,,phaedo  ,by ,plato   ,translated by   
,benjamin ,jowett     ,,introduction4   
,after an interval of some months or    
years1 and at ,phlius1 a town of        
,peloponnesus1 the tale of the last     
hours of ,socrates is narrated to       
,echecrates and other ,phliasians by    
,phaedo the 'beloved disciple4' ,the    
,dialogue necessarily takes the form of 
a narrative1 because ,socrates has to be
 described acting as well as speaking4  
,the minutest particulars of the event  
are interesting to distant friends1 and 
the narrator has an equal interest in   
them4  ,during the voyage of the sacred 
ship to and from ,delos1 which has      
occupied thirty days1 the execution of  
,socrates has been deferred4 7,compare  
,xen4 ,mem47 ,the time has been passed  
by him in conversation with a select    
company of disciples4 ,but now the holy 
season is over1 and the disciples meet  
earlier than usual in order that they   
may converse with ,socrates for the last
 time4 ,those who were present1 and     

those who might have been expected to be
 present1 are mentioned by name4 ,there 
are ,simmias and ,cebes 7,crito71 two   
disciples of ,philolaus whom ,socrates  
'by his enchantments has attracted from 
,thebes' 7,mem471 ,crito the aged       
friend1 the attendant of the prison1 who
 is as good as a friend--these take part
 in the conversation4 ,there are present
 also1 ,hermogenes1 from whom ,xenophon 
derived his information about the trial 
of ,socrates 7,mem471 the 'madman'      
,apollodorus 7,symp471 ,euclid and      
,terpsion from ,megara 7compare         
,theaet471 ,ctesippus1 ,antisthenes1    
,menexenus1 and some other less-known   
members of the ,socratic circle1 all of 
whom are silent auditors4 ,aristippus1  
,cleombrotus1 and ,plato are noted as   
absent4 ,almost as soon as the friends  
of ,socrates enter the prison ,xanthippe
 and her children are sent home in the  
care of one of ,crito's servants4       
,socrates himself has just been released
 from chains1 and is led by this        

circumstance to make the natural remark 
that 'pleasure follows pain4' 7,observe 
that ,plato is preparing the way for his
 doctrine of the alternation of         
opposites47 ',aesop would have          
represented them in a fable as a        
two-headed creature of the gods4' ,the  
mention of ,aesop reminds ,cebes of a   
question which had been asked by ,evenus
 the poet 7compare ,apol473 ',why       
,socrates1 who was not a poet1 while in 
prison had been putting ,aesop into     
verse8'--',because several times in his 
life he had been warned in dreams that  
he should practise music2 and as he was 
about to die and was not certain of what
 was meant1 he wished to fulfil the     
admonition in the letter as well as in  
the spirit1 by writing verses as well as
 by cultivating philosophy4 ,tell this  
to ,evenus2 and say that ,i would have  
him follow me in death4' ',he is not at 
all the sort of man to comply with your 
request1 ,socrates4' ',why1 is he not a 
philosopher8' ',yes4' ',then he will be 

willing to die1 although he will not    
take his own life1 for that is held to  
be unlawful4'  ,cebes asks why suicide  
is thought not to be right1 if death is 
to be accounted a good8 ,well1 7#a7     
according to one explanation1 because   
man is a prisoner1 who must not open the
 door of his prison and run away--this  
is the truth in a 'mystery4' ,or 7#b7   
rather1 because he is not his own       
property1 but a possession of the gods1 
and has no right to make away with that 
which does not belong to him4 ,but why1 
asks ,cebes1 if he is a possession of   
the gods1 should he wish to die and     
leave them8 ,for he is under their      
protection2 and surely he cannot take   
better care of himself than they take of
 him4 ,simmias explains that ,cebes is  
really referring to ,socrates1 whom they
 think too unmoved at the prospect of   
leaving the gods and his friends4       
,socrates answers that he is going to   
other gods who are wise and good1 and   
perhaps to better friends2 and he       

professes that he is ready to defend    
himself against the charge of ,cebes4   
,the company shall be his judges1 and he
 hopes that he will be more successful  
in convincing them than he had been in  
convincing the court4  ,the philosopher 
desires death--which the wicked world   
will insinuate that he also deserves3   
and perhaps he does1 but not in any     
sense which they are capable of         
understanding4 ,enough of them3 the real
 question is1 ,what is the nature of    
that death which he desires8 ,death is  
the separation of soul and body--and the
 philosopher desires such a separation4 
,he would like to be freed from the     
dominion of bodily pleasures and of the 
senses1 which are always perturbing his 
mental vision4 ,he wants to get rid of  
eyes and ears1 and with the light of the
 mind only to behold the light of truth4
 ,all the evils and impurities and      
necessities of men come from the body4  
,and death separates him from these     
corruptions1 which in life he cannot    

wholly lay aside4 ,why then should he   
repine when the hour of separation      
arrives8 ,why1 if he is dead while he   
lives1 should he fear that other death1 
through which alone he can behold wisdom
 in her purity8  ,besides1 the          
philosopher has notions of good and evil
 unlike those of other men4 ,for they   
are courageous because they are afraid  
of greater dangers1 and temperate       
because they desire greater pleasures4  
,but he disdains this balancing of      
pleasures and pains1 which is the       
exchange of commerce and not of virtue4 
,all the virtues1 including wisdom1 are 
regarded by him only as purifications of
 the soul4 ,and this was the meaning of 
the founders of the mysteries when they 
said1 ',many are the wand-bearers but   
few are the mystics4' 7,compare ,matt4  
xxii43 ',many are called but few are    
chosen4'7 ,and in the hope that he is   
one of these mystics1 ,socrates is now  
departing4 ,this is his answer to any   
one who charges him with indifference at

 the prospect of leaving the gods and   
his friends4  ,still1 a fear is         
expressed that the soul upon leaving the
 body may vanish away like smoke or air4
 ,socrates in answer appeals first of   
all to the old ,orphic tradition that   
the souls of the dead are in the world  
below1 and that the living come from    
them4 ,this he attempts to found on a   
philosophical assumption that all       
opposites--e4g4 less1 greater2 weaker1  
stronger2 sleeping1 waking2 life1       
death--are generated out of each other4 
,nor can the process of generation be   
only a passage from living to dying1 for
 then all would end in death4 ,the      
perpetual sleeper 7,endymion7 would be  
no longer distinguished from the rest of
 mankind4 ,the circle of nature is not  
complete unless the living come from the
 dead as well as pass to them4  ,the    
,platonic doctrine of reminiscence is   
then adduced as a confirmation of the   
pre-existence of the soul4 ,some proofs 
of this doctrine are demanded4 ,one     

proof given is the same as that of the  
,meno1 and is derived from the latent   
knowledge of mathematics1 which may be  
elicited from an unlearned person when a
 diagram is presented to him4 ,again1   
there is a power of association1 which  
from seeing ,simmias may remember       
,cebes1 or from seeing a picture of     
,simmias may remember ,simmias4 ,the    
lyre may recall the player of the lyre1 
and equal pieces of wood or stone may be
 associated with the higher notion of   
absolute equality4 ,but here observe    
that material equalities fall short of  
the conception of absolute equality with
 which they are compared1 and which is  
the measure of them4 ,and the measure or
 standard must be prior to that which is
 measured1 the idea of equality prior to
 the visible equals4 ,and if prior to   
them1 then prior also to the perceptions
 of the senses which recall them1 and   
therefore either given before birth or  
at birth4 ,but all men have not this    
knowledge1 nor have any without a       

process of reminiscence2 which is a     
proof that it is not innate or given at 
birth1 unless indeed it was given and   
taken away at the same instant4 ,but if 
not given to men in birth1 it must have 
been given before birth--this is the    
only alternative which remains4 ,and if 
we had ideas in a former state1 then our
 souls must have existed and must have  
had intelligence in a former state4 ,the
 pre-existence of the soul stands or    
falls with the doctrine of ideas4  ,it  
is objected by ,simmias and ,cebes that 
these arguments only prove a former and 
not a future existence4 ,socrates       
answers this objection by recalling the 
previous argument1 in which he had shown
 that the living come from the dead4    
,but the fear that the soul at departing
 may vanish into air 7especially if     
there is a wind blowing at the time7 has
 not yet been charmed away4 ,he         
proceeds3 ,when we fear that the soul   
will vanish away1 let us ask ourselves  
what is that which we suppose to be     

liable to dissolution8 ,is it the simple
 or the compound1 the unchanging or the 
changing1 the invisible idea or the     
visible object of sense8 ,clearly the   
latter and not the former2 and therefore
 not the soul1 which in her own pure    
thought is unchangeable1 and only when  
using the senses descends into the      
region of change4 ,again1 the soul      
commands1 the body serves3 in this      
respect too the soul is akin to the     
divine1 and the body to the mortal4 ,and
 in every point of view the soul is the 
image of divinity and immortality1 and  
the body of the human and mortal4 ,and  
whereas the body is liable to speedy    
dissolution1 the soul is almost if not  
quite indissoluble4 7,compare ,tim47    
,yet even the body may be preserved for 
ages by the embalmer's art3 how         
unlikely1 then1 that the soul will      
perish and be dissipated into air while 
on her way to the good and wise ,god6   
,she has been gathered into herself1    
holding aloof from the body1 and        

practising death all her life long1 and 
she is now finally released from the    
errors and follies and passions of men1 
and for ever dwells in the company of   
the gods4  ,but the soul which is       
polluted and engrossed by the corporeal1
 and has no eye except that of the      
senses1 and is weighed down by the      
bodily appetites1 cannot attain to this 
abstraction4 ,in her fear of the world  
below she lingers about the sepulchre1  
loath to leave the body which she loved1
 a ghostly apparition1 saturated with   
sense1 and therefore visible4 ,at length
 entering into some animal of a nature  
congenial to her former life of         
sensuality or violence1 she takes the   
form of an ass1 a wolf or a kite4 ,and  
of these earthly souls the happiest are 
those who have practised virtue without 
philosophy2 they are allowed to pass    
into gentle and social natures1 such as 
bees and ants4 7,compare ,republic1     
,meno47 ,but only the philosopher who   
departs pure is permitted to enter the  

company of the gods4 7,compare          
,phaedrus47 ,this is the reason why he  
abstains from fleshly lusts1 and not    
because he fears loss or disgrace1 which
 is the motive of other men4 ,he too has
 been a captive1 and the willing agent  
of his own captivity4 ,but philosophy   
has spoken to him1 and he has heard her 
voice2 she has gently entreated him1 and
 brought him out of the 'miry clay1' and
 purged away the mists of passion and   
the illusions of sense which envelope   
him2 his soul has escaped from the      
influence of pleasures and pains1 which 
are like nails fastening her to the     
body4 ,to that prison-house she will not
 return2 and therefore she abstains from
 bodily pleasures--not from a desire of 
having more or greater ones1 but because
 she knows that only when calm and free 
from the dominion of the body can she   
behold the light of truth4  ,simmias and
 ,cebes remain in doubt2 but they are   
unwilling to raise objections at such a 
time4 ,socrates wonders at their        

reluctance4 ,let them regard him rather 
as the swan1 who1 having sung the       
praises of ,apollo all his life long1   
sings at his death more lustily than    
ever4 ,simmias acknowledges that there  
is cowardice in not probing truth to the
 bottom4 ',and if truth divine and      
inspired is not to be had1 then let a   
man take the best of human notions1 and 
upon this frail bark let him sail       
through life4' ,he proceeds to state his
 difficulty3 ,it has been argued that   
the soul is invisible and incorporeal1  
and therefore immortal1 and prior to the
 body4 ,but is not the soul acknowledged
 to be a harmony1 and has she not the   
same relation to the body1 as the       
harmony--which like her is              
invisible--has to the lyre8 ,and yet the
 harmony does not survive the lyre4     
,cebes has also an objection1 which like
 ,simmias he expresses in a figure4 ,he 
is willing to admit that the soul is    
more lasting than the body4 ,but the    
more lasting nature of the soul does not

 prove her immortality2 for after having
 worn out many bodies in a single life1 
and many more in successive births and  
deaths1 she may at last perish1 or1 as  
,socrates afterwards restates the       
objection1 the very act of birth may be 
the beginning of her death1 and her last
 body may survive her1 just as the coat 
of an old weaver is left behind him     
after he is dead1 although a man is more
 lasting than his coat4 ,and he who     
would prove the immortality of the soul1
 must prove not only that the soul      
outlives one or many bodies1 but that   
she outlives them all4  ,the audience1  
like the chorus in a play1 for a moment 
interpret the feelings of the actors2   
there is a temporary depression1 and    
then the enquiry is resumed4 ,it is a   
melancholy reflection that arguments1   
like men1 are apt to be deceivers2 and  
those who have been often deceived      
become distrustful both of arguments and
 of friends4 ,but this unfortunate      
experience should not make us either    

haters of men or haters of arguments4   
,the want of health and truth is not in 
the argument1 but in ourselves4         
,socrates1 who is about to die1 is      
sensible of his own weakness2 he desires
 to be impartial1 but he cannot help    
feeling that he has too great an        
interest in the truth of the argument4  
,and therefore he would have his friends
 examine and refute him1 if they think  
that he is in error4  ,at his request   
,simmias and ,cebes repeat their        
objections4 ,they do not go to the      
length of denying the pre-existence of  
ideas4 ,simmias is of opinion that the  
soul is a harmony of the body4 ,but the 
admission of the pre-existence of ideas1
 and therefore of the soul1 is at       
variance with this4 7,compare a parallel
 difficulty in ,theaet47 ,for a harmony 
is an effect1 whereas the soul is not an
 effect1 but a cause2 a harmony follows1
 but the soul leads2 a harmony admits of
 degrees1 and the soul has no degrees4  
,again1 upon the supposition that the   

soul is a harmony1 why is one soul      
better than another8 ,are they more or  
less harmonized1 or is there one harmony
 within another8 ,but the soul does not 
admit of degrees1 and cannot therefore  
be more or less harmonized4 ,further1   
the soul is often engaged in resisting  
the affections of the body1 as ,homer   
describes ,odysseus 'rebuking his       
heart4' ,could he have written this     
under the idea that the soul is a       
harmony of the body8 ,nay rather1 are we
 not contradicting ,homer and ourselves 
in affirming anything of the sort8  ,the
 goddess ,harmonia1 as ,socrates        
playfully terms the argument of         
,simmias1 has been happily disposed of2 
and now an answer has to be given to the
 ,theban ,cadmus4 ,socrates             
recapitulates the argument of ,cebes1   
which1 as he remarks1 involves the whole
 question of natural growth or          
causation2 about this he proposes to    
narrate his own mental experience4 ,when
 he was young he had puzzled himself    

with physics3 he had enquired into the  
growth and decay of animals1 and the    
origin of thought1 until at last he     
began to doubt the self-evident fact    
that growth is the result of eating and 
drinking2 and so he arrived at the      
conclusion that he was not meant for    
such enquiries4 ,nor was he less        
perplexed with notions of comparison and
 number4 ,at first he had imagined      
himself to understand differences of    
greater and less1 and to know that ten  
is two more than eight1 and the like4   
,but now those very notions appeared to 
him to contain a contradiction4 ,for how
 can one be divided into two8 ,or two be
 compounded into one8 ,these are        
difficulties which ,socrates cannot     
answer4 ,of generation and destruction  
he knows nothing4 ,but he has a confused
 notion of another method in which      
matters of this sort are to be          
investigated4 7,compare ,republic2      
,charm47  ,then he heard some one       
reading out of a book of ,anaxagoras1   

that mind is the cause of all things4   
,and he said to himself3 ,if mind is the
 cause of all things1 surely mind must  
dispose them all for the best4 ,the new 
teacher will show me this 'order of the 
best' in man and nature4 ,how great had 
been his hopes and how great his        
disappointment6 ,for he found that his  
new friend was anything but consistent  
in his use of mind as a cause1 and that 
he soon introduced winds1 waters1 and   
other eccentric notions4 7,compare      
,arist4 ,metaph47 ,it was as if a person
 had said that ,socrates is sitting here
 because he is made up of bones and     
muscles1 instead of telling the true    
reason--that he is here because the     
,athenians have thought good to sentence
 him to death1 and he has thought good  
to await his sentence4 ,had his bones   
and muscles been left by him to their   
own ideas of right1 they would long ago 
have taken themselves off4 ,but surely  
there is a great confusion of the cause 
and condition in all this4 ,and this    

confusion also leads people into all    
sorts of erroneous theories about the   
position and motions of the earth4 ,none
 of them know how much stronger than any
 ,atlas is the power of the best4 ,but  
this 'best' is still undiscovered2 and  
in enquiring after the cause1 we can    
only hope to attain the second best4    
,now there is a danger in the           
contemplation of the nature of things1  
as there is a danger in looking at the  
sun during an eclipse1 unless the       
precaution is taken of looking only at  
the image reflected in the water1 or in 
a glass4 7,compare ,laws2 ,republic47   
',i was afraid1' says ,socrates1 'that  
,i might injure the eye of the soul4 ,i 
thought that ,i had better return to the
 old and safe method of ideas4 ,though  
,i do not mean to say that he who       
contemplates existence through the      
medium of ideas sees only through a     
glass darkly1 any more than he who      
contemplates actual effects4'  ,if the  
existence of ideas is granted to him1   

,socrates is of opinion that he will    
then have no difficulty in proving the  
immortality of the soul4 ,he will only  
ask for a further admission3--that      
beauty is the cause of the beautiful1   
greatness the cause of the great1       
smallness of the small1 and so on of    
other things4 ,this is a safe and simple
 answer1 which escapes the              
contradictions of greater and less      
7greater by reason of that which is     
smaller671 of addition and subtraction1 
and the other difficulties of relation4 
,these subtleties he is for leaving to  
wiser heads than his own2 he prefers to 
test ideas by the consistency of their  
consequences1 and1 if asked to give an  
account of them1 goes back to some      
higher idea or hypothesis which appears 
to him to be the best1 until at last he 
arrives at a resting-place4 7,republic2 
,phil47  ,the doctrine of ideas1 which  
has long ago received the assent of the 
,socratic circle1 is now affirmed by the
 ,phliasian auditor to command the      

assent of any man of sense4 ,the        
narrative is continued2 ,socrates is    
desirous of explaining how opposite     
ideas may appear to co-exist but do not 
really co-exist in the same thing or    
person4 ,for example1 ,simmias may be   
said to have greatness and also         
smallness1 because he is greater than   
,socrates and less than ,phaedo4 ,and   
yet ,simmias is not really great and    
also small1 but only when compared to   
,phaedo and ,socrates4 ,i use the       
illustration1 says ,socrates1 because ,i
 want to show you not only that ideal   
opposites exclude one another1 but also 
the opposites in us4 ,i1 for example1   
having the attribute of smallness remain
 small1 and cannot become great3 the    
smallness which is in me drives out     
greatness4  ,one of the company here    
remarked that this was inconsistent with
 the old assertion that opposites       
generated opposites4 ,but that1 replies 
,socrates1 was affirmed1 not of opposite
 ideas either in us or in nature1 but of

 opposition in the concrete--not of life
 and death1 but of individuals living   
and dying4 ,when this objection has been
 removed1 ,socrates proceeds3 ,this     
doctrine of the mutual exclusion of     
opposites is not only true of the       
opposites themselves1 but of things     
which are inseparable from them4 ,for   
example1 cold and heat are opposed2 and 
fire1 which is inseparable from heat1   
cannot co-exist with cold1 or snow1     
which is inseparable from cold1 with    
heat4 ,again1 the number three excludes 
the number four1 because three is an odd
 number and four is an even number1 and 
the odd is opposed to the even4 ,thus we
 are able to proceed a step beyond 'the 
safe and simple answer4' ,we may say1   
not only that the odd excludes the even1
 but that the number three1 which       
participates in oddness1 excludes the   
even4 ,and in like manner1 not only does
 life exclude death1 but the soul1 of   
which life is the inseparable attribute1
 also excludes death4 ,and that of which

 life is the inseparable attribute is by
 the force of the terms imperishable4   
,if the odd principle were imperishable1
 then the number three would not perish 
but remove1 on the approach of the even 
principle4 ,but the immortal is         
imperishable2 and therefore the soul on 
the approach of death does not perish   
but removes4  ,thus all objections      
appear to be finally silenced4 ,and now 
the application has to be made3 ,if the 
soul is immortal1 'what manner of       
persons ought we to be8' having regard  
not only to time but to eternity4 ,for  
death is not the end of all1 and the    
wicked is not released from his evil by 
death2 but every one carries with him   
into the world below that which he is or
 has become1 and that only4  ,for after 
death the soul is carried away to       
judgment1 and when she has received her 
punishment returns to earth in the      
course of ages4 ,the wise soul is       
conscious of her situation1 and follows 
the attendant angel who guides her      

through the windings of the world below2
 but the impure soul wanders hither and 
thither without companion or guide1 and 
is carried at last to her own place1 as 
the pure soul is also carried away to   
hers4 ',in order that you may understand
 this1 ,i must first describe to you the
 nature and conformation of the earth4' 
,now the whole earth is a globe placed  
in the centre of the heavens1 and is    
maintained there by the perfection of   
balance4 ,that which we call the earth  
is only one of many small hollows1      
wherein collect the mists and waters and
 the thick lower air2 but the true earth
 is above1 and is in a finer and subtler
 element4 ,and if1 like birds1 we could 
fly to the surface of the air1 in the   
same manner that fishes come to the top 
of the sea1 then we should behold the   
true earth and the true heaven and the  
true stars4 ,our earth is everywhere    
corrupted and corroded2 and even the    
land which is fairer than the sea1 for  
that is a mere chaos or waste of water  

and mud and sand1 has nothing to show in
 comparison of the other world4 ,but the
 heavenly earth is of divers colours1   
sparkling with jewels brighter than gold
 and whiter than any snow1 having       
flowers and fruits innumerable4 ,and the
 inhabitants dwell some on the shore of 
the sea of air1 others in 'islets of the
 blest1' and they hold converse with the
 gods1 and behold the sun1 moon and     
stars as they truly are1 and their other
 blessedness is of a piece with this4   
,the hollows on the surface of the globe
 vary in size and shape from that which 
we inhabit3 but all are connected by    
passages and perforations in the        
interior of the earth4 ,and there is one
 huge chasm or opening called ,tartarus1
 into which streams of fire and water   
and liquid mud are ever flowing2 of     
these small portions find their way to  
the surface and form seas and rivers and
 volcanoes4 ,there is a perpetual       
inhalation and exhalation of the air    
rising and falling as the waters pass   

into the depths of the earth and return 
again1 in their course forming lakes and
 rivers1 but never descending below the 
centre of the earth2 for on either side 
the rivers flowing either way are       
stopped by a precipice4 ,these rivers   
are many and mighty1 and there are four 
principal ones1 ,oceanus1 ,acheron1     
,pyriphlegethon1 and ,cocytus4 ,oceanus 
is the river which encircles the earth2 
,acheron takes an opposite direction1   
and after flowing under the earth       
through desert places1 at last reaches  
the ,acherusian lake1--this is the river
 at which the souls of the dead await   
their return to earth4 ,pyriphlegethon  
is a stream of fire1 which coils round  
the earth and flows into the depths of  
,tartarus4 ,the fourth river1 ,cocytus1 
is that which is called by the poets the
 ,stygian river1 and passes into and    
forms the lake ,styx1 from the waters of
 which it gains new and strange powers4 
,this river1 too1 falls into ,tartarus4 
,the dead are first of all judged       

according to their deeds1 and those who 
are incurable are thrust into ,tartarus1
 from which they never come out4 ,those 
who have only committed venial sins are 
first purified of them1 and then        
rewarded for the good which they have   
done4 ,those who have committed crimes1 
great indeed1 but not unpardonable1 are 
thrust into ,tartarus1 but are cast     
forth at the end of a year by way of    
,pyriphlegethon or ,cocytus1 and these  
carry them as far as the ,acherusian    
lake1 where they call upon their victims
 to let them come out of the rivers into
 the lake4 ,and if they prevail1 then   
they are let out and their sufferings   
cease3 if not1 they are borne           
unceasingly into ,tartarus and back     
again1 until they at last obtain mercy4 
,the pure souls also receive their      
reward1 and have their abode in the     
upper earth1 and a select few in still  
fairer 'mansions4'  ,socrates is not    
prepared to insist on the literal       
accuracy of this description1 but he is 

confident that something of the kind is 
true4 ,he who has sought after the      
pleasures of knowledge and rejected the 
pleasures of the body1 has reason to be 
of good hope at the approach of death2  
whose voice is already speaking to him1 
and who will one day be heard calling   
all men4  ,the hour has come at which he
 must drink the poison1 and not much    
remains to be done4 ,how shall they bury
 him8 ,that is a question which he      
refuses to entertain1 for they are      
burying1 not him1 but his dead body4    
,his friends had once been sureties that
 he would remain1 and they shall now be 
sureties that he has run away4 ,yet he  
would not die without the customary     
ceremonies of washing and burial4 ,shall
 he make a libation of the poison8 ,in  
the spirit he will1 but not in the      
letter4 ,one request he utters in the   
very act of death1 which has been a     
puzzle to after ages4 ,with a sort of   
irony he remembers that a trifling      
religious duty is still unfulfilled1    

just as above he desires before he      
departs to compose a few verses in order
 to satisfy a scruple about a           
dream--unless1 indeed1 we suppose him to
 mean1 that he was now restored to      
health1 and made the customary offering 
to ,asclepius in token of his recovery4 
9999999999  #a4 ,the doctrine of the    
immortality of the soul has sunk deep   
into the heart of the human race2 and   
men are apt to rebel against any        
examination of the nature or grounds of 
their belief4 ,they do not like to      
acknowledge that this1 as well as the   
other 'eternal ideas2 of man1 has a     
history in time1 which may be traced in 
,greek poetry or philosophy1 and also in
 the ,hebrew ,scriptures4 ,they convert 
feeling into reasoning1 and throw a     
network of dialectics over that which is
 really a deeply-rooted instinct4 ,in   
the same temper which ,socrates reproves
 in himself they are disposed to think  
that even fallacies will do no harm1 for
 they will die with them1 and while they

 live they will gain by the delusion4   
,and when they consider the numberless  
bad arguments which have been pressed   
into the service of theology1 they say1 
like the companions of ,socrates1 ',what
 argument can we ever trust again8' ,but
 there is a better and higher spirit to 
be gathered from the ,phaedo1 as well as
 from the other writings of ,plato1     
which says that first principles should 
be most constantly reviewed 7,phaedo and
 ,crat471 and that the highest subjects 
demand of us the greatest accuracy      
7,republic72 also that we must not      
become misologists because arguments are
 apt to be deceivers4  #b4 ,in former   
ages there was a customary rather than a
 reasoned belief in the immortality of  
the soul4 ,it was based on the authority
 of the ,church1 on the necessity of    
such a belief to morality and the order 
of society1 on the evidence of an       
historical fact1 and also on analogies  
and figures of speech which filled up   
the void or gave an expression in words 

to a cherished instinct4 ,the mass of   
mankind went on their way busy with the 
affairs of this life1 hardly stopping to
 think about another4 ,but in our own   
day the question has been reopened1 and 
it is doubtful whether the belief which 
in the first ages of ,christianity was  
the strongest motive of action can      
survive the conflict with a scientific  
age in which the rules of evidence are  
stricter and the mind has become more   
sensitive to criticism4 ,it has faded   
into the distance by a natural process  
as it was removed further and further   
from the historical fact on which it has
 been supposed to rest4 ,arguments      
derived from material things such as the
 seed and the ear of corn or transitions
 in the life of animals from one state  
of being to another 7the chrysalis and  
the butterfly7 are not 'in pari materia'
 with arguments from the visible to the 
invisible1 and are therefore felt to be 
no longer applicable4 ,the evidence to  
the historical fact seems to be weaker  

than was once supposed3 it is not       
consistent with itself1 and is based    
upon documents which are of unknown     
origin4 ,the immortality of man must be 
proved by other arguments than these if 
it is again to become a living belief4  
,we must ask ourselves afresh why we    
still maintain it1 and seek to discover 
a foundation for it in the nature of    
,god and in the first principles of     
morality4  #c4 ,at the outset of the    
discussion we may clear away a          
confusion4 ,we certainly do not mean by 
the immortality of the soul the         
immortality of fame1 which whether worth
 having or not can only be ascribed to a
 very select class of the whole race of 
mankind1 and even the interest in these 
few is comparatively short-lived4 ,to   
have been a benefactor to the world1    
whether in a higher or a lower sphere of
 life and thought1 is a great thing3 to 
have the reputation of being one1 when  
men have passed out of the sphere of    
earthly praise or blame1 is hardly      

worthy of consideration4 ,the memory of 
a great man1 so far from being immortal1
 is really limited to his own           
generation3--so long as his friends or  
his disciples are alive1 so long as his 
books continue to be read1 so long as   
his political or military successes fill
 a page in the history of his country4  
,the praises which are bestowed upon him
 at his death hardly last longer than   
the flowers which are strewed upon his  
coffin or the 'immortelles' which are   
laid upon his tomb4 ,literature makes   
the most of its heroes1 but the true man
 is well aware that far from enjoying an
 immortality of fame1 in a generation or
 two1 or even in a much shorter time1 he
 will be forgotten and the world will   
get on without him4  #d4 ,modern        
philosophy is perplexed at this whole   
question1 which is sometimes fairly     
given up and handed over to the realm of
 faith4 ,the perplexity should not be   
forgotten by us when we attempt to      
submit the ,phaedo of ,plato to the     

requirements of logic4 ,for what idea   
can we form of the soul when separated  
from the body8 ,or how can the soul be  
united with the body and still be       
independent8 ,is the soul related to the
 body as the ideal to the real1 or as   
the whole to the parts1 or as the       
subject to the object1 or as the cause  
to the effect1 or as the end to the     
means8 ,shall we say with ,aristotle1   
that the soul is the entelechy or form  
of an organized living body8 or with    
,plato1 that she has a life of her own8 
,is the ,pythagorean image of the       
harmony1 or that of the monad1 the truer
 expression8 ,is the soul related to the
 body as sight to the eye1 or as the    
boatman to his boat8 7,arist4 de ,anim47
 ,and in another state of being is the  
soul to be conceived of as vanishing    
into infinity1 hardly possessing an     
existence which she can call her own1 as
 in the pantheistic system of ,spinoza3 
or as an individual informing another   
body and entering into new relations1   

but retaining her own character8        
7,compare ,gorgias47 ,or is the         
opposition of soul and body a mere      
illusion1 and the true self neither soul
 nor body1 but the union of the two in  
the ',i' which is above them8 ,and is   
death the assertion of this             
individuality in the higher nature1 and 
the falling away into nothingness of the
 lower8 ,or are we vainly attempting to 
pass the boundaries of human thought8   
,the body and the soul seem to be       
inseparable1 not only in fact1 but in   
our conceptions of them2 and any        
philosophy which too closely unites     
them1 or too widely separates them1     
either in this life or in another1      
disturbs the balance of human nature4   
,no thinker has perfectly adjusted them1
 or been entirely consistent with       
himself in describing their relation to 
one another4 ,nor can we wonder that    
,plato in the infancy of human thought  
should have confused mythology and      
philosophy1 or have mistaken verbal     

arguments for real ones4  #e4 ,again1   
believing in the immortality of the     
soul1 we must still ask the question of 
,socrates1 ',what is that which we      
suppose to be immortal8' ,is it the     
personal and individual element in us1  
or the spiritual and universal8 ,is it  
the principle of knowledge or of        
goodness1 or the union of the two8 ,is  
it the mere force of life which is      
determined to be1 or the consciousness  
of self which cannot be got rid of1 or  
the fire of genius which refuses to be  
extinguished8 ,or is there a hidden     
being which is allied to the ,author of 
all existence1 who is because he is     
perfect1 and to whom our ideas of       
perfection give us a title to belong8   
,whatever answer is given by us to these
 questions1 there still remains the     
necessity of allowing the permanence of 
evil1 if not for ever1 at any rate for a
 time1 in order that the wicked 'may not
 have too good a bargain4' ,for the     
annihilation of evil at death1 or the   

eternal duration of it1 seem to involve 
equal difficulties in the moral         
government of the universe4 ,sometimes  
we are led by our feelings1 rather than 
by our reason1 to think of the good and 
wise only as existing in another life4  
,why should the mean1 the weak1 the     
idiot1 the infant1 the herd of men who  
have never in any proper sense the use  
of reason1 reappear with blinking eyes  
in the light of another world8 ,but our 
second thought is that the hope of      
humanity is a common one1 and that all  
or none will be partakers of            
immortality4 ,reason does not allow us  
to suppose that we have any greater     
claims than others1 and experience may  
often reveal to us unexpected flashes of
 the higher nature in those whom we had 
despised4 ,why should the wicked suffer 
any more than ourselves8 had we been    
placed in their circumstances should we 
have been any better than they8 ,the    
worst of men are objects of pity rather 
than of anger to the philanthropist2    

must they not be equally such to divine 
benevolence8 ,even more than the good   
they have need of another life2 not that
 they may be punished1 but that they may
 be educated4 ,these are a few of the   
reflections which arise in our minds    
when we attempt to assign any form to   
our conceptions of a future state4      
,there are some other questions which   
are disturbing to us because we have no 
answer to them4 ,what is to become of   
the animals in a future state8 ,have we 
not seen dogs more faithful and         
intelligent than men1 and men who are   
more stupid and brutal than any animals8
 ,does their life cease at death1 or is 
there some 'better thing reserved' also 
for them8 ,they may be said to have a   
shadow or imitation of morality1 and    
imperfect moral claims upon the         
benevolence of man and upon the justice 
of ,god4 ,we cannot think of the least  
or lowest of them1 the insect1 the bird1
 the inhabitants of the sea or the      
desert1 as having any place in a future 

world1 and if not all1 why should those 
who are specially attached to man be    
deemed worthy of any exceptional        
privilege8 ,when we reason about such a 
subject1 almost at once we degenerate   
into nonsense4 ,it is a passing thought 
which has no real hold on the mind4 ,we 
may argue for the existence of animals  
in a future state from the attributes of
 ,god1 or from texts of ,scripture      
7',are not two sparrows sold for one    
farthing8' etc471 but the truth is that 
we are only filling up the void of      
another world with our own fancies4     
,again1 we often talk about the origin  
of evil1 that great bugbear of          
theologians1 by which they frighten us  
into believing any superstition4 ,what  
answer can be made to the old           
commonplace1 ',is not ,god the author of
 evil1 if he knowingly permitted1 but   
could have prevented it8' ,even if we   
assume that the inequalities of this    
life are rectified by some transposition
 of human beings in another1 still the  

existence of the very least evil if it  
could have been avoided1 seems to be at 
variance with the love and justice of   
,god4 ,and so we arrive at the          
conclusion that we are carrying logic   
too far1 and that the attempt to frame  
the world according to a rule of divine 
perfection is opposed to experience and 
had better be given up4 ,the case of the
 animals is our own4 ,we must admit that
 the ,divine ,being1 although perfect   
himself1 has placed us in a state of    
life in which we may work together with 
him for good1 but we are very far from  
having attained to it4  #f4 ,again1     
ideas must be given through something2  
and we are always prone to argue about  
the soul from analogies of outward      
things which may serve to embody our    
thoughts1 but are also partly delusive4 
,for we cannot reason from the natural  
to the spiritual1 or from the outward to
 the inward4 ,the progress of           
physiological science1 without bringing 
us nearer to the great secret1 has      

tended to remove some erroneous notions 
respecting the relations of body and    
mind1 and in this we have the advantage 
of the ancients4 ,but no one imagines   
that any seed of immortality is to be   
discerned in our mortal frames4 ,most   
people have been content to rest their  
belief in another life on the agreement 
of the more enlightened part of mankind1
 and on the inseparable connection of   
such a doctrine with the existence of a 
,god--also in a less degree on the      
impossibility of doubting about the     
continued existence of those whom we    
love and reverence in this world4 ,and  
after all has been said1 the figure1 the
 analogy1 the argument1 are felt to be  
only approximations in different forms  
to an expression of the common sentiment
 of the human heart4 ,that we shall live
 again is far more certain than that we 
shall take any particular form of life4 
#g4 ,when we speak of the immortality of
 the soul1 we must ask further what we  
mean by the word immortality4 ,for of   

the duration of a living being in       
countless ages we can form no           
conception2 far less than a three years'
 old child of the whole of life4 ,the   
naked eye might as well try to see the  
furthest star in the infinity of heaven4
 ,whether time and space really exist   
when we take away the limits of them may
 be doubted2 at any rate the thought of 
them when unlimited us so overwhelming  
to us as to lose all distinctness4      
,philosophers have spoken of them as    
forms of the human mind1 but what is the
 mind without them8 ,as then infinite   
time1 or an existence out of time1 which
 are the only possible explanations of  
eternal duration1 are equally           
inconceivable to us1 let us substitute  
for them a hundred or a thousand years  
after death1 and ask not what will be   
our employment in eternity1 but what    
will happen to us in that definite      
portion of time2 or what is now         
happening to those who passed out of    
life a hundred or a thousand years ago4 

,do we imagine that the wicked are      
suffering torments1 or that the good are
 singing the praises of ,god1 during a  
period longer than that of a whole life1
 or of ten lives of men8 ,is the        
suffering physical or mental8 ,and does 
the worship of ,god consist only of     
praise1 or of many forms of service8    
,who are the wicked1 and who are the    
good1 whom we venture to divide by a    
hard and fast line2 and in which of the 
two classes should we place ourselves   
and our friends8 ,may we not suspect    
that we are making differences of kind1 
because we are unable to imagine        
differences of degree8--putting the     
whole human race into heaven or hell for
 the greater convenience of logical     
division8 ,are we not at the same time  
describing them both in superlatives1   
only that we may satisfy the demands of 
rhetoric8 ,what is that pain which does 
not become deadened after a thousand    
years8 or what is the nature of that    
pleasure or happiness which never       

wearies by monotony8 ,earthly pleasures 
and pains are short in proportion as    
they are keen2 of any others which are  
both intense and lasting we have no     
experience1 and can form no idea4 ,the  
words or figures of speech which we use 
are not consistent with themselves4 ,for
 are we not imagining ,heaven under the 
similitude of a church1 and ,hell as a  
prison1 or perhaps a madhouse or chamber
 of horrors8 ,and yet to beings         
constituted as we are1 the monotony of  
singing psalms would be as great an     
infliction as the pains of hell1 and    
might be even pleasantly interrupted by 
them4 ,where are the actions worthy of  
rewards greater than those which are    
conferred on the greatest benefactors of
 mankind8 ,and where are the crimes     
which according to ,plato's merciful    
reckoning1--more merciful1 at any rate1 
than the eternal damnation of so-called 
,christian teachers1--for every ten     
years in this life deserve a hundred of 
punishment in the life to come8 ,we     

should be ready to die of pity if we    
could see the least of the sufferings   
which the writers of ,infernos and      
,purgatorios have attributed to the     
damned4 ,yet these joys and terrors seem
 hardly to exercise an appreciable      
influence over the lives of men4 ,the   
wicked man when old1 is not1 as ,plato  
supposes 7,republic71 more agitated by  
the terrors of another world when he is 
nearer to them1 nor the good in an      
ecstasy at the joys of which he is soon 
to be the partaker4 ,age numbs the sense
 of both worlds2 and the habit of life  
is strongest in death4 ,even the dying  
mother is dreaming of her lost children 
as they were forty or fifty years       
before1 'pattering over the boards1' not
 of reunion with them in another state  
of being4 ,most persons when the last   
hour comes are resigned to the order of 
nature and the will of ,god4 ,they are  
not thinking of ,dante's ,inferno or    
,paradiso1 or of the ,pilgrim's         
,progress4 ,heaven and hell are not     

realities to them1 but words or ideas2  
the outward symbols of some great       
mystery1 they hardly know what4 ,many   
noble poems and pictures have been      
suggested by the traditional            
representations of them1 which have been
 fixed in forms of art and can no longer
 be altered4 ,many sermons have been    
filled with descriptions of celestial or
 infernal mansions4 ,but hardly even in 
childhood did the thought of heaven and 
hell supply the motives of our actions1 
or at any time seriously affect the     
substance of our belief4  #h4 ,another  
life must be described1 if at all1 in   
forms of thought and not of sense4 ,to  
draw pictures of heaven and hell1       
whether in the language of ,scripture or
 any other1 adds nothing to our real    
knowledge1 but may perhaps disguise our 
ignorance4 ,the truest conception which 
we can form of a future life is a state 
of progress or education--a progress    
from evil to good1 from ignorance to    
knowledge4 ,to this we are led by the   

analogy of the present life1 in which we
 see different races and nations of men1
 and different men and women of the same
 nation1 in various states or stages of 
cultivation2 some more and some less    
developed1 and all of them capable of   
improvement under favourable            
circumstances4 ,there are punishments   
too of children when they are growing up
 inflicted by their parents1 of elder   
offenders which are imposed by the law  
of the land1 of all men at all times of 
life1 which are attached by the laws of 
nature to the performance of certain    
actions4 ,all these punishments are     
really educational2 that is to say1 they
 are not intended to retaliate on the   
offender1 but to teach him a lesson4    
,also there is an element of chance in  
them1 which is another name for our     
ignorance of the laws of nature4 ,there 
is evil too inseparable from good       
7compare ,lysis72 not always punished   
here1 as good is not always rewarded4   
,it is capable of being indefinitely    

diminished2 and as knowledge increases1 
the element of chance may more and more 
disappear4  ,for we do not argue merely 
from the analogy of the present state of
 this world to another1 but from the    
analogy of a probable future to which we
 are tending4 ,the greatest changes of  
which we have had experience as yet are 
due to our increasing knowledge of      
history and of nature4 ,they have been  
produced by a few minds appearing in    
three or four favoured nations1 in a    
comparatively short period of time4 ,may
 we be allowed to imagine the minds of  
men everywhere working together during  
many ages for the completion of our     
knowledge8 ,may not the science of      
physiology transform the world8 ,again1 
the majority of mankind have really     
experienced some moral improvement2     
almost every one feels that he has      
tendencies to good1 and is capable of   
becoming better4 ,and these germs of    
good are often found to be developed by 
new circumstances1 like stunted trees   

when transplanted to a better soil4 ,the
 differences between the savage and the 
civilized man1 or between the civilized 
man in old and new countries1 may be    
indefinitely increased4 ,the first      
difference is the effect of a few       
thousand1 the second of a few hundred   
years4 ,we congratulate ourselves that  
slavery has become industry2 that law   
and constitutional government have      
superseded despotism and violence2 that 
an ethical religion has taken the place 
of ,fetichism4 ,there may yet come a    
time when the many may be as well off as
 the few2 when no one will be weighed   
down by excessive toil2 when the        
necessity of providing for the body will
 not interfere with mental improvement2 
when the physical frame may be          
strengthened and developed2 and the     
religion of all men may become a        
reasonable service4  ,nothing therefore1
 either in the present state of man or  
in the tendencies of the future1 as far 
as we can entertain conjecture of them1 

would lead us to suppose that ,god      
governs us vindictively in this world1  
and therefore we have no reason to infer
 that he will govern us vindictively in 
another4 ,the true argument from analogy
 is not1 ',this life is a mixed state of
 justice and injustice1 of great waste1 
of sudden casualties1 of                
disproportionate punishments1 and       
therefore the like inconsistencies1     
irregularities1 injustices are to be    
expected in another2' but ',this life is
 subject to law1 and is in a state of   
progress1 and therefore law and progress
 may be believed to be the governing    
principles of another4' ,all the        
analogies of this world would be against
 unmeaning punishments inflicted a      
hundred or a thousand years after an    
offence had been committed4 ,suffering  
there might be as a part of education1  
but not hopeless or protracted2 as there
 might be a retrogression of individuals
 or of bodies of men1 yet not such as to
 interfere with a plan for the          

improvement of the whole 7compare       
,laws47  #i4 ,but some one will say3    
,that we cannot reason from the seen to 
the unseen1 and that we are creating    
another world after the image of this1  
just as men in former ages have created 
gods in their own likeness4 ,and we1    
like the companions of ,socrates1 may   
feel discouraged at hearing our         
favourite 'argument from analogy' thus  
summarily disposed of4 ,like himself1   
too1 we may adduce other arguments in   
which he seems to have anticipated us1  
though he expresses them in different   
language4 ,for we feel that the soul    
partakes of the ideal and invisible2 and
 can never fall into the error of       
confusing the external circumstances of 
man with his higher self2 or his origin 
with his nature4 ,it is as repugnant to 
us as it was to him to imagine that our 
moral ideas are to be attributed only to
 cerebral forces4 ,the value of a human 
soul1 like the value of a man's life to 
himself1 is inestimable1 and cannot be  

reckoned in earthly or material things4 
,the human being alone has the          
consciousness of truth and justice and  
love1 which is the consciousness of     
,god4 ,and the soul becoming more       
conscious of these1 becomes more        
conscious of her own immortality4  #aj4 
,the last ground of our belief in       
immortality1 and the strongest1 is the  
perfection of the divine nature4 ,the   
mere fact of the existence of ,god does 
not tend to show the continued existence
 of man4 ,an evil ,god or an indifferent
 ,god might have had the power1 but not 
the will1 to preserve us4 ,he might have
 regarded us as fitted to minister to   
his service by a succession of          
existences1--like the animals1 without  
attributing to each soul an incomparable
 value4 ,but if he is perfect1 he must  
will that all rational beings should    
partake of that perfection which he     
himself is4 ,in the words of the        
,timaeus1 he is good1 and therefore he  
desires that all other things should be 

as like himself as possible4 ,and the   
manner in which he accomplishes this is 
by permitting evil1 or rather degrees of
 good1 which are otherwise called evil4 
,for all progress is good relatively to 
the past1 and yet may be comparatively  
evil when regarded in the light of the  
future4 ,good and evil are relative     
terms1 and degrees of evil are merely   
the negative aspect of degrees of good4 
,of the absolute goodness of any finite 
nature we can form no conception2 we are
 all of us in process of transition from
 one degree of good or evil to another4 
,the difficulties which are urged about 
the origin or existence of evil are mere
 dialectical puzzles1 standing in the   
same relation to ,christian philosophy  
as the puzzles of the ,cynics and       
,megarians to the philosophy of ,plato4 
,they arise out of the tendency of the  
human mind to regard good and evil both 
as relative and absolute2 just as the   
riddles about motion are to be explained
 by the double conception of space or   

matter1 which the human mind has the    
power of regarding either as continuous 
or discrete4  ,in speaking of divine    
perfection1 we mean to say that ,god is 
just and true and loving1 the author of 
order and not of disorder1 of good and  
not of evil4 ,or rather1 that he is     
justice1 that he is truth1 that he is   
love1 that he is order1 that he is the  
very progress of which we were speaking2
 and that wherever these qualities are  
present1 whether in the human soul or in
 the order of nature1 there is ,god4 ,we
 might still see him everywhere1 if we  
had not been mistakenly seeking for him 
apart from us1 instead of in us2 away   
from the laws of nature1 instead of in  
them4 ,and we become united to him not  
by mystical absorption1 but by          
partaking1 whether consciously or       
unconsciously1 of that truth and justice
 and love which he himself is4  ,thus   
the belief in the immortality of the    
soul rests at last on the belief in     
,god4 ,if there is a good and wise ,god1

 then there is a progress of mankind    
towards perfection2 and if there is no  
progress of men towards perfection1 then
 there is no good and wise ,god4 ,we    
cannot suppose that the moral government
 of ,god of which we see the beginnings 
in the world and in ourselves will cease
 when we pass out of life4  #aa4        
,considering the 'feebleness of the     
human faculties and the uncertainty of  
the subject1' we are inclined to believe
 that the fewer our words the better4   
,at the approach of death there is not  
much said2 good men are too honest to go
 out of the world professing more than  
they know4 ,there is perhaps no         
important subject about which1 at any   
time1 even religious people speak so    
little to one another4 ,in the fulness  
of life the thought of death is mostly  
awakened by the sight or recollection of
 the death of others rather than by the 
prospect of our own4 ,we must also      
acknowledge that there are degrees of   
the belief in immortality1 and many     

forms in which it presents itself to the
 mind4 ,some persons will say no more   
than that they trust in ,god1 and that  
they leave all to ,him4 ,it is a great  
part of true religion not to pretend to 
know more than we do4 ,others when they 
quit this world are comforted with the  
hope ',that they will see and know their
 friends in heaven4' ,but it is better  
to leave them in the hands of ,god and  
to be assured that 'no evil shall touch 
them4' ,there are others again to whom  
the belief in a divine personality has  
ceased to have any longer a meaning2 yet
 they are satisfied that the end of all 
is not here1 but that something still   
remains to us1 'and some better thing   
for the good than for the evil4' ,they  
are persuaded1 in spite of their        
theological nihilism1 that the ideas of 
justice and truth and holiness and love 
are realities4 ,they cherish an         
enthusiastic devotion to the first      
principles of morality4 ,through these  
they see1 or seem to see1 darkly1 and in

 a figure1 that the soul is immortal4   
,but besides differences of theological 
opinion which must ever prevail about   
things unseen1 the hope of immortality  
is weaker or stronger in men at one time
 of life than at another2 it even varies
 from day to day4 ,it comes and goes2   
the mind1 like the sky1 is apt to be    
overclouded4 ,other generations of men  
may have sometimes lived under an       
'eclipse of faith1' to us the total     
disappearance of it might be compared to
 the 'sun falling from heaven4' ,and we 
may sometimes have to begin again and   
acquire the belief for ourselves2 or to 
win it back again when it is lost4 ,it  
is really weakest in the hour of death4 
,for ,nature1 like a kind mother or     
nurse1 lays us to sleep without         
frightening us2 physicians1 who are the 
witnesses of such scenes1 say that under
 ordinary circumstances there is no fear
 of the future4 ,often1 as ,plato tells 
us1 death is accompanied 'with          
pleasure4' 7,tim47 ,when the end is     

still uncertain1 the cry of many a one  
has been1 ',pray1 that ,i may be taken4'
 ,the last thoughts even of the best men
 depend chiefly on the accidents of     
their bodily state4 ,pain soon          
overpowers the desire of life2 old age1 
like the child1 is laid to sleep almost 
in a moment4 ,the long experience of    
life will often destroy the interest    
which mankind have in it4 ,so various   
are the feelings with which different   
persons draw near to death2 and still   
more various the forms in which         
imagination clothes it4 ,for this       
alternation of feeling compare the ,old 
,testament1--,psalm vi42 ,isaiah2       
,eccles4  #ab4 ,when we think of ,god   
and of man in his relation to ,god2 of  
the imperfection of our present state   
and yet of the progress which is        
observable in the history of the world  
and of the human mind2 of the depth and 
power of our moral ideas which seem to  
partake of the very nature of ,god      
,himself2 when we consider the contrast 

between the physical laws to which we   
are subject and the higher law which    
raises us above them and is yet a part  
of them2 when we reflect on our capacity
 of becoming the 'spectators of all time
 and all existence1' and of framing in  
our own minds the ideal of a perfect    
,being2 when we see how the human mind  
in all the higher religions of the      
world1 including ,buddhism1             
notwithstanding some aberrations1 has   
tended towards such a belief--we have   
reason to think that our destiny is     
different from that of animals2 and     
though we cannot altogether shut out the
 childish fear that the soul upon       
leaving the body may 'vanish into thin  
air1' we have still1 so far as the      
nature of the subject admits1 a hope of 
immortality with which we comfort       
ourselves on sufficient grounds4 ,the   
denial of the belief takes the heart out
 of human life2 it lowers men to the    
level of the material4 ,as ,goethe also 
says1 ',he is dead even in this world   

who has no belief in another4'  #ac4 ,it
 is well also that we should sometimes  
think of the forms of thought under     
which the idea of immortality is most   
naturally presented to us4 ,it is clear 
that to our minds the risen soul can no 
longer be described1 as in a picture1 by
 the symbol of a creature half-bird1    
half-human1 nor in any other form of    
sense4 ,the multitude of angels1 as in  
,milton1 singing the ,almighty's        
praises1 are a noble image1 and may     
furnish a theme for the poet or the     
painter1 but they are no longer an      
adequate expression of the kingdom of   
,god which is within us4 ,neither is    
there any mansion1 in this world or     
another1 in which the departed can be   
imagined to dwell and carry on their    
occupations4 ,when this earthly         
tabernacle is dissolved1 no other       
habitation or building can take them in3
 it is in the language of ideas only    
that we speak of them4  ,first of all   
there is the thought of rest and freedom

 from pain2 they have gone home1 as the 
common saying is1 and the cares of this 
world touch them no more4 ,secondly1 we 
may imagine them as they were at their  
best and brightest1 humbly fulfilling   
their daily round of duties--selfless1  
childlike1 unaffected by the world2 when
 the eye was single and the whole body  
seemed to be full of light2 when the    
mind was clear and saw into the purposes
 of ,god4 ,thirdly1 we may think of them
 as possessed by a great love of ,god   
and man1 working out ,his will at a     
further stage in the heavenly           
pilgrimage4 ,and yet we acknowledge that
 these are the things which eye hath not
 seen nor ear heard and therefore it    
hath not entered into the heart of man  
in any sensible manner to conceive them4
 ,fourthly1 there may have been some    
moments in our own lives when we have   
risen above ourselves1 or been conscious
 of our truer selves1 in which the will 
of ,god has superseded our wills1 and we
 have entered into communion with ,him1 

and been partakers for a brief season of
 the ,divine truth and love1 in which   
like ,christ we have been inspired to   
utter the prayer1 ',i in them1 and thou 
in me1 that we may be all made perfect  
in one4' ,these precious moments1 if we 
have ever known them1 are the nearest   
approach which we can make to the idea  
of immortality4  #ad4 ,returning now to 
the earlier stage of human thought which
 is represented by the writings of      
,plato1 we find that many of the same   
questions have already arisen3 there is 
the same tendency to materialism2 the   
same inconsistency in the application of
 the idea of mind2 the same doubt       
whether the soul is to be regarded as a 
cause or as an effect2 the same falling 
back on moral convictions4 ,in the      
,phaedo the soul is conscious of her    
divine nature1 and the separation from  
the body which has been commenced in    
this life is perfected in another4      
,beginning in mystery1 ,socrates1 in the
 intermediate part of the ,dialogue1    

attempts to bring the doctrine of a     
future life into connection with his    
theory of knowledge4 ,in proportion as  
he succeeds in this1 the individual     
seems to disappear in a more general    
notion of the soul2 the contemplation of
 ideas 'under the form of eternity'     
takes the place of past and future      
states of existence4 ,his language may  
be compared to that of some modern      
philosophers1 who speak of eternity1 not
 in the sense of perpetual duration of  
time1 but as an ever-present quality of 
the soul4 ,yet at the conclusion of the 
,dialogue1 having 'arrived at the end of
 the intellectual world' 7,republic71 he
 replaces the veil of mythology1 and    
describes the soul and her attendant    
genius in the language of the mysteries 
or of a disciple of ,zoroaster4 ,nor can
 we fairly demand of ,plato a           
consistency which is wanting among      
ourselves1 who acknowledge that another 
world is beyond the range of human      
thought1 and yet are always seeking to  

represent the mansions of heaven or hell
 in the colours of the painter1 or in   
the descriptions of the poet or         
rhetorician4  #ae4 ,the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul was not new to  
the ,greeks in the age of ,socrates1    
but1 like the unity of ,god1 had a      
foundation in the popular belief4 ,the  
old ,homeric notion of a gibbering ghost
 flitting away to ,hades2 or of a few   
illustrious heroes enjoying the isles of
 the blest2 or of an existence divided  
between the two2 or the ,hesiodic1 of   
righteous spirits1 who become guardian  
angels1--had given place in the         
mysteries and the ,orphic poets to      
representations1 partly fanciful1 of a  
future state of rewards and punishments4
 7,laws47 ,the reticence of the ,greeks 
on public occasions and in some part of 
their literature respecting this        
'underground' religion1 is not to be    
taken as a measure of the diffusion of  
such beliefs4 ,if ,pericles in the      
funeral oration is silent on the        

consolations of immortality1 the poet   
,pindar and the tragedians on the other 
hand constantly assume the continued    
existence of the dead in an upper or    
under world4 ,darius and ,laius are     
still alive2 ,antigone will be dear to  
her brethren after death2 the way to the
 palace of ,cronos is found by those who
 'have thrice departed from evil4' ,the 
tragedy of the ,greeks is not 'rounded' 
by this life1 but is deeply set in      
decrees of fate and mysterious workings 
of powers beneath the earth4 ,in the    
caricature of ,aristophanes there is    
also a witness to the common sentiment4 
,the ,ionian and ,pythagorean           
philosophies arose1 and some new        
elements were added to the popular      
belief4 ,the individual must find an    
expression as well as the world4 ,either
 the soul was supposed to exist in the  
form of a magnet1 or of a particle of   
fire1 or of light1 or air1 or water2 or 
of a number or of a harmony of number2  
or to be or have1 like the stars1 a     

principle of motion 7,arist4 de ,anim474
 ,at length ,anaxagoras1 hardly         
distinguishing between life and mind1 or
 between mind human and divine1 attained
 the pure abstraction2 and this1 like   
the other abstractions of ,greek        
philosophy1 sank deep into the human    
intelligence4 ,the opposition of the    
intelligible and the sensible1 and of   
,god to the world1 supplied an analogy  
which assisted in the separation of soul
 and body4 ,if ideas were separable from
 phenomena1 mind was also separable from
 matter2 if the ideas were eternal1 the 
mind that conceived them was eternal    
too4 ,as the unity of ,god was more     
distinctly acknowledged1 the conception 
of the human soul became more developed4
 ,the succession1 or alternation of life
 and death1 had occurred to             
,heracleitus4 ,the ,eleatic ,parmenides 
had stumbled upon the modern thesis1    
that 'thought and being are the same4'  
,the ,eastern belief in transmigration  
defined the sense of individuality2 and 

some1 like ,empedocles1 fancied that the
 blood which they had shed in another   
state of being was crying against them1 
and that for thirty thousand years they 
were to be 'fugitives and vagabonds upon
 the earth4' ,the desire of recognizing 
a lost mother or love or friend in the  
world below 7,phaedo7 was a natural     
feeling which1 in that age as well as in
 every other1 has given distinctness to 
the hope of immortality4 ,nor were      
ethical considerations wanting1 partly  
derived from the necessity of punishing 
the greater sort of criminals1 whom no  
avenging power of this world could      
reach4 ,the voice of conscience1 too1   
was heard reminding the good man that he
 was not altogether innocent4           
7,republic47 ,to these indistinct       
longings and fears an expression was    
given in the mysteries and ,orphic      
poets3 a 'heap of books' 7,republic71   
passing under the names of ,musaeus and 
,orpheus in ,plato's time1 were filled  
with notions of an under-world4  #af4   

,yet after all the belief in the        
individuality of the soul after death   
had but a feeble hold on the ,greek     
mind4 ,like the personality of ,god1 the
 personality of man in a future state   
was not inseparably bound up with the   
reality of his existence4 ,for the      
distinction between the personal and    
impersonal1 and also between the divine 
and human1 was far less marked to the   
,greek than to ourselves4 ,and as ,plato
 readily passes from the notion of the  
good to that of ,god1 he also passes    
almost imperceptibly to himself and his 
reader from the future life of the      
individual soul to the eternal being of 
the absolute soul4 ,there has been a    
clearer statement and a clearer denial  
of the belief in modern times than is   
found in early ,greek philosophy1 and   
hence the comparative silence on the    
whole subject which is often remarked in
 ancient writers1 and particularly in   
,aristotle4 ,for ,plato and ,aristotle  
are not further removed in their        

teaching about the immortality of the   
soul than they are in their theory of   
knowledge4  #ag4 ,living in an age when 
logic was beginning to mould human      
thought1 ,plato naturally cast his      
belief in immortality into a logical    
form4 ,and when we consider how much the
 doctrine of ideas was also one of      
words1 it is not surprising that he     
should have fallen into verbal          
fallacies3 early logic is always        
mistaking the truth of the form for the 
truth of the matter4 ,it is easy to see 
that the alternation of opposites is not
 the same as the generation of them out 
of each other2 and that the generation  
of them out of each other1 which is the 
first argument in the ,phaedo1 is at    
variance with their mutual exclusion of 
each other1 whether in themselves or in 
us1 which is the last4 ,for even if we  
admit the distinction which he draws    
between the opposites and the things    
which have the opposites1 still         
individuals fall under the latter class2

 and we have to pass out of the region  
of human hopes and fears to a conception
 of an abstract soul which is the       
impersonation of the ideas4 ,such a     
conception1 which in ,plato himself is  
but half expressed1 is unmeaning to us1 
and relative only to a particular stage 
in the history of thought4 ,the doctrine
 of reminiscence is also a fragment of a
 former world1 which has no place in the
 philosophy of modern times4 ,but ,plato
 had the wonders of psychology just     
opening to him1 and he had not the      
explanation of them which is supplied by
 the analysis of language and the       
history of the human mind4 ,the         
question1 ',whence come our abstract    
ideas8' he could only answer by an      
imaginary hypothesis4 ,nor is it        
difficult to see that his crowning      
argument is purely verbal1 and is but   
the expression of an instinctive        
confidence put into a logical           
form3--',the soul is immortal because it
 contains a principle of                

imperishableness4' ,nor does he himself 
seem at all to be aware that nothing is 
added to human knowledge by his 'safe   
and simple answer1' that beauty is the  
cause of the beautiful2 and that he is  
merely reasserting the ,eleatic being   
'divided by the ,pythagorean numbers1'  
against the ,heracleitean doctrine of   
perpetual generation4 ,the answer to the
 'very serious question' of generation  
and destruction is really the denial of 
them4 ,for this he would substitute1 as 
in the ,republic1 a system of ideas1    
tested1 not by experience1 but by their 
consequences1 and not explained by      
actual causes1 but by a higher1 that is1
 a more general notion4 ,consistency    
with themselves is the only test which  
is to be applied to them4 7,republic1   
and ,phaedo47  #ah4 ,to deal fairly with
 such arguments1 they should be         
translated as far as possible into their
 modern equivalents4 ',if the ideas of  
men are eternal1 their souls are        
eternal1 and if not the ideas1 then not 

the souls4' ,such an argument stands    
nearly in the same relation to ,plato   
and his age1 as the argument from the   
existence of ,god to immortality among  
ourselves4 ',if ,god exists1 then the   
soul exists after death2 and if there is
 no ,god1 there is no existence of the  
soul after death4' ,for the ideas are to
 his mind the reality1 the truth1 the   
principle of permanence1 as well as of  
intelligence and order in the world4    
,when ,simmias and ,cebes say that they 
are more strongly persuaded of the      
existence of ideas than they are of the 
immortality of the soul1 they represent 
fairly enough the order of thought in   
,greek philosophy4 ,and we might say in 
the same way that we are more certain of
 the existence of ,god than we are of   
the immortality of the soul1 and are led
 by the belief in the one to a belief in
 the other4 ,the parallel1 as ,socrates 
would say1 is not perfect1 but agrees in
 as far as the mind in either case is   
regarded as dependent on something above

 and beyond herself4 ,the analogy may   
even be pressed a step further3 ',we are
 more certain of our ideas of truth and 
right than we are of the existence of   
,god1 and are led on in the order of    
thought from one to the other4' ,or more
 correctly3 ',the existence of right and
 truth is the existence of ,god1 and can
 never for a moment be separated from   
,him4'  #ai4 ,the main argument of the  
,phaedo is derived from the existence of
 eternal ideas of which the soul is a   
partaker2 the other argument of the     
alternation of opposites is replaced by 
this4 ,and there have not been wanting  
philosophers of the idealist school who 
have imagined that the doctrine of the  
immortality of the soul is a theory of  
knowledge1 and that in what has preceded
 ,plato is accommodating himself to the 
popular belief4 ,such a view can only be
 elicited from the ,phaedo by what may  
be termed the transcendental method of  
interpretation1 and is obviously        
inconsistent with the ,gorgias and the  

,republic4 ,those who maintain it are   
immediately compelled to renounce the   
shadow which they have grasped1 as a    
play of words only4 ,but the truth is1  
that ,plato in his argument for the     
immortality of the soul has collected   
many elements of proof or persuasion1   
ethical and mythological as well as     
dialectical1 which are not easily to be 
reconciled with one another2 and he is  
as much in earnest about his doctrine of
 retribution1 which is repeated in all  
his more ethical writings1 as about his 
theory of knowledge4 ,and while we may  
fairly translate the dialectical into   
the language of ,hegel1 and the         
religious and mythological into the     
language of ,dante or ,bunyan1 the      
ethical speaks to us still in the same  
voice1 and appeals to a common feeling4 
#bj4 ,two arguments of this ethical     
character occur in the ,phaedo4 ,the    
first may be described as the aspiration
 of the soul after another state of     
being4 ,like the ,oriental or ,christian

 mystic1 the philosopher is seeking to  
withdraw from impurities of sense1 to   
leave the world and the things of the   
world1 and to find his higher self4     
,plato recognizes in these aspirations  
the foretaste of immortality2 as ,butler
 and ,addison in modern times have      
argued1 the one from the moral          
tendencies of mankind1 the other from   
the progress of the soul towards        
perfection4 ,in using this argument     
,plato has certainly confused the soul  
which has left the body1 with the soul  
of the good and wise4 7,compare         
,republic47 ,such a confusion was       
natural1 and arose partly out of the    
antithesis of soul and body4 ,the soul  
in her own essence1 and the soul        
'clothed upon' with virtues and graces1 
were easily interchanged with one       
another1 because on a subject which     
passes expression the distinctions of   
language can hardly be maintained4  #ba4
 ,the ethical proof of the immortality  
of the soul is derived from the         

necessity of retribution4 ,the wicked   
would be too well off if their evil     
deeds came to an end4 ,it is not to be  
supposed that an ,ardiaeus1 an          
,archelaus1 an ,ismenias could ever have
 suffered the penalty of their crimes in
 this world4 ,the manner in which this  
retribution is accomplished ,plato      
represents under the figures of         
mythology4 ,doubtless he felt that it   
was easier to improve than to invent1   
and that in religion especially the     
traditional form was required in order  
to give verisimilitude to the myth4 ,the
 myth too is far more probable to that  
age than to ours1 and may fairly be     
regarded as 'one guess among many' about
 the nature of the earth1 which he      
cleverly supports by the indications of 
geology4 ,not that he insists on the    
absolute truth of his own particular    
notions3 'no man of sense will be       
confident in such matters2 but he will  
be confident that something of the kind 
is true4' ,as in other passages 7,gorg41

 ,tim41 compare ,crito71 he wins belief 
for his fictions by the moderation of   
his statements2 he does not1 like ,dante
 or ,swedenborg1 allow himself to be    
deceived by his own creations4  ,the    
,dialogue must be read in the light of  
the situation4 ,and first of all we are 
struck by the calmness of the scene4    
,like the spectators at the time1 we    
cannot pity ,socrates2 his mien and his 
language are so noble and fearless4 ,he 
is the same that he ever was1 but milder
 and gentler1 and he has in no degree   
lost his interest in dialectics2 he will
 not forego the delight of an argument  
in compliance with the jailer's         
intimation that he should not heat      
himself with talking4 ,at such a time he
 naturally expresses the hope of his    
life1 that he has been a true mystic and
 not a mere retainer or wand-bearer3 and
 he refers to passages of his personal  
history4 ,to his old enemies the ,comic 
poets1 and to the proceedings on the    
trial1 he alludes playfully2 but he     

vividly remembers the disappointment    
which he felt in reading the books of   
,anaxagoras4 ,the return of ,xanthippe  
and his children indicates that the     
philosopher is not 'made of oak or      
rock4' ,some other traits of his        
character may be noted2 for example1 the
 courteous manner in which he inclines  
his head to the last objector1 or the   
ironical touch1 ',me already1 as the    
tragic poet would say1 the voice of fate
 calls2' or the depreciation of the     
arguments with which 'he comforted      
himself and them2' or his fear of       
'misology2' or his references to ,homer2
 or the playful smile with which he     
'talks like a book' about greater and   
less2 or the allusion to the possibility
 of finding another teacher among       
barbarous races 7compare ,polit472 or   
the mysterious reference to another     
science 7mathematics87 of generation and
 destruction for which he is vainly     
feeling4 ,there is no change in him2    
only now he is invested with a sort of  

sacred character1 as the prophet or     
priest of ,apollo the ,god of the       
festival1 in whose honour he first of   
all composes a hymn1 and then like the  
swan pours forth his dying lay4 ,perhaps
 the extreme elevation of ,socrates     
above his own situation1 and the        
ordinary interests of life 7compare his 
jeu d'esprit about his burial1 in which 
for a moment he puts on the ',silenus   
mask'71 create in the mind of the reader
 an impression stronger than could be   
derived from arguments that such a one  
has in him 'a principle which does not  
admit of death4'  ,the other persons of 
the ,dialogue may be considered under   
two heads3 7#a7 private friends2 7#b7   
the respondents in the argument4  ,first
 there is ,crito1 who has been already  
introduced to us in the ,euthydemus and 
the ,crito2 he is the equal in years of 
,socrates1 and stands in quite a        
different relation to him from his      
younger disciples4 ,he is a man of the  
world who is rich and prosperous        

7compare the jest in the ,euthydemus71  
the best friend of ,socrates1 who wants 
to know his commands1 in whose presence 
he talks to his family1 and who performs
 the last duty of closing his eyes4 ,it 
is observable too that1 as in the       
,euthydemus1 ,crito shows no aptitude   
for philosophical discussions4 ,nor     
among the friends of ,socrates must the 
jailer be forgotten1 who seems to have  
been introduced by ,plato in order to   
show the impression made by the         
extraordinary man on the common4 ,the   
gentle nature of the man is indicated by
 his weeping at the announcement of his 
errand and then turning away1 and also  
by the words of ,socrates to his        
disciples3 ',how charming the man is6   
since ,i have been in prison he has been
 always coming to me1 and is as good as 
could be to me4' ,we are reminded too   
that he has retained this gentle nature 
amid scenes of death and violence by the
 contrasts which he draws between the   
behaviour of ,socrates and of others    

when about to die4  ,another person who 
takes no part in the philosophical      
discussion is the excitable             
,apollodorus1 the same who1 in the      
,symposium1 of which he is the narrator1
 is called 'the madman1' and who        
testifies his grief by the most violent 
emotions4 ,phaedo is also present1 the  
'beloved disciple' as he may be termed1 
who is described1 if not 'leaning on his
 bosom1' as seated next to ,socrates1   
who is playing with his hair4 ,he too1  
like ,apollodorus1 takes no part in the 
discussion1 but he loves above all      
things to hear and speak of ,socrates   
after his death4 ,the calmness of his   
behaviour1 veiling his face when he can 
no longer restrain his tears1 contrasts 
with the passionate outcries of the     
other4 ,at a particular point the       
argument is described as falling before 
the attack of ,simmias4 ,a sort of      
despair is introduced in the minds of   
the company4 ,the effect of this is     
heightened by the description of        

,phaedo1 who has been the eye-witness of
 the scene1 and by the sympathy of his  
,phliasian auditors who are beginning to
 think 'that they too can never trust an
 argument again4' ,and the intense      
interest of the company is communicated 
not only to the first auditors1 but to  
us who in a distant country read the    
narrative of their emotions after more  
than two thousand years have passed     
away4  ,the two principal interlocutors 
are ,simmias and ,cebes1 the disciples  
of ,philolaus the ,pythagorean          
philosopher of ,thebes4 ,simmias is     
described in the ,phaedrus as fonder of 
an argument than any man living2 and    
,cebes1 although finally persuaded by   
,socrates1 is said to be the most       
incredulous of human beings4 ,it is     
,cebes who at the commencement of the   
,dialogue asks why 'suicide is held to  
be unlawful1' and who first supplies the
 doctrine of recollection in            
confirmation of the pre-existence of the
 soul4 ,it is ,cebes who urges that the 

pre-existence does not necessarily      
involve the future existence of the     
soul1 as is shown by the illustration of
 the weaver and his coat4 ,simmias1 on  
the other hand1 raises the question     
about harmony and the lyre1 which is    
naturally put into the mouth of a       
,pythagorean disciple4 ,it is ,simmias1 
too1 who first remarks on the           
uncertainty of human knowledge1 and only
 at last concedes to the argument such a
 qualified approval as is consistent    
with the feebleness of the human        
faculties4 ,cebes is the deeper and more
 consecutive thinker1 ,simmias more     
superficial and rhetorical2 they are    
distinguished in much the same manner as
 ,adeimantus and ,glaucon in the        
,republic4  ,other persons1 ,menexenus1 
,ctesippus1 ,lysis1 are old friends2    
,evenus has been already satirized in   
the ,apology2 ,aeschines and ,epigenes  
were present at the trial2 ,euclid and  
,terpsion will reappear in the          
,introduction to the ,theaetetus1       

,hermogenes has already appeared in the 
,cratylus4 ,no inference can fairly be  
drawn from the absence of ,aristippus1  
nor from the omission of ,xenophon1 who 
at the time of ,socrates' death was in  
,asia4 ,the mention of ,plato's own     
absence seems like an expression of     
sorrow1 and may1 perhaps1 be an         
indication that the report of the       
conversation is not to be taken         
literally4  ,the place of the ,dialogue 
in the series is doubtful4 ,the doctrine
 of ideas is certainly carried beyond   
the ,socratic point of view2 in no other
 of the writings of ,plato is the theory
 of them so completely developed4       
,whether the belief in immortality can  
be attributed to ,socrates or not is    
uncertain2 the silence of the           
,memorabilia1 and of the earlier        
,dialogues of ,plato1 is an argument to 
the contrary4 ,yet in the ,cyropaedia   
,xenophon has put language into the     
mouth of the dying ,cyrus which recalls 
the ,phaedo1 and may have been derived  

from the teaching of ,socrates4 ,it may 
be fairly urged that the greatest       
religious interest of mankind could not 
have been wholly ignored by one who     
passed his life in fulfilling the       
commands of an oracle1 and who          
recognized a ,divine plan in man and    
nature4 7,xen4 ,mem47 ,and the language 
of the ,apology and of the ,crito       
confirms this view4  ,the ,phaedo is not
 one of the ,socratic ,dialogues of     
,plato2 nor1 on the other hand1 can it  
be assigned to that later stage of the  
,platonic writings at which the doctrine
 of ideas appears to be forgotten4 ,it  
belongs rather to the intermediate      
period of the ,platonic philosophy1     
which roughly corresponds to the        
,phaedrus1 ,gorgias1 ,republic1         
,theaetetus4 ,without pretending to     
determine the real time of their        
composition1 the ,symposium1 ,meno1     
,euthyphro1 ,apology1 ,phaedo may be    
conveniently read by us in this order as
 illustrative of the life of ,socrates4 

,another chain may be formed of the     
,meno1 ,phaedrus1 ,phaedo1 in which the 
immortality of the soul is connected    
with the doctrine of ideas4 ,in the     
,meno the theory of ideas is based on   
the ancient belief in transmigration1   
which reappears again in the ,phaedrus  
as well as in the ,republic and         
,timaeus1 and in all of them is         
connected with a doctrine of            
retribution4 ,in the ,phaedrus the      
immortality of the soul is supposed to  
rest on the conception of the soul as a 
principle of motion1 whereas in the     
,republic the argument turns on the     
natural continuance of the soul1 which1 
if not destroyed by her own proper evil1
 can hardly be destroyed by any other4  
,the soul of man in the ,timaeus is     
derived from the ,supreme ,creator1 and 
either returns after death to her       
kindred star1 or descends into the lower
 life of an animal4 ,the ,apology       
expresses the same view as the ,phaedo1 
but with less confidence2 there the     

probability of death being a long sleep 
is not excluded4 ,the ,theaetetus also  
describes1 in a digression1 the desire  
of the soul to fly away and be with     
,god--'and to fly to him is to be like  
him4' ,the ,symposium may be observed to
 resemble as well as to differ from the 
,phaedo4 ,while the first notion of     
immortality is only in the way of       
natural procreation or of posthumous    
fame and glory1 the higher revelation of
 beauty1 like the good in the ,republic1
 is the vision of the eternal idea4 ,so 
deeply rooted in ,plato's mind is the   
belief in immortality2 so various are   
the forms of expression which he        
employs4  ,as in several other          
,dialogues1 there is more of system in  
the ,phaedo than appears at first sight4
 ,the succession of arguments is based  
on previous philosophies2 beginning with
 the mysteries and the ,heracleitean    
alternation of opposites1 and proceeding
 to the ,pythagorean harmony and        
transmigration2 making a step by the aid

 of ,platonic reminiscence1 and a       
further step by the help of the nous of 
,anaxagoras2 until at last we rest in   
the conviction that the soul is         
inseparable from the ideas1 and belongs 
to the world of the invisible and       
unknown4 ,then1 as in the ,gorgias or   
,republic1 the curtain falls1 and the   
veil of mythology descends upon the     
argument4 ,after the confession of      
,socrates that he is an interested      
party1 and the acknowledgment that no   
man of sense will think the details of  
his narrative true1 but that something  
of the kind is true1 we return from     
speculation to practice4 ,he is himself 
more confident of immortality than he is
 of his own arguments2 and the          
confidence which he expresses is less   
strong than that which his cheerfulness 
and composure in death inspire in us4   
,difficulties of two kinds occur in the 
,phaedo--one kind to be explained out of
 contemporary philosophy1 the other not 
admitting of an entire solution4 7#a7   

,the difficulty which ,socrates says    
that he experienced in explaining       
generation and corruption2 the          
assumption of hypotheses which proceed  
from the less general to the more       
general1 and are tested by their        
consequences2 the puzzle about greater  
and less2 the resort to the method of   
ideas1 which to us appear only abstract 
terms1--these are to be explained out of
 the position of ,socrates and ,plato in
 the history of philosophy4 ,they were  
living in a twilight between the        
sensible and the intellectual world1 and
 saw no way of connecting them4 ,they   
could neither explain the relation of   
ideas to phenomena1 nor their           
correlation to one another4 ,the very   
idea of relation or comparison was      
embarrassing to them4 ,yet in this      
intellectual uncertainty they had a     
conception of a proof from results1 and 
of a moral truth1 which remained        
unshaken amid the questionings of       
philosophy4 7#b7 ,the other is a        

difficulty which is touched upon in the 
,republic as well as in the ,phaedo1 and
 is common to modern and ancient        
philosophy4 ,plato is not altogether    
satisfied with his safe and simple      
method of ideas4 ,he wants to have      
proved to him by facts that all things  
are for the best1 and that there is one 
mind or design which pervades them all4 
,but this 'power of the best' he is     
unable to explain2 and therefore takes  
refuge in universal ideas4 ,and are not 
we at this day seeking to discover that 
which ,socrates in a glass darkly       
foresaw8  ,some resemblances to the     
,greek drama may be noted in all the    
,dialogues of ,plato4 ,the ,phaedo is   
the tragedy of which ,socrates is the   
protagonist and ,simmias and ,cebes the 
secondary performers1 standing to them  
in the same relation as to ,glaucon and 
,adeimantus in the ,republic4 ,no       
,dialogue has a greater unity of subject
 and feeling4 ,plato has certainly      
fulfilled the condition of ,greek1 or   

rather of all art1 which requires that  
scenes of death and suffering should be 
clothed in beauty4 ,the gathering of the
 friends at the commencement of the     
,dialogue1 the dismissal of ,xanthippe1 
whose presence would have been out of   
place at a philosophical discussion1 but
 who returns again with her children to 
take a final farewell1 the dejection of 
the audience at the temporary overthrow 
of the argument1 the picture of         
,socrates playing with the hair of      
,phaedo1 the final scene in which       
,socrates alone retains his             
composure--are masterpieces of art4 ,and
 the chorus at the end might have       
interpreted the feeling of the play3    
',there can no evil happen to a good man
 in life or death4'  ',the art of       
concealing art' is nowhere more perfect 
than in those writings of ,plato which  
describe the trial and death of         
,socrates4 ,their charm is their        
simplicity1 which gives them            
verisimilitude2 and yet they touch1 as  

if incidentally1 and because they were  
suitable to the occasion1 on some of the
 deepest truths of philosophy4 ,there is
 nothing in any tragedy1 ancient or     
modern1 nothing in poetry or history    
7with one exception71 like the last     
hours of ,socrates in ,plato4 ,the      
master could not be more fitly occupied 
at such a time than in discoursing of   
immortality2 nor the disciples more     
divinely consoled4 ,the arguments1 taken
 in the spirit and not in the letter1   
are our arguments2 and ,socrates by     
anticipation may be even thought to     
refute some 'eccentric notions2 current 
in our own age4 ,for there are          
philosophers among ourselves who do not 
seem to understand how much stronger is 
the power of intelligence1 or of the    
best1 than of ,atlas1 or mechanical     
force4 ,how far the words attributed to 
,socrates were actually uttered by him  
we forbear to ask2 for no answer can be 
given to this question4 ,and it is      
better to resign ourselves to the       

feeling of a great work1 than to linger 
among critical uncertainties4           
,,phaedo   ,,persons ,,of ,,the         
,,dialogue3  ,phaedo1 who is the        
narrator of the dialogue to ,echecrates 
of ,phlius4 ,socrates1 ,apollodorus1    
,simmias1 ,cebes1 ,crito and an         
,attendant of the ,prison4  ,,scene3    
,the ,prison of ,socrates4  ,,place ,,of
 ,,the ,,narration3 ,phlius4            
,,echecrates3 ,were you yourself1       
,phaedo1 in the prison with ,socrates on
 the day when he drank the poison8      
,,phaedo3 ,yes1 ,echecrates1 ,i was4    
,,echecrates3 ,i should so like to hear 
about his death4 ,what did he say in his
 last hours8 ,we were informed that he  
died by taking poison1 but no one knew  
anything more2 for no ,phliasian ever   
goes to ,athens now1 and it is a long   
time since any stranger from ,athens has
 found his way hither2 so that we had no
 clear account4  ,,phaedo3 ,did you not 
hear of the proceedings at the trial8   
,,echecrates3 ,yes2 some one told us    

about the trial1 and we could not       
understand why1 having been condemned1  
he should have been put to death1 not at
 the time1 but long afterwards4 ,what   
was the reason of this8  ,,phaedo3 ,an  
accident1 ,echecrates3 the stern of the 
ship which the ,athenians send to ,delos
 happened to have been crowned on the   
day before he was tried4  ,,echecrates3 
,what is this ship8  ,,phaedo3 ,it is   
the ship in which1 according to         
,athenian tradition1 ,theseus went to   
,crete when he took with him the        
fourteen youths1 and was the saviour of 
them and of himself4 ,and they were said
 to have vowed to ,apollo at the time1  
that if they were saved they would send 
a yearly mission to ,delos4 ,now this   
custom still continues1 and the whole   
period of the voyage to and from ,delos1
 beginning when the priest of ,apollo   
crowns the stern of the ship1 is a holy 
season1 during which the city is not    
allowed to be polluted by public        
executions2 and when the vessel is      

detained by contrary winds1 the time    
spent in going and returning is very    
considerable4 ,as ,i was saying1 the    
ship was crowned on the day before the  
trial1 and this was the reason why      
,socrates lay in prison and was not put 
to death until long after he was        
condemned4  ,,echecrates3 ,what was the 
manner of his death1 ,phaedo8 ,what was 
said or done8 ,and which of his friends 
were with him8 ,or did the authorities  
forbid them to be present--so that he   
had no friends near him when he died8   
,,phaedo3 ,no2 there were several of    
them with him4  ,,echecrates3 ,if you   
have nothing to do1 ,i wish that you    
would tell me what passed1 as exactly as
 you can4  ,,phaedo3 ,i have nothing at 
all to do1 and will try to gratify your 
wish4 ,to be reminded of ,socrates is   
always the greatest delight to me1      
whether ,i speak myself or hear another 
speak of him4  ,,echecrates3 ,you will  
have listeners who are of the same mind 
with you1 and ,i hope that you will be  

as exact as you can4  ,,phaedo3 ,i had a
 singular feeling at being in his       
company4 ,for ,i could hardly believe   
that ,i was present at the death of a   
friend1 and therefore ,i did not pity   
him1 ,echecrates2 he died so fearlessly1
 and his words and bearing were so noble
 and gracious1 that to me he appeared   
blessed4 ,i thought that in going to the
 other world he could not be without a  
divine call1 and that he would be happy1
 if any man ever was1 when he arrived   
there1 and therefore ,i did not pity him
 as might have seemed natural at such an
 hour4 ,but ,i had not the pleasure     
which ,i usually feel in philosophical  
discourse 7for philosophy was the theme 
of which we spoke74 ,i was pleased1 but 
in the pleasure there was also a strange
 admixture of pain2 for ,i reflected    
that he was soon to die1 and this double
 feeling was shared by us all2 we were  
laughing and weeping by turns1          
especially the excitable                
,apollodorus--you know the sort of man8 

,,echecrates3 ,yes4  ,,phaedo3 ,he was  
quite beside himself2 and ,i and all of 
us were greatly moved4  ,,echecrates3   
,who were present8  ,,phaedo3 ,of native
 ,athenians there were1 besides         
,apollodorus1 ,critobulus and his father
 ,crito1 ,hermogenes1 ,epigenes1        
,aeschines1 ,antisthenes2 likewise      
,ctesippus of the deme of ,paeania1     
,menexenus1 and some others2 ,plato1 if 
,i am not mistaken1 was ill4            
,,echecrates3 ,were there any strangers8
  ,,phaedo3 ,yes1 there were2 ,simmias  
the ,theban1 and ,cebes1 and            
,phaedondes2 ,euclid and ,terpison1 who 
came from ,megara4  ,,echecrates3 ,and  
was ,aristippus there1 and ,cleombrotus8
  ,,phaedo3 ,no1 they were said to be in
 ,aegina4  ,,echecrates3 ,any one else8 
,,phaedo3 ,i think that these were      
nearly all4  ,,echecrates3 ,well1 and   
what did you talk about8  ,,phaedo3 ,i  
will begin at the beginning1 and        
endeavour to repeat the entire          
conversation4 ,on the previous days we  

had been in the habit of assembling     
early in the morning at the court in    
which the trial took place1 and which is
 not far from the prison4 ,there we used
 to wait talking with one another until 
the opening of the doors 7for they were 
not opened very early72 then we went in 
and generally passed the day with       
,socrates4 ,on the last morning we      
assembled sooner than usual1 having     
heard on the day before when we quitted 
the prison in the evening that the      
sacred ship had come from ,delos1 and so
 we arranged to meet very early at the  
accustomed place4 ,on our arrival the   
jailer who answered the door1 instead of
 admitting us1 came out and told us to  
stay until he called us4 ',for the      
,eleven1' he said1 'are now with        
,socrates2 they are taking off his      
chains1 and giving orders that he is to 
die to-day4' ,he soon returned and said 
that we might come in4 ,on entering we  
found ,socrates just released from      
chains1 and ,xanthippe1 whom you know1  

sitting by him1 and holding his child in
 her arms4 ,when she saw us she uttered 
a cry and said1 as women will3 ',o      
,socrates1 this is the last time that   
either you will converse with your      
friends1 or they with you4' ,socrates   
turned to ,crito and said3 ',crito1 let 
some one take her home4' ,some of       
,crito's people accordingly led her     
away1 crying out and beating herself4   
,and when she was gone1 ,socrates1      
sitting up on the couch1 bent and rubbed
 his leg1 saying1 as he was rubbing3    
,how singular is the thing called       
pleasure1 and how curiously related to  
pain1 which might be thought to be the  
opposite of it2 for they are never      
present to a man at the same instant1   
and yet he who pursues either is        
generally compelled to take the other2  
their bodies are two1 but they are      
joined by a single head4 ,and ,i cannot 
help thinking that if ,aesop had        
remembered them1 he would have made a   
fable about ,god trying to reconcile    

their strife1 and how1 when he could    
not1 he fastened their heads together2  
and this is the reason why when one     
comes the other follows1 as ,i know by  
my own experience now1 when after the   
pain in my leg which was caused by the  
chain pleasure appears to succeed4      
,upon this ,cebes said3 ,i am glad1     
,socrates1 that you have mentioned the  
name of ,aesop4 ,for it reminds me of a 
question which has been asked by many1  
and was asked of me only the day before 
yesterday by ,evenus the poet--he will  
be sure to ask it again1 and therefore  
if you would like me to have an answer  
ready for him1 you may as well tell me  
what ,i should say to him3--he wanted to
 know why you1 who never before wrote a 
line of poetry1 now that you are in     
prison are turning ,aesop's fables into 
verse1 and also composing that hymn in  
honour of ,apollo4  ,tell him1 ,cebes1  
he replied1 what is the truth--that ,i  
had no idea of rivalling him or his     
poems2 to do so1 as ,i knew1 would be no

 easy task4 ,but ,i wanted to see       
whether ,i could purge away a scruple   
which ,i felt about the meaning of      
certain dreams4 ,in the course of my    
life ,i have often had intimations in   
dreams 'that ,i should compose music4'  
,the same dream came to me sometimes in 
one form1 and sometimes in another1 but 
always saying the same or nearly the    
same words3 ',cultivate and make music1'
 said the dream4 ,and hitherto ,i had   
imagined that this was only intended to 
exhort and encourage me in the study of 
philosophy1 which has been the pursuit  
of my life1 and is the noblest and best 
of music4 ,the dream was bidding me do  
what ,i was already doing1 in the same  
way that the competitor in a race is    
bidden by the spectators to run when he 
is already running4 ,but ,i was not     
certain of this1 for the dream might    
have meant music in the popular sense of
 the word1 and being under sentence of  
death1 and the festival giving me a     
respite1 ,i thought that it would be    

safer for me to satisfy the scruple1    
and1 in obedience to the dream1 to      
compose a few verses before ,i departed4
 ,and first ,i made a hymn in honour of 
the god of the festival1 and then       
considering that a poet1 if he is really
 to be a poet1 should not only put      
together words1 but should invent       
stories1 and that ,i have no invention1 
,i took some fables of ,aesop1 which ,i 
had ready at hand and which ,i          
knew--they were the first ,i came       
upon--and turned them into verse4 ,tell 
this to ,evenus1 ,cebes1 and bid him be 
of good cheer2 say that ,i would have   
him come after me if he be a wise man1  
and not tarry2 and that to-day ,i am    
likely to be going1 for the ,athenians  
say that ,i must4  ,simmias said3 ,what 
a message for such a man6 having been a 
frequent companion of his ,i should say 
that1 as far as ,i know him1 he will    
never take your advice unless he is     
obliged4  ,why1 said ,socrates1--is not 
,evenus a philosopher8  ,i think that he

 is1 said ,simmias4  ,then he1 or any   
man who has the spirit of philosophy1   
will be willing to die1 but he will not 
take his own life1 for that is held to  
be unlawful4  ,here he changed his      
position1 and put his legs off the couch
 on to the ground1 and during the rest  
of the conversation he remained sitting4
  ,why do you say1 enquired ,cebes1 that
 a man ought not to take his own life1  
but that the philosopher will be ready  
to follow the dying8  ,socrates replied3
 ,and have you1 ,cebes and ,simmias1 who
 are the disciples of ,philolaus1 never 
heard him speak of this8  ,yes1 but his 
language was obscure1 ,socrates4  ,my   
words1 too1 are only an echo2 but there 
is no reason why ,i should not repeat   
what ,i have heard3 and indeed1 as ,i am
 going to another place1 it is very meet
 for me to be thinking and talking of   
the nature of the pilgrimage which ,i am
 about to make4 ,what can ,i do better  
in the interval between this and the    
setting of the sun8  ,then tell me1     

,socrates1 why is suicide held to be    
unlawful8 as ,i have certainly heard    
,philolaus1 about whom you were just now
 asking1 affirm when he was staying with
 us at ,thebes3 and there are others who
 say the same1 although ,i have never   
understood what was meant by any of     
them4  ,do not lose heart1 replied      
,socrates1 and the day may come when you
 will understand4 ,i suppose that you   
wonder why1 when other things which are 
evil may be good at certain times and to
 certain persons1 death is to be the    
only exception1 and why1 when a man is  
better dead1 he is not permitted to be  
his own benefactor1 but must wait for   
the hand of another4  ,very true1 said  
,cebes1 laughing gently and speaking in 
his native ,boeotian4  ,i admit the     
appearance of inconsistency in what ,i  
am saying2 but there may not be any real
 inconsistency after all4 ,there is a   
doctrine whispered in secret that man is
 a prisoner who has no right to open the
 door and run away2 this is a great     

mystery which ,i do not quite           
understand4 ,yet ,i too believe that the
 gods are our guardians1 and that we are
 a possession of theirs4 ,do you not    
agree8  ,yes1 ,i quite agree1 said      
,cebes4  ,and if one of your own        
possessions1 an ox or an ass1 for       
example1 took the liberty of putting    
himself out of the way when you had     
given no intimation of your wish that he
 should die1 would you not be angry with
 him1 and would you not punish him if   
you could8  ,certainly1 replied ,cebes4 
,then1 if we look at the matter thus1   
there may be reason in saying that a man
 should wait1 and not take his own life 
until ,god summons him1 as he is now    
summoning me4  ,yes1 ,socrates1 said    
,cebes1 there seems to be truth in what 
you say4 ,and yet how can you reconcile 
this seemingly true belief that ,god is 
our guardian and we his possessions1    
with the willingness to die which we    
were just now attributing to the        
philosopher8 ,that the wisest of men    

should be willing to leave a service in 
which they are ruled by the gods who are
 the best of rulers1 is not reasonable2 
for surely no wise man thinks that when 
set at liberty he can take better care  
of himself than the gods take of him4 ,a
 fool may perhaps think so--he may argue
 that he had better run away from his   
master1 not considering that his duty is
 to remain to the end1 and not to run   
away from the good1 and that there would
 be no sense in his running away4 ,the  
wise man will want to be ever with him  
who is better than himself4 ,now this1  
,socrates1 is the reverse of what was   
just now said2 for upon this view the   
wise man should sorrow and the fool     
rejoice at passing out of life4  ,the   
earnestness of ,cebes seemed to please  
,socrates4 ,here1 said he1 turning to   
us1 is a man who is always inquiring1   
and is not so easily convinced by the   
first thing which he hears4  ,and       
certainly1 added ,simmias1 the objection
 which he is now making does appear to  

me to have some force4 ,for what can be 
the meaning of a truly wise man wanting 
to fly away and lightly leave a master  
who is better than himself8 ,and ,i     
rather imagine that ,cebes is referring 
to you2 he thinks that you are too ready
 to leave us1 and too ready to leave the
 gods whom you acknowledge to be our    
good masters4  ,yes1 replied ,socrates2 
there is reason in what you say4 ,and so
 you think that ,i ought to answer your 
indictment as if ,i were in a court8    
,we should like you to do so1 said      
,simmias4  ,then ,i must try to make a  
more successful defence before you than 
,i did when before the judges4 ,for ,i  
am quite ready to admit1 ,simmias and   
,cebes1 that ,i ought to be grieved at  
death1 if ,i were not persuaded in the  
first place that ,i am going to other   
gods who are wise and good 7of which ,i 
am as certain as ,i can be of any such  
matters71 and secondly 7though ,i am not
 so sure of this last7 to men departed1 
better than those whom ,i leave behind2 

and therefore ,i do not grieve as ,i    
might have done1 for ,i have good hope  
that there is yet something remaining   
for the dead1 and as has been said of   
old1 some far better thing for the good 
than for the evil4  ,but do you mean to 
take away your thoughts with you1       
,socrates8 said ,simmias4 ,will you not 
impart them to us8--for they are a      
benefit in which we too are entitled to 
share4 ,moreover1 if you succeed in     
convincing us1 that will be an answer to
 the charge against yourself4  ,i will  
do my best1 replied ,socrates4 ,but you 
must first let me hear what ,crito      
wants2 he has long been wishing to say  
something to me4  ,only this1 ,socrates1
 replied ,crito3--the attendant who is  
to give you the poison has been telling 
me1 and he wants me to tell you1 that   
you are not to talk much1 talking1 he   
says1 increases heat1 and this is apt to
 interfere with the action of the       
poison2 persons who excite themselves   
are sometimes obliged to take a second  

or even a third dose4  ,then1 said      
,socrates1 let him mind his business and
 be prepared to give the poison twice or
 even thrice if necessary2 that is all4 
,i knew quite well what you would say1  
replied ,crito2 but ,i was obliged to   
satisfy him4  ,never mind him1 he said4 
,and now1 ,o my judges1 ,i desire to    
prove to you that the real philosopher  
has reason to be of good cheer when he  
is about to die1 and that after death he
 may hope to obtain the greatest good in
 the other world4 ,and how this may be1 
,simmias and ,cebes1 ,i will endeavour  
to explain4 ,for ,i deem that the true  
votary of philosophy is likely to be    
misunderstood by other men2 they do not 
perceive that he is always pursuing     
death and dying2 and if this be so1 and 
he has had the desire of death all his  
life long1 why when his time comes      
should he repine at that which he has   
been always pursuing and desiring8      
,simmias said laughingly3 ,though not in
 a laughing humour1 you have made me    

laugh1 ,socrates2 for ,i cannot help    
thinking that the many when they hear   
your words will say how truly you have  
described philosophers1 and our people  
at home will likewise say that the life 
which philosophers desire is in reality 
death1 and that they have found them out
 to be deserving of the death which they
 desire4  ,and they are right1 ,simmias1
 in thinking so1 with the exception of  
the words 'they have found them out'2   
for they have not found out either what 
is the nature of that death which the   
true philosopher deserves1 or how he    
deserves or desires death4 ,but enough  
of them3--let us discuss the matter     
among ourselves3 ,do we believe that    
there is such a thing as death8  ,to be 
sure1 replied ,simmias4  ,is it not the 
separation of soul and body8 ,and to be 
dead is the completion of this2 when the
 soul exists in herself1 and is released
 from the body and the body is released 
from the soul1 what is this but death8  
,just so1 he replied4  ,there is another

 question1 which will probably throw    
light on our present inquiry if you and 
,i can agree about it3--,ought the      
philosopher to care about the           
pleasures--if they are to be called     
pleasures--of eating and drinking8      
,certainly not1 answered ,simmias4  ,and
 what about the pleasures of            
love--should he care for them8  ,by no  
means4  ,and will he think much of the  
other ways of indulging the body1 for   
example1 the acquisition of costly      
raiment1 or sandals1 or other adornments
 of the body8 ,instead of caring about  
them1 does he not rather despise        
anything more than nature needs8 ,what  
do you say8  ,i should say that the true
 philosopher would despise them4  ,would
 you not say that he is entirely        
concerned with the soul and not with the
 body8 ,he would like1 as far as he can1
 to get away from the body and to turn  
to the soul4  ,quite true4  ,in matters 
of this sort philosophers1 above all    
other men1 may be observed in every sort

 of way to dissever the soul from the   
communion of the body4  ,very true4     
,whereas1 ,simmias1 the rest of the     
world are of opinion that to him who has
 no sense of pleasure and no part in    
bodily pleasure1 life is not worth      
having2 and that he who is indifferent  
about them is as good as dead4  ,that is
 also true4  ,what again shall we say of
 the actual acquirement of              
knowledge8--is the body1 if invited to  
share in the enquiry1 a hinderer or a   
helper8 ,i mean to say1 have sight and  
hearing any truth in them8 ,are they    
not1 as the poets are always telling us1
 inaccurate witnesses8 and yet1 if even 
they are inaccurate and indistinct1 what
 is to be said of the other senses8--for
 you will allow that they are the best  
of them8  ,certainly1 he replied4  ,then
 when does the soul attain truth8--for  
in attempting to consider anything in   
company with the body she is obviously  
deceived4  ,true4  ,then must not true  
existence be revealed to her in thought1

 if at all8  ,yes4  ,and thought is best
 when the mind is gathered into herself 
and none of these things trouble        
her--neither sounds nor sights nor pain 
nor any pleasure1--when she takes leave 
of the body1 and has as little as       
possible to do with it1 when she has no 
bodily sense or desire1 but is aspiring 
after true being8  ,certainly4  ,and in 
this the philosopher dishonours the     
body2 his soul runs away from his body  
and desires to be alone and by herself8 
,that is true4  ,well1 but there is     
another thing1 ,simmias3 ,is there or is
 there not an absolute justice8         
,assuredly there is4  ,and an absolute  
beauty and absolute good8  ,of course4  
,but did you ever behold any of them    
with your eyes8  ,certainly not4  ,or   
did you ever reach them with any other  
bodily sense8--and ,i speak not of these
 alone1 but of absolute greatness1 and  
health1 and strength1 and of the essence
 or true nature of everything4 ,has the 
reality of them ever been perceived by  

you through the bodily organs8 or       
rather1 is not the nearest approach to  
the knowledge of their several natures  
made by him who so orders his           
intellectual vision as to have the most 
exact conception of the essence of each 
thing which he considers8  ,certainly4  
,and he attains to the purest knowledge 
of them who goes to each with the mind  
alone1 not introducing or intruding in  
the act of thought sight or any other   
sense together with reason1 but with the
 very light of the mind in her own      
clearness searches into the very truth  
of each2 he who has got rid1 as far as  
he can1 of eyes and ears and1 so to     
speak1 of the whole body1 these being in
 his opinion distracting elements which 
when they infect the soul hinder her    
from acquiring truth and knowledge--who1
 if not he1 is likely to attain the     
knowledge of true being8  ,what you say 
has a wonderful truth in it1 ,socrates1 
replied ,simmias4  ,and when real       
philosophers consider all these things1 

will they not be led to make a          
reflection which they will express in   
words something like the following8     
',have we not found1' they will say1 'a 
path of thought which seems to bring us 
and our argument to the conclusion1 that
 while we are in the body1 and while the
 soul is infected with the evils of the 
body1 our desire will not be satisfied8 
and our desire is of the truth4 ,for the
 body is a source of endless trouble to 
us by reason of the mere requirement of 
food2 and is liable also to diseases    
which overtake and impede us in the     
search after true being3 it fills us    
full of loves1 and lusts1 and fears1 and
 fancies of all kinds1 and endless      
foolery1 and in fact1 as men say1 takes 
away from us the power of thinking at   
all4 ,whence come wars1 and fightings1  
and factions8 whence but from the body  
and the lusts of the body8 wars are     
occasioned by the love of money1 and    
money has to be acquired for the sake   
and in the service of the body2 and by  

reason of all these impediments we have 
no time to give to philosophy2 and1 last
 and worst of all1 even if we are at    
leisure and betake ourselves to some    
speculation1 the body is always breaking
 in upon us1 causing turmoil and        
confusion in our enquiries1 and so      
amazing us that we are prevented from   
seeing the truth4 ,it has been proved to
 us by experience that if we would have 
pure knowledge of anything we must be   
quit of the body--the soul in herself   
must behold things in themselves3 and   
then we shall attain the wisdom which we
 desire1 and of which we say that we are
 lovers1 not while we live1 but after   
death2 for if while in company with the 
body1 the soul cannot have pure         
knowledge1 one of two things            
follows--either knowledge is not to be  
attained at all1 or1 if at all1 after   
death4 ,for then1 and not till then1 the
 soul will be parted from the body and  
exist in herself alone4 ,in this present
 life1 ,i reckon that we make the       

nearest approach to knowledge when we   
have the least possible intercourse or  
communion with the body1 and are not    
surfeited with the bodily nature1 but   
keep ourselves pure until the hour when 
,god himself is pleased to release us4  
,and thus having got rid of the         
foolishness of the body we shall be pure
 and hold converse with the pure1 and   
know of ourselves the clear light       
everywhere1 which is no other than the  
light of truth4' ,for the impure are not
 permitted to approach the pure4 ,these 
are the sort of words1 ,simmias1 which  
the true lovers of knowledge cannot help
 saying to one another1 and thinking4   
,you would agree2 would you not8        
,undoubtedly1 ,socrates4  ,but1 ,o my   
friend1 if this is true1 there is great 
reason to hope that1 going whither ,i   
go1 when ,i have come to the end of my  
journey1 ,i shall attain that which has 
been the pursuit of my life4 ,and       
therefore ,i go on my way rejoicing1 and
 not ,i only1 but every other man who   

believes that his mind has been made    
ready and that he is in a manner        
purified4  ,certainly1 replied ,simmias4
  ,and what is purification but the     
separation of the soul from the body1 as
 ,i was saying before2 the habit of the 
soul gathering and collecting herself   
into herself from all sides out of the  
body2 the dwelling in her own place     
alone1 as in another life1 so also in   
this1 as far as she can2--the release of
 the soul from the chains of the body8  
,very true1 he said4  ,and this         
separation and release of the soul from 
the body is termed death8  ,to be sure1 
he said4  ,and the true philosophers1   
and they only1 are ever seeking to      
release the soul4 ,is not the separation
 and release of the soul from the body  
their especial study8  ,that is true4   
,and1 as ,i was saying at first1 there  
would be a ridiculous contradiction in  
men studying to live as nearly as they  
can in a state of death1 and yet        
repining when it comes upon them4       

,clearly4  ,and the true philosophers1  
,simmias1 are always occupied in the    
practice of dying1 wherefore also to    
them least of all men is death terrible4
 ,look at the matter thus3--if they have
 been in every way the enemies of the   
body1 and are wanting to be alone with  
the soul1 when this desire of theirs is 
granted1 how inconsistent would they be 
if they trembled and repined1 instead of
 rejoicing at their departure to that   
place where1 when they arrive1 they hope
 to gain that which in life they        
desired--and this was wisdom--and at the
 same time to be rid of the company of  
their enemy4 ,many a man has been       
willing to go to the world below        
animated by the hope of seeing there an 
earthly love1 or wife1 or son1 and      
conversing with them4 ,and will he who  
is a true lover of wisdom1 and is       
strongly persuaded in like manner that  
only in the world below he can worthily 
enjoy her1 still repine at death8 ,will 
he not depart with joy8 ,surely he will1

 ,o my friend1 if he be a true          
philosopher4 ,for he will have a firm   
conviction that there and there only1 he
 can find wisdom in her purity4 ,and if 
this be true1 he would be very absurd1  
as ,i was saying1 if he were afraid of  
death4  ,he would1 indeed1 replied      
,simmias4  ,and when you see a man who  
is repining at the approach of death1 is
 not his reluctance a sufficient proof  
that he is not a lover of wisdom1 but a 
lover of the body1 and probably at the  
same time a lover of either money or    
power1 or both8  ,quite so1 he replied4 
,and is not courage1 ,simmias1 a quality
 which is specially characteristic of   
the philosopher8  ,certainly4  ,there is
 temperance again1 which even by the    
vulgar is supposed to consist in the    
control and regulation of the passions1 
and in the sense of superiority to      
them--is not temperance a virtue        
belonging to those only who despise the 
body1 and who pass their lives in       
philosophy8  ,most assuredly4  ,for the 

courage and temperance of other men1 if 
you will consider them1 are really a    
contradiction4  ,how so8  ,well1 he     
said1 you are aware that death is       
regarded by men in general as a great   
evil4  ,very true1 he said4  ,and do not
 courageous men face death because they 
are afraid of yet greater evils8  ,that 
is quite true4  ,then all but the       
philosophers are courageous only from   
fear1 and because they are afraid2 and  
yet that a man should be courageous from
 fear1 and because he is a coward1 is   
surely a strange thing4  ,very true4    
,and are not the temperate exactly in   
the same case8 ,they are temperate      
because they are intemperate--which     
might seem to be a contradiction1 but is
 nevertheless the sort of thing which   
happens with this foolish temperance4   
,for there are pleasures which they are 
afraid of losing2 and in their desire to
 keep them1 they abstain from some      
pleasures1 because they are overcome by 
others2 and although to be conquered by 

pleasure is called by men intemperance1 
to them the conquest of pleasure        
consists in being conquered by pleasure4
 ,and that is what ,i mean by saying    
that1 in a sense1 they are made         
temperate through intemperance4  ,such  
appears to be the case4  ,yet the       
exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain
 for another fear or pleasure or pain1  
and of the greater for the less1 as if  
they were coins1 is not the exchange of 
virtue4 ,o my blessed ,simmias1 is there
 not one true coin for which all things 
ought to be exchanged8--and that is     
wisdom2 and only in exchange for this1  
and in company with this1 is anything   
truly bought or sold1 whether courage or
 temperance or justice4 ,and is not all 
true virtue the companion of wisdom1 no 
matter what fears or pleasures or other 
similar goods or evils may or may not   
attend her8 ,but the virtue which is    
made up of these goods1 when they are   
severed from wisdom and exchanged with  
one another1 is a shadow of virtue only1

 nor is there any freedom or health or  
truth in her2 but in the true exchange  
there is a purging away of all these    
things1 and temperance1 and justice1 and
 courage1 and wisdom herself are the    
purgation of them4 ,the founders of the 
mysteries would appear to have had a    
real meaning1 and were not talking      
nonsense when they intimated in a figure
 long ago that he who passes            
unsanctified and uninitiated into the   
world below will lie in a slough1 but   
that he who arrives there after         
initiation and purification will dwell  
with the gods4 ,for 'many1' as they say 
in the mysteries1 'are the              
thyrsus-bearers1 but few are the        
mystics1'--meaning1 as ,i interpret the 
words1 'the true philosophers4' ,in the 
number of whom1 during my whole life1 ,i
 have been seeking1 according to my     
ability1 to find a place2--whether ,i   
have sought in a right way or not1 and  
whether ,i have succeeded or not1 ,i    
shall truly know in a little while1 if  

,god will1 when ,i myself arrive in the 
other world--such is my belief4 ,and    
therefore ,i maintain that ,i am right1 
,simmias and ,cebes1 in not grieving or 
repining at parting from you and my     
masters in this world1 for ,i believe   
that ,i shall equally find good masters 
and friends in another world4 ,but most 
men do not believe this saying2 if then 
,i succeed in convincing you by my      
defence better than ,i did the ,athenian
 judges1 it will be well4  ,cebes       
answered3 ,i agree1 ,socrates1 in the   
greater part of what you say4 ,but in   
what concerns the soul1 men are apt to  
be incredulous2 they fear that when she 
has left the body her place may be      
nowhere1 and that on the very day of    
death she may perish and come to an     
end--immediately on her release from the
 body1 issuing forth dispersed like     
smoke or air and in her flight vanishing
 away into nothingness4 ,if she could   
only be collected into herself after she
 has obtained release from the evils of 

which you are speaking1 there would be  
good reason to hope1 ,socrates1 that    
what you say is true4 ,but surely it    
requires a great deal of argument and   
many proofs to show that when the man is
 dead his soul yet exists1 and has any  
force or intelligence4  ,true1 ,cebes1  
said ,socrates2 and shall ,i suggest    
that we converse a little of the        
probabilities of these things8  ,i am   
sure1 said ,cebes1 that ,i should       
greatly like to know your opinion about 
them4  ,i reckon1 said ,socrates1 that  
no one who heard me now1 not even if he 
were one of my old enemies1 the ,comic  
poets1 could accuse me of idle talking  
about matters in which ,i have no       
concern3--,if you please1 then1 we will 
proceed with the inquiry4  ,suppose we  
consider the question whether the souls 
of men after death are or are not in the
 world below4 ,there comes into my mind 
an ancient doctrine which affirms that  
they go from hence into the other world1
 and returning hither1 are born again   

from the dead4 ,now if it be true that  
the living come from the dead1 then our 
souls must exist in the other world1 for
 if not1 how could they have been born  
again8 ,and this would be conclusive1 if
 there were any real evidence that the  
living are only born from the dead2 but 
if this is not so1 then other arguments 
will have to be adduced4  ,very true1   
replied ,cebes4  ,then let us consider  
the whole question1 not in relation to  
man only1 but in relation to animals    
generally1 and to plants1 and to        
everything of which there is generation1
 and the proof will be easier4 ,are not 
all things which have opposites         
generated out of their opposites8 ,i    
mean such things as good and evil1 just 
and unjust--and there are innumerable   
other opposites which are generated out 
of opposites4 ,and ,i want to show that 
in all opposites there is of necessity a
 similar alternation2 ,i mean to say1   
for example1 that anything which becomes
 greater must become greater after being

 less4  ,true4  ,and that which becomes 
less must have been once greater and    
then have become less4  ,yes4  ,and the 
weaker is generated from the stronger1  
and the swifter from the slower4  ,very 
true4  ,and the worse is from the       
better1 and the more just is from the   
more unjust4  ,of course4  ,and is this 
true of all opposites8 and are we       
convinced that all of them are generated
 out of opposites8  ,yes4  ,and in this 
universal opposition of all things1 are 
there not also two intermediate         
processes which are ever going on1 from 
one to the other opposite1 and back     
again2 where there is a greater and a   
less there is also an intermediate      
process of increase and diminution1 and 
that which grows is said to wax1 and    
that which decays to wane8  ,yes1 he    
said4  ,and there are many other        
processes1 such as division and         
composition1 cooling and heating1 which 
equally involve a passage into and out  
of one another4 ,and this necessarily   

holds of all opposites1 even though not 
always expressed in words--they are     
really generated out of one another1 and
 there is a passing or process from one 
to the other of them8  ,very true1 he   
replied4  ,well1 and is there not an    
opposite of life1 as sleep is the       
opposite of waking8  ,true1 he said4    
,and what is it8  ,death1 he answered4  
,and these1 if they are opposites1 are  
generated the one from the other1 and   
have there their two intermediate       
processes also8  ,of course4  ,now1 said
 ,socrates1 ,i will analyze one of the  
two pairs of opposites which ,i have    
mentioned to you1 and also its          
intermediate processes1 and you shall   
analyze the other to me4 ,one of them ,i
 term sleep1 the other waking4 ,the     
state of sleep is opposed to the state  
of waking1 and out of sleeping waking is
 generated1 and out of waking1 sleeping2
 and the process of generation is in the
 one case falling asleep1 and in the    
other waking up4 ,do you agree8  ,i     

entirely agree4  ,then1 suppose that you
 analyze life and death to me in the    
same manner4 ,is not death opposed to   
life8  ,yes4  ,and they are generated   
one from the other8  ,yes4  ,what is    
generated from the living8  ,the dead4  
,and what from the dead8  ,i can only   
say in answer--the living4  ,then the   
living1 whether things or persons1      
,cebes1 are generated from the dead8    
,that is clear1 he replied4  ,then the  
inference is that our souls exist in the
 world below8  ,that is true4  ,and one 
of the two processes or generations is  
visible--for surely the act of dying is 
visible8  ,surely1 he said4  ,what then 
is to be the result8 ,shall we exclude  
the opposite process8 ,and shall we     
suppose nature to walk on one leg only8 
,must we not rather assign to death some
 corresponding process of generation8   
,certainly1 he replied4  ,and what is   
that process8  ,return to life4  ,and   
return to life1 if there be such a      
thing1 is the birth of the dead into the

 world of the living8  ,quite true4     
,then here is a new way by which we     
arrive at the conclusion that the living
 come from the dead1 just as the dead   
come from the living2 and this1 if true1
 affords a most certain proof that the  
souls of the dead exist in some place   
out of which they come again4  ,yes1    
,socrates1 he said2 the conclusion seems
 to flow necessarily out of our previous
 admissions4  ,and that these admissions
 were not unfair1 ,cebes1 he said1 may  
be shown1 ,i think1 as follows3 ,if     
generation were in a straight line only1
 and there were no compensation or      
circle in nature1 no turn or return of  
elements into their opposites1 then you 
know that all things would at last have 
the same form and pass into the same    
state1 and there would be no more       
generation of them4  ,what do you mean8 
he said4  ,a simple thing enough1 which 
,i will illustrate by the case of sleep1
 he replied4 ,you know that if there    
were no alternation of sleeping and     

waking1 the tale of the sleeping        
,endymion would in the end have no      
meaning1 because all other things would 
be asleep1 too1 and he would not be     
distinguishable from the rest4 ,or if   
there were composition only1 and no     
division of substances1 then the chaos  
of ,anaxagoras would come again4 ,and in
 like manner1 my dear ,cebes1 if all    
things which partook of life were to    
die1 and after they were dead remained  
in the form of death1 and did not come  
to life again1 all would at last die1   
and nothing would be alive--what other  
result could there be8 ,for if the      
living spring from any other things1 and
 they too die1 must not all things at   
last be swallowed up in death8 7,but    
compare ,republic47  ,there is no       
escape1 ,socrates1 said ,cebes2 and to  
me your argument seems to be absolutely 
true4  ,yes1 he said1 ,cebes1 it is and 
must be so1 in my opinion2 and we have  
not been deluded in making these        
admissions2 but ,i am confident that    

there truly is such a thing as living   
again1 and that the living spring from  
the dead1 and that the souls of the dead
 are in existence1 and that the good    
souls have a better portion than the    
evil4  ,cebes added3 ,your favorite     
doctrine1 ,socrates1 that knowledge is  
simply recollection1 if true1 also      
necessarily implies a previous time in  
which we have learned that which we now 
recollect4 ,but this would be impossible
 unless our soul had been in some place 
before existing in the form of man2 here
 then is another proof of the soul's    
immortality4  ,but tell me1 ,cebes1 said
 ,simmias1 interposing1 what arguments  
are urged in favour of this doctrine of 
recollection4 ,i am not very sure at the
 moment that ,i remember them4  ,one    
excellent proof1 said ,cebes1 is        
afforded by questions4 ,if you put a    
question to a person in a right way1 he 
will give a true answer of himself1 but 
how could he do this unless there were  
knowledge and right reason already in   

him8 ,and this is most clearly shown    
when he is taken to a diagram or to     
anything of that sort4 7,compare ,meno47
  ,but if1 said ,socrates1 you are still
 incredulous1 ,simmias1 ,i would ask you
 whether you may not agree with me when 
you look at the matter in another       
way2--,i mean1 if you are still         
incredulous as to whether knowledge is  
recollection4  ,incredulous1 ,i am not1 
said ,simmias2 but ,i want to have this 
doctrine of recollection brought to my  
own recollection1 and1 from what ,cebes 
has said1 ,i am beginning to recollect  
and be convinced2 but ,i should still   
like to hear what you were going to say4
  ,this is what ,i would say1 he        
replied3--,we should agree1 if ,i am not
 mistaken1 that what a man recollects he
 must have known at some previous time4 
,very true4  ,and what is the nature of 
this knowledge or recollection8 ,i mean 
to ask1 ,whether a person who1 having   
seen or heard or in any way perceived   
anything1 knows not only that1 but has a

 conception of something else which is  
the subject1 not of the same but of some
 other kind of knowledge1 may not be    
fairly said to recollect that of which  
he has the conception8  ,what do you    
mean8  ,i mean what ,i may illustrate by
 the following instance3--,the knowledge
 of a lyre is not the same as the       
knowledge of a man8  ,true4  ,and yet   
what is the feeling of lovers when they 
recognize a lyre1 or a garment1 or      
anything else which the beloved has been
 in the habit of using8 ,do not they1   
from knowing the lyre1 form in the      
mind's eye an image of the youth to whom
 the lyre belongs8 ,and this is         
recollection4 ,in like manner any one   
who sees ,simmias may remember ,cebes2  
and there are endless examples of the   
same thing4  ,endless1 indeed1 replied  
,simmias4  ,and recollection is most    
commonly a process of recovering that   
which has been already forgotten through
 time and inattention4  ,very true1 he  
said4  ,well2 and may you not also from 

seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre 
remember a man8 and from the picture of 
,simmias1 you may be led to remember    
,cebes8  ,true4  ,or you may also be led
 to the recollection of ,simmias        
himself8  ,quite so4  ,and in all these 
cases1 the recollection may be derived  
from things either like or unlike8  ,it 
may be4  ,and when the recollection is  
derived from like things1 then another  
consideration is sure to arise1 which   
is--whether the likeness in any degree  
falls short or not of that which is     
recollected8  ,very true1 he said4  ,and
 shall we proceed a step further1 and   
affirm that there is such a thing as    
equality1 not of one piece of wood or   
stone with another1 but that1 over and  
above this1 there is absolute equality8 
,shall we say so8  ,say so1 yes1 replied
 ,simmias1 and swear to it1 with all the
 confidence in life4  ,and do we know   
the nature of this absolute essence8    
,to be sure1 he said4  ,and whence did  
we obtain our knowledge8 ,did we not see

 equalities of material things1 such as 
pieces of wood and stones1 and gather   
from them the idea of an equality which 
is different from them8 ,for you will   
acknowledge that there is a difference4 
,or look at the matter in another       
way3--,do not the same pieces of wood or
 stone appear at one time equal1 and at 
another time unequal8  ,that is certain4
  ,but are real equals ever unequal8 or 
is the idea of equality the same as of  
inequality8  ,impossible1 ,socrates4    
,then these 7so-called7 equals are not  
the same with the idea of equality8  ,i 
should say1 clearly not1 ,socrates4     
,and yet from these equals1 although    
differing from the idea of equality1 you
 conceived and attained that idea8      
,very true1 he said4  ,which might be   
like1 or might be unlike them8  ,yes4   
,but that makes no difference2 whenever 
from seeing one thing you conceived     
another1 whether like or unlike1 there  
must surely have been an act of         
recollection8  ,very true4  ,but what   

would you say of equal portions of wood 
and stone1 or other material equals8 and
 what is the impression produced by     
them8 ,are they equals in the same sense
 in which absolute equality is equal8 or
 do they fall short of this perfect     
equality in a measure8  ,yes1 he said1  
in a very great measure too4  ,and must 
we not allow1 that when ,i or any one1  
looking at any object1 observes that the
 thing which he sees aims at being some 
other thing1 but falls short of1 and    
cannot be1 that other thing1 but is     
inferior1 he who makes this observation 
must have had a previous knowledge of   
that to which the other1 although       
similar1 was inferior8  ,certainly4     
,and has not this been our own case in  
the matter of equals and of absolute    
equality8  ,precisely4  ,then we must   
have known equality previously to the   
time when we first saw the material     
equals1 and reflected that all these    
apparent equals strive to attain        
absolute equality1 but fall short of it8

  ,very true4  ,and we recognize also   
that this absolute equality has only    
been known1 and can only be known1      
through the medium of sight or touch1 or
 of some other of the senses1 which are 
all alike in this respect8  ,yes1       
,socrates1 as far as the argument is    
concerned1 one of them is the same as   
the other4  ,from the senses then is    
derived the knowledge that all sensible 
things aim at an absolute equality of   
which they fall short8  ,yes4  ,then    
before we began to see or hear or       
perceive in any way1 we must have had a 
knowledge of absolute equality1 or we   
could not have referred to that standard
 the equals which are derived from the  
senses8--for to that they all aspire1   
and of that they fall short4  ,no other 
inference can be drawn from the previous
 statements4  ,and did we not see and   
hear and have the use of our other      
senses as soon as we were born8         
,certainly4  ,then we must have acquired
 the knowledge of equality at some      

previous time8  ,yes4  ,that is to say1 
before we were born1 ,i suppose8  ,true4
  ,and if we acquired this knowledge    
before we were born1 and were born      
having the use of it1 then we also knew 
before we were born and at the instant  
of birth not only the equal or the      
greater or the less1 but all other      
ideas2 for we are not speaking only of  
equality1 but of beauty1 goodness1      
justice1 holiness1 and of all which we  
stamp with the name of essence in the   
dialectical process1 both when we ask   
and when we answer questions4 ,of all   
this we may certainly affirm that we    
acquired the knowledge before birth8    
,we may4  ,but if1 after having         
acquired1 we have not forgotten what in 
each case we acquired1 then we must     
always have come into life having       
knowledge1 and shall always continue to 
know as long as life lasts--for knowing 
is the acquiring and retaining knowledge
 and not forgetting4 ,is not forgetting1
 ,simmias1 just the losing of knowledge8

  ,quite true1 ,socrates4  ,but if the  
knowledge which we acquired before birth
 was lost by us at birth1 and if        
afterwards by the use of the senses we  
recovered what we previously knew1 will 
not the process which we call learning  
be a recovering of the knowledge which  
is natural to us1 and may not this be   
rightly termed recollection8  ,very     
true4  ,so much is clear--that when we  
perceive something1 either by the help  
of sight1 or hearing1 or some other     
sense1 from that perception we are able 
to obtain a notion of some other thing  
like or unlike which is associated with 
it but has been forgotten4 ,whence1 as  
,i was saying1 one of two alternatives  
follows3--either we had this knowledge  
at birth1 and continued to know through 
life2 or1 after birth1 those who are    
said to learn only remember1 and        
learning is simply recollection4  ,yes1 
that is quite true1 ,socrates4  ,and    
which alternative1 ,simmias1 do you     
prefer8 ,had we the knowledge at our    

birth1 or did we recollect the things   
which we knew previously to our birth8  
,i cannot decide at the moment4  ,at any
 rate you can decide whether he who has 
knowledge will or will not be able to   
render an account of his knowledge8     
,what do you say8  ,certainly1 he will4 
,but do you think that every man is able
 to give an account of these very       
matters about which we are speaking8    
,would that they could1 ,socrates1 but  
,i rather fear that to-morrow1 at this  
time1 there will no longer be any one   
alive who is able to give an account of 
them such as ought to be given4  ,then  
you are not of opinion1 ,simmias1 that  
all men know these things8  ,certainly  
not4  ,they are in process of           
recollecting that which they learned    
before8  ,certainly4  ,but when did our 
souls acquire this knowledge8--not since
 we were born as men8  ,certainly not4  
,and therefore1 previously8  ,yes4      
,then1 ,simmias1 our souls must also    
have existed without bodies before they 

were in the form of man1 and must have  
had intelligence4  ,unless indeed you   
suppose1 ,socrates1 that these notions  
are given us at the very moment of      
birth2 for this is the only time which  
remains4  ,yes1 my friend1 but if so1   
when do we lose them8 for they are not  
in us when we are born--that is         
admitted4 ,do we lose them at the moment
 of receiving them1 or if not at what   
other time8  ,no1 ,socrates1 ,i perceive
 that ,i was unconsciously talking      
nonsense4  ,then may we not say1        
,simmias1 that if1 as we are always     
repeating1 there is an absolute beauty1 
and goodness1 and an absolute essence of
 all things2 and if to this1 which is   
now discovered to have existed in our   
former state1 we refer all our          
sensations1 and with this compare them1 
finding these ideas to be pre-existent  
and our inborn possession--then our     
souls must have had a prior existence1  
but if not1 there would be no force in  
the argument8 ,there is the same proof  

that these ideas must have existed      
before we were born1 as that our souls  
existed before we were born2 and if not 
the ideas1 then not the souls4  ,yes1   
,socrates2 ,i am convinced that there is
 precisely the same necessity for the   
one as for the other2 and the argument  
retreats successfully to the position   
that the existence of the soul before   
birth cannot be separated from the      
existence of the essence of which you   
speak4 ,for there is nothing which to my
 mind is so patent as that beauty1      
goodness1 and the other notions of which
 you were just now speaking1 have a most
 real and absolute existence2 and ,i am 
satisfied with the proof4  ,well1 but is
 ,cebes equally satisfied8 for ,i must  
convince him too4  ,i think1 said       
,simmias1 that ,cebes is satisfied3     
although he is the most incredulous of  
mortals1 yet ,i believe that he is      
sufficiently convinced of the existence 
of the soul before birth4 ,but that     
after death the soul will continue to   

exist is not yet proven even to my own  
satisfaction4 ,i cannot get rid of the  
feeling of the many to which ,cebes was 
referring--the feeling that when the man
 dies the soul will be dispersed1 and   
that this may be the extinction of her4 
,for admitting that she may have been   
born elsewhere1 and framed out of other 
elements1 and was in existence before   
entering the human body1 why after      
having entered in and gone out again may
 she not herself be destroyed and come  
to an end8  ,very true1 ,simmias1 said  
,cebes2 about half of what was required 
has been proven2 to wit1 that our souls 
existed before we were born3--that the  
soul will exist after death as well as  
before birth is the other half of which 
the proof is still wanting1 and has to  
be supplied2 when that is given the     
demonstration will be complete4  ,but   
that proof1 ,simmias and ,cebes1 has    
been already given1 said ,socrates1 if  
you put the two arguments together--,i  
mean this and the former one1 in which  

we admitted that everything living is   
born of the dead4 ,for if the soul      
exists before birth1 and in coming to   
life and being born can be born only    
from death and dying1 must she not after
 death continue to exist1 since she has 
to be born again8--,surely the proof    
which you desire has been already       
furnished4 ,still ,i suspect that you   
and ,simmias would be glad to probe the 
argument further4 ,like children1 you   
are haunted with a fear that when the   
soul leaves the body1 the wind may      
really blow her away and scatter her2   
especially if a man should happen to die
 in a great storm and not when the sky  
is calm4  ,cebes answered with a smile3 
,then1 ,socrates1 you must argue us out 
of our fears--and yet1 strictly         
speaking1 they are not our fears1 but   
there is a child within us to whom death
 is a sort of hobgoblin2 him too we must
 persuade not to be afraid when he is   
alone in the dark4  ,socrates said3 ,let
 the voice of the charmer be applied    

daily until you have charmed away the   
fear4  ,and where shall we find a good  
charmer of our fears1 ,socrates1 when   
you are gone8  ,hellas1 he replied1 is a
 large place1 ,cebes1 and has many good 
men1 and there are barbarous races not a
 few3 seek for him among them all1 far  
and wide1 sparing neither pains nor     
money2 for there is no better way of    
spending your money4 ,and you must seek 
among yourselves too2 for you will not  
find others better able to make the     
search4  ,the search1 replied ,cebes1   
shall certainly be made4 ,and now1 if   
you please1 let us return to the point  
of the argument at which we digressed4  
,by all means1 replied ,socrates2 what  
else should ,i please8  ,very good4     
,must we not1 said ,socrates1 ask       
ourselves what that is which1 as we     
imagine1 is liable to be scattered1 and 
about which we fear8 and what again is  
that about which we have no fear8 ,and  
then we may proceed further to enquire  
whether that which suffers dispersion is

 or is not of the nature of soul--our   
hopes and fears as to our own souls will
 turn upon the answers to these         
questions4  ,very true1 he said4  ,now  
the compound or composite may be        
supposed to be naturally capable1 as of 
being compounded1 so also of being      
dissolved2 but that which is            
uncompounded1 and that only1 must be1 if
 anything is1 indissoluble4  ,yes2 ,i   
should imagine so1 said ,cebes4  ,and   
the uncompounded may be assumed to be   
the same and unchanging1 whereas the    
compound is always changing and never   
the same4  ,i agree1 he said4  ,then now
 let us return to the previous          
discussion4 ,is that idea or essence1   
which in the dialectical process we     
define as essence or true               
existence--whether essence of equality1 
beauty1 or anything else--are these     
essences1 ,i say1 liable at times to    
some degree of change8 or are they each 
of them always what they are1 having the
 same simple self-existent and          

unchanging forms1 not admitting of      
variation at all1 or in any way1 or at  
any time8  ,they must be always the     
same1 ,socrates1 replied ,cebes4  ,and  
what would you say of the many          
beautiful--whether men or horses or     
garments or any other things which are  
named by the same names and may be      
called equal or beautiful1--are they all
 unchanging and the same always1 or     
quite the reverse8 ,may they not rather 
be described as almost always changing  
and hardly ever the same1 either with   
themselves or with one another8  ,the   
latter1 replied ,cebes2 they are always 
in a state of change4  ,and these you   
can touch and see and perceive with the 
senses1 but the unchanging things you   
can only perceive with the mind--they   
are invisible and are not seen8  ,that  
is very true1 he said4  ,well1 then1    
added ,socrates1 let us suppose that    
there are two sorts of existences--one  
seen1 the other unseen4  ,let us suppose
 them4  ,the seen is the changing1 and  

the unseen is the unchanging8  ,that may
 be also supposed4  ,and1 further1 is   
not one part of us body1 another part   
soul8  ,to be sure4  ,and to which class
 is the body more alike and akin8       
,clearly to the seen--no one can doubt  
that4  ,and is the soul seen or not     
seen8  ,not by man1 ,socrates4  ,and    
what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is
 that which is or is not visible to the 
eye of man8  ,yes1 to the eye of man4   
,and is the soul seen or not seen8  ,not
 seen4  ,unseen then8  ,yes4  ,then the 
soul is more like to the unseen1 and the
 body to the seen8  ,that follows       
necessarily1 ,socrates4  ,and were we   
not saying long ago that the soul when  
using the body as an instrument of      
perception1 that is to say1 when using  
the sense of sight or hearing or some   
other sense 7for the meaning of         
perceiving through the body is          
perceiving through the senses7--were we 
not saying that the soul too is then    
dragged by the body into the region of  

the changeable1 and wanders and is      
confused2 the world spins round her1 and
 she is like a drunkard1 when she       
touches change8  ,very true4  ,but when 
returning into herself she reflects1    
then she passes into the other world1   
the region of purity1 and eternity1 and 
immortality1 and unchangeableness1 which
 are her kindred1 and with them she ever
 lives1 when she is by herself and is   
not let or hindered2 then she ceases    
from her erring ways1 and being in      
communion with the unchanging is        
unchanging4 ,and this state of the soul 
is called wisdom8  ,that is well and    
truly said1 ,socrates1 he replied4  ,and
 to which class is the soul more nearly 
alike and akin1 as far as may be        
inferred from this argument1 as well as 
from the preceding one8  ,i think1      
,socrates1 that1 in the opinion of every
 one who follows the argument1 the soul 
will be infinitely more like the        
unchangeable--even the most stupid      
person will not deny that4  ,and the    

body is more like the changing8  ,yes4  
,yet once more consider the matter in   
another light3 ,when the soul and the   
body are united1 then nature orders the 
soul to rule and govern1 and the body to
 obey and serve4 ,now which of these two
 functions is akin to the divine8 and   
which to the mortal8 ,does not the      
divine appear to you to be that which   
naturally orders and rules1 and the     
mortal to be that which is subject and  
servant8  ,true4  ,and which does the   
soul resemble8  ,the soul resembles the 
divine1 and the body the mortal--there  
can be no doubt of that1 ,socrates4     
,then reflect1 ,cebes3 of all which has 
been said is not this the               
conclusion8--that the soul is in the    
very likeness of the divine1 and        
immortal1 and intellectual1 and uniform1
 and indissoluble1 and unchangeable2 and
 that the body is in the very likeness  
of the human1 and mortal1 and           
unintellectual1 and multiform1 and      
dissoluble1 and changeable4 ,can this1  

my dear ,cebes1 be denied8  ,it cannot4 
,but if it be true1 then is not the body
 liable to speedy dissolution8 and is   
not the soul almost or altogether       
indissoluble8  ,certainly4  ,and do you 
further observe1 that after a man is    
dead1 the body1 or visible part of him1 
which is lying in the visible world1 and
 is called a corpse1 and would naturally
 be dissolved and decomposed and        
dissipated1 is not dissolved or         
decomposed at once1 but may remain for a
 for some time1 nay even for a long     
time1 if the constitution be sound at   
the time of death1 and the season of the
 year favourable8 ,for the body when    
shrunk and embalmed1 as the manner is in
 ,egypt1 may remain almost entire       
through infinite ages2 and even in      
decay1 there are still some portions1   
such as the bones and ligaments1 which  
are practically indestructible3--,do you
 agree8  ,yes4  ,and is it likely that  
the soul1 which is invisible1 in passing
 to the place of the true ,hades1 which 

like her is invisible1 and pure1 and    
noble1 and on her way to the good and   
wise ,god1 whither1 if ,god will1 my    
soul is also soon to go1--that the soul1
 ,i repeat1 if this be her nature and   
origin1 will be blown away and destroyed
 immediately on quitting the body1 as   
the many say8 ,that can never be1 my    
dear ,simmias and ,cebes4 ,the truth    
rather is1 that the soul which is pure  
at departing and draws after her no     
bodily taint1 having never voluntarily  
during life had connection with the     
body1 which she is ever avoiding1       
herself gathered into herself2--and     
making such abstraction her perpetual   
study--which means that she has been a  
true disciple of philosophy2 and        
therefore has in fact been always       
engaged in the practice of dying8 ,for  
is not philosophy the practice of       
death8--  ,certainly--  ,that soul1 ,i  
say1 herself invisible1 departs to the  
invisible world--to the divine and      
immortal and rational3 thither arriving1

 she is secure of bliss and is released 
from the error and folly of men1 their  
fears and wild passions and all other   
human ills1 and for ever dwells1 as they
 say of the initiated1 in company with  
the gods 7compare ,apol474 ,is not this 
true1 ,cebes8  ,yes1 said ,cebes1 beyond
 a doubt4  ,but the soul which has been 
polluted1 and is impure at the time of  
her departure1 and is the companion and 
servant of the body always1 and is in   
love with and fascinated by the body and
 by the desires and pleasures of the    
body1 until she is led to believe that  
the truth only exists in a bodily form1 
which a man may touch and see and taste1
 and use for the purposes of his        
lusts1--the soul1 ,i mean1 accustomed to
 hate and fear and avoid the            
intellectual principle1 which to the    
bodily eye is dark and invisible1 and   
can be attained only by philosophy2--do 
you suppose that such a soul will depart
 pure and unalloyed8  ,impossible1 he   
replied4  ,she is held fast by the      

corporeal1 which the continual          
association and constant care of the    
body have wrought into her nature4      
,very true4  ,and this corporeal        
element1 my friend1 is heavy and weighty
 and earthy1 and is that element of     
sight by which a soul is depressed and  
dragged down again into the visible     
world1 because she is afraid of the     
invisible and of the world              
below--prowling about tombs and         
sepulchres1 near which1 as they tell us1
 are seen certain ghostly apparitions of
 souls which have not departed pure1 but
 are cloyed with sight and therefore    
visible4  7,compare ,milton1 ,comus3--  
',but when lust1      ,by unchaste      
looks1 loose gestures1 and foul talk1   
,but most by lewd and lavish act of sin1
      ,lets in defilement to the inward 
parts1      ,the soul grows clotted by  
contagion1      ,imbodies1 and imbrutes1
 till she quite lose1      ,the divine  
property of her first being4      ,such 
are those thick and gloomy shadows damp 

,oft seen in charnel vaults and         
sepulchres1      ,lingering1 and sitting
 by a new made grave1      ,as loath to 
leave the body that it lov'd1      ,and 
linked itself by carnal sensuality      
,to a degenerate and degraded state4'7  
,that is very likely1 ,socrates4  ,yes1 
that is very likely1 ,cebes2 and these  
must be the souls1 not of the good1 but 
of the evil1 which are compelled to     
wander about such places in payment of  
the penalty of their former evil way of 
life2 and they continue to wander until 
through the craving after the corporeal 
which never leaves them1 they are       
imprisoned finally in another body4 ,and
 they may be supposed to find their     
prisons in the same natures which they  
have had in their former lives4  ,what  
natures do you mean1 ,socrates8  ,what  
,i mean is that men who have followed   
after gluttony1 and wantonness1 and     
drunkenness1 and have had no thought of 
avoiding them1 would pass into asses and
 animals of that sort4 ,what do you     

think8  ,i think such an opinion to be  
exceedingly probable4  ,and those who   
have chosen the portion of injustice1   
and tyranny1 and violence1 will pass    
into wolves1 or into hawks and          
kites2--whither else can we suppose them
 to go8  ,yes1 said ,cebes2 with such   
natures1 beyond question4  ,and there is
 no difficulty1 he said1 in assigning to
 all of them places answering to their  
several natures and propensities8       
,there is not1 he said4  ,some are      
happier than others2 and the happiest   
both in themselves and in the place to  
which they go are those who have        
practised the civil and social virtues  
which are called temperance and justice1
 and are acquired by habit and attention
 without philosophy and mind4 7,compare 
,republic47  ,why are they the happiest8
  ,because they may be expected to pass 
into some gentle and social kind which  
is like their own1 such as bees or wasps
 or ants1 or back again into the form of
 man1 and just and moderate men may be  

supposed to spring from them4  ,very    
likely4  ,no one who has not studied    
philosophy and who is not entirely pure 
at the time of his departure is allowed 
to enter the company of the ,gods1 but  
the lover of knowledge only4 ,and this  
is the reason1 ,simmias and ,cebes1 why 
the true votaries of philosophy abstain 
from all fleshly lusts1 and hold out    
against them and refuse to give         
themselves up to them1--not because they
 fear poverty or the ruin of their      
families1 like the lovers of money1 and 
the world in general2 nor like the      
lovers of power and honour1 because they
 dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil
 deeds4  ,no1 ,socrates1 that would not 
become them1 said ,cebes4  ,no indeed1  
he replied2 and therefore they who have 
any care of their own souls1 and do not 
merely live moulding and fashioning the 
body1 say farewell to all this2 they    
will not walk in the ways of the blind3 
and when philosophy offers them         
purification and release from evil1 they

 feel that they ought not to resist her 
influence1 and whither she leads they   
turn and follow4  ,what do you mean1    
,socrates8  ,i will tell you1 he said4  
,the lovers of knowledge are conscious  
that the soul was simply fastened and   
glued to the body--until philosophy     
received her1 she could only view real  
existence through the bars of a prison1 
not in and through herself2 she was     
wallowing in the mire of every sort of  
ignorance2 and by reason of lust had    
become the principal accomplice in her  
own captivity4 ,this was her original   
state2 and then1 as ,i was saying1 and  
as the lovers of knowledge are well     
aware1 philosophy1 seeing how terrible  
was her confinement1 of which she was to
 herself the cause1 received and gently 
comforted her and sought to release her1
 pointing out that the eye and the ear  
and the other senses are full of        
deception1 and persuading her to retire 
from them1 and abstain from all but the 
necessary use of them1 and be gathered  

up and collected into herself1 bidding  
her trust in herself and her own pure   
apprehension of pure existence1 and to  
mistrust whatever comes to her through  
other channels and is subject to        
variation2 for such things are visible  
and tangible1 but what she sees in her  
own nature is intelligible and          
invisible4 ,and the soul of the true    
philosopher thinks that she ought not to
 resist this deliverance1 and therefore 
abstains from pleasures and desires and 
pains and fears1 as far as she is able2 
reflecting that when a man has great    
joys or sorrows or fears or desires1 he 
suffers from them1 not merely the sort  
of evil which might be anticipated--as  
for example1 the loss of his health or  
property which he has sacrificed to his 
lusts--but an evil greater far1 which is
 the greatest and worst of all evils1   
and one of which he never thinks4  ,what
 is it1 ,socrates8 said ,cebes4  ,the   
evil is that when the feeling of        
pleasure or pain is most intense1 every 

soul of man imagines the objects of this
 intense feeling to be then plainest and
 truest3 but this is not so1 they are   
really the things of sight4  ,very true4
  ,and is not this the state in which   
the soul is most enthralled by the body8
  ,how so8  ,why1 because each pleasure 
and pain is a sort of nail which nails  
and rivets the soul to the body1 until  
she becomes like the body1 and believes 
that to be true which the body affirms  
to be true2 and from agreeing with the  
body and having the same delights she is
 obliged to have the same habits and    
haunts1 and is not likely ever to be    
pure at her departure to the world      
below1 but is always infected by the    
body2 and so she sinks into another body
 and there germinates and grows1 and has
 therefore no part in the communion of  
the divine and pure and simple4  ,most  
true1 ,socrates1 answered ,cebes4  ,and 
this1 ,cebes1 is the reason why the true
 lovers of knowledge are temperate and  
brave2 and not for the reason which the 

world gives4  ,certainly not4           
,certainly not6 ,the soul of a          
philosopher will reason in quite another
 way2 she will not ask philosophy to    
release her in order that when released 
she may deliver herself up again to the 
thraldom of pleasures and pains1 doing a
 work only to be undone again1 weaving  
instead of unweaving her ,penelope's    
web4 ,but she will calm passion1 and    
follow reason1 and dwell in the         
contemplation of her1 beholding the true
 and divine 7which is not matter of     
opinion71 and thence deriving           
nourishment4 ,thus she seeks to live    
while she lives1 and after death she    
hopes to go to her own kindred and to   
that which is like her1 and to be freed 
from human ills4 ,never fear1 ,simmias  
and ,cebes1 that a soul which has been  
thus nurtured and has had these         
pursuits1 will at her departure from the
 body be scattered and blown away by the
 winds and be nowhere and nothing4      
,when ,socrates had done speaking1 for a

 considerable time there was silence2 he
 himself appeared to be meditating1 as  
most of us were1 on what had been said2 
only ,cebes and ,simmias spoke a few    
words to one another4 ,and ,socrates    
observing them asked what they thought  
of the argument1 and whether there was  
anything wanting8 ,for1 said he1 there  
are many points still open to suspicion 
and attack1 if any one were disposed to 
sift the matter thoroughly4 ,should you 
be considering some other matter ,i say 
no more1 but if you are still in doubt  
do not hesitate to say exactly what you 
think1 and let us have anything better  
which you can suggest2 and if you think 
that ,i can be of any use1 allow me to  
help you4  ,simmias said3 ,i must       
confess1 ,socrates1 that doubts did     
arise in our minds1 and each of us was  
urging and inciting the other to put the
 question which we wanted to have       
answered and which neither of us liked  
to ask1 fearing that our importunity    
might be troublesome under present at   

such a time4  ,socrates replied with a  
smile3 ,o ,simmias1 what are you saying8
 ,i am not very likely to persuade other
 men that ,i do not regard my present   
situation as a misfortune1 if ,i cannot 
even persuade you that ,i am no worse   
off now than at any other time in my    
life4 ,will you not allow that ,i have  
as much of the spirit of prophecy in me 
as the swans8 ,for they1 when they      
perceive that they must die1 having sung
 all their life long1 do then sing more 
lustily than ever1 rejoicing in the     
thought that they are about to go away  
to the god whose ministers they are4    
,but men1 because they are themselves   
afraid of death1 slanderously affirm of 
the swans that they sing a lament at the
 last1 not considering that no bird     
sings when cold1 or hungry1 or in pain1 
not even the nightingale1 nor the       
swallow1 nor yet the hoopoe2 which are  
said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow1    
although ,i do not believe this to be   
true of them any more than of the swans4

 ,but because they are sacred to        
,apollo1 they have the gift of prophecy1
 and anticipate the good things of      
another world1 wherefore they sing and  
rejoice in that day more than they ever 
did before4 ,and ,i too1 believing      
myself to be the consecrated servant of 
the same ,god1 and the fellow-servant of
 the swans1 and thinking that ,i have   
received from my master gifts of        
prophecy which are not inferior to      
theirs1 would not go out of life less   
merrily than the swans4 ,never mind     
then1 if this be your only objection1   
but speak and ask anything which you    
like1 while the eleven magistrates of   
,athens allow4  ,very good1 ,socrates1  
said ,simmias2 then ,i will tell you my 
difficulty1 and ,cebes will tell you    
his4 ,i feel myself1 7and ,i daresay    
that you have the same feeling71 how    
hard or rather impossible is the        
attainment of any certainty about       
questions such as these in the present  
life4 ,and yet ,i should deem him a     

coward who did not prove what is said   
about them to the uttermost1 or whose   
heart failed him before he had examined 
them on every side4 ,for he should      
persevere until he has achieved one of  
two things3 either he should discover1  
or be taught the truth about them2 or1  
if this be impossible1 ,i would have him
 take the best and most irrefragable of 
human theories1 and let this be the raft
 upon which he sails through life--not  
without risk1 as ,i admit1 if he cannot 
find some word of ,god which will more  
surely and safely carry him4 ,and now1  
as you bid me1 ,i will venture to       
question you1 and then ,i shall not have
 to reproach myself hereafter with not  
having said at the time what ,i think4  
,for when ,i consider the matter1 either
 alone or with ,cebes1 the argument does
 certainly appear to me1 ,socrates1 to  
be not sufficient4  ,socrates answered3 
,i dare say1 my friend1 that you may be 
right1 but ,i should like to know in    
what respect the argument is            

insufficient4  ,in this respect1 replied
 ,simmias3--,suppose a person to use the
 same argument about harmony and the    
lyre--might he not say that harmony is a
 thing invisible1 incorporeal1 perfect1 
divine1 existing in the lyre which is   
harmonized1 but that the lyre and the   
strings are matter and material1        
composite1 earthy1 and akin to          
mortality8 ,and when some one breaks the
 lyre1 or cuts and rends the strings1   
then he who takes this view would argue 
as you do1 and on the same analogy1 that
 the harmony survives and has not       
perished--you cannot imagine1 he would  
say1 that the lyre without the strings1 
and the broken strings themselves which 
are mortal remain1 and yet that the     
harmony1 which is of heavenly and       
immortal nature and kindred1 has        
perished--perished before the mortal4   
,the harmony must still be somewhere1   
and the wood and strings will decay     
before anything can happen to that4 ,the
 thought1 ,socrates1 must have occurred 

to your own mind that such is our       
conception of the soul2 and that when   
the body is in a manner strung and held 
together by the elements of hot and     
cold1 wet and dry1 then the soul is the 
harmony or due proportionate admixture  
of them4 ,but if so1 whenever the       
strings of the body are unduly loosened 
or overstrained through disease or other
 injury1 then the soul1 though most     
divine1 like other harmonies of music or
 of works of art1 of course perishes at 
once1 although the material remains of  
the body may last for a considerable    
time1 until they are either decayed or  
burnt4 ,and if any one maintains that   
the soul1 being the harmony of the      
elements of the body1 is first to perish
 in that which is called death1 how     
shall we answer him8  ,socrates looked  
fixedly at us as his manner was1 and    
said with a smile3 ,simmias has reason  
on his side2 and why does not some one  
of you who is better able than myself   
answer him8 for there is force in his   

attack upon me4 ,but perhaps1 before we 
answer him1 we had better also hear what
 ,cebes has to say that we may gain time
 for reflection1 and when they have both
 spoken1 we may either assent to them1  
if there is truth in what they say1 or  
if not1 we will maintain our position4  
,please to tell me then1 ,cebes1 he     
said1 what was the difficulty which     
troubled you8  ,cebes said3 ,i will tell
 you4 ,my feeling is that the argument  
is where it was1 and open to the same   
objections which were urged before2 for 
,i am ready to admit that the existence 
of the soul before entering into the    
bodily form has been very ingeniously1  
and1 if ,i may say so1 quite            
sufficiently proven2 but the existence  
of the soul after death is still1 in my 
judgment1 unproven4 ,now my objection is
 not the same as that of ,simmias2 for  
,i am not disposed to deny that the soul
 is stronger and more lasting than the  
body1 being of opinion that in all such 
respects the soul very far excels the   

body4 ,well1 then1 says the argument to 
me1 why do you remain                   
unconvinced8--,when you see that the    
weaker continues in existence after the 
man is dead1 will you not admit that the
 more lasting must also survive during  
the same period of time8 ,now ,i will   
ask you to consider whether the         
objection1 which1 like ,simmias1 ,i will
 express in a figure1 is of any weight4 
,the analogy which ,i will adduce is    
that of an old weaver1 who dies1 and    
after his death somebody says3--,he is  
not dead1 he must be alive2--see1 there 
is the coat which he himself wove and   
wore1 and which remains whole and       
undecayed4 ,and then he proceeds to ask 
of some one who is incredulous1 whether 
a man lasts longer1 or the coat which is
 in use and wear2 and when he is        
answered that a man lasts far longer1   
thinks that he has thus certainly       
demonstrated the survival of the man1   
who is the more lasting1 because the    
less lasting remains4 ,but that1        

,simmias1 as ,i would beg you to remark1
 is a mistake2 any one can see that he  
who talks thus is talking nonsense4 ,for
 the truth is1 that the weaver          
aforesaid1 having woven and worn many   
such coats1 outlived several of them1   
and was outlived by the last2 but a man 
is not therefore proved to be slighter  
and weaker than a coat4 ,now the        
relation of the body to the soul may be 
expressed in a similar figure2 and any  
one may very fairly say in like manner  
that the soul is lasting1 and the body  
weak and shortlived in comparison4 ,he  
may argue in like manner that every soul
 wears out many bodies1 especially if a 
man live many years4 ,while he is alive 
the body deliquesces and decays1 and the
 soul always weaves another garment and 
repairs the waste4 ,but of course1      
whenever the soul perishes1 she must    
have on her last garment1 and this will 
survive her2 and then at length1 when   
the soul is dead1 the body will show its
 native weakness1 and quickly decompose 

and pass away4 ,i would therefore rather
 not rely on the argument from superior 
strength to prove the continued         
existence of the soul after death4 ,for 
granting even more than you affirm to be
 possible1 and acknowledging not only   
that the soul existed before birth1 but 
also that the souls of some exist1 and  
will continue to exist after death1 and 
will be born and die again and again1   
and that there is a natural strength in 
the soul which will hold out and be born
 many times--nevertheless1 we may be    
still inclined to think that she will   
weary in the labours of successive      
births1 and may at last succumb in one  
of her deaths and utterly perish2 and   
this death and dissolution of the body  
which brings destruction to the soul may
 be unknown to any of us1 for no one of 
us can have had any experience of it3   
and if so1 then ,i maintain that he who 
is confident about death has but a      
foolish confidence1 unless he is able to
 prove that the soul is altogether      

immortal and imperishable4 ,but if he   
cannot prove the soul's immortality1 he 
who is about to die will always have    
reason to fear that when the body is    
disunited1 the soul also may utterly    
perish4  ,all of us1 as we afterwards   
remarked to one another1 had an         
unpleasant feeling at hearing what they 
said4 ,when we had been so firmly       
convinced before1 now to have our faith 
shaken seemed to introduce a confusion  
and uncertainty1 not only into the      
previous argument1 but into any future  
one2 either we were incapable of forming
 a judgment1 or there were no grounds of
 belief4  ,,echecrates3 ,there ,i feel  
with you--by heaven ,i do1 ,phaedo1 and 
when you were speaking1 ,i was beginning
 to ask myself the same question3 ,what 
argument can ,i ever trust again8 ,for  
what could be more convincing than the  
argument of ,socrates1 which has now    
fallen into discredit8 ,that the soul is
 a harmony is a doctrine which has      
always had a wonderful attraction for   

me1 and1 when mentioned1 came back to me
 at once1 as my own original conviction4
 ,and now ,i must begin again and find  
another argument which will assure me   
that when the man is dead the soul      
survives4 ,tell me1 ,i implore you1 how 
did ,socrates proceed8 ,did he appear to
 share the unpleasant feeling which you 
mention8 or did he calmly meet the      
attack8 ,and did he answer forcibly or  
feebly8 ,narrate what passed as exactly 
as you can4  ,,phaedo3 ,often1          
,echecrates1 ,i have wondered at        
,socrates1 but never more than on that  
occasion4 ,that he should be able to    
answer was nothing1 but what astonished 
me was1 first1 the gentle and pleasant  
and approving manner in which he        
received the words of the young men1 and
 then his quick sense of the wound which
 had been inflicted by the argument1 and
 the readiness with which he healed it4 
,he might be compared to a general      
rallying his defeated and broken army1  
urging them to accompany him and return 

to the field of argument4  ,,echecrates3
 ,what followed8  ,,phaedo3 ,you shall  
hear1 for ,i was close to him on his    
right hand1 seated on a sort of stool1  
and he on a couch which was a good deal 
higher4 ,he stroked my head1 and pressed
 the hair upon my neck--he had a way of 
playing with my hair2 and then he said3 
,to-morrow1 ,phaedo1 ,i suppose that    
these fair locks of yours will be       
severed4  ,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i suppose   
that they will1 ,i replied4  ,not so1 if
 you will take my advice4  ,what shall  
,i do with them8 ,i said4  ,to-day1 he  
replied1 and not to-morrow1 if this     
argument dies and we cannot bring it to 
life again1 you and ,i will both shave  
our locks2 and if ,i were you1 and the  
argument got away from me1 and ,i could 
not hold my ground against ,simmias and 
,cebes1 ,i would myself take an oath1   
like the ,argives1 not to wear hair any 
more until ,i had renewed the conflict  
and defeated them4  ,yes1 ,i said1 but  
,heracles himself is said not to be a   

match for two4  ,summon me then1 he     
said1 and ,i will be your ,iolaus until 
the sun goes down4  ,i summon you       
rather1 ,i rejoined1 not as ,heracles   
summoning ,iolaus1 but as ,iolaus might 
summon ,heracles4  ,that will do as     
well1 he said4 ,but first let us take   
care that we avoid a danger4  ,of what  
nature8 ,i said4  ,lest we become       
misologists1 he replied1 no worse thing 
can happen to a man than this4 ,for as  
there are misanthropists or haters of   
men1 there are also misologists or      
haters of ideas1 and both spring from   
the same cause1 which is ignorance of   
the world4 ,misanthropy arises out of   
the too great confidence of             
inexperience2--you trust a man and think
 him altogether true and sound and      
faithful1 and then in a little while he 
turns out to be false and knavish2 and  
then another and another1 and when this 
has happened several times to a man1    
especially when it happens among those  
whom he deems to be his own most trusted

 and familiar friends1 and he has often 
quarreled with them1 he at last hates   
all men1 and believes that no one has   
any good in him at all4 ,you must have  
observed this trait of character8  ,i   
have4  ,and is not the feeling          
discreditable8 ,is it not obvious that  
such an one having to deal with other   
men1 was clearly without any experience 
of human nature2 for experience would   
have taught him the true state of the   
case1 that few are the good and few the 
evil1 and that the great majority are in
 the interval between them4  ,what do   
you mean8 ,i said4  ,i mean1 he replied1
 as you might say of the very large and 
very small1 that nothing is more        
uncommon than a very large or very small
 man2 and this applies generally to all 
extremes1 whether of great and small1 or
 swift and slow1 or fair and foul1 or   
black and white3 and whether the        
instances you select be men or dogs or  
anything else1 few are the extremes1 but
 many are in the mean between them4 ,did

 you never observe this8  ,yes1 ,i said1
 ,i have4  ,and do you not imagine1 he  
said1 that if there were a competition  
in evil1 the worst would be found to be 
very few8  ,yes1 that is very likely1 ,i
 said4  ,yes1 that is very likely1 he   
replied2 although in this respect       
arguments are unlike men--there ,i was  
led on by you to say more than ,i had   
intended2 but the point of comparison   
was1 that when a simple man who has no  
skill in dialectics believes an argument
 to be true which he afterwards imagines
 to be false1 whether really false or   
not1 and then another and another1 he   
has no longer any faith left1 and great 
disputers1 as you know1 come to think at
 last that they have grown to be the    
wisest of mankind2 for they alone       
perceive the utter unsoundness and      
instability of all arguments1 or indeed1
 of all things1 which1 like the currents
 in the ,euripus1 are going up and down 
in never-ceasing ebb and flow4  ,that is
 quite true1 ,i said4  ,yes1 ,phaedo1 he

 replied1 and how melancholy1 if there  
be such a thing as truth or certainty or
 possibility of knowledge--that a man   
should have lighted upon some argument  
or other which at first seemed true and 
then turned out to be false1 and instead
 of blaming himself and his own want of 
wit1 because he is annoyed1 should at   
last be too glad to transfer the blame  
from himself to arguments in general3   
and for ever afterwards should hate and 
revile them1 and lose truth and the     
knowledge of realities4  ,yes1 indeed1  
,i said2 that is very melancholy4  ,let 
us then1 in the first place1 he said1 be
 careful of allowing or of admitting    
into our souls the notion that there is 
no health or soundness in any arguments 
at all4 ,rather say that we have not yet
 attained to soundness in ourselves1 and
 that we must struggle manfully and do  
our best to gain health of mind--you and
 all other men having regard to the     
whole of your future life1 and ,i myself
 in the prospect of death4 ,for at this 

moment ,i am sensible that ,i have not  
the temper of a philosopher2 like the   
vulgar1 ,i am only a partisan4 ,now the 
partisan1 when he is engaged in a       
dispute1 cares nothing about the rights 
of the question1 but is anxious only to 
convince his hearers of his own         
assertions4 ,and the difference between 
him and me at the present moment is     
merely this--that whereas he seeks to   
convince his hearers that what he says  
is true1 ,i am rather seeking to        
convince myself2 to convince my hearers 
is a secondary matter with me4 ,and do  
but see how much ,i gain by the         
argument4 ,for if what ,i say is true1  
then ,i do well to be persuaded of the  
truth1 but if there be nothing after    
death1 still1 during the short time that
 remains1 ,i shall not distress my      
friends with lamentations1 and my       
ignorance will not last1 but will die   
with me1 and therefore no harm will be  
done4 ,this is the state of mind1       
,simmias and ,cebes1 in which ,i        

approach the argument4 ,and ,i would ask
 you to be thinking of the truth and not
 of ,socrates3 agree with me1 if ,i seem
 to you to be speaking the truth2 or if 
not1 withstand me might and main1 that  
,i may not deceive you as well as myself
 in my enthusiasm1 and like the bee1    
leave my sting in you before ,i die4    
,and now let us proceed1 he said4 ,and  
first of all let me be sure that ,i have
 in my mind what you were saying4       
,simmias1 if ,i remember rightly1 has   
fears and misgivings whether the soul1  
although a fairer and diviner thing than
 the body1 being as she is in the form  
of harmony1 may not perish first4 ,on   
the other hand1 ,cebes appeared to grant
 that the soul was more lasting than the
 body1 but he said that no one could    
know whether the soul1 after having worn
 out many bodies1 might not perish      
herself and leave her last body behind  
her2 and that this is death1 which is   
the destruction not of the body but of  
the soul1 for in the body the work of   

destruction is ever going on4 ,are not  
these1 ,simmias and ,cebes1 the points  
which we have to consider8  ,they both  
agreed to this statement of them4  ,he  
proceeded3 ,and did you deny the force  
of the whole preceding argument1 or of a
 part only8  ,of a part only1 they      
replied4  ,and what did you think1 he   
said1 of that part of the argument in   
which we said that knowledge was        
recollection1 and hence inferred that   
the soul must have previously existed   
somewhere else before she was enclosed  
in the body8  ,cebes said that he had   
been wonderfully impressed by that part 
of the argument1 and that his conviction
 remained absolutely unshaken4 ,simmias 
agreed1 and added that he himself could 
hardly imagine the possibility of his   
ever thinking differently4  ,but1       
rejoined ,socrates1 you will have to    
think differently1 my ,theban friend1 if
 you still maintain that harmony is a   
compound1 and that the soul is a harmony
 which is made out of strings set in the

 frame of the body2 for you will surely 
never allow yourself to say that a      
harmony is prior to the elements which  
compose it4  ,never1 ,socrates4  ,but do
 you not see that this is what you imply
 when you say that the soul existed     
before she took the form and body of    
man1 and was made up of elements which  
as yet had no existence8 ,for harmony is
 not like the soul1 as you suppose2 but 
first the lyre1 and the strings1 and the
 sounds exist in a state of discord1 and
 then harmony is made last of all1 and  
perishes first4 ,and how can such a     
notion of the soul as this agree with   
the other8  ,not at all1 replied        
,simmias4  ,and yet1 he said1 there     
surely ought to be harmony in a         
discourse of which harmony is the theme4
  ,there ought1 replied ,simmias4  ,but 
there is no harmony1 he said1 in the two
 propositions that knowledge is         
recollection1 and that the soul is a    
harmony4 ,which of them will you retain8
  ,i think1 he replied1 that ,i have a  

much stronger faith1 ,socrates1 in the  
first of the two1 which has been fully  
demonstrated to me1 than in the latter1 
which has not been demonstrated at all1 
but rests only on probable and plausible
 grounds2 and is therefore believed by  
the many4 ,i know too well that these   
arguments from probabilities are        
impostors1 and unless great caution is  
observed in the use of them1 they are   
apt to be deceptive--in geometry1 and in
 other things too4 ,but the doctrine of 
knowledge and recollection has been     
proven to me on trustworthy grounds2 and
 the proof was that the soul must have  
existed before she came into the body1  
because to her belongs the essence of   
which the very name implies existence4  
,having1 as ,i am convinced1 rightly    
accepted this conclusion1 and on        
sufficient grounds1 ,i must1 as ,i      
suppose1 cease to argue or allow others 
to argue that the soul is a harmony4    
,let me put the matter1 ,simmias1 he    
said1 in another point of view3 ,do you 

imagine that a harmony or any other     
composition can be in a state other than
 that of the elements1 out of which it  
is compounded8  ,certainly not4  ,or do 
or suffer anything other than they do or
 suffer8  ,he agreed4  ,then a harmony  
does not1 properly speaking1 lead the   
parts or elements which make up the     
harmony1 but only follows them4  ,he    
assented4  ,for harmony cannot possibly 
have any motion1 or sound1 or other     
quality which is opposed to its parts4  
,that would be impossible1 he replied4  
,and does not the nature of every       
harmony depend upon the manner in which 
the elements are harmonized8  ,i do not 
understand you1 he said4  ,i mean to say
 that a harmony admits of degrees1 and  
is more of a harmony1 and more          
completely a harmony1 when more truly   
and fully harmonized1 to any extent     
which is possible2 and less of a        
harmony1 and less completely a harmony1 
when less truly and fully harmonized4   
,true4  ,but does the soul admit of     

degrees8 or is one soul in the very     
least degree more or less1 or more or   
less completely1 a soul than another8   
,not in the least4  ,yet surely of two  
souls1 one is said to have intelligence 
and virtue1 and to be good1 and the     
other to have folly and vice1 and to be 
an evil soul3 and this is said truly8   
,yes1 truly4  ,but what will those who  
maintain the soul to be a harmony say of
 this presence of virtue and vice in the
 soul8--will they say that here is      
another harmony1 and another discord1   
and that the virtuous soul is           
harmonized1 and herself being a harmony 
has another harmony within her1 and that
 the vicious soul is inharmonical and   
has no harmony within her8  ,i cannot   
tell1 replied ,simmias2 but ,i suppose  
that something of the sort would be     
asserted by those who say that the soul 
is a harmony4  ,and we have already     
admitted that no soul is more a soul    
than another2 which is equivalent to    
admitting that harmony is not more or   

less harmony1 or more or less completely
 a harmony8  ,quite true4  ,and that    
which is not more or less a harmony is  
not more or less harmonized8  ,true4    
,and that which is not more or less     
harmonized cannot have more or less of  
harmony1 but only an equal harmony8     
,yes1 an equal harmony4  ,then one soul 
not being more or less absolutely a soul
 than another1 is not more or less      
harmonized8  ,exactly4  ,and therefore  
has neither more nor less of discord1   
nor yet of harmony8  ,she has not4  ,and
 having neither more nor less of harmony
 or of discord1 one soul has no more    
vice or virtue than another1 if vice be 
discord and virtue harmony8  ,not at all
 more4  ,or speaking more correctly1    
,simmias1 the soul1 if she is a harmony1
 will never have any vice2 because a    
harmony1 being absolutely a harmony1 has
 no part in the inharmonical4  ,no4     
,and therefore a soul which is          
absolutely a soul has no vice8  ,how can
 she have1 if the previous argument     

holds8  ,then1 if all souls are equally 
by their nature souls1 all souls of all 
living creatures will be equally good8  
,i agree with you1 ,socrates1 he said4  
,and can all this be true1 think you8 he
 said2 for these are the consequences   
which seem to follow from the assumption
 that the soul is a harmony8  ,it cannot
 be true4  ,once more1 he said1 what    
ruler is there of the elements of human 
nature other than the soul1 and         
especially the wise soul8 ,do you know  
of any8  ,indeed1 ,i do not4  ,and is   
the soul in agreement with the          
affections of the body8 or is she at    
variance with them8 ,for example1 when  
the body is hot and thirsty1 does not   
the soul incline us against drinking8   
and when the body is hungry1 against    
eating8 ,and this is only one instance  
out of ten thousand of the opposition of
 the soul to the things of the body4    
,very true4  ,but we have already       
acknowledged that the soul1 being a     
harmony1 can never utter a note at      

variance with the tensions and          
relaxations and vibrations and other    
affections of the strings out of which  
she is composed2 she can only follow1   
she cannot lead them8  ,it must be so1  
he replied4  ,and yet do we not now     
discover the soul to be doing the exact 
opposite--leading the elements of which 
she is believed to be composed2 almost  
always opposing and coercing them in all
 sorts of ways throughout life1         
sometimes more violently with the pains 
of medicine and gymnastic2 then again   
more gently2 now threatening1 now       
admonishing the desires1 passions1      
fears1 as if talking to a thing which is
 not herself1 as ,homer in the ,odyssee 
represents ,odysseus doing in the       
words--  ',he beat his breast1 and thus 
reproached his heart3 ,endure1 my heart2
 far worse hast thou endured6'  ,do you 
think that ,homer wrote this under the  
idea that the soul is a harmony capable 
of being led by the affections of the   
body1 and not rather of a nature which  

should lead and master them--herself a  
far diviner thing than any harmony8     
,yes1 ,socrates1 ,i quite think so4     
,then1 my friend1 we can never be right 
in saying that the soul is a harmony1   
for we should contradict the divine     
,homer1 and contradict ourselves4       
,true1 he said4  ,thus much1 said       
,socrates1 of ,harmonia1 your ,theban   
goddess1 who has graciously yielded to  
us2 but what shall ,i say1 ,cebes1 to   
her husband ,cadmus1 and how shall ,i   
make peace with him8  ,i think that you 
will discover a way of propitiating him1
 said ,cebes2 ,i am sure that you have  
put the argument with ,harmonia in a    
manner that ,i could never have         
expected4 ,for when ,simmias was        
mentioning his difficulty1 ,i quite     
imagined that no answer could be given  
to him1 and therefore ,i was surprised  
at finding that his argument could not  
sustain the first onset of yours1 and   
not impossibly the other1 whom you call 
,cadmus1 may share a similar fate4      

,nay1 my good friend1 said ,socrates1   
let us not boast1 lest some evil eye    
should put to flight the word which ,i  
am about to speak4 ,that1 however1 may  
be left in the hands of those above1    
while ,i draw near in ,homeric fashion1 
and try the mettle of your words4 ,here 
lies the point3--,you want to have it   
proven to you that the soul is          
imperishable and immortal1 and the      
philosopher who is confident in death   
appears to you to have but a vain and   
foolish confidence1 if he believes that 
he will fare better in the world below  
than one who has led another sort of    
life1 unless he can prove this2 and you 
say that the demonstration of the       
strength and divinity of the soul1 and  
of her existence prior to our becoming  
men1 does not necessarily imply her     
immortality4 ,admitting the soul to be  
longlived1 and to have known and done   
much in a former state1 still she is not
 on that account immortal2 and her      
entrance into the human form may be a   

sort of disease which is the beginning  
of dissolution1 and may at last1 after  
the toils of life are over1 end in that 
which is called death4 ,and whether the 
soul enters into the body once only or  
many times1 does not1 as you say1 make  
any difference in the fears of          
individuals4 ,for any man1 who is not   
devoid of sense1 must fear1 if he has no
 knowledge and can give no account of   
the soul's immortality4 ,this1 or       
something like this1 ,i suspect to be   
your notion1 ,cebes2 and ,i designedly  
recur to it in order that nothing may   
escape us1 and that you may1 if you     
wish1 add or subtract anything4  ,but1  
said ,cebes1 as far as ,i see at        
present1 ,i have nothing to add or      
subtract3 ,i mean what you say that ,i  
mean4  ,socrates paused awhile1 and     
seemed to be absorbed in reflection4 ,at
 length he said3 ,you are raising a     
tremendous question1 ,cebes1 involving  
the whole nature of generation and      
corruption1 about which1 if you like1 ,i

 will give you my own experience2 and if
 anything which ,i say is likely to     
avail towards the solution of your      
difficulty you may make use of it4  ,i  
should very much like1 said ,cebes1 to  
hear what you have to say4  ,then ,i    
will tell you1 said ,socrates4 ,when ,i 
was young1 ,cebes1 ,i had a prodigious  
desire to know that department of       
philosophy which is called the          
investigation of nature2 to know the    
causes of things1 and why a thing is and
 is created or destroyed appeared to me 
to be a lofty profession2 and ,i was    
always agitating myself with the        
consideration of questions such as      
these3--,is the growth of animals the   
result of some decay which the hot and  
cold principle contracts1 as some have  
said8 ,is the blood the element with    
which we think1 or the air1 or the fire8
 or perhaps nothing of the kind--but the
 brain may be the originating power of  
the perceptions of hearing and sight and
 smell1 and memory and opinion may come 

from them1 and science may be based on  
memory and opinion when they have       
attained fixity4 ,and then ,i went on to
 examine the corruption of them1 and    
then to the things of heaven and earth1 
and at last ,i concluded myself to be   
utterly and absolutely incapable of     
these enquiries1 as ,i will             
satisfactorily prove to you4 ,for ,i was
 fascinated by them to such a degree    
that my eyes grew blind to things which 
,i had seemed to myself1 and also to    
others1 to know quite well2 ,i forgot   
what ,i had before thought self-evident 
truths2 e4g4 such a fact as that the    
growth of man is the result of eating   
and drinking2 for when by the digestion 
of food flesh is added to flesh and bone
 to bone1 and whenever there is an      
aggregation of congenial elements1 the  
lesser bulk becomes larger and the small
 man great4 ,was not that a reasonable  
notion8  ,yes1 said ,cebes1 ,i think so4
  ,well2 but let me tell you something  
more4 ,there was a time when ,i thought 

that ,i understood the meaning of       
greater and less pretty well2 and when  
,i saw a great man standing by a little 
one1 ,i fancied that one was taller than
 the other by a head2 or one horse would
 appear to be greater than another      
horse3 and still more clearly did ,i    
seem to perceive that ten is two more   
than eight1 and that two cubits are more
 than one1 because two is the double of 
one4  ,and what is now your notion of   
such matters8 said ,cebes4  ,i should be
 far enough from imagining1 he replied1 
that ,i knew the cause of any of them1  
by heaven ,i should2 for ,i cannot      
satisfy myself that1 when one is added  
to one1 the one to which the addition is
 made becomes two1 or that the two units
 added together make two by reason of   
the addition4 ,i cannot understand how1 
when separated from the other1 each of  
them was one and not two1 and now1 when 
they are brought together1 the mere     
juxtaposition or meeting of them should 
be the cause of their becoming two3     

neither can ,i understand how the       
division of one is the way to make two2 
for then a different cause would produce
 the same effect1--as in the former     
instance the addition and juxtaposition 
of one to one was the cause of two1 in  
this the separation and subtraction of  
one from the other would be the cause4  
,nor am ,i any longer satisfied that ,i 
understand the reason why one or        
anything else is either generated or    
destroyed or is at all1 but ,i have in  
my mind some confused notion of a new   
method1 and can never admit the other4  
,then ,i heard some one reading1 as he  
said1 from a book of ,anaxagoras1 that  
mind was the disposer and cause of all1 
and ,i was delighted at this notion1    
which appeared quite admirable1 and ,i  
said to myself3 ,if mind is the         
disposer1 mind will dispose all for the 
best1 and put each particular in the    
best place2 and ,i argued that if any   
one desired to find out the cause of the
 generation or destruction or existence 

of anything1 he must find out what state
 of being or doing or suffering was best
 for that thing1 and therefore a man had
 only to consider the best for himself  
and others1 and then he would also know 
the worse1 since the same science       
comprehended both4 ,and ,i rejoiced to  
think that ,i had found in ,anaxagoras a
 teacher of the causes of existence such
 as ,i desired1 and ,i imagined that he 
would tell me first whether the earth is
 flat or round2 and whichever was true1 
he would proceed to explain the cause   
and the necessity of this being so1 and 
then he would teach me the nature of the
 best and show that this was best2 and  
if he said that the earth was in the    
centre1 he would further explain that   
this position was the best1 and ,i      
should be satisfied with the explanation
 given1 and not want any other sort of  
cause4 ,and ,i thought that ,i would    
then go on and ask him about the sun and
 moon and stars1 and that he would      
explain to me their comparative         

swiftness1 and their returnings and     
various states1 active and passive1 and 
how all of them were for the best4 ,for 
,i could not imagine that when he spoke 
of mind as the disposer of them1 he     
would give any other account of their   
being as they are1 except that this was 
best2 and ,i thought that when he had   
explained to me in detail the cause of  
each and the cause of all1 he would go  
on to explain to me what was best for   
each and what was good for all4 ,these  
hopes ,i would not have sold for a large
 sum of money1 and ,i seized the books  
and read them as fast as ,i could in my 
eagerness to know the better and the    
worse4  ,what expectations ,i had       
formed1 and how grievously was ,i       
disappointed6 ,as ,i proceeded1 ,i found
 my philosopher altogether forsaking    
mind or any other principle of order1   
but having recourse to air1 and ether1  
and water1 and other eccentricities4 ,i 
might compare him to a person who began 
by maintaining generally that mind is   

the cause of the actions of ,socrates1  
but who1 when he endeavoured to explain 
the causes of my several actions in     
detail1 went on to show that ,i sit here
 because my body is made up of bones and
 muscles2 and the bones1 as he would    
say1 are hard and have joints which     
divide them1 and the muscles are        
elastic1 and they cover the bones1 which
 have also a covering or environment of 
flesh and skin which contains them2 and 
as the bones are lifted at their joints 
by the contraction or relaxation of the 
muscles1 ,i am able to bend my limbs1   
and this is why ,i am sitting here in a 
curved posture--that is what he would   
say1 and he would have a similar        
explanation of my talking to you1 which 
he would attribute to sound1 and air1   
and hearing1 and he would assign ten    
thousand other causes of the same sort1 
forgetting to mention the true cause1   
which is1 that the ,athenians have      
thought fit to condemn me1 and          
accordingly ,i have thought it better   

and more right to remain here and       
undergo my sentence2 for ,i am inclined 
to think that these muscles and bones of
 mine would have gone off long ago to   
,megara or ,boeotia--by the dog they    
would1 if they had been moved only by   
their own idea of what was best1 and if 
,i had not chosen the better and nobler 
part1 instead of playing truant and     
running away1 of enduring any punishment
 which the state inflicts4 ,there is    
surely a strange confusion of causes and
 conditions in all this4 ,it may be     
said1 indeed1 that without bones and    
muscles and the other parts of the body 
,i cannot execute my purposes4 ,but to  
say that ,i do as ,i do because of them1
 and that this is the way in which mind 
acts1 and not from the choice of the    
best1 is a very careless and idle mode  
of speaking4 ,i wonder that they cannot 
distinguish the cause from the          
condition1 which the many1 feeling about
 in the dark1 are always mistaking and  
misnaming4 ,and thus one man makes a    

vortex all round and steadies the earth 
by the heaven2 another gives the air as 
a support to the earth1 which is a sort 
of broad trough4 ,any power which in    
arranging them as they are arranges them
 for the best never enters into their   
minds2 and instead of finding any       
superior strength in it1 they rather    
expect to discover another ,atlas of the
 world who is stronger and more         
everlasting and more containing than the
 good2--of the obligatory and containing
 power of the good they think nothing2  
and yet this is the principle which ,i  
would fain learn if any one would teach 
me4 ,but as ,i have failed either to    
discover myself1 or to learn of any one 
else1 the nature of the best1 ,i will   
exhibit to you1 if you like1 what ,i    
have found to be the second best mode of
 enquiring into the cause4  ,i should   
very much like to hear1 he replied4     
,socrates proceeded3--,i thought that as
 ,i had failed in the contemplation of  
true existence1 ,i ought to be careful  

that ,i did not lose the eye of my soul2
 as people may injure their bodily eye  
by observing and gazing on the sun      
during an eclipse1 unless they take the 
precaution of only looking at the image 
reflected in the water1 or in some      
similar medium4 ,so in my own case1 ,i  
was afraid that my soul might be blinded
 altogether if ,i looked at things with 
my eyes or tried to apprehend them by   
the help of the senses4 ,and ,i thought 
that ,i had better have recourse to the 
world of mind and seek there the truth  
of existence4 ,i dare say that the      
simile is not perfect--for ,i am very   
far from admitting that he who          
contemplates existences through the     
medium of thought1 sees them only       
'through a glass darkly1' any more than 
he who considers them in action and     
operation4 ,however1 this was the method
 which ,i adopted3 ,i first assumed some
 principle which ,i judged to be the    
strongest1 and then ,i affirmed as true 
whatever seemed to agree with this1     

whether relating to the cause or to     
anything else2 and that which disagreed 
,i regarded as untrue4 ,but ,i should   
like to explain my meaning more clearly1
 as ,i do not think that you as yet     
understand me4  ,no indeed1 replied     
,cebes1 not very well4  ,there is       
nothing new1 he said1 in what ,i am     
about to tell you2 but only what ,i have
 been always and everywhere repeating in
 the previous discussion and on other   
occasions3 ,i want to show you the      
nature of that cause which has occupied 
my thoughts4 ,i shall have to go back to
 those familiar words which are in the  
mouth of every one1 and first of all    
assume that there is an absolute beauty 
and goodness and greatness1 and the     
like2 grant me this1 and ,i hope to be  
able to show you the nature of the      
cause1 and to prove the immortality of  
the soul4  ,cebes said3 ,you may proceed
 at once with the proof1 for ,i grant   
you this4  ,well1 he said1 then ,i      
should like to know whether you agree   

with me in the next step2 for ,i cannot 
help thinking1 if there be anything     
beautiful other than absolute beauty    
should there be such1 that it can be    
beautiful only in as far as it partakes 
of absolute beauty--and ,i should say   
the same of everything4 ,do you agree in
 this notion of the cause8  ,yes1 he    
said1 ,i agree4  ,he proceeded3 ,i know 
nothing and can understand nothing of   
any other of those wise causes which are
 alleged2 and if a person says to me    
that the bloom of colour1 or form1 or   
any such thing is a source of beauty1 ,i
 leave all that1 which is only confusing
 to me1 and simply and singly1 and      
perhaps foolishly1 hold and am assured  
in my own mind that nothing makes a     
thing beautiful but the presence and    
participation of beauty in whatever way 
or manner obtained2 for as to the manner
 ,i am uncertain1 but ,i stoutly contend
 that by beauty all beautiful things    
become beautiful4 ,this appears to me to
 be the safest answer which ,i can give1

 either to myself or to another1 and to 
this ,i cling1 in the persuasion that   
this principle will never be overthrown1
 and that to myself or to any one who   
asks the question1 ,i may safely reply1 
,that by beauty beautiful things become 
beautiful4 ,do you not agree with me8   
,i do4  ,and that by greatness only     
great things become great and greater   
greater1 and by smallness the less      
become less8  ,true4  ,then if a person 
were to remark that ,a is taller by a   
head than ,b1 and ,b less by a head than
 ,a1 you would refuse to admit his      
statement1 and would stoutly contend    
that what you mean is only that the     
greater is greater by1 and by reason of1
 greatness1 and the less is less only   
by1 and by reason of1 smallness2 and    
thus you would avoid the danger of      
saying that the greater is greater and  
the less less by the measure of the     
head1 which is the same in both1 and    
would also avoid the monstrous absurdity
 of supposing that the greater man is   

greater by reason of the head1 which is 
small4 ,you would be afraid to draw such
 an inference1 would you not8  ,indeed1 
,i should1 said ,cebes1 laughing4  ,in  
like manner you would be afraid to say  
that ten exceeded eight by1 and by      
reason of1 two2 but would say by1 and by
 reason of1 number2 or you would say    
that two cubits exceed one cubit not by 
a half1 but by magnitude8-for there is  
the same liability to error in all these
 cases4  ,very true1 he said4  ,again1  
would you not be cautious of affirming  
that the addition of one to one1 or the 
division of one1 is the cause of two8   
,and you would loudly asseverate that   
you know of no way in which anything    
comes into existence except by          
participation in its own proper essence1
 and consequently1 as far as you know1  
the only cause of two is the            
participation in duality--this is the   
way to make two1 and the participation  
in one is the way to make one4 ,you     
would say3 ,i will let alone puzzles of 

division and addition--wiser heads than 
mine may answer them2 inexperienced as  
,i am1 and ready to start1 as the       
proverb says1 at my own shadow1 ,i      
cannot afford to give up the sure ground
 of a principle4 ,and if any one assails
 you there1 you would not mind him1 or  
answer him1 until you had seen whether  
the consequences which follow agree with
 one another or not1 and when you are   
further required to give an explanation 
of this principle1 you would go on to   
assume a higher principle1 and a higher1
 until you found a resting-place in the 
best of the higher2 but you would not   
confuse the principle and the           
consequences in your reasoning1 like the
 ,eristics--at least if you wanted to   
discover real existence4 ,not that this 
confusion signifies to them1 who never  
care or think about the matter at all1  
for they have the wit to be well pleased
 with themselves however great may be   
the turmoil of their ideas4 ,but you1 if
 you are a philosopher1 will certainly  

do as ,i say4  ,what you say is most    
true1 said ,simmias and ,cebes1 both    
speaking at once4  ,,echecrates3 ,yes1  
,phaedo2 and ,i do not wonder at their  
assenting4 ,any one who has the least   
sense will acknowledge the wonderful    
clearness of ,socrates' reasoning4      
,,phaedo3 ,certainly1 ,echecrates2 and  
such was the feeling of the whole       
company at the time4  ,,echecrates3     
,yes1 and equally of ourselves1 who were
 not of the company1 and are now        
listening to your recital4 ,but what    
followed8  ,,phaedo3 ,after all this had
 been admitted1 and they had that ideas 
exist1 and that other things participate
 in them and derive their names from    
them1 ,socrates1 if ,i remember rightly1
 said3--  ,this is your way of speaking2
 and yet when you say that ,simmias is  
greater than ,socrates and less than    
,phaedo1 do you not predicate of        
,simmias both greatness and smallness8  
,yes1 ,i do4  ,but still you allow that 
,simmias does not really exceed         

,socrates1 as the words may seem to     
imply1 because he is ,simmias1 but by   
reason of the size which he has2 just as
 ,simmias does not exceed ,socrates     
because he is ,simmias1 any more than   
because ,socrates is ,socrates1 but     
because he has smallness when compared  
with the greatness of ,simmias8  ,true4 
,and if ,phaedo exceeds him in size1    
this is not because ,phaedo is ,phaedo1 
but because ,phaedo has greatness       
relatively to ,simmias1 who is          
comparatively smaller8  ,that is true4  
,and therefore ,simmias is said to be   
great1 and is also said to be small1    
because he is in a mean between them1   
exceeding the smallness of the one by   
his greatness1 and allowing the         
greatness of the other to exceed his    
smallness4 ,he added1 laughing1 ,i am   
speaking like a book1 but ,i believe    
that what ,i am saying is true4         
,simmias assented4  ,i speak as ,i do   
because ,i want you to agree with me in 
thinking1 not only that absolute        

greatness will never be great and also  
small1 but that greatness in us or in   
the concrete will never admit the small 
or admit of being exceeded3 instead of  
this1 one of two things will happen1    
either the greater will fly or retire   
before the opposite1 which is the less1 
or at the approach of the less has      
already ceased to exist2 but will not1  
if allowing or admitting of smallness1  
be changed by that2 even as ,i1 having  
received and admitted smallness when    
compared with ,simmias1 remain just as  
,i was1 and am the same small person4   
,and as the idea of greatness cannot    
condescend ever to be or become small1  
in like manner the smallness in us      
cannot be or become great2 nor can any  
other opposite which remains the same   
ever be or become its own opposite1 but 
either passes away or perishes in the   
change4  ,that1 replied ,cebes1 is quite
 my notion4  ,hereupon one of the       
company1 though ,i do not exactly       
remember which of them1 said3 ,in       

heaven's name1 is not this the direct   
contrary of what was admitted           
before--that out of the greater came the
 less and out of the less the greater1  
and that opposites were simply generated
 from opposites2 but now this principle 
seems to be utterly denied4  ,socrates  
inclined his head to the speaker and    
listened4 ,i like your courage1 he said1
 in reminding us of this4 ,but you do   
not observe that there is a difference  
in the two cases4 ,for then we were     
speaking of opposites in the concrete1  
and now of the essential opposite which1
 as is affirmed1 neither in us nor in   
nature can ever be at variance with     
itself3 then1 my friend1 we were        
speaking of things in which opposites   
are inherent and which are called after 
them1 but now about the opposites which 
are inherent in them and which give     
their name to them2 and these essential 
opposites will never1 as we maintain1   
admit of generation into or out of one  
another4 ,at the same time1 turning to  

,cebes1 he said3 ,are you at all        
disconcerted1 ,cebes1 at our friend's   
objection8  ,no1 ,i do not feel so1 said
 ,cebes2 and yet ,i cannot deny that ,i 
am often disturbed by objections4  ,then
 we are agreed after all1 said          
,socrates1 that the opposite will never 
in any case be opposed to itself8  ,to  
that we are quite agreed1 he replied4   
,yet once more let me ask you to        
consider the question from another point
 of view1 and see whether you agree with
 me3--,there is a thing which you term  
heat1 and another thing which you term  
cold8  ,certainly4  ,but are they the   
same as fire and snow8  ,most assuredly 
not4  ,heat is a thing different from   
fire1 and cold is not the same with     
snow8  ,yes4  ,and yet you will surely  
admit1 that when snow1 as was before    
said1 is under the influence of heat1   
they will not remain snow and heat2 but 
at the advance of the heat1 the snow    
will either retire or perish8  ,very    
true1 he replied4  ,and the fire too at 

the advance of the cold will either     
retire or perish2 and when the fire is  
under the influence of the cold1 they   
will not remain as before1 fire and     
cold4  ,that is true1 he said4  ,and in 
some cases the name of the idea is not  
only attached to the idea in an eternal 
connection1 but anything else which1 not
 being the idea1 exists only in the form
 of the idea1 may also lay claim to it4 
,i will try to make this clearer by an  
example3--,the odd number is always     
called by the name of odd8  ,very true4 
,but is this the only thing which is    
called odd8 ,are there not other things 
which have their own name1 and yet are  
called odd1 because1 although not the   
same as oddness1 they are never without 
oddness8--that is what ,i mean to       
ask--whether numbers such as the number 
three are not of the class of odd4 ,and 
there are many other examples3 would you
 not say1 for example1 that three may be
 called by its proper name1 and also be 
called odd1 which is not the same with  

three8 and this may be said not only of 
three but also of five1 and of every    
alternate number--each of them without  
being oddness is odd1 and in the same   
way two and four1 and the other series  
of alternate numbers1 has every number  
even1 without being evenness4 ,do you   
agree8  ,of course4  ,then now mark the 
point at which ,i am aiming3--not only  
do essential opposites exclude one      
another1 but also concrete things1      
which1 although not in themselves       
opposed1 contain opposites2 these1 ,i   
say1 likewise reject the idea which is  
opposed to that which is contained in   
them1 and when it approaches them they  
either perish or withdraw4 ,for example2
 ,will not the number three endure      
annihilation or anything sooner than be 
converted into an even number1 while    
remaining three8  ,very true1 said      
,cebes4  ,and yet1 he said1 the number  
two is certainly not opposed to the     
number three8  ,it is not4  ,then not   
only do opposite ideas repel the advance

 of one another1 but also there are     
other natures which repel the approach  
of opposites4  ,very true1 he said4     
,suppose1 he said1 that we endeavour1 if
 possible1 to determine what these are4 
,by all means4  ,are they not1 ,cebes1  
such as compel the things of which they 
have possession1 not only to take their 
own form1 but also the form of some     
opposite8  ,what do you mean8  ,i mean1 
as ,i was just now saying1 and as ,i am 
sure that you know1 that those things   
which are possessed by the number three 
must not only be three in number1 but   
must also be odd4  ,quite true4  ,and on
 this oddness1 of which the number three
 has the impress1 the opposite idea will
 never intrude8  ,no4  ,and this impress
 was given by the odd principle8  ,yes4 
,and to the odd is opposed the even8    
,true4  ,then the idea of the even      
number will never arrive at three8  ,no4
  ,then three has no part in the even8  
,none4  ,then the triad or number three 
is uneven8  ,very true4  ,to return then

 to my distinction of natures which are 
not opposed1 and yet do not admit       
opposites--as1 in the instance given1   
three1 although not opposed to the even1
 does not any the more admit of the     
even1 but always brings the opposite    
into play on the other side2 or as two  
does not receive the odd1 or fire the   
cold--from these examples 7and there are
 many more of them7 perhaps you may be  
able to arrive at the general           
conclusion1 that not only opposites will
 not receive opposites1 but also that   
nothing which brings the opposite will  
admit the opposite of that which it     
brings1 in that to which it is brought4 
,and here let me recapitulate--for there
 is no harm in repetition4 ,the number  
five will not admit the nature of the   
even1 any more than ten1 which is the   
double of five1 will admit the nature of
 the odd4 ,the double has another       
opposite1 and is not strictly opposed to
 the odd1 but nevertheless rejects the  
odd altogether4 ,nor again will parts in

 the ratio #c3b1 nor any fraction in    
which there is a half1 nor again in     
which there is a third1 admit the notion
 of the whole1 although they are not    
opposed to the whole3 ,you will agree8  
,yes1 he said1 ,i entirely agree and go 
along with you in that4  ,and now1 he   
said1 let us begin again2 and do not you
 answer my question in the words in     
which ,i ask it3 let me have not the old
 safe answer of which ,i spoke at first1
 but another equally safe1 of which the 
truth will be inferred by you from what 
has been just said4 ,i mean that if any 
one asks you 'what that is1 of which the
 inherence makes the body hot1' you will
 reply not heat 7this is what ,i call   
the safe and stupid answer71 but fire1 a
 far superior answer1 which we are now  
in a condition to give4 ,or if any one  
asks you 'why a body is diseased1' you  
will not say from disease1 but from     
fever2 and instead of saying that       
oddness is the cause of odd numbers1 you
 will say that the monad is the cause of

 them3 and so of things in general1 as  
,i dare say that you will understand    
sufficiently without my adducing any    
further examples4  ,yes1 he said1 ,i    
quite understand you4  ,tell me1 then1  
what is that of which the inherence will
 render the body alive8  ,the soul1 he  
replied4  ,and is this always the case8 
,yes1 he said1 of course4  ,then        
whatever the soul possesses1 to that she
 comes bearing life8  ,yes1 certainly4  
,and is there any opposite to life8     
,there is1 he said4  ,and what is that8 
,death4  ,then the soul1 as has been    
acknowledged1 will never receive the    
opposite of what she brings4            
,impossible1 replied ,cebes4  ,and now1 
he said1 what did we just now call that 
principle which repels the even8  ,the  
odd4  ,and that principle which repels  
the musical1 or the just8  ,the         
unmusical1 he said1 and the unjust4     
,and what do we call the principle which
 does not admit of death8  ,the         
immortal1 he said4  ,and does the soul  

admit of death8  ,no4  ,then the soul is
 immortal8  ,yes1 he said4  ,and may we 
say that this has been proven8  ,yes1   
abundantly proven1 ,socrates1 he        
replied4  ,supposing that the odd were  
imperishable1 must not three be         
imperishable8  ,of course4  ,and if that
 which is cold were imperishable1 when  
the warm principle came attacking the   
snow1 must not the snow have retired    
whole and unmelted--for it could never  
have perished1 nor could it have        
remained and admitted the heat8  ,true1 
he said4  ,again1 if the uncooling or   
warm principle were imperishable1 the   
fire when assailed by cold would not    
have perished or have been extinguished1
 but would have gone away unaffected8   
,certainly1 he said4  ,and the same may 
be said of the immortal3 if the immortal
 is also imperishable1 the soul when    
attacked by death cannot perish2 for the
 preceding argument shows that the soul 
will not admit of death1 or ever be     
dead1 any more than three or the odd    

number will admit of the even1 or fire  
or the heat in the fire1 of the cold4   
,yet a person may say3 ',but although   
the odd will not become even at the     
approach of the even1 why may not the   
odd perish and the even take the place  
of the odd8' ,now to him who makes this 
objection1 we cannot answer that the odd
 principle is imperishable2 for this has
 not been acknowledged1 but if this had 
been acknowledged1 there would have been
 no difficulty in contending that at the
 approach of the even the odd principle 
and the number three took their         
departure2 and the same argument would  
have held good of fire and heat and any 
other thing4  ,very true4  ,and the same
 may be said of the immortal3 if the    
immortal is also imperishable1 then the 
soul will be imperishable as well as    
immortal2 but if not1 some other proof  
of her imperishableness will have to be 
given4  ,no other proof is needed1 he   
said2 for if the immortal1 being        
eternal1 is liable to perish1 then      

nothing is imperishable4  ,yes1 replied 
,socrates1 and yet all men will agree   
that ,god1 and the essential form of    
life1 and the immortal in general1 will 
never perish4  ,yes1 all men1 he        
said--that is true2 and what is more1   
gods1 if ,i am not mistaken1 as well as 
men4  ,seeing then that the immortal is 
indestructible1 must not the soul1 if   
she is immortal1 be also imperishable8  
,most certainly4  ,then when death      
attacks a man1 the mortal portion of him
 may be supposed to die1 but the        
immortal retires at the approach of     
death and is preserved safe and sound8  
,true4  ,then1 ,cebes1 beyond question1 
the soul is immortal and imperishable1  
and our souls will truly exist in       
another world6  ,i am convinced1        
,socrates1 said ,cebes1 and have nothing
 more to object2 but if my friend       
,simmias1 or any one else1 has any      
further objection to make1 he had better
 speak out1 and not keep silence1 since 
,i do not know to what other season he  

can defer the discussion1 if there is   
anything which he wants to say or to    
have said4  ,but ,i have nothing more to
 say1 replied ,simmias2 nor can ,i see  
any reason for doubt after what has been
 said4 ,but ,i still feel and cannot    
help feeling uncertain in my own mind1  
when ,i think of the greatness of the   
subject and the feebleness of man4      
,yes1 ,simmias1 replied ,socrates1 that 
is well said3 and ,i may add that first 
principles1 even if they appear certain1
 should be carefully considered2 and    
when they are satisfactorily            
ascertained1 then1 with a sort of       
hesitating confidence in human reason1  
you may1 ,i think1 follow the course of 
the argument2 and if that be plain and  
clear1 there will be no need for any    
further enquiry4  ,very true4  ,but     
then1 ,o my friends1 he said1 if the    
soul is really immortal1 what care      
should be taken of her1 not only in     
respect of the portion of time which is 
called life1 but of eternity6 ,and the  

danger of neglecting her from this point
 of view does indeed appear to be awful4
 ,if death had only been the end of all1
 the wicked would have had a good       
bargain in dying1 for they would have   
been happily quit not only of their     
body1 but of their own evil together    
with their souls4 ,but now1 inasmuch as 
the soul is manifestly immortal1 there  
is no release or salvation from evil    
except the attainment of the highest    
virtue and wisdom4 ,for the soul when on
 her progress to the world below takes  
nothing with her but nurture and        
education2 and these are said greatly to
 benefit or greatly to injure the       
departed1 at the very beginning of his  
journey thither4  ,for after death1 as  
they say1 the genius of each individual1
 to whom he belonged in life1 leads him 
to a certain place in which the dead are
 gathered together1 whence after        
judgment has been given they pass into  
the world below1 following the guide1   
who is appointed to conduct them from   

this world to the other3 and when they  
have there received their due and       
remained their time1 another guide      
brings them back again after many       
revolutions of ages4 ,now this way to   
the other world is not1 as ,aeschylus   
says in the ,telephus1 a single and     
straight path--if that were so no guide 
would be needed1 for no one could miss  
it2 but there are many partings of the  
road1 and windings1 as ,i infer from the
 rites and sacrifices which are offered 
to the gods below in places where three 
ways meet on earth4 ,the wise and       
orderly soul follows in the straight    
path and is conscious of her            
surroundings2 but the soul which desires
 the body1 and which1 as ,i was relating
 before1 has long been fluttering about 
the lifeless frame and the world of     
sight1 is after many struggles and many 
sufferings hardly and with violence     
carried away by her attendant genius1   
and when she arrives at the place where 
the other souls are gathered1 if she be 

impure and have done impure deeds1      
whether foul murders or other crimes    
which are the brothers of these1 and the
 works of brothers in crime--from that  
soul every one flees and turns away2 no 
one will be her companion1 no one her   
guide1 but alone she wanders in         
extremity of evil until certain times   
are fulfilled1 and when they are        
fulfilled1 she is borne irresistibly to 
her own fitting habitation2 as every    
pure and just soul which has passed     
through life in the company and under   
the guidance of the gods has also her   
own proper home4  ,now the earth has    
divers wonderful regions1 and is indeed 
in nature and extent very unlike the    
notions of geographers1 as ,i believe on
 the authority of one who shall be      
nameless4  ,what do you mean1 ,socrates8
 said ,simmias4 ,i have myself heard    
many descriptions of the earth1 but ,i  
do not know1 and ,i should very much    
like to know1 in which of these you put 
faith4  ,and ,i1 ,simmias1 replied      

,socrates1 if ,i had the art of ,glaucus
 would tell you2 although ,i know not   
that the art of ,glaucus could prove the
 truth of my tale1 which ,i myself      
should never be able to prove1 and even 
if ,i could1 ,i fear1 ,simmias1 that my 
life would come to an end before the    
argument was completed4 ,i may describe 
to you1 however1 the form and regions of
 the earth according to my conception of
 them4  ,that1 said ,simmias1 will be   
enough4  ,well1 then1 he said1 my       
conviction is1 that the earth is a round
 body in the centre of the heavens1 and 
therefore has no need of air or any     
similar force to be a support1 but is   
kept there and hindered from falling or 
inclining any way by the equability of  
the surrounding heaven and by her own   
equipoise4 ,for that which1 being in    
equipoise1 is in the centre of that     
which is equably diffused1 will not     
incline any way in any degree1 but will 
always remain in the same state and not 
deviate4 ,and this is my first notion4  

,which is surely a correct one1 said    
,simmias4  ,also ,i believe that the    
earth is very vast1 and that we who     
dwell in the region extending from the  
river ,phasis to the ,pillars of        
,heracles inhabit a small portion only  
about the sea1 like ants or frogs about 
a marsh1 and that there are other       
inhabitants of many other like places2  
for everywhere on the face of the earth 
there are hollows of various forms and  
sizes1 into which the water and the mist
 and the lower air collect4 ,but the    
true earth is pure and situated in the  
pure heaven--there are the stars also2  
and it is the heaven which is commonly  
spoken of by us as the ether1 and of    
which our own earth is the sediment     
gathering in the hollows beneath4 ,but  
we who live in these hollows are        
deceived into the notion that we are    
dwelling above on the surface of the    
earth2 which is just as if a creature   
who was at the bottom of the sea were to
 fancy that he was on the surface of the

 water1 and that the sea was the heaven 
through which he saw the sun and the    
other stars1 he having never come to the
 surface by reason of his feebleness and
 sluggishness1 and having never lifted  
up his head and seen1 nor ever heard    
from one who had seen1 how much purer   
and fairer the world above is than his  
own4 ,and such is exactly our case3 for 
we are dwelling in a hollow of the      
earth1 and fancy that we are on the     
surface2 and the air we call the heaven1
 in which we imagine that the stars     
move4 ,but the fact is1 that owing to   
our feebleness and sluggishness we are  
prevented from reaching the surface of  
the air3 for if any man could arrive at 
the exterior limit1 or take the wings of
 a bird and come to the top1 then like a
 fish who puts his head out of the water
 and sees this world1 he would see a    
world beyond2 and1 if the nature of man 
could sustain the sight1 he would       
acknowledge that this other world was   
the place of the true heaven and the    

true light and the true earth4 ,for our 
earth1 and the stones1 and the entire   
region which surrounds us1 are spoilt   
and corroded1 as in the sea all things  
are corroded by the brine1 neither is   
there any noble or perfect growth1 but  
caverns only1 and sand1 and an endless  
slough of mud3 and even the shore is not
 to be compared to the fairer sights of 
this world4 ,and still less is this our 
world to be compared with the other4 ,of
 that upper earth which is under the    
heaven1 ,i can tell you a charming tale1
 ,simmias1 which is well worth hearing4 
,and we1 ,socrates1 replied ,simmias1   
shall be charmed to listen to you4  ,the
 tale1 my friend1 he said1 is as        
follows3--,in the first place1 the      
earth1 when looked at from above1 is in 
appearance streaked like one of those   
balls which have leather coverings in   
twelve pieces1 and is decked with       
various colours1 of which the colours   
used by painters on earth are in a      
manner samples4 ,but there the whole    

earth is made up of them1 and they are  
brighter far and clearer than ours2     
there is a purple of wonderful lustre1  
also the radiance of gold1 and the white
 which is in the earth is whiter than   
any chalk or snow4 ,of these and other  
colours the earth is made up1 and they  
are more in number and fairer than the  
eye of man has ever seen2 the very      
hollows 7of which ,i was speaking7      
filled with air and water have a colour 
of their own1 and are seen like light   
gleaming amid the diversity of the other
 colours1 so that the whole presents a  
single and continuous appearance of     
variety in unity4 ,and in this fair     
region everything that grows--trees1 and
 flowers1 and fruits--are in a like     
degree fairer than any here2 and there  
are hills1 having stones in them in a   
like degree smoother1 and more          
transparent1 and fairer in colour than  
our highly-valued emeralds and          
sardonyxes and jaspers1 and other gems1 
which are but minute fragments of them3 

for there all the stones are like our   
precious stones1 and fairer still       
7compare ,republic74 ,the reason is1    
that they are pure1 and not1 like our   
precious stones1 infected or corroded by
 the corrupt briny elements which       
coagulate among us1 and which breed     
foulness and disease both in earth and  
stones1 as well as in animals and       
plants4 ,they are the jewels of the     
upper earth1 which also shines with gold
 and silver and the like1 and they are  
set in the light of day and are large   
and abundant and in all places1 making  
the earth a sight to gladden the        
beholder's eye4 ,and there are animals  
and men1 some in a middle region1 others
 dwelling about the air as we dwell     
about the sea2 others in islands which  
the air flows round1 near the continent3
 and in a word1 the air is used by them 
as the water and the sea are by us1 and 
the ether is to them what the air is to 
us4 ,moreover1 the temperament of their 
seasons is such that they have no       

disease1 and live much longer than we   
do1 and have sight and hearing and      
smell1 and all the other senses1 in far 
greater perfection1 in the same         
proportion that air is purer than water 
or the ether than air4 ,also they have  
temples and sacred places in which the  
gods really dwell1 and they hear their  
voices and receive their answers1 and   
are conscious of them and hold converse 
with them1 and they see the sun1 moon1  
and stars as they truly are1 and their  
other blessedness is of a piece with    
this4  ,such is the nature of the whole 
earth1 and of the things which are      
around the earth2 and there are divers  
regions in the hollows on the face of   
the globe everywhere1 some of them      
deeper and more extended than that which
 we inhabit1 others deeper but with a   
narrower opening than ours1 and some are
 shallower and also wider4 ,all have    
numerous perforations1 and there are    
passages broad and narrow in the        
interior of the earth1 connecting them  

with one another2 and there flows out of
 and into them1 as into basins1 a vast  
tide of water1 and huge subterranean    
streams of perennial rivers1 and springs
 hot and cold1 and a great fire1 and    
great rivers of fire1 and streams of    
liquid mud1 thin or thick 7like the     
rivers of mud in ,sicily1 and the lava  
streams which follow them71 and the     
regions about which they happen to flow 
are filled up with them4 ,and there is a
 swinging or see-saw in the interior of 
the earth which moves all this up and   
down1 and is due to the following       
cause3--,there is a chasm which is the  
vastest of them all1 and pierces right  
through the whole earth2 this is that   
chasm which ,homer describes in the     
words1--       ',far off1 where is the  
inmost depth beneath the earth2'  and   
which he in other places1 and many other
 poets1 have called ,tartarus4 ,and the 
see-saw is caused by the streams flowing
 into and out of this chasm1 and they   
each have the nature of the soil through

 which they flow4 ,and the reason why   
the streams are always flowing in and   
out1 is that the watery element has no  
bed or bottom1 but is swinging and      
surging up and down1 and the surrounding
 wind and air do the same2 they follow  
the water up and down1 hither and       
thither1 over the earth--just as in the 
act of respiration the air is always in 
process of inhalation and               
exhalation2--and the wind swinging with 
the water in and out produces fearful   
and irresistible blasts3 when the waters
 retire with a rush into the lower parts
 of the earth1 as they are called1 they 
flow through the earth in those regions1
 and fill them up like water raised by a
 pump1 and then when they leave those   
regions and rush back hither1 they again
 fill the hollows here1 and when these  
are filled1 flow through subterranean   
channels and find their way to their    
several places1 forming seas1 and lakes1
 and rivers1 and springs4 ,thence they  
again enter the earth1 some of them     

making a long circuit into many lands1  
others going to a few places and not so 
distant2 and again fall into ,tartarus1 
some at a point a good deal lower than  
that at which they rose1 and others not 
much lower1 but all in some degree lower
 than the point from which they came4   
,and some burst forth again on the      
opposite side1 and some on the same     
side1 and some wind round the earth with
 one or many folds like the coils of a  
serpent1 and descend as far as they can1
 but always return and fall into the    
chasm4 ,the rivers flowing in either    
direction can descend only to the centre
 and no further1 for opposite to the    
rivers is a precipice4  ,now these      
rivers are many1 and mighty1 and        
diverse1 and there are four principal   
ones1 of which the greatest and         
outermost is that called ,oceanus1 which
 flows round the earth in a circle2 and 
in the opposite direction flows         
,acheron1 which passes under the earth  
through desert places into the          

,acherusian lake3 this is the lake to   
the shores of which the souls of the    
many go when they are dead1 and after   
waiting an appointed time1 which is to  
some a longer and to some a shorter     
time1 they are sent back to be born     
again as animals4 ,the third river      
passes out between the two1 and near the
 place of outlet pours into a vast      
region of fire1 and forms a lake larger 
than the ,mediterranean ,sea1 boiling   
with water and mud2 and proceeding muddy
 and turbid1 and winding about the      
earth1 comes1 among other places1 to the
 extremities of the ,acherusian ,lake1  
but mingles not with the waters of the  
lake1 and after making many coils about 
the earth plunges into ,tartarus at a   
deeper level4 ,this is that             
,pyriphlegethon1 as the stream is       
called1 which throws up jets of fire in 
different parts of the earth4 ,the      
fourth river goes out on the opposite   
side1 and falls first of all into a wild
 and savage region1 which is all of a   

dark-blue colour1 like lapis lazuli2 and
 this is that river which is called the 
,stygian river1 and falls into and forms
 the ,lake ,styx1 and after falling into
 the lake and receiving strange powers  
in the waters1 passes under the earth1  
winding round in the opposite direction1
 and comes near the ,acherusian lake    
from the opposite side to               
,pyriphlegethon4 ,and the water of this 
river too mingles with no other1 but    
flows round in a circle and falls into  
,tartarus over against ,pyriphlegethon2 
and the name of the river1 as the poets 
say1 is ,cocytus4  ,such is the nature  
of the other world2 and when the dead   
arrive at the place to which the genius 
of each severally guides them1 first of 
all1 they have sentence passed upon     
them1 as they have lived well and       
piously or not4 ,and those who appear to
 have lived neither well nor ill1 go to 
the river ,acheron1 and embarking in any
 vessels which they may find1 are       
carried in them to the lake1 and there  

they dwell and are purified of their    
evil deeds1 and having suffered the     
penalty of the wrongs which they have   
done to others1 they are absolved1 and  
receive the rewards of their good deeds1
 each of them according to his deserts4 
,but those who appear to be incurable by
 reason of the greatness of their       
crimes--who have committed many and     
terrible deeds of sacrilege1 murders    
foul and violent1 or the like--such are 
hurled into ,tartarus which is their    
suitable destiny1 and they never come   
out4 ,those again who have committed    
crimes1 which1 although great1 are not  
irremediable--who in a moment of anger1 
for example1 have done violence to a    
father or a mother1 and have repented   
for the remainder of their lives1 or1   
who have taken the life of another under
 the like extenuating                   
circumstances--these are plunged into   
,tartarus1 the pains of which they are  
compelled to undergo for a year1 but at 
the end of the year the wave casts them 

forth--mere homicides by way of         
,cocytus1 parricides and matricides by  
,pyriphlegethon--and they are borne to  
the ,acherusian lake1 and there they    
lift up their voices and call upon the  
victims whom they have slain or wronged1
 to have pity on them1 and to be kind to
 them1 and let them come out into the   
lake4 ,and if they prevail1 then they   
come forth and cease from their         
troubles2 but if not1 they are carried  
back again into ,tartarus and from      
thence into the rivers unceasingly1     
until they obtain mercy from those whom 
they have wronged3 for that is the      
sentence inflicted upon them by their   
judges4 ,those too who have been        
pre-eminent for holiness of life are    
released from this earthly prison1 and  
go to their pure home which is above1   
and dwell in the purer earth2 and of    
these1 such as have duly purified       
themselves with philosophy live         
henceforth altogether without the body1 
in mansions fairer still which may not  

be described1 and of which the time     
would fail me to tell4  ,wherefore1     
,simmias1 seeing all these things1 what 
ought not we to do that we may obtain   
virtue and wisdom in this life8 ,fair is
 the prize1 and the hope great6  ,a man 
of sense ought not to say1 nor will ,i  
be very confident1 that the description 
which ,i have given of the soul and her 
mansions is exactly true4 ,but ,i do say
 that1 inasmuch as the soul is shown to 
be immortal1 he may venture to think1   
not improperly or unworthily1 that      
something of the kind is true4 ,the     
venture is a glorious one1 and he ought 
to comfort himself with words like      
these1 which is the reason why ,i       
lengthen out the tale4 ,wherefore1 ,i   
say1 let a man be of good cheer about   
his soul1 who having cast away the      
pleasures and ornaments of the body as  
alien to him and working harm rather    
than good1 has sought after the         
pleasures of knowledge2 and has arrayed 
the soul1 not in some foreign attire1   

but in her own proper jewels1           
temperance1 and justice1 and courage1   
and nobility1 and truth--in these       
adorned she is ready to go on her       
journey to the world below1 when her    
hour comes4 ,you1 ,simmias and ,cebes1  
and all other men1 will depart at some  
time or other4 ,me already1 as the      
tragic poet would say1 the voice of fate
 calls4 ,soon ,i must drink the poison2 
and ,i think that ,i had better repair  
to the bath first1 in order that the    
women may not have the trouble of       
washing my body after ,i am dead4  ,when
 he had done speaking1 ,crito said3 ,and
 have you any commands for us1          
,socrates--anything to say about your   
children1 or any other matter in which  
we can serve you8  ,nothing particular1 
,crito1 he replied3 only1 as ,i have    
always told you1 take care of           
yourselves2 that is a service which you 
may be ever rendering to me and mine and
 to all of us1 whether you promise to do
 so or not4 ,but if you have no thought 

for yourselves1 and care not to walk    
according to the rule which ,i have     
prescribed for you1 not now for the     
first time1 however much you may profess
 or promise at the moment1 it will be of
 no avail4  ,we will do our best1 said  
,crito3 ,and in what way shall we bury  
you8  ,in any way that you like2 but you
 must get hold of me1 and take care that
 ,i do not run away from you4 ,then he  
turned to us1 and added with a          
smile3--,i cannot make ,crito believe   
that ,i am the same ,socrates who have  
been talking and conducting the         
argument2 he fancies that ,i am the     
other ,socrates whom he will soon see1 a
 dead body--and he asks1 ,how shall he  
bury me8 ,and though ,i have spoken many
 words in the endeavour to show that    
when ,i have drunk the poison ,i shall  
leave you and go to the joys of the     
blessed1--these words of mine1 with     
which ,i was comforting you and myself1 
have had1 as ,i perceive1 no effect upon
 ,crito4 ,and therefore ,i want you to  

be surety for me to him now1 as at the  
trial he was surety to the judges for   
me3 but let the promise be of another   
sort2 for he was surety for me to the   
judges that ,i would remain1 and you    
must be my surety to him that ,i shall  
not remain1 but go away and depart2 and 
then he will suffer less at my death1   
and not be grieved when he sees my body 
being burned or buried4 ,i would not    
have him sorrow at my hard lot1 or say  
at the burial1 ,thus we lay out         
,socrates1 or1 ,thus we follow him to   
the grave or bury him2 for false words  
are not only evil in themselves1 but    
they infect the soul with evil4 ,be of  
good cheer1 then1 my dear ,crito1 and   
say that you are burying my body only1  
and do with that whatever is usual1 and 
what you think best4  ,when he had      
spoken these words1 he arose and went   
into a chamber to bathe2 ,crito followed
 him and told us to wait4 ,so we        
remained behind1 talking and thinking of
 the subject of discourse1 and also of  

the greatness of our sorrow2 he was like
 a father of whom we were being         
bereaved1 and we were about to pass the 
rest of our lives as orphans4 ,when he  
had taken the bath his children were    
brought to him--7he had two young sons  
and an elder one72 and the women of his 
family also came1 and he talked to them 
and gave them a few directions in the   
presence of ,crito2 then he dismissed   
them and returned to us4  ,now the hour 
of sunset was near1 for a good deal of  
time had passed while he was within4    
,when he came out1 he sat down with us  
again after his bath1 but not much was  
said4 ,soon the jailer1 who was the     
servant of the ,eleven1 entered and     
stood by him1 saying3--,to you1         
,socrates1 whom ,i know to be the       
noblest and gentlest and best of all who
 ever came to this place1 ,i will not   
impute the angry feelings of other men1 
who rage and swear at me1 when1 in      
obedience to the authorities1 ,i bid    
them drink the poison--indeed1 ,i am    

sure that you will not be angry with me2
 for others1 as you are aware1 and not  
,i1 are to blame4 ,and so fare you well1
 and try to bear lightly what must needs
 be--you know my errand4 ,then bursting 
into tears he turned away and went out4 
,socrates looked at him and said3 ,i    
return your good wishes1 and will do as 
you bid4 ,then turning to us1 he said1  
,how charming the man is3 since ,i have 
been in prison he has always been coming
 to see me1 and at times he would talk  
to me1 and was as good to me as could   
be1 and now see how generously he       
sorrows on my account4 ,we must do as he
 says1 ,crito2 and therefore let the cup
 be brought1 if the poison is prepared3 
if not1 let the attendant prepare some4 
,yet1 said ,crito1 the sun is still upon
 the hill-tops1 and ,i know that many a 
one has taken the draught late1 and     
after the announcement has been made to 
him1 he has eaten and drunk1 and enjoyed
 the society of his beloved2 do not     
hurry--there is time enough4  ,socrates 

said3 ,yes1 ,crito1 and they of whom you
 speak are right in so acting1 for they 
think that they will be gainers by the  
delay2 but ,i am right in not following 
their example1 for ,i do not think that 
,i should gain anything by drinking the 
poison a little later2 ,i should only be
 ridiculous in my own eyes for sparing  
and saving a life which is already      
forfeit4 ,please then to do as ,i say1  
and not to refuse me4  ,crito made a    
sign to the servant1 who was standing   
by2 and he went out1 and having been    
absent for some time1 returned with the 
jailer carrying the cup of poison4      
,socrates said3 ,you1 my good friend1   
who are experienced in these matters1   
shall give me directions how ,i am to   
proceed4 ,the man answered3 ,you have   
only to walk about until your legs are  
heavy1 and then to lie down1 and the    
poison will act4 ,at the same time he   
handed the cup to ,socrates1 who in the 
easiest and gentlest manner1 without the
 least fear or change of colour or      

feature1 looking at the man with all his
 eyes1 ,echecrates1 as his manner was1  
took the cup and said3 ,what do you say 
about making a libation out of this cup 
to any god8 ,may ,i1 or not8 ,the man   
answered3 ,we only prepare1 ,socrates1  
just so much as we deem enough4 ,i      
understand1 he said3 but ,i may and must
 ask the gods to prosper my journey from
 this to the other world--even so--and  
so be it according to my prayer4 ,then  
raising the cup to his lips1 quite      
readily and cheerfully he drank off the 
poison4 ,and hitherto most of us had    
been able to control our sorrow2 but now
 when we saw him drinking1 and saw too  
that he had finished the draught1 we    
could no longer forbear1 and in spite of
 myself my own tears were flowing fast2 
so that ,i covered my face and wept1 not
 for him1 but at the thought of my own  
calamity in having to part from such a  
friend4 ,nor was ,i the first2 for      
,crito1 when he found himself unable to 
restrain his tears1 had got up1 and ,i  

followed2 and at that moment1           
,apollodorus1 who had been weeping all  
the time1 broke out in a loud and       
passionate cry which made cowards of us 
all4 ,socrates alone retained his       
calmness3 ,what is this strange outcry8 
he said4 ,i sent away the women mainly  
in order that they might not misbehave  
in this way1 for ,i have been told that 
a man should die in peace4 ,be quiet1   
then1 and have patience4 ,when we heard 
his words we were ashamed1 and refrained
 our tears2 and he walked about until1  
as he said1 his legs began to fail1 and 
then he lay on his back1 according to   
the directions1 and the man who gave him
 the poison now and then looked at his  
feet and legs2 and after a while he     
pressed his foot hard1 and asked him if 
he could feel2 and he said1 ,no2 and    
then his leg1 and so upwards and        
upwards1 and showed us that he was cold 
and stiff4 ,and he felt them himself1   
and said3 ,when the poison reaches the  
heart1 that will be the end4 ,he was    

beginning to grow cold about the groin1 
when he uncovered his face1 for he had  
covered himself up1 and said--they were 
his last words--he said3 ,crito1 ,i owe 
a cock to ,asclepius2 will you remember 
to pay the debt8 ,the debt shall be     
paid1 said ,crito2 is there anything    
else8 ,there was no answer to this      
question2 but in a minute or two a      
movement was heard1 and the attendants  
uncovered him2 his eyes were set1 and   
,crito closed his eyes and mouth4  ,such
 was the end1 ,echecrates1 of our       
friend2 concerning whom ,i may truly    
say1 that of all the men of his time    
whom ,i have known1 he was the wisest   
and justest and best4