,,gorgias    by ,plato    ,translated by
 ,benjamin ,jowett      ,contents       
,,introduction   ,,gorgias              
,,introduction      ,in several of the  
dialogues of ,plato1 doubts have arisen 
among his  interpreters as to which of  
the various subjects discussed in them  
is  the main thesis4 ,the speakers have 
the freedom of conversation2 no  severe 
rules of art restrict them1 and         
sometimes we are inclined to  think1    
with one of the dramatis personae in the
 ,theaetetus1 that the  digressions have
 the greater interest4 ,yet in the most 
irregular of the  dialogues there is    
also a certain natural growth or unity2 
the  beginning is not forgotten at the  
end1 and numerous allusions and         
references are interspersed1 which form 
the loose connecting links of  the      
whole4 ,we must not neglect this unity1 
but neither must we attempt  to confine 
the ,platonic dialogue on the           
,procrustean bed of a single  idea4     
7,compare ,introduction to the          

,phaedrus47    ,two tendencies seem to  
have beset the interpreters of ,plato in
 this  matter4 ,first1 they have        
endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon  
one  another by the slightest threads2  
and have thus been led to opposite  and 
contradictory assertions respecting     
their order and sequence4 ,the  mantle  
of ,schleiermacher has descended upon   
his successors1 who have  applied his   
method with the most various results4   
,the value and use of  the method has   
been hardly1 if at all1 examined either 
by him or them4  ,secondly1 they have   
extended almost indefinitely the scope  
of each  separate dialogue2 in this way 
they think that they have escaped all   
difficulties1 not seeing that what they 
have gained in generality they  have    
lost in truth and distinctness4         
,metaphysical conceptions easily  pass  
into one another2 and the simpler       
notions of antiquity1 which we  can only
 realize by an effort1 imperceptibly    
blend with the more  familiar theories  

of modern philosophers4 ,an eye for     
proportion is  needed 7his own art of   
measuring7 in the study of ,plato1 as   
well as of  other great artists4 ,we may
 hardly admit that the moral antithesis 
of  good and pleasure1 or the           
intellectual antithesis of knowledge and
  opinion1 being and appearance1 are    
never far off in a ,platonic            
discussion4 ,but because they are in the
 background1 we should not bring  them  
into the foreground1 or expect to       
discern them equally in all the         
dialogues4    ,there may be some        
advantage in drawing out a little the   
main outlines  of the building2 but the 
use of this is limited1 and may be      
easily  exaggerated4 ,we may give ,plato
 too much system1 and alter the natural 
form and connection of his thoughts4    
,under the idea that his dialogues  are 
finished works of art1 we may find a    
reason for everything1 and  lose the    
highest characteristic of art1 which is 
simplicity4 ,most great  works receive a

 new light from a new and original mind4
 ,but whether  these new lights are true
 or only suggestive1 will depend on     
their  agreement with the spirit of     
,plato1 and the amount of direct        
evidence  which can be urged in support 
of them4 ,when a theory is running away 
with us1 criticism does a friendly      
office in counselling moderation1  and  
recalling us to the indications of the  
text4    ,like the ,phaedrus1 the       
,gorgias has puzzled students of ,plato 
by the  appearance of two or more       
subjects4 ,under the cover of rhetoric  
higher  themes are introduced2 the      
argument expands into a general view of 
the  good and evil of man4 ,after making
 an ineffectual attempt to obtain a     
sound definition of his art from        
,gorgias1 ,socrates assumes the         
existence of a universal art of flattery
 or simulation having several           
branches3--this is the genus of which   
rhetoric is only one1 and not the       
highest species4 ,to flattery is opposed

 the true and noble art of life  which  
he who possesses seeks always to impart 
to others1 and which at  last triumphs1 
if not here1 at any rate in another     
world4 ,these two  aspects of life and  
knowledge appear to be the two leading  
ideas of the  dialogue4 ,the true and   
the false in individuals and states1 in 
the  treatment of the soul as well as of
 the body1 are conceived under the      
forms of true and false art4 ,in the    
development of this opposition  there   
arise various other questions1 such as  
the two famous paradoxes  of ,socrates  
7paradoxes as they are to the world in  
general1 ideals as  they may be more    
worthily called73 7#a7 that to do is    
worse than to  suffer evil2 and 7#b7    
that when a man has done evil he had    
better be  punished than unpunished2 to 
which may be added 7#c7 a third         
,socratic  paradox or ideal1 that bad   
men do what they think best1 but not    
what  they desire1 for the desire of all
 is towards the good4 ,that pleasure  is

 to be distinguished from good is proved
 by the simultaneousness of  pleasure   
and pain1 and by the possibility of the 
bad having in certain  cases pleasures  
as great as those of the good1 or even  
greater4 ,not  merely rhetoricians1 but 
poets1 musicians1 and other artists1 the
 whole  tribe of statesmen1 past as well
 as present1 are included in the class  
of flatterers4 ,the true and false      
finally appear before the  judgment-seat
 of the gods below4    ,the dialogue    
naturally falls into three divisions1 to
 which the three  characters of         
,gorgias1 ,polus1 and ,callicles        
respectively correspond2  and the form  
and manner change with the stages of the
 argument4  ,socrates is deferential    
towards ,gorgias1 playful and yet       
cutting in  dealing with the youthful   
,polus1 ironical and sarcastic in his   
encounter with ,callicles4 ,in the first
 division the question is  asked--,what 
is rhetoric8 ,to this there is no answer
 given1 for ,gorgias  is soon made to   

contradict himself by ,socrates1 and the
 argument is  transferred to the hands  
of his disciple ,polus1 who rushes to   
the  defence of his master4 ,the answer 
has at last to be given by ,socrates    
himself1 but before he can even explain 
his meaning to ,polus1 he must          
enlighten him upon the great subject of 
shams or flatteries4 ,when ,polus  finds
 his favourite art reduced to the level 
of cookery1 he replies  that at any rate
 rhetoricians1 like despots1 have great 
power4 ,socrates  denies that they have 
any real power1 and hence arise the     
three  paradoxes already mentioned4     
,although they are strange to him1      
,polus is  at last convinced of their   
truth2 at least1 they seem to him to    
follow  legitimately from the premises4 
,thus the second act of the dialogue    
closes4 ,then ,callicles appears on the 
scene1 at first maintaining that        
pleasure is good1 and that might is     
right1 and that law is nothing but  the 
combination of the many weak against the

 few strong4 ,when he is  confuted he   
withdraws from the argument1 and leaves 
,socrates to arrive  at the conclusion  
by himself4 ,the conclusion is that     
there are two  kinds of statesmanship1 a
 higher and a lower--that which makes   
the  people better1 and that which only 
flatters them1 and he exhorts           
,callicles to choose the higher4 ,the   
dialogue terminates with a mythus  of a 
final judgment1 in which there will be  
no more flattery or  disguise1 and no   
further use for the teaching of         
rhetoric4    ,the characters of the     
three interlocutors also correspond to  
the parts  which are assigned to them4  
,gorgias is the great rhetorician1 now  
advanced in years1 who goes from city to
 city displaying his talents1  and is   
celebrated throughout ,greece4 ,like all
 the ,sophists in the  dialogues of     
,plato1 he is vain and boastful1 yet he 
has also a certain  dignity1 and is     
treated by ,socrates with considerable  
respect4 ,but he  is no match for him in

 dialectics4 ,although he has been      
teaching  rhetoric all his life1 he is  
still incapable of defining his own art4
  ,when his ideas begin to clear up1 he 
is unwilling to admit that  rhetoric can
 be wholly separated from justice and   
injustice1 and this  lingering sentiment
 of morality1 or regard for public      
opinion1 enables  ,socrates to detect   
him in a contradiction4 ,like           
,protagoras1 he is  described as of a   
generous nature2 he expresses his       
approbation of  ,socrates' manner of    
approaching a question2 he is quite 8one
 of  ,socrates' sort1 ready to be       
refuted as well as to refute10 and very 
eager that ,callicles and ,socrates     
should have the game out4 ,he knows by  
experience that rhetoric exercises great
 influence over other men1 but  he is   
unable to explain the puzzle how        
rhetoric can teach everything  and know 
nothing4    ,polus is an impetuous      
youth1 a runaway 8colt10 as ,socrates   
describes  him1 who wanted originally to

 have taken the place of ,gorgias under 
the  pretext that the old man was tired1
 and now avails himself of the  earliest
 opportunity to enter the lists4 ,he is 
said to be the author of  a work on     
rhetoric1 and is again mentioned in the 
,phaedrus1 as the  inventor of balanced 
or double forms of speech 7compare      
,gorg42 ,symp474  ,at first he is       
violent and ill-mannered1 and is angry  
at seeing his  master overthrown4 ,but  
in the judicious hands of ,socrates he  
is soon  restored to good-humour1 and   
compelled to assent to the required     
conclusion4 ,like ,gorgias1 he is       
overthrown because he compromises2 he   
is unwilling to say that to do is fairer
 or more honourable than to  suffer     
injustice4 ,though he is fascinated by  
the power of rhetoric1 and  dazzled by  
the splendour of success1 he is not     
insensible to higher  arguments4 ,plato 
may have felt that there would be an    
incongruity in a  youth maintaining the 
cause of injustice against the world4   

,he has  never heard the other side of  
the question1 and he listens to the     
paradoxes1 as they appear to him1 of    
,socrates with evident  astonishment4   
,he can hardly understand the meaning of
 ,archelaus being  miserable1 or of     
rhetoric being only useful in           
self-accusation4 ,when  the argument    
with him has fairly run out4            
,callicles1 in whose house they are     
assembled1 is introduced on the  stage3 
he is with difficulty convinced that    
,socrates is in earnest2 for  if these  
things are true1 then1 as he says with  
real emotion1 the  foundations of       
society are upside down4 ,in him another
 type of  character is represented2 he  
is neither sophist nor philosopher1 but 
man of the world1 and an accomplished   
,athenian gentleman4 ,he might be       
described in modern language as a cynic 
or materialist1 a lover of  power and   
also of pleasure1 and unscrupulous in   
his means of attaining  both4 ,there is 
no desire on his part to offer any      

compromise in the  interests of         
morality2 nor is any concession made by 
him4 ,like  ,thrasymachus in the        
,republic1 though he is not of the same 
weak and  vulgar class1 he consistently 
maintains that might is right4 ,his     
great  motive of action is political    
ambition2 in this he is                 
characteristically ,greek4 ,like ,anytus
 in the ,meno1 he is the enemy of  the  
,sophists2 but favours the new art of   
rhetoric1 which he regards as  an       
excellent weapon of attack and defence4 
,he is a despiser of mankind  as he is  
of philosophy1 and sees in the laws of  
the state only a  violation of the order
 of nature1 which intended that the     
stronger  should govern the weaker      
7compare ,republic74 ,like other men of 
the  world who are of a speculative turn
 of mind1 he generalizes the bad  side  
of human nature1 and has easily brought 
down his principles to his  practice4   
,philosophy and poetry alike supply him 
with distinctions  suited to his view of

 human life4 ,he has a good will to     
,socrates1 whose  talents he evidently  
admires1 while he censures the puerile  
use which  he makes of them4 ,he        
expresses a keen intellectual interest  
in the  argument4 ,like ,anytus1 again1 
he has a sympathy with other men of the 
world2 the ,athenian statesmen of a     
former generation1 who showed no        
weakness and made no mistakes1 such as  
,miltiades1 ,themistocles1  ,pericles1  
are his favourites4 ,his ideal of human 
character is a man of  great passions   
and great powers1 which he has developed
 to the utmost1  and which he uses in   
his own enjoyment and in the government 
of others4  ,had ,critias been the name 
instead of ,callicles1 about whom we    
know  nothing from other sources1 the   
opinions of the man would have seemed   
to reflect the history of his life4     
,and now the combat deepens4 ,in        
,callicles1 far more than in any sophist
  or rhetorician1 is concentrated the   
spirit of evil against which  ,socrates 

is contending1 the spirit of the world1 
the spirit of the many  contending      
against the one wise man1 of which the  
,sophists1 as he  describes them in the 
,republic1 are the imitators rather than
 the  authors1 being themselves carried 
away by the great tide of public        
opinion4 ,socrates approaches his       
antagonist warily from a distance1  with
 a sort of irony which touches with a   
light hand both his personal  vices     
7probably in allusion to some scandal of
 the day7 and his  servility to the     
populace4 ,at the same time1 he is in   
most profound  earnest1 as ,chaerephon  
remarks4 ,callicles soon loses his      
temper1 but  the more he is irritated1  
the more provoking and matter of fact   
does  ,socrates become4 ,a repartee of  
his which appears to have been really   
made to the 8omniscient0 ,hippias1      
according to the testimony of  ,xenophon
 7,mem471 is introduced4 ,he is called  
by ,callicles a popular  declaimer1 and 
certainly shows that he has the power1  

in the words of  ,gorgias1 of being 8as 
long as he pleases10 or 8as short as he 
pleases0  7compare ,protag474 ,callicles
 exhibits great ability in defending    
himself and attacking ,socrates1 whom he
 accuses of trifling and                
word-splitting2 he is scandalized that  
the legitimate consequences of  his own 
argument should be stated in plain      
terms2 after the manner of  men of the  
world1 he wishes to preserve the        
decencies of life4 ,but he  cannot      
consistently maintain the bad sense of  
words2 and getting  confused between the
 abstract notions of better1 superior1  
stronger1 he  is easily turned round by 
,socrates1 and only induced to continue 
the  argument by the authority of       
,gorgias4 ,once1 when ,socrates is      
describing  the manner in which the     
ambitious citizen has to identify       
himself with  the people1 he partially  
recognizes the truth of his words4      
,the ,socrates of the ,gorgias may be   
compared with the ,socrates of the      

,protagoras and ,meno4 ,as in other     
dialogues1 he is the enemy of the       
,sophists and rhetoricians2 and also of 
the statesmen1 whom he regards  as      
another variety of the same species4    
,his behaviour is governed by  that of  
his opponents2 the least forwardness or 
egotism on their part  is met by a      
corresponding irony on the part of      
,socrates4 ,he must speak1  for         
philosophy will not allow him to be     
silent4 ,he is indeed more  ironical and
 provoking than in any other of ,plato's
 writings3 for he is  8fooled to the top
 of his bent0 by the worldliness of     
,callicles4 ,but he  is also more deeply
 in earnest4 ,he rises higher than even 
in the ,phaedo  and ,crito3 at first    
enveloping his moral convictions in a   
cloud of dust  and dialectics1 he ends  
by losing his method1 his life1 himself1
 in  them4 ,as in the ,protagoras and   
,phaedrus1 throwing aside the veil of   
irony1 he makes a speech1 but1 true to  
his character1 not until his  adversary 

has refused to answer any more          
questions4 ,the presentiment of  his own
 fate is hanging over him4 ,he is aware 
that ,socrates1 the single  real teacher
 of politics1 as he ventures to call    
himself1 cannot safely  go to war with  
the whole world1 and that in the courts 
of earth he will  be condemned4 ,but he 
will be justified in the world below4   
,then the  position of ,socrates and    
,callicles will be reversed2 all those  
things  8unfit for ears polite0 which   
,callicles has prophesied as likely to  
happen to him in this life1 the         
insulting language1 the box on the      
ears1 will recoil upon his assailant4   
7,compare ,republic1 and the  similar   
reversal of the position of the lawyer  
and the philosopher in  the             
,theaetetus74    ,there is an           
interesting allusion to his own         
behaviour at the trial of  the generals 
after the battle of ,arginusae1 which he
 ironically  attributes to his ignorance
 of the manner in which a vote of the   

assembly should be taken4 ,this is said 
to have happened 8last year0  7,b4,c4   
#djf71 and therefore the assumed date of
 the dialogue has been  fixed at #dje   
,b4,c41 when ,socrates would already    
have been an old man4  ,the date is     
clearly marked1 but is scarcely         
reconcilable with another  indication of
 time1 viz4 the 8recent0 usurpation of  
,archelaus1 which  occurred in the year 
#dac2 and still less with the 8recent0  
death of  ,pericles1 who really died    
twenty-four years previously 7#dbi      
,b4,c47 and  is afterwards reckoned     
among the statesmen of a past age2 or   
with the  mention of ,nicias1 who died  
in #dac1 and is nevertheless spoken of  
as a  living witness4 ,but we shall     
hereafter have reason to observe1 that  
although there is a general consistency 
of times and persons in the  ,dialogues 
of ,plato1 a precise dramatic date is an
 invention of his  commentators         
7,preface to ,republic74    ,the        
conclusion of the ,dialogue is          

remarkable1 7#a7 for the truly          
characteristic declaration of ,socrates 
that he is ignorant of the true  nature 
and bearing of these things1 while he   
affirms at the same time  that no one   
can maintain any other view without     
being ridiculous4 ,the  profession of   
ignorance reminds us of the earlier and 
more exclusively  ,socratic ,dialogues4 
,but neither in them1 nor in the        
,apology1 nor in the  ,memorabilia of   
,xenophon1 does ,socrates express any   
doubt of the  fundamental truths of     
morality4 ,he evidently regards this    
8among the  multitude of questions0     
which agitate human life 8as the        
principle  which alone remains          
unshaken40 ,he does not insist here1 any
 more than  in the ,phaedo1 on the      
literal truth of the myth1 but only on  
the  soundness of the doctrine which is 
contained in it1 that doing wrong is    
worse than suffering1 and that a man    
should be rather than seem2 for  the    
next best thing to a man's being just is

 that he should be  corrected and become
 just2 also that he should avoid all    
flattery1  whether of himself or of     
others2 and that rhetoric should be     
employed  for the maintenance of the    
right only4 ,the revelation of another  
life  is a recapitulation of the        
argument in a figure4    7#b7 ,socrates 
makes the singular remark1 that he is   
himself the only  true politician of his
 age4 ,in other passages1 especially in 
the  ,apology1 he disclaims being a     
politician at all4 ,there he is         
convinced  that he or any other good man
 who attempted to resist the popular    
will  would be put to death before he   
had done any good to himself or others4 
,here he anticipates such a fate for    
himself1 from the fact that he is  8the 
only man of the present day who performs
 his public duties at  all40 ,the two   
points of view are not really           
inconsistent1 but the  difference       
between them is worth noticing3         
,socrates is and is not a  public man4  

,not in the ordinary sense1 like        
,alcibiades or ,pericles1 but  in a     
higher one2 and this will sooner or     
later entail the same  consequences on  
him4 ,he cannot be a private man if he  
would2 neither  can he separate morals  
from politics4 ,nor is he unwilling to  
be a  politician1 although he foresees  
the dangers which await him2 but he     
must first become a better and wiser    
man1 for he as well as ,callicles  is in
 a state of perplexity and uncertainty4 
,and yet there is an  inconsistency3 for
 should not ,socrates too have taught   
the citizens  better than to put him to 
death8    ,and now1 as he himself says1 
we will 8resume the argument from the   
beginning40    ,socrates1 who is        
attended by his inseparable disciple1   
,chaerephon1  meets ,callicles in the   
streets of ,athens4 ,he is informed that
 he has  just missed an exhibition of   
,gorgias1 which he regrets1 because he  
was  desirous1 not of hearing ,gorgias  
display his rhetoric1 but of            

interrogating him concerning the nature 
of his art4 ,callicles proposes  that   
they shall go with him to his own house1
 where ,gorgias is staying4  ,there they
 find the great rhetorician and his     
younger friend and  disciple ,polus4    
,,socrates3 ,put the question to him1   
,chaerephon4    ,,chaerephon3 ,what     
question8    ,,socrates3 ,who is        
he8--such a question as would elicit    
from a man the  answer1 8,i am a        
cobbler40    ,polus suggests that       
,gorgias may be tired1 and desires to   
answer for  him4 8,who is ,gorgias80    
asks ,chaerephon1 imitating the manner  
of his  master ,socrates4 8,one of the  
best of men1 and a proficient in the    
best  and noblest of experimental arts10
 etc41 replies ,polus1 in rhetorical    
and balanced phrases4 ,socrates is      
dissatisfied at the length and          
unmeaningness of the answer2 he tells   
the disconcerted volunteer that  he has 
mistaken the quality for the nature of  
the art1 and remarks to  ,gorgias1 that 

,polus has learnt how to make a speech1 
but not how to  answer a question4 ,he  
wishes that ,gorgias would answer him4  
,gorgias is  willing enough1 and replies
 to the question asked by               
,chaerephon1--that  he is a rhetorician1
 and in ,homeric language1 8boasts      
himself to be a  good one40 ,at the     
request of ,socrates he promises to be  
brief2 for 8he  can be as long as he    
pleases1 and as short as he pleases40   
,socrates  would have him bestow his    
length on others1 and proceeds to ask   
him a  number of questions1 which are   
answered by him to his own great        
satisfaction1 and with a brevity which  
excites the admiration of  ,socrates4   
,the result of the discussion may be    
summed up as follows3--    ,rhetoric    
treats of discourse2 but music and      
medicine1 and other  particular arts1   
are also concerned with discourse2 in   
what way then  does rhetoric differ from
 them8 ,gorgias draws a distinction     
between the  arts which deal with words1

 and the arts which have to do with     
external  actions4 ,socrates extends    
this distinction further1 and divides   
all  productive arts into two classes3  
7#a7 arts which may be carried on in    
silence2 and 7#b7 arts which have to do 
with words1 or in which words  are      
coextensive with action1 such as        
arithmetic1 geometry1 rhetoric4  ,but   
still ,gorgias could hardly have meant  
to say that arithmetic was  the same as 
rhetoric4 ,even in the arts which are   
concerned with words  there are         
differences4 ,what then distinguishes   
rhetoric from the other  arts which have
 to do with words8 8,the words which    
rhetoric uses relate  to the best and   
greatest of human things40 ,but tell me1
 ,gorgias1 what  are the best8 8,health 
first1 beauty next1 wealth third10 in   
the words  of the old song1 or how would
 you rank them8 ,the arts will come to  
you  in a body1 each claiming precedence
 and saying that her own good is        
superior to that of the rest--,how will 

you choose between them8 8,i  should    
say1 ,socrates1 that the art of         
persuasion1 which gives freedom  to all 
men1 and to individuals power in the    
state1 is the greatest  good40 ,but what
 is the exact nature of this            
persuasion8--is the  persevering retort3
 ,you could not describe ,zeuxis as a   
painter1 or even  as a painter of       
figures1 if there were other painters of
 figures2  neither can you define       
rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion1
 because  there are other arts which    
persuade1 such as arithmetic1 which is  
an  art of persuasion about odd and even
 numbers4 ,gorgias is made to see  the  
necessity of a further limitation1 and  
he now defines rhetoric as  the art of  
persuading in the law courts1 and in the
 assembly1 about the  just and unjust4  
,but still there are two sorts of       
persuasion3 one which  gives knowledge1 
and another which gives belief without  
knowledge2 and  knowledge is always     
true1 but belief may be either true or  

false1--there  is therefore a further   
question3 which of the two sorts of     
persuasion  does rhetoric effect in     
courts of law and assemblies8 ,plainly  
that  which gives belief and not that   
which gives knowledge2 for no one can   
impart a real knowledge of such matters 
to a crowd of persons in a few  minutes4
 ,and there is another point to be      
considered3--when the assembly  meets to
 advise about walls or docks or military
 expeditions1 the  rhetorician is not   
taken into counsel1 but the architect1  
or the  general4 ,how would ,gorgias    
explain this phenomenon8 ,all who intend
 to  become disciples1 of whom there are
 several in the company1 and not        
,socrates only1 are eagerly             
asking3--,about what then will rhetoric 
teach  us to persuade or advise the     
state8    ,gorgias illustrates the      
nature of rhetoric by adducing the      
example of  ,themistocles1 who persuaded
 the ,athenians to build their docks and
  walls1 and of ,pericles1 whom         

,socrates himself has heard speaking    
about  the middle wall of the ,piraeus4 
,he adds that he has exercised a similar
  power over the patients of his brother
 ,herodicus4 ,he could be chosen a      
physician by the assembly if he pleased1
 for no physician could compete  with a 
rhetorician in popularity and influence4
 ,he could persuade the  multitude of   
anything by the power of his rhetoric2  
not that the  rhetorician ought to abuse
 this power any more than a boxer should
  abuse the art of self-defence4        
,rhetoric is a good thing1 but1 like all
  good things1 may be unlawfully used4  
,neither is the teacher of the art  to  
be deemed unjust because his pupils are 
unjust and make a bad use of  the       
lessons which they have learned from    
him4    ,socrates would like to know    
before he replies1 whether ,gorgias will
  quarrel with him if he points out a   
slight inconsistency into which he  has 
fallen1 or whether he1 like himself1 is 
one who loves to be  refuted4 ,gorgias  

declares that he is quite one of his    
sort1 but fears  that the argument may  
be tedious to the company4 ,the company 
cheer1 and  ,chaerephon and ,callicles  
exhort them to proceed4 ,socrates gently
 points  out the supposed inconsistency 
into which ,gorgias appears to have     
fallen1 and which he is inclined to     
think may arise out of a                
misapprehension of his own4 ,the        
rhetorician has been declared by        
,gorgias to be more persuasive to the   
ignorant than the physician1 or  any    
other expert4 ,and he is said to be     
ignorant1 and this ignorance of  his is 
regarded by ,gorgias as a happy         
condition1 for he has escaped the       
trouble of learning4 ,but is he as      
ignorant of just and unjust as he is  of
 medicine or building8 ,gorgias is      
compelled to admit that if he did  not  
know them previously he must learn them 
from his teacher as a part  of the art  
of rhetoric4 ,but he who has learned    
carpentry is a  carpenter1 and he who   

has learned music is a musician1 and he 
who has  learned justice is just4 ,the  
rhetorician then must be a just man1 and
  rhetoric is a just thing4 ,but        
,gorgias has already admitted the       
opposite  of this1 viz4 that rhetoric   
may be abused1 and that the rhetorician 
may  act unjustly4 ,how is the          
inconsistency to be explained8    ,the  
fallacy of this argument is twofold2 for
 in the first place1 a man  may know    
justice and not be just--here is the old
 confusion of the arts  and the         
virtues2--nor can any teacher be        
expected to counteract wholly  the bent 
of natural character2 and secondly1 a   
man may have a degree of  justice1 but  
not sufficient to prevent him from ever 
doing wrong4 ,polus  is naturally       
exasperated at the sophism1 which he is 
unable to detect2  of course1 he says1  
the rhetorician1 like every one else1   
will admit  that he knows justice 7how  
can he do otherwise when pressed by the 
interrogations of ,socrates871 but he   

thinks that great want of manners  is   
shown in bringing the argument to such a
 pass4 ,socrates ironically  replies1   
that when old men trip1 the young set   
them on their legs  again2 and he is    
quite willing to retract1 if he can be  
shown to be in  error1 but upon one     
condition1 which is that ,polus studies 
brevity4  ,polus is in great indignation
 at not being allowed to use as many    
words  as he pleases in the free state  
of ,athens4 ,socrates retorts1 that yet 
harder will be his own case1 if he is   
compelled to stay and listen to  them4  
,after some altercation they agree      
7compare ,protag471 that ,polus  shall  
ask and ,socrates answer4    8,what is  
the art of ,rhetoric80 says ,polus4 ,not
 an art at all1 replies  ,socrates1 but 
a thing which in your book you affirm to
 have created  art4 ,polus asks1 8,what 
thing80 and ,socrates answers1 ,an      
experience or  routine of making a sort 
of delight or gratification4 8,but is   
not  rhetoric a fine thing80 ,i have not

 yet told you what rhetoric is4 ,will   
you ask me another question--,what is   
cookery8 8,what is cookery80 ,an        
experience or routine of making a sort  
of delight or gratification4  ,then they
 are the same1 or rather fall under the 
same class1 and  rhetoric has still to  
be distinguished from cookery4 8,what is
  rhetoric80 asks ,polus once more4 ,a  
part of a not very creditable whole1    
which may be termed flattery1 is the    
reply4 8,but what part80 ,a shadow  of a
 part of politics4 ,this1 as might be   
expected1 is wholly  unintelligible1    
both to ,gorgias and ,polus2 and1 in    
order to explain his  meaning to them1  
,socrates draws a distinction between   
shadows or  appearances and realities2  
e4g4 there is real health of body or    
soul1  and the appearance of them2 real 
arts and sciences1 and the simulations  
of them4 ,now the soul and body have two
 arts waiting upon them1 first  the art 
of politics1 which attends on the soul1 
having a legislative  part and a        

judicial part2 and another art attending
 on the body1 which  has no generic     
name1 but may also be described as      
having two divisions1  one of which is  
medicine and the other gymnastic4       
,corresponding with  these four arts or 
sciences there are four shams or        
simulations of  them1 mere experiences1 
as they may be termed1 because they give
 no  reason of their own existence4 ,the
 art of dressing up is the sham or      
simulation of gymnastic1 the art of     
cookery1 of medicine2 rhetoric is  the  
simulation of justice1 and sophistic of 
legislation4 ,they may be  summed up in 
an arithmetical formula3--    ,tiring3  
gymnastic33 cookery3 medicine33         
sophistic3 legislation4    ,and1        
,cookery3 medicine33 rhetoric3 the art  
of justice4    ,and this is the true    
scheme of them1 but when measured only  
by the  gratification which they        
procure1 they become jumbled together   
and  return to their aboriginal chaos4  
,socrates apologizes for the length of  

his speech1 which was necessary to the  
explanation of the subject1 and  begs   
,polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on
 him4    8,do you mean to say that the  
rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers80  
,they are not esteemed at all4 8,why1   
have they not great power1 and can  they
 not do whatever they desire80 ,they    
have no power1 and they only do  what   
they think best1 and never what they    
desire2 for they never attain  the true 
object of desire1 which is the good4    
8,as if you1 ,socrates1  would not envy 
the possessor of despotic power1 who can
 imprison1  exile1 kill any one whom he 
pleases40 ,but ,socrates replies that he
 has  no wish to put any one to death2  
he who kills another1 even justly1 is   
not to be envied1 and he who kills him  
unjustly is to be pitied2 it is  better 
to suffer than to do injustice4 ,he does
 not consider that going  about with a  
dagger and putting men out of the way1  
or setting a house  on fire1 is real    
power4 ,to this ,polus assents1 on the  

ground that such  acts would be         
punished1 but he is still of opinion    
that evil-doers1 if  they are           
unpunished1 may be happy enough4 ,he    
instances ,archelaus1 son  of           
,perdiccas1 the usurper of ,macedonia4  
,does not ,socrates think him           
happy8--,socrates would like to know    
more about him2 he cannot pronounce     
even the great king to be happy1 unless 
he knows his mental and moral           
condition4 ,polus explains that         
,archelaus was a slave1 being the son of
  a woman who was the slave of ,alcetas1
 brother of ,perdiccas king of          
,macedon--and he1 by every species of   
crime1 first murdering his uncle  and   
then his cousin and half-brother1       
obtained the kingdom4 ,this was  very   
wicked1 and yet all the world1 including
 ,socrates1 would like to  have his     
place4 ,socrates dismisses the appeal to
 numbers2 ,polus1 if he  will1 may      
summon all the rich men of ,athens1     
,nicias and his brothers1               

,aristocrates1 the house of ,pericles1  
or any other great family--this is  the 
kind of evidence which is adduced in    
courts of justice1 where truth  depends 
upon numbers4 ,but ,socrates employs    
proof of another sort2 his  appeal is to
 one witness only1--that is to say1 the 
person with whom he  is speaking2 him he
 will convict out of his own mouth4 ,and
 he is  prepared to show1 after his     
manner1 that ,archelaus cannot be a     
wicked  man and yet happy4    ,the      
evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes1
 and miserable if he  suffers           
punishment2 but ,socrates thinks him    
less miserable if he  suffers than if he
 escapes4 ,polus is of opinion that such
 a paradox as  this hardly deserves     
refutation1 and is at any rate          
sufficiently  refuted by the fact4      
,socrates has only to compare the lot of
 the  successful tyrant who is the envy 
of the world1 and of the wretch who1    
having been detected in a criminal      
attempt against the state1 is  crucified

 or burnt to death4 ,socrates replies1  
that if they are both  criminal they are
 both miserable1 but that the unpunished
 is the more  miserable of the two4 ,at 
this ,polus laughs outright1 which leads
  ,socrates to remark that laughter is a
 new species of refutation4 ,polus      
replies1 that he is already refuted2 for
 if he will take the votes of  the      
company1 he will find that no one agrees
 with him4 ,to this ,socrates  rejoins1 
that he is not a public man1 and        
7referring to his own conduct  at the   
trial of the generals after the battle  
of ,arginusae7 is unable  to take the   
suffrages of any company1 as he had     
shown on a recent  occasion2 he can only
 deal with one witness at a time1 and   
that is the  person with whom he is     
arguing4 ,but he is certain that in the 
opinion  of any man to do is worse than 
to suffer evil4    ,polus1 though he    
will not admit this1 is ready to        
acknowledge that to  do evil is         
considered the more foul or             

dishonourable of the two4 ,but  what is 
fair and what is foul2 whether the terms
 are applied to bodies1  colours1       
figures1 laws1 habits1 studies1 must    
they not be defined with  reference to  
pleasure and utility8 ,polus assents to 
this latter  doctrine1 and is easily    
persuaded that the fouler of two things 
must  exceed either in pain or in hurt4 
,but the doing cannot exceed the        
suffering of evil in pain1 and therefore
 must exceed in hurt4 ,thus  doing is   
proved by the testimony of ,polus       
himself to be worse or more  hurtful    
than suffering4    ,there remains the   
other question3 ,is a guilty man better 
off when he is  punished or when he is  
unpunished8 ,socrates replies1 that what
 is done  justly is suffered justly3 if 
the act is just1 the effect is just2 if 
to punish is just1 to be punished is    
just1 and therefore fair1 and  therefore
 beneficent2 and the benefit is that the
 soul is improved4  ,there are three    
evils from which a man may suffer1 and  

which affect him  in estate1 body1 and  
soul2--these are1 poverty1 disease1     
injustice2 and  the foulest of these is 
injustice1 the evil of the soul1 because
 that  brings the greatest hurt4 ,and   
there are three arts which heal these   
evils--trading1 medicine1 justice--and  
the fairest of these is justice4  ,happy
 is he who has never committed          
injustice1 and happy in the second      
degree he who has been healed by        
punishment4 ,and therefore the criminal 
should himself go to the judge as he    
would to the physician1 and purge  away 
his crime4 ,rhetoric will enable him to 
display his guilt in proper  colours1   
and to sustain himself and others in    
enduring the necessary  penalty4 ,and   
similarly if a man has an enemy1 he will
 desire not to  punish him1 but that he 
shall go unpunished and become worse and
 worse1  taking care only that he does  
no injury to himself4 ,these are at     
least  conceivable uses of the art1 and 
no others have been discovered by us4   

,here ,callicles1 who has been listening
 in silent amazement1 asks  ,chaerephon 
whether ,socrates is in earnest1 and on 
receiving the  assurance that he is1    
proceeds to ask the same question of    
,socrates  himself4 ,for if such        
doctrines are true1 life must have been 
turned  upside down1 and all of us are  
doing the opposite of what we ought to  
be doing4    ,socrates replies in a     
style of playful irony1 that before men 
can  understand one another they must   
have some common feeling4 ,and such a   
community of feeling exists between     
himself and ,callicles1 for both of     
them are lovers1 and they have both a   
pair of loves2 the beloved of           
,callicles are the ,athenian ,demos and 
,demos the son of ,pyrilampes2 the      
beloved of ,socrates are ,alcibiades and
 philosophy4 ,the peculiarity of        
,callicles is that he can never         
contradict his loves2 he changes as his 
,demos changes in all his opinions2 he  
watches the countenance of both  his    

loves1 and repeats their sentiments1 and
 if any one is surprised at  his sayings
 and doings1 the explanation of them is1
 that he is not a  free agent1 but must 
always be imitating his two loves4 ,and 
this is the  explanation of ,socrates'  
peculiarities also4 ,he is always       
repeating  what his mistress1           
,philosophy1 is saying to him1 who      
unlike his other  love1 ,alcibiades1 is 
ever the same1 ever true4 ,callicles    
must refute  her1 or he will never be at
 unity with himself2 and discord in life
 is  far worse than the discord of      
musical sounds4    ,callicles answers1  
that ,gorgias was overthrown because1 as
 ,polus said1  in compliance with       
popular prejudice he had admitted that  
if his pupil  did not know justice the  
rhetorician must teach him2 and ,polus  
has been  similarly entangled1 because  
his modesty led him to admit that to    
suffer is more honourable than to do    
injustice4 ,by custom 8yes10 but  not by
 nature1 says ,callicles4 ,and ,socrates

 is always playing between  the two     
points of view1 and putting one in the  
place of the other4 ,in  this very      
argument1 what ,polus only meant in a   
conventional sense has  been affirmed by
 him to be a law of nature4 ,for        
convention says that  8injustice is     
dishonourable10 but nature says that    
8might is right40  ,and we are always   
taming down the nobler spirits among us 
to the  conventional level4 ,but        
sometimes a great man will rise up and  
reassert  his original rights1 trampling
 under foot all our formularies1 and    
then  the light of natural justice      
shines forth4 ,pindar says1 8,law1 the  
king  of all1 does violence with high   
hand20 as is indeed proved by the       
example of ,heracles1 who drove off the 
oxen of ,geryon and never paid  for     
them4    ,this is the truth1 ,socrates1 
as you will be convinced1 if you leave  
philosophy and pass on to the real      
business of life4 ,a little  philosophy 
is an excellent thing2 too much is the  

ruin of a man4 ,he who  has not 8passed 
his metaphysics0 before he has grown up 
to manhood will  never know the world4  
,philosophers are ridiculous when they  
take to  politics1 and ,i dare say that 
politicians are equally ridiculous when 
they take to philosophy3 8,every man10  
as ,euripides says1 8is fondest of  that
 in which he is best40 ,philosophy is   
graceful in youth1 like the  lisp of    
infancy1 and should be cultivated as a  
part of education2 but  when a grown-up 
man lisps or studies philosophy1 ,i     
should like to beat  him4 ,none of those
 over-refined natures ever come to any  
good2 they  avoid the busy haunts of    
men1 and skulk in corners1 whispering to
 a few  admiring youths1 and never      
giving utterance to any noble           
sentiments4    ,for you1 ,socrates1 ,i  
have a regard1 and therefore ,i say to  
you1 as  ,zethus says to ,amphion in the
 play1 that you have 8a noble soul      
disguised in a puerile exterior40 ,and  
,i would have you consider the  danger  

which you and other philosophers incur4 
,for you would not know  how to defend  
yourself if any one accused you in a    
law-court1--there you  would stand1 with
 gaping mouth and dizzy brain1 and might
 be murdered1  robbed1 boxed on the ears
 with impunity4 ,take my advice1 then1  
and get  a little common sense2 leave to
 others these frivolities2 walk in the  
ways of the wealthy and be wise4        
,socrates professes to have found in    
,callicles the philosopher's            
touchstone2 and he is certain that any  
opinion in which they both agree  must  
be the very truth4 ,callicles has all   
the three qualities which are  needed in
 a critic--knowledge1 good-will1        
frankness2 ,gorgias and ,polus1         
although learned men1 were too modest1  
and their modesty made them  contradict 
themselves4 ,but ,callicles is          
well-educated2 and he is not  too modest
 to speak out 7of this he has already   
given proof71 and his  good-will is     
shown both by his own profession and by 

his giving the  same caution against    
philosophy to ,socrates1 which ,socrates
 remembers  hearing him give long ago to
 his own clique of friends4 ,he will    
pledge  himself to retract any error    
into which he may have fallen1 and which
  ,callicles may point out4 ,but he     
would like to know first of all what he 
and ,pindar mean by natural justice4 ,do
 they suppose that the rule of  justice 
is the rule of the stronger or of the   
better80 8,there is no  difference40    
,then are not the many superior to the  
one1 and the  opinions of the many      
better8 ,and their opinion is that      
justice is  equality1 and that to do is 
more dishonourable than to suffer wrong4
  ,and as they are the superior or      
stronger1 this opinion of theirs must   
be in accordance with natural as well as
 conventional justice4 8,why  will you  
continue splitting words8 ,have ,i not  
told you that the  superior is the      
better80 ,but what do you mean by the   
better8 ,tell me  that1 and please to be

 a little milder in your language1 if   
you do not  wish to drive me away4 8,i  
mean the worthier1 the wiser40 ,you mean
 to  say that one man of sense ought to 
rule over ten thousand fools8 8,yes1    
that is my meaning40 ,ought the         
physician then to have a larger share of
  meats and drinks8 or the weaver to    
have more coats1 or the cobbler  larger 
shoes1 or the farmer more seed8 8,you   
are always saying the same  things1     
,socrates40 ,yes1 and on the same       
subjects too2 but you are never  saying 
the same things4 ,for1 first1 you       
defined the superior to be the          
stronger1 and then the wiser1 and now   
something else2--what ,,do you mean8    
8,i mean men of political ability1 who  
ought to govern and to have more  than  
the governed40 ,than themselves8 8,what 
do you mean80 ,i mean to say  that every
 man is his own governor4 8,i see that  
you mean those dolts1  the temperate4   
,but my doctrine is1 that a man should  
let his desires  grow1 and take the     

means of satisfying them4 ,to the many  
this is  impossible1 and therefore they 
combine to prevent him4 ,but if he is a 
king1 and has power1 how base would he  
be in submitting to them6 ,to  invite   
the common herd to be lord over him1    
when he might have the  enjoyment of all
 things6 ,for the truth is1 ,socrates1  
that luxury and  self-indulgence are    
virtue and happiness2 all the rest is   
mere talk40    ,socrates compliments    
,callicles on his frankness in saying   
what other  men only think4 ,according  
to his view1 those who want nothing are 
not  happy4 8,why10 says ,callicles1 8if
 they were1 stones and the dead would   
be happy40 ,socrates in reply is led    
into a half-serious1 half-comic  vein of
 reflection4 8,who knows10 as ,euripides
 says1 8whether life may  not be death1 
and death life80 ,nay1 there are        
philosophers who maintain  that even in 
life we are dead1 and that the body     
7soma7 is the tomb  7sema7 of the soul4 
,and some ingenious ,sicilian has made  

an allegory1  in which he represents    
fools as the uninitiated1 who are       
supposed to be  carrying water to a     
vessel1 which is full of holes1 in a    
similarly  holey sieve1 and this sieve  
is their own soul4 ,the idea is         
fanciful1  but nevertheless is a figure 
of a truth which ,i want to make you    
acknowledge1 viz4 that the life of      
contentment is better than the life  of 
indulgence4 ,are you disposed to admit  
that8 8,far otherwise40 ,then  hear     
another parable4 ,the life of           
self-contentment and self-indulgence    
may be represented respectively by two  
men1 who are filling jars with  streams 
of wine1 honey1 milk1--the jars of the  
one are sound1 and the  jars of the     
other leaky2 the first fills his jars1  
and has no more  trouble with them2 the 
second is always filling them1 and would
 suffer  extreme misery if he desisted4 
,are you of the same opinion still8     
8,yes1  ,socrates1 and the figure       
expresses what ,i mean4 ,for true       

pleasure is a  perpetual stream1 flowing
 in and flowing out4 ,to be hungry and  
always  eating1 to be thirsty and always
 drinking1 and to have all the other    
desires and to satisfy them1 that1 as ,i
 admit1 is my idea of  happiness40 ,and 
to be itching and always scratching8 8,i
 do not deny  that there may be         
happiness even in that40 ,and to indulge
 unnatural  desires1 if they are        
abundantly satisfied8 ,callicles is     
indignant at  the introduction of such  
topics4 ,but he is reminded by ,socrates
 that  they are introduced1 not by him1 
but by the maintainer of the identity   
of pleasure and good4 ,will ,callicles  
still maintain this8 8,yes1 for the     
sake of consistency1 he will40 ,the     
answer does not satisfy ,socrates1  who 
fears that he is losing his touchstone4 
,a profession of seriousness  on the    
part of ,callicles reassures him1 and   
they proceed with the  argument4        
,pleasure and good are the same1 but    
knowledge and courage are  not the same 

either with pleasure or good1 or with   
one another4  ,socrates disproves the   
first of these statements by showing    
that two  opposites cannot coexist1 but 
must alternate with one another--to be  
well and ill together is impossible4    
,but pleasure and pain are              
simultaneous1 and the cessation of them 
is simultaneous2 e4g4 in the  case of   
drinking and thirsting1 whereas good and
 evil are not  simultaneous1 and do not 
cease simultaneously1 and therefore     
pleasure  cannot be the same as good4   
,callicles has already lost his temper1 
and can only be persuaded to go  on by  
the interposition of ,gorgias4          
,socrates1 having already guarded       
against objections by distinguishing    
courage and knowledge from  pleasure and
 good1 proceeds3--,the good are good by 
the presence of good1  and the bad are  
bad by the presence of evil4 ,and the   
brave and wise are  good1 and the       
cowardly and foolish are bad4 ,and he   
who feels pleasure  is good1 and he who 

feels pain is bad1 and both feel        
pleasure and pain  in nearly the same   
degree1 and sometimes the bad man or    
coward in a  greater degree4 ,therefore 
the bad man or coward is as good as the 
brave  or may be even better4           
,callicles endeavours now to avert the  
inevitable absurdity by affirming  that 
he and all mankind admitted some        
pleasures to be good and others  bad4   
,the good are the beneficial1 and the   
bad are the hurtful1 and we  should     
choose the one and avoid the other4 ,but
 this1 as ,socrates  observes1 is a     
return to the old doctrine of himself   
and ,polus1 that  all things should be  
done for the sake of the good4          
,callicles assents to this1 and         
,socrates1 finding that they are agreed 
in distinguishing pleasure from good1   
returns to his old division of          
empirical habits1 or shams1 or          
flatteries1 which study pleasure only1  
and the arts which are concerned with   
the higher interests of soul and  body4 

,does ,callicles agree to this division8
 ,callicles will agree to  anything1 in 
order that he may get through the       
argument4 ,which of the  arts then are  
flatteries8 ,flute-playing1             
harp-playing1 choral  exhibitions1 the  
dithyrambics of ,cinesias are all       
equally condemned on  the ground that   
they give pleasure only2 and ,meles the 
harp-player1 who  was the father of     
,cinesias1 failed even in that4 ,the    
stately muse of  ,tragedy is bent upon  
pleasure1 and not upon improvement4     
,poetry in  general is only a rhetorical
 address to a mixed audience of men1    
women1  and children4 ,and the orators  
are very far from speaking with a view  
to  what is best2 their way is to humour
 the assembly as if they were  children4
    ,callicles replies1 that this is    
only true of some of them2 others have  
a real regard for their fellow-citizens4
 ,granted2 then there are two  species  
of oratory2 the one a flattery1 another 
which has a real regard  for the        

citizens4 ,but where are the orators    
among whom you find the  latter8        
,callicles admits that there are none   
remaining1 but there were  such in the  
days when ,themistocles1 ,cimon1        
,miltiades1 and the great  ,pericles    
were still alive4 ,socrates replies that
 none of these were  true artists1      
setting before themselves the duty of   
bringing order out  of disorder4 ,the   
good man and true orator has a settled  
design1 running  through his life1 to   
which he conforms all his words and     
actions2 he  desires to implant justice 
and eradicate injustice1 to implant all 
virtue and eradicate all vice in the    
minds of his citizens4 ,he is the       
physician who will not allow the sick   
man to indulge his appetites with  a    
variety of meats and drinks1 but insists
 on his exercising  self-restraint4 ,and
 this is good for the soul1 and better  
than the  unrestrained indulgence which 
,callicles was recently approving4      
,here ,callicles1 who had been with     

difficulty brought to this point1  turns
 restive1 and suggests that ,socrates   
shall answer his own  questions4        
8,then10 says ,socrates1 8one man must  
do for two20 and though  he had hoped to
 have given ,callicles an 8,amphion0 in 
return for his  8,zethus10 he is willing
 to proceed2 at the same time1 he hopes 
that  ,callicles will correct him1 if he
 falls into error4 ,he recapitulates    
the advantages which he has already     
won3--    ,the pleasant is not the same 
as the good--,callicles and ,i are      
agreed  about that1--but pleasure is to 
be pursued for the sake of the good1 and
  the good is that of which the presence
 makes us good2 we and all things  good 
have acquired some virtue or other4 ,and
 virtue1 whether of body or  soul1 of   
things or persons1 is not attained by   
accident1 but is due to  order and      
harmonious arrangement4 ,and the soul   
which has order is  better than the soul
 which is without order1 and is         
therefore temperate  and is therefore   

good1 and the intemperate is bad4 ,and  
he who is  temperate is also just and   
brave and pious1 and has attained the   
perfection of goodness and therefore of 
happiness1 and the intemperate  whom you
 approve is the opposite of all this and
 is wretched4 ,he  therefore who would  
be happy must pursue temperance and     
avoid  intemperance1 and if possible    
escape the necessity of punishment1 but 
if he have done wrong he must endure    
punishment4 ,in this way states and     
individuals should seek to attain       
harmony1 which1 as the wise tell us1  is
 the bond of heaven and earth1 of gods  
and men4 ,callicles has never           
discovered the power of geometrical     
proportion in both worlds2 he would     
have men aim at disproportion and       
excess4 ,but if he be wrong in this1    
and if self-control is the true secret  
of happiness1 then the paradox  is true 
that the only use of rhetoric is in     
self-accusation1 and ,polus  was right  
in saying that to do wrong is worse than

 to suffer wrong1 and  ,gorgias was     
right in saying that the rhetorician    
must be a just man4  ,and you were wrong
 in taunting me with my defenceless     
condition1 and in  saying that ,i might 
be accused or put to death or boxed on  
the ears  with impunity4 ,for ,i may    
repeat once more1 that to strike is     
worse than  to be stricken--to do than  
to suffer4 ,what ,i said then is now    
made fast  in adamantine bonds4 ,i      
myself know not the true nature of these
 things1  but ,i know that no one can   
deny my words and not be ridiculous4 ,to
 do  wrong is the greatest of evils1 and
 to suffer wrong is the next  greatest  
evil4 ,he who would avoid the last must 
be a ruler1 or the  friend of a ruler2  
and to be the friend he must be the     
equal of the  ruler1 and must also      
resemble him4 ,under his protection he  
will suffer  no evil1 but will he also  
do no evil8 ,nay1 will he not rather do 
all  the evil which he can and escape8  
,and in this way the greatest of all    

evils will befall him4 8,but this       
imitator of the tyrant10 rejoins        
,callicles1 8will kill any one who does 
not similarly imitate him40  ,socrates  
replies that he is not deaf1 and that he
 has heard that  repeated many times1   
and can only reply1 that a bad man will 
kill a  good one4 8,yes1 and that is the
 provoking thing40 ,not provoking to a  
man of sense who is not studying the    
arts which will preserve him from       
danger2 and this1 as you say1 is the use
 of rhetoric in courts of  justice4 ,but
 how many other arts are there which    
also save men from  death1 and are yet  
quite humble in their pretensions--such 
as the art of  swimming1 or the art of  
the pilot8 ,does not the pilot do men at
 least  as much service as the          
rhetorician1 and yet for the voyage from
 ,aegina  to ,athens he does not charge 
more than two obols1 and when he        
disembarks is quite unassuming in his   
demeanour8 ,the reason is that he  is   
not certain whether he has done his     

passengers any good in saving  them from
 death1 if one of them is diseased in   
body1 and still more if  he is diseased 
in mind--who can say8 ,the engineer too 
will often save  whole cities1 and yet  
you despise him1 and would not allow    
your son to  marry his daughter1 or his 
son to marry yours4 ,but what reason is 
there  in this8 ,for if virtue only     
means the saving of life1 whether your  
own  or another's1 you have no right to 
despise him or any practiser of  saving 
arts4 ,but is not virtue something      
different from saving and  being saved8 
,i would have you rather consider       
whether you ought not to  disregard     
length of life1 and think only how you  
can live best1 leaving  all besides to  
the will of ,heaven4 ,for you must not  
expect to have  influence either with   
the ,athenian ,demos or with ,demos the 
son of  ,pyrilampes1 unless you become  
like them4 ,what do you say to this8    
8,there is some truth in what you are   
saying1 but ,i do not entirely  believe 

you40    ,that is because you are in    
love with ,demos4 ,but let us have a    
little  more conversation4 ,you remember
 the two processes--one which was       
directed to pleasure1 the other which   
was directed to making men as  good as  
possible4 ,and those who have the care  
of the city should make  the citizens as
 good as possible4 ,but who would       
undertake a public  building1 if he had 
never had a teacher of the art of       
building1 and had  never constructed a  
building before8 or who would undertake 
the duty of  state-physician1 if he had 
never cured either himself or any one   
else8  ,should we not examine him before
 we entrusted him with the office8 ,and 
as ,callicles is about to enter public  
life1 should we not examine him8  ,whom 
has he made better8 ,for we have already
 admitted that this is the  statesman's 
proper business4 ,and we must ask the   
same question about  ,pericles1 and     
,cimon1 and ,miltiades1 and             
,themistocles4 ,whom did they  make     

better8 ,nay1 did not ,pericles make the
 citizens worse8 ,for he gave  them pay1
 and at first he was very popular with  
them1 but at last they  condemned him to
 death4 ,yet surely he would be a bad   
tamer of animals  who1 having received  
them gentle1 taught them to kick and    
butt1 and man  is an animal2 and        
,pericles who had the charge of man only
 made him  wilder1 and more savage and  
unjust1 and therefore he could not have 
been a good statesman4 ,the same tale   
might be repeated about ,cimon1         
,themistocles1 ,miltiades4 ,but the     
charioteer who keeps his seat at first  
is not thrown out when he gains greater 
experience and skill4 ,the  inference   
is1 that the statesman of a past age    
were no better than  those of our own4  
,they may have been cleverer            
constructors of docks and  harbours1 but
 they did not improve the character of  
the citizens4 ,i  have told you again   
and again 7and ,i purposely use the same
 images7  that the soul1 like the body1 

may be treated in two ways--there is the
  meaner and the higher art4 ,you seemed
 to understand what ,i said at the      
time1 but when ,i ask you who were the  
really good statesmen1 you  answer--as  
if ,i asked you who were the good       
trainers1 and you answered1  ,thearion1 
the baker1 ,mithoecus1 the author of the
 ,sicilian  cookery-book1 ,sarambus1 the
 vintner4 ,and you would be affronted if
 ,i  told you that these are a parcel of
 cooks who make men fat only to make    
them thin4 ,and those whom they have    
fattened applaud them1 instead of       
finding fault with them1 and lay the    
blame of their subsequent  disorders on 
their physicians4 ,in this respect1     
,callicles1 you are like  them2 you     
applaud the statesmen of old1 who       
pandered to the vices of  the citizens1 
and filled the city with docks and      
harbours1 but  neglected virtue and     
justice4 ,and when the fit of illness   
comes1 the  citizens who in like manner 
applauded ,themistocles1 ,pericles1 and 

others1 will lay hold of you and my     
friend ,alcibiades1 and you will  suffer
 for the misdeeds of your predecessors4 
,the old story is always  being         
repeated--8after all his services1 the  
ungrateful city banished  him1 or       
condemned him to death40 ,as if the     
statesman should not have  taught the   
city better6 ,he surely cannot blame the
 state for having  unjustly used him1   
any more than the sophist or teacher can
 find fault  with his pupils if they    
cheat him4 ,and the sophist and orator  
are in  the same case2 although you     
admire rhetoric and despise sophistic1  
whereas sophistic is really the higher  
of the two4 ,the teacher of the  arts   
takes money1 but the teacher of virtue  
or politics takes no money1  because    
this is the only kind of service which  
makes the disciple  desirous of         
requiting his teacher4    ,socrates     
concludes by finally asking1 to which of
 the two modes of  serving the state    
,callicles invites him3--8to the        

inferior and  ministerial one10 is the  
ingenuous reply4 ,that is the only way  
of  avoiding death1 replies ,socrates2  
and he has heard often enough1 and      
would rather not hear again1 that the   
bad man will kill the good4 ,but  he    
thinks that such a fate is very likely  
reserved for him1 because he  remarks   
that he is the only person who teaches  
the true art of  politics4 ,and very    
probably1 as in the case which he       
described to  ,polus1 he may be the     
physician who is tried by a jury of     
children4 ,he  cannot say that he has   
procured the citizens any pleasure1 and 
if any  one charges him with perplexing 
them1 or with reviling their elders1 he 
will not be able to make them understand
 that he has only been actuated  by a   
desire for their good4 ,and therefore   
there is no saying what his  fate may   
be4 8,and do you think that a man who is
 unable to help himself  is in a good   
condition80 ,yes1 ,callicles1 if he have
 the true self-help1  which is never to 

have said or done any wrong to himself  
or others4 ,if  ,i had not this kind of 
self-help1 ,i should be ashamed2 but if 
,i die for  want of your flattering     
rhetoric1 ,i shall die in peace4 ,for   
death is no  evil1 but to go to the     
world below laden with offences is the  
worst of  evils4 ,in proof of which ,i  
will tell you a tale3--    ,under the   
rule of ,cronos1 men were judged on the 
day of their death1  and when judgment  
had been given upon them they           
departed--the good to  the islands of   
the blest1 the bad to the house of      
vengeance4 ,but as  they were still     
living1 and had their clothes on at the 
time when they  were being judged1 there
 was favouritism1 and ,zeus1 when he    
came to the  throne1 was obliged to     
alter the mode of procedure1 and try    
them after  death1 having first sent    
down ,prometheus to take away from them 
the  foreknowledge of death4 ,minos1    
,rhadamanthus1 and ,aeacus were         
appointed  to be the judges2            

,rhadamanthus for ,asia1 ,aeacus for    
,europe1 and ,minos  was to hold the    
court of appeal4 ,now death is the      
separation of soul  and body1 but after 
death soul and body alike retain their  
characteristics2 the fat man1 the dandy1
 the branded slave1 are all             
distinguishable4 ,some prince or        
potentate1 perhaps even the great king  
himself1 appears before ,rhadamanthus1  
and he instantly detects him1  though he
 knows not who he is2 he sees the scars 
of perjury and  iniquity1 and sends him 
away to the house of torment4    ,for   
there are two classes of souls who      
undergo punishment--the curable  and the
 incurable4 ,the curable are those who  
are benefited by their  punishment2 the 
incurable are such as ,archelaus1 who   
benefit others by  becoming a warning to
 them4 ,the latter class are generally  
kings and  potentates2 meaner persons1  
happily for themselves1 have not the    
same  power of doing injustice4         
,sisyphus and ,tityus1 not ,thersites1  

are  supposed by ,homer to be undergoing
 everlasting punishment4 ,not that      
there is anything to prevent a great man
 from being a good one1 as is  shown by 
the famous example of ,aristeides1 the  
son of ,lysimachus4 ,but  to            
,rhadamanthus the souls are only known  
as good or bad2 they are  stripped of   
their dignities and preferments2 he     
despatches the bad to  ,tartarus1       
labelled either as curable or incurable1
 and looks with love  and admiration on 
the soul of some just one1 whom he sends
 to the  islands of the blest4 ,similar 
is the practice of ,aeacus2 and ,minos  
overlooks them1 holding a golden        
sceptre1 as ,odysseus in ,homer saw him 
8,wielding a sceptre of gold1 and giving
 laws to the dead40      ,my wish for   
myself and my fellow-men is1 that we may
 present our souls  undefiled to the    
judge in that day2 my desire in life is 
to be able to  meet death4 ,and ,i      
exhort you1 and retort upon you the     
reproach which  you cast upon me1--that 

you will stand before the judge1 gaping1
 and  with dizzy brain1 and any one may 
box you on the ear1 and do you all      
manner of evil4    ,perhaps you think   
that this is an old wives' fable4 ,but  
you1 who are  the three wisest men in   
,hellas1 have nothing better to say1 and
 no one  will ever show that to do is   
better than to suffer evil4 ,a man      
should  study to be1 and not merely to  
seem4 ,if he is bad1 he should become   
good1 and avoid all flattery1 whether of
 the many or of the few4    ,follow me1 
then2 and if you are looked down upon1  
that will do you no  harm4 ,and when we 
have practised virtue1 we will betake   
ourselves to  politics1 but not until we
 are delivered from the shameful state  
of  ignorance and uncertainty in which  
we are at present4 ,let us follow in    
the way of virtue and justice1 and not  
in the way to which you1  ,callicles1   
invite us2 for that way is nothing      
worth4    ,we will now consider in order
 some of the principal points of the    

dialogue4 ,having regard 7#a7 to the age
 of ,plato and the ironical  character  
of his writings1 we may compare him with
 himself1 and with  other great         
teachers1 and we may note in passing the
 objections of his  critics4 ,and then  
7#b7 casting one eye upon him1 we may   
cast another  upon ourselves1 and       
endeavour to draw out the great lessons 
which he  teaches for all time1 stripped
 of the accidental form in which they   
are  enveloped4    7#a7 ,in the         
,gorgias1 as in nearly all the other    
dialogues of ,plato1 we  are made aware 
that formal logic has as yet no         
existence4 ,the old  difficulty of      
framing a definition recurs4 ,the       
illusive analogy of the  arts and the   
virtues also continues4 ,the ambiguity  
of several words1  such as nature1      
custom1 the honourable1 the good1 is not
 cleared up4  ,the ,sophists are still  
floundering about the distinction of the
 real  and seeming4 ,figures of speech  
are made the basis of arguments4 ,the   

possibility of conceiving a universal   
art or science1 which admits of         
application to a particular             
subject-matter1 is a difficulty which   
remains unsolved1 and has not altogether
 ceased to haunt the world at  the      
present day 7compare ,charmides74 ,the  
defect of clearness is also  apparent in
 ,socrates himself1 unless we suppose   
him to be practising on  the simplicity 
of his opponent1 or rather perhaps      
trying an experiment  in dialectics4    
,nothing can be more fallacious than the
 contradiction  which he pretends to    
have discovered in the answers of       
,gorgias 7see  above74 ,the advantages  
which he gains over ,polus are also due 
to a  false antithesis of pleasure and  
good1 and to an erroneous assertion     
that an agent and a patient may be      
described by similar predicates2--a     
mistake which ,aristotle partly shares  
and partly corrects in the  ,nicomachean
 ,ethics4 ,traces of a 8robust          
sophistry0 are likewise  discernible in 

his argument with ,callicles4    7#b7   
,although ,socrates professes to be     
convinced by reason only1 yet the       
argument is often a sort of dialectical 
fiction1 by which he conducts  himself  
and others to his own ideal of life and 
action4 ,and we may  sometimes wish that
 we could have suggested answers to his 
antagonists1  or pointed out to them the
 rocks which lay concealed under the    
ambiguous terms good1 pleasure1 and the 
like4 ,but it would be as  useless to   
examine his arguments by the            
requirements of modern logic1  as to    
criticise this ideal from a merely      
utilitarian point of view4 ,if  we say  
that the ideal is generally regarded as 
unattainable1 and that  mankind will by 
no means agree in thinking that the     
criminal is happier  when punished than 
when unpunished1 any more than they     
would agree to  the stoical paradox that
 a man may be happy on the rack1 ,plato 
has  already admitted that the world is 
against him4 ,neither does he mean to   

say that ,archelaus is tormented by the 
stings of conscience2 or that  the      
sensations of the impaled criminal are  
more agreeable than those of  the tyrant
 drowned in luxurious enjoyment4        
,neither is he speaking1 as  in the     
,protagoras1 of virtue as a calculation 
of pleasure1 an opinion  which he       
afterwards repudiates in the ,phaedo4   
,what then is his meaning8  ,his meaning
 we shall be able to illustrate best by 
parallel notions1  which1 whether       
justifiable by logic or not1 have always
 existed among  mankind4 ,we must remind
 the reader that ,socrates himself      
implies that  he will be understood or  
appreciated by very few4    ,he is      
speaking not of the consciousness of    
happiness1 but of the idea  of          
happiness4 ,when a martyr dies in a good
 cause1 when a soldier falls  in battle1
 we do not suppose that death or wounds 
are without pain1 or  that their        
physical suffering is always compensated
 by a mental  satisfaction4 ,still we   

regard them as happy1 and we would a    
thousand  times rather have their death 
than a shameful life4 ,nor is this only 
because we believe that they will obtain
 an immortality of fame1 or  that they  
will have crowns of glory in another    
world1 when their  enemies and          
persecutors will be proportionably      
tormented4 ,men are found  in a few     
instances to do what is right1 without  
reference to public  opinion or to      
consequences4 ,and we regard them as    
happy on this ground  only1 much as     
,socrates' friends in the opening of the
 ,phaedo are  described as regarding    
him2 or as was said of another1 8they   
looked  upon his face as upon the face  
of an angel40 ,we are not concerned to  
justify this idealism by the standard of
 utility or public opinion1 but  merely 
to point out the existence of such a    
sentiment in the better  part of human  
nature4    ,the idealism of ,plato is   
founded upon this sentiment4 ,he would  
maintain  that in some sense or other   

truth and right are alone to be sought1 
and  that all other goods are only      
desirable as means towards these4 ,he is
  thought to have erred in 8considering 
the agent only1 and making no  reference
 to the happiness of others1 as affected
 by him40 ,but the  happiness of others 
or of mankind1 if regarded as an end1 is
 really  quite as ideal and almost as   
paradoxical to the common understanding 
as  ,plato's conception of happiness4   
,for the greatest happiness of the      
greatest number may mean also the       
greatest pain of the individual which   
will procure the greatest pleasure of   
the greatest number4 ,ideas of  utility1
 like those of duty and right1 may be   
pushed to unpleasant  consequences4 ,nor
 can ,plato in the ,gorgias be deemed   
purely  self-regarding1 considering that
 ,socrates expressly mentions the duty  
of imparting the truth when discovered  
to others4 ,nor must we forget  that the
 side of ethics which regards others is 
by the ancients merged  in politics4    

,both in ,plato and ,aristotle1 as well 
as in the ,stoics1 the  social          
principle1 though taking another form1  
is really far more  prominent than in   
most modern treatises on ethics4    ,the
 idealizing of suffering is one of the  
conceptions which have  exercised the   
greatest influence on mankind4 ,into the
 theological  import of this1 or into   
the consideration of the errors to which
 the  idea may have given rise1 we need 
not now enter4 ,all will agree that  the
 ideal of the ,divine ,sufferer1 whose  
words the world would not  receive1 the 
man of sorrows of whom the ,hebrew      
prophets spoke1 has sunk  deep into the 
heart of the human race4 ,it is a       
similar picture of  suffering goodness  
which ,plato desires to pourtray1 not   
without an  allusion to the fate of his 
master ,socrates4 ,he is convinced that1
  somehow or other1 such an one must be 
happy in life or after death4 ,in  the  
,republic1 he endeavours to show that   
his happiness would be assured  here in 

a well-ordered state4 ,but in the actual
 condition of human  things the wise and
 good are weak and miserable2 such an   
one is like a  man fallen among wild    
beasts1 exposed to every sort of wrong  
and  obloquy4    ,plato1 like other     
philosophers1 is thus led on to the     
conclusion1 that  if 8the ways of ,god0 
to man are to be 8justified10 the hopes 
of another  life must be included4 ,if  
the question could have been put to him1
  whether a man dying in torments was   
happy still1 even if1 as he  suggests in
 the ,apology1 8death be only a long    
sleep10 we can hardly  tell what would  
have been his answer4 ,there have been a
 few1 who1 quite  independently of      
rewards and punishments or of posthumous
 reputation1  or any other influence of 
public opinion1 have been willing to    
sacrifice their lives for the good of   
others4 ,it is difficult to say  how far
 in such cases an unconscious hope of a 
future life1 or a  general faith in the 
victory of good in the world1 may have  

supported  the sufferers4 ,but this     
extreme idealism is not in accordance   
with the  spirit of ,plato4 ,he supposes
 a day of retribution1 in which the good
  are to be rewarded and the wicked     
punished4 ,though1 as he says in the    
,phaedo1 no man of sense will maintain  
that the details of the stories  about  
another world are true1 he will insist  
that something of the kind  is true1 and
 will frame his life with a view to this
 unknown future4  ,even in the ,republic
 he introduces a future life as an      
afterthought1  when the superior        
happiness of the just has been          
established on what is  thought to be an
 immutable foundation4 ,at the same time
 he makes a  point of determining his   
main thesis independently of remoter    
consequences4    7#c7 ,plato's theory of
 punishment is partly vindictive1 partly
  corrective4 ,in the ,gorgias1 as well 
as in the ,phaedo and ,republic1 a  few 
great criminals1 chiefly tyrants1 are   
reserved as examples4 ,but  most men    

have never had the opportunity of       
attaining this pre-eminence  of evil4   
,they are not incurable1 and their      
punishment is intended for  their       
improvement4 ,they are to suffer because
 they have sinned2 like  sick men1 they 
must go to the physician and be healed4 
,on this  representation of ,plato's the
 criticism has been made1 that the      
analogy  of disease and injustice is    
partial only1 and that suffering1       
instead  of improving men1 may have just
 the opposite effect4    ,like the      
general analogy of the arts and the     
virtues1 the analogy of  disease and    
injustice1 or of medicine and justice1  
is certainly  imperfect4 ,but ideas must
 be given through something2 the nature 
of the  mind which is unseen can only be
 represented under figures derived from 
visible objects4 ,if these figures are  
suggestive of some new aspect  under    
which the mind may be considered1 we    
cannot find fault with them  for not    
exactly coinciding with the ideas       

represented4 ,they partake of  the      
imperfect nature of language1 and must  
not be construed in too  strict a       
manner4 ,that ,plato sometimes reasons  
from them as if they were  not figures  
but realities1 is due to the defective  
logical analysis of  his age4    ,nor   
does he distinguish between the         
suffering which improves and the        
suffering which only punishes and       
deters4 ,he applies to the sphere of    
ethics a conception of punishment which 
is really derived from criminal  law4   
,he does not see that such punishment is
 only negative1 and  supplies no        
principle of moral growth or            
development4 ,he is not far off  the    
higher notion of an education of man to 
be begun in this world1 and  to be      
continued in other stages of existence1 
which is further  developed in the      
,republic4 ,and ,christian thinkers1 who
 have ventured  out of the beaten track 
in their meditations on the 8last       
things10 have  found a ray of light in  

his writings4 ,but he has not explained 
how or  in what way punishment is to    
contribute to the improvement of        
mankind4  ,he has not followed out the  
principle which he affirms in the       
,republic1  that 8,god is the author of 
evil only with a view to good10 and that
  8they were the better for being       
punished40 ,still his doctrine of a     
future state of rewards and punishments 
may be compared favourably with  that   
perversion of ,christian doctrine which 
makes the everlasting  punishment of    
human beings depend on a brief moment of
 time1 or even on  the accident of an   
accident4 ,and he has escaped the       
difficulty which  has often beset       
divines1 respecting the future destiny  
of the meaner  sort of men 7,thersites  
and the like71 who are neither very good
 nor  very bad1 by not counting them    
worthy of eternal damnation4    ,we do  
,plato violence in pressing his figures 
of speech or chains of  argument2 and   
not less so in asking questions which   

were beyond the  horizon of his vision1 
or did not come within the scope of his 
design4  ,the main purpose of the       
,gorgias is not to answer questions     
about a  future world1 but to place in  
antagonism the true and false life1 and 
to contrast the judgments and opinions  
of men with judgment according  to the  
truth4 ,plato may be accused of         
representing a superhuman or            
transcendental virtue in the description
 of the just man in the  ,gorgias1 or in
 the companion portrait of the          
philosopher in the  ,theaetetus2 and at 
the same time may be thought to be      
condemning a  state of the world which  
always has existed and always will exist
 among  men4 ,but such ideals act       
powerfully on the imagination of        
mankind4 ,and  such condemnations are   
not mere paradoxes of philosophers1 but 
the  natural rebellion of the higher    
sense of right in man against the       
ordinary conditions of human life4 ,the 
greatest statesmen have fallen  very far

 short of the political ideal1 and are  
therefore justly  involved in the       
general condemnation4    ,subordinate to
 the main purpose of the dialogue are   
some other  questions1 which may be     
briefly considered3--    a4 ,the        
antithesis of good and pleasure1 which  
as in other dialogues is  supposed to   
consist in the permanent nature of the  
one compared with  the transient and    
relative nature of the other4 ,good and 
pleasure1  knowledge and sense1 truth   
and opinion1 essence and generation1    
virtue  and pleasure1 the real and the  
apparent1 the infinite and finite1      
harmony or beauty and discord1 dialectic
 and rhetoric or poetry1 are so  many   
pairs of opposites1 which in ,plato     
easily pass into one another1  and are  
seldom kept perfectly distinct4 ,and we 
must not forget that  ,plato's          
conception of pleasure is the           
,heracleitean flux transferred to  the  
sphere of human conduct4 ,there is some 
degree of unfairness in  opposing the   

principle of good1 which is objective1  
to the principle of  pleasure1 which is 
subjective4 ,for the assertion of the   
permanence of  good is only based on the
 assumption of its objective character4 
,had  ,plato fixed his mind1 not on the 
ideal nature of good1 but on the        
subjective consciousness of happiness1  
that would have been found to be  as    
transient and precarious as pleasure4   
b4 ,the arts or sciences1 when pursued  
without any view to truth1 or the       
improvement of human life1 are called   
flatteries4 ,they are all alike         
dependent upon the opinion of mankind1  
from which they are derived4 ,to  ,plato
 the whole world appears to be sunk in  
error1 based on  self-interest4 ,to this
 is opposed the one wise man hardly     
professing to  have found truth1 yet    
strong in the conviction that a virtuous
 life is  the only good1 whether        
regarded with reference to this world or
 to  another4 ,statesmen1 ,sophists1    
rhetoricians1 poets1 are alike brought  

up  for judgment4 ,they are the parodies
 of wise men1 and their arts are the    
parodies of true arts and sciences4 ,all
 that they call science is  merely the  
result of that study of the tempers of  
the ,great ,beast1  which he describes  
in the ,republic4    c4 ,various other  
points of contact naturally suggest     
themselves between  the ,gorgias and    
other dialogues1 especially the         
,republic1 the ,philebus1  and the      
,protagoras4 ,there are closer          
resemblances both of spirit and         
language in the ,republic than in any   
other dialogue1 the verbal  similarity  
tending to show that they were written  
at the same period of  ,plato's life4   
,for the ,republic supplies that        
education and training of  which the    
,gorgias suggests the necessity4 ,the   
theory of the many weak  combining      
against the few strong in the formation 
of society 7which is  indeed a partial  
truth71 is similar in both of them1 and 
is expressed  in nearly the same        

language4 ,the sufferings and fate of   
the just man1  the powerlessness of     
evil1 and the reversal of the situation 
in another  life1 are also points of    
similarity4 ,the poets1 like the        
rhetoricians1  are condemned because    
they aim at pleasure only1 as in the    
,republic  they are expelled by the     
,state1 because they are imitators1 and 
minister to the weaker side of human    
nature4 ,that poetry is akin to         
rhetoric may be compared with the       
analogous notion1 which occurs in the   
,protagoras1 that the ancient poets were
 the ,sophists of their day4 ,in  some  
other respects the ,protagoras rather   
offers a contrast than a  parallel4 ,the
 character of ,protagoras may be        
compared with that of  ,gorgias1 but the
 conception of happiness is different in
 the two  dialogues2 being described in 
the former1 according to the old        
,socratic  notion1 as deferred or       
accumulated pleasure1 while in the      
,gorgias1 and  in the ,phaedo1 pleasure 

and good are distinctly opposed4        
,this opposition is carried out from a  
speculative point of view in the        
,philebus4 ,there neither pleasure nor  
wisdom are allowed to be the chief      
good1 but pleasure and good are not so  
completely opposed as in the  ,gorgias4 
,for innocent pleasures1 and such as    
have no antecedent pains1  are allowed  
to rank in the class of goods4 ,the     
allusion to ,gorgias'  definition of    
rhetoric 7,philebus2 compare ,gorg471 as
 the art of  persuasion1 of all arts the
 best1 for to it all things submit1 not 
by  compulsion1 but of their own free   
will--marks a close and perhaps         
designed connection between the two     
dialogues4 ,in both the ideas of        
measure1 order1 harmony1 are the        
connecting links between the beautiful  
and the good4    ,in general spirit and 
character1 that is1 in irony and        
antagonism to  public opinion1 the      
,gorgias most nearly resembles the      
,apology1 ,crito1  and portions of the  

,republic1 and like the ,philebus1      
though from  another point of view1 may 
be thought to stand in the same relation
 to  ,plato's theory of morals which the
 ,theaetetus bears to his theory of     
knowledge4    d4 ,a few minor points    
still remain to be summed up3 7#a7 ,the 
extravagant  irony in the reason which  
is assigned for the pilot's modest      
charge2  and in the proposed use of     
rhetoric as an instrument of            
self-condemnation2 and in the mighty    
power of geometrical equality in  both  
worlds4 7#b7 ,the reference of the      
mythus to the previous discussion       
should not be overlooked3 the fate      
reserved for incurable criminals  such  
as ,archelaus2 the retaliation of the   
box on the ears2 the  nakedness of the  
souls and of the judges who are stript  
of the clothes  or disguises which      
rhetoric and public opinion have        
hitherto provided  for them 7compare    
,swift's notion that the universe is a  
suit of  clothes1 ,tale of a ,tub74 ,the

 fiction seems to have involved ,plato  
in  the necessity of supposing that the 
soul retained a sort of corporeal       
likeness after death4 7#c7 ,the appeal  
of the authority of ,homer1 who  says   
that ,odysseus saw ,minos in his court  
8holding a golden sceptre10  which gives
 verisimilitude to the tale4    ,it is  
scarcely necessary to repeat that ,plato
 is playing 8both sides of  the game10  
and that in criticising the characters  
of ,gorgias and ,polus1  we are not     
passing any judgment on historical      
individuals1 but only  attempting to    
analyze the 8dramatis personae' as they 
were conceived by  him4 ,neither is it  
necessary to enlarge upon the obvious   
fact that  ,plato is a dramatic writer1 
whose real opinions cannot always be    
assumed to be those which he puts into  
the mouth of ,socrates1 or any  other   
speaker who appears to have the best of 
the argument2 or to  repeat the         
observation that he is a poet as well as
 a philosopher2 or  to remark that he is

 not to be tried by a modern standard1  
but  interpreted with reference to his  
place in the history of thought and  the
 opinion of his time4    ,it has been   
said that the most characteristic       
feature of the ,gorgias is  the         
assertion of the right of dissent1 or   
private judgment4 ,but this  mode of    
stating the question is really opposed  
both to the spirit of  ,plato and of    
ancient philosophy generally4 ,for      
,plato is not asserting  any abstract   
right or duty of toleration1 or         
advantage to be derived  from freedom of
 thought2 indeed1 in some other parts of
 his writings  7e4g4 ,laws71 he has     
fairly laid himself open to the charge  
of  intolerance4 ,no speculations had as
 yet arisen respecting the 8liberty  of 
prophesying2' and ,plato is not         
affirming any abstract right of this    
nature3 but he is asserting the duty and
 right of the one wise and true  man to 
dissent from the folly and falsehood of 
the many4 ,at the same  time he         

acknowledges the natural result1 which  
he hardly seeks to  avert1 that he who  
speaks the truth to a multitude1        
regardless of  consequences1 will       
probably share the fate of ,socrates4   
,the irony of ,plato sometimes veils    
from us the height of idealism to  which
 he soars4 ,when declaring truths which 
the many will not receive1  he puts on  
an armour which cannot be pierced by    
them4 ,the weapons of  ridicule are     
taken out of their hands and the laugh  
is turned against  themselves4 ,the     
disguises which ,socrates assumes are   
like the parables  of the ,new          
,testament1 or the oracles of the       
,delphian ,god2 they half  conceal1 half
 reveal1 his meaning4 ,the more he is in
 earnest1 the more  ironical he becomes2
 and he is never more in earnest or more
 ironical  than in the ,gorgias4 ,he    
hardly troubles himself to answer       
seriously the  objections of ,gorgias   
and ,polus1 and therefore he sometimes  
appears to  be careless of the ordinary 

requirements of logic4 ,yet in the      
highest  sense he is always logical and 
consistent with himself4 ,the form of   
the  argument may be paradoxical2 the   
substance is an appeal to the higher    
reason4 ,he is uttering truths before   
they can be understood1 as in all  ages 
the words of philosophers1 when they are
 first uttered1 have found  the world   
unprepared for them4 ,a further         
misunderstanding arises out of  the     
wildness of his humour2 he is supposed  
not only by ,callicles1 but  by the rest
 of mankind1 to be jesting when he is   
profoundly serious4 ,at  length he makes
 even ,polus in earnest4 ,finally1 he   
drops the argument1  and heedless any   
longer of the forms of dialectic1 he    
loses himself in  a sort of triumph1    
while at the same time he retaliates    
upon his  adversaries4 ,from this       
confusion of jest and earnest1 we may   
now return  to the ideal truth1 and draw
 out in a simple form the main theses of
  the dialogue4    ,first ,thesis3--    

,it is a greater evil to do than to     
suffer injustice4    ,compare the ,new  
,testament--    8,it is better to suffer
 for well doing than for evil           
doing40--#a ,pet4    ,and the ,sermon on
 the ,mount--    8,blessed are they that
 are persecuted for righteousness'      
sake40--,matt4    ,the words of         
,socrates are more abstract than the    
words of ,christ1 but  they equally     
imply that the only real evil is moral  
evil4 ,the righteous  may suffer or die1
 but they have their reward2 and even if
 they had no  reward1 would be happier  
than the wicked4 ,the world1 represented
 by  ,polus1 is ready1 when they are    
asked1 to acknowledge that injustice is 
dishonourable1 and for their own sakes  
men are willing to punish the  offender 
7compare ,republic74 ,but they are not  
equally willing to  acknowledge that    
injustice1 even if successful1 is       
essentially evil1  and has the nature of
 disease and death4 ,especially when    
crimes are  committed on the great      

scale--the crimes of tyrants1 ancient or
  modern--after a while1 seeing that    
they cannot be undone1 and have  become 
a part of history1 mankind are disposed 
to forgive them1 not  from any          
magnanimity or charity1 but because     
their feelings are blunted  by time1 and
 8to forgive is convenient to them40    
,the tangle of good and  evil can no    
longer be unravelled2 and although they 
know that the end  cannot justify the   
means1 they feel also that good has     
often come out  of evil4 ,but ,socrates 
would have us pass the same judgment on 
the  tyrant now and always2 though he is
 surrounded by his satellites1 and  has 
the applauses of ,europe and ,asia      
ringing in his ears2 though he is  the  
civilizer or liberator of half a        
continent1 he is1 and always will  be1  
the most miserable of men4 ,the greatest
 consequences for good or  for evil     
cannot alter a hair's breadth the       
morality of actions which  are right or 
wrong in themselves4 ,this is the       

standard which ,socrates  holds up to   
us4 ,because politics1 and perhaps human
 life generally1 are  of a mixed nature 
we must not allow our principles to sink
 to the level  of our practice4    ,and 
so of private individuals--to them1 too1
 the world occasionally  speaks of the  
consequences of their actions3--if they 
are lovers of  pleasure1 they will ruin 
their health2 if they are false or      
dishonest1  they will lose their        
character4 ,but ,socrates would speak to
 them1 not  of what will be1 but of what
 is--of the present consequence of      
lowering  and degrading the soul4 ,and  
all higher natures1 or perhaps all men  
everywhere1 if they were not tempted by 
interest or passion1 would  agree with  
him--they would rather be the victims   
than the perpetrators  of an act of     
treachery or of tyranny4 ,reason tells  
them that death  comes sooner or later  
to all1 and is not so great an evil as  
an  unworthy life1 or rather1 if rightly
 regarded1 not an evil at all1 but  to a

 good man the greatest good4 ,for in all
 of us there are slumbering  ideals of  
truth and right1 which may at any time  
awaken and develop a  new life in us4   
,second ,thesis3--    ,it is better to  
suffer for wrong doing than not to      
suffer4    ,there might have been a     
condition of human life in which the    
penalty  followed at once1 and was      
proportioned to the offence4 ,moral evil
 would  then be scarcely distinguishable
 from physical2 mankind would avoid     
vice as they avoid pain or death4 ,but  
nature1 with a view of deepening  and   
enlarging our characters1 has for the   
most part hidden from us the            
consequences of our actions1 and we can 
only foresee them by an effort  of      
reflection4 ,to awaken in us this habit 
of reflection is the business  of early 
education1 which is continued in maturer
 years by observation  and experience4  
,the spoilt child is in later life said 
to be  unfortunate--he had better have  
suffered when he was young1 and been    

saved from suffering afterwards4 ,but is
 not the sovereign equally  unfortunate 
whose education and manner of life are  
always concealing  from him the         
consequences of his own actions1 until  
at length they are  revealed to him in  
some terrible downfall1 which may1      
perhaps1 have  been caused not by his   
own fault8 ,another illustration is     
afforded by  the pauper and criminal    
classes1 who scarcely reflect at all1   
except on  the means by which they can  
compass their immediate ends4 ,we pity  
them1  and make allowances for them2 but
 we do not consider that the same       
principle applies to human actions      
generally4 ,not to have been found  out 
in some dishonesty or folly1 regarded   
from a moral or religious  point of     
view1 is the greatest of misfortunes4   
,the success of our evil  doings is a   
proof that the gods have ceased to      
strive with us1 and have  given us over 
to ourselves4 ,there is nothing to      
remind us of our sins1  and therefore   

nothing to correct them4 ,like our      
sorrows1 they are  healed by time2      
8,while rank corruption1 mining all     
within1  ,infects unseen40      ,the    
8accustomed irony0 of ,socrates adds a  
corollary to the  argument3--8,would you
 punish your enemy1 you should allow him
 to escape  unpunished0--this is the    
true retaliation4 7,compare the obscure 
verse of  ,proverbs1 8,therefore if     
thine enemy hunger1 feed him10 etc41    
quoted in  ,romans47    ,men are not in 
the habit of dwelling upon the dark side
 of their own  lives3 they do not easily
 see themselves as others see them4     
,they are  very kind and very blind to  
their own faults2 the rhetoric of       
self-love  is always pleading with them 
on their own behalf4 ,adopting a similar
  figure of speech1 ,socrates would have
 them use rhetoric1 not in defence  but 
in accusation of themselves4 ,as they   
are guided by feeling rather  than by   
reason1 to their feelings the appeal    
must be made4 ,they must  speak to      

themselves2 they must argue with        
themselves2 they must paint  in eloquent
 words the character of their own evil  
deeds4 ,to any  suffering which they    
have deserved1 they must persuade       
themselves to  submit4 ,under the figure
 there lurks a real thought1 which1     
expressed  in another form1 admits of an
 easy application to ourselves4 ,for do 
not  we too accuse as well as excuse    
ourselves8 ,and we call to our aid the  
rhetoric of prayer and preaching1 which 
the mind silently employs while  the    
struggle between the better and the     
worse is going on within us4  ,and      
sometimes we are too hard upon          
ourselves1 because we want to  restore  
the balance which self-love has         
overthrown or disturbed2 and  then again
 we may hear a voice as of a parent     
consoling us4 ,in  religious diaries a  
sort of drama is often enacted by the   
consciences  of men 8accusing or else   
excusing them40 ,for all our life long  
we are  talking with ourselves3--,what  

is thought but speech8 ,what is feeling 
but  rhetoric8 ,and if rhetoric is used 
on one side only we shall be always  in 
danger of being deceived4 ,and so the   
words of ,socrates1 which at  first     
sounded paradoxical1 come home to the   
experience of all of us4    ,third      
,thesis3--    ,we do not what we will1  
but what we wish4    ,socrates would    
teach us a lesson which we are slow to  
learn--that good  intentions1 and even  
benevolent actions1 when they are not   
prompted by  wisdom1 are of no value4   
,we believe something to be for our good
 which  we afterwards find out not to be
 for our good4 ,the consequences may be 
inevitable1 for they may follow an      
invariable law1 yet they may often  be  
the very opposite of what is expected by
 us4 ,when we increase  pauperism by    
almsgiving2 when we tie up property     
without regard to  changes of           
circumstances2 when we say hastily what 
we deliberately  disapprove2 when we do 
in a moment of passion what upon        

reflection we  regret2 when from any    
want of self-control we give another an 
advantage  over us--we are doing not    
what we will1 but what we wish4 ,all    
actions of  which the consequences are  
not weighed and foreseen1 are of this   
impotent and paralytic sort2 and the    
author of them has 8the least  possible 
power0 while seeming to have the        
greatest4 ,for he is actually  bringing 
about the reverse of what he intended4  
,and yet the book of  nature is open to 
him1 in which he who runs may read if he
 will  exercise ordinary attention2     
every day offers him experiences of his 
own and of other men's characters1 and  
he passes them unheeded by4 ,the        
contemplation of the consequences of    
actions1 and the ignorance of men  in   
regard to them1 seems to have led       
,socrates to his famous                 
thesis3--8,virtue is knowledge20 which  
is not so much an error or paradox  as a
 half truth1 seen first in the twilight 
of ethical philosophy1 but  also the    

half of the truth which is especially   
needed in the present  age4 ,for as the 
world has grown older men have been too 
apt to imagine  a right and wrong apart 
from consequences2 while a few1 on the  
other  hand1 have sought to resolve them
 wholly into their consequences4 ,but   
,socrates1 or ,plato for him1 neither   
divides nor identifies them2 though  the
 time has not yet arrived either for    
utilitarian or transcendental  systems  
of moral philosophy1 he recognizes the  
two elements which seem  to lie at the  
basis of morality4 7,compare the        
following3 8,now1 and for  us1 it is a  
time to ,hellenize and to praise        
knowing2 for we have  ,hebraized too    
much and have overvalued doing4 ,but the
 habits and  discipline received from   
,hebraism remain for our race an eternal
  possession4 ,and as humanity is       
constituted1 one must never assign the  
second rank to-day without being ready  
to restore them to the first            
to-morrow40 ,sir ,william ,w4 ,hunter1  

,preface to ,orissa47    ,fourth        
,thesis3--    ,to be and not to seem is 
the end of life4    ,the ,greek in the  
age of ,plato admitted praise to be one 
of the chief  incentives to moral       
virtue1 and to most men the opinion of  
their  fellows is a leading principle of
 action4 ,hence a certain element of    
seeming enters into all things2 all or  
almost all desire to appear  better than
 they are1 that they may win the esteem 
or admiration of  others4 ,a man of     
ability can easily feign the language of
 piety or  virtue2 and there is an      
unconscious as well as a conscious      
hypocrisy  which1 according to          
,socrates1 is the worst of the two4     
,again1 there is  the sophistry of      
classes and professions4 ,there are the 
different  opinions about themselves and
 one another which prevail in different 
ranks of society4 ,there is the bias    
given to the mind by the study of  one  
department of human knowledge to the    
exclusion of the rest2 and  stronger far

 the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary
 or party interest  in certain tenets4  
,there is the sophistry of law1 the     
sophistry of  medicine1 the sophistry of
 politics1 the sophistry of theology4   
,all of  these disguises wear the       
appearance of the truth2 some of them   
are very  ancient1 and we do not easily 
disengage ourselves from them2 for we   
have inherited them1 and they have      
become a part of us4 ,the sophistry  of 
an ancient ,greek sophist is nothing    
compared with the sophistry of a        
religious order1 or of a church in which
 during many ages falsehood has  been   
accumulating1 and everything has been   
said on one side1 and  nothing on the   
other4 ,the conventions and customs     
which we observe in  conversation1 and  
the opposition of our interests when we 
have dealings  with one another 78the   
buyer saith1 it is nought--it is        
nought10 etc471  are always obscuring   
our sense of truth and right4 ,the      
sophistry of  human nature is far more  

subtle than the deceit of any one man4  
,few  persons speak freely from their   
own natures1 and scarcely any one dares 
to think for himself3 most of us        
imperceptibly fall into the opinions  of
 those around us1 which we partly help  
to make4 ,a man who would shake  himself
 loose from them1 requires great force  
of mind2 he hardly knows  where to begin
 in the search after truth4 ,on every   
side he is met by  the world1 which is  
not an abstraction of theologians1 but  
the most  real of all things1 being     
another name for ourselves when regarded
  collectively and subjected to the     
influences of society4    ,then comes   
,socrates1 impressed as no other man    
ever was1 with the  unreality and       
untruthfulness of popular opinion1 and  
tells mankind that  they must be and not
 seem4 ,how are they to be8 ,at any rate
 they must  have the spirit and desire  
to be4 ,if they are ignorant1 they must 
acknowledge their ignorance to          
themselves2 if they are conscious of    

doing evil1 they must learn to do well2 
if they are weak1 and have  nothing in  
them which they can call themselves1    
they must acquire  firmness and         
consistency2 if they are indifferent1   
they must begin to  take an interest in 
the great questions which surround them4
 ,they must  try to be what they would  
fain appear in the eyes of their        
fellow-men4  ,a single individual cannot
 easily change public opinion2 but he   
can be  true and innocent1 simple and   
independent2 he can know what he does1  
and what he does not know2 and though   
not without an effort1 he can  form a   
judgment of his own1 at least in common 
matters4 ,in his most  secret actions he
 can show the same high principle       
7compare ,republic7  which he shows when
 supported and watched by public        
opinion4 ,and on  some fitting occasion1
 on some question of humanity or truth  
or right1  even an ordinary man1 from   
the natural rectitude of his            
disposition1  may be found to take up   

arms against a whole tribe of           
politicians and  lawyers1 and be too    
much for them4    ,who is the true and  
who the false statesman8--    ,the true 
statesman is he who brings order out of 
disorder2 who first  organizes and then 
administers the government of his own   
country2 and  having made a nation1     
seeks to reconcile the national         
interests with  those of ,europe and of 
mankind4 ,he is not a mere theorist1 nor
 yet a  dealer in expedients2 the whole 
and the parts grow together in his      
mind2 while the head is conceiving1 the 
hand is executing4 ,although  obliged to
 descend to the world1 he is not of the 
world4 ,his thoughts  are fixed not on  
power or riches or extension of         
territory1 but on an  ideal state1 in   
which all the citizens have an equal    
chance of health  and life1 and the     
highest education is within the reach of
 all1 and the  moral and intellectual   
qualities of every individual are freely
  developed1 and 8the idea of good0 is  

the animating principle of the  whole4  
,not the attainment of freedom alone1 or
 of order alone1 but how  to unite      
freedom with order is the problem which 
he has to solve4    ,the statesman who  
places before himself these lofty aims  
has undertaken  a task which will call  
forth all his powers4 ,he must control  
himself  before he can control others2  
he must know mankind before he can      
manage  them4 ,he has no private likes  
or dislikes2 he does not conceal        
personal  enmity under the disguise of  
moral or political principle3 such      
meannesses1 into which men too often    
fall unintentionally1 are absorbed  in  
the consciousness of his mission1 and in
 his love for his country  and for      
mankind4 ,he will sometimes ask himself 
what the next generation  will say of   
him2 not because he is careful of       
posthumous fame1 but  because he knows  
that the result of his life as a whole  
will then be  more fairly judged4 ,he   
will take time for the execution of his 

plans2  not hurrying them on when the   
mind of a nation is unprepared for them2
  but like the ,ruler of the ,universe  
,himself1 working in the appointed      
time1 for he knows that human life1 8if 
not long in comparison with  eternity0  
7,republic71 is sufficient for the      
fulfilment of many great  purposes4 ,he 
knows1 too1 that the work will be still 
going on when he  is no longer here2 and
 he will sometimes1 especially when his 
powers  are failing1 think of that other
 8city of which the pattern is in       
heaven0 7,republic74    ,the false      
politician is the serving-man of the    
state4 ,in order to  govern men he      
becomes like them2 their 8minds are     
married in  conjunction20 they 8bear    
themselves0 like vulgar and tyrannical  
masters1 and he is their obedient       
servant4 ,the true politician1 if he    
would rule men1 must make them like     
himself2 he must 8educate his  party0   
until they cease to be a party2 he must 
breathe into them the  spirit which will

 hereafter give form to their           
institutions4 ,politics  with him are   
not a mechanism for seeming what he is  
not1 or for  carrying out the will of   
the majority4 ,himself a representative 
man1 he  is the representative not of   
the lower but of the higher elements of 
the nation4 ,there is a better 7as well 
as a worse7 public opinion of  which he 
seeks to lay hold2 as there is also a   
deeper current of human  affairs in     
which he is borne up when the waves     
nearer the shore are  threatening him4  
,he acknowledges that he cannot take the
 world by  force--two or three moves on 
the political chess board are all that  
he  can fore see--two or three weeks    
moves on the political chessboard are   
all that he can foresee--two or three   
weeks or months are granted to him  in  
which he can provide against a coming   
struggle4 ,but he knows also  that there
 are permanent principles of politics   
which are always  tending to the        
well-being of states--better            

administration1 better  education1 the  
reconciliation of conflicting elements1 
increased  security against external    
enemies4 ,these are not 8of to-day or   
yesterday10 but are the same in all     
times1 and under all forms of           
government4 ,then when the storm        
descends and the winds blow1 though he  
knows not beforehand the hour of danger1
 the pilot1 not like ,plato's  captain  
in the ,republic1 half-blind and deaf1  
but with penetrating eye  and quick ear1
 is ready to take command of the ship   
and guide her into  port4    ,the false 
politician asks not what is true1 but   
what is the opinion of  the world--not  
what is right1 but what is expedient4   
,the only measures  of which he approves
 are the measures which will pass4 ,he  
has no  intention of fighting an uphill 
battle2 he keeps the roadway of         
politics4 ,he is unwilling to incur the 
persecution and enmity which  political 
convictions would entail upon him4 ,he  
begins with popularity1  and in fair    

weather sails gallantly along4 ,but     
unpopularity soon  follows him4 ,for men
 expect their leaders to be better and  
wiser than  themselves3 to be their     
guides in danger1 their saviours in     
extremity2  they do not really desire   
them to obey all the ignorant impulses  
of the  popular mind2 and if they fail  
them in a crisis they are disappointed4 
,then1 as ,socrates says1 the cry of    
ingratitude is heard1 which is most     
unreasonable2 for the people1 who have  
been taught no better1 have done  what  
might be expected of them1 and their    
statesmen have received  justice at     
their hands4    ,the true statesman is  
aware that he must adapt himself to     
times and  circumstances4 ,he must have 
allies if he is to fight against the    
world2  he must enlighten public        
opinion2 he must accustom his followers 
to act  together4 ,although he is not   
the mere executor of the will of the    
majority1 he must win over the majority 
to himself4 ,he is their leader  and not

 their follower1 but in order to lead he
 must also follow4 ,he  will neither    
exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a
 statesman1  neither adopting the       
8laissez faire0 nor the 8paternal       
government0  principle2 but he will1    
whether he is dealing with children in  
politics1 or with full-grown men1 seek  
to do for the people what the           
government can do for them1 and what1   
from imperfect education or  deficient  
powers of combination1 they cannot do   
for themselves4 ,he  knows that if he   
does too much for them they will do     
nothing2 and that  if he does nothing   
for them they will in some states of    
society be  utterly helpless4 ,for the  
many cannot exist without the few1 if   
the  material force of a country is from
 below1 wisdom and experience are  from 
above4 ,it is not a small part of human 
evils which kings and  governments make 
or cure4 ,the statesman is well aware   
that a great  purpose carried out       
consistently during many years will at  

last be  executed4 ,he is playing for a 
stake which may be partly determined by 
some accident1 and therefore he will    
allow largely for the unknown  element  
of politics4 ,but the game being one in 
which chance and skill  are combined1 if
 he plays long enough he is certain of  
victory4 ,he will  not be always        
consistent1 for the world is changing2  
and though he  depends upon the support 
of a party1 he will remember that he is 
the  minister of the whole4 ,he lives   
not for the present1 but for the        
future1 and he is not at all sure that  
he will be appreciated either  now or   
then4 ,for he may have the existing     
order of society against him1  and may  
not be remembered by a distant          
posterity4    ,there are always         
discontented idealists in politics who1 
like ,socrates  in the ,gorgias1 find   
fault with all statesmen past as well as
 present1  not excepting the greatest   
names of history4 ,mankind have an      
uneasy  feeling that they ought to be   

better governed than they are4 ,just as 
the actual philosopher falls short of   
the one wise man1 so does the  actual   
statesman fall short of the ideal4 ,and 
so partly from vanity and  egotism1 but 
partly also from a true sense of the    
faults of eminent  men1 a temper of     
dissatisfaction and criticism springs up
 among those  who are ready enough to   
acknowledge the inferiority of their own
  powers4 ,no matter whether a statesman
 makes high professions or none at      
all--they are reduced sooner or later to
 the same level4 ,and sometimes  the    
more unscrupulous man is better esteemed
 than the more  conscientious1 because  
he has not equally deceived             
expectations4 ,such  sentiments may be  
unjust1 but they are widely spread2 we  
constantly  find them recurring in      
reviews and newspapers1 and still       
oftener in  private conversation4    ,we
 may further observe that the art of    
government1 while in some  respects     
tending to improve1 has in others a     

tendency to degenerate1 as  institutions
 become more popular4 ,governing for the
 people cannot  easily be combined with 
governing by the people3 the interests  
of  classes are too strong for the ideas
 of the statesman who takes a           
comprehensive view of the whole4        
,according to ,socrates the true        
governor will find ruin or death staring
 him in the face1 and will only  be     
induced to govern from the fear of being
 governed by a worse man  than himself  
7,republic74 ,and in modern times1      
though the world has  grown milder1 and 
the terrible consequences which ,plato  
foretells no  longer await an ,english  
statesman1 any one who is not actuated  
by a  blind ambition will only undertake
 from a sense of duty a work in which   
he is most likely to fail2 and even if  
he succeed1 will rarely be  rewarded by 
the gratitude of his own generation4    
,socrates1 who is not a politician at   
all1 tells us that he is the only  real 
politician of his time4 ,let us         

illustrate the meaning of his words  by 
applying them to the history of our own 
country4 ,he would have said  that not  
,pitt or ,fox1 or ,canning or ,sir ,r4  
,peel1 are the real  politicians of     
their time1 but ,locke1 ,hume1 ,adam    
,smith1 ,bentham1  ,ricardo4 ,these     
during the greater part of their lives  
occupied an  inconsiderable space in the
 eyes of the public4 ,they were private 
persons2 nevertheless they sowed in the 
minds of men seeds which in the  next   
generation have become an irresistible  
power4 8,herein is that  saying true1   
,one soweth and another reapeth40 ,we   
may imagine with ,plato  an ideal       
statesman in whom practice and          
speculation are perfectly  harmonized2  
for there is no necessary opposition    
between them4 ,but  experience shows    
that they are commonly divorced--the    
ordinary  politician is the interpreter 
or executor of the thoughts of others1  
and hardly ever brings to the birth a   
new political conception4 ,one or  two  

only in modern times1 like the ,italian 
statesman ,cavour1 have  created the    
world in which they moved4 ,the         
philosopher is naturally  unfitted for  
political life2 his great ideas are not 
understood by the  many2 he is a        
thousand miles away from the questions  
of the day4 ,yet  perhaps the lives of  
thinkers1 as they are stiller and       
deeper1 are also  happier than the lives
 of those who are more in the public    
eye4 ,they  have the promise of the     
future1 though they are regarded as     
dreamers  and visionaries by their own  
contemporaries4 ,and when they are no   
longer here1 those who would have been  
ashamed of them during their  lives     
claim kindred with them1 and are proud  
to be called by their  names4 7,compare 
,thucyd47    ,who is the true poet8     
,plato expels the poets from his        
,republic because they are allied to    
sense2 because they stimulate the       
emotions2 because they are thrice       
removed from the ideal truth4 ,and in a 

similar spirit he declares in  the      
,gorgias that the stately muse of       
tragedy is a votary of pleasure  and not
 of truth4 ,in modern times we almost   
ridicule the idea of poetry  admitting  
of a moral4 ,the poet and the prophet1  
or preacher1 in  primitive antiquity are
 one and the same2 but in later ages    
they seem  to fall apart4 ,the great art
 of novel writing1 that peculiar        
creation  of our own and the last       
century1 which1 together with the sister
 art of  review writing1 threatens to   
absorb all literature1 has even less of 
seriousness in her composition4 ,do we  
not often hear the novel writer         
censured for attempting to convey a     
lesson to the minds of his readers8     
,yet the true office of a poet or writer
 of fiction is not merely to  give      
amusement1 or to be the expression of   
the feelings of mankind1  good or bad1  
or even to increase our knowledge of    
human nature4 ,there  have been poets in
 modern times1 such as ,goethe or       

,wordsworth1 who have  not forgotten    
their high vocation of teachers2 and the
 two greatest of  the ,greek dramatists 
owe their sublimity to their ethical    
character4  ,the noblest truths1 sung of
 in the purest and sweetest language1   
are  still the proper material of       
poetry4 ,the poet clothes them with     
beauty1  and has a power of making them 
enter into the hearts and memories of   
men4 ,he has not only to speak of themes
 above the level of ordinary  life1 but 
to speak of them in a deeper and        
tenderer way than they are  ordinarily  
felt1 so as to awaken the feeling of    
them in others4 ,the old  he makes young
 again2 the familiar principle he       
invests with a new  dignity2 he finds a 
noble expression for the common-places  
of morality  and politics4 ,he uses the 
things of sense so as to indicate what  
is  beyond2 he raises us through earth  
to heaven4 ,he expresses what the       
better part of us would fain say1 and   
the half-conscious feeling is           

strengthened by the expression4 ,he is  
his own critic1 for the spirit of       
poetry and of criticism are not divided 
in him4 ,his mission is not to  disguise
 men from themselves1 but to reveal to  
them their own nature1  and make them   
better acquainted with the world around 
them4 ,true poetry  is the remembrance  
of youth1 of love1 the embodiment in    
words of the  happiest and holiest      
moments of life1 of the noblest thoughts
 of man1  of the greatest deeds of the  
past4 ,the poet of the future may return
 to  his greater calling of the prophet 
or teacher2 indeed1 we hardly know  what
 may not be effected for the human race 
by a better use of the  poetical and    
imaginative faculty4 ,the reconciliation
 of poetry1 as of  religion1 with truth1
 may still be possible4 ,neither is the 
element of  pleasure to be excluded4    
,for when we substitute a higher        
pleasure for a  lower we raise men in   
the scale of existence4 ,might not the  
novelist1  too1 make an ideal1 or rather

 many ideals of social life1 better than
 a  thousand sermons8 ,plato1 like the  
,puritans1 is too much afraid of  poetic
 and artistic influences4 ,but he is not
 without a true sense of  the noble     
purposes to which art may be applied    
7,republic74    ,modern poetry is often 
a sort of plaything1 or1 in ,plato's    
language1 a  flattery1 a sophistry1 or  
sham1 in which1 without any serious     
purpose1  the poet lends wings to his   
fancy and exhibits his gifts of language
  and metre4 ,such an one seeks to      
gratify the taste of his readers2 he    
has the 8savoir faire10 or trick of     
writing1 but he has not the higher      
spirit of poetry4 ,he has no conception 
that true art should bring order  out of
 disorder2 that it should make provision
 for the soul's highest  interest2 that 
it should be pursued only with a view to
 8the  improvement of the citizens40 ,he
 ministers to the weaker side of human  
nature 7,republic72 he idealizes the    
sensual2 he sings the strain of  love in

 the latest fashion2 instead of raising 
men above themselves he  brings them    
back to the 8tyranny of the many        
masters10 from which all  his life long 
a good man has been praying to be       
delivered4 ,and often1  forgetful of    
measure and order1 he will express not  
that which is  truest1 but that which is
 strongest4 ,instead of a great and     
nobly-executed subject1 perfect in every
 part1 some fancy of a heated  brain is 
worked out with the strangest           
incongruity4 ,he is not the  master of  
his words1 but his words--perhaps       
borrowed from another--the  faded       
reflection of some ,french or ,german or
 ,italian writer1 have the  better of   
him4 ,though we are not going to banish 
the poets1 how can we  suppose that such
 utterances have any healing or         
life-giving influence  on the minds of  
men8    8,let us hear the conclusion of 
the whole matter30 ,art then must be    
true1 and politics must be true1 and the
 life of man must be true and  not a    

seeming or sham4 ,in all of them order  
has to be brought out of  disorder1     
truth out of error and falsehood4 ,this 
is what we mean by the  greatest        
improvement of man4 ,and so1 having     
considered in what way 8we  can best    
spend the appointed time1 we leave the  
result with ,god40 ,plato  does not say 
that ,god will order all things for the 
best 7compare  ,phaedo71 but he         
indirectly implies that the evils of    
this life will be  corrected in another4
 ,and as we are very far from the best  
imaginable  world at present1 ,plato    
here1 as in the ,phaedo and ,republic1  
supposes a  purgatory or place of       
education for mankind in general1 and   
for a very  few a ,tartarus or hell4    
,the myth which terminates the dialogue 
is not  the revelation1 but rather1 like
 all similar descriptions1 whether in   
the ,bible or ,plato1 the veil of       
another life4 ,for no visible thing can 
reveal the invisible4 ,of this ,plato1  
unlike some commentators on  ,scripture1

 is fully aware4 ,neither will he       
dogmatize about the manner  in which we 
are 8born again0 7,republic74 ,only he  
is prepared to  maintain the ultimate   
triumph of truth and right1 and declares
 that no  one1 not even the wisest of   
the ,greeks1 can affirm any other       
doctrine  without being ridiculous4     
,there is a further paradox of ethics1  
in which pleasure and pain are  held to 
be indifferent1 and virtue at the time  
of action and without  regard to        
consequences is happiness4 ,from this   
elevation or  exaggeration of feeling   
,plato seems to shrink3 he leaves it to 
the  ,stoics in a later generation to   
maintain that when impaled or on the    
rack the philosopher may be happy       
7compare ,republic74 ,it is observable  
that in the ,republic he raises this    
question1 but it is not really          
discussed2 the veil of the ideal state1 
the shadow of another life1 are  allowed
 to descend upon it and it passes out of
 sight4 ,the martyr or  sufferer in the 

cause of right or truth is often        
supposed to die in  raptures1 having his
 eye fixed on a city which is in heaven4
 ,but if  there were no future1 might he
 not still be happy in the performance  
of  an action which was attended only by
 a painful death8 ,he himself may be    
ready to thank ,god that he was thought 
worthy to do ,him the least  service1   
without looking for a reward2 the joys  
of another life may not  have been      
present to his mind at all4 ,do we      
suppose that the mediaeval  saint1 ,st4 
,bernard1 ,st4 ,francis1 ,st4 ,catharine
 of ,sienna1 or the  ,catholic priest   
who lately devoted himself to death by a
 lingering  disease that he might solace
 and help others1 was thinking of the   
8sweets0 of heaven8 ,no2 the work was   
already heaven to him and enough4  ,much
 less will the dying patriot be dreaming
 of the praises of man or  of an        
immortality of fame3 the sense of duty1 
of right1 and trust in  ,god will be    
sufficient1 and as far as the mind can  

reach1 in that hour4  ,if he were       
certain that there were no life to come1
 he would not have  wished to speak or  
act otherwise than he did in the cause  
of truth or  of humanity4 ,neither1 on  
the other hand1 will he suppose that    
,god has  forsaken him or that the      
future is to be a mere blank to him4    
,the  greatest act of faith1 the only   
faith which cannot pass away1 is his    
who has not known1 but yet has believed4
 ,a very few among the sons of  men have
 made themselves independent of         
circumstances1 past1 present1  or to    
come4 ,he who has attained to such a    
temper of mind has already  present with
 him eternal life2 he needs no arguments
 to convince him of  immortality2 he has
 in him already a principle stronger    
than death4 ,he  who serves man without 
the thought of reward is deemed to be a 
more  faithful servant than he who works
 for hire4 ,may not the service of      
,god1 which is the more disinterested1  
be in like manner the higher8 ,and      

although only a very few in the course  
of the world's history--,christ  himself
 being one of them--have attained to    
such a noble conception of  ,god and of 
the human soul1 yet the ideal of them   
may be present to us1  and the          
remembrance of them be an example to us1
 and their lives may  shed a light on   
many dark places both of philosophy and 
theology4    ,,the ,,myths ,,of ,,plato4
    ,the myths of ,plato are a          
phenomenon unique in literature4 ,there 
are  four longer ones3 these occur in   
the ,phaedrus1 ,phaedo1 ,gorgias1 and   
,republic4 ,that in the ,republic is the
 most elaborate and finished of  them4  
,three of these greater myths1 namely   
those contained in the  ,phaedo1 the    
,gorgias and the ,republic1 relate to   
the destiny of human  souls in a future 
life4 ,the magnificent myth in the      
,phaedrus treats of  the immortality1 or
 rather the eternity of the soul1 in    
which is  included a former as well as a
 future state of existence4 ,to these   

may  be added1 7#a7 the myth1 or rather 
fable1 occurring in the ,statesman1 in  
which the life of innocence is          
contrasted with the ordinary life of man
  and the consciousness of evil3 7#b7   
the legend of the ,island of  ,atlantis1
 an imaginary history1 which is a       
fragment only1 commenced in  the        
,timaeus and continued in the ,critias3 
7#c7 the much less artistic  fiction of 
the foundation of the ,cretan colony    
which is introduced in  the preface to  
the ,laws1 but soon falls into the      
background3 7#d7 the  beautiful but     
rather artificial tale of ,prometheus   
and ,epimetheus  narrated in his        
rhetorical manner by ,protagoras in the 
dialogue called  after him3 7#e7 the    
speech at the beginning of the          
,phaedrus1 which is a  parody of the    
orator ,lysias2 the rival speech of     
,socrates and the  recantation of it4   
,to these may be added 7#f7 the tale of 
the  grasshoppers1 and 7#g7 the tale of 
,thamus and of ,theuth1 both in the     

,phaedrus3 7#h7 the parable of the ,cave
 7,republic71 in which the previous     
argument is recapitulated1 and the      
nature and degrees of knowledge  having 
been previously set forth in the        
abstract are represented in a  picture3 
7#i7 the fiction of the earth-born men  
7,republic2 compare  ,laws71 in which by
 the adaptation of an old tradition     
,plato makes a new  beginning for his   
society3 7#aj7 the myth of ,aristophanes
 respecting the  division of the sexes1 
,sym43 7#aa7 the parable of the noble   
captain1 the  pilot1 and the mutinous   
sailors 7,republic71 in which is        
represented the  relation of the better 
part of the world1 and of the           
philosopher1 to  the mob of politicians3
 7#ab7 the ironical tale of the pilot   
who plies  between ,athens and ,aegina  
charging only a small payment for saving
 men  from death1 the reason being that 
he is uncertain whether to live or  die 
is better for them 7,gor473 7#ac7 the   
treatment of freemen and  citizens by   

physicians and of slaves by their       
apprentices1--a somewhat  laboured      
figure of speech intended to illustrate 
the two different ways  in which the    
laws speak to men 7,laws74 ,there also  
occur in ,plato  continuous images2 some
 of them extend over several pages1     
appearing  and reappearing at intervals3
 such as the bees stinging and stingless
  7paupers and thieves7 in the ,eighth  
,book of the ,republic1 who are         
generated in the transition from        
timocracy to oligarchy3 the sun1 which  
is to the visible world what the idea of
 good is to the intellectual1  in the   
,sixth ,book of the ,republic3 the      
composite animal1 having the  form of a 
man1 but containing under a human skin a
 lion and a  many-headed monster        
7,republic73 the great beast1 i4e4 the  
populace3 and  the wild beast within us1
 meaning the passions which are always  
liable  to break out3 the animated      
comparisons of the degradation of       
philosophy  by the arts to the          

dishonoured maiden1 and of the tyrant to
 the  parricide1 who 8beats his father1 
having first taken away his arms03  the 
dog1 who is your only philosopher3 the  
grotesque and rather paltry  image of   
the argument wandering about without a  
head 7,laws71 which is  repeated1 not   
improved1 from the ,gorgias3 the        
argument personified as  veiling her    
face 7,republic71 as engaged in a chase1
 as breaking upon us  in a first1 second
 and third wave3--on these figures of   
speech the  changes are rung many times 
over4 ,it is observable that nearly all 
these parables or continuous images are 
found in the ,republic2 that  which     
occurs in the ,theaetetus1 of the       
midwifery of ,socrates1 is  perhaps the 
only exception4 ,to make the list       
complete1 the mathematical  figure of   
the number of the state 7,republic71 or 
the numerical interval  which separates 
king from tyrant1 should not be         
forgotten4    ,the myth in the ,gorgias 
is one of those descriptions of another 

life  which1 like the ,sixth ,aeneid of 
,virgil1 appear to contain reminiscences
  of the mysteries4 ,it is a vision of  
the rewards and punishments which  await
 good and bad men after death4 ,it      
supposes the body to continue  and to be
 in another world what it has become in 
this4 ,it includes a  ,paradiso1        
,purgatorio1 and ,inferno1 like the     
sister myths of the ,phaedo  and the    
,republic4 ,the ,inferno is reserved for
 great criminals only4 ,the  argument of
 the dialogue is frequently referred to1
 and the meaning  breaks through so as  
rather to destroy the liveliness and    
consistency  of the picture4 ,the       
structure of the fiction is very slight1
 the chief  point or moral being that in
 the judgments of another world there is
 no  possibility of concealment3 ,zeus  
has taken from men the power of         
foreseeing death1 and brings together   
the souls both of them and their  judges
 naked and undisguised at the           
judgment-seat4 ,both are exposed to     

view1 stripped of the veils and clothes 
which might prevent them from  seeing   
into or being seen by one another4      
,the myth of the ,phaedo is of the same 
type1 but it is more  cosmological1 and 
also more poetical4 ,the beautiful and  
ingenious fancy  occurs to ,plato that  
the upper atmosphere is an earth and    
heaven in  one1 a glorified earth1      
fairer and purer than that in which we  
dwell4  ,as the fishes live in the      
ocean1 mankind are living in a lower    
sphere1  out of which they put their    
heads for a moment or two and behold a  
world beyond4 ,the earth which we       
inhabit is a sediment of the coarser    
particles which drop from the world     
above1 and is to that heavenly  earth   
what the desert and the shores of the   
ocean are to us4 ,a part of  the myth   
consists of description of the interior 
of the earth1 which  gives the          
opportunity of introducing several      
mythological names and of  providing    
places of torment for the wicked4 ,there

 is no clear  distinction of soul and   
body2 the spirits beneath the earth are 
spoken  of as souls only1 yet they      
retain a sort of shadowy form when they 
cry  for mercy on the shores of the     
lake2 and the philosopher alone is said 
to have got rid of the body4 ,all the   
three myths in ,plato which relate  to  
the world below have a place for        
repentant sinners1 as well as other     
homes or places for the very good and   
very bad4 ,it is a natural  reflection  
which is made by ,plato elsewhere1 that 
the two extremes of  human character are
 rarely met with1 and that the          
generality of mankind  are between them4
 ,hence a place must be found for them4 
,in the myth of  the ,phaedo they are   
carried down the river ,acheron to the  
,acherusian  lake1 where they dwell1 and
 are purified of their evil deeds1 and  
receive the rewards of their good4      
,there are also incurable sinners1  who 
are cast into ,tartarus1 there to remain
 as the penalty of atrocious  crimes2   

these suffer everlastingly4 ,and there  
is another class of  hardly-curable     
sinners who are allowed from time to    
time to approach  the shores of the     
,acherusian lake1 where they cry to     
their victims for  mercy2 which if they 
obtain they come out into the lake and  
cease from  their torments4    ,neither 
this1 nor any of the three greater myths
 of ,plato1 nor perhaps  any allegory or
 parable relating to the unseen world1  
is consistent  with itself4 ,the        
language of philosophy mingles with that
 of mythology2  abstract ideas are      
transformed into persons1 figures of    
speech into  realities4 ,these myths may
 be compared with the ,pilgrim's        
,progress of  ,bunyan1 in which         
discussions of theology are mixed up    
with the  incidents of travel1 and      
mythological personages are associated  
with  human beings3 they are also       
garnished with names and phrases taken  
out  of ,homer1 and with other fragments
 of ,greek tradition4    ,the myth of   

the ,republic is more subtle and also   
more consistent than  either of the two 
others4 ,it has a greater verisimilitude
 than they  have1 and is full of touches
 which recall the experiences of human  
life4 ,it will be noticed by an         
attentive reader that the twelve days   
during which ,er lay in a trance after  
he was slain coincide with the  time    
passed by the spirits in their          
pilgrimage4 ,it is a curious            
observation1 not often made1 that good  
men who have lived in a  well-governed  
city 7shall we say in a religious and   
respectable  society87 are more likely  
to make mistakes in their choice of life
 than  those who have had more          
experience of the world and of evil4 ,it
 is a  more familiar remark that we     
constantly blame others when we have    
only  ourselves to blame2 and the       
philosopher must acknowledge1 however   
reluctantly1 that there is an element of
 chance in human life with  which it is 
sometimes impossible for man to cope4   

,that men drink more  of the waters of  
forgetfulness than is good for them is a
 poetical  description of a familiar    
truth4 ,we have many of us known men    
who1 like  ,odysseus1 have wearied of   
ambition and have only desired rest4 ,we
  should like to know what became of the
 infants 8dying almost as soon as  they 
were born10 but ,plato only raises1     
without satisfying1 our  curiosity4 ,the
 two companies of souls1 ascending and  
descending at  either chasm of heaven   
and earth1 and conversing when they come
 out  into the meadow1 the majestic     
figures of the judges sitting in heaven1
  the voice heard by ,ardiaeus1 are     
features of the great allegory which    
have an indescribable grandeur and      
power4 ,the remark already made         
respecting the inconsistency of the two 
other myths must be extended  also to   
this3 it is at once an orrery1 or model 
of the heavens1 and a  picture of the   
,day of ,judgment4    ,the three myths  
are unlike anything else in ,plato4     

,there is an  ,oriental1 or rather an   
,egyptian element in them1 and they have
 an  affinity to the mysteries and to   
the ,orphic modes of worship4 ,to a     
certain extent they are un-,greek2 at   
any rate there is hardly anything  like 
them in other ,greek writings which have
 a serious purpose2 in  spirit they are 
mediaeval4 ,they are akin to what may be
 termed the  underground religion in all
 ages and countries4 ,they are presented
 in  the most lively and graphic manner1
 but they are never insisted on as      
true2 it is only affirmed that nothing  
better can be said about a  future life4
 ,plato seems to make use of them when  
he has reached the  limits of human     
knowledge2 or1 to borrow an expression  
of his own1 when  he is standing on the 
outside of the intellectual world4 ,they
 are very  simple in style2 a few       
touches bring the picture home to the   
mind1 and  make it present to us4 ,they 
have also a kind of authority gained by 
the  employment of sacred and familiar  

names1 just as mere fragments of the    
words of ,scripture1 put together in any
 form and applied to any  subject1 have 
a power of their own4 ,they are a       
substitute for poetry  and mythology2   
and they are also a reform of mythology4
 ,the moral of  them may be summed up in
 a word or two3 ,after death the        
,judgment2 and  8there is some better   
thing remaining for the good than for   
the evil40    ,all literature gathers   
into itself many elements of the past3  
for  example1 the tale of the earth-born
 men in the ,republic appears at  first 
sight to be an extravagant fancy1 but it
 is restored to propriety  when we      
remember that it is based on a legendary
 belief4 ,the art of  making stories of 
ghosts and apparitions credible is said 
to consist in  the manner of telling    
them4 ,the effect is gained by many     
literary and  conversational devices1   
such as the previous raising of         
curiosity1 the  mention of little       
circumstances1 simplicity1              

picturesqueness1 the  naturalness of the
 occasion1 and the like4 ,this art is   
possessed by  ,plato in a degree which  
has never been equalled4    ,the myth in
 the ,phaedrus is even greater than the 
myths which have been  already          
described1 but is of a different        
character4 ,it treats of a  former      
rather than of a future life4 ,it       
represents the conflict of  reason aided
 by passion or righteous indignation on 
the one hand1 and  of the animal lusts  
and instincts on the other4 ,the soul of
 man has  followed the company of some  
god1 and seen truth in the form of the  
universal before it was born in this    
world4 ,our present life is the  result 
of the struggle which was then carried  
on4 ,this world is  relative to a former
 world1 as it is often projected into a 
future4 ,we  ask the question1 ,where   
were men before birth8 ,as we likewise  
enquire1  ,what will become of them     
after death8 ,the first question is     
unfamiliar  to us1 and therefore seems  

to be unnatural2 but if we survey the   
whole  human race1 it has been as       
influential and as widely spread as the 
other4 ,in the ,phaedrus it is really a 
figure of speech in which the           
8spiritual combat0 of this life is      
represented4 ,the majesty and power  of 
the whole passage--especially of what   
may be called the theme or  proem       
7beginning 8,the mind through all her   
being is immortal07--can only  be       
rendered very inadequately in another   
language4    ,the myth in the ,statesman
 relates to a former cycle of existence1
 in  which men were born of the earth1  
and by the reversal of the earth's      
motion had their lives reversed and were
 restored to youth and beauty3  the dead
 came to life1 the old grew middle-aged1
 and the middle-aged  young2 the youth  
became a child1 the child an infant1 the
 infant  vanished into the earth4 ,the  
connection between the reversal of the  
earth's motion and the reversal of human
 life is of course verbal only1  yet    

,plato1 like theologians in other ages1 
argues from the consistency  of the tale
 to its truth4 ,the new order of the    
world was immediately  under the        
government of ,god2 it was a state of   
innocence in which men  had neither     
wants nor cares1 in which the earth     
brought forth all  things spontaneously1
 and ,god was to man what man now is to 
the  animals4 ,there were no great      
estates1 or families1 or private        
possessions1 nor any traditions of the  
past1 because men were all born  out of 
the earth4 ,this is what ,plato calls   
the 8reign of ,cronos20 and  in like    
manner he connects the reversal of the  
earth's motion with some  legend of     
which he himself was probably the       
inventor4    ,the question is then      
asked1 under which of these two cycles  
of  existence was man the               
happier1--under that of ,cronos1 which  
was a state  of innocence1 or that of   
,zeus1 which is our ordinary life8 ,for 
a while  ,plato balances the two sides  

of the serious controversy1 which he has
  suggested in a figure4 ,the answer    
depends on another question3 ,what use  
did the children of ,cronos make of     
their time8 ,they had boundless  leisure
 and the faculty of discoursing1 not    
only with one another1 but  with the    
animals4 ,did they employ these         
advantages with a view to  philosophy1  
gathering from every nature some        
addition to their store of  knowledge8  
or1 ,did they pass their time in eating 
and drinking and  telling stories to one
 another and to the beasts8--in either  
case there  would be no difficulty in   
answering4 ,but then1 as ,plato rather  
mischievously adds1 8,nobody knows what 
they did10 and therefore the  doubt must
 remain undetermined4    ,to the first  
there succeeds a second epoch4 ,after   
another natural  convulsion1 in which   
the order of the world and of human life
 is once  more reversed1 ,god withdraws 
his guiding hand1 and man is left to the
  government of himself4 ,the world     

begins again1 and arts and laws are     
slowly and painfully invented4 ,a       
secular age succeeds to a  theocratical4
 ,in this fanciful tale ,plato has      
dropped1 or almost  dropped1 the garb of
 mythology4 ,he suggests several curious
 and  important thoughts1 such as the   
possibility of a state of innocence1    
the existence of a world without        
traditions1 and the difference between  
human and divine government4 ,he has    
also carried a step further his         
speculations concerning the abolition of
 the family and of property1  which he  
supposes to have no place among the     
children of ,cronos any  more than in   
the ideal state4    ,it is              
characteristic of ,plato and of his age 
to pass from the abstract  to the       
concrete1 from poetry to reality4       
,language is the expression of  the     
seen1 and also of the unseen1 and moves 
in a region between them4 ,a  great     
writer knows how to strike both these   
chords1 sometimes remaining  within the 

sphere of the visible1 and then again   
comprehending a wider  range and soaring
 to the abstract and universal4 ,even in
 the same  sentence he may employ both  
modes of speech not improperly or       
inharmoniously4 ,it is useless to       
criticise the broken metaphors of       
,plato1 if the effect of the whole is to
 create a picture not such as  can be   
painted on canvas1 but which is full of 
life and meaning to the  reader4 ,a poem
 may be contained in a word or two1     
which may call up not  one but many     
latent images2 or half reveal to us by a
 sudden flash the  thoughts of many     
hearts4 ,often the rapid transition from
 one image to  another is pleasing to   
us3 on the other hand1 any single figure
 of  speech if too often repeated1 or   
worked out too much at length1 becomes  
prosy and monotonous4 ,in theology and  
philosophy we necessarily include  both 
8the moral law within and the starry    
heaven above10 and pass from  one to the
 other 7compare for examples ,psalms    

xviii4 and xix474 ,whether  such a use  
of language is puerile or noble depends 
upon the genius of  the writer or       
speaker1 and the familiarity of the     
associations  employed4    ,in the myths
 and parables of ,plato the ease and    
grace of conversation  is not forgotten3
 they are spoken1 not written words1    
stories which are  told to a living     
audience1 and so well told that we are  
more than  half-inclined to believe them
 7compare ,phaedrus74 ,as in            
conversation  too1 the striking image or
 figure of speech is not forgotten1 but 
is  quickly caught up1 and alluded to   
again and again2 as it would still be   
in our own day in a genial and          
sympathetic society4 ,the descriptions  
of  ,plato have a greater life and      
reality than is to be found in any      
modern  writing4 ,this is due to their  
homeliness and simplicity4 ,plato can do
  with words just as he pleases2 to him 
they are indeed 8more plastic  than wax0
 7,republic74 ,we are in the habit of   

opposing speech and  writing1 poetry and
 prose4 ,but he has discovered a use of 
language in  which they are united2     
which gives a fitting expression to the 
highest  truths2 and in which the       
trifles of courtesy and the             
familiarities of  daily life are not    
overlooked4            ,,gorgias    ,by 
,plato    ,translated by ,benjamin      
,jowett    ,,persons ,,of ,,the         
,,dialogue3 ,callicles1 ,socrates1      
,chaerephon1 ,gorgias1  ,polus4         
,,scene3 ,the house of ,callicles4      
,,callicles3 ,the wise man1 as the      
proverb says1 is late for a fray1 but   
not for a feast4    ,,socrates3 ,and are
 we late for a feast8    ,,callicles3   
,yes1 and a delightful feast2 for       
,gorgias has just been  exhibiting to us
 many fine things4    ,,socrates3 ,it is
 not my fault1 ,callicles2 our friend   
,chaerephon is to  blame2 for he would  
keep us loitering in the ,agora4        
,,chaerephon3 ,never mind1 ,socrates2   
the misfortune of which ,i have been    

the cause ,i will also repair2 for      
,gorgias is a friend of mine1 and ,i    
will make him give the exhibition again 
either now1 or1 if you prefer1  at some 
other time4    ,,callicles3 ,what is the
 matter1 ,chaerephon--does ,socrates    
want to hear  ,gorgias8    ,,chaerephon3
 ,yes1 that was our intention in coming4
    ,,callicles3 ,come into my house1   
then2 for ,gorgias is staying with me1  
and he shall exhibit to you4            
,,socrates3 ,very good1 ,callicles2 but 
will he answer our questions8 for ,i    
want to hear from him what is the nature
 of his art1 and what it is  which he   
professes and teaches2 he may1 as you   
7,chaerephon7 suggest1  defer the       
exhibition to some other time4          
,,callicles3 ,there is nothing like     
asking him1 ,socrates2 and indeed to    
answer questions is a part of his       
exhibition1 for he was saying only  just
 now1 that any one in my house might put
 any question to him1 and  that he would
 answer4    ,,socrates3 ,how fortunate6 

will you ask him1 ,chaerephon--8        
,,chaerephon3 ,what shall ,i ask him8   
,,socrates3 ,ask him who he is4         
,,chaerephon3 ,what do you mean8        
,,socrates3 ,i mean such a question as  
would elicit from him1 if he had  been a
 maker of shoes1 the answer that he is a
 cobbler4 ,do you  understand8          
,,chaerephon3 ,i understand1 and will   
ask him3 ,tell me1 ,gorgias1 is our     
friend ,callicles right in saying that  
you undertake to answer any  questions  
which you are asked8    ,,gorgias3      
,quite right1 ,chaerephon3 ,i was saying
 as much only just now2  and ,i may add1
 that many years have elapsed since any 
one has asked me  a new one4            
,,chaerephon3 ,then you must be very    
ready1 ,gorgias4    ,,gorgias3 ,of that1
 ,chaerephon1 you can make trial4       
,,polus3 ,yes1 indeed1 and if you like1 
,chaerephon1 you may make trial of  me  
too1 for ,i think that ,gorgias1 who has
 been talking a long time1 is  tired4   
,,chaerephon3 ,and do you1 ,polus1 think

 that you can answer better than        
,gorgias8    ,,polus3 ,what does that   
matter if ,i answer well enough for you8
    ,,chaerephon3 ,not at all3--and you 
shall answer if you like4    ,,polus3   
,ask3--    ,,chaerephon3 ,my question is
 this3 ,if ,gorgias had the skill of his
  brother ,herodicus1 what ought we to  
call him8 ,ought he not to have the     
name which is given to his brother8     
,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,chaerephon3   
,then we should be right in calling him 
a physician8    ,,polus3 ,yes4          
,,chaerephon3 ,and if he had the skill  
of ,aristophon the son of ,aglaophon1   
or of his brother ,polygnotus1 what     
ought we to call him8    ,,polus3       
,clearly1 a painter4    ,,chaerephon3   
,but now what shall we call him--what is
 the art in which he  is skilled4       
,,polus3 ,o ,chaerephon1 there are many 
arts among mankind which are            
experimental1 and have their origin in  
experience1 for experience makes  the   
days of men to proceed according to art1

 and inexperience according  to chance1 
and different persons in different ways 
are proficient in  different arts1 and  
the best persons in the best arts4 ,and 
our friend  ,gorgias is one of the best1
 and the art in which he is a proficient
 is  the noblest4    ,,socrates3 ,polus 
has been taught how to make a capital   
speech1 ,gorgias2  but he is not        
fulfilling the promise which he made to 
,chaerephon4    ,,gorgias3 ,what do you 
mean1 ,socrates8    ,,socrates3 ,i mean 
that he has not exactly answered the    
question which he  was asked4           
,,gorgias3 ,then why not ask him        
yourself8    ,,socrates3 ,but ,i would  
much rather ask you1 if you are disposed
 to  answer3 for ,i see1 from the few   
words which ,polus has uttered1 that he 
has attended more to the art which is   
called rhetoric than to  dialectic4     
,,polus3 ,what makes you say so1        
,socrates8    ,,socrates3 ,because1     
,polus1 when ,chaerephon asked you what 
was the art  which ,gorgias knows1 you  

praised it as if you were answering some
 one  who found fault with it1 but you  
never said what the art was4    ,,polus3
 ,why1 did ,i not say that it was the   
noblest of arts8    ,,socrates3 ,yes1   
indeed1 but that was no answer to the   
question3 nobody  asked what was the    
quality1 but what was the nature1 of the
 art1 and by  what name we were to      
describe ,gorgias4 ,and ,i would still  
beg you  briefly and clearly1 as you    
answered ,chaerephon when he asked you  
at  first1 to say what this art is1 and 
what we ought to call ,gorgias3 ,or     
rather1 ,gorgias1 let me turn to you1   
and ask the same question1--what  are we
 to call you1 and what is the art which 
you profess8    ,,gorgias3 ,rhetoric1   
,socrates1 is my art4    ,,socrates3    
,then ,i am to call you a rhetorician8  
,,gorgias3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 and a good  
one too1 if you would call me that      
which1 in ,homeric language1 8,i boast  
myself to be40    ,,socrates3 ,i should 
wish to do so4    ,,gorgias3 ,then pray 

do4    ,,socrates3 ,and are we to say   
that you are able to make other men     
rhetoricians8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes1 that  
is exactly what ,i profess to make them1
 not only at  ,athens1 but in all       
places4    ,,socrates3 ,and will you    
continue to ask and answer questions1   
,gorgias1  as we are at present doing1  
and reserve for another occasion the    
longer  mode of speech which ,polus was 
attempting8 ,will you keep your promise1
  and answer shortly the questions which
 are asked of you8    ,,gorgias3 ,some  
answers1 ,socrates1 are of necessity    
longer2 but ,i will do  my best to make 
them as short as possible2 for a part of
 my profession  is that ,i can be as    
short as any one4    ,,socrates3 ,that  
is what is wanted1 ,gorgias2 exhibit the
 shorter method  now1 and the longer one
 at some other time4    ,,gorgias3      
,well1 ,i will2 and you will certainly  
say1 that you never heard  a man use    
fewer words4    ,,socrates3 ,very good  
then2 as you profess to be a            

rhetorician1 and a  maker of            
rhetoricians1 let me ask you1 with what 
is rhetoric concerned3  ,i might ask    
with what is weaving concerned1 and you 
would reply 7would  you not871 with the 
making of garments8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,and music is concerned with
 the composition of melodies8           
,,gorgias3 ,it is4    ,,socrates3 ,by   
,here1 ,gorgias1 ,i admire the          
surpassing brevity of your  answers4    
,,gorgias3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i do think 
myself good at that4    ,,socrates3 ,i  
am glad to hear it2 answer me in like   
manner about  rhetoric3 with what is    
rhetoric concerned8    ,,gorgias3 ,with 
discourse4    ,,socrates3 ,what sort of 
discourse1 ,gorgias8--such discourse as 
would  teach the sick under what        
treatment they might get well8          
,,gorgias3 ,no4    ,,socrates3 ,then    
rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of 
discourse8    ,,gorgias3 ,certainly not4
    ,,socrates3 ,and yet rhetoric makes 
men able to speak8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4  

,,socrates3 ,and to understand that     
about which they speak8    ,,gorgias3   
,of course4    ,,socrates3 ,but does not
 the art of medicine1 which we were just
 now  mentioning1 also make men able to 
understand and speak about the sick8    
,,gorgias3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3   
,then medicine also treats of discourse8
    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,of 
discourse concerning diseases8          
,,gorgias3 ,just so4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 does not gymnastic also treat of       
discourse concerning the  good or evil  
condition of the body8    ,,gorgias3    
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,and the     
same1 ,gorgias1 is true of the other    
arts3--all of them  treat of discourse  
concerning the subjects with which they 
severally  have to do4    ,,gorgias3    
,clearly4    ,,socrates3 ,then why1 if  
you call rhetoric the art which treats  
of  discourse1 and all the other arts   
treat of discourse1 do you not call     
them arts of rhetoric8    ,,gorgias3    
,because1 ,socrates1 the knowledge of   

the other arts has only to  do with some
 sort of external action1 as of the     
hand2 but there is no  such action of   
the hand in rhetoric which works and    
takes effect only  through the medium of
 discourse4 ,and therefore ,i am        
justified in saying  that rhetoric      
treats of discourse4    ,,socrates3 ,i  
am not sure whether ,i entirely         
understand you1 but ,i dare  say ,i     
shall soon know better2 please to answer
 me a question3--you would  allow that  
there are arts8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4     
,,socrates3 ,as to the arts generally1  
they are for the most part  concerned   
with doing1 and require little or no    
speaking2 in painting1  and statuary1   
and many other arts1 the work may       
proceed in silence2 and  of such arts ,i
 suppose you would say that they do not 
come within the  province of rhetoric4  
,,gorgias3 ,you perfectly conceive my   
meaning1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,but 
there are other arts which work wholly  
through the medium  of language1 and    

require either no action or very little1
 as1 for  example1 the arts of          
arithmetic1 of calculation1 of geometry1
 and of  playing draughts2 in some of   
these speech is pretty nearly           
co-extensive  with action1 but in most  
of them the verbal element is           
greater--they  depend wholly on words   
for their efficacy and power3 and ,i    
take your  meaning to be that rhetoric  
is an art of this latter sort8          
,,gorgias3 ,exactly4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 yet ,i do not believe that you really  
mean to call any of  these arts         
rhetoric2 although the precise          
expression which you used  was1 that    
rhetoric is an art which works and takes
 effect only through  the medium of     
discourse2 and an adversary who wished  
to be captious  might say1 8,and so1    
,gorgias1 you call arithmetic rhetoric40
 ,but ,i do  not think that you really  
call arithmetic rhetoric any more than  
geometry would be so called by you4     
,,gorgias3 ,you are quite right1        

,socrates1 in your apprehension of my   
meaning4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 let
 me now have the rest of my             
answer3--seeing  that rhetoric is one of
 those arts which works mainly by the   
use of  words1 and there are other arts 
which also use words1 tell me what is   
that quality in words with which        
rhetoric is concerned3--,suppose that a 
person asks me about some of the arts   
which ,i was mentioning just now2  he   
might say1 8,socrates1 what is          
arithmetic80 and ,i should reply to     
him1 as you replied to me1 that         
arithmetic is one of those arts which   
take effect through words4 ,and then he 
would proceed to ask3 8,words  about    
what80 and ,i should reply1 ,words about
 odd and even numbers1 and  how many    
there are of each4 ,and if he asked     
again3 8,what is the art of             
calculation80 ,i should say1 ,that also 
is one of the arts which is  concerned  
wholly with words4 ,and if he further   
said1 8,concerned with  what80 ,i should

 say1 like the clerks in the assembly1  
8as aforesaid0 of  arithmetic1 but with 
a difference1 the difference being that 
the art of  calculation considers not   
only the quantities of odd and even     
numbers1  but also their numerical      
relations to themselves and to one      
another4  ,and suppose1 again1 ,i were  
to say that astronomy is only words--he 
would  ask1 8,words about what1         
,socrates80 and ,i should answer1 that  
astronomy  tells us about the motions of
 the stars and sun and moon1 and their  
relative swiftness4    ,,gorgias3 ,you  
would be quite right1 ,socrates4        
,,socrates3 ,and now let us have from   
you1 ,gorgias1 the truth about          
rhetoric3 which you would admit 7would  
you not87 to be one of those  arts which
 act always and fulfil all their ends   
through the medium of  words8           
,,gorgias3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,words 
which do what8 ,i should ask4 ,to what  
class of things do  the words which     
rhetoric uses relate8    ,,gorgias3 ,to 

the greatest1 ,socrates1 and the best of
 human things4    ,,socrates3 ,that     
again1 ,gorgias is ambiguous2 ,i am     
still in the dark3 for  which are the   
greatest and best of human things8 ,i   
dare say that you  have heard men       
singing at feasts the old drinking song1
 in which the  singers enumerate the    
goods of life1 first health1 beauty     
next1  thirdly1 as the writer of the    
song says1 wealth honestly obtained4    
,,gorgias3 ,yes1 ,i know the song2 but  
what is your drift8    ,,socrates3 ,i   
mean to say1 that the producers of those
 things which the  author of the song   
praises1 that is to say1 the physician1 
the trainer1  the money-maker1 will at  
once come to you1 and first the         
physician will  say3 8,o ,socrates1     
,gorgias is deceiving you1 for my art is
 concerned  with the greatest good of   
men and not his40 ,and when ,i ask1 ,who
 are  you8 he will reply1 8,i am a      
physician40 ,what do you mean8 ,i shall 
say4  ,do you mean that your art        

produces the greatest good8             
8,certainly10 he  will answer1 8for is  
not health the greatest good8 ,what     
greater good  can men have1 ,socrates80 
,and after him the trainer will come and
 say1  8,i too1 ,socrates1 shall be     
greatly surprised if ,gorgias can show  
more  good of his art than ,i can show  
of mine40 ,to him again ,i shall say1   
,who  are you1 honest friend1 and what  
is your business8 8,i am a trainer10 he 
will reply1 8and my business is to make 
men beautiful and strong in  body40     
,when ,i have done with the trainer1    
there arrives the  money-maker1 and he1 
as ,i expect1 will utterly despise them 
all4  8,consider ,socrates10 he will    
say1 8whether ,gorgias or any one else  
can  produce any greater good than      
wealth40 ,well1 you and ,i say to him1  
and  are you a creator of wealth8       
8,yes10 he replies4 ,and who are you8   
8,a  money-maker40 ,and do you consider 
wealth to be the greatest good of  man8 
8,of course10 will be his reply4 ,and we

 shall rejoin3 ,yes2 but our  friend    
,gorgias contends that his art produces 
a greater good than  yours4 ,and then he
 will be sure to go on and ask1 8,what  
good8 ,let  ,gorgias answer40 ,now ,i   
want you1 ,gorgias1 to imagine that this
 question  is asked of you by them and  
by me2 ,what is that which1 as you say1 
is  the greatest good of man1 and of    
which you are the creator8 ,answer us4  
,,gorgias3 ,that good1 ,socrates1 which 
is truly the greatest1 being that  which
 gives to men freedom in their own      
persons1 and to individuals the  power  
of ruling over others in their several  
states4    ,,socrates3 ,and what would  
you consider this to be8    ,,gorgias3  
,what is there greater than the word    
which persuades the judges  in the      
courts1 or the senators in the council1 
or the citizens in the  assembly1 or at 
any other political meeting8--if you    
have the power of  uttering this word1  
you will have the physician your slave1 
and the  trainer your slave1 and the    

money-maker of whom you talk will be    
found  to gather treasures1 not for     
himself1 but for you who are able to    
speak  and to persuade the multitude4   
,,socrates3 ,now ,i think1 ,gorgias1    
that you have very accurately explained 
what you conceive to be the art of      
rhetoric2 and you mean to say1 if ,i  am
 not mistaken1 that rhetoric is the     
artificer of persuasion1 having  this   
and no other business1 and that this is 
her crown and end4 ,do you  know any    
other effect of rhetoric over and above 
that of producing  persuasion8          
,,gorgias3 ,no3 the definition seems to 
me very fair1 ,socrates2 for  persuasion
 is the chief end of rhetoric4          
,,socrates3 ,then hear me1 ,gorgias1 for
 ,i am quite sure that if there ever    
was a man who entered on the discussion 
of a matter from a pure love of  knowing
 the truth1 ,i am such a one1 and ,i    
should say the same of you4             
,,gorgias3 ,what is coming1 ,socrates8  
,,socrates3 ,i will tell you3 ,i am very

 well aware that ,i do not know  what1  
according to you1 is the exact nature1  
or what are the topics of  that         
persuasion of which you speak1 and which
 is given by rhetoric2  although ,i have
 a suspicion about both the one and the 
other4 ,and ,i am  going to ask--what is
 this power of persuasion which is given
 by  rhetoric1 and about what8 ,but why1
 if ,i have a suspicion1 do ,i ask      
instead of telling you8 ,not for your   
sake1 but in order that the  argument   
may proceed in such a manner as is most 
likely to set forth  the truth4 ,and ,i 
would have you observe1 that ,i am right
 in asking this  further question3 ,if  
,i asked1 8,what sort of a painter is   
,zeuxis80 and  you said1 8,the painter  
of figures10 should ,i not be right in  
asking1  8,what kind of figures1 and    
where do you find them80    ,,gorgias3  
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and the     
reason for asking this second question  
would be1 that  there are other painters
 besides1 who paint many other figures8 

,,gorgias3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,but if
 there had been no one but ,zeuxis who  
painted them1  then you would have      
answered very well8    ,,gorgias3 ,quite
 so4    ,,socrates3 ,now ,i want to know
 about rhetoric in the same way2--is    
rhetoric the only art which brings      
persuasion1 or do other arts have  the  
same effect8 ,i mean to say--,does he   
who teaches anything persuade  men of   
that which he teaches or not8           
,,gorgias3 ,he persuades1               
,socrates1--there can be no mistake     
about that4    ,,socrates3 ,again1 if we
 take the arts of which we were just now
  speaking3--do not arithmetic and the  
arithmeticians teach us the  properties 
of number8    ,,gorgias3 ,certainly4    
,,socrates3 ,and therefore persuade us  
of them8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4            
,,socrates3 ,then arithmetic as well as 
rhetoric is an artificer of  persuasion8
    ,,gorgias3 ,clearly4    ,,socrates3 
,and if any one asks us what sort of    
persuasion1 and about  what1--we shall  

answer1 persuasion which teaches the    
quantity of odd and  even2 and we shall 
be able to show that all the other arts 
of which we  were just now speaking are 
artificers of persuasion1 and of what   
sort1  and about what4    ,,gorgias3    
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,then        
rhetoric is not the only artificer of   
persuasion8    ,,gorgias3 ,true4        
,,socrates3 ,seeing1 then1 that not only
 rhetoric works by persuasion1 but  that
 other arts do the same1 as in the case 
of the painter1 a question  has arisen  
which is a very fair one3 ,of what      
persuasion is rhetoric the  artificer1  
and about what8--is not that a fair way 
of putting the  question8    ,,gorgias3 
,i think so4    ,,socrates3 ,then1 if   
you approve the question1 ,gorgias1 what
 is the  answer8    ,,gorgias3 ,i       
answer1 ,socrates1 that rhetoric is the 
art of persuasion in  courts of law and 
other assemblies1 as ,i was just now    
saying1 and about  the just and unjust4 
,,socrates3 ,and that1 ,gorgias1 was    

what ,i was suspecting to be your       
notion2 yet ,i would not have you wonder
 if by-and-by ,i am found  repeating a  
seemingly plain question2 for ,i ask not
 in order to confute  you1 but as ,i was
 saying that the argument may proceed   
consecutively1  and that we may not get 
the habit of anticipating and suspecting
 the  meaning of one another's words2 ,i
 would have you develope your own  views
 in your own way1 whatever may be your  
hypothesis4    ,,gorgias3 ,i think that 
you are quite right1 ,socrates4         
,,socrates3 ,then let me raise another  
question2 there is such a thing as      
8having learned08    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4   
,,socrates3 ,and there is also 8having  
believed08    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,and is the 8having learned0
 the same as 8having believed10  and are
 learning and belief the same things8   
,,gorgias3 ,in my judgment1 ,socrates1  
they are not the same4    ,,socrates3   
,and your judgment is right1 as you may 
ascertain in this  way3--,if a person   

were to say to you1 8,is there1         
,gorgias1 a false belief  as well as a  
true80--you would reply1 if ,i am not   
mistaken1 that there  is4    ,,gorgias3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 but is there
 a false knowledge as well as a true8   
,,gorgias3 ,no4    ,,socrates3 ,no1     
indeed2 and this again proves that      
knowledge and belief  differ4           
,,gorgias3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3   
,and yet those who have learned as well 
as those who have  believed are         
persuaded8    ,,gorgias3 ,just so4      
,,socrates3 ,shall we then assume two   
sorts of persuasion1--one which is  the 
source of belief without knowledge1 as  
the other is of knowledge8    ,,gorgias3
 ,by all means4    ,,socrates3 ,and     
which sort of persuasion does rhetoric  
create in courts  of law and other      
assemblies about the just and unjust1   
the sort of  persuasion which gives     
belief without knowledge1 or that which 
gives  knowledge8    ,,gorgias3         
,clearly1 ,socrates1 that which only    

gives belief4    ,,socrates3 ,then      
rhetoric1 as would appear1 is the       
artificer of a  persuasion which creates
 belief about the just and unjust1 but  
gives no  instruction about them8       
,,gorgias3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and   
the rhetorician does not instruct the   
courts of law or  other assemblies about
 things just and unjust1 but he creates 
belief  about them2 for no one can be   
supposed to instruct such a vast        
multitude about such high matters in a  
short time8    ,,gorgias3 ,certainly    
not4    ,,socrates3 ,come1 then1 and let
 us see what we really mean about       
rhetoric2 for ,i do not know what my own
 meaning is as yet4 ,when the  assembly 
meets to elect a physician or a         
shipwright or any other  craftsman1 will
 the rhetorician be taken into counsel8 
,surely not4 ,for  at every election he 
ought to be chosen who is most skilled2 
and1  again1 when walls have to be built
 or harbours or docks to be             
constructed1 not the rhetorician but the

 master workman will advise2 or  when   
generals have to be chosen and an order 
of battle arranged1 or a  position      
taken1 then the military will advise and
 not the rhetoricians3  what do you say1
 ,gorgias8 ,since you profess to be a   
rhetorician and a  maker of             
rhetoricians1 ,i cannot do better than  
learn the nature of your  art from you4 
,and here let me assure you that ,i have
 your interest in  view as well as my   
own4 ,for likely enough some one or     
other of the  young men present might   
desire to become your pupil1 and in fact
 ,i see  some1 and a good many too1 who 
have this wish1 but they would be too   
modest to question you4 ,and therefore  
when you are interrogated by me1  ,i    
would have you imagine that you are     
interrogated by them4 8,what is  the use
 of coming to you1 ,gorgias80 they will 
say--8about what will you  teach us to  
advise the state8--about the just and   
unjust only1 or about  those other      
things also which ,socrates has just    

mentioned80 ,how will  you answer them8 
,,gorgias3 ,i like your way of leading  
us on1 ,socrates1 and ,i will  endeavour
 to reveal to you the whole nature of   
rhetoric4 ,you must have  heard1 ,i     
think1 that the docks and the walls of  
the ,athenians and the  plan of the     
harbour were devised in accordance with 
the counsels1  partly of ,themistocles1 
and partly of ,pericles1 and not at the 
suggestion of the builders4             
,,socrates3 ,such is the tradition1     
,gorgias1 about ,themistocles2 and ,i   
myself heard the speech of ,pericles    
when he advised us about the middle     
wall4    ,,gorgias3 ,and you will       
observe1 ,socrates1 that when a decision
 has to be  given in such matters the   
rhetoricians are the advisers2 they are 
the  men who win their point4           
,,socrates3 ,i had that in my admiring  
mind1 ,gorgias1 when ,i asked what is   
the nature of rhetoric1 which always    
appears to me1 when ,i look at the      
matter in this way1 to be a marvel of   

greatness4    ,,gorgias3 ,a marvel1     
indeed1 ,socrates1 if you only knew how 
rhetoric  comprehends and holds under   
her sway all the inferior arts4 ,let me 
offer you a striking example of this4   
,on several occasions ,i have been  with
 my brother ,herodicus or some other    
physician to see one of his  patients1  
who would not allow the physician to    
give him medicine1 or  apply the knife  
or hot iron to him2 and ,i have         
persuaded him to do for  me what he     
would not do for the physician just by  
the use of rhetoric4  ,and ,i say that  
if a rhetorician and a physician were to
 go to any city1  and had there to argue
 in the ,ecclesia or any other assembly 
as to  which of them should be elected  
state-physician1 the physician would    
have no chance2 but he who could speak  
would be chosen if he wished2  and in a 
contest with a man of any other         
profession the rhetorician  more than   
any one would have the power of getting 
himself chosen1 for  he can speak more  

persuasively to the multitude than any  
of them1 and  on any subject4 ,such is  
the nature and power of the art of      
rhetoric6  ,and yet1 ,socrates1 rhetoric
 should be used like any other          
competitive  art1 not against           
everybody1--the rhetorician ought not to
 abuse his  strength any more than a    
pugilist or pancratiast or other master 
of  fence2--because he has powers which 
are more than a match either for  friend
 or enemy1 he ought not therefore to    
strike1 stab1 or slay his  friends4     
,suppose a man to have been trained in  
the palestra and to be a  skilful       
boxer1--he in the fulness of his        
strength goes and strikes his  father or
 mother or one of his familiars or      
friends2 but that is no  reason why the 
trainers or fencing-masters should be   
held in  detestation or banished from   
the city2--surely not4 ,for they taught 
their art for a good purpose1 to be used
 against enemies and  evil-doers1 in    
self-defence not in aggression1 and     

others have  perverted their            
instructions1 and turned to a bad use   
their own  strength and skill4 ,but not 
on this account are the teachers bad1   
neither is the art in fault1 or bad in  
itself2 ,i should rather say that  those
 who make a bad use of the art are to   
blame4 ,and the same argument  holds    
good of rhetoric2 for the rhetorician   
can speak against all men  and upon any 
subject1--in short1 he can persuade the 
multitude better  than any other man of 
anything which he pleases1 but he should
 not  therefore seek to defraud the     
physician or any other artist of his    
reputation merely because he has the    
power2 he ought to use rhetoric  fairly1
 as he would also use his athletic      
powers4 ,and if after having  become a  
rhetorician he makes a bad use of his   
strength and skill1 his  instructor     
surely ought not on that account to be  
held in detestation  or banished4 ,for  
he was intended by his teacher to make a
 good use of  his instructions1 but he  

abuses them4 ,and therefore he is the   
person  who ought to be held in         
detestation1 banished1 and put to death1
 and  not his instructor4    ,,socrates3
 ,you1 ,gorgias1 like myself1 have had  
great experience of  disputations1 and  
you must have observed1 ,i think1 that  
they do not  always terminate in mutual 
edification1 or in the definition by    
either  party of the subjects which they
 are discussing2 but disagreements are  
apt to arise--somebody says that another
 has not spoken truly or  clearly2 and  
then they get into a passion and begin  
to quarrel1 both  parties conceiving    
that their opponents are arguing from   
personal  feeling only and jealousy of  
themselves1 not from any interest in the
  question at issue4 ,and sometimes they
 will go on abusing one another  until  
the company at last are quite vexed at  
themselves for ever  listening to such  
fellows4 ,why do ,i say this8 ,why1     
because ,i cannot  help feeling that you
 are now saying what is not quite       

consistent or  accordant with what you  
were saying at first about rhetoric4    
,and ,i am  afraid to point this out to 
you1 lest you should think that ,i have 
some  animosity against you1 and that ,i
 speak1 not for the sake of  discovering
 the truth1 but from jealousy of you4   
,now if you are one of  my sort1 ,i     
should like to cross-examine you1 but if
 not ,i will let you  alone4 ,and what  
is my sort8 you will ask4 ,i am one of  
those who are  very willing to be       
refuted if ,i say anything which is not 
true1 and  very willing to refute any   
one else who says what is not true1 and 
quite as ready to be refuted as to      
refute2 for ,i hold that this is the    
greater gain of the two1 just as the    
gain is greater of being cured of  a    
very great evil than of curing another4 
,for ,i imagine that there is  no evil  
which a man can endure so great as an   
erroneous opinion about  the matters of 
which we are speaking2 and if you claim 
to be one of my  sort1 let us have the  

discussion out1 but if you would rather 
have  done1 no matter2--let us make an  
end of it4    ,,gorgias3 ,i should say1 
,socrates1 that ,i am quite the man whom
 you  indicate2 but1 perhaps1 we ought  
to consider the audience1 for1 before   
you came1 ,i had already given a long   
exhibition1 and if we proceed the       
argument may run on to a great length4  
,and therefore ,i think that we  should 
consider whether we may not be detaining
 some part of the  company when they are
 wanting to do something else4          
,,chaerephon3 ,you hear the audience    
cheering1 ,gorgias and ,socrates1 which 
shows their desire to listen to you2 and
 for myself1 ,heaven forbid that  ,i    
should have any business on hand which  
would take me away from a  discussion so
 interesting and so ably maintained4    
,,callicles3 ,by the gods1 ,chaerephon1 
although ,i have been present at  many  
discussions1 ,i doubt whether ,i was    
ever so much delighted before1  and     
therefore if you go on discoursing all  

day ,i shall be the better  pleased4    
,,socrates3 ,i may truly say1           
,callicles1 that ,i am willing1 if      
,gorgias is4    ,,gorgias3 ,after all   
this1 ,socrates1 ,i should be disgraced 
if ,i refused1  especially as ,i have   
promised to answer all comers2 in       
accordance with  the wishes of the      
company1 then1 do you begin1 and ask of 
me any  question which you like4        
,,socrates3 ,let me tell you then1      
,gorgias1 what surprises me in your     
words2 though ,i dare say that you may  
be right1 and ,i may have  misunderstood
 your meaning4 ,you say that you can    
make any man1 who will  learn of you1 a 
rhetorician8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4        
,,socrates3 ,do you mean that you will  
teach him to gain the ears of the       
multitude on any subject1 and this not  
by instruction but by  persuasion8      
,,gorgias3 ,quite so4    ,,socrates3    
,you were saying1 in fact1 that the     
rhetorician will have  greater powers of
 persuasion than the physician even in a

 matter of  health8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes1 
with the multitude1--that is4           
,,socrates3 ,you mean to say1 with the  
ignorant2 for with those who know  he   
cannot be supposed to have greater      
powers of persuasion4    ,,gorgias3     
,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,but if he is
 to have more power of persuasion than  
the  physician1 he will have greater    
power than he who knows8    ,,gorgias3  
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,although he 
is not a physician3--is he8             
,,gorgias3 ,no4    ,,socrates3 ,and he  
who is not a physician must1 obviously1 
be ignorant of  what the physician      
knows4    ,,gorgias3 ,clearly4          
,,socrates3 ,then1 when the rhetorician 
is more persuasive than the  physician1 
the ignorant is more persuasive with the
 ignorant than he  who has              
knowledge8--is not that the inference8  
,,gorgias3 ,in the case supposed3--yes4 
,,socrates3 ,and the same holds of the  
relation of rhetoric to all the  other  
arts2 the rhetorician need not know the 

truth about things2 he  has only to     
discover some way of persuading the     
ignorant that he has  more knowledge    
than those who know8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes1
 ,socrates1 and is not this a great     
comfort8--not to have  learned the other
 arts1 but the art of rhetoric only1 and
 yet to be in  no way inferior to the   
professors of them8    ,,socrates3      
,whether the rhetorician is or not      
inferior on this account is  a question 
which we will hereafter examine if the  
enquiry is likely to  be of any service 
to us2 but ,i would rather begin by     
asking1 whether he  is or is not as     
ignorant of the just and unjust1 base   
and honourable1  good and evil1 as he is
 of medicine and the other arts2 ,i mean
 to say1  does he really know anything  
of what is good and evil1 base or       
honourable1 just or unjust in them2 or  
has he only a way with the  ignorant of 
persuading them that he not knowing is  
to be esteemed to  know more about these
 things than some one else who knows8   

,or must the  pupil know these things   
and come to you knowing them before he  
can  acquire the art of rhetoric8 ,if he
 is ignorant1 you who are the teacher   
of rhetoric will not teach him--it is   
not your business2 but you will  make   
him seem to the multitude to know them1 
when he does not know  them2 and seem to
 be a good man1 when he is not4 ,or will
 you be unable  to teach him rhetoric at
 all1 unless he knows the truth of these
 things  first8 ,what is to be said     
about all this8 ,by heavens1 ,gorgias1  
,i wish  that you would reveal to me the
 power of rhetoric1 as you were saying  
that you would4    ,,gorgias3 ,well1    
,socrates1 ,i suppose that if the pupil 
does chance not to  know them1 he will  
have to learn of me these things as     
well4    ,,socrates3 ,say no more1 for  
there you are right2 and so he whom you 
make  a rhetorician must either know the
 nature of the just and unjust  already1
 or he must be taught by you4           
,,gorgias3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3   

,well1 and is not he who has learned    
carpentering a carpenter8    ,,gorgias3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and he who has    
learned music a musician8    ,,gorgias3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and he who has    
learned medicine is a physician1 in like
  manner8 ,he who has learned anything  
whatever is that which his  knowledge   
makes him4    ,,gorgias3 ,certainly4    
,,socrates3 ,and in the same way1 he who
 has learned what is just is just8      
,,gorgias3 ,to be sure4    ,,socrates3  
,and he who is just may be supposed to  
do what is just8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,and must not the just man  
always desire to do what is just8       
,,gorgias3 ,that is clearly the         
inference4    ,,socrates3 ,surely1 then1
 the just man will never consent to do  
injustice8    ,,gorgias3 ,certainly not4
    ,,socrates3 ,and according to the   
argument the rhetorician must be a just 
man8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 
,and will therefore never be willing to 
do injustice8    ,,gorgias3 ,clearly    

not4    ,,socrates3 ,but do you remember
 saying just now that the trainer is not
  to be accused or banished if the      
pugilist makes a wrong use of his       
pugilistic art2 and in like manner1 if  
the rhetorician makes a bad and  unjust 
use of his rhetoric1 that is not to be  
laid to the charge of his  teacher1 who 
is not to be banished1 but the          
wrong-doer himself who made  a bad use  
of his rhetoric--he is to be            
banished--was not that said8            
,,gorgias3 ,yes1 it was4    ,,socrates3 
,but now we are affirming that the      
aforesaid rhetorician will  never have  
done injustice at all8    ,,gorgias3    
,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and at the very  
outset1 ,gorgias1 it was said that      
rhetoric  treated of discourse1 not     
7like arithmetic7 about odd and even1   
but  about just and unjust8 ,was not    
this said8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,i was thinking at the time1
 when ,i heard you saying so1 that      
rhetoric1 which is always discoursing   

about justice1 could not possibly  be an
 unjust thing4 ,but when you added1     
shortly afterwards1 that the            
rhetorician might make a bad use of     
rhetoric ,i noted with surprise the     
inconsistency into which you had fallen2
 and ,i said1 that if you  thought1 as  
,i did1 that there was a gain in being  
refuted1 there would  be an advantage in
 going on with the question1 but if not1
 ,i would  leave off4 ,and in the course
 of our investigations1 as you will see 
yourself1 the rhetorician has been      
acknowledged to be incapable of  making 
an unjust use of rhetoric1 or of        
willingness to do injustice4 ,by  the   
dog1 ,gorgias1 there will be a great    
deal of discussion1 before we  get at   
the truth of all this4    ,,polus3 ,and 
do even you1 ,socrates1 seriously       
believe what you are now  saying about  
rhetoric8 ,what6 because ,gorgias was   
ashamed to deny that  the rhetorician   
knew the just and the honourable and the
 good1 and  admitted that to any one who

 came to him ignorant of them he could  
teach them1 and then out of this        
admission there arose a                 
contradiction--the thing which you      
dearly love1 and to which not he1 but   
you1 brought the argument by your       
captious questions--7do you seriously   
believe that there is any truth in all  
this87 ,for will any one ever           
acknowledge that he does not know1 or   
cannot teach1 the nature of  justice8   
,the truth is1 that there is great want 
of manners in bringing  the argument to 
such a pass4    ,,socrates3 ,illustrious
 ,polus1 the reason why we provide      
ourselves with  friends and children is1
 that when we get old and stumble1 a    
younger  generation may be at hand to   
set us on our legs again in our words   
and  in our actions3 and now1 if ,i and 
,gorgias are stumbling1 here are you    
who should raise us up2 and ,i for my   
part engage to retract any error  into  
which you may think that ,i have        
fallen-upon one condition3    ,,polus3  

,what condition8    ,,socrates3 ,that   
you contract1 ,polus1 the prolixity of  
speech in which  you indulged at first4 
,,polus3 ,what6 do you mean that ,i may 
not use as many words as ,i please8     
,,socrates3 ,only to think1 my friend1  
that having come on a visit to  ,athens1
 which is the most free-spoken state in 
,hellas1 you when you got  there1 and   
you alone1 should be deprived of the    
power of speech--that  would be hard    
indeed4 ,but then consider my           
case3--shall not ,i be very  hardly     
used1 if1 when you are making a long    
oration1 and refusing to  answer what   
you are asked1 ,i am compelled to stay  
and listen to you1  and may not go away8
 ,i say rather1 if you have a real      
interest in the  argument1 or1 to repeat
 my former expression1 have any desire  
to set it  on its legs1 take back any   
statement which you please2 and in your 
turn  ask and answer1 like myself and   
,gorgias--refute and be refuted3 for ,i 
suppose that you would claim to know    

what ,gorgias knows--would you not8     
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and you1 
like him1 invite any one to ask you     
about anything  which he pleases1 and   
you will know how to answer him8        
,,polus3 ,to be sure4    ,,socrates3    
,and now1 which will you do1 ask or     
answer8    ,,polus3 ,i will ask2 and do 
you answer me1 ,socrates1 the same      
question  which ,gorgias1 as you        
suppose1 is unable to answer3 ,what is  
rhetoric8    ,,socrates3 ,do you mean   
what sort of an art8    ,,polus3 ,yes4  
,,socrates3 ,to say the truth1 ,polus1  
it is not an art at all1 in my  opinion4
    ,,polus3 ,then what1 in your        
opinion1 is rhetoric8    ,,socrates3 ,a 
thing which1 as ,i was lately reading in
 a book of yours1  you say that you have
 made an art4    ,,polus3 ,what thing8  
,,socrates3 ,i should say a sort of     
experience4    ,,polus3 ,does rhetoric  
seem to you to be an experience8        
,,socrates3 ,that is my view1 but you   
may be of another mind4    ,,polus3 ,an 

experience in what8    ,,socrates3 ,an  
experience in producing a sort of       
delight and  gratification4    ,,polus3 
,and if able to gratify others1 must not
 rhetoric be a fine  thing8             
,,socrates3 ,what are you saying1       
,polus8 ,why do you ask me whether      
rhetoric is a fine thing or not1 when ,i
 have not as yet told you what  rhetoric
 is8    ,,polus3 ,did ,i not hear you   
say that rhetoric was a sort of         
experience8    ,,socrates3 ,will you1   
who are so desirous to gratify others1  
afford a  slight gratification to me8   
,,polus3 ,i will4    ,,socrates3 ,will  
you ask me1 what sort of an art is      
cookery8    ,,polus3 ,what sort of an   
art is cookery8    ,,socrates3 ,not an  
art at all1 ,polus4    ,,polus3 ,what   
then8    ,,socrates3 ,i should say an   
experience4    ,,polus3 ,in what8 ,i    
wish that you would explain to me4      
,,socrates3 ,an experience in producing 
a sort of delight and  gratification1   
,polus4    ,,polus3 ,then are cookery   

and rhetoric the same8    ,,socrates3   
,no1 they are only different parts of   
the same profession4    ,,polus3 ,of    
what profession8    ,,socrates3 ,i am   
afraid that the truth may seem          
discourteous2 and ,i  hesitate to       
answer1 lest ,gorgias should imagine    
that ,i am making fun of  his own       
profession4 ,for whether or not this is 
that art of rhetoric  which ,gorgias    
practises ,i really cannot tell3--from  
what he was just now  saying1 nothing   
appeared of what he thought of his art1 
but the  rhetoric which ,i mean is a    
part of a not very creditable whole4    
,,gorgias3 ,a part of what1 ,socrates8  
,say what you mean1 and never mind  me4 
,,socrates3 ,in my opinion then1        
,gorgias1 the whole of which rhetoric is
 a  part is not an art at all1 but the  
habit of a bold and ready wit1 which    
knows how to manage mankind3 this habit 
,i sum up under the word  8flattery02   
and it appears to me to have many other 
parts1 one of which  is cookery1 which  

may seem to be an art1 but1 as ,i       
maintain1 is only an  experience or     
routine and not an art3--another part is
 rhetoric1 and the  art of attiring and 
sophistry are two others3 thus there are
 four  branches1 and four different     
things answering to them4 ,and ,polus   
may  ask1 if he likes1 for he has not as
 yet been informed1 what part of        
flattery is rhetoric3 he did not see    
that ,i had not yet answered him  when  
he proceeded to ask a further question3 
,whether ,i do not think  rhetoric a    
fine thing8 ,but ,i shall not tell him  
whether rhetoric is a  fine thing or    
not1 until ,i have first answered1      
8,what is rhetoric80 ,for  that would   
not be right1 ,polus2 but ,i shall be   
happy to answer1 if you  will ask me1   
,what part of flattery is rhetoric8     
,,polus3 ,i will ask and do you answer8 
,what part of flattery is rhetoric8     
,,socrates3 ,will you understand my     
answer8 ,rhetoric1 according to my      
view1 is the ghost or counterfeit of a  

part of politics4    ,,polus3 ,and noble
 or ignoble8    ,,socrates3 ,ignoble1 ,i
 should say1 if ,i am compelled to      
answer1 for ,i  call what is bad        
ignoble3 though ,i doubt whether you    
understand what ,i  was saying before4  
,,gorgias3 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i cannot
 say that ,i understand myself4         
,,socrates3 ,i do not wonder1 ,gorgias2 
for ,i have not as yet explained        
myself1 and our friend ,polus1 colt by  
name and colt by nature1 is apt  to run 
away4 7,this is an untranslatable play  
on the name 8,polus10 which  means 8a   
colt407    ,,gorgias3 ,never mind him1  
but explain to me what you mean by      
saying that  rhetoric is the counterfeit
 of a part of politics4    ,,socrates3  
,i will try1 then1 to explain my notion 
of rhetoric1 and if ,i  am mistaken1 my 
friend ,polus shall refute me4 ,we may  
assume the  existence of bodies and of  
souls8    ,,gorgias3 ,of course4        
,,socrates3 ,you would further admit    
that there is a good condition of       

either of them8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes4     
,,socrates3 ,which condition may not be 
really good1 but good only in           
appearance8 ,i mean to say1 that there  
are many persons who appear to be  in   
good health1 and whom only a physician  
or trainer will discern at  first sight 
not to be in good health4    ,,gorgias3 
,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and this applies 
not only to the body1 but also to the   
soul3  in either there may be that which
 gives the appearance of health and  not
 the reality8    ,,gorgias3 ,yes1       
certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and now ,i   
will endeavour to explain to you more   
clearly what  ,i mean3 ,the soul and    
body being two1 have two arts           
corresponding to  them3 there is the art
 of politics attending on the soul2 and 
another  art attending on the body1 of  
which ,i know no single name1 but which 
may be described as having two          
divisions1 one of them gymnastic1 and   
the other medicine4 ,and in politics    
there is a legislative part1 which      

answers to gymnastic1 as justice does to
 medicine2 and the two parts  run into  
one another1 justice having to do with  
the same subject as  legislation1 and   
medicine with the same subject as       
gymnastic1 but with  a difference4 ,now1
 seeing that there are these four arts1 
two attending  on the body and two on   
the soul for their highest good2        
flattery  knowing1 or rather guessing   
their natures1 has distributed herself  
into  four shams or simulations of them2
 she puts on the likeness of some one   
or other of them1 and pretends to be    
that which she simulates1 and  having no
 regard for men's highest interests1 is 
ever making pleasure  the bait of the   
unwary1 and deceiving them into the     
belief that she is  of the highest value
 to them4 ,cookery simulates the        
disguise of  medicine1 and pretends to  
know what food is the best for the body2
 and  if the physician and the cook had 
to enter into a competition in which    
children were the judges1 or men who had

 no more sense than children1  as to    
which of them best understands the      
goodness or badness of food1  the       
physician would be starved to death4 ,a 
flattery ,i deem this to be  and of an  
ignoble sort1 ,polus1 for to you ,i am  
now addressing myself1  because it aims 
at pleasure without any thought of the  
best4 ,an art ,i  do not call it1 but   
only an experience1 because it is unable
 to explain  or to give a reason of the 
nature of its own applications4 ,and ,i 
do not  call any irrational thing an    
art2 but if you dispute my words1 ,i am 
prepared to argue in defence of them4   
,cookery1 then1 ,i maintain to be a     
flattery which takes the form of        
medicine2 and tiring1 in like manner1 is
 a flattery which takes the  form of    
gymnastic1 and is knavish1 false1       
ignoble1 illiberal1 working  deceitfully
 by the help of lines1 and colours1 and 
enamels1 and  garments1 and making men  
affect a spurious beauty to the neglect 
of the  true beauty which is given by   

gymnastic4    ,i would rather not be    
tedious1 and therefore ,i will only say1
 after the  manner of the geometricians 
7for ,i think that by this time you will
 be  able to follow7    as tiring3      
gymnastic33 cookery3 medicine2    or    
rather1    as tiring3 gymnastic33       
sophistry3 legislation2    and    as    
cookery3 medicine33 rhetoric3 justice4  
,and this1 ,i say1 is the natural       
difference between the rhetorician and  
the sophist1 but by reason of their near
 connection1 they are apt to be  jumbled
 up together2 neither do they know what 
to make of themselves1  nor do other men
 know what to make of them4 ,for if the 
body presided  over itself1 and were not
 under the guidance of the soul1 and the
 soul  did not discern and discriminate 
between cookery and medicine1 but the   
body was made the judge of them1 and the
 rule of judgment was the  bodily       
delight which was given by them1 then   
the word of ,anaxagoras1  that word with
 which you1 friend ,polus1 are so well  

acquainted1 would  prevail far and wide3
 8,chaos0 would come again1 and cookery1
 health1  and medicine would mingle in  
an indiscriminate mass4 ,and now ,i have
  told you my notion of rhetoric1 which 
is1 in relation to the soul1 what       
cookery is to the body4 ,i may have been
 inconsistent in making a long  speech1 
when ,i would not allow you to discourse
 at length4 ,but ,i think  that ,i may  
be excused1 because you did not         
understand me1 and could  make no use of
 my answer when ,i spoke shortly1 and   
therefore ,i had to  enter into an      
explanation4 ,and if ,i show an equal   
inability to make use  of yours1 ,i hope
 that you will speak at equal length2   
but if ,i am able  to understand you1   
let me have the benefit of your brevity1
 as is only  fair3 ,and now you may do  
what you please with my answer4         
,,polus3 ,what do you mean8 do you think
 that rhetoric is flattery8             
,,socrates3 ,nay1 ,i said a part of     
flattery2 if at your age1 ,polus1 you   

cannot remember1 what will you do       
by-and-by1 when you get older8          
,,polus3 ,and are the good rhetoricians 
meanly regarded in states1 under  the   
idea that they are flatterers8          
,,socrates3 ,is that a question or the  
beginning of a speech8    ,,polus3 ,i am
 asking a question4    ,,socrates3 ,then
 my answer is1 that they are not        
regarded at all4    ,,polus3 ,how not   
regarded8 ,have they not very great     
power in states8    ,,socrates3 ,not if 
you mean to say that power is a good to 
the possessor4    ,,polus3 ,and that is 
what ,i do mean to say4    ,,socrates3  
,then1 if so1 ,i think that they have   
the least power of all  the citizens4   
,,polus3 ,what6 are they not like       
tyrants8 ,they kill and despoil and     
exile  any one whom they please4        
,,socrates3 ,by the dog1 ,polus1 ,i     
cannot make out at each deliverance of  
yours1 whether you are giving an opinion
 of your own1 or asking a  question of  
me4    ,,polus3 ,i am asking a question 

of you4    ,,socrates3 ,yes1 my friend1 
but you ask two questions at once4      
,,polus3 ,how two questions8            
,,socrates3 ,why1 did you not say just  
now that the rhetoricians are like      
tyrants1 and that they kill and despoil 
or exile any one whom they  please8     
,,polus3 ,i did4    ,,socrates3 ,well   
then1 ,i say to you that here are two   
questions in one1  and ,i will answer   
both of them4 ,and ,i tell you1 ,polus1 
that  rhetoricians and tyrants have the 
least possible power in states1 as ,i   
was just now saying2 for they do        
literally nothing which they will1 but  
only what they think best4    ,,polus3  
,and is not that a great power8         
,,socrates3 ,polus has already said the 
reverse4    ,,polus3 ,said the reverse6 
nay1 that is what ,i assert4            
,,socrates3 ,no1 by the great--what do  
you call him8--not you1 for you say     
that power is a good to him who has the 
power4    ,,polus3 ,i do4    ,,socrates3
 ,and would you maintain that if a fool 

does what he thinks  best1 this is a    
good1 and would you call this great     
power8    ,,polus3 ,i should not4       
,,socrates3 ,then you must prove that   
the rhetorician is not a fool1 and  that
 rhetoric is an art and not a           
flattery--and so you will have refuted  
me2 but if you leave me unrefuted1 why1 
the rhetoricians who do what  they think
 best in states1 and the tyrants1 will  
have nothing upon  which to congratulate
 themselves1 if as you say1 power be    
indeed a  good1 admitting at the same   
time that what is done without sense is 
an  evil4    ,,polus3 ,yes2 ,i admit    
that4    ,,socrates3 ,how then can the  
rhetoricians or the tyrants have great  
power  in states1 unless ,polus can     
refute ,socrates1 and prove to him that 
they  do as they will8    ,,polus3 ,this
 fellow--    ,,socrates3 ,i say that    
they do not do as they will2--now refute
 me4    ,,polus3 ,why1 have you not     
already said that they do as they think 
best8    ,,socrates3 ,and ,i say so     

still4    ,,polus3 ,then surely they do 
as they will8    ,,socrates3 ,i deny it4
    ,,polus3 ,but they do what they     
think best8    ,,socrates3 ,aye4        
,,polus3 ,that1 ,socrates1 is monstrous 
and absurd4    ,,socrates3 ,good words1 
good ,polus1 as ,i may say in your own  
peculiar  style2 but if you have any    
questions to ask of me1 either prove    
that ,i  am in error or give the answer 
yourself4    ,,polus3 ,very well1 ,i am 
willing to answer that ,i may know what 
you mean4    ,,socrates3 ,do men appear 
to you to will that which they do1 or to
 will  that further end for the sake of 
which they do a thing8 when they take   
medicine1 for example1 at the bidding of
 a physician1 do they will the  drinking
 of the medicine which is painful1 or   
the health for the sake  of which they  
drink8    ,,polus3 ,clearly1 the health4
    ,,socrates3 ,and when men go on a   
voyage or engage in business1 they do   
not will that which they are doing at   
the time2 for who would desire to  take 

the risk of a voyage or the trouble of  
business8--,but they will1 to  have the 
wealth for the sake of which they go on 
a voyage4    ,,polus3 ,certainly4       
,,socrates3 ,and is not this universally
 true8 ,if a man does something for  the
 sake of something else1 he wills not   
that which he does1 but that  for the   
sake of which he does it4    ,,polus3   
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and are not all   
things either good or evil1 or          
intermediate  and indifferent8          
,,polus3 ,to be sure1 ,socrates4        
,,socrates3 ,wisdom and health and      
wealth and the like you would call      
goods1 and their opposites evils8       
,,polus3 ,i should4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
the things which are neither good nor   
evil1 and which  partake sometimes of   
the nature of good and at other times of
 evil1 or  of neither1 are such as      
sitting1 walking1 running1 sailing2 or1 
again1  wood1 stones1 and the           
like3--these are the things which you   
call neither  good nor evil8    ,,polus3

 ,exactly so4    ,,socrates3 ,are these 
indifferent things done for the sake of 
the good1  or the good for the sake of  
the indifferent8    ,,polus3 ,clearly1  
the indifferent for the sake of the     
good4    ,,socrates3 ,when we walk we   
walk for the sake of the good1 and under
 the  idea that it is better to walk1   
and when we stand we stand equally for  
the sake of the good8    ,,polus3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,and when we kill a man we  
kill him or exile him or despoil  him of
 his goods1 because1 as we think1 it    
will conduce to our good8    ,,polus3   
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,men who do  
any of these things do them for the sake
 of the  good8    ,,polus3 ,yes4        
,,socrates3 ,and did we not admit that  
in doing something for the sake of      
something else1 we do not will those    
things which we do1 but that other      
thing for the sake of which we do them8 
,,polus3 ,most true4    ,,socrates3     
,then we do not will simply to kill a   
man or to exile him or  to despoil him  

of his goods1 but we will to do that    
which conduces to  our good1 and if the 
act is not conducive to our good we do  
not will  it2 for we will1 as you say1  
that which is our good1 but that which  
is  neither good nor evil1 or simply    
evil1 we do not will4 ,why are you      
silent1 ,polus8 ,am ,i not right8       
,,polus3 ,you are right4    ,,socrates3 
,hence we may infer1 that if any one1   
whether he be a tyrant  or a            
rhetorician1 kills another or exiles    
another or deprives him of  his         
property1 under the idea that the act is
 for his own interests when  really not 
for his own interests1 he may be said to
 do what seems best  to him8    ,,polus3
 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,but does he do   
what he wills if he does what is evil8  
,why do  you not answer8    ,,polus3    
,well1 ,i suppose not4    ,,socrates3   
,then if great power is a good as you   
allow1 will such a one  have great power
 in a state8    ,,polus3 ,he will not4  
,,socrates3 ,then ,i was right in saying

 that a man may do what seems good  to  
him in a state1 and not have great      
power1 and not do what he wills8        
,,polus3 ,as though you1 ,socrates1     
would not like to have the power of     
doing what seemed good to you in the    
state1 rather than not2 you would  not  
be jealous when you saw any one killing 
or despoiling or  imprisoning whom he   
pleased1 ,oh1 no6    ,,socrates3 ,justly
 or unjustly1 do you mean8    ,,polus3  
,in either case is he not equally to be 
envied8    ,,socrates3 ,forbear1 ,polus6
    ,,polus3 ,why 8forbear08            
,,socrates3 ,because you ought not to   
envy wretches who are not to be  envied1
 but only to pity them4    ,,polus3 ,and
 are those of whom ,i spoke wretches8   
,,socrates3 ,yes1 certainly they are4   
,,polus3 ,and so you think that he who  
slays any one whom he pleases1 and      
justly slays him1 is pitiable and       
wretched8    ,,socrates3 ,no1 ,i do not 
say that of him3 but neither do ,i think
 that he  is to be envied4    ,,polus3  

,were you not saying just now that he is
 wretched8    ,,socrates3 ,yes1 my      
friend1 if he killed another unjustly1  
in which case  he is also to be pitied2 
and he is not to be envied if he killed 
him  justly4    ,,polus3 ,at any rate   
you will allow that he who is unjustly  
put to death  is wretched1 and to be    
pitied8    ,,socrates3 ,not so much1    
,polus1 as he who kills him1 and not so 
much as  he who is justly killed4       
,,polus3 ,how can that be1 ,socrates8   
,,socrates3 ,that may very well be1     
inasmuch as doing injustice is the      
greatest of evils4    ,,polus3 ,but is  
it the greatest8 ,is not suffering      
injustice a greater  evil8              
,,socrates3 ,certainly not4    ,,polus3 
,then would you rather suffer than do   
injustice8    ,,socrates3 ,i should not 
like either1 but if ,i must choose      
between them1  ,i would rather suffer   
than do4    ,,polus3 ,then you would not
 wish to be a tyrant8    ,,socrates3    
,not if you mean by tyranny what ,i     

mean4    ,,polus3 ,i mean1 as ,i said   
before1 the power of doing whatever     
seems good  to you in a state1 killing1 
banishing1 doing in all things as you   
like4    ,,socrates3 ,well then1        
illustrious friend1 when ,i have said my
 say1 do  you reply to me4 ,suppose that
 ,i go into a crowded ,agora1 and take a
  dagger under my arm4 ,polus1 ,i say to
 you1 ,i have just acquired rare  power1
 and become a tyrant2 for if ,i think   
that any of these men whom  you see     
ought to be put to death1 the man whom  
,i have a mind to kill is  as good as   
dead2 and if ,i am disposed to break his
 head or tear his  garment1 he will have
 his head broken or his garment torn in 
an  instant4 ,such is my great power in 
this city4 ,and if you do not believe   
me1 and ,i show you the dagger1 you     
would probably reply3 ,socrates1 in     
that sort of way any one may have great 
power--he may burn any house  which he  
pleases1 and the docks and triremes of  
the ,athenians1 and all  their other    

vessels1 whether public or private--but 
can you believe that  this mere doing as
 you think best is great power8         
,,polus3 ,certainly not such doing as   
this4    ,,socrates3 ,but can you tell  
me why you disapprove of such a power8  
,,polus3 ,i can4    ,,socrates3 ,why    
then8    ,,polus3 ,why1 because he who  
did as you say would be certain to be   
punished4    ,,socrates3 ,and punishment
 is an evil8    ,,polus3 ,certainly4    
,,socrates3 ,and you would admit once   
more1 my good sir1 that great power  is 
a benefit to a man if his actions turn  
out to his advantage1 and  that this is 
the meaning of great power2 and if not1 
then his power is  an evil and is no    
power4 ,but let us look at the matter in
 another  way3--do we not acknowledge   
that the things of which we were        
speaking1  the infliction of death1 and 
exile1 and the deprivation of property  
are  sometimes a good and sometimes not 
a good8    ,,polus3 ,certainly4         
,,socrates3 ,about that you and ,i may  

be supposed to agree8    ,,polus3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,tell me1 then1 when do you 
say that they are good and when  that   
they are evil--what principle do you lay
 down8    ,,polus3 ,i would rather1     
,socrates1 that you should answer as    
well as ask  that question4             
,,socrates3 ,well1 ,polus1 since you    
would rather have the answer from me1   
,i say that they are good when they are 
just1 and evil when they are  unjust4   
,,polus3 ,you are hard of refutation1   
,socrates1 but might not a child  refute
 that statement8    ,,socrates3 ,then ,i
 shall be very grateful to the child1   
and equally  grateful to you if you will
 refute me and deliver me from my       
foolishness4 ,and ,i hope that refute me
 you will1 and not weary of doing  good 
to a friend4    ,,polus3 ,yes1          
,socrates1 and ,i need not go far or    
appeal to antiquity2  events which      
happened only a few days ago are enough 
to refute you1 and  to prove that many  
men who do wrong are happy4             

,,socrates3 ,what events8    ,,polus3   
,you see1 ,i presume1 that ,archelaus   
the son of ,perdiccas is now  the ruler 
of ,macedonia8    ,,socrates3 ,at any   
rate ,i hear that he is4    ,,polus3    
,and do you think that he is happy or   
miserable8    ,,socrates3 ,i cannot say1
 ,polus1 for ,i have never had any      
acquaintance  with him4    ,,polus3 ,and
 cannot you tell at once1 and without   
having an acquaintance  with him1       
whether a man is happy8    ,,socrates3  
,most certainly not4    ,,polus3 ,then  
clearly1 ,socrates1 you would say that  
you did not even know  whether the great
 king was a happy man8    ,,socrates3   
,and ,i should speak the truth2 for ,i  
do not know how he stands  in the matter
 of education and justice4    ,,polus3  
,what6 and does all happiness consist in
 this8    ,,socrates3 ,yes1 indeed1     
,polus1 that is my doctrine2 the men and
 women  who are gentle and good are also
 happy1 as ,i maintain1 and the unjust  
and evil are miserable4    ,,polus3     

,then1 according to your doctrine1 the  
said ,archelaus is  miserable8          
,,socrates3 ,yes1 my friend1 if he is   
wicked4    ,,polus3 ,that he is wicked  
,i cannot deny2 for he had no title at  
all to  the throne which he now         
occupies1 he being only the son of a    
woman who  was the slave of ,alcetas the
 brother of ,perdiccas2 he himself      
therefore  in strict right was the slave
 of ,alcetas2 and if he had meant to do 
rightly he would have remained his      
slave1 and then1 according to your      
doctrine1 he would have been happy4 ,but
 now he is unspeakably  miserable1 for  
he has been guilty of the greatest      
crimes3 in the first  place he invited  
his uncle and master1 ,alcetas1 to come 
to him1 under  the pretence that he     
would restore to him the throne which   
,perdiccas  has usurped1 and after      
entertaining him and his son ,alexander1
 who was  his own cousin1 and nearly of 
an age with him1 and making them drunk1 
he threw them into a waggon and carried 

them off by night1 and slew  them1 and  
got both of them out of the way2 and    
when he had done all  this wickedness he
 never discovered that he was the most  
miserable of  all men1 and was very far 
from repenting3 shall ,i tell you how he
  showed his remorse8 he had a younger  
brother1 a child of seven years  old1   
who was the legitimate son of           
,perdiccas1 and to him of right the     
kingdom belonged2 ,archelaus1 however1  
had no mind to bring him up as he  ought
 and restore the kingdom to him2 that   
was not his notion of  happiness2 but   
not long afterwards he threw him into a 
well and drowned  him1 and declared to  
his mother ,cleopatra that he had fallen
 in while  running after a goose1 and   
had been killed4 ,and now as he is the  
greatest criminal of all the            
,macedonians1 he may be supposed to be  
the  most miserable and not the happiest
 of them1 and ,i dare say that there    
are many ,athenians1 and you would be at
 the head of them1 who would  rather be 

any other ,macedonian than ,archelaus6  
,,socrates3 ,i praised you at first1    
,polus1 for being a rhetorician rather  
than a reasoner4 ,and this1 as ,i       
suppose1 is the sort of argument with   
which you fancy that a child might      
refute me1 and by which ,i stand        
refuted when ,i say that the unjust man 
is not happy4 ,but1 my good  friend1    
where is the refutation8 ,i cannot admit
 a word which you have  been saying4    
,,polus3 ,that is because you will not2 
for you surely must think as ,i do4     
,,socrates3 ,not so1 my simple friend1  
but because you will refute me  after   
the manner which rhetoricians practise  
in courts of law4 ,for  there the one   
party think that they refute the other  
when they bring  forward a number of    
witnesses of good repute in proof of    
their  allegations1 and their adversary 
has only a single one or none at all4   
,but this kind of proof is of no value  
where truth is the aim2 a man may  often
 be sworn down by a multitude of false  

witnesses who have a great  air of      
respectability4 ,and in this argument   
nearly every one1 ,athenian  and        
stranger alike1 would be on your side1  
if you should bring  witnesses in       
disproof of my statement2--you may1 if  
you will1 summon  ,nicias the son of    
,niceratus1 and let his brothers1 who   
gave the row of  tripods which stand in 
the precincts of ,dionysus1 come with   
him2 or you  may summon ,aristocrates1  
the son of ,scellius1 who is the giver  
of that  famous offering which is at    
,delphi2 summon1 if you will1 the whole 
house of ,pericles1 or any other great  
,athenian family whom you  choose2--they
 will all agree with you3 ,i only am    
left alone and cannot  agree1 for you do
 not convince me2 although you produce  
many false  witnesses against me1 in the
 hope of depriving me of my inheritance1
  which is the truth4 ,but ,i consider  
that nothing worth speaking of will     
have been effected by me unless ,i make 
you the one witness of my words2  nor by

 you1 unless you make me the one witness
 of yours2 no matter  about the rest of 
the world4 ,for there are two ways of   
refutation1 one  which is yours and that
 of the world in general2 but mine is of
 another  sort--let us compare them1 and
 see in what they differ4 ,for1 indeed1 
we  are at issue about matters which to 
know is honourable and not to know      
disgraceful2 to know or not to know     
happiness and misery--that is the  chief
 of them4 ,and what knowledge can be    
nobler8 or what ignorance more          
disgraceful than this8 ,and therefore ,i
 will begin by asking you whether  you  
do not think that a man who is unjust   
and doing injustice can be  happy1      
seeing that you think ,archelaus unjust1
 and yet happy8 ,may ,i  assume this to 
be your opinion8    ,,polus3 ,certainly4
    ,,socrates3 ,but ,i say that this is
 an impossibility--here is one point    
about which we are at issue3--very good4
 ,and do you mean to say also  that if  
he meets with retribution and punishment

 he will still be  happy8    ,,polus3   
,certainly not2 in that case he will be 
most miserable4    ,,socrates3 ,on the  
other hand1 if the unjust be not        
punished1 then1  according to you1 he   
will be happy8    ,,polus3 ,yes4        
,,socrates3 ,but in my opinion1 ,polus1 
the unjust or doer of unjust  actions is
 miserable in any case1--more miserable1
 however1 if he be not  punished and    
does not meet with retribution1 and less
 miserable if he  be punished and meets 
with retribution at the hands of gods   
and men4    ,,polus3 ,you are           
maintaining a strange doctrine1         
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,i shall try  
to make you agree with me1 ,o my friend1
 for as a  friend ,i regard you4 ,then  
these are the points at issue between   
us--are  they not8 ,i was saying that to
 do is worse than to suffer injustice8  
,,polus3 ,exactly so4    ,,socrates3    
,and you said the opposite8    ,,polus3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,i said also that  
the wicked are miserable1 and you       

refuted  me8    ,,polus3 ,by ,zeus1 ,i  
did4    ,,socrates3 ,in your own        
opinion1 ,polus4    ,,polus3 ,yes1 and  
,i rather suspect that ,i was in the    
right4    ,,socrates3 ,you further said 
that the wrong-doer is happy if he be   
unpunished8    ,,polus3 ,certainly4     
,,socrates3 ,and ,i affirm that he is   
most miserable1 and that those who  are 
punished are less miserable--are you    
going to refute this  proposition also8 
,,polus3 ,a proposition which is harder 
of refutation than the other1           
,socrates4    ,,socrates3 ,say rather1  
,polus1 impossible2 for who can refute  
the truth8    ,,polus3 ,what do you     
mean8 ,if a man is detected in an unjust
 attempt to  make himself a tyrant1 and 
when detected is racked1 mutilated1 has 
his  eyes burned out1 and after having  
had all sorts of great injuries         
inflicted on him1 and having seen his   
wife and children suffer the  like1 is  
at last impaled or tarred and burned    
alive1 will he be happier  than if he   

escape and become a tyrant1 and continue
 all through life  doing what he likes  
and holding the reins of government1 the
 envy and  admiration both of citizens  
and strangers8 ,is that the paradox     
which1  as you say1 cannot be refuted8  
,,socrates3 ,there again1 noble ,polus1 
you are raising hobgoblins instead  of  
refuting me2 just now you were calling  
witnesses against me4 ,but  please to   
refresh my memory a little2 did you     
say--8in an unjust attempt  to make     
himself a tyrant08    ,,polus3 ,yes1 ,i 
did4    ,,socrates3 ,then ,i say that   
neither of them will be happier than the
  other1--neither he who unjustly       
acquires a tyranny1 nor he who suffers  
in the attempt1 for of two miserables   
one cannot be the happier1 but  that he 
who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the 
more miserable of the  two4 ,do you     
laugh1 ,polus8 ,well1 this is a new kind
 of refutation1--when  any one says     
anything1 instead of refuting him to    
laugh at him4    ,,polus3 ,but do you   

not think1 ,socrates1 that you have been
 sufficiently  refuted1 when you say    
that which no human being will allow8   
,ask the  company4    ,,socrates3 ,o    
,polus1 ,i am not a public man1 and only
 last year1 when my  tribe were serving 
as ,prytanes1 and it became my duty as  
their  president to take the votes1     
there was a laugh at me1 because ,i was 
unable to take them4 ,and as ,i failed  
then1 you must not ask me to count  the 
suffrages of the company now2 but if1 as
 ,i was saying1 you have no  better     
argument than numbers1 let me have a    
turn1 and do you make trial  of the sort
 of proof which1 as ,i think1 is        
required2 for ,i shall  produce one     
witness only of the truth of my words1  
and he is the person  with whom ,i am   
arguing2 his suffrage ,i know how to    
take2 but with the  many ,i have nothing
 to do1 and do not even address myself  
to them4 ,may  ,i ask then whether you  
will answer in turn and have your words 
put to  the proof8 ,for ,i certainly    

think that ,i and you and every man do  
really  believe1 that to do is a greater
 evil than to suffer injustice3 and not 
to be punished than to be punished4     
,,polus3 ,and ,i should say neither ,i1 
nor any man3 would you yourself1 for    
example1 suffer rather than do          
injustice8    ,,socrates3 ,yes1 and you1
 too2 ,i or any man would4    ,,polus3  
,quite the reverse2 neither you1 nor ,i1
 nor any man4    ,,socrates3 ,but will  
you answer8    ,,polus3 ,to be sure1 ,i 
will2 for ,i am curious to hear what you
 can have  to say4    ,,socrates3 ,tell 
me1 then1 and you will know1 and let us 
suppose that ,i  am beginning at the    
beginning3 which of the two1 ,polus1 in 
your  opinion1 is the worst8--to do     
injustice or to suffer8    ,,polus3 ,i  
should say that suffering was worst4    
,,socrates3 ,and which is the greater   
disgrace8--,answer4    ,,polus3 ,to do4 
,,socrates3 ,and the greater disgrace is
 the greater evil8    ,,polus3          
,certainly not4    ,,socrates3 ,i       

understand you to say1 if ,i am not     
mistaken1 that the  honourable is not   
the same as the good1 or the disgraceful
 as the evil8    ,,polus3 ,certainly    
not4    ,,socrates3 ,let me ask a       
question of you3 ,when you speak of     
beautiful  things1 such as bodies1      
colours1 figures1 sounds1 institutions1 
do you  not call them beautiful in      
reference to some standard3 bodies1 for 
example1 are beautiful in proportion as 
they are useful1 or as the  sight of    
them gives pleasure to the spectators2  
can you give any other  account of      
personal beauty8    ,,polus3 ,i cannot4 
,,socrates3 ,and you would say of       
figures or colours generally that they  
were beautiful1 either by reason of the 
pleasure which they give1 or of  their  
use1 or of both8    ,,polus3 ,yes1 ,i   
should4    ,,socrates3 ,and you would   
call sounds and music beautiful for the 
same  reason8    ,,polus3 ,i should4    
,,socrates3 ,laws and institutions also 
have no beauty in them except in  so far

 as they are useful or pleasant or both8
    ,,polus3 ,i think not4              
,,socrates3 ,and may not the same be    
said of the beauty of knowledge8        
,,polus3 ,to be sure1 ,socrates2 and ,i 
very much approve of your measuring     
beauty by the standard of pleasure and  
utility4    ,,socrates3 ,and deformity  
or disgrace may be equally measured by  
the  opposite standard of pain and evil8
    ,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,then when of two beautiful things one  
exceeds in beauty1 the  measure of the  
excess is to be taken in one or both of 
these2 that is  to say1 in pleasure or  
utility or both8    ,,polus3 ,very true4
    ,,socrates3 ,and of two deformed    
things1 that which exceeds in deformity 
or disgrace1 exceeds either in pain or  
evil--must it not be so8    ,,polus3    
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,but then again1   
what was the observation which you just 
now  made1 about doing and suffering    
wrong8 ,did you not say1 that suffering 
wrong was more evil1 and doing wrong    

more disgraceful8    ,,polus3 ,i did4   
,,socrates3 ,then1 if doing wrong is    
more disgraceful than suffering1 the    
more disgraceful must be more painful   
and must exceed in pain or in  evil or  
both3 does not that also follow8        
,,polus3 ,of course4    ,,socrates3     
,first1 then1 let us consider whether   
the doing of injustice  exceeds the     
suffering in the consequent pain3 ,do   
the injurers suffer  more than the      
injured8    ,,polus3 ,no1 ,socrates2    
certainly not4    ,,socrates3 ,then they
 do not exceed in pain8    ,,polus3 ,no4
    ,,socrates3 ,but if not in pain1    
then not in both8    ,,polus3 ,certainly
 not4    ,,socrates3 ,then they can only
 exceed in the other8    ,,polus3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,that is to say1 in evil8   
,,polus3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,then    
doing injustice will have an excess of  
evil1 and will  therefore be a greater  
evil than suffering injustice8          
,,polus3 ,clearly4    ,,socrates3 ,but  
have not you and the world already      

agreed that to do  injustice is more    
disgraceful than to suffer8    ,,polus3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and that is now   
discovered to be more evil8    ,,polus3 
,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and would you    
prefer a greater evil or a greater      
dishonour to  a less one8 ,answer1      
,polus1 and fear not2 for you will come 
to no harm  if you nobly resign yourself
 into the healing hand of the argument  
as  to a physician without shrinking1   
and either say 8,yes0 or 8,no0 to me4   
,,polus3 ,i should say 8,no40           
,,socrates3 ,would any other man prefer 
a greater to a less evil8    ,,polus3   
,no1 not according to this way of       
putting the case1 ,socrates4            
,,socrates3 ,then ,i said truly1 ,polus1
 that neither you1 nor ,i1 nor any  man1
 would rather do than suffer injustice2 
for to do injustice is the  greater evil
 of the two4    ,,polus3 ,that is the   
conclusion4    ,,socrates3 ,you see1    
,polus1 when you compare the two kinds  
of  refutations1 how unlike they are4   

,all men1 with the exception of  myself1
 are of your way of thinking2 but your  
single assent and witness  are enough   
for me1--,i have no need of any other1  
,i take your suffrage1  and am          
regardless of the rest4 ,enough of this1
 and now let us proceed  to the next    
question2 which is1 ,whether the        
greatest of evils to a  guilty man is to
 suffer punishment1 as you supposed1 or 
whether to  escape punishment is not a  
greater evil1 as ,i supposed4           
,consider3--,you  would say that to     
suffer punishment is another name for   
being justly  corrected when you do     
wrong8    ,,polus3 ,i should4           
,,socrates3 ,and would you not allow    
that all just things are honourable  in 
so far as they are just8 ,please to     
reflect1 and tell me your  opinion4     
,,polus3 ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i think that 
they are4    ,,socrates3 ,consider      
again3--,where there is an agent1 must  
there not also  be a patient8           
,,polus3 ,i should say so4              

,,socrates3 ,and will not the patient   
suffer that which the agent does1  and  
will not the suffering have the quality 
of the action8 ,i mean1 for  example1   
that if a man strikes1 there must be    
something which is  stricken8           
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and if   
the striker strikes violently or        
quickly1 that which  is struck will be  
struck violently or quickly8    ,,polus3
 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and the         
suffering to him who is stricken is of  
the same  nature as the act of him who  
strikes8    ,,polus3 ,yes4              
,,socrates3 ,and if a man burns1 there  
is something which is burned8           
,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 if he burns in excess or so as to cause
 pain1 the thing  burned will be burned 
in the same way8    ,,polus3 ,truly4    
,,socrates3 ,and if he cuts1 the same   
argument holds--there will be  something
 cut8    ,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3  
,and if the cutting be great or deep or 
such as will cause  pain1 the cut will  

be of the same nature8    ,,polus3 ,that
 is evident4    ,,socrates3 ,then you   
would agree generally to the universal  
proposition  which ,i was just now      
asserting3 that the affection of the    
patient  answers to the affection of the
 agent8    ,,polus3 ,i agree4           
,,socrates3 ,then1 as this is admitted1 
let me ask whether being punished  is   
suffering or acting8    ,,polus3        
,suffering1 ,socrates2 there can be no  
doubt of that4    ,,socrates3 ,and      
suffering implies an agent8    ,,polus3 
,certainly1 ,socrates2 and he is the    
punisher4    ,,socrates3 ,and he who    
punishes rightly1 punishes justly8      
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and      
therefore he acts justly8    ,,polus3   
,justly4    ,,socrates3 ,then he who is 
punished and suffers retribution1       
suffers  justly8    ,,polus3 ,that is   
evident4    ,,socrates3 ,and that which 
is just has been admitted to be         
honourable8    ,,polus3 ,certainly4     
,,socrates3 ,then the punisher does what

 is honourable1 and the punished        
suffers what is honourable8    ,,polus3 
,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and if what is   
honourable1 then what is good1 for the  
honourable is either pleasant or useful8
    ,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,then he who is punished suffers what is
 good8    ,,polus3 ,that is true4       
,,socrates3 ,then he is benefited8      
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,do ,i    
understand you to mean what ,i mean by  
the term  8benefited08 ,i mean1 that if 
he be justly punished his soul is       
improved4    ,,polus3 ,surely4          
,,socrates3 ,then he who is punished is 
delivered from the evil of his  soul8   
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and is he
 not then delivered from the greatest   
evil8 ,look at  the matter in this      
way3--,in respect of a man's estate1 do 
you see any  greater evil than poverty8 
,,polus3 ,there is no greater evil4     
,,socrates3 ,again1 in a man's bodily   
frame1 you would say that the evil  is  
weakness and disease and deformity8     

,,polus3 ,i should4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
do you not imagine that the soul        
likewise has some evil  of her own8     
,,polus3 ,of course4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 this you would call injustice and      
ignorance and  cowardice1 and the like8 
,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,so 
then1 in mind1 body1 and estate1 which  
are three1 you have  pointed out three  
corresponding evils--injustice1 disease1
 poverty8    ,,polus3 ,true4            
,,socrates3 ,and which of the evils is  
the most disgraceful8--,is not the  most
 disgraceful of them injustice1 and in  
general the evil of the  soul8          
,,polus3 ,by far the most4              
,,socrates3 ,and if the most            
disgraceful1 then also the worst8       
,,polus3 ,what do you mean1 ,socrates8  
,,socrates3 ,i mean to say1 that is most
 disgraceful has been already  admitted 
to be most painful or hurtful1 or both4 
,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 now injustice and all evil in the soul 
has been admitted  by us to be most     

disgraceful8    ,,polus3 ,it has been   
admitted4    ,,socrates3 ,and most      
disgraceful either because most painful 
and causing  excessive pain1 or most    
hurtful1 or both8    ,,polus3           
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and         
therefore to be unjust and intemperate1 
and cowardly and  ignorant1 is more     
painful than to be poor and sick8       
,,polus3 ,nay1 ,socrates2 the           
painfulness does not appear to me to    
follow  from your premises4             
,,socrates3 ,then1 if1 as you would     
argue1 not more painful1 the evil of    
the soul is of all evils the most       
disgraceful2 and the excess of  disgrace
 must be caused by some preternatural   
greatness1 or  extraordinary hurtfulness
 of the evil4    ,,polus3 ,clearly4     
,,socrates3 ,and that which exceeds most
 in hurtfulness will be the  greatest of
 evils8    ,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3
 ,then injustice and intemperance1 and  
in general the depravity  of the soul1  
are the greatest of evils8    ,,polus3  

,that is evident4    ,,socrates3 ,now1  
what art is there which delivers us from
 poverty8 ,does  not the art of making  
money8    ,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 
,and what art frees us from disease8    
,does not the art of  medicine8         
,,polus3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3 ,and
 what from vice and injustice8 ,if you  
are not able to  answer at once1 ask    
yourself whither we go with the sick1   
and to whom  we take them4    ,,polus3  
,to the physicians1 ,socrates4          
,,socrates3 ,and to whom do we go with  
the unjust and intemperate8    ,,polus3 
,to the judges1 you mean4    ,,socrates3
 --,who are to punish them8    ,,polus3 
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and do not those  
who rightly punish others1 punish them  
in  accordance with a certain rule of   
justice8    ,,polus3 ,clearly4          
,,socrates3 ,then the art of            
money-making frees a man from poverty2  
medicine from disease2 and justice from 
intemperance and injustice8    ,,polus3 
,that is evident4    ,,socrates3 ,which1

 then1 is the best of these three8      
,,polus3 ,will you enumerate them8      
,,socrates3 ,money-making1 medicine1 and
 justice4    ,,polus3 ,justice1         
,socrates1 far excels the two others4   
,,socrates3 ,and justice1 if the best1  
gives the greatest pleasure or          
advantage or both8    ,,polus3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,but is the being healed a  
pleasant thing1 and are those who  are  
being healed pleased8    ,,polus3 ,i    
think not4    ,,socrates3 ,a useful     
thing1 then8    ,,polus3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,yes1 because the patient is
 delivered from a great evil2 and  this 
is the advantage of enduring the        
pain--that you get well8    ,,polus3    
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and would he
 be the happier man in his bodily       
condition1 who  is healed1 or who never 
was out of health8    ,,polus3 ,clearly 
he who was never out of health4         
,,socrates3 ,yes2 for happiness surely  
does not consist in being delivered     
from evils1 but in never having had     

them4    ,,polus3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 
,and suppose the case of two persons who
 have some evil in  their bodies1 and   
that one of them is healed and delivered
 from evil1  and another is not healed1 
but retains the evil--which of them is  
the  most miserable8    ,,polus3        
,clearly he who is not healed4          
,,socrates3 ,and was not punishment said
 by us to be a deliverance from  the    
greatest of evils1 which is vice8       
,,polus3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and     
justice punishes us1 and makes us more  
just1 and is the  medicine of our vice8 
,,polus3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,he1     
then1 has the first place in the scale  
of happiness who  has never had vice in 
his soul2 for this has been shown to be 
the  greatest of evils4    ,,polus3     
,clearly4    ,,socrates3 ,and he has the
 second place1 who is delivered from    
vice8    ,,polus3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 
,that is to say1 he who receives        
admonition and rebuke and  punishment8  
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,then he  

lives worst1 who1 having been unjust1   
has no  deliverance from injustice8     
,,polus3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3     
,that is1 he lives worst who commits the
 greatest crimes1 and  who1 being the   
most unjust of men1 succeeds in escaping
 rebuke or  correction or punishment2   
and this1 as you say1 has been          
accomplished  by ,archelaus and other   
tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates8
  7,compare ,republic47    ,,polus3     
,true4    ,,socrates3 ,may not their way
 of proceeding1 my friend1 be compared  
to  the conduct of a person who is      
afflicted with the worst of diseases and
  yet contrives not to pay the penalty  
to the physician for his sins  against  
his constitution1 and will not be cured1
 because1 like a child1  he is afraid of
 the pain of being burned or cut3--,is  
not that a parallel  case8    ,,polus3  
,yes1 truly4    ,,socrates3 ,he would   
seem as if he did not know the nature of
 health and  bodily vigour2 and if we   
are right1 ,polus1 in our previous      

conclusions1  they are in a like case   
who strive to evade justice1 which they 
see to  be painful1 but are blind to the
 advantage which ensues from it1 not    
knowing how far more miserable a        
companion a diseased soul is than a     
diseased body2 a soul1 ,i say1 which is 
corrupt and unrighteous and  unholy4    
,and hence they do all that they can to 
avoid punishment and to  avoid being    
released from the greatest of evils2    
they provide  themselves with money and 
friends1 and cultivate to the utmost    
their  powers of persuasion4 ,but if we1
 ,polus1 are right1 do you see what     
follows1 or shall we draw out the       
consequences in form8    ,,polus3 ,if   
you please4    ,,socrates3 ,is it not a 
fact that injustice1 and the doing of   
injustice1  is the greatest of evils8   
,,polus3 ,that is quite clear4          
,,socrates3 ,and further1 that to suffer
 punishment is the way to be  released  
from this evil8    ,,polus3 ,true4      
,,socrates3 ,and not to suffer1 is to   

perpetuate the evil8    ,,polus3 ,yes4  
,,socrates3 ,to do wrong1 then1 is      
second only in the scale of evils2 but  
to do wrong and not to be punished1 is  
first and greatest of all8    ,,polus3  
,that is true4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 and
 was not this the point in dispute1 my  
friend8 ,you  deemed ,archelaus happy1  
because he was a very great criminal and
  unpunished3 ,i1 on the other hand1    
maintained that he or any other who     
like him has done wrong and has not been
 punished1 is1 and ought to be1  the    
most miserable of all men2 and that the 
doer of injustice is more  miserable    
than the sufferer2 and he who escapes   
punishment1 more  miserable than he who 
suffers4--,was not that what ,i said8   
,,polus3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and it   
has been proved to be true8    ,,polus3 
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,well1       
,polus1 but if this is true1 where is   
the great use of  rhetoric8 ,if we admit
 what has been just now said1 every man 
ought in  every way to guard himself    

against doing wrong1 for he will thereby
  suffer great evil8    ,,polus3 ,true4 
,,socrates3 ,and if he1 or any one about
 whom he cares1 does wrong1 he  ought of
 his own accord to go where he will be  
immediately punished2 he  will run to   
the judge1 as he would to the physician1
 in order that the  disease of injustice
 may not be rendered chronic and become 
the  incurable cancer of the soul2 must 
we not allow this consequence1  ,polus1 
if our former admissions are to         
stand3--is any other inference          
consistent with them8    ,,polus3 ,to   
that1 ,socrates1 there can be but one   
answer4    ,,socrates3 ,then rhetoric is
 of no use to us1 ,polus1 in helping a  
man to  excuse his own injustice1 that  
of his parents or friends1 or children  
or country2 but may be of use to any one
 who holds that instead of  excusing he 
ought to accuse--himself above all1 and 
in the next degree  his family or any of
 his friends who may be doing wrong2 he 
should  bring to light the iniquity and 

not conceal it1 that so the wrong-doer  
may suffer and be made whole2 and he    
should even force himself and  others   
not to shrink1 but with closed eyes like
 brave men to let the  physician operate
 with knife or searing iron1 not        
regarding the pain1  in the hope of     
attaining the good and the honourable2  
let him who has  done things worthy of  
stripes1 allow himself to be scourged1  
if of  bonds1 to be bound1 if of a fine1
 to be fined1 if of exile1 to be        
exiled1 if of death1 to die1 himself    
being the first to accuse himself  and  
his own relations1 and using rhetoric to
 this end1 that his and  their unjust   
actions may be made manifest1 and that  
they themselves may  be delivered from  
injustice1 which is the greatest evil4  
,then1 ,polus1  rhetoric would indeed be
 useful4 ,do you say 8,yes0 or 8,no0 to 
that8    ,,polus3 ,to me1 ,socrates1    
what you are saying appears very        
strange1  though probably in agreement  
with your premises4    ,,socrates3 ,is  

not this the conclusion1 if the premises
 are not  disproven8    ,,polus3 ,yes2  
it certainly is4    ,,socrates3 ,and    
from the opposite point of view1 if     
indeed it be our duty  to harm another1 
whether an enemy or not--,i except the  
case of  self-defence--then ,i have to  
be upon my guard--but if my enemy       
injures a  third person1 then in every  
sort of way1 by word as well as deed1 ,i
  should try to prevent his being       
punished1 or appearing before the       
judge2 and if he appears1 ,i should     
contrive that he should escape1 and  not
 suffer punishment3 if he has stolen a  
sum of money1 let him keep  what he has 
stolen and spend it on him and his1     
regardless of religion  and justice2 and
 if he have done things worthy of death1
 let him not  die1 but rather be        
immortal in his wickedness2 or1 if this 
is not  possible1 let him at any rate be
 allowed to live as long as he can4 ,for
  such purposes1 ,polus1 rhetoric may be
 useful1 but is of small if of any  use 

to him who is not intending to commit   
injustice2 at least1 there  was no such 
use discovered by us in the previous    
discussion4    ,,callicles3 ,tell me1   
,chaerephon1 is ,socrates in earnest1 or
 is he  joking8    ,,chaerephon3 ,i     
should say1 ,callicles1 that he is in   
most profound  earnest2 but you may well
 ask him4    ,,callicles3 ,by the gods1 
and ,i will4 ,tell me1 ,socrates1 are   
you in  earnest1 or only in jest8 ,for  
if you are in earnest1 and what you say 
is true1 is not the whole of human life 
turned upside down2 and are we  not     
doing1 as would appear1 in everything   
the opposite of what we ought  to be    
doing8    ,,socrates3 ,o ,callicles1 if 
there were not some community of        
feelings  among mankind1 however varying
 in different persons--,i mean to say1  
if  every man's feelings were peculiar  
to himself and were not shared by  the  
rest of his species--,i do not see how  
we could ever communicate our           
impressions to one another4 ,i make this

 remark because ,i perceive that  you   
and ,i have a common feeling4 ,for we   
are lovers both1 and both of us  have   
two loves apiece3--,i am the lover of   
,alcibiades1 the son of  ,cleinias1 and 
of philosophy2 and you of the ,athenian 
,demus1 and of  ,demus the son of       
,pyrilampes4 ,now1 ,i observe that you1 
with all your  cleverness1 do not       
venture to contradict your favourite in 
any word or  opinion of his2 but as he  
changes you change1 backwards and       
forwards4  ,when the ,athenian ,demus   
denies anything that you are saying in  
the  assembly1 you go over to his       
opinion2 and you do the same with       
,demus1  the fair young son of          
,pyrilampes4 ,for you have not the power
 to resist  the words and ideas of your 
loves2 and if a person were to express  
surprise at the strangeness of what you 
say from time to time when  under their 
influence1 you would probably reply to  
him1 if you were  honest1 that you      
cannot help saying what your loves say  

unless they are  prevented2 and that you
 can only be silent when they are4 ,now 
you must  understand that my words are  
an echo too1 and therefore you need not 
wonder at me2 but if you want to silence
 me1 silence philosophy1 who is  my     
love1 for she is always telling me what 
,i am now telling you1 my  friend2      
neither is she capricious like my other 
love1 for the son of  ,cleinias says one
 thing to-day and another thing         
to-morrow1 but  philosophy is always    
true4 ,she is the teacher at whose words
 you are  now wondering1 and you have   
heard her yourself4 ,her you must       
refute1  and either show1 as ,i was     
saying1 that to do injustice and to     
escape  punishment is not the worst of  
all evils2 or1 if you leave her word    
unrefuted1 by the dog the god of ,egypt1
 ,i declare1 ,o ,callicles1 that        
,callicles will never be at one with    
himself1 but that his whole life  will  
be a discord4 ,and yet1 my friend1 ,i   
would rather that my lyre  should be    

inharmonious1 and that there should be  
no music in the chorus  which ,i        
provided2 aye1 or that the whole world  
should be at odds with  me1 and oppose  
me1 rather than that ,i myself should be
 at odds with  myself1 and contradict   
myself4    ,,callicles3 ,o ,socrates1   
you are a regular declaimer1 and seem to
 be  running riot in the argument4 ,and 
now you are declaiming in this way      
because ,polus has fallen into the same 
error himself of which he  accused      
,gorgias3--for he said that when        
,gorgias was asked by you1  whether1 if 
some one came to him who wanted to learn
 rhetoric1 and did  not know justice1 he
 would teach him justice1 ,gorgias in   
his modesty  replied that he would1     
because he thought that mankind in      
general would  be displeased if he      
answered 8,no02 and then in consequence 
of this  admission1 ,gorgias was        
compelled to contradict himself1 that   
being just  the sort of thing in which  
you delight4 ,whereupon ,polus laughed  

at you  deservedly1 as ,i think2 but now
 he has himself fallen into the same    
trap4 ,i cannot say very much for his   
wit when he conceded to you that  to do 
is more dishonourable than to suffer    
injustice1 for this was the  admission  
which led to his being entangled by you2
 and because he was  too modest to say  
what he thought1 he had his mouth       
stopped4 ,for the  truth is1 ,socrates1 
that you1 who pretend to be engaged in  
the pursuit  of truth1 are appealing now
 to the popular and vulgar notions of   
right1  which are not natural1 but only 
conventional4 ,convention and nature are
  generally at variance with one        
another3 and hence1 if a person is too  
modest to say what he thinks1 he is     
compelled to contradict himself2  and   
you1 in your ingenuity perceiving the   
advantage to be thereby  gained1 slyly  
ask of him who is arguing conventionally
 a question which  is to be determined  
by the rule of nature2 and if he is     
talking of the  rule of nature1 you slip

 away to custom3 as1 for instance1 you  
did in  this very discussion about doing
 and suffering injustice4 ,when ,polus  
was speaking of the conventionally      
dishonourable1 you assailed him from    
the point of view of nature2 for by the 
rule of nature1 to suffer  injustice is 
the greater disgrace because the greater
 evil2 but  conventionally1 to do evil  
is the more disgraceful4 ,for the       
suffering  of injustice is not the part 
of a man1 but of a slave1 who indeed had
  better die than live2 since when he is
 wronged and trampled upon1 he is       
unable to help himself1 or any other    
about whom he cares4 ,the reason1  as ,i
 conceive1 is that the makers of laws   
are the majority who are  weak2 and they
 make laws and distribute praises and   
censures with a  view to themselves and 
to their own interests2 and they terrify
 the  stronger sort of men1 and those   
who are able to get the better of them1 
in order that they may not get the      
better of them2 and they say1 that      

dishonesty is shameful and unjust2      
meaning1 by the word injustice1 the     
desire of a man to have more than his   
neighbours2 for knowing their own       
inferiority1 ,i suspect that they are   
too glad of equality4 ,and  therefore   
the endeavour to have more than the     
many1 is conventionally  said to be     
shameful and unjust1 and is called      
injustice 7compare  ,republic71 whereas 
nature herself intimates that it is just
 for the  better to have more than the  
worse1 the more powerful than the       
weaker2  and in many ways she shows1    
among men as well as among animals1 and 
indeed among whole cities and races1    
that justice consists in the  superior  
ruling over and having more than the    
inferior4 ,for on what  principle of    
justice did ,xerxes invade ,hellas1 or  
his father the  ,scythians8 7not to     
speak of numberless other examples74    
,nay1 but these  are the men who act    
according to nature2 yes1 by ,heaven1   
and according  to the law of nature3    

not1 perhaps1 according to that         
artificial law1  which we invent and    
impose upon our fellows1 of whom we take
 the best  and strongest from their     
youth upwards1 and tame them like young 
lions1--charming them with the sound of 
the voice1 and saying to them1  that    
with equality they must be content1 and 
that the equal is the  honourable and   
the just4 ,but if there were a man who  
had sufficient  force1 he would shake   
off and break through1 and escape from  
all this2  he would trample under foot  
all our formulas and spells and charms1 
and  all our laws which are against     
nature3 the slave would rise in         
rebellion and be lord over us1 and the  
light of natural justice would  shine   
forth4 ,and this ,i take to be the      
sentiment of ,pindar1 when he  says in  
his poem1 that    8,law is the king of  
all1 of mortals as well as of           
immortals20    this1 as he says1        
8,makes might to be right1 doing        
violence with highest hand2 as ,i infer 

from the deeds of ,heracles1 for without
 buying them--0 7,fragm4 ,incert4  #aea 
7,bockh747 --,i do not remember the     
exact words1 but the meaning is1  that  
without buying them1 and without their  
being given to him1 he  carried off the 
oxen of ,geryon1 according to the law of
 natural right1  and that the oxen and  
other possessions of the weaker and     
inferior  properly belong to the        
stronger and superior4 ,and this is     
true1 as you  may ascertain1 if you will
 leave philosophy and go on to higher   
things3  for philosophy1 ,socrates1 if  
pursued in moderation and at the proper 
age1 is an elegant accomplishment1 but  
too much philosophy is the ruin  of     
human life4 ,even if a man has good     
parts1 still1 if he carries  philosophy 
into later life1 he is necessarily      
ignorant of all those  things which a   
gentleman and a person of honour ought  
to know2 he is  inexperienced in the    
laws of the ,state1 and in the language 
which ought  to be used in the dealings 

of man with man1 whether private or     
public1  and utterly ignorant of the    
pleasures and desires of mankind and of 
human character in general4 ,and people 
of this sort1 when they betake          
themselves to politics or business1 are 
as ridiculous as ,i imagine the         
politicians to be1 when they make their 
appearance in the arena of  philosophy4 
,for1 as ,euripides says1    8,every man
 shines in that and pursues that1 and   
devotes the greatest  portion of the day
 to that in which he most excels10      
7,antiope1 fragm4  #bj 7,dindorf747     
but anything in which he is inferior1 he
 avoids and depreciates1 and  praises   
the opposite from partiality to himself1
 and because he thinks  that he will    
thus praise himself4 ,the true principle
 is to unite them4  ,philosophy1 as a   
part of education1 is an excellent      
thing1 and there is  no disgrace to a   
man while he is young in pursuing such a
 study2 but  when he is more advanced in
 years1 the thing becomes ridiculous1   

and ,i  feel towards philosophers as ,i 
do towards those who lisp and imitate   
children4 ,for ,i love to see a little  
child1 who is not of an age to  speak   
plainly1 lisping at his play2 there is  
an appearance of grace and  freedom in  
his utterance1 which is natural to his  
childish years4 ,but  when ,i hear some 
small creature carefully articulating   
its words1 ,i am  offended2 the sound is
 disagreeable1 and has to my ears the   
twang of  slavery4 ,so when ,i hear a   
man lisping1 or see him playing like a  
child1  his behaviour appears to me     
ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of    
stripes4 ,and ,i have the same feeling  
about students of philosophy2 when  ,i  
see a youth thus engaged1--the study    
appears to me to be in character1  and  
becoming a man of liberal education1 and
 him who neglects  philosophy ,i regard 
as an inferior man1 who will never      
aspire to  anything great or noble4 ,but
 if ,i see him continuing the study in  
later  life1 and not leaving off1 ,i    

should like to beat him1 ,socrates2 for1
 as  ,i was saying1 such a one1 even    
though he have good natural parts1      
becomes effeminate4 ,he flies from the  
busy centre and the market-place1  in   
which1 as the poet says1 men become     
distinguished2 he creeps into a  corner 
for the rest of his life1 and talks in a
 whisper with three or  four admiring   
youths1 but never speaks out like a     
freeman in a  satisfactory manner4 ,now 
,i1 ,socrates1 am very well inclined    
towards  you1 and my feeling may be     
compared with that of ,zethus towards   
,amphion1 in the play of ,euripides1    
whom ,i was mentioning just now3 for  ,i
 am disposed to say to you much what    
,zethus said to his brother1 that  you1 
,socrates1 are careless about the things
 of which you ought to be  careful2 and 
that you    8,who have a soul so noble1 
are remarkable for a puerile exterior2  
,neither in a court of justice could you
 state a case1 or give any  reason or   
proof1 ,or offer valiant counsel on     

another's behalf40    ,and you must not 
be offended1 my dear ,socrates1 for ,i  
am speaking out  of good-will towards   
you1 if ,i ask whether you are not      
ashamed of being  thus defenceless2     
which ,i affirm to be the condition not 
of you only  but of all those who will  
carry the study of philosophy too far4  
,for  suppose that some one were to take
 you1 or any one of your sort1 off to   
prison1 declaring that you had done     
wrong when you had done no wrong1  you  
must allow that you would not know what 
to do3--there you would  stand giddy and
 gaping1 and not having a word to say2  
and when you went  up before the ,court1
 even if the accuser were a poor        
creature and not  good for much1 you    
would die if he were disposed to claim  
the penalty  of death4 ,and yet1        
,socrates1 what is the value of    8,an 
art which converts a man of sense into a
 fool10      who is helpless1 and has no
 power to save either himself or others1
  when he is in the greatest danger and 

is going to be despoiled by his  enemies
 of all his goods1 and has to live1     
simply deprived of his  rights of       
citizenship8--he being a man who1 if ,i 
may use the expression1  may be boxed on
 the ears with impunity4 ,then1 my good 
friend1 take my  advice1 and refute no  
more3    8,learn the philosophy of      
business1 and acquire the reputation of 
wisdom4 ,but leave to others these      
niceties10    whether they are to be    
described as follies or absurdities3    
8,for they will only ,give you poverty  
for the inmate of your dwelling40       
,cease1 then1 emulating these paltry    
splitters of words1 and emulate  only   
the man of substance and honour1 who is 
well to do4    ,,socrates3 ,if my soul1 
,callicles1 were made of gold1 should ,i
 not  rejoice to discover one of those  
stones with which they test gold1 and   
the very best possible one to which ,i  
might bring my soul2 and if the  stone  
and ,i agreed in approving of her       
training1 then ,i should know  that ,i  

was in a satisfactory state1 and that no
 other test was needed  by me4          
,,callicles3 ,what is your meaning1     
,socrates8    ,,socrates3 ,i will tell  
you2 ,i think that ,i have found in you 
the desired  touchstone4    ,,callicles3
 ,why8    ,,socrates3 ,because ,i am    
sure that if you agree with me in any of
 the  opinions which my soul forms1 ,i  
have at last found the truth indeed4    
,for ,i consider that if a man is to    
make a complete trial of the good or    
evil of the soul1 he ought to have three
 qualities--knowledge1  good-will1      
outspokenness1 which are all possessed  
by you4 ,many whom ,i  meet are unable  
to make trial of me1 because they are   
not wise as you  are2 others are wise1  
but they will not tell me the truth1    
because they  have not the same interest
 in me which you have2 and these two    
strangers1 ,gorgias and ,polus1 are     
undoubtedly wise men and my very good   
friends1 but they are not outspoken     
enough1 and they are too modest4  ,why1 

their modesty is so great that they are 
driven to contradict  themselves1 first 
one and then the other of them1 in the  
face of a  large company1 on matters of 
the highest moment4 ,but you have all   
the  qualities in which these others are
 deficient1 having received an          
excellent education2 to this many       
,athenians can testify4 ,and you are my 
friend4 ,shall ,i tell you why ,i think 
so8 ,i know that you1 ,callicles1  and  
,tisander of ,aphidnae1 and ,andron the 
son of ,androtion1 and  ,nausicydes of  
the deme of ,cholarges1 studied         
together3 there were four  of you1 and  
,i once heard you advising with one     
another as to the extent  to which the  
pursuit of philosophy should be carried1
 and1 as ,i know1  you came to the      
conclusion that the study should not be 
pushed too much  into detail4 ,you were 
cautioning one another not to be        
overwise2 you  were afraid that too much
 wisdom might unconsciously to          
yourselves be  the ruin of you4 ,and now

 when ,i hear you giving the same advice
 to me  which you then gave to your most
 intimate friends1 ,i have a sufficient 
evidence of your real good-will to me4  
,and of the frankness of your  nature   
and freedom from modesty ,i am assured  
by yourself1 and the  assurance is      
confirmed by your last speech4 ,well    
then1 the inference in  the present case
 clearly is1 that if you agree with me  
in an argument  about any point1 that   
point will have been sufficiently tested
 by us1  and will not require to be     
submitted to any further test4 ,for you 
could  not have agreed with me1 either  
from lack of knowledge or from          
superfluity of modesty1 nor yet from a  
desire to deceive me1 for you  are my   
friend1 as you tell me yourself4 ,and   
therefore when you and ,i  are agreed1  
the result will be the attainment of    
perfect truth4 ,now  there is no nobler 
enquiry1 ,callicles1 than that which you
 censure me  for making1--,what ought   
the character of a man to be1 and what  

his  pursuits1 and how far is he to go1 
both in maturer years and in youth8     
,for be assured that if ,i err in my own
 conduct ,i do not err  intentionally1  
but from ignorance4 ,do not then desist 
from advising me1  now that you have    
begun1 until ,i have learned clearly    
what this is  which ,i am to practise1  
and how ,i may acquire it4 ,and if you  
find me  assenting to your words1 and   
hereafter not doing that to which ,i    
assented1 call me 8dolt10 and deem me   
unworthy of receiving further           
instruction4 ,once more1 then1 tell me  
what you and ,pindar mean by  natural   
justice3 ,do you not mean that the      
superior should take the  property of   
the inferior by force2 that the better  
should rule the  worse1 the noble have  
more than the mean8 ,am ,i not right in 
my  recollection8    ,,callicles3 ,yes2 
that is what ,i was saying1 and so ,i   
still aver4    ,,socrates3 ,and do you  
mean by the better the same as the      
superior8 for ,i  could not make out    

what you were saying at the             
time--whether you meant  by the superior
 the stronger1 and that the weaker must 
obey the  stronger1 as you seemed to    
imply when you said that great cities   
attack  small ones in accordance with   
natural right1 because they are superior
  and stronger1 as though the superior  
and stronger and better were the  same2 
or whether the better may be also the   
inferior and weaker1 and  the superior  
the worse1 or whether better is to be   
defined in the same  way as             
superior3--this is the point which ,i   
want to have cleared up4 ,are  the      
superior and better and stronger the    
same or different8    ,,callicles3 ,i   
say unequivocally that they are the     
same4    ,,socrates3 ,then the many are 
by nature superior to the one1 against  
whom1 as you were saying1 they make the 
laws8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4       
,,socrates3 ,then the laws of the many  
are the laws of the superior8           
,,callicles3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3 

,then they are the laws of the better2  
for the superior class  are far better1 
as you were saying8    ,,callicles3     
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and since they are
 superior1 the laws which are made by   
them  are by nature good8               
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
are not the many of opinion1 as you were
 lately saying1  that justice is        
equality1 and that to do is more        
disgraceful than to  suffer             
injustice8--is that so or not8 ,answer1 
,callicles1 and let no  modesty be found
 to come in the way2 do the many think1 
or do they not  think thus8--,i must beg
 of you to answer1 in order that if you 
agree  with me ,i may fortify myself by 
the assent of so competent an           
authority4    ,,callicles3 ,yes2 the    
opinion of the many is what you say4    
,,socrates3 ,then not only custom but   
nature also affirms that to do is  more 
disgraceful than to suffer injustice1   
and that justice is  equality2 so that  
you seem to have been wrong in your     

former assertion1  when accusing me you 
said that nature and custom are opposed1
 and that  ,i1 knowing this1 was        
dishonestly playing between them1       
appealing to  custom when the argument  
is about nature1 and to nature when the 
argument is about custom8               
,,callicles3 ,this man will never cease 
talking nonsense4 ,at your age1         
,socrates1 are you not ashamed to be    
catching at words and chuckling  over   
some verbal slip8 do you not see--have  
,i not told you already1 that  by       
superior ,i mean better3 do you imagine 
me to say1 that if a rabble  of slaves  
and nondescripts1 who are of no use     
except perhaps for their  physical      
strength1 get together1 their ipsissima 
verba are laws8    ,,socrates3 ,ho6 my  
philosopher1 is that your line8         
,,callicles3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,i was thinking1 ,callicles1 that       
something of the kind must  have been in
 your mind1 and that is why ,i repeated 
the question1--,what  is the superior8  

,i wanted to know clearly what you      
meant2 for you  surely do not think that
 two men are better than one1 or that   
your  slaves are better than you because
 they are stronger8 ,then please to     
begin again1 and tell me who the better 
are1 if they are not the  stronger2 and 
,i will ask you1 great ,sir1 to be a    
little milder in your  instructions1 or 
,i shall have to run away from you4     
,,callicles3 ,you are ironical4         
,,socrates3 ,no1 by the hero ,zethus1   
,callicles1 by whose aid you were just  
now saying many ironical things against 
me1 ,i am not3--tell me1 then1  whom you
 mean1 by the better8    ,,callicles3 ,i
 mean the more excellent4    ,,socrates3
 ,do you not see that you are yourself  
using words which have  no meaning and  
that you are explaining nothing8--will  
you tell me  whether you mean by the    
better and superior the wiser1 or if    
not1 whom8    ,,callicles3 ,most        
assuredly1 ,i do mean the wiser4        
,,socrates3 ,then according to you1 one 

wise man may often be superior to  ten  
thousand fools1 and he ought to rule    
them1 and they ought to be his          
subjects1 and he ought to have more than
 they should4 ,this is what ,i  believe 
that you mean 7and you must not suppose 
that ,i am  word-catching71 if you allow
 that the one is superior to the ten    
thousand8    ,,callicles3 ,yes2 that is 
what ,i mean1 and that is what ,i       
conceive to be  natural justice--that   
the better and wiser should rule and    
have more  than the inferior4           
,,socrates3 ,stop there1 and let me ask 
you what you would say in this  case3   
,let us suppose that we are all together
 as we are now2 there are  several of   
us1 and we have a large common store of 
meats and drinks1  and there are all    
sorts of persons in our company having  
various  degrees of strength and        
weakness1 and one of us1 being a        
physician1 is  wiser in the matter of   
food than all the rest1 and he is       
probably  stronger than some and not so 

strong as others of us--will he not1    
being  wiser1 be also better than we    
are1 and our superior in this matter of 
food8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4       
,,socrates3 ,either1 then1 he will have 
a larger share of the meats and  drinks1
 because he is better1 or he will have  
the distribution of all  of them by     
reason of his authority1 but he will not
 expend or make use  of a larger share  
of them on his own person1 or if he     
does1 he will be  punished2--his share  
will exceed that of some1 and be less   
than that of  others1 and if he be the  
weakest of all1 he being the best of all
 will  have the smallest share of all1  
,callicles3--am ,i not right1 my friend8
    ,,callicles3 ,you talk about meats  
and drinks and physicians and other     
nonsense2 ,i am not speaking of them4   
,,socrates3 ,well1 but do you admit that
 the wiser is the better8 ,answer       
8,yes0 or 8,no40    ,,callicles3 ,yes4  
,,socrates3 ,and ought not the better to
 have a larger share8    ,,callicles3   

,not of meats and drinks4    ,,socrates3
 ,i understand3 then1 perhaps1 of       
coats--the skilfullest weaver  ought to 
have the largest coat1 and the greatest 
number of them1 and go  about clothed in
 the best and finest of them8           
,,callicles3 ,fudge about coats6        
,,socrates3 ,then the skilfullest and   
best in making shoes ought to have  the 
advantage in shoes2 the shoemaker1      
clearly1 should walk about in  the      
largest shoes1 and have the greatest    
number of them8    ,,callicles3 ,fudge  
about shoes6 ,what nonsense are you     
talking8    ,,socrates3 ,or1 if this is 
not your meaning1 perhaps you would say 
that  the wise and good and true        
husbandman should actually have a larger
  share of seeds1 and have as much seed 
as possible for his own land8           
,,callicles3 ,how you go on1 always     
talking in the same way1 ,socrates6     
,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,callicles1 and also  
about the same things4    ,,callicles3  
,yes1 by the ,gods1 you are literally   

always talking of  cobblers and fullers 
and cooks and doctors1 as if this had to
 do with  our argument4    ,,socrates3  
,but why will you not tell me in what a 
man must be superior  and wiser in order
 to claim a larger share2 will you      
neither accept a  suggestion1 nor offer 
one8    ,,callicles3 ,i have already    
told you4 ,in the first place1 ,i mean  
by  superiors not cobblers or cooks1 but
 wise politicians who understand  the   
administration of a state1 and who are  
not only wise1 but also  valiant and    
able to carry out their designs1 and not
 the men to faint  from want of soul4   
,,socrates3 ,see now1 most excellent    
,callicles1 how different my charge     
against you is from that which you bring
 against me1 for you reproach  me with  
always saying the same2 but ,i reproach 
you with never saying  the same about   
the same things1 for at one time you    
were defining the  better and the       
superior to be the stronger1 then again 
as the wiser1  and now you bring forward

 a new notion2 the superior and the     
better are  now declared by you to be   
the more courageous3 ,i wish1 my good   
friend1  that you would tell me1 once   
for all1 whom you affirm to be the      
better  and superior1 and in what they  
are better8    ,,callicles3 ,i have     
already told you that ,i mean those who 
are wise and  courageous in the         
administration of a state--they ought to
 be the rulers  of their states1 and    
justice consists in their having more   
than their  subjects4    ,,socrates3    
,but whether rulers or subjects will    
they or will they not  have more than   
themselves1 my friend8    ,,callicles3  
,what do you mean8    ,,socrates3 ,i    
mean that every man is his own ruler2   
but perhaps you think  that there is no 
necessity for him to rule himself2 he is
 only required  to rule others8         
,,callicles3 ,what do you mean by his   
8ruling over himself08    ,,socrates3 ,a
 simple thing enough2 just what is      
commonly said1 that a man  should be    

temperate and master of himself1 and    
ruler of his own  pleasures and         
passions4    ,,callicles3 ,what         
innocence6 you mean those fools1--the   
temperate8    ,,socrates3               
,certainly3--any one may know that to be
 my meaning4    ,,callicles3 ,quite so1 
,socrates2 and they are really fools1   
for how can a  man be happy who is the  
servant of anything8 ,on the contrary1  
,i plainly  assert1 that he who would   
truly live ought to allow his desires to
 wax  to the uttermost1 and not to      
chastise them2 but when they have grown 
to  their greatest he should have       
courage and intelligence to minister to 
them and to satisfy all his longings4   
,and this ,i affirm to be natural       
justice and nobility4 ,to this however  
the many cannot attain2 and they  blame 
the strong man because they are ashamed 
of their own weakness1  which they      
desire to conceal1 and hence they say   
that intemperance is  base4 ,as ,i have 
remarked already1 they enslave the      

nobler natures1 and  being unable to    
satisfy their pleasures1 they praise    
temperance and  justice out of their own
 cowardice4 ,for if a man had been      
originally  the son of a king1 or had a 
nature capable of acquiring an empire or
 a  tyranny or sovereignty1 what could  
be more truly base or evil than         
temperance--to a man like him1 ,i say1  
who might freely be enjoying every      
good1 and has no one to stand in his    
way1 and yet has admitted custom  and   
reason and the opinion of other men to  
be lords over him8--must not  he be in a
 miserable plight whom the reputation of
 justice and  temperance hinders from   
giving more to his friends than to his  
enemies1  even though he be a ruler in  
his city8 ,nay1 ,socrates1 for you      
profess  to be a votary of the truth1   
and the truth is this3--that luxury and 
intemperance and licence1 if they be    
provided with means1 are virtue  and    
happiness--all the rest is a mere       
bauble1 agreements contrary to  nature1 

foolish talk of men1 nothing worth4     
7,compare ,republic47    ,,socrates3    
,there is a noble freedom1 ,callicles1  
in your way of  approaching the         
argument2 for what you say is what the  
rest of the  world think1 but do not    
like to say4 ,and ,i must beg of you to 
persevere1 that the true rule of human  
life may become manifest4 ,tell  me1    
then3--you say1 do you not1 that in the 
rightly-developed man the  passions     
ought not to be controlled1 but that we 
should let them grow  to the utmost and 
somehow or other satisfy them1 and that 
this is  virtue8    ,,callicles3 ,yes2  
,i do4    ,,socrates3 ,then those who   
want nothing are not truly said to be   
happy8    ,,callicles3 ,no indeed1 for  
then stones and dead men would be the   
happiest of all4    ,,socrates3 ,but    
surely life according to your view is an
 awful thing2 and  indeed ,i think that 
,euripides may have been right in       
saying1    8,who knows if life be not   
death and death life20    and that we   

are very likely dead2 ,i have heard a   
philosopher say that  at this moment we 
are actually dead1 and that the body    
7soma7 is our  tomb 7sema 7compare      
,phaedr4771 and that the part of the    
soul which is  the seat of the desires  
is liable to be tossed about by words   
and blown  up and down2 and some        
ingenious person1 probably a ,sicilian  
or an  ,italian1 playing with the word1 
invented a tale in which he called the  
soul--because of its believing and      
make-believe nature--a vessel 7,an      
untranslatable pun1--dia to pithanon te 
kai pistikon onomase pithon471  and the 
ignorant he called the uninitiated or   
leaky1 and the place in  the souls of   
the uninitiated in which the desires are
 seated1 being the  intemperate and     
incontinent part1 he compared to a      
vessel full of  holes1 because it can   
never be satisfied4 ,he is not of your  
way of  thinking1 ,callicles1 for he    
declares1 that of all the souls in      
,hades1  meaning the invisible world    

7aeides71 these uninitiated or leaky    
persons are the most miserable1 and that
 they pour water into a vessel  which is
 full of holes out of a colander which  
is similarly perforated4  ,the colander1
 as my informer assures me1 is the soul1
 and the soul  which he compares to a   
colander is the soul of the ignorant1   
which is  likewise full of holes1 and   
therefore incontinent1 owing to a bad   
memory and want of faith4 ,these notions
 are strange enough1 but they  show the 
principle which1 if ,i can1 ,i would    
fain prove to you2 that you  should     
change your mind1 and1 instead of the   
intemperate and insatiate  life1 choose 
that which is orderly and sufficient and
 has a due  provision for daily needs4  
,do ,i make any impression on you1 and  
are you  coming over to the opinion that
 the orderly are happier than the       
intemperate8 ,or do ,i fail to persuade 
you1 and1 however many tales ,i         
rehearse to you1 do you continue of the 
same opinion still8    ,,callicles3 ,the

 latter1 ,socrates1 is more like the    
truth4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 ,i will    
tell you another image1 which comes out 
of the  same school3--,let me request   
you to consider how far you would accept
  this as an account of the two lives of
 the temperate and intemperate in  a    
figure3--,there are two men1 both of    
whom have a number of casks2 the  one   
man has his casks sound and full1 one of
 wine1 another of honey1  and a third of
 milk1 besides others filled with other 
liquids1 and the  streams which fill    
them are few and scanty1 and he can only
 obtain them  with a great deal of toil 
and difficulty2 but when his casks are  
once  filled he has no need to feed them
 any more1 and has no further trouble   
with them or care about them4 ,the      
other1 in like manner1 can procure      
streams1 though not without difficulty2 
but his vessels are leaky and  unsound1 
and night and day he is compelled to be 
filling them1 and if  he pauses for a   
moment1 he is in an agony of pain4 ,such

 are their  respective lives3--,and now 
would you say that the life of the      
intemperate is happier than that of the 
temperate8 ,do ,i not convince  you that
 the opposite is the truth8             
,,callicles3 ,you do not convince me1   
,socrates1 for the one who has filled   
himself has no longer any pleasure left2
 and this1 as ,i was just now  saying1  
is the life of a stone3 he has neither  
joy nor sorrow after he  is once filled2
 but the pleasure depends on the        
superabundance of the  influx4          
,,socrates3 ,but the more you pour in1  
the greater the waste2 and the  holes   
must be large for the liquid to escape4 
,,callicles3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,the life which you are now depicting is
 not that of a dead  man1 or of a stone1
 but of a cormorant2 you mean that he is
 to be  hungering and eating8           
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
he is to be thirsting and drinking8     
,,callicles3 ,yes1 that is what ,i mean2
 he is to have all his desires  about   

him1 and to be able to live happily in  
the gratification of them4              
,,socrates3 ,capital1 excellent2 go on  
as you have begun1 and have no  shame2  
,i1 too1 must disencumber myself of     
shame3 and first1 will you  tell me     
whether you include itching and         
scratching1 provided you have  enough of
 them and pass your life in scratching1 
in your notion of  happiness8           
,,callicles3 ,what a strange being you  
are1 ,socrates6 a regular  mob-orator4  
,,socrates3 ,that was the reason1       
,callicles1 why ,i scared ,polus and    
,gorgias1 until they were too modest to 
say what they thought2 but you  will not
 be too modest and will not be scared1  
for you are a brave man4  ,and now1     
answer my question4    ,,callicles3 ,i  
answer1 that even the scratcher would   
live pleasantly4    ,,socrates3 ,and if 
pleasantly1 then also happily8          
,,callicles3 ,to be sure4    ,,socrates3
 ,but what if the itching is not        
confined to the head8 ,shall ,i  pursue 

the question8 ,and here1 ,callicles1 ,i 
would have you consider how  you would  
reply if consequences are pressed upon  
you1 especially if in  the last resort  
you are asked1 whether the life of a    
catamite is not  terrible1 foul1        
miserable8 ,or would you venture to say1
 that they too  are happy1 if they only 
get enough of what they want8           
,,callicles3 ,are you not ashamed1      
,socrates1 of introducing such topics   
into the argument8    ,,socrates3 ,well1
 my fine friend1 but am ,i the          
introducer of these  topics1 or he who  
says without any qualification that all 
who feel  pleasure in whatever manner   
are happy1 and who admits of no         
distinction  between good and bad       
pleasures8 ,and ,i would still ask1     
whether you say  that pleasure and good 
are the same1 or whether there is some  
pleasure  which is not a good8          
,,callicles3 ,well1 then1 for the sake  
of consistency1 ,i will say that  they  
are the same4    ,,socrates3 ,you are   

breaking the original agreement1        
,callicles1 and will  no longer be a    
satisfactory companion in the search    
after truth1 if you  say what is        
contrary to your real opinion4          
,,callicles3 ,why1 that is what you are 
doing too1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3    
,then we are both doing wrong4 ,still1  
my dear friend1 ,i would  ask you to    
consider whether pleasure1 from whatever
 source derived1 is  the good2 for1 if  
this be true1 then the disagreeable     
consequences  which have been darkly    
intimated must follow1 and many others4 
,,callicles3 ,that1 ,socrates1 is only  
your opinion4    ,,socrates3 ,and do    
you1 ,callicles1 seriously maintain what
 you are  saying8    ,,callicles3       
,indeed ,i do4    ,,socrates3 ,then1 as 
you are in earnest1 shall we proceed    
with the  argument8    ,,callicles3 ,by 
all means4 7,or1 8,i am in profound     
earnest407    ,,socrates3 ,well1 if you 
are willing to proceed1 determine this  
question  for me3--,there is something1 

,i presume1 which you would call        
knowledge8    ,,callicles3 ,there is4   
,,socrates3 ,and were you not saying    
just now1 that some courage implied     
knowledge8    ,,callicles3 ,i was4      
,,socrates3 ,and you were speaking of   
courage and knowledge as two things     
different from one another8             
,,callicles3 ,certainly ,i was4         
,,socrates3 ,and would you say that     
pleasure and knowledge are the same1  or
 not the same8    ,,callicles3 ,not the 
same1 ,o man of wisdom4    ,,socrates3  
,and would you say that courage differed
 from pleasure8    ,,callicles3         
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 
let us remember that ,callicles1 the    
,acharnian1  says that pleasure and good
 are the same2 but that knowledge and   
courage are not the same1 either with   
one another1 or with the good4          
,,callicles3 ,and what does our friend  
,socrates1 of ,foxton1 say--does he     
assent to this1 or not8    ,,socrates3  
,he does not assent2 neither will       

,callicles1 when he sees  himself truly4
 ,you will admit1 ,i suppose1 that good 
and evil fortune  are opposed to each   
other8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4            
,,socrates3 ,and if they are opposed to 
each other1 then1 like health and       
disease1 they exclude one another2 a man
 cannot have them both1 or be  without  
them both1 at the same time8            
,,callicles3 ,what do you mean8         
,,socrates3 ,take the case of any bodily
 affection3--a man may have the         
complaint in his eyes which is called   
ophthalmia8    ,,callicles3 ,to be sure4
    ,,socrates3 ,but he surely cannot   
have the same eyes well and sound at the
  same time8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly 
not4    ,,socrates3 ,and when he has got
 rid of his ophthalmia1 has he got rid  
of  the health of his eyes too8 ,is the 
final result1 that he gets rid of  them 
both together8    ,,callicles3          
,certainly not4    ,,socrates3 ,that    
would surely be marvellous and absurd8  
,,callicles3 ,very4    ,,socrates3 ,i   

suppose that he is affected by them1 and
 gets rid of them  in turns8            
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
he may have strength and weakness in the
 same way1 by  fits8    ,,callicles3    
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,or swiftness and  
slowness8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4   
,,socrates3 ,and does he have and not   
have good and happiness1 and their      
opposites1 evil and misery1 in a similar
 alternation8 7,compare  ,republic47    
,,callicles3 ,certainly he has4         
,,socrates3 ,if then there be anything  
which a man has and has not at the  same
 time1 clearly that cannot be good and  
evil--do we agree8 ,please not  to      
answer without consideration4           
,,callicles3 ,i entirely agree4         
,,socrates3 ,go back now to our former  
admissions4--,did you say that to       
hunger1 ,i mean the mere state of       
hunger1 was pleasant or painful8        
,,callicles3 ,i said painful1 but that  
to eat when you are hungry is  pleasant4
    ,,socrates3 ,i know2 but still the  

actual hunger is painful3 am ,i not     
right8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4            
,,socrates3 ,and thirst1 too1 is        
painful8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 very4    
,,socrates3 ,need ,i adduce any more    
instances1 or would you agree that all  
wants or desires are painful8           
,,callicles3 ,i agree1 and therefore you
 need not adduce any more  instances4   
,,socrates3 ,very good4 ,and you would  
admit that to drink1 when you are       
thirsty1 is pleasant8    ,,callicles3   
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and in the        
sentence which you have just uttered1   
the word  8thirsty0 implies pain8       
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
the word 8drinking0 is expressive of    
pleasure1 and of the  satisfaction of   
the want8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4         
,,socrates3 ,there is pleasure in       
drinking8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4   
,,socrates3 ,when you are thirsty8      
,,socrates3 ,and in pain8               
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,do   
you see the inference3--that pleasure   

and pain are  simultaneous1 when you say
 that being thirsty1 you drink8 ,for are
 they  not simultaneous1 and do they not
 affect at the same time the same  part1
 whether of the soul or the body8--which
 of them is affected cannot  be supposed
 to be of any consequence3 ,is not this 
true8    ,,callicles3 ,it is4           
,,socrates3 ,you said also1 that no man 
could have good and evil fortune  at the
 same time8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 ,i    
did4    ,,socrates3 ,but you admitted1  
that when in pain a man might also have 
pleasure8    ,,callicles3 ,clearly4     
,,socrates3 ,then pleasure is not the   
same as good fortune1 or pain the  same 
as evil fortune1 and therefore the good 
is not the same as the  pleasant8       
,,callicles3 ,i wish ,i knew1 ,socrates1
 what your quibbling means4             
,,socrates3 ,you know1 ,callicles1 but  
you affect not to know4    ,,callicles3 
,well1 get on1 and don't keep fooling3  
then you will know  what a wiseacre you 
are in your admonition of me4           

,,socrates3 ,does not a man cease from  
his thirst and from his pleasure in     
drinking at the same time8              
,,callicles3 ,i do not understand what  
you are saying4    ,,gorgias3 ,nay1     
,callicles1 answer1 if only for our     
sakes2--we should like  to hear the     
argument out4    ,,callicles3 ,yes1     
,gorgias1 but ,i must complain of the   
habitual trifling  of ,socrates2 he is  
always arguing about little and unworthy
 questions4    ,,gorgias3 ,what matter8 
,your reputation1 ,callicles1 is not at 
stake4 ,let  ,socrates argue in his own 
fashion4    ,,callicles3 ,well1 then1   
,socrates1 you shall ask these little   
peddling  questions1 since ,gorgias     
wishes to have them4    ,,socrates3 ,i  
envy you1 ,callicles1 for having been   
initiated into the  great mysteries     
before you were initiated into the      
lesser4 ,i thought  that this was not   
allowable4 ,but to return to our        
argument3--,does not a  man cease from  
thirsting and from the pleasure of      

drinking at the same  moment8           
,,callicles3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
if he is hungry1 or has any other       
desire1 does he not  cease from the     
desire and the pleasure at the same     
moment8    ,,callicles3 ,very true4     
,,socrates3 ,then he ceases from pain   
and pleasure at the same moment8        
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,but  
he does not cease from good and evil at 
the same moment1  as you have admitted3 
do you still adhere to what you said8   
,,callicles3 ,yes1 ,i do2 but what is   
the inference8    ,,socrates3 ,why1 my  
friend1 the inference is that the good  
is not the  same as the pleasant1 or the
 evil the same as the painful2 there is 
a  cessation of pleasure and pain at the
 same moment2 but not of good and  evil1
 for they are different4 ,how then can  
pleasure be the same as  good1 or pain  
as evil8 ,and ,i would have you look at 
the matter in  another light1 which     
could hardly1 ,i think1 have been       
considered by you  when you identified  

them3 ,are not the good good because    
they have good  present with them1 as   
the beautiful are those who have beauty 
present  with them8    ,,callicles3     
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and do you call   
the fools and cowards good men8 ,for you
 were  saying just now that the         
courageous and the wise are the         
good--would you  not say so8            
,,callicles3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,and did you never see a foolish child  
rejoicing8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 ,i     
have4    ,,socrates3 ,and a foolish man 
too8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 certainly2   
but what is your drift8    ,,socrates3  
,nothing particular1 if you will only   
answer4    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 ,i have4  
,,socrates3 ,and did you ever see a     
sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing8    
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,which
 rejoice and sorrow most--the wise or   
the foolish8    ,,callicles3 ,they are  
much upon a par1 ,i think1 in that      
respect4    ,,socrates3 ,enough3 ,and   
did you ever see a coward in battle8    

,,callicles3 ,to be sure4    ,,socrates3
 ,and which rejoiced most at the        
departure of the enemy1 the  coward or  
the brave8    ,,callicles3 ,i should say
 8most0 of both2 or at any rate1 they   
rejoiced  about equally4    ,,socrates3 
,no matter2 then the cowards1 and not   
only the brave1 rejoice8    ,,callicles3
 ,greatly4    ,,socrates3 ,and the      
foolish2 so it would seem8              
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
are only the cowards pained at the      
approach of their  enemies1 or are the  
brave also pained8    ,,callicles3 ,both
 are pained4    ,,socrates3 ,and are    
they equally pained8    ,,callicles3 ,i 
should imagine that the cowards are more
 pained4    ,,socrates3 ,and are they   
not better pleased at the enemy's       
departure8    ,,callicles3 ,i dare say4 
,,socrates3 ,then are the foolish and   
the wise and the cowards and the  brave 
all pleased and pained1 as you were     
saying1 in nearly equal  degree2 but are
 the cowards more pleased and pained    

than the brave8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4   
,,socrates3 ,but surely the wise and    
brave are the good1 and the foolish  and
 the cowardly are the bad8              
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,then 
the good and the bad are pleased and    
pained in a nearly  equal degree8       
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,then 
are the good and bad good and bad in a  
nearly equal  degree1 or have the bad   
the advantage both in good and evil8    
7i4e4 in  having more pleasure and more 
pain47    ,,callicles3 ,i really do not 
know what you mean4    ,,socrates3 ,why1
 do you not remember saying that the    
good were good  because good was present
 with them1 and the evil because evil2  
and that  pleasures were goods and pains
 evils8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 ,i        
remember4    ,,socrates3 ,and are not   
these pleasures or goods present to     
those who  rejoice--if they do rejoice8 
,,callicles3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,then those who rejoice are good when   
goods are present with  them8           

,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
those who are in pain have evil or      
sorrow present with  them8              
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
would you still say that the evil are   
evil by reason of  the presence of evil8
    ,,callicles3 ,i should4             
,,socrates3 ,then those who rejoice are 
good1 and those who are in pain  evil8  
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,the  
degrees of good and evil vary with the  
degrees of  pleasure and of pain8       
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,have 
the wise man and the fool1 the brave and
 the coward1 joy  and pain in nearly    
equal degrees8 or would you say that the
 coward has  more8    ,,callicles3 ,i   
should say that he has4    ,,socrates3  
,help me then to draw out the conclusion
 which follows from  our admissions2 for
 it is good to repeat and review what is
 good twice  and thrice over1 as they   
say4 ,both the wise man and the brave   
man we  allow to be good8               
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  

the foolish man and the coward to be    
evil8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4       
,,socrates3 ,and he who has joy is good8
    ,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3   
,and he who is in pain is evil8         
,,callicles3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,the good and evil both have joy and    
pain1 but1 perhaps1 the  evil has more  
of them8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,then must we not infer1    
that the bad man is as good and bad  as 
the good1 or1 perhaps1 even better8--is 
not this a further inference  which     
follows equally with the preceding from 
the assertion that the  good and the    
pleasant are the same3--can this be     
denied1 ,callicles8    ,,callicles3 ,i  
have been listening and making          
admissions to you1  ,socrates2 and ,i   
remark that if a person grants you      
anything in play1  you1 like a child1   
want to keep hold and will not give it  
back4 ,but do  you really suppose that  
,i or any other human being denies that 
some  pleasures are good and others bad8

    ,,socrates3 ,alas1 ,callicles1 how  
unfair you are6 you certainly treat me  
as if ,i were a child1 sometimes saying 
one thing1 and then another1 as  if you 
were meaning to deceive me4 ,and yet ,i 
thought at first that you  were my      
friend1 and would not have deceived me  
if you could have  helped4 ,but ,i see  
that ,i was mistaken2 and now ,i suppose
 that ,i must  make the best of a bad   
business1 as they said of old1 and take 
what ,i  can get out of you4--,well1    
then1 as ,i understand you to say1 ,i   
may  assume that some pleasures are good
 and others evil8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,the beneficial are good1   
and the hurtful are evil8               
,,callicles3 ,to be sure4    ,,socrates3
 ,and the beneficial are those which do 
some good1 and the  hurtful are those   
which do some evil8    ,,callicles3     
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,take1 for example1
 the bodily pleasures of eating and     
drinking1 which we were just now        
mentioning--you mean to say that those  

which promote health1 or any other      
bodily excellence1 are good1 and  their 
opposites evil8    ,,callicles3         
,certainly4    ,,socrates3 ,and in the  
same way there are good pains and there 
are evil  pains8    ,,callicles3 ,to be 
sure4    ,,socrates3 ,and ought we not  
to choose and use the good pleasures and
  pains8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4    
,,socrates3 ,but not the evil8          
,,callicles3 ,clearly4    ,,socrates3   
,because1 if you remember1 ,polus and ,i
 have agreed that all  our actions are  
to be done for the sake of the          
good2--and will you agree  with us in   
saying1 that the good is the end of all 
our actions1 and  that all our actions  
are to be done for the sake of the good1
 and not  the good for the sake of      
them8--will you add a third vote to our 
two8    ,,callicles3 ,i will4           
,,socrates3 ,then pleasure1 like        
everything else1 is to be sought for the
  sake of that which is good1 and not   
that which is good for the sake of      

pleasure8    ,,callicles3 ,to be sure4  
,,socrates3 ,but can every man choose   
what pleasures are good and what are    
evil1 or must he have art or knowledge  
of them in detail8    ,,callicles3 ,he  
must have art4    ,,socrates3 ,let me   
now remind you of what ,i was saying to 
,gorgias and  ,polus2 ,i was saying1 as 
you will not have forgotten1 that there 
were  some processes which aim only at  
pleasure1 and know nothing of a better  
and worse1 and there are other processes
 which know good and evil4 ,and  ,i     
considered that cookery1 which ,i do not
 call an art1 but only an  experience1  
was of the former class1 which is       
concerned with pleasure1  and that the  
art of medicine was of the class which  
is concerned with  the good4 ,and now1  
by the god of friendship1 ,i must beg   
you1 ,callicles1  not to jest1 or to    
imagine that ,i am jesting with you2 do 
not answer at  random and contrary to   
your real opinion--for you will observe 
that we  are arguing about the way of   

human life2 and to a man who has any    
sense  at all1 what question can be more
 serious than this8--whether he should  
follow after that way of life to which  
you exhort me1 and act what you  call   
the manly part of speaking in the       
assembly1 and cultivating  rhetoric1 and
 engaging in public affairs1 according  
to the principles  now in vogue2 or     
whether he should pursue the life of    
philosophy2--and  in what the latter way
 differs from the former4 ,but perhaps  
we had  better first try to distinguish 
them1 as ,i did before1 and when we have
  come to an agreement that they are    
distinct1 we may proceed to consider  in
 what they differ from one another1 and 
which of them we should  choose4        
,perhaps1 however1 you do not even now  
understand what ,i mean8    ,,callicles3
 ,no1 ,i do not4    ,,socrates3 ,then ,i
 will explain myself more clearly3      
seeing that you and  ,i have agreed that
 there is such a thing as good1 and that
 there is  such a thing as pleasure1 and

 that pleasure is not the same as good1 
and that the pursuit and process of     
acquisition of the one1 that is         
pleasure1 is different from the pursuit 
and process of acquisition of  the      
other1 which is good--,i wish that you  
would tell me whether you  agree with me
 thus far or not--do you agree8         
,,callicles3 ,i do4    ,,socrates3 ,then
 ,i will proceed1 and ask whether you   
also agree with me1  and whether you    
think that ,i spoke the truth when ,i   
further said to  ,gorgias and ,polus    
that cookery in my opinion is only an   
experience1 and  not an art at all2 and 
that whereas medicine is an art1 and    
attends to  the nature and constitution 
of the patient1 and has principles of   
action and reason in each case1 cookery 
in attending upon pleasure  never       
regards either the nature or reason of  
that pleasure to which she  devotes     
herself1 but goes straight to her end1  
nor ever considers or  calculates       
anything1 but works by experience and   

routine1 and just  preserves the        
recollection of what she has usually    
done when producing  pleasure4 ,and     
first1 ,i would have you consider       
whether ,i have proved  what ,i was     
saying1 and then whether there are not  
other similar  processes which have to  
do with the soul--some of them processes
 of art1  making a provision for the    
soul's highest interest--others         
despising the  interest1 and1 as in the 
previous case1 considering only the     
pleasure  of the soul1 and how this may 
be acquired1 but not considering what   
pleasures are good or bad1 and having no
 other aim but to afford  gratification1
 whether good or bad4 ,in my opinion1   
,callicles1 there are  such processes1  
and this is the sort of thing which ,i  
term flattery1  whether concerned with  
the body or the soul1 or whenever       
employed with  a view to pleasure and   
without any consideration of good and   
evil4 ,and  now ,i wish that you would  
tell me whether you agree with us in    

this  notion1 or whether you differ4    
,,callicles3 ,i do not differ2 on the   
contrary1 ,i agree2 for in that way ,i  
shall soonest bring the argument to an  
end1 and shall oblige my friend         
,gorgias4    ,,socrates3 ,and is this   
notion true of one soul1 or of two or   
more8    ,,callicles3 ,equally true of  
two or more4    ,,socrates3 ,then a man 
may delight a whole assembly1 and yet   
have no  regard for their true          
interests8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4        
,,socrates3 ,can you tell me the        
pursuits which delight mankind--or      
rather1  if you would prefer1 let me    
ask1 and do you answer1 which of them   
belong to the pleasurable class1 and    
which of them not8 ,in the first  place1
 what say you of flute-playing8 ,does   
not that appear to be an art  which     
seeks only pleasure1 ,callicles1 and    
thinks of nothing else8    ,,callicles3 
,i assent4    ,,socrates3 ,and is not   
the same true of all similar arts1 as1  
for  example1 the art of playing the    

lyre at festivals8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4
    ,,socrates3 ,and what do you say of 
the choral art and of dithyrambic       
poetry8--are not they of the same       
nature8 ,do you imagine that ,cinesias  
the son of ,meles cares about what will 
tend to the moral improvement of  his   
hearers1 or about what will give        
pleasure to the multitude8              
,,callicles3 ,there can be no mistake   
about ,cinesias1 ,socrates4             
,,socrates3 ,and what do you say of his 
father1 ,meles the harp-player8 ,did  he
 perform with any view to the good of   
his hearers8 ,could he be said  to      
regard even their pleasure8 ,for his    
singing was an infliction to his        
audience4 ,and of harp-playing and      
dithyrambic poetry in general1 what     
would you say8 ,have they not been      
invented wholly for the sake of         
pleasure8    ,,callicles3 ,that is my   
notion of them4    ,,socrates3 ,and as  
for the ,muse of ,tragedy1 that solemn  
and august  personage--what are her     

aspirations8 ,is all her aim and desire 
only to  give pleasure to the           
spectators1 or does she fight against   
them and  refuse to speak of their      
pleasant vices1 and willingly proclaim  
in word  and song truths welcome and    
unwelcome8--which in your judgment is   
her  character8    ,,callicles3 ,there  
can be no doubt1 ,socrates1 that        
,tragedy has her face  turned towards   
pleasure and the gratification of the   
audience4    ,,socrates3 ,and is not    
that the sort of thing1 ,callicles1     
which we were  just now describing as   
flattery8    ,,callicles3 ,quite true4  
,,socrates3 ,well now1 suppose that we  
strip all poetry of song and rhythm  and
 metre1 there will remain speech8       
7,compare ,republic47    ,,callicles3   
,to be sure4    ,,socrates3 ,and this   
speech is addressed to a crowd of       
people8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,then poetry is a sort of   
rhetoric8    ,,callicles3 ,true4        
,,socrates3 ,and do not the poets in the

 theatres seem to you to be             
rhetoricians8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4     
,,socrates3 ,then now we have discovered
 a sort of rhetoric which is  addressed 
to a crowd of men1 women1 and children1 
freemen and slaves4  ,and this is not   
much to our taste1 for we have described
 it as having  the nature of flattery4  
,,callicles3 ,quite true4    ,,socrates3
 ,very good4 ,and what do you say of    
that other rhetoric which  addresses the
 ,athenian assembly and the assemblies  
of freemen in other  states8 ,do the    
rhetoricians appear to you always to aim
 at what is  best1 and do they seek to  
improve the citizens by their speeches1 
or  are they too1 like the rest of      
mankind1 bent upon giving them pleasure1
  forgetting the public good in the     
thought of their own interest1  playing 
with the people as with children1 and   
trying to amuse them1 but  never        
considering whether they are better or  
worse for this8    ,,callicles3 ,i must 
distinguish4 ,there are some who have a 

real care of  the public in what they   
say1 while others are such as you       
describe4    ,,socrates3 ,i am contented
 with the admission that rhetoric is of 
two  sorts2 one1 which is mere flattery 
and disgraceful declamation2 the  other1
 which is noble and aims at the training
 and improvement of the  souls of the   
citizens1 and strives to say what is    
best1 whether welcome  or unwelcome1 to 
the audience2 but have you ever known   
such a rhetoric2  or if you have1 and   
can point out any rhetorician who is of 
this stamp1  who is he8    ,,callicles3 
,but1 indeed1 ,i am afraid that ,i      
cannot tell you of any such  among the  
orators who are at present living4      
,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 can you mention
 any one of a former generation1  who   
may be said to have improved the        
,athenians1 who found them worse  and   
made them better1 from the day that he  
began to make speeches8 for1  indeed1 ,i
 do not know of such a man4             
,,callicles3 ,what6 did you never hear  

that ,themistocles was a good man1  and 
,cimon and ,miltiades and ,pericles1 who
 is just lately dead1 and whom  you     
heard yourself8    ,,socrates3 ,yes1    
,callicles1 they were good men1 if1 as  
you said at first1  true virtue consists
 only in the satisfaction of our own    
desires and  those of others2 but if    
not1 and if1 as we were afterwards      
compelled to  acknowledge1 the          
satisfaction of some desires makes us   
better1 and of  others1 worse1 and we   
ought to gratify the one and not the    
other1 and  there is an art in          
distinguishing them1--can you tell me of
 any of these  statesmen who did        
distinguish them8    ,,callicles3 ,no1  
indeed1 ,i cannot4    ,,socrates3 ,yet1 
surely1 ,callicles1 if you look you will
 find such a one4  ,suppose that we just
 calmly consider whether any of these   
was such as ,i  have described4 ,will   
not the good man1 who says whatever he  
says with a  view to the best1 speak    
with a reference to some standard and   

not at  random2 just as all other       
artists1 whether the painter1 the       
builder1  the shipwright1 or any other  
look all of them to their own work1 and 
do  not select and apply at random what 
they apply1 but strive to give a        
definite form to it8 ,the artist        
disposes all things in order1 and       
compels the one part to harmonize and   
accord with the other part1 until  he   
has constructed a regular and systematic
 whole2 and this is true of  all        
artists1 and in the same way the        
trainers and physicians1 of whom  we    
spoke before1 give order and regularity 
to the body3 do you deny  this8         
,,callicles3 ,no2 ,i am ready to admit  
it4    ,,socrates3 ,then the house in   
which order and regularity prevail is   
good2  that in which there is disorder1 
evil8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4             
,,socrates3 ,and the same is true of a  
ship8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4             
,,socrates3 ,and the same may be said of
 the human body8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4  

,,socrates3 ,and what would you say of  
the soul8 ,will the good soul be  that  
in which disorder is prevalent1 or that 
in which there is harmony  and order8   
,,callicles3 ,the latter follows from   
our previous admissions4    ,,socrates3 
,what is the name which is given to the 
effect of harmony and  order in the     
body8    ,,callicles3 ,i suppose that   
you mean health and strength8           
,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,i do2 and what is the
 name which you would give to the       
effect of harmony and order in the soul8
 ,try and discover a name for  this as  
well as for the other4    ,,callicles3  
,why not give the name yourself1        
,socrates8    ,,socrates3 ,well1 if you 
had rather that ,i should1 ,i will2 and 
you shall  say whether you agree with   
me1 and if not1 you shall refute and    
answer  me4 8,healthy10 as ,i conceive1 
is the name which is given to the       
regular  order of the body1 whence comes
 health and every other bodily          
excellence3 is that true or not8        

,,callicles3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
8lawful0 and 8law0 are the names which  
are given to the  regular order and     
action of the soul1 and these make men  
lawful and  orderly3--and so we have    
temperance and justice3 have we not8    
,,callicles3 ,granted4    ,,socrates3   
,and will not the true rhetorician who  
is honest and  understands his art have 
his eye fixed upon these1 in all the    
words  which he addresses to the souls  
of men1 and in all his actions1 both in 
what he gives and in what he takes away8
 ,will not his aim be to implant        
justice in the souls of his citizens and
 take away injustice1 to  implant       
temperance and take away intemperance1  
to implant every virtue  and take away  
every vice8 ,do you not agree8          
,,callicles3 ,i agree4    ,,socrates3   
,for what use is there1 ,callicles1 in  
giving to the body of a  sick man who is
 in a bad state of health a quantity of 
the most  delightful food or drink or   
any other pleasant thing1 which may be  

really as bad for him as if you gave him
 nothing1 or even worse if  rightly     
estimated4 ,is not that true8           
,,callicles3 ,i will not say ,no to it4 
,,socrates3 ,for in my opinion there is 
no profit in a man's life if his  body  
is in an evil plight--in that case his  
life also is evil3 am ,i not  right8    
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,when 
a man is in health the physicians will  
generally allow  him to eat when he is  
hungry and drink when he is thirsty1 and
 to  satisfy his desires as he likes1   
but when he is sick they hardly suffer  
him to satisfy his desires at all3 even 
you will admit that8    ,,callicles3    
,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and does not the  
same argument hold of the soul1 my good 
sir8  ,while she is in a bad state and  
is senseless and intemperate and unjust 
and unholy1 her desires ought to be     
controlled1 and she ought to be         
prevented from doing anything which does
 not tend to her own  improvement4      
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,such 

treatment will be better for the soul   
herself8    ,,callicles3 ,to be sure4   
,,socrates3 ,and to restrain her from   
her appetites is to chastise her8       
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,then 
restraint or chastisement is better for 
the soul than  intemperance or the      
absence of control1 which you were just 
now  preferring8    ,,callicles3 ,i do  
not understand you1 ,socrates1 and ,i   
wish that you would  ask some one who   
does4    ,,socrates3 ,here is a         
gentleman who cannot endure to be       
improved or to  subject himself to that 
very chastisement of which the argument 
speaks6    ,,callicles3 ,i do not heed a
 word of what you are saying1 and have  
only  answered hitherto out of civility 
to ,gorgias4    ,,socrates3 ,what are we
 to do1 then8 ,shall we break off in the
 middle8    ,,callicles3 ,you shall     
judge for yourself4    ,,socrates3      
,well1 but people say that 8a tale      
should have a head and not  break off in
 the middle10 and ,i should not like to 

have the argument  going about without a
 head 7compare ,laws72 please then to go
 on a  little longer1 and put the head  
on4    ,,callicles3 ,how tyrannical you 
are1 ,socrates6 ,i wish that you and    
your  argument would rest1 or that you  
would get some one else to argue with   
you4    ,,socrates3 ,but who else is    
willing8--,i want to finish the         
argument4    ,,callicles3 ,cannot you   
finish without my help1 either talking  
straight  on1 or questioning and        
answering yourself8    ,,socrates3 ,must
 ,i then say with ,epicharmus1 8,two men
 spoke before1 but  now one shall be    
enough08 ,i suppose that there is       
absolutely no help4  ,and if ,i am to   
carry on the enquiry by myself1 ,i will 
first of all  remark that not only ,i   
but all of us should have an ambition to
 know  what is true and what is false in
 this matter1 for the discovery of the  
truth is a common good4 ,and now ,i will
 proceed to argue according to my  own  
notion4 ,but if any of you think that ,i

 arrive at conclusions which  are untrue
 you must interpose and refute me1 for  
,i do not speak from  any knowledge of  
what ,i am saying2 ,i am an enquirer    
like yourselves1  and therefore1 if my  
opponent says anything which is of      
force1 ,i shall  be the first to agree  
with him4 ,i am speaking on the         
supposition that  the argument ought to 
be completed2 but if you think otherwise
 let us  leave off and go our ways4     
,,gorgias3 ,i think1 ,socrates1 that we 
should not go our ways until you  have  
completed the argument2 and this appears
 to me to be the wish of  the rest of   
the company2 ,i myself should very much 
like to hear what  more you have to say4
    ,,socrates3 ,i too1 ,gorgias1 should
 have liked to continue the argument    
with ,callicles1 and then ,i might have 
given him an 8,amphion0 in return  for  
his 8,zethus02 but since you1           
,callicles1 are unwilling to continue1  
,i hope that you will listen1 and       
interrupt me if ,i seem to you to be in 

error4 ,and if you refute me1 ,i shall  
not be angry with you as you are  with  
me1 but ,i shall inscribe you as the    
greatest of benefactors on the  tablets 
of my soul4    ,,callicles3 ,my good    
fellow1 never mind me1 but get on4      
,,socrates3 ,listen to me1 then1 while  
,i recapitulate the argument3--,is the  
pleasant the same as the good8 ,not the 
same4 ,callicles and ,i are agreed      
about that4 ,and is the pleasant to be  
pursued for the sake of the good8  or   
the good for the sake of the pleasant8  
,the pleasant is to be pursued  for the 
sake of the good4 ,and that is pleasant 
at the presence of which  we are        
pleased1 and that is good at the        
presence of which we are good8  ,to be  
sure4 ,and we are good1 and all good    
things whatever are good when  some     
virtue is present in us or them8 ,that1 
,callicles1 is my  conviction4 ,but the 
virtue of each thing1 whether body or   
soul1  instrument or creature1 when     
given to them in the best way comes to  

them not by chance but as the result of 
the order and truth and art  which are  
imparted to them3 ,am ,i not right8 ,i  
maintain that ,i am4 ,and  is not the   
virtue of each thing dependent on order 
or arrangement8 ,yes1  ,i say4 ,and that
 which makes a thing good is the proper 
order inhering  in each thing8 ,such is 
my view4 ,and is not the soul which has 
an order  of her own better than that   
which has no order8 ,certainly4 ,and the
 soul  which has order is orderly8 ,of  
course4 ,and that which is orderly is   
temperate8 ,assuredly4 ,and the         
temperate soul is good8 ,no other answer
  can ,i give1 ,callicles dear2 have you
 any8    ,,callicles3 ,go on1 my good   
fellow4    ,,socrates3 ,then ,i shall   
proceed to add1 that if the temperate   
soul is  the good soul1 the soul which  
is in the opposite condition1 that is1  
the foolish and intemperate1 is the bad 
soul4 ,very true4    ,and will not the  
temperate man do what is proper1 both in
 relation to  the gods and to men2--for 

he would not be temperate if he did not8
  ,certainly he will do what is proper4 
,in his relation to other men he  will  
do what is just2 and in his relation to 
the gods he will do what  is holy2 and  
he who does what is just and holy must  
be just and holy8  ,very true4 ,and must
 he not be courageous8 for the duty of a
 temperate  man is not to follow or to  
avoid what he ought not1 but what he    
ought1  whether things or men or        
pleasures or pains1 and patiently to    
endure  when he ought2 and therefore1   
,callicles1 the temperate man1 being1 as
  we have described1 also just and      
courageous and holy1 cannot be other    
than a perfectly good man1 nor can the  
good man do otherwise than well  and    
perfectly whatever he does2 and he who  
does well must of necessity  be happy   
and blessed1 and the evil man who does  
evil1 miserable3 now  this latter is he 
whom you were applauding--the           
intemperate who is the  opposite of the 
temperate4 ,such is my position1 and    

these things ,i  affirm to be true4 ,and
 if they are true1 then ,i further      
affirm that he  who desires to be happy 
must pursue and practise temperance and 
run  away from intemperance as fast as  
his legs will carry him3 he had  better 
order his life so as not to need        
punishment2 but if either he or  any of 
his friends1 whether private individual 
or city1 are in need of  punishment1    
then justice must be done and he must   
suffer punishment1 if  he would be      
happy4 ,this appears to me to be the aim
 which a man ought  to have1 and towards
 which he ought to direct all the       
energies both of  himself and of the    
state1 acting so that he may have       
temperance and  justice present with him
 and be happy1 not suffering his lusts  
to be  unrestrained1 and in the         
never-ending desire satisfy them leading
 a  robber's life4 ,such a one is the   
friend neither of ,god nor man1 for he  
is incapable of communion1 and he who is
 incapable of communion is also         

incapable of friendship4 ,and           
philosophers tell us1 ,callicles1 that  
communion and friendship and orderliness
 and temperance and justice  bind       
together heaven and earth and gods and  
men1 and that this universe  is         
therefore called ,cosmos or order1 not  
disorder or misrule1 my  friend4 ,but   
although you are a philosopher you seem 
to me never to have  observed that      
geometrical equality is mighty1 both    
among gods and men2  you think that you 
ought to cultivate inequality or excess1
 and do not  care about                 
geometry4--,well1 then1 either the      
principle that the happy  are made happy
 by the possession of justice and       
temperance1 and the  miserable miserable
 by the possession of vice1 must be     
refuted1 or1 if  it is granted1 what    
will be the consequences8 ,all the      
consequences  which ,i drew before1     
,callicles1 and about which you asked me
 whether ,i  was in earnest when ,i said
 that a man ought to accuse himself and 

his  son and his friend if he did       
anything wrong1 and that to this end he 
should use his rhetoric--all those      
consequences are true4 ,and that which  
you thought that ,polus was led to admit
 out of modesty is true1 viz41  that1 to
 do injustice1 if more disgraceful than 
to suffer1 is in that  degree worse2 and
 the other position1 which1 according to
 ,polus1  ,gorgias admitted out of      
modesty1 that he who would truly be a   
rhetorician ought to be just and have a 
knowledge of justice1 has also  turned  
out to be true4    ,and now1 these      
things being as we have said1 let us    
proceed in the next  place to consider  
whether you are right in throwing in my 
teeth that ,i  am unable to help myself 
or any of my friends or kinsmen1 or to  
save  them in the extremity of danger1  
and that ,i am in the power of another  
like an outlaw to whom any one may do   
what he likes1--he may box my  ears1    
which was a brave saying of yours2 or   
take away my goods or  banish me1 or    

even do his worst and kill me2 a        
condition which1 as you  say1 is the    
height of disgrace4 ,my answer to you is
 one which has been  already often      
repeated1 but may as well be repeated   
once more4 ,i tell  you1 ,callicles1    
that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully 
is not the  worst evil which can befall 
a man1 nor to have my purse or my body  
cut  open1 but that to smite and slay me
 and mine wrongfully is far more        
disgraceful and more evil2 aye1 and to  
despoil and enslave and pillage1  or in 
any way at all to wrong me and mine1 is 
far more disgraceful and  evil to the   
doer of the wrong than to me who am the 
sufferer4 ,these  truths1 which have    
been already set forth as ,i state them 
in the  previous discussion1 would seem 
now to have been fixed and riveted by   
us1 if ,i may use an expression which is
 certainly bold1 in words which  are    
like bonds of iron and adamant2 and     
unless you or some other still  more    
enterprising hero shall break them1     

there is no possibility of  denying what
 ,i say4 ,for my position has always    
been1 that ,i myself am  ignorant how   
these things are1 but that ,i have never
 met any one who  could say otherwise1  
any more than you can1 and not appear   
ridiculous4  ,this is my position still1
 and if what ,i am saying is true1 and  
injustice is the greatest of evils to   
the doer of injustice1 and yet  there is
 if possible a greater than this        
greatest of evils 7compare  ,republic71 
in an unjust man not suffering          
retribution1 what is that  defence of   
which the want will make a man truly    
ridiculous8 ,must not  the defence be   
one which will avert the greatest of    
human evils8 ,and  will not the worst of
 all defences be that with which a man  
is unable  to defend himself or his     
family or his friends8--and next will   
come that  which is unable to avert the 
next greatest evil2 thirdly that which  
is  unable to avert the third greatest  
evil2 and so of other evils4 ,as is  the

 greatness of evil so is the honour of  
being able to avert them in  their      
several degrees1 and the disgrace of not
 being able to avert  them4 ,am ,i not  
right ,callicles8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 
quite right4    ,,socrates3 ,seeing then
 that there are these two evils1 the    
doing  injustice and the suffering      
injustice--and we affirm that to do     
injustice is a greater1 and to suffer   
injustice a lesser evil--by what        
devices can a man succeed in obtaining  
the two advantages1 the one of  not     
doing and the other of not suffering    
injustice8 must he have the  power1 or  
only the will to obtain them8 ,i mean to
 ask whether a man  will escape         
injustice if he has only the will to    
escape1 or must he  have provided       
himself with the power8    ,,callicles3 
,he must have provided himself with the 
power2 that is clear4    ,,socrates3    
,and what do you say of doing injustice8
 ,is the will only  sufficient1 and will
 that prevent him from doing injustice1 

or must he  have provided himself with  
power and art2 and if he have not       
studied  and practised1 will he be      
unjust still8 ,surely you might say1    
,callicles1 whether you think that      
,polus and ,i were right in admitting   
the conclusion that no one does wrong   
voluntarily1 but that all do  wrong     
against their will8    ,,callicles3     
,granted1 ,socrates1 if you will only   
have done4    ,,socrates3 ,then1 as     
would appear1 power and art have to be  
provided in  order that we may do no    
injustice8    ,,callicles3 ,certainly4  
,,socrates3 ,and what art will protect  
us from suffering injustice1 if not     
wholly1 yet as far as possible8 ,i want 
to know whether you agree with  me2 for 
,i think that such an art is the art of 
one who is either a  ruler or even      
tyrant himself1 or the equal and        
companion of the ruling  power4         
,,callicles3 ,well said1 ,socrates2 and 
please to observe how ready ,i am to    
praise you when you talk sense4         

,,socrates3 ,think and tell me whether  
you would approve of another view  of   
mine3 ,to me every man appears to be    
most the friend of him who is  most like
 to him--like to like1 as ancient sages 
say3 ,would you not  agree to this8     
,,callicles3 ,i should4    ,,socrates3  
,but when the tyrant is rude and        
uneducated1 he may be  expected to fear 
any one who is his superior in virtue1  
and will never  be able to be perfectly 
friendly with him4    ,,callicles3 ,that
 is true4    ,,socrates3 ,neither will  
he be the friend of any one who is      
greatly his  inferior1 for the tyrant   
will despise him1 and will never        
seriously  regard him as a friend4      
,,callicles3 ,that again is true4       
,,socrates3 ,then the only friend worth 
mentioning1 whom the tyrant can  have1  
will be one who is of the same          
character1 and has the same likes  and  
dislikes1 and is at the same time       
willing to be subject and  subservient  
to him2 he is the man who will have     

power in the state1 and  no one will    
injure him with impunity3--is not that  
so8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3
 ,and if a young man begins to ask how  
he may become great and  formidable1    
this would seem to be the way--he will  
accustom himself1  from his youth       
upward1 to feel sorrow and joy on the   
same occasions as  his master1 and will 
contrive to be as like him as possible8 
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and  
in this way he will have accomplished1  
as you and your  friends would say1 the 
end of becoming a great man and not     
suffering  injury8    ,,callicles3 ,very
 true4    ,,socrates3 ,but will he also 
escape from doing injury8 ,must not the 
very  opposite be true1--if he is to be 
like the tyrant in his injustice1 and   
to have influence with him8 ,will he not
 rather contrive to do as much  wrong as
 possible1 and not be punished8         
,,callicles3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
by the imitation of his master and by   
the power which he  thus acquires will  

not his soul become bad and corrupted1  
and will not  this be the greatest evil 
to him8    ,,callicles3 ,you always     
contrive somehow or other1 ,socrates1 to
 invert  everything3 do you not know    
that he who imitates the tyrant will1 if
 he  has a mind1 kill him who does not  
imitate him and take away his goods8    
,,socrates3 ,excellent ,callicles1 ,i am
 not deaf1 and ,i have heard that a     
great many times from you and from      
,polus and from nearly every man in  the
 city1 but ,i wish that you would hear  
me too4 ,i dare say that he  will kill  
him if he has a mind--the bad man will  
kill the good and true4    ,,callicles3 
,and is not that just the provoking     
thing8    ,,socrates3 ,nay1 not to a man
 of sense1 as the argument shows3 do you
  think that all our cares should be    
directed to prolonging life to the      
uttermost1 and to the study of those    
arts which secure us from danger        
always2 like that art of rhetoric which 
saves men in courts of law1 and  which  

you advise me to cultivate8             
,,callicles3 ,yes1 truly1 and very good 
advice too4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 my    
friend1 but what do you think of        
swimming2 is that  an art of any great  
pretensions8    ,,callicles3 ,no1       
indeed4    ,,socrates3 ,and yet surely  
swimming saves a man from death1 and    
there are  occasions on which he must   
know how to swim4 ,and if you despise   
the  swimmers1 ,i will tell you of      
another and greater art1 the art of the 
pilot1 who not only saves the souls of  
men1 but also their bodies and          
properties from the extremity of danger1
 just like rhetoric4 ,yet his  art is   
modest and unpresuming3 it has no airs  
or pretences of doing  anything         
extraordinary1 and1 in return for the   
same salvation which is  given by the   
pleader1 demands only two obols1 if he  
brings us from  ,aegina to ,athens1 or  
for the longer voyage from ,pontus or   
,egypt1 at the  utmost two drachmae1    
when he has saved1 as ,i was just now   

saying1 the  passenger and his wife and 
children and goods1 and safely          
disembarked  them at the ,piraeus1--this
 is the payment which he asks in return 
for so  great a boon2 and he who is the 
master of the art1 and has done all     
this1 gets out and walks about on the   
sea-shore by his ship in an  unassuming 
way4 ,for he is able to reflect and is  
aware that he cannot  tell which of his 
fellow-passengers he has benefited1 and 
which of them  he has injured in not    
allowing them to be drowned4 ,he knows  
that they  are just the same when he has
 disembarked them as when they embarked1
  and not a whit better either in their 
bodies or in their souls2 and he        
considers that if a man who is afflicted
 by great and incurable bodily  diseases
 is only to be pitied for having        
escaped1 and is in no way  benefited by 
him in having been saved from drowning1 
much less he who  has great and         
incurable diseases1 not of the body1 but
 of the soul1  which is the more        

valuable part of him2 neither is life   
worth having  nor of any profit to the  
bad man1 whether he be delivered from   
the sea1  or the law-courts1 or any     
other devourer2--and so he reflects that
 such  a one had better not live1 for he
 cannot live well4 7,compare ,republic47
    ,and this is the reason why the     
pilot1 although he is our saviour1 is   
not usually conceited1 any more than the
 engineer1 who is not at all  behind    
either the general1 or the pilot1 or any
 one else1 in his saving  power1 for he 
sometimes saves whole cities4 ,is there 
any comparison  between him and the     
pleader8 ,and if he were to talk1       
,callicles1 in your  grandiose style1 he
 would bury you under a mountain of     
words1 declaring  and insisting that we 
ought all of us to be engine-makers1 and
 that no  other profession is worth     
thinking about2 he would have plenty to 
say4  ,nevertheless you despise him and 
his art1 and sneeringly call him an     
engine-maker1 and you will not allow    

your daughters to marry his son1  or    
marry your son to his daughters4 ,and   
yet1 on your principle1 what  justice or
 reason is there in your refusal8 ,what 
right have you to  despise the          
engine-maker1 and the others whom ,i was
 just now  mentioning8 ,i know that you 
will say1 8,i am better1 and better     
born40  ,but if the better is not what  
,i say1 and virtue consists only in a   
man  saving himself and his1 whatever   
may be his character1 then your  censure
 of the engine-maker1 and of the        
physician1 and of the other  arts of    
salvation1 is ridiculous4 ,o my friend6 
,i want you to see that  the noble and  
the good may possibly be something      
different from saving  and being        
saved3--,may not he who is truly a man  
cease to care about  living a certain   
time8--he knows1 as women say1 that no  
man can escape  fate1 and therefore he  
is not fond of life2 he leaves all that 
with  ,god1 and considers in what way he
 can best spend his appointed           

term2--whether by assimilating himself  
to the constitution under which  he     
lives1 as you at this moment have to    
consider how you may become as  like as 
possible to the ,athenian people1 if you
 mean to be in their  good graces1 and  
to have power in the state2 whereas ,i  
want you to  think and see whether this 
is for the interest of either of us2--,i
 would  not have us risk that which is  
dearest on the acquisition of this      
power1 like the ,thessalian             
enchantresses1 who1 as they say1 bring  
down  the moon from heaven at the risk  
of their own perdition4 ,but if you     
suppose that any man will show you the  
art of becoming great in the  city1 and 
yet not conforming yourself to the ways 
of the city1 whether  for better or     
worse1 then ,i can only say that you are
 mistaken1  ,callides2 for he who would 
deserve to be the true natural friend of
 the  ,athenian ,demus1 aye1 or of      
,pyrilampes' darling who is called after
  them1 must be by nature like them1 and

 not an imitator only4 ,he1 then1  who  
will make you most like them1 will make 
you as you desire1 a  statesman and     
orator3 for every man is pleased when he
 is spoken to in  his own language and  
spirit1 and dislikes any other4 ,but    
perhaps you1  sweet ,callicles1 may be  
of another mind4 ,what do you say8      
,,callicles3 ,somehow or other your     
words1 ,socrates1 always appear to me   
to be good words2 and yet1 like the rest
 of the world1 ,i am not quite          
convinced by them4 7,compare ,symp43 #a 
,alcib47    ,,socrates3 ,the reason is1 
,callicles1 that the love of ,demus     
which abides  in your soul is an        
adversary to me2 but ,i dare say that if
 we recur to  these same matters1 and   
consider them more thoroughly1 you may  
be  convinced for all that4 ,please1    
then1 to remember that there are two    
processes of training all things1       
including body and soul2 in the one1  as
 we said1 we treat them with a view to  
pleasure1 and in the other  with a view 

to the highest good1 and then we do not 
indulge but resist  them3 was not that  
the distinction which we drew8          
,,callicles3 ,very true4    ,,socrates3 
,and the one which had pleasure in view 
was just a vulgar  flattery3--was not   
that another of our conclusions8        
,,callicles3 ,be it so1 if you will have
 it4    ,,socrates3 ,and the other had  
in view the greatest improvement of that
  which was ministered to1 whether body 
or soul8    ,,callicles3 ,quite true4   
,,socrates3 ,and must we not have the   
same end in view in the treatment of    
our city and citizens8 ,must we not try 
and make them as good as  possible8 ,for
 we have already discovered that there  
is no use in  imparting to them any     
other good1 unless the mind of those who
 are to  have the good1 whether money1  
or office1 or any other sort of power1  
be  gentle and good4 ,shall we say that8
    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 certainly1 if you
 like4    ,,socrates3 ,well1 then1 if   
you and ,i1 ,callicles1 were intending  

to set  about some public business1 and 
were advising one another to undertake  
buildings1 such as walls1 docks or      
temples of the largest size1 ought  we  
not to examine ourselves1 first1 as to  
whether we know or do not  know the art 
of building1 and who taught us8--would  
not that be  necessary1 ,callicles8     
,,callicles3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,in  
the second place1 we should have to     
consider whether we  had ever           
constructed any private house1 either of
 our own or for our  friends1 and       
whether this building of ours was a     
success or not2 and if  upon            
consideration we found that we had had  
good and eminent masters1  and had been 
successful in constructing many fine    
buildings1 not only  with their         
assistance1 but without them1 by our own
 unaided skill--in  that case prudence  
would not dissuade us from proceeding to
 the  construction of public works4 ,but
 if we had no master to show1 and only  
a number of worthless buildings or none 

at all1 then1 surely1 it would  be      
ridiculous in us to attempt public      
works1 or to advise one another  to     
undertake them4 ,is not this true8      
,,callicles3 ,certainly4    ,,socrates3 
,and does not the same hold in all other
 cases8 ,if you and ,i  were physicians1
 and were advising one another that we  
were competent  to practise as          
state-physicians1 should ,i not ask     
about you1 and would  you not ask about 
me1 ,well1 but how about ,socrates      
himself1 has he good  health8 and was   
any one else ever known to be cured by  
him1 whether  slave or freeman8 ,and ,i 
should make the same enquiries about    
you4 ,and  if we arrived at the         
conclusion that no one1 whether citizen 
or  stranger1 man or woman1 had ever    
been any the better for the medical     
skill of either of us1 then1 by ,heaven1
 ,callicles1 what an absurdity to  think
 that we or any human being should be so
 silly as to set up as  state-physicians
 and advise others like ourselves to do 

the same1  without having first         
practised in private1 whether           
successfully or not1  and acquired      
experience of the art6 ,is not this1 as 
they say1 to begin  with the big jar    
when you are learning the potter's art2 
which is a  foolish thing8              
,,callicles3 ,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and 
now1 my friend1 as you are already      
beginning to be a  public character1 and
 are admonishing and reproaching me for 
not being  one1 suppose that we ask a   
few questions of one another4 ,tell me1 
then1  ,callicles1 how about making any 
of the citizens better8 ,was there ever 
a man who was once vicious1 or unjust1  
or intemperate1 or foolish1 and  became 
by the help of ,callicles good and      
noble8 ,was there ever such a  man1     
whether citizen or stranger1 slave or   
freeman8 ,tell me1 ,callicles1  if a    
person were to ask these questions of   
you1 what would you answer8  ,whom would
 you say that you had improved by your  
conversation8 ,there  may have been good

 deeds of this sort which were done by  
you as a  private person1 before you    
came forward in public4 ,why will you   
not  answer8    ,,callicles3 ,you are   
contentious1 ,socrates4    ,,socrates3  
,nay1 ,i ask you1 not from a love of    
contention1 but because ,i  really want 
to know in what way you think that      
affairs should be  administered among   
us--whether1 when you come to the       
administration of  them1 you have any   
other aim but the improvement of the    
citizens8 ,have  we not already admitted
 many times over that such is the duty  
of a  public man8 ,nay1 we have surely  
said so2 for if you will not answer for 
yourself ,i must answer for you4 ,but if
 this is what the good man ought  to    
effect for the benefit of his own state1
 allow me to recall to you  the names of
 those whom you were just now           
mentioning1 ,pericles1 and  ,cimon1 and 
,miltiades1 and ,themistocles1 and ask  
whether you still think  that they were 
good citizens4    ,,callicles3 ,i do4   

,,socrates3 ,but if they were good1 then
 clearly each of them must have  made   
the citizens better instead of worse8   
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,and1 
therefore1 when ,pericles first began to
 speak in the  assembly1 the ,athenians 
were not so good as when he spoke last8 
,,callicles3 ,very likely4              
,,socrates3 ,nay1 my friend1 8likely0 is
 not the word2 for if he was a  good    
citizen1 the inference is certain4      
,,callicles3 ,and what difference does  
that make8    ,,socrates3 ,none2 only ,i
 should like further to know whether the
  ,athenians are supposed to have been  
made better by ,pericles1 or1 on the    
contrary1 to have been corrupted by him2
 for ,i hear that he was the  first who 
gave the people pay1 and made them idle 
and cowardly1 and  encouraged them in   
the love of talk and money4             
,,callicles3 ,you heard that1 ,socrates1
 from the laconising set who bruise     
their ears4    ,,socrates3 ,but what ,i 
am going to tell you now is not mere    

hearsay1 but  well known both to you and
 me3 that at first1 ,pericles was       
glorious and  his character unimpeached 
by any verdict of the ,athenians--this  
was  during the time when they were not 
so good--yet afterwards1 when they  had 
been made good and gentle by him1 at the
 very end of his life they  convicted   
him of theft1 and almost put him to     
death1 clearly under the  notion that he
 was a malefactor4    ,,callicles3      
,well1 but how does that prove          
,pericles' badness8    ,,socrates3 ,why1
 surely you would say that he was a bad 
manager of asses  or horses or oxen1 who
 had received them originally neither   
kicking nor  butting nor biting him1 and
 implanted in them all these savage     
tricks8  ,would he not be a bad manager 
of any animals who received them gentle1
  and made them fiercer than they were  
when he received them8 ,what do you     
say8    ,,callicles3 ,i will do you the 
favour of saying 8yes40    ,,socrates3  
,and will you also do me the favour of  

saying whether man is  an animal8       
,,callicles3 ,certainly he is4          
,,socrates3 ,and was not ,pericles a    
shepherd of men8    ,,callicles3 ,yes4  
,,socrates3 ,and if he was a good       
political shepherd1 ought not the       
animals who were his subjects1 as we    
were just now acknowledging1 to  have   
become more just1 and not more unjust8  
,,callicles3 ,quite true4    ,,socrates3
 ,and are not just men gentle1 as ,homer
 says8--or are you of  another mind8    
,,callicles3 ,i agree4    ,,socrates3   
,and yet he really did make them more   
savage than he received  them1 and their
 savageness was shown towards himself2  
which he must  have been very far from  
desiring4    ,,callicles3 ,do you want  
me to agree with you8    ,,socrates3    
,yes1 if ,i seem to you to speak the    
truth4    ,,callicles3 ,granted then4   
,,socrates3 ,and if they were more      
savage1 must they not have been more    
unjust and inferior8    ,,callicles3    
,granted again4    ,,socrates3 ,then    

upon this view1 ,pericles was not a good
 statesman8    ,,callicles3 ,that is1   
upon your view4    ,,socrates3 ,nay1 the
 view is yours1 after what you have     
admitted4 ,take  the case of ,cimon     
again4 ,did not the very persons whom he
 was serving  ostracize him1 in order   
that they might not hear his voice for  
ten  years8 and they did just the same  
to ,themistocles1 adding the penalty  of
 exile2 and they voted that ,miltiades1 
the hero of ,marathon1 should  be thrown
 into the pit of death1 and he was only 
saved by the ,prytanis4  ,and yet1 if   
they had been really good men1 as you   
say1 these things  would never have     
happened to them4 ,for the good         
charioteers are not  those who at first 
keep their place1 and then1 when they   
have broken-in  their horses1 and       
themselves become better charioteers1   
are thrown  out--that is not the way    
either in charioteering or in any       
profession4--,what do you think8        
,,callicles3 ,i should think not4       

,,socrates3 ,well1 but if so1 the truth 
is as ,i have said already1 that in  the
 ,athenian ,state no one has ever shown 
himself to be a good  statesman--you    
admitted that this was true of our      
present statesmen1 but  not true of     
former ones1 and you preferred them to  
the others2 yet they  have turned out to
 be no better than our present ones2 and
 therefore1  if they were rhetoricians1 
they did not use the true art of        
rhetoric or  of flattery1 or they would 
not have fallen out of favour4          
,,callicles3 ,but surely1 ,socrates1 no 
living man ever came near any one  of   
them in his performances4    ,,socrates3
 ,o1 my dear friend1 ,i say nothing     
against them regarded as the            
serving-men of the ,state2 and ,i do    
think that they were certainly more     
serviceable than those who are living   
now1 and better able to gratify  the    
wishes of the ,state2 but as to         
transforming those desires and not      
allowing them to have their way1 and    

using the powers which they had1        
whether of persuasion or of force1 in   
the improvement of their fellow         
citizens1 which is the prime object of  
the truly good citizen1 ,i do not  see  
that in these respects they were a whit 
superior to our present  statesmen1     
although ,i do admit that they were more
 clever at providing  ships and walls   
and docks1 and all that4 ,you and ,i    
have a ridiculous  way1 for during the  
whole time that we are arguing1 we are  
always going  round and round to the    
same point1 and constantly              
misunderstanding one  another4 ,if ,i am
 not mistaken1 you have admitted and    
acknowledged more  than once1 that there
 are two kinds of operations which have 
to do with  the body1 and two which have
 to do with the soul3 one of the two is 
ministerial1 and if our bodies are      
hungry provides food for them1 and  if  
they are thirsty gives them drink1 or if
 they are cold supplies them  with      
garments1 blankets1 shoes1 and all that 

they crave4 ,i use the same  images as  
before intentionally1 in order that you 
may understand me the  better4 ,the     
purveyor of the articles may provide    
them either wholesale  or retail1 or he 
may be the maker of any of them1--the   
baker1 or the  cook1 or the weaver1 or  
the shoemaker1 or the currier2 and in so
 doing1  being such as he is1 he is     
naturally supposed by himself and every 
one  to minister to the body4 ,for none 
of them know that there is another      
art--an art of gymnastic and medicine   
which is the true minister of the  body1
 and ought to be the mistress of all the
 rest1 and to use their  results        
according to the knowledge which she has
 and they have not1 of  the real good or
 bad effects of meats and drinks on the 
body4 ,all other  arts which have to do 
with the body are servile and menial and
  illiberal2 and gymnastic and medicine 
are1 as they ought to be1 their         
mistresses4 ,now1 when ,i say that all  
this is equally true of the soul1  you  

seem at first to know and understand and
 assent to my words1 and  then a little 
while afterwards you come repeating1    
,has not the ,state  had good and noble 
citizens8 and when ,i ask you who they  
are1 you  reply1 seemingly quite in     
earnest1 as if ,i had asked1 ,who are or
 have  been good trainers8--and you had 
replied1 ,thearion1 the baker1          
,mithoecus1 who wrote the ,sicilian     
cookery-book1 ,sarambus1 the vintner3   
these are ministers of the body1        
first-rate in their art2 for the first  
makes admirable loaves1 the second      
excellent dishes1 and the third  capital
 wine2--to me these appear to be the    
exact parallel of the  statesmen whom   
you mention4 ,now you would not be      
altogether pleased if  ,i said to you1  
,my friend1 you know nothing of         
gymnastics2 those of whom  you are      
speaking to me are only the ministers   
and purveyors of luxury1  who have no   
good or noble notions of their art1 and 
may very likely be  filling and         

fattening men's bodies and gaining their
 approval1 although  the result is that 
they lose their original flesh in the   
long run1 and  become thinner than they 
were before2 and yet they1 in their     
simplicity1 will not attribute their    
diseases and loss of flesh to  their    
entertainers2 but when in after years   
the unhealthy surfeit  brings the       
attendant penalty of disease1 he who    
happens to be near them  at the time1   
and offers them advice1 is accused and  
blamed by them1 and  if they could they 
would do him some harm2 while they      
proceed to  eulogize the men who have   
been the real authors of the mischief4  
,and  that1 ,callicles1 is just what you
 are now doing4 ,you praise the men who 
feasted the citizens and satisfied their
 desires1 and people say that  they have
 made the city great1 not seeing that   
the swollen and  ulcerated condition of 
the ,state is to be attributed to these 
elder  statesmen2 for they have filled  
the city full of harbours and docks and 

walls and revenues and all that1 and    
have left no room for justice and       
temperance4 ,and when the crisis of the 
disorder comes1 the people will  blame  
the advisers of the hour1 and applaud   
,themistocles and ,cimon and  ,pericles1
 who are the real authors of their      
calamities2 and if you are  not careful 
they may assail you and my friend       
,alcibiades1 when they are  losing not  
only their new acquisitions1 but also   
their original  possessions2 not that   
you are the authors of these misfortunes
 of  theirs1 although you may perhaps be
 accessories to them4 ,a great piece  of
 work is always being made1 as ,i see   
and am told1 now as of old2  about our  
statesmen4 ,when the ,state treats any  
of them as malefactors1  ,i observe that
 there is a great uproar and indignation
 at the supposed  wrong which is done to
 them2 8after all their many services to
 the  ,state1 that they should unjustly 
perish10--so the tale runs4 ,but the cry
  is all a lie2 for no statesman ever   

could be unjustly put to death by  the  
city of which he is the head4 ,the case 
of the professed statesman  is1 ,i      
believe1 very much like that of the     
professed sophist2 for the  sophists1   
although they are wise men1 are         
nevertheless guilty of a  strange piece 
of folly2 professing to be teachers of  
virtue1 they will  often accuse their   
disciples of wronging them1 and         
defrauding them of  their pay1 and      
showing no gratitude for their services4
 ,yet what can be  more absurd than that
 men who have become just and good1 and 
whose  injustice has been taken away    
from them1 and who have had justice     
implanted in them by their teachers1    
should act unjustly by reason of  the   
injustice which is not in them8 ,can    
anything be more irrational1 my         
friends1 than this8 ,you1 ,callicles1   
compel me to be a mob-orator1  because  
you will not answer4    ,,callicles3    
,and you are the man who cannot speak   
unless there is some  one to answer8    

,,socrates3 ,i suppose that ,i can2 just
 now1 at any rate1 the speeches  which  
,i am making are long enough because you
 refuse to answer me4 ,but  ,i adjure   
you by the god of friendship1 my good   
sir1 do tell me whether  there does not 
appear to you to be a great             
inconsistency in saying that  you have  
made a man good1 and then blaming him   
for being bad8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1 it 
appears so to me4    ,,socrates3 ,do you
 never hear our professors of education 
speaking in  this inconsistent manner8  
,,callicles3 ,yes1 but why talk of men  
who are good for nothing8    ,,socrates3
 ,i would rather say1 why talk of men   
who profess to be rulers1  and declare  
that they are devoted to the improvement
 of the city1 and  nevertheless upon    
occasion declaim against the utter      
vileness of the  city3--do you think    
that there is any difference between one
 and the  other8 ,my good friend1 the   
sophist and the rhetorician1 as ,i was  
saying  to ,polus1 are the same1 or     

nearly the same2 but you ignorantly     
fancy  that rhetoric is a perfect thing1
 and sophistry a thing to be despised2  
whereas the truth is1 that sophistry is 
as much superior to rhetoric as         
legislation is to the practice of law1  
or gymnastic to medicine4 ,the  orators 
and sophists1 as ,i am inclined to      
think1 are the only class who  cannot   
complain of the mischief ensuing to     
themselves from that which  they teach  
others1 without in the same breath      
accusing themselves of  having done no  
good to those whom they profess to      
benefit4 ,is not this  a fact8          
,,callicles3 ,certainly it is4          
,,socrates3 ,if they were right in      
saying that they make men better1 then  
they are the only class who can afford  
to leave their remuneration to  those   
who have been benefited by them4        
,whereas if a man has been  benefited in
 any other way1 if1 for example1 he has 
been taught to run  by a trainer1 he    
might possibly defraud him of his pay1  

if the trainer  left the matter to him1 
and made no agreement with him that he  
should  receive money as soon as he had 
given him the utmost speed2 for not     
because of any deficiency of speed do   
men act unjustly1 but by reason  of     
injustice4    ,,callicles3 ,very true4  
,,socrates3 ,and he who removes         
injustice can be in no danger of being  
treated unjustly3 he alone can safely   
leave the honorarium to his  pupils1 if 
he be really able to make them good--am 
,i not right8 7,compare  ,protag47      
,,callicles3 ,yes4    ,,socrates3 ,then 
we have found the reason why there is no
 dishonour in a  man receiving pay who  
is called in to advise about building or
 any  other art8    ,,callicles3 ,yes1  
we have found the reason4    ,,socrates3
 ,but when the point is1 how a man may  
become best himself1 and  best govern   
his family and state1 then to say that  
you will give no  advice gratis is held 
to be dishonourable8    ,,callicles3    
,true4    ,,socrates3 ,and why8 ,because

 only such benefits call forth a desire 
to  requite them1 and there is evidence 
that a benefit has been conferred  when 
the benefactor receives a return2       
otherwise not4 ,is this true8           
,,callicles3 ,it is4    ,,socrates3     
,then to which service of the ,state do 
you invite me8  determine for me4 ,am ,i
 to be the physician of the ,state who  
will strive  and struggle to make the   
,athenians as good as possible2 or am ,i
 to be  the servant and flatterer of the
 ,state8 ,speak out1 my good friend1    
freely and fairly as you did at first   
and ought to do again1 and tell  me your
 entire mind4    ,,callicles3 ,i say    
then that you should be the servant of  
the ,state4    ,,socrates3 ,the         
flatterer8 well1 sir1 that is a noble   
invitation4    ,,callicles3 ,the        
,mysian1 ,socrates1 or what you please4 
,for if you refuse1  the consequences   
will be--    ,,socrates3 ,do not repeat 
the old story--that he who likes will   
kill me  and get my money2 for then ,i  

shall have to repeat the old answer1    
that  he will be a bad man and will kill
 the good1 and that the money will be   
of no use to him1 but that he will      
wrongly use that which he wrongly  took1
 and if wrongly1 basely1 and if basely1 
hurtfully4    ,,callicles3 ,how         
confident you are1 ,socrates1 that you  
will never come to  harm6 you seem to   
think that you are living in another    
country1 and can  never be brought into 
a court of justice1 as you very likely  
may be  brought by some miserable and   
mean person4    ,,socrates3 ,then ,i    
must indeed be a fool1 ,callicles1 if ,i
 do not know  that in the ,athenian     
,state any man may suffer anything4 ,and
 if ,i am  brought to trial and incur   
the dangers of which you speak1 he will 
be a  villain who brings me to trial--of
 that ,i am very sure1 for no good man  
would accuse the innocent4 ,nor shall ,i
 be surprised if ,i am put to  death4   
,shall ,i tell you why ,i anticipate    
this8    ,,callicles3 ,by all means4    

,,socrates3 ,i think that ,i am the only
 or almost the only ,athenian living    
who practises the true art of politics2 
,i am the only politician of my  time4  
,now1 seeing that when ,i speak my words
 are not uttered with any  view of      
gaining favour1 and that ,i look to what
 is best and not to what  is most       
pleasant1 having no mind to use those   
arts and graces which you  recommend1 ,i
 shall have nothing to say in the       
justice court4 ,and you  might argue    
with me1 as ,i was arguing with         
,polus3--,i shall be tried just  as a   
physician would be tried in a court of  
little boys at the  indictment of the   
cook4 ,what would he reply under such   
circumstances1  if some one were to     
accuse him1 saying1 8,o my boys1 many   
evil things  has this man done to you3  
he is the death of you1 especially of   
the  younger ones among you1 cutting and
 burning and starving and  suffocating  
you1 until you know not what to do2 he  
gives you the  bitterest potions1 and   

compels you to hunger and thirst4 ,how  
unlike the  variety of meats and sweets 
on which ,i feasted you60 ,what do you  
suppose that the physician would be able
 to reply when he found himself  in such
 a predicament8 ,if he told the truth he
 could only say1 8,all  these evil      
things1 my boys1 ,i did for your        
health10 and then would  there not just 
be a clamour among a jury like that8    
,how they would cry  out6               
,,callicles3 ,i dare say4    ,,socrates3
 ,would he not be utterly at a loss for 
a reply8    ,,callicles3 ,he certainly  
would4    ,,socrates3 ,and ,i too shall 
be treated in the same way1 as ,i well  
know1  if ,i am brought before the      
court4 ,for ,i shall not be able to     
rehearse  to the people the pleasures   
which ,i have procured for them1 and    
which1  although ,i am not disposed to  
envy either the procurers or enjoyers of
  them1 are deemed by them to be        
benefits and advantages4 ,and if any one
  says that ,i corrupt young men1 and   

perplex their minds1 or that ,i speak   
evil of old men1 and use bitter words   
towards them1 whether in private  or    
public1 it is useless for me to reply1  
as ,i truly might3--8,all this ,i  do   
for the sake of justice1 and with a view
 to your interest1 my  judges1 and to   
nothing else40 ,and therefore there is  
no saying what may  happen to me4       
,,callicles3 ,and do you think1         
,socrates1 that a man who is thus       
defenceless is in a good position8      
,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,callicles1 if he have
 that defence1 which as you have  often 
acknowledged he should have--if he be   
his own defence1 and have  never said or
 done anything wrong1 either in respect 
of gods or men2  and this has been      
repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the 
best sort of  defence4 ,and if any one  
could convict me of inability to defend 
myself  or others after this sort1 ,i   
should blush for shame1 whether ,i was  
convicted before many1 or before a few1 
or by myself alone2 and if ,i  died from

 want of ability to do so1 that would   
indeed grieve me4 ,but if  ,i died      
because ,i have no powers of flattery or
 rhetoric1 ,i am very sure  that you    
would not find me repining at death4    
,for no man who is not an  utter fool   
and coward is afraid of death itself1   
but he is afraid of  doing wrong4 ,for  
to go to the world below having one's   
soul full of  injustice is the last and 
worst of all evils4 ,and in proof of    
what ,i  say1 if you have no objection1 
,i should like to tell you a story4     
,,callicles3 ,very well1 proceed2 and   
then we shall have done4    ,,socrates3 
,listen1 then1 as story-tellers say1 to 
a very pretty tale1  which ,i dare say  
that you may be disposed to regard as a 
fable only1  but which1 as ,i believe1  
is a true tale1 for ,i mean to speak the
 truth4  ,homer tells us 7,il471 how    
,zeus and ,poseidon and ,pluto divided  
the  empire which they inherited from   
their father4 ,now in the days of       
,cronos there existed a law respecting  

the destiny of man1 which has  always   
been1 and still continues to be in      
,heaven1--that he who has lived  all his
 life in justice and holiness shall go1 
when he is dead1 to the  ,islands of the
 ,blessed1 and dwell there in perfect   
happiness out of the  reach of evil2 but
 that he who has lived unjustly and     
impiously shall  go to the house of     
vengeance and punishment1 which is      
called ,tartarus4  ,and in the time of  
,cronos1 and even quite lately in the   
reign of ,zeus1  the judgment was given 
on the very day on which the men were to
 die2  the judges were alive1 and the   
men were alive2 and the consequence was 
that the judgments were not well given4 
,then ,pluto and the authorities  from  
the ,islands of the ,blessed came to    
,zeus1 and said that the souls  found   
their way to the wrong places4 ,zeus    
said3 8,i shall put a stop to  this2 the
 judgments are not well given1 because  
the persons who are  judged have their  
clothes on1 for they are alive2 and     

there are many  who1 having evil souls1 
are apparelled in fair bodies1 or       
encased in  wealth or rank1 and1 when   
the day of judgment arrives1 numerous   
witnesses come forward and testify on   
their behalf that they have lived       
righteously4 ,the judges are awed by    
them1 and they themselves too have      
their clothes on when judging2 their    
eyes and ears and their whole  bodies   
are interposed as a veil before their   
own souls4 ,all this is a  hindrance to 
them2 there are the clothes of the      
judges and the clothes  of the          
judged4--,what is to be done8 ,i will   
tell you3--,in the first place1  ,i will
 deprive men of the foreknowledge of    
death1 which they possess at  present3  
this power which they have ,prometheus  
has already received my  orders to take 
from them3 in the second place1 they    
shall be entirely  stripped before they 
are judged1 for they shall be judged    
when they are  dead2 and the judge too  
shall be naked1 that is to say1 dead--he

 with  his naked soul shall pierce into 
the other naked souls2 and they shall   
die suddenly and be deprived of all     
their kindred1 and leave their  brave   
attire strewn upon the earth--conducted 
in this manner1 the  judgment will be   
just4 ,i knew all about the matter      
before any of you1  and therefore ,i    
have made my sons judges2 two from      
,asia1 ,minos and  ,rhadamanthus1 and   
one from ,europe1 ,aeacus4 ,and these1  
when they are  dead1 shall give judgment
 in the meadow at the parting of the    
ways1  whence the two roads lead1 one to
 the ,islands of the ,blessed1 and the  
other to ,tartarus4 ,rhadamanthus shall 
judge those who come from ,asia1  and   
,aeacus those who come from ,europe4    
,and to ,minos ,i shall give the        
primacy1 and he shall hold a court of   
appeal1 in case either of the two       
others are in any doubt3--then the      
judgment respecting the last journey  of
 men will be as just as possible40      
,from this tale1 ,callicles1 which ,i   

have heard and believe1 ,i draw the     
following inferences3--,death1 if ,i am 
right1 is in the first place the        
separation from one another of two      
things1 soul and body2 nothing else4    
,and after they are separated they      
retain their several natures1 as in     
life2 the body keeps the same habit1 and
 the results of treatment or  accident  
are distinctly visible in it3 for       
example1 he who by nature or  training  
or both1 was a tall man while he was    
alive1 will remain as he  was1 after he 
is dead2 and the fat man will remain    
fat2 and so on2 and  the dead man1 who  
in life had a fancy to have flowing     
hair1 will have  flowing hair4 ,and if  
he was marked with the whip and had the 
prints of  the scourge1 or of wounds in 
him when he was alive1 you might see the
  same in the dead body2 and if his     
limbs were broken or misshapen when  he 
was alive1 the same appearance would be 
visible in the dead4 ,and in  a word1   
whatever was the habit of the body      

during life would be  distinguishable   
after death1 either perfectly1 or in a  
great measure  and for a certain time4  
,and ,i should imagine that this is     
equally true  of the soul1 ,callicles2  
when a man is stripped of the body1 all 
the  natural or acquired affections of  
the soul are laid open to view4--,and   
when they come to the judge1 as those   
from ,asia come to ,rhadamanthus1  he   
places them near him and inspects them  
quite impartially1 not  knowing whose   
the soul is3 perhaps he may lay hands on
 the soul of the  great king1 or of some
 other king or potentate1 who has no    
soundness in  him1 but his soul is      
marked with the whip1 and is full of the
 prints  and scars of perjuries and     
crimes with which each action has       
stained  him1 and he is all crooked with
 falsehood and imposture1 and has no    
straightness1 because he has lived      
without truth4 ,him ,rhadamanthus       
beholds1 full of all deformity and      
disproportion1 which is caused by       

licence and luxury and insolence and    
incontinence1 and despatches him        
ignominiously to his prison1 and there  
he undergoes the punishment  which he   
deserves4    ,now the proper office of  
punishment is twofold3 he who is rightly
  punished ought either to become better
 and profit by it1 or he ought to  be   
made an example to his fellows1 that    
they may see what he suffers1  and fear 
and become better4 ,those who are       
improved when they are  punished by gods
 and men1 are those whose sins are      
curable2 and they  are improved1 as in  
this world so also in another1 by pain  
and  suffering2 for there is no other   
way in which they can be delivered  from
 their evil4 ,but they who have been    
guilty of the worst crimes1 and  are    
incurable by reason of their crimes1 are
 made examples2 for1 as  they are       
incurable1 the time has passed at which 
they can receive any  benefit4 ,they get
 no good themselves1 but others get good
 when they  behold them enduring for    

ever the most terrible and painful and  
fearful  sufferings as the penalty of   
their sins--there they are1 hanging up  
as  examples1 in the prison-house of the
 world below1 a spectacle and a  warning
 to all unrighteous men who come        
thither4 ,and among them1 as ,i         
confidently affirm1 will be found       
,archelaus1 if ,polus truly reports of  
him1 and any other tyrant who is like   
him4 ,of these fearful examples1  most1 
as ,i believe1 are taken from the class 
of tyrants and kings and  potentates and
 public men1 for they are the authors of
 the greatest and  most impious crimes1 
because they have the power4 ,and ,homer
 witnesses  to the truth of this2 for   
they are always kings and potentates    
whom he  has described as suffering     
everlasting punishment in the world     
below3  such were ,tantalus and         
,sisyphus and ,tityus4 ,but no one ever 
described  ,thersites1 or any private   
person who was a villain1 as suffering  
everlasting punishment1 or as incurable4

 ,for to commit the worst  crimes1 as ,i
 am inclined to think1 was not in his   
power1 and he was  happier than those   
who had the power4 ,no1 ,callicles1 the 
very bad men  come from the class of    
those who have power 7compare           
,republic74 ,and yet  in that very class
 there may arise good men1 and worthy of
 all  admiration they are1 for where    
there is great power to do wrong1 to    
live and to die justly is a hard thing1 
and greatly to be praised1 and  few     
there are who attain to this4 ,such good
 and true men1 however1  there have     
been1 and will be again1 at ,athens and 
in other states1 who  have fulfilled    
their trust righteously2 and there is   
one who is quite  famous all over       
,hellas1 ,aristeides1 the son of        
,lysimachus4 ,but1 in  general1 great   
men are also bad1 my friend4    ,as ,i  
was saying1 ,rhadamanthus1 when he gets 
a soul of the bad kind1  knows nothing  
about him1 neither who he is1 nor who   
his parents are2 he  knows only that he 

has got hold of a villain2 and seeing   
this1 he  stamps him as curable or      
incurable1 and sends him away to        
,tartarus1  whither he goes and receives
 his proper recompense4 ,or1 again1 he  
looks  with admiration on the soul of   
some just one who has lived in holiness 
and truth2 he may have been a private   
man or not2 and ,i should say1          
,callicles1 that he is most likely to   
have been a philosopher who has  done   
his own work1 and not troubled himself  
with the doings of other  men in his    
lifetime2 him ,rhadamanthus sends to the
 ,islands of the  ,blessed4 ,aeacus does
 the same2 and they both have sceptres1 
and judge2  but ,minos alone has a      
golden sceptre and is seated looking on1
 as  ,odysseus in ,homer declares that  
he saw him3    8,holding a sceptre of   
gold1 and giving laws to the dead40     
,now ,i1 ,callicles1 am persuaded of the
 truth of these things1 and ,i  consider
 how ,i shall present my soul whole and 
undefiled before the  judge in that day4

 ,renouncing the honours at which the   
world aims1 ,i  desire only to know the 
truth1 and to live as well as ,i can1   
and1 when  ,i die1 to die as well as ,i 
can4 ,and1 to the utmost of my power1 ,i
  exhort all other men to do the same4  
,and1 in return for your  exhortation of
 me1 ,i exhort you also to take part in 
the great combat1  which is the combat  
of life1 and greater than every other   
earthly  conflict4 ,and ,i retort your  
reproach of me1 and say1 that you will  
not  be able to help yourself when the  
day of trial and judgment1 of which ,i  
was speaking1 comes upon you2 you will  
go before the judge1 the son of         
,aegina1 and1 when he has got you in his
 grip and is carrying you off1  you will
 gape and your head will swim round1    
just as mine would in the  courts of    
this world1 and very likely some one    
will shamefully box you  on the ears1   
and put upon you any sort of insult4    
,perhaps this may appear to you to be   
only an old wife's tale1 which you  will

 contemn4 ,and there might be reason in 
your contemning such tales1  if by      
searching we could find out anything    
better or truer3 but now you  see that  
you and ,polus and ,gorgias1 who are the
 three wisest of the  ,greeks of our    
day1 are not able to show that we ought 
to live any life  which does not profit 
in another world as well as in this4    
,and of all  that has been said1 nothing
 remains unshaken but the saying1 that  
to do  injustice is more to be avoided  
than to suffer injustice1 and that the  
reality and not the appearance of virtue
 is to be followed above all  things1 as
 well in public as in private life2 and 
that when any one has  been wrong in    
anything1 he is to be chastised1 and    
that the next best  thing to a man being
 just is that he should become just1 and
 be  chastised and punished2 also that  
he should avoid all flattery of  himself
 as well as of others1 of the few or of 
the many3 and rhetoric  and any other   
art should be used by him1 and all his  

actions should be  done always1 with a  
view to justice4    ,follow me then1 and
 ,i will lead you where you will be     
happy in life and  after death1 as the  
argument shows4 ,and never mind if some 
one despises  you as a fool1 and insults
 you1 if he has a mind2 let him strike  
you1  by ,zeus1 and do you be of good   
cheer1 and do not mind the insulting    
blow1 for you will never come to any    
harm in the practice of virtue1 if  you 
are a really good and true man4 ,when we
 have practised virtue  together1 we    
will apply ourselves to politics1 if    
that seems desirable1  or we will advise
 about whatever else may seem good to   
us1 for we shall  be better able to     
judge then4 ,in our present condition we
 ought not to  give ourselves airs1 for 
even on the most important subjects we  
are  always changing our minds2 so      
utterly stupid are we6 ,let us1 then1   
take  the argument as our guide1 which  
has revealed to us that the best way  of
 life is to practise justice and every  

virtue in life and death4 ,this  way let
 us go2 and in this exhort all men to   
follow1 not in the way to  which you    
trust and in which you exhort me to     
follow you2 for that way1  ,callicles1  
is nothing worth4