6 ,no1 the author will say1 ,god1 when once he had resolved to create men1 resolved at the same time to give them all the advantages possible in the world1 and it is the same with regard to creatures of other kinds4 ,i answer1 that if this advantage were connected of necessity with their nature1 the author would be speaking in accordance with his hypothesis4 ,that not being so1 however1 he must admit that ,god's resolve to give every possible advantage to men arises from a new election independent of that one which prompted ,god to make men4 ,but whence comes this new election8 ,does it also come from mere indifference8 ,if such is the case1 nothing prompts ,god to seek the good of men1 and if he sometimes comes to do it1 it will be merely by accident4 ,but the author maintains that ,god was prompted to the choice by his goodness2 therefore the good and ill of creatures is no matter of indifference to him1 and there are in him primary choices to which the goodness of the object prompts him4 ,he chooses not only to create men1 but also to create men as happy as it is possible to be in this system4 ,after that not the least vestige of mere indifference will be left1 for we can reason concerning the entire world just as we have reasoned concerning the human race4 ,god resolved to create a world1 but he was bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world as should contain the greatest possible amount of order1 regularity1 virtue1 happiness4 ,for ,i can see no excuse for saying that whereas ,god was prompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create as perfect as is possible within this system1 he had not the same good intention towards the whole universe4 ,there we have come back again to the goodness of the objects2 and pure indifference1 where ,god would act without cause1 is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our gifted author1 with whom the force of truth1 once the heart of the matter was reached1 prevailed over a speculative hypothesis1 which cannot admit of any application to the reality of things4 #bc4 ,since1 therefore1 nothing is altogether indifferent to ,god1 who knows all degrees1 all effects1 all relations of things1 and who penetrates at one and the same time all their possible connexions1 let us see whether at least the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him absolutely indifferent in his choice4 ,the author regales us with this pure #dcb indifference as with a handsome present4 ,here are the proofs of it which he gives3 7#a7 ,we feel it within us4 7#b7 ,we have experience within ourselves of its marks and its properties4 7#c7 ,we can show that other causes which might determine our will are insufficient4 ,as for the first point1 he asserts that in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at the same time pure indifference4 ,but ,i do not agree that we feel such indifference1 or that this alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom4 ,we feel usually within us something which inclines us to our choice4 ,at times it happens1 however1 that we cannot account for all our dispositions4 ,if we give our mind to the question1 we shall recognize that the constitution of our body and of bodies in our environment1 the present or previous temper of our soul1 together with countless small things included under these comprehensive headings1 may contribute towards our greater or lesser predilection for certain objects1 and the variation of our opinions from one time to another4 ,at the same time we shall recognize that none would attribute this to mere indifference1 or to some indefinable force of the soul which has the same effect upon objects as colours are said to have upon the chameleon4 ,thus the author has no cause here to appeal to the judgement of the people3 he does so1 saying that in many things the people reason better than the philosophers4 ,it is true that certain philosophers have been misled by chimeras1 and it would seem that mere indifference is numbered among chimerical notions4 ,but when someone maintains that a thing does not exist because the common herd does not perceive it1 here the populace cannot be regarded as a good judge1 being1 as it is1 only guided by the senses4 ,many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by the wind4 ,the majority do not know of imperceptible bodies1 the fluid which causes weight or elasticity1 magnetic matter1 to say nothing of atoms and other indivisible substances4 ,do we say then that these things are not because the common herd does not know of them8 ,if so1 we shall be able to say also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition or inclination contributing towards the production of its act1 because there are many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently perceived by the common herd1 for lack of attention and thought4 ,secondly1 as to the marks of the power in question1 ,i have already refuted the claim advanced for it1 that it possesses the advantage of making one active1 the real cause of one's action1 and subject to responsibility and morality3 #dcc these are not genuine marks of its existence4 ,here is one the author adduces1 which is not genuine either1 namely1 that we have within us a power of resisting natural appetites1 that is to say of resisting not only the senses1 but also the reason4 ,but ,i have already stated this fact3 one resists natural appetites through other natural appetites4 ,one sometimes endures inconveniences1 and is happy to do so2 but that is on account of some hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill and exceeds it3 either one anticipates good from it1 or one finds good in it4 ,the author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearances which he has introduced on the scene1 that we render agreeable what at first displeased us4 ,but who cannot see that the true reason is1 that application and attention to the object and custom change our disposition and consequently our natural appetites8 ,once we become used to a rather high degree of cold or heat1 it no longer incommodes us as it formerly did1 and yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice4 ,time is needed1 for instance1 to bring about that hardening1 or rather that callosity1 which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a degree of heat that would burn our hands4 ,the populace1 whom the author invokes1 guess correctly the cause of this effect1 although they sometimes apply it in a laughable manner4 ,two serving-maids being close to the fire in the kitchen1 one who has burnt herself says to the other3 ,oh1 my dear1 who will be able to endure the fire of purgatory8 ,the other answers3 ,don't be absurd1 my good woman1 one grows used to everything4 #bd4 ,but 7the author will say7 this wonderful power which causes us to be indifferent to everything1 or inclined towards everything1 simply at our own free will1 prevails over reason itself4 ,and this is his third proof1 namely1 that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without having recourse to this power4 ,one sees numbers of people despising the entreaties of their friends1 the counsels of their neighbours1 the reproaches of their conscience1 discomforts1 tortures1 death1 the wrath of ,god1 hell itself1 for the sake of running after follies which have no claim to be good or tolerable1 save as being freely chosen by such people4 ,all is well in this argument1 with the exception of the last words only4 ,for when one takes an actual instance one will find that there were reasons or causes which led the man to his choice1 and that there are very strong bonds to fasten #dcd him thereto4 ,a love-affair1 for example1 will never have arisen from mere indifference3 inclination or passion will have played its part2 but habit and stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather than separation from the beloved4 ,here is another example cited by the author3 an atheist1 a man like ,lucilio ,vanini 7that is what many people call him1 whereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of ,giulio ,cesare ,vanini in his works71 will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera rather than renounce his impiety4 ,the author does not name ,vanini2 and the truth is that this man repudiated his wrong opinions1 until he was convicted of having published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism4 ,when he was asked whether there was a ,god1 he plucked some grass1 saying3 ,et levis est cespes qui probet esse ,deum4 ,but since the ,attorney ,general to the ,parliament of ,toulouse desired to cause annoyance to the ,first ,president 7so it is said71 to whom ,vanini was granted considerable access1 teaching his children philosophy1 if indeed he was not altogether in the service of that magistrate1 the inquisition was carried through rigorously4 ,vanini1 seeing that there was no chance of pardon1 declared himself1 when at the point of death1 for what he was1 an atheist2 and there was nothing very extraordinary in that4 ,but supposing there were an atheist who gave himself up for torture1 vanity might be in his case a strong enough motive1 as in that of the ,gymnosophist1 ,calanus1 and of the ,sophist who1 according to ,lucian's account1 was burnt to death of his own will4 ,but the author thinks that that very vanity1 that stubbornness1 those other wild intentions of persons who otherwise seem to have quite good sense1 cannot be explained by the appetites that arise from the representation of good and evil1 and that they compel us to have recourse to that transcendent power which transforms good into evil1 and evil into good1 and the indifferent into good or into evil4 ,but we do not need to go so far1 and the causes of our errors are only too visible4 ,indeed1 we can make these transformations1 but it is not as with the ,fairies1 by a mere act of this magic power1 but by obscuring and suppressing in one's mind the representations of good or bad qualities which are naturally attached to certain objects1 and by contemplating only such representations as conform to our taste or our prejudices2 or #dce again1 because one attaches to the objects1 by dint of thinking of them1 certain qualities which are connected with them only accidentally or through our habitual contemplation of them4 ,for example1 all my life long ,i detest a certain kind of good food1 because in my childhood ,i found in it something distasteful1 which made a strong impression upon me4 ,on the other hand1 a certain natural defect will be pleasing to me1 because it will revive within me to some extent the thought of a person ,i used to esteem or love4 ,a young man will have been delighted by the applause which has been showered upon him after some successful public action2 the impression of this great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to reputation2 he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes this passion1 and that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to attain his end4 ,for although he may know very well that he will not feel what is said of him after his death1 the representation he makes of it for himself beforehand creates a strong impression on his mind4 ,and there are always motives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless and absurd to those who do not enter into these motives4 ,in a word1 a strong or oft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs1 our imagination1 our memory1 and even our reasoning4 ,it happens that a man1 by dint of having often related something untrue1 which he has perhaps invented1 finally comes to believe in it himself4 ,and as one often represents to oneself something pleasing1 one makes it easy to imagine1 and one thinks it also easy to put into effect1 whence it comes that one persuades oneself easily of what one wishes4 ,et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt4 #be4 ,errors are therefore1 absolutely speaking1 never voluntary1 although the will very often contributes towards them indirectly1 owing to the pleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts1 or owing to the aversion one feels for others4 ,beautiful print in a book will help towards making it persuasive to the reader4 ,the air and manner of a speaker will win the audience for him4 ,one will be inclined to despise doctrines coming from a man one despises or hates1 or from another who resembles him in some point that strikes us4 ,i have already said why one is readily disposed to believe what is advantageous or agreeable1 and ,i have known people who at first had changed their religion for worldly #dcf considerations1 but who have been persuaded 7and well persuaded7 afterwards that they had taken the right course4 ,one sees also that stubbornness is not simply wrong choice persevering1 but also a disposition to persevere therein1 which is due to some good supposed to be inherent in the choice1 or some evil imagined as arising from a change4 ,the first choice has perchance been made in mere levity1 but the intention to abide by it springs from certain stronger reasons or impressions4 ,there are even some writers on ethics who lay it down that one ought to abide by one's choice so as not to be inconstant or appear so4 ,yet perseverance is wrong when one despises the warnings of reason1 especially when the subject is important enough to be examined carefully2 but when the thought of change is unpleasant1 one readily averts one's attention from it1 and that is the way which most frequently leads one to stubbornness4 ,the author wished to connect stubbornness with his so-called pure indifference4 ,he might then have taken into account that to make us cling to a choice there would be need of more than the mere choice itself or a pure indifference1 especially if this choice has been made lightly1 and all the more lightly in proportion to the indifference shown4 ,in such a case we shall be readily inclined to reverse the choice1 unless vanity1 habit1 interest or some other motive makes us persevere therein4 ,it must not be supposed either that vengeance pleases without cause4 ,persons of intense feeling ponder upon it day and night1 and it is hard for them to efface the impression of the wrong or the affront they have sustained4 ,they picture for themselves a very great pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comes upon them every moment1 and which causes some to find vengeance sweeter than life itself4 ,quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa4 ,the author would wish to persuade us that usually1 when our desire or our aversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it1 we have given to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us1 through the alleged power of choice which makes things appear good or evil as we wish4 ,one has had two degrees of natural evil1 one gives oneself six degrees of artificial good through the power that can choose without cause4 ,thus one will have four degrees of net good 7ch4 #e1 sect4 #b1 #g74 ,if that could be carried out it would take us far1 as ,i have already said here4 ,the #dcg author even thinks that ambition1 avarice1 the gambling mania and other frivolous passions derive all their force from this power 7ch4 #e1 sect4 #e1 sub-sect4 #f74 ,but there are besides so many false appearances in things1 so many imaginations capable of enlarging or diminishing objects1 so many unjustified connexions in our arguments1 that there is no need of this little ,fairy1 that is1 of this inward power operating as it were by enchantment1 to whom the author attributes all these disorders4 ,indeed1 ,i have already said repeatedly that when we resolve upon some course contrary to acknowledged reason1 we are prompted to it by another reason stronger to outward appearance1 such as1 for instance1 is the pleasure of appearing independent and of performing an extraordinary action4 ,there was in days past at the ,court of ,osnabrck a tutor to the pages1 who1 like a second ,mucius ,scaevola1 held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting a gangrene1 in order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than a very acute pain4 ,few people will follow his example2 and ,i do not even know if a writer could easily be found who1 having once affirmed the existence of a power capable of choosing without cause1 or even contrary to reason1 would be willing to prove his case by his own example1 in renouncing some good benefice or some high office1 simply in order to display this superiority of will over reason4 ,but ,i am sure at the least that an intelligent man would not do so4 ,he would be presently aware that someone would nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simply imitated ,heliodorus1 ,bishop of ,larissa4 ,that man 7so it is said7 held his book on ,theagenes and ,chariclea dearer than his bishopric2 and such a thing may easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense with his office and when he is sensitive to reputation4 ,thus every day people are found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices1 that is to say1 actual goods to the mere semblance of them4 #bf4 ,if ,i wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted author1 which often come back to matters previously considered in our inquiry1 usually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition1 ,i should be obliged to proceed too far2 but ,i hope that ,i shall be able to avoid doing so1 having1 as ,i think1 sufficiently met all his reasons4 ,the best thing is that with him practice usually corrects and amends theory4 ,after having advanced the hypothesis1 in the second section of this fifth chapter1 #dch that we approach ,god through the capacity to choose without reason1 and that this power being of the noblest kind its exercise is the most capable of making one happy1 things in the highest degree paradoxical1 since it is reason which leads us to imitate ,god and our happiness lies in following reason3 after that1 ,i say1 the author provides an excellent corrective1 for he says rightly 7 #e7 that in order to be happy we must adapt our choice to things1 since things are scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us1 and that this is in effect adapting oneself to the divine will4 ,doubtless that is well said1 but it implies besides that our will must be guided as far as possible by the reality of the objects1 and by true representations of good and evil4 ,consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed to freedom1 and the power of choosing without cause1 far from ministering to our happiness1 will be useless and even highly prejudicial4 ,thus it is happily the case that this power nowhere exists1 and that it is 'a being of reasoning reason'1 as some ,schoolmen call the fictions that are not even possible4 ,as for me1 ,i should have preferred to call them 'beings of non-reasoning reason'4 ,also ,i think that the third section 7on wrong elections7 may pass1 since it says that one must not choose things that are impossible1 inconsistent1 harmful1 contrary to the divine will1 or already taken by others4 ,moreover1 the author remarks appositely that by prejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine will1 which desires that all be happy as far as it is possible4 ,i will say as much of the fourth section1 where there is mention of the source of wrong elections1 which are error or ignorance1 negligence1 fickleness in changing too readily1 stubbornness in not changing in time1 and bad habits2 finally there is the importunity of the appetites1 which often drive us inopportunely towards external things4 ,the fifth section is designed to reconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness of ,god2 and this section1 as it is diffuse1 is divided into sub-sections4 ,the author has cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection3 for he asserts that without a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in the choice there would be no sin4 ,now it was very easy for ,god to refuse to creatures a power so irrational4 ,it was sufficient for them to be actuated by the representations of goods and evils2 it was therefore easy1 according to the author's hypothesis1 for ,god to prevent sin4 ,to extricate himself from this difficulty1 he has no other resource than to state that if this power #dci were removed from things the world would be nothing but a purely passive machine4 ,but that is the very thing which ,i have disproved4 ,if this power were missing in the world 7as in fact it is71 one would hardly complain of the fact4 ,souls will be well content with the representations of goods and evils for the making of their choice1 and the world will remain as beautiful as it is4 ,the author comes back to what he had already put forward here1 that without this power there would be no happiness4 ,but ,i have given a sufficient answer to that1 and there is not the slightest probability in this assertion and in certain other paradoxes he puts forward here to support his principal paradox4 #bg4 ,he makes a small digression on prayer 7sub-sect4 #d71 saying that those who pray to ,god hope for some change in the order of nature2 but it seems as though1 according to his opinion1 they are mistaken4 ,in reality1 men will be content if their prayers are heard1 without troubling themselves as to whether the course of nature is changed in their favour1 or not4 ,indeed1 if they receive succour from good angels there will be no change in the general order of things4 ,also this opinion of our author is a very reasonable one1 that there is a system of spiritual substances1 just as there is of corporeal substances1 and that the spiritual have communication with one another1 even as bodies do4 ,god employs the ministry of angels in his rule of mankind1 without any detriment to the order of nature4 ,nevertheless1 it is easier to put forward theories on these matters than to explain them1 unless one have recourse to my system of ,harmony4 ,but the author goes somewhat further4 ,he believes that the mission of the ,holy ,spirit was a great miracle in the beginning1 but that now his operations within us are natural4 ,i leave it to him to explain his opinion1 and to settle the matter with other theologians4 ,yet ,i observe that he finds the natural efficacy of prayer in the power it has of making the soul better1 of overcoming the passions1 and of winning for oneself a certain degree of new grace4 ,i can say almost the same things on my hypothesis1 which represents the will as acting only in accordance with motives2 and ,i am immune from the difficulties in which the author has become involved over his power of choosing without cause4 ,he is in great embarrassment also with regard to the foreknowledge of ,god4 ,for if the soul is perfectly indifferent in its choice how is it possible to foresee this choice8 and what sufficient reason will one be able to find for the knowledge of a#ddj thing1 if there is no reason for its existence8 ,the author puts off to some other occasion the solution of this difficulty1 which would require 7according to him7 an entire work4 ,for the rest1 he sometimes speaks pertinently1 and in conformity with my principles1 on the subject of moral evil4 ,he says1 for example 7sub-sect4 #f71 that vices and crimes do not detract from the beauty of the universe1 but rather add to it1 just as certain dissonances would offend the ear by their harshness if they were heard quite alone1 and yet in combination they render the harmony more pleasing4 ,he also points out divers goods involved in evils1 for instance1 the usefulness of prodigality in the rich and avarice in the poor2 indeed it serves to make the arts flourish4 ,we must also bear in mind that we are not to judge the universe by the small size of our globe and of all that is known to us4 ,for the stains and defects in it may be found as useful for enhancing the beauty of the rest as patches1 which have nothing beautiful in themselves1 are by the fair sex found adapted to embellish the whole face1 although they disfigure the part they cover4 ,cotta1 in ,cicero's book1 had compared providence1 in its granting of reason to men1 to a physician who allows wine to a patient1 notwithstanding that he foresees the misuse which will be made thereof by the patient1 at the expense of his life4 ,the author replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require1 and that the good which accrues is greater than the evil4 ,if ,god had not given reason to man there would have been no man at all1 and ,god would be like a physician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill4 ,one may add that it is not reason which is harmful in itself1 but the absence of reason2 and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means1 but not adequately about an end1 or about that bad end we have proposed to ourselves4 ,thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil deed4 ,the author also puts forward the objection made by ,epicurus in the book by ,lactantius on the wrath of ,god4 ,the terms of the objection are more or less as follows4 ,either ,god wishes to banish evils and cannot contrive to do so1 in which case he would be weak2 or he can abolish them1 and will not1 which would be a sign of malignity in him2 or again he lacks power and also will1 which would make him appear both weak and jealous2 or finally he can and will1 but in this case it will be asked why he then does not banish evil1 if he exists8 ,the author replies that ,god cannot banish evil1 that he does not wish to either1 and that notwithstanding he is neither malicious #dda nor weak4 ,i should have preferred to say that he can banish evil1 but that he does not wish to do so absolutely1 and rightly so1 because he would then banish good at the same time1 and he would banish more good than evil4 ,finally our author1 having finished his learned work1 adds an ,appendix1 in which he speaks of the ,divine ,laws4 ,he fittingly divides these laws into natural and positive4 ,he observes that the particular laws of the nature of animals must give way to the general laws of bodies1 that ,god is not in reality angered when his laws are violated1 but that order demanded that he who sins should bring an evil upon himself1 and that he who does violence to others should suffer violence in his turn4 ,but he believes that the positive laws of ,god rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause its infliction4 ,and that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnation of the wicked1 which no longer serves either for correction or example1 and which nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of ,god1 although the wicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves4 ,he suspects1 however1 that these punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous people4 ,he is doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to be nothing3 for it might be that the damned are fools1 capable of clinging to their state of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind which1 he maintains1 makes them congratulate themselves on their false judgements in the midst of their misery1 and take pleasure in finding fault with the will of ,god4 ,for every day one sees peevish1 malicious1 envious people who enjoy the thought of their ills1 and seek to bring affliction upon themselves4 ,these ideas are not worthy of contempt1 and ,i have sometimes had the like myself1 but ,i am far from passing final judgement on them4 ,i related1 in #bga of the essays written to oppose ,m4 ,bayle1 the fable of the ,devil's refusal of the pardon a hermit offers him on ,god's behalf4 ,baron ,andr ,taifel1 an ,austrian nobleman1 ,knight of the ,court of ,ferdinand ,archduke of ,austria who became the second emperor of that name1 alluding to his name 7which appears to mean ,devil in ,german7 assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr1 with this ,spanish motto1 ,mas perdido1 y menos arrepentido1 the more lost1 the less repentant1 which indicates a hopeless passion from which one cannot free oneself4 ,this motto was afterwards repeated by the ,spanish ,count of ,villamediana when he was said to be in love with the ,queen4 ,coming to the question why evil often happens to the good and good to the wicked1 #ddb our illustrious author thinks that it has been sufficiently answered1 and that hardly any doubt remains on that point4 ,he observes nevertheless that one may often doubt whether good people who endure affliction have not been made good by their very misfortune1 and whether the fortunate wicked have not perhaps been spoilt by prosperity4 ,he adds that we are often bad judges1 when it is a question of recognizing not only a virtuous man1 but also a happy man4 ,one often honours a hypocrite1 and one despises another whose solid virtue is without pretence4 ,we are poor judges of happiness also1 and often felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contented poor man1 while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of the great4 ,finally the author observes1 that the greatest felicity here on earth lies in the hope of future happiness1 and thus it may be said that to the wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction or chastisement1 and to the good nothing save what ministers to their greater good4 ,these conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion1 and one can say nothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work4 #ddc 99 99 99 99 99 ,,causa ,,dei ,,asserta ,,per ,,justitiam ,,ejus cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque actionibus conciliatam4 ,the original edition of the ,theodicy contained a fourth appendix under this title4 ,it presented in scholastic ,latin a formal summary of the positive doctrine expressed by the ,french treatise4 ,it satisfied the academic requirements of its day1 but would not1 presumably1 be of interest to many modern readers1 and is consequently omitted here4 #dde 99 99 99 99 99 ,,index ,ablard1 #abb1 #bcb-d1 #bgb ,abraham1 #bji ,adam1 #bbb1 #bgj-b1 #cdf-g ,adam ,kadmon1 #acc ,albius1 ,thomas1 #abb ,alcuin1 #gg ,alfonso1 ,king of ,castile1 #bdg-h ,aloysius ,novarinus1 #aia ,alrasi1 #bhh ,alvarez1 #adi ,ambrose1 ,st41 #aec1 #aid ,amyraut1 #bch ,anaxagoras1 #cec ,andradius1 ,jacques ,payva1 #agf ,andreas ,cisalpinus1 #ha ,angelus ,silesius1 ,johann1 #gi ,annat1 #cdd-e ,anselm1 ,st41 #gg ,antipater1 #bcb ,aquinas1 ,thomas1 see ,thomas ,arcesilaus1 #ccg ,archidemus1 #bcb ,aristotelians1 #bg-h ,aristotle1 #ac1 #gf-h1 #ha1 #adh1 #agj1 #aie1 #bjc1 #bbi1 #bda1 #bdc-d1 #bfe1 #bfi1 #bhc1 #cjd1 #cji-aj1 #cbd1 #ceb1 #cec1 #dji ,arminius1 see ,irminius ,arminius 7,jacob ,harmensen71 #chc1 #cih ,arnauld1 #fg1 #hi1 #bbe1 #bed1 #bfj1 #bfd-f1 #cea ,arriaga1 #aab1 #cef ,arrian1 #bcb ,assassins1 #bhd ,athanasius1 ,st41 #hg ,augustine 7of ,hippo71 ,st41 #fj1 #ajj1 #abb1 #acd1 #adh1 #aff1 #agc1 #ahg1 #bbf1 #bgd1 #bhe1 #bid1 #bif-g1 #cjj-c1 #cdg1 #ceb-c1 #cgh1 #chd1 #dji1 #dab ----1 his disciples1 #ade1 #big1 #cjj1 #cbd1 #ccj1 #cdh ,augustus 7,emperor71 #bhg ,aulus ,gellius1 #beh-i1 #cbe1 #cbg ,aureolus1 ,cardinal1 #aci1 #cec ,averroes1 ,averroists1 #gg ff4 ,bacon1 ,francis1 #cjf ,baez1 #adi ,barbaro1 ,ermolao1 #agj ,baron1 ,vincent1 #aba ,baronius1 ,robert1 #hd ,barton1 ,thomas1 #abb ,basil1 ,st41 #bba1 #ceb ,bayle1 ,p41 #cd ff4 et passim ,becher1 ,johann ,joachim1 #ccd-e ,becker1 #bba ,bede1 #gg ,bellarmine1 ,st4 ,robert1 #ajg1 #cac1 #cbc ,berigardus1 ,claudius1 #ha ,berkeley1 ,bp41 #aa ,bernard1 ,st41 #bgg ,bernier1 #aci1 #cec ,bertius1 #bbg de ,bze1 ,theodore1 #bgd ,birgitta1 ,revelations of ,st41 #agc ,boethius1 #gf1 #cfe-f ,bonartes1 ,thomas1 #eh1 #aba-b ,bonaventura1 ,st41 #bid des ,bosses1 ,fr41 #aba1 #chi ,bossuet1 #aj ,bradwardine1 ,abp41 #aei1 #agf ,bramhall1 ,bp4 ,john1 #afa1 #cic ,bredenburg1 ,johan1 #cdi-ej ,brunswick1 ,duke of1 #h1 #hb ,buckingham1 ,duke of1 #adb ,buridan's ass1 #aej1 #caa1 #cab ,burnet1 ,thomas1 #bgh ,cabalists1 #gi1 #acc1 #cdg ,caesar ,cremoninus1 #ha ,cajetan1 ,cardinal1 #ajj1 #bdc ,calanus1 #bhd1 #dcd ,caligula1 #bbg ,calixtus1 #ajh ,calli1 #cei ,callimachus1 #bac ,calovius1 #hd ,calvin1 #hd-e1 #aja1 #afe1 #bbb1 #bch1 #bdj1 #cbh ,cameron1 #cac ,campanella1 #bag ,capella1 ,martianus1 #bfd ,cardan1 ,jerome1 #bhb1 #bhf ,carneades1 #cab1 #cbj-a1 #ccg ,caroli1 ,andreas1 #bbg ,casaubon1 ,meric1 #bhe ,caselius1 #hb ,cassiodorus1 #gf ,page #ddf ,casuists1 #aid1 #bbb1 #bda ,catharin1 ,ambrose1 #agc ,catherine de ,medicis1 #bbg ,cato1 #bfc1 #cah ,celsus1 #ajb-c ,chardin1 #bji de la ,charmoye1 ,abb1 #bac ,chemnitz1 ,martin1 #aaa1 #agf ,christine1 ,queen of ,sweden1 #if1 #ajd ,chrysippus1 #bbi-cb1 #beh-i1 #cbd-g ,cicero1 #ii1 #aid1 #bbi-cb1 #bda1 #bhf1 #big1 #cab1 #cba1 #cbd-e1 #cdb ,claudian1 #acb1 #aia1 #bae ,cleanthes1 #bcc1 #cbd ,coelius ,secundus ,curio1 #acd ,coimbra1 ,fathers of1 #cbe ,colerus1 #cej ,conringius1 #afa1 #dbb ,constance1 ,council of1 #bcd de la 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,sales1 ,st41 #agf ,francis ,xavier1 ,st41 #agf ,freitag1 ,johann1 #aga ,fromondus1 ,libertus1 #hi ,fulgentius1 #afg ,fur praedestinatus1 #bbg della ,galla1 ,julius ,caesar1 #aga ,gassendi1 #ab1 #ccg ,gatacre1 ,thomas1 #bfb ,gerhard1 ,johann1 #bia ,gerson1 #gi ,gibieuf1 #cdd-e ,glarea1 ,antonio1 #cff ,godescalc1 #afg1 #bid ,gomarists1 #bbg ,gregory1 ,st41 the ,great1 #ajj1 #bia1 #bic1 #bid ,gregory1 ,st41 of ,nazianzus1 #agc ,gregory1 ,st41 of ,nyssa1 #acb ,gregory of ,rimini1 #agc ,grotius1 #gg1 #ia1 #afa1 #aid1 #bda1 #bdc1 #bgf ,guerre1 ,martin1 #ig-h ,gymnosophists1 #bhd ,hartsoeker1 #agb ,heliodorus of ,larissa1 #dcg ,heraclitus1 #cbd ,herminius1 see ,irminius ,hermippus1 #bji ,herodotus1 #aif1 #bjh1 #baj ,heshusius1 ,tilemann1 #hb ,hobbes1 ,thomas1 #fg1 #hi1 #aei1 #afa1 #bcd1 #bfe1 #cdh1 #cic ff41 #daj ,hoffmann1 ,daniel1 #hb ,horace1 #aca1 #cah ,homer1 #bhd ,hyde1 #bji ,innocent ,,iii1 ,pope1 #aca ,irminius1 #bji ,isbrand1 #bch ,jansenists1 #ade1 #cdf-g ,jansenius1 #cdd ,jacquelot1 #aeg1 #bbc1 #bei1 #bfe1 #bgh1 #cda ,jerome1 ,st41 #acb ,john of ,damascus1 ,st41 #gg ,page #ddg ,john ,scot1 #aga ,jung1 #bfa ,jupiter1 #bac ,jurieu1 #agd1 #ahg1 #bij-b1 #cef ,justin1 #bjh ,keckermann1 ,bartholomaeus1 #ajf ,keilah1 siege of1 #ade-f ,kendal1 ,george1 #bbh ,kepler1 #adj1 #cec ,kerkering1 #cea ,kessler1 ,andreas1 #hc ,kortholt1 ,sebastian1 #cea ,krell1 ,nicolas1 #cih de ,labadie1 ,jean1 #hb ,lactantius1 #bba1 #bhe1 #bhf1 #ddj ,lami1 ,franois1 #hi1 #cei ,lateran ,council1 #hj ,laud1 ,abp41 #cih de ,launoy1 #ajj ,lazarus1 #bid le ,clerc1 #fd1 #aba1 #acb1 #bde1 #bib ,leeuwenhoek1 #agb ,limbourg1 #cej ,lipsius1 ,justus1 #cbe1 #ccg1 #cec ,livy1 #bfc ,locke1 ,john1 #h1 #i1 #cc-d1 #hf1 #dji ,lscher1 #bih ,louis of ,dole1 #adi1 #cec ,lucan1 #abb1 #bab ,lucian1 #bfe1 #dcd ,lucretius1 #cbj ,lully1 ,raymond1 #ajf ,luther1 #fg1 #ha1 #ii1 #aja1 #aaj-aa1 #abb1 #bih1 #cbh1 #cie ,machiavelli1 #baf ,maignan1 #cei ,maimonides1 #bhg-h ,malebranche1 #agb1 #bdd1 #bed ff41 #bgf1 #bhj1 #ccc1 #cei1 #cfa ,manichaeans1 #ei1 #ih1 #aac1 #abd1 #bjh1 #bgd1 #dai ,marchetti1 #cbj ,marcion1 #bac ,marcus ,aurelius1 #bfc ,mary1 ,blessed ,virgin1 #aic ,matthieu1 ,pierre1 #bjd ,maurice1 ,prince1 #cih ,melanchthon1 #ha ,melissus1 #bah1 #bbj ,mnage1 #bcb ,meyer1 ,louis1 #hb ,mithras1 #bji ,molina1 #ade1 #agc1 #bjg ,molinists1 #ade1 #cag1 #cbd1 #cdb ,more1 ,henry1 #afi ,moses ,germanus1 #gi de la ,motte le ,vayer1 #bhb ,musaeus1 ,johann1 #hf1 #aaa ,naud1 ,gabriel1 #ha ,newcastle1 ,duke of1 #cic ff4 ,newton1 ,isaac1 #cd1 #he-f ,nicole1 #if-g1 #agd1 #bia1 #bii ,nominalists1 #bjc ,novarini1 #bhf ,ochino1 ,bernardino1 #hi ,onomaus1 #cbe ,opalenius1 #aid ,origen1 #ajb-c1 #acb1 #bce1 #bid ,origenists1 #bfj1 #bib ,orobio1 #cej ,ovid1 #bji1 #bbj1 #cjf ,pardies1 #ccc ,pascal1 #ce ,paul1 ,st41 #abi-cj1 #bch1 #bfj ,paulicians1 see ,manichaeans ,pelagius1 #aci ,plisson1 #agf ,pereir1 ,louis1 #aci ,peter ,lombard1 #bij ,pfanner1 #ceb ,pierre de ,saint-,joseph1 #cdb1 #ceg ,pietists1 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