,,parmenides    ,by ,plato              
,translated by ,benjamin ,jowett        
,,introduction ,,and ,,analysis4    ,the
 awe with which ,plato regarded the     
character of 'the great'  ,parmenides   
has extended to the dialogue which he   
calls by his name4 ,none  of the        
writings of ,plato have been more       
copiously illustrated1 both in  ancient 
and modern times1 and in none of them   
have the interpreters  been more at     
variance with one another4 ,nor is this 
surprising4 ,for the  ,parmenides is    
more fragmentary and isolated than any  
other dialogue1 and  the design of the  
writer is not expressly stated4 ,the    
date is uncertain2  the relation to the 
other writings of ,plato is also        
uncertain2 the  connexion between the   
two parts is at first sight extremely   
obscure2  and in the latter of the two  
we are left in doubt as to whether      
,plato is  speaking his own sentiments  
by the lips of ,parmenides1 and         
overthrowing  him out of his own mouth1 

or whether he is propounding            
consequences  which would have been     
admitted by ,zeno and ,parmenides       
themselves4 ,the  contradictions which  
follow from the hypotheses of the one   
and many have  been regarded by some as 
transcendental mysteries2 by others as a
 mere  illustration1 taken at random1 of
 a new method4 ,they seem to have been  
inspired by a sort of dialectical       
frenzy1 such as may be supposed to  have
 prevailed in the ,megarian ,school     
7compare ,cratylus1 etc474 ,the         
criticism on his own doctrine of ,ideas 
has also been considered1 not as  a real
 criticism1 but as an exuberance of the 
metaphysical imagination  which enabled 
,plato to go beyond himself4 ,to the    
latter part of the  dialogue we may     
certainly apply the words in which he   
himself describes  the earlier          
philosophers in the ,sophist3 ',they    
went on their way rather  regardless of 
whether we understood them or not4'     
,the ,parmenides in point of style is   

one of the best of the ,platonic        
writings2 the first portion of the      
dialogue is in no way defective in  ease
 and grace and dramatic interest2 nor in
 the second part1 where  there was no   
room for such qualities1 is there any   
want of clearness or  precision4 ,the   
latter half is an exquisite mosaic1 of  
which the small  pieces are with the    
utmost fineness and regularity adapted  
to one  another4 ,like the ,protagoras1 
,phaedo1 and others1 the whole is a     
narrated dialogue1 combining with the   
mere recital of the words spoken1  the  
observations of the reciter on the      
effect produced by them4 ,thus we  are  
informed by him that ,zeno and          
,parmenides were not altogether pleased 
at the request of ,socrates that they   
would examine into the nature of  the   
one and many in the sphere of ,ideas1   
although they received his  suggestion  
with approving smiles4 ,and we are glad 
to be told that  ,parmenides was 'aged  
but well-favoured1' and that ,zeno was  

'very  good-looking'2 also that         
,parmenides affected to decline the     
great  argument1 on which1 as ,zeno knew
 from experience1 he was not unwilling  
to enter4 ,the character of ,antiphon1  
the half-brother of ,plato1 who  had    
once been inclined to philosophy1 but   
has now shown the hereditary            
disposition for horses1 is very         
naturally described4 ,he is the sole    
depositary of the famous dialogue2 but1 
although he receives the  strangers like
 a courteous gentleman1 he is impatient 
of the trouble of  reciting it4 ,as they
 enter1 he has been giving orders to a  
bridle-maker2  by this slight touch     
,plato verifies the previous description
 of him4  ,after a little persuasion he 
is induced to favour the ,clazomenians1 
who  come from a distance1 with a       
rehearsal4 ,respecting the visit of     
,zeno  and ,parmenides to ,athens1 we   
may observe--first1 that such a visit is
  consistent with dates1 and may        
possibly have occurred2 secondly1 that  

,plato is very likely to have invented  
the meeting 7',you1 ,socrates1 can      
easily invent ,egyptian tales or        
anything else1' ,phaedrus72 thirdly1    
that  no reliance can be placed on the  
circumstance as determining the date  of
 ,parmenides and ,zeno2 fourthly1 that  
the same occasion appears to be         
referred to by ,plato in two other      
places 7,theaet41 ,soph474    ,many     
interpreters have regarded the          
,parmenides as a 'reductio ad  absurdum'
 of the ,eleatic philosophy4 ,but would 
,plato have been likely to  place this  
in the mouth of the great ,parmenides   
himself1 who appeared  to him1 in       
,homeric language1 to be 'venerable and 
awful1' and to have  a 'glorious depth  
of mind'8 7,theaet474 ,it may be        
admitted that he has  ascribed to an    
,eleatic stranger in the ,sophist       
opinions which went  beyond the         
doctrines of the ,eleatics4 ,but the    
,eleatic stranger expressly  criticises 
the doctrines in which he had been      

brought up2 he admits that  he is going 
to 'lay hands on his father             
,parmenides4' ,nothing of this  kind is 
said of ,zeno and ,parmenides4 ,how     
then1 without a word of  explanation1   
could ,plato assign to them the         
refutation of their own  tenets8    ,the
 conclusion at which we must arrive is  
that the ,parmenides is not  a          
refutation of the ,eleatic philosophy4  
,nor would such an explanation  afford  
any satisfactory connexion of the first 
and second parts of the  dialogue4 ,and 
it is quite inconsistent with ,plato's  
own relation to the  ,eleatics4 ,for of 
all the pre-,socratic philosophers1 he  
speaks of them  with the greatest       
respect4 ,but he could hardly have      
passed upon them a  more unmeaning      
slight than to ascribe to their great   
master tenets the  reverse of those     
which he actually held4    ,two         
preliminary remarks may be made4 ,first1
 that whatever latitude we  may allow to
 ,plato in bringing together by a 'tour 

de force1' as in the  ,phaedrus1        
dissimilar themes1 yet he always in some
 way seeks to find  a connexion for     
them4 ,many threads join together in one
 the love and  dialectic of the         
,phaedrus4 ,we cannot conceive that the 
great artist  would place in            
juxtaposition two absolutely divided and
 incoherent  subjects4 ,and hence we are
 led to make a second remark3 viz4 that 
no explanation of the ,parmenides can be
 satisfactory which does not  indicate  
the connexion of the first and second   
parts4 ,to suppose that  ,plato would   
first go out of his way to make         
,parmenides attack the  ,platonic       
,ideas1 and then proceed to a similar   
but more fatal assault on  his own      
doctrine of ,being1 appears to be the   
height of absurdity4    ,perhaps there  
is no passage in ,plato showing greater 
metaphysical power  than that in which  
he assails his own theory of ,ideas4    
,the arguments are  nearly1 if not      
quite1 those of ,aristotle2 they are the

 objections which  naturally occur to a 
modern student of philosophy4 ,many     
persons will be  surprised to find      
,plato criticizing the very conceptions 
which have been  supposed in after ages 
to be peculiarly characteristic of him4 
,how can  he have placed himself so     
completely without them8 ,how can he    
have ever  persisted in them after      
seeing the fatal objections which might 
be urged  against them8 ,the            
consideration of this difficulty has led
 a recent  critic 7,ueberweg71 who in   
general accepts the authorised canon of 
the  ,platonic writings1 to condemn the 
,parmenides as spurious4 ,the accidental
  want of external evidence1 at first   
sight1 seems to favour this opinion4    
,in answer1 it might be sufficient to   
say1 that no ancient writing of  equal  
length and excellence is known to be    
spurious4 ,nor is the silence  of       
,aristotle to be hastily assumed2 there 
is at least a doubt whether  his use of 
the same arguments does not involve the 

inference that he  knew the work4 ,and1 
if the ,parmenides is spurious1 like    
,ueberweg1 we  are led on further than  
we originally intended1 to pass a       
similar  condemnation on the ,theaetetus
 and ,sophist1 and therefore on the     
,politicus 7compare ,theaet41 ,soph474  
,but the objection is in reality        
fanciful1 and rests on the assumption   
that the doctrine of the ,ideas was     
held by ,plato throughout his life in   
the same form4 ,for the truth  is1 that 
the ,platonic ,ideas were in constant   
process of growth and  transmutation2   
sometimes veiled in poetry and          
mythology1 then again  emerging as fixed
 ,ideas1 in some passages regarded as   
absolute and  eternal1 and in others as 
relative to the human mind1 existing in 
and derived from external objects as    
well as transcending them4 ,the         
anamnesis of the ,ideas is chiefly      
insisted upon in the mythical portions  
of the dialogues1 and really occupies a 
very small space in the entire  works of

 ,plato4 ,their transcendental existence
 is not asserted1 and  is therefore     
implicitly denied in the ,philebus2     
different forms  are ascribed to them in
 the ,republic1 and they are mentioned  
in the  ,theaetetus1 the ,sophist1 the  
,politicus1 and the ,laws1 much as      
,universals  would be spoken of in      
modern books4 ,indeed1 there are very   
faint traces  of the transcendental     
doctrine of ,ideas1 that is1 of their   
existence  apart from the mind1 in any  
of ,plato's writings1 with the exception
 of  the ,meno1 the ,phaedrus1 the      
,phaedo1 and in portions of the         
,republic4 ,the  stereotyped form which 
,aristotle has given to them is not     
found in ,plato  7compare ,essay on the 
,platonic ,ideas in the ,introduction to
 the ,meno47    ,the full discussion of 
this subject involves a comprehensive   
survey of  the philosophy of ,plato1    
which would be out of place here4 ,but1 
without  digressing further from the    
immediate subject of the ,parmenides1 we

  may remark that ,plato is quite       
serious in his objections to his own    
doctrines3 nor does ,socrates attempt to
 offer any answer to them4 ,the         
perplexities which surround the one and 
many in the sphere of the ,ideas  are   
also alluded to in the ,philebus1 and no
 answer is given to them4 ,nor  have    
they ever been answered1 nor can they be
 answered by any one else  who separates
 the phenomenal from the real4 ,to      
suppose that ,plato1 at a  later period 
of his life1 reached a point of view    
from which he was able  to answer them1 
is a groundless assumption4 ,the real   
progress of ,plato's  own mind has been 
partly concealed from us by the dogmatic
 statements of  ,aristotle1 and also by 
the degeneracy of his own followers1    
with whom a  doctrine of numbers quickly
 superseded ,ideas4    ,as a preparation
 for answering some of the difficulties 
which have  been suggested1 we may begin
 by sketching the first portion of the  
dialogue3--    ,cephalus1 of ,clazomenae

 in ,ionia1 the birthplace of           
,anaxagoras1 a  citizen of no mean city 
in the history of philosophy1 who is the
  narrator of the dialogue1 describes   
himself as meeting ,adeimantus and      
,glaucon in the ,agora at ,athens4      
',welcome1 ,cephalus3 can we do anything
  for you in ,athens8' ',why1 yes3 ,i   
came to ask a favour of you4 ,first1    
tell me your half-brother's name1 which 
,i have forgotten--he was a mere  child 
when ,i was last here2--,i know his     
father's1 which is ,pyrilampes4'  ',yes1
 and the name of our brother is         
,antiphon4 ,but why do you ask8'  ',let 
me introduce to you some countrymen of  
mine1 who are lovers of  philosophy2    
they have heard that ,antiphon remembers
 a conversation of  ,socrates with      
,parmenides and ,zeno1 of which the     
report came to him from  ,pythodorus1   
,zeno's friend4' ',that is quite true4' 
',and can they hear the  dialogue8'     
',nothing easier2 in the days of his    
youth he made a careful  study of the   

piece2 at present1 his thoughts have    
another direction3 he  takes after his  
grandfather1 and has given up philosophy
 for horses4'    ',we went to look for  
him1 and found him giving instructions  
to a worker  in brass about a bridle4   
,when he had done with him1 and had     
learned  from his brothers the purpose  
of our visit1 he saluted me as an old   
acquaintance1 and we asked him to repeat
 the dialogue4 ,at first1 he  complained
 of the trouble1 but he soon consented4 
,he told us that  ,pythodorus had       
described to him the appearance of      
,parmenides and ,zeno2  they had come to
 ,athens at the great ,panathenaea1 the 
former being at  the time about         
sixty-five years old1 aged but          
well-favoured--,zeno1 who  was said to  
have been beloved of ,parmenides in the 
days of his youth1  about forty1 and    
very good-looking3--that they lodged    
with ,pythodorus at  the ,ceramicus     
outside the wall1 whither ,socrates1    
then a very young  man1 came to see     

them3 ,zeno was reading one of his      
theses1 which he  had nearly finished1  
when ,pythodorus entered with           
,parmenides and  ,aristoteles1 who was  
afterwards one of the ,thirty4 ,when the
 recitation  was completed1 ,socrates   
requested that the first thesis of the  
treatise  might be read again4'    ',you
 mean1 ,zeno1' said ,socrates1 'to argue
 that being1 if it is many1  must be    
both like and unlike1 which is a        
contradiction2 and each  division of    
your argument is intended to elicit a   
similar absurdity1  which may be        
supposed to follow from the assumption  
that being is many4'  ',such is my      
meaning4' ',i see1' said ,socrates1     
turning to ,parmenides1  'that ,zeno is 
your second self in his writings too2   
you prove admirably  that the all is    
one3 he gives proofs no less convincing 
that the many  are nought4 ,to deceive  
the world by saying the same thing in   
entirely  different forms1 is a strain  
of art beyond most of us4' ',yes1       

,socrates1'  said ,zeno2 'but though you
 are as keen as a ,spartan hound1 you do
 not  quite catch the motive of the     
piece1 which was only intended to       
protect  ,parmenides against ridicule by
 showing that the hypothesis of the     
existence of the many involved greater  
absurdities than the hypothesis  of the 
one4 ,the book was a youthful           
composition of mine1 which was  stolen  
from me1 and therefore ,i had no choice 
about the publication4' ',i  quite      
believe you1' said ,socrates2 'but will 
you answer me a question8 ,i  should    
like to know1 whether you would assume  
an idea of likeness in the  abstract1   
which is the contradictory of unlikeness
 in the abstract1 by  participation in  
either or both of which things are like 
or unlike  or partly both4 ,for the same
 things may very well partake of like   
and  unlike in the concrete1 though like
 and unlike in the abstract are         
irreconcilable4 ,nor does there appear  
to me to be any absurdity in            

maintaining that the same things may    
partake of the one and many1 though  ,i 
should be indeed surprised to hear that 
the absolute one is also  many4 ,for    
example1 ,i1 being many1 that is to say1
 having many parts or  members1 am yet  
also one1 and partake of the one1 being 
one of seven  who are here present      
7compare ,philebus74 ,this is not an    
absurdity1 but  a truism4 ,but ,i should
 be amazed if there were a similar      
entanglement in  the nature of the ideas
 themselves1 nor can ,i believe that one
 and many1  like and unlike1 rest and   
motion1 in the abstract1 are capable    
either of  admixture or of separation4' 
,pythodorus said that in his opinion    
,parmenides and ,zeno were not very     
well pleased at the questions which were
 raised2 nevertheless1 they  looked at  
one another and smiled in seeming       
delight and admiration of  ,socrates4   
',tell me1' said ,parmenides1 'do you   
think that the abstract  ideas of       
likeness1 unity1 and the rest1 exist    

apart from individuals  which partake of
 them8 and is this your own             
distinction8' ',i think that  there are 
such ideas4' ',and would you make       
abstract ideas of the just1  the        
beautiful1 the good8' ',yes1' he said4  
',and of human beings like  ourselves1  
of water1 fire1 and the like8' ',i am   
not certain4' ',and would  you be       
undecided also about ideas of which the 
mention will1 perhaps1  appear          
laughable3 of hair1 mud1 filth1 and     
other things which are base  and vile8' 
',no1 ,parmenides2 visible things like  
these are1 as ,i believe1  only what    
they appear to be3 though ,i am         
sometimes disposed to imagine  that     
there is nothing without an idea2 but ,i
 repress any such notion1  from a fear  
of falling into an abyss of nonsense4'  
',you are young1  ,socrates1 and        
therefore naturally regard the opinions 
of men2 the time  will come when        
philosophy will have a firmer hold of   
you1 and you will  not despise even the 

meanest things4 ,but tell me1 is your   
meaning that  things become like by     
partaking of likeness1 great by         
partaking of  greatness1 just and       
beautiful by partaking of justice and   
beauty1 and  so of other ideas8' ',yes1 
that is my meaning4' ',and do you       
suppose the  individual to partake of   
the whole1 or of the part8' ',why not of
 the  whole8' said ,socrates4           
',because1' said ,parmenides1 'in that  
case the  whole1 which is one1 will     
become many4' ',nay1' said ,socrates1   
'the whole  may be like the day1 which  
is one and in many places3 in this way  
the ideas may be one and also many4'    
',in the same sort of way1' said        
,parmenides1 'as a sail1 which is one1  
may be a cover to many--that is  your   
meaning8' ',yes4' ',and would you say   
that each man is covered by the  whole  
sail1 or by a part only8' ',by a part4' 
',then the ideas have parts1  and the   
objects partake of a part of them only8'
 ',that seems to follow4'  ',and would  

you like to say that the ideas are      
really divisible and yet  remain one8'  
',certainly not4' ',would you venture to
 affirm that great  objects have a      
portion only of greatness transferred to
 them2 or that  small or equal objects  
are small or equal because they are only
 portions  of smallness or equality8'   
',impossible4' ',but how can individuals
  participate in ideas1 except in the   
ways which ,i have mentioned8' ',that   
is not an easy question to answer4' ',i 
should imagine the conception of  ideas 
to arise as follows3 you see great      
objects pervaded by a common  form or   
idea of greatness1 which you abstract4' 
',that is quite true4'  ',and supposing 
you embrace in one view the idea of     
greatness thus gained  and the          
individuals which it comprises1 a       
further idea of greatness  arises1 which
 makes both great2 and this may go on to
 infinity4'  ,socrates replies that the 
ideas may be thoughts in the mind only2 
in  this case1 the consequence would no 

longer follow4 ',but must not the       
thought be of something which is the    
same in all and is the idea8 ,and  if   
the world partakes in the ideas1 and the
 ideas are thoughts1 must not  all      
things think8 ,or can thought be without
 thought8' ',i acknowledge the          
unmeaningness of this1' says ,socrates1 
'and would rather have recourse  to the 
explanation that the ideas are types in 
nature1 and that other  things partake  
of them by becoming like them4' ',but to
 become like them  is to be comprehended
 in the same idea2 and the likeness of  
the idea and  the individuals implies   
another idea of likeness1 and another   
without  end4' ',quite true4' ',the     
theory1 then1 of participation by       
likeness  has to be given up4 ,you have 
hardly yet1 ,socrates1 found out the    
real  difficulty of maintaining abstract
 ideas4' ',what difficulty8' ',the      
greatest of all perhaps is this3 an     
opponent will argue that the ideas  are 
not within the range of human knowledge2

 and you cannot disprove the  assertion 
without a long and laborious            
demonstration1 which he may be  unable  
or unwilling to follow4 ,in the first   
place1 neither you nor any  one who     
maintains the existence of absolute     
ideas will affirm that they  are        
subjective4' ',that would be a          
contradiction4' ',true2 and therefore   
any relation in these ideas is a        
relation which concerns themselves      
only2 and the objects which are named   
after them1 are relative to one  another
 only1 and have nothing to do with the  
ideas themselves4' ',how do  you mean8' 
said ,socrates4 ',i may illustrate my   
meaning in this way3 one  of us has a   
slave2 and the idea of a slave in the   
abstract is relative  to the idea of a  
master in the abstract2 this            
correspondence of ideas1  however1 has  
nothing to do with the particular       
relation of our slave to  us4--,do you  
see my meaning8' ',perfectly4' ',and    
absolute knowledge in  the same way     

corresponds to absolute truth and being1
 and particular  knowledge to particular
 truth and being4' ,clearly4' ',and     
there is a  subjective knowledge which  
is of subjective truth1 having many     
kinds1  general and particular4 ,but the
 ideas themselves are not subjective1   
and  therefore are not within our ken4' 
',they are not4' ',then the beautiful   
and the good in their own nature are    
unknown to us8' ',it would seem so4'    
',there is a worse consequence yet4'    
',what is that8' ',i think we must      
admit that absolute knowledge is the    
most exact knowledge1 which we must     
therefore attribute to ,god4 ,but then  
see what follows3 ,god1 having  this    
exact knowledge1 can have no knowledge  
of human things1 as we  have divided the
 two spheres1 and forbidden any passing 
from one to the  other3--the gods have  
knowledge and authority in their world  
only1 as  we have in ours4' ',yet1      
surely1 to deprive ,god of knowledge is 
monstrous4'--',these are some of the    

difficulties which are involved  in the 
assumption of absolute ideas2 the       
learner will find them nearly           
impossible to understand1 and the       
teacher who has to impart them will     
require superhuman ability2 there will  
always be a suspicion1 either  that they
 have no existence1 or are beyond human 
knowledge4' ',there ,i  agree with you1'
 said ,socrates4 ',yet if these         
difficulties induce you  to give up     
universal ideas1 what becomes of the    
mind8 and where are the  reasoning and  
reflecting powers8 philosophy is at an  
end4' ',i certainly  do not see my way4'
 ',i think1' said ,parmenides1 'that    
this arises out  of your attempting to  
define abstractions1 such as the good   
and  the beautiful and the just1 before 
you have had sufficient previous        
training2 ,i noticed your deficiency    
when you were talking with              
,aristoteles1 the day before yesterday4 
,your enthusiasm is a wonderful  gift2  
but ,i fear that unless you discipline  

yourself by dialectic  while you are    
young1 truth will elude your grasp4'    
',and what kind of  discipline would you
 recommend8' ',the training which you   
heard ,zeno  practising2 at the same    
time1 ,i admire your saying to him that 
you did  not care to consider the       
difficulty in reference to visible      
objects1  but only in relation to       
ideas4' ',yes2 because ,i think that in 
visible  objects you may easily show any
 number of inconsistent consequences4'  
',yes2 and you should consider1 not only
 the consequences which follow  from a  
given hypothesis1 but the consequences  
also which follow from the  denial of   
the hypothesis4 ,for example1 what      
follows from the assumption  of the     
existence of the many1 and the          
counter-argument of what follows  from  
the denial of the existence of the many3
 and similarly of likeness  and         
unlikeness1 motion1 rest1 generation1   
corruption1 being and not  being4 ,and  
the consequences must include           

consequences to the things  supposed and
 to other things1 in themselves and in  
relation to one  another1 to individuals
 whom you select1 to the many1 and to   
the all2  these must be drawn out both  
on the affirmative and on the negative  
hypothesis1--that is1 if you are to     
train yourself perfectly to the         
intelligence of the truth4' ',what you  
are suggesting seems to be a  tremendous
 process1 and one of which ,i do not    
quite understand the  nature1' said     
,socrates2 'will you give me an         
example8' ',you must not  impose such a 
task on a man of my years1' said        
,parmenides4 ',then will  you1 ,zeno8'  
',let us rather1' said ,zeno1 with a    
smile1 'ask ,parmenides1  for the       
undertaking is a serious one1 as he     
truly says2 nor could ,i urge  him to   
make the attempt1 except in a select    
audience of persons who will  understand
 him4' ,the whole party joined in the   
request4    ,here we have1 first of all1
 an unmistakable attack made by the     

youthful  ,socrates on the paradoxes of 
,zeno4 ,he perfectly understands their  
drift1  and ,zeno himself is supposed to
 admit this4 ,but they appear to him1 as
  he says in the ,philebus also1 to be  
rather truisms than paradoxes4 ,for     
every one must acknowledge the obvious  
fact1 that the body being one  has many 
members1 and that1 in a thousand ways1  
the like partakes of  the unlike1 the   
many of the one4 ,the real difficulty   
begins with the  relations of ideas in  
themselves1 whether of the one and many1
 or of  any other ideas1 to one another 
and to the mind4 ,but this was a problem
  which the ,eleatic philosophers had   
never considered2 their thoughts had    
not gone beyond the contradictions of   
matter1 motion1 space1 and the  like4   
,it was no wonder that ,parmenides and  
,zeno should hear the novel             
speculations of ,socrates with mixed    
feelings of admiration and  displeasure4
 ,he was going out of the received      
circle of disputation into  a region in 

which they could hardly follow him4     
,from the crude idea of  ,being in the  
abstract1 he was about to proceed to    
universals or general  notions4 ,there  
is no contradiction in material things  
partaking of the  ideas of one and many2
 neither is there any contradiction in  
the ideas  of one and many1 like and    
unlike1 in themselves4 ,but the         
contradiction  arises when we attempt to
 conceive ideas in their connexion1 or  
to  ascertain their relation to         
phenomena4 ,still he affirms the        
existence of  such ideas2 and this is   
the position which is now in turn       
submitted to  the criticisms of         
,parmenides4    ,to appreciate truly the
 character of these criticisms1 we must 
remember  the place held by ,parmenides 
in the history of ,greek philosophy4 ,he
  is the founder of idealism1 and also  
of dialectic1 or1 in modern             
phraseology1 of metaphysics and logic   
7,theaet41 ,soph474 ,like ,plato1  he is
 struggling after something wider and   

deeper than satisfied the  contemporary 
,pythagoreans4 ,and ,plato with a true  
instinct recognizes  him as his         
spiritual father1 whom he 'revered and  
honoured more than all  other           
philosophers together4' ,he may be      
supposed to have thought more  than he  
said1 or was able to express4 ,and1     
although he could not1 as  a matter of  
fact1 have criticized the ideas of      
,plato without an  anachronism1 the     
criticism is appropriately placed in the
 mouth of the  founder of the ideal     
philosophy4    ,there was probably a    
time in the life of ,plato when the     
ethical teaching  of ,socrates came into
 conflict with the metaphysical theories
 of the  earlier philosophers1 and he   
sought to supplement the one by the     
other4  ,the older philosophers were    
great and awful2 and they had the charm 
of  antiquity4 ,something which found a 
response in his own mind seemed to  have
 been lost as well as gained in the     
,socratic dialectic4 ,he felt no        

incongruity in the veteran ,parmenides  
correcting the youthful ,socrates4  ,two
 points in his criticism are especially 
deserving of notice4 ,first  of all1    
,parmenides tries him by the test of    
consistency4 ,socrates is  willing to   
assume ideas or principles of the just1 
the beautiful1 the  good1 and to extend 
them to man 7compare ,phaedo72 but he is
 reluctant to  admit that there are     
general ideas of hair1 mud1 filth1 etc4 
,there is an  ethical universal or idea1
 but is there also a universal of       
physics8--of  the meanest things in the 
world as well as of the greatest8       
,parmenides  rebukes this want of       
consistency in ,socrates1 which he      
attributes to his  youth4 ,as he grows  
older1 philosophy will take a firmer    
hold of him1 and  then he will despise  
neither great things nor small1 and he  
will think  less of the opinions of     
mankind 7compare ,soph474 ,here is      
lightly touched  one of the most        
familiar principles of modern           

philosophy1 that in the  meanest        
operations of nature1 as well as in the 
noblest1 in mud and  filth1 as well as  
in the sun and stars1 great truths are  
contained4 ,at  the same time1 we may   
note also the transition in the mind of 
,plato1  to which ,aristotle alludes    
7,met471 when1 as he says1 he           
transferred the  ,socratic universal of 
ethics to the whole of nature4    ,the  
other criticism of ,parmenides on       
,socrates attributes to him a want  of  
practice in dialectic4 ,he has observed 
this deficiency in him when  talking to 
,aristoteles on a previous occasion4    
,plato seems to imply  that there was   
something more in the dialectic of ,zeno
 than in the mere  interrogation of     
,socrates4 ,here1 again1 he may perhaps 
be describing  the process which his own
 mind went through when he first became 
more  intimately acquainted1 whether at 
,megara or elsewhere1 with the ,eleatic 
and ,megarian philosophers4 ,still1     
,parmenides does not deny to ,socrates  

the credit of having gone beyond them in
 seeking to apply the paradoxes  of     
,zeno to ideas2 and this is the         
application which he himself makes of   
them in the latter part of the dialogue4
 ,he then proceeds to explain  to him   
the sort of mental gymnastic which he   
should practise4 ,he should  consider   
not only what would follow from a given 
hypothesis1 but what  would follow from 
the denial of it1 to that which is the  
subject of  the hypothesis1 and to all  
other things4 ,there is no trace in the 
,memorabilia of ,xenophon of any such   
method being attributed to  ,socrates2  
nor is the dialectic here spoken of that
 'favourite method' of  proceeding by   
regular divisions1 which is described in
 the ,phaedrus and  ,philebus1 and of   
which examples are given in the         
,politicus and in the  ,sophist4 ,it is 
expressly spoken of as the method which 
,socrates had  heard ,zeno practise in  
the days of his youth 7compare ,soph474 
,the discussion of ,socrates with       

,parmenides is one of the most          
remarkable  passages in ,plato4 ,few    
writers have ever been able to          
anticipate 'the  criticism of the       
morrow' on their favourite notions4 ,but
 ,plato may here  be said to anticipate 
the judgment not only of the morrow1 but
 of  all after-ages on the ,platonic    
,ideas4 ,for in some points he touches  
questions which have not yet received   
their solution in modern  philosophy4   
,the first difficulty which ,parmenides 
raises respecting the ,platonic  ideas  
relates to the manner in which          
individuals are connected with  them4   
,do they participate in the ideas1 or do
 they merely resemble them8  ,parmenides
 shows that objections may be urged     
against either of these  modes of       
conceiving the connection4 ,things are  
little by partaking of  littleness1     
great by partaking of greatness1 and the
 like4 ,but they  cannot partake of a   
part of greatness1 for that will not    
make them  great1 etc42 nor can each    

object monopolise the whole4 ,the only  
answer  to this is1 that 'partaking' is 
a figure of speech1 really corresponding
  to the processes which a later logic  
designates by the terms  'abstraction'  
and 'generalization4' ,when we have     
described accurately  the methods or    
forms which the mind employs1 we cannot 
further criticize  them2 at least we can
 only criticize them with reference to  
their  fitness as instruments of thought
 to express facts4    ,socrates attempts
 to support his view of the ideas by the
 parallel of  the day1 which is one and 
in many places2 but he is easily driven 
from  his position by a counter         
illustration of ,parmenides1 who        
compares the  idea of greatness to a    
sail4 ,he truly explains to ,socrates   
that he has  attained the conception of 
ideas by a process of generalization4   
,at  the same time1 he points out a     
difficulty1 which appears to be         
involved--viz4 that the process of      
generalization will go on to  infinity4 

,socrates meets the supposed difficulty 
by a flash of light1  which is indeed   
the true answer 'that the ideas are in  
our minds  only4' ,neither realism is   
the truth1 nor nominalism is the truth1 
but  conceptualism2 and conceptualism or
 any other psychological theory falls   
very far short of the infinite subtlety 
of language and thought4    ,but the    
realism of ancient philosophy will not  
admit of this answer1  which is repelled
 by ,parmenides with another truth or   
half-truth of  later philosophy1 ',every
 subject or subjective must have an     
object4'  ,here is the great though     
unconscious truth 7shall we say87 or    
error1  which underlay the early ,greek 
philosophy4 ',ideas must have a real    
existence2' they are not mere forms or  
opinions1 which may be changed          
arbitrarily by individuals4 ,but the    
early ,greek philosopher never  clearly 
saw that true ideas were only universal 
facts1 and that there  might be error in
 universals as well as in particulars4  

,socrates makes one more attempt to     
defend the ,platonic ,ideas by          
representing them as paradigms2 this is 
again answered by the  'argumentum ad   
infinitum4' ,we may remark1 in passing1 
that the process  which is thus         
described has no real existence4 ,the   
mind1 after having  obtained a general  
idea1 does not really go on to form     
another which  includes that1 and all   
the individuals contained under it1 and 
another  and another without end4 ,the  
difficulty belongs in fact to the       
,megarian  age of philosophy1 and is due
 to their illogical logic1 and to the   
general ignorance of the ancients       
respecting the part played by language  
in the process of thought4 ,no such     
perplexity could ever trouble  a modern 
metaphysician1 any more than the fallacy
 of 'calvus' or  'acervus1' or of       
',achilles and the tortoise4' ,these    
'surds' of  metaphysics ought to        
occasion no more difficulty in          
speculation than a  perpetually         

recurring fraction in arithmetic4    ,it
 is otherwise with the objection which  
follows3 ,how are we to bridge  the     
chasm between human truth and absolute  
truth1 between gods and men8  ,this is  
the difficulty of philosophy in all     
ages3 ,how can we get beyond  the circle
 of our own ideas1 or how1 remaining    
within them1 can we have  any criterion 
of a truth beyond and independent of    
them8 ,parmenides  draws out this       
difficulty with great clearness4        
,according to him1 there  are not only  
one but two chasms3 the first1 between  
individuals and the  ideas which have a 
common name2 the second1 between the    
ideas in us and  the ideas absolute4    
,the first of these two difficulties    
mankind1 as  we may say1 a little       
parodying the language of the ,philebus1
 have long  agreed to treat as obsolete2
 the second remains a difficulty for us 
as  well as for the ,greeks of the      
fourth century before ,christ1 and is   
the  stumbling-block of ,kant's ,kritik1

 and of the ,hamiltonian adaptation  of 
,kant1 as well as of the ,platonic      
ideas4 ,it has been said that 'you      
cannot criticize ,revelation4' ',then   
how do you know what is ,revelation1  or
 that there is one at all1' is the      
immediate rejoinder--',you know  nothing
 of things in themselves4' ',then how do
 you know that there are  things in     
themselves8' ,in some respects1 the     
difficulty pressed harder  upon the     
,greek than upon ourselves4 ,for        
conceiving of ,god more under the       
attribute of knowledge than we do1 he   
was more under the necessity  of        
separating the divine from the human1 as
 two spheres which had no  communication
 with one another4    ,it is remarkable 
that ,plato1 speaking by the mouth of   
,parmenides1  does not treat even this  
second class of difficulties as hopeless
 or  insoluble4 ,he says only that they 
cannot be explained without a long and  
laborious demonstration3 ',the teacher  
will require superhuman ability1  and   

the learner will be hard of             
understanding4' ,but an attempt must be 
made to find an answer to them2 for1 as 
,socrates and ,parmenides both  admit1  
the denial of abstract ideas is the     
destruction of the mind4 ,we  can easily
 imagine that among the ,greek schools  
of philosophy in the  fourth century    
before ,christ a panic might arise from 
the denial of  universals1 similar to   
that which arose in the last century    
from ,hume's  denial of our ideas of    
cause and effect4 ,men do not at first  
recognize  that thought1 like digestion1
 will go on much the same1              
notwithstanding  any theories which may 
be entertained respecting the nature of 
the  process4 ,parmenides attributes the
 difficulties in which ,socrates is     
involved to a want of comprehensiveness 
in his mode of reasoning2 he  should    
consider every question on the negative 
as well as the positive  hypothesis1    
with reference to the consequences which
 flow from the  denial as well as from  

the assertion of a given statement4     
,the argument which follows is the most 
singular in ,plato4 ,it appears  to be  
an imitation1 or parody1 of the         
,zenonian dialectic1 just as the        
speeches in the ,phaedrus are an        
imitation of the style of ,lysias1 or as
  the derivations in the ,cratylus or   
the fallacies of the ,euthydemus are  a 
parody of some contemporary ,sophist4   
,the interlocutor is not supposed1  as  
in most of the other ,platonic          
dialogues1 to take a living part in the 
argument2 he is only required to say    
',yes' and ',no' in the right places4   
,a hint has been already given that the 
paradoxes of ,zeno admitted of a  higher
 application4 ,this hint is the thread  
by which ,plato connects the  two parts 
of the dialogue4    ,the paradoxes of   
,parmenides seem trivial to us1 because 
the words to  which they relate have    
become trivial2 their true nature as    
abstract  terms is perfectly understood 
by us1 and we are inclined to regard the

  treatment of them in ,plato as a mere 
straw-splitting1 or legerdemain of      
words4 ,yet there was a power in them   
which fascinated the ,neoplatonists  for
 centuries afterwards4 ,something that  
they found in them1 or brought  to      
them--some echo or anticipation of a    
great truth or error1 exercised  a      
wonderful influence over their minds4   
,to do the ,parmenides justice1 we      
should imagine similar aporiai raised on
 themes as sacred to us1 as the  notions
 of ,one or ,being were to an ancient   
,eleatic4 ',if ,god is1 what  follows8  
,if ,god is not1 what follows8' ,or     
again3 ,if ,god is or is not the  world2
 or if ,god is or is not many1 or has or
 has not parts1 or is or is  not in the 
world1 or in time2 or is or is not      
finite or infinite4 ,or if  the world is
 or is not2 or has or has not a         
beginning or end2 or is or  is not      
infinite1 or infinitely divisible4 ,or  
again3 if ,god is or is not  identical  
with his laws2 or if man is or is not   

identical with the laws  of nature4 ,we 
can easily see that here are many       
subjects for thought1  and that from    
these and similar hypotheses questions  
of great interest  might arise4 ,and we 
also remark1 that the conclusions       
derived from  either of the two         
alternative propositions might be       
equally impossible  and contradictory4  
,when we ask what is the object of these
 paradoxes1 some have answered  that    
they are a mere logical puzzle1 while   
others have seen in them an  ,hegelian  
propaedeutic of the doctrine of ,ideas4 
,the first of these views  derives      
support from the manner in which        
,parmenides speaks of a similar  method 
being applied to all ,ideas4 ,yet it is 
hard to suppose that ,plato  would have 
furnished so elaborate an example1 not  
of his own but of  the ,eleatic         
dialectic1 had he intended only to give 
an illustration of  method4 ,the second 
view has been often overstated by those 
who1 like  ,hegel himself1 have tended  

to confuse ancient with modern          
philosophy4  ,we need not deny that     
,plato1 trained in the school of        
,cratylus and  ,heracleitus1 may have   
seen that a contradiction in terms is   
sometimes  the best expression of a     
truth higher than either 7compare       
,soph474 ,but  his ideal theory is not  
based on antinomies4 ,the correlation of
 ,ideas  was the metaphysical difficulty
 of the age in which he lived2 and the  
,megarian and ,cynic philosophy was a   
'reductio ad absurdum' of their         
isolation4 ,to restore them to their    
natural connexion and to detect the     
negative element in them is the aim of  
,plato in the ,sophist4 ,but his  view  
of their connexion falls very far short 
of the ,hegelian identity  of ,being and
 ,not-being4 ,the ,being and ,not-being 
of ,plato never merge in  each other1   
though he is aware that 'determination  
is only negation4'    ,after criticizing
 the hypotheses of others1 it may appear
 presumptuous  to add another guess to  

the many which have been already        
offered4 ,may we  say1 in ,platonic     
language1 that we still seem to see     
vestiges of a track  which has not yet  
been taken8 ,it is quite possible that  
the obscurity  of the ,parmenides would 
not have existed to a contemporary      
student of  philosophy1 and1 like the   
similar difficulty in the ,philebus1 is 
really due to our ignorance of the mind 
of the age4 ,there is an obscure        
,megarian influence on ,plato which     
cannot wholly be cleared up1 and is  not
 much illustrated by the doubtful       
tradition of his retirement to  ,megara 
after the death of ,socrates4 ,for      
,megara was within a walk of  ,athens   
7,phaedr471 and ,plato might have       
learned the ,megarian doctrines  without
 settling there4    ,we may begin by    
remarking that the theses of ,parmenides
 are expressly  said to follow the      
method of ,zeno1 and that the complex   
dilemma1 though  declared to be capable 
of universal application1 is applied in 

this  instance to ,zeno's familiar      
question of the 'one and many4' ,here1  
then1  is a double indication of the    
connexion of the ,parmenides with the   
,eristic school4 ,the old ,eleatics had 
asserted the existence of ,being1  which
 they at first regarded as finite1 then 
as infinite1 then as  neither finite nor
 infinite1 to which some of them had    
given what  ,aristotle calls 'a form1'  
others had ascribed a material nature   
only4  ,the tendency of their philosophy
 was to deny to ,being all predicates4  
,the ,megarians1 who succeeded them1    
like the ,cynics1 affirmed that no      
predicate could be asserted of any      
subject2 they also converted the  idea  
of ,being into an abstraction of ,good1 
perhaps with the view of  preserving a  
sort of neutrality or indifference      
between the mind and  things4 ,as if    
they had said1 in the language of modern
 philosophy3  ',being is not only       
neither finite nor infinite1 neither at 
rest nor in  motion1 but neither        

subjective nor objective4'    ,this is  
the track along which ,plato is leading 
us4 ,zeno had attempted to  prove the   
existence of the one by disproving the  
existence of the many1  and ,parmenides 
seems to aim at proving the existence of
 the subject  by showing the            
contradictions which follow from the    
assertion of any  predicates4 ,take the 
simplest of all notions1 'unity'2 you   
cannot even  assert being or time of    
this without involving a contradiction4 
,but is  the contradiction also the     
final conclusion8 ,probably no more than
 of  ,zeno's denial of the many1 or of  
,parmenides' assault upon the ,ideas2 no
  more than of the earlier dialogues 'of
 search4' ,to us there seems to  be no  
residuum of this long piece of          
dialectics4 ,but to the mind of         
,parmenides and ,plato1                 
',gott-betrunkene ,menschen1' there     
still remained  the idea of 'being' or  
'good1' which could not be conceived1   
defined1  uttered1 but could not be got 

rid of4 ,neither of them would have     
imagined that their disputation ever    
touched the ,divine ,being 7compare     
,phil474 ,the same difficulties about   
,unity and ,being are raised in the     
,sophist2 but there only as preliminary 
to their final solution4    ,if this    
view is correct1 the real aim of the    
hypotheses of ,parmenides  is to        
criticize the earlier ,eleatic          
philosophy from the point of view of    
,zeno or the ,megarians4 ,it is the same
 kind of criticism which ,plato has     
extended to his own doctrine of ,ideas4 
,nor is there any want of poetical      
consistency in attributing to the       
'father ,parmenides' the last review  of
 the ,eleatic doctrines4 ,the latest    
phases of all philosophies were         
fathered upon the founder of the school4
    ,other critics have regarded the    
final conclusion of the ,parmenides     
either as sceptical or as ,heracleitean4
 ,in the first case1 they assume  that  
,plato means to show the impossibility  

of any truth4 ,but this is not  the     
spirit of ,plato1 and could not with    
propriety be put into the mouth  of     
,parmenides1 who1 in this very dialogue1
 is urging ,socrates1 not to  doubt     
everything1 but to discipline his mind  
with a view to the more  precise        
attainment of truth4 ,the same remark   
applies to the second of  the two       
theories4 ,plato everywhere ridicules   
7perhaps unfairly7 his  ,heracleitean   
contemporaries3 and if he had intended  
to support an  ,heracleitean thesis1    
would hardly have chosen ,parmenides1   
the condemner  of the 'undiscerning     
tribe who say that things both are and  
are not1'  to be the speaker4 ,nor1     
thirdly1 can we easily persuade         
ourselves with  ,zeller that by the     
'one' he means the ,idea2 and that he is
 seeking to  prove indirectly the unity 
of the ,idea in the multiplicity of     
phenomena4    ,we may now endeavour to  
thread the mazes of the labyrinth which 
,parmenides knew so well1 and trembled  

at the thought of them4    ,the argument
 has two divisions3 ,there is the       
hypothesis that         #a4  ,one is4   
#b4  ,one is not4       ,if one is1 it  
is nothing4       ,if one is not1 it is 
everything4         ,but is and is not  
may be taken in two senses3             
,either one is one1       ,or1 one has  
being1         from which opposite      
consequences are deduced1       #a4;a4  
,if one is one1 it is nothing4          
#a4;b4  ,if one has being1 it is all    
things4         ,to which are appended  
two subordinate consequences3           
#a4;aa4  ,if one has being1 all other   
things are4       #a4;bb4  ,if one is   
one1 all other things are not4          
,the same distinction is then applied to
 the negative hypothesis3       #b4;a4  
,if one is not one1 it is all things4   
#b4;b4  ,if one has not being1 it is    
nothing4         ,involving two parallel
 consequences respecting the other or   
remainder3       #b4;aa4  ,if one is not
 one1 other things are all4             

#b4;bb4  ,if one has not being1 other   
things are not4      44444    ',i cannot
 refuse1' said ,parmenides1 'since1 as  
,zeno remarks1 we are  alone1 though ,i 
may say with ,ibycus1 who in his old age
 fell in love1 ,i1  like the old        
racehorse1 tremble at the prospect of   
the course which ,i am  to run1 and     
which ,i know so well4 ,but as ,i must  
attempt this laborious  game1 what shall
 be the subject8 ,suppose ,i take my own
 hypothesis of  the one4' ',by all      
means1' said ,zeno4 ',and who will      
answer me8 ,shall ,i  propose the       
youngest8 he will be the most likely to 
say what he thinks1  and his answers    
will give me time to breathe4' ',i am   
the youngest1' said  ,aristoteles1 'and 
at your service2 proceed with your      
questions4'--,the  result may be summed 
up as follows3--    #a4;a4 ,one is not  
many1 and therefore has no parts1 and   
therefore is not  a whole1 which is a   
sum of parts1 and therefore has neither 
beginning1  middle1 nor end1 and is     

therefore unlimited1 and therefore      
formless1  being neither round nor      
straight1 for neither round nor straight
 can be  defined without assuming that  
they have parts2 and therefore is not in
  place1 whether in another which would 
encircle and touch the one at  many     
points2 or in itself1 because that which
 is self-containing is also  contained1 
and therefore not one but two4 ,this    
being premised1 let us  consider whether
 one is capable either of motion or     
rest4 ,for motion is  either change of  
substance1 or motion on an axis1 or from
 one place to  another4 ,but the one is 
incapable of change of substance1 which 
implies  that it ceases to be itself1 or
 of motion on an axis1 because there    
would be parts around the axis2 and any 
other motion involves change of  place4 
,but existence in place has been already
 shown to be impossible2  and yet more  
impossible is coming into being in      
place1 which implies  partial existence 
in two places at once1 or entire        

existence neither  within nor without   
the same2 and how can this be8 ,and more
 impossible  still is the coming into   
being either as a whole or parts of that
 which  is neither a whole nor parts4   
,the one1 then1 is incapable of motion4 
,but neither can the one be in anything1
 and therefore not in the same1  whether
 itself or some other1 and is therefore 
incapable of rest4  ,neither is one the 
same with itself or any other1 or other 
than itself  or any other4 ,for if other
 than itself1 then other than one1 and  
therefore not one2 and1 if the same with
 other1 it would be other1 and  other   
than one4 ,neither can one while        
remaining one be other than other2  for 
other1 and not one1 is the other than   
other4 ,but if not other by  virtue of  
being one1 not by virtue of itself2 and 
if not by virtue  of itself1 not itself 
other1 and if not itself other1 not     
other than  anything4 ,neither will one 
be the same with itself4 ,for the nature
 of  the same is not that of the one1   

but a thing which becomes the same with 
anything does not become one2 for       
example1 that which becomes the same    
with the many becomes many and not one4 
,and therefore if the one is the  same  
with itself1 the one is not one with    
itself2 and therefore one and  not one4 
,and therefore one is neither other than
 other1 nor the same  with itself4      
,neither will the one be like or unlike 
itself or other2  for likeness is       
sameness of affections1 and the one and 
the same are  different4 ,and one having
 any affection which is other than being
 one  would be more than one4 ,the one1 
then1 cannot have the same affection    
with and therefore cannot be like itself
 or other2 nor can the one  have any    
other affection than its own1 that is1  
be unlike itself or any  other1 for this
 would imply that it was more than one4 
,the one1 then1  is neither like nor    
unlike itself or other4 ,this being the 
case1 neither  can the one be equal or  
unequal to itself or other4 ,for        

equality implies  sameness of measure1  
as inequality implies a greater or less 
number  of measures4 ,but the one1 not  
having sameness1 cannot have sameness of
  measure2 nor a greater or less number 
of measures1 for that would imply  parts
 and multitude4 ,once more1 can one be  
older or younger than itself  or other8 
or of the same age with itself or other8
 ,that would imply  likeness and        
unlikeness1 equality and inequality4    
,therefore one cannot  be in time1      
because that which is in time is ever   
becoming older and  younger than itself1
 7for older and younger are relative    
terms1 and he  who becomes older becomes
 younger17 and is also of the same age  
with  itself4 ,none of which1 or any    
other expressions of time1 whether past1
  future1 or present1 can be affirmed of
 one4 ,one neither is1 has been1  nor   
will be1 nor becomes1 nor has1 nor will 
become4 ,and1 as these are  the only    
modes of being1 one is not1 and is not  
one4 ,but to that which  is not1 there  

is no attribute or relative1 neither    
name nor word nor  idea nor science nor 
perception nor opinion appertaining4    
,one1 then1 is  neither named1 nor      
uttered1 nor known1 nor perceived1 nor  
imagined4 ,but  can all this be true8   
',i think not4'    #a4;b4 ,let us1      
however1 commence the inquiry again4 ,we
 have to work out  all the consequences 
which follow on the assumption that the 
one is4 ,if  one is1 one partakes of    
being1 which is not the same with one2  
the words  'being' and 'one' have       
different meanings4 ,observe the        
consequence3 ,in  the one of being or   
the being of one are two parts1 being   
and one1 which  form one whole4 ,and    
each of the two parts is also a whole1  
and involves  the other1 and may be     
further subdivided into one and being1  
and is  therefore not one but two2 and  
thus one is never one1 and in this way  
the one1 if it is1 becomes many and     
infinite4 ,again1 let us conceive  of a 
one which by an effort of abstraction we

 separate from being3 will  this        
abstract one be one or many8 ,you say   
one only2 let us see4 ,in the  first    
place1 the being of one is other than   
one2 and one and being1  if different1  
are so because they both partake of the 
nature of other1  which is therefore    
neither one nor being2 and whether we   
take being  and other1 or being and one1
 or one and other1 in any case we have  
two  things which separately are called 
either1 and together both4 ,and both    
are two and either of two is severally  
one1 and if one be added to any  of the 
pairs1 the sum is three2 and two is an  
even number1 three an odd2  and two     
units exist twice1 and therefore there  
are twice two2 and three  units exist   
thrice1 and therefore there are thrice  
three1 and taken  together they give    
twice three and thrice two3 we have even
 numbers  multiplied into even1 and odd 
into even1 and even into odd numbers4   
,but  if one is1 and both odd and even  
numbers are implied in one1 must not    

every number exist8 ,and number is      
infinite1 and therefore existence must  
be infinite1 for all and every number   
partakes of being2 therefore  being has 
the greatest number of parts1 and every 
part1 however great or  however small1  
is equally one4 ,but can one be in many 
places and yet be  a whole8 ,if not a   
whole it must be divided into parts and 
represented  by a number corresponding  
to the number of the parts4 ,and if so1 
we were  wrong in saying that being has 
the greatest number of parts2 for being 
is coequal and coextensive with one1 and
 has no more parts than one2 and  so the
 abstract one broken up into parts by   
being is many and infinite4  ,but the   
parts are parts of a whole1 and the     
whole is their containing  limit1 and   
the one is therefore limited as well as 
infinite in number2  and that which is a
 whole has beginning1 middle1 and end1  
and a middle  is equidistant from the   
extremes2 and one is therefore of a     
certain  figure1 round or straight1 or a

 combination of the two1 and being a    
whole includes all the parts which are  
the whole1 and is therefore             
self-contained4 ,but then1 again1 the   
whole is not in the parts1 whether  all 
or some4 ,not in all1 because1 if in    
all1 also in one2 for1 if  wanting in   
any one1 how in all8--not in some1      
because the greater would  then be      
contained in the less4 ,but if not in   
all1 nor in any1 nor in  some1 either   
nowhere or in other4 ,and if nowhere1   
nothing2 therefore in  other4 ,the one  
as a whole1 then1 is in another1 but    
regarded as a sum  of parts is in       
itself2 and is1 therefore1 both in      
itself and in another4  ,this being the 
case1 the one is at once both at rest   
and in motion3 at  rest1 because resting
 in itself2 in motion1 because it is    
ever in other4  ,and if there is truth  
in what has preceded1 one is the same   
and not the  same with itself and other4
 ,for everything in relation to every   
other  thing is either the same with it 

or other2 or if neither the same nor    
other1 then in the relation of part to a
 whole or whole to a part4 ,but  one    
cannot be a part or whole in relation to
 one1 nor other than  one2 and is       
therefore the same with one4 ,yet this  
sameness is again  contradicted by one  
being in another place from itself which
 is in the  same place2 this follows    
from one being in itself and in another2
 one1  therefore1 is other than itself4 
,but if anything is other than anything1
  will it not be other than other8 ,and 
the not one is other than the one1  and 
the one than the not one2 therefore one 
is other than all others4  ,but the same
 and the other exclude one another1 and 
therefore the other  can never be in the
 same2 nor can the other be in anything 
for ever so  short a time1 as for that  
time the other will be in the same4 ,and
 the  other1 if never in the same1      
cannot be either in the one or in the   
not  one4 ,and one is not other than not
 one1 either by reason of other or  of  

itself2 and therefore they are not other
 than one another at all4  ,neither can 
the not one partake or be part of one1  
for in that case it  would be one2 nor  
can the not one be number1 for that also
 involves one4  ,and therefore1 not     
being other than the one or related to  
the one as  a whole to parts or parts to
 a whole1 not one is the same as one4   
,wherefore the one is the same and also 
not the same with the others  and also  
with itself2 and is therefore like and  
unlike itself and the  others1 and just 
as different from the others as they are
 from the one1  neither more nor less4  
,but if neither more nor less1 equally  
different2  and therefore the one and   
the others have the same relations4     
,this may  be illustrated by the case of
 names3 when you repeat the same name   
twice  over1 you mean the same thing2   
and when you say that the other is other
  than the one1 or the one other than   
the other1 this very word other         
7eteron71 which is attributed to both1  

implies sameness4 ,one1 then1 as  being 
other than others1 and other as being   
other than one1 are alike in  that they 
have the relation of otherness2 and     
likeness is similarity  of relations4   
,and everything as being other of       
everything is also like  everything4    
,again1 same and other1 like and unlike1
 are opposites3 and  since in virtue of 
being other than the others the one is  
like them1 in  virtue of being the same 
it must be unlike4 ,again1 one1 as      
having the  same relations1 has no      
difference of relation1 and is therefore
 not  unlike1 and therefore like2 or1 as
 having different relations1 is         
different and unlike4 ,thus1 one1 as    
being the same and not the same with    
itself and others--for both these       
reasons and for either of them--is  also
 like and unlike itself and the others4 
,again1 how far can one touch  itself   
and the others8 ,as existing in others1 
it touches the others2 and  as existing 
in itself1 touches only itself4 ,but    

from another point of  view1 that which 
touches another must be next in order of
 place2 one1  therefore1 must be next in
 order of place to itself1 and would    
therefore  be two1 and in two places4   
,but one cannot be two1 and therefore   
cannot  be in contact with itself4 ,nor 
again can one touch the other4 ,two     
objects are required to make one        
contact2 three objects make two         
contacts2 and all the objects in the    
world1 if placed in a series1 would     
have as many contacts as there are      
objects1 less one4 ,but if one only     
exists1 and not two1 there is no        
contact4 ,and the others1 being other   
than one1 have no part in one1 and      
therefore none in number1 and  therefore
 two has no existence1 and therefore    
there is no contact4  ,for all which    
reasons1 one has and has not contact    
with itself and the  others4    ,once   
more1 ,is one equal and unequal to      
itself and the others8 ,suppose  one and
 the others to be greater or less than  

each other or equal to one  another1    
they will be greater or less or equal by
 reason of equality or  greatness or    
smallness inhering in them in addition  
to their own proper  nature4 ,let us    
begin by assuming smallness to be       
inherent in one3 in  this case the      
inherence is either in the whole or in a
 part4 ,if the  first1 smallness is     
either coextensive with the whole one1  
or contains  the whole1 and1 if         
coextensive with the one1 is equal to   
the one1 or  if containing the one will 
be greater than the one4 ,but smallness 
thus  performs the function of equality 
or of greatness1 which is impossible4   
,again1 if the inherence be in a part1  
the same contradiction follows3         
smallness will be equal to the part or  
greater than the part2 therefore        
smallness will not inhere in anything1  
and except the idea of smallness  there 
will be nothing small4 ,neither will    
greatness2 for greatness will  have a   
greater2--and there will be no small in 

relation to which it is  great4 ,and    
there will be no great or small in      
objects1 but greatness  and smallness   
will be relative only to each other2    
therefore the others  cannot be greater 
or less than the one2 also the one can  
neither exceed  nor be exceeded by the  
others1 and they are therefore equal to 
one  another4 ,and this will be true    
also of the one in relation to itself3  
one will be equal to itself as well as  
to the others 7talla74 ,yet one1  being 
in itself1 must also be about itself1   
containing and contained1  and is       
therefore greater and less than itself4 
,further1 there is nothing  beside the  
one and the others2 and as these must be
 in something1 they  must therefore be  
in one another2 and as that in which a  
thing is is  greater than the thing1 the
 inference is that they are both greater
 and  less than one another1 because    
containing and contained in one another4
  ,therefore the one is equal to and    
greater and less than itself or other1  

having also measures or parts or numbers
 equal to or greater or less  than      
itself or other4    ,but does one       
partake of time8 ,this must be          
acknowledged1 if the one  partakes of   
being4 ,for 'to be' is the participation
 of being in present  time1 'to have    
been' in past1 'to be about to be' in   
future time4 ,and  as time is ever      
moving forward1 the one becomes older   
than itself2 and  therefore younger than
 itself2 and is older and also younger  
when in the  process of becoming it     
arrives at the present2 and it is always
 older  and younger1 for at any moment  
the one is1 and therefore it becomes    
and is not older and younger than itself
 but during an equal time with  itself1 
and is therefore contemporary with      
itself4    ,and what are the relations  
of the one to the others8 ,is it or does
 it  become older or younger than they8 
,at any rate the others are more than   
one1 and one1 being the least of all    
numbers1 must be prior in time to       

greater numbers4 ,but on the other hand1
 one must come into being in a  manner  
accordant with its own nature4 ,now one 
has parts or others1 and  has therefore 
a beginning1 middle1 and end1 of which  
the beginning is  first and the end     
last4 ,and the parts come into existence
 first2 last of  all the whole1         
contemporaneously with the end1 being   
therefore younger1  while the parts or  
others are older than the one4 ,but1    
again1 the one  comes into being in each
 of the parts as much as in the whole1  
and must  be of the same age with them4 
,therefore one is at once older and     
younger  than the parts or others1 and  
also contemporaneous with them1 for no  
part can be a part which is not one4 ,is
 this true of becoming as well as       
being8 ,thus much may be affirmed1 that 
the same things which are older  or     
younger cannot become older or younger  
in a greater degree than they  were at  
first by the addition of equal times4   
,but1 on the other hand1  the one1 if   

older than others1 has come into being a
 longer time than  they have4 ,and when 
equal time is added to a longer and     
shorter1 the  relative difference       
between them is diminished4 ,in this way
 that which  was older becomes younger1 
and that which was younger becomes      
older1  that is to say1 younger and     
older than at first2 and they ever      
become  and never have become1 for then 
they would be4 ,thus the one and others 
always are and are becoming and not     
becoming younger and also older than    
one another4 ,and one1 partaking of time
 and also partaking of becoming  older  
and younger1 admits of all time1        
present1 past1 and future--was1  is1    
shall be--was becoming1 is becoming1    
will become4 ,and there is  science of  
the one1 and opinion and name and       
expression1 as is already  implied in   
the fact of our inquiry4    ,yet once   
more1 if one be one and many1 and       
neither one nor many1 and  also         
participant of time1 must there not be a

 time at which one as being  one        
partakes of being1 and a time when one  
as not being one is deprived  of being8 
,but these two contradictory states     
cannot be experienced  by the one both  
together3 there must be a time of       
transition4 ,and the  transition is a   
process of generation and destruction1  
into and from  being and not-being1 the 
one and the others4 ,for the generation 
of the  one is the destruction of the   
others1 and the generation of the others
  is the destruction of the one4 ,there 
is also separation and aggregation1     
assimilation and dissimilation1         
increase1 diminution1 equalization1  a  
passage from motion to rest1 and from   
rest to motion in the one and  many4    
,but when do all these changes take     
place8 ,when does motion become  rest1  
or rest motion8 ,the answer to this     
question will throw a light  upon all   
the others4 ,nothing can be in motion   
and at rest at the same  time2 and      
therefore the change takes place 'in a  

moment'--which is a  strange expression1
 and seems to mean change in no time4   
,which is true  also of all the other   
changes1 which likewise take place in no
 time4    #a4;aa4 ,but if one is1 what  
happens to the others1 which in the     
first  place are not one1 yet may       
partake of one in a certain way8 ,the   
others  are other than the one because  
they have parts1 for if they had no     
parts  they would be simply one1 and    
parts imply a whole to which they       
belong2  otherwise each part would be a 
part of many1 and being itself one of   
them1 of itself1 and if a part of all1  
of each one of the other parts1  which  
is absurd4 ,for a part1 if not a part of
 one1 must be a part of  all but this   
one1 and if so not a part of each one2  
and if not a part  of each one1 not a   
part of any one of many1 and so not of  
one2 and if of  none1 how of all8       
,therefore a part is neither a part of  
many nor of  all1 but of an absolute and
 perfect whole or one4 ,and if the      

others have  parts1 they must partake of
 the whole1 and must be the whole of    
which  they are the parts4 ,and each    
part1 as the word 'each' implies1 is    
also  an absolute one4 ,and both the    
whole and the parts partake of one1 for 
the whole of which the parts are parts  
is one1 and each part is one part  of   
the whole2 and whole and parts as       
participating in one are other  than    
one1 and as being other than one are    
many and infinite2 and however  small a 
fraction you separate from them is many 
and not one4 ,yet the  fact of their    
being parts furnishes the others with a 
limit towards  other parts and towards  
the whole2 they are finite and also     
infinite3  finite through participation 
in the one1 infinite in their own       
nature4  ,and as being finite1 they are 
alike2 and as being infinite1 they are  
alike2 but as being both finite and also
 infinite1 they are in the  highest     
degree unlike4 ,and all other opposites 
might without difficulty  be shown to   

unite in them4    #a4;bb4 ,once more1   
leaving all this3 ,is there not also an 
opposite series  of consequences which  
is equally true of the others1 and may  
be deduced  from the existence of one8  
,there is4 ,one is distinct from the    
others1  and the others from one2 for   
one and the others are all things1 and  
there is no third existence besides     
them4 ,and the whole of one cannot  be  
in others nor parts of it1 for it is    
separated from others and has  no parts1
 and therefore the others have no unity1
 nor plurality1 nor  duality1 nor any   
other number1 nor any opposition or     
distinction1 such  as likeness and      
unlikeness1 some and other1 generation  
and corruption1  odd and even4 ,for if  
they had these they would partake either
 of one  opposite1 and this would be a  
participation in one2 or of two         
opposites1  and this would be a         
participation in two4 ,thus if one      
exists1 one is all  things1 and likewise
 nothing1 in relation to one and to the 

others4    #b4;a4 ,but1 again1 assume   
the opposite hypothesis1 that the one is
 not1  and what is the consequence8 ,in 
the first place1 the proposition1 that  
one is not1 is clearly opposed to the   
proposition1 that not one is not4  ,the 
subject of any negative proposition     
implies at once knowledge and           
difference4 ,thus 'one' in the          
proposition--',the one is not1' must be 
something known1 or the words would be  
unintelligible2 and again this  'one    
which is not' is something different    
from other things4 ,moreover1  this and 
that1 some and other1 may be all        
attributed or related to  the one which 
is not1 and which though non-existent   
may and must have  plurality1 if the one
 only is non-existent and nothing else2 
but if all  is not-being there is       
nothing which can be spoken of4 ,also   
the one which  is not differs1 and is   
different in kind from the others1 and  
therefore  unlike them2 and they being  
other than the one1 are unlike the one1 

which is therefore unlike them4 ,but    
one1 being unlike other1 must be  like  
itself2 for the unlikeness of one to    
itself is the destruction of  the       
hypothesis2 and one cannot be equal to  
the others2 for that would  suppose     
being in the one1 and the others would  
be equal to one and like  one2 both     
which are impossible1 if one does not   
exist4 ,the one which  is not1 then1 if 
not equal is unequal to the others1 and 
in equality  implies great and small1   
and equality lies between great and     
small1 and  therefore the one which is  
not partakes of equality4 ,further1 the 
one  which is not has being2 for that   
which is true is1 and it is true that   
the one is not4 ,and so the one which is
 not1 if remitting aught of the  being  
of non-existence1 would become existent4
 ,for not being implies the  being of   
not-being1 and being the not-being of   
not-being2 or more truly  being partakes
 of the being of being and not of the   
being of not-being1  and not-being of   

the being of not-being and not of the   
not-being  of not-being4 ,and therefore 
the one which is not has being and also 
not-being4 ,and the union of being and  
not-being involves change or  motion4   
,but how can not-being1 which is        
nowhere1 move or change1 either  from   
one place to another or in the same     
place8 ,and whether it is or is  not1 it
 would cease to be one if experiencing a
 change of substance4 ,the  one which is
 not1 then1 is both in motion and at    
rest1 is altered and  unaltered1 and    
becomes and is destroyed1 and does not  
become and is not  destroyed4    #b4;b4 
,once more1 let us ask the question1 ,if
 one is not1 what happens in  regard to 
one8 ,the expression 'is not' implies   
negation of being3--do we  mean by this 
to say that a thing1 which is not1 in a 
certain sense is8  or do we mean        
absolutely to deny being of it8 ,the    
latter4 ,then the one  which is not can 
neither be nor become nor perish nor    
experience change  of substance or      

place4 ,neither can rest1 or motion1 or 
greatness1 or  smallness1 or equality1  
or unlikeness1 or likeness either to    
itself or  other1 or attribute or       
relation1 or now or hereafter or        
formerly1 or  knowledge or opinion or   
perception or name or anything else be  
asserted  of that which is not4         
#b4;aa4 ,once more1 if one is not1 what 
becomes of the others8 ,if we  speak of 
them they must be1 and their very name  
implies difference1 and  difference     
implies relation1 not to the one1 which 
is not1 but to  one another4 ,and they  
are others of each other not as units   
but  as infinities1 the least of which  
is also infinity1 and capable of        
infinitesimal division4 ,and they will  
have no unity or number1 but only  a    
semblance of unity and number2 and the  
least of them will appear large  and    
manifold in comparison with the         
infinitesimal fractions into which  it  
may be divided4 ,further1 each particle 
will have the appearance of  being equal

 with the fractions4 ,for in passing    
from the greater to the  less it must   
reach an intermediate point1 which is   
equality4 ,moreover1  each particle     
although having a limit in relation to  
itself and to other  particles1 yet it  
has neither beginning1 middle1 nor end2 
for there is  always a beginning before 
the beginning1 and a middle within the  
middle1  and an end beyond the end1     
because the infinitesimal division is   
never  arrested by the one4 ,thus all   
being is one at a distance1 and broken  
up when near1 and like at a distance and
 unlike when near2 and also the         
particles which compose being seem to be
 like and unlike1 in rest and  motion1  
in generation and corruption1 in contact
 and separation1 if one  is not4        
#b4;bb4 ,once more1 let us inquire1 ,if 
the one is not1 and the others of  the  
one are1 what follows8 ,in the first    
place1 the others will not be  the one1 
nor the many1 for in that case the one  
would be contained in  them2 neither    

will they appear to be one or many2     
because they have no  communion or      
participation in that which is not1 nor 
semblance of that  which is not4 ,if one
 is not1 the others neither are1 nor    
appear to be  one or many1 like or      
unlike1 in contact or separation4 ,in   
short1 if one  is not1 nothing is4      
,the result of all which is1 that       
whether one is or is not1 one and the   
others1 in relation to themselves and to
 one another1 are and are not1  and     
appear to be and appear not to be1 in   
all manner of ways4    ,i4 ,on the first
 hypothesis we may remark3 first1 ,that 
one is one is  an identical proposition1
 from which we might expect that no     
further  consequences could be deduced4 
,the train of consequences which        
follows1  is inferred by altering the   
predicate into 'not many4' ,yet1        
perhaps1 if  a strict ,eristic had been 
present1 oios aner ei kai nun paren1 he 
might  have affirmed that the not many  
presented a different aspect of the     

conception from the one1 and was        
therefore not identical with it4 ,such  
a subtlety would be very much in        
character with the ,zenonian dialectic4 
,secondly1 ,we may note1 that the       
conclusion is really involved in the    
premises4 ,for one is conceived as one1 
in a sense which excludes all           
predicates4 ,when the meaning of one has
 been reduced to a point1 there  is no  
use in saying that it has neither parts 
nor magnitude4 ,thirdly1  ,the          
conception of the same is1 first of all1
 identified with the one2  and then by a
 further analysis distinguished from1   
and even opposed to  it4 ,fourthly1 ,we 
may detect notions1 which have          
reappeared in modern  philosophy1 e4g4  
the bare abstraction of undefined unity1
 answering to  the ,hegelian ',seyn1' or
 the identity of contradictions 'that   
which is  older is also younger1' etc41 
or the ,kantian conception of an a      
priori  synthetical proposition 'one    
is4'    ,,ii4 ,in the first series of   

propositions the word 'is' is really the
  copula2 in the second1 the verb of    
existence4 ,as in the first series1  the
 negative consequence followed from one 
being affirmed to be  equivalent to the 
not many2 so here the affirmative       
consequence is  deduced from one being  
equivalent to the many4    ,in the      
former case1 nothing could be predicated
 of the one1 but now                    
everything--multitude1 relation1 place1 
time1 transition4 ,one is  regarded in  
all the aspects of one1 and with a      
reference to all the  consequences which
 flow1 either from the combination or   
the separation  of them4 ,the notion of 
transition involves the singular        
extra-temporal  conception of           
'suddenness4' ,this idea of 'suddenness'
 is based upon the  contradiction which 
is involved in supposing that anything  
can be in two  places at once4 ,it is a 
mere fiction2 and we may observe that   
similar  antinomies have led modern     
philosophers to deny the reality of time

 and  space4 ,it is not the             
infinitesimal of time1 but the negative 
of time4  ,by the help of this invention
 the conception of change1 which sorely 
exercised the minds of early thinkers1  
seems to be1 but is not really  at all  
explained4 ,the difficulty arises out of
 the imperfection of  language1 and     
should therefore be no longer regarded  
as a difficulty at  all4 ,the only way  
of meeting it1 if it exists1 is to      
acknowledge that  this rather puzzling  
double conception is necessary to the   
expression  of the phenomena of motion  
or change1 and that this and similar    
double  notions1 instead of being       
anomalies1 are among the higher and more
  potent instruments of human thought4  
,the processes by which ,parmenides     
obtains his remarkable results may be   
summed up as follows3 7#a7 ,compound or 
correlative ideas which involve  each   
other1 such as1 being and not-being1 one
 and many1 are conceived  sometimes in a
 state of composition1 and sometimes of 

division3 7#b7 ,the  division or        
distinction is sometimes heightened into
 total opposition1  e4g4 between one and
 same1 one and other3 or 7#c7 ,the idea1
 which has  been already divided1 is    
regarded1 like a number1 as capable of  
further  infinite subdivision3 7#d7 ,the
 argument often proceeds 'a dicto       
secundum  quid ad dictum simpliciter'   
and conversely3 7#e7 ,the analogy of    
opposites  is misused by him2 he argues 
indiscriminately sometimes from what is 
like1 sometimes from what is unlike in  
them3 7#f7 ,the idea of being or        
not-being is identified with existence  
or non-existence in place  or time3 7#g7
 ,the same ideas are regarded sometimes 
as in process of  transition1 sometimes 
as alternatives or opposites3 7#h7      
,there are no  degrees or kinds of      
sameness1 likeness1 difference1 nor any 
adequate  conception of motion or       
change3 7#i7 ,one1 being1 time1 like    
space in  ,zeno's puzzle of ,achilles   
and the tortoise1 are regarded sometimes

 as  continuous and sometimes as        
discrete3 7#aj7 ,in some parts of the   
argument  the abstraction is so rarefied
 as to become not only fallacious1 but  
almost unintelligible1 e4g4 in the      
contradiction which is elicited out  of 
the relative terms older and younger3   
7#aa7 ,the relation between two  terms  
is regarded under contradictory aspects1
 as for example when  the existence of  
the one and the non-existence of the one
 are equally  assumed to involve the    
existence of the many3 7#ab7 ,words are 
used  through long chains of argument1  
sometimes loosely1 sometimes with the   
precision of numbers or of geometrical  
figures4    ,the argument is a very     
curious piece of work1 unique in        
literature4  ,it seems to be an         
exposition or rather a 'reductio ad     
absurdum' of the  ,megarian philosophy1 
but we are too imperfectly acquainted   
with this  last to speak with confidence
 about it4 ,it would be safer to say    
that it  is an indication of the        

sceptical1 hyperlogical fancies which   
prevailed  among the contemporaries of  
,socrates4 ,it throws an indistinct     
light upon  ,aristotle1 and makes us    
aware of the debt which the world owes  
to him or  his school4 ,it also bears a 
resemblance to some modern speculations1
 in  which an attempt is made to narrow 
language in such a manner that number   
and figure may be made a calculus of    
thought4 ,it exaggerates one side  of   
logic and forgets the rest4 ,it has the 
appearance of a mathematical  process2  
the inventor of it delights1 as         
mathematicians do1 in eliciting  or     
discovering an unexpected result4 ,it   
also helps to guard us against  some    
fallacies by showing the consequences   
which flow from them4    ,in the        
,parmenides we seem to breathe the      
spirit of the ,megarian  philosophy1    
though we cannot compare the two in     
detail4 ,but ,plato also  goes beyond   
his ,megarian contemporaries2 he has    
split their straws over  again1 and     

admitted more than they would have      
desired4 ,he is indulging  the          
analytical tendencies of his age1 which 
can divide but not combine4  ,and he    
does not stop to inquire whether the    
distinctions which he makes  are shadowy
 and fallacious1 but 'whither the       
argument blows' he follows4    ,,iii4   
,the negative series of propositions    
contains the first conception  of the   
negation of a negation4 ,two minus signs
 in arithmetic or algebra  make a plus4 
,two negatives destroy each other4 ,this
 abstruse notion is  the foundation of  
the ,hegelian logic4 ,the mind must not 
only admit  that determination is       
negation1 but must get through negation 
into  affirmation4 ,whether this process
 is real1 or in any way an assistance   
to thought1 or1 like some other logical 
forms1 a mere figure of speech          
transferred from the sphere of          
mathematics1 may be doubted4 ,that      
,plato  and the most subtle philosopher 
of the nineteenth century should have   

lighted upon the same notion1 is a      
singular coincidence of ancient and     
modern thought4    ,,iv4 ,the one and   
the many or others are reduced to their 
strictest  arithmetical meaning4 ,that  
one is three or three one1 is a         
proposition  which has1 perhaps1 given  
rise to more controversy in the world   
than  any other4 ,but no one has ever   
meant to say that three and one are to  
be  taken in the same sense4 ,whereas   
the one and many of the ,parmenides have
  precisely the same meaning2 there is  
no notion of one personality or         
substance having many attributes or     
qualities4 ,the truth seems to  be      
rather the opposite of that which       
,socrates implies3 ,there is no         
contradiction in the concrete1 but in   
the abstract2 and the more  abstract the
 idea1 the more palpable will be the    
contradiction4 ,for just  as nothing can
 persuade us that the number one is the 
number three1 so  neither can we be     
persuaded that any abstract idea is     

identical with  its opposite1 although  
they may both inhere together in some   
external  object1 or some more          
comprehensive conception4 ,ideas1       
persons1 things  may be one in one sense
 and many in another1 and may have      
various  degrees of unity and plurality4
 ,but in whatever sense and in whatever 
degree they are one they cease to be    
many2 and in whatever degree or  sense  
they are many they cease to be one4     
,two points remain to be considered3    
#ast1 the connexion between the first   
and second parts of the dialogue2       
#bndly1 the relation of the ,parmenides 
to the other dialogues4    ,i4 ,in both 
divisions of the dialogue the principal 
speaker is the same1  and the method    
pursued by him is also the same1 being a
 criticism on  received opinions3 first1
 on the doctrine of ,ideas2 secondly1 of
 ,being4  ,from the ,platonic ,ideas we 
naturally proceed to the ,eleatic ,one  
or ,being  which is the foundation of   
them4 ,they are the same philosophy in  

two  forms1 and the simpler form is the 
truer and deeper4 ,for the ,platonic    
,ideas are mere numerical differences1  
and the moment we attempt to            
distinguish between them1 their         
transcendental character is lost2 ideas 
of justice1 temperance1 and good1 are   
really distinguishable only with        
reference to their application in the   
world4 ,if we once ask how they  are    
related to individuals or to the ideas  
of the divine mind1 they are  again     
merged in the aboriginal notion of      
,being4 ,no one can answer the          
questions which ,parmenides asks of     
,socrates4 ,and yet these questions are 
asked with the express acknowledgment   
that the denial of ideas will be  the   
destruction of the human mind4 ,the true
 answer to the difficulty  here thrown  
out is the establishment of a rational  
psychology2 and  this is a work which is
 commenced in the ,sophist4 ,plato1 in  
urging the  difficulty of his own       
doctrine of ,ideas1 is far from denying 

that some  doctrine of ,ideas is        
necessary1 and for this he is paving the
 way4    ,in a similar spirit he        
criticizes the ,eleatic doctrine of     
,being1 not  intending to deny          
,ontology1 but showing that the old     
,eleatic notion1  and the very name     
',being1' is unable to maintain itself  
against the  subtleties of the          
,megarians4 ,he did not mean to say that
 ,being or  ,substance had no existence1
 but he is preparing for the development
  of his later view1 that ideas were    
capable of relation4 ,the fact that     
contradictory consequences follow from  
the existence or non-existence  of one  
or many1 does not prove that they have  
or have not existence1  but rather that 
some different mode of conceiving them  
is required4  ,parmenides may still have
 thought that ',being was1' just as     
,kant would  have asserted the existence
 of 'things in themselves1' while       
denying the  transcendental use of the  
,categories4    ,several lesser links   

also connect the first and second parts 
of the  dialogue3 7#a7 ,the thesis is   
the same as that which ,zeno has been   
already  discussing3 7#b7 ,parmenides   
has intimated in the first part1 that   
the  method of ,zeno should1 as         
,socrates desired1 be extended to       
,ideas3 7#c7  ,the difficulty of        
participating in greatness1 smallness1  
equality is  urged against the ,ideas as
 well as against the ,one4    ,,ii4 ,the
 ,parmenides is not only a criticism of 
the ,eleatic notion of  ,being1 but also
 of the methods of reasoning then in    
existence1 and  in this point of view1  
as well as in the other1 may be regarded
 as an  introduction to the ,sophist4   
,long ago1 in the ,euthydemus1 the      
vulgar  application of the 'both and    
neither' ,eristic had been subjected to 
a  similar criticism1 which there takes 
the form of banter and irony1 here  of  
illustration4    ,the attack upon the   
,ideas is resumed in the ,philebus1 and 
is followed  by a return to a more      

rational philosophy4 ,the perplexity of 
the ,one and  ,many is there confined to
 the region of ,ideas1 and replaced by a
 theory  of classification2 the ,good   
arranged in classes is also contrasted  
with  the barren abstraction of the     
,megarians4 ,the war is carried on      
against  the ,eristics in all the later 
dialogues1 sometimes with a playful     
irony1  at other times with a sort of   
contempt4 ,but there is no lengthened   
refutation of them4 ,the ,parmenides    
belongs to that stage of the  dialogues 
of ,plato in which he is partially under
 their influence1 using  them as a sort 
of 'critics or diviners' of the truth of
 his own1 and of  the ,eleatic theories4
 ,in the ,theaetetus a similar negative 
dialectic  is employed in the attempt to
 define science1 which after every      
effort  remains undefined still4 ,the   
same question is revived from the       
objective  side in the ,sophist3 ,being 
and ,not-being are no longer exhibited  
in  opposition1 but are now reconciled2 

and the true nature of ,not-being is    
discovered and made the basis of the    
correlation of ideas4 ,some  links are  
probably missing which might have been  
supplied if we had  trustworthy accounts
 of ,plato's oral teaching4    ,to sum  
up3 the ,parmenides of ,plato is a      
critique1 first1 of the ,platonic       
,ideas1 and secondly1 of the ,eleatic   
doctrine of ,being4 ,neither are        
absolutely denied4 ,but certain         
difficulties and consequences are shown 
in the assumption of either1 which prove
 that the ,platonic as well as  the     
,eleatic doctrine must be remodelled4   
,the negation and contradiction  which  
are involved in the conception of the   
,one and ,many are preliminary  to their
 final adjustment4 ,the ,platonic ,ideas
 are tested by the  interrogative method
 of ,socrates2 the ,eleatic ,one or     
,being is tried by  the severer and     
perhaps impossible method of            
hypothetical consequences1  negative and
 affirmative4 ,in the latter we have an 

example of the  ,zenonian or ,megarian  
dialectic1 which proceeded1 not 'by     
assailing  premises1 but conclusions'2  
this is worked out and improved by      
,plato4  ,when primary abstractions are 
used in every conceivable sense1 any or 
every conclusion may be deduced from    
them4 ,the words 'one1' 'other1'        
'being1' 'like1' 'same1' 'whole1' and   
their opposites1 have slightly          
different meanings1 as they are applied 
to objects of thought or  objects of    
sense--to number1 time1 place1 and to   
the higher ideas of  the reason2--and   
out of their different meanings this    
'feast' of  contradictions 'has been    
provided4'    444    ,the ,parmenides of
 ,plato belongs to a stage of philosophy
 which has  passed away4 ,at first we   
read it with a purely antiquarian or    
historical  interest2 and with          
difficulty throw ourselves back into a  
state of  the human mind in which ,unity
 and ,being occupied the attention of   
philosophers4 ,we admire the precision  

of the language1 in which1 as in  some  
curious puzzle1 each word is exactly    
fitted into every other1  and long      
trains of argument are carried out with 
a sort of geometrical  accuracy4 ,we    
doubt whether any abstract notion could 
stand the searching  cross-examination  
of ,parmenides2 and may at last perhaps 
arrive at the  conclusion that ,plato   
has been using an imaginary method to   
work out an  unmeaning conclusion4 ,but 
the truth is1 that he is carrying on a  
process  which is not either useless or 
unnecessary in any age of philosophy4   
,we fail to understand him1 because we  
do not realize that the questions  which
 he is discussing could have had any    
value or importance4 ,we  suppose them  
to be like the speculations of some of  
the ,schoolmen1  which end in nothing4  
,but in truth he is trying to get rid of
 the  stumbling-blocks of thought which 
beset his contemporaries4 ,seeing that  
the ,megarians and ,cynics were making  
knowledge impossible1 he takes  their   

'catch-words' and analyzes them from    
every conceivable point of  view4 ,he is
 criticizing the simplest and most      
general of our ideas1 in  which1 as they
 are the most comprehensive1 the danger 
of error is the  most serious2 for1 if  
they remain unexamined1 as in a         
mathematical  demonstration1 all that   
flows from them is affected1 and the    
error  pervades knowledge far and wide4 
,in the beginning of philosophy this    
correction of human ideas was even more 
necessary than in our own  times1       
because they were more bound up with    
words2 and words when once  presented to
 the mind exercised a greater power over
 thought4 ,there is  a natural realism  
which says1 ',can there be a word devoid
 of meaning1 or  an idea which is an    
idea of nothing8' ,in modern times      
mankind have often  given too great     
importance to a word or idea4 ,the      
philosophy of the  ancients was still   
more in slavery to them1 because they   
had not the  experience of error1 which 

would have placed them above the        
illusion4    ,the method of the         
,parmenides may be compared with the    
process of  purgation1 which ,bacon     
sought to introduce into philosophy4    
,plato is  warning us against two sorts 
of ',idols of the ,den'3 first1 his own 
,ideas1 which he himself having created 
is unable to connect in any way  with   
the external world2 secondly1 against   
two idols in particular1  ',unity' and  
',being1' which had grown up in the     
pre-,socratic philosophy1  and were     
still standing in the way of all        
progress and development of  thought4   
,he does not say with ,bacon1 ',let us  
make truth by experiment1'  or ',from   
these vague and inexact notions let us  
turn to facts4' ,the time  has not yet  
arrived for a purely inductive          
philosophy4 ,the instruments  of thought
 must first be forged1 that they may be 
used hereafter by  modern inquirers4    
,how1 while mankind were disputing about
 universals1  could they classify       

phenomena8 ,how could they investigate  
causes1 when  they had not as yet       
learned to distinguish between a cause  
and an end8  ,how could they make any   
progress in the sciences without first  
arranging  them8 ,these are the         
deficiencies which ,plato is seeking to 
supply in an  age when knowledge was a  
shadow of a name only4 ,in the earlier  
dialogues  the ,socratic conception of  
universals is illustrated by his genius2
 in  the ,phaedrus the nature of        
division is explained2 in the ,republic 
the  law of contradiction and the unity 
of knowledge are asserted2 in the  later
 dialogues he is constantly engaged both
 with the theory and  practice of       
classification4 ,these were the 'new    
weapons1' as he terms  them in the      
,philebus1 which he was preparing for   
the use of some who1 in  after ages1    
would be found ready enough to disown   
their obligations  to the great master1 
or rather1 perhaps1 would be incapable  
of  understanding them4    ,numberless  

fallacies1 as we are often truly told1  
have originated in a  confusion of the  
'copula1' and the 'verb of existence4'  
,would not the  distinction which ,plato
 by the mouth of ,parmenides makes      
between ',one  is one' and ',one has    
being' have saved us from this and many 
similar  confusions8 ,we see again that 
a long period in the history of         
philosophy  was a barren tract1 not     
uncultivated1 but unfruitful1 because   
there  was no inquiry into the relation 
of language and thought1 and the        
metaphysical imagination was incapable  
of supplying the missing link  between  
words and things4 ,the famous dispute   
between ,nominalists and  ,realists     
would never have been heard of1 if1     
instead of transferring the  ,platonic  
,ideas into a crude ,latin phraseology1 
the spirit of ,plato had  been truly    
understood and appreciated4 ,upon the   
term substance at least  two celebrated 
theological controversies appear to     
hinge1 which would  not have existed1 or

 at least not in their present form1 if 
we had  'interrogated' the word         
substance1 as ,plato has the notions of 
,unity and  ,being4 ,these weeds of     
philosophy have struck their roots deep 
into  the soil1 and are always tending  
to reappear1 sometimes in new-fangled   
forms2 while similar words1 such as     
development1 evolution1 law1 and  the   
like1 are constantly put in the place of
 facts1 even by writers who  profess to 
base truth entirely upon fact4 ,in an   
unmetaphysical age there  is probably   
more metaphysics in the common sense    
7i4e4 more a  priori assumption7 than in
 any other1 because there is more       
complete  unconsciousness that we are   
resting on our own ideas1 while we      
please  ourselves with the conviction   
that we are resting on facts4 ,we do    
not consider how much metaphysics are   
required to place us above  metaphysics1
 or how difficult it is to prevent the  
forms of expression  which are ready    
made for our use from outrunning actual 

observation and  experiment4    ,in the 
last century the educated world were    
astonished to find that the  whole      
fabric of their ideas was falling to    
pieces1 because ,hume amused  himself by
 analyzing the word 'cause' into uniform
 sequence4 ,then arose  a philosophy    
which1 equally regardless of the history
 of the mind1  sought to save mankind   
from scepticism by assigning to our     
notions  of 'cause and effect1'         
'substance and accident1' 'whole and    
part1'  a necessary place in human      
thought4 ,without them we could have  no
 experience1 and therefore they were    
supposed to be prior to  experience--to 
be incrusted on the ',i'2 although in   
the phraseology of  ,kant there could be
 no transcendental use of them1 or1 in  
other words1  they were only applicable 
within the range of our knowledge4 ,but 
into  the origin of these ideas1 which  
he obtains partly by an analysis of the 
proposition1 partly by development of   
the 'ego1' he never inquires--they  seem

 to him to have a necessary existence2  
nor does he attempt to  analyse the     
various senses in which the word 'cause'
 or 'substance' may  be employed4       
,the philosophy of ,berkeley could never
 have had any meaning1 even  to himself1
 if he had first analyzed from every    
point of view the  conception of        
'matter4' ,this poor forgotten word     
7which was 'a very good  word' to       
describe the simplest generalization of 
external objects7 is  now superseded in 
the vocabulary of physical philosophers 
by 'force1'  which seems to be accepted 
without any rigid examination of its    
meaning1  as if the general idea of     
'force' in our minds furnished an       
explanation  of the infinite variety of 
forces which exist in the universe4 ,a  
similar  ambiguity occurs in the use of 
the favourite word 'law1' which is      
sometimes regarded as a mere            
abstraction1 and then elevated into a   
real  power or entity1 almost taking the
 place of ,god4 ,theology1 again1 is    

full of undefined terms which have      
distracted the human mind for ages4     
,mankind have reasoned from them1 but   
not to them2 they have drawn out  the   
conclusions without proving the         
premises2 they have asserted the        
premises without examining the terms4   
,the passions of religious parties  have
 been roused to the utmost about words  
of which they could have  given no      
explanation1 and which had really no    
distinct meaning4 ,one sort  of them1   
faith1 grace1 justification1 have been  
the symbols of one  class of disputes2  
as the words substance1 nature1 person1 
of another1  revelation1 inspiration1   
and the like1 of a third4 ,all of them  
have been  the subject of endless       
reasonings and inferences2 but a spell  
has hung  over the minds of theologians 
or philosophers which has prevented them
  from examining the words themselves4  
,either the effort to rise above  and   
beyond their own first ideas was too    
great for them1 or there might1         

perhaps1 have seemed to be an           
irreverence in doing so4 ,about the     
,divine  ,being ,himself1 in whom all   
true theological ideas live and move1   
men  have spoken and reasoned much1 and 
have fancied that they instinctively    
know ,him4 ,but they hardly suspect that
 under the name of ,god even            
,christians have included two characters
 or natures as much opposed as  the good
 and evil principle of the ,persians4   
,to have the true use of words we must  
compare them with things2 in using  them
 we acknowledge that they seldom give a 
perfect representation of  our meaning4 
,in like manner when we interrogate our 
ideas we find that  we are not using    
them always in the sense which we       
supposed4 ,and ,plato1  while he        
criticizes the inconsistency of his own 
doctrine of universals  and draws out   
the endless consequences which flow from
 the assertion  either that ',being is' 
or that ',being is not1' by no means    
intends  to deny the existence of       

universals or the unity under which they
  are comprehended4 ,there is nothing   
further from his thoughts than          
scepticism4 ,but before proceeding he   
must examine the foundations which  he  
and others have been laying2 there is   
nothing true which is not from  some    
point of view untrue1 nothing absolute  
which is not also relative  7compare    
,republic74    ,and so1 in modern times1
 because we are called upon to analyze  
our ideas  and to come to a distinct    
understanding about the meaning of      
words2  because we know that the powers 
of language are very unequal to the     
subtlety of nature or of mind1 we do not
 therefore renounce the use of  them2   
but we replace them in their old        
connexion1 having first tested  their   
meaning and quality1 and having         
corrected the error which is  involved  
in them2 or rather always remembering to
 make allowance for  the adulteration or
 alloy which they contain4 ,we cannot   
call a new  metaphysical world into     

existence any more than we can frame a  
new  universal language2 in thought as  
in speech1 we are dependent on the      
past4 ,we know that the words 'cause'   
and 'effect' are very far from          
representing to us the continuity or the
 complexity of nature or the  different 
modes or degrees in which phenomena are 
connected4 ,yet we  accept them as the  
best expression which we have of the    
correlation of  forces or objects4 ,we  
see that the term 'law' is a mere       
abstraction1  under which laws of matter
 and of mind1 the law of nature and the 
law of  the land are included1 and some 
of these uses of the word are confusing1
  because they introduce into one sphere
 of thought associations  which belong  
to another2 for example1 order or       
sequence is apt to be  confounded with  
external compulsion and the internal    
workings of the  mind with their        
material antecedents4 ,yet none of them 
can be dispensed  with2 we can only be  
on our guard against the error or       

confusion which  arises out of them4    
,thus in the use of the word 'substance'
 we are far  from supposing that there  
is any mysterious substratum apart from 
the  objects which we see1 and we       
acknowledge that the negative notion is 
very likely to become a positive one4   
,still we retain the word as a          
convenient generalization1 though not   
without a double sense1 substance1  and 
essence1 derived from the two-fold      
translation of the ,greek ousia4    ,so 
the human mind makes the reflection that
 ,god is not a person like              
ourselves--is not a cause like the      
material causes in nature1 nor even  an 
intelligent cause like a human          
agent--nor an individual1 for ,he is    
universal2 and that every possible      
conception which we can form of ,him  is
 limited by the human faculties4 ,we    
cannot by any effort of thought  or     
exertion of faith be in and out of our  
own minds at the same instant4  ,how can
 we conceive ,him under the forms of    

time and space1 who is out of  time and 
space8 ,how get rid of such forms and   
see ,him as ,he is8 ,how  can we imagine
 ,his relation to the world or to       
ourselves8 ,innumerable  contradictions 
follow from either of the two           
alternatives1 that ,god is  or that ,he 
is not4 ,yet we are far from saying that
 we know nothing of  ,him1 because all  
that we know is subject to the          
conditions of human  thought4 ,to the   
old belief in ,him we return1 but with  
corrections4 ,he is  a person1 but not  
like ourselves2 a mind1 but not a human 
mind2 a cause1  but not a material      
cause1 nor yet a maker or artificer4    
,the words which  we use are imperfect  
expressions of ,his true nature2 but we 
do not  therefore lose faith in what is 
best and highest in ourselves and in the
  world4    ',a little philosophy takes 
us away from ,god2 a great deal brings  
us back  to ,him4' ,when we begin to    
reflect1 our first thoughts respecting  
,him and  ourselves are apt to be       

sceptical4 ,for we can analyze our      
religious as  well as our other ideas2  
we can trace their history2 we can      
criticize  their perversion2 we see that
 they are relative to the human mind and
  to one another4 ,but when we have     
carried our criticism to the furthest   
point1 they still remain1 a necessity of
 our moral nature1 better known  and    
understood by us1 and less liable to be 
shaken1 because we are more  aware of   
their necessary imperfection4 ,they come
 to us with 'better  opinion1 better    
confirmation1' not merely as the        
inspirations either of  ourselves or of 
another1 but deeply rooted in history   
and in the human  mind4                 
,,parmenides      ,,persons ,,of ,,the  
,,dialogue3 ,cephalus1 ,adeimantus1     
,glaucon1 ,antiphon1  ,pythodorus1      
,socrates1 ,zeno1 ,parmenides1          
,aristoteles4    ,cephalus rehearses a  
dialogue which is supposed to have been 
narrated in  his presence by ,antiphon1 
the half-brother of ,adeimantus and     

,glaucon1 to  certain ,clazomenians4    
,we had come from our home at           
,clazomenae to ,athens1 and met         
,adeimantus  and ,glaucon in the ,agora4
 ,welcome1 ,cephalus1 said ,adeimantus1 
taking me  by the hand2 is there        
anything which we can do for you in     
,athens8    ,yes2 that is why ,i am     
here2 ,i wish to ask a favour of you4   
,what may that be8 he said4    ,i want  
you to tell me the name of your half    
brother1 which ,i have  forgotten2 he   
was a mere child when ,i last came      
hither from ,clazomenae1  but that was a
 long time ago2 his father's name1 if ,i
 remember rightly1  was ,pyrilampes8    
,yes1 he said1 and the name of our      
brother1 ,antiphon2 but why do you ask8 
,let me introduce some countrymen of    
mine1 ,i said2 they are lovers of       
philosophy1 and have heard that         
,antiphon was intimate with a certain   
,pythodorus1 a friend of ,zeno1 and     
remembers a conversation which took     
place between ,socrates1 ,zeno1 and     

,parmenides many years ago1 ,pythodorus 
having often recited it to him4         
,quite true4    ,and could we hear it8  
,i asked4    ,nothing easier1 he        
replied2 when he was a youth he made a  
careful study  of the piece2 at present 
his thoughts run in another direction2  
like his  grandfather ,antiphon he is   
devoted to horses4 ,but1 if that is what
 you  want1 let us go and look for him2 
he dwells at ,melita1 which is quite    
near1 and he has only just left us to go
 home4    ,accordingly we went to look  
for him2 he was at home1 and in the act 
of giving a bridle to a smith to be     
fitted4 ,when he had done with the      
smith1 his brothers told him the purpose
 of our visit2 and he saluted me  as an 
acquaintance whom he remembered from my 
former visit1 and we  asked him to      
repeat the dialogue4 ,at first he was   
not very willing1 and  complained of the
 trouble1 but at length he consented4   
,he told us that  ,pythodorus had       
described to him the appearance of      

,parmenides and ,zeno2  they came to    
,athens1 as he said1 at the great       
,panathenaea2 the former  was1 at the   
time of his visit1 about #fe years old1 
very white with age1  but well favoured4
 ,zeno was nearly #dj years of age1 tall
 and fair to  look upon2 in the days of 
his youth he was reported to have been  
beloved by ,parmenides4 ,he said that   
they lodged with ,pythodorus in the     
,ceramicus1 outside the wall1 whither   
,socrates1 then a very young man1  came 
to see them1 and many others with him2  
they wanted to hear the  writings of    
,zeno1 which had been brought to ,athens
 for the first time  on the occasion of 
their visit4 ,these ,zeno himself read  
to them in the  absence of ,parmenides1 
and had very nearly finished when       
,pythodorus  entered1 and with him      
,parmenides and ,aristoteles who was    
afterwards  one of the ,thirty1 and     
heard the little that remained of the   
dialogue4  ,pythodorus had heard ,zeno  
repeat them before4    ,when the        

recitation was completed1 ,socrates     
requested that the first  thesis of the 
first argument might be read over again1
 and this having  been done1 he said3   
,what is your meaning1 ,zeno8 ,do you   
maintain that  if being is many1 it must
 be both like and unlike1 and that this 
is  impossible1 for neither can the like
 be unlike1 nor the unlike like--is     
that your position8    ,just so1 said   
,zeno4    ,and if the unlike cannot be  
like1 or the like unlike1 then according
 to  you1 being could not be many2 for  
this would involve an impossibility4    
,in all that you say have you any other 
purpose except to disprove the  being of
 the many8 and is not each division of  
your treatise intended to  furnish a    
separate proof of this1 there being in  
all as many proofs of  the not-being of 
the many as you have composed arguments8
 ,is that your  meaning1 or have ,i     
misunderstood you8    ,no1 said ,zeno2  
you have correctly understood my general
 purpose4    ,i see1 ,parmenides1 said  

,socrates1 that ,zeno would like to be  
not only  one with you in friendship but
 your second self in his writings too2  
he  puts what you say in another way1   
and would fain make believe that he is  
telling us something which is new4 ,for 
you1 in your poems1 say ,the ,all  is   
one1 and of this you adduce excellent   
proofs2 and he on the other  hand says  
,there is no many2 and on behalf of this
 he offers overwhelming  evidence4 ,you 
affirm unity1 he denies plurality4 ,and 
so you deceive the  world into believing
 that you are saying different things   
when really  you are saying much the    
same4 ,this is a strain of art beyond   
the reach  of most of us4    ,yes1      
,socrates1 said ,zeno4 ,but although you
 are as keen as a ,spartan  hound in    
pursuing the track1 you do not fully    
apprehend the true motive  of the       
composition1 which is not really such an
 artificial work as you  imagine2 for   
what you speak of was an accident2 there
 was no pretence of  a great purpose2   

nor any serious intention of deceiving  
the world4  ,the truth is1 that these   
writings of mine were meant to protect  
the  arguments of ,parmenides against   
those who make fun of him and seek to   
show the many ridiculous and            
contradictory results which they suppose
  to follow from the affirmation of the 
one4 ,my answer is addressed to the     
partisans of the many1 whose attack ,i  
return with interest by retorting  upon 
them that their hypothesis of the being 
of many1 if carried out1  appears to be 
still more ridiculous than the          
hypothesis of the being  of one4 ,zeal  
for my master led me to write the book  
in the days of  my youth1 but some one  
stole the copy2 and therefore ,i had no 
choice  whether it should be published  
or not2 the motive1 however1 of writing1
  was not the ambition of an elder man1 
but the pugnacity of a young one4  ,this
 you do not seem to see1 ,socrates2     
though in other respects1 as ,i  was    
saying1 your notion is a very just one4 

,i understand1 said ,socrates1 and quite
 accept your account4 ,but tell  me1    
,zeno1 do you not further think that    
there is an idea of likeness  in itself1
 and another idea of unlikeness1 which  
is the opposite of  likeness1 and that  
in these two1 you and ,i and all other  
things to  which we apply the term many1
 participate--things which participate  
in likeness become in that degree and   
manner like2 and so far as they         
participate in unlikeness become in that
 degree unlike1 or both like and  unlike
 in the degree in which they participate
 in both8 ,and may not all  things      
partake of both opposites1 and be both  
like and unlike1 by reason  of this     
participation8--,where is the wonder8   
,now if a person could prove  the       
absolute like to become unlike1 or the  
absolute unlike to become  like1 that1  
in my opinion1 would indeed be a wonder2
 but there is  nothing extraordinary1   
,zeno1 in showing that the things which 
only  partake of likeness and unlikeness

 experience both4 ,nor1 again1 if a     
person were to show that all is one by  
partaking of one1 and at the same  time 
many by partaking of many1 would that be
 very astonishing4 ,but if  he were to  
show me that the absolute one was many1 
or the absolute  many one1 ,i should be 
truly amazed4 ,and so of all the rest3  
,i should  be surprised to hear that the
 natures or ideas themselves had these  
opposite qualities2 but not if a person 
wanted to prove of me that ,i was  many 
and also one4 ,when he wanted to show   
that ,i was many he would say  that ,i  
have a right and a left side1 and a     
front and a back1 and an  upper and a   
lower half1 for ,i cannot deny that ,i  
partake of multitude2  when1 on the     
other hand1 he wants to prove that ,i am
 one1 he will say1  that we who are here
 assembled are seven1 and that ,i am one
 and partake  of the one4 ,in both      
instances he proves his case4 ,so again1
 if a person  shows that such things as 
wood1 stones1 and the like1 being many  

are  also one1 we admit that he shows   
the coexistence of the one and many1    
but he does not show that the many are  
one or the one many2 he  is uttering not
 a paradox but a truism4 ,if however1 as
 ,i just now  suggested1 some one were  
to abstract simple notions of like1     
unlike1  one1 many1 rest1 motion1 and   
similar ideas1 and then to show that    
these  admit of admixture and separation
 in themselves1 ,i should be very much  
astonished4 ,this part of the argument  
appears to be treated by you1  ,zeno1 in
 a very spirited manner2 but1 as ,i was 
saying1 ,i should be  far more amazed if
 any one found in the ideas themselves  
which are  apprehended by reason1 the   
same puzzle and entanglement which you  
have  shown to exist in visible objects4
    ,while ,socrates was speaking1      
,pythodorus thought that ,parmenides and
 ,zeno  were not altogether pleased at  
the successive steps of the argument2   
but  still they gave the closest        
attention1 and often looked at one      

another1  and smiled as if in admiration
 of him4 ,when he had finished1         
,parmenides  expressed their feelings in
 the following words3--    ,socrates1 he
 said1 ,i admire the bent of your mind  
towards philosophy2  tell me now1 was   
this your own distinction between ideas 
in themselves  and the things which     
partake of them8 and do you think that  
there is an  idea of likeness apart from
 the likeness which we possess1 and of  
the  one and many1 and of the other     
things which ,zeno mentioned8    ,i     
think that there are such ideas1 said   
,socrates4    ,parmenides proceeded3    
,and would you also make absolute ideas 
of the just  and the beautiful and the  
good1 and of all that class8    ,yes1 he
 said1 ,i should4    ,and would you make
 an idea of man apart from us and from  
all other human  creatures1 or of fire  
and water8    ,i am often undecided1    
,parmenides1 as to whether ,i ought to  
include them  or not4    ,and would you 
feel equally undecided1 ,socrates1 about

 things of which  the mention may       
provoke a smile8--,i mean such things as
 hair1 mud1 dirt1  or anything else     
which is vile and paltry2 would you     
suppose that each  of these has an idea 
distinct from the actual objects with   
which we come  into contact1 or not8    
,certainly not1 said ,socrates2 visible 
things like these are such as  they     
appear to us1 and ,i am afraid that     
there would be an absurdity in  assuming
 any idea of them1 although ,i sometimes
 get disturbed1 and begin  to think that
 there is nothing without an idea2 but  
then again1 when ,i  have taken up this 
position1 ,i run away1 because ,i am    
afraid that ,i may  fall into a         
bottomless pit of nonsense1 and perish2 
and so ,i return to  the ideas of which 
,i was just now speaking1 and occupy    
myself with them4    ,yes1 ,socrates1   
said ,parmenides2 that is because you   
are still young2 the  time will come1 if
 ,i am not mistaken1 when philosophy    
will have a firmer  grasp of you1 and   

then you will not despise even the      
meanest things2 at  your age1 you are   
too much disposed to regard the opinions
 of men4 ,but  ,i should like to know   
whether you mean that there are certain 
ideas of  which all other things        
partake1 and from which they derive     
their names2  that similars1 for        
example1 become similar1 because they   
partake of  similarity2 and great things
 become great1 because they partake of  
greatness2 and that just and beautiful  
things become just and beautiful1       
because they partake of justice and     
beauty8    ,yes1 certainly1 said        
,socrates that is my meaning4    ,then  
each individual partakes either of the  
whole of the idea or else of  a part of 
the idea8 ,can there be any other mode  
of participation8    ,there cannot be1  
he said4    ,then do you think that the 
whole idea is one1 and yet1 being one1  
is in  each one of the many8    ,why    
not1 ,parmenides8 said ,socrates4       
,because one and the same thing will    

exist as a whole at the same time  in   
many separate individuals1 and will     
therefore be in a state of  separation  
from itself4    ,nay1 but the idea may  
be like the day which is one and the    
same in many  places at once1 and yet   
continuous with itself2 in this way each
 idea  may be one and the same in all at
 the same time4    ,i like your way1    
,socrates1 of making one in many places 
at once4 ,you  mean to say1 that if ,i  
were to spread out a sail and cover a   
number of  men1 there would be one whole
 including many--is not that your       
meaning8    ,i think so4    ,and would  
you say that the whole sail includes    
each man1 or a part of it  only1 and    
different parts different men8    ,the  
latter4    ,then1 ,socrates1 the ideas  
themselves will be divisible1 and things
 which  participate in them will have a 
part of them only and not the whole idea
  existing in each of them8    ,that    
seems to follow4    ,then would you like
 to say1 ,socrates1 that the one idea is

 really  divisible and yet remains one8 
,certainly not1 he said4    ,suppose    
that you divide absolute greatness1 and 
that of the many great  things1 each one
 is great in virtue of a portion of     
greatness less than  absolute           
greatness--is that conceivable8    ,no4 
,or will each equal thing1 if possessing
 some small portion of equality  less   
than absolute equality1 be equal to some
 other thing by virtue of  that portion 
only8    ,impossible4    ,or suppose one
 of us to have a portion of smallness2  
this is but a part  of the small1 and   
therefore the absolutely small is       
greater2 if the  absolutely small be    
greater1 that to which the part of the  
small is  added will be smaller and not 
greater than before4    ,how absurd6    
,then in what way1 ,socrates1 will all  
things participate in the ideas1 if     
they are unable to participate in them  
either as parts or wholes8    ,indeed1  
he said1 you have asked a question which
 is not easily answered4    ,well1 said 

,parmenides1 and what do you say of     
another question8    ,what question8    
,i imagine that the way in which you are
 led to assume one idea of each  kind is
 as follows3--,you see a number of great
 objects1 and when you  look at them    
there seems to you to be one and the    
same idea 7or nature7  in them all2     
hence you conceive of greatness as one4 
,very true1 said ,socrates4    ,and if  
you go on and allow your mind in like   
manner to embrace in one  view the idea 
of greatness and of great things which  
are not the idea1  and to compare them1 
will not another greatness arise1 which 
will appear  to be the source of all    
these8    ,it would seem so4    ,then   
another idea of greatness now comes into
 view over and above  absolute          
greatness1 and the individuals which    
partake of it2 and then  another1 over  
and above all these1 by virtue of which 
they will all  be great1 and so each    
idea instead of being one will be       
infinitely  multiplied4    ,but may not 

the ideas1 asked ,socrates1 be thoughts 
only1 and have no  proper existence     
except in our minds1 ,parmenides8 ,for  
in that case each  idea may still be    
one1 and not experience this infinite   
multiplication4    ,and can there be    
individual thoughts which are thoughts  
of nothing8    ,impossible1 he said4    
,the thought must be of something8      
,yes4    ,of something which is or which
 is not8    ,of something which is4     
,must it not be of a single something1  
which the thought recognizes as         
attaching to all1 being a single form or
 nature8    ,yes4    ,and will not the  
something which is apprehended as one   
and the same in  all1 be an idea8       
,from that1 again1 there is no escape4  
,then1 said ,parmenides1 if you say that
 everything else participates  in the   
ideas1 must you not say either that     
everything is made up of  thoughts1 and 
that all things think2 or that they are 
thoughts but have  no thought8    ,the  
latter view1 ,parmenides1 is no more    

rational than the previous one4  ,in my 
opinion1 the ideas are1 as it were1     
patterns fixed in nature1 and  other    
things are like them1 and resemblances  
of them--what is meant by  the          
participation of other things in the    
ideas1 is really assimilation  to them4 
,but if1 said he1 the individual is like
 the idea1 must not the idea also  be   
like the individual1 in so far as the   
individual is a resemblance of  the     
idea8 ,that which is like1 cannot be    
conceived of as other than the  like of 
like4    ,impossible4    ,and when two  
things are alike1 must they not partake 
of the same idea8    ,they must4    ,and
 will not that of which the two partake1
 and which makes them alike1  be the    
idea itself8    ,certainly4    ,then the
 idea cannot be like the individual1 or 
the individual like the  idea2 for if   
they are alike1 some further idea of    
likeness will always  be coming to      
light1 and if that be like anything     
else1 another2 and new  ideas will be   

always arising1 if the idea resembles   
that which partakes  of it8    ,quite   
true4    ,the theory1 then1 that other  
things participate in the ideas by      
resemblance1 has to be given up1 and    
some other mode of participation        
devised8    ,it would seem so4    ,do   
you see then1 ,socrates1 how great is   
the difficulty of affirming the  ideas  
to be absolute8    ,yes1 indeed4        
,and1 further1 let me say that as yet   
you only understand a small part  of the
 difficulty which is involved if you    
make of each thing a single  idea1      
parting it off from other things4       
,what difficulty8 he said4    ,there are
 many1 but the greatest of all is       
this3--,if an opponent argues  that     
these ideas1 being such as we say they  
ought to be1 must remain  unknown1 no   
one can prove to him that he is wrong1  
unless he who denies  their existence be
 a man of great ability and knowledge1  
and is  willing to follow a long and    
laborious demonstration2 he will remain 

unconvinced1 and still insist that they 
cannot be known4    ,what do you mean1  
,parmenides8 said ,socrates4    ,in the 
first place1 ,i think1 ,socrates1 that  
you1 or any one who  maintains the      
existence of absolute essences1 will    
admit that they  cannot exist in us4    
,no1 said ,socrates2 for then they would
 be no longer absolute4    ,true1 he    
said2 and therefore when ideas are what 
they are in relation to  one another1   
their essence is determined by a        
relation among themselves1  and has     
nothing to do with the resemblances1 or 
whatever they are to be  termed1 which  
are in our sphere1 and from which we    
receive this or that  name when we      
partake of them4 ,and the things which  
are within our sphere  and have the same
 names with them1 are likewise only     
relative to one  another1 and not to the
 ideas which have the same names with   
them1 but  belong to themselves and not 
to them4    ,what do you mean8 said     
,socrates4    ,i may illustrate my      

meaning in this way1 said               
,parmenides3--,a master has  a slave2   
now there is nothing absolute in the    
relation between them1  which is simply 
a relation of one man to another4 ,but  
there is also an  idea of mastership in 
the abstract1 which is relative to the  
idea of  slavery in the abstract4 ,these
 natures have nothing to do with us1    
nor we with them2 they are concerned    
with themselves only1 and we with       
ourselves4 ,do you see my meaning8      
,yes1 said ,socrates1 ,i quite see your 
meaning4    ,and will not knowledge--,i 
mean absolute knowledge--answer to      
absolute  truth8    ,certainly4    ,and 
each kind of absolute knowledge will    
answer to each kind of absolute  being8 
,yes4    ,but the knowledge which we    
have1 will answer to the truth which we 
have2  and again1 each kind of knowledge
 which we have1 will be a knowledge of  
each kind of being which we have8       
,certainly4    ,but the ideas           
themselves1 as you admit1 we have not1  

and cannot have8    ,no1 we cannot4     
,and the absolute natures or kinds are  
known severally by the absolute  idea of
 knowledge8    ,yes4    ,and we have not
 got the idea of knowledge8    ,no4     
,then none of the ideas are known to us1
 because we have no share in  absolute  
knowledge8    ,i suppose not4    ,then  
the nature of the beautiful in itself1  
and of the good in itself1  and all     
other ideas which we suppose to exist   
absolutely1 are unknown to  us8    ,it  
would seem so4    ,i think that there is
 a stranger consequence still4    ,what 
is it8    ,would you1 or would you not  
say1 that absolute knowledge1 if there  
is  such a thing1 must be a far more    
exact knowledge than our knowledge2 and 
the same of beauty and of the rest8     
,yes4    ,and if there be such a thing  
as participation in absolute knowledge1 
no  one is more likely than ,god to have
 this most exact knowledge8             
,certainly4    ,but then1 will ,god1    
having absolute knowledge1 have a       

knowledge of human  things8    ,why not8
    ,because1 ,socrates1 said           
,parmenides1 we have admitted that the  
ideas are  not valid in relation to     
human things2 nor human things in       
relation to  them2 the relations of     
either are limited to their respective  
spheres4    ,yes1 that has been         
admitted4    ,and if ,god has this      
perfect authority1 and perfect          
knowledge1 his  authority cannot rule   
us1 nor his knowledge know us1 or any   
human thing2  just as our authority does
 not extend to the gods1 nor our        
knowledge  know anything which is       
divine1 so by parity of reason they1    
being gods1  are not our masters1       
neither do they know the things of men4 
,yet1 surely1 said ,socrates1 to deprive
 ,god of knowledge is monstrous4        
,these1 ,socrates1 said ,parmenides1 are
 a few1 and only a few of the           
difficulties in which we are involved if
 ideas really are and we  determine each
 one of them to be an absolute unity4   

,he who hears what  may be said against 
them will deny the very existence of    
them--and even  if they do exist1 he    
will say that they must of necessity be 
unknown  to man2 and he will seem to    
have reason on his side1 and as we were 
remarking just now1 will be very        
difficult to convince2 a man must  be   
gifted with very considerable ability   
before he can learn that  everything has
 a class and an absolute essence2 and   
still more  remarkable will he be who   
discovers all these things for himself1 
and  having thoroughly investigated them
 is able to teach them to others4    ,i 
agree with you1 ,parmenides1 said       
,socrates2 and what you say is very     
much to my mind4    ,and yet1 ,socrates1
 said ,parmenides1 if a man1 fixing his 
attention on  these and the like        
difficulties1 does away with ideas of   
things and will  not admit that every   
individual thing has its own determinate
 idea which  is always one and the same1
 he will have nothing on which his mind 

can  rest2 and so he will utterly       
destroy the power of reasoning1 as you  
seem  to me to have particularly noted4 
,very true1 he said4    ,but1 then1 what
 is to become of philosophy8 ,whither   
shall we turn1 if  the ideas are        
unknown8    ,i certainly do not see my  
way at present4    ,yes1 said           
,parmenides2 and ,i think that this     
arises1 ,socrates1 out of  your         
attempting to define the beautiful1 the 
just1 the good1 and the  ideas          
generally1 without sufficient previous  
training4 ,i noticed your  deficiency1  
when ,i heard you talking here with your
 friend ,aristoteles1  the day before   
yesterday4 ,the impulse that carries you
 towards  philosophy is assuredly noble 
and divine2 but there is an art which is
  called by the vulgar idle talking1 and
 which is often imagined to be  useless2
 in that you must train and exercise    
yourself1 now that you are  young1 or   
truth will elude your grasp4    ,and    
what is the nature of this exercise1    

,parmenides1 which you would  recommend8
    ,that which you heard ,zeno         
practising2 at the same time1 ,i give   
you  credit for saying to him that you  
did not care to examine the perplexity  
in reference to visible things1 or to   
consider the question that way2  but    
only in reference to objects of thought1
 and to what may be called  ideas4      
,why1 yes1 he said1 there appears to me 
to be no difficulty in showing by  this 
method that visible things are like and 
unlike and may experience  anything4    
,quite true1 said ,parmenides2 but ,i   
think that you should go a step         
further1 and consider not only the      
consequences which flow from a  given   
hypothesis1 but also the consequences   
which flow from denying the  hypothesis2
 and that will be still better training 
for you4    ,what do you mean8 he said4 
,i mean1 for example1 that in the case  
of this very hypothesis of  ,zeno's     
about the many1 you should inquire not  
only what will be the  consequences to  

the many in relation to themselves and  
to the one1 and  to the one in relation 
to itself and the many1 on the          
hypothesis of the  being of the many1   
but also what will be the consequences  
to the one  and the many in their       
relation to themselves and to each      
other1 on the  opposite hypothesis4 ,or1
 again1 if likeness is or is not1 what  
will  be the consequences in either of  
these cases to the subjects of the      
hypothesis1 and to other things1 in     
relation both to themselves and to  one 
another1 and so of unlikeness2 and the  
same holds good of motion and  rest1 of 
generation and destruction1 and even of 
being and not-being4  ,in a word1 when  
you suppose anything to be or not to be1
 or to be in any  way affected1 you must
 look at the consequences in relation to
 the  thing itself1 and to any other    
things which you choose1--to each of    
them  singly1 to more than one1 and to  
all2 and so of other things1 you must   
look at them in relation to themselves  

and to anything else which you  suppose 
either to be or not to be1 if you would 
train yourself perfectly  and see the   
real truth4    ,that1 ,parmenides1 is a 
tremendous business of which you speak1 
and ,i do  not quite understand you2    
will you take some hypothesis and go    
through  the steps8--then ,i shall      
apprehend you better4    ,that1         
,socrates1 is a serious task to impose  
on a man of my years4    ,then will you1
 ,zeno8 said ,socrates4    ,zeno        
answered with a smile3--,let us make our
 petition to ,parmenides  himself1 who  
is quite right in saying that you are   
hardly aware of the  extent of the task 
which you are imposing on him2 and if   
there were more  of us ,i should not ask
 him1 for these are not subjects which  
any one1  especially at his age1 can    
well speak of before a large audience2  
most  people are not aware that this    
roundabout progress through all things  
is the only way in which the mind can   
attain truth and wisdom4 ,and           

therefore1 ,parmenides1 ,i join in the  
request of ,socrates1 that ,i may  hear 
the process again which ,i have not     
heard for a long time4    ,when ,zeno   
had thus spoken1 ,pythodorus1 according 
to ,antiphon's report  of him1 said1    
that he himself and ,aristoteles and the
 whole company  entreated ,parmenides to
 give an example of the process4 ,i     
cannot refuse1  said ,parmenides2 and   
yet ,i feel rather like ,ibycus1 who1   
when in his  old age1 against his will1 
he fell in love1 compared himself to an 
old  racehorse1 who was about to run in 
a chariot race1 shaking with fear at    
the course he knew so well--this was his
 simile of himself4 ,and ,i also        
experience a trembling when ,i remember 
through what an ocean of words  ,i have 
to wade at my time of life4 ,but ,i must
 indulge you1 as ,zeno says  that ,i    
ought1 and we are alone4 ,where shall ,i
 begin8 ,and what shall be  our first   
hypothesis1 if ,i am to attempt this    
laborious pastime8 ,shall ,i  begin with

 myself1 and take my own hypothesis the 
one8 and consider the  consequences     
which follow on the supposition either  
of the being or of  the not-being of    
one8    ,by all means1 said ,zeno4      
,and who will answer me8 he said4 ,shall
 ,i propose the youngest8 ,he will  not 
make difficulties and will be the most  
likely to say what he thinks2  and his  
answers will give me time to breathe4   
,i am the one whom you mean1            
,parmenides1 said ,aristoteles2 for ,i  
am the  youngest and at your service4   
,ask1 and ,i will answer4    ,parmenides
 proceeded3 #a4;a4 ,if one is1 he said1 
the one cannot be many8    ,impossible4 
,then the one cannot have parts1 and    
cannot be a whole8    ,why not8         
,because every part is part of a whole2 
is it not8    ,yes4    ,and what is a   
whole8 would not that of which no part  
is wanting be a  whole8    ,certainly4  
,then1 in either case1 the one would be 
made up of parts2 both as being a       
whole1 and also as having parts8    ,to 

be sure4    ,and in either case1 the one
 would be many1 and not one8    ,true4  
,but1 surely1 it ought to be one and not
 many8    ,it ought4    ,then1 if the   
one is to remain one1 it will not be a  
whole1 and will not  have parts8    ,no4
    ,but if it has no parts1 it will    
have neither beginning1 middle1 nor end2
  for these would of course be parts of 
it4    ,right4    ,but then1 again1 a   
beginning and an end are the limits of  
everything8    ,certainly4    ,then the 
one1 having neither beginning nor end1  
is unlimited8    ,yes1 unlimited4       
,and therefore formless2 for it cannot  
partake either of round or  straight4   
,but why8    ,why1 because the round is 
that of which all the extreme points are
  equidistant from the centre8    ,yes4 
,and the straight is that of which the  
centre intercepts the view of the       
extremes8    ,true4    ,then the one    
would have parts and would be many1 if  
it partook either of  a straight or of a
 circular form8    ,assuredly4    ,but  

having no parts1 it will be neither     
straight nor round8    ,right4    ,and1 
being of such a nature1 it cannot be in 
any place1 for it cannot be  either in  
another or in itself4    ,how so8       
,because if it were in another1 it would
 be encircled by that in which  it was1 
and would touch it at many places and   
with many parts2 but that  which is one 
and indivisible1 and does not partake of
 a circular nature1  cannot be touched  
all round in many places4    ,certainly 
not4    ,but if1 on the other hand1 one 
were in itself1 it would also be        
contained by nothing else but itself2   
that is to say1 if it were really  in   
itself2 for nothing can be in anything  
which does not contain it4              
,impossible4    ,but then1 that which   
contains must be other than that which  
is  contained8 for the same whole cannot
 do and suffer both at once2 and if  so1
 one will be no longer one1 but two8    
,true4    ,then one cannot be anywhere1 
either in itself or in another8    ,no4 

,further consider1 whether that which is
 of such a nature can have either  rest 
or motion4    ,why not8    ,why1 because
 the one1 if it were moved1 would be    
either moved in place  or changed in    
nature2 for these are the only kinds of 
motion4    ,yes4    ,and the one1 when  
it changes and ceases to be itself1     
cannot be any  longer one4    ,it       
cannot4    ,it cannot therefore         
experience the sort of motion which is  
change of  nature8    ,clearly not4     
,then can the motion of the one be in   
place8    ,perhaps4    ,but if the one  
moved in place1 must it not either move 
round and round  in the same place1 or  
from one place to another8    ,it must4 
,and that which moves in a circle must  
rest upon a centre2 and that which  goes
 round upon a centre must have parts    
which are different from the  centre2   
but that which has no centre and no     
parts cannot possibly be  carried round 
upon a centre8    ,impossible4    ,but  
perhaps the motion of the one consists  

in change of place8    ,perhaps so1 if  
it moves at all4    ,and have we not    
already shown that it cannot be in      
anything8    ,yes4    ,then its coming  
into being in anything is still more    
impossible2 is it  not8    ,i do not see
 why4    ,why1 because anything which   
comes into being in anything1 can       
neither  as yet be in that other thing  
while still coming into being1 nor be   
altogether out of it1 if already coming 
into being in it4    ,certainly not4    
,and therefore whatever comes into being
 in another must have parts1 and  then  
one part may be in1 and another part out
 of that other2 but that  which has no  
parts can never be at one and the same  
time neither wholly  within nor wholly  
without anything4    ,true4    ,and is  
there not a still greater impossibility 
in that which has no  parts1 and is not 
a whole1 coming into being anywhere1    
since it cannot  come into being either 
as a part or as a whole8    ,clearly4   
,then it does not change place by       

revolving in the same spot1 nor by      
going somewhere and coming into being in
 something2 nor again1 by change  in    
itself8    ,very true4    ,then in      
respect of any kind of motion the one is
 immoveable8    ,immoveable4    ,but    
neither can the one be in anything1 as  
we affirm8    ,yes1 we said so4    ,then
 it is never in the same8    ,why not8  
,because if it were in the same it would
 be in something4    ,certainly4    ,and
 we said that it could not be in itself1
 and could not be in other8    ,true4   
,then one is never in the same place8   
,it would seem not4    ,but that which  
is never in the same place is never     
quiet or at rest8    ,never4    ,one    
then1 as would seem1 is neither at rest 
nor in motion8    ,it certainly appears 
so4    ,neither will it be the same with
 itself or other2 nor again1 other than 
itself or other4    ,how is that8    ,if
 other than itself it would be other    
than one1 and would not be one4         
,true4    ,and if the same with other1  

it would be that other1 and not itself2 
so  that upon this supposition too1 it  
would not have the nature of one1 but   
would be other than one8    ,it would4  
,then it will not be the same with      
other1 or other than itself8    ,it will
 not4    ,neither will it be other than 
other1 while it remains one2 for not    
one1  but only other1 can be other than 
other1 and nothing else4    ,true4      
,then not by virtue of being one will it
 be other8    ,certainly not4    ,but if
 not by virtue of being one1 not by     
virtue of itself2 and if not  by virtue 
of itself1 not itself1 and itself not   
being other at all1 will  not be other  
than anything8    ,right4    ,neither   
will one be the same with itself4       
,how not8    ,surely the nature of the  
one is not the nature of the same4      
,why not8    ,it is not when anything   
becomes the same with anything that it  
becomes  one4    ,what of that8         
,anything which becomes the same with   
the many1 necessarily becomes many  and 

not one4    ,true4    ,but1 if there    
were no difference between the one and  
the same1 when a  thing became the same1
 it would always become one2 and when it
 became  one1 the same8    ,certainly4  
,and1 therefore1 if one be the same with
 itself1 it is not one with  itself1 and
 will therefore be one and also not one4
    ,surely that is impossible4    ,and 
therefore the one can neither be other  
than other1 nor the same with  itself4  
,impossible4    ,and thus the one can   
neither be the same1 nor other1 either  
in relation  to itself or other8    ,no4
    ,neither will the one be like       
anything or unlike itself or other4     
,why not8    ,because likeness is       
sameness of affections4    ,yes4    ,and
 sameness has been shown to be of a     
nature distinct from oneness8    ,that  
has been shown4    ,but if the one had  
any other affection than that of being  
one1 it would  be affected in such a way
 as to be more than one2 which is       
impossible4    ,true4    ,then the one  

can never be so affected as to be the   
same either with  another or with       
itself8    ,clearly not4    ,then it    
cannot be like another1 or like itself8 
,no4    ,nor can it be affected so as to
 be other1 for then it would be affected
  in such a way as to be more than one4 
,it would4    ,that which is affected   
otherwise than itself or another1 will  
be unlike  itself or another1 for       
sameness of affections is likeness4     
,true4    ,but the one1 as appears1     
never being affected otherwise1 is never
 unlike  itself or other8    ,never4    
,then the one will never be either like 
or unlike itself or other8    ,plainly  
not4    ,again1 being of this nature1 it
 can neither be equal nor unequal either
  to itself or to other4    ,how is     
that8    ,why1 because the one if equal 
must be of the same measures as that to 
which it is equal4    ,true4    ,and if 
greater or less than things which are   
commensurable with it1 the  one will    
have more measures than that which is   

less1 and fewer than that  which is     
greater8    ,yes4    ,and so of things  
which are not commensurate with it1 the 
one will have  greater measures than    
that which is less and smaller than that
 which is  greater4    ,certainly4      
,but how can that which does not partake
 of sameness1 have either the  same     
measures or have anything else the same8
    ,impossible4    ,and not having the 
same measures1 the one cannot be equal  
either with  itself or with another8    
,it appears so4    ,but again1 whether  
it have fewer or more measures1 it will 
have as many  parts as it has measures2 
and thus again the one will be no longer
 one  but will have as many parts as    
measures4    ,right4    ,and if it were 
of one measure1 it would be equal to    
that measure2 yet it  has been shown to 
be incapable of equality4    ,it has4   
,then it will neither partake of one    
measure1 nor of many1 nor of few1  nor  
of the same at all1 nor be equal to     
itself or another2 nor be  greater or   

less than itself1 or other8             
,certainly4    ,well1 and do we suppose 
that one can be older1 or younger than  
anything1  or of the same age with it8  
,why not8    ,why1 because that which is
 of the same age with itself or other1  
must  partake of equality or likeness of
 time2 and we said that the one did  not
 partake either of equality or of       
likeness8    ,we did say so4    ,and we 
also said1 that it did not partake of   
inequality or unlikeness4    ,very true4
    ,how then can one1 being of this    
nature1 be either older or younger than 
anything1 or have the same age with it8 
,in no way4    ,then one cannot be older
 or younger1 or of the same age1 either 
with  itself or with another8           
,clearly not4    ,then the one1 being of
 this nature1 cannot be in time at all2 
for must  not that which is in time1 be 
always growing older than itself8       
,certainly4    ,and that which is older1
 must always be older than something    
which is  younger8    ,true4    ,then1  

that which becomes older than itself1   
also becomes at the same  time younger  
than itself1 if it is to have something 
to become older  than4    ,what do you  
mean8    ,i mean this3--,a thing does   
not need to become different from       
another  thing which is already         
different2 it ,,is different1 and if its
 different  has become1 it has become   
different2 if its different will be1 it 
will  be different2 but of that which is
 becoming different1 there cannot  have 
been1 or be about to be1 or yet be1 a   
different--the only different  possible 
is one which is becoming4    ,that is   
inevitable4    ,but1 surely1 the elder  
is a difference relative to the younger1
 and to  nothing else4    ,true4        
,then that which becomes older than     
itself must also1 at the same time1     
become younger than itself8    ,yes4    
,but again1 it is true that it cannot   
become for a longer or for a  shorter   
time than itself1 but it must become1   
and be1 and have become1  and be about  

to be1 for the same time with itself8   
,that again is inevitable4    ,then     
things which are in time1 and partake of
 time1 must in every case1  ,i suppose1 
be of the same age with themselves2 and 
must also become at  once older and     
younger than themselves8    ,yes4       
,but the one did not partake of those   
affections8    ,not at all4    ,then it 
does not partake of time1 and is not in 
any time8    ,so the argument shows4    
,well1 but do not the expressions 'was1'
 and 'has become1' and 'was  becoming1' 
signify a participation of past time8   
,certainly4    ,and do not 'will be1'   
'will become1' 'will have become1'      
signify a  participation of future time8
    ,yes4    ,and 'is1' or 'becomes1'   
signifies a participation of present    
time8    ,certainly4    ,and if the one 
is absolutely without participation in  
time1 it never  had become1 or was      
becoming1 or was at any time1 or is now 
become or  is becoming1 or is1 or will  
become1 or will have become1 or will be1

  hereafter4    ,most true4    ,but are 
there any modes of partaking of being   
other than these8    ,there are none4   
,then the one cannot possibly partake of
 being8    ,that is the inference4      
,then the one is not at all8    ,clearly
 not4    ,then the one does not exist in
 such way as to be one2 for if it were  
and partook of being1 it would already  
be2 but if the argument is to be        
trusted1 the one neither is nor is one8 
,true4    ,but that which is not admits 
of no attribute or relation8    ,of     
course not4    ,then there is no name1  
nor expression1 nor perception1 nor     
opinion1 nor  knowledge of it8          
,clearly not4    ,then it is neither    
named1 nor expressed1 nor opined1 nor   
known1 nor does  anything that is       
perceive it4    ,so we must infer4      
,but can all this be true about the one8
    ,i think not4    #a4;b4 ,suppose1   
now1 that we return once more to the    
original hypothesis2  let us see        
whether1 on a further review1 any new   

aspect of the question  appears4    ,i  
shall be very happy to do so4    ,we say
 that we have to work out together all  
the consequences1 whatever  they may be1
 which follow1 if the one is8    ,yes4  
,then we will begin at the              
beginning3--,if one is1 can one be1 and 
not  partake of being8    ,impossible4  
,then the one will have being1 but its  
being will not be the same with  the    
one2 for if the same1 it would not be   
the being of the one2 nor  would the one
 have participated in being1 for the    
proposition that one  is would have been
 identical with the proposition that one
 is one2  but our hypothesis is not if  
one is one1 what will follow1 but if one
  is3--am ,i not right8    ,quite right4
    ,we mean to say1 that being has not 
the same significance as one8    ,of    
course4    ,and when we put them        
together shortly1 and say ',one is1'    
that is  equivalent to saying1 'partakes
 of being'8    ,quite true4    ,once    
more then let us ask1 if one is what    

will follow4 ,does not this  hypothesis 
necessarily imply that one is of such a 
nature as to have  parts8    ,how so8   
,in this way3--,if being is predicated  
of the one1 if the one is1 and one  of  
being1 if being is one2 and if being and
 one are not the same2 and  since the   
one1 which we have assumed1 is1 must not
 the whole1 if it is  one1 itself be1   
and have for its parts1 one and being8  
,certainly4    ,and is each of these    
parts--one and being--to be simply      
called a part1  or must the word 'part' 
be relative to the word 'whole'8    ,the
 latter4    ,then that which is one is  
both a whole and has a part8            
,certainly4    ,again1 of the parts of  
the one1 if it is--,i mean being and    
one--does  either fail to imply the     
other8 is the one wanting to being1 or  
being to  the one8    ,impossible4      
,thus1 each of the parts also has in    
turn both one and being1 and is at  the 
least made up of two parts2 and the same
 principle goes on for ever1  and every 

part whatever has always these two      
parts2 for being always  involves one1  
and one being2 so that one is always    
disappearing1 and  becoming two4        
,certainly4    ,and so the one1 if it   
is1 must be infinite in multiplicity8   
,clearly4    ,let us take another       
direction4    ,what direction8    ,we   
say that the one partakes of being and  
therefore it is8    ,yes4    ,and in    
this way1 the one1 if it has being1 has 
turned out to be many8    ,true4    ,but
 now1 let us abstract the one which1 as 
we say1 partakes of  being1 and try to  
imagine it apart from that of which1 as 
we say1 it  partakes--will this abstract
 one be one only or many8    ,one1 ,i   
think4    ,let us see3--,must not the   
being of one be other than one8 for the 
one is  not being1 but1 considered as   
one1 only partook of being8             
,certainly4    ,if being and the one be 
two different things1 it is not because 
the one  is one that it is other than   
being2 nor because being is being that  

it  is other than the one2 but they     
differ from one another in virtue of    
otherness and difference4    ,certainly4
    ,so that the other is not the       
same--either with the one or with being8
    ,certainly not4    ,and therefore   
whether we take being and the other1 or 
being and the one1  or the one and the  
other1 in every such case we take two   
things1 which  may be rightly called    
both4    ,how so4    ,in this way--you  
may speak of being8    ,yes4    ,and    
also of one8    ,yes4    ,then now we   
have spoken of either of them8    ,yes4 
,well1 and when ,i speak of being and   
one1 ,i speak of them both8             
,certainly4    ,and if ,i speak of being
 and the other1 or of the one and the   
other1--in  any such case do ,i not     
speak of both8    ,yes4    ,and must not
 that which is correctly called both1 be
 also two8    ,undoubtedly4    ,and of  
two things how can either by any        
possibility not be one8    ,it cannot4  
,then1 if the individuals of the pair   

are together two1 they must be          
severally one8    ,clearly4    ,and if  
each of them is one1 then by the        
addition of any one to any pair1  the   
whole becomes three8    ,yes4    ,and   
three are odd1 and two are even8    ,of 
course4    ,and if there are two there  
must also be twice1 and if there are    
three  there must be thrice2 that is1 if
 twice one makes two1 and thrice one    
three8    ,certainly4    ,there are two1
 and twice1 and therefore there must be 
twice two2 and  there are three1 and    
there is thrice1 and therefore there    
must be thrice  three8    ,of course4   
,if there are three and twice1 there is 
twice three2 and if there are two  and  
thrice1 there is thrice two8            
,undoubtedly4    ,here1 then1 we have   
even taken even times1 and odd taken odd
 times1 and  even taken odd times1 and  
odd taken even times4    ,true4    ,and 
if this is so1 does any number remain   
which has no necessity to be8    ,none  
whatever4    ,then if one is1 number    

must also be8    ,it must4    ,but if   
there is number1 there must also be     
many1 and infinite  multiplicity of     
being2 for number is infinite in        
multiplicity1 and  partakes also of     
being3 am ,i not right8    ,certainly4  
,and if all number participates in      
being1 every part of number will also   
participate8    ,yes4    ,then being is 
distributed over the whole multitude of 
things1 and  nothing that is1 however   
small or however great1 is devoid of it8
 ,and1  indeed1 the very supposition of 
this is absurd1 for how can that which  
is1 be devoid of being8    ,in no way4  
,and it is divided into the greatest and
 into the smallest1 and into  being of  
all sizes1 and is broken up more than   
all things2 the divisions  of it have no
 limit4    ,true4    ,then it has the   
greatest number of parts8    ,yes1 the  
greatest number4    ,is there any of    
these which is a part of being1 and yet 
no part8    ,impossible4    ,but if it  
is at all and so long as it is1 it must 

be one1 and cannot be  none8            
,certainly4    ,then the one attaches to
 every single part of being1 and does   
not fail  in any part1 whether great or 
small1 or whatever may be the size of   
it8    ,true4    ,but reflect3--,can    
one1 in its entirety1 be in many places 
at the same  time8    ,no2 ,i see the   
impossibility of that4    ,and if not in
 its entirety1 then it is divided2 for  
it cannot be present  with all the parts
 of being1 unless divided4    ,true4    
,and that which has parts will be as    
many as the parts are8    ,certainly4   
,then we were wrong in saying just now1 
that being was distributed into  the    
greatest number of parts4 ,for it is not
 distributed into parts more  than the  
one1 into parts equal to the one2 the   
one is never wanting  to being1 or being
 to the one1 but being two they are     
co-equal and  co-extensive4             
,certainly that is true4    ,the one    
itself1 then1 having been broken up into
 parts by being1 is many  and infinite8 

,true4    ,then not only the one which  
has being is many1 but the one itself   
distributed by being1 must also be many8
    ,certainly4    ,further1 inasmuch as
 the parts are parts of a whole1 the    
one1 as a  whole1 will be limited2 for  
are not the parts contained by the      
whole8    ,certainly4    ,and that which
 contains1 is a limit8    ,of course4   
,then the one if it has being is one and
 many1 whole and parts1 having  limits  
and yet unlimited in number8            
,clearly4    ,and because having limits1
 also having extremes8    ,certainly4   
,and if a whole1 having beginning and   
middle and end4 ,for can anything  be a 
whole without these three8 ,and if any  
one of them is wanting to  anything1    
will that any longer be a whole8    ,no4
    ,then the one1 as appears1 will have
 beginning1 middle1 and end4    ,it     
will4    ,but1 again1 the middle will be
 equidistant from the extremes2 or it   
would not be in the middle8    ,yes4    
,then the one will partake of figure1   

either rectilinear or round1 or a  union
 of the two8    ,true4    ,and if this  
is the case1 it will be both in itself  
and in another too4    ,how8    ,every  
part is in the whole1 and none is       
outside the whole4    ,true4    ,and all
 the parts are contained by the whole8  
,yes4    ,and the one is all its parts1 
and neither more nor less than all8     
,no4    ,and the one is the whole8      
,of course4    ,but if all the parts are
 in the whole1 and the one is all of    
them and  the whole1 and they are all   
contained by the whole1 the one will be 
contained by the one2 and thus the one  
will be in itself4    ,that is true4    
,but then1 again1 the whole is not in   
the parts--neither in all the  parts1   
nor in some one of them4 ,for if it is  
in all1 it must be in one2  for if there
 were any one in which it was not1 it   
could not be in all  the parts2 for the 
part in which it is wanting is one of   
all1 and if the  whole is not in this1  
how can it be in them all8    ,it       

cannot4    ,nor can the whole be in some
 of the parts2 for if the whole were in 
some  of the parts1 the greater would be
 in the less1 which is impossible4      
,yes1 impossible4    ,but if the whole  
is neither in one1 nor in more than one1
 nor in all of  the parts1 it must be in
 something else1 or cease to be anywhere
 at all8    ,certainly4    ,if it were  
nowhere1 it would be nothing2 but being 
a whole1 and not  being in itself1 it   
must be in another4    ,very true4      
,the one then1 regarded as a whole1 is  
in another1 but regarded as being  all  
its parts1 is in itself2 and therefore  
the one must be itself in  itself and   
also in another4    ,certainly4    ,the 
one then1 being of this nature1 is of   
necessity both at rest and in  motion8  
,how8    ,the one is at rest since it is
 in itself1 for being in one1 and not   
passing out of this1 it is in the same1 
which is itself4    ,true4    ,and that 
which is ever in the same1 must be ever 
at rest8    ,certainly4    ,well1 and   

must not that1 on the contrary1 which is
 ever in other1 never  be in the same2  
and if never in the same1 never at rest1
 and if not at  rest1 in motion8        
,true4    ,then the one being always    
itself in itself and other1 must always 
be  both at rest and in motion8         
,clearly4    ,and must be the same with 
itself1 and other than itself2 and also 
the  same with the others1 and other    
than the others2 this follows from its  
previous affections4    ,how so8        
,everything in relation to every other  
thing1 is either the same or  other2 or 
if neither the same nor other1 then in  
the relation of a part  to a whole1 or  
of a whole to a part4    ,clearly4      
,and is the one a part of itself8       
,certainly not4    ,since it is not a   
part in relation to itself it cannot be 
related to  itself as whole to part8    
,it cannot4    ,but is the one other    
than one8    ,no4    ,and therefore not 
other than itself8    ,certainly not4   
,if then it be neither other1 nor a     

whole1 nor a part in relation to        
itself1 must it not be the same with    
itself8    ,certainly4    ,but then1    
again1 a thing which is in another place
 from 'itself1' if  this 'itself'       
remains in the same place with itself1  
must be other than  'itself1' for it    
will be in another place8    ,true4     
,then the one has been shown to be at   
once in itself and in another8    ,yes4 
,thus1 then1 as appears1 the one will be
 other than itself8    ,true4    ,well1 
then1 if anything be other than         
anything1 will it not be other  than    
that which is other8    ,certainly4     
,and will not all things that are not   
one1 be other than the one1 and the  one
 other than the not-one8    ,of course4 
,then the one will be other than the    
others8    ,true4    ,but1              
consider3--,are not the absolute same1  
and the absolute other1  opposites to   
one another8    ,of course4    ,then    
will the same ever be in the other1 or  
the other in the same8    ,they will    

not4    ,if then the other is never in  
the same1 there is nothing in which  the
 other is during any space of time2 for 
during that space of time1  however     
small1 the other would be in the same4  
,is not that true8    ,yes4    ,and     
since the other is never in the same1 it
 can never be in anything  that is4     
,true4    ,then the other will never be 
either in the not-one1 or in the one8   
,certainly not4    ,then not by reason  
of otherness is the one other than the  
not-one1 or  the not-one other than the 
one4    ,no4    ,nor by reason of       
themselves will they be other than one  
another1 if not  partaking of the other4
    ,how can they be8    ,but if they   
are not other1 either by reason of      
themselves or of the  other1 will they  
not altogether escape being other than  
one another8    ,they will4    ,again1  
the not-one cannot partake of the one2  
otherwise it would not  have been       
not-one1 but would have been in some way
 one4    ,true4    ,nor can the not-one 

be number2 for having number1 it would  
not have been  not-one at all4    ,it   
would not4    ,again1 is the not-one    
part of the one2 or rather1 would it not
 in that  case partake of the one8      
,it would4    ,if then1 in every point  
of view1 the one and the not-one are    
distinct1  then neither is the one part 
or whole of the not-one1 nor is the     
not-one  part or whole of the one8      
,no4    ,but we said that things which  
are neither parts nor wholes of one     
another1 nor other than one another1    
will be the same with one  another3--so 
we said8    ,yes4    ,then shall we say 
that the one1 being in this relation to 
the not-one1  is the same with it8      
,let us say so4    ,then it is the same 
with itself and the others1 and also    
other than  itself and the others4      
,that appears to be the inference4      
,and it will also be like and unlike    
itself and the others8    ,perhaps4     
,since the one was shown to be other    
than the others1 the others will  also  

be other than the one4    ,yes4    ,and 
the one is other than the others in the 
same degree that the others  are other  
than it1 and neither more nor less8     
,true4    ,and if neither more nor less1
 then in a like degree8    ,yes4    ,in 
virtue of the affection by which the one
 is other than others and  others in    
like manner other than it1 the one will 
be affected like the  others and the    
others like the one4    ,how do you     
mean8    ,i may take as an illustration 
the case of names3 ,you give a name to a
  thing8    ,yes4    ,and you may say   
the name once or oftener8    ,yes4      
,and when you say it once1 you mention  
that of which it is the name8 and  when 
more than once1 is it something else    
which you mention8 or must it  always be
 the same thing of which you speak1     
whether you utter the name  once or more
 than once8    ,of course it is the     
same4    ,and is not 'other' a name     
given to a thing8    ,certainly4        
,whenever1 then1 you use the word       

'other1' whether once or oftener1 you   
name that of which it is the name1 and  
to no other do you give the name8       
,true4    ,then when we say that the    
others are other than the one1 and the  
one  other than the others1 in repeating
 the word 'other' we speak of that      
nature to which the name is applied1 and
 of no other8    ,quite true4    ,then  
the one which is other than others1 and 
the other which is other  than the one1 
in that the word 'other' is applied to  
both1 will be in  the same condition2   
and that which is in the same condition 
is like8    ,yes4    ,then in virtue of 
the affection by which the one is other 
than the  others1 every thing will be   
like every thing1 for every thing is    
other  than every thing4    ,true4      
,again1 the like is opposed to the      
unlike8    ,yes4    ,and the other to   
the same8    ,true again4    ,and the   
one was also shown to be the same with  
the others8    ,yes4    ,and to be the  
same with the others is the opposite of 

being other than  the others8           
,certainly4    ,and in that it was other
 it was shown to be like8    ,yes4      
,but in that it was the same it will be 
unlike by virtue of the opposite        
affection to that which made it like2   
and this was the affection of           
otherness4    ,yes4    ,the same then   
will make it unlike2 otherwise it will  
not be the opposite  of the other4      
,true4    ,then the one will be both    
like and unlike the others2 like in so  
far as  it is other1 and unlike in so   
far as it is the same4    ,yes1 that    
argument may be used4    ,and there is  
another argument4    ,what8    ,in so   
far as it is affected in the same way it
 is not affected  otherwise1 and not    
being affected otherwise is not unlike1 
and not  being unlike1 is like2 but in  
so far as it is affected by other it is 
otherwise1 and being otherwise affected 
is unlike4    ,true4    ,then because   
the one is the same with the others and 
other than the  others1 on either of    

these two grounds1 or on both of them1  
it will be  both like and unlike the    
others8    ,certainly4    ,and in the   
same way as being other than itself and 
the same with itself1  on either of     
these two grounds and on both of them1  
it will be like and  unlike itself8     
,of course4    ,again1 how far can the  
one touch or not touch itself and       
others8--consider4    ,i am considering4
    ,the one was shown to be in itself  
which was a whole8    ,true4    ,and    
also in other things8    ,yes4    ,in so
 far as it is in other things it would  
touch other things1 but in  so far as it
 is in itself it would be debarred from 
touching them1 and  would touch itself  
only4    ,clearly4    ,then the         
inference is that it would touch both8  
,it would4    ,but what do you say to a 
new point of view8 ,must not that which 
is to  touch another be next to that    
which it is to touch1 and occupy the    
place  nearest to that in which what it 
touches is situated8    ,true4    ,then 

the one1 if it is to touch itself1 ought
 to be situated next to  itself1 and    
occupy the place next to that in which  
itself is8    ,it ought4    ,and that   
would require that the one should be    
two1 and be in two places  at once1 and 
this1 while it is one1 will never       
happen4    ,no4    ,then the one cannot 
touch itself any more than it can be    
two8    ,it cannot4    ,neither can it  
touch others4    ,why not8    ,the      
reason is1 that whatever is to touch    
another must be in separation  from1 and
 next to1 that which it is to touch1 and
 no third thing can be  between them4   
,true4    ,two things1 then1 at the     
least are necessary to make contact     
possible8    ,they are4    ,and if to   
the two a third be added in due order1  
the number of terms  will be three1 and 
the contacts two8    ,yes4    ,and every
 additional term makes one additional   
contact1 whence it  follows that the    
contacts are one less in number than the
 terms2 the  first two terms exceeded   

the number of contacts by one1 and the  
whole  number of terms exceeds the whole
 number of contacts by one in like      
manner2 and for every one which is      
afterwards added to the number of       
terms1 one contact is added to the      
contacts4    ,true4    ,whatever is the 
whole number of things1 the contacts    
will be always one  less4    ,true4     
,but if there be only one1 and not two1 
there will be no contact8    ,how can   
there be8    ,and do we not say that the
 others being other than the one are not
 one  and have no part in the one8      
,true4    ,then they have no number1 if 
they have no one in them8    ,of course 
not4    ,then the others are neither one
 nor two1 nor are they called by the    
name  of any number8    ,no4    ,one1   
then1 alone is one1 and two do not      
exist8    ,clearly not4    ,and if there
 are not two1 there is no contact8      
,there is not4    ,then neither does the
 one touch the others1 nor the others   
the one1 if  there is no contact8       

,certainly not4    ,for all which       
reasons the one touches and does not    
touch itself and the  others8    ,true4 
,further--is the one equal and unequal  
to itself and others8    ,how do you    
mean8    ,if the one were greater or    
less than the others1 or the others     
greater  or less than the one1 they     
would not be greater or less than each  
other  in virtue of their being the one 
and the others2 but1 if in addition to  
their being what they are they had      
equality1 they would be equal to one    
another1 or if the one had smallness and
 the others greatness1 or the  one had  
greatness and the others                
smallness--whichever kind had greatness 
would be greater1 and whichever had     
smallness would be smaller8             
,certainly4    ,then there are two such 
ideas as greatness and smallness2 for if
 they  were not they could not be       
opposed to each other and be present in 
that  which is4    ,how could they8     
,if1 then1 smallness is present in the  

one it will be present either in  the   
whole or in a part of the whole8        
,certainly4    ,suppose the first2 it   
will be either co-equal and co-extensive
 with the  whole one1 or will contain   
the one8    ,clearly4    ,if it be      
co-extensive with the one it will be    
co-equal with the one1 or  if containing
 the one it will be greater than the    
one8    ,of course4    ,but can         
smallness be equal to anything or       
greater than anything1 and  have the    
functions of greatness and equality and 
not its own functions8    ,impossible4  
,then smallness cannot be in the whole  
of one1 but1 if at all1 in a part  only8
    ,yes4    ,and surely not in all of a
 part1 for then the difficulty of the   
whole  will recur2 it will be equal to  
or greater than any part in which it is4
    ,certainly4    ,then smallness will 
not be in anything1 whether in a whole  
or in a part2  nor will there be        
anything small but actual smallness4    
,true4    ,neither will greatness be in 

the one1 for if greatness be in anything
  there will be something greater other 
and besides greatness itself1  namely1  
that in which greatness is2 and this too
 when the small itself  is not there1   
which the one1 if it is great1 must     
exceed2 this1 however1  is impossible1  
seeing that smallness is wholly absent4 
,true4    ,but absolute greatness is    
only greater than absolute smallness1   
and  smallness is only smaller than     
absolute greatness4    ,very true4      
,then other things not greater or less  
than the one1 if they have neither      
greatness nor smallness2 nor have       
greatness or smallness any power of     
exceeding or being exceeded in relation 
to the one1 but only in relation  to one
 another2 nor will the one be greater or
 less than them or others1  if it has   
neither greatness nor smallness4        
,clearly not4    ,then if the one is    
neither greater nor less than the       
others1 it cannot  either exceed or be  
exceeded by them8    ,certainly not4    

,and that which neither exceeds nor is  
exceeded1 must be on an equality2  and  
being on an equality1 must be equal4    
,of course4    ,and this will be true   
also of the relation of the one to      
itself2 having  neither greatness nor   
smallness in itself1 it will neither    
exceed nor be  exceeded by itself1 but  
will be on an equality with and equal to
 itself4    ,certainly4    ,then the one
 will be equal both to itself and the   
others8    ,clearly so4    ,and yet the 
one1 being itself in itself1 will also  
surround and be  without itself2 and1 as
 containing itself1 will be greater than
 itself2  and1 as contained in itself1  
will be less2 and will thus be greater  
and  less than itself4    ,it will4     
,now there cannot possibly be anything  
which is not included in the one  and   
the others8    ,of course not4    ,but1 
surely1 that which is must always be    
somewhere8    ,yes4    ,but that which  
is in anything will be less1 and that in
 which it is will  be greater2 in no    

other way can one thing be in another4  
,true4    ,and since there is nothing   
other or besides the one and the others1
 and  they must be in something1 must   
they not be in one another1 the one in  
the others and the others in the one1 if
 they are to be anywhere8    ,that is   
clear4    ,but inasmuch as the one is in
 the others1 the others will be greater 
than the one1 because they contain the  
one1 which will be less than the        
others1 because it is contained in them2
 and inasmuch as the others  are in the 
one1 the one on the same principle will 
be greater than the  others1 and the    
others less than the one4    ,true4     
,the one1 then1 will be equal to and    
greater and less than itself and the    
others8    ,clearly4    ,and if it be   
greater and less and equal1 it will be  
of equal and more  and less measures or 
divisions than itself and the others1   
and if of  measures1 also of parts8     
,of course4    ,and if of equal and more
 and less measures or divisions1 it will

 be in  number more or less than itself 
and the others1 and likewise equal in   
number to itself and to the others8     
,how is that8    ,it will be of more    
measures than those things which it     
exceeds1 and of  as many parts as       
measures2 and so with that to which it  
is equal1 and  that than which it is    
less4    ,true4    ,and being greater   
and less than itself1 and equal to      
itself1 it will  be of equal measures   
with itself and of more and fewer       
measures than  itself2 and if of        
measures then also of parts8    ,it     
will4    ,and being of equal parts with 
itself1 it will be numerically equal to 
itself2 and being of more parts1 more1  
and being of less1 less than  itself8   
,certainly4    ,and the same will hold  
of its relation to other things2        
inasmuch as it  is greater than them1 it
 will be more in number than them2 and  
inasmuch  as it is smaller1 it will be  
less in number2 and inasmuch as it is   
equal  in size to other things1 it will 

be equal to them in number4             
,certainly4    ,once more1 then1 as     
would appear1 the one will be in number 
both equal  to and more and less than   
both itself and all other things4    ,it
 will4    ,does the one also partake of 
time8 ,and is it and does it become     
older  and younger than itself and      
others1 and again1 neither younger nor  
older  than itself and others1 by virtue
 of participation in time8    ,how do   
you mean8    ,if one is1 being must be  
predicated of it8    ,yes4    ,but to be
 7einai7 is only participation of being 
in present time1 and to  have been is   
the participation of being at a past    
time1 and to be about  to be is the     
participation of being at a future time8
    ,very true4    ,then the one1 since 
it partakes of being1 partakes of time8 
,certainly4    ,and is not time always  
moving forward8    ,yes4    ,then the   
one is always becoming older than       
itself1 since it moves  forward in time8
    ,certainly4    ,and do you remember 

that the older becomes older than that  
which becomes  younger8    ,i remember4 
,then since the one becomes older than  
itself1 it becomes younger at the  same 
time8    ,certainly4    ,thus1 then1 the
 one becomes older as well as younger   
than itself8    ,yes4    ,and it is     
older 7is it not87 when in becoming1 it 
gets to the point of  time between 'was'
 and 'will be1' which is 'now'3 for     
surely in going  from the past to the   
future1 it cannot skip the present8     
,no4    ,and when it arrives at the     
present it stops from becoming older1   
and  no longer becomes1 but is older1   
for if it went on it would never be     
reached by the present1 for it is the   
nature of that which goes on1  to touch 
both the present and the future1 letting
 go the present and  seizing the future1
 while in process of becoming between   
them4    ,true4    ,but that which is   
becoming cannot skip the present2 when  
it reaches the  present it ceases to    
become1 and is then whatever it may     

happen to be  becoming4    ,clearly4    
,and so the one1 when in becoming older 
it reaches the present1 ceases to       
become1 and is then older4              
,certainly4    ,and it is older than    
that than which it was becoming older1  
and it was  becoming older than itself4 
,yes4    ,and that which is older is    
older than that which is younger8       
,true4    ,then the one is younger than 
itself1 when in becoming older it       
reaches  the present8    ,certainly4    
,but the present is always present with 
the one during all its being2 for       
whenever it is it is always now4        
,certainly4    ,then the one always both
 is and becomes older and younger than  
itself8    ,truly4    ,and is it or does
 it become a longer time than itself or 
an equal time  with itself8    ,an equal
 time4    ,but if it becomes or is for  
an equal time with itself1 it is of the 
same  age with itself8    ,of course4   
,and that which is of the same age1 is  
neither older nor younger8    ,no4      

,the one1 then1 becoming and being the  
same time with itself1 neither is  nor  
becomes older or younger than itself8   
,i should say not4    ,and what are its 
relations to other things8 ,is it or    
does it become  older or younger than   
they8    ,i cannot tell you4    ,you can
 at least tell me that others than the  
one are more than the  one--other would 
have been one1 but the others have      
multitude1 and are  more than one8      
,they will have multitude4    ,and a    
multitude implies a number larger than  
one8    ,of course4    ,and shall we say
 that the lesser or the greater is the  
first to come or  to have come into     
existence8    ,the lesser4    ,then the 
least is the first8 ,and that is the    
one8    ,yes4    ,then the one of all   
things that have number is the first to 
come into  being2 but all other things  
have also number1 being plural and not  
singular4    ,they have4    ,and since  
it came into being first it must be     
supposed to have come into  being prior 

to the others1 and the others later2 and
 the things which  came into being      
later1 are younger than that which      
preceded them8 ,and  so the other things
 will be younger than the one1 and the  
one older than  other things8    ,true4 
,what would you say of another question8
 ,can the one have come into being      
contrary to its own nature1 or is that  
impossible8    ,impossible4    ,and yet1
 surely1 the one was shown to have      
parts2 and if parts1 then a  beginning1 
middle and end8    ,yes4    ,and a      
beginning1 both of the one itself and of
 all other things1 comes  into being    
first of all2 and after the beginning1  
the others follow1  until you reach the 
end8    ,certainly4    ,and all these   
others we shall affirm to be parts of   
the whole and of the  one1 which1 as    
soon as the end is reached1 has become  
whole and one8    ,yes2 that is what we 
shall say4    ,but the end comes last1  
and the one is of such a nature as to   
come into  being with the last2 and1    

since the one cannot come into being    
except in  accordance with its own      
nature1 its nature will require that it 
should  come into being after the       
others1 simultaneously with the end4    
,clearly4    ,then the one is younger   
than the others and the others older    
than the  one4    ,that also is clear in
 my judgment4    ,well1 and must not a  
beginning or any other part of the one  
or of  anything1 if it be a part and not
 parts1 being a part1 be also of        
necessity one8    ,certainly4    ,and   
will not the one come into being        
together with each part--together  with 
the first part when that comes into     
being1 and together with the  second    
part and with all the rest1 and will not
 be wanting to any part1  which is added
 to any other part until it has reached 
the last and  become one whole2 it will 
be wanting neither to the middle1 nor to
  the first1 nor to the last1 nor to any
 of them1 while the process of  becoming
 is going on8    ,true4    ,then the one

 is of the same age with all the others1
 so that if the one  itself does not    
contradict its own nature1 it will be   
neither prior  nor posterior to the     
others1 but simultaneous2 and according 
to this  argument the one will be       
neither older nor younger than the      
others1 nor  the others than the one1   
but according to the previous argument  
the one  will be older and younger than 
the others and the others than the one4 
,certainly4    ,after this manner then  
the one is and has become4 ,but as to   
its becoming  older and younger than the
 others1 and the others than the one1   
and  neither older nor younger1 what    
shall we say8 ,shall we say as of being 
so also of becoming1 or otherwise8    ,i
 cannot answer4    ,but ,i can venture  
to say1 that even if one thing were     
older or younger  than another1 it could
 not become older or younger in a       
greater degree  than it was at first2   
for equals added to unequals1 whether to
 periods  of time or to anything else1  

leave the difference between them the   
same  as at first4    ,of course4       
,then that which is1 cannot become older
 or younger than that which  is1 since  
the difference of age is always the     
same2 the one is and has  become older  
and the other younger2 but they are no  
longer becoming so4    ,true4    ,and   
the one which is does not therefore     
become either older or younger  than the
 others which are4    ,no4    ,but      
consider whether they may not become    
older and younger in another  way4      
,in what way8    ,just as the one was   
proven to be older than the others and  
the others  than the one4    ,and what  
of that8    ,if the one is older than   
the others1 has come into being a longer
 time  than the others4    ,yes4    ,but
 consider again2 if we add equal time to
 a greater and a less time1  will the   
greater differ from the less time by an 
equal or by a smaller  portion than     
before8    ,by a smaller portion4       
,then the difference between the age of 

the one and the age of the others  will 
not be afterwards so great as at first1 
but if an equal time be  added to both  
of them they will differ less and less  
in age8    ,yes4    ,and that which     
differs in age from some other less than
 formerly1 from  being older will become
 younger in relation to that other than 
which it  was older8    ,yes1 younger4  
,and if the one becomes younger the     
others aforesaid will become older  than
 they were before1 in relation to the   
one4    ,certainly4    ,then that which 
had become younger becomes older        
relatively to that  which previously had
 become and was older2 it never really  
is older1 but  is always becoming1 for  
the one is always growing on the side of
 youth  and the other on the side of    
age4 ,and in like manner the older is   
always  in process of becoming younger  
than the younger2 for as they are always
  going in opposite directions they     
become in ways the opposite to one      
another1 the younger older than the     

older1 and the older younger than  the  
younger4 ,they cannot1 however1 have    
become2 for if they had already  become 
they would be and not merely become4    
,but that is impossible2 for  they are  
always becoming both older and younger  
than one another3 the  one becomes      
younger than the others because it was  
seen to be older and  prior1 and the    
others become older than the one because
 they came into  being later2 and in the
 same way the others are in the same    
relation to  the one1 because they were 
seen to be older1 and prior to the one4 
,that is clear4    ,inasmuch then1 one  
thing does not become older or younger  
than another1  in that they always      
differ from each other by an equal      
number1 the one  cannot become older or 
younger than the others1 nor the others 
than the  one2 but inasmuch as that     
which came into being earlier and that  
which  came into being later must       
continually differ from each other by a 
different portion--in this point of view

 the others must become older  and      
younger than the one1 and the one than  
the others4    ,certainly4    ,for all  
these reasons1 then1 the one is and     
becomes older and younger  than itself  
and the others1 and neither is nor      
becomes older or younger  than itself or
 the others4    ,certainly4    ,but     
since the one partakes of time1 and     
partakes of becoming older and  younger1
 must it not also partake of the past1  
the present1 and the  future8    ,of    
course it must4    ,then the one was and
 is and will be1 and was becoming and is
 becoming  and will become8             
,certainly4    ,and there is and was and
 will be something which is in relation 
to it  and belongs to it8    ,true4     
,and since we have at this moment       
opinion and knowledge and perception of 
the one1 there is opinion and knowledge 
and perception of it8    ,quite right4  
,then there is name and expression for  
it1 and it is named and expressed1  and 
everything of this kind which appertains

 to other things appertains  to the one4
    ,certainly1 that is true4    ,yet   
once more and for the third time1 let us
 consider3 ,if the one is  both one and 
many1 as we have described1 and is      
neither one nor many1  and participates 
in time1 must it not1 in as far as it is
 one1 at times  partake of being1 and in
 as far as it is not one1 at times not  
partake  of being8    ,certainly4       
,but can it partake of being when not   
partaking of being1 or not partake  of  
being when partaking of being8          
,impossible4    ,then the one partakes  
and does not partake of being at        
different times1  for that is the only  
way in which it can partake and not     
partake of the  same4    ,true4    ,and 
is there not also a time at which it    
assumes being and relinquishes          
being--for how can it have and not have 
the same thing unless it  receives and  
also gives it up at some time8          
,impossible4    ,and the assuming of    
being is what you would call becoming8  

,i should4    ,and the relinquishing of 
being you would call destruction8    ,i 
should4    ,the one then1 as would      
appear1 becomes and is destroyed by     
taking and  giving up being4            
,certainly4    ,and being one and many  
and in process of becoming and being    
destroyed1  when it becomes one it      
ceases to be many1 and when many1 it    
ceases to be  one8    ,certainly4       
,and as it becomes one and many1 must it
 not inevitably experience  separation  
and aggregation8    ,inevitably4    ,and
 whenever it becomes like and unlike it 
must be assimilated and  dissimilated8  
,yes4    ,and when it becomes greater or
 less or equal it must grow or diminish 
or  be equalized8    ,true4    ,and when
 being in motion it rests1 and when     
being at rest it changes to  motion1 it 
can surely be in no time at all8    ,how
 can it8    ,but that a thing which is  
previously at rest should be afterwards 
in motion1 or previously in motion and  
afterwards at rest1 without             

experiencing change1 is impossible4     
,impossible4    ,and surely there cannot
 be a time in which a thing can be at   
once  neither in motion nor at rest8    
,there cannot4    ,but neither can it   
change without changing4    ,true4      
,when then does it change2 for it cannot
 change either when at rest1 or  when in
 motion1 or when in time8    ,it cannot4
    ,and does this strange thing in     
which it is at the time of changing     
really exist8    ,what thing8    ,the   
moment4 ,for the moment seems to imply a
 something out of which  change takes   
place into either of two states2 for the
 change is not from  the state of rest  
as such1 nor from the state of motion as
 such2 but  there is this curious nature
 which we call the moment lying between 
rest  and motion1 not being in any time2
 and into this and out of this what is  
in motion changes into rest1 and what is
 at rest into motion4    ,so it appears4
    ,and the one then1 since it is at   
rest and also in motion1 will change  to

 either1 for only in this way can it be 
in both4 ,and in changing it  changes in
 a moment1 and when it is changing it   
will be in no time1 and  will not then  
be either in motion or at rest4    ,it  
will not4    ,and it will be in the same
 case in relation to the other changes1 
when  it passes from being into         
cessation of being1 or from not-being   
into  becoming--then it passes between  
certain states of motion and rest1 and  
neither is nor is not1 nor becomes nor  
is destroyed4    ,very true4    ,and on 
the same principle1 in the passage from 
one to many and from  many to one1 the  
one is neither one nor many1 neither    
separated nor  aggregated2 and in the   
passage from like to unlike1 and from   
unlike to  like1 it is neither like nor 
unlike1 neither in a state of           
assimilation  nor of dissimilation2 and 
in the passage from small to great and  
equal  and back again1 it will be       
neither small nor great1 nor equal1 nor 
in a  state of increase1 or diminution1 

or equalization4    ,true4    ,all      
these1 then1 are the affections of the  
one1 if the one has being4    ,of       
course4    #a4;aa4 ,but if one is1 what 
will happen to the others--is not that  
also to  be considered8    ,yes4    ,let
 us show then1 if one is1 what will be  
the affections of the others  than the  
one4    ,let us do so4    ,inasmuch as  
there are things other than the one1 the
 others are not the  one2 for if they   
were they could not be other than the   
one4    ,very true4    ,nor are the     
others altogether without the one1 but  
in a certain way they  participate in   
the one4    ,in what way8    ,because   
the others are other than the one       
inasmuch as they have parts2  for if    
they had no parts they would be simply  
one4    ,right4    ,and parts1 as we    
affirm1 have relation to a whole8    ,so
 we say4    ,and a whole must           
necessarily be one made up of many2 and 
the parts will  be parts of the one1 for
 each of the parts is not a part of     

many1 but of  a whole4    ,how do you   
mean8    ,if anything were a part of    
many1 being itself one of them1 it will 
surely be a part of itself1 which is    
impossible1 and it will be a part  of   
each one of the other parts1 if of all2 
for if not a part of some  one1 it will 
be a part of all the others but this    
one1 and thus will not  be a part of    
each one2 and if not a part of each1 one
 it will not be a  part of any one of   
the many2 and not being a part of any   
one1 it cannot  be a part or anything   
else of all those things of none of     
which it is  anything4    ,clearly not4 
,then the part is not a part of the     
many1 nor of all1 but is of a certain   
single form1 which we call a whole1     
being one perfect unity framed out  of  
all--of this the part will be a part4   
,certainly4    ,if1 then1 the others    
have parts1 they will participate in the
 whole and  in the one4    ,true4       
,then the others than the one must be   
one perfect whole1 having parts4        

,certainly4    ,and the same argument   
holds of each part1 for the part must   
participate  in the one2 for if each of 
the parts is a part1 this means1 ,i     
suppose1  that it is one separate from  
the rest and self-related2 otherwise it 
is  not each4    ,true4    ,but when we 
speak of the part participating in the  
one1 it must clearly  be other than one2
 for if not1 it would not merely have   
participated1  but would have been one2 
whereas only the one itself can be one4 
,very true4    ,both the whole and the  
part must participate in the one2 for   
the whole  will be one whole1 of which  
the parts will be parts2 and each part  
will  be one part of the whole which is 
the whole of the part4    ,true4    ,and
 will not the things which participate  
in the one1 be other than it8    ,of    
course4    ,and the things which are    
other than the one will be many2 for if 
the  things which are other than the one
 were neither one nor more than one1    
they would be nothing4    ,true4        

,but1 seeing that the things which      
participate in the one as a part1 and   
in the one as a whole1 are more than    
one1 must not those very things  which  
participate in the one be infinite in   
number8    ,how so8    ,let us look at  
the matter thus3--,is it not a fact that
 in partaking of  the one they are not  
one1 and do not partake of the one at   
the very time  when they are partaking  
of it8    ,clearly4    ,they do so then 
as multitudes in which the one is not   
present8    ,very true4    ,and if we   
were to abstract from them in idea the  
very smallest fraction1  must not that  
least fraction1 if it does not partake  
of the one1 be a  multitude and not one8
    ,it must4    ,and if we continue to 
look at the other side of their nature1 
regarded  simply1 and in itself1 will   
not they1 as far as we see them1 be     
unlimited in number8    ,certainly4     
,and yet1 when each several part becomes
 a part1 then the parts have  a limit in
 relation to the whole and to each      

other1 and the whole in  relation to the
 parts4    ,just so4    ,the result to  
the others than the one is that the     
union of themselves  and the one appears
 to create a new element in them which  
gives to them  limitation in relation to
 one another2 whereas in their own      
nature they  have no limit4    ,that is 
clear4    ,then the others than the one1
 both as whole and parts1 are infinite1 
and  also partake of limit4             
,certainly4    ,then they are both like 
and unlike one another and themselves4  
,how is that8    ,inasmuch as they are  
unlimited in their own nature1 they are 
all  affected in the same way4    ,true4
    ,and inasmuch as they all partake of
 limit1 they are all affected in the    
same way4    ,of course4    ,but        
inasmuch as their state is both limited 
and unlimited1 they are  affected in    
opposite ways4    ,yes4    ,and         
opposites are the most unlike of things4
    ,certainly4    ,considered1 then1 in
 regard to either one of their          

affections1 they will  be like          
themselves and one another2 considered  
in reference to both of  them together1 
most opposed and most unlike4    ,that  
appears to be true4    ,then the others 
are both like and unlike themselves and 
one another8    ,true4    ,and they are 
the same and also different from one    
another1 and in motion  and at rest1 and
 experience every sort of opposite      
affection1 as may be  proved without    
difficulty of them1 since they have been
 shown to have  experienced the         
affections aforesaid8    ,true4         
#a4;bb4 ,suppose1 now1 that we leave the
 further discussion of these  matters as
 evident1 and consider again upon the   
hypothesis that the  one is1 whether    
opposite of all this is or is not       
equally true of the  others4    ,by all 
means4    ,then let us begin again1 and 
ask1 ,if one is1 what must be the       
affections  of the others8    ,let us   
ask that question4    ,must not the one 
be distinct from the others1 and the    

others from the  one8    ,why so8       
,why1 because there is nothing else     
beside them which is distinct from  both
 of them2 for the expression 'one and   
the others' includes all  things4       
,yes1 all things4    ,then we cannot    
suppose that there is anything different
 from them in  which both the one and   
the others might exist8    ,there is    
nothing4    ,then the one and the others
 are never in the same8    ,true4       
,then they are separated from each      
other8    ,yes4    ,and we surely cannot
 say that what is truly one has parts8  
,impossible4    ,then the one will not  
be in the others as a whole1 nor as     
part1 if it be  separated from the      
others1 and has no parts8               
,impossible4    ,then there is no way in
 which the others can partake of the    
one1 if they  do not partake either in  
whole or in part8    ,it would seem not4
    ,then there is no way in which the  
others are one1 or have in themselves   
any unity8    ,there is not4    ,nor are

 the others many2 for if they were many1
 each part of them would  be a part of  
the whole2 but now the others1 not      
partaking in any way of  the one1 are   
neither one nor many1 nor whole1 nor    
part4    ,true4    ,then the others     
neither are nor contain two or three1 if
 entirely  deprived of the one8         
,true4    ,then the others are neither  
like nor unlike the one1 nor is likeness
  and unlikeness in them2 for if they   
were like and unlike1 or had in them    
likeness and unlikeness1 they would have
 two natures in them opposite to  one   
another4    ,that is clear4    ,but for 
that which partakes of nothing to       
partake of two things was held  by us to
 be impossible8    ,impossible4    ,then
 the others are neither like nor unlike 
nor both1 for if they were  like or     
unlike they would partake of one of     
those two natures1 which  would be one  
thing1 and if they were both they would 
partake of  opposites which would be two
 things1 and this has been shown to be  

impossible4    ,true4    ,therefore they
 are neither the same1 nor other1 nor in
 motion1 nor at  rest1 nor in a state of
 becoming1 nor of being destroyed1 nor  
greater1  nor less1 nor equal1 nor have 
they experienced anything else of the   
sort2 for1 if they are capable of       
experiencing any such affection1 they   
will participate in one and two and     
three1 and odd and even1 and in  these1 
as has been proved1 they do not         
participate1 seeing that they are       
altogether and in every way devoid of   
the one4    ,very true4    ,therefore if
 one is1 the one is all things1 and also
 nothing1 both in  relation to itself   
and to other things4    ,certainly4     
#b4;a4 ,well1 and ought we not to       
consider next what will be the          
consequence if the one is not8    ,yes2 
we ought4    ,what is the meaning of the
 hypothesis--,if the one is not2 is     
there any  difference between this and  
the hypothesis--,if the not one is not8 
,there is a difference1 certainly4      

,is there a difference only1 or rather  
are not the two expressions--if  the one
 is not1 and if the not one is not1     
entirely opposed8    ,they are entirely 
opposed4    ,and suppose a person to    
say3--,if greatness is not1 if smallness
 is not1  or anything of that sort1 does
 he not mean1 whenever he uses such an  
expression1 that 'what is not' is other 
than other things8    ,to be sure4      
,and so when he says ',if one is not' he
 clearly means1 that what 'is not'  is  
other than all others2 we know what he  
means--do we not8    ,yes1 we do4       
,when he says 'one1' he says something  
which is known2 and secondly  something 
which is other than all other things2 it
 makes no difference  whether he        
predicate of one being or not-being1 for
 that which is said  'not to be' is     
known to be something all the same1 and 
is distinguished  from other things4    
,certainly4    ,then ,i will begin      
again1 and ask3 ,if one is not1 what are
 the  consequences8 ,in the first place1

 as would appear1 there is a knowledge  
of it1 or the very meaning of the words1
 'if one is not1' would not be  known4  
,true4    ,secondly1 the others differ  
from it1 or it could not be described as
  different from the others8            
,certainly4    ,difference1 then1       
belongs to it as well as knowledge2 for 
in speaking of  the one as different    
from the others1 we do not speak of a   
difference in  the others1 but in the   
one4    ,clearly so4    ,moreover1 the  
one that is not is something and        
partakes of relation to  'that1' and    
'this1' and 'these1' and the like1 and  
is an attribute of  'this'2 for the one1
 or the others than the one1 could not  
have been  spoken of1 nor could any     
attribute or relative of the one that is
 not  have been or been spoken of1 nor  
could it have been said to be anything1 
if it did not partake of 'some1' or of  
the other relations just now  mentioned4
    ,true4    ,being1 then1 cannot be   
ascribed to the one1 since it is not2   

but the  one that is not may or rather  
must participate in many things1 if it  
and  nothing else is not2 if1 however1  
neither the one nor the one that  is not
 is supposed not to be1 and we are      
speaking of something of a  different   
nature1 we can predicate nothing of it4 
,but supposing that the  one that is not
 and nothing else is not1 then it must  
participate in the  predicate 'that1'   
and in many others4    ,certainly4      
,and it will have unlikeness in relation
 to the others1 for the others  being   
different from the one will be of a     
different kind4    ,certainly4    ,and  
are not things of a different kind also 
other in kind8    ,of course4    ,and   
are not things other in kind unlike8    
,they are unlike4    ,and if they are   
unlike the one1 that which they are     
unlike will clearly  be unlike them8    
,clearly so4    ,then the one will have 
unlikeness in respect of which the      
others are  unlike it8    ,that would   
seem to be true4    ,and if unlikeness  

to other things is attributed to it1 it 
must have  likeness to itself4    ,how  
so8    ,if the one have unlikeness to   
one1 something else must be meant2 nor  
will the hypothesis relate to one2 but  
it will relate to something other  than 
one8    ,quite so4    ,but that cannot  
be4    ,no4    ,then the one must have  
likeness to itself8    ,it must4        
,again1 it is not equal to the others2  
for if it were equal1 then it  would at 
once be and be like them in virtue of   
the equality2 but if one  has no being1 
then it can neither be nor be like8     
,it cannot4    ,but since it is not     
equal to the others1 neither can the    
others be equal  to it8    ,certainly   
not4    ,and things that are not equal  
are unequal8    ,true4    ,and they are 
unequal to an unequal8    ,of course4   
,then the one partakes of inequality1   
and in respect of this the others  are  
unequal to it8    ,very true4    ,and   
inequality implies greatness and        
smallness8    ,yes4    ,then the one1 if

 of such a nature1 has greatness and    
smallness8    ,that appears to be true4 
,and greatness and smallness always     
stand apart8    ,true4    ,then there is
 always something between them8         
,there is4    ,and can you think of     
anything else which is between them     
other than  equality8    ,no1 it is     
equality which lies between them4       
,then that which has greatness and      
smallness also has equality1 which  lies
 between them8    ,that is clear4       
,then the one1 which is not1 partakes1  
as would appear1 of greatness and       
smallness and equality8    ,clearly4    
,further1 it must surely in a sort      
partake of being8    ,how so8    ,it    
must be so1 for if not1 then we should  
not speak the truth in saying  that the 
one is not4 ,but if we speak the truth1 
clearly we must say what  is4 ,am ,i not
 right8    ,yes4    ,and since we affirm
 that we speak truly1 we must also      
affirm that we say  what is8            
,certainly4    ,then1 as would appear1  

the one1 when it is not1 is2 for if it  
were  not to be when it is not1 but     
7,or1 'to remit something of existence  
in  relation to not-being4'7 were to    
relinquish something of being1 so as to 
become not-being1 it would at once be4  
,quite true4    ,then the one which is  
not1 if it is to maintain itself1 must  
have the  being of not-being as the bond
 of not-being1 just as being must have  
as  a bond the not-being of not-being in
 order to perfect its own being2  for   
the truest assertion of the being of    
being and of the not-being of  not-being
 is when being partakes of the being of 
being1 and not of the  being of         
not-being--that is1 the perfection of   
being2 and when not-being  does not     
partake of the not-being of not-being   
but of the being of  not-being--that is 
the perfection of not-being4    ,most   
true4    ,since then what is partakes of
 not-being1 and what is not of being1   
must  not the one also partake of being 
in order not to be8    ,certainly4      

,then the one1 if it is not1 clearly has
 being8    ,clearly4    ,and has        
not-being also1 if it is not8    ,of    
course4    ,but can anything which is in
 a certain state not be in that state   
without changing8    ,impossible4       
,then everything which is and is not in 
a certain state1 implies change8        
,certainly4    ,and change is motion--we
 may say that8    ,yes1 motion4    ,and 
the one has been proved both to be and  
not to be8    ,yes4    ,and therefore is
 and is not in the same state8    ,yes4 
,thus the one that is not has been shown
 to have motion also1 because it        
changes from being to not-being8        
,that appears to be true4    ,but surely
 if it is nowhere among what is1 as is  
the fact1 since it is  not1 it cannot   
change from one place to another8       
,impossible4    ,then it cannot move by 
changing place8    ,no4    ,nor can it  
turn on the same spot1 for it nowhere   
touches the same1 for  the same is1 and 
that which is not cannot be reckoned    

among things that  are8    ,it cannot4  
,then the one1 if it is not1 cannot turn
 in that in which it is not8    ,no4    
,neither can the one1 whether it is or  
is not1 be altered into other  than     
itself1 for if it altered and became    
different from itself1 then we  could   
not be still speaking of the one1 but of
 something else8    ,true4    ,but if   
the one neither suffers alteration1 nor 
turns round in the same  place1 nor     
changes place1 can it still be capable  
of motion8    ,impossible4    ,now that 
which is unmoved must surely be at rest1
 and that which is at  rest must stand  
still8    ,certainly4    ,then the one  
that is not1 stands still1 and is also  
in motion8    ,that seems to be true4   
,but if it be in motion it must         
necessarily undergo alteration1 for     
anything which is moved1 in so far as it
 is moved1 is no longer in the  same    
state1 but in another8    ,yes4    ,then
 the one1 being moved1 is altered8      
,yes4    ,and1 further1 if not moved in 

any way1 it will not be altered in any  
way8    ,no4    ,then1 in so far as the 
one that is not is moved1 it is altered1
 but in  so far as it is not moved1 it  
is not altered8    ,right4    ,then the 
one that is not is altered and is not   
altered8    ,that is clear4    ,and must
 not that which is altered become other 
than it previously  was1 and lose its   
former state and be destroyed2 but that 
which is not  altered can neither come  
into being nor be destroyed8    ,very   
true4    ,and the one that is not1 being
 altered1 becomes and is destroyed2 and 
not being altered1 neither becomes nor  
is destroyed2 and so the one that  is   
not becomes and is destroyed1 and       
neither becomes nor is destroyed8       
,true4    #b4;b4 ,and now1 let us go    
back once more to the beginning1 and see
 whether  these or some other           
consequences will follow4    ,let us do 
as you say4    ,if one is not1 we ask   
what will happen in respect of one8     
,that is the  question4    ,yes4    ,do 

not the words 'is not' signify absence  
of being in that to which we  apply     
them8    ,just so4    ,and when we say  
that a thing is not1 do we mean that it 
is not in one  way but is in another8 or
 do we mean1 absolutely1 that what is   
not has  in no sort or way or kind      
participation of being8    ,quite       
absolutely4    ,then1 that which is not 
cannot be1 or in any way participate in 
being8    ,it cannot4    ,and did we not
 mean by becoming1 and being destroyed1 
the assumption of  being and the loss of
 being8    ,nothing else4    ,and can   
that which has no participation in      
being1 either assume or lose  being8    
,impossible4    ,the one then1 since it 
in no way is1 cannot have or lose or    
assume being  in any way8    ,true4     
,then the one that is not1 since it in  
no way partakes of being1 neither       
perishes nor becomes8    ,no4    ,then  
it is not altered at all2 for if it were
 it would become and be  destroyed8     
,true4    ,but if it be not altered it  

cannot be moved8    ,certainly not4     
,nor can we say that it stands1 if it is
 nowhere2 for that which stands  must   
always be in one and the same spot8     
,of course4    ,then we must say that   
the one which is not never stands still 
and never  moves8    ,neither4    ,nor  
is there any existing thing which can be
 attributed to it2 for if  there had    
been1 it would partake of being8        
,that is clear4    ,and therefore       
neither smallness1 nor greatness1 nor   
equality1 can be  attributed to it8     
,no4    ,nor yet likeness nor           
difference1 either in relation to itself
 or to  others8    ,clearly not4        
,well1 and if nothing should be         
attributed to it1 can other things be   
attributed to it8    ,certainly not4    
,and therefore other things can neither 
be like or unlike1 the same1 or         
different in relation to it8    ,they   
cannot4    ,nor can what is not1 be     
anything1 or be this thing1 or be       
related to or  the attribute of this or 

that or other1 or be past1 present1 or  
future4  ,nor can knowledge1 or opinion1
 or perception1 or expression1 or name1 
or  any other thing that is1 have any   
concern with it8    ,no4    ,then the   
one that is not has no condition of any 
kind8    ,such appears to be the        
conclusion4    #b4;aa4 ,yet once more2  
if one is not1 what becomes of the      
others8 ,let us  determine that4        
,yes2 let us determine that4    ,the    
others must surely be2 for if they1 like
 the one1 were not1 we could  not be now
 speaking of them4    ,true4    ,but to 
speak of the others implies             
difference--the terms 'other' and       
'different' are synonymous8    ,true4   
,other means other than other1 and      
different1 different from the           
different8    ,yes4    ,then1 if there  
are to be others1 there is something    
than which they will  be other8         
,certainly4    ,and what can that       
be8--for if the one is not1 they will   
not be other  than the one4    ,they    

will not4    ,then they will be other   
than each other2 for the only remaining 
alternative is that they are other than 
nothing4    ,true4    ,and they are each
 other than one another1 as being plural
 and not  singular2 for if one is not1  
they cannot be singular1 but every      
particle  of them is infinite in number2
 and even if a person takes that which  
appears to be the smallest fraction1    
this1 which seemed one1 in a moment     
evanesces into many1 as in a dream1 and 
from being the smallest becomes  very   
great1 in comparison with the fractions 
into which it is split up8    ,very     
true4    ,and in such particles the     
others will be other than one another1  
if  others are1 and the one is not8     
,exactly4    ,and will there not be many
 particles1 each appearing to be one1   
but not  being one1 if one is not8      
,true4    ,and it would seem that number
 can be predicated of them if each of   
them  appears to be one1 though it is   
really many8    ,it can4    ,and there  

will seem to be odd and even among them1
 which will also have  no reality1 if   
one is not8    ,yes4    ,and there will 
appear to be a least among them2 and    
even this will seem  large and manifold 
in comparison with the many small       
fractions which are  contained in it8   
,certainly4    ,and each particle will  
be imagined to be equal to the many and 
little2  for it could not have appeared 
to pass from the greater to the less    
without having appeared to arrive at the
 middle2 and thus would arise  the      
appearance of equality4    ,yes4    ,and
 having neither beginning1 middle1 nor  
end1 each separate particle  yet appears
 to have a limit in relation to itself  
and other4    ,how so8    ,because1 when
 a person conceives of any one of these 
as such1 prior  to the beginning another
 beginning appears1 and there is another
 end1  remaining after the end1 and in  
the middle truer middles within but     
smaller1 because no unity can be        
conceived of any of them1 since the one 

is not4    ,very true4    ,and so all   
being1 whatever we think of1 must be    
broken up into  fractions1 for a        
particle will have to be conceived of   
without unity8    ,certainly4    ,and   
such being when seen indistinctly and at
 a distance1 appears to  be one2 but    
when seen near and with keen intellect1 
every single thing  appears to be       
infinite1 since it is deprived of the   
one1 which is not8    ,nothing more     
certain4    ,then each of the others    
must appear to be infinite and finite1  
and one  and many1 if others than the   
one exist and not the one4    ,they     
must4    ,then will they not appear to  
be like and unlike8    ,in what way8    
,just as in a picture things appear to  
be all one to a person standing at  a   
distance1 and to be in the same state   
and alike8    ,true4    ,but when you   
approach them1 they appear to be many   
and different2 and  because of the      
appearance of the difference1 different 
in kind from1 and  unlike1 themselves8  

,true4    ,and so must the particles    
appear to be like and unlike themselves 
and  each other4    ,certainly4    ,and 
must they not be the same and yet       
different from one another1 and in      
contact with themselves1 although they  
are separated1 and having  every sort of
 motion1 and every sort of rest1 and    
becoming and being  destroyed1 and in   
neither state1 and the like1 all which  
things may be  easily enumerated1 if the
 one is not and the many are8    ,most  
true4    #b4;bb4 ,once more1 let us go  
back to the beginning1 and ask if the   
one is  not1 and the others of the one  
are1 what will follow4    ,let us ask   
that question4    ,in the first place1  
the others will not be one8             
,impossible4    ,nor will they be many2 
for if they were many one would be      
contained  in them4 ,but if no one of   
them is one1 all of them are nought1 and
  therefore they will not be many4      
,true4    ,if there be no one in the    
others1 the others are neither many nor 

one4    ,they are not4    ,nor do they  
appear either as one or many4    ,why   
not8    ,because the others have no sort
 or manner or way of communion with any 
sort of not-being1 nor can anything     
which is not1 be connected with any  of 
the others2 for that which is not has no
 parts4    ,true4    ,nor is there an   
opinion or any appearance of not-being  
in connexion with  the others1 nor is   
not-being ever in any way attributed to 
the others4    ,no4    ,then if one is  
not1 there is no conception of any of   
the others either  as one or many2 for  
you cannot conceive the many without the
 one4    ,you cannot4    ,then if one is
 not1 the others neither are1 nor can be
 conceived to be  either one or many8   
,it would seem not4    ,nor as like or  
unlike8    ,no4    ,nor as the same or  
different1 nor in contact or separation1
 nor in any  of those states which we   
enumerated as appearing to be2--the     
others  neither are nor appear to be any
 of these1 if one is not8    ,true4     

,then may we not sum up the argument in 
a word and say truly3 ,if one is  not1  
then nothing is8    ,certainly4    ,let 
thus much be said2 and further let us   
affirm what seems to be the  truth1     
that1 whether one is or is not1 one and 
the others in relation to  themselves   
and one another1 all of them1 in every  
way1 are and are not1  and appear to be 
and appear not to be4    ,most true4