,,some ,,turns ,,of ,,thought ,,in      
,,modern ,,philosophy  ,five ,essays    
,,by   ,,george ,,santayana   ,,new     
,,york ,,charles ,,scribner',s ,,sons   
#aicc     ,published under the auspices 
of ,,the ,,royal ,,society ,,of         
,,literature  ,,printed ,,in ,,great    
,,britain     ,,contents  ,i4 ,locke and
 the ,frontiers of ,common ,sense       
page #a  ,paper read before the ,royal  
,society of ,literature on the occasion 
of the ,tercentenary of the birth of    
,john ,locke4 ,with some ,supplementary 
,notes   ,,ii4 ,fifty ,years of ,british
 ,idealism                              
#dh  ,reflections on the republication  
of ,bradley's ,ethical ,studies   ,,iii4
 ,revolutions in ,science               
#ga  ,some ,comments on the ,theory of  
,relativity and the new ,physics   ,,iv4
 ,a ,long ,way ,round to ,nirvana       
#hg  ,development of a suggestion found 
in ,freud's ,beyond the ,pleasure       
,principle   ,v4 ,the ,prestige of the  
,infinite                               

#ajb  ,a review of ,julien ,benda's     
,sketch of a consistent theory of the   
relations between ,god and the ,world   
,the ,author's acknowledgments are due  
to the ,editors of ,the ,new ,adelphi1  
,the ,dial1 and the ,journal of         
,philosophy1 in which one or more of    
these ,essays originally appeared4      
,i  ,,locke ,,and ,,the ,,frontiers ,,of
 ,,common ,,sense#a   ,a good portrait  
of ,locke would require an elaborate    
background4 ,his is not a figure to     
stand statuesquely in a void3 the pose  
might not seem grand enough for bronze  
or marble4 ,rather he should be painted 
in the manner of the ,dutch masters1 in 
a sunny interior1 scrupulously furnished
 with all the implements of domestic    
comfort and philosophic enquiry3 the    
,holy ,bible open majestically before   
him1 and beside it that other           
revelation--the terrestrial globe4 ,his 
hand might be pointing to a microscope  
set for examining the internal          
constitution of a beetle3 but for the   

moment his eye should be seen wandering 
through the open window1 to admire the  
blessings of thrift and liberty manifest
 in the people so worthily busy in the  
market-place1 wrong as many a monkish   
notion might be that still troubled     
their poor heads4 ,from them his        
enlarged thoughts would easily pass to  
the stout carved ships in the river     
beyond1 intrepidly setting sail for the 
,indies1 or for savage ,america4 ,yes1  
he too had travelled1 and not only in   
thought4 ,he knew how many strange      
nations and false religions lodged in   
this round earth1 itself but a speck in 
the universe4 ,there were few ingenious 
authors that he had not perused1 or     
philosophical instruments that he had   
not1 as far as possible1 examined and   
tested2 and no man better than he could 
understand and prize the recent         
discoveries of the incomparable ,mr     
,newton4 ,nevertheless1 a certain       
uneasiness in that spare frame1 a       
certain knitting of the brows in that   

aquiline countenance1 would suggest that
 in the midst of their earnest eloquence
 the philosopher's thoughts might       
sometimes come to a stand4 ,indeed1 the 
visible scene did not exhaust the       
complexity of his problem2 for there was
 also what he called the scene of ideas1
 immaterial and private1 but often more 
crowded and pressing than the public    
scene4 ,locke was the father of modern  
psychology1 and the birth of this airy  
monster1 this half-natural changeling1  
was not altogether easy or fortunate4#b 
,i wish my erudition allowed me to fill 
in this picture as the subject deserves1
 and to trace home the sources of       
,locke's opinions1 and their immense    
influence4 ,unfortunately1 ,i can       
consider him--what is hardly fair--only 
as a pure philosopher3 for had ,locke's 
mind been more profound1 it might have  
been less influential4 ,he was in       
sympathy with the coming age1 and was   
able to guide it3 an age that confided  
in easy1 eloquent reasoning1 and        

proposed to be saved1 in this world and 
the next1 with as little philosophy and 
as little religion as possible4 ,locke  
played in the eighteenth century very   
much the part that fell to ,kant in the 
nineteenth4 ,when quarrelled with1 no   
less than when embraced1 his opinions   
became a point of departure for         
universal developments4 ,the more we    
look into the matter1 the more we are   
impressed by the patriarchal dignity of 
,locke's mind4 ,father of psychology1   
father of the criticism of knowledge1   
father of theoretical liberalism1       
god-father at least of the ,american    
political system1 of ,voltaire and the  
,encyclopaedia1 at home he was the      
ancestor of that whole school of polite 
moderate opinion which can unite liberal
 ,christianity with mechanical science  
and with psychological idealism4 ,he was
 invincibly rooted in a prudential      
morality1 in a rationalised             
,protestantism1 in respect for liberty  
and law3 above all he was deeply        

convinced1 as he puts it1 that the      
handsome conveniences of life are better
 than nasty penury4 ,locke still speaks1
 or spoke until lately1 through many a  
modern mind1 when this mind was most    
sincere2 and two hundred years before   
,queen ,victoria he was a ,victorian in 
essence4  ,a chief element in this      
modernness of ,locke was something that 
had hardly appeared before in pure      
philosophy1 although common in religion3
 ,i mean1 the tendency to deny one's own
 presuppositions--not by accident or    
inadvertently1 but proudly and with an  
air of triumph4 ,presuppositions are    
imposed on all of us by life itself3 for
 instance the presupposition that life  
is to continue1 and that it is worth    
living4 ,belief is born on the wing and 
awakes to many tacit commitments4       
,afterwards1 in reflection1 we may      
wonder at finding these presuppositions 
on our hands and1 being ignorant of the 
natural causes which have imposed them  
on the animal mind1 we may be offended  

at them4 ,their arbitrary and dogmatic  
character will tempt us to condemn them1
 and to take for granted that the       
analysis which undermines them is       
justified1 and will prove fruitful4 ,but
 this critical assurance in its turn    
seems to rely on a dubious              
presupposition1 namely1 that human      
opinion must always evolve in a single  
line1 dialectically1 providentially1 and
 irresistibly4 ,it is at least          
conceivable that the opposite should    
sometimes be the case4 ,some of the     
primitive presuppositions of human      
reason might have been correct and      
inevitable1 whilst the tendency to deny 
them might have sprung from a plausible 
misunderstanding1 or the exaggeration of
 a half-truth3 so that the critical     
opinion itself1 after destroying the    
spontaneous assumptions on which it     
rested1 might be incapable of           
subsisting4  ,in ,locke the central     
presuppositions1 which he embraced      
heartily and without question1 were     

those of common sense4 ,he adopted what 
he calls a plain1 historical method1    
fit1 in his own words1 to be brought    
into well-bred company and polite       
conversation4 ,men1 barely by the use of
 their natural faculties1 might attain  
to all the knowledge possible or worth  
having4 ,all children1 he writes1 that  
are born into this world1 being         
surrounded with bodies that perpetually 
and diversely affect them have a variety
 of ideas imprinted on their minds4     
,external material things as objects of 
,sensation1 and the operations of our   
own minds as objects of ,reflection1 are
 to me1 he continues1 the only originals
 from which all our ideas take their    
beginnings4 ,every act of sensation1 he 
writes elsewhere1 when duly considered1 
gives us an equal view of both parts of 
nature1 the corporeal and the spiritual4
 ,for whilst ,i know1 by seeing or      
hearing1444 that there is some corporeal
 being without me1 the object of that   
sensation1 ,i do more certainly know    

that there is some spiritual being      
within me that sees and hears4  ,resting
 on these clear perceptions1 the natural
 philosophy of ,locke falls into two    
parts1 one strictly physical and        
scientific1 the other critical and      
psychological4 ,in respect to the       
composition of matter1 ,locke accepted  
the most advanced theory of his day1    
which happened to be a very old one3 the
 theory of ,democritus that the material
 universe contains nothing but a        
multitude of solid atoms coursing       
through infinite space3 but ,locke added
 a religious note to this materialism by
 suggesting that infinite space1 in its 
sublimity1 must be an attribute of ,god4
 ,he also believed what few materialists
 would venture to assert1 that if we    
could thoroughly examine the cosmic     
mechanism we should see the demonstrable
 necessity of every complication that   
ensues1 even of the existence and       
character of mind3 for it was no harder 
for ,god to endow matter with the power 

of thinking than to endow it with the   
power of moving4  ,in the atomic theory 
we have a graphic image asserted to     
describe accurately1 or even            
exhaustively1 the intrinsic constitution
 of things1 or their primary qualities4 
,perhaps1 in so far as physical         
hypotheses must remain graphic at all1  
it is an inevitable theory4 ,it was     
first suggested by the wearing out and  
dissolution of all material objects1 and
 by the specks of dust floating in a    
sunbeam2 and it is confirmed1 on an     
enlarged scale1 by the stellar universe 
as conceived by modern astronomy4 ,when 
today we talk of nuclei and electrons1  
if we imagine them at all1 we imagine   
them as atoms4 ,but it is all a picture1
 prophesying what we might see through a
 sufficiently powerful microscope2 the  
important philosophical question is the 
one raised by the other half of ,locke's
 natural philosophy1 by optics and the  
general criticism of perception4 ,how   
far1 if at all1 may we trust the images 

in our minds to reveal the nature of    
external things8  ,on this point the    
doctrine of ,locke1 through             
,descartes1#c was also derived from     
,democritus4 ,it was that all the       
sensible qualities of things1 except    
position1 shape1 solidity1 number and   
motion1 were only ideas in us1 projected
 and falsely regarded as lodged in      
things4 ,in the things1 these imputed or
 secondary qualities were simply powers1
 inherent in their atomic constitution1 
and calculated to excite sensations of  
that character in our bodies4 ,this     
doctrine is readily established by      
,locke's plain historical method1 when  
applied to the study of rainbows1       
mirrors1 effects of perspective1 dreams1
 jaundice1 madness1 and the will to     
believe3 all of which go to convince us 
that the ideas which we impulsively     
assume to be qualities of objects are   
always1 in their seat and origin1       
evolved in our own heads4  ,these two   
parts of ,locke's natural philosophy1   

however1 are not in perfect equilibrium4
 ,all the feelings and ideas of an      
animal must be equally conditioned by   
his organs and passions1#d and he cannot
 be aware of what goes on beyond him1   
except as it affects his own life4#e    
,how then could ,locke1 or could        
,democritus1 suppose that his ideas of  
space and atoms were less human1 less   
graphic1 summary1 and symbolic1 than his
 sensations of sound or colour8 ,the    
language of science1 no less than that  
of sense1 should have been recognised to
 be a human language2 and the nature of 
anything existent collateral with       
ourselves1 be that collateral existence 
material or mental1 should have been    
confessed to be a subject for faith and 
for hypothesis1 never1 by any           
possibility1 for absolute or direct     
intuition4  ,there is no occasion to    
take alarm at this doctrine as if it    
condemned us to solitary confinement1   
and to ignorance of the world in which  
we live4 ,we see and know the world     

through our eyes and our intelligence1  
in visual and in intellectual terms3 how
 else should a world be seen or known   
which is not the figment of a dream1 but
 a collateral power1 pressing and alien8
 ,in the cognisance which an animal may 
take of his surroundings--and surely all
 animals take such cognisance--the      
subjective and moral character of his   
feelings1 on finding himself so         
surrounded1 does not destroy their      
cognitive value4 ,these feelings1 as    
,locke says1 are signs3 to take them for
 signs is the essence of intelligence4  
,animals that are sensitive physically  
are also sensitive morally1 and feel the
 friendliness or hostility which        
surrounds them4 ,even pain and pleasure 
are no idle sensations1 satisfied with  
their own presence3 they violently      
summon attention to the objects that are
 their source4 ,can love or hate be felt
 without being felt towards             
something--something near and potent1   
yet external1 uncontrolled1 and         

mysterious8 ,when ,i dodge a missile or 
pick a berry1 is it likely that my mind 
should stop to dwell on its pure        
sensations or ideas without recognising 
or pursuing something material8         
,analytic reflection often ignores the  
essential energy of mind1 which is      
originally more intelligent than        
sensuous1 more appetitive and dogmatic  
than aesthetic4 ,but the feelings and   
ideas of an active animal cannot help   
uniting internal moral intensity with   
external physical reference2 and the    
natural conditions of sensibility       
require that perceptions should owe     
their existence and quality to the      
living organism with its moral bias1 and
 that at the same time they should be   
addressed to the external objects which 
entice that organism or threaten it4    
,all ambitions must be defeated when    
they ask for the impossible4 ,the       
ambition to know is not an exception2   
and certainly our perceptions cannot    
tell us how the world would look if     

nobody saw it1 or how valuable it would 
be if nobody cared for it4 ,but our     
perceptions1 as ,locke again said1 are  
sufficient for our welfare and          
appropriate to our condition4 ,they are 
not only a wonderful entertainment in   
themselves1 but apart from their        
sensuous and grammatical quality1 by    
their distribution and method of        
variation1 they may inform us most      
exactly about the order and mechanism of
 nature4 ,we see in the science of today
 how completely the most accurate       
knowledge--proved to be accurate by its 
application in the arts--may shed every 
pictorial element1 and the whole        
language of experience1 to become a pure
 method of calculation and control4 ,and
 by a pleasant compensation1 our        
aesthetic life may become freer1 more   
self-sufficing1 more humbly happy in    
itself3 and without trespassing in any  
way beyond the modesty of nature1 we may
 consent to be like little children1    
chirping our human note2 since the life 

of reason in us may well become science 
in its validity1 whilst remaining poetry
 in its texture4  ,i think1 then1 that  
by a slight re-arrangement of ,locke's  
pronouncements in natural philosophy1   
they could be made inwardly consistent1 
and still faithful to the first         
presuppositions of common sense1        
although certainly far more chastened   
and sceptical than impulsive opinion is 
likely to be in the first instance4     
,there were other presuppositions in the
 philosophy of ,locke besides his       
fundamental naturalism2 and in his      
private mind probably the most important
 was his ,christian faith1 which was not
 only confident and sincere1 but        
prompted him at times to high           
speculation4 ,he had friends among the  
,cambridge ,platonists1 and he found in 
,newton a brilliant example of          
scientific rigour capped with mystical  
insights4 ,yet if we consider ,locke's  
philosophical position in the abstract1 
his ,christianity almost disappears4 ,in

 form his theology and ethics were      
strictly rationalistic2 yet one who was 
a ,deist in philosophy might remain a   
,christian in religion4 ,there was no   
great harm in a special revelation1     
provided it were simple and short1 and  
left the broad field of truth open in   
almost every direction to free and      
personal investigation4 ,a free man and 
a good man would certainly never admit1 
as coming from ,god1 any doctrine       
contrary to his private reason or       
political interest2 and the moral       
precepts actually vouchsafed to us in   
the ,gospels were most acceptable1      
seeing that they added a sublime        
eloquence to maxims which sound reason  
would have arrived at in any case4      
,evidently common sense had nothing to  
fear from religious faith of this       
character2 but the matter could not end 
there4 ,common sense is not more        
convinced of anything than of the       
difference between good and evil1       
advantage and disaster2 and it cannot   

dispense with a moral interpretation of 
the universe4 ,socrates1 who spoke      
initially for common sense1 even thought
 the moral interpretation of existence  
the whole of philosophy4 ,he would not  
have seen anything comic in the satire  
of ,molire making his chorus of young   
doctors chant in unison that opium      
causes sleep because it has a dormitive 
virtue4 ,the virtues or moral uses of   
things1 according to ,socrates1 were the
 reason why the things had been created 
and were what they were2 the admirable  
virtues of opium defined its perfection1
 and the perfection of a thing was the  
full manifestation of its deepest       
nature4 ,doubtless this moral           
interpretation of the universe had been 
overdone1 and it had been a capital     
error in ,socrates to make that         
interpretation exclusive and to         
substitute it for natural philosophy4   
,locke1 who was himself a medical man1  
knew what a black cloak for ignorance   
and villainy ,scholastic verbiage might 

be in that profession4 ,he also knew1   
being an enthusiast for experimental    
science1 that in order to control the   
movement of matter--which is to realise 
those virtues and perfections--it is    
better to trace the movement of matter  
materialistically2 for it is in the act 
of manifesting its own powers1 and not1 
as ,socrates and the ,scholastics       
fancied1 by obeying a foreign magic1    
that matter sometimes assumes or        
restores the forms so precious in the   
healer's or the moralist's eyes4 ,at the
 same time1 the manner in which the     
moral world rests upon the natural1     
though divined1 perhaps1 by a few       
philosophers1 has not been generally    
understood2 and ,locke1 whose broad     
humanity could not exclude the moral    
interpretation of nature1 was driven in 
the end to the view of ,socrates4 ,he   
seriously invoked the ,scholastic maxim 
that nothing can produce that which it  
does not contain4 ,for this reason the  
unconscious1 after all1 could never have

 given rise to consciousness4           
,observation and experiment could not be
 allowed to decide this point3 the moral
 interpretation of things1 because more 
deeply rooted in human experience1 must 
envelop the physical interpretation1 and
 must have the last word4  ,it was      
characteristic of ,locke's simplicity   
and intensity that he retained these    
insulated sympathies in various         
quarters4 ,a further instance of his    
many-sidedness was his fidelity to pure 
intuition1 his respect for the          
infallible revelation of ideal being1   
such as we have of sensible qualities or
 of mathematical relations4 ,in dreams  
and in hallucinations appearances may   
deceive us1 and the objects we think we 
see may not exist at all4 ,yet in       
suffering an illusion we must entertain 
an idea2 and the manifest character of  
these ideas is that of which alone1     
,locke thinks1 we can have certain      
knowledge4       ,these1 he writes1 are 
two very different things and carefully 

to      be distinguished3 it being one  
thing to perceive and know the idea     
of white or black1 and quite another to 
examine what kind of      particles they
 must be1 and how arranged 444 to make  
any object      appear white or black4  
,a man infallibly knows1 as soon as ever
 he      has them in his mind1 that the 
ideas he calls white and round are      
the very ideas they are1 and that they  
are not other ideas which he      calls 
red or square4444 ,this 444 the mind 444
 always perceives at      first sight2  
and if ever there happen any doubt about
 it1 it will      always be found to be 
about the names and not the ideas       
themselves4  ,this sounds like high     
,platonic doctrine for a philosopher of 
the ,left2 but ,locke's utilitarian     
temper very soon reasserted itself in   
this subject4 ,mathematical ideas were  
not only lucid but true3 and he demanded
 this truth1 which he called reality1 of
 all ideas worthy of consideration3 mere
 ideas would be worthless4 ,very likely 

he forgot1 in his philosophic           
puritanism1 that fiction and music might
 have an intrinsic charm4 ,where the    
frontier of human wisdom should be drawn
 in this direction was clearly          
indicated1 in ,locke's day1 by ,spinoza1
 who says3       ,if1 in keeping        
non-existent things present to the      
imagination1 the      mind were at the  
same time aware that those things did   
not exist1      surely it would regard  
this gift of imagination as a virtue in 
its      own constitution1 not as a     
vice3 especially if such an imaginative 
faculty depended on nothing except the  
mind's own nature3 that is      to say1 
if this mental faculty of imagination   
were free4  ,but ,locke had not so firm 
a hold on truth that he could afford to 
play with fancy2 and as he pushed       
forward the claims of human jurisdiction
 rather too far in physics1 by assuming 
the current science to be literally     
true1 so1 in the realm of imagination1  
he retrenched somewhat illiberally our  

legitimate possessions4 ,strange that as
 modern philosophy transfers the visible
 wealth of nature more and more to the  
mind1 the mind should seem to lose      
courage and to become ashamed of its own
 fertility4 ,the hard-pressed natural   
man will not indulge his imagination    
unless it poses for truth2 and being    
half aware of this imposition1 he is    
more troubled at the thought of being   
deceived than at the fact of being      
mechanised or being bored3 and he would 
wish to escape imagination altogether4  
,a good ,god1 he murmurs1 could not have
 made us poets against our will4        
,against his will1 however1 ,locke was  
drawn to enlarge the subjective sphere4 
,the actual existence of mind was       
evident3 you had only to notice the fact
 that you were thinking4 ,conscious     
mind1 being thus known to exist directly
 and independently of the body1 was a   
primary constituent of reality3 it was a
 fact on its own account4#f ,common     
sense seemed to testify to this1 not    

only when confronted with the ,i think1 
therefore ,i am of ,descartes1 but      
whenever a thought produced an action4  
,since mind and body interacted1#g each 
must be as real as the other and1 as it 
were1 on the same plane of being4       
,locke1 like a good ,protestant1 felt   
the right of the conscious inner man to 
assert himself3 and when he looked into 
his own mind1 he found nothing to define
 this mind except the ideas which       
occupied it4 ,the existence which he was
 so sure of in himself was therefore the
 existence of his ideas4  ,here1 by an  
insensible shift in the meaning of the  
word idea1 a momentous revolution had   
taken place in psychology4 ,ideas had   
originally meant objective terms        
distinguished in thought-images1        
qualities1 concepts1 propositions4 ,but 
now ideas began to mean living thoughts1
 moments or states of consciousness4    
,they became atoms of mind1 constituents
 of experience1 very much as material   
atoms were conceived to be constituents 

of natural objects4 ,sensations became  
the only objects of sensation1 and ideas
 the only objects of ideas2 so that the 
material world was rendered superfluous1
 and the only scientific problem was now
 to construct a universe in terms of    
analytic psychology4 ,locke himself did 
not go so far1 and continued to assign  
physical causes and physical objects to 
some1 at least1 of his mental units2 and
 indeed sensations and ideas could not  
very well have other than physical      
causes1 the existence of which this new 
psychology was soon to deny3 so that    
about the origin of its data it was     
afterwards compelled to preserve a      
discreet silence4 ,but as to their      
combinations and reappearances1 it was  
able to invoke the principle of         
association3 a thread on which many     
shrewd observations may be strung1 but  
which also1 when pressed1 appears to be 
nothing but a verbal mask for organic   
habits in matter4  ,the fact is that    
there are two sorts of unobjectionable  

psychology1 neither of which describes a
 mechanism of disembodied mental states1
 such as the followers of ,locke        
developed into modern idealism1 to the  
confusion of common sense4#h ,one       
unobjectionable sort of psychology is   
biological1 and studies life from the   
outside4 ,the other sort1 relying on    
memory and dramatic imagination1        
reproduces life from the inside1 and is 
literary4 ,if the literary psychologist 
is a man of genius1 by the clearness and
 range of his memory1 by quickness of   
sympathy and power of suggestion1 he may
 come very near to the truth of         
experience1 as it has been or might be  
unrolled in a human being4#i ,the ideas 
with which ,locke operates are simply   
high lights picked out by attention in  
this nebulous continuum1 and identified 
by names4 ,ideas1 in the original ideal 
sense of the word1 are indeed the only  
definite terms which attention can      
discriminate and rest upon2 but the     
unity of these units is specious1 not   

existential4 ,if ideas were not logical 
or aesthetic essences but               
self-subsisting feelings1 each knowing  
itself1 they would be insulated for     
ever2 no spirit could ever survey1      
recognise1 or compare them2 and mind    
would have disappeared in the analysis  
of mind4  ,these considerations might   
enable us1 ,i think1 to mark the just   
frontier of common sense even in this   
debatable land of psychology4 ,all that 
is biological1 observable1 and          
documentary in psychology falls within  
the lines of physical science and offers
 no difficulty in principle4 ,nor need  
literary psychology form a dangerous    
salient in the circuit of nature4 ,the  
dramatic poet or dramatic historian     
necessarily retains the presupposition  
of a material world1 since beyond his   
personal memory 7and even within it7 he 
has nothing to stimulate and control his
 dramatic imagination save knowledge of 
the material circumstances in which     
people live1 and of the material        

expression in action or words which they
 give to their feelings4 ,his moral     
insight simply vivifies the scene that  
nature and the sciences of nature spread
 out before him3 they tell him what has 
happened1 and his heart tells him what  
has been felt4 ,only literature can     
describe experience for the excellent   
reason that the terms of experience are 
moral and literary from the beginning4  
,mind is incorrigibly poetical3 not     
because it is not attentive to material 
facts and practical exigencies1 but     
because1 being intensely attentive to   
them1 it turns them into pleasures and  
pains1 and into many-coloured ideas4    
,yet at every turn there is a           
possibility and an occasion for         
transmuting this poetry into science1   
because ideas and emotions1 being caused
 by material events1 refer to these     
events1 and record their order4  ,all   
philosophies are frail1 in that they are
 products of the human mind1 in which   
everything is essentially reactive1     

spontaneous1 and volatile3 but as in    
passion and in language1 so in          
philosophy1 there are certain           
comparatively steady and hereditary     
principles1 forming a sort of orthodox  
reason1 which is or which may become the
 current grammar of mankind4 ,of        
philosophers who are orthodox in this   
sense1 only the earliest or the most    
powerful1 an ,aristotle or a ,spinoza1  
need to be remembered1 in that they     
stamp their language and temper upon    
human reason itself4 ,the rest of the   
orthodox are justly lost in the crowd   
and relegated to the chorus4 ,the       
frailty of heretical philosophers is    
more conspicuous and interesting3 it    
makes up the chronique scandaleuse of   
the mind1 or the history of philosophy4 
,locke belongs to both camps3 he was    
restive in his orthodoxy and timid in   
his heresies2 and like so many other    
initiators of revolutions1 he would be  
dismayed at the result of his work4 ,in 
intention ,locke occupied an almost     

normal philosophic position1 rendered   
precarious not by what was traditional  
in it1 like the categories of substance 
and power1 but rather by certain        
incidental errors--notably by admitting 
an experience independent of bodily     
life1 yet compounded and evolving in a  
mechanical fashion4 ,but ,i do not find 
in him a prickly nest of obsolete       
notions and contradictions from which1  
fledged at last1 we have flown to our   
present enlightenment4 ,in his person1  
in his temper1 in his allegiances and   
hopes1 he was the prototype of a race of
 philosophers native and dominant among 
people of ,english speech1 if not in    
academic circles1 at least in the       
national mind4 ,if we make allowance for
 a greater personal subtlety1 and for   
the diffidence and perplexity inevitable
 in the present moral anarchy of the    
world1 we may find this same ,lockian   
eclecticism and prudence in the late    
,lord ,balfour3 and ,i have myself had  
the advantage of being the pupil of a   

gifted successor and1 in many ways1     
emulator1 of ,locke1 ,i mean ,william   
,james4 ,so great1 at bottom1 does their
 spiritual kinship seem to me to be1    
that ,i can hardly conceive ,locke      
vividly without seeing him as a sort of 
,william ,james of the seventeenth      
century4 ,and who of you has not known  
some other spontaneous1 inquisitive1    
unsettled genius1 no less preoccupied   
with the marvellous intelligence of some
 ,brazilian parrot1 than with the sad   
obstinacy of some ,bishop of ,worcester8
 ,here is eternal freshness of          
conviction and ardour for reform2 great 
keenness of perception in spots1 and in 
other spots lacunae and impulsive       
judgments2 distrust of tradition1 of    
words1 of constructive argument2 horror 
of vested interests and of their smooth 
defenders2 a love of navigating alone   
and exploring for oneself even the      
coasts already well charted by others4  
,here is romanticism united with a      
scientific conscience and power of      

destructive analysis balanced by moral  
enthusiasm4 ,doubtless ,locke might have
 dug his foundations deeper and         
integrated his faith better4 ,his system
 was no metaphysical castle1 no         
theological acropolis3 rather a homely  
ancestral manor house built in several  
styles of architecture3 a ,tudor chapel1
 a ,palladian front toward the new      
geometrical garden1 a ,jacobean parlour 
for political consultation and learned  
disputes1 and even--since we are almost 
in the eighteenth century--a ,chinese   
cabinet full of curios4 ,it was a       
habitable philosophy1 and not too       
inharmonious4 ,there was no greater     
incongruity in its parts than in the    
gentle variations of ,english weather or
 in the qualified moods and insights of 
a civilised mind4 ,impoverished as we   
are1 morally and humanly1 we can no     
longer live in such a rambling mansion4 
,it has become a national monument4 ,on 
the days when it is open we revisit it  
with admiration2 and those chambers and 

garden walks re-echo to us the clear    
dogmas and savoury diction of the       
sage--omnivorous1 artless1              
loquacious--whose dwelling it was4   #a 
,paper read before the ,royal ,society  
of ,literature on the occasion of the   
,tercentenary of the birth of ,john     
,locke4  #b ,see note ,i1 p4 #bf4  #c   
,see note ,,ii1 p4 #bi4  #d ,see note   
,,iii1 p4 #ce4  #e ,see note ,,iv1 p4   
#cf4  #f ,see note ,v1 p4 #cg4  #g ,see 
note ,,vi1 p4 #ci4  #h ,see note ,,vii1 
p4 #dc4  #i ,see note ,,viii1 p4 #df4   
,,supplementary ,,notes   ,i  ,page #c4 
,this airy monster1 this half-natural   
changeling4  ,monsters and changelings  
were pointed to by ,locke with a certain
 controversial relish3 they proved that 
nature was not compressed or            
compressible within ,aristotelian genera
 and species1 but was a free mechanism  
subject to indefinite change4 ,mechanism
 in physics is favourable to liberty in 
politics and morals3 each creature has a
 right to be what it spontaneously is1  

and not what some previous              
classification alleges that it ought to 
have been4 ,the ,protestant and         
revolutionary independence of ,locke's  
mind here gives us a foretaste of       
,darwin and even of ,nietzsche4 ,but    
,locke was moderate even in his         
radicalisms4 ,a human nature totally    
fluid would of itself have proved       
anarchical2 but in order to stem that   
natural anarchy it was fortunately      
possible to invoke the conditions of    
prosperity and happiness strictly laid  
down by the ,creator4 ,the improvidence 
and naughtiness of nature was called to 
book at every turn by the pleasures and 
pains divinely appended to things       
enjoined and to things forbidden1 and   
ultimately by hell and by heaven4 ,yet  
if rewards and punishments were attached
 to human action and feeling in this    
perfectly external and arbitrary        
fashion1 whilst the feelings and actions
 spontaneous in mankind counted for     
nothing in the rule of morals and of    

wisdom1 we should be living under the   
most cruel and artificial of tyrannies2 
and it would not be long before the     
authority of such a code would be called
 in question and the reality of those   
arbitrary rewards and punishments would 
be denied1 both for this world and for  
any other4 ,in a truly rational morality
 moral sanctions would have to vary with
 the variation of species1 each new race
 or individual or mode of feeling       
finding its natural joy in a new way of 
life4 ,the monsters would not be        
monsters except to rustic prejudice1 and
 the changelings would be simply        
experiments in creation4 ,the glee of   
,locke in seeing nature elude scholastic
 conventions would then lose its savour1
 since those staid conventions          
themselves would have become obsolete4  
,nature would henceforth present nothing
 but pervasive metamorphosis1           
irresponsible and endless4 ,to correct  
the weariness of such pure flux we might
 indeed invoke the idea of a progress or

 evolution towards something always     
higher and better2 but this idea simply 
reinstates1 under a temporal form1 the  
dominance of a specific standard1 to    
which nature is asked to conform4       
,genera and species might shift and     
glide into one another at will1 but     
always in the authorised direction4 ,if1
 on the contrary1 transformation had no 
predetermined direction1 we should be   
driven back1 for a moral principle1 to  
each of the particular types of life    
generated on the way3 as in estimating  
the correctness or beauty of language we
 appeal to the speech and genius of each
 nation at each epoch1 without imposing 
the grammar of one language or age upon 
another4 ,it is only in so far as1 in   
the midst of the flux1 certain tropes   
become organised and recurrent1 that any
 interests or beauties can be           
transmitted from moment to moment or    
from generation to generation4 ,physical
 integration is a prerequisite to moral 
integrity2 and unless an individual or a

 species is sufficiently organised and  
determinate to aspire to a              
distinguishable form of life1 eschewing 
all others1 that individual or species  
can bear no significant name1 can       
achieve no progress1 and can approach no
 beauty or perfection4  ,thus1 so long  
as in a fluid world there is some       
measure of life and organisation1       
monsters and changelings will always    
remain possible physically and          
regrettable morally4 ,small deviations  
from the chosen type or the chosen      
direction of progress will continue to  
be called morbid and ugly1 and great    
deviations or reversals will continue to
 be called monstrous4 ,this is but the  
seamy side of that spontaneous          
predilection1 grounded in our deepest   
nature1 by which we recognise beauty and
 nobleness at first sight1 with immense 
refreshment and perfect certitude4      
,,ii  ,page #h4 ,through ,descartes4    
,very characteristic was the tireless   
polemic which ,locke carried on against 

,descartes4 ,the outraged plain facts   
had to be defended against sweeping and 
arbitrary theories4 ,there were no      
innate ideas or maxims3 children were   
not born murmuring that things equal to 
the same thing were equal to one        
another3 and an urchin knew that pain   
was caused by the paternal slipper      
before he reflected philosophically that
 everything must have a cause4 ,again1  
extension was not the essence of matter1
 which must be solid as well1 to be     
distinguishable from empty space4       
,finally1 thinking was not the essence  
of the soul3 a man1 without dying1 might
 lose consciousness3 this often         
happened1 or at least could not be      
prevented from happening by a definition
 framed by a ,french philosopher4 ,these
 protests were evidently justified by   
common sense3 yet they missed the       
speculative radicalism and depth of the 
,cartesian doctrines1 which had struck  
the keynotes of all modern philosophy   
and science3 for they assumed1 for the  

first time in history1 the              
transcendental point of view4 ,no wonder
 that ,locke could not do justice to    
this great novelty3 ,descartes himself  
did not do so1 but ignored his          
subjective first principles in the      
development of his system2 and it was   
not until adopted by ,kant1 or rather by
 ,fichte1 that the transcendental method
 showed its true colours4 ,even today   
philosophers fumble with it1 patching   
soliloquy with physics and physics with 
soliloquy4 ,moreover1 ,locke's          
misunderstandings of ,descartes were    
partly justified by the latter's verbal 
concessions to tradition and authority4 
,a man who has a clear head1 and like   
,descartes is rendered by his           
aristocratic pride both courteous and   
disdainful1 may readily conform to usage
 in his language1 and even in his       
personal sentiments1 without taking     
either too seriously3 he is not         
struggling to free his own mind1 which  
is free already1 nor very hopeful of    

freeing that of most people4 ,the innate
 ideas were not explicit thoughts but   
categories employed unwittingly1 as     
people in speaking conform to the       
grammar of the vernacular without being 
aware that they do so4 ,as for extension
 being the essence of matter1 since     
matter existed and was a substance1 it  
would always have been more than its    
essence3 a sort of ether the parts of   
which might move and might have         
different and calculable dynamic values4
 ,the gist of this definition of matter 
was to clear the decks for scientific   
calculation1 by removing from nature the
 moral density and moral magic with     
which the ,socratic philosophy had      
encumbered it4 ,science would be        
employed in describing the movements of 
bodies1 leaving it for the senses and   
feelings to appreciate the cross-lights 
that might be generated in the process4 
,though not following the technique of  
,descartes1 the physics of our own day  
realises his ideal1 and traces in nature

 a mathematical dynamism1 perfectly     
sufficient for exact prevision and      
mechanical art4  ,similarly1 in saying  
that the essence of the soul was to     
think1 ,descartes detached              
consciousness1 or actual spirit1 from   
the meshes of all unknown organic or    
invented mental mechanisms4 ,it was an  
immense clarification and liberation in 
its proper dimension3 but this pure     
consciousness was not a soul2 it was not
 the animal psyche1 or principle of     
organisation1 life1 and passion--a      
principle which1 according to           
,descartes1 was material4 ,to have      
called such a material principle the    
soul would have shocked all ,christian  
conceptions2 but if ,descartes had      
abstained from giving that consecrated  
name to mere consciousness1 he need not 
have been wary of making the latter     
intermittent and evanescent1 as it      
naturally is4 ,he was driven to the     
conclusion that the soul can never stop 
thinking1 by the desire to placate      

orthodox opinion1 and his own ,christian
 sentiments1 at the expense of          
attributing to actual consciousness a   
substantial independence and a directive
 physical force which were incongruous  
with it3 a force and independence       
perfectly congruous with the ,platonic  
soul1 which had been a mythological     
being1 a supernatural spirit or daemon  
or incubus1 incarnate in the natural    
world1 and partly dominating it4 ,the   
relations of such a soul to the         
particular body or bodies which it might
 weave for itself on earth1 to the      
actions which it performed through such 
bodies1 and to the current of its own   
thoughts1 then became questions for     
theology1 or for a moralistic theory of 
the universe4 ,they were questions      
remote from the preoccupations of the   
modern mind2 yet it was not possible    
either for ,locke or for ,descartes to  
clear their fresh conceptions altogether
 from those ancient dreams4  ,what views
 precisely did ,locke oppose to these   

radical tendencies of ,descartes8  ,in  
respect to the nature of matter1 ,i have
 indicated above the position of ,locke3
 pictorially he accepted an ordinary    
atomism2 scientifically1 the physics of 
,newton4  ,on the other two points      
,locke's convictions were implicit      
rather than speculative3 he resisted the
 ,cartesian theories without much       
developing his own1 as after all was    
natural in a critic engaged in proving  
that our natural faculties were not     
intended for speculation4 ,all knowledge
 came from experience1 and no man could 
know the savour of a pineapple without  
having tasted it4 ,yet this savour1     
according to ,locke1 did not reside at  
first in the pineapple1 to be conveyed  
on contact to the palate and to the     
mind2 but it was generated in the       
process of gustation2 or perhaps we     
should rather say that it was generated 
in the mind on occasion of that process4
 ,at least1 then1 in respect to         
secondary qualities1 and to all moral   

values1 the terms of human knowledge    
were not drawn from the objects         
encountered in the world1 but from an   
innate sensibility proper to the human  
body or mind4 ,experience--if this word 
meant the lifelong train of ideas which 
made a man's moral being--was not a     
source of knowledge but was knowledge   
7or illusion7 itself1 produced by organs
 endowed with a special native          
sensibility in contact with varying     
external stimuli4 ,this conclusion would
 then not have contradicted1 but exactly
 expressed1 the doctrine of innate      
categories4  ,as to the soul1 which     
might exist without thinking1 ,locke    
still called it an immaterial substance3
 not so immaterial1 however1 as not to  
be conveyed bodily with him in his coach
 from ,london to ,oxford4 ,although1    
like ,hobbes1 ,locke believed in the    
power of the ,english language to       
clarify the human intellect1 he here    
ignored the advice of ,hobbes to turn   
that befuddling ,latin phrase into plain

 ,english4 ,substance meant body3       
immaterial meant bodiless3 therefore    
immaterial substance meant bodiless     
body4 ,true1 substance had not really   
meant body for ,aristotle or the        
,schoolmen2 but who now knew or cared   
what anything had meant for them8 ,locke
 scornfully refused to consider what a  
substantial form may have signified2 and
 in still maintaining that he had a     
soul1 and calling it a spiritual        
substance1 he was probably simply       
protesting that there was something     
living and watchful within his breast1  
the invisible moral agent in all his    
thoughts and actions4 ,it was he that   
had them and did them2 and this self of 
his was far from being reducible to a   
merely logical impersonal subject1 an ,i
 think presupposed in all thought3 for  
what would this ,i think have become    
when it was not thinking8 ,on the other 
hand it mattered very little what the   
substance of a thinking being might be3 
,god might even have endowed the body   

with the faculty of thinking1 and of    
generating ideas on occasion of certain 
impacts4 ,yet a man was a man for all   
that3 and ,locke was satisfied that he  
knew1 at least well enough for an honest
 ,englishman1 what he was4 ,he was what 
he felt himself to be3 and this inner   
man of his was not merely the living    
self1 throbbing now in his heart2 it was
 all his moral past1 all that he        
remembered to have been4 ,if1 from      
moment to moment1 the self was a        
spiritual energy astir within1 in       
retrospect the living present seemed1 as
 it were1 to extend its tentacles and to
 communicate its subjectivity to his    
whole personal past4 ,the limits of his 
personality were those of his memory1   
and his experience included everything  
that his living mind could appropriate  
and re-live4 ,in a word1 he was his idea
 of himself3 and this insight opens a   
new chapter not only in his philosophy  
but in the history of human             
self-estimation4 ,mankind was henceforth

 invited not to think of itself as a    
tribe of natural beings1 nor of souls1  
with a specific nature and fixed        
possibilities4 ,each man was a romantic 
personage or literary character3 he was 
simply what he was thought to be1 and   
might become anything that he could will
 to become4 ,the way was opened for     
,napoleon on the one hand and for       
,fichte on the other4   ,,iii  ,page #i4
 ,all ideas must be equally conditioned4
  ,even the mathematical ideas which    
seem so exactly to describe the dynamic 
order of nature are not repetitions of  
their natural counterpart3 for          
mathematical form in nature is a web of 
diffuse relations enacted2 in the mind  
it is a thought possessed1 the logical  
synthesis of those deployed relations4  
,to run in a circle is one thing2 to    
conceive a circle is another4 ,our mind 
by its animal roots 7which render it    
relevant to the realm of matter and     
cognitive7 and by its spiritual         
actuality 7which renders it original1   

synthetic1 and emotional7 is a language1
 from its beginnings2 almost1 we might  
say1 a biological poetry2 and the       
greater the intellectuality and poetic  
abstraction the greater the possible    
range4 ,yet we must not expect this     
scope of speculation in us to go with   
adequacy or exhaustiveness3 on the      
contrary1 mathematics and religion1 each
 in its way so sure1 leave most of the  
truth out4   ,,iv  ,page #i4 ,he cannot 
be aware of what goes on beyond him1    
except as it affects his own life4      
,even that spark of divine intelligence 
which comes into the animal soul1 as    
,aristotle says1 from beyond the gates1 
comes and is called down by the         
exigencies of physical life4 ,an animal 
endowed with locomotion cannot merely   
feast sensuously on things as they      
appear1 but must react upon them at the 
first signal1 and in so doing must      
virtually and in intent envisage them as
 they are in themselves4 ,for it is by  
virtue of their real constitution and   

intrinsic energy that they act upon us  
and suffer change in turn at our hands2 
so that whatsoever form things may take 
to our senses and intellect1 they take  
that form by exerting their material    
powers upon us1 and intertwining them in
 action with our own organisms4  ,thus  
the appearance of things is always1 in  
some measure1 a true index to their     
reality4 ,animals are inevitably engaged
 in self-transcending action1 and the   
consciousness of self-transcending      
action is self-transcendent knowledge4  
,the very nature of animal life makes it
 possible1 within animal consciousness1 
to discount appearance and to correct   
illusion--things which in a vegetative  
or aesthetic sensibility would not be   
distinguishable from pure experience    
itself4 ,but when aroused to            
self-transcendent attention1 feeling    
must needs rise to intelligence1 so that
 external fact and impartial truth come 
within the range of consciousness1 not  
indeed by being contained there1 but by 

being aimed at4   ,v  ,page #ai4        
,conscious mind was a fact on its own   
account4  ,this conscious mind was a    
man's moral being1 and personal identity
 could not extend further than possible 
memory4 ,this doctrine of ,locke's had  
some comic applications4 ,the ,bishop of
 ,worcester was alarmed4 ,if actions    
which a hardened sinner had forgotten   
were no longer his1 a short memory would
 be a great blessing in the ,day of     
,judgment4 ,on the other hand1 a        
theology more plastic than              
,stillingfleet's would one day find in  
this same doctrine a new means of       
edification4 ,for if ,i may disown all  
actions ,i have forgotten1 may not      
things not done or witnessed by me in   
the body be now appropriated and        
incorporated in my consciousness1 if    
only ,i conceive them vividly8 ,the door
 is then open to all the noble          
ambiguities of idealism4 ,as my         
consciousness expands1 or thinks it     
expands1 into dramatic sympathy with    

universal experience1 that experience   
becomes my own4 ,i may say ,i have been 
the agent in all past achievements4     
,emerson could know that he was         
,shakespeare and ,caesar and ,christ4   
,futurity is mine also1 in every        
possible direction at once2 and ,i am   
one with the spirit of the universe and 
with ,god4  ,locke reassured the ,bishop
 of ,worcester1 and was humbly confident
 that ,divine ,justice would find a way 
of vindicating ,itself in spite of human
 wit4 ,he might have added that if the  
sin of ,adam could not only be imputed  
to us juridically but could actually    
taint our consciousness--as it certainly
 does if by ,adam we understand our     
whole material heritage--so surely the  
sins done or the habits acquired by the 
body beyond the scope of consciousness  
may taint or clarify this consciousness 
now4 ,indeed1 the idea we form of       
ourselves and of our respective         
experiences is a figment of vanity1 a   
product of dramatic imagination1 without

 cognitive import save as a reading of  
the hidden forces1 physical or divine1  
which have formed us and actually govern
 us4   ,,vi  ,page #ai4 ,mind and body  
interacted4  ,the self which acts in a  
man is itself moved by forces which have
 long been familiar to common sense1    
without being understood except         
dramatically4 ,these forces are called  
the passions2 or when the dramatic units
 distinguished are longish strands      
rather than striking episodes1 they are 
called temperament1 character1 or will2 
or perhaps1 weaving all these strands   
and episodes together again into one    
moral fabric1 we call them simply human 
nature4 ,but in what does this vague    
human nature reside1 and how does it    
operate on the non-human world8         
,certainly not within the conscious     
sphere1 or in the superficial miscellany
 of experience4 ,immediate experience is
 the intermittent chaos which human     
nature1 in combination with external    
circumstances1 is invoked to support and

 to rationalise4 ,is human nature1 then1
 resident in each individual soul8      
,certainly3 but the soul is merely      
another name for that active principle  
which we are looking for1 to be the seat
 of our sensibility and the source of   
our actions4 ,is this psychic power1    
then1 resident in the body8             
,undoubtedly2 since it is hereditary and
 transmitted by a seed1 and continually 
aroused and modified by material        
agencies4  ,since this soul or self in  
the body is so obscure1 the temptation  
is great to dramatise its energies and  
to describe them in myths4 ,myth is the 
normal means of describing those forces 
of nature which we cannot measure or    
understand2 if we could understand or   
measure them we should describe them    
prosaically and analytically1 in what is
 called science4 ,but nothing is less   
measurable1 or less intelligible to us1 
in spite of being so near us and        
familiar1 as the life of this carnal    
instrument1 so soft and so violent1     

which breeds our sensations and         
precipitates our actions4 ,we see today 
how the ,freudian psychology1 just      
because it is not satisfied with        
registering the routine of consciousness
 but endeavours to trace its hidden     
mechanism and to unravel its physical   
causes1 is driven to use the most       
frankly mythological language4 ,the     
physiological processes concerned1      
though presupposed1 are not on the scale
 of human perception and not traceable  
in detail2 and the moral action1 though 
familiar in snatches1 has to be patched 
by invented episodes1 and largely       
attributed to daemonic personages that  
never come on the stage4  ,locke1 in his
 psychology of morals1 had at first     
followed the verbal rationalism by which
 people attribute motives to themselves 
and to one another4 ,human actions were 
explained by the alleged pursuit of the 
greater prospective pleasure1 and       
avoidance of the greater prospective    
pain4 ,but this way of talking1 though  

not so poetical as ,freud's1 is no less 
mythical4 ,eventual goods and evils have
 no present existence and no power3 they
 cannot even be discerned prophetically1
 save by the vaguest fancy1 entirely    
based on the present impulses and       
obsessions of the soul4 ,no future good1
 no future evil avails to move us1      
except--as ,locke said after examining  
the facts more closely--when a certain  
uneasiness in the soul 7or in the body7 
causes us to turn to those untried goods
 and evils with a present and living    
interest4 ,this actual uneasiness1 with 
the dream pictures which it evokes1 is a
 mere symptom of the direction in which 
human nature in us is already moving1 or
 already disposed to move4 ,without this
 prior physical impulse1 heaven may     
beckon and hell may yawn without causing
 the least variation in conduct4 ,as in 
religious conversion all is due to the  
call of grace1 so in ordinary action all
 is due to the ripening of natural      
impulses and powers within the psyche4  

,the uneasiness observed by ,locke is   
merely the consciousness of this        
ripening1 before the field of relevant  
action has been clearly discerned4      
,when all this is considered1 the       
ostensible interaction between mind and 
body puts on a new aspect4 ,there are no
 purely mental ideas or intentions      
followed by material effects3 there are 
no material events followed by a purely 
mental sensation or idea4 ,mental events
 are always elements in total natural   
events containing material elements     
also3 material elements form the organ1 
the stimulus1 and probably also the     
object for those mental sensations or   
ideas4 ,moreover1 the physical strand   
alone is found to be continuous and     
traceable2 the conscious strand1 the    
sequence of mental events1 flares up and
 dies down daily1 if not hourly2 and the
 medley of its immediate                
features--images1 words1                
moods--juxtaposes ,china and ,peru1 past
 and future1 in the most irresponsible  

confusion4 ,on the other hand1 in human 
life it is a part of the conscious      
element--intentions1 affections1 plans1 
and reasonings--that explains the course
 of action3 dispersed temporally1 our   
dominant thoughts contain the reason for
 our continuous behaviour1 and seem to  
guide it4 ,they are not so much links in
 a chain of minute consecutive          
causes--an idea or an act of will often 
takes time to work and works1 as it     
were1 only posthumously--as they are    
general overarching moral inspirations  
and resolves1 which the machinery of our
 bodies executes in its own way1 often  
rendering our thoughts more precise in  
the process1 or totally transforming    
them4 ,we do roughly what we meant to   
do1 barring accidents4 ,the reasons lie 
deep in our compound nature1 being      
probably inarticulate2 and our action in
 a fragmentary way betrays our moral    
disposition3 betrays it in both senses  
of the word betray1 now revealing it    
unawares1 and now sadly disappointing   

it4  ,i leave it for the reader's       
reflection to decide whether we should  
call such cohabitation of mind with body
 interaction1 or not rather sympathetic 
concomitance1 self-annotation1 and a    
partial prophetic awakening to a life   
which we are leading automatically4     
,,vii  ,page #ba4 ,to the confusion of  
common sense4  ,berkeley and his        
followers sometimes maintain that common
 sense is on their side1 that they have 
simply analysed the fact of our         
experience of the material world1 and if
 there is any paradox in their idealism1
 it is merely verbal and disappears with
 familiarity4 ,all the reality1 they    
say1 all the force1 obduracy1 and       
fertility of nature subsist undiminished
 after we discover that this reality    
resides1 and can only reside1 in the    
fixed order of our experience4  ,but no3
 analysis of immediate experience will  
never disclose any fixed order in it2   
the surface of experience1 when not     
interpreted materialistically1 is an    

inextricable dream4 ,berkeley and his   
followers1 when they look in this       
direction1 towards nature and the       
rationale of experience and science1 are
 looking away from their own system1 and
 relying instead on the automatic       
propensity of human nature to routine1  
so that we spontaneously prepare for    
repeating our actions 7not our          
experience7 and even anticipate their   
occasions2 a propensity further biased  
by the dominant rhythms of the psyche1  
so that we assume a future not so much  
similar to the past1 as better4 ,when   
developed1 this propensity turns into   
trust in natural or divine laws2 but it 
is contrary to common sense to expect   
such laws to operate apart from matter  
and from the material continuity of     
external occasions4 ,this appears       
clearly in our trust in persons--a      
radical animal propensity--which is     
consonant with common sense when these  
persons are living bodies1 but becomes  
superstitious1 or at least highly       

speculative1 when these persons are     
disembodied spirits4  ,it is a pity that
 the beautiful system of ,berkeley      
should have appeared in an unspiritual  
age1 when religion was mundane and      
perfunctory1 and the free spirit1 where 
it stirred1 was romantic and wilful4    
,for that system was essentially        
religious3 it put the spirit face to    
face with ,god1 everywhere1 always1 and 
in everything it turned experience into 
a divine language for the monition and  
expression of the inner man4 ,such an   
instrument1 in spiritual hands1 might   
have served to dispel all natural       
illusions and affections1 and to        
disinfect the spirit of worldliness and 
egotism4 ,but ,berkeley and his         
followers had no such thought4 ,all they
 wished was to substitute a social for a
 material world1 precisely because a    
merely social world might make worldly  
interests loom larger and might induce  
mankind1 against the evidence of their  
senses and the still small voice in     

their hearts1 to live as if their       
worldly interests were absolute and must
 needs dominate the spirit4  ,morally   
this system thus came to sanction a     
human servitude to material things such 
as ancient materialists would have      
scorned2 and theoretically the system   
did not escape the dogmatic commitments 
of common sense against which it        
protested4 ,for far from withdrawing    
into the depths of the private spirit1  
it professed to describe universal      
experience and the evolution of all     
human ideas4 ,this notion of experience 
originally presupposed a natural agent  
or subject to endure that experience1   
and to profit by it1 by learning to live
 in better harmony with external        
circumstances4 ,each agent or subject of
 experience might1 at other times1      
become an object of experience also3 for
 they all formed part of a material     
world1 which they might envisage in     
common in their perceptions4 ,now the   
criticism which repudiates this common  

material medium1 like all criticism or  
doubt1 is secondary and partial3 it     
continues to operate with all the       
assumptions of common sense1 save the   
one which it is expressly criticising4  
,so1 in repudiating the material world1 
this philosophy retains the notion of   
various agents or subjects gathering    
experience2 and we are not expected to  
doubt that there are just as many       
streams of experience without a world1  
as there were people in the world when  
the world existed4 ,but the number and  
nature of these experiences have now    
become undiscoverable1 the material     
persons having been removed who formerly
 were so placed as to gather easily     
imagined experiences1 and to be able to 
communicate them2 and the very notion of
 experience has been emptied of its     
meaning1 when no external common world  
subsists to impose that same experience 
on everybody4 ,it was not knowledge of  
existing experiences in vacuo that led  
common sense to assume a material world1

 but knowledge of an existing material  
world led it to assume existing1 and    
regularly reproducible1 experiences4    
,thus the whole social convention       
posited by empirical idealism is        
borrowed without leave1 and rests on the
 belief in nature for which it is       
substituted4   ,,viii  ,page #ba4 ,the  
literary psychologist may come very near
 to the truth of experience4            
,experience cannot be in itself an      
object of science1 because it is        
essentially invisible1 immeasurable1    
fugitive1 and private2 and although it  
may be shared or repeated1 the evidence 
for that repetition or that unanimity   
cannot be found by comparing a present  
experience with another experience by   
hypothesis absent4 ,both the absent     
experience and its agreement with the   
present experience must be imagined     
freely and credited instinctively1 in   
view of the known circumstances in which
 the absent experience is conceived to  
have occurred4 ,the only instrument for 

conceiving experience at large is       
accordingly private imagination2 and    
such imagination cannot be tested1      
although it may be guided and perhaps   
recast by fresh observations or reports 
concerning the action and language of   
other people4 ,for action and language1 
being contagious1 and being the material
 counterpart of experience in each of   
us1 may voluntarily or involuntarily    
suggest our respective experience to one
 another1 by causing each to re-enact   
more or less accurately within himself  
the experience of the rest4 ,thus alien 
thoughts and feelings are revealed or   
suggested to us in common life1 not     
without a subjective transformation     
increasing1 so to speak1 as the square  
of the distance3 and even the record of 
experience in people's own words1 when  
these are not names for recognisable    
external things1 awakens in the reader1 
in another age or country1 quite        
incommensurable ideas4 ,yet1 under      
favourable circumstances1 such          

suggestion or revelation of experience1 
without ever becoming science1 may      
become public unanimity in sentiment1   
and may produce a truthful and lively   
dramatic literature4  ,all modern       
philosophy1 in so far as it is a        
description of experience and not of    
nature1 therefore seems to belong to the
 sphere of literature1 and to be without
 scientific value4     ,,ii  ,,fifty    
,,years ,,of ,,british ,,idealism#aj    
,after fifty years1 an old milestone in 
the path of philosophy1 ,bradley's      
,ethical ,studies1 has been set up      
again1 as if to mark the distance which 
,english opinion has traversed in the   
interval4 ,it has passed from insular   
dogmatism to universal bewilderment2 and
 a chief agent in the change has been   
,bradley himself1 with his scornful and 
delicate intellect1 his wit1 his        
candour1 his persistence1 and the       
baffling futility of his conclusions4   
,in this early book we see him coming   
forth like a young ,david against every 

clumsy champion of utilitarianism1      
hedonism1 positivism1 or empiricism4    
,and how smooth and polished were the   
little stones in his sling6 ,how fatally
 they would have lodged in the forehead 
of that composite monster1 if only it   
had had a forehead6 ,some of them might 
even have done murderous execution in   
,bradley's own camp3 for instance1 this 
pebble cast playfully at the            
metaphysical idol called ,law3 ,it is   
always wet on half-holidays because of  
the ,law of ,raininess1 but sometimes it
 is not wet1 because of the             
,supplementary ,law of ,sunshine4       
,bradley and his friends achieved a     
notable victory in the academic field3  
philosophic authority and influence     
passed largely into their hands in all  
,english-speaking universities4 ,but it 
was not exactly from these seats of     
learning that naturalism and            
utilitarianism needed to be dislodged2  
like the corresponding radicalisms of   
our day1 these doctrines prevailed      

rather in certain political and         
intellectual circles outside1           
consciously revolutionary and often     
half-educated2 and ,i am afraid that the
 braggart ,goliaths of today need       
chastening at least as much as those of 
fifty years ago4 ,in a country          
officially ,christian1 and especially in
 ,oxford1 it is natural and fitting that
 academic authority should belong to    
orthodox tradition--theological1        
,platonic1 and ,aristotelian4 ,bradley1 
save for a few learned quotations1      
strangely ignored this orthodoxy        
entrenched behind his back4 ,in contrast
 with it he was himself a heretic1 with 
first principles devastating every      
settled belief3 and it was really this  
venerable silent partner at home that   
his victory superseded1 at least in     
appearance and for a season4 ,david did 
not slay ,goliath1 but he dethroned     
,saul4 ,saul was indeed already under a 
cloud1 and all in ,david's heart was not
 unkindness in that direction4 ,bradley 

might almost be called an unbelieving   
,newman2 time1 especially1 seems to have
 brought his suffering and refined      
spirit into greater sympathy with       
ancient sanctities4 ,originally1 for    
instance1 venting the hearty ,protestant
 sentiment that only the ,christianity  
of laymen is sound1 he had written3 ,i  
am happy to say that 'religieux' has no 
,english equivalent4 ,but a later note  
says3 ,this is not true except of       
,modern ,english only4 ,and1 in any     
case1 it won't do1 and was wrong and due
 to ignorance4 ,however secluded the    
religious life1 it may be practical     
indirectly if through the unity of the  
spiritual body it can be taken as       
vicarious4 ,the if here saves the       
principle that all values must be       
social1 and that the social organism is 
the sole moral reality3 yet how near    
this bubble comes to being pricked6 ,we 
seem clearly to feel that the question  
is not whether spiritual life subserves 
animal society1 but whether animal      

society ever is stirred and hallowed    
into spiritual life4  ,all this1        
however1 in that age of progress1 was   
regarded as obsolete3 there was no      
longer to be any spirit except the      
spirit of the times4 ,true1 the         
ritualists might be striving to revive  
the latent energies of religious        
devotion1 with some dubious help from   
aestheticism3 but against the rising    
tide of mechanical progress and romantic
 anarchy1 and against the mania for     
rewriting history1 traditional          
philosophy then seemed helpless and     
afraid to defend itself3 it is only now 
beginning to recover its intellectual   
courage4 ,for the moment1 speculative   
radicals saw light in a different       
quarter4 ,german idealism was nothing if
 not self-confident2 it was relatively  
new2 it was encyclopaedic in its display
 of knowledge1 which it could manipulate
 dialectically with dazzling1 if not    
stable1 results2 it was ,protestant in  
temper and autonomous in principle2 and 

altogether it seemed a sovereign and    
providential means of suddenly turning  
the tables on the threatened naturalism4
 ,by developing romantic intuition from 
within and packing all knowledge into   
one picture1 the universe might be shown
 to be1 like intuition itself1          
thoroughly spiritual1 personal1 and     
subjective4  ,the fundamental axiom of  
the new logic was that the only possible
 reality was consciousness4             
,people find1 writes ,bradley1 a subject
 and an object correlated      in       
consciousness4444 ,to go out of that    
unity is for us literally to      go out
 of our minds4444 ,when mind is made    
only a part of the whole1      there is 
a question which must be answered4444   
,if about any      matter we know       
nothing whatsoever1 can we say anything 
about it8      ,can we even say that it 
is8 ,and if it is not in consciousness1 
how      can we know it8444 ,and        
conversely1 if we know it1 it cannot be 
not      mind4  ,bradley challenged his 

contemporaries to refute this argument2 
and not being able to do so1 many of    
them felt constrained to accept it1     
perhaps not without grave misgivings4   
,for was it not always a rooted         
conviction of the ,british mind that    
knowledge brings material power1 and    
that any figments of consciousness 7in  
religion1 for instance7 not bringing    
material power are dangerous            
bewitchments1 and not properly          
knowledge8 ,yet it is no less           
characteristic of the ,british mind to  
yield occasionally1 up to a certain     
point1 to some such enthusiastic fancy1 
provided that its incompatibility with  
honest action may be denied or ignored4 
,so in this case ,british idealists1 in 
the act of defining knowledge           
idealistically1 as the presence to      
consciousness of its own phenomena1     
never really ceased to assume           
transcendent knowledge of a             
self-existing world1 social and         
psychological1 if not material3 and they

 continued scrupulously to readjust     
their ideas to those dark facts1 often  
more faithfully than the avowed         
positivists or scientific psychologists4
  ,what could ethics properly be to a   
philosopher who on principle might not  
trespass beyond the limits of           
consciousness8 ,only ethical sentiment4 
,bradley was satisfied to appeal to the 
moral consciousness of his day1 without 
seeking to transform it4 ,the most      
intentionally eloquent passage in his   
book describes war-fever unifying and   
carrying away a whole people3 that was  
the summit of moral consciousness and of
 mystic virtue4 ,his aim1 even in       
ethics1 was avowedly to describe that   
which exists1 to describe moral         
experience1 without proposing a         
different form for it4 ,a man must be a 
man of his own time1 or nothing2 to set 
up to be better than the world was the  
beginning of immorality2 and virtue lay 
in accepting one's station and its      
duties4 ,the moralist should fill his   

mind with a concrete picture of the task
 and standards of his age and nation1   
and should graft his own ideals upon    
that tree2 this need not prevent moral  
consciousness from including a decided  
esteem for non-political excellences    
like health1 beauty1 or intelligence1   
which are not ordinarily called virtues 
by modern moralists4 ,yet they were     
undeniably good2 better1 perhaps1 than  
any painful and laborious dutifulness2  
so that the strictly moral consciousness
 might run over1 and presently lose     
itself in something higher4 ,indeed1    
even health1 beauty1 and intelligence1  
which seemed at first so clearly good1  
might lose their sharpness on a wider   
view4 ,in the panorama that would       
ultimately fill the mind these so-called
 goods and virtues could not be         
conceived without their complementary   
vices and evils4 ,thus all moral        
consciousness1 and even all vital       
preference might ultimately be          
superseded3 they might appear to have   

belonged to a partial and rather low    
stage in the self-development of        
consciousness4  ,with this dissolution  
of his moral judgments always in        
prospect1 why should ,bradley1 or any   
idealist1 have pursued ethical studies  
at all8 ,since all phases of life were  
equally necessary to enrich an infinite 
consciousness1 which must know both good
 and evil in order to merge and to      
transcend them1 he could hardly nurse   
any intense enthusiasm for a different  
complexion to be given to the lives of  
men4 ,his moral passion--for he had it1 
caustic and burning clear--was purely   
intellectual3 it was shame that in      
,england the moral consciousness should 
have been expressed in systems          
dialectically so primitive as those of  
the positivists and utilitarians4 ,he   
acknowledged1 somewhat superciliously1  
that their hearts were in the right     
place2 yet1 if we are to have ethics at 
all1 were not their thoughts in the     
right place also8 ,they were concerned  

not with analysis of the moral          
consciousness but with the conduct of   
affairs and the reform of institutions4 
,the spectacle of human wretchedness    
profoundly moved them2 their minds were 
bent on transforming society1 so that a 
man's station and its duties might cease
 to be what a decayed feudal            
organisation and an inhuman             
industrialism had made of them4 ,they   
revolted against the miserable condition
 of the masses of mankind1 and against  
the miserable consolations which        
official religion1 or a philosophy like 
,bradley's1 offered them in their       
misery4 ,the utilitarians were at least 
intent on existence and on the course of
 events2 they wished to transform       
institutions to fit human nature better1
 and to educate human nature by those   
new institutions so that it might better
 realise its latent capacities4 ,these  
are matters which a man may modify by   
his acts and they are therefore the     
proper concern of the moralist4 ,were   

they much to blame if they neglected to 
define pleasure or happiness and used   
catch-words1 dialectically vague1 to    
indicate a direction of effort          
politically quite unmistakable8         
,doubtless their political action1 like 
their philosophical nomenclature1 was   
revolutionary and relied too much on    
wayward feelings ignorant of their own  
causes4 ,revolution1 no less than       
tradition1 is but a casual and clumsy   
expression of human nature in contact   
with circumstances2 yet pain and        
pleasure and spontaneous hopes1 however 
foolish1 are direct expressions of that 
contact1 and speak for the soul2 whereas
 a man's station and its duties are     
purely conventional1 and may altogether 
misrepresent his native capacities4 ,the
 protest of human nature against the    
world and its oppressions is the strong 
side of every rebellion2 it was the     
moral side of utilitarianism1 of the    
rebellion against irrational morality4  
,unfortunately the ,english reformers   

were themselves idealists of a sort1    
entangled in the vehicles of perception1
 and talking about sensations and ideas1
 pleasures and pains1 as if these had   
been the elements of human nature1 or   
even of nature at large3 and only the   
most meagre of verbal systems1 and the  
most artificial1 can be constructed out 
of such materials4 ,moreover1 they spoke
 much of pleasure and happiness1 and    
hardly at all of misery and pain3       
whereas it would have been wiser1 and   
truer to their real inspiration1 to have
 laid all the emphasis on evils to be   
abated1 leaving the good to shape itself
 in freedom4 ,suffering is the instant  
and obvious sign of some outrage done to
 human nature2 without this natural     
recoil1 actual or imminent1 no morality 
would have any sanction1 and no precept 
could be imperative4 ,what silliness to 
command me to pursue pleasure or to     
avoid it1 if in any case everything     
would be well6 ,save for some shadow of 
dire repentance looming in the distance1

 ,i am deeply free to walk as ,i will4  
,the choice of pleasure for a principle 
of morals was particularly unfortunate  
in the ,british utilitarians2 it lent   
them an air of frivolity absurdly       
contrary to their true character4       
,pleasure might have been a fit enough  
word in the mouth of ,aristippus1 a     
semi-oriental untouched by the least    
sense of responsibility1 or even on the 
lips of humanists in the eighteenth     
century1 who1 however sordid their lives
 may sometimes have been1 could still   
move in imagination to the music of     
,mozart1 in the landscape of ,watteau or
 of ,fragonard4 ,but in the land and age
 of ,dickens the moral ideal was not so 
much pleasure as kindness3 this tenderer
 word not only expresses better the     
motive at work1 but it points to the    
distressing presence of misery in the   
world1 to make natural kindness         
laborious and earnest1 and turn it into 
a legislative system4  ,bradley's       
hostility to pleasure was not fanatical3

 one's station and its duties might have
 their agreeable side4 ,it is probably  
good for you1 he tells us1 to have1 say1
 not less than two glasses of wine after
 dinner4 ,six on ordinary occasions is  
perhaps too many2 but as to three or    
four1 they are neither one way nor the  
other4 ,if the voluptuary was condemned1
 it was for the commonplace reason which
 a hedonist1 too1 might invoke1 that a  
life of pleasure soon palls and becomes 
unpleasant4 ,bradley's objection to     
pleasure was merely speculative3 he     
found it too abstract4 ,to call a       
pleasure when actually felt an          
abstraction is an exquisite absurdity3  
but pleasure1 in its absolute essence1  
is certainly simple and indefinable4 ,if
 instead of enjoying it on the wing1 and
 as an earnest of the soul's momentary  
harmony1 we attempt to arrest and       
observe it1 we find it strangely dumb2  
we are not informed by it concerning its
 occasion1 nor carried from it by any   
logical implication to the natural      

object in which it might be found4 ,a   
pure hedonist ought therefore to be     
rather relieved if all images lapsed    
from his consciousness and he could     
luxuriate in sheer pleasure1 dark and   
overwhelming4 ,true1 such bliss would be
 rather inhuman1 and of the sort which  
we rashly assign to the oyster3 but why 
should a radical and intrepid           
philosopher be ashamed of that8 ,the    
condition of ,bradley's                 
,absolute--feeling in which all         
distinctions are transcended and        
merged--seems to be something of that   
kind2 but there would be a strange irony
 in attributing this mystical and       
rapturous ideal to such ponderous       
worthies as ,mill and ,spencer1 whose   
minds were nothing if not anxious1      
perturbed1 instrumental1 and full of    
respect for variegated facts1 and who   
were probably incapable of tasting pure 
pleasure at all4  ,but if pleasure1 in  
its pure essence1 might really be the   
highest good for a mystic who should be 

lost in it1 it would be no guide to a   
moralist wishing to control events1 and 
to distribute particular pleasures or   
series of pleasures as richly as        
possible in the world4 ,for this purpose
 he would need to understand human      
nature and its variable functions1 in   
which different persons and peoples may 
find their sincere pleasures2 and this  
knowledge would first lend to his       
general love of pleasure any point of   
application in the governance of life or
 in benevolent legislation4 ,some       
concrete image of a happy human world   
would take the place of the futile      
truism that pleasure is good and pain   
evil4 ,this is1 of course1 what         
utilitarian moralists meant to do1 and  
actually did1 in so far as their human  
sympathies extended1 which was not to   
the highest things2 but it was not what 
they said1 and ,bradley had a clear     
advantage over them in the war of words4
 ,a pleasure is not a programme3 it     
exists here and not there1 for me and   

for no one else1 once and never again4  
,when past1 it leaves the will as empty 
and as devoid of allegiance as if it had
 never existed2 pleasure is sand1 though
 it have the colour of gold4 ,but this  
is evidently true of all existence4     
,each living moment1 each dead man1 each
 cycle of the universe leaves nothing   
behind it but a void which perhaps      
something kindred may refill4 ,a ,hegel1
 after identifying himself for a moment 
with the ,absolute ,idea1 is in his     
existence no less subject to sleepiness1
 irritation1 and death than if he had   
been modestly satisfied with the joys of
 an oyster4 ,it is only their common    
form1 or their common worship1 that can 
give to the quick moments of life any   
mutual relevance or sympathy2 and       
existence would not come at all within  
sight of a good1 either momentary or    
final1 if it were not inwardly directed 
upon realising some definite essence4   
,for the rest this essence may be as    
simple as you will1 if the nature       

directed upon it is unified and simple2 
and it would be mere intellectual       
snobbery to condemn pleasure because it 
has not so many subdivisions in it as an
 encyclopaedia of the sciences4 ,for the
 moralist pleasure and pain may even be 
the better guides1 because they express 
more directly and boldly the instinctive
 direction of animal life1 and thereby  
mark more clearly the genuine difference
 between good and evil4  ,we may well   
say with ,bradley that the good is      
self-realisation2 but what is the self8 
,certainly not the feeling or           
consciousness of the moment1 nor the    
life of the world1 nor pure spirit4 ,the
 self that can systematically           
distinguish good from evil is an animal 
soul4 ,it grows from a seed2 its        
potentiality is definite and its fate   
precarious2 and in man it requires      
society to rear it and tradition to     
educate it4 ,the good is accordingly    
social1 in so far as the soul demands   
society2 but it is the nature of the    

individual that determines the kind and 
degree of sociability that is good for  
him1 and draws the line between society 
that is a benefit and society that is a 
nuisance4 ,to subordinate the soul      
fundamentally to society or the         
individual to the state is sheer        
barbarism3 the ,greeks1 sometimes       
invoked to support this form of         
idolatry1 were never guilty of it2 on   
the contrary1 their lawgivers were      
always reforming and planning the state 
so that the soul might be perfect in it4
 ,discipline is a help to the spirit3   
but even social relations1 when like    
love1 friendship1 or sport they are     
spontaneous and good in themselves1     
retire as far as possible from the      
pressure of the world1 and build their  
paradise apart1 simple1 and hidden in   
the wilderness2 while all the ultimate  
hopes and assurances of the spirit      
escape altogether into the silent       
society of nature1 of truth1 of essence1
 far from those fatuous worldly         

conventions which hardly make up for    
their tyranny by their instability3 for 
the prevalent moral fashion is always   
growing old1 and human nature is always 
becoming young again4 ,world-worship is 
the expedient of those who1 having lost 
the soul that is in them1 look for it in
 things external1 where there is no     
soul3 and by a curious recoil1 it is    
also the expedient of those who seek    
their lost soul in actual consciousness1
 where it also is not3 for sensations   
and ideas are not the soul but only     
passing and partial products of its     
profound animal life4 ,moral            
consciousness in particular would never 
have arisen and would be gratuitous1    
save for the ferocious bias of a natural
 living creature1 defending itself      
against its thousand enemies4  ,nor     
would knowledge in its turn be knowledge
 if it were merely intuition of essence1
 such as the sensualist1 the poet1 or   
the dialectician may rest in4 ,if the   
imagery of logic or passion ever comes  

to convey knowledge1 it does so by      
virtue of a concomitant physical        
adjustment to external things2 for the  
nerve of real or transcendent knowledge 
is the notice which one part of the     
world may take of another part2 and it  
is this momentous cognisance1 no matter 
what intangible feelings may supply     
terms for its prosody1 that enlarges the
 mind to some practical purpose and     
informs it about the world4             
,consciousness then ceases to be passive
 sense or idle ideation and becomes     
belief and intelligence4 ,then the      
essences which form the content of      
consciousness may be vivified and       
trippingly run over1 like the syllables 
of a familiar word1 in the active       
recognition of things and people and of 
all the ominous or pliable forces of    
nature4 ,for essences1 being eternal and
 non-existent in themselves1 cannot come
 to consciousness by their own          
initiative1 but only as occasion and the
 subtle movements of the soul may evoke 

their forms2 so that the fact that they 
are given to consciousness has a natural
 status and setting in the material     
world1 and is part of the same natural  
event as the movement of the soul and   
body which supports that consciousness4 
,there is therefore no need of refuting 
idealism1 which is an honest examination
 of conscience in a reflective mind4    
,refutations and proofs depend on       
pregnant meanings assigned to terms1    
meanings first rendered explicit and    
unambiguous by those very proofs or     
refutations4 ,on any different          
acceptation of those terms1 these proofs
 and refutations fall to the ground2 and
 it remains a question for good sense1  
not for logic at all1 how far the terms 
in either case describe anything        
existent4 ,if by knowledge we understand
 intuition of essences1 idealism        
follows2 but it follows only in respect 
to essences given in intuition3 nothing 
follows concerning the seat1 origin1    
conditions1 or symptomatic value of such

 intuition1 nor even that such intuition
 ever actually occurs4 ,idealism1       
therefore1 without being refuted1 may be
 hemmed in and humanised by natural     
knowledge about it and about its place  
in human speculation2 the most          
recalcitrant materialist 7like myself7  
might see its plausibility during a     
somewhat adolescent phase of            
self-consciousness4 ,consciousness      
itself he might accept and relish as the
 natural spiritual resonance of action  
and passion1 recognising it in its proud
 isolation and specious autonomy1 like  
the mountain republics of ,andorra and  
,san ,marino4  ,german idealism is a    
mighty pose1 an attitude always possible
 to a self-conscious and reflective     
being3 but it is hardly a system1 since 
it contradicts beliefs which in action  
are inevitable2 it may therefore be     
readily swallowed1 but it can never be  
digested4 ,neither of its two           
ingredients--romantic scepticism and    
romantic superstition--agrees           

particularly with the ,british stomach4 
,not romantic scepticism3 for in        
,england an instinctive distrust of too 
much clearness and logic1 a difficulty  
in drawing all the consequences of any  
principle1 soon gave to this most       
radical of philosophies a prim and      
religious air3 its purity was alloyed   
with all sorts of conventions3 so much  
so that we find ,british ,hegelians     
often deeply engaged in psychology1     
cosmology1 or religion1 as if they took 
their idealism for a kind of physics1   
and wished merely to reinterpret the    
facts of nature in an edifying way1     
without uprooting them from their       
natural places4 ,this has been made     
easier by giving idealism an objective1 
non-psychological turn3 events1 and     
especially feelings and ideas1 will then
 be swallowed up in the essences which  
they display4 ,thus ,bradley maintained 
that two thoughts1 no matter how remote 
from each other in time or space1 were  
identically the same1 and not merely    

similar1 if only they contemplated the  
same idea4 ,mind itself ceased in this  
way to mean a series of existing        
feelings and was identified with        
intelligence2 and intelligence in its   
turn was identified with the ,idea or   
,logos which might be the ultimate theme
 of intelligence4 ,there could be only  
one mind1 so conceived1 since there     
could be only one total system in the   
universe visible to omniscience4  ,as to
 romantic scepticism1 we may see by     
contrast what it would be1 when left to 
itself1 if we consider those lucid      
,italians who have taken up their       
idealism late and with open eyes4 ,in   
,croce and ,gentile the transcendental  
attitude is kept pure3 for them there is
 really no universe save spirit creating
 its experience2 and if we ask whence or
 on what principle occasions arise for  
all this compulsory fiction1 we are     
reminded that this question1 with any   
answer which spirit might invent for it1
 belongs not to philosophy but to some  

special science like physiology1 itself1
 of course1 only a particular product of
 creative thought4 ,thus the more       
impetuously the inquisitive squirrel    
would rush from his cage1 the faster and
 faster he causes the cage to whirl     
about his ears4 ,he has not the remotest
 chance of reaching his imaginary       
bait--,god1 nature1 or truth2 for to    
seek such things is to presuppose them1 
and to presuppose anything1 if spirit be
 absolute1 is to invent it4 ,even those 
philosophies of history which the       
idealist may for some secret reason be  
impelled to construct would be          
superstitious1 according to his own     
principles1 if he took them for more    
than poetic fictions of the historian2  
so that in the study of history1 as in  
every other study1 all the diligence and
 sober learning which the philosopher   
may possess are non-philosophical1 since
 they presuppose independent events and 
material documents4 ,thus perfect       
idealism turns out to be pure literary  

sport1 like lyric poetry1 in which no   
truth is conveyed save the miscellaneous
 truths taken over from common sense or 
the special sciences2 and the gay       
spirit1 supposed to be living and       
shining of its own sweet will1 can find 
nothing to live or shine upon save the  
common natural world4  ,such at least   
would be the case if romantic           
superstition did not supervene1         
demanding that the spirit should impose 
some arbitrary rhythm or destiny on the 
world which it creates3 but this side of
 idealism has been cultivated chiefly by
 the intrepid ,germans3 some of them1   
like ,spengler and ,keyserling1 still   
thrive and grow famous on it without a  
blush4 ,the modest ,english in these    
matters take shelter under the wing of  
science speculatively extended1 or      
traditional religion prudently          
rationalised3 the scope of the spirit1  
like its psychological distribution1 is 
conceived realistically4 ,it might      
almost prove an euthanasia for ,british 

idealism to lose itself in the new      
metaphysics of nature which the         
mathematicians are evolving2 and since  
this metaphysics1 though materialistic  
in effect1 is more subtle and abstruse  
than popular materialism1 ,british      
idealism might perhaps be said to       
survive in it1 having now passed        
victoriously into its opposite1 and     
being merged in something higher4   #aj 
,ethical ,studies1 by ,f4,h4 ,bradley1  
,o4,m41 ,,ll4,d4 7,glasgow71 late       
,fellow of ,merton ,college1 ,oxford2   
second edition revised1 with additional 
notes by the ,author4 ,oxford1 ,the     
,clarendon ,press1 #aibg4     ,,iii     
,,revolutions ,,in ,,science   ,since   
the beginning of the twentieth century1 
science has gained notably in           
expertness1 and lost notably in         
authority4 ,we are bombarded with       
inventions2 but if we ask the inventors 
what they have learned of the depths of 
nature1 which somehow they have probed  
with such astonishing success1 their    

faces remain blank4 ,they may be chewing
 gum2 or they may tell us that if an    
aeroplane could only fly fast enough1 it
 would get home before it starts2 or    
they may urge us to come with them into 
a dark room1 to hold hands1 and to      
commune with the dear departed4         
,practically there may be no harm in    
such a division of labour1 the inventors
 doing the work and the professors the  
talking4 ,the experts may themselves be 
inexpert in verbal expression1 or       
content with stock phrases1 or          
profoundly sceptical1 or too busy to    
think4 ,nevertheless1 skill and         
understanding are at their best when    
they go together and adorn the same     
mind4 ,modern science until lately had  
realised this ideal3 it was an extension
 of common perception and common sense4 
,we could trust it implicitly1 as we do 
a map or a calendar2 it was not true for
 us merely in an argumentative or       
visionary sense1 as are religion and    
philosophy4 ,geography went hand in hand

 with travel1 ,copernican astronomy with
 circumnavigation of the globe3 and even
 the theory of evolution and the        
historical sciences in the nineteenth   
century were continuous with liberal    
reform3 people saw in the past1 as they 
then learned to conceive it1 simply an  
extension of those transformations which
 they were witnessing in the present4   
,they could think they knew the world as
 a man knows his native town1 or the    
contents of his chest of drawers3 nature
 was our home1 and science was our home 
knowledge4 ,for it is not intrinsic     
clearness or coherence that make ideas  
persuasive1 but connection with action1 
or with some voluminous inner response1 
which is readiness to act4 ,it is a     
sense of on-coming fate1 a compulsion to
 do or to suffer1 that produces the     
illusion of perfect knowledge4  ,i call 
it illusion1 although our contact with  
things may be real1 and our sensations  
and thoughts may be inevitable and      
honest2 because nevertheless it is      

always an illusion to suppose that our  
images are the intrinsic qualities of   
things1 or reproduce them exactly4 ,the 
,ptolemaic system1 for instance1 was    
perfectly scientific2 it was based on   
careful and prolonged observation and on
 just reasoning2 but it was modelled on 
an image--the spherical blue dome of the
 heavens--proper only to an observer on 
the earth1 and not transferable to a    
universe which is diffuse1 centreless1  
fluid1 and perhaps infinite4 ,when the  
imagination1 for any reason1 comes to be
 peopled with images of the latter sort1
 the modern1 and especially the latest1 
astronomy becomes more persuasive4 ,for 
although ,i suspect that even ,einstein 
is an imperfect relativist1 and retains 
,euclidean space and absolute time at   
the bottom of his calculation1 and      
recovers them at the end1 yet the effort
 to express the system of nature as it  
would appear from any station and to any
 sensorium seems to be eminently        
enlightening4  ,theory and practice in  

the latest science are still allied1    
otherwise neither of them would prosper 
as it does2 but each has taken a leap in
 its own direction4 ,the distance       
between them has become greater than the
 naked eye can measure1 and each of them
 in itself has become unintelligible4   
,we roll and fly at dizzy speeds1 and   
hear at incredible distances2 at the    
same time we imagine and calculate to   
incredible depths4 ,the technique of    
science1 like that of industry1 has     
become a thing in itself2 the one veils 
its object1 which is nature1 as the     
other defeats its purpose1 which is     
happiness4 ,science often seems to be   
less the study of things than the study 
of science4 ,it is now more scholastic  
than philosophy ever was4 ,we are       
invited to conceive organisms within    
organisms1 so minute1 so free1 and so   
dynamic1 that the heart of matter seems 
to explode into an endless discharge of 
fireworks1 or a mathematical nightmare  
realised in a thousand places at once1  

and become the substance of the world4  
,what is even more remarkable--for the  
notion of infinite organisation has been
 familiar to the learned at least since 
the time of ,leibniz--the theatre of    
science is transformed no less than the 
actors and the play4 ,the upright walls 
of space1 the steady tread of time1     
begin to fail us2 they bend now so      
obligingly to our perspectives that we  
no longer seem to travel through them1  
but to carry them with us1 shooting them
 out or weaving them about us according 
to some native fatality1 which is left  
unexplained4 ,we seem to have reverted  
in some sense from ,copernicus to       
,ptolemy3 except that the centre is now 
occupied1 not by the solid earth1 but by
 any geometrical point chosen for the   
origin of calculation4 ,time1 too1 is   
not measured by the sun or stars1 but by
 any clock--that is1 by any recurrent   
rhythm taken as a standard of           
comparison4 ,it would seem that the     
existence and energy of each chosen     

centre1 as well as its career and       
encounters1 hang on the collateral      
existence of other centres of force1    
among which it must wend its way3 yet   
the only witness to their presence1 and 
the only known property of their        
substance1 is their radio-activity1 or  
the physical light which they shed4     
,light1 in its physical being1 is       
accordingly the measure of all things in
 this new philosophy3 and if we ask     
ourselves why this element should have  
been preferred1 the answer is not far to
 seek4 ,light is the only medium through
 which very remote or very minute       
particles of matter can be revealed to  
science4 ,whatever the nature of things 
may be intrinsically1 science must      
accordingly express the universe in     
terms of light4  ,these reforms have    
come from within3 they are triumphs of  
method4 ,we make an evident advance in  
logic1 and in that parsimony which is   
dear to philosophers 7though not to     
nature71 if we refuse to assign given   

terms and relations to any prior medium1
 such as absolute time or space1 which  
cannot be given with them4 ,observable  
spaces and times1 like the facts        
observed in them1 are given separately  
and in a desultory fashion4 ,initially1 
then1 there are as many spaces and times
 as there are observers1 or rather      
observations2 these are the specious    
times and spaces of dreams1 of sensuous 
life1 and of romantic biography4 ,each  
is centred here and now1 and stretched  
outwards1 forward1 and back1 as far as  
imagination has the strength to project 
it4 ,then1 when objects and events have 
been posited as self-existent1 and when 
a clock and a system of co-ordinates    
have been established for measuring     
them1 a single mathematical space and   
time may be deployed about them1        
conceived to contain all things1 and to 
supply them with their respective places
 and dates4 ,this gives us the cosmos of
 classical physics4 ,but this system    
involves the uncritical notion of light 

and matter travelling through media     
previously existing1 and being carried  
down1 like a boat drifting down stream1 
by a flowing time which has a pace of   
its own1 and imposes it on all          
existence4 ,in reality1 each clock and  
each landscape is self-centred and      
initially absolute3 its time and space  
are irrelevant to those of any other    
landscape or clock1 unless the objects  
or events revealed there1 being posited 
as self-existent1 actually coincide with
 those revealed also in another         
landscape1 or dated by another clock4   
,it is only by travelling along its own 
path at its own rate that experience or 
light can ever reach a point lying on   
another path also1 so that two          
observations1 and two measures1 may     
coincide at their ultimate terms1 their 
starting-points or their ends4          
,positions are therefore not independent
 of the journey which terminates in     
them1 and thereby individuates them2 and
 dates are not independent of the events

 which distinguish them4 ,the flux of   
existence comes first3 matter and light 
distend time by their pulses1 they      
distend space by their deployments4     
,this1 if ,i understand it1 is one half 
the new theory2 the other half is not   
less acceptable4 ,newton had described  
motion as a result of two principles3   
the first1 inertia1 was supposed to be  
inherent in bodies2 the second1 gravity1
 was incidental to their co-existence4  
,yet inherent inertia can only be       
observed relatively3 it makes no        
difference to me whether ,i am said to  
be moving at a great speed or absolutely
 at rest1 if ,i am not jolted or        
breathless1 and if my felt environment  
does not change4 ,inertia1 or weight1 in
 so far as it denotes something         
intrinsic1 seems to be but another name 
for substance or the principle of       
existence3 in so far as it denotes the  
first law of motion1 it seems to be     
relative to an environment4 ,it would   
therefore be preferable to combine      

inertia and attraction in a single      
formula1 expressing the behaviour of    
bodies towards one another in all their 
conjunctions1 without introducing any   
inherent forces or absolute measures4   
,this seems to have been done by        
,einstein1 or at least impressively     
suggested3 and it has been found that   
the new calculations correspond to      
certain delicate observations more      
accurately than the old4  ,this         
revolution in science seems1 then1 to be
 perfectly legal1 and ought to be       
welcomed2 yet only under one important  
moral condition1 and with a paradoxical 
result4 ,the moral condition is that the
 pride of science should turn into      
humility1 that it should no longer      
imagine that it is laying bare the      
intrinsic nature of things4 ,and the    
paradoxical result is this3 that the    
forms of science are optional1 like     
various languages or methods of         
notation4 ,one may be more convenient or
 subtle than another1 according to the  

place1 senses1 interests1 and scope of  
the explorer2 a reform in science may   
render the old theories antiquated1 like
 the habit of wearing togas1 or of going
 naked2 but it cannot render them false1
 or itself true4 ,science1 when it is   
more than the gossip of adventure or of 
experiment1 yields practical assurances 
couched in symbolic terms1 but no       
ultimate insight3 so that the           
intellectual vacancy of the expert1     
which ,i was deriding1 is a sort of     
warrant of his solidity4 ,it is rather  
when the expert prophesies1 when he     
propounds a new philosophy founded on   
his latest experiments1 that we may     
justly smile at his system1 and wait for
 the next4  ,self-knowledge--and the new
 science is full of self-knowledge--is a
 great liberator3 if perhaps it imposes 
some retrenchment1 essentially it       
revives courage4 ,then at last we see   
what we are and what we can do4 ,the    
spirit can abandon its vain commitments 
and false pretensions1 like a young man 

free at last to throw off his clothes   
and run naked along the sands4          
,intelligence is never gayer1 never     
surer1 than when it is strictly formal1 
satisfied with the evidence of its      
materials1 as with the lights of jewels1
 and filled with mounting speculations1 
as with a sort of laughter4 ,if all the 
arts aspire to the condition of music1  
all the sciences aspire to the condition
 of mathematics4 ,their logic is their  
spontaneous and intelligible side3 and  
while they differ from mathematics and  
from one another in being directed in   
the first instance upon various         
unintelligible existing objects1 yet as 
they advance1 they unite3 because they  
are everywhere striving to discover in  
those miscellaneous objects some        
intelligible order and method4 ,and as  
the emotion of the pure artist1 whatever
 may be his materials1 lies in finding  
in them some formal harmony or imposing 
it upon them1 so the interest of the    
scientific mind1 in so far as it is free

 and purely intellectual1 lies in       
tracing their formal pattern4 ,the      
mathematician can afford to leave to his
 clients1 the engineers1 or perhaps the 
popular philosophers1 the emotion of    
belief3 for himself he keeps the lyrical
 pleasure of metre and of evolving      
equations3 and it is a pleasant surprise
 to him1 and an added problem1 if he    
finds that the arts can use his         
calculations1 or that the senses can    
verify them2 much as if a composer found
 that the sailors could heave better    
when singing his songs4  ,yet such      
independence1 however glorious inwardly1
 cannot help diminishing the prestige of
 the arts in the world4 ,if science     
misled us before1 when it was full of   
clearness and confidence1 how shall we  
trust it now that it is all mystery and 
paradox8 ,if classical physics needed   
this fundamental revision1 near to      
experience and fruitful as it was1 what 
revision will not romantic physics      
require8 ,nor is the future alone       

insecure3 even now the prophets hardly  
understand one another1 or perhaps      
themselves2 and some of them interlard  
their science with the most dubious     
metaphysics4 ,naturally the enemies of  
science have not been slow to seize this
 opportunity3 the soft-hearted1 the     
muddle-headed1 the superstitious are all
 raising their voices1 no longer in     
desperate resistance to science1 but    
hopefully1 and in its name4 ,science1   
they tell us1 is no longer hostile to   
religion1 or to divination of any sort4 
,indeed1 divination is a science too4   
,physics is no longer materialistic     
since space is now curved1 and filled   
with an ether through which light       
travels at #cjj1jjj kilometres per      
second--an immaterial rate3 because if  
anything material ventured to move at   
that forbidden speed1 it would be so    
flattened that it would cease to exist4 
,indeed1 matter is now hardly needed at 
all2 its place has been taken by        
radio-activity1 and by electrons which  

dart and whirl with such miraculous     
swiftness1 that occasionally1 for no    
known reason1 they can skip from orbit  
to orbit without traversing the         
intervening positions--an evident proof 
of free-will in them4 ,or if solids     
should still seem to be material1 there 
are astral bodies as well which are     
immaterial although physical2 and as to 
ether and electricity1 they are the very
 substance of spirit4 ,all this ,i find 
announced in newspapers and even in     
books as the breakdown of scientific    
materialism3 and yet1 when was          
materialism more arrant and barbarous   
than in these announcements8 ,something 
no doubt has broken down3 but ,i am     
afraid it is rather the habit of        
thinking clearly and the power to       
discern the difference between material 
and spiritual things4  ,the latest      
revolution in science will probably not 
be the last4 ,i do not know what        
internal difficulties1 contradictions1  
or ominous obscurities may exist in the 

new theories1 or what logical seeds of  
change1 perhaps of radical change1 might
 be discovered there by a competent     
critic4 ,i base my expectation on two   
circumstances somewhat more external and
 visible to the lay mind4 ,one          
circumstance is that the new theories   
seem to be affected1 and partly         
inspired1 by a particular philosophy1   
itself utterly insecure4 ,this          
philosophy regards the point of view as 
controlling or even creating the object 
seen2 in other words1 it identifies the 
object with the experience or the       
knowledge of it3 it is essentially a    
subjective1 psychological1 ,protestant  
philosophy4 ,the study of perspectives1 
which a severer critic might call       
illusions1 is one of the most           
interesting and enlightening of studies1
 and for my own part ,i should be       
content to dwell almost exclusively in  
that poetic and moral atmosphere1 in the
 realm of literature and of humanism4   
,yet ,i cannot help seeing that neither 

in logic nor in natural genesis can     
perspectives be the ultimate object of  
science1 since a plurality of points of 
view1 somehow comparable1 must be       
assumed in the beginning1 as well as    
common principles of projection1 and    
ulterior points of contact or           
coincidence4 ,such assumptions1 which   
must persist throughout1 seem to        
presuppose an absolute system of nature 
behind all the relative systems of      
science4  ,the other circumstance which 
points to further revolutions is social4
 ,the new science is unintelligible to  
almost all of us2 it can be tested only 
by very delicate observations and very  
difficult reasoning4 ,we accept it on   
the authority of a few professors who   
themselves have accepted it with a      
contagious alacrity1 as if caught in a  
whirlwind4 ,it has sprung up            
mysteriously and mightily1 like         
mysticism in a cloister or theology in a
 council3 a ,soviet of learned men has  
proclaimed it4 ,moreover1 it is not     

merely a system among systems1 but a    
movement among movements4 ,a system1    
even when it has serious rivals1 may be 
maintained for centuries as religions   
are maintained1 institutionally2 but a  
movement comes to an end2 it is followed
 presently by a period of assimilation  
which transforms it1 or by a movement in
 some other direction4 ,i ask myself    
accordingly whether the condition of the
 world in the coming years will be      
favourable to refined and paradoxical   
science4 ,the extension of education    
will have enabled the uneducated to     
pronounce upon everything4 ,will the    
patronage of capital and enterprise     
subsist1 to encourage discovery and     
reward invention8 ,will a jealous and   
dogmatic democracy respect the          
unintelligible insight of the few8 ,will
 a perhaps starving democracy support   
materially its ,soviet of seers8 ,but   
let us suppose that no utilitarian      
fanaticism supervenes1 and no           
intellectual surfeit or discouragement4 

,may not the very profundity of the new 
science and its metaphysical affinities 
lead it to bolder developments1         
inscrutable to the public and           
incompatible with one another1 like the 
gnostic sects of declining antiquity8   
,then perhaps that luminous modern thing
 which until recently was called        
science1 in contrast to all personal    
philosophies1 may cease to exist        
altogether1 being petrified into routine
 in the practitioners1 and fading in the
 professors into abstruse speculations4 
,,iv  ,a ,,long ,,way ,,round ,,to      
,,nirvana   ,that the end of life is    
death may be called a truism1 since the 
various kinds of immortality that might 
perhaps supervene would none of them    
abolish death1 but at best would weave  
life and death together into the texture
 of a more comprehensive destiny4 ,the  
end of one life might be the beginning  
of another1 if the ,creator had composed
 his great work like a dramatic poet1   
assigning successive lines to different 

characters4 ,death would then be merely 
the cue at the end of each speech1      
summoning the next personage to break in
 and keep the ball rolling4 ,or perhaps1
 as some suppose1 all the characters are
 assumed in turn by a single            
supernatural ,spirit1 who amid his      
endless improvisations is imagining     
himself living for the moment in this   
particular solar and social system4     
,death in such a universal monologue    
would be but a change of scene or of    
metre1 while in the scramble of a real  
comedy it would be a change of actors4  
,in either case every voice would be    
silenced sooner or later1 and death     
would end each particular life1 in spite
 of all possible sequels4  ,the relapse 
of created things into nothing is no    
violent fatality1 but something         
naturally quite smooth and proper4 ,this
 has been set forth recently1 in a novel
 way1 by a philosopher from whom we     
hardly expected such a lesson1 namely   
,professor ,sigmund ,freud4 ,he has now 

broadened his conception of sexual      
craving or libido into a general        
principle of attraction or concretion in
 matter1 like the ,eros of the ancient  
poets ,hesiod and ,empedocles4 ,the     
windows of that stuffy clinic have been 
thrown open2 that smell of acrid        
disinfectants1 those hysterical shrieks1
 have escaped into the cold night4 ,the 
troubles of the sick soul1 we are given 
to understand1 as well as their cure1   
after all flow from the stars4  ,i am   
glad that ,freud has resisted the       
tendency to represent this principle of 
,love as the only principle in nature4  
,unity somehow exercises an evil spell  
over metaphysicians4 ,it is admitted    
that in real life it is not well for    
,one to be alone1 and ,i think pure     
unity is no less barren and graceless in
 metaphysics4 ,you must have plurality  
to start with1 or trinity1 or at least  
duality1 if you wish to get anywhere1   
even if you wish to get effectively into
 the bosom of the ,one1 abandoning your 

separate existence4 ,freud1 like        
,empedocles1 has prudently introduced a 
prior principle for ,love to play with2 
not ,strife1 however 7which is only an  
incident in ,love71 but ,inertia1 or the
 tendency towards peace and death4 ,let 
us suppose that matter was originally   
dead1 and perfectly content to be so1   
and that it still relapses1 when it can1
 into its old equilibrium4 ,but the     
homogeneous 7as ,spencer would say7 when
 it is finite is unstable3 and matter1  
presumably not being co-extensive with  
space1 necessarily forms aggregates     
which have an inside and an outside4    
,the parts of such bodies are           
accordingly differently exposed to      
external influences and differently     
related to one another4 ,this           
inequality1 even in what seems most     
quiescent1 is big with changes1 destined
 to produce in time a wonderful         
complexity4 ,it is the source of all    
uneasiness1 of life1 and of love4       
,let us imagine writes ,freud#aa an     

undifferentiated vesicle of             
sensitive substance3 then its surface1  
exposed as it is to the      outer      
world1 is by its very position          
differentiated1 and serves as      an   
organ for receiving stimuli4444 ,this   
morsel of living substance      floats  
about in an outer world which is charged
 with the most      potent energies1 and
 it would be destroyed 444 if it were   
not      furnished with protection      
against stimulation4 ,on the other hand 
the sensitive cortical layer has no     
protective barrier against              
excitations emanating from within4444   
,the most prolific sources of      such 
excitations are the so-called instincts 
of the organism4444      ,the child     
never gets tired of demanding the       
repetition of a game      444 he wants  
always to hear the same story instead of
 a new one1      insists inexorably on  
exact repetition1 and corrects each     
deviation      which the narrator lets  
slip by mistake4444 ,according to this1 

an      instinct would be a tendency in 
living organic matter impelling it      
towards reinstatement of an earlier     
condition1 one which it had             
abandoned under the influence of        
external disturbing forces--a kind      
of organic elasticity1 or1 to put it    
another way1 the manifestation      of  
inertia in organic life4       ,if1     
then1 all organic instincts are         
conservative1 historically              
acquired1 and directed towards          
regression1 towards reinstatement of    
something earlier1 we are obliged to    
place all the results of      organic   
development to the credit of external1  
disturbing1 and      distracting        
influences4 ,the rudimentary creature   
would from its      very beginning not  
have wanted to change1 would1 if        
circumstances      had remained the     
same1 have always merely repeated the   
same course      of existence4444 ,it   
would be counter to the conservative    
nature of      instinct if the goal of  

life were a state never hitherto        
reached4      ,it must be rather an     
ancient starting point1 which the living
 being      left long ago1 and to which 
it harks back again by all the          
circuitous paths of development4444 ,the
 goal of all life is      death4444     
,through a long period of time the      
living substance may have 444      had  
death within easy reach 444 until       
decisive external influences            
altered in such a way as to compel it to
 ever greater deviations      from the  
original path of life1 and to ever more 
complicated and      circuitous routes  
to the attainment of the goal of death4 
,these      circuitous ways to death1   
faithfully retained by the conservative 
instincts1 would be neither more nor    
less than the phenomena of      life as 
we know it4  ,freud puts forth these    
interesting suggestions with much       
modesty1 admitting that they are vague  
and uncertain and 7what it is even more 
important to notice7 mythical in their  

terms2 but it seems to me that1 for all 
that1 they are an admirable counterblast
 to prevalent follies4 ,when we hear    
that there is1 animating the whole      
universe1 an lan vital1 or general      
impulse toward some unknown but single  
ideal1 the terms used are no less       
uncertain1 mythical1 and vague1 but the 
suggestion conveyed is false--false1 ,i 
mean1 to the organic source of life and 
aspiration1 to the simple naturalness of
 nature3 whereas the suggestion conveyed
 by ,freud's speculations is true4 ,in  
what sense can myths and metaphors be   
true or false8 ,in the sense that1 in   
terms drawn from moral predicaments or  
from literary psychology1 they may      
report the general movement and the     
pertinent issue of material facts1 and  
may inspire us with a wise sentiment in 
their presence4 ,in this sense ,i should
 say that ,greek mythology was true and 
,calvinist theology was false4 ,the     
chief terms employed in psycho-analysis 
have always been metaphorical3          

unconscious wishes1 the                 
pleasure-principle1 the ,oedipus        
complex1 ,narcissism1 the censor2       
nevertheless1 interesting and profound  
vistas may be opened up1 in such terms1 
into the tangle of events in a man's    
life1 and a fresh start may be made with
 fewer encumbrances and less morbid     
inhibition4 ,the shortcomings of our    
description1 ,freud says1 would probably
 disappear if for psychological terms we
 could substitute physiological or      
chemical ones4 ,these too only          
constitute a metaphorical language1 but 
one familiar to us for a much longer    
time1 and perhaps also simpler4 ,all    
human discourse is metaphorical1 in that
 our perceptions and thoughts are       
adventitious signs for their objects1 as
 names are1 and by no means copies of   
what is going on materially in the      
depths of nature2 but just as the       
sportsman's eye1 which yields but a     
summary graphic image1 can trace the    
flight of a bird through the air quite  

well enough to shoot it and bring it    
down1 so the myths of a wise philosopher
 about the origin of life or of dreams1 
though expressed symbolically1 may      
reveal the pertinent movement of nature 
to us1 and may kindle in us just        
sentiments and true expectations in     
respect to our fate--for his own soul is
 the bird this sportsman is shooting4   
,now ,i think these new myths of        
,freud's about life1 like his old ones  
about dreams1 are calculated to         
enlighten and to chasten us enormously  
about ourselves4 ,the human spirit1 when
 it awakes1 finds itself in trouble2 it 
is burdened1 for no reason it can       
assign1 with all sorts of anxieties     
about food1 pressures1 pricks1 noises1  
and pains4 ,it is born1 as another wise 
myth has it1 in original sin4 ,and the  
passions and ambitions of life1 as they 
come on1 only complicate this burden and
 make it heavier1 without rendering it  
less incessant or gratuitous4 ,whence   
this fatality1 and whither does it lead8

 ,it comes from heredity1 and it leads  
to propagation4 ,when we ask how        
heredity could be started or            
transmitted1 our ignorance of nature and
 of past time reduces us to silence or  
to wild conjectures4 ,something--let us 
call it matter--must always have        
existed1 and some of its parts1 under   
pressure of the others1 must have got   
tied up into knots1 like the mainspring 
of a watch1 in such a violent and       
unhappy manner that when the pressure is
 relaxed they fly open as fast as they  
can1 and unravel themselves with a vast 
sense of relief4 ,hence the longing to  
satisfy latent passions1 with the       
fugitive pleasure in doing so4 ,but the 
external agencies that originally wound 
up that mainspring never cease to       
operate2 every fresh stimulus gives it  
another turn1 until it snaps1 or grows  
flaccid1 or is unhinged4 ,moreover1 from
 time to time1 when circumstances       
change1 these external agencies may     
encrust that primary organ with minor   

organs attached to it4 ,every           
impression1 every adventure1 leaves a   
trace or rather a seed behind it4 ,it   
produces a further complication in the  
structure of the body1 a fresh charge1  
which tends to repeat the impressed     
motion in season and out of season4     
,hence that perpetual docility or       
ductility in living substance which     
enables it to learn tricks1 to remember 
facts1 and 7when the seeds of past      
experiences marry and cross in the      
brain7 to imagine new experiences1      
pleasing or horrible4 ,every act        
initiates a new habit and may implant a 
new instinct4 ,we see people even late  
in life carried away by political or    
religious contagions or developing      
strange vices2 there would be no peace  
in old age1 but rather a greater and    
greater obsession by all sorts of cares1
 were it not that time1 in exposing us  
to many adventitious influences1 weakens
 or discharges our primitive passions2  
we are less greedy1 less lusty1 less    

hopeful1 less generous4 ,but these      
weakened primitive impulses are         
naturally by far the strongest and most 
deeply rooted in the organism3 so that  
although an old man may be converted or 
may take up some hobby1 there is usually
 something thin in his elderly zeal1    
compared with the heartiness of youth2  
nor is it edifying to see a soul in     
which the plainer human passions are    
extinct becoming a hotbed of chance     
delusions4  ,in any case each fresh     
habit taking root in the organism forms 
a little mainspring or instinct of its  
own1 like a parasite2 so that an        
elaborate mechanism is gradually        
developed1 where each lever and spring  
holds the other down1 and all hold the  
mainspring down together1 allowing it to
 unwind itself only very gradually1 and 
meantime keeping the whole clock ticking
 and revolving1 and causing the smooth  
outer face which it turns to the world1 
so clean and innocent1 to mark the time 
of day amiably for the passer-by4 ,but  

there is a terribly complicated labour  
going on beneath1 propelled with        
difficulty1 and balanced precariously1  
with much secret friction and failure4  
,no wonder that the engine often gets   
visibly out of order1 or stops short3   
the marvel is that it ever manages to go
 at all4 ,nor is it satisfied with      
simply revolving and1 when at last      
dismounted1 starting afresh in the      
person of some seed it has dropped1 a   
portion of its substance with all its   
concentrated instincts wound up tightly 
within it1 and eager to repeat the      
ancestral experiment2 all this growth is
 not merely material and vain4 ,each    
clock in revolving strikes the hour1    
even the quarters1 and often with lovely
 chimes4 ,these chimes we call          
perceptions1 feelings1 purposes1 and    
dreams2 and it is because we are taken  
up entirely with this mental music1 and 
perhaps think that it sounds of itself  
and needs no music-box to make it1 that 
we find such difficulty in conceiving   

the nature of our own clocks and are    
compelled to describe them only         
musically1 that is1 in myths4 ,but the  
ineptitude of our aesthetic minds to    
unravel the nature of mechanism does not
 deprive these minds of their own       
clearness and euphony4 ,besides sounding
 their various musical notes1 they have 
the cognitive function of indicating the
 hour and catching the echoes of distant
 events or of maturing inward           
dispositions4 ,this information and     
emotion1 added to incidental pleasures  
in satisfying our various passions1 make
 up the life of an incarnate spirit4    
,they reconcile it to the external      
fatality that has wound up the organism1
 and is breaking it down2 and they      
rescue this organism and all its works  
from the indignity of being a vain      
complication and a waste of motion4     
,that the end of life should be death   
may sound sad3 yet what other end can   
anything have8 ,the end of an evening   
party is to go to bed2 but its use is to

 gather congenial people together1 that 
they may pass the time pleasantly4 ,an  
invitation to the dance is not rendered 
ironical because the dance cannot last  
for ever2 the youngest of us and the    
most vigorously wound up1 after a few   
hours1 has had enough of sinuous        
stepping and prancing4 ,the             
transitoriness of things is essential to
 their physical being1 and not at all   
sad in itself2 it becomes sad by virtue 
of a sentimental illusion1 which makes  
us imagine that they wish to endure1 and
 that their end is always untimely2 but 
in a healthy nature it is not so4 ,what 
is truly sad is to have some impulse    
frustrated in the midst of its career1  
and robbed of its chosen object2 and    
what is painful is to have an organ     
lacerated or destroyed when it is still 
vigorous1 and not ready for its natural 
sleep and dissolution4 ,we must not     
confuse the itch which our unsatisfied  
instincts continue to cause with the    
pleasure of satisfying and dismissing   

each of them in turn4 ,could they all be
 satisfied harmoniously we should be    
satisfied once for all and completely4  
,then doing and dying would coincide    
throughout and be a perfect pleasure4   
,this same insight is contained in      
another wise myth which has inspired    
morality and religion in ,india from    
time immemorial3 ,i mean the doctrine of
 ,karma4 ,we are born1 it says1 with a  
heritage1 a character imposed1 and a    
long task assigned1 all due to the      
ignorance which in our past lives has   
led us into all sorts of commitments4   
,these obligations we must pay off1     
relieving the pure spirit within us from
 its accumulated burdens1 from debts and
 assets both equally oppressive4 ,we    
cannot disentangle ourselves by mere    
frivolity1 nor by suicide3 frivolity    
would only involve us more deeply in the
 toils of fate1 and suicide would but   
truncate our misery and leave us for    
ever a confessed failure4 ,when life is 
understood to be a process of           

redemption1 its various phases are taken
 up in turn without haste and without   
undue attachment2 their coming and going
 have all the keenness of pleasure1 the 
holiness of sacrifice1 and the beauty of
 art4 ,the point is to have expressed   
and discharged all that was latent in   
us2 and to this perfect relief various  
temperaments and various traditions     
assign different names1 calling it      
having one's day1 or doing one's duty1  
or realising one's ideal1 or saving     
one's soul4 ,the task in any case is    
definite and imposed on us by nature1   
whether we recognise it or not2         
therefore we can make true moral        
progress or fall into real errors4      
,wisdom and genius lie in discerning    
this prescribed task and in doing it    
readily1 cleanly1 and without           
distraction4 ,folly on the contrary     
imagines that any scent is worth        
following1 that we have an infinite     
nature1 or no nature in particular1 that
 life begins without obligations and can

 do business without capital1 and that  
the will is vacuously free1 instead of  
being a specific burden and a tight     
hereditary knot to be unravelled4 ,some 
philosophers without self-knowledge     
think that the variations and further   
entanglements which the future may bring
 are the manifestation of spirit2 but   
they are1 as ,freud has indicated1      
imposed on living beings by external    
pressure1 and take shape in the realm of
 matter4 ,it is only after the organs of
 spirit are formed mechanically that    
spirit can exist1 and can distinguish   
the better from the worse in the fate of
 those organs1 and therefore in its own 
fate4 ,spirit has nothing to do with    
infinite existence4 ,infinite existence 
is something physical and ambiguous2    
there is no scale in it and no centre4  
,the depths of the human heart are      
finite1 and they are dark only to       
ignorance4 ,deep and dark as a soul may 
be when you look down into it from      
outside1 it is something perfectly      

natural2 and the same understanding that
 can unearth our suppressed young       
passions1 and dispel our stubborn bad   
habits1 can show us where our true good 
lies4 ,nature has marked out the path   
for us beforehand2 there are snares in  
it1 but also primroses1 and it leads to 
peace4     ,v  ,,the ,,prestige ,,of    
,,the ,,infinite   ,the more complex the
 world becomes and the more it rises    
above the indeterminate1 so much the    
farther removed it is from ,god2 that is
 to say1 so much the more impious it is4
 ,m4 ,julien ,benda#ab is not led to    
this startling utterance by any         
political or sentimental grudge4 ,it is 
not the late war1 nor the peace of      
,versailles1 nor the parlous state of   
the arts1 nor the decay of morality and 
prosperity that disgusts him with our   
confused world4 ,it is simply           
overmastering respect for the infinite4 
,la ,trahison des ,clercs1 or ,treason  
of the ,levites1 with which he had      
previously upbraided the intellectuals  

of his time1 now appears to consist     
precisely in coveting a part in this    
world's inheritance1 and forgetting that
 the inheritance of the ,levites is the 
,lord3 which1 being interpreted         
philosophically1 means that a           
philosopher is bound to measure all     
things by the infinite4  ,this infinite 
is not rhetorical1 as if we spoke of    
infinite thought or infinite love3 it is
 physico-mathematical4 ,nothing but     
number1 ,m4 ,benda tells us1 seems to   
him intelligible4 ,time1 space1 volume1 
and complexity 7which appears to the    
senses as quality7 stretch in a series  
of units1 positions1 or degrees1 to     
infinity1 as number does3 and in such   
homogeneous series1 infinite in both    
directions1 there will be no fixed point
 of origin for counting or surveying the
 whole and no particular predominant    
scale4 ,every position will be          
essentially identical with every other2 
every suggested structure will be       
collapsible and reversible2 and the     

position and relations of every unit    
will be indistinguishable from those of 
every other4 ,in the infinite1 ,m4      
,benda says1 the parts have no identity3
 each number in the scale1 as we begin  
counting from different points of       
origin1 bears also every other number4  
,this is no mere mathematical puzzle2   
the thought has a strange moral         
eloquence4 ,seen in their infinite      
setting1 which we may presume to be     
their ultimate environment1 all things  
lose their central position and their   
dominant emphasis4 ,the contrary of what
 we first think of them or of           
ourselves--for instance that we are     
alive1 while they are dead or unborn--is
 also true4 ,egotism becomes absurd2    
pride and shame become the vainest of   
illusions4 ,if then it be repugnant to  
reason that the series of numbers1      
moments1 positions1 and volumes should  
be limited--and the human spirit has a  
great affinity to the infinite--all     
specific quality and variety in things  

must be superficial and deeply unreal4  
,they are masks in the carnival of      
phenomena1 to be observed without       
conviction1 and secretly dismissed as   
ironical by those who have laid up their
 treasure in the infinite4  ,this       
mathematical dissolution of particulars 
is reinforced by moral considerations   
which are more familiar4 ,existence--any
 specific fact asserting itself in any  
particular place or moment--is          
inevitably contingent1 arbitrary1       
gratuitous1 and insecure4 ,a sense of   
insecurity is likely to be the first    
wedge by which repentance penetrates    
into the animal heart4 ,if a man did not
 foresee death and fear it1 he might    
never come at all to the unnatural      
thought of renouncing life4 ,in fact1 he
 does not often remember death3 yet his 
whole gay world is secretly afraid of   
being found out1 of being foiled in the 
systematic bluff by which it lives as if
 its life were immortal2 and far more   
than the brave young man fears death in 

his own person1 the whole life of the   
world fears to be exorcised by          
self-knowledge1 and lost in air4 ,and   
with good reason3 because1 whether we   
stop to notice this circumstance or not1
 every fact1 every laborious beloved    
achievement of man or of nature1 has    
come to exist against infinite odds4 ,in
 the dark grab-bag of ,being1 this      
chosen fact was surrounded by           
innumerable possible variations or      
contradictions of it2 and each of those 
possibilities1 happening not to be      
realised here and now1 yet possesses    
intrinsically exactly the same aptitude 
or claim to existence4 ,nor are these   
claims and aptitudes merely imaginary   
and practically contemptible4 ,the flux 
of existence is continually repenting of
 its choices1 and giving everything     
actual the lie1 by continually          
substituting something else1 no less    
specific and no less nugatory4 ,this    
world1 any world1 exists only by an     
unmerited privilege4 ,its glory is      

offensive to the spirit1 like the       
self-sufficiency of some obstreperous   
nobody1 who happens to have drawn the   
big prize in a lottery4 ,the world1 ,m4 
,benda writes1 inspires me with a double
 sentiment4 ,i feel it to be full of    
grandeur1 because it has succeeded in   
asserting itself and coming to exist2   
and ,i feel it to be pitiful1 when ,i   
consider how it hung on a mere nothing  
that this particular world should never 
have existed4 ,and though this so       
accidental world1 by its manifold       
beauties and excitements1 may arouse our
 romantic enthusiasm1 it is             
fundamentally an unholy world4 ,its     
creation1 he adds in italics1 is        
something which reason would wish had   
never taken place4  ,for we must not    
suppose that ,god1 when ,god is defined 
as infinite ,being1 can be the creator  
of the world4 ,such a notion would      
hopelessly destroy that coherence in    
thought to which ,m4 ,benda aspires4    
,the infinite cannot be selective2 it   

cannot possess a particular structure   
7such1 for instance1 as the ,trinity7   
nor a particular quality 7such as       
goodness74 ,it cannot exert power or    
give direction4 ,nothing can be         
responsible for the world except the    
world itself4 ,it has created1 or is    
creating1 itself perpetually by its own 
arbitrary act1 by a groundless          
self-assertion which may be called      
7somewhat metaphorically7 will1 or even 
original sin3 the original sin of       
existence1 particularity1 selfishness1  
or separation from ,god4 ,existence1    
being absolutely contingent and         
ungrounded1 is perfectly free3 and if it
 ties itself up in its own habits or    
laws1 and becomes a terrible nightmare  
to itself by its automatic monotony1    
that still is only its own work and1    
figuratively speaking1 its own fault4   
,nothing save its own arbitrary and     
needless pressure keeps it going in that
 round4 ,this fatality is impressive1   
and popular religion has symbolised it  

in the person of a deity far more often 
recognised and worshipped than infinite 
,being4 ,this popular deity1 a symbol   
for the forces of nature and history1   
the patron of human welfare and         
morality1 ,m4 ,benda calls the imperial 
,god4       ,it is clear that these two 
,gods 444 have nothing to do with one   
another4 ,the ,god whom ,marshal de     
,villars1 rising in his stirrups        
and pointing his drawn sword            
heavenwards1 thanks on the evening of   
,denain1 is one ,god3 quite another is  
the ,god within whose bosom the         
author of the ,imitation1 in a corner of
 his cell1 feels the      nothingness of
 all human victories4  ,it follows from 
this1 if we are coherent1 that any      
return to ,god which ascetic philosophy 
may bring about cannot be a social      
reform1 a transition to some better form
 of natural existence in a promised     
land1 a renovated earth1 or a material  
or temporal heaven4 ,nor can the error  
of creation be corrected violently by a 

second arbitrary act1 such as suicide1  
or the annihilation of the universe by  
some ultimate general collapse4 ,if such
 events happen1 they still leave the    
door open to new creations and fresh    
errors4 ,but the marvel is 7,i will     
return to this point presently7 that the
 world1 in the person of a human        
individual endowed with reason1 may     
perceive the error of its ways and      
correct it ideally1 in the sphere of    
estimation and worship4 ,such is the    
only possible salvation4 ,reason1 in    
order to save us1 and we1 in order to be
 saved1 must both subsist3 we must both 
be incidents in the existing world4 ,we 
may then1 by the operation of reason in 
us1 recover our allegiance to the       
infinite1 for we are bone of its bone   
and flesh of its flesh3 and by our      
secret sympathy with it we may rescind  
every particular claim and dismiss      
silently every particular form of being1
 as something unreal and unholy4  ,an   
even more cogent reason why ,m4 ,benda's

 ,god cannot have been the creator of   
the world is that avowedly this ,god has
 never existed4 ,we are expressly warned
 that if ,god is infinite ,being he     
excludes existence1 in so far as to     
exist means to be distinct4 ,in the     
sense which everybody attaches to the   
word existence1 ,god1 as ,i conceive    
him1 does not exist4 ,of course1 in the 
mind of a lover of the infinite1 this   
fact is not derogatory to ,god1 but     
derogatory to existence4 ,the infinite  
remains the first and the ultimate term 
in thought1 the fundamental dimension   
common to all things1 however otherwise 
they may be qualified2 it remains the   
eternal background against which they   
all are defined and into which they soon
 disappear4 ,evidently1 in this         
divine--because indestructible and      
necessary--dimension1 ,being is         
incapable of making choices1 adopting   
paths of evolution1 or exercising power2
 it knows nothing of phenomena2 it is   
not their cause nor their sanction4 ,it 

is incapable of love1 wrath1 or any     
other passion4 ,i will add1 writes ,m4  
,benda1 something else which theories of
 an impersonal deity have less often    
pointed out4 ,since infinity is         
incompatible with personal being1 ,god  
is incapable of morality4 ,thus mere    
intuition and analysis of the infinite1 
since this infinite is itself passive   
and indifferent1 may prove a subtle     
antidote to passion1 to folly1 and even 
to life4  ,i think ,m4 ,benda succeeds  
admirably in the purpose announced in   
his title of rendering his discourse    
coherent4 ,if once we accept his        
definitions1 his corollaries follow4    
,clearly and bravely he disengages his  
idea of infinity from other properties  
usually assigned to the deity1 such as  
power1 omniscience1 goodness1 and       
tutelary functions in respect to life1  
or to some special human society4 ,but  
coherence is not completeness1 nor even 
a reasonable measure of descriptive     
truth2 and certain considerations are   

omitted from ,m4 ,benda's view which are
 of such moment that1 if they were      
included1 they might transform the whole
 issue4 ,perhaps the chief of these     
omissions is that of an organ for       
thought4 ,m4 ,benda throughout is       
engaged simply in clarifying his own    
ideas1 and repeatedly disclaims any     
ulterior pretensions4 ,he finds in the  
panorama of his thoughts an idea of     
infinite ,being1 or ,god1 and proceeds  
to study the relation of that conception
 to all others4 ,it is a task of        
critical analysis and religious         
confession3 and nothing could be more   
legitimate and1 to some of us1 more     
interesting4 ,but whence these various  
ideas1 and whence the spell which the   
idea of infinite ,being in particular   
casts over the meditative mind8 ,unless 
we can view these movements of thought  
in their natural setting and order of   
genesis1 we shall be in danger of       
turning autobiography into cosmology and
 inwardness into folly4  ,one of the    

most notable points in ,m4 ,benda's     
analysis is his insistence on the leap  
involved in passing from infinite ,being
 to any particular fact or system of    
facts2 and again the leap involved in   
passing1 when the converted spirit      
returns to ,god1 from specific animal   
interests--no matter how generous1      
social1 or altruistic these interests   
may be--to absolute renunciation and    
sympathy with the absolute4 ,that a will
 to return to ,god should arise in the  
phenomenal world seems to be a miracle  
no less wonderful 7though it be less    
wondered at7 than that the world should 
arise in the bosom of ,god4 ,love of    
man1 charity1 humanitarianism are       
nothing but the selfishness of the race1
 by which each animal species assures   
its specific existence4 ,to surrender   
one's individuality for the benefit of a
 larger self is something quite         
different from disinterestedness2 it is 
the exact opposite4 ,and certainly1 if  
we regarded infinite ,being as a        

cosmological medium--say1 empty space   
and time--there would be a miraculous   
break1 an unaccountable new beginning1  
if that glassy expanse was suddenly     
wrinkled by something called energy4    
,but in fact there need never have been 
such a leap1 or such a miracle1 because 
there could never have been such a      
transition4 ,infinite ,being is not a   
material vacuum in the bosom of which a 
world might arise4 ,it is a ,platonic   
idea--though ,plato never entertained   
it--an essence1 non-existent and        
immutable1 not in the same field of     
reality at all as a world of moving and 
colliding things4 ,such an essence is   
not conceivably the seat of the         
variations that enliven the world4 ,it  
is only in thought that we may pass from
 infinite ,being to an existing         
universe2 and when we turn from one to  
the other1 and say that now energy has  
emerged from the bosom of ,god1 we are  
turning over a new leaf1 or rather      
picking up an entirely different volume4

 ,the natural world is composed of      
objects and events which theory may     
regard as transformations of a          
hypothetical energy2 an energy which ,m4
 ,benda--who when he comes down to the  
physical world is a good                
materialist--conceives to have condensed
 and distributed itself into matter1    
which in turn composed organisms and    
ultimately generated consciousness and  
reason4 ,but in whatever manner the     
natural world may have evolved1 it is   
found and posited by us in perception   
and action1 not1 like infinite ,being1  
defined in thought4 ,this contrast is   
ontological1 and excludes any derivation
 of the one object from the other4 ,m4  
,benda himself tells us so2 and we may  
wonder why he introduced infinite ,being
 at all into his description of the     
world4 ,the reason doubtless is that he 
was not engaged in describing the world1
 except by the way1 but rather in       
classifying and clarifying his ideas in 
view of determining his moral           

allegiance4 ,and he arranged his terms1 
whether ideal or materials1 in a single 
series1 because they were alike present 
to his intuition1 and he was concerned  
to arrange them in a hierarchy1         
according to their moral dignity4  ,not 
only is infinite ,being an incongruous  
and obstructive term to describe the    
substance of the world 7which1 if it    
subtends the changes in the world and   
causes them1 must evidently change with 
them71 but even mathematical space and  
time1 in their ideal infinity1 may be   
very far from describing truly the      
medium and groundwork of the universe4  
,that is a question for investigation   
and hypothesis1 not for intuition4 ,but 
in the life of intuition1 when that life
 takes a mathematical turn1 empty space 
and time and their definable structure  
may be important themes2 while1 when the
 same life becomes a discipline of the  
affections1 we see by this latest       
example1 as well as by many a renowned  
predecessor of ,m4 ,benda1 that infinite

 ,being may dominate the scene4  ,nor is
 this eventual dominance so foreign to  
the natural mind1 or such a miraculous  
conversion1 as it might seem4 ,here1    
too1 there is no derivation of object   
from object1 but an alternative for the 
mind4 ,as ,m4 ,benda points out1 natural
 interests and sympathies may expand    
indefinitely1 so as to embrace a family1
 a nation1 or the whole animate         
universe2 we might even be chiefly      
occupied with liberal pursuits1 such as 
science or music2 the more we laboured  
at these things and delighted in them1  
the less ready should we be for         
renunciation and detachment4 ,must      
conversion then descend upon us from    
heaven like a thunderbolt8 ,far from it4
 ,we need not look for the principle of 
spiritual life in the distance3 we have 
it at home from the beginning4 ,even the
 idea of infinite ,being1 though        
unnamed1 is probably familiar4 ,perhaps 
in the biography of the human race1 or  
of each budding mind1 the infinite or   

indeterminate may have been the primary 
datum4 ,on that homogeneous sensuous    
background1 blank at first but secretly 
plastic1 a spot here and a movement     
there may gradually have become         
discernible1 until the whole picture of 
nature and history had shaped itself as 
we see it4 ,a certain sense of that     
primitive datum1 the infinite or        
indeterminate1 may always remain as it  
were the outstretched canvas on which   
every picture is painted4 ,and when the 
pictures vanish1 as in deep sleep1 the  
ancient simplicity and quietness may be 
actually recovered1 in a conscious union
 with ,brahma4 ,so sensuous1 so         
intimate1 so unsophisticated the return 
to ,god may be for the spirit1 without  
excluding the other avenues1            
intellectual and ascetic1 by which this 
return may be effected in waking life1  
though then not so much in act as in    
intent only and allegiance4  ,i confess 
that formerly ,i had some difficulty in 
sharing the supreme respect for infinite

 ,being which animates so many saints3  
it seemed to me the dazed1 the empty1   
the deluded side of spirituality4 ,why  
rest in an object which can be redeemed 
from blank negation only by a blank     
intensity8 ,but time has taught me not  
to despise any form of vital            
imagination1 any discipline which may   
achieve perfection after any kind4      
,intuition is a broadly based activity2 
it engages elaborate organs and sums up 
and synthesises accumulated impressions4
 ,it may therefore easily pour the      
riches of its ancestry into the image or
 the sentiment which it evokes1 poor as 
this sentiment or image might seem if   
expressed in words4 ,in rapt or ecstatic
 moments1 the vital momentum1 often the 
moral escape1 is everything1 and the    
achievement1 apart from that blessed    
relief1 little or nothing4 ,infinite    
,being may profit in this way by        
offering a contrast to infinite         
annoyance4 ,moreover1 in my own way1 ,i 
have discerned in pure ,being the       

involution of all forms4 ,as felt1 pure 
,being may be indeterminate1 but as     
conceived reflectively it includes all  
determinations3 so that when deployed   
into the realm of essence1 infinite or  
indeterminate ,being truly contains     
entertainment for all eternity4  ,m4    
,benda feels this pregnancy of the      
infinite on the mathematical side2 but  
he hardly notices the fact1 proclaimed  
so gloriously by ,spinoza1 that the     
infinity of extension is only one of an 
infinity of infinites4 ,there is an     
aesthetic infinite1 or many aesthetic   
infinites1 composed of all the forms    
which nature or imagination might       
exhibit2 and where imagination fails1   
there are infinite remainders of the    
unimagined4 ,the version which ,m4      
,benda gives us of infinite ,being1     
limited to the mathematical dimension1  
is therefore unnecessarily cold and     
stark4 ,his one infinity is monochrome1 
whereas the total infinity of essence1  
in which an infinity of outlines is only

 one item1 is infinitely many-coloured4 
,phenomena therefore fall1 in their     
essential variety1 within and not       
without infinite ,being3 so that in     
returning to ,god we might take the     
whole world with us1 not indeed in its  
blind movement and piecemeal            
illumination1 as events occur1 but in an
 after-image and panoramic portrait1 as 
events are gathered together in the     
realm of truth4  ,on the whole ,i think 
,m4 ,benda's two ,gods are less         
unfriendly to one another than his      
aggrieved tone might suggest4 ,this     
pregnant little book ends on a tragic   
note4       ,hitherto human             
self-assertion in the state or the      
family1 while      serving the imperial 
,god1 has paid some grudging honours1 at
 least      verbally1 to the infinite   
,god as well1 under the guise of        
liberalism1 love of mankind1 or the     
negation of classes4 ,but today         
this imperfect homage is retracted1 and 
nothing is reverenced      except that  

which gives strength4 ,if anyone        
preaches human      kindness1 it is in  
order to establish a strong community   
martially trained1 like a super-state1  
to oppose everything not      included  
within it1 and to become omnipotent in  
the art of      utilising the non-human 
forces of nature4444 ,the will to return
 to      ,god may prove to have been1 in
 the history of the phenomenal world1   
a sublime accident4  ,certainly the will
 to return to ,god1 if not an accident1 
is an incident in the life of the world2
 and the whole world itself is a sublime
 accident1 in the sense that its        
existence is contingent1 groundless1 and
 precarious4 ,yet so long as the        
imperial ,god continues successfully to 
keep our world going1 it will be no     
accident1 but a natural necessity1 that 
many a mind should turn to the thought  
of the infinite with awe1 with a sense  
of liberation1 and even with joy4 ,the  
infinite ,god owes all his worshippers1 
little as he may care for them1 to the  

success of the imperial ,god in creating
 reflective and speculative minds4 ,or  
7to drop these mythological expressions 
which may become tiresome7 philosophers 
owe to nature and to the discipline of  
moral life their capacity to look beyond
 nature and beyond morality4 ,and while 
they may look beyond1 and take comfort  
in the vision1 they cannot pass beyond4 
,as ,m4 ,benda says1 the most faithful  
,levite can return to the infinite only 
in his thought2 in his life he must     
remain a lay creature4 ,yet nature1 in  
forming the human soul1 unintentionally 
unlocked for the mind the doors to truth
 and to essence1 partly by obliging the 
soul to attend to things which are      
outside1 and partly by endowing the soul
 with far greater potentialities of     
sensation and invention than daily life 
is likely to call forth4 ,our minds are 
therefore naturally dissatisfied with   
their lot and speculatively directed    
upon an outspread universe in which our 
persons count for almost nothing4 ,these

 insights are calculated to give our    
brutal wills some pause4 ,intuition of  
the infinite and recourse to the        
infinite for religious inspiration      
follow of themselves1 and can never be  
suppressed altogether1 so long as life  
is conscious and experience provokes    
reflection4  ,spirit is certainly not   
one of the forces producing spirit1 but 
neither is it a contrary force4 ,it is  
the actuality of feeling1 of            
observation1 of meaning4 ,spirit has no 
unmannerly quarrel with its parents1 its
 hosts1 or even its gaolers3 they know  
not what they do4 ,yet spirit belongs   
intrinsically to another sphere1 and    
cannot help wondering at the world1 and 
suffering in it4 ,the man in whom spirit
 is awake will continue to live and act1
 but with a difference4 ,in so far as he
 has become pure spirit he will have    
transcended the fear of death or defeat2
 for now his instinctive fear1 which    
will subsist1 will be neutralised by an 
equally sincere consent to die and to   

fail4 ,he will live henceforth in a     
truer and more serene sympathy with     
nature than is possible to rival natural
 beings4 ,natural beings are perpetually
 struggling to live only1 and not to    
die2 so that their will is in hopeless  
rebellion against the divine decrees    
which they must obey notwithstanding4   
,the spiritual man1 on the contrary1 in 
so far as he has already passed         
intellectually into the eternal world1  
no longer endures unwillingly the       
continual death involved in living1 or  
the final death involved in having been 
born4 ,he renounces everything          
religiously in the very act of attaining
 it1 resigning existence itself as      
gladly as he accepts it1 or even more   
gladly2 because the emphasis which      
action and passion lend to the passing  
moment seems to him arbitrary and       
violent2 and as each task or experience 
is dismissed in turn1 he accounts the   
end of it more blessed than the         
beginning4   #aa ,the following         

quotations are drawn from ,beyond the   
,pleasure ,principle1 by ,sigmund       
,freud2 authorised translation by       
,c4,j4,m4 ,hubback4 ,the ,international 
,psycho-,analytic ,press1 #aibb1 pp4    
#bi-dh4 ,the italics are in the         
original4  #ab ,essai d'un ,discours    
cohrent sur les ,rapports de ,dieu et du
 ,monde4 ,par ,julien ,benda4 ,librairie
 ,gallimard1 ,paris1 #aica4