,thoughts on ,religion  ,,by ,,the      
,,late  ,,george ,,john ,,romanes       
,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d41 ,f4,r4,s4  ,,edited   
,,by  ,,charles ,,gore1 ,d4,d4 ,,bishop 
,,of ,,worcester  ,twelfth ,impression  
,,longmans1 ,,green1 ,,and ,,co4 #ci    
,,paternoster ,,row1 ,,london ,,and     
,,bombay  #aijd     ,,contents          
,,page  ,,editor',s ,,preface           
#e   ,,part ,i4  ,,the ,,influence ,,of 
,,science ,,upon ,,religion4  ,,essay ,i
                                        
#cg  ,,essay ,,ii                       
#ef   ,,part ,,ii4  ,,notes ,,for ,a    
,,work ,,on ,a ,,candid ,,examination   
,,of ,,religion4  ,,introductory ,,note 
,,by ,,the ,,editor                     
#ia   #a4 ,,introductory                
#ih   #b4 ,,definition ,,of ,,terms     
,,and ,,purpose ,,of ,,this ,,treatise  
#ajd   #c4 ,,causality                  
#aaf   #d4 ,,faith                      
#aca   #e4 ,,faith ,,in ,,christianity  
#aed  ,,concluding ,,note ,,by ,,the    
,,editor                            #ahd

     ,,publisher',s ,,note   ,the       
present edition of ,romanes' ,thoughts  
on ,religion is issued in response to a 
request which has been made with some   
frequency of late for very cheap        
reprints of standard religious and      
theological works4  #ci ,,paternoster   
,,row1      ,,london1      ,january1    
#aijd4     ,,editor',s ,,preface   ,the 
late ,mr4 ,george ,john ,romanes--the   
author within the last few years of     
,darwin and ,after ,darwin1 and of the  
,examination of ,weismannism--occupied a
 distinguished place in contemporary    
biology4 ,but his mind was also         
continuously and increasingly active on 
the problems of metaphysics and         
theology4 ,and at his death in the early
 summer of this year 7#ahid71 he left   
among his papers some notes1 made mostly
 in the previous winter1 for a work     
which he was intending to write on the  
fundamental questions of religion4 ,he  
had desired that these notes should be  
given to me and that ,i should do with  

them as ,i thought best4 ,his literary  
executors accordingly handed them over  
to me1 in company with some unpublished 
essays1 two of which form the first part
 of the present volume4  ,after reading 
the notes myself1 and obtaining the     
judgement of others in whom ,i feel     
confidence upon them1 ,i have no        
hesitation either in publishing by far  
the greater part of them1 or in         
publishing them with the author's name  
in spite of the fact that the book as   
originally projected was to have been   
anonymous4 ,from the few words which    
,george ,romanes said to me on the      
subject1 ,i have no doubt that he       
realized that the notes if published    
after his death must be published with  
his name4  ,i have said that after      
reading these notes ,i feel no doubt    
that they ought to be published4 ,they  
claim it both by their intrinsic value  
and by the light they throw on the      
religious thought of a scientific man   
who was not only remarkably able and    

clear-headed1 but also many-sided1 as   
few men are1 in his capacities1 and     
singularly candid and open-hearted4 ,to 
all these qualities the notes which are 
now offered to the public will bear     
unmistakeable witness4  ,with more      
hesitation it has been decided to print 
also the unpublished essays already     
referred to4 ,these1 as representing an 
earlier stage of thought than is        
represented in the notes1 naturally     
appear first4  ,both ,essays and ,notes 
however represent the same tendency of a
 mind from a position of unbelief in the
 ,christian ,revelation toward one of   
belief in it4 ,they represent1 ,i say1 a
 tendency of one 'seeking after ,god if 
haply he might feel after ,him and find 
,him1' and not a position of settled    
orthodoxy4 ,even the ,notes contain in  
fact many things which could not come   
from a settled believer4 ,this being so 
it is natural that ,i should say a word 
as to the way in which ,i have          
understood my function as an editor4 ,i 

have decided the question of publishing 
each ,note solely by the consideration  
whether or no it was sufficiently       
finished to be intelligible4 ,i have    
rigidly excluded any question of my own 
agreement or disagreement with it4 ,in  
the case of one ,note in particular1 ,i 
doubt whether ,i should have published  
it1 had it not been that my decided     
disagreement with its contents made me  
fear that ,i might be prejudiced in     
withholding it4  ,the ,notes1 with the  
papers which precede them1 will1 ,i     
think1 be better understood if ,i give  
some preliminary account of their       
antecedents1 that is of ,romanes'       
previous publications on the subject of 
religion4  ,in #ahgc an essay of ,george
 ,romanes gained the ,burney ,prize at  
,cambridge1 the subject being ,christian
 ,prayer considered in relation to the  
belief that the ,almighty governs the   
world by general laws4 ,this was        
published in #ahgd1 with an appendix on 
,the ,physical ,efficacy of ,prayer4 ,in

 this essay1 written when he was        
twenty-five years old1 ,romanes shows   
the characteristic qualities of his mind
 and style already developed4 ,the      
sympathy with the scientific point of   
view is there1 as might be expected     
perhaps in a ,cambridge ',scholar in    
,natural ,science'3 the logical acumen  
and love of exact distinctions is there3
 there too the natural piety and        
spiritual appreciation of the nature of 
,christian prayer--a piety and          
appreciation which later intellectual   
habits of thought could never eradicate4
 ,the essay1 as judged by the standard  
of prize compositions1 is of remarkable 
ability1 and strictly proceeds within   
the limits of the thesis4 ,on the one   
side1 for the purpose of the argument1  
the existence of a ,personal ,god is    
assumed#a1 and also the reality of the  
,christian ,revelation which assures us 
that we have reason to expect real      
answers1 even though conditionally and  
within restricted limits1 to prayers for

 physical goods#b4 ,on the other side1  
there is taken for granted the belief   
that general laws pervade the observable
 domain of physical nature4 ,then the   
question is considered--how is the      
physical efficacy of prayer which the   
,christian accepts on the authority of  
revelation compatible with the          
scientifically known fact that ,god     
governs the world by general laws8 ,the 
answer is mainly found in emphasizing   
the limited sphere within which         
scientific inquiry can be conducted and 
scientific knowledge can obtain4        
,special divine acts of response to     
prayer1 even in the physical sphere1 may
 occur--force may be even originated in 
response to prayer--and still not       
produce any phenomenon such as science  
must take cognizance of and regard as   
miraculous or contrary to the known     
order4  ,on one occasion the ,notes     
refer back to this essay#c1 and more    
frequently1 as we shall have occasion to
 notice1 they reproduce thoughts which  

had already been expressed in the       
earlier work but had been obscured or   
repudiated in the interval4 ,i have no  
grounds for knowing whether in the main 
,romanes remained satisfied with the    
reasoning and conclusion of his earliest
 essay1 granted the theistic hypothesis 
on which it rests#d4 ,but this          
hypothesis itself1 very shortly after   
publishing this essay1 he was led to    
repudiate4 ,in other words1 his mind    
moved rapidly and sharply into a        
position of reasoned scepticism about   
the existence of ,god at all4 ,the      
,burney ,essay was published in #ahgd4  
,already in #ahgf at least he had       
written an anonymous work with a wholly 
sceptical conclusion1 entitled ',a      
,candid ,examination of ,theism' by     
,physicus#e4 ,as the ,notes were written
 with direct reference to this work1    
some detailed account of its argument   
seems necessary2 and this is to be found
 in the last chapter of the work itself1
 where the author summarizes his        

arguments and draws his conclusions4 ,i 
venture therefore to reproduce this     
chapter at length#f4   ' #a4 ,our       
analysis is now at an end1 and a very   
few words will here suffice to convey an
 epitomized recollection of the numerous
 facts and conclusions which we have    
found it necessary to contemplate4 ,we  
first disposed of the conspicuously     
absurd supposition that the origin of   
things1 or the mystery of existence i4e4
 the fact that anything exists at all1  
admits of being explained by the theory 
of ,theism in any further degree than by
 the theory of ,atheism4 ,next it was   
shown that the argument ,our heart      
requires a ,god is invalid1 seeing that 
such a subjective necessity1 even if    
made out1 could not be sufficient to    
prove--or even to render probable--an   
objective existence4 ,and with regard to
 the further argument that the fact of  
our theistic aspirations points to ,god 
as to their explanatory cause1 it became
 necessary to observe that the argument 

could only be admissible after the      
possibility of the operation of natural 
causes in the production of our theistic
 aspirations had been excluded4         
,similarly the argument from the        
supposed intuitive necessity of         
individual thought i4e4 the alleged fact
 that men find it impossible to rid     
themselves of the persuasion that ,god  
exists was found to be untenable1 first1
 because1 even if the supposed necessity
 were a real one1 it would only possess 
an individual applicability2 and second1
 that1 as a matter of fact1 it is       
extremely improbable that the supposed  
necessity is a real necessity even for  
the individual who asserts it1 while it 
is absolutely certain that it is not    
such to the vast majority of the race4  
,the argument from the general consent  
of mankind1 being so obviously          
fallacious both as to facts and         
principles1 was passed over without     
comment2 while the argument from a first
 cause was found to involve a logical   

suicide4 ,lastly1 the argument that1 as 
human volition is a cause in nature1    
therefore all causation is probably     
volitional in character1 was shown to   
consist in a stretch of inference so    
outrageous that the argument had to be  
pronounced worthless4  ' #b4 ,proceeding
 next to examine the less superficial   
arguments in favour of ,theism1 it was  
first shown that the syllogism1 ,all    
known minds are caused by an unknown    
mind2 our mind is a known mind2         
therefore our mind is caused by an      
unknown mind1--is a syllogism that is   
inadmissible for two reasons4 ,in the   
first place1 it does not account for    
mind 7in the abstract7 to refer it to a 
prior mind for its origin2 and          
therefore1 although the hypothesis1 if  
admitted1 would be an explanation of    
known mind1 it is useless as an argument
 for the existence of the unknown mind1 
the assumption of which forms the basis 
of that explanation4 ,again1 in the next
 place1 if it be said that mind is so   

far an entity sui generis that it must  
be either self-existing or caused by    
another mind1 there is no assignable    
warrant for the assertion4 ,and this is 
the second objection to the above       
syllogism2 for anything within the whole
 range of the possible may1 for aught   
that we can tell1 be competent to       
produce a self-conscious intelligence4  
,thus an objector to the above syllogism
 need not hold any theory of things at  
all2 but even as opposed to the definite
 theory of materialism1 the above       
syllogism has not so valid an           
argumentative basis to stand upon4 ,we  
know that what we call matter and force 
are to all appearance eternal1 while we 
have no corresponding evidence of a mind
 that is even apparently eternal4       
,further1 within experience mind is     
invariably associated with highly       
differentiated collocations of matter   
and distributions of force1 and many    
facts go to prove1 and none to negative1
 the conclusion that the grade of       

intelligence invariably depends upon1 or
 at least is associated with1 a         
corresponding grade of cerebral         
development4 ,there is thus both a      
qualitative and a quantitative relation 
between intelligence and cerebral       
organisation4 ,and if it is said that   
matter and motion cannot produce        
consciousness because it is             
inconceivable that they should1 we have 
seen at some length that this is no     
conclusive consideration as applied to a
 subject of a confessedly transcendental
 nature1 and that in the present case it
 is particularly inconclusive1 because1 
as it is speculatively certain that the 
substance of mind must be unknowable1 it
 seems  priori probable that1 whatever  
is the cause of the unknowable reality1 
this cause should be more difficult to  
render into thought in that relation    
than would some other hypothetical      
substance which is imagined as more akin
 to mind4 ,and if it is said that the   
more conceivable cause is the more      

probable cause1 we have seen that it is 
in this case impossible to estimate the 
validity of the remark4 ,lastly1 the    
statement that the cause must contain   
actually all that its effects can       
contain1 was seen to be inadmissible in 
logic and contradicted by everyday      
experience2 while the argument from the 
supposed freedom of the will and the    
existence of the moral sense was        
negatived both deductively by the theory
 of evolution1 and inductively by the   
doctrine of utilitarianism4' ,the theory
 of the freedom of the will is indeed at
 this stage of thought utterly          
untenable#g2 the evidence is            
overwhelming that the moral sense is the
 result of a purely natural evolution#h1
 and this result1 arrived at on general 
grounds1 is confirmed with irresistible 
force by the account of our human       
conscience which is supplied by the     
theory of utilitarianism1 a theory based
 on the widest and most unexceptionable 
of inductions#i4 ',on the whole1 then1  

with regard to the argument from the    
existence of the human mind1 we were    
compelled to decide that it is destitute
 of any assignable weight1 there being  
nothing more to lead to the conclusion  
that our mind has been caused by another
 mind1 than to the conclusion that it   
has been caused by anything else        
whatsoever4  ' #c4 ,with regard to the  
argument from ,design1 it was observed  
that ,mill's presentation of it in his  
,essay on ,theism is merely a           
resuscitation of the argument as        
presented by ,paley1 ,bell1 and         
,chalmers4 ,and indeed we saw that the  
first-named writer treated this whole   
subject with a feebleness and inaccuracy
 very surprising in him2 for while he   
has failed to assign anything like due  
weight to the inductive evidence of     
organic evolution1 he did not hesitate  
to rush into a supernatural explanation 
of biological phenomena4 ,moreover1 he  
has failed signally in his analysis of  
the ,design argument1 seeing that1 in   

common with all previous writers1 he    
failed to observe that it is utterly    
impossible for us to know the relations 
in which the supposed ,designer stands  
to the ,designed1--much less to argue   
from the fact that the ,supreme ,mind1  
even supposing it to exist1 caused the  
observable products by any particular   
intellectual process4 ,in other words1  
all advocates of the ,design argument   
have failed to perceive that1 even if we
 grant nature to be due to a creating   
,mind1 still we have no shadow of a     
right to conclude that this ,mind can   
only have exerted its creative power by 
means of such and such cogitative       
operations4 ,how absurd1 therefore1 must
 it be to raise the supposed evidence of
 such cogitative operations into        
evidences of the existence of a creating
 ,mind6 ,if a theist retorts that it is1
 after all1 of very little importance   
whether or not we are able to divine the
 methods of creation1 so long as the    
facts are there to attest that1 in some 

way or other1 the observable phenomena  
of nature must be due to ,intelligence  
of some kind as their ultimate cause1   
then ,i am the first to endorse this    
remark4 ,it has always appeared to me   
one of the most unaccountable things in 
the history of speculation that so many 
competent writers can have insisted upon
 ,design as an argument for ,theism1    
when they must all have known perfectly 
well that they have no means of         
ascertaining the subjective psychology  
of that ,supreme ,mind whose existence  
the argument is adduced to demonstrate4 
,the truth is1 that the argument from   
teleology must1 and can only1 rest upon 
the observable facts of nature1 without 
reference to the intellectual processes 
by which these facts may be supposed to 
have been accomplished4 ,but1 looking to
 the present state of our knowledge1    
this is merely to change the            
teleological argument in its gross      
,paleyian form1 into the argument from  
the ubiquitous operation of general     

laws4'  ' #d4 ,this argument was thus#aj
 stated in contrast with the argument   
from design4 ',the argument from design 
says1 there must be a ,god1 because such
 and such an organic structure must have
 been due to such and such an           
intellectual process4 ,the argument from
 general laws says1 ,there must be a    
,god1 because such and such an organic  
structure must in some way or other have
 been ultimately due to intelligence4'  
,every structure exhibits with more or  
less of complexity the principle of     
order2 it is related to all other things
 in a universal order4 ,this            
universality of order renders irrational
 the hypothesis of chance in accounting 
for the universe4 ',let us think of the 
supreme causality as we may1 the fact   
remains that from it there emanates a   
directive influence of uninterrupted    
consistency1 on a scale of stupendous   
magnitude and exact precision worthy of 
our highest conceptions of deity#aa4'   
,the argument was developed in the words

 of ,professor ,baden ,powell4 ',that   
which requires reason and thought to    
understand must be itself thought and   
reason4 ,that which mind alone can      
investigate or express must be itself   
mind4 ,and if the highest conception    
attained is but partial1 then the mind  
and reason studied is greater than the  
mind and reason of the student4 ,if the 
more it is studied the more vast and    
complex is the necessary connection in  
reason disclosed1 then the more evident 
is the vast extent and compass of the   
reason thus partially manifested and its
 reality as existing in the immutably   
connected order of objects examined1    
independently of the mind of the        
investigator4' ,this argument from the  
universal ,kosmos has the advantage of  
being wholly independent of the method  
by which things came to be what they    
are4 ,it is unaffected by the acceptance
 of evolution4 ,till quite recently it  
seemed irrefutable#ab4  ',but           
nevertheless we are constrained to      

acknowledge that its apparent power     
dwindles to nothing in view of the      
indisputable fact that1 if force and    
matter have been eternal1 all and every 
natural law must have resulted by way of
 necessary consequence4444 ,it does not 
admit of one moment's questioning that  
it is as certainly true that all the    
exquisite beauty and melodious harmony  
of nature follows necessarily as        
inevitably from the persistence of force
 and the primary qualities of matter as 
it is certainly true that force is      
persistent or that matter is extended or
 impenetrable#ac4444 ,it will be        
remembered that ,i dwelt at considerable
 length and with much earnestness upon  
this truth1 not only because of its     
enormous importance in its bearing upon 
our subject1 but also because no one has
 hitherto considered it in that         
relation4' ,it was also pointed out that
 the coherence and correspondence of the
 macrocosm of the universe with the     
microcosm of the human mind can be      

accounted for by the fact that the human
 mind is only one of the products of    
general evolution1 its subjective       
relations necessarily reflecting those  
external relations of which they        
themselves are the product#ad4  ' #e4   
,the next step1 however1 was to mitigate
 the severity of the conclusion that was
 liable to be formed upon the utter and 
hopeless collapse of all the possible   
arguments in favour of ,theism4 ,having 
fully demonstrated that there is no     
shadow of a positive argument in support
 of the theistic theory1 there arose the
 danger that some persons might         
erroneously conclude that for this      
reason the theistic theory must be      
untrue4 ,it therefore became necessary  
to point out1 that although1 as far as  
we can see1 nature does not require an  
,intelligent ,cause to account for any  
of her phenomena1 yet it is possible    
that1 if we could see farther1 we should
 see that nature could not be what she  
is unless she had owed her existence to 

an ,intelligent ,cause4 ,or1 in other   
words1 the probability there is that an 
,intelligent ,cause is unnecessary to   
explain any of the phenomena of nature1 
is only equal to the probability there  
is that the doctrine of the persistence 
of force is everywhere and eternally    
true4  ',as a final step in our         
analysis1 therefore1 we altogether      
quitted the region of experience1 and   
ignoring even the very foundations of   
science1 and so all the most certain of 
relative truths1 we carried the         
discussion into the transcendental      
region of purely formal considerations4 
,and here we laid down the canon1 that  
the value of any probability1 in its    
last analysis1 is determined by the     
number1 the importance1 and the         
definiteness of the relations known1 as 
compared with those of the relations    
unknown2 and1 consequently1 that in     
cases where the unknown relations are   
more numerous1 more important1 or more  
indefinite than are the known relations1

 the value of our inference varies      
inversely as the difference in these    
respects between the relations compared4
 ,from which canon it followed1 that as 
the problem of ,theism is the most      
ultimate of all problems1 and so        
contains in its unknown relations all   
that is to man unknown and unknowable1  
these relations must be pronounced the  
most indefinite of all relations that it
 is possible for man to contemplate2    
and1 consequently1 that although we have
 here the entire range of experience    
from which to argue1 we are unable to   
estimate the real value of any argument 
whatsoever4 ,the unknown relations in   
our attempted induction being wholly    
indefinite1 both in respect of their    
number and importance1 as compared with 
the known relations1 it is impossible   
for us to determine any definite        
probability either for or against the   
being of a ,god4 ,therefore1 although it
 is true that1 so far as human science  
can penetrate or human thought infer1 we

 can perceive no evidence of ,god1 yet  
we have no right on this account to     
conclude that there is no ,god4 ,the    
probability1 therefore1 that nature is  
devoid of ,deity1 while it is of the    
strongest kind if regarded              
scientifically--amounting1 in fact1 to a
 scientific demonstration1--is          
nevertheless wholly worthless if        
regarded logically4 ,although it is as  
true as is the fundamental basis of all 
science and of all experience that1 if  
there is a ,god1 ,his existence1        
considered as a cause of the universe1  
is superfluous1 it may nevertheless be  
true that1 if there had never been a    
,god1 the universe could never have     
existed4  ',hence these formal          
considerations proved conclusively that1
 no matter how great the probability of 
,atheism might appear to be in a        
relative sense1 we have no means of     
estimating such probability in an       
absolute sense4 ,from which position    
there emerged the possibility of another

 argument in favour of ,theism--or      
rather let us say1 of a reappearance of 
the teleological argument in another    
form4 ,for it may be said1 seeing that  
these formal considerations exclude     
legitimate reasoning either for or      
against ,deity in an absolute sense1    
while they do not exclude such reasoning
 in a relative sense1 if there yet      
remain any theistic deductions which may
 properly be drawn from experience1     
these may now be adduced to balance the 
atheistic deductions from the           
persistence of force4 ,for although the 
latter deductions have clearly shown the
 existence of ,deity to be superfluous  
in a scientific sense1 the formal       
considerations in question have no less 
clearly opened up beyond the sphere of  
science a possible locus for the        
existence of ,deity2 so that if there   
are any facts supplied by experience for
 which the atheistic deductions appear  
insufficient to account1 we are still   
free to account for them in a relative  

sense by the hypothesis of ,theism4     
,and1 it may be urged1 we do find such  
an unexplained residuum in the          
correlation of general laws in the      
production of cosmic harmony4 ,it       
signifies nothing1 the argument may run1
 that we are unable to conceive the     
methods whereby the supposed ,mind      
operates in producing cosmic harmony2   
nor does it signify that its operation  
must now be relegated to a              
super-scientific province4 ,what does   
signify is that1 taking a general view  
of nature1 we find it impossible to     
conceive of the extent and variety of   
her harmonious processes as other than  
products of intelligent causation4 ,now 
this sublimated form of the teleological
 argument1 it will be remembered1 ,i    
denoted a metaphysical teleology1 in    
order sharply to distinguish it from all
 previous forms of that argument1 which1
 in contradistinction ,i denoted        
scientific teleologies4 ,and the        
distinction1 it will be remembered1     

consisted in this--that while all       
previous forms of teleology1 by resting 
on a basis which was not beyond the     
possible reach of science1 laid         
themselves open to the possibility of   
scientific refutation1 the metaphysical 
system of teleology1 by resting on a    
basis which is clearly beyond the       
possible reach of science1 can never be 
susceptible of scientific refutation4   
,and that this metaphysical system of   
teleology does rest on such a basis is  
indisputable2 for while it accepts the  
most ultimate truths of which science   
can ever be cognizant--viz4 the         
persistence of force and the            
consequently necessary genesis of       
natural law1--it nevertheless maintains 
that the necessity of regarding ,mind as
 the ultimate cause of things is not on 
this account removed2 and1 therefore1   
that if science now requires the        
operation of a ,supreme ,mind to be     
posited in a super-scientific sphere1   
then in a super-scientific sphere it    

ought to be posited4 ,no doubt this     
hypothesis at first sight seems         
gratuitous1 seeing that1 so far as      
science can penetrate1 there is no need 
of any such hypothesis at all--cosmic   
harmony resulting as a physically       
necessary consequence from the combined 
action of natural laws1 which in turn   
result as a physically necessary        
consequence of the persistence of force 
and the primary qualities of matter4    
,but although it is thus indisputably   
true that metaphysical teleology is     
wholly gratuitous if considered         
scientifically1 it may not be true that 
it is wholly gratuitous if considered   
psychologically4 ,in other words1 if it 
is more conceivable that ,mind should be
 the ultimate cause of cosmic harmony   
than that the persistence of force      
should be so1 then it is not irrational 
to accept the more conceivable          
hypothesis in preference to the less    
conceivable one1 provided that the      
choice is made with the diffidence which

 is required by the considerations      
adduced in ,chapter ,v especially the   
,canon of probability laid down in the  
second paragraph of this section1  #e4  
',i conclude1 therefore1 that the       
hypothesis of metaphysical teleology1   
although in a physical sense gratuitous1
 may be in a psychological sense        
legitimate4 ,but as against the         
fundamental position on which alone this
 argument can rest--viz4 the position   
that the fundamental postulate of       
,atheism is more inconceivable than is  
the fundamental postulate of ,theism--we
 have seen two important objections to  
lie4  ',for1 in the first place1 the    
sense in which the word inconceivable is
 here used is that of the impossibility 
of framing realizable relations in the  
thought2 not that of the impossibility  
of framing abstract relations in        
thought4 ,in the same sense1 though in a
 lower degree1 it is true that the      
complexity of the human organization and
 its functions is inconceivable2 but in 

this sense the word inconceivable has   
much less weight in an argument than it 
has in its true sense4 ,and1 without    
waiting again to dispute 7as we did in  
the case of the speculative standing of 
,materialism7 how far even the genuine  
test of inconceivability ought to be    
allowed to make against an inference    
which there is a body of scientific     
evidence to substantiate1 we went on to 
the second objection against this       
fundamental position of metaphysical    
teleology4 ,this objection1 it will be  
remembered1 was1 that it is as          
impossible to conceive of cosmic harmony
 as an effect of ,mind i4e4 ,mind being 
what we know it in experience to be1 as 
it is to conceive of it as an effect of 
mindless evolution4 ,the argument from  
inconceivability1 therefore1 admits of  
being turned with quite as terrible an  
effect on ,theism1 as it can possibly be
 made to exert on ,atheism4  ',hence    
this more refined form of teleology     
which we are considering1 and which we  

saw to be the last of the possible      
arguments in favour of ,theism1 is met  
on its own ground by a very crushing    
opposition3 by its metaphysical         
character it has escaped the opposition 
of physical science1 only to encounter a
 new opposition in the region of pure   
psychology to which it fled4 ,as a      
conclusion to our whole inquiry1        
therefore1 it devolved on us to         
determine the relative magnitudes of    
these opposing forces4 ,and in doing    
this we first observed that1 if the     
supporters of metaphysical teleology    
objected  priori to the method whereby  
the genesis of natural law was deduced  
from the datum of the persistence of    
force1 in that this method involved an  
unrestricted use of illegitimate        
symbolic conceptions2 then it is no less
 open to an atheist to object  priori to
 the method whereby a directing ,mind   
was inferred from the datum of cosmic   
harmony1 in that this method involved   
the postulation of an unknowable        

cause1--and this of a character which   
the whole history of human thought has  
proved the human mind to exhibit an     
overweening tendency to postulate as the
 cause of natural phenomena4 ,on these  
grounds1 therefore1 ,i concluded that1  
so far as their respective standing     
priori is concerned1 both theories may  
be regarded as about equally suspicious4
 ,and similarly with regard to their    
standing  posteriori2 for as both       
theories require to embody at least one 
infinite term1 they must each alike be  
pronounced absolutely inconceivable4    
,but1 finally1 if the question were put 
to me which of the two theories ,i      
regarded as the more rational1 ,i       
observed that this is a question which  
no one man can answer for another4 ,for 
as the test of absolute inconceivability
 is equally destructive of both         
theories1 if a man wishes to choose     
between them1 his choice can only be    
determined by what ,i have designated   
relative inconceivability--i4e4 in      

accordance with the verdict given by his
 individual sense of probability as     
determined by his previous habit of     
thought4 ,and forasmuch as the test of  
relative inconceivability may be held in
 this matter legitimately to vary with  
the character of the mind which applies 
it1 the strictly rational probability of
 the question to which it is applied    
varies in like manner4 ,or otherwise    
presented1 the only alternative for any 
man in this matter is either to         
discipline himself into an attitude of  
pure scepticism1 and thus to refuse in  
thought to entertain either a           
probability or an improbability         
concerning the existence of a ,god2 or  
else to incline in thought towards an   
affirmation or a negation of ,god1      
according as his previous habits of     
thought have rendered such an           
inclination more facile in the one      
direction than in the other4 ,and       
although1 under such circumstances1 ,i  
should consider that man the more       

rational who carefully suspended his    
judgement1 ,i conclude that if this     
course is departed from1 neither the    
metaphysical teleologist nor the        
scientific atheist has any perceptible  
advantage over the other in respect of  
rationality4 ,for as the formal         
conditions of a metaphysical teleology  
are undoubtedly present on the one hand1
 and the formal conditions of a         
speculative atheism are as undoubtedly  
present on the other1 there is thus in  
both cases a logical vacuum supplied    
wherein the pendulum of thought is free 
to swing in whichever direction it may  
be made to swing by the momentum of     
preconceived ideas4  ' #f4 ,such is the 
outcome of our investigation1 and       
considering the abstract nature of the  
subject1 the immense divergence of      
opinion which at the present time is    
manifested with regard to it1 as well as
 the confusing amount of good1 bad and  
indifferent literature on both sides of 
the controversy which is                

extant2--considering these things1 ,i do
 not think that the result of our       
inquiry can be justly complained of on  
the score of its lacking precision4 ,at 
a time like the present1 when           
traditional beliefs respecting ,theism  
are so generally accepted1 and so       
commonly concluded as a matter of course
 to have a large and valid basis of     
induction whereon to rest1 ,i cannot but
 feel that a perusal of this short      
essay1 by showing how very concise the  
scientific status of the subject really 
is1 will do more to settle the minds of 
most readers as to the exact standing at
 the present time of all the            
probabilities of the question1 than     
could a perusal of all the rest of the  
literature upon this subject4 ,and1     
looking to the present condition of     
speculative philosophy1 ,i regard it as 
of the utmost importance to have clearly
 shown that the advance of science has  
now entitled us to assert1 without the  
least hesitation1 that the hypothesis of

 ,mind in nature is as certainly        
superfluous to account for any of the   
phenomena of nature1 as the scientific  
doctrine of the persistence of force and
 the indestructibility of matter is     
certainly true4  ',on the other hand1 if
 any one is inclined to complain that   
the logical aspect of the question has  
not proved itself so unequivocally      
definite as has the scientific1 ,i must 
ask him to consider that1 in any matter 
which does not admit of actual          
demonstration1 some margin must of      
necessity be left for variations of     
individual opinion4 ,and1 if he bears   
this consideration in mind1 ,i feel sure
 that he cannot properly complain of my 
not having done my utmost in this case  
to define as sharply as possible the    
character and the limits of this margin4
  ' #g4 ,and now1 in conclusion1 ,i feel
 it is desirable to state that any      
antecedent bias with regard to ,theism  
which ,i individually possess is        
unquestionably on the side of           

traditional beliefs4 ,it is therefore   
with the utmost sorrow that ,i find     
myself compelled to accept the          
conclusions here worked out2 and nothing
 would have induced me to publish them1 
save the strength of my conviction that 
it is the duty of every member of       
society to give his fellows the benefit 
of his labours for whatever they may be 
worth4 ,just as ,i am confident that    
truth must in the end be the most       
profitable for the race1 so ,i am       
persuaded that every individual         
endeavour to attain it1 provided only   
that such endeavour is unbiassed and    
sincere1 ought without hesitation to be 
made the common property of all men1 no 
matter in what direction the results of 
its promulgation may appear to tend4    
,and so far as the ruination of         
individual happiness is concerned1 no   
one can have a more lively perception   
than myself of the possibly disastrous  
tendency of my work4 ,so far as ,i am   
individually concerned1 the result of   

this analysis has been to show that1    
whether ,i regard the problem of ,theism
 on the lower plane of strictly relative
 probability1 or on the higher plane of 
purely formal considerations1 it equally
 becomes my obvious duty to stifle all  
belief of the kind which ,i conceive to 
be the noblest1 and to discipline my    
intellect with regard to this matter    
into an attitude of the purest          
scepticism4 ,and forasmuch as ,i am far 
from being able to agree with those who 
affirm that the twilight doctrine of the
 new faith is a desirable substitute for
 the waning splendour of the old1 ,i am 
not ashamed to confess that with this   
virtual negation of ,god the universe to
 me has lost its soul of loveliness2 and
 although from henceforth the precept to
 work while it is day will doubtless but
 gain an intensified force from the     
terribly intensified meaning of the     
words that the night cometh when no man 
can work1 yet when at times ,i think1 as
 think at times ,i must1 of the         

appalling contrast between the hallowed 
glory of that creed which once was mine1
 and the lonely mystery of existence as 
now ,i find it1--at such times ,i shall 
ever feel it impossible to avoid the    
sharpest pang of which my nature is     
susceptible4 ,for whether it be due to  
my intelligence not being sufficiently  
advanced to meet the requirements of the
 age1 or whether it be due to the memory
 of those sacred associations which to  
me at least were the sweetest that life 
has given1 ,i cannot but feel that for  
me1 and for others who think as ,i do1  
there is a dreadful truth in those words
 of ,hamilton1--,philosophy having      
become a meditation1 not merely of      
death1 but of annihilation1 the precept 
know thyself has become transformed into
 the terrific oracle to ,o,edipus--     
,mayest thou ne'er know the truth of    
what thou art4'  ,this analysis will    
have been at least sufficient to give a 
clear idea of the general argument of   
the ,candid ,examination and of its     

melancholy conclusions4 ,what will most 
strike a somewhat critical reader is    
perhaps 7#a7 the tone of certainty1 and 
7#b7 the belief in the almost exclusive 
right of the scientific method in the   
court of reason4  ,as evidence of 7#a7  
,i would adduce the following brief     
quotations3--       ,p4 xi4 ',possible  
errors in reasoning apart1 the rational 
position      of ,theism as here defined
 must remain without material           
modification      as long as our        
intelligence remains human4'       ,p4  
#bd4 ',i am quite unable to understand  
how any one at the present      day1 and
 with the most moderate powers of       
abstract thinking1 can      possibly    
bring himself to embrace the theory of  
,free-will4'       ,p4 #fd4             
',undoubtedly we have no alternative but
 to conclude that the      hypothesis of
 mind in nature is now logically proved 
to be as      certainly superfluous as  
the very basis of all science is        
certainly      true4 ,there can no      

longer be any more doubt that the       
existence of a      ,god is wholly      
unnecessary to explain any of the       
phenomena of the      universe1 than    
there is doubt that if ,i leave go of my
 pen it will      fall upon the table4' 
,as evidence of 7#b7 ,i would adduce    
from the preface--       ',to my mind1  
therefore1 it is impossible to resist   
the conclusion      that1 looking to    
this undoubted pre-eminence of the      
scientific      methods as ways to      
truth1 whether or not there is a ,god1  
the      question as to his existence is
 both more morally and more             
reverently contemplated if we regard it 
purely as a problem for      methodical 
analysis to solve1 than if we regard it 
in any other      light4'  ,it is in    
respect both of 7#a7 and 7#b7 that the  
change in ,romanes' thought as exhibited
 in his later ,notes is most            
conspicuous#ae4  ,at what date ,george  
,romanes' mind began to react from the  
conclusions of the ,candid ,examination 

,i cannot say4 ,but after a period of   
ten years--in his ,rede lecture of      
#ahheaf--we find his frame of mind very 
much changed4 ,this lecture1 on ,mind   
and ,motion1 consists of a severe       
criticism of the materialistic account  
of mind4 ,on the other hand             
'spiritualism'--or the theory which     
would suppose that mind is the cause of 
motion--is pronounced from the point of 
view of science not impossible indeed   
but 'unsatisfactory1' and the more      
probable conclusion is found in a       
'monism' like ,bruno's--according to    
which mind and motion are co-ordinate   
and probably co-extensive aspects of the
 same universal fact--a monism which may
 be called ,pantheism1 but may also be  
regarded as an extension of contracted  
views of ,theism#ag4 ,the position      
represented by this lecture may be seen 
sufficiently from its conclusion3--     
',if the advance of natural science is  
now steadily leading us to the          
conclusion that there is no motion      

without mind1 must we not see how the   
independent conclusion of mental science
 is thus independently confirmed--the   
conclusion1 ,i mean1 that there is no   
being without knowing8 ,to me1 at least1
 it does appear that the time has come  
when we may begin1 as it were in a      
dawning light1 to see that the study of 
,nature and the study of ,mind are      
meeting upon this greatest of possible  
truths4 ,and if this is the case--if    
there is no motion without mind1 no     
being without knowing--shall we infer1  
with ,clifford1 that universal being is 
mindless1 or answer with a dogmatic     
negative that most stupendous of        
questions1--,is there knowledge with the
 ,most ,high8 ,if there is no motion    
without mind1 no being without knowing1 
may we not rather infer1 with ,bruno1   
that it is in the medium of mind1 and in
 the medium of knowledge1 we live1 and  
move1 and have our being8  ',this1 ,i   
think1 is the direction in which the    
inference points1 if we are careful to  

set out the logical conditions with     
complete impartiality4 ,but the ulterior
 question remains1 whether1 so far as   
science is concerned1 it is here        
possible to point any inference at all3 
the whole orbit of human knowledge may  
be too narrow to afford a parallax for  
measurements so vast4 ,yet even here1 if
 it be true that the voice of science   
must thus of necessity speak the        
language of agnosticism1 at least let us
 see to it that the language is pure#ah2
 let us not tolerate any barbarisms     
introduced from the side of aggressive  
dogma4 ,so shall we find that this new  
grammar of thought does not admit of any
 constructions radically opposed to more
 venerable ways of thinking2 even if we 
do not find that the often-quoted words 
of its earliest formulator apply with   
special force to its latest             
dialects--that if a little knowledge of 
physiology and a little knowledge of    
psychology dispose men to atheism1 a    
deeper knowledge of both1 and1 still    

more1 a deeper thought upon their       
relations to one another1 will lead men 
back to some form of religion1 which if 
it be more vague1 may also be more      
worthy than that of earlier days4'      
,some time before #ahhi three articles  
were written for the ,nineteenth        
,century on the ,influence of ,science  
upon ,religion4 ,they were never        
published1 for what reason ,i am not    
able to ascertain4 ,but ,i have thought 
it worth while to print the first two of
 them as a 'first part' of this volume1 
both because they contain--written in   
,george ,romanes' own name--an important
 criticism upon the ,candid ,examination
 which he had published anonymously1 and
 also because1 with their entirely      
sceptical result1 they exhibit very     
clearly a stage in the mental history of
 their author4 ,the antecedents of these
 papers those who have read this        
,introduction will now be in a position 
to understand4 ,what remains to be said 
by way of further introduction to the   

,notes had better be reserved till      
later4                                  
,c4,g4   ,,footnotes3  #a p4 #g4  #b p4 
#agc4  #c ,see p4 #aaj4  #d ,but see an 
interesting note in ,romanes' ,mind and 
,motion and ,monism 7,longmans1 #ahie7  
p4 #aaa4  #e ,published in ,trbner's    
,english and ,foreign ,philosophical    
,library in #ahgh1 but written 'several 
years ago' 7preface74 ',i have refrained
 from publishing it1' the author        
explains1 'lest1 after having done so1  
,i should find that more mature thought 
had modified the conclusions which the  
author sets forth4'  #f ,at times ,i    
have sought to make the argument of the 
chapter more intelligible by introducing
 references to earlier parts of the book
 or explanations in my own words4 ,these
 latter ,i have inserted in square      
brackets4  #g p4 #bd4  #h p4 #bh4  #i p4
 #bh4  #aj p4 #de4  #aa p4 #dg4  #ab p4 
#ej4  #ac p4 #fc4  #ad pp4 #eh ff4  #ae 
,with reference to the views and        
arguments of the ,candid ,examination1  

it may be interesting to notice here in 
detail that ,george ,romanes 7#a7 came  
to attach much more importance to the   
subjective religious needs and          
intuitions of the human spirit 7pp4 #aca
 ff472 7#b7 perceived that the          
subjective religious consciousness can  
be regarded objectively as a broad human
 phenomenon 7pp4 #adg f472 7#c7         
criticized his earlier theory of        
causation and returned towards the      
theory that all causation is volitional 
7pp4 #ajb1 #aah72 7#d7 definitely       
repudiated the materialistic account of 
the origin of mind 7pp4 #cj1 #ca72 7#e7 
returned to the use of the expression   
'the argument from design1' and         
therefore presumably abandoned his      
strong objection to it2 7#f7 'saw       
through' ,herbert ,spencer's refutation 
of the wider teleology expressed by     
,baden ,powell1 and felt the force of   
the teleology again 7p4 #gb72 7#g7      
recognized that the scientific          
objections to the doctrine of the       

freedom of the will are not finally     
valid 7p4 #abh74  #af ,see ,mind and    
,motion and ,monism1 pp4 #cf ff4  #ag   
,in some ',notes' of the ,summer of     
#ahic ,i find the statement1 ',the      
result 7of philosophical inquiry7 has   
been that in his millennial             
contemplation and experience man has    
attained certainty with regard to       
certain aspects of the world problem1 no
 less secure than that which he has     
gained in the domain of physical        
science1 e4g4  ,logical priority of mind
 over matter4  ,consequent untenability 
of materialism4  ,relativity of         
knowledge4  ,the order of nature1       
conservation of energy and              
indestructibility of matter within human
 experience1 the principle of evolution 
and survival of the fittest4'  #ah ,for 
the meaning of 'pure' agnosticism see   
below1 pp4 #ajg ff4     ,,part ,i4      
,,the ,,influence ,,of ,,science ,,upon 
,,religion4     ,i4   ,i propose to     
consider1 in a series of three papers1  

the influence of ,science upon          
,religion4 ,in doing this ,i shall seek 
to confine myself to the strictly       
rational aspect of the subject1 without 
travelling into any matters of          
sentiment4 ,moreover1 ,i shall aim at   
estimating in the first instance the    
kind and degree of influence which has  
been exerted by ,science upon ,religion 
in the past1 and then go on to estimate 
the probable extent of this influence in
 the future4 ,the first two papers will 
be devoted to the past and prospective  
influence of ,science upon ,natural     
,religion1 while the third will be      
devoted to the past and prospective     
influence of ,science upon ,revealed    
,religion#ai4  ,few subjects have       
excited so much interest of late years  
as that which ,i thus mark out for      
discussion4 ,this can scarcely be       
considered a matter of surprise1 seeing 
that the influence in question is not   
only very direct1 but also extremely    
important from every point of view4 ,for

 generations and for centuries in       
succession ,religion maintained an      
undisputed sway over men's minds--if not
 always as a practical guide in matters 
of conduct1 at least as a regulator of  
belief4 ,even among the comparatively   
few who in previous centuries           
professedly rejected ,christianity1     
there can be no doubt that their        
intellectual conceptions were largely   
determined by it3 for ,christianity     
being then the only court of appeal with
 reference to all these conceptions1    
even the few minds which were           
professedly without its jurisdiction    
could scarcely escape its indirect      
influence through the minds of others4  
,but as side by side with the venerable 
institution a new court of appeal was   
gradually formed1 we cannot wonder that 
it should have come to be regarded in   
the light of a rival to the old--more   
especially as the searching methods of  
its inquiry and the certain character of
 its judgements were much more in       

consonance with the requirements of an  
age disposed to scepticism4 ,and this   
spirit of rivalry is still further      
fostered by the fact that ,science has  
unquestionably exerted upon ,religion   
what ,mr4 ,fiske terms a 'purifying     
influence4' ,that is to say1 not only   
are the scientific methods of inquiry   
after truth more congenial to sceptical 
minds than are the religious methods    
7which may broadly be defined as        
accepting truth on authority71 but the  
results of the former have more than    
once directly contradicted those of the 
latter3 science has in several cases    
incontestably demonstrated that         
religious teaching has been wrong as to 
matters of fact4 ,further still1 the    
great advance of natural knowledge which
 has characterized the present century1 
has caused our ideas upon many subjects 
connected with philosophy to undergo a  
complete metamorphosis4 ,a well-educated
 man of the present day is absolutely   
precluded from regarding some of the    

,christian dogmas from the same         
intellectual standpoint as his          
forefathers1 even though he may still   
continue to accept them in some other   
sense4 ,in short1 our whole key of      
thinking or tone of thought having been 
in certain respects changed1 we can no  
longer anticipate that in these respects
 it should continue to harmonize with   
the unalterable system of theology4     
,such ,i conceive to be the ways in     
which ,science has exerted her influence
 upon ,religion1 and it is needless to  
dwell upon the potency of their united  
effect4 ,no one can read even a         
newspaper without perceiving how great  
this effect has been4 ,on the one hand1 
sceptics are triumphantly confident that
 the light of dawning knowledge has     
begun finally to dispel the darkness of 
superstition1 while religious persons1  
on the other hand1 tremble to think what
 the future1 if judged by the past1 is  
likely to bring forth4 ,on both sides we
 have free discussion1 strong language1 

and earnest canvassing4 ,year by year   
stock is taken1 and year by year the    
balance is found to preponderate in     
favour of ,science4  ,this being the    
state of things of the present time1 ,i 
think that with the experience of the   
kind and degree of influence which      
,science has exerted upon ,religion in  
the past1 we have material enough       
whereby to estimate the probable extent 
of such influence in the future4 ,this1 
therefore1 ,i shall endeavour to do by  
seeking to define1 on general           
principles1 the limits within which it  
is antecedently possible that the       
influence in question can be exercised4 
,but in order to do this1 it is         
necessary to begin by estimating the    
kind and degree of the influence which  
has been exerted by ,science upon       
,religion in the past4  ,thus much      
premised1 we have in the first place to 
define the essential nature both of     
,science and of ,religion3 for this is  
clearly the first step in an analysis   

which has for its object an estimation  
of the actual and possible effects of   
one of these departments of thought upon
 the other4  ,science1 then1 is         
essentially a department of thought     
having exclusive reference to the       
,proximate4 ,more particularly1 it is a 
department of thought having for its    
object the explanation of natural       
phenomena by the discovery of natural   
7or proximate7 causes4 ,in so far as    
,science ventures to trespass beyond    
this her only legitimate domain1 and    
seeks to interpret natural phenomena by 
the immediate agency of supernatural or 
ultimate causes1 in that degree has she 
ceased to be physical science1 and      
become ontological speculation4 ,the    
truth of this statement has now been    
practically recognized by all scientific
 workers2 and terms describing final    
causes have been banished from their    
vocabulary in astronomy1 chemistry1     
geology1 biology1 and even in           
psychology4  ,religion1 on the other    

hand1 is a department of thought having 
no less exclusive reference to the      
,ultimate4 ,more particularly1 it is a  
department of thought having for its    
object a self-conscious and intelligent 
,being1 which it regards as a ,personal 
,god1 and the fountain-head of all      
causation4 ,i am1 of course1 aware that 
the term ,religion has been of late     
years frequently used in senses which   
this definition would not cover2 but ,i 
conceive that this only shows how       
frequently the term in question has been
 abused4 ,to call any theory of things a
 ,religion which does not present any   
belief in any form of ,deity1 is to     
apply the word to the very opposite of  
that which it has hitherto been used to 
denote4 ,to speak of the ,religion of   
the ,unknowable1 the ,religion of       
,cosmism1 the ,religion of ,humanity1   
and so forth1 where the personality of  
the ,first ,cause is not recognized1 is 
as unmeaning as it would be to speak of 
the love of a triangle1 or the          

rationality of the equator4 ,that is to 
say1 if any meaning is to be extracted  
from the terms at all1 it is only to be 
so by using them in some metaphorical   
sense4 ,we may1 for instance1 say that  
there is such a thing as a ,religion of 
,humanity1 because we may begin by      
deifying ,humanity in our own           
estimation1 and then go on to worship   
our ideal4 ,but by thus giving ,humanity
 the name of ,deity we are not really   
creating a new religion3 we are merely  
using a metaphor1 which may or may not  
be successful as a matter of poetic     
diction1 but which most assuredly       
presents no shred of value as a matter  
of philosophical statement4 ,indeed1 in 
this relation it is worse than          
valueless3 it is misleading4 ,variations
 or reversals in the meanings of words  
are not of uncommon occurrence in the   
ordinary growth of languages2 but it is 
not often that we find1 as in this case1
 the whole meaning of a term            
intentionally and gratuitously changed  

by the leaders of philosophical thought4
 ,humanity1 for example1 is an abstract 
idea of our own making3 it is not an    
object any more than the equator is an  
object4 ,therefore1 if it were possible 
to construct a religion by this curious 
device of metaphorically ascribing to   
,humanity the attributes of ,deity1 it  
ought to be as logically possible to    
construct1 let us say1 a theory of      
brotherly regard towards the equator1 by
 metaphorically ascribing to it the     
attributes of man4 ,the distinguishing  
features of any theory which can        
properly be termed a ,religion1 is that 
it should refer to the ultimate source1 
or sources1 of things3 and that it      
should suppose this source to be of an  
objective1 intelligent1 and personal    
nature4 ,to apply the term ,religion to 
any other theory is merely to abuse it4 
,from these definitions1 then1 it       
appears that the aims and methods of    
,science are exclusively concerned with 
the ascertaining and the proof of the   

proximate ,how of things and processes  
physical3 her problem is1 as ,mill      
states it1 to discover what are the     
fewest number of 7phenomenal7 data      
which1 being granted1 will explain the  
phenomena of experience4 ,on the other  
hand1 ,religion is not in any way       
concerned with causation1 further than  
to assume that all things and all       
processes are ultimately due to         
intelligent personality4 ,religion is   
thus1 as ,mr4 ,spencer says1 'an  priori
 theory of the universe'--to which1     
however1 we must add1 'and a theory     
which assumes intelligent personality as
 the originating source of the          
universe4' ,without this needful        
addition1 a religion would be in no way 
logically distinguished from a          
philosophy4  ,from these definitions1   
then1 it clearly follows that in their  
purest forms1 ,science and ,religion    
really have no point of logical contact4
 ,only if ,science could transcend the  
conditions of space and time1 of        

phenomenal relativity1 and of all human 
limitations1 only then could ,science be
 in a position to touch the supernatural
 theory of ,religion4 ,but obviously1 if
 ,science could do this1 she would cease
 to be ,science4 ,in soaring above the  
region of phenomena and entering the    
tenuous aether of noumena1 her present  
wings1 which we call her methods1 would 
in such an atmosphere be no longer of   
any service for movement4 ,out of time1 
out of place1 and out of phenomenal     
relation1 ,science could no longer exist
 as such4  ,on the other hand1 ,religion
 in its purest form is equally          
incompetent to affect ,science4 ,for1 as
 we have already seen1 ,religion as such
 is not concerned with the phenomenal   
sphere3 her theory of ontology cannot   
have any reference to the ,how of       
phenomenal causation4 ,hence it is      
evident that1 as in their purest or most
 ideal forms they move in different     
mental planes1 ,science and ,religion   
cannot exhibit interference4  ,thus far 

the remarks which ,i have made apply    
equally to all forms of ,religion1 as   
such1 whether actual or possible1 and in
 so far as the ,religion is pure4 ,but  
it is notorious that until quite        
recently ,religion did exercise upon    
,science1 not only an influence1 but an 
overpowering influence4 ,belief in      
divine agency being all but universal1  
while the methods of scientific research
 had not as yet been distinctly         
formulated1 it was in previous          
generations the usual habit of mind to  
refer any natural phenomenon1 the       
physical causation of which had not been
 ascertained1 to the more or less       
immediate causal action of the ,deity4  
,but we now see that this habit of mind 
arose from a failure to distinguish     
between the essentially distinct        
characters of ,science and ,religion as 
departments of thought1 and therefore   
that it was only so far as the ,religion
 of former times was impure--or mixed   
with the ingredients of thought which   

belong to ,science--that the baleful    
influence in question was exerted4 ,the 
gradual1 successive1 and now all but    
total abolition of final causes from the
 thoughts of scientific men1 to which   
allusion has already been made1 is      
merely an expression of the fact that   
scientific men as a body have come fully
 to recognize the fundamental           
distinction between ,science and        
,religion which ,i have stated4  ,or1 to
 put the matter in another way1         
scientific men as a body--and1 indeed1  
all persons whose ideas on such matters 
are abreast of the times--perceive      
plainly enough that a religious         
explanation of any natural phenomenon   
is1 from a scientific point of view1 no 
explanation at all4 ,for a religious    
explanation consists in referring the   
observed phenomenon to the ,first       
,cause--i4e4 to merge that particular   
phenomenon in the general or final      
mystery of things4 ,a scientific        
explanation1 on the other hand1 consists

 in referring the observed phenomenon to
 its physical causes1 and in no case can
 such an explanation entertain the      
hypothesis of a final cause without     
abandoning its character as a scientific
 explanation4 ,for example1 if a child  
brings me a flower and asks why it has  
such a curious form1 bright colour1     
sweet perfume1 and so on1 and if ,i     
answer1 ,because ,god made it so1 ,i am 
not really answering the child's        
question3 ,i am merely concealing my    
ignorance of ,nature under a guise of   
piety1 and excusing my indolence in the 
study of botany4 ,it was the            
appreciation of this fact that led ,mr4 
,darwin to observe in his ,origin of    
,species that the theory of creation    
does not serve to explain any of the    
facts with which it is concerned1 but   
merely re-states these facts as they are
 observed to occur4 ,that is to say1 by 
thus merging the facts as observed into 
the final mystery of things1 we are not 
even attempting to explain them in any  

scientific sense3 for it would be       
obviously possible to get rid of the    
necessity of thus explaining any natural
 phenomenon whatsoever by referring it  
to the immediate causal action of the   
,deity4 ,if any phenomenon were actually
 to occur which did proceed from the    
immediate causal action of the ,deity1  
then ex hypothesi1 there would be no    
physical causes to investigate1 and the 
occupation of ,othello1 in the person of
 a man of science1 would be gone4 ,such 
a phenomenon would be miraculous1 and   
therefore from its very nature beyond   
the reach of scientific investigation4  
,properly speaking1 then1 the religious 
theory of final causes does not explain 
any of the phenomena of ,nature3 it     
merely re-states the phenomena as       
observed--or1 if we prefer so to say1 it
 is itself an ultimate and universal    
explanation of all possible phenomena   
taken collectively4 ,for it must be     
admitted that behind all possible       
explanations of a scientific kind1 there

 lies a great inexplicable1 which just  
because of its ultimate character1      
cannot be merged into anything          
further--that is to say1 cannot be      
explained4 ',it is what it is1' is all  
that we can say of it3 ',i am that ,i   
am' is all that it could say of itself4 
,and it is in referring phenomena to    
this inexplicable source of physical    
causation that the theory of ,religion  
essentially consists4 ,the theory of    
,science1 on the other hand1 consists in
 the assumption that there is always a  
practically endless chain of physical   
causation to investigate--i4e4 an       
endless series of phenomena to be       
explained4 ,so that1 if we define the   
process of explanation as the process of
 referring observed phenomena to their  
adequate causes1 we may say that        
,religion1 by the aid of a general      
theory of things in the postulation of  
an intelligent ,first ,cause1 furnishes 
to her own satisfaction an ultimate     
explanation of the universe as a whole1 

and therefore is not concerned with any 
of those proximate explanations or      
discovery of second causes1 which form  
the exclusive subject-matter of         
,science4 ,in other words1 we recur to  
the definitions already stated1 to the  
effect that ,religion is a department of
 thought having1 as such1 exclusive     
reference to the ,ultimate1 while       
,science is a department of thought     
having1 as such1 no less exclusive      
reference to the ,proximate4 ,when these
 two departments of thought overlap1    
interference results1 and we find       
confusion4 ,therefore it was that when  
the religious theory of final causes    
intruded upon the field of scientific   
inquiry1 it was passing beyond its      
logical domain2 and seeking to arrogate 
the function of explaining this or that 
phenomenon in detail1 it ceased to be a 
purely religious theory1 while at the   
same time and for the same reason it    
blocked the way of scientific           
progress#bj4  ,this remark serves to    

introduce one of the chief topics with  
which ,i have to deal--viz4 the doctrine
 of ,design in ,nature1 and thus the    
whole question of ,natural ,religion in 
its relation to ,natural ,science4 ,in  
handling this topic ,i shall endeavour  
to take as broad and deep a view as ,i  
can of the present standing of ,natural 
,religion1 without waiting to show step 
by step the ways and means by which it  
has been brought into this position1 by 
the influence of ,science4  ,in the     
earliest dawn of recorded thought1      
teleology in some form or another has   
been the most generally accepted theory 
whereby the order of ,nature is         
explained4 ,it is not1 however1 my      
object in this paper to trace the       
history of this theory from its first   
rude beginnings in ,fetishism to its    
final development in ,theism4 ,i intend 
to devote myself exclusively to the     
question as to the present standing of  
this theory1 and ,i allude to its past  
history only in order to examine the    

statement which is frequently made1 to  
the effect that its general prevalence  
in all ages and among all peoples of the
 world lends to it a certain degree of  
'antecedent credibility4' ,with         
reference to this point1 ,i should say1 
that1 whether or not the order of       
,nature is due to a disposing ,mind1 the
 hypothesis of mental agency in         
,nature--or1 as the ,duke of ,argyll    
terms it1 the hypothesis of             
'anthropopsychism'--must necessarily    
have been the earliest hypothesis4 ,what
 we find in ,nature is the universal    
prevalence of causation1 and long before
 the no less universal equivalency      
between causes and effects--i4e4 the    
universal prevalence of natural         
law--became a matter of even the vaguest
 appreciation1 the general fact that    
nothing happens without a cause of some 
kind was fully recognized4 ,indeed1 the 
recognition of this fact is not only    
presented by the lowest races of the    
present day1 but1 as ,i have myself     

given evidence to show1 likewise by     
animals and infants#ba4 ,and therefore1 
it appears to me probable that those    
psychologists are right who argue that  
the idea of cause is intuitive1 in the  
same sense that the ideas of space and  
time are intuitive--i4e4 the instinctive
 or inherited effect of ancestral       
experience4  ,now if it is thus a matter
 of certainty that the recognition of   
causality in ,nature is co-extensive    
with1 and even anterior to1 the human   
mind1 it appears to me no less certain  
that the first attempt at assigning a   
cause of this or that observed event in 
,nature--i4e4 the first attempts at a   
rational explanation of the phenomena of
 ,nature--must have been of an          
anthropopsychic kind4 ,no other         
explanation was1 as it were1 so ready to
 hand as that of projecting into        
external ,nature the agency of volition1
 which was known to each individual as  
the apparent fountain-head of causal    
activity so far as he and his neighbours

 were concerned4 ,to reach this most    
obvious explanation of causality in     
,nature1 it did not require that        
primitive man should know1 as we know1  
that the very conception of causality   
arises out of our sense of effort in    
voluntary action2 it only required that 
this should be the fact1 and then it    
must needs follow that when any natural 
phenomenon was thought about at all with
 reference to its causality1 the cause  
inferred should be one of a psychical   
kind4 ,i need not wait to trace the     
gradual integration of this             
anthropopsychic hypothesis from its     
earliest and most diffused form of what 
we may term polypsychism 7wherein the   
causes inferred were almost as          
personally numerous as the effects      
contemplated71 through polytheism       
7wherein many effects of a like kind    
were referred to one deity1 who1 as it  
were1 took special charge over that     
class71 up to monotheism 7wherein all   
causation is gathered up into the       

monopsychism of a single personality73  
it is enough thus briefly to show that  
from first to last the hypothesis of    
anthropopsychism is a necessary phase of
 mental evolution under existing        
conditions1 and this whether or not the 
hypothesis is true4  ,thus viewed1 ,i do
 not think that 'the general consent of 
mankind' is a fact of any argumentative 
weight in favour of the anthropopsychic 
theory--so far1 ,i mean1 as the matter  
of causation is concerned--whether this 
be in fetishism or in the teleology of  
our own day3 the general consent of     
mankind in the larger question of theism
 7where sundry other matters besides    
causation fail to be considered7 does   
not here concern us4 ,indeed1 it appears
 to me that if we are to go back to the 
savages for any guarantee of our        
anthropopsychic theory1 the pledge which
 we receive is of worse than no value4  
,as well might we conclude that a match 
is a living organism1 because this is to
 the mind of a savage the most obvious  

explanation of its movements1 as        
conclude on precisely similar grounds   
that our belief in teleology derives any
 real support from any of the more      
primitive phases of anthropopsychism4   
,it seems to me1 therefore1 that in     
seeking to estimate the evidence of     
design in ,nature1 we must as it were   
start de novo1 without reference to     
anterior beliefs upon the subject4 ,the 
question is essentially one to be       
considered in the light of all the      
latest knowledge that we possess1 and by
 the best faculties of thinking that we 
7the heirs of all the ages7 are able to 
bring to bear upon it4 ,i shall1        
therefore1 only allude to the history of
 anthropopsychism in so far as ,i may   
find it necessary to do so for the sake 
of elucidating my argument4  ,and here  
it is needful to consider first what    
,paley called 'the state of the         
argument' before the ,darwinian epoch4  
,this is clearly and tersely presented  
by ,paley in his classical illustration 

of finding a watch upon a heath--an     
illustration so well known that ,i need 
not here re-state it4 ,i will merely    
observe1 therefore1 that it conveys1 as 
it were in one's watch-pocket1 the whole
 of the argument from design2 and that  
it is not in my opinion open to the     
stricture which was passed upon it by   
,mill where he says1--',the inference   
would not be from marks of design1 but  
because ,i already know by direct       
experience that watches are made by     
men4' ,this appears to me to miss the   
whole point of ,paley's meaning1 for    
there would be obviously no argument at 
all unless he be understood to mean that
 the evidence of design which is        
supposed to be afforded by examination  
of the watch1 is supposed to be afforded
 by this examination only1 and not from 
any of the direct knowledge alluded to  
by ,mill4 ,for the purposes of the      
illustration1 it must clearly be assumed
 that the finder of the watch has no    
previous or direct knowledge touching   

the manufacture of watches4 ,apart from 
this curious misunderstanding1 ,mill was
 at one with ,paley upon the whole      
subject4  ,again1 it is no real         
objection to the argument or            
illustration to say1 as we often have   
said1 that it does not account for the  
watchmaker4 ,the object of the argument 
from design is to prove the existence of
 a designer3 not to explain that        
existence4 ,indeed1 it would be suicidal
 to the whole argument in its relation  
to ,theism1 if the possibility of any   
such explanation were entertained2 for  
such a possibility could only be        
entertained on the supposition that the 
being of the ,deity admits of being     
explained--i4e4 that the ,deity is not  
ultimate4  ,lastly1 the argument is     
precisely the same as that which occurs 
in numerous passages of ,scripture and  
in theological writings all over the    
world down to the present time4 ,that is
 to say1 everywhere in organic nature we
 meet with innumerable adaptations of   

means to ends1 which in very many cases 
present a degree of refinement and      
complexity in comparison with which the 
adaptations of means to ends in a watch 
are but miserable and rudimentary       
attempts at mechanism4 ,no one can know 
so well as the modern biologist in what 
an immeasurable degree the mechanisms   
which occur in such profusion in nature 
surpass1 in every form of excellence1   
the highest triumphs of human invention4
 ,hence at first sight it does          
unquestionably appear that we could have
 no stronger or better evidence of      
purpose than is thus afforded4 ,in the  
words of ,paley3 'arrangement1          
disposition of parts1 subserviency of   
means to an end1 relation of instruments
 to a use1 imply the presence of        
intelligence and mind4'  ,but next the  
question arises1 ,although such things  
certainly may#bb imply the presence of  
mind as their explanatory cause1 are we 
entitled to assume that there can be in 
nature no other cause competent to      

produce these effects8 ,this is a       
question which never seems to have      
occurred to ,paley1 ,bell1 ,chalmers1 or
 indeed to any of the natural           
theologians up to the time of ,darwin4  
,this1 ,i think1 is a remarkable fact1  
because the question is one which1 as a 
mere matter of logical form1 appears to 
lie so much upon the surface4 ,but      
nevertheless the fact remains that      
natural theologians1 so far as ,i know  
without exception1 were satisfied to    
assume as an axiom that mechanism could 
have no cause other than that of a      
designing mind2 and therefore their work
 was restricted to tracing out in detail
 the number and the excellency of the   
mechanisms which were to be met with in 
nature4 ,it is1 however1 obvious that   
the mere accumulation of such cases can 
have no real1 or logical1 effect upon   
the argument4 ,the mechanisms which we  
encounter in nature are so amazing in   
their perfections1 that the attentive   
study of any one of them would 7as      

,paley in his illustration virtually1   
though not expressly1 contends7 be      
sufficient to carry the whole position1 
if the assumption be conceded that      
mechanism can only be due to mind4      
,therefore the argument is not really1  
or logically1 strengthened by the mere  
accumulation of any number of special   
cases of mechanism in nature1 all as    
mechanisms similar in kind4 ,let us now 
consider this argument4  ,if we are     
disposed to wonder why natural          
theologians prior to the days of ,darwin
 were content to assume that mind is the
 only possible cause of mechanism1 ,i   
think we have a ready answer in the     
universal prevalence of their belief in 
special creation4 ,for ,i think it is   
unquestionable that1 upon the basis of  
this belief1 the assumption is          
legitimate4 ,that is to say1 if we start
 with the belief that all species of    
plants and animals were originally      
introduced to the complex conditions of 
their several environments suddenly and 

ready made 7in some such manner as      
watches are turned out from a           
manufactory71 then ,i think we are      
reasonably entitled to assume that no   
conceivable cause1 other than that of   
intelligent purpose1 could possibly be  
assigned in explanation of the effects4 
,it is1 of course1 needless to observe  
that in so far as this previous belief  
in special creation was thus allowed to 
affect the argument from design1 that   
argument became an instance of circular 
reasoning4 ,and it is1 perhaps1 equally 
needless to observe that the mere fact  
of evolution1 as distinguished from     
special creation--or of the gradual     
development of living mechanisms1 as    
distinguished from their sudden and     
ready-made apparition--would not in any 
way affect the argument from design1    
unless it could be shown that the       
process of evolution admits the         
possibility of some other cause which is
 not admitted by the hypothesis of      
special creation4 ,but this is precisely

 what is shown by the theory of         
evolution as propounded by ,darwin4     
,that is to say1 the theory of the      
gradual development of living mechanisms
 propounded by ,darwin1 is something    
more than a theory of gradual           
development as distinguished from sudden
 creation4 ,it is this1 but it is also a
 theory of a purely scientific kind     
which seeks to explain the purely       
physical causes of that development4    
,and this is the point where natural    
science begins to exert her influence   
upon natural theology--or the point     
where the theory of evolution begins to 
affect the theory of design4 ,as this is
 a most important part of our subject1  
and one upon which an extraordinary     
amount of confusion at the present time 
prevails1 ,i shall in my next paper     
carefully consider it in all its        
bearings4  ,,footnotes3  #ai ,the third 
paper is not published because ,romanes'
 views on the relation between science  
and faith in ,revealed ,religion are    

better and more maturely expressed in   
the ,notes4--,,ed4  #bj ,to avoid       
misunderstanding ,i may observe that in 
the above definitions ,i am considering 
,religion and ,science under the        
conditions in which they actually exist4
 ,it is conceivable that under other    
conditions these two departments of     
thought might not be so sharply         
separated4 ,thus1 for instance1 if a    
,religion were to appear carrying a     
revelation to ,science upon matters of  
physical causation1 such a ,religion    
7supposing the revelation were found by 
experiment to be true7 ought to be held 
to exercise upon ,science a strictly    
legitimate influence4  #ba ,mental      
,evolution in ,animals1 pp4 #aee-h4  #bb
 ,i have put 'may' in place of 'do' for 
the sake of argument4--,,ed4     ,,ii4  
,suppose the man who found the watch    
upon a heath to continue his walk till  
he comes down to the sea-shore1 and     
suppose further that he is as ignorant  
of physical geography as he is of       

watch-making4 ,he soon begins to observe
 a number of adaptations of means to    
ends1 which1 if less refined and        
delicate than those that formed the     
object of his study in the watch1 are on
 the other hand much more impressive    
from the greatly larger scale on which  
they are displayed4 ,first1 he observes 
that there is a beautiful basin hollowed
 out in the land for the reception of a 
bay2 that the sides of this basin1 which
 from being near its opening are most   
exposed to the action of large rolling  
billows1 are composed of rocky cliffs1  
evidently in order to prevent the       
further encroachment of the sea1 and the
 consequent destruction of the entire   
bay2 that the sides of the basin1 which 
from being successively situated more   
inland are successively less and less   
exposed to the action of large waves1   
are constituted successively of smaller 
rocks1 passing into shingle1 and        
eventually into the finest sand3 that as
 the tides rise and fall with as great a

 regularity as was exhibited by the     
movements of the watch1 the stones are  
carefully separated out from the sand to
 be arranged in sloping layers by       
themselves1 and this always with a most 
beautiful reference to the places round 
the margin of the basin which are most  
in danger of being damaged by the action
 of the waves4 ,he would further        
observe1 upon closer inspection1 that   
this process of selective arrangement   
goes into matters of the most minute    
detail4 ,here1 for instance1 he would   
observe a mile or two of a particular   
kind of seaweed artistically arranged in
 one long sinuous line upon the beach2  
there he would see a wonderful deposit  
of shells2 in another place a lovely    
little purple heap of garnet sand1 the  
minute particles of which have all been 
carefully picked out from the           
surrounding acres of yellow sand4       
,again1 he would notice that the streams
 which come down to the bay are all     
flowing in channels admirably dug out   

for the purpose2 and1 being led by      
curiosity to investigate the teleology  
of these various streams1 he would find 
that they serve to supply the water     
which the sea loses by evaporation1 and 
also1 by a wonderful piece of           
adjustment1 to furnish fresh water to   
those animals and plants which thrive   
best in fresh water1 and yet by their   
combined action to carry down sufficient
 mineral constituents to give that      
precise degree of saltness to the sea as
 a whole which is required for the      
maintenance of pelagic life4 ,lastly1   
continuing his investigations along this
 line of inquiry1 he would find that a  
thousand different habitats were all    
thoughtfully adapted to the needs of a  
hundred thousand different forms of     
life1 none of which could survive if    
these habitats were reversed4 ,now1 ,i  
think that our imaginary inquirer would 
be a dull man if1 as the result of all  
this study1 he failed to conclude that  
the evidence of ,design furnished by the

 marine bay was at least as cogent as   
that which he had previously found in   
his study of the watch4  ,but there is  
this great difference between the two   
cases4 ,whereas by subsequent inquiry he
 could ascertain as a matter of fact    
that the watch was due to intelligent   
contrivance1 he could make no such      
discovery with reference to the marine  
bay3 in the one case intelligent        
contrivance as a cause is independently 
demonstrable1 while in the other case it
 can only be inferred4 ,what1 then1 is  
the value of the inference8  ,if1 after 
the studies of our imaginary teleologist
 had been completed1 he were introduced 
to the library of the ,royal ,society1  
and if he were then to spend a year or  
two in making himself acquainted with   
the leading results of modern science1  
,i fancy that he would end by being both
 a wiser and a sadder man4 ,at least ,i 
am certain that in learning more he     
would feel that he is understanding     
less--that the archaic simplicity of his

 earlier explanations must give place to
 a matured perplexity upon the whole    
subject4 ,to begin with1 he would now   
find that every one of the adjustments  
of means to ends which excited his      
admiration on the sea-coast were due to 
physical causes which are perfectly well
 understood4 ,the cliffs stood at the   
opening of the bay because the sea in   
past ages had encroached upon the       
coast-line until it met with these      
cliffs1 which then opposed its further  
progress2 the bay was a depression in   
the land which happened to be there when
 the sea arrived1 and into which the sea
 consequently flowed2 the successive    
occurrence of rocks1 shingle1 and sand  
was due to the actions of the waves     
themselves2 the segregation of          
sea-weeds1 shells1 pebbles1 and         
different kinds of sand1 was due to     
their different degrees of specific     
gravity2 the fresh-water streams ran in 
channels because they had themselves    
been the means of excavating them2 and  

the multitudinous forms of life were all
 adapted to their several habitats      
simply because the unsuited forms were  
not able to live in them4 ,in all these 
cases1 therefore1 our teleologist in the
 light of fuller knowledge would be     
compelled to conclude at least this     
much--that the adaptations which he had 
so greatly admired when he supposed that
 they were all due to contrivance in    
anticipation of the existing phenomena1 
cease to furnish the same evidence of   
intelligent design when it is found that
 no one of them was prepared beforehand 
by any independent or external cause4   
,he would therefore be led to conclude  
that if the teleological interpretation 
of the facts were to be saved at all1 it
 could only be so by taking a much wider
 view of the subject than was afforded  
by the particular cases of apparent     
design which at first appeared so       
cogent4 ,that is to say1 he would feel  
that he must abandon the supposition of 
any special design in the construction  

of that particular bay1 and fall back   
upon the theory of a much more general  
design in the construction of one great 
scheme of ,nature as a whole4 ,in short 
he would require to dislodge his        
argument from the special adjustments   
which in the first instance appeared to 
him so suggestive1 to those general laws
 of ,nature which by their united       
operation give rise to a cosmos as      
distinguished from a chaos4  ,now ,i    
have been careful thus to present in all
 its more important details an imaginary
 argument drawn from inorganic nature1  
because it furnishes a complete analogy 
to the actual argument which is drawn   
from organic nature4 ,without any       
question1 the instances of apparent     
design1 or of the apparently intentional
 adaptation of means to ends1 which we  
meet with in organic nature1 are        
incomparably more numerous and          
suggestive than anything with which we  
meet in inorganic nature4 ,but if once  
we find good reason to conclude that the

 former1 like the latter1 are all due1  
not to the immediate1 special and       
prospective action of a contriving      
intelligence 7as in watch-making or     
creation71 but to the agency of         
secondary or physical causes acting     
under the influence of what we call     
general laws1 then it seems to me that  
no matter how numerous or how wonderful 
the adaptations of means to ends in     
organic nature may be1 they furnish one 
no other or better evidence of design   
than is furnished by any of the facts of
 inorganic nature4  ,for the sake of    
clearness let us take any special case4 
,paley says1 ',i know of no better      
method of introducing so large a subject
 than that of comparing a single thing  
with a single thing2 an eye1 for        
example1 with a telescope4' ,he then    
goes on to point out the analogies      
between these two pieces of apparatus1  
and ends by asking1 ',how is it         
possible1 under circumstances of such   
close affinity1 and under the operation 

of equal evidence1 to exclude           
contrivance in the case of the eye1 yet 
to acknowledge the proof of contrivance 
having been employed1 as the plainest   
and clearest of all propositions in the 
case of the telescope8'  ,well1 the     
answer to be made is that only upon the 
hypothesis of special creation can this 
analogy hold3 on the hypothesis of      
evolution by physical causes the        
evidence in the two cases is not equal4 
,for1 upon this hypothesis we have the  
eye beginning1 not as a ready-made      
structure prepared beforehand for the   
purposes of seeing1 but as a mere       
differentiation of the ends of nerves in
 the skin1 probably in the first        
instance to enable them better to       
discriminate changes of temperature4    
,pigment having been laid down in these 
places the better to secure this purpose
 7,i use teleological terms for the sake
 of brevity71 the nerve-ending begins to
 distinguish between light and darkness4
 ,the better to secure this further     

purpose1 the simplest conceivable form  
of lens begins to appear in the shape of
 small refractive bodies4 ,behind these 
sensory cells are developed1 forming the
 earliest indication of a retina        
presenting a single layer4 ,and so on1  
step by step1 till we reach the eye of  
an eagle4  ,of course the teleologist   
will here answer--',the fact of such a  
gradual building up is no argument      
against design3 whether the structure   
appeared on a sudden or was the result  
of a slow elaboration1 the marks of     
design in either case occur in the      
structure as it stands4' ,all of which  
is very true2 but ,i am not maintaining 
that the fact of a gradual development  
in itself does affect the argument from 
design4 ,i am maintaining that it only  
does so because it reveals the          
possibility 7excluded by the hypothesis 
of sudden or special creation7 of the   
structure having been proximately due to
 the operation of physical causes4      
,thus1 for the value of argument1 let us

 assume that natural selection has been 
satisfactorily established as a cause   
adequate to account for all these       
effects4 ,given the facts of heredity1  
variation1 struggle for existence1 and  
the consequent survival of the fittest1 
what follows8 ,why that each step in the
 prolonged and gradual development of   
the eye was brought about by the        
elimination of all the less adapted     
structures in any given generation1 i4e4
 the selection of all the better adapted
 to perpetuate the improvement by       
heredity4 ,will the teleologist maintain
 that this selective process is itself  
indicative of special design8 ,if so1 it
 appears to me that he is logically     
bound to maintain that the long line of 
seaweed1 the shells1 the stones and the 
little heap of garnet sand upon the     
sea-coast are all equally indicative of 
special design4 ,the general laws       
relating to specific gravity are at     
least of as much importance in the      
economy of nature as are the general    

laws relating to specific               
differentiation2 and in each            
illustration alike we find the result of
 the operation of known physical causes 
to be that of selection4 ,if it should  
be argued in reply that the selection in
 the one case is obviously purposeless1 
while in the other it is as obviously   
purposive1 ,i answer that this is pure  
assumption4 ,it is perhaps not too much 
to say that every geological formation  
on the face of the globe is either      
wholly or in part due to the selective  
influence of specific gravity1 and who  
shall say that the construction of the  
earth's crust is a less important matter
 in the general scheme of things 7if    
there is such a scheme7 than is the     
evolution of an eye8 ,or who shall say  
that because we see an apparently       
intentional adaptation of means to ends 
as the result of selection in the case  
of the eye1 there is no intention served
 by the result of selection in the case 
of the sea-weeds1 stones1 sand1 mud8    

,for anything that we can know to the   
contrary1 the supposed intelligence may 
take a greater delight in the latter    
than in the former process4  ,for the   
sake of clearness ,i have assumed that  
the physical causes with which we are   
already acquainted are sufficient to    
explain the observed phenomena of       
organic nature4 ,but it clearly makes no
 difference whether or not this         
assumption is conceded1 provided we     
allow that the observed phenomena are   
all due to physical causes of some kind1
 be they known or unknown4 ,that is to  
say1 in whatever measure we exclude the 
hypothesis of the direct or immediate   
intervention of the ,deity in organic   
nature 7miracle71 in that measure we are
 reducing the evidence of design in     
organic nature to precisely the same    
logical position as that which is       
occupied by the evidence of design in   
inorganic nature4 ,hence ,i conceive    
that ,mill has shown a singular want of 
penetration where1 after observing with 

reference to natural selection1         
'creative forethought is not absolutely 
the only link by which the origin of the
 wonderful mechanism of the eye may be  
connected with the fact of sight1' he   
goes on to say1 'leaving this remarkable
 speculation 7i4e4 that of natural      
selection7 to whatever fate the progress
 of discovery may have in store for it1 
in the present state of knowledge the   
adaptations in nature afford a large    
balance of probability in favour of     
creation by intelligence4' ,i say this  
passage seems to me to show a singular  
want of penetration1 and ,i say so      
because it appears to argue that the    
issue lies between the hypothesis of    
special design and the hypothesis of    
natural selection4 ,but it does not do  
so4 ,the issue really lies between      
special design and natural causes4      
,survival of the fittest is one of these
 causes which has been suggested1 and   
shown by a large accumulation of        
evidence to be probably a true cause4   

,but even if it were to be disproved as 
a cause1 the real argumentative position
 of teleology would not thereby be      
effected1 unless we were to conclude    
that there can be no other causes of a  
secondary or physical kind concerned in 
the production of the observed          
adaptations4  ,i trust that ,i have now 
made it sufficiently clear why ,i hold  
that if we believe the reign of natural 
law1 or the operation of physical       
causes1 to extend throughout organic    
nature in the same universal manner as  
we believe this in the case of inorganic
 nature1 then we can find no better     
evidence of design in the one province  
than in the other4 ,the mere fact that  
we meet with more numerous and          
apparently more complete instances of   
design in the one province than in the  
other is1 ex hypothesi1 merely due to   
our ignorance of the natural causation  
in the more intricate province4 ,in     
studying biological phenomena we are all
 at present in the intellectual position

 of our imaginary teleologist when      
studying the marine bay3 we do not know 
the natural causes which have produced  
the observed results4 ,but if1 after    
having obtained a partial key in the    
theory of natural selection1 we trust to
 the large analogy which is afforded by 
the simpler provinces of ,nature1 and   
conclude that physical causes are       
everywhere concerned in the production  
of organic structures1 then we have     
concluded that any evidence of design   
which these structures present is of    
just the same logical value as that     
which we may attach to the evidence of  
design in inorganic nature4 ,if it      
should still be urged that the          
adaptations met with in organic nature  
are from their number and unity much    
more suggestive of design than anything 
met with in inorganic nature1 ,i must   
protest that this is to change the      
ground of argument and to evade the only
 point in dispute4 ,no one denies the   
obvious fact stated3 the only question  

is whether any number and any quantity  
of adaptations in any one department of 
nature afford other or better evidence  
of design than is afforded by           
adaptations in other departments1 when  
all departments alike are supposed to be
 equally the outcome of physical        
causation4 ,and this question ,i answer 
in the negative1 because we have no     
means of ascertaining the extent to     
which the process of natural selection1 
or any other physical cause1 is         
competent to produce adaptations of the 
kind observed4  ,thus1 to take another  
instance of apparent design from        
inorganic nature1 it has been argued    
that the constitution of the atmosphere 
is clearly designed for the support of  
vegetable and animal life4 ,but before  
this conclusion can be established upon 
the facts1 it must be shown that life   
could exist under no other material     
conditions than those which are         
furnished to it by the elementary       
constituents of the atmosphere4 ,this1  

however1 it is clearly impossible to    
show4 ,for anything that we can know to 
the contrary1 life may actually be      
existing upon some of the other heavenly
 bodies under totally different         
conditions as to atmosphere2 and the    
fact that on this planet all life has   
come to be dependent upon the gases     
which occur in our atmosphere1 may be   
due simply to the fact that it was only 
the forms of life which were able to    
adapt themselves 7through natural       
selection or other physical causes7 to  
these particular gases which could      
possibly be expected to occur--just as  
in matters of still smaller detail1 it  
was only those forms of life that were  
suited to their several habitats in the 
marine bay1 which could possibly be     
expected to be found in these several   
situations4 ,now1 if a set of           
adjustments so numerous and so delicate 
as those on which the relations of every
 known form of life to the constituent  
gases of the atmosphere are seen to     

depend1 can thus be shown not           
necessarily to imply the action of any  
disposing intelligence1 how is it       
possible to conclude that any less      
general exhibitions of adjustment imply 
this1 so long as every case of          
adjustment1 whether or not ultimately   
due to design1 is regarded as           
proximately due to physical causes8  ,in
 view of these considerations1          
therefore1 ,i think it is perfectly     
clear that if the argument from         
teleology is to be saved at all1 it can 
only be so by shifting it from the      
narrow basis of special adaptations1 to 
the broad area of ,nature as a whole4   
,and here ,i confess that to my mind the
 argument does acquire a weight which1  
if long and attentively considered1     
deserves to be regarded as enormous4    
,for1 although this and that particular 
adjustment in ,nature may be seen to be 
proximately due to physical causes1 and 
although we are prepared on the grounds 
of the largest possible analogy to infer

 that all other such particular cases   
are likewise due to physical causes1 the
 more ultimate question arises1 ,how is 
it that all physical causes conspire1 by
 their united action1 to the production 
of a general order of ,nature8 ,it is   
against all analogy to suppose that such
 an end as this can be accomplished by  
such means as those1 in the way of mere 
chance or 'the fortuitous concourse of  
atoms4' ,we are led by the most         
fundamental dictates of our reason to   
conclude that there must be some cause  
for this co-operation of causes4 ,i know
 that from ,lucretius' time this has    
been denied2 but it has been denied only
 on grounds of feeling4 ,no possible    
reason can be given for the denial which
 does not run counter to the law of     
causation itself4 ,i am therefore       
perfectly clear that the only question  
which1 from a purely rational point of  
view1 here stands to be answered is     
this--,of what nature are we to suppose 
the causa causarum to be8  ,on this     

point only two hypotheses have ever been
 advanced1 and ,i think it is impossible
 to conceive that any third one is open4
 ,of these two hypotheses the earliest1 
and of course the most obvious1 is that 
of mental purpose4 ,the other hypothesis
 is one which we owe to the far-reaching
 thought of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,in 
,chapter ,,vii of his ,first ,principles
 he argues that all causation arises    
immediately out of existence as such1   
or1 as he states it1 that 'uniformity of
 law inevitably follows from the        
persistence of force4' ,for 'if in any  
two cases there is exact likeness not   
only between those most conspicuous     
antecedents which we distinguish as the 
causes1 but also between those          
accompanying antecedents which we call  
the conditions1 we cannot affirm that   
the effects will differ1 without        
affirming either that some force has    
come into existence or that some force  
has ceased to exist4 ,if the            
co-operative forces in the one case are 

equal to those in the other1 each to    
each1 in distribution and amount2 then  
it is impossible to conceive the product
 of their joint action in the one case  
as unlike that in the other1 without    
conceiving one or more of the forces to 
have increased or diminished in         
quantity2 and this is conceiving that   
force is not persistent4'  ,now this    
interpretation of causality as the      
immediate outcome of existence must be  
considered first as a theory of         
causation1 and next as a theory in      
relation to ,theism4 ,as a theory of    
causation it has not met with the       
approval of mathematicians1 physicists1 
or logicians1 leading representatives of
 all these departments of thought having
 expressly opposed it1 while1 so far as 
,i am aware1 no representative of any   
one of them has spoken in its favour#bc4
 ,but with this point ,i am not at      
present concerned1 for even if the      
theory were admitted to furnish a full  
and complete explanation of causality1  

it would still fail to account for the  
harmonious relation of causes1 or the   
fact with which we are now alone        
concerned4 ,this distinction is not     
perceived by the anonymous author       
',physicus1' who1 in his ,candid        
,examination of ,theism1 lays great     
stress upon ,mr4 ,spencer's theory of   
causation as subversive of ,theism1 or  
at least as superseding the necessity of
 theistic hypothesis by furnishing a    
full explanation of the order of ,nature
 on purely physical grounds4 ,but he    
fails to perceive that even if ,mr4     
,spencer's theory were conceded fully to
 explain all the facts of causality1 it 
would in no wise tend to explain the    
cosmos in which these facts occur4 ,it  
may be true that causation depends upon 
the 'persistence of force'3 it does not 
follow that all manifestations of force 
should on this account have been        
directed to occur as they do occur4     
,for1 if we follow back any sequence of 
physical causation1 we soon find that it

 spreads out on all sides into a network
 of physical relations which are        
literally infinite both in space        
7conditions7 and in time 7antecedent    
causes74 ,now1 even if we suppose that  
the persistence of force is a sufficient
 explanation of the occurrence of the   
particular sequence contemplated so far 
as the exhibition of force is there     
concerned1 we are thus as far as ever   
from explaining the determination of    
this force into the particular channel  
through which it flows4 ,it may be quite
 true that the resultant is determined  
as to magnitude and direction by the    
components2 but what about the magnitude
 and direction of the components8 ,if it
 is said that they in turn were         
determined by the outcome of previous   
systems1 how about these systems8 ,and  
so on till we spread away into the      
infinite network already mentioned4     
,only if we knew the origin of all      
series of all such systems could we be  
in a position to say that an adequate   

intelligence might determine beforehand 
by calculation the state of any one part
 of the universe at any given instant of
 time4 ,but1 as the series are infinite 
both in number and extent1 this         
knowledge is clearly out of the         
question4 ,moreover1 even if it could be
 imagined as possible1 it could only be 
so imagined at the expense of supposing 
an origin of physical causation in time2
 and this amounts to supposing a state  
of things prior to such causation1 and  
out of which it arose4 ,but to suppose  
this is to suppose some extra-physical  
source of physical causation2 and       
whether this supposition is made with   
reference to a physical event occurring 
under immediate observation 7miracle71  
or to a physical event in past time1 or 
to the origin of all physical events1 it
 is alike incompatible with any theory  
that seeks to give a purely physical    
explanation of the physical universe as 
a whole4 ,it is1 in short1 the old story
 about a stream not being able to rise  

above its source4 ,physical causation   
cannot be made to supply its own        
explanation1 and the mere persistence of
 force1 even if it were conceded to     
account for particular cases of physical
 sequence1 can give no account of the   
ubiquitous and eternal direction of     
force in the construction and           
maintenance of universal order4  ,we are
 thus1 as it were1 driven upon the      
theory of ,theism as furnishing the only
 nameable explanation of this universal 
order4 ,that is to say1 by no logical   
artifice can we escape from the         
conclusion that1 as far as we can see1  
this universal order must be regarded as
 due to some one integrating principle2 
and that this1 so far as we can see1 is 
most probably of the nature of mind4 ,at
 least it must be allowed that we can   
conceive of it under no other aspect2   
and that if any particular adaptation in
 organic nature is held to be suggestive
 of such an agency1 the sum total of all
 adaptations in the universe must be    

held to be incomparably more so4 ,i     
shall not1 however1 dwell upon this     
theme since it has been well treated by 
several modern writers1 and with special
 cogency by the ,rev4 ,baden ,powell4 ,i
 will merely observe that ,i do not     
consider it necessary to the display of 
this argument in favour of ,theism that 
we should speak of 'natural laws4' ,it  
is enough to take our stand upon the    
broadest general fact that ,nature is a 
system1 and that the order observable in
 this system is absolutely universal1   
eternally enduring1 and infinitely      
exact2 while only upon the supposition  
of its being such is our experience     
conceived as possible1 or our knowledge 
conceived as attainable4  ,having thus  
stated as emphatically as ,i can that in
 my opinion no explanation of natural   
order can be either conceived or named  
other than that of intelligence as the  
supreme directing cause1 ,i shall       
proceed to two other questions which    
arise immediately out of this           

conclusion4 ,the first of these         
questions is as to the presumable       
character of this supreme ,intelligence 
so far as any data of inference upon    
this point are supplied by our          
observation of ,nature2 and the other   
question is as to the strictly formal   
cogency of any conclusions either with  
reference to the existence or the       
character of such an intelligence#bd4 ,i
 shall consider these two points        
separately4  ,no sooner have we reached 
the conclusion that the only hypothesis 
whereby the general order of ,nature    
admits of being in any degree accounted 
for is that it is due to a cause of a   
mental kind1 than we confront the fact  
that this cause must be widely different
 from anything that we know of ,mind in 
ourselves4 ,and we soon discover that   
this difference must be conceived as not
 merely of degree1 however great1 but of
 kind4 ,in other words1 although we may 
conclude that the nearest analogue of   
the causa causarum given in experience  

is the human mind1 we are bound to      
acknowledge that in all fundamental     
points the analogy is so remote that it 
becomes a question whether we are really
 very much nearer the truth by          
entertaining it4 ,thus1 for instance1 as
 ,mr4 ,spencer has pointed out1 our only
 conception of that which we know as    
,mind in ourselves is the conception of 
a series of states of consciousness4    
,but1 he continues1 ',put a series of   
states of consciousness as cause and the
 evolving universe as effect1 and then  
endeavour to see the last as flowing    
from the first4 ,i find it possible to  
imagine in some dim way a series of     
states of consciousness serving as      
antecedent to any one of the movements  
,i see going on2 for my own states of   
consciousness are often indirectly the  
antecedents to such movements4 ,but how 
if ,i attempt to think of such a series 
as antecedent to all actions throughout 
the universe 4448 ,if to account for    
this infinitude of physical changes     

everywhere going on1 ,mind must be      
conceived as there1 under the guise of  
simple-dynamics1 then the reply is1     
that1 to be so conceived1 ,mind must be 
divested of all attributes by which it  
is distinguished2 and that1 when thus   
divested of its distinguishing          
attributes the conception               
disappears--the word ,mind stands for a 
blank4'  ,moreover1 ',how is the        
originating ,mind to be thought of as   
having states produced by things        
objective to it1 as discriminating among
 these states1 and classing them as like
 and unlike2 and as preferring one      
objective result to another8'#be        
,hence1 without continuing this line of 
argument1 which it would not be         
difficult to trace through every        
constituent branch of human psychology1 
we may take it as unquestionable that1  
if there is a ,divine ,mind1 it must    
differ so essentially from the human    
mind1 that it becomes illogical to      
designate the two by the same name3 the 

attributes of eternity and ubiquity are 
in themselves enough to place such a    
,mind in a category sui generis1 wholly 
different from anything which the       
analogy furnished by our own mind       
enables us even dimly to conceive4 ,and 
this1 of course1 is no more than        
theologians admit4 ,god's thoughts are  
above our thoughts1 and a ,god who would
 be comprehensible to our intelligence  
would be no ,god at all1 they say4      
,which may be true enough1 only we must 
remember that in whatever measure we are
 thus precluded from understanding the  
,divine ,mind1 in that measure are we   
precluded from founding any conclusions 
as to its nature upon analogies         
furnished by the human mind4 ,the theory
 ceases to be anthropomorphic3 it ceases
 to be even 'anthropopsychic'3 it is    
affiliated with the conception of mind  
only in virtue of the one fact that it  
serves to give the best provisional     
account of the order of ,nature1 by     
supposing an infinite extension of some 

of the faculties of the human mind1 with
 a concurrent obliteration of all the   
essential conditions under which alone  
these faculties are known to exist4     
,obviously of such a ,mind as this no   
predication is logically possible4 ,if  
such a ,mind exists1 it is not          
conceivable as existing1 and we are     
precluded from assigning to it any      
attributes4  ,thus much on general      
grounds4 ,descending now to matters of  
more detail1 let us assume with the     
natural theologians that such a ,mind   
does exist1 that it so far resembles the
 human mind as to be a conscious1       
personal intelligence1 and that the care
 of such a ,mind is over all its works4 
,even upon the grounds of this          
supposition we meet with a number of    
large and general facts which indicate  
that this ,mind ought still to be       
regarded as apparently very unlike its  
'image' in the mind of man4 ,i will not 
here dwell upon the argument of seeming 
waste and purposeless action in ,nature1

 because ,i think that this may be      
fairly met by the ulterior argument     
already drawn from ,nature as a         
whole--viz4 that as a whole1 ,nature is 
a cosmos1 and therefore that what to us 
appears wasteful and purposeless in     
matters of detail may not be so in      
relation to the scheme of things as a   
whole4 ,but ,i am doubtful whether this 
ulterior argument can fairly be adduced 
to meet the apparent absence in ,nature 
of that which in man we term morality4  
,for in the human mind the sense of     
right and wrong--with all its           
accompanying or constituting emotions of
 love1 sympathy1 justice1 c4--is so     
important a factor1 that however greatly
 we may imagine the intellectual side of
 the human mind to be extended1 we can  
scarcely imagine that the moral side    
could ever become so apparently eclipsed
 as to end in the authorship of such a  
work as we find in terrestrial nature4  
,it is useless to hide our eyes to the  
state of matters which meets us here4   

,most of the instances of special design
 which are relied upon by the natural   
theologian to prove the intelligent     
nature of the ,first ,cause1 have as    
their end or object the infliction of   
painful death or the escape from        
remorseless enemies2 and so far the     
argument in favour of the intelligent   
nature of the ,first ,cause is an       
argument against its morality4 ,again1  
even if we quit the narrower basis on   
which teleological argument has rested  
in the past1 and stand that argument    
upon the broader ground of ,nature as a 
whole1 it scarcely becomes less         
incompatible with any inference to the  
morality of that ,cause1 seeing that the
 facts to which ,i have alluded are not 
merely occasional and1 as it were1      
outweighed by contrary facts of a more  
general kind1 but manifestly constitute 
the leading feature of the scheme of    
organic nature as a whole3 or1 if this  
were held to be questionable1 it could  
only follow that we are not entitled to 

infer that there is any such scheme at  
all4  ,nature1 as red in tooth and claw 
with ravin1 is thus without question a  
large and general fact that must be     
considered by any theory of teleology   
which can be propounded4 ,i do not think
 that this aspect of the matter could be
 conveyed in stronger terms than it is  
by ',physicus#bf1' whom ,i shall        
therefore quote3--  ',supposing the     
,deity to be1 what ,professor ,flint    
maintains that he is--viz4 omnipotent1  
and there can be no inference more      
transparent than that such wholesale    
suffering1 for whatever ends designed1  
exhibits an incalculably greater        
deficiency of beneficence in the divine 
character than that which we know in    
any1 the very worst1 of human           
characters4 ,for let us pause for one   
moment to think of what suffering in    
,nature means4 ,some hundreds of        
millions of years ago some millions of  
millions of animals must be supposed to 
have become sentient4 ,since that time  

till the present1 there must have been  
millions and millions of generations of 
millions and millions of individuals4   
,and throughout all this period of      
incalculable duration1 this             
inconceivable host of sentient organisms
 have been in a state of unceasing      
battle1 dread1 ravin1 pain4 ,looking to 
the outcome1 we find that more than one 
half of the species which have survived 
the ceaseless struggle are parasitic in 
their habits1 lower and insentient forms
 of life feasting on higher and sentient
 forms2 we find teeth and talons whetted
 for slaughter1 hooks and suckers       
moulded for torment--everywhere a reign 
of terror1 hunger1 sickness1 with oozing
 blood and quivering limbs1 with gasping
 breath and eyes of innocence that dimly
 close in deaths of cruel torture6 ,is  
it said that there are compensating     
enjoyments8 ,i care not to strike the   
balance2 the enjoyments ,i plainly      
perceive to be as physically necessary  
as the pains1 and this whether or not   

evolution is due to design4444 ,am ,i   
told that ,i am not competent to judge  
the purposes of the ,almighty8 ,i answer
 that if there are purposes1 ,i am able 
to judge of them so far as ,i can see2  
and if ,i am expected to judge of ,his  
purposes when they appear to be         
beneficent1 ,i am in consistency obliged
 also to judge of them when they appear 
to be malevolent4 ,and it can be no     
possible extenuation of the latter to   
point to the final result as order and  
beauty1 so long as the means adopted by 
the ,omnipotent ,designer are known to  
have been so terrible4 ,all that we     
could legitimately assert in this case  
would be that1 so far as observation can
 extend1 ,he cares for animal perfection
 to the exclusion of animal enjoyment1  
and even to the total disregard of      
animal suffering4 ,but to assert this   
would merely be to deny beneficence as  
an attribute of ,god#bg4'  ,the         
reasoning here appears as unassailable  
as it is obvious4 ,if1 as the writer    

goes on to say1 we see a rabbit panting 
in the iron jaws of a spring trap1 and  
in consequence abhor the devilish nature
 of the being who1 with full powers of  
realizing what pain means1 can          
deliberately employ his whole faculties 
of invention in contriving a thing so   
hideously cruel2 what are we to think of
 a ,being who1 with yet higher faculties
 of thought and knowledge1 and with an  
unlimited choice of means to secure ,his
 ends1 has contrived untold thousands of
 mechanisms no less diabolical8 ,in     
short1 so far as ,nature can teach us1  
or 'observation can extend1' it does    
appear that the scheme1 if it is a      
scheme1 is the product of a ,mind which 
differs from the more highly evolved    
type of human mind in that it is        
immensely more intellectual without     
being nearly so moral4 ,and the same    
thing is indicated by the rough and     
indiscriminate manner in which justice  
is allotted--even if it can be said to  
be allotted at all4 ,when we contrast   

the certainty and rigour with which any 
offence against 'physical law' is       
punished by ,nature 7no matter though   
the sin be but one of ignorance71 with  
the extreme uncertainty and laxity with 
which she meets any offence against     
'moral law1' we are constrained to feel 
that the system of legislation 7if we   
may so term it7 is conspicuously        
different from that which would have    
been devised by any intelligence which  
in any sense could be called            
'anthropopsychic4'  ,the only answer to 
these difficulties open to the natural  
theologian is that which is drawn from  
the constitution of the human mind4 ,it 
is argued that the fact of this mind    
having so large an ingredient of        
morality in its constitution may be     
taken as proof that its originating     
source is likewise of a moral character4
 ,this argument1 however1 appears to me 
of a questionable character1 seeing     
that1 for anything we can tell to the   
contrary1 the moral sense may have been 

given to1 or developed in1 man simply on
 account of its utility to the          
species--just in the same way as teeth  
in the shark or poison in the snake4 ,if
 so1 the occurrence of the moral sense  
in man would merely furnish one other   
instance of the intellectual1 as        
distinguished from the moral1 nature of 
,god2 and there seems to be in itself no
 reason why we should take any other    
view4 ,the mere fact that to us the     
moral sense seems such a great and holy 
thing1 is doubtless 7under any view7    
owing to its importance to the          
well-being of our species4 ,in itself1  
or as it appears to other possible      
beings intellectual like ourselves1 but 
existing under unlike conditions1 the   
moral sense of man may be regarded as of
 no more significance than the social   
instincts of bees4 ,more particularly   
may this consideration apply to the case
 of a ,mind existing1 according to the  
theological theory of things1 wholly    
beyond the pale of anything analogous to

 those social relations out of which1   
according to the scientific theory of   
evolution1 the moral sense has been     
developed in ourselves#bh4  ,the truth  
is that in this matter natural          
theologians begin by assuming that the  
,first ,cause1 if intelligent1 must be  
moral2 and then they are blinded to the 
strictly logical weakness of the        
argument whereby they endeavour to      
sustain their assumption4 ,for aught    
that we can tell to the contrary1 it may
 be quite as 'anthropomorphic' a notion 
to attribute morality to ,god as it     
would be to attribute those capacities  
for sensuous enjoyment with which the   
,greeks endowed their divinities4 ,the  
,deity may be as high above the one as  
the other--or rather perhaps we may say 
as much external to the one as to the   
other4 ,without being supra-moral1 and  
still less immoral1 ,he may be un-moral3
 our ideas of morality may have no      
meaning as applied to ,him4  ,but if we 
go thus far in one direction1 ,i think1 

per contra1 it must in consistency be   
allowed that the argument from the      
constitution of the human mind acquires 
more weight when it is shifted from the 
moral sense to the religious instincts4 
,for1 on the one hand1 these instincts  
are not of such obvious use to the      
species as are those of morality2 and1  
on the other hand1 while they are       
unquestionably very general1 very       
persistent1 and very powerful1 they do  
not appear to serve any 'end' or        
'purpose' in the scheme of things1      
unless we accept the theory which is    
given of them by those in whom they are 
most strongly developed4 ,here ,i think 
we have an argument of legitimate force1
 although it does not appear that such  
was the opinion entertained of it by    
,mill4 ,i think the argument is of      
legitimate force1 because if the        
religious instincts of the human race   
point to no reality as their object1    
they are out of analogy with all other  
instinctive endowments4 ,elsewhere in   

the animal kingdom we never meet with   
such a thing as an instinct pointing    
aimlessly1 and therefore the fact of man
 being1 as it is said1 'a religious     
animal'--i4e4 presenting a class of     
feelings of a peculiar nature directed  
to particular ends1 and most akin to1 if
 not identical with1 true instinct--is  
so far1 in my opinion1 a legitimate     
argument in favour of the reality of    
some object towards which the religious 
side of this animal's nature is         
directed4 ,and ,i do not think that this
 argument is invalidated by such facts  
as that widely different intellectual   
conceptions touching the character of   
this object are entertained by different
 races of mankind2 that the force of the
 religious instincts differs greatly in 
different individuals even of the same  
race2 that these instincts admit of     
being greatly modified by education2    
that they would probably fail to be     
developed in any individual without at  
least so much education as is required  

to furnish the needful intellectual     
conceptions on which they are founded2  
or that we may not improbably trace     
their origin1 as ,mr4 ,spencer traces   
it1 to a primitive mode of interpreting 
dreams4 ,for even in view of all these  
considerations the fact remains that    
these instincts exist1 and therefore1   
like all other instincts1 may be        
supposed to have a definite meaning1    
even though1 like all other instincts1  
they may be supposed to have had a      
natural cause1 which both in the        
individual and in the race requires1 as 
in the natural development of all other 
instincts1 the natural conditions for   
its occurrence to be supplied4 ,in a    
word1 if animal instincts generally1    
like organic structures or inorganic    
systems1 are held to betoken purpose1   
the religious nature of man would stand 
out as an anomaly in the general scheme 
of things if it alone were purposeless4 
,hence we have here what seems to me a  
valid inference1 so far as it goes1 to  

the effect that1 if the general order of
 ,nature is due to ,mind1 the character 
of that ,mind is such as it is conceived
 to be by the most highly developed form
 of religion4 ,a conclusion which is no 
doubt the opposite of that which we     
reached by contemplating the phenomena  
of biology2 and a contradiction which   
can only be overcome by supposing1      
either that ,nature conceals ,god1 while
 man reveals ,him1 or that ,nature      
reveals ,god while man misrepresents    
,him4  ,there is still one other fact of
 a very wide and general kind presented 
by ,nature1 which1 if the order of      
,nature is taken to be the expression of
 intelligent purpose1 ought in my       
opinion to be regarded as of great      
weight in furnishing evidence upon the  
ethical quality of that purpose4 ,it is 
a fact which1 so far as ,i know1 has not
 been considered by any other writer2   
but from its being one of the most      
general of all the facts relating to the
 sentient creation1 and from its        

admitting of no one single exception1 ,i
 feel that ,i am not able too strongly  
to emphasize its argumentative          
importance4 ,this fact is1 as ,i have   
stated it on a former occasion1 'that   
amid all the millions of mechanisms and 
instincts in the animal kingdom1 there  
is no one instance of a mechanism or    
instinct occurring in one species for   
the exclusive benefit of another        
species1 although there are a few cases 
in which a mechanism or instinct that is
 of benefit to its possessor has come   
also to be utilized by other species4   
,now1 on the beneficent design theory it
 is impossible to explain why1 when all 
the mechanisms in the same species are  
invariably correlated for the benefit of
 that species1 there should never be any
 such correlation between mechanisms in 
different species1 or why the same      
remark should apply to instincts4 ,for  
how magnificent a display of ,divine    
beneficence would organic nature have   
afforded1 if all1 or even some1 species 

had been so inter-related as to minister
 to each other's necessities4 ,organic  
species might then have been likened to 
a countless multitude of voices all     
singing in one harmonious psalm of      
praise4 ,but1 as it is1 we see no       
vestige of such co-ordination2 every    
species is for itself1 and for itself   
alone--an outcome of the always and     
everywhere fiercely raging struggle for 
life#bi4'  ,the large and general fact  
thus stated constitutes1 in my opinion1 
the strongest of all arguments in favour
 of ,mr4 ,darwin's theory of natural    
selection1 and therefore we can see the 
probable reason why it is what it is1 so
 far as the question of its physical    
causation is concerned4 ,but where the  
question is1 ,supposing the physical    
causation ultimately due to ,mind1 what 
are we to infer concerning the character
 of the ,mind which has adopted this    
method of causation8--then we again     
reach the answer that1 so far as we can 
judge from a conscientious examination  

of these facts1 this ,mind does not show
 that it is of a nature which in man we 
should call moral4 ,of course behind the
 physical appearances there may be a    
moral justification1 so that from these 
appearances we are not entitled to say  
more than that from the fact of its     
having chosen a method of physical      
causation leading to these results1 it  
has presented to us the appearance1 as  
before observed1 of caring for animal   
perfection to the exclusion of animal   
enjoyment1 and even to the total        
disregard of animal suffering4  ,in     
conclusion1 it is of importance to      
insist upon a truth which in discussions
 of this kind is too often              
disregarded--viz4 that all our          
reasonings being of a character relative
 to our knowledge1 our inferences are   
uncertain in a degree proportionate to  
the extent of our ignorance2 and that as
 with reference to the topics which we  
have been considering our ignorance is  
of immeasurable extent1 any conclusions 

that we may have formed are1 as ,bishop 
,butler would say1 'infinitely          
precarious4' ,or1 as ,i have previously 
presented this formal aspect of the     
matter while discussing the teleological
 argument with ,professor ,asa          
,gray1--',i suppose it will be admitted 
that the validity of an inference       
depends upon the number1 the importance1
 and the definiteness of the things or  
ratios known1 as compared with the      
number1 importance1 and definiteness of 
the things or ratios unknown1 but       
inferred4 ,if so1 we should be logically
 cautious in drawing inferences from the
 natural to the supernatural3 for       
although we have the entire sphere of   
experience from which to draw an        
inference1 we are unable to gauge the   
probability of the inference when       
drawn--the unknown ratios being         
confessedly of unknown number1          
importance1 and degree of definiteness3 
the whole orbit of human knowledge is   
insufficient to obtain a parallax       

whereby to institute the required       
measurements or to determine the        
proportion between the terms known and  
the terms unknown4 ,otherwise phrased1  
we may say--as our knowledge of a part  
is to our knowledge of a whole1 so is   
our inference from that part to the     
reality of that whole4 ,who1 therefore1 
can say1 even upon the hypothesis of    
,theism1 that our inferences or idea of 
design would have any meaning if applied
 to the ,all-,upholder1 whose thoughts  
are not as our thoughts8'#cj ,and of    
course1 mutatis mutandis1 the same      
remarks apply to all inferences having a
 negative tendency4  ,as an outcome of  
the whole of this discussion1 then1 ,i  
think it appears that the influence of  
,science upon ,natural ,religion has    
been uniformly of a destructive         
character4 ,step by step it has driven  
back the apparent evidence of direct or 
special design in ,nature1 until now    
this evidence resides exclusively in the
 one great and general fact that ,nature

 as a whole is a ,cosmos4 ,further than 
this it is obviously impossible that the
 destructive influence of ,science can  
extend1 because ,science can only exist 
upon the basis of this fact4 ,but when  
we allow that this great and universal  
fact--which but for the effects of      
unremitting familiarity could scarcely  
fail to be intellectually               
overwhelming--does betoken mental agency
 in ,nature1 we immediately find it     
impossible to determine the probable    
character of such a mind1 even supposing
 that it exists4 ,we cannot conceive of 
it as presenting any one of the         
qualities which essentially characterize
 what we know as mind in ourselves2 and 
therefore the word ,mind1 as applied to 
the supposed agency1 stands for a blank4
 ,further1 even if we disregard this    
difficulty1 and assume that in some way 
or other incomprehensible to us a ,mind 
does exist as far transcending the human
 mind as the human mind transcends      
mechanical motion2 still we are met by  

some very large and general facts in    
,nature which seem strongly to indicate 
that this ,mind1 if it exists1 is either
 deficient in1 or wholly destitute of1  
that class of feelings which in man we  
term moral2 while1 on the other hand1   
the religious aspirations of man himself
 may be taken to indicate the opposite  
conclusion4 ,and1 lastly1 with reference
 to the whole course of such reasonings1
 we have seen that any degree of        
measurable probability1 as attaching to 
the conclusions1 is unattainable4 ,from 
all which it appears that ,natural      
,religion at the present time can only  
be regarded as a system full of         
intellectual contradictions and moral   
perplexities2 so that if we go to her   
with these greatest of all questions3   
',is there knowledge with the ,most     
,high8' ',shall not the ,judge of all   
the earth do right8' the only clear     
answer which we receive is the one that 
comes back to us from the depths of our 
own heart--',when ,i thought upon this  

it was too painful for me4'             
,,footnotes3  #bc ,a note 7of #ahic7    
contains the following3 ',being1        
considered in the abstract1 is logically
 equivalent to ,not-,being or ,nothing4 
,for if by successive stages of         
abstraction1 we divest the conception of
 ,being of attribute and relation we    
reach the conception of that which      
cannot be1 i4e4 a logical contradiction1
 or the logical correlative of ,being   
which is ,nothing4 7,all this is well   
expressed in ,caird's ,evolution of     
,religion47 ,the failure to perceive    
this fact constitutes a ground fallacy  
in my ,candid ,examination of ,theism1  
where ,i represent ,being as being a    
sufficient explanation of the ,order of 
,nature or the law of ,causation4'  #bd 
,this promise is only partially         
fulfilled in the penultimate paragraph  
of the essay4--,,ed4  #be ,essays1 vol4 
iii4 p4 #bdf et seq4 ,the whole passage 
ought to be consulted1 being too long to
 quote here4  #bf ,in an essay on ,prof4

 ,flint's ,theism1 appended to the      
,candid ,examination4  #bg ,a ,candid   
,examination of ,theism1 pp4 #aga-b4    
#bh ,i have1 as ,editor1 resisted a     
temptation to intervene in the above    
argument4 ,but ,i think ,i may intervene
 on a matter of fact1 and point out that
 'according to the theological theory of
 things1' i4e4 according to the         
,trinitarian doctrine1 ,god's ,nature   
consists in what is strictly 'analogous 
to social relations1' and ,he not merely
 exhibits in ,his creation1 but ,himself
 is ,love4 ,see1 on the subject1        
especially1 ,r4,h4 ,hutton's essay on   
the ,incarnation1 in his ,theological   
,essays 7,macmillan74--,,ed4  #bi       
,scientific ,evidences of ,organic      
,evolution1 pp4 #gf-g4  #cj ,nature1    
,april #e1 #ahhc4     ,,part ,,ii4      
,introductory ,note by the ,editor4     
,little more requires to be said by way 
of introduction to the ,notes which are 
all that ,george ,romanes was able to   
write of a work that was to have been   

entitled ,a ,candid ,examination of     
,religion4 ,what little does require to 
be said must be by way of bridging the  
interval of thought which exists between
 the ,essays which have just preceded   
and the ,notes which represent more     
nearly his final phase of mind4  ,the   
most anti-theistic feature in the       
,essays is the stress laid in them on   
the evidence which ,nature supplies1 or 
is supposed to supply1 antagonistic to  
the belief in the goodness of ,god4  ,on
 this mysterious and perplexing subject 
,george ,romanes appears to have had    
more to say but did not live to say     
it#ca4 ,we may notice however that in   
#ahhi1 in a paper read before the       
,aristotelian ,society1 on 'the         
,evidence of ,design in ,nature#cb1' he 
appears to allow more weight than before
 to the argument that the method of     
physical development must be judged in  
the light of its result4 ,this paper was
 part of a ,symposium4 ,mr4 ,s4         
,alexander has argued in a previous     

paper against the hypothesis of 'design'
 in ,nature on the ground that 'the fair
 order of ,nature is only acquired by a 
wholesale waste and sacrifice4' ,this   
argument was developed by pointing to   
the obvious 'mal-adjustments1' 'aimless 
destructions1' c41 which characterize   
the processes of ,nature4 ,but these1   
,romanes replies1 necessarily belong to 
the process considered as one of        
'natural selection4' ,the question is   
only3 ,is such a process per se         
incompatible with the hypothesis of     
design8 ,and he replies in the negative4
   ',the fair order of ,nature is only  
acquired by a wholesale waste and       
sacrifice4 ,granted4 ,but if the        
wholesale waste and sacrifice1 as       
antecedent1 leads to a fair order of    
,nature as its consequent1 how can it be
 said that the wholesale waste and      
sacrifice has been a failure8 ,or how   
can it be said that1 in point of fact1  
there has been a waste1 or has been a   
sacrifice8 ,clearly such things can only

 be said when our point of view is      
restricted to the means 7i4e4 the       
wholesale destruction of the less fit72 
not when we extend our view to what1    
even within the limits of human         
observation1 is unquestionably the end  
7i4e4 the causal result in an ever      
improving world of types74 ,a candidate 
who is plucked in a ,civil ,service     
examination because he happens to be one
 of the less fitted to pass1 is no doubt
 an instance of failure so far as his   
own career is concerned2 but it does not
 therefore follow that the system of    
examination is a failure in its final   
end of securing the best men for the    
,civil ,service4 ,and the fact that the 
general outcome of all the individual   
failures in ,nature is that of securing 
what ,mr4 ,alexander calls the fair     
order of ,nature1 is assuredly evidence 
that the modus operandi has not been a  
failure in relation to what1 if there be
 any ,design in ,nature at all1 must be 
regarded as the higher purpose of such  

,design4 ,therefore1 cases of individual
 or otherwise relative failure cannot be
 quoted as evidence against the         
hypothesis of there being such ,design4 
,the fact that the general system of    
natural causation has for its eventual  
result a fair order of ,nature1 cannot  
of itself be a fact inimical to the     
hypothesis of ,design in ,nature1 even  
though it be true that such causation   
entails the continual elimination of the
 less efficient types4  ',to the best of
 my judgement1 then1 this argument from 
failure1 random trial1 blind blundering1
 or in whatever other terminology the   
argument may be presented1 is only valid
 as against the theory of what ,mr4     
,alexander alludes to as a              
,carpenter-,god1 i4e4 that if there be  
,design in ,nature at all1 it must      
everywhere be special ,design2 so that  
the evidence of it may as well be tested
 by any given minute fragment of        
,nature--such as one individual organism
 or class of organisms--as by having    

regard to the whole ,cosmos4 ,the       
evidence of ,design in this sense ,i    
fully allow has been totally destroyed  
by the proof of natural selection4 ,but 
such destruction has only brought into  
clearer relief the much larger question 
that rises behind1 viz4 as before       
phrased1 ,is there anything about the   
method of natural causation1 considered 
as a whole1 that is inimical to the     
theory of ,design in ,nature1 considered
 as a whole8'   ,it is true that this   
argument does not bear directly upon the
 character of the ,god whose 'design'   
,nature exhibits3 but indirectly it     
does#cc4 ,for instance1 such an argument
 as that found above 7on p4 #gi3 'we see
 a rabbit1 c4'7 seems to be only valid  
on the postulate here described as that 
of the ',carpenter-,god4'  ,it is also  
probable that ,romanes felt the         
difficulty arising from the cruelty of  
nature less1 as he was led to dwell more
 on humanity as the most important part 
of nature1 and perceived the function of

 suffering in the economy of human life 
7pp4 #adb1 #aed73 and also as he became 
more impressed with the positive        
evidences for ,christianity as at once  
the religion of sorrow and the          
revelation of ,god as ,love 7pp4 #afc1  
ff474 ,the ,christian ,faith supplies   
believers not only with an argument     
against pessimism from general results1 
but also with such an insight into the  
,divine character and method as enables 
them at least to bear hopefully the     
awful perplexities which arise from the 
spectacle of individuals suffering4  ,in
 the last year or two of his life he    
read very attentively a great number of 
books on ',christian ,evidences1' from  
,pascal's ,penses downwards1 and studied
 carefully the appearance of 'plan' in  
the ,biblical ,revelation considered as 
a whole4 ,the fact of this study appears
 in fragmentary remarks1 indices and    
references1 which ,george ,romanes left 
behind him in note-books4 ,the results  
of it will not be unapparent in the     

following ,notes1 which1 ,i need to     
remind my readers1 are1 in spite of     
their small bulk1 the sole reason for   
the existence of this volume4  ,in      
reading these ,i can hardly conceive any
 one not being possessed with a profound
 regret that the author was not allowed 
to complete his work4 ,and it is only   
fair to ask every reader of the         
following pages to remember that he is  
reading1 in the main1 incomplete notes  
and not finished work4 ,this will       
account for a great deal that may seem  
sketchy and unsatisfactory in the       
treatment of different points1 and also 
for repetitions and traces of           
inconsistency4 ,but ,i can hardly think 
any one can read these notes to the end 
without agreeing with me that if ,i had 
withheld them from publication1 the     
world would have lost the witness of a  
mind1 both able and profoundly sincere1 
feeling after ,god and finding ,him4    
,c4,g4  ,,footnotes3  #ca ,see below p4 
#adb1 and note4 ,i find also the        

following note of a date subsequent to  
#ahhi4 ',it is a fact that pessimism is 
illogical1 simply because we are        
inadequate judges of the world1 and     
pessimism would therefore be opposed to 
agnosticism4 ,we may know that there is 
something out of joint between the world
 and ourselves2 but we cannot know how  
far this is the fault of the world or of
 ourselves4'  #cb ,proceedings of the   
,aristotelian ,society 7,williams       
,norgate71 vol4 i4 no4 #c1 pp4 #gb1 #gc4
  #cc ,i ought also to mention that     
,romanes on the ,sunday before his death
 expressed to me verbally his entire    
agreement with the argument of          
,professor ,knight's ,aspects of ,theism
 7,macmillan1 #ahic72 in which on this  
subject see pp4 #ahd-ahf1 ',a larger    
good is evolved through the winnowing   
process by which physical nature casts  
its weaker products aside1' c4          
,,notes ,,for ,a ,,work ,,on ,a ,,candid
 ,,examination ,,of ,,religion4  ,,by   
,,metaphysicus4   ,proposed ,mottoes4   

',i quite admit the difficulty of       
believing that in every man there       
is an eye of the soul which1 when by    
other pursuits lost and      dimmed1 is 
by this purified and re-illumined2 and  
is more precious      far than ten      
thousand bodily eyes1 for by this alone 
is truth seen4      ,now there are two  
classes of persons1 one class who will  
agree with      you and will take your  
words as a revelation2 another class who
      have no understanding of them and 
to whom they will naturally be as       
idle tales4       ',and you had better  
decide at once with which of the two you
 are      arguing2 or1 perhaps1 you will
 say with neither1 and that your        
chief aim in carrying on the argument is
 your own improvement2 at      the same 
time not grudging to either any benefit 
which they may      derive4'--,,plato4  
',if we would reprove with success1 and 
show another his mistake1 we      must  
see from what side he views the matter1 
for on that side it is      generally   

true3 and1 admitting this truth1 show   
him the side on      which it is        
false4'--,,pascal4      #a4             
,,introductory4   ,many years ago ,i    
published in ,messrs4 ,trbner's         
',philosophical ,series1' a short       
treatise entitled ,a ,candid            
,examination of ,theism by ',physicus4' 
,although the book made some stir at the
 time1 and has since exhibited a        
vitality never anticipated by its       
author1 the secret of its authorship has
 been well preserved#cd4 ,this secret it
 is my intention1 if possible1 still to 
preserve2 but as it is desirable 7on    
several accounts which will become      
apparent in the following pages7 to avow
 identity of authorship1 the present    
essay appears under the same            
pseudonym#ce as its predecessor4 ,the   
reason why the first essay appeared     
anonymously is truthfully stated in the 
preface thereof1 viz4 in order that the 
reasoning should be judged on its own   
merits1 without the bias which is apt to

 arise on the part of a reader from a   
knowledge of the authority--or absence  
of authority--on the part of a writer4  
,this reason1 in my opinion1 still holds
 good as regards ,a ,candid ,examination
 of ,theism1 and applies in equal       
measure to the present sequel in ,a     
,candid ,examination of ,religion4  ,it 
will be shown that in many respects the 
negative conclusions reached in the     
former essay have been greatly modified 
by the results of maturer thought as now
 presented in the second4 ,therefore it 
seems desirable to state at the outset  
that1 as far as ,i am capable of        
judging1 the modifications in question  
have not been due in any measure to     
influence from without4 ,they appear to 
have been due exclusively to the results
 of my own further thought1 as briefly  
set out in the following pages1 with no 
indebtedness to private friends and but 
little to published utterances in the   
form of books1 c4 ,nevertheless1 no very
 original ideas are here presented4     

,indeed1 ,i suppose it would nowadays be
 impossible to present any idea touching
 religion1 which has not at some time or
 another been presented previously4     
,still much may be done in the          
furthering of one's thought by changing 
points of view1 selecting and arranging 
ideas already more or less familiar1 so 
that they may be built into new         
combinations2 and this1 ,i think1 ,i    
have in no small degree accomplished as 
regards the microcosm of my own mind4   
,but ,i state this much only for the    
sake of adding a confession that1 as far
 as introspection can carry one1 it does
 not appear to me that the modifications
 which my views have undergone since the
 publication of my previous ,candid     
,examination are due so much to purely  
logical processes of the intellect1 as  
to the sub-conscious 7and therefore more
 or less unanalyzable7 influences due to
 the ripening experience of life4 ,the  
extent to which this is true i4e4 the   
extent to which experience modifies     

logic#cf is seldom1 if ever1 realized1  
although it is practically exemplified  
every day by the sobering caution which 
advancing age exercises upon the mind4  
,not so much by any above-board play of 
syllogism as by some underhand cheating 
of consciousness1 do the accumulating   
experiences of life and of thought      
slowly enrich the judgement4 ,and this1 
one need hardly say1 is especially true 
in such regions of thought as present   
the most tenuous media for the progress 
of thought by the comparatively clumsy  
means of syllogistic locomotion4 ,for   
the further we ascend from the solid    
ground of verification1 the less        
confidence should we place in our wings 
of speculation1 while the more do we    
find the practical wisdom of such       
intellectual caution1 or distrust of    
ratiocination1 as can be given only by  
experience4 ,therefore1 most of all is  
this the case in those departments of   
thought which are furthest from the     
region of our sensuous life--viz4       

metaphysics and religion4 ,and1 as a    
matter of fact1 it is just in these     
departments of thought that we find the 
rashness of youth most amenable to the  
discipline in question by the experience
 of age4  ,however1 in spite of this    
confession1 ,i have no doubt that even  
in the matter of pure and conscious     
reason further thought has enabled me to
 detect serious errors1 or rather       
oversights1 in the very foundations of  
my ,candid ,examination of ,theism4 ,i  
still think1 indeed1 that from the      
premises there laid down the conclusions
 result in due logical sequence1 so     
that1 as a matter of mere ratiocination1
 ,i am not likely ever to detect any    
serious flaws1 especially as this has   
not been done by anybody else during the
 many years of its existence4 ,but ,i   
now clearly perceive two wellnigh fatal 
oversights which ,i then committed4 ,the
 first was undue confidence in merely   
syllogistic conclusions1 even when      
derived from sound premises1 in regions 

of such high abstraction4 ,the second   
was1 in not being sufficiently careful  
in examining the foundations of my      
criticism1 i4e4 the validity of its     
premises4 ,i will here briefly consider 
these two points separately4  ,as       
regards the first point1 never was any  
one more arrogant in his claims for pure
 reason than ,i was--more arrogant in   
spirit though not in letter1 this being 
due to contact with science2 without    
ever considering how opposed to reason  
itself is the unexpressed assumption of 
my earlier argument as to ,god ,himself1
 as if ,his existence were a merely     
physical problem to be solved by man's  
reason alone1 without reference to his  
other and higher faculties#cg4  ,the    
second point is of still more           
importance1 because so seldom1 if ever1 
recognized4  ,at the time of writing the
 ,candid ,examination ,i perceived      
clearly how the whole question of       
,theism from the side of reason turned  
on the question as to the nature of     

natural causation4 ,my theory of natural
 causation obeyed the ,law of           
,parsimony1 resolving all into ,being as
 such2 but1 on the other hand1 it erred 
in not considering whether 'higher      
causes' are not 'necessary' to account  
for spiritual facts--i4e4 whether the   
ultimate ,being must not be at least as 
high as the intellectual and spiritual  
nature of man1 i4e4 higher than anything
 merely physical or mechanical4 ,the    
supposition that it must does not       
violate the ,law of ,parsimony4  ,pure  
agnostics ought to investigate the      
religious consciousness of ,christians  
as a phenomenon which may possibly be   
what ,christians themselves believe it  
to be1 i4e4 of ,divine origin4 ,and this
 may be done without entering into any  
question as to the objective validity of
 ,christian dogmas4 ,the metaphysics of 
,christianity may be all false in fact1 
and yet the spirit of ,christianity may 
be true in substance--i4e4 it may be the
 highest 'good gift from above' as yet  

given to man4  ,my present object1 then1
 like that of ,socrates1 is not to      
impart any philosophical system1 or even
 positive knowledge1 but a frame of     
mind1 what ,i may term1 pure            
agnosticism1 as distinguished from what 
is commonly so called4  ,,footnotes3    
#cd ,the first edition1 which was       
published in #ahgh1 was rapidly         
exhausted1 but1 as my object in         
publishing was solely that of soliciting
 criticism for my own benefit1 ,i       
arranged with the publishers not to     
issue any further edition4 ,the work has
 therefore been out of print for many   
years4  ,this 'arrangement' was however 
not actually made1 or at least was      
unknown to the present publishing firm  
of ,kegan ,paul1 ,trench1 ,trbner  ,co4 
,thus a new edition of the book was     
published in #ahib1 to the author's     
surprise4--,,ed4  #ce ,or rather it was 
intended that it should appear under the
 pseudonym of ',metaphysicus4'--,,ed4   
#cf ,words in square brackets have been 

added by me4 ,but ,i have not introduced
 the brackets when ,i have simply       
inserted single unimportant words       
obviously necessary for the             
sense4--,,ed4  #cg ,see p4 #bi1         
quotation from ,preface of ',physicus4' 
,the state of mind expressed in the     
above ,note is a return to the earlier  
frame of mind of the ,burney ,essay1    
e4g4 p4 #bj4 ,that essay was full of the
 thought that ,christian evidences are  
very manifold and largely               
'extra-scientific4'--,,ed4      #b4     
,,definition ,,of ,,terms ,,and         
,,purpose ,,of ,,this ,,treatise4   ,to 
understand ,george ,romanes' mind close 
attention must be paid to the following 
section4 ,also to the fact1 not         
explicitly noticed by him1 that he uses 
the word 'reason' 7see p4 #aab7 in a    
sense closely resembling that in which  
,mr4 ,kidd has recently used it in his  
,social ,evolution4 ,he uses it1 that   
is1 in a restricted sense as equivalent 
to the process of scientific            

ratiocination4 ,his main position is    
therefore this3 ,scientific             
ratiocination cannot find adequate      
grounds for belief in ,god4 ,but the    
pure agnostic must recognize that ,god  
may have revealed ,himself by other     
means than that of scientific           
ratiocination4 ,as religion is for the  
whole man1 so all human faculties may be
 required to seek after ,god and find   
,him--emotions and experiences of an    
extra-'rational' kind4 ,the 'pure       
agnostic' must be prepared to welcome   
evidence of all sorts4--,,ed4  ,it is   
desirable to be clear at the outset as  
to the meaning which ,i shall throughout
 attach to certain terms and phrases4   
,theism4  ,it will frequently be said1  
'on the theory of ,theism1' 'supposing  
,theism true1' c4 ,by such phrase my    
meaning will always be equivalent       
to--'supposing1 for the sake of         
argument1 that the nearest approach     
which the human mind can make to a true 
notion of the ens realissimum1 is that  

of an inconceivably magnified image of  
itself at its best4'   ,christianity4   
,similarly1 when it is said1 'supposing 
,christianity true1' what will be meant 
is--'supposing for the sake of argument1
 that the ,christian system as a whole1 
from its earliest dawn in ,judaism1 to  
the phase of its development at the     
present time1 is the highest revelation 
of ,himself which a personal ,deity has 
vouchsafed to mankind4' ,this ,i intend 
to signify an attitude of pure          
agnosticism as regards any particular   
dogma of ,christianity--even that of the
 ,incarnation4  ,should it be said that 
by holding in suspense any distinctive  
dogma of ,christianity1 ,i am not       
considering ,christianity at all1 ,i    
reply1 ,not so2 ,i am not writing a     
theological1 but a philosophical        
treatise1 and shall consider            
,christianity merely as one of many     
religions1 though1 of course1 the       
latest1 c4 ,thus considered1            
,christianity takes its place as the    

highest manifestation of evolution in   
this department of the human mind2 but  
,i am not concerned even with so        
important an ecclesiastical dogma as    
that of the ,incarnation of ,god in     
,christ4 ,as far as this treatise has to
 go1 that dogma may or may not be true4 
,the important question for us is1 ,has 
,god spoken through the medium of our   
religious instincts8 ,and although this 
will necessarily involve the question   
whether or how far in the case of       
,christianity there is objective        
evidence of ,his having spoken by the   
mouth of holy men of the ,old ,testament
 which have been since the world began1 
such will be the case only because it is
 a question of objective evidence       
whether or how far the religious        
instincts of these men1 or this race of 
men1 have been so much superior to those
 of other men1 or races of men1 as to   
have enabled them to predict future     
events of a religious character4 ,and   
whether or not in these latter days ,god

 has spoken by ,his own ,son is not a   
question for us1 further than to        
investigate the higher class of         
religious phenomena which unquestionably
 have been present in the advent and    
person of ,jesus4 ,the question whether 
,jesus was the ,son of ,god1 is1        
logically speaking1 a question of       
ontology1 which1 qu pure agnostics1 we  
are logically forbidden to touch4  ,but 
elsewhere ,i ought to show that1 from my
 point of view as to the fundamental    
question being whether ,god has spoken  
at all through the religious instincts  
of mankind1 it may very well be that    
,christ was not ,god1 and yet that ,he  
gave the highest revelation of ,god4 ,if
 the 'first ,man' was allegorical1 why  
not the 'second'8 ,it is1 indeed1 an    
historical fact that the 'second ,man'  
existed1 but so likewise may the        
'first4' ,and1 as regards the 'personal 
claims' of ,christ1 all that ,he said is
 not incompatible with ,his having been 
,gabriel1 and ,his ,holy ,ghost1        

,michael#ch4 ,or ,he may have been a man
 deceived as to ,his own personality1   
and yet the vehicle of highest          
inspiration4   ,religion4  ,by the term 
'religion1' ,i shall mean any theory of 
personal agency in the universe1 belief 
in which is strong enough in any degree 
to influence conduct4 ,no term has been 
used more loosely of late years1 or in a
 greater variety of meanings4 ,of course
 anybody may use it in any sense he     
pleases1 provided he defines exactly in 
what sense he does so4 ,the above seems 
to be most in accordance with           
traditional usage4   ,agnosticism 'pure'
 and 'impure'4  ,the modern and highly  
convenient term ',agnosticism1' is used 
in two very different senses4 ,by its   
originator1 ,professor ,huxley1 it was  
coined to signify an attitude of        
reasoned ignorance touching everything  
that lies beyond the sphere of          
sense-perception--a professed inability 
to found valid belief on any other      
basis4 ,it is in this its original      

sense--and also1 in my opinion1 its only
 philosophically justifiable sense--that
 ,i shall understand the term4 ,but the 
other1 and perhaps more popular sense in
 which the word is now employed1 is as  
the correlative of ,mr4 ,h4 ,spencer's  
doctrine of the ,unknowable4  ,this     
latter term is philosophically          
erroneous1 implying important negative  
knowledge that if there be a ,god we    
know this much about ,him--that ,he     
cannot reveal ,himself to man#ci4 ,pure 
agnosticism is as defined by ,huxley4   
,of all the many scientific men whom ,i 
have known1 the most pure in his        
agnosticism--not only in profession but 
in spirit and conduct--was ,darwin4     
7,what he says in his autobiography     
about ,christianity#dj shows no         
profundity of thought in the direction  
of philosophy or religion4 ,his mind was
 too purely inductive for this4 ,but1 on
 this very account1 it is the more      
remarkable that his rejection of        
,christianity was due1 not to any a     

priori bias against the creed on grounds
 of reason as absurd1 but solely on the 
ground of an apparent moral objection a 
posteriori#da47 ,faraday and many other 
first-rate originators in science were  
like ,darwin4  ,as an illustration of   
impure agnosticism take ,hume's a priori
 argument against miracles1 leading on  
to the analogous case of the attitude of
 scientific men towards modern          
spiritualism4 ,notwithstanding that they
 have the close analogy of mesmerism as 
an object-lesson to warn them1          
scientific men as a class are here quite
 as dogmatic as the straightest sect of 
theologians4 ,i may give examples which 
can cause no offence1 inasmuch as the   
men in question have themselves made the
 facts public1 viz4 ---- refusing to go 
to a famous spiritualist2 ---- refusing 
to try ---- in thought-reading#db4      
,these men all professed to be agnostics
 at the very time when thus so          
egregiously violating their philosophy  
by their conduct4  ,of course ,i do not 

mean to say that1 even to a pure        
agnostic1 reason should not be guided in
 part by antecedent presumption--e4g4 in
 ordinary life1 the prima facie case1   
motive1 c41 counts for evidence in a    
court of law--and where there is a      
strong antecedent improbability a       
proportionately greater weight of       
evidence a posteriori is needed to      
counterbalance it3 so that1 e4g4 better 
evidence would be needed to convict the 
,archbishop of ,canterbury than a       
vagabond of pocket-picking4 ,and so it  
is with speculative philosophy4 ,but in 
both cases our only guide is known      
analogy2 therefore1 the further we are  
removed from possible experience--i4e4  
the more remote from experience the     
sphere contemplated--the less value     
attaches to antecedent presumptions#dc4 
,maximum remoteness from possible       
experience is reached in the sphere of  
the final mystery of things with which  
religion has to do2 so that here all    
presumption has faded away into a       

vanishing point1 and pure agnosticism is
 our only rational attitude4 ,in other  
words1 here we should all alike be pure 
agnostics as far as reason is concerned2
 and1 if any of us are to attain to any 
information1 it can only be by means of 
some super-added faculty of our minds4  
,the questions as to whether there are  
any such super-added faculties2 if so1  
whether they ever appear to have been   
acted upon from without2 if they have1  
in what manner they have2 what is their 
report2 how far they are trustworthy in 
that report1 and so on--these are the   
questions with which this treatise is to
 be mainly concerned4  ,my own attitude 
may be here stated4 ,i do not claim any 
religious certainty of an intuitive kind
 myself2 but am nevertheless able to    
investigate the abstract logic of the   
matter4 ,and1 although this may seem but
 barren dialectic1 it may1 ,i hope1 be  
of practical service if it secures a    
fair hearing to the reports given by the
 vast majority of mankind who           

unquestionably believe them to emanate  
from some such super-added              
faculties--numerous and diverse though  
their religions be4 ,besides1 in my     
youth ,i published an essay 7the ,candid
 ,examination7 which excited a good deal
 of interest at the time1 and has been  
long out of print4 ,in that treatise ,i 
have since come to see that ,i was wrong
 touching what ,i constituted the basal 
argument for my negative conclusion4    
,therefore ,i now feel it obligatory on 
me to publish the following results of  
my maturer thought1 from the same       
stand-point of pure reason4 ,even though
 ,i have obtained no further light from 
the side of intuition1 ,i have from that
 of intellect4 ,so that1 if there be in 
truth any such intuition1 ,i occupy with
 regard to the organ of it the same     
position as that of the blind lecturer  
on optics4 ,but on this very account ,i 
cannot be accused of partiality towards 
it4  ,it is generally assumed that when 
a man has clearly perceived agnosticism 

to be the only legitimate attitude of   
reason to rest in with regard to        
religion 7as ,i will subsequently show  
that it is71 he has thereby finished    
with the matter2 he can go no further4  
,the main object of this treatise is to 
show that such is by no means the case4 
,he has then only begun his enquiry into
 the grounds and justification of       
religious belief4 ,for reason is not the
 only attribute of man1 nor is it the   
only faculty which he habitually employs
 for the ascertainment of truth4 ,moral 
and spiritual faculties are of no less  
importance in their respective spheres  
even of everyday life2 faith1 trust1    
taste1 c41 are as needful in            
ascertaining truth as to character1     
beauty1 c41 as is reason4 ,indeed we may
 take it that reason is concerned in    
ascertaining truth only where causation 
is concerned2 the appropriate organs for
 its ascertainment where anything else  
is concerned belong to the moral and    
spiritual region4   ,as ,herbert        

,spencer says1 'men of science may be   
divided into two classes1 of which the  
one1 well exemplified by ,faraday1      
keeping their religion and their science
 absolutely separate1 are unperplexed by
 any incongruities between them1 and the
 other of which1 occupying themselves   
exclusively with the facts of science1  
never ask what implications they have4  
,be it trilobite or be it double star1  
their thought about it is much like the 
thought of ,peter ,bell about the       
primrose#dd4' ,now1 both these classes  
are logical1 since both1 as to their    
religion1 adopt an attitude of pure     
agnosticism1 not only in theory1 but    
also in practice4 ,what1 however1 have  
we to say of the third class1 which     
,spencer does not mention1 although it  
is1 ,i think1 the largest1 viz4 of those
 scientific men who expressly abstain   
from drawing a line of division between 
science and religion and then judge of  
religion purely on the principles and by
 the method of science#de8   ,there are 

two opposite casts of mind--the         
mechanical 7scientific1 c47 and the     
spiritual 7artistic1 religious1 c474    
,these may alternate even in the same   
individual4 ,an 'agnostic' has no       
hesitation--even though he himself      
keenly experience the latter--that the  
former only is worthy of trust4 ,but a  
pure agnostic must know better1 as he   
will perceive that there is nothing to  
choose between the two in point of      
trustworthiness4 ,indeed1 if choice has 
to be made the mystic might claim higher
 authority for his direct intuitions4   
,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer has well said1 in
 the opening section of his ,synthetic  
,philosophy1 that wherever human thought
 appears to be radically divided1 there 
must be truth on both sides and that the
 'reconciliation' of opposing views is  
to be found by emphasizing that ultimate
 element of truth which on each side    
underlies manifold differences4 ,more   
than is generally supposed depends on   
points of view1 especially where first  

principles of a subject are in dispute4 
,opposite sides of the same shield may  
present wholly different aspects#df4    
,spencer alludes to this with special   
reference to the conflict between       
science and religion2 and it is in this 
same connexion that ,i also allude to   
it4 ,for it seems to me1 after many     
years of thought upon the subject1 that 
the 'reconciliation' admits of being    
carried much further than it has been by
 him4 ,for he effects this              
reconciliation only to the extent of    
showing that religion arises from the   
recognition of fundamental              
mystery--which it may be proved that    
science also recognizes in all her      
fundamental ideas4 ,this1 however1 is   
after all little more than a platitude4 
,that our ultimate scientific ideas     
7i4e4 ultimate grounds of experience7   
are inexplicable1 is a proposition which
 is self-evident since the dawn of human
 thought4 ,my aim is to carry the       
'reconciliation' into much more detail  

and yet without quitting the grounds of 
pure reason4 ,i intend to take science  
and religion in their present highly    
developed states as such1 and show that 
on a systematic examination of the      
latter by the methods of the former1 the
 'conflict' between the two may be not  
merely 'reconciled' as regards the      
highest generalities of each1 but       
entirely abolished in all matters of    
detail which can be regarded as of any  
great importance4   ,in any methodical  
enquiry the first object should be to   
ascertain the fundamental principles    
with which the enquiry is concerned4 ,in
 actual research1 however1 it is by no  
means always the case that the enquirer 
knows1 or is able at first to ascertain 
what those principles are4 ,in fact1 it 
is often only at the end of a research1 
that they are discovered to be the      
fundamental principles4 ,such has been  
my own experience with regard to the    
subject of the present enquiry4         
,although all my thinking life has been 

concerned1 off and on1 in contemplating 
the problem of our religious instincts1 
the sundry attempts which have been made
 by mankind for securing their          
gratification1 and the important        
question as to their objective          
justification1 it is only in advanced   
years that ,i have clearly perceived    
wherein the first principles of such a  
research must consist4 ,and ,i doubt    
whether any one has hitherto clearly    
defined this point4 ,the principles in  
question are the nature of causation and
 the nature of faith4   ,my objects then
 in this treatise are1 mainly1 three3   
#ast1 to purify agnosticism2 #bnd1 to   
consider more fully than heretofore1 and
 from the stand-point of pure           
agnosticism1 the nature of natural      
causation1 or1 more correctly1 the      
relation of what we know on the subject 
of such causation to the question of    
,theism2 and1 #crd1 again starting from 
the same stand-point1 to consider the   
religious consciousnesses of men as     

phenomena of experience 7i4e4 as        
regarded by us from without71 and       
especially in their highest phase of    
development as exhibited in             
,christianity4  ,,footnotes3  #ch ,i4e4 
supernatural but not strictly ,divine   
,persons4 ,surely1 however1 the         
proposition is not maintainable4--,,ed4 
#ci ,this is another instance of        
recurrence to an earlier thought2 see   
,burney ,essay1 p4 #be1 and cf4 ,mind   
and ,motion and ,monism1 p4 #aag1 note  
#a4--;,,ed4  #dj ,life and ,letters of  
,charles ,darwin1 i4 #cjh4  #da ,see    
further1 p4 #ahb4--;,,ed4  #db ,on the  
whole ,i have thought it best to omit   
the names4--,,ed4  #dc ,the ,,ms4 note  
here continues3 ',here introduce all    
that ,i say on the subject in my ,burney
 ,prize4' ,i have not1 however1         
introduced any quotation into the text  
because 7#a7 ,i think ,romanes makes his
 meaning plain in the text as it stands2
 7#b7 ,i cannot find in the essay in    
question any exactly appropriate passage

 of reasonable length to quote4 ,the    
greater part of the essay is1 however1  
directed to meet the scientific         
objection to the doctrine that prayer is
 answered in the physical region1 by    
showing that this objection consists in 
an argument from the known to the       
unknown1 i4e4 from the known sphere of  
invariable physical laws to the unknown 
sphere of ,god's relation to all such   
laws2 and is1 therefore1 weak in        
proportion as the unknown sphere is     
remote from possible experience of a    
scientific kind1 and admits of an       
indefinite number of possibilities1 more
 or less conceivable to our imagination1
 which would or might prevent the       
scientific argument from having         
legitimate application to the question  
in hand4--,,ed4  #dd ,fortnightly       
,review1 ,feb4 #ahid4  #de ,some such   
phrase is necessary to complete the     
sentence4--,,ed4  #df ,first            
,principles1 ,part ,i1 ch4 #a4      #c4 
,,causality4   ,only because we are so  

familiar with the great phenomenon of   
causality do we take it for granted1 and
 think that we reach an ultimate        
explanation of anything when we have    
succeeded in finding the 'cause'        
thereof3 when1 in point of fact1 we have
 only succeeded in merging it in the    
mystery of mysteries4 ,i often wish we  
could have come into the world1 like the
 young of some other mammals1 with all  
the powers of intellect that we shall   
ever subsequently attain already        
developed1 but without any individual   
experience1 and so without any of the   
blunting effects of custom4 ,could we   
have done so1 surely nothing in the     
world would more acutely excite our     
intelligent astonishment than the one   
universal fact of causation4 ,that      
everything which happens should have a  
cause1 that this should invariably be   
proportioned to its effect1 so that1 no 
matter how complex the interaction of   
causes1 the same interaction should     
always produce the same result2 that    

this rigidly exact system of energizing 
should be found to present all the      
appearances of universality and of      
eternity1 so that1 e4g41 the motion of  
the solar system in space is being      
determined by some causes beyond human  
ken1 and that we are indebted to        
billions of cellular unions1 each       
involving billions of separate causes1  
for our hereditary passage from an      
invertebrate ancestry1--that such things
 should be1 would surely strike us as   
the most wonderful fact in this         
wonderful universe4  ,now1 although     
familiarity with this fact has made us  
forget its wonder to the extent of      
virtually assuming that we know all     
about it1 philosophical enquiry shows   
that1 besides empirically knowing it to 
be a fact1 we only know one other thing 
about it1 viz4--that our knowledge of it
 is derived from our own activity when  
we ourselves are causes4 ,no result of  
psychological analysis seems to me more 
certain than this#dg4 ,if it were not   

for our own volitions1 we should be     
ignorant of what we can now not doubt1  
on pain of suicidal scepticism1 to be   
the most general fact of nature4 ,such1 
at least1 seems to me by far the most   
reasonable theory of our idea of        
causality1 and is the one now most      
generally entertained by philosophers of
 every school4  ,now1 to the plain man  
it will always seem that if our very    
notion of causality is derived from our 
own volition--as our very notion of     
energy is derived from our sense of     
effort in overcoming resistance by our  
volition--presumably the truest notion  
we can form of that in which causation  
objectively consists is the notion      
derived from that known mode of         
existence which alone gives us the      
notion of causality at all4 ,hence the  
plain man will always infer that all    
energy is of the nature of will-energy1 
and all objective causation of the      
nature of subjective4 ,nor is this      
inference confined to the plain man2 the

 deepest philosophical thinkers have    
arrived at substantially the same       
opinion1 e4g4 ,hegel1 ,schopenhauer4 ,so
 that the direct and most natural       
interpretation of causality in external 
nature which is drawn by primitive      
thought in savages and young children1  
seems destined to become also the       
ultimate deliverance of human thought in
 the highest levels of its culture#dh4  
,but1 be this as it may1 we are not     
concerned with any such questions of    
abstract philosophical speculation4 ,as 
pure agnostics they lie beyond our      
sphere4 ,therefore1 ,i allude to them   
only for the sake of showing that there 
is nothing either in the science or     
philosophy of mankind inimical to the   
theory of natural causation being the   
energizing of a will objective to us4   
,and we can plainly see that if such be 
the case1 and if that will be           
self-consistent1 its operations1 as     
revealed in natural causation1 must     
appear to us when considered en bloc 7or

 not piece-meal as by savages71         
non-volitional1 or mechanical4  ,of all 
philosophical theories of causality the 
most repugnant to reason must be those  
of ,hume1 ,kant and ,mill1 which while  
differing from one another agree in     
this--that they attribute the principle 
of causality to a creation of our own   
minds1 or in other words deny that there
 is anything objective in the relation  
of cause and effect--i4e4 in the very   
thing which all physical science is     
engaged in discovering in particular    
cases of it4   ,the conflict of ,science
 and ,religion has always arisen from   
one common ground of agreement1 or      
fundamental postulate of both           
parties--without which1 indeed1 it would
 plainly have been impossible that any  
conflict could have arisen1 inasmuch as 
there would then have been no field for 
battle4 ,every thesis must rest on some 
hypothesis2 therefore1 in cases where   
two or more rival theses rest on a      
common hypothesis1 the disputes must    

needs collapse so soon as the common    
hypothesis is proved erroneous4 ,and    
proportionably1 in whatever degree the  
previously common hypothesis is shown to
 be dubious1 in that degree are the     
disputations shown to be possibly       
unreal4 ,now1 it is one of the main     
objects of this treatise to show that   
the common hypothesis on which all the  
disputes between ,science and ,religion 
have arisen1 is highly dubious4 ,and not
 only so1 but that quite apart from     
modern science all the difficulties on  
the side of intellect 7or reason7 which 
religious belief has ever encountered in
 the past1 or can ever encounter in the 
future1 whether in the individual or the
 race1 arise1 and arise exclusively1    
from the self-same ground of this highly
 dubious hypothesis4  ,the hypothesis1  
or fundamental postulate1 in question   
is1 ,if there be a personal ,god1 ,he is
 not immediately concerned with natural 
causation4 ,it is assumed that qua      
'first cause1' ,he can in no way be     

concerned with 'second causes1' further 
than by having started them in the first
 instance as a great machinery of       
'natural causation1' working under      
'general laws4' ,true the theory of     
,deism1 which entertains more or less   
expressly this hypothesis of ',deus ex  
machina1' has during the present century
 been more and more superseded by that  
of ,theism1 which entertains also in    
some indefinable measure the doctrine of
 'immanence'2 as well as by that of     
,pantheism1 which expressly holds this  
doctrine to the exclusion in toto of its
 rival4 ,but ,theism has never yet      
entertained it sufficiently or up to the
 degree required by the pure logic of   
the case1 while ,pantheism has but      
rarely considered the rival doctrine of 
personality--or the possible union of   
immanence with personality4#di  ,now it 
is the object of this book to go much   
further than any one has hitherto gone  
in proving the possibility of this      
union4 ,for ,i purpose to show that1    

provided only we lay aside all          
prejudice1 sentiment1 c41 and follow to 
its logical termination the guidance of 
pure reason1 there are no other         
conclusions to be reached than these4   
,namely1 7,a7 ,that if there be a       
personal ,god1 no reason can be assigned
 why ,he should not be immanent in      
nature1 or why all causation should not 
be the immediate expression of ,his     
will4 7,b7 ,that every available reason 
points to the inference that ,he        
probably is so4 7,c7 ,that if ,he is so1
 and if ,his will is self-consistent1   
all natural causation must needs appear 
to us 'mechanical4' ,therefore 7,d7 that
 it is no argument against the divine   
origin of a thing1 event1 c41 to prove  
it due to natural causation4  ,after    
having dealt briefly with 7,a71 7,b7 and
 7,c71 ,i would show that 7,d7 is the   
most practically important of these four
 conclusions4 ,for the fundamental      
hypothesis which ,i began by mentioning 
is just the opposite of this4 ,whether  

tacitly or expressly1 it has always been
 assumed by both sides in the           
controversy between ,science and        
,religion1 that as soon as this that and
 the other phenomenon has been explained
 by means of natural causation1 it has  
thereupon ceased to be ascribable       
directly to ,god4 ,the distinction      
between the natural and the supernatural
 has always been regarded by both sides 
as indisputably sound1 and this         
fundamental agreement as to ground of   
battle has furnished the only possible  
condition to fighting4 ,it has also     
furnished the condition of all the past1
 and may possibly furnish the condition 
of all the future1 discomfitures of     
religion4 ,true religion is indeed      
learning her lesson that something is   
wrong in her method of fighting1 and    
many of her soldiers are now waking up  
to the fact that it is here that her    
error lies--as in past times they woke  
up to see the error of denying the      
movement of the earth1 the antiquity of 

the earth1 the origin of species by     
evolution1 c4 ,but no one1 even of her  
captains and generals1 has so far       
followed up their advantage to its      
ultimate consequences4 ,and this is what
 ,i want to do4 ,the logical advantage  
is clearly on their side2 and it is     
their own fault if they do not gain the 
ultimate victory1--not only as against  
science1 but as against intellectual    
dogmatism in every form4 ,this can be   
routed all along the line4 ,for science 
is only the organized study of natural  
causation1 and the experience of every  
human being1 in so far as it leads to   
dogmatism on purely intellectual        
grounds1 does so on account of          
entertaining the fundamental postulate  
in question4 ,the influence of custom   
and want of imagination is here very    
great4 ,but the answer always should be 
to move the ulterior question--what is  
the nature of natural causation8  ,now  
,i propose to push to its full logical  
conclusion the consequence of this      

answer4 ,for no one1 even the most      
orthodox1 has as yet learnt this lesson 
of religion to anything like fullness4  
,god is still grudged ,his own universe1
 so to speak1 as far and as often as ,he
 can possibly be4 ,as examples we may   
take the natural growth of ,christianity
 out of previous religions2 the natural 
spread of it2 the natural conversion of 
,st4 ,paul1 or of anybody else4 ,it is  
still assumed on both sides that there  
must be something inexplicable or       
miraculous about a phenomenon in order  
to its being divine4  ,what else have   
science and religion ever had to fight  
about save on the basis of this common  
hypothesis1 and hence as to whether the 
causation of such and such a phenomenon 
has been 'natural' or 'super-natural4'  
,for even the disputes as to science    
contradicting scripture1 ultimately turn
 on the assumption of inspiration       
7supposing it genuine7 being            
'super-natural' as to its causation4    
,once grant that it is 'natural' and all

 possible ground of dispute is removed4 
,i can well understand why infidelity   
should make the basal assumption in     
question1 because its whole case must   
rest thereon4 ,but surely it is time for
 theists to abandon this assumption4    
,the assumed distinction between        
causation as natural and super-natural  
no doubt began in superstition in       
prehistoric time1 and throughout the    
historical period has continued from a  
vague feeling that the action of ,god   
must be mysterious1 and hence that the  
province of religion must be within the 
super-sensuous4 ,now1 it is true enough 
that the finite cannot comprehend the   
infinite1 and hence the feeling in      
question is logically sound4 ,but under 
the influence of this feeling1 men have 
always committed the fallacy of         
concluding that if a phenomenon has been
 explained in terms of natural          
causation1 it has thereby been explained
 in toto--forgetting that it has only   
been explained up to the point where    

such causation is concerned1 and that   
the real question of ultimate causation 
has merely been thus postponed4 ,and    
assuredly beyond this point there is an 
infinitude of mystery sufficient to     
satisfy the most exacting mystic4 ,for  
even ,herbert ,spencer allows that in   
ultimate analysis all natural causation 
is inexplicable4  ,logically regarded   
the advance of science1 far from having 
weakened religion1 has immeasurably     
strengthened it4 ,for it has proved the 
uniformity of natural causation4 ,the   
so-called natural sphere has increased  
at the expense of the 'super-natural4'  
,unquestionably4 ,but although to lower 
grades of culture this always seems a   
fact inimical to religion1 we may now   
perceive it is quite the reverse1 since 
it merely goes to abolish the primitive 
or uncultured distinction in question4  
,it is indeed most extraordinary how    
long this distinction has held sway1 or 
how it is the ablest men of all         
generations have quietly assumed that   

when once we know the natural causation 
of any phenomenon1 we therefore know all
 about it--or1 as it were1 have removed 
it from the sphere of mystery           
altogether1 when1 in point of fact1 we  
have only merged it in a much greater   
mystery than ever4  ,but the answer to  
our astonishment how this distinction   
has managed to survive so long lies in  
the extraordinary effect of custom1     
which here seems to slay reason         
altogether2 and the more a man busies   
himself with natural causes 7e4g4 in    
scientific research7 the greater does   
this slavery to custom become1 till at  
last he seems positively unable to      
perceive the real state of the          
case--regarding any rational thinking   
thereon as chimerical1 so that the term 
'meta-physical1' even in its            
etymological sense as super-sensuous or 
beyond physical causation1 becomes a    
term of rational reproach4 ,obviously   
such a man has written himself down1 if 
not an ass1 at all events a creature    

wholly incapable of rationally treating 
any of the highest problems presented   
either by nature or by man4  ,on any    
logical theory of ,theism there can be  
no such distinction between 'natural'   
and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn1 
since on that theory all causation is   
but the action of the ,divine ,will4    
,and if we draw any distinction between 
such action as 'immediate' or 'mediate1'
 we can only mean this as valid in      
relation to mankind--i4e4 in relation to
 our experience4 ,for1 obviously1 it    
would be wholly incompatible with pure  
agnosticism to suppose that we are      
capable of drawing any such distinction 
in relation to the ,divine activity     
itself4 ,even apart from the theory of  
,theism1 pure agnosticism must take it  
that the real distinction is not between
 natural and supernatural1 but between  
the explicable and the                  
inexplicable--meaning by those terms    
that which is and that which is not     
accountable by such causes as fall      

within the range of human observation4  
,or1 in other words1 the distinction is 
really between the observable and the   
unobservable causal processes of the    
universe4  ,although science is         
essentially engaged in explaining1 her  
work is necessarily confined to the     
sphere of natural causation2 beyond that
 sphere 7i4e4 the sensuous7 she can     
explain nothing4 ,in other words1 even  
if she were able to explain the natural 
causation of everything1 she would be   
unable to assign the ultimate raison    
d'tre of anything4   ,it is not my      
intention to write an essay on the      
nature of causality1 or even to attempt 
a survey of the sundry theories which   
have been propounded on this subject by 
philosophers4 ,indeed1 to attempt this  
would be little less than to write a    
history of philosophy itself4           
,nevertheless it is necessary for my    
purpose to make a few remarks touching  
the main branches of thought upon the   
matter#ej4  ,the remarkable nature of   

the facts4 ,these are remarkable1 since 
they are common to all human experience4
 ,everything that happens has a cause4  
,the same happening has always the same 
cause--or the same consequent the same  
antecedent4 ,it is only familiarity with
 this great fact that prevents universal
 wonder at it1 for1 notwithstanding all 
the theories upon it1 no one has ever   
really shown why it is so4 ,that the    
same causes always produce the same     
effects is a proposition which expresses
 a fundamental fact of our knowledge1   
but the knowledge of this fact is purely
 empirical2 we can show no reason why it
 should be a fact4 ,doubtless1 if it    
were not a fact1 there could be no      
so-called ',order of ,nature1' and      
consequently no science1 no philosophy1 
or perhaps 7if the irregularity were    
sufficiently frequent7 no possibility of
 human experience4 ,but although this is
 easy enough to show1 it in no wise     
tends to show why the same causes should
 always produce the same effects4  ,so  

manifest is it that our knowledge of the
 fact in question is only empirical1    
that some of our ablest thinkers1 such  
as ,hume and ,mill1 have failed to      
perceive even so much as the            
intellectual necessity of looking beyond
 our empirical knowledge of the fact to 
gain any explanation of the fact itself4
 ,therefore they give to the world the  
wholly vacuous1 or merely tautological  
theory of causation--viz4 that of       
constancy of sequence within human      
observation#ea4   ,if it be said of my  
argument touching causality1 that it is 
naturalizing or materializing the       
super-natural or spiritual 7as most     
orthodox persons will feel71 my reply is
 that deeper thought will show it to be 
at least as susceptible of the opposite 
view--viz4 that it is subsuming the     
natural into the super-natural1 or      
spiritualizing the material3 and a pure 
agnostic1 least of all1 should have     
anything to say as against either of    
these alternative points of view4 ,or we

 may state the matter thus3 in as far as
 pure reason can have anything to say in
 the matter1 she ought to incline       
towards the view of my doctrine         
spiritualizing the material1 because it 
is pretty certain that we could know    
nothing about natural causation--even so
 much as its existence--but for our own 
volitions4   ,free ,will#eb4  ,having   
read all that is said to be worth       
reading on the ,free ,will controversy1 
it appears to me that the main issues   
and their logical conclusions admit of  
being summed up in a very few words1    
thus3--  #a4 ,a writer1 before he       
undertakes to deal with this subject at 
all1 should be conscious of fully       
perceiving the fundamental distinction  
between responsibility as merely legal  
and as also moral2 otherwise he cannot  
but miss the very essence of the        
question in debate4 ,no one questions   
the patent fact of responsibility as    
legal2 the only question is touching    
responsibility as moral4 ,yet the       

principal bulk of literature on ,free   
,will and ,necessity arises from        
disputants on both sides failing to     
perceive this basal distinction4 ,even  
such able writers as ,spencer1 ,huxley  
and ,clifford are in this position4  #b4
 ,the root question is as to whether the
 will is caused or un-caused4 ,for      
however much this root-question may be  
obscured by its own abundant foliage1   
the latter can have no existence but    
that which it derives from the former4  
#c4 ,consequently1 if libertarians grant
 causality as appertaining to the will1 
however much they may beat about the    
bush1 they are surrendering their       
position all along the line1 unless they
 fall back upon the more ultimate       
question as to the nature of natural    
causation4 ,now it can be proved that   
this more ultimate question is          
scientifically unanswerable4 ,therefore 
both sides may denominate natural       
causation x--an unknown quantity4  #d4  
,hence the whole controversy ought to be

 seen by both sides to resolve itself   
into this--is or is not the will        
determined by x8 ,and1 if this seems but
 a barren question to debate1 ,i do not 
undertake to deny the fact4 ,at the same
 time there is clearly this real issue  
remaining--viz4 ,is the will            
self-determining1 or is it              
determined--i4e4 from without8  #e4 ,if 
determined from without1 is there any   
room for freedom1 in the sense required 
for saving the doctrine of moral        
responsibility8 ,and ,i think the answer
 to this must be an unconditional       
negative4  #f4 ,but1 observe1 it is not 
one and the same thing to ask1 ,is the  
will entirely determined from without8  
and ,is the will entirely determined by 
natural causation 7x78 ,for the unknown 
quantity x may very well include x'1 if 
by x' we understand all the unknown     
ingredients of personality4  #g4 ,hence1
 determinists gain no advantage over    
their adversaries by any possible proof 
7at present impossible7 that all acts of

 will are due to natural causation1     
unless they can show the nature of the  
latter1 and that it is of such a nature 
as supports their conclusion4 ,for aught
 we at present know1 the will may very  
well be free in the sense required1 even
 though all its acts are due to x4  #h4 
,in particular1 for aught we know to the
 contrary1 all may be due to x'1 i4e4   
all causation may be of the nature of   
will 7as1 indeed1 many systems of       
philosophy maintain71 with the result   
that every human will is of the nature  
of a ,first ,cause4 ,in support of which
 possibility it may be remarked that    
most philosophies are led to the theory 
of a causa causarum as regards x4  #i4  
,to the obvious objection that with a   
plurality of first causes--each the fons
 et origo of a new and never-ending     
stream of causality--the cosmos must    
sooner or later become a chaos by       
cumulative intersection of the streams1 
the answer is to be found in the theory 
of monism#ec4  #aj4 ,nevertheless1 the  

ultimate difficulty remains which is    
depicted in my essay on the ',world as  
an ,eject#ed4' ,but this1 again1 is     
merged in the mystery of ,personality1  
which is only known as an inexplicable1 
and seemingly ultimate1 fact4  #aa4 ,so 
that the general conclusion of the whole
 matter must be--pure agnosticism4      
,,footnotes3  #dg ,here it was intended 
to insert further explanation 'showing  
that mere observation of causality in   
external nature would not have yielded  
idea of anything further than time and  
space relations4'--,,ed4  #dh ,this     
theory was suggested in the ,burney     
,essay1 p4 #acf1 and ridiculed in the   
,candid ,examination2 see above1 p4 #aa4
 ,romanes intended at this point to     
consider at greater length his old views
 'on causation as due to being qua      
being4'--,,ed4  #di ,see1 however1      
,aubrey ,moore in ,lux ,mundi1 pp4      
#id-if1 and ,le ,conte1 ,evolution in   
its ,relation to ,religious ,thought1   
pp4 #cce1 ff4 ,n4,b4 ,the references not

 enclosed in brackets are the author's1 
not mine4--,,ed4  #ej ,nothing more     
however was written than what follows   
immediately4--,,ed4  #ea ,the author    
intended further to show the vacuity of 
this theory and point out how ,mill     
himself appears to perceive it by his   
introduction after the term 'invariably'
 of the term 'unconditionally'2 he      
refers also to ,martineau1 ,study of    
,religion1 i4 pp4 #aeb1 #c4--;,,ed4  #eb
 ,romanes' thoughts about ,free ,will   
are more lucidly expressed in an essay  
published subsequently to these ,notes  
in ,mind and ,motion and ,monism1 pp4   
#abi ff4--,,ed4  #ec ,see above1 p4     
#ca4--;,,ed4  #ed ,contemporary ,review1
 ,july #ahhf4 ,but the 'ultimate        
difficulty' referred to above would seem
 to be the relation of manifold         
dependent human wills to the ,one       
,ultimate and ,all-embracing            
,will4--,,ed4      #d4 ,,faith4   ,faith
 in its religious sense is distinguished
 not only from opinion 7or belief       

founded on reason alone71 in that it    
contains a spiritual element3 it is     
further distinguished from belief       
founded on the affections1 by needing an
 active co-operation of the will4 ,thus 
all parts of the human mind have to be  
involved in faith--intellect1 emotions1 
will4 ,we 'believe' in the theory of    
evolution on grounds of reason alone2 we
 'believe' in the affection of our      
parents1 children1 c41 almost 7or it may
 be exclusively7 on what ,i have called 
spiritual grounds--i4e4 on grounds of   
spiritual experience2 for this we need  
no exercise either of reason or of will4
 ,but no one can 'believe' in ,god1 or a
 fortiori in ,christ1 without also a    
severe effort of will4 ,this ,i hold to 
be a matter of fact1 whether or not     
there be a ,god or a ,christ4  ,observe 
will is to be distinguished from desire4
 ,it matters not what psychologists may 
have to say upon this subject4 ,whether 
desire differs from will in kind or only
 in degree--whether will is desire in   

action1 so to speak1 and desire but     
incipient will--are questions with which
 we need not trouble ourselves4 ,for it 
is certain that there are agnostics who 
would greatly prefer being theists1 and 
theists who would give all they possess 
to be ,christians1 if they could thus   
secure promotion by purchase--i4e4 by   
one single act of will4 ,but yet the    
desire is not strong enough to sustain  
the will in perpetual action1 so as to  
make the continual sacrifices which     
,christianity entails4 ,perhaps the     
hardest of these sacrifices to an       
intelligent man is that of his own      
intellect4 ,at least ,i am certain that 
this is so in my own case4 ,i have been 
so long accustomed to constitute my     
reason my sole judge of truth1 that even
 while reason itself tells me it is not 
unreasonable to expect that the heart   
and the will should be required to join 
with reason in seeking ,god 7for        
religion is for the whole man71 ,i am   
too jealous of my reason to exercise my 

will in the direction of my most        
heart-felt desires4 ,for assuredly the  
strongest desire of my nature is to find
 that that nature is not deceived in its
 highest aspirations4 ,yet ,i cannot    
bring myself so much as to make a       
venture in the direction of faith4 ,for 
instance1 regarded from one point of    
view it seems reasonable enough that    
,christianity should have enjoined the  
doing of the doctrine as a necessary    
condition to ascertaining 7i4e4         
'believing'7 its truth4 ,but from       
another1 and my more habitual point of  
view1 it seems almost an affront to     
reason to make any such 'fool's         
experiment'--just as to some scientific 
men it seems absurd and childish to     
expect them to investigate the          
'superstitious' follies of modern       
spiritualism4 ,even the simplest act of 
will in regard to religion--that of     
prayer--has not been performed by me for
 at least a quarter of a century1 simply
 because it has seemed so impossible to 

pray1 as it were1 hypothetically1 that  
much as ,i have always desired to be    
able to pray1 ,i cannot will the        
attempt4 ,to justify myself for what my 
better judgement has often seen to be   
essentially irrational1 ,i have ever    
made sundry excuses4 ,the chief of them 
has run thus4 ,even supposing           
,christianity true1 and even supposing  
that after having so far sacrificed my  
reason to my desire as to have satisfied
 the supposed conditions to obtaining   
'grace1' or direct illumination from    
,god1--even then would not my reason    
turn round and revenge herself upon me8 
,for surely even then my habitual       
scepticism would make me say to         
myself--'this is all very sublime and   
very comforting2 but what evidence have 
you to give me that the whole business  
is anything more than self-delusion8    
,the wish was probably father to the    
thought1 and you might much better have 
performed your act of will by going in  
for a course of ,indian hemp4' ,of      

course a ,christian would answer to this
 that the internal light would not admit
 of such doubt1 any more than seeing the
 sun does--that ,god knows us well      
enough to prevent that1 c41 and also    
that it is unreasonable not to try an   
experiment lest the result should prove 
too good to be credible1 and so on4 ,and
 ,i do not dispute that the ,christian  
would be justified in so answering1 but 
,i only adduce the matter as an         
illustration of the difficulty which is 
experienced in conforming to all the    
conditions of attaining to ,christian   
faith--even supposing it to be sound4   
,others have doubtless other            
difficulties1 but mine is chiefly1 ,i   
think1 that of an undue regard to       
reason1 as against heart and            
will--undue1 ,i mean1 if so it be that  
,christianity is true1 and the          
conditions to faith in it have been of  
divine ordination4  ,this influence of  
will on belief1 even in matters secular1
 is the more pronounced the further     

removed these matters may be from       
demonstration 7as already remarked72 but
 this is most of all the case where our 
personal interests are affected--whether
 these be material or intellectual1 such
 as credit for consistency1 c4 ,see1 for
 example1 how closely1 in the respects  
we are considering1 political beliefs   
resemble religious4 ,unless the points  
of difference are such that truth is    
virtually demonstrable on one side1 so  
that adhesion to the opposite is due to 
conscious sacrifice of integrity to     
expediency1 we always find that         
party-spectacles so colour the view as  
to leave reason at the mercy of will1   
custom1 interest1 and all the other     
circumstances which similarly operate on
 religious beliefs4 ,it seems to make   
but little difference in either case    
what level of general education1 mental 
power1 special training1 c41 is brought 
to bear upon the question under         
judgement4 ,from the ,premier to the    
peasant we find the same difference of  

opinion in politics as we do in         
religion4 ,and in each case the         
explanation is the same4 ,beliefs are so
 little dependent on reason alone that  
in such regions of thought--i4e4 where  
personal interests are affected and the 
evidences of truth are not in their     
nature demonstrable--it really seems as 
if reason ceases to be a judge of       
evidence or guide to truth1 and becomes 
a mere advocate of opinion already      
formed on quite other grounds4 ,now     
these other grounds are1 as we have     
seen1 mainly the accidents of habit or  
custom1 wish being father to the        
thought1 c4  ,now this may be all       
deplorable enough in politics1 and in   
all other beliefs secular2 but who shall
 say it is not exactly as it ought to be
 in the matter of beliefs religious8    
,for1 unless we beg the question of a   
future life in the negative1 we must    
entertain at least the possibility of   
our being in a state of probation in    
respect of an honest use not only of our

 reason1 but probably still more of     
those other ingredients of human nature 
which go to determine our beliefs       
touching this most important of all     
matters4  ,it is remarkable how even in 
politics it is the moral and spiritual  
elements of character which lead to     
success in the long run1 even more than 
intellectual ability--supposing1 of     
course1 that the latter is not below the
 somewhat high level of our             
,parliamentary assemblies4  ,as regards 
the part that is played by will in the  
determining of belief1 one can show how 
unconsciously large this is even in     
matters of secular interest4 ,reason is 
very far indeed from being the sole     
guide of judgement that it is usually   
taken to be--so far1 indeed1 that1 save 
in matters approaching down-right       
demonstration 7where of course there is 
no room for any other ingredient7 it is 
usually hampered by custom1 prejudice1  
dislike1 c41 to a degree that would     
astonish the most sober philosopher     

could he lay bare to himself all the    
mental processes whereby the complex act
 of assent or dissent is eventually     
determined#ee4  ,as showing how little  
reason alone has to do with the         
determining of religious belief1 let us 
take the case of mathematicians4 ,this  
,i think is the fairest case we can     
take1 seeing that of all intellectual   
pursuits that of mathematical research  
is the most exact1 as well as the most  
exclusive in its demand upon the powers 
of reason1 and hence that1 as a class1  
the men who have achieved highest       
eminence in that pursuit may be fairly  
taken as the fittest representatives of 
our species in respect of the faculty of
 pure reason4 ,yet whenever they have   
turned their exceptional powers in this 
respect upon the problems of religion1  
how suggestively well balanced are their
 opposite conclusions--so much so indeed
 that we can only conclude that reason  
counts for very little in the complex of
 mental processes which here determine  

judgement4  ,thus1 if we look to the    
greatest mathematicians in the world's  
history1 we find ,kepler and ,newton as 
,christians2 ,la ,place1 on the other   
hand1 an infidel4 ,or1 coming to our own
 times1 and confining our attention to  
the principal seat of mathematical      
study3--when ,i was at ,cambridge1 there
 was a galaxy of genius in that         
department emanating from that place    
such as had never before been equalled4 
,and the curious thing in our present   
connexion is that all the most          
illustrious names were ranged on the    
side of orthodoxy4 ,sir ,w4 ,thomson1   
,sir ,george ,stokes1 ,professors ,tait1
 ,adams1 ,clerk-,maxwell1 and           
,cayley--not to mention a number of     
lesser lights1 such as ,routh1          
,todhunter1 ,ferrers1 c4--were all      
avowed ,christians4 ,clifford had only  
just moved at a bound from the extreme  
of asceticism to that of infidelity--an 
individual instance which ,i deem of    
particular interest in the present      

connexion1 as showing the dominating    
influence of a forcedly emotional       
character even on so powerful an        
intellectual one1 for the rationality of
 the whole structure of ,christian      
belief cannot have so reversed its poles
 within a few months4  ,now it would    
doubtless be easy to find elsewhere than
 in ,cambridge mathematicians of the    
first order who in our own generation   
are1 or have been1 professedly          
anti-,christian in their                
beliefs1--although certainly not so     
great an array of such extraordinary    
powers4 ,but1 be this as it may1 the    
case of ,cambridge in my own time seems 
to me of itself enough to prove that    
,christian belief is neither made nor   
marred by the highest powers of         
reasoning1 apart from other and still   
more potent factors4   ,faith and       
,superstition4  ,whether or not         
,christianity is true1 there is a great 
distinction between these two things4   
,for while the main ingredient of       

,christian faith is the moral element1  
this has no part in superstition4 ,in   
point of fact1 the only point of        
resemblance is that both present the    
mental state called belief4 ,it is on   
this account they are so often          
confounded by anti-,christians1 and even
 by non-,christians2 the much more      
important point of difference is not    
noted1 viz4 that belief in the one case 
is purely intellectual1 while in the    
other it is chiefly moral4 ,qua purely  
intellectual1 belief may indicate       
nothing but sheer credulity in absence  
of evidence2 but where a moral basis is 
added1 the case is clearly different2   
for even if it appears to be sheer      
credulity to an outsider1 that may be   
because he does not take into account   
the additional evidence supplied by the 
moral facts4   ,faith and superstition  
are often confounded1 or even           
identified4 ,and1 unquestionably1 they  
are identical up to a certain           
point--viz4 they both present the mental

 state of belief4 ,all people can see   
this2 but not all people can see        
further1 or define the differentiae4    
,these are as follows3 ,first1 supposing
 ,christianity true1 there is the       
spiritual verification4 ,second1        
supposing ,christianity false1 there is 
still the moral ingredient1 which ex    
hypothesi is absent in superstition4 ,in
 other words1 both faith and            
superstition rest on an intellectual    
basis 7which may be pure credulity72 but
 faith rests also on a moral1 even if   
not likewise on a spiritual4 ,even in   
human relations there is a wide         
difference between 'belief' in a        
scientific theory and 'faith' in a      
personal character4 ,and the difference 
is in the latter comprising a moral     
element4  ',faith-healing1' therefore1  
has no real point of resemblance with   
'thy faith hath saved thee' of the ,new 
,testament1 unless we sink the personal 
differences between a modern            
faith-healer and ,jesus ,christ as      

objects of faith4  ,belief is not       
exclusively founded on objective        
evidence appealing to reason 7opinion71 
but mainly on subjective evidence       
appealing to some altogether different  
faculty 7faith74 ,now1 whether          
,christians are right or wrong in what  
they believe1 ,i hold it as certain as  
anything can be that the distinction    
which ,i have just drawn1 and which they
 all implicitly draw for themselves1 is 
logically valid4 ,for no one is entitled
 to deny the possibility of what may be 
termed an organ of spiritual            
discernment4 ,in fact to do so would be 
to vacate the position of pure          
agnosticism in toto--and this even if   
there were no objective1 or strictly    
scientific1 evidences in favour of such 
an organ1 such as we have in the lives  
of the saints1 and1 in a lower degree1  
in the universality of the religious    
sentiment4 ,now1 if there be such an    
organ1 it follows from preceding        
paragraphs1 that not only will the main 

evidences for ,christianity be          
subjective1 but that they ought to be   
so3 they ought to be so1 ,i mean1 on the
 ,christian supposition of the object of
 ,christianity being moral probation1   
and 'faith' both the test and the       
reward4  ,from this many practical      
considerations ensue4 ,e4g4 the duty of 
parents to educate their children in    
what they believe as distinguished from 
what they know4 ,this would be          
unjustifiable if faith were the same as 
opinion4 ,but it is fully justifiable if
 a man not only knows that he believes  
7opinion7 but believes that he knows    
7faith74 ,whether or not the ,christian 
differs from the 'natural man' in having
 a spiritual organ of cognition1        
provided he honestly believes such is   
the case1 it would be immoral in him not
 to proceed in accordance with what he  
thus believes to be his knowledge4 ,this
 obligation is recognized in education  
in every other case4 ,he is morally     
right even if mentally deluded4         

,huxley1 in ,lay ,sermons1 says that    
faith has been proved a 'cardinal sin'  
by science4 ,now1 this is true enough of
 credulity1 superstition1 c41 and       
science has done no end of good in      
developing our ideas of method1         
evidence1 c4 ,but this is all on the    
side of intellect4 ',faith' is not      
touched by such facts or considerations4
 ,and what a terrible hell science would
 have made of the world1 if she had     
abolished the 'spirit of faith' even in 
human relations4 ,the fact is1 ,huxley  
falls into the common error of          
identifying 'faith' with opinion4       
,supposing ,christianity true1 it is    
very reasonable that faith in the sense 
already explained should be constituted 
the test of divine acceptance4 ,if there
 be such a thing as ,christ's winnowing 
fan1 the quality of sterling weight for 
the discovery of which it is adapted    
cannot be conceived as anything other   
than this moral quality4 ,no one could  
suppose a revelation appealing to the   

mere intellect of man1 since acceptance 
would thus become a mere matter of      
prudence in subscribing to a            
demonstration made by higher intellects4
  ,it is also a matter of fact that if  
,christianity is truthful in            
representing this world as a school of  
moral probation1 we cannot conceive a   
system better adapted to this end than  
is the world1 or a better schoolmaster  
than ,christianity4 ,this is proved not 
only by general reasoning1 but also by  
the work of ,christianity in the world1 
its adaptation to individual needs1 c4  
,consider also the extraordinary        
diversity of human characters in respect
 both of morality and spirituality      
though all are living in the same world4
 ,out of the same external material or  
environment such astonishingly diverse  
products arise according to the use made
 of it4 ,even human suffering in its    
worst forms can be welcome if justified 
by faith in such an object4 ',ills have 
no weight1 and tears no bitterness1' but

 are rather to be 'gloried in#ef4'  ,it 
is a further fact that only by means of 
this theory of probation is it possible 
to give any meaning to the world1 i4e4  
any raison d'tre of human existence4    
,supposing ,christianity true1 every man
 must stand or fall by the results of   
his own conduct1 as developed through   
his own moral character4 7,this could   
not be so if the test were intellectual 
ability47 ,yet this does not hinder that
 the exercise of will in the direction  
of religion should need help in order to
 attain belief4 ,nor does it hinder that
 some men should need more help and     
others less4 ,indeed1 it may well be    
that some men are intentionally         
precluded from receiving any help1 so as
 not to increase their responsibility1  
or receive but little1 so as to         
constitute intellectual difficulties a  
moral trial4 ,but clearly1 if such      
things are so1 we are inadequate judges4
   ,it is a fact that we all feel the   
intellectual part of man to be 'higher' 

than the animal1 whatever our theory of 
his origin4 ,it is a fact that we all   
feel the moral part of man to be        
'higher' than the intellectual1 whatever
 our theory of either may be4 ,it is    
also a fact that we all similarly feel  
the spiritual to be 'higher' than the   
moral1 whatever our theory of religion  
may be4 ,it is what we understand by    
man's moral1 and still more his         
spiritual1 qualities that go to         
constitute 'character4' ,and it is      
astonishing how in all walks of life it 
is character that tells in the long run4
  ,it is a fact that these distinctions 
are all well marked and universally     
recognized--viz4             ,animality4
            ,intellectuality4           
,human ,morality4                       
,spirituality4  ,morality and           
spirituality are to be distinguished as 
two very different things4 ,a man may be
 highly moral in his conduct without    
being in any degree spiritual in his    
nature1 and1 though to a lesser extent1 

vice versa4 ,and1 objectively1 we see   
the same distinction between morals and 
religion4 ,by spirituality ,i mean the  
religious temperament1 whether or not   
associated with any particular creed or 
dogma4  ,there is no doubt that         
intellectual pleasures are more         
satisfying and enduring than sensual--or
 even sensuous4 ,and1 to those who have 
experienced them1 so it is with         
spiritual over intellectual1 artistic1  
c4 ,this is an objective fact1          
abundantly testified to by every one who
 has had experience3 and it seems to    
indicate that the spiritual nature of   
man is the highest part of man--the     
culminating point of his being4   ,it is
 probably true1 as ,renan says in his   
posthumous work1 that there will always 
be materialists and spiritualists1      
inasmuch as it will always be observable
 on the one hand that there is no       
thought without brain1 while1 on the    
other hand1 instincts of man will always
 aspire to higher beliefs4 ,but this is 

just what ought to be if religion is    
true1 and we are in a state of          
probation4 ,and is it not probable that 
the materialistic position 7discredited 
even by philosophy7 is due simply to    
custom and want of imagination8 ,else   
why the inextinguishable instincts8     
,it is much more easy to disbelieve than
 to believe4 ,this is obvious on the    
side of reason1 but it is also true on  
that of spirit1 for to disbelieve is in 
accordance with environment or custom1  
while to believe necessitates a         
spiritual use of the imagination4 ,for  
both these reasons1 very few unbelievers
 have any justification1 either         
intellectual or spiritual1 for their own
 unbelief4  ,unbelief is usually due to 
indolence1 often to prejudice1 and never
 a thing to be proud of4   ',why should 
it be thought a thing incredible with   
you that ,god should raise the dead8'   
,clearly no answer can be given by the  
pure agnostic4 ,but he will naturally   
say in reply1 'the question rather is1  

why should it be thought credible with  
you that there is a ,god1 or1 if there  
is1 that he should raise the dead8' ,and
 ,i think the wise ,christian will      
answer1 ',i believe in the resurrection 
of the dead1 partly on grounds of       
reason1 partly on those of intuition1   
but chiefly on both combined2 so to     
speak1 it is my whole character which   
accepts the whole system of which the   
doctrine of personal immortality forms  
an essential part4' ,and to this it may 
be fairly added that the ,christian     
doctrine of the resurrection of our     
bodily form cannot have been arrived at 
for the purpose of meeting modern       
materialistic objections to the doctrine
 of personal immortality2 hence it is   
certainly a strange doctrine to have    
been propounded at that time1 together  
with its companion1 and scarcely less   
distinctive1 doctrine of the vileness of
 the body4 ,why was it not said that the
 'soul' alone should survive as a       
disembodied 'spirit'8 ,or if form were  

supposed necessary for man as           
distinguished from ,god1 that he was to 
be an angel8 ,but1 be this as it may1   
the doctrine of the resurrection seems  
to have fully met beforehand the        
materialistic objection to a future     
life1 and so to have raised the ulterior
 question with which this paragraph     
opens4   ,we have seen in the           
,introduction that all first principles 
even of scientific facts are known by   
intuition and not by reason4 ,no one can
 deny this4 ,now1 if there be a ,god1   
the fact is certainly of the nature of a
 first principle2 for it must be the    
first of all first principles4 ,no one  
can dispute this4 ,no one can therefore 
dispute the necessary conclusion1 that1 
if there be a ,god1 ,he is knowable1 7if
 knowable at all7 by intuition and not  
by reason4  ,indeed a little thought is 
enough to show that from its very nature
 as such1 reason must be incapable of   
adjudicating on the subject1 for it is a
 process of inferring from the known to 

the unknown4  ,or thus4 ,it would be    
against reason itself to suppose that   
,god1 even if ,he exists1 can be known  
by reason2 ,he must be known1 if        
knowable at all1 by intuition#eg4       
,observe1 although ,god might give an   
objective revelation of ,himself1 e4g4  
as ,christians believe ,he has1 even    
this would not give knowledge of ,him   
save to those who believe the           
revelations genuine2 and ,i doubt       
whether it is logically possible for any
 form of objective revelation of itself 
to compel belief in it4 ,assuredly one  
rising from the dead to testify thereto 
would not1 nor would letters of fire    
across the sky do so4 ,but1 even if it  
were logically possible1 we need not    
consider the abstract possibility1      
seeing that1 as a matter of fact1 no    
such demonstrative revelation has been  
given4  ,hence1 the only legitimate     
attitude of pure reason is pure         
agnosticism4 ,no one can deny this4     
,but1 it will be said1 there is this    

vast difference between our intuitive   
knowledge of all other first principles 
and that alleged of the 'first of all   
first principles1' viz4 that the latter 
is confessedly not known to all men4    
,now1 assuredly1 there is here a vast   
difference4 ,but so there ought to be1  
if we are here in a state of probation1 
as before explained4 ,and that we are in
 such a state is not only the hypothesis
 of religion1 but the sole rational     
explanation as well as moral            
justification of our existence as       
rational beings and moral agents#eh4    
,it is not necessarily true1 as ,j4,s4  
,mill and all other agnostics think1    
that even if internal intuition be of   
divine origin1 the illumination thus    
furnished can only be of evidential     
value to the individual subject thereof4
 ,on the contrary1 it may be studied    
objectively1 even if not experienced    
subjectively2 and ought to be so studied
 by a pure agnostic desirous of light   
from any quarter4 ,even if he does not  

know it as a noumenon he can investigate
 it as a phenomenon4 ,and1 supposing it 
to be of divine origin1 as its subjects 
believe and he has no reason to doubt1  
he may gain much evidence against its   
being a mere psychological illusion from
 identical reports of it in all ages4   
,thus1 if any large section of the race 
were to see flames issuing from magnets1
 there would be no doubt as to their    
objective reality4   ,the testimony     
given by ,socrates to the occurrence in 
himself of an internal ,voice1 having   
all the definiteness of an auditory     
hallucination1 has given rise to much   
speculation by subsequent philosophers4 
,many explanations are suggested1 but if
 we remember the critical nature of     
,socrates' own mind1 the literal nature 
of his mode of teaching1 and the high   
authority which attaches to ,plato's    
opinion on the subject1 the probability 
seems to incline towards the ',demon'   
having been1 in ,socrates' own          
consciousness1 an actual auditory       

sensation4 ,be this however as it may1  
,i suppose there is no question that we 
may adopt this view of the matter at    
least to the extent of classifying      
,socrates with ,luther1 ,pascal1 c41 not
 to mention all the line of ,hebrew and 
other prophets1 who agree in speaking of
 a ,divine ,voice4  ,if so1 the further 
question arises whether we are to       
classify all these with lunatics in whom
 the phenomena of auditory hallucination
 are habitual4  ,without doubt this     
hypothesis is most in accordance with   
the temper of our age1 partly because it
 obeys the law of parsimony1 and partly 
because it negatives a priori the       
possibility of revelation4  ,but if we  
look at the matter from the point of    
view of pure agnosticism1 we are not    
entitled to adopt so rough and ready an 
interpretation4  ,suppose then that not 
only ,socrates and all great religious  
reformers and founders of religious     
systems both before and after him were  
similarly stricken with mental disease1 

but that similar phenomena had occurred 
in the case of all scientific           
discoverers such as ,galileo1 ,newton1  
,darwin1 c4--supposing all these men to 
have declared that their main ideas had 
been communicated by subjective         
sensations as of spoken language1 so    
that all the progress of the world's    
scientific thought had resembled that of
 the world's religious thought1 and had 
been attributed by the promoters thereof
 to direct inspirations of this         
kind--would it be possible to deny that 
the testimony thus afforded to the fact 
of subjective revelation would have been
 overwhelming8 ,or could it any longer  
have been maintained that supposing a   
revelation to be communicated           
subjectively the fact thereof could only
 be of any evidential value to the      
recipient himself8 ,to this it will no  
doubt be answered1 ',no1 but in the case
 supposed the evidence arises not from  
the fact of their subjective intuition  
but from that of its objective          

verification in the results of science4'
 ,quite so2 but this is exactly the test
 appealed to by the ,hebrew             
prophets--the test of true and lying    
prophets being in the fulfilment or     
non-fulfilment of their prophecies and  
',by their fruits ye shall know them4'  
,therefore it is as absurd to say that  
the religious consciousness of minds    
other than our own can be barred        
antecedently as evidence1 as it is to   
say that testimony to the miraculous is 
similarly barred4 ,the pure agnostic    
must always carefully avoid the 'high   
priori road4' ,but1 on the other hand1  
he must be all the more assiduous in    
estimating fairly the character1 both as
 to quantity and quality1 of evidence a 
posteriori4 ,now this evidence in the   
present case is twofold1 positive and   
negative4 ,it will be convenient to     
consider the negative first4  ,the      
negative evidence is furnished by the   
nature of man without ,god4 ,it is      
thoroughly miserable1 as is well shown  

by ,pascal1 who has devoted the whole of
 the first part of his treatise to this 
subject4 ,i need not go over the ground 
which he has already so well traversed4 
,some men are not conscious of the cause
 of this misery3 this1 however1 does not
 prevent the fact of their being        
miserable4 ,for the most part they      
conceal the fact as well as possible    
from themselves1 by occupying their     
minds with society1 sport1 frivolity of 
all kinds1 or1 if intellectually        
disposed1 with science1 art1 literature1
 business1 c4 ,this however is but to   
fill the starving belly with husks4 ,i  
know from experience the intellectual   
distractions of scientific research1    
philosophical speculation1 and artistic 
pleasures2 but am also well aware that  
even when all are taken together and    
well sweetened to taste1 in respect of  
consequent reputation1 means1 social    
position1 c41 the whole concoction is   
but as high confectionery to a starving 
man4 ,he may cheat himself for a        

time--especially if he be a strong      
man--into the belief that he is         
nourishing himself by denying his       
natural appetite2 but soon finds he was 
made for some altogether different kind 
of food1 even though of much less       
tastefulness as far as the palate is    
concerned4  ,some men indeed never      
acknowledge this articulately or        
distinctly even to themselves1 yet      
always show it plainly enough to others4
 ,take1 e4g41 'that last infirmity of   
noble minds4' ,i suppose the most       
exalted and least 'carnal' of worldly   
joys consists in the adequate           
recognition by the world of high        
achievement by ourselves4 ,yet it is    
notorious that--                 ,it is 
by ,god decreed      ,fame shall not    
satisfy the highest need4  ,it has been 
my lot to know not a few of the famous  
men of our generation1 and ,i have      
always observed that this is profoundly 
true4 ,like all other 'moral'           
satisfactions1 this soon palls by       

custom1 and as soon as one end of       
distinction is reached1 another is pined
 for4 ,there is no finality to rest in1 
while disease and death are always      
standing in the background4 ,custom may 
even blind men to their own misery1 so  
far as not to make them realize what is 
wanting2 yet the want is there4  ,i take
 it then as unquestionably true that    
this whole negative side of the subject 
proves a vacuum in the soul of man which
 nothing can fill save faith in ,god4   
,now take the positive side4 ,consider  
the happiness of religious--and chiefly 
of the highest religious1 i4e4          
,christian--belief4 ,it is a matter of  
fact that besides being most intense1 it
 is most enduring1 growing1 and never   
staled by custom4 ,in short1 according  
to the universal testimony of those who 
have it1 it differs from all other      
happiness not only in degree but in     
kind4 ,those who have it can usually    
testify to what they used to be without 
it4 ,it has no relation to intellectual 

status4 ,it is a thing by itself and    
supreme4  ,so much for the individual4  
,but positive evidence does not end     
here4 ,look at the effects of ,christian
 belief as exercised on human           
society--#ast1 by individual ,christians
 on the family1 c42 and1 #bnd1 by the   
,christian ,church on the world4  ,all  
this may lead on to an argument from the
 adaptation of ,christianity to human   
higher needs4 ,all men must feel these  
needs more or less in proportion as     
their higher natures1 moral and         
spiritual1 are developed4 ,now          
,christianity is the only religion which
 is adapted to meet them1 and1 according
 to those who are alone able to testify1
 does so most abundantly4 ,all these    
men1 of every sect1 nationality1 c41    
agree in their account of their         
subjective experience2 so as to this    
there can be no question4 ,the only     
question is as to whether they are all  
deceived4  ,,peu ,,de ,,chose4          
',la vie est vaine3        ,un peu      

d'amour1      ,un peu de haine 444      
,et puis--bon jour6       ,la vie est   
brve3        ,un peu d'espoir1      ,un 
peu de rve 444        ,et puis--bon     
soir6'  ,the above is a terse and true  
criticism of this life without hope of a
 future one4 ,is it satisfactory8 ,but  
,christian faith1 as a matter of fact1  
changes it entirely4       ',the night  
has a thousand eyes1        ,and the day
 but one2      ,yet the light of a whole
 world dies        ,with the setting    
sun4       ,the mind has a thousand     
eyes1        ,and the heart but one2    
,yet the light of a whole life dies     
,when love is done4'  ,love is known to 
be all this4 ,how great1 then1 is       
,christianity1 as being the religion of 
love1 and causing men to believe both in
 the cause of love's supremacy and the  
infinity of ,god's love to man4         
,,footnotes3  #ee ,cf4 ,pascal1 ,penses4
 ',for we must not mistake ourselves1 we
 have as much that is automatic in us as
 intellectual1 and hence it comes that  

the instrument by which persuasion is   
brought about is not demonstration      
alone4 ,how few things are demonstrated6
 ,proofs can only convince the mind2    
custom makes our strongest proofs and   
those which we hold most firmly1 it     
sways the automaton1 which draws the    
unconscious intellect after it4444 ,it  
is then custom that makes so many men   
,christians1 custom that makes them     
,turks1 heathen1 artisans1 soldiers1 c4 
,lastly1 we must resort to custom when  
once the mind has seen where truth is1  
in order to slake our thirst and steep  
ourselves in that belief which escapes  
us at every hour1 for to have proofs    
always at hand were too onerous4 ,we    
must acquire a more easy belief1 that of
 custom1 which without violence1 without
 art1 without argument1 causes our      
assent and inclines all our powers to   
this belief1 so that our soul naturally 
falls into it4444  ',it is not enough to
 believe only by force of conviction if 
the automaton is inclined to believe the

 contrary4 ,both parts of us then must  
be obliged to believe1 the intellect by 
arguments which it is enough to have    
admitted once in our lives1 the         
automaton by custom1 and by not allowing
 it to incline in the contrary          
direction4 ,inclina cor meum ,deus4'    
,see also ,newman's ,grammar of ,assent1
 chap4 vi4 and ,church's ,human ,life   
and its ,conditions1 pp4 #fg-i4  #ef    
,the author has added1 ,for suffering in
 brutes see further on1 but nothing     
further on the subject appears to have  
been written4--,,ed4  #eg ,in this      
connexion ,i may again notice that two  
days before his death ,george ,romanes  
expressed his cordial approval of       
,professor ,knight's ,aspects of        
,theism--a work in which great stress is
 laid on the argument from intuition in 
different forms4--,,ed4  #eh ,on this   
subject see ,pascal1 ,penses 7,kegan    
,paul's trans47 p4 #ajc4      #e4       
,,faith ,,in ,,christianity4            
,christianity comes up for serious      

investigation in the present treatise1  
because this ,examination of ,religion  
i4e4 of the validity of the religious   
consciousness has to do with the        
evidences of ,theism presented by man1  
and not only by nature minus man4 ,now  
of the religious consciousness          
,christianity is unquestionably the     
highest product4  ,when ,i wrote the    
preceding treatise the ,candid          
,examination1 ,i did not sufficiently   
appreciate the immense importance of    
human nature1 as distinguished from     
physical nature1 in any enquiry touching
 ,theism4 ,but since then ,i have       
seriously studied anthropology          
7including the science of comparative   
religions71 psychology and metaphysics1 
with the result of clearly seeing that  
human nature is the most important part 
of nature as a whole whereby to         
investigate the theory of ,theism4 ,this
 ,i ought to have anticipated on merely 
a priori grounds1 and no doubt should   
have perceived1 had ,i not been too much

 immersed in merely physical research4  
,moreover1 in those days1 ,i took it for
 granted that ,christianity was played  
out1 and never considered it at all as  
having any rational bearing on the      
question of ,theism4 ,and1 though this  
was doubtless inexcusable1 ,i still     
think that the rational standing of     
,christianity has materially improved   
since then4 ,for then it seemed that    
,christianity was destined to succumb as
 a rational system before the double    
assault of ,darwin from without and the 
negative school of criticism from       
within4 ,not only the book of organic   
nature1 but likewise its own sacred     
documents1 seemed to be declaring       
against it4 ,but now all this has been  
very materially changed4 ,we have all   
more or less grown to see that          
,darwinism is like ,copernicanism1 c41  
in this respect#ei2 while the outcome of
 the great textual battle#fj is         
impartially considered a signal victory 
for ,christianity4 ,prior to the new    

,biblical science1 there was really no  
rational basis in thoughtful minds1     
either for the date of any one of the   
,new ,testament books1 or1 consequently1
 for the historical truth of any one of 
the events narrated in them4 ,gospels1  
,acts and ,epistles were all alike      
shrouded in this uncertainty4 ,hence the
 validity of the eighteenth-century     
scepticism4 ,but now all this kind of   
scepticism has been rendered obsolete1  
and for ever impossible2 while the      
certainty of enough of ,st4 ,paul's     
writings for the practical purpose of   
displaying the belief of the apostles   
has been established1 as well as the    
certainty of the publication of the     
,synoptics within the first century4 ,an
 enormous gain has thus accrued to the  
objective evidences of ,christianity4   
,it is most important that the expert   
investigator should be exact1 and1 as in
 any other science1 the lay public must 
take on authority as trustworthy only   
what both sides are agreed upon4 ,but1  

as in any other science1 experts are apt
 to lose sight of the importance of the 
main results agreed upon1 in their      
fighting over lesser points still in    
dispute4 ,now it is enough for us that  
the ,epistles to the ,romans1           
,galatians1 and ,corinthians1 have been 
agreed upon as genuine1 and that the    
same is true of the ,synoptics so far as
 concerns the main doctrine of ,christ  
,himself4   ,the extraordinary candour  
of ,christ's biographers must not be    
forgotten#fa4 ,notice also such         
sentences as 'but some doubted1' and 7in
 the account of ,pentecost7 'these men  
are full of new wine#fb4' ,such         
observations are wonderfully true to    
human nature2 but no less wonderfully   
opposed to any 'accretion' theory4      
,observe1 when we become honestly pure  
agnostics the whole scene changes by the
 change in our point of view4 ,we may   
then read the records impartially1 or on
 their own merits1 without any          
antecedent conviction that they must be 

false4 ,it is then an open question     
whether they are not true as history4   
,there is so much to be said in         
objective evidence for ,christianity    
that were the central doctrines thus    
testified to anything short of          
miraculous1 no one would doubt4 ,but we 
are not competent judges a priori of    
what a revelation should be4 ,if our    
agnosticism be pure1 we have no right to
 pre-judge the case on prima facie      
grounds4   ,one of the strongest pieces 
of objective evidence in favour of      
,christianity is not sufficiently       
enforced by apologists4 ,indeed1 ,i am  
not aware that ,i have ever seen it     
mentioned4 ,it is the absence from the  
biography of ,christ of any doctrines   
which the subsequent growth of human    
knowledge--whether in natural science1  
ethics1 political economy1 or           
elsewhere--has had to discount4 ,this   
negative argument is really almost as   
strong as is the positive one from what 
,christ did teach4 ,for when we consider

 what a large number of sayings are     
recorded of--or at least attributed     
to--,him1 it becomes most remarkable    
that in literal truth there is no reason
 why any of ,his words should ever pass 
away in the sense of becoming obsolete4 
',not even now could it be easy1' says  
,john ,stuart ,mill1 'even for an       
unbeliever1 to find a better translation
 of the rule of virtue from the abstract
 into the concrete1 than to endeavour so
 to live that ,christ would approve our 
life#fc4' ,contrast ,jesus ,christ in   
this respect with other thinkers of like
 antiquity4 ,even ,plato1 who1 though   
some #djj years ,b4,c4 in point of time1
 was greatly in advance of ,him in      
respect of philosophic thought--not only
 because ,athens then presented the     
extraordinary phenomenon which it did of
 genius in all directions never since   
equalled1 but also because he1 following
 ,socrates1 was1 so to speak1 the       
greatest representative of human reason 
in the direction of spirituality--even  

,plato1 ,i say1 is nowhere in this      
respect as compared with ,christ4 ,read 
the dialogues1 and see how enormous is  
the contrast with the ,gospels in       
respect of errors of all kinds--reaching
 even to absurdity in respect of reason1
 and to sayings shocking to the moral   
sense4 ,yet this is confessedly the     
highest level of human reason on the    
lines of spirituality1 when unaided by  
alleged revelation4  ,two things may be 
said in reply4 ,first1 that the ,jews   
7,rabbis7 of ,christ's period had       
enunciated most of ,christ's ethical    
sayings4 ,but1 even so far as this is   
true1 the sayings were confessedly      
extracted or deduced from the ,old      
,testament1 and so ex hypothesi due to  
original inspiration4 ,again1 it is not 
very far true1 because1 as ,ecce ,homo  
says1 the ethical sayings of ,christ1   
even when anticipated by ,rabbis and the
 ,old ,testament1 were selected by ,him4
   ,it is a general1 if not a universal1
 rule that those who reject             

,christianity with contempt are those   
who care not for religion of any kind4  
',depart from us' has always been the   
sentiment of such4 ,on the other hand1  
those in whom the religious sentiment is
 intact1 but who have rejected          
,christianity on intellectual grounds1  
still almost deify ,christ4 ,these facts
 are remarkable4  ,if we estimate the   
greatness of a man by the influence     
which he has exerted on mankind1 there  
can be no question1 even from the       
secular point of view1 that ,christ is  
much the greatest man who has ever      
lived4  ,it is on all sides worth       
considering 7blatant ignorance or base  
vulgarity alone excepted7 that the      
revolution effected by ,christianity in 
human life is immeasurable and          
unparalleled by any other movement in   
history2 though most nearly approached  
by that of the ,jewish religion1 of     
which1 however1 it is a development1 so 
that it may be regarded as of a piece   
with it4 ,if thus regarded1 this whole  

system of religion is so immeasurably in
 advance of all others1 that it may     
fairly be said1 if it had not been for  
the ,jews1 the human race would not have
 had any religion worth our serious     
attention as such4 ,the whole of that   
side of human nature would never have   
been developed in civilized life4 ,and  
although there are numberless           
individuals who are not conscious of its
 development in themselves1 yet even    
these have been influenced to an        
enormous extent by the atmosphere of    
religion around them4  ,but not only is 
,christianity thus so immeasurably in   
advance of all other religions4 ,it is  
no less so of every other system of     
thought that has ever been promulgated  
in regard to all that is moral and      
spiritual4 ,whether it be true or false1
 it is certain that neither philosophy1 
science1 nor poetry has ever produced   
results in thought1 conduct1 or beauty  
in any degree to be compared with it4   
,this ,i think will be on all hands     

allowed as regards conduct4 ,as regards 
thought and beauty it may be disputed4  
,but1 consider1 what has all the science
 or all the philosophy of the world done
 for the thought of mankind to be       
compared with the one doctrine1 ',god is
 love'8 ,whether or not true1 conceive  
what belief in it has been to thousands 
of millions of our race--i4e4 its       
influence on human thought1 and thence  
on human conduct4 ,thus to admit its    
incomparable influence in conduct is    
indirectly to admit it as regards       
thought4 ,again1 as regards beauty1 the 
man who fails to see its incomparable   
excellence in this respect merely shows 
his own deficiency in the appreciation  
of all that is noblest in man4 ,true or 
not true1 the entire ,story of the      
,cross1 from its commencement in        
prophetic aspiration to its culmination 
in the ,gospel1 is by far the most      
magnificent presentation in literature4 
,and surely the fact of its having all  
been lived does not detract from its    

poetic value4 ,nor does the fact of its 
being capable of appropriation by the   
individual ,christian of to-day as still
 a vital religion detract from its      
sublimity4 ,only to a man wholly        
destitute of spiritual perception can it
 be that ,christianity should fail to   
appear the greatest exhibition of the   
beautiful1 the sublime1 and of all else 
that appeals to our spiritual nature1   
which has ever been known upon our      
earth4  ,yet this side of its adaptation
 is turned only towards men of highest  
culture4 ,the most remarkable thing     
about ,christianity is its adaptation to
 all sorts and conditions of men4 ,are  
you highly intellectual8 ,there is in   
its problems1 historical and            
philosophical1 such worlds of material  
as you may spend your life upon with the
 same interminable interest as is open  
to the students of natural science4 ,or 
are you but a peasant in your parish    
church1 with knowledge of little else   
than your ,bible8 ,still are you 444#fd 

,regeneration4  ,how remarkable is the  
doctrine of ,regeneration per se1 as it 
is stated in the ,new ,testament#fe1 and
 how completely it fits in with the     
non-demonstrative character of          
,revelation to reason alone1 with the   
hypothesis of moral probation1 c4 ,now  
this doctrine is one of the distinctive 
notes of ,christianity4 ,that is1       
,christ foretold repeatedly and         
distinctly--as did also ,his apostles   
after ,him--that while those who        
received the ,holy ,ghost1 who came to  
the ,father through faith in the ,son1  
who were born again of the ,spirit1 7and
 many other synonymous phrases17 would  
be absolutely certain of ,christian     
truth as it were by direct vision or    
intuition1 the carnally minded on the   
other hand would not be affected by any 
amount of direct evidence1 even though  
one rose from the dead--as indeed       
,christ shortly afterwards did1 with    
fulfilment of this prediction4 ,thus    
scepticism may be taken by ,christians  

as corroborating ,christianity4  ,by all
 means let us retain our independence of
 judgement2 but this is pre-eminently a 
matter in which pure agnostics must     
abstain from arrogance and consider the 
facts impartially as unquestionable     
phenomena of experience4  ,shortly after
 the death of ,christ1 this phenomenon  
which had been foretold by ,him         
occurred1 and appears to have done so   
for the first time4 ,it has certainly   
continued to manifest itself ever since1
 and has been attributed by professed   
historians to that particular moment in 
time called ,pentecost1 producing much  
popular excitement and a large number of
 ,christian believers4  ,but1 whether or
 not we accept this account1 it is      
unquestionable that the apostles were   
filled with faith in the person and     
office of their ,master1 which is enough
 to justify ,his doctrine of            
regeneration4   ,conversions4  ,st4     
,augustine after thirty years of age1   
and other ,fathers1 bear testimony to a 

sudden1 enduring and extraordinary      
change in themselves1 called            
conversion#ff4  ,now this experience has
 been repeated and testified to by      
countless millions of civilized men and 
women in all nations and all degrees of 
culture4 ,it signifies not whether the  
conversion be sudden or gradual1 though1
 as a psychological phenomenon1 it is   
more remarkable when sudden and there is
 no symptom of mental aberration        
otherwise4 ,but even as a gradual growth
 in mature age1 its evidential value is 
not less4 7,cf4 ,bunyan1 c47  ,in all   
cases it is not a mere change of belief 
or opinion2 this is by no means the     
point2 the point is that it is a        
modification of character1 more or less 
profound4  ,seeing what a complex thing 
is character1 this change therefore     
cannot be simple4 ,that it may all be   
due to so-called natural causes is no   
evidence against its so-called          
supernatural source1 unless we beg the  
whole question of the ,divine in        

,nature4 ,to pure agnostics the evidence
 from conversions and regeneration lies 
in the bulk of these psychological      
phenomena1 shortly after the death of   
,christ1 with their continuance ever    
since1 their general similarity all over
 the world1 c41 c4   ,christianity and  
,pain4  ,christianity1 from its         
foundation in ,judaism1 has throughout  
been a religion of sacrifice and sorrow4
 ,it has been a religion of blood and   
tears1 and yet of profoundest happiness 
to its votaries4 ,the apparent paradox  
is due to its depth1 and to the union of
 these seemingly diverse roots in ,love4
 ,it has been throughout and growingly a
 religion--or rather let us say the     
religion--of ,love1 with these          
apparently opposite qualities4 ,probably
 it is only those whose characters have 
been deepened by experiences gained in  
this religion itself who are so much as 
capable of intelligently resolving this 
paradox4  ,fakirs hang on hooks1 ,pagans
 cut themselves and even their children1

 sacrifice captives1 c41 for the sake of
 propitiating diabolical deities4 ,the  
,jewish and ,christian idea of sacrifice
 is doubtless a survival of this idea of
 ,god by way of natural causation1 yet  
this is no evidence against the         
completed idea of the ,godhead being    
such as the ,christian belief represents
 it1 for supposing the completed idea to
 be true1 the earlier ideals would have 
been due to the earlier inspirations1 in
 accordance with the developmental      
method of ,revelation hereafter to be   
discussed#fg4  ,but ,christianity1 with 
its roots in ,judaism1 is1 as ,i have   
said1 par excellence the religion of    
sorrow1 because it reaches to truer and 
deeper levels of our spiritual nature1  
and therefore has capabilities both of  
sorrow and joy which are presumably     
non-existent except in civilized man4 ,i
 mean the sorrows and the joys of a     
fully evolved spiritual life--such as   
were attained wonderfully early1        
historically speaking1 in the case of   

the ,jews1 and are now universally      
diffused throughout ,christendom4 ,in   
short1 the sorrows and the joys in      
question are those which arise from the 
fully developed consciousness of sin    
against a ,god of ,love1 as             
distinguished from propitiation of      
malignant spirits4 ,these joys and      
sorrows are wholly spiritual1 not merely
 physical1 and culminate in the         
cry1',thou desirest no sacrifice4444    
,the sacrifice of ,god is a troubled    
spirit#fh4'   ,i agree with ,pascal#fi  
that there is virtually nothing to be   
gained by being a theist as             
distinguished from a ,christian4        
,unitarianism is only an affair of the  
reason--a merely abstract theory of the 
mind1 having nothing to do with the     
heart1 or the real needs of mankind4 ,it
 is only when it takes the ,new         
,testament1 tears out a few of its      
leaves relating to the divinity of      
,christ1 and appropriates all the rest1 
that its system becomes in any degree   

possible as a basis for personal        
religion4  ,if there is a ,deity it     
seems to be in some indefinite degree   
more probable that ,he should impart a  
,revelation than that ,he should not4   
,women1 as a class1 are in all countries
 much more disposed to ,christianity    
than men4 ,i think the scientific       
explanation of this is to be found in   
the causes assigned in my essay on      
,mental differences between ,men and    
,women#gj4 ,but1 if ,christianity be    
supposed true1 there would1 of course1  
be a more ultimate explanation of a     
religious kind--as in all other cases   
where causation is concerned4 ,and1 in  
that case ,i have no doubt that the     
largest part of the explanation would   
consist in the passions of women being  
less ardent than those of men1 and also 
much more kept under restraint by social
 conditions of life4 ,this applies not  
only to purity1 but likewise to most of 
the other psychological differentiae    
between the sexes1 such as ambition1    

selfishness1 pride of power1 and so     
forth4 ,in short1 the whole ideal of    
,christian ethics is of a feminine as   
distinguished from a masculine type#ga4 
,now nothing is so inimical to          
,christian belief as un-,christian      
conduct4 ,this is especially the case as
 regards impurity2 for whether the fact 
be explained on religious or            
non-religious grounds1 it has more to do
 with unbelief than has the speculative 
reason4 ,consequently1 woman is1 for all
 these reasons1 the 'fitter' type for   
receiving and retaining ,christian      
belief4   ,modern agnosticism is        
performing this great service to        
,christian faith2 it is silencing all   
rational scepticism of the a priori     
kind4 ,and this it is bound to do more  
and more the purer it becomes4 ,in every
 generation it must henceforth become   
more and more recognized by logical     
thinking1 that all antecedent objections
 to ,christianity founded on reason     
alone are ipso facto nugatory4 ,now1 all

 the strongest objections to            
,christianity have ever been those of   
the antecedent kind2 hence the effect of
 modern thinking is that of more and    
more diminishing the purely speculative 
difficulties1 such as that of the       
,incarnation1 c4 ,in other words the    
force of ,butler's argument about our   
being incompetent judges#gb is being    
more and more increased4  ,and the      
logical development of this lies in the 
view already stated about natural       
causation4 ,for1 just as pure           
agnosticism must allow that reason is   
incompetent to adjudicate a priori for  
or against ,christian miracles1         
including the ,incarnation1 so it must  
further allow that1 if they ever took   
place1 reason can have nothing to say   
against their being all of one piece    
with causation in general4 ,hence1 so   
far as reason is concerned1 pure        
agnosticism must allow that it is only  
the event which can ultimately prove    
whether ,christianity is true or false4 

',if it be of ,god we cannot overthrow  
it1 lest haply we be found even to fight
 against ,god4' ,but the individual     
cannot wait for this empirical          
determination4 ,what then is he to do8  
,the unbiassed answer of pure           
agnosticism ought reasonably to be1 in  
the words of ,john ,hunter1 ',do not    
think2 try4' ,that is1 in this case1 try
 the only experiment available--the     
experiment of faith4 ,do the doctrine1  
and if ,christianity be true1 the       
verification will come1 not indeed      
mediately through any course of         
speculative reason1 but immediately by  
spiritual intuition4 ,only if a man has 
faith enough to make this venture       
honestly1 will he be in a just position 
for deciding the issue4 ,thus viewed it 
would seem that the experiment of faith 
is not a 'fool's experiment'2 but1 on   
the contrary1 so that there is enough   
prima facie evidence to arrest serious  
attention1 such an experimental trial   
would seem to be the rational duty of a 

pure agnostic4  ,it is a fact that      
,christian belief is much more due to   
doing than to thinking1 as              
prognosticated by the ,new ,testament4  
',if any man will do ,his will1 he shall
 know of the doctrine1 whether it be of 
,god' 7,st4 ,john vii4 #ag74 ,and       
surely1 even on grounds of reason       
itself1 it should be allowed that1      
supposing ,christianity to be 'of ,god1'
 it ought to appeal to the spiritual    
rather than to the rational side of our 
nature4   ,even within the region of    
pure reason 7or the 'prima facie case'7 
modern science1 as directed on the ,new 
,testament criticism1 has surely done   
more for ,christianity than against it4 
,for1 after half a century of battle    
over the text by the best scholars1 the 
dates of the ,gospels have been fixed   
within the first century1 and at least  
four of ,st4 ,paul's epistles have had  
their authenticity proved beyond doubt4 
,now this is enough to destroy all      
eighteenth-century criticism as to the  

doubtfulness of the historical existence
 of ,christ and ,his apostles1          
'inventions of priests1' c41 which was  
the most formidable kind of criticism of
 all4 ,there is no longer any question  
as to historical facts1 save the        
miraculous1 which1 however1 are ruled   
out by negative criticism on merely a   
priori grounds4 ,this remaining--and1 ex
 hypothesi1 necessary--doubt is of very 
different importance from the other4    
,again1 the ,pauline epistles of proved 
authenticity are enough for all that is 
wanted to show the belief of ,christ's  
contemporaries4  ,these are facts of the
 first order of importance to have      
proved4 ,old ,testament criticism is as 
yet too immature to consider4   ,plan in
 ,revelation4  ,the views which ,i      
entertained on this subject when an     
undergraduate i4e4 the ordinary orthodox
 views were abandoned in presence of the
 theory of ,evolution--i4e4 the theory  
of natural causation as probably        
furnishing a scientific explanation of  

the religious phenomena of ,judaism or1 
which is the same thing1 an explanation 
in terms of ascertainable causes up to  
some certain point2 which however in    
this particular case cannot be          
determined within wide limits1 so that  
the history of ,israel will always      
embody an element of 'mystery' much more
 than any other history4  ,it was not   
until twenty-five years later that ,i   
saw clearly the full implications of my 
present views on natural causation4 ,as 
applied to this particular case these   
views show that to a theist1 at all     
events 7i4e4 to any one who on          
independent grounds has accepted the    
theory of ,theism71 it ought not to make
 much difference to the evidential value
 of the ,divine ,plan of ,revelation as 
exhibited in the ,old and ,new          
,testaments1 even if it be granted that 
the whole has been due to so-called     
natural causes only4 ,i say1 'not much  
difference1' for that it ought to make  
some difference ,i do not deny4 ,take a 

precisely analogous case4 ,the theory of
 evolution by natural causes is often   
said to make no logical difference in   
the evidence of plan or design          
manifested in organic nature--it being  
only a question of modus operandi       
whether all pieces of organic machinery 
were produced suddenly or by degrees2   
the evidence of design is equally there 
in either case4 ,now ,i have shown      
elsewhere that this is wrong#gc4 ,it may
 not make much difference to a man who  
is already a theist1 for then it is but 
a question of modus1 but it makes a     
great difference to the evidence of     
,theism4  ,so it is in evidence of plan 
in proof of a revelation4 ,if there had 
been no alleged revelation up to the    
present time1 and if ,christ were now to
 appear suddenly in ,his first advent in
 all the power and glory which          
,christians expect for ,his second1 the 
proof of ,his revelation would be       
demonstrative4 ,so that1 as a mere      
matter of evidence1 a sudden revelation 

might be much more convincing than a    
gradual one4 ,but it would be quite out 
of analogy with causation in nature#gd4 
,besides1 even a gradual revelation     
might be given easily1 which would be of
 demonstrative value--as by making      
prophecies of historical events1        
scientific discoveries1 c41 so clear as 
to be unmistakeable4 ,but1 as before    
shown1 a demonstrative revelation has   
not been made1 and there may well be    
good reasons why it should not4 ,now1 if
 there are such reasons 7e4g4 our state 
of probation71 we can well see that the 
gradual unfolding of a plan of          
revelation1 from earliest dawn of       
history to the end of the world 7',i    
speak as a fool'7 is much preferable to 
a sudden manifestation sufficiently late
 in the world's history to be           
historically attested for all subsequent
 time4 ,for       #ast4 ,gradual        
evolution is in analogy with ,god's     
other work4       #bnd4 ,it does not    
leave ,him without witness at any time  

during the      historical period4      
#crd4 ,it gives ample scope for         
persevering research at all             
times--i4e4 a moral test1 and not merely
 an intellectual assent to      some one
 7ex hypothesi7 unequivocally attested  
event in history4  ,the appearance of   
plan in revelation is1 in fact1         
certainly remarkable enough to arrest   
serious attention4  ,if revelation has  
been of a progressive character1 then it
 follows that it must have been so1 not 
only historically1 but likewise         
intellectually1 morally1 and            
spiritually4 ,for thus only could it be 
always adapted to the advancing         
conditions of the human race4 ,this     
reflection destroys all those numerous  
objections against ,scripture on account
 of the absurdity or immorality of its  
statements or precepts1 unless it can be
 shown that the modifications suggested 
by criticism as requisite to bring the  
statements or precepts into harmony with
 modern advancement would have been as  

well adapted to the requirements of the 
world at the date in question1 as were  
the actual statements or precepts before
 us4   ,supposing ,christianity true1 it
 is certain that the revelation which it
 conveys has been predetermined at least
 since the dawn of the historical       
period4 ,this is certain because the    
objective evidences of ,christianity as 
a revelation have their origin in that  
dawn4 ,and these objective evidences are
 throughout evidence of a scheme1 in    
which the end can be seen from the      
beginning4 ,and the very methods whereby
 this scheme is itself revealed are such
 7still supposing that it is a scheme7  
as present remarkable evidences of      
design4 ,these methods are1 broadly     
speaking1 miracles1 prophecy and the    
results of the teaching1 c41 upon       
mankind4 ,now one may show that no      
better methods could conceivably have   
been designed for the purpose of        
latter-day evidence1 combined with moral
 and religious teaching throughout4 ,the

 mere fact of it being so largely       
incorporated with secular history       
renders the ,christian religion unique3 
so to speak1 the world1 throughout its  
entire historical period1 has been      
constituted the canvas on which this    
divine revelation has been painted--and 
painted so gradually that not until the 
process had been going on for a couple  
of thousand years was it possible to    
perceive the subject thereof4           
,christian ,dogmas4  ,whether or not    
,christ was ,himself divine would make  
no difference so far as the             
consideration of ,christianity as the   
highest phase of evolution is concerned1
 or from the purely secular scientific  
point of view4 ,from the religious point
 of view1 or that touching the relation 
of ,god to man1 it would of course make 
a great difference2 but the difference  
belongs to the same region of thought as
 that which applies to all the previous 
moments of evolution4 ,thus the passage 
from the non-moral to the moral appears1

 from the secular or scientific point of
 view1 to be due1 as far as we can see1 
to mechanical causes in natural         
selection or what not4 ,but1 just as in 
the case of the passage from the        
non-mental to the mental1 c41 this      
passage may have been ultimately due to 
divine volition1 and must have been so  
due on the theory of ,theism4           
,therefore1 ,i say1 it makes no         
difference from a secular or scientific 
point of view whether or not ,christ was
 ,himself divine2 since1 in either case1
 the movement which ,he inaugurated was 
the proximate or phenomenal cause of the
 observable results4  ,thus1 even the   
question of the divinity of ,christ     
ultimately resolves itself into the     
question of all questions--viz4 is or is
 not mechanical causation 'the outward  
and visible form of an inward and       
spiritual grace'8 ,is it phenomenal or  
ontological2 ultimate or derivative8    
,similarly as regards the redemption4   
,whether or not ,christ was really      

divine1 in as far as a belief in ,his   
divinity has been a necessary cause of  
the moral and religious evolution which 
has resulted from ,his life on earth1 it
 has equally and so far 'saved ,his     
people from their sins'2 that is1 of    
course1 it has saved them from their own
 sense of sin as an abiding curse4      
,whether or not ,he has effected any    
corresponding change of an objective    
character in the ontological sphere1    
again depends on the 'question of       
questions' just stated4                 
,reasonableness of the ,doctrines of the
 ,incarnation and the ,trinity4  ,pure  
agnostics and those who search for ,god 
in ,christianity should have nothing to 
do with metaphysical theology4 ,that is 
a department of enquiry which1 ex       
hypothesi1 is transcendental1 and is    
only to be considered after             
,christianity has been accepted4 ,the   
doctrines of the ,incarnation and the   
,trinity seemed to me most absurd in my 
agnostic days4 ,but now1 as a pure      

agnostic1 ,i see in them no rational    
difficulty at all4 ,as to the ,trinity1 
the plurality of persons is necessarily 
implied in the companion doctrine of the
 ,incarnation4 ,so that at best there is
 here but one difficulty1 since1 duality
 being postulated in the doctrine of the
 ,incarnation1 there is no further      
difficulty for pure agnosticism in the  
doctrine of plurality4 ,now at one time 
it seemed to me impossible that any     
proposition1 verbally intelligible as   
such1 could be more violently absurd    
than that of the doctrine of the        
,incarnation4 ,now ,i see that this     
standpoint is wholly irrational1 due    
only to the blindness of reason itself  
promoted by purely scientific habits of 
thought4 ',but it is opposed to common  
sense4' ,no doubt1 utterly so2 but so it
 ought to be if true4 ,common sense is  
merely a rough register of common       
experience2 but the ,incarnation1 if it 
ever took place1 whatever else it may   
have been1 at all events cannot have    

been a common event4 ',but it is        
derogatory to ,god to become man4' ,how 
do you know8 ,besides1 ,christ was not  
an ordinary man4 ,both negative         
criticism and the historical effects of 
,his life prove this2 while1 if we for a
 moment adopt the ,christian point of   
view for the sake of argument1 the whole
 raison d'tre of mankind is bound up in 
,him4 ,lastly1 there are considerations 
per contra1 rendering an incarnation    
antecedently probable#ge4 ,on antecedent
 grounds there must be mysteries        
unintelligible to reason as to the      
nature of ,god1 c41 supposing a         
revelation to be made at all4 ,therefore
 their occurrence in ,christianity is no
 proper objection to ,christianity4     
,why1 again1 stumble a priori over the  
doctrine of the ,trinity--especially as 
man himself is a triune being1 of body1 
mind 7i4e4 reason71 and spirit 7i4e4    
moral1 aesthetic1 religious faculties78 
,the unquestionable union of these no   
less unquestionably distinct orders of  

being in man is known immediately as a  
fact of experience1 but is as           
unintelligible by any process of logic  
or reason as is the alleged triunity of 
,god4   ,adam1 the ,fall1 the ,origin of
 ,evil4  ,these1 all taken together as  
,christian dogmas1 are undoubtedly hard 
hit by the scientific proof of evolution
 7but are the only dogmas which can     
fairly be said to be so71 and1 as       
constituting the logical basis of the   
whole plan1 they certainly do appear at 
first sight necessarily to involve in   
their destruction that of the entire    
superstructure4 ,but the question is    
whether1 after all1 they have been      
destroyed for a pure agnostic4 ,in other
 words1 whether my principles are not as
 applicable in turning the flank of     
infidelity here as everywhere else4     
,first1 as regards ,adam and ,eve1      
observe1 to begin with1 that long before
 ,darwin the story of man in ,paradise  
was recognized by thoughtful theologians
 as allegorical4 ,indeed1 read with     

unprejudiced eyes1 the first chapters of
 ,genesis ought always to have been seen
 to be a poem as distinguished from a   
history3 nor could it ever have been    
mistaken for a history1 but for         
preconceived ideas on the matter of     
inspiration4 ,but to pure agnostics     
there should be no such preconceived    
ideas2 so that nowadays no presumption  
should be raised against it as inspired1
 merely because it has been proved not  
to be a history--and this even though we
 cannot see of what it is allegorical4  
,for1 supposing it inspired1 it has     
certainly done good service in the past 
and can do so likewise in the present1  
by giving an allegorical1 though not a  
literal1 starting-point for the ,divine 
,plan of ,redemption4   ,the evidence of
 ,natural and ,revealed ,religion       
compared4  ,it is often said that       
evolution of organic forms gives as good
 evidence of design as would their      
special creation1 inasmuch as all the   
facts of adaptation1 in which the       

evidence consists1 are there in either  
case4 ,but here it is overlooked that   
the very question at issue is thus      
begged4 ,the question is1 ,are these    
facts of adaptation per se sufficient   
evidence of design as their cause8 ,but 
if it be allowed1 as it must be1 that   
under hypothesis of evolution by natural
 causes the facts of adaptation belong  
to the same category as all the other   
facts of nature1 no more special        
argument for design can be founded on   
these facts than on any others in       
nature4 ,so that the facts of           
adaptation1 like all other facts1 are   
only available as arguments for design  
when it is assumed that all natural     
causation is of a mental character3     
which assumption merely begs the        
question of design anywhere4 ,or1 in    
other words1 on the supposition of their
 having been due to natural causes1 the 
facts of adaptation are only then       
available as per se good evidence of    
design1 when it has already been assumed

 that1 qua due to natural causes1 they  
are due to design4  ,natural religion   
resembles ,revealed religion in this4   
,supposing both divine1 both have been  
arranged so that1 as far as reason can  
lead us1 there is only enough evidence  
of design to arouse serious attention to
 the question of it4 ,in other words1 as
 regards both1 the attitude of pure     
reason ought to be that of pure         
agnosticism4 7,observe that the         
inadequacy of teleology1 or design in   
nature1 to prove ,theism has been       
expressly recognized by all the more    
intellectual ,christians of all ages1   
although such recognition has become    
more general since ,darwin4 ,on this    
point ,i may refer to ,pascal           
especially#gf1 and many other authors47 
,this is another striking analogy       
between ,nature and ,revelation1        
supposing both to have emanated from the
 same author--i4e4 quite as much so as  
identity of developmental method in     
both4  ,supposing the hypothesis of     

design in both to be true1 it follows   
that in both this hypothesis can be     
alike verified only by the organ of     
immediate intuition--i4e4 that other    
mode of human apprehension which is     
supplementary to the rational4 ,here    
again we note the analogy4 ,and if a man
 has this supplementary mode of         
apprehending the highest truth 7by      
hypothesis such71 it will be his duty to
 exercise his spiritual eyesight in     
searching for ,god in nature as in      
revelation1 when 7still on our present  
hypothesis that ',god is1 and is the    
rewarder of them who seek ,him          
diligently'7 he will find that his      
subjective evidence of ,god in ,nature  
and in ,revelation will mutually        
corroborate one another--so yielding    
additional evidence to his reason4  ,the
 teleology of ,revelation supplements   
that of ,nature1 and so1 to the         
spiritually minded man1 they logically  
and mutually corroborate one another4   
,paley's writings form an excellent     

illustration of the identity of the     
teleological argument from ,nature and  
from ,revelation2 though a very         
imperfect illustration of the latter    
taken by itself1 inasmuch as he treats  
only of the ,new ,testament1 and even of
 that very partially--ignoring all that 
went before ,christ1 and much of what   
happened after the apostles4 ,yet ,paley
 himself does not seem to have observed 
the similarity of the argument1 as      
developed in his ,natural ,theology and 
,evidences of ,christianity             
respectively4 ,but no one has developed 
the argument better in both cases4 ,his 
great defect was in not perceiving that 
this teleological argument1 per se1 is  
not in either case enough to convince1  
but only to arouse serious attention4   
,paley everywhere represents that such  
an appeal to reason alone ought to be   
sufficient4 ,he fails to see that if it 
were1 there could be no room for faith4 
,in other words1 he fails to recognize  
the spiritual organ in man1 and its     

complementary object1 grace in ,god4 ,so
 far he fails to be a ,christian4 ,and1 
whether ,theism and ,christianity be    
true or false1 it is certain that the   
teleological argument alone ought to    
result1 not in conviction1 but in       
agnosticism4   ,the antecedent          
improbability against a miracle being   
wrought by a man without a moral object 
is apt to be confused with that of its  
being done by ,god with an adequate     
moral object4 ,the former is            
immeasurably great2 the latter is only  
equal to that of the theory of          
,theism--i4e4 nil4   ,christian         
,demonology#gg4  ,it will be said1      
',however you may seek to explain away a
 priori objections to miracles on a     
priori grounds1 there remains the fact  
that ,christ accepted the current       
superstition in regard to diabolic      
possession4 ,now the devils damn the    
doctrine4 ,for you must choose the horn 
of your dilemma1 either the current     
theory was true or it was not4 ,if you  

say true1 you must allow that the same  
theory is true for all similar stages of
 culture1 but not for the later stages1 
and therefore that the most successful  
exorcist is ,science1 albeit ,science   
works not by faith in the theory1 but by
 rejection of it4 ,observe1 the diseases
 are so well described by the record1   
that there is no possibility of         
mistaking them4 ,hence you must suppose 
that they were due to devils in ,a4,d4  
#cj1 and to nervous disorders in ,a4,d4 
#ahid4 ,on the other hand1 if you choose
 the other horn1 you must accept either 
the hypothesis of the ignorance or that 
of the mendacity of ,christ4'  ,the     
answer is1 that either hypothesis may be
 accepted by ,christianity4 ,for the    
sake of argument we may exclude the     
question whether the acceptance of the  
devil theory by ,christ was really      
historical1 or merely attributed to ,him
 by ,his biographers after ,his death4  
,if ,christ knew that the facts were not
 due to devils1 ,he may also have known 

it was best to fall in with current     
theory1 rather than to puzzle the people
 with a lecture on pathology4 ,if ,he   
did not know1 why should ,he1 if ,he had
 previously 'emptied ,himself' of       
omniscience8 ,in either case1 if ,he had
 denied the current theory1 ,he would   
have been giving evidence of scientific 
knowledge or of scientific intuition    
beyond the culture of ,his time1 and    
this1 as in countless other cases1 was  
not in accordance with ,his method1     
which1 whether we suppose it divine or  
human1 has nowhere proved ,his divine   
mission by foreknowledge of natural     
science4  ,the particular question of   
,christ and demonology is but part of a 
much larger one4   ,darwin's            
,difficulty#gh4  ,the answer to         
,darwin's objection about so small a    
proportion of mankind having ever heard 
of ,christ1 is manifold3--  #a4         
,supposing ,christianity true1 it is the
 highest and final revelation2 i4e4 the 
scheme of revelation has been           

developmental4 ,therefore1 it follows   
from the very method that the larger    
proportion of mankind should never hear 
of ,christ1 i4e4 all who live before    
,his advent4  #b4 ,but these were not   
left 'without witness4' ,they all had   
their religion and their moral sense1   
each at its appropriate stage of        
development4 ,therefore 'the times of   
ignorance ,god winked at' 7,acts xvii4  
#cj74  #c4 ,moreover these men were not 
devoid of benefit from ,christ1 because 
it is represented that ,he died for all 
men--i4e4 but for ,him i4e4 apart from  
the knowledge of what was to come ,god  
would not have 'winked at the times of  
ignorance4' ,the efficacy of atonement  
is represented as transcendental1 and   
not dependent on the accident of hearing
 about the ,atoner4  #d4 ,it is         
remarkable that of all men ,darwin      
should have been worsted by this        
fallacious argument4 ,for it has        
received its death-blow from the theory 
of evolution3 i4e4 if it be true that   

evolution has been the method of natural
 causation1 and if it be true that the  
method of natural causation is due to a 
,divinity1 then it follows that the     
lateness of ,christ's appearance on     
earth must have been designed4 ,for it  
is certain that ,he could not have      
appeared at any earlier date without    
having violated the method of evolution4
 ,therefore1 on the theory of ,theism1  
,he ought to have appeared when ,he     
did--i4e4 at the earliest possible      
moment in history4  ,so as to the       
suitability of the moment of ,christ's  
appearance in other respects4 ,even     
secular historians are agreed as to the 
suitability of the combinations1 and    
deduce the success of ,his system of    
morals and religion from this fact4 ,so 
with students of comparative religions4 
,,footnotes3  #ei ,i4e4 a theory which  
comes at first as a shock to the current
 teaching of ,christianity1 but is      
finally seen to be in no antagonism to  
its necessary principles4--,,ed4  #fj   

,i4e4 the battle in regard to the       
,christian texts or documents4--,,ed4   
#fa ,see ,gore's ,bampton ,lectures1 pp4
 #gd ff4  #fb ,matt1 xxviii4 #ag2 ,acts 
ii4 #ac4  #fc ,three ,essays on ,theism1
 p4 #bee4  #fd ,note unfinished4--,,ed4 
#fe ,george ,romanes began to make a    
collection of ,n4,t4 texts bearing on   
the subject4--,,ed4  #ff ,see ,pascal1  
,penses1 p4 #bde4  #fg ,the notes on    
this subject were often too fragmentary 
for publication4--,,ed4  #fh ,ps4 li4   
#fi ,penses1 pp4 #ia-ic4  #gj ,see      
,nineteenth ,century1 ,may #ahhg4  #ga  
,the essay mentioned above should be    
read in explanation of this expression4 
,george ,romanes' meaning would be more 
accurately expressed1 ,i think1 had he  
said3 ',the ideal of ,christian         
character holds in prominence the       
elements which we regard as             
characteristically feminine1 e4g4       
development of affections1 readiness of 
trust1 love of service1 readiness to    
suffer1 c4'--,,ed4  #gb ,see ,analogy1  

part i4 ch4 #g2 part ii4 ch4 #c1 #d1 c4 
#gc ,see ,conclusion of ,darwin and     
,after ,darwin1 part ,i4  #gd ,i should 
somewhere show how much better a        
treatise ,butler might have written had 
he known about evolution as the general 
law of nature4  #ge ,see ,gore's        
,bampton ,lectures1 lect4 ii4  #gf      
,penses1 pp4 #bje ff4  #gg ,romanes'    
line of argument in this note seems to  
me impossible to maintain4 ,the emphasis
 which ,jesus ,christ lays on diabolic  
agency is so great that1 if it is not a 
reality1 ,he must be regarded either as 
seriously misled about realities which  
concern the spiritual life1 or else as  
seriously misleading others4 ,and in    
neither case could ,he be even the      
perfect ,prophet4 ,i think ,i am        
justified in explaining my disagreement 
with ,romanes' argument at this point   
particularly4--,,ed4  #gh ,there is     
nothing in ,darwin's writings which     
seems to me to justify ,romanes in      
attributing this difficulty to him      

specially4 ,but he knew ,darwin so      
intimately and reverenced him so        
profoundly that he is not likely to have
 been in error on the subject4--,,ed4   
,concluding ,note by the ,editor3--     
,the intellectual attitude towards      
,christianity expressed in these notes  
may be described as--7#a7 'pure         
agnosticism' in the region of the       
scientific 'reason1' coupled with 7#b7 a
 vivid recognition of the spiritual     
necessity of faith and of the legitimacy
 and value of its intuitions2 7#c7 a    
perception of the positive strength of  
the historical and spiritual evidences  
of ,christianity4  ,george ,romanes came
 to recognize1 as in these written notes
 so also in conversation1 that it was   
'reasonable to be a ,christian believer'
 before the activity or habit of faith  
had been recovered4 ,his life was cut   
short very soon after this point was    
reached2 but it will surprise no one to 
learn that the writer of these          
',thoughts' returned before his death to

 that full1 deliberate communion with   
the ,church of ,jesus ,christ which he  
had for so many years been              
conscientiously compelled to forego4 ,in
 his case the 'pure in heart' was after 
a long period of darkness allowed1 in a 
measure before his death1 to 'see ,god4'
      ,fecisti nos ad te1 ,domine2 et   
inquietum est cor nostrum donec         
requiescat in te4   ,,oxford3 ,,horace  
,,hart ,,printer ,,to ,,the ,,university
   ,,advertisements   ,the ,oxford      
,library of ,practical ,theology        
,edited by the ,rev4 ,w4,c4,e4          
,,newbolt1 ,m4,a41 ,canon and           
,chancellor of ,st4 ,paul's2 and the    
,rev4 ,,darwell ,,stone1      ,m4,a41   
,librarian of the ,pusey ,house1        
,oxford4         99       99       99   
99       99  ,price #es4 each volume4   
,,religion4 ,by the ,rev4 ,w4,c4,e4     
,,newbolt1 ,m4,a41 ,canon and           
,chancellor of ,st4 ,paul's4            
,fifth ,impression4       ',the ,oxford 
,library of ,practical ,theology makes a

 good beginning      with ,canon        
,newbolt's volume on religion4444 ,the  
publishers have      spared no pains in 
making the appearance of the volumes as 
attractive as possible4 ,the binding1   
type1 and general get up of      the    
volume just issued leave nothing to be  
desired4'--,guardian4  ,,holy ,,baptism4
 ,by the ,rev4 ,,darwell ,,stone1       
,m4,a41 ,librarian of the ,pusey ,house1
 ,oxford4                               
,third ,edition4       ',few books on   
,baptism contain more thoughtful and    
useful      instruction on the rite1 and
 we give ,mr4 ,stone's effort our       
highest      approval4 ,it might well be
 made a text-book for candidates for the
      diaconate1 or at least in         
theological colleges4 ,as a book for    
thoughtful laymen it is also certain to 
find a place4'--,church      ,times4    
,,confirmation4 ,by the ,right ,rev4    
,a4,c4,a4 ,,hall1 ,d4,d41 ,bishop of    
,vermont4                               
,third ,impression4       ',to the      

parochial clergy this volume may be     
warmly commended4 ,they      will find  
it to be a storehouse of material for   
their instruction1      and quite the   
best treatise that we have on the       
subject it treats4      ,it is          
thoroughly practical1 and gives exactly 
the kind of teaching      that is       
wanted4'--,guardian4  ,,the ,,history   
,,of ,,the ,,book ,,of ,,common         
,,prayer4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,leighton      
,,pullan1 ,m4,a41 ,fellow of ,st4 ,john 
,baptist's ,college1 ,oxford1    ,third 
,edition4       ',mr4 ,pullan's book    
will no doubt have1 as it deserves to   
have1 a      large number of readers1   
and they will gain a great deal from the
      perusal of it4 ,it may be         
certainly recommended to the ordinary   
layman as by far the best book on the   
subject available4'--,pilot4  ,,holy    
,,matrimony4 ,by the ,rev4 ,w4,j4 ,,knox
 ,,little1 ,m4,a41 ,canon of ,worcester4
                                        
,second ,edition4       ',canon ,knox   

,little has given us a most exhaustive  
treatise on ,holy      ,matrimony       
written in his best and happiest style1 
and giving ample      proofs of wide    
research and deep study of the various  
aspects1 and      the essential         
characteristics of ,christian           
marriage4444 ,we would      strongly    
advise the clergy to place this work    
upon their shelves as      a book of    
reference1 while it forms a complete    
manual of      instruction to aid them  
in the preparation of addresses on the  
subject4'--,church ,bells4  ,,the       
,,incarnation4 ,by the ,rev4 ,h4,v4,s4  
,,eck1 ,m4,a41 ,rector of ,bethnal      
,green4                                 
,second ,edition4       ',the teaching  
is sound1 and the book may be placed    
with confidence      in the hands of    
candidates for ,orders or of intelligent
 and      educated lay people who desire
 fuller instruction on the central      
doctrines of the ,faith than can be     
provided in sermons4'      --,guardian4 

,,foreign ,,missions4 ,by the ,right    
,rev4 ,e4,t4 ,,churton1 ,d4,d41 formerly
 ,bishop of ,nassau4       ',we welcome 
,bishop ,churton's book as an           
authoritative exposition of      the    
modern ,high ,church view of ,missions1 
,it is good for us all to               
understand it1 thereby we shall be saved
 alike from uninstructed      admiration
 and indiscriminate                     
denunciation4'--,church ,missionary     
,intelligencer4  ,,prayer4 ,by the ,rev4
 ,,arthur ,,john ,,worlledge1 ,m4,a41   
,canon and ,chancellor of ,truro4       
,second ,edition4       ',we do not know
 of any book about prayer which is      
equally useful2      and we anticipate  
that it will be a standard work for1 at 
any rate1      a considerable           
time4'--,pilot4  ,,sunday4 ,by the ,rev4
 ,w4,b4 ,,trevelyan1 ,m4,a41 ,vicar of  
,st4 ,matthew's1 ,westminster4          
,second ,edition4       ',an extremely  
useful contribution to a difficult and  
important      subject1 and we are      

confident it will rank high in the      
series to      which it                 
belongs4'--,guardian4  ,,the ,,christian
 ,,tradition4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,leighton  
,,pullan1 ,m4,a41 ,fellow of ,st4 ,john 
,baptist's ,college1 ,oxford4           
',mr4 ,pullan affirms that the critics  
of orthodox ,christianity are      now  
destroying one another's theories much  
more than they are      destroying the  
,catholic ,faith4 ,however that may be1 
his book should      render some        
assistance in determining what is and   
what is not ,the      ,faith once       
delivered to the ,saints4 ,it is a      
worthy addition to the      series to   
which it belongs4'--,westminster        
,gazette4  ,,books ,,of ,,devotion4 ,by 
the ,rev4 ,,charles ,,bodington1 ,canon 
and ,precentor of ,lichfield4           
',extremely valuable for its high tone1 
fidelity to ,catholic      standards1   
and powerful advocacy of reality in     
private devotion4 ,to      those who    
have never studied the subject1 it      

should reveal a mine      of devotional 
wealth1 yet to be worked with profit to 
man and glory      to ,god4'--,church   
,times4  ,,holy ,,orders4 ,by the ,rev4 
,a4,r4 ,,whitham1 ,m4,a41 ,principal of 
,culham ,college1 ,abingdon4       ',for
 the educated layman who wishes to know 
what the ,church is      teaching about 
the ministry1 and what the relation of  
the laity to      it really is1 this is 
the best book with which we have met4   
,young      men who are considering     
whether they will seek ordination will  
find      in it excellent statements on 
the position and work and               
responsibilities of the                 
ordained4'--,pilot4  ,,the ,,church     
,,catechism ,,the ,,christian',s        
,,manual4 ,by the ,rev4 ,w4,c4,e4       
,,newbolt1 ,m4,a41 ,canon and           
,chancellor of ,st4 ,paul's4       ',we 
think the book should be in the         
possession of every teacher who      can
 afford it1 and in every ,church        
,library for the benefit of those       

who cannot4'--,the ,reader and          
,layworker4  ,,the ,,holy ,,communion4  
,by the ,rev4 ,,darwell ,,stone1 ,m4,a41
 ,librarian of the ,pusey ,house1       
,oxford4  ,,religious ,,ceremonial4 ,by 
the ,rev4 ,,walter ,,howard ,,frere1    
,m4,a41 of the ,community of the        
,resurrection1 ,examining ,chaplain to  
the ,bishop of ,rochester4              
,in preparation4  ,,the ,,bible4 ,by the
 ,rev4 ,,darwell ,,stone1 ,m4,a41       
,librarian of the ,pusey ,house1        
,oxford4                                
,in preparation4  ,,old ,,testament     
,,criticism4 ,by the ,very ,rev4 ,,henry
 ,,wace1 ,d4,d41 ,dean of ,canterbury4  
,in preparation4  ,,new ,,testament     
,,criticism4 ,by the ,rev4 ,r4,j4       
,,knowling1 ,d4,d41 ,professor of ,new  
,testament ,exegesis at ,king's         
,college1 ,london4     ,in preparation4 
,,the ,,holy ,,trinity4 ,by the ,right  
,rev4 ,l4,g4 ,,mylne1 ,d4,d41 late      
,bishop of ,bombay4                     
,in preparation4  ,,the ,,anglican      

,,church4 ,by the ,rev4 ,,arthur ,,john 
,,worlledge1 ,m4,a41 ,canon and         
,chancellor of ,truro4                  
,in preparation4  ,,the ,,atonement4 ,by
 the ,rev4 ,,leighton ,,pullan1 ,m4,a41 
,fellow of ,st4 ,john ,baptist's        
,college1 ,oxford4                      
,in preparation4  ,,church ,,history4   
,by the ,rev4 ,h4,n4 ,,bate1 ,m4,a41    
,fellow of ,magdalen ,college1 ,oxford4 
#b vols4                                
,in preparation4  ,,church ,,work4 ,by  
the ,rev4 ,,bernard ,,reynolds1 ,m4,a41 
,prebendary of ,st4 ,paul's4            
,in preparation4  ,,visitation ,,of     
,,the ,,sick4 ,by the ,rev4 ,e4,f4      
,,russell1 ,m4,a41 of ,st4 ,alban's1    
,holborn4                               
,in preparation4   ,,handbooks ,,for    
,,the ,,clergy  ,,edited ,,by ,,the     
,,rev4 ,,arthur ,w4 ,,robinson1 ,b4,d4  
,,vicar ,,of ,,allhallows ,,barking ,,by
 ,,the ,,tower   ,crown #hvo1 price #bs4
 #f;d4 net each volume4       ,the      
purpose of the writers of this ,series  

is to present in a clear      and       
attractive way the responsibilities and 
opportunities of the      ,clergy of    
to-day1 and to offer such practical     
guidance1 in regard      both to aims   
and to methods1 as experience may have  
shown to be      valuable4 ,it is hoped 
that the ,series1 while primarily       
intended for      those who are already 
face to face with the duties and        
problems of      the ministerial office1
 may be of interest and assistance also 
to      others who are considering the  
question of entering into ,holy         
,orders4  ,,third ,,impression4  ,,the  
,,personal ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,clergy4  
,by the ,,editor4       ',it is a short 
book1 but it covers a wide1 field4      
,every line of it      tells1 and it is 
excellent reading4 ,not the least       
valuable part of      the book are the  
extremely apt and striking quotations   
from various      writers of eminence1  
which are placed in the form of notes at
 the      end of the chapters4 ,it is   

emphatically a book for both clergy and 
laity to buy and study4'--,church       
,times4       ',we are grateful for a   
little book which will be of service to 
many      priests1 young and old4 ,we   
need more priests1 and such a book may  
well increase their number by explaining
 the nature of the life to      which a 
vocation to ,holy ,orders calls men2 but
 we need still more      that priests   
should realise the life to which they   
are called and      pledged2 and this   
they can hardly fail to do if they      
listen to ,mr4      ,robinson's prudent 
and tender counsels4'--,church          
,quarterly      ,review4  ,,second      
,,edition4  ,,patristic ,,study4 ,by the
 ,rev4 ,h4,b4 ,,swete1 ,d4,d41 ,regius  
,professor of ,divinity in the          
,university of ,cambridge4       ',the  
whole of the work which this little     
volume contains is most      admirably  
done4 ,sufficient is told about the     
personal history of      the ,fathers to
 make the study of their writings       

profitable4'      --,church ,quarterly  
,review4       ',this is an admirable   
little guide-book to wide study by one  
who      well knows how to guide4 ,it is
 sound and learned1 and crammed full    
of information1 yet pleasant in style   
and easy to understand4'      --,pall   
,mall ,gazette4  ,,second ,,impression4 
,,the ,,ministry ,,of ,,conversion4 ,by 
the ,rev4 ,a4,j4 ,,mason1 ,d4,d41       
,master of ,pembroke ,college1          
,cambridge1 and ,canon of ,canterbury4  
',it will be found most valuable and    
interesting4'--,guardian4       ',canon 
,mason has given a manual that should be
 carefully studied by      all1 whether 
clergy or laity1 who have in any way to 
share in the      ,ministry of          
,conversion by preaching1 by parochial  
organisation1      or by personal       
influence4'--,scottish ,guardian4       
,,third ,,impression4  ,,foreign        
,,missions4 ,by the ,right ,rev4 ,h4,h4 
,,montgomery1 ,d4,d41 formerly ,bishop  
of ,tasmania1 ,secretary of the ,society

 for the ,propagation of the ,gospel in 
,foreign ,parts4       ',bishop         
,montgomery's admirable little book4444 
,into a limited      compass he has     
compressed the very kind of information 
which gives      one an adequate        
impression of the spirit which pervades 
a religion1      of what is its strength
 and weakness1 what its relation to     
,christianity1 what1 the side upon which
 it must be approached4'      ,church   
,quarterly ,review4  ,,third            
,,impression4  ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,the 
,,gospels4 ,by the ,very ,rev4 ,j4      
,,armitage ,,robinson1 ,d4,d41 ,dean of 
,westminster4       ',nothing could be  
more desirable than that the ,anglican  
clergy      should be equipped with     
knowledge of the kind to which this     
little      volume will introduce them1 
and should regard the questions with    
which ,biblical study abounds in the    
candid spirit1 and with the      breadth
 of view which they see here            
exemplified4'--,spectator4       ',the  

little book on the ,gospels1 which the  
new ,dean of ,westminster      has      
recently published1 is one to be warmly 
commended alike to      clergy and      
laity4 ,any intelligent person who takes
 the trouble to      work through this  
little volume of #aej pages will be     
rewarded by      gaining from it as     
clear a view of the synoptic problem as 
is      possible without prolonged and  
independent study of the                
sources4'--,the ,pilot4  ,a ,,christian 
,,apologetic4 ,by the ,very ,rev4       
,,wilford ,l4 ,,robbins1 ,dean of the   
,general ,theological ,seminary1 ,new   
,york2 ,author of ,an ,essay toward     
,faith4       ',we commend this handbook
 with confidence as a helpful guide to  
those clergy and teachers who have      
thoughtful doubters to deal with1       
and who wish to build safely if they    
build at all4'--,church of      ,ireland
 ,gazette4  ,,pastoral ,,visitation4 ,by
 the ,rev4 ,h4,e4 ,,savage1 ,m4,a41     
,vicar of ,south ,shields1 and ,hon4    

,canon of ,durham4       ',this is an   
excellent book4'--,spectator4           
,,authority ,,in ,,the ,,church4 ,by the
 ,very ,rev4 ,t4,b4 ,,strong1 ,d4,d41   
,dean of ,christ ,church4       ',this  
is a valuable and timely book1 small in 
bulk1 but weighty      both in style and
 substance4444 ,the ,dean's essay is an 
admirable      one1 and is well         
calculated to clear men's minds in      
regard to      questions of very        
far-reaching importance4 ,its calm tone1
 and its      clear and penetrating     
thought1 are alike characteristic of the
      author1 and give a peculiar       
distinction to everything he            
writes4'--,guardian4  ,,the ,,study ,,of
 ,,ecclesiastical ,,history4 ,by the    
,right ,rev4 ,w4,e4 ,,collins1 ,d4,d41  
,bishop of ,gibraltar4       ',a book   
which displays the master-mind on every 
page1 and has what      many            
master-minds lack1 a sober1 practical1  
common-sense strain      about it1 which
 is hardly ever found in those who set  

out to      instruct us in ,church      
,history1 or ,canon ,law1 or ,catholic  
use4'      --,church ,bells4  ,,lay     
,,work ,,and ,,the ,,office ,,of        
,,reader4 ,by the ,right ,rev4 ,,huyshe 
,,yeatman-,,biggs1 ,d4,d41 ,lord ,bishop
 of ,southwark4  ,,religion ,,and       
,,science4 ,by the ,rev4 ,p4,n4         
,,waggett1 ,m4,a41 of the ,society of   
,st4 ,john the ,evangelist1 ,cowley4    
,,church ,,music4 ,by ,a4 ,,madeley     
,,richardson1 ,mus4 ,doc41 ,organist of 
,st4 ,saviour's ,collegiate ,church1    
,southwark4  ,,intemperance4 ,by the    
,right ,rev4 ,h4,h4 ,,pereira1 ,d4,d41  
,bishop of ,croydon4                    
,in preparation4  ,,schools4 ,by the    
,rev4 ,w4 ,,foxley ,,norris1 ,m4,a41    
,rector of ,barnsley1 and ,hon4 ,canon  
of ,wakefield4                          
,in preparation4   ,,longmans1 ,,green1 
,,and ,,co4 ,,london1 ,,new ,,york1     
,,and ,,bombay