,,meno  by ,plato  ,translated by       
,benjamin ,jowett     ,,introduction4   
,this ,dialogue begins abruptly with a  
question of ,meno1 who asks1 'whether   
virtue can be taught4' ,socrates replies
 that he does not as yet know what      
virtue is1 and has never known anyone   
who did4 ',then he cannot have met      
,gorgias when he was at ,athens4' ,yes1 
,socrates had met him1 but he has a bad 
memory1 and has forgotten what ,gorgias 
said4 ,will ,meno tell him his own      
notion1 which is probably not very      
different from that of ,gorgias8 ',o    
yes--nothing easier3 there is the virtue
 of a man1 of a woman1 of an old man1   
and of a child2 there is a virtue of    
every age and state of life1 all of     
which may be easily described4'         
,socrates reminds ,meno that this is    
only an enumeration of the virtues and  
not a definition of the notion which is 
common to them all4 ,in a second attempt
 ,meno defines virtue to be 'the power  
of command4' ,but to this1 again1       

exceptions are taken4 ,for there must be
 a virtue of those who obey1 as well as 
of those who command2 and the power of  
command must be justly or not unjustly  
exercised4 ,meno is very ready to admit 
that justice is virtue3 ',would you say 
virtue or a virtue1 for there are other 
virtues1 such as courage1 temperance1   
and the like2 just as round is a figure1
 and black and white are colours1 and   
yet there are other figures and other   
colours4 ,let ,meno take the examples of
 figure and colour1 and try to define   
them4' ,meno confesses his inability1   
and after a process of interrogation1 in
 which ,socrates explains to him the    
nature of a 'simile in multis1'         
,socrates himself defines figure as 'the
 accompaniment of colour4' ,but some one
 may object that he does not know the   
meaning of the word 'colour2' and if he 
is a candid friend1 and not a mere      
disputant1 ,socrates is willing to      
furnish him with a simpler and more     
philosophical definition1 into which no 

disputed word is allowed to intrude3    
',figure is the limit of form4' ,meno   
imperiously insists that he must still  
have a definition of colour4 ,some      
raillery follows2 and at length         
,socrates is induced to reply1 'that    
colour is the effluence of form1        
sensible1 and in due proportion to the  
sight4' ,this definition is exactly     
suited to the taste of ,meno1 who       
welcomes the familiar language of       
,gorgias and ,empedocles4 ,socrates is  
of opinion that the more abstract or    
dialectical definition of figure is far 
better4  ,now that ,meno has been made  
to understand the nature of a general   
definition1 he answers in the spirit of 
a ,greek gentleman1 and in the words of 
a poet1 'that virtue is to delight in   
things honourable1 and to have the power
 of getting them4' ,this is a nearer    
approximation than he has yet made to a 
complete definition1 and1 regarded as a 
piece of proverbial or popular morality1
 is not far from the truth4 ,but the    

objection is urged1 'that the honourable
 is the good1' and as every one equally 
desires the good1 the point of the      
definition is contained in the words1   
'the power of getting them4' ',and they 
must be got justly or with justice4'    
,the definition will then stand thus3   
',virtue is the power of getting good   
with justice4' ,but justice is a part of
 virtue1 and therefore virtue is the    
getting of good with a part of virtue4  
,the definition repeats the word        
defined4  ,meno complains that the      
conversation of ,socrates has the effect
 of a torpedo's shock upon him4 ,when he
 talks with other persons he has plenty 
to say about virtue2 in the presence of 
,socrates1 his thoughts desert him4     
,socrates replies that he is only the   
cause of perplexity in others1 because  
he is himself perplexed4 ,he proposes to
 continue the enquiry4 ,but how1 asks   
,meno1 can he enquire either into what  
he knows or into what he does not know8 
,this is a sophistical puzzle1 which1 as

 ,socrates remarks1 saves a great deal  
of trouble to him who accepts it4 ,but  
the puzzle has a real difficulty latent 
under it1 to which ,socrates will       
endeavour to find a reply4 ,the         
difficulty is the origin of knowledge3--
  ,he has heard from priests and        
priestesses1 and from the poet ,pindar1 
of an immortal soul which is born again 
and again in successive periods of      
existence1 returning into this world    
when she has paid the penalty of ancient
 crime1 and1 having wandered over all   
places of the upper and under world1 and
 seen and known all things at one time  
or other1 is by association out of one  
thing capable of recovering all4 ,for   
nature is of one kindred2 and every soul
 has a seed or germ which may be        
developed into all knowledge4 ,the      
existence of this latent knowledge is   
further proved by the interrogation of  
one of ,meno's slaves1 who1 in the      
skilful hands of ,socrates1 is made to  
acknowledge some elementary relations of

 geometrical figures4 ,the theorem that 
the square of the diagonal is double the
 square of the side--that famous        
discovery of primitive mathematics1 in  
honour of which the legendary           
,pythagoras is said to have sacrificed a
 hecatomb--is elicited from him4 ,the   
first step in the process of teaching   
has made him conscious of his own       
ignorance4 ,he has had the 'torpedo's   
shock' given him1 and is the better for 
the operation4 ,but whence had the      
uneducated man this knowledge8 ,he had  
never learnt geometry in this world2 nor
 was it born with him2 he must therefore
 have had it when he was not a man4 ,and
 as he always either was or was not a   
man1 he must have always had it4        
7,compare ,phaedo47  ,after ,socrates   
has given this specimen of the true     
nature of teaching1 the original        
question of the teachableness of virtue 
is renewed4 ,again he professes a desire
 to know 'what virtue is' first4 ,but he
 is willing to argue the question1 as   

mathematicians say1 under an hypothesis4
 ,he will assume that if virtue is      
knowledge1 then virtue can be taught4   
7,this was the stage of the argument at 
which the ,protagoras concluded47       
,socrates has no difficulty in showing  
that virtue is a good1 and that goods1  
whether of body or mind1 must be under  
the direction of knowledge4 ,upon the   
assumption just made1 then1 virtue is   
teachable4 ,but where are the teachers8 
,there are none to be found4 ,this is   
extremely discouraging4 ,virtue is no   
sooner discovered to be teachable1 than 
the discovery follows that it is not    
taught4 ,virtue1 therefore1 is and is   
not teachable4  ,in this dilemma an     
appeal is made to ,anytus1 a respectable
 and well-to-do citizen of the old      
school1 and a family friend of ,meno1   
who happens to be present4 ,he is asked 
'whether ,meno shall go to the ,sophists
 and be taught4' ,the suggestion throws 
him into a rage4 ',to whom1 then1 shall 
,meno go8' asks ,socrates4 ,to any      

,athenian gentleman--to the great       
,athenian statesmen of past times4      
,socrates replies here1 as elsewhere    
7,laches1 ,prot471 that ,themistocles1  
,pericles1 and other great men1 had sons
 to whom they would surely1 if they     
could have done so1 have imparted their 
own political wisdom2 but no one ever   
heard that these sons of theirs were    
remarkable for anything except riding   
and wrestling and similar               
accomplishments4 ,anytus is angry at the
 imputation which is cast on his        
favourite statesmen1 and on a class to  
which he supposes himself to belong2 he 
breaks off with a significant hint4 ,the
 mention of another opportunity of      
talking with him1 and the suggestion    
that ,meno may do the ,athenian people a
 service by pacifying him1 are evident  
allusions to the trial of ,socrates4    
,socrates returns to the consideration  
of the question 'whether virtue is      
teachable1' which was denied on the     
ground that there are no teachers of it3

 7for the ,sophists are bad teachers1   
and the rest of the world do not profess
 to teach74 ,but there is another point 
which we failed to observe1 and in which
 ,gorgias has never instructed ,meno1   
nor ,prodicus ,socrates4 ,this is the   
nature of right opinion4 ,for virtue may
 be under the guidance of right opinion 
as well as of knowledge2 and right      
opinion is for practical purposes as    
good as knowledge1 but is incapable of  
being taught1 and is also liable1 like  
the images of ,daedalus1 to 'walk off1' 
because not bound by the tie of the     
cause4 ,this is the sort of instinct    
which is possessed by statesmen1 who are
 not wise or knowing persons1 but only  
inspired or divine4 ,the higher virtue1 
which is identical with knowledge1 is an
 ideal only4 ,if the statesman had this 
knowledge1 and could teach what he knew1
 he would be like ,tiresias in the world
 below1--'he alone has wisdom1 but the  
rest flit like shadows4'  ,this         
,dialogue is an attempt to answer the   

question1 ,can virtue be taught8 ,no one
 would either ask or answer such a      
question in modern times4 ,but in the   
age of ,socrates it was only by an      
effort that the mind could rise to a    
general notion of virtue as distinct    
from the particular virtues of courage1 
liberality1 and the like4 ,and when a   
hazy conception of this ideal was       
attained1 it was only by a further      
effort that the question of the         
teachableness of virtue could be        
resolved4  ,the answer which is given by
 ,plato is paradoxical enough1 and seems
 rather intended to stimulate than to   
satisfy enquiry4 ,virtue is knowledge1  
and therefore virtue can be taught4 ,but
 virtue is not taught1 and therefore in 
this higher and ideal sense there is no 
virtue and no knowledge4 ,the teaching  
of the ,sophists is confessedly         
inadequate1 and ,meno1 who is their     
pupil1 is ignorant of the very nature of
 general terms4 ,he can only produce out
 of their armoury the sophism1 'that you

 can neither enquire into what you know 
nor into what you do not know2' to which
 ,socrates replies by his theory of     
reminiscence4  ,to the doctrine that    
virtue is knowledge1 ,plato has been    
constantly tending in the previous      
,dialogues4 ,but the new truth is no    
sooner found than it vanishes away4 ',if
 there is knowledge1 there must be      
teachers2 and where are the teachers8'  
,there is no knowledge in the higher    
sense of systematic1 connected1 reasoned
 knowledge1 such as may one day be      
attained1 and such as ,plato himself    
seems to see in some far off vision of a
 single science4 ,and there are no      
teachers in the higher sense of the     
word2 that is to say1 no real teachers  
who will arouse the spirit of enquiry in
 their pupils1 and not merely instruct  
them in rhetoric or impart to them      
ready-made information for a fee of     
'one' or of 'fifty drachms4' ,plato is  
desirous of deepening the notion of     
education1 and therefore he asserts the 

paradox that there are no educators4    
,this paradox1 though different in form1
 is not really different from the remark
 which is often made in modern times by 
those who would depreciate either the   
methods of education commonly employed1 
or the standard attained--that 'there is
 no true education among us4'  ,there   
remains still a possibility which must  
not be overlooked4 ,even if there be no 
true knowledge1 as is proved by 'the    
wretched state of education1' there may 
be right opinion1 which is a sort of    
guessing or divination resting on no    
knowledge of causes1 and incommunicable 
to others4 ,this is the gift which our  
statesmen have1 as is proved by the     
circumstance that they are unable to    
impart their knowledge to their sons4   
,those who are possessed of it cannot be
 said to be men of science or           
philosophers1 but they are inspired and 
divine4  ,there may be some trace of    
irony in this curious passage1 which    
forms the concluding portion of the     

,dialogue4 ,but ,plato certainly does   
not mean to intimate that the           
supernatural or divine is the true basis
 of human life4 ,to him knowledge1 if   
only attainable in this world1 is of all
 things the most divine4 ,yet1 like     
other philosophers1 he is willing to    
admit that 'probability is the guide of 
life 7,butler's ,analogy472' and he is  
at the same time desirous of contrasting
 the wisdom which governs the world with
 a higher wisdom4 ,there are many       
instincts1 judgments1 and anticipations 
of the human mind which cannot be       
reduced to rule1 and of which the       
grounds cannot always be given in words4
 ,a person may have some skill or latent
 experience which he is able to use     
himself and is yet unable to teach      
others1 because he has no principles1   
and is incapable of collecting or       
arranging his ideas4 ,he has practice1  
but not theory2 art1 but not science4   
,this is a true fact of psychology1     
which is recognized by ,plato in this   

passage4 ,but he is far from saying1 as 
some have imagined1 that inspiration or 
divine grace is to be regarded as higher
 than knowledge4 ,he would not have     
preferred the poet or man of action to  
the philosopher1 or the virtue of custom
 to the virtue based upon ideas4  ,also 
here1 as in the ,ion and ,phaedrus1     
,plato appears to acknowledge an        
unreasoning element in the higher nature
 of man4 ,the philosopher only has      
knowledge1 and yet the statesman and the
 poet are inspired4 ,there may be a sort
 of irony in regarding in this way the  
gifts of genius4 ,but there is no reason
 to suppose that he is deriding them1   
any more than he is deriding the        
phenomena of love or of enthusiasm in   
the ,symposium1 or of oracles in the    
,apology1 or of divine intimations when 
he is speaking of the daemonium of      
,socrates4 ,he recognizes the lower form
 of right opinion1 as well as the higher
 one of science1 in the spirit of one   
who desires to include in his philosophy

 every aspect of human life2 just as he 
recognizes the existence of popular     
opinion as a fact1 and the ,sophists as 
the expression of it4  ,this ,dialogue  
contains the first intimation of the    
doctrine of reminiscence and of the     
immortality of the soul4 ,the proof is  
very slight1 even slighter than in the  
,phaedo and ,republic4 ,because men had 
abstract ideas in a previous state1 they
 must have always had them1 and their   
souls therefore must have always        
existed4 ,for they must always have been
 either men or not men4 ,the fallacy of 
the latter words is transparent4 ,and   
,socrates himself appears to be         
conscious of their weakness2 for he adds
 immediately afterwards1 ',i have said  
some things of which ,i am not          
altogether confident4' 7,compare        
,phaedo47 ,it may be observed1 however1 
that the fanciful notion of             
pre-existence is combined with a true   
but partial view of the origin and unity
 of knowledge1 and of the association of

 ideas4 ,knowledge is prior to any      
particular knowledge1 and exists not in 
the previous state of the individual1   
but of the race4 ,it is potential1 not  
actual1 and can only be appropriated by 
strenuous exertion4  ,the idealism of   
,plato is here presented in a less      
developed form than in the ,phaedo and  
,phaedrus4 ,nothing is said of the      
pre-existence of ideas of justice1      
temperance1 and the like4 ,nor is       
,socrates positive of anything but the  
duty of enquiry4 ,the doctrine of       
reminiscence too is explained more in   
accordance with fact and experience as  
arising out of the affinities of nature 
7ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses74 
,modern philosophy says that all things 
in nature are dependent on one another2 
the ancient philosopher had the same    
truth latent in his mind when he        
affirmed that out of one thing all the  
rest may be recovered4 ,the subjective  
was converted by him into an objective2 
the mental phenomenon of the association

 of ideas 7compare ,phaedo7 became a    
real chain of existences4 ,the germs of 
two valuable principles of education may
 also be gathered from the 'words of    
priests and priestesses3' 7#a7 that true
 knowledge is a knowledge of causes     
7compare ,aristotle's theory of         
episteme72 and 7#b7 that the process of 
learning consists not in what is brought
 to the learner1 but in what is drawn   
out of him4  ,some lesser points of the 
dialogue may be noted1 such as 7#a7 the 
acute observation that ,meno prefers the
 familiar definition1 which is          
embellished with poetical language1 to  
the better and truer one2 or 7#b7 the   
shrewd reflection1 which may admit of an
 application to modern as well as to    
ancient teachers1 that the ,sophists    
having made large fortunes2 this must   
surely be a criterion of their powers of
 teaching1 for that no man could get a  
living by shoemaking who was not a good 
shoemaker2 or 7#c7 the remark conveyed1 
almost in a word1 that the verbal       

sceptic is saved the labour of thought  
and enquiry 7ouden dei to toiouto       
zeteseos74 ,characteristic also of the  
temper of the ,socratic enquiry is1 7#d7
 the proposal to discuss the            
teachableness of virtue under an        
hypothesis1 after the manner of the     
mathematicians2 and 7#e7 the repetition 
of the favourite doctrine which occurs  
so frequently in the earlier and more   
,socratic ,dialogues1 and gives a colour
 to all of them--that mankind only      
desire evil through ignorance2 7#f7 the 
experiment of eliciting from the        
slave-boy the mathematical truth which  
is latent in him1 and 7#g7 the remark   
that he is all the better for knowing   
his ignorance4  ,the character of ,meno1
 like that of ,critias1 has no relation 
to the actual circumstances of his life4
 ,plato is silent about his treachery to
 the ten thousand ,greeks1 which        
,xenophon has recorded1 as he is also   
silent about the crimes of ,critias4 ,he
 is a ,thessalian ,alcibiades1 rich and 

luxurious--a spoilt child of fortune1   
and is described as the hereditary      
friend of the great king4 ,like         
,alcibiades he is inspired with an      
ardent desire of knowledge1 and is      
equally willing to learn of ,socrates   
and of the ,sophists4 ,he may be        
regarded as standing in the same        
relation to ,gorgias as ,hippocrates in 
the ,protagoras to the other great      
,sophist4 ,he is the sophisticated youth
 on whom ,socrates tries his            
cross-examining powers1 just as in the  
,charmides1 the ,lysis1 and the         
,euthydemus1 ingenuous boyhood is made  
the subject of a similar experiment4 ,he
 is treated by ,socrates in a           
half-playful manner suited to his       
character2 at the same time he appears  
not quite to understand the process to  
which he is being subjected4 ,for he is 
exhibited as ignorant of the very       
elements of dialectics1 in which the    
,sophists have failed to instruct their 
disciple4 ,his definition of virtue as  

'the power and desire of attaining      
things honourable1' like the first      
definition of justice in the ,republic1 
is taken from a poet4 ,his answers have 
a sophistical ring1 and at the same time
 show the sophistical incapacity to     
grasp a general notion4  ,anytus is the 
type of the narrow-minded man of the    
world1 who is indignant at innovation1  
and equally detests the popular teacher 
and the true philosopher4 ,he seems1    
like ,aristophanes1 to regard the new   
opinions1 whether of ,socrates or the   
,sophists1 as fatal to ,athenian        
greatness4 ,he is of the same class as  
,callicles in the ,gorgias1 but of a    
different variety2 the immoral and      
sophistical doctrines of ,callicles are 
not attributed to him4 ,the moderation  
with which he is described is           
remarkable1 if he be the accuser of     
,socrates1 as is apparently indicated by
 his parting words4 ,perhaps ,plato may 
have been desirous of showing that the  
accusation of ,socrates was not to be   

attributed to badness or malevolence1   
but rather to a tendency in men's minds4
 ,or he may have been regardless of the 
historical truth of the characters of   
his dialogue1 as in the case of ,meno   
and ,critias4 ,like ,chaerephon 7,apol47
 the real ,anytus was a democrat1 and   
had joined ,thrasybulus in the conflict 
with the thirty4  ,the ,protagoras      
arrived at a sort of hypothetical       
conclusion1 that if 'virtue is          
knowledge1 it can be taught4' ,in the   
,euthydemus1 ,socrates himself offered  
an example of the manner in which the   
true teacher may draw out the mind of   
youth2 this was in contrast to the      
quibbling follies of the ,sophists4 ,in 
the ,meno the subject is more developed2
 the foundations of the enquiry are laid
 deeper1 and the nature of knowledge is 
more distinctly explained4 ,there is a  
progression by antagonism of two        
opposite aspects of philosophy4 ,but at 
the moment when we approach nearest1 the
 truth doubles upon us and passes out of

 our reach4 ,we seem to find that the   
ideal of knowledge is irreconcilable    
with experience4 ,in human life there is
 indeed the profession of knowledge1 but
 right opinion is our actual guide4     
,there is another sort of progress from 
the general notions of ,socrates1 who   
asked simply1 'what is friendship8'     
'what is temperance8' 'what is courage8'
 as in the ,lysis1 ,charmides1 ,laches1 
to the transcendentalism of ,plato1 who1
 in the second stage of his philosophy1 
sought to find the nature of knowledge  
in a prior and future state of          
existence4  ,the difficulty in framing  
general notions which has appeared in   
this and in all the previous ,dialogues 
recurs in the ,gorgias and ,theaetetus  
as well as in the ,republic4 ,in the    
,gorgias too the statesmen reappear1 but
 in stronger opposition to the          
philosopher4 ,they are no longer allowed
 to have a divine insight1 but1 though  
acknowledged to have been clever men and
 good speakers1 are denounced as 'blind 

leaders of the blind4' ,the doctrine of 
the immortality of the soul is also     
carried further1 being made the         
foundation not only of a theory of      
knowledge1 but of a doctrine of rewards 
and punishments4 ,in the ,republic the  
relation of knowledge to virtue is      
described in a manner more consistent   
with modern distinctions4 ,the existence
 of the virtues without the possession  
of knowledge in the higher or           
philosophical sense is admitted to be   
possible4 ,right opinion is again       
introduced in the ,theaetetus as an     
account of knowledge1 but is rejected on
 the ground that it is irrational 7as   
here1 because it is not bound by the tie
 of the cause71 and also because the    
conception of false opinion is given up 
as hopeless4 ,the doctrines of ,plato   
are necessarily different at different  
times of his life1 as new distinctions  
are realized1 or new stages of thought  
attained by him4 ,we are not therefore  
justified1 in order to take away the    

appearance of inconsistency1 in         
attributing to him hidden meanings or   
remote allusions4  ,there are no        
external criteria by which we can       
determine the date of the ,meno4 ,there 
is no reason to suppose that any of the 
,dialogues of ,plato were written before
 the death of ,socrates2 the ,meno1     
which appears to be one of the earliest 
of them1 is proved to have been of a    
later date by the allusion of ,anytus4  
,we cannot argue that ,plato was more   
likely to have written1 as he has done1 
of ,meno before than after his miserable
 death2 for we have already seen1 in the
 examples of ,charmides and ,critias1   
that the characters in ,plato are very  
far from resembling the same characters 
in history4 ,the repulsive picture which
 is given of him in the ,anabasis of    
,xenophon1 where he also appears as the 
friend of ,aristippus 'and a fair youth 
having lovers1' has no other trait of   
likeness to the ,meno of ,plato4  ,the  
place of the ,meno in the series is     

doubtfully indicated by internal        
evidence4 ,the main character of the    
,dialogue is ,socrates2 but to the      
'general definitions' of ,socrates is   
added the ,platonic doctrine of         
reminiscence4 ,the problems of virtue   
and knowledge have been discussed in the
 ,lysis1 ,laches1 ,charmides1 and       
,protagoras2 the puzzle about knowing   
and learning has already appeared in the
 ,euthydemus4 ,the doctrines of         
immortality and pre-existence are       
carried further in the ,phaedrus and    
,phaedo2 the distinction between opinion
 and knowledge is more fully developed  
in the ,theaetetus4 ,the lessons of     
,prodicus1 whom he facetiously calls his
 master1 are still running in the mind  
of ,socrates4 ,unlike the later         
,platonic ,dialogues1 the ,meno arrives 
at no conclusion4 ,hence we are led to  
place the ,dialogue at some point of    
time later than the ,protagoras1 and    
earlier than the ,phaedrus and ,gorgias4
 ,the place which is assigned to it in  

this work is due mainly to the desire to
 bring together in a single volume all  
the ,dialogues which contain allusions  
to the trial and death of ,socrates4    
9999999999     ,,on ,,the ,,ideas ,,of  
,,plato4  ,plato's doctrine of ideas has
 attained an imaginary clearness and    
definiteness which is not to be found in
 his own writings4 ,the popular account 
of them is partly derived from one or   
two passages in his ,dialogues          
interpreted without regard to their     
poetical environment4 ,it is due also to
 the misunderstanding of him by the     
,aristotelian school2 and the erroneous 
notion has been further narrowed and has
 become fixed by the realism of the     
schoolmen4 ,this popular view of the    
,platonic ideas may be summed up in some
 such formula as the following3 ',truth 
consists not in particulars1 but in     
universals1 which have a place in the   
mind of ,god1 or in some far-off heaven4
 ,these were revealed to men in a former
 state of existence1 and are recovered  

by reminiscence 7anamnesis7 or          
association from sensible things4 ,the  
sensible things are not realities1 but  
shadows only1 in relation to the truth4'
 ,these unmeaning propositions are      
hardly suspected to be a caricature of a
 great theory of knowledge1 which ,plato
 in various ways and under many figures 
of speech is seeking to unfold4 ,poetry 
has been converted into dogma2 and it is
 not remarked that the ,platonic ideas  
are to be found only in about a third of
 ,plato's writings and are not confined 
to him4 ,the forms which they assume are
 numerous1 and if taken literally1      
inconsistent with one another4 ,at one  
time we are in the clouds of mythology1 
at another among the abstractions of    
mathematics or metaphysics2 we pass     
imperceptibly from one to the other4    
,reason and fancy are mingled in the    
same passage4 ,the ideas are sometimes  
described as many1 coextensive with the 
universals of sense and also with the   
first principles of ethics2 or again    

they are absorbed into the single idea  
of good1 and subordinated to it4 ,they  
are not more certain than facts1 but    
they are equally certain 7,phaedo74     
,they are both personal and impersonal4 
,they are abstract terms3 they are also 
the causes of things2 and they are even 
transformed into the demons or spirits  
by whose help ,god made the world4 ,and 
the idea of good 7,republic7 may without
 violence be converted into the ,supreme
 ,being1 who 'because ,he was good'     
created all things 7,tim474  ,it would  
be a mistake to try and reconcile these 
differing modes of thought4 ,they are   
not to be regarded seriously as having a
 distinct meaning4 ,they are parables1  
prophecies1 myths1 symbols1 revelations1
 aspirations after an unknown world4    
,they derive their origin from a deep   
religious and contemplative feeling1 and
 also from an observation of curious    
mental phenomena4 ,they gather up the   
elements of the previous philosophies1  
which they put together in a new form4  

,their great diversity shows the        
tentative character of early endeavours 
to think4 ,they have not yet settled    
down into a single system4 ,plato uses  
them1 though he also criticises them2 he
 acknowledges that both he and others   
are always talking about them1          
especially about the ,idea of ,good2 and
 that they are not peculiar to himself  
7,phaedo2 ,republic2 ,soph474 ,but in   
his later writings he seems to have laid
 aside the old forms of them4 ,as he    
proceeds he makes for himself new modes 
of expression more akin to the          
,aristotelian logic4  ,yet amid all     
these varieties and incongruities1 there
 is a common meaning or spirit which    
pervades his writings1 both those in    
which he treats of the ideas and those  
in which he is silent about them4 ,this 
is the spirit of idealism1 which in the 
history of philosophy has had many names
 and taken many forms1 and has in a     
measure influenced those who seemed to  
be most averse to it4 ,it has often been

 charged with inconsistency and         
fancifulness1 and yet has had an        
elevating effect on human nature1 and   
has exercised a wonderful charm and     
interest over a few spirits who have    
been lost in the thought of it4 ,it has 
been banished again and again1 but has  
always returned4 ,it has attempted to   
leave the earth and soar heavenwards1   
but soon has found that only in         
experience could any solid foundation of
 knowledge be laid4 ,it has degenerated 
into pantheism1 but has again emerged4  
,no other knowledge has given an equal  
stimulus to the mind4 ,it is the science
 of sciences1 which are also ideas1 and 
under either aspect require to be       
defined4 ,they can only be thought of in
 due proportion when conceived in       
relation to one another4 ,they are the  
glasses through which the kingdoms of   
science are seen1 but at a distance4    
,all the greatest minds1 except when    
living in an age of reaction against    
them1 have unconsciously fallen under   

their power4  ,the account of the       
,platonic ideas in the ,meno is the     
simplest and clearest1 and we shall best
 illustrate their nature by giving this 
first and then comparing the manner in  
which they are described elsewhere1 e4g4
 in the ,phaedrus1 ,phaedo1 ,republic2  
to which may be added the criticism of  
them in the ,parmenides1 the personal   
form which is attributed to them in the 
,timaeus1 the logical character which   
they assume in the ,sophist and         
,philebus1 and the allusion to them in  
the ,laws4 ,in the ,cratylus they dawn  
upon him with the freshness of a        
newly-discovered thought4  ,the ,meno   
goes back to a former state of          
existence1 in which men did and suffered
 good and evil1 and received the reward 
or punishment of them until their sin   
was purged away and they were allowed to
 return to earth4 ,this is a tradition  
of the olden time1 to which priests and 
poets bear witness4 ,the souls of men   
returning to earth bring back a latent  

memory of ideas1 which were known to    
them in a former state4 ,the            
recollection is awakened into life and  
consciousness by the sight of the things
 which resemble them on earth4 ,the soul
 evidently possesses such innate ideas  
before she has had time to acquire them4
 ,this is proved by an experiment tried 
on one of ,meno's slaves1 from whom     
,socrates elicits truths of arithmetic  
and geometry1 which he had never learned
 in this world4 ,he must therefore have 
brought them with him from another4     
,the notion of a previous state of      
existence is found in the verses of     
,empedocles and in the fragments of     
,heracleitus4 ,it was the natural answer
 to two questions1 ',whence came the    
soul8 ,what is the origin of evil8' and 
prevailed far and wide in the east4 ,it 
found its way into ,hellas probably     
through the medium of ,orphic and       
,pythagorean rites and mysteries4 ,it   
was easier to think of a former than of 
a future life1 because such a life has  

really existed for the race though not  
for the individual1 and all men come    
into the world1 if not 'trailing clouds 
of glory1' at any rate able to enter    
into the inheritance of the past4 ,in   
the ,phaedrus1 as well as in the ,meno1 
it is this former rather than a future  
life on which ,plato is disposed to     
dwell4 ,there the ,gods1 and men        
following in their train1 go forth to   
contemplate the heavens1 and are borne  
round in the revolutions of them4 ,there
 they see the divine forms of justice1  
temperance1 and the like1 in their      
unchangeable beauty1 but not without an 
effort more than human4 ,the soul of man
 is likened to a charioteer and two     
steeds1 one mortal1 the other immortal4 
,the charioteer and the mortal steed are
 in fierce conflict2 at length the      
animal principle is finally overpowered1
 though not extinguished1 by the        
combined energies of the passionate and 
rational elements4 ,this is one of those
 passages in ,plato which1 partaking    

both of a philosophical and poetical    
character1 is necessarily indistinct and
 inconsistent4 ,the magnificent figure  
under which the nature of the soul is   
described has not much to do with the   
popular doctrine of the ideas4 ,yet     
there is one little trait in the        
description which shows that they are   
present to ,plato's mind1 namely1 the   
remark that the soul1 which had seen    
truths in the form of the universal1    
cannot again return to the nature of an 
animal4  ,in the ,phaedo1 as in the     
,meno1 the origin of ideas is sought for
 in a previous state of existence4      
,there was no time when they could have 
been acquired in this life1 and         
therefore they must have been recovered 
from another4 ,the process of recovery  
is no other than the ordinary law of    
association1 by which in daily life the 
sight of one thing or person recalls    
another to our minds1 and by which in   
scientific enquiry from any part of     
knowledge we may be led on to infer the 

whole4 ,it is also argued that ideas1 or
 rather ideals1 must be derived from a  
previous state of existence because they
 are more perfect than the sensible     
forms of them which are given by        
experience4 ,but in the ,phaedo the     
doctrine of ideas is subordinate to the 
proof of the immortality of the soul4   
',if the soul existed in a previous     
state1 then it will exist in a future   
state1 for a law of alternation pervades
 all things4' ,and1 ',if the ideas      
exist1 then the soul exists2 if not1    
not4' ,it is to be observed1 both in the
 ,meno and the ,phaedo1 that ,socrates  
expresses himself with diffidence4 ,he  
speaks in the ,phaedo of the words with 
which he has comforted himself and his  
friends1 and will not be too confident  
that the description which he has given 
of the soul and her mansions is exactly 
true1 but he 'ventures to think that    
something of the kind is true4' ,and in 
the ,meno1 after dwelling upon the      
immortality of the soul1 he adds1 ',of  

some things which ,i have said ,i am not
 altogether confident' 7compare         
,apology2 ,gorgias74 ,from this class of
 uncertainties he exempts the difference
 between truth and appearance1 of which 
he is absolutely convinced4  ,in the    
,republic the ideas are spoken of in two
 ways1 which though not contradictory   
are different4 ,in the tenth book they  
are represented as the genera or general
 ideas under which individuals having a 
common name are contained4 ,for example1
 there is the bed which the carpenter   
makes1 the picture of the bed which is  
drawn by the painter1 the bed existing  
in nature of which ,god is the author4  
,of the latter all visible beds are only
 the shadows or reflections4 ,this and  
similar illustrations or explanations   
are put forth1 not for their own sake1  
or as an exposition of ,plato's theory  
of ideas1 but with a view of showing    
that poetry and the mimetic arts are    
concerned with an inferior part of the  
soul and a lower kind of knowledge4 ,on 

the other hand1 in the #fth and #gth    
books of the ,republic we reach the     
highest and most perfect conception1    
which ,plato is able to attain1 of the  
nature of knowledge4 ,the ideas are now 
finally seen to be one as well as many1 
causes as well as ideas1 and to have a  
unity which is the idea of good and the 
cause of all the rest4 ,they seem1      
however1 to have lost their first aspect
 of universals under which individuals  
are contained1 and to have been         
converted into forms of another kind1   
which are inconsistently regarded from  
the one side as images or ideals of     
justice1 temperance1 holiness and the   
like2 from the other as hypotheses1 or  
mathematical truths or principles4  ,in 
the ,timaeus1 which in the series of    
,plato's works immediately follows the  
,republic1 though probably written some 
time afterwards1 no mention occurs of   
the doctrine of ideas4 ,geometrical     
forms and arithmetical ratios furnish   
the laws according to which the world is

 created4 ,but though the conception of 
the ideas as genera or species is       
forgotten or laid aside1 the distinction
 of the visible and intellectual is as  
firmly maintained as ever4 ,the ,,idea  
of good likewise disappears and is      
superseded by the conception of a       
personal ,god1 who works according to a 
final cause or principle of goodness    
which he himself is4 ,no doubt is       
expressed by ,plato1 either in the      
,timaeus or in any other dialogue1 of   
the truths which he conceives to be the 
first and highest4 ,it is not the       
existence of ,god or the idea of good   
which he approaches in a tentative or   
hesitating manner1 but the              
investigations of physiology4 ,these he 
regards1 not seriously1 as a part of    
philosophy1 but as an innocent          
recreation 7,tim474  ,passing on to the 
,parmenides1 we find in that dialogue   
not an exposition or defence of the     
doctrine of ideas1 but an assault upon  
them1 which is put into the mouth of the

 veteran ,parmenides1 and might be      
ascribed to ,aristotle himself1 or to   
one of his disciples4 ,the doctrine     
which is assailed takes two or three    
forms1 but fails in any of them to      
escape the dialectical difficulties     
which are urged against it4 ,it is      
admitted that there are ideas of all    
things1 but the manner in which         
individuals partake of them1 whether of 
the whole or of the part1 and in which  
they become like them1 or how ideas can 
be either within or without the sphere  
of human knowledge1 or how the human and
 divine can have any relation to each   
other1 is held to be incapable of       
explanation4 ,and yet1 if there are no  
universal ideas1 what becomes of        
philosophy8 7,parmenides47 ,in the      
,sophist the theory of ideas is spoken  
of as a doctrine held not by ,plato1 but
 by another sect of philosophers1 called
 'the ,friends of ,ideas1' probably the 
,megarians1 who were very distinct from 
him1 if not opposed to him 7,sophist74  

,nor in what may be termed ,plato's     
abridgement of the history of philosophy
 7,soph471 is any mention made such as  
we find in the first book of            
,aristotle's ,metaphysics1 of the       
derivation of such a theory or of any   
part of it from the ,pythagoreans1 the  
,eleatics1 the ,heracleiteans1 or even  
from ,socrates4 ,in the ,philebus1      
probably one of the latest of the       
,platonic ,dialogues1 the conception of 
a personal or semi-personal deity       
expressed under the figure of mind1 the 
king of all1 who is also the cause1 is  
retained4 ,the one and many of the      
,phaedrus and ,theaetetus is still      
working in the mind of ,plato1 and the  
correlation of ideas1 not of 'all with  
all1' but of 'some with some1' is       
asserted and explained4 ,but they are   
spoken of in a different manner1 and are
 not supposed to be recovered from a    
former state of existence4 ,the         
metaphysical conception of truth passes 
into a psychological one1 which is      

continued in the ,laws1 and is the final
 form of the ,platonic philosophy1 so   
far as can be gathered from his own     
writings 7see especially ,laws74 ,in the
 ,laws he harps once more on the old    
string1 and returns to general          
notions3--these he acknowledges to be   
many1 and yet he insists that they are  
also one4 ,the guardian must be made to 
recognize the truth1 for which he has   
contended long ago in the ,protagoras1  
that the virtues are four1 but they are 
also in some sense one 7,laws2 compare  
,protagoras74  ,so various1 and if      
regarded on the surface only1           
inconsistent1 are the statements of     
,plato respecting the doctrine of ideas4
 ,if we attempted to harmonize or to    
combine them1 we should make out of     
them1 not a system1 but the caricature  
of a system4 ,they are the ever-varying 
expression of ,plato's ,idealism4 ,the  
terms used in them are in their         
substance and general meaning the same1 
although they seem to be different4     

,they pass from the subject to the      
object1 from earth 7diesseits7 to heaven
 7jenseits7 without regard to the gulf  
which later theology and philosophy have
 made between them4 ,they are also      
intended to supplement or explain each  
other4 ,they relate to a subject of     
which ,plato himself would have said    
that 'he was not confident of the       
precise form of his own statements1 but 
was strong in the belief that something 
of the kind was true4' ,it is the       
spirit1 not the letter1 in which they   
agree--the spirit which places the      
divine above the human1 the spiritual   
above the material1 the one above the   
many1 the mind before the body4  ,the   
stream of ancient philosophy in the     
,alexandrian and ,roman times widens    
into a lake or sea1 and then disappears 
underground to reappear after many ages 
in a distant land4 ,it begins to flow   
again under new conditions1 at first    
confined between high and narrow banks1 
but finally spreading over the continent

 of ,europe4 ,it is and is not the same 
with ancient philosophy4 ,there is a    
great deal in modern philosophy which is
 inspired by ancient4 ,there is much in 
ancient philosophy which was 'born out  
of due time2 and before men were capable
 of understanding it4 ,to the fathers of
 modern philosophy1 their own thoughts  
appeared to be new and original1 but    
they carried with them an echo or shadow
 of the past1 coming back by            
recollection from an elder world4 ,of   
this the enquirers of the seventeenth   
century1 who to themselves appeared to  
be working out independently the enquiry
 into all truth1 were unconscious4 ,they
 stood in a new relation to theology and
 natural philosophy1 and for a time     
maintained towards both an attitude of  
reserve and separation4 ,yet the        
similarities between modern and ancient 
thought are greater far than the        
differences4 ,all philosophy1 even that 
part of it which is said to be based    
upon experience1 is really ideal2 and   

ideas are not only derived from facts1  
but they are also prior to them and     
extend far beyond them1 just as the mind
 is prior to the senses4  ,early ,greek 
speculation culminates in the ideas of  
,plato1 or rather in the single idea of 
good4 ,his followers1 and perhaps he    
himself1 having arrived at this         
elevation1 instead of going forwards    
went backwards from philosophy to       
psychology1 from ideas to numbers4 ,but 
what we perceive to be the real meaning 
of them1 an explanation of the nature   
and origin of knowledge1 will always    
continue to be one of the first problems
 of philosophy4  ,plato also left behind
 him a most potent instrument1 the forms
 of logic--arms ready for use1 but not  
yet taken out of their armoury4 ,they   
were the late birth of the early ,greek 
philosophy1 and were the only part of it
 which has had an uninterrupted hold on 
the mind of ,europe4 ,philosophies come 
and go2 but the detection of fallacies1 
the framing of definitions1 the         

invention of methods still continue to  
be the main elements of the reasoning   
process4  ,modern philosophy1 like      
ancient1 begins with very simple        
conceptions4 ,it is almost wholly a     
reflection on self4 ,it might be        
described as a quickening into life of  
old words and notions latent in the     
semi-barbarous ,latin1 and putting a new
 meaning into them4 ,unlike ancient     
philosophy1 it has been unaffected by   
impressions derived from outward nature3
 it arose within the limits of the mind 
itself4 ,from the time of ,descartes to 
,hume and ,kant it has had little or    
nothing to do with facts of science4 ,on
 the other hand1 the ancient and        
mediaeval logic retained a continuous   
influence over it1 and a form like that 
of mathematics was easily impressed upon
 it2 the principle of ancient philosophy
 which is most apparent in it is        
scepticism2 we must doubt nearly every  
traditional or received notion1 that we 
may hold fast one or two4 ,the being of 

,god in a personal or impersonal form   
was a mental necessity to the first     
thinkers of modern times3 from this     
alone all other ideas could be deduced4 
,there had been an obscure presentiment 
of 'cognito1 ergo sum' more than #bjjj  
years previously4 ,the ,eleatic notion  
that being and thought were the same was
 revived in a new form by ,descartes4   
,but now it gave birth to consciousness 
and self-reflection3 it awakened the    
'ego' in human nature4 ,the mind naked  
and abstract has no other certainty but 
the conviction of its own existence4 ',i
 think1 therefore ,i am2' and this      
thought is ,god thinking in me1 who has 
also communicated to the reason of man  
his own attributes of thought and       
extension--these are truly imparted to  
him because ,god is true 7compare       
,republic74 ,it has been often remarked 
that ,descartes1 having begun by        
dismissing all presuppositions1         
introduces several3 he passes almost at 
once from scepticism to dogmatism4 ,it  

is more important for the illustration  
of ,plato to observe that he1 like      
,plato1 insists that ,god is true and   
incapable of deception 7,republic7--that
 he proceeds from general ideas1 that   
many elements of mathematics may be     
found in him4 ,a certain influence of   
mathematics both on the form and        
substance of their philosophy is        
discernible in both of them4 ,after     
making the greatest opposition between  
thought and extension1 ,descartes1 like 
,plato1 supposes them to be reunited for
 a time1 not in their own nature but by 
a special divine act 7compare           
,phaedrus71 and he also supposes all the
 parts of the human body to meet in the 
pineal gland1 that alone affording a    
principle of unity in the material frame
 of man4 ,it is characteristic of the   
first period of modern philosophy1 that 
having begun 7like the ,presocratics7   
with a few general notions1 ,descartes  
first falls absolutely under their      
influence1 and then quickly discards    

them4 ,at the same time he is less able 
to observe facts1 because they are too  
much magnified by the glasses through   
which they are seen4 ,the common logic  
says 'the greater the extension1 the    
less the comprehension1' and we may put 
the same thought in another way and say 
of abstract or general ideas1 that the  
greater the abstraction of them1 the    
less are they capable of being applied  
to particular and concrete natures4     
,not very different from ,descartes in  
his relation to ancient philosophy is   
his successor ,spinoza1 who lived in the
 following generation4 ,the system of   
,spinoza is less personal and also less 
dualistic than that of ,descartes4 ,in  
this respect the difference between them
 is like that between ,xenophanes and   
,parmenides4 ,the teaching of ,spinoza  
might be described generally as the     
,jewish religion reduced to an          
abstraction and taking the form of the  
,eleatic philosophy4 ,like ,parmenides1 
he is overpowered and intoxicated with  

the idea of ,being or ,god4 ,the        
greatness of both philosophies consists 
in the immensity of a thought which     
excludes all other thoughts2 their      
weakness is the necessary separation of 
this thought from actual existence and  
from practical life4 ,in neither of them
 is there any clear opposition between  
the inward and outward world4 ,the      
substance of ,spinoza has two           
attributes1 which alone are cognizable  
by man1 thought and extension2 these are
 in extreme opposition to one another1  
and also in inseparable identity4 ,they 
may be regarded as the two aspects or   
expressions under which ,god or         
substance is unfolded to man4 ,here a   
step is made beyond the limits of the   
,eleatic philosophy4 ,the famous theorem
 of ,spinoza1 ',omnis determinatio est  
negatio1' is already contained in the   
'negation is relation' of ,plato's      
,sophist4 ,the grand description of the 
philosopher in ,republic ,,vi1 as the   
spectator of all time and all existence1

 may be paralleled with another famous  
expression of ,spinoza1 ',contemplatio  
rerum sub specie eternitatis4'          
,according to ,spinoza finite objects   
are unreal1 for they are conditioned by 
what is alien to them1 and by one       
another4 ,human beings are included in  
the number of them4 ,hence there is no  
reality in human action and no place for
 right and wrong4 ,individuality is     
accident4 ,the boasted freedom of the   
will is only a consciousness of         
necessity4 ,truth1 he says1 is the      
direction of the reason towards the     
infinite1 in which all things repose2   
and herein lies the secret of man's     
well-being4 ,in the exaltation of the   
reason or intellect1 in the denial of   
the voluntariness of evil 7,timaeus2    
,laws7 ,spinoza approaches nearer to    
,plato than in his conception of an     
infinite substance4 ,as ,socrates said  
that virtue is knowledge1 so ,spinoza   
would have maintained that knowledge    
alone is good1 and what contributes to  

knowledge useful4 ,both are equally far 
from any real experience or observation 
of nature4 ,and the same difficulty is  
found in both when we seek to apply     
their ideas to life and practice4 ,there
 is a gulf fixed between the infinite   
substance and finite objects or         
individuals of ,spinoza1 just as there  
is between the ideas of ,plato and the  
world of sense4  ,removed from ,spinoza 
by less than a generation is the        
philosopher ,leibnitz1 who after        
deepening and intensifying the          
opposition between mind and matter1     
reunites them by his preconcerted       
harmony 7compare again ,phaedrus74 ,to  
him all the particles of matter are     
living beings which reflect on one      
another1 and in the least of them the   
whole is contained4 ,here we catch a    
reminiscence both of the omoiomere1 or  
similar particles of ,anaxagoras1 and of
 the world-animal of the ,timaeus4  ,in 
,bacon and ,locke we have another       
development in which the mind of man is 

supposed to receive knowledge by a new  
method and to work by observation and   
experience4 ,but we may remark that it  
is the idea of experience1 rather than  
experience itself1 with which the mind  
is filled4 ,it is a symbol of knowledge 
rather than the reality which is        
vouchsafed to us4 ,the ,organon of      
,bacon is not much nearer to actual     
facts than the ,organon of ,aristotle or
 the ,platonic idea of good4 ,many of   
the old rags and ribbons which defaced  
the garment of philosophy have been     
stripped off1 but some of them still    
adhere4 ,a crude conception of the ideas
 of ,plato survives in the 'forms' of   
,bacon4 ,and on the other hand1 there   
are many passages of ,plato in which the
 importance of the investigation of     
facts is as much insisted upon as by    
,bacon4 ,both are almost equally        
superior to the illusions of language1  
and are constantly crying out against   
them1 as against other idols4  ,locke   
cannot be truly regarded as the author  

of sensationalism any more than of      
idealism4 ,his system is based upon     
experience1 but with him experience     
includes reflection as well as sense4   
,his analysis and construction of ideas 
has no foundation in fact2 it is only   
the dialectic of the mind 'talking to   
herself4' ,the philosophy of ,berkeley  
is but the transposition of two words4  
,for objects of sense he would          
substitute sensations4 ,he imagines     
himself to have changed the relation of 
the human mind towards ,god and nature2 
they remain the same as before1 though  
he has drawn the imaginary line by which
 they are divided at a different point4 
,he has annihilated the outward world1  
but it instantly reappears governed by  
the same laws and described under the   
same names4  ,a like remark applies to  
,david ,hume1 of whose philosophy the   
central principle is the denial of the  
relation of cause and effect4 ,he would 
deprive men of a familiar term which    
they can ill afford to lose2 but he     

seems not to have observed that this    
alteration is merely verbal and does not
 in any degree affect the nature of     
things4 ,still less did he remark that  
he was arguing from the necessary       
imperfection of language against the    
most certain facts4 ,and here1 again1 we
 may find a parallel with the ancients4 
,he goes beyond facts in his scepticism1
 as they did in their idealism4 ,like   
the ancient ,sophists1 he relegates the 
more important principles of ethics to  
custom and probability4 ,but crude and  
unmeaning as this philosophy is1 it     
exercised a great influence on his      
successors1 not unlike that which ,locke
 exercised upon ,berkeley and ,berkeley 
upon ,hume himself4 ,all three were both
 sceptical and ideal in almost equal    
degrees4 ,neither they nor their        
predecessors had any true conception of 
language or of the history of           
philosophy4 ,hume's paradox has been    
forgotten by the world1 and did not any 
more than the scepticism of the ancients

 require to be seriously refuted4 ,like 
some other philosophical paradoxes1 it  
would have been better left to die out4 
,it certainly could not be refuted by a 
philosophy such as ,kant's1 in which1 no
 less than in the previously mentioned  
systems1 the history of the human mind  
and the nature of language are almost   
wholly ignored1 and the certainty of    
objective knowledge is transferred to   
the subject2 while absolute truth is    
reduced to a figment1 more abstract and 
narrow than ,plato's ideas1 of 'thing in
 itself1' to which1 if we reason        
strictly1 no predicate can be applied4  
,the question which ,plato has raised   
respecting the origin and nature of     
ideas belongs to the infancy of         
philosophy2 in modern times it would no 
longer be asked4 ,their origin is only  
their history1 so far as we know it2    
there can be no other4 ,we may trace    
them in language1 in philosophy1 in     
mythology1 in poetry1 but we cannot     
argue a priori about them4 ,we may      

attempt to shake them off1 but they are 
always returning1 and in every sphere of
 science and human action are tending to
 go beyond facts4 ,they are thought to  
be innate1 because they have been       
familiar to us all our lives1 and we can
 no longer dismiss them from our mind4  
,many of them express relations of terms
 to which nothing exactly or nothing at 
all in rerum natura corresponds4 ,we are
 not such free agents in the use of them
 as we sometimes imagine4 ,fixed ideas  
have taken the most complete possession 
of some thinkers who have been most     
determined to renounce them1 and have   
been vehemently affirmed when they could
 be least explained and were incapable  
of proof4 ,the world has often been led 
away by a word to which no distinct     
meaning could be attached4 ,abstractions
 such as 'authority1' 'equality1'       
'utility1' 'liberty1' 'pleasure1'       
'experience1' 'consciousness1' 'chance1'
 'substance1' 'matter1' 'atom1' and a   
heap of other metaphysical and          

theological terms1 are the source of    
quite as much error and illusion and    
have as little relation to actual facts 
as the ideas of ,plato4 ,few students of
 theology or philosophy have            
sufficiently reflected how quickly the  
bloom of a philosophy passes away2 or   
how hard it is for one age to understand
 the writings of another2 or how nice a 
judgment is required of those who are   
seeking to express the philosophy of one
 age in the terms of another4 ,the      
'eternal truths' of which metaphysicians
 speak have hardly ever lasted more than
 a generation4 ,in our own day schools  
or systems of philosophy which have once
 been famous have died before the       
founders of them4 ,we are still1 as in  
,plato's age1 groping about for a new   
method more comprehensive than any of   
those which now prevail2 and also more  
permanent4 ,and we seem to see at a     
distance the promise of such a method1  
which can hardly be any other than the  
method of idealized experience1 having  

roots which strike far down into the    
history of philosophy4 ,it is a method  
which does not divorce the present from 
the past1 or the part from the whole1 or
 the abstract from the concrete1 or     
theory from fact1 or the divine from the
 human1 or one science from another1 but
 labours to connect them4 ,along such a 
road we have proceeded a few steps1     
sufficient1 perhaps1 to make us reflect 
on the want of method which prevails in 
our own day4 ,in another age1 all the   
branches of knowledge1 whether relating 
to ,god or man or nature1 will become   
the knowledge of 'the revelation of a   
single science' 7,symp471 and all       
things1 like the stars in heaven1 will  
shed their light upon one another4      
,,meno   ,,persons ,,of ,,the           
,,dialogue3 ,meno1 ,socrates1 ,a ,slave 
of ,meno 7,boy71 ,anytus4   ,,meno3 ,can
 you tell me1 ,socrates1 whether virtue 
is acquired by teaching or by practice2 
or if neither by teaching nor by        
practice1 then whether it comes to man  

by nature1 or in what other way8        
,,socrates3 ,o ,meno1 there was a time  
when the ,thessalians were famous among 
the other ,hellenes only for their      
riches and their riding2 but now1 if ,i 
am not mistaken1 they are equally famous
 for their wisdom1 especially at        
,larisa1 which is the native city of    
your friend ,aristippus4 ,and this is   
,gorgias' doing2 for when he came there1
 the flower of the ,aleuadae1 among them
 your admirer ,aristippus1 and the other
 chiefs of the ,thessalians1 fell in    
love with his wisdom4 ,and he has taught
 you the habit of answering questions in
 a grand and bold style1 which becomes  
those who know1 and is the style in     
which he himself answers all comers2 and
 any ,hellene who likes may ask him     
anything4 ,how different is our lot6 my 
dear ,meno4 ,here at ,athens there is a 
dearth of the commodity1 and all wisdom 
seems to have emigrated from us to you4 
,i am certain that if you were to ask   
any ,athenian whether virtue was natural

 or acquired1 he would laugh in your    
face1 and say3 ',stranger1 you have far 
too good an opinion of me1 if you think 
that ,i can answer your question4 ,for  
,i literally do not know what virtue is1
 and much less whether it is acquired by
 teaching or not4' ,and ,i myself1      
,meno1 living as ,i do in this region of
 poverty1 am as poor as the rest of the 
world2 and ,i confess with shame that ,i
 know literally nothing about virtue2   
and when ,i do not know the 'quid' of   
anything how can ,i know the 'quale'8   
,how1 if ,i knew nothing at all of      
,meno1 could ,i tell if he was fair1 or 
the opposite of fair2 rich and noble1 or
 the reverse of rich and noble8 ,do you 
think that ,i could8  ,,meno3 ,no1      
indeed4 ,but are you in earnest1        
,socrates1 in saying that you do not    
know what virtue is8 ,and am ,i to carry
 back this report of you to ,thessaly8  
,,socrates3 ,not only that1 my dear boy1
 but you may say further that ,i have   
never known of any one else who did1 in 

my judgment4  ,,meno3 ,then you have    
never met ,gorgias when he was at       
,athens8  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,i have4    
,,meno3 ,and did you not think that he  
knew8  ,,socrates3 ,i have not a good   
memory1 ,meno1 and therefore ,i cannot  
now tell what ,i thought of him at the  
time4 ,and ,i dare say that he did know1
 and that you know what he said3 please1
 therefore1 to remind me of what he     
said2 or1 if you would rather1 tell me  
your own view2 for ,i suspect that you  
and he think much alike4  ,,meno3 ,very 
true4  ,,socrates3 ,then as he is not   
here1 never mind him1 and do you tell   
me3 ,by the gods1 ,meno1 be generous1   
and tell me what you say that virtue is2
 for ,i shall be truly delighted to find
 that ,i have been mistaken1 and that   
you and ,gorgias do really have this    
knowledge2 although ,i have been just   
saying that ,i have never found anybody 
who had4  ,,meno3 ,there will be no     
difficulty1 ,socrates1 in answering your
 question4 ,let us take first the virtue

 of a man--he should know how to        
administer the state1 and in the        
administration of it to benefit his     
friends and harm his enemies2 and he    
must also be careful not to suffer harm 
himself4 ,a woman's virtue1 if you wish 
to know about that1 may also be easily  
described3 her duty is to order her     
house1 and keep what is indoors1 and    
obey her husband4 ,every age1 every     
condition of life1 young or old1 male or
 female1 bond or free1 has a different  
virtue3 there are virtues numberless1   
and no lack of definitions of them2 for 
virtue is relative to the actions and   
ages of each of us in all that we do4   
,and the same may be said of vice1      
,socrates 7,compare ,arist4 ,pol474     
,,socrates3 ,how fortunate ,i am1 ,meno6
 ,when ,i ask you for one virtue1 you   
present me with a swarm of them         
7,compare ,theaet471 which are in your  
keeping4 ,suppose that ,i carry on the  
figure of the swarm1 and ask of you1    
,what is the nature of the bee8 and you 

answer that there are many kinds of     
bees1 and ,i reply3 ,but do bees differ 
as bees1 because there are many and     
different kinds of them2 or are they not
 rather to be distinguished by some     
other quality1 as for example beauty1   
size1 or shape8 ,how would you answer   
me8  ,,meno3 ,i should answer that bees 
do not differ from one another1 as bees4
  ,,socrates3 ,and if ,i went on to say3
 ,that is what ,i desire to know1 ,meno2
 tell me what is the quality in which   
they do not differ1 but are all         
alike2--would you be able to answer8    
,,meno3 ,i should4  ,,socrates3 ,and so 
of the virtues1 however many and        
different they may be1 they have all a  
common nature which makes them virtues2 
and on this he who would answer the     
question1 ',what is virtue8' would do   
well to have his eye fixed3 ,do you     
understand8  ,,meno3 ,i am beginning to 
understand2 but ,i do not as yet take   
hold of the question as ,i could wish4  
,,socrates3 ,when you say1 ,meno1 that  

there is one virtue of a man1 another of
 a woman1 another of a child1 and so on1
 does this apply only to virtue1 or     
would you say the same of health1 and   
size1 and strength8 ,or is the nature of
 health always the same1 whether in man 
or woman8  ,,meno3 ,i should say that   
health is the same1 both in man and     
woman4  ,,socrates3 ,and is not this    
true of size and strength8 ,if a woman  
is strong1 she will be strong by reason 
of the same form and of the same        
strength subsisting in her which there  
is in the man4 ,i mean to say that      
strength1 as strength1 whether of man or
 woman1 is the same4 ,is there any      
difference8  ,,meno3 ,i think not4      
,,socrates3 ,and will not virtue1 as    
virtue1 be the same1 whether in a child 
or in a grown-up person1 in a woman or  
in a man8  ,,meno3 ,i cannot help       
feeling1 ,socrates1 that this case is   
different from the others4  ,,socrates3 
,but why8 ,were you not saying that the 
virtue of a man was to order a state1   

and the virtue of a woman was to order a
 house8  ,,meno3 ,i did say so4         
,,socrates3 ,and can either house or    
state or anything be well ordered       
without temperance and without justice8 
,,meno3 ,certainly not4  ,,socrates3    
,then they who order a state or a house 
temperately or justly order them with   
temperance and justice8  ,,meno3        
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,then both men 
and women1 if they are to be good men   
and women1 must have the same virtues of
 temperance and justice8  ,,meno3 ,true4
  ,,socrates3 ,and can either a young   
man or an elder one be good1 if they are
 intemperate and unjust8  ,,meno3 ,they 
cannot4  ,,socrates3 ,they must be      
temperate and just8  ,,meno3 ,yes4      
,,socrates3 ,then all men are good in   
the same way1 and by participation in   
the same virtues8  ,,meno3 ,such is the 
inference4  ,,socrates3 ,and they surely
 would not have been good in the same   
way1 unless their virtue had been the   
same8  ,,meno3 ,they would not4         

,,socrates3 ,then now that the sameness 
of all virtue has been proven1 try and  
remember what you and ,gorgias say that 
virtue is4  ,,meno3 ,will you have one  
definition of them all8  ,,socrates3    
,that is what ,i am seeking4  ,,meno3   
,if you want to have one definition of  
them all1 ,i know not what to say1 but  
that virtue is the power of governing   
mankind4  ,,socrates3 ,and does this    
definition of virtue include all virtue8
 ,is virtue the same in a child and in a
 slave1 ,meno8 ,can the child govern his
 father1 or the slave his master2 and   
would he who governed be any longer a   
slave8  ,,meno3 ,i think not1 ,socrates4
  ,,socrates3 ,no1 indeed2 there would  
be small reason in that4 ,yet once more1
 fair friend2 according to you1 virtue  
is 'the power of governing2' but do you 
not add 'justly and not unjustly'8      
,,meno3 ,yes1 ,socrates2 ,i agree there2
 for justice is virtue4  ,,socrates3    
,would you say 'virtue1' ,meno1 or 'a   
virtue'8  ,,meno3 ,what do you mean8    

,,socrates3 ,i mean as ,i might say     
about anything2 that a round1 for       
example1 is 'a figure' and not simply   
'figure1' and ,i should adopt this mode 
of speaking1 because there are other    
figures4  ,,meno3 ,quite right2 and that
 is just what ,i am saying about        
virtue--that there are other virtues as 
well as justice4  ,,socrates3 ,what are 
they8 tell me the names of them1 as ,i  
would tell you the names of the other   
figures if you asked me4  ,,meno3       
,courage and temperance and wisdom and  
magnanimity are virtues2 and there are  
many others4  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,meno2  
and again we are in the same case3 in   
searching after one virtue we have found
 many1 though not in the same way as    
before2 but we have been unable to find 
the common virtue which runs through    
them all4  ,,meno3 ,why1 ,socrates1 even
 now ,i am not able to follow you in the
 attempt to get at one common notion of 
virtue as of other things4  ,,socrates3 
,no wonder2 but ,i will try to get      

nearer if ,i can1 for you know that all 
things have a common notion4 ,suppose   
now that some one asked you the question
 which ,i asked before3 ,meno1 he would 
say1 what is figure8 ,and if you        
answered 'roundness1' he would reply to 
you1 in my way of speaking1 by asking   
whether you would say that roundness is 
'figure' or 'a figure2' and you would   
answer 'a figure4'  ,,meno3 ,certainly4 
,,socrates3 ,and for this reason--that  
there are other figures8  ,,meno3 ,yes4 
,,socrates3 ,and if he proceeded to ask1
 ,what other figures are there8 you     
would have told him4  ,,meno3 ,i should4
  ,,socrates3 ,and if he similarly asked
 what colour is1 and you answered       
whiteness1 and the questioner rejoined1 
,would you say that whiteness is colour 
or a colour8 you would reply1 ,a colour1
 because there are other colours as     
well4  ,,meno3 ,i should4  ,,socrates3  
,and if he had said1 ,tell me what they 
are8--you would have told him of other  
colours which are colours just as much  

as whiteness4  ,,meno3 ,yes4            
,,socrates3 ,and suppose that he were to
 pursue the matter in my way1 he would  
say3 ,ever and anon we are landed in    
particulars1 but this is not what ,i    
want2 tell me then1 since you call them 
by a common name1 and say that they are 
all figures1 even when opposed to one   
another1 what is that common nature     
which you designate as figure--which    
contains straight as well as round1 and 
is no more one than the other--that     
would be your mode of speaking8  ,,meno3
 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and in speaking    
thus1 you do not mean to say that the   
round is round any more than straight1  
or the straight any more straight than  
round8  ,,meno3 ,certainly not4         
,,socrates3 ,you only assert that the   
round figure is not more a figure than  
the straight1 or the straight than the  
round8  ,,meno3 ,very true4  ,,socrates3
 ,to what then do we give the name of   
figure8 ,try and answer4 ,suppose that  
when a person asked you this question   

either about figure or colour1 you were 
to reply1 ,man1 ,i do not understand    
what you want1 or know what you are     
saying2 he would look rather astonished 
and say3 ,do you not understand that ,i 
am looking for the 'simile in multis'8  
,and then he might put the question in  
another form3 ,meno1 he might say1 what 
is that 'simile in multis' which you    
call figure1 and which includes not only
 round and straight figures1 but all8   
,could you not answer that question1    
,meno8 ,i wish that you would try2 the  
attempt will be good practice with a    
view to the answer about virtue4        
,,meno3 ,i would rather that you should 
answer1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,shall  
,i indulge you8  ,,meno3 ,by all means4 
,,socrates3 ,and then you will tell me  
about virtue8  ,,meno3 ,i will4         
,,socrates3 ,then ,i must do my best1   
for there is a prize to be won4  ,,meno3
 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,well1 ,i will
 try and explain to you what figure is4 
,what do you say to this                

answer8--,figure is the only thing which
 always follows colour4 ,will you be    
satisfied with it1 as ,i am sure that ,i
 should be1 if you would let me have a  
similar definition of virtue8  ,,meno3  
,but1 ,socrates1 it is such a simple    
answer4  ,,socrates3 ,why simple8       
,,meno3 ,because1 according to you1     
figure is that which always follows     
colour4  7,,socrates3 ,granted47        
,,meno3 ,but if a person were to say    
that he does not know what colour is1   
any more than what figure is--what sort 
of answer would you have given him8     
,,socrates3 ,i should have told him the 
truth4 ,and if he were a philosopher of 
the eristic and antagonistic sort1 ,i   
should say to him3 ,you have my answer1 
and if ,i am wrong1 your business is to 
take up the argument and refute me4 ,but
 if we were friends1 and were talking as
 you and ,i are now1 ,i should reply in 
a milder strain and more in the         
dialectician's vein2 that is to say1 ,i 
should not only speak the truth1 but ,i 

should make use of premises which the   
person interrogated would be willing to 
admit4 ,and this is the way in which ,i 
shall endeavour to approach you4 ,you   
will acknowledge1 will you not1 that    
there is such a thing as an end1 or     
termination1 or extremity8--all which   
words ,i use in the same sense1 although
 ,i am aware that ,prodicus might draw  
distinctions about them3 but still you1 
,i am sure1 would speak of a thing as   
ended or terminated--that is all which  
,i am saying--not anything very         
difficult4  ,,meno3 ,yes1 ,i should2 and
 ,i believe that ,i understand your     
meaning4  ,,socrates3 ,and you would    
speak of a surface and also of a solid1 
as for example in geometry4  ,,meno3    
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,well then1 you are  
now in a condition to understand my     
definition of figure4 ,i define figure  
to be that in which the solid ends2 or1 
more concisely1 the limit of solid4     
,,meno3 ,and now1 ,socrates1 what is    
colour8  ,,socrates3 ,you are           

outrageous1 ,meno1 in thus plaguing a   
poor old man to give you an answer1 when
 you will not take the trouble of       
remembering what is ,gorgias' definition
 of virtue4  ,,meno3 ,when you have told
 me what ,i ask1 ,i will tell you1      
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,a man who was  
blindfolded has only to hear you        
talking1 and he would know that you are 
a fair creature and have still many     
lovers4  ,,meno3 ,why do you think so8  
,,socrates3 ,why1 because you always    
speak in imperatives3 like all beauties 
when they are in their prime1 you are   
tyrannical2 and also1 as ,i suspect1 you
 have found out that ,i have weakness   
for the fair1 and therefore to humour   
you ,i must answer4  ,,meno3 ,please do4
  ,,socrates3 ,would you like me to     
answer you after the manner of ,gorgias1
 which is familiar to you8  ,,meno3 ,i  
should like nothing better4  ,,socrates3
 ,do not he and you and ,empedocles say 
that there are certain effluences of    
existence8  ,,meno3 ,certainly4         

,,socrates3 ,and passages into which and
 through which the effluences pass8     
,,meno3 ,exactly4  ,,socrates3 ,and some
 of the effluences fit into the         
passages1 and some of them are too small
 or too large8  ,,meno3 ,true4          
,,socrates3 ,and there is such a thing  
as sight8  ,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3   
,and now1 as ,pindar says1 'read my     
meaning3'--colour is an effluence of    
form1 commensurate with sight1 and      
palpable to sense4  ,,meno3 ,that1      
,socrates1 appears to me to be an       
admirable answer4  ,,socrates3 ,why1    
yes1 because it happens to be one which 
you have been in the habit of hearing3  
and your wit will have discovered1 ,i   
suspect1 that you may explain in the    
same way the nature of sound and smell1 
and of many other similar phenomena4    
,,meno3 ,quite true4  ,,socrates3 ,the  
answer1 ,meno1 was in the orthodox      
solemn vein1 and therefore was more     
acceptable to you than the other answer 
about figure4  ,,meno3 ,yes4            

,,socrates3 ,and yet1 ,o son of         
,alexidemus1 ,i cannot help thinking    
that the other was the better2 and ,i am
 sure that you would be of the same     
opinion1 if you would only stay and be  
initiated1 and were not compelled1 as   
you said yesterday1 to go away before   
the mysteries4  ,,meno3 ,but ,i will    
stay1 ,socrates1 if you will give me    
many such answers4  ,,socrates3 ,well   
then1 for my own sake as well as for    
yours1 ,i will do my very best2 but ,i  
am afraid that ,i shall not be able to  
give you very many as good3 and now1 in 
your turn1 you are to fulfil your       
promise1 and tell me what virtue is in  
the universal2 and do not make a        
singular into a plural1 as the facetious
 say of those who break a thing1 but    
deliver virtue to me whole and sound1   
and not broken into a number of pieces3 
,i have given you the pattern4  ,,meno3 
,well then1 ,socrates1 virtue1 as ,i    
take it1 is when he1 who desires the    
honourable1 is able to provide it for   

himself2 so the poet says1 and ,i say   
too--  ',virtue is the desire of things 
honourable and the power of attaining   
them4'  ,,socrates3 ,and does he who    
desires the honourable also desire the  
good8  ,,meno3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 
,then are there some who desire the evil
 and others who desire the good8 ,do not
 all men1 my dear sir1 desire good8     
,,meno3 ,i think not4  ,,socrates3      
,there are some who desire evil8        
,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,do you mean 
that they think the evils which they    
desire1 to be good2 or do they know that
 they are evil and yet desire them8     
,,meno3 ,both1 ,i think4  ,,socrates3   
,and do you really imagine1 ,meno1 that 
a man knows evils to be evils and       
desires them notwithstanding8  ,,meno3  
,certainly ,i do4  ,,socrates3 ,and     
desire is of possession8  ,,meno3 ,yes1 
of possession4  ,,socrates3 ,and does he
 think that the evils will do good to   
him who possesses them1 or does he know 
that they will do him harm8  ,,meno3    

,there are some who think that the evils
 will do them good1 and others who know 
that they will do them harm4            
,,socrates3 ,and1 in your opinion1 do   
those who think that they will do them  
good know that they are evils8  ,,meno3 
,certainly not4  ,,socrates3 ,is it not 
obvious that those who are ignorant of  
their nature do not desire them2 but    
they desire what they suppose to be     
goods although they are really evils2   
and if they are mistaken and suppose the
 evils to be goods they really desire   
goods8  ,,meno3 ,yes1 in that case4     
,,socrates3 ,well1 and do those who1 as 
you say1 desire evils1 and think that   
evils are hurtful to the possessor of   
them1 know that they will be hurt by    
them8  ,,meno3 ,they must know it4      
,,socrates3 ,and must they not suppose  
that those who are hurt are miserable in
 proportion to the hurt which is        
inflicted upon them8  ,,meno3 ,how can  
it be otherwise8  ,,socrates3 ,but are  
not the miserable ill-fated8  ,,meno3   

,yes1 indeed4  ,,socrates3 ,and does any
 one desire to be miserable and         
ill-fated8  ,,meno3 ,i should say not1  
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,but if there is
 no one who desires to be miserable1    
there is no one1 ,meno1 who desires     
evil2 for what is misery but the desire 
and possession of evil8  ,,meno3 ,that  
appears to be the truth1 ,socrates1 and 
,i admit that nobody desires evil4      
,,socrates3 ,and yet1 were you not      
saying just now that virtue is the      
desire and power of attaining good8     
,,meno3 ,yes1 ,i did say so4            
,,socrates3 ,but if this be affirmed1   
then the desire of good is common to    
all1 and one man is no better than      
another in that respect8  ,,meno3 ,true4
  ,,socrates3 ,and if one man is not    
better than another in desiring good1 he
 must be better in the power of         
attaining it8  ,,meno3 ,exactly4        
,,socrates3 ,then1 according to your    
definition1 virtue would appear to be   
the power of attaining good8  ,,meno3 ,i

 entirely approve1 ,socrates1 of the    
manner in which you now view this       
matter4  ,,socrates3 ,then let us see   
whether what you say is true from       
another point of view2 for very likely  
you may be right3--,you affirm virtue to
 be the power of attaining goods8       
,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and the     
goods which you mean are such as health 
and wealth and the possession of gold   
and silver1 and having office and honour
 in the state--those are what you would 
call goods8  ,,meno3 ,yes1 ,i should    
include all those4  ,,socrates3 ,then1  
according to ,meno1 who is the          
hereditary friend of the great king1    
virtue is the power of getting silver   
and gold2 and would you add that they   
must be gained piously1 justly1 or do   
you deem this to be of no consequence8  
,and is any mode of acquisition1 even if
 unjust and dishonest1 equally to be    
deemed virtue8  ,,meno3 ,not virtue1    
,socrates1 but vice4  ,,socrates3 ,then 
justice or temperance or holiness1 or   

some other part of virtue1 as would     
appear1 must accompany the acquisition1 
and without them the mere acquisition of
 good will not be virtue4  ,,meno3 ,why1
 how can there be virtue without these8 
,,socrates3 ,and the non-acquisition of 
gold and silver in a dishonest manner   
for oneself or another1 or in other     
words the want of them1 may be equally  
virtue8  ,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3    
,then the acquisition of such goods is  
no more virtue than the non-acquisition 
and want of them1 but whatever is       
accompanied by justice or honesty is    
virtue1 and whatever is devoid of       
justice is vice4  ,,meno3 ,it cannot be 
otherwise1 in my judgment4  ,,socrates3 
,and were we not saying just now that   
justice1 temperance1 and the like1 were 
each of them a part of virtue8  ,,meno3 
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and so1 ,meno1 this 
is the way in which you mock me4        
,,meno3 ,why do you say that1 ,socrates8
  ,,socrates3 ,why1 because ,i asked you
 to deliver virtue into my hands whole  

and unbroken1 and ,i gave you a pattern 
according to which you were to frame    
your answer2 and you have forgotten     
already1 and tell me that virtue is the 
power of attaining good justly1 or with 
justice2 and justice you acknowledge to 
be a part of virtue4  ,,meno3 ,yes4     
,,socrates3 ,then it follows from your  
own admissions1 that virtue is doing    
what you do with a part of virtue2 for  
justice and the like are said by you to 
be parts of virtue4  ,,meno3 ,what of   
that8  ,,socrates3 ,what of that6 ,why1 
did not ,i ask you to tell me the nature
 of virtue as a whole8 ,and you are very
 far from telling me this2 but declare  
every action to be virtue which is done 
with a part of virtue2 as though you had
 told me and ,i must already know the   
whole of virtue1 and this too when      
frittered away into little pieces4 ,and1
 therefore1 my dear ,meno1 ,i fear that 
,i must begin again and repeat the same 
question3 ,what is virtue8 for          
otherwise1 ,i can only say1 that every  

action done with a part of virtue is    
virtue2 what else is the meaning of     
saying that every action done with      
justice is virtue8 ,ought ,i not to ask 
the question over again2 for can any one
 who does not know virtue know a part of
 virtue8  ,,meno3 ,no2 ,i do not say    
that he can4  ,,socrates3 ,do you       
remember how1 in the example of figure1 
we rejected any answer given in terms   
which were as yet unexplained or        
unadmitted8  ,,meno3 ,yes1 ,socrates2   
and we were quite right in doing so4    
,,socrates3 ,but then1 my friend1 do not
 suppose that we can explain to any one 
the nature of virtue as a whole through 
some unexplained portion of virtue1 or  
anything at all in that fashion2 we     
should only have to ask over again the  
old question1 ,what is virtue8 ,am ,i   
not right8  ,,meno3 ,i believe that you 
are4  ,,socrates3 ,then begin again1 and
 answer me1 ,what1 according to you and 
your friend ,gorgias1 is the definition 
of virtue8  ,,meno3 ,o ,socrates1 ,i    

used to be told1 before ,i knew you1    
that you were always doubting yourself  
and making others doubt2 and now you are
 casting your spells over me1 and ,i am 
simply getting bewitched and enchanted1 
and am at my wits' end4 ,and if ,i may  
venture to make a jest upon you1 you    
seem to me both in your appearance and  
in your power over others to be very    
like the flat torpedo fish1 who         
torpifies those who come near him and   
touch him1 as you have now torpified me1
 ,i think4 ,for my soul and my tongue   
are really torpid1 and ,i do not know   
how to answer you2 and though ,i have   
been delivered of an infinite variety of
 speeches about virtue before now1 and  
to many persons--and very good ones they
 were1 as ,i thought--at this moment ,i 
cannot even say what virtue is4 ,and ,i 
think that you are very wise in not     
voyaging and going away from home1 for  
if you did in other places as you do in 
,athens1 you would be cast into prison  
as a magician4  ,,socrates3 ,you are a  

rogue1 ,meno1 and had all but caught me4
  ,,meno3 ,what do you mean1 ,socrates8 
,,socrates3 ,i can tell why you made a  
simile about me4  ,,meno3 ,why8         
,,socrates3 ,in order that ,i might make
 another simile about you4 ,for ,i know 
that all pretty young gentlemen like to 
have pretty similes made about them--as 
well they may--but ,i shall not return  
the compliment4 ,as to my being a       
torpedo1 if the torpedo is torpid as    
well as the cause of torpidity in       
others1 then indeed ,i am a torpedo1 but
 not otherwise2 for ,i perplex others1  
not because ,i am clear1 but because ,i 
am utterly perplexed myself4 ,and now ,i
 know not what virtue is1 and you seem  
to be in the same case1 although you did
 once perhaps know before you touched   
me4 ,however1 ,i have no objection to   
join with you in the enquiry4  ,,meno3  
,and how will you enquire1 ,socrates1   
into that which you do not know8 ,what  
will you put forth as the subject of    
enquiry8 ,and if you find what you want1

 how will you ever know that this is the
 thing which you did not know8          
,,socrates3 ,i know1 ,meno1 what you    
mean2 but just see what a tiresome      
dispute you are introducing4 ,you argue 
that a man cannot enquire either about  
that which he knows1 or about that which
 he does not know2 for if he knows1 he  
has no need to enquire2 and if not1 he  
cannot2 for he does not know the very   
subject about which he is to enquire    
7,compare ,aristot4 ,post4 ,anal474     
,,meno3 ,well1 ,socrates1 and is not the
 argument sound8  ,,socrates3 ,i think  
not4  ,,meno3 ,why not8  ,,socrates3 ,i 
will tell you why3 ,i have heard from   
certain wise men and women who spoke of 
things divine that--  ,,meno3 ,what did 
they say8  ,,socrates3 ,they spoke of a 
glorious truth1 as ,i conceive4  ,,meno3
 ,what was it8 and who were they8       
,,socrates3 ,some of them were priests  
and priestesses1 who had studied how    
they might be able to give a reason of  
their profession3 there have been poets 

also1 who spoke of these things by      
inspiration1 like ,pindar1 and many     
others who were inspired4 ,and they     
say--mark1 now1 and see whether their   
words are true--they say that the soul  
of man is immortal1 and at one time has 
an end1 which is termed dying1 and at   
another time is born again1 but is never
 destroyed4 ,and the moral is1 that a   
man ought to live always in perfect     
holiness4 ',for in the ninth year       
,persephone sends the souls of those    
from whom she has received the penalty  
of ancient crime back again from beneath
 into the light of the sun above1 and   
these are they who become noble kings   
and mighty men and great in wisdom and  
are called saintly heroes in after      
ages4' ,the soul1 then1 as being        
immortal1 and having been born again    
many times1 and having seen all things  
that exist1 whether in this world or in 
the world below1 has knowledge of them  
all2 and it is no wonder that she should
 be able to call to remembrance all that

 she ever knew about virtue1 and about  
everything2 for as all nature is akin1  
and the soul has learned all things2    
there is no difficulty in her eliciting 
or as men say learning1 out of a single 
recollection all the rest1 if a man is  
strenuous and does not faint2 for all   
enquiry and all learning is but         
recollection4 ,and therefore we ought   
not to listen to this sophistical       
argument about the impossibility of     
enquiry3 for it will make us idle2 and  
is sweet only to the sluggard2 but the  
other saying will make us active and    
inquisitive4 ,in that confiding1 ,i will
 gladly enquire with you into the nature
 of virtue4  ,,meno3 ,yes1 ,socrates2   
but what do you mean by saying that we  
do not learn1 and that what we call     
learning is only a process of           
recollection8 ,can you teach me how this
 is8  ,,socrates3 ,i told you1 ,meno1   
just now that you were a rogue1 and now 
you ask whether ,i can teach you1 when  
,i am saying that there is no teaching1 

but only recollection2 and thus you     
imagine that you will involve me in a   
contradiction4  ,,meno3 ,indeed1        
,socrates1 ,i protest that ,i had no    
such intention4 ,i only asked the       
question from habit2 but if you can     
prove to me that what you say is true1  
,i wish that you would4  ,,socrates3 ,it
 will be no easy matter1 but ,i will try
 to please you to the utmost of my      
power4 ,suppose that you call one of    
your numerous attendants1 that ,i may   
demonstrate on him4  ,,meno3 ,certainly4
 ,come hither1 boy4  ,,socrates3 ,he is 
,greek1 and speaks ,greek1 does he not8 
,,meno3 ,yes1 indeed2 he was born in the
 house4  ,,socrates3 ,attend now to the 
questions which ,i ask him1 and observe 
whether he learns of me or only         
remembers4  ,,meno3 ,i will4            
,,socrates3 ,tell me1 boy1 do you know  
that a figure like this is a square8    
,,boy3 ,i do4  ,,socrates3 ,and you know
 that a square figure has these four    
lines equal8  ,,boy3 ,certainly4        

,,socrates3 ,and these lines which ,i   
have drawn through the middle of the    
square are also equal8  ,,boy3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,a square may be of any     
size8  ,,boy3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and if one side of the figure be of two
 feet1 and the other side be of two     
feet1 how much will the whole be8 ,let  
me explain3 if in one direction the     
space was of two feet1 and in the other 
direction of one foot1 the whole would  
be of two feet taken once8  ,,boy3 ,yes4
  ,,socrates3 ,but since this side is   
also of two feet1 there are twice two   
feet8  ,,boy3 ,there are4  ,,socrates3  
,then the square is of twice two feet8  
,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and how many 
are twice two feet8 count and tell me4  
,,boy3 ,four1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3   
,and might there not be another square  
twice as large as this1 and having like 
this the lines equal8  ,,boy3 ,yes4     
,,socrates3 ,and of how many feet will  
that be8  ,,boy3 ,of eight feet4        
,,socrates3 ,and now try and tell me the

 length of the line which forms the side
 of that double square3 this is two     
feet--what will that be8  ,,boy3        
,clearly1 ,socrates1 it will be double4 
,,socrates3 ,do you observe1 ,meno1 that
 ,i am not teaching the boy anything1   
but only asking him questions2 and now  
he fancies that he knows how long a line
 is necessary in order to produce a     
figure of eight square feet2 does he    
not8  ,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
does he really know8  ,,meno3 ,certainly
 not4  ,,socrates3 ,he only guesses that
 because the square is double1 the line 
is double4  ,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 
,observe him while he recalls the steps 
in regular order4 7,to the ,boy37 ,tell 
me1 boy1 do you assert that a double    
space comes from a double line8         
,remember that ,i am not speaking of an 
oblong1 but of a figure equal every way1
 and twice the size of this--that is to 
say of eight feet2 and ,i want to know  
whether you still say that a double     
square comes from double line8  ,,boy3  

,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,but does not this   
line become doubled if we add another   
such line here8  ,,boy3 ,certainly4     
,,socrates3 ,and four such lines will   
make a space containing eight feet8     
,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,let us       
describe such a figure3 ,would you not  
say that this is the figure of eight    
feet8  ,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
are there not these four divisions in   
the figure1 each of which is equal to   
the figure of four feet8  ,,boy3 ,true4 
,,socrates3 ,and is not that four times 
four8  ,,boy3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3  
,and four times is not double8  ,,boy3  
,no1 indeed4  ,,socrates3 ,but how much8
  ,,boy3 ,four times as much4           
,,socrates3 ,therefore the double line1 
boy1 has given a space1 not twice1 but  
four times as much4  ,,boy3 ,true4      
,,socrates3 ,four times four are        
sixteen--are they not8  ,,boy3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,what line would give you a 
space of eight feet1 as this gives one  
of sixteen feet2--do you see8  ,,boy3   

,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and the space of    
four feet is made from this half line8  
,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,good2 and is 
not a space of eight feet twice the size
 of this1 and half the size of the      
other8  ,,boy3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 
,such a space1 then1 will be made out of
 a line greater than this one1 and less 
than that one8  ,,boy3 ,yes2 ,i think   
so4  ,,socrates3 ,very good2 ,i like to 
hear you say what you think4 ,and now   
tell me1 is not this a line of two feet 
and that of four8  ,,boy3 ,yes4         
,,socrates3 ,then the line which forms  
the side of eight feet ought to be more 
than this line of two feet1 and less    
than the other of four feet8  ,,boy3 ,it
 ought4  ,,socrates3 ,try and see if you
 can tell me how much it will be4       
,,boy3 ,three feet4  ,,socrates3 ,then  
if we add a half to this line of two1   
that will be the line of three4 ,here   
are two and there is one2 and on the    
other side1 here are two also and there 
is one3 and that makes the figure of    

which you speak8  ,,boy3 ,yes4          
,,socrates3 ,but if there are three feet
 this way and three feet that way1 the  
whole space will be three times three   
feet8  ,,boy3 ,that is evident4         
,,socrates3 ,and how much are three     
times three feet8  ,,boy3 ,nine4        
,,socrates3 ,and how much is the double 
of four8  ,,boy3 ,eight4  ,,socrates3   
,then the figure of eight is not made   
out of a line of three8  ,,boy3 ,no4    
,,socrates3 ,but from what line8--tell  
me exactly2 and if you would rather not 
reckon1 try and show me the line4       
,,boy3 ,indeed1 ,socrates1 ,i do not    
know4  ,,socrates3 ,do you see1 ,meno1  
what advances he has made in his power  
of recollection8 ,he did not know at    
first1 and he does not know now1 what is
 the side of a figure of eight feet3 but
 then he thought that he knew1 and      
answered confidently as if he knew1 and 
had no difficulty2 now he has a         
difficulty1 and neither knows nor       
fancies that he knows4  ,,meno3 ,true4  

,,socrates3 ,is he not better off in    
knowing his ignorance8  ,,meno3 ,i think
 that he is4  ,,socrates3 ,if we have   
made him doubt1 and given him the       
'torpedo's shock1' have we done him any 
harm8  ,,meno3 ,i think not4            
,,socrates3 ,we have certainly1 as would
 seem1 assisted him in some degree to   
the discovery of the truth2 and now he  
will wish to remedy his ignorance1 but  
then he would have been ready to tell   
all the world again and again that the  
double space should have a double side4 
,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,but do you 
suppose that he would ever have enquired
 into or learned what he fancied that he
 knew1 though he was really ignorant of 
it1 until he had fallen into perplexity 
under the idea that he did not know1 and
 had desired to know8  ,,meno3 ,i think 
not1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,then he   
was the better for the torpedo's touch8 
,,meno3 ,i think so4  ,,socrates3 ,mark 
now the farther development4 ,i shall   
only ask him1 and not teach him1 and he 

shall share the enquiry with me3 and do 
you watch and see if you find me telling
 or explaining anything to him1 instead 
of eliciting his opinion4 ,tell me1 boy1
 is not this a square of four feet which
 ,i have drawn8  ,,boy3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,and now ,i add another     
square equal to the former one8  ,,boy3 
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and a third1 which  
is equal to either of them8  ,,boy3     
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,suppose that we fill
 up the vacant corner8  ,,boy3 ,very    
good4  ,,socrates3 ,here1 then1 there   
are four equal spaces8  ,,boy3 ,yes4    
,,socrates3 ,and how many times larger  
is this space than this other8  ,,boy3  
,four times4  ,,socrates3 ,but it ought 
to have been twice only1 as you will    
remember4  ,,boy3 ,true4  ,,socrates3   
,and does not this line1 reaching from  
corner to corner1 bisect each of these  
spaces8  ,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and 
are there not here four equal lines     
which contain this space8  ,,boy3 ,there
 are4  ,,socrates3 ,look and see how    

much this space is4  ,,boy3 ,i do not   
understand4  ,,socrates3 ,has not each  
interior line cut off half of the four  
spaces8  ,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and 
how many spaces are there in this       
section8  ,,boy3 ,four4  ,,socrates3    
,and how many in this8  ,,boy3 ,two4    
,,socrates3 ,and four is how many times 
two8  ,,boy3 ,twice4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
this space is of how many feet8  ,,boy3 
,of eight feet4  ,,socrates3 ,and from  
what line do you get this figure8       
,,boy3 ,from this4  ,,socrates3 ,that   
is1 from the line which extends from    
corner to corner of the figure of four  
feet8  ,,boy3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
that is the line which the learned call 
the diagonal4 ,and if this is the proper
 name1 then you1 ,meno's slave1 are     
prepared to affirm that the double space
 is the square of the diagonal8  ,,boy3 
,certainly1 ,socrates4  ,,socrates3     
,what do you say of him1 ,meno8 ,were   
not all these answers given out of his  
own head8  ,,meno3 ,yes1 they were all  

his own4  ,,socrates3 ,and yet1 as we   
were just now saying1 he did not know8  
,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,but still  
he had in him those notions of his--had 
he not8  ,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3     
,then he who does not know may still    
have true notions of that which he does 
not know8  ,,meno3 ,he has4  ,,socrates3
 ,and at present these notions have just
 been stirred up in him1 as in a dream2 
but if he were frequently asked the same
 questions1 in different forms1 he would
 know as well as any one at last8       
,,meno3 ,i dare say4  ,,socrates3       
,without any one teaching him he will   
recover his knowledge for himself1 if he
 is only asked questions8  ,,meno3 ,yes4
  ,,socrates3 ,and this spontaneous     
recovery of knowledge in him is         
recollection8  ,,meno3 ,true4           
,,socrates3 ,and this knowledge which he
 now has must he not either have        
acquired or always possessed8  ,,meno3  
,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,but if he always    
possessed this knowledge he would always

 have known2 or if he has acquired the  
knowledge he could not have acquired it 
in this life1 unless he has been taught 
geometry2 for he may be made to do the  
same with all geometry and every other  
branch of knowledge4 ,now1 has any one  
ever taught him all this8 ,you must know
 about him1 if1 as you say1 he was born 
and bred in your house4  ,,meno3 ,and ,i
 am certain that no one ever did teach  
him4  ,,socrates3 ,and yet he has the   
knowledge8  ,,meno3 ,the fact1          
,socrates1 is undeniable4  ,,socrates3  
,but if he did not acquire the knowledge
 in this life1 then he must have had and
 learned it at some other time8  ,,meno3
 ,clearly he must4  ,,socrates3 ,which  
must have been the time when he was not 
a man8  ,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and 
if there have been always true thoughts 
in him1 both at the time when he was and
 was not a man1 which only need to be   
awakened into knowledge by putting      
questions to him1 his soul must have    
always possessed this knowledge1 for he 

always either was or was not a man8     
,,meno3 ,obviously4  ,,socrates3 ,and if
 the truth of all things always existed 
in the soul1 then the soul is immortal4 
,wherefore be of good cheer1 and try to 
recollect what you do not know1 or      
rather what you do not remember4        
,,meno3 ,i feel1 somehow1 that ,i like  
what you are saying4  ,,socrates3 ,and  
,i1 ,meno1 like what ,i am saying4 ,some
 things ,i have said of which ,i am not 
altogether confident4 ,but that we shall
 be better and braver and less helpless 
if we think that we ought to enquire1   
than we should have been if we indulged 
in the idle fancy that there was no     
knowing and no use in seeking to know   
what we do not know2--that is a theme   
upon which ,i am ready to fight1 in word
 and deed1 to the utmost of my power4   
,,meno3 ,there again1 ,socrates1 your   
words seem to me excellent4  ,,socrates3
 ,then1 as we are agreed that a man     
should enquire about that which he does 
not know1 shall you and ,i make an      

effort to enquire together into the     
nature of virtue8  ,,meno3 ,by all      
means1 ,socrates4 ,and yet ,i would much
 rather return to my original question1 
,whether in seeking to acquire virtue we
 should regard it as a thing to be      
taught1 or as a gift of nature1 or as   
coming to men in some other way8        
,,socrates3 ,had ,i the command of you  
as well as of myself1 ,meno1 ,i would   
not have enquired whether virtue is     
given by instruction or not1 until we   
had first ascertained 'what it is4' ,but
 as you think only of controlling me who
 am your slave1 and never of controlling
 yourself1--such being your notion of   
freedom1 ,i must yield to you1 for you  
are irresistible4 ,and therefore ,i have
 now to enquire into the qualities of a 
thing of which ,i do not as yet know the
 nature4 ,at any rate1 will you         
condescend a little1 and allow the      
question ',whether virtue is given by   
instruction1 or in any other way1' to be
 argued upon hypothesis8 ,as the        

geometrician1 when he is asked whether a
 certain triangle is capable being      
inscribed in a certain circle 7,or1     
whether a certain area is capable of    
being inscribed as a triangle in a      
certain circle471 will reply3 ',i cannot
 tell you as yet2 but ,i will offer a   
hypothesis which may assist us in       
forming a conclusion3 ,if the figure be 
such that when you have produced a given
 side of it 7,or1 when you apply it to  
the given line1 i4e4 the diameter of the
 circle 7autou7471 the given area of the
 triangle falls short by an area        
corresponding to the part produced 7,or1
 similar to the area so applied471 then 
one consequence follows1 and if this is 
impossible then some other2 and         
therefore ,i wish to assume a hypothesis
 before ,i tell you whether this        
triangle is capable of being inscribed  
in the circle'3--that is a geometrical  
hypothesis4 ,and we too1 as we know not 
the nature and qualities of virtue1 must
 ask1 whether virtue is or is not       

taught1 under a hypothesis3 as thus1 if 
virtue is of such a class of mental     
goods1 will it be taught or not8 ,let   
the first hypothesis be that virtue is  
or is not knowledge1--in that case will 
it be taught or not8 or1 as we were just
 now saying1 'remembered'8 ,for there is
 no use in disputing about the name4    
,but is virtue taught or not8 or rather1
 does not every one see that knowledge  
alone is taught8  ,,meno3 ,i agree4     
,,socrates3 ,then if virtue is          
knowledge1 virtue will be taught8       
,,meno3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,then  
now we have made a quick end of this    
question3 if virtue is of such a nature1
 it will be taught2 and if not1 not8    
,,meno3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,the   
next question is1 whether virtue is     
knowledge or of another species8        
,,meno3 ,yes1 that appears to be the    
question which comes next in order4     
,,socrates3 ,do we not say that virtue  
is a good8--,this is a hypothesis which 
is not set aside4  ,,meno3 ,certainly4  

,,socrates3 ,now1 if there be any sort  
of good which is distinct from          
knowledge1 virtue may be that good2 but 
if knowledge embraces all good1 then we 
shall be right in thinking that virtue  
is knowledge8  ,,meno3 ,true4           
,,socrates3 ,and virtue makes us good8  
,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and if we   
are good1 then we are profitable2 for   
all good things are profitable8  ,,meno3
 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,then virtue is     
profitable8  ,,meno3 ,that is the only  
inference4  ,,socrates3 ,then now let us
 see what are the things which severally
 profit us4 ,health and strength1 and   
beauty and wealth--these1 and the like  
of these1 we call profitable8  ,,meno3  
,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and yet these      
things may also sometimes do us harm3   
would you not think so8  ,,meno3 ,yes4  
,,socrates3 ,and what is the guiding    
principle which makes them profitable or
 the reverse8 ,are they not profitable  
when they are rightly used1 and hurtful 
when they are not rightly used8  ,,meno3

 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,next1 let us 
consider the goods of the soul3 they are
 temperance1 justice1 courage1 quickness
 of apprehension1 memory1 magnanimity1  
and the like8  ,,meno3 ,surely4         
,,socrates3 ,and such of these as are   
not knowledge1 but of another sort1 are 
sometimes profitable and sometimes      
hurtful2 as1 for example1 courage       
wanting prudence1 which is only a sort  
of confidence8 ,when a man has no sense 
he is harmed by courage1 but when he has
 sense he is profited8  ,,meno3 ,true4  
,,socrates3 ,and the same may be said of
 temperance and quickness of            
apprehension2 whatever things are       
learned or done with sense are          
profitable1 but when done without sense 
they are hurtful8  ,,meno3 ,very true4  
,,socrates3 ,and in general1 all that   
the soul attempts or endures1 when under
 the guidance of wisdom1 ends in        
happiness2 but when she is under the    
guidance of folly1 in the opposite8     
,,meno3 ,that appears to be true4       

,,socrates3 ,if then virtue is a quality
 of the soul1 and is admitted to be     
profitable1 it must be wisdom or        
prudence1 since none of the things of   
the soul are either profitable or       
hurtful in themselves1 but they are all 
made profitable or hurtful by the       
addition of wisdom or of folly2 and     
therefore if virtue is profitable1      
virtue must be a sort of wisdom or      
prudence8  ,,meno3 ,i quite agree4      
,,socrates3 ,and the other goods1 such  
as wealth and the like1 of which we were
 just now saying that they are sometimes
 good and sometimes evil1 do not they   
also become profitable or hurtful1      
accordingly as the soul guides and uses 
them rightly or wrongly2 just as the    
things of the soul herself are benefited
 when under the guidance of wisdom and  
harmed by folly8  ,,meno3 ,true4        
,,socrates3 ,and the wise soul guides   
them rightly1 and the foolish soul      
wrongly4  ,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3    
,and is not this universally true of    

human nature8 ,all other things hang    
upon the soul1 and the things of the    
soul herself hang upon wisdom1 if they  
are to be good2 and so wisdom is        
inferred to be that which profits--and  
virtue1 as we say1 is profitable8       
,,meno3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
thus we arrive at the conclusion that   
virtue is either wholly or partly       
wisdom8  ,,meno3 ,i think that what you 
are saying1 ,socrates1 is very true4    
,,socrates3 ,but if this is true1 then  
the good are not by nature good8        
,,meno3 ,i think not4  ,,socrates3 ,if  
they had been1 there would assuredly    
have been discerners of characters among
 us who would have known our future     
great men2 and on their showing we      
should have adopted them1 and when we   
had got them1 we should have kept them  
in the citadel out of the way of harm1  
and set a stamp upon them far rather    
than upon a piece of gold1 in order that
 no one might tamper with them2 and when
 they grew up they would have been      

useful to the state8  ,,meno3 ,yes1     
,socrates1 that would have been the     
right way4  ,,socrates3 ,but if the good
 are not by nature good1 are they made  
good by instruction8  ,,meno3 ,there    
appears to be no other alternative1     
,socrates4 ,on the supposition that     
virtue is knowledge1 there can be no    
doubt that virtue is taught4            
,,socrates3 ,yes1 indeed2 but what if   
the supposition is erroneous8  ,,meno3  
,i certainly thought just now that we   
were right4  ,,socrates3 ,yes1 ,meno2   
but a principle which has any soundness 
should stand firm not only just now1 but
 always4  ,,meno3 ,well2 and why are you
 so slow of heart to believe that       
knowledge is virtue8  ,,socrates3 ,i    
will try and tell you why1 ,meno4 ,i do 
not retract the assertion that if virtue
 is knowledge it may be taught2 but ,i  
fear that ,i have some reason in        
doubting whether virtue is knowledge3   
for consider now and say whether virtue1
 and not only virtue but anything that  

is taught1 must not have teachers and   
disciples8  ,,meno3 ,surely4            
,,socrates3 ,and conversely1 may not the
 art of which neither teachers nor      
disciples exist be assumed to be        
incapable of being taught8  ,,meno3     
,true2 but do you think that there are  
no teachers of virtue8  ,,socrates3 ,i  
have certainly often enquired whether   
there were any1 and taken great pains to
 find them1 and have never succeeded2   
and many have assisted me in the search1
 and they were the persons whom ,i      
thought the most likely to know4 ,here  
at the moment when he is wanted we      
fortunately have sitting by us ,anytus1 
the very person of whom we should make  
enquiry2 to him then let us repair4 ,in 
the first place1 he is the son of a     
wealthy and wise father1 ,anthemion1 who
 acquired his wealth1 not by accident or
 gift1 like ,ismenias the ,theban 7who  
has recently made himself as rich as    
,polycrates71 but by his own skill and  
industry1 and who is a well-conditioned1

 modest man1 not insolent1 or           
overbearing1 or annoying2 moreover1 this
 son of his has received a good         
education1 as the ,athenian people      
certainly appear to think1 for they     
choose him to fill the highest offices4 
,and these are the sort of men from whom
 you are likely to learn whether there  
are any teachers of virtue1 and who they
 are4 ,please1 ,anytus1 to help me and  
your friend ,meno in answering our      
question1 ,who are the teachers8        
,consider the matter thus3 ,if we wanted
 ,meno to be a good physician1 to whom  
should we send him8 ,should we not send 
him to the physicians8  ,,anytus3       
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,or if we      
wanted him to be a good cobbler1 should 
we not send him to the cobblers8        
,,anytus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and so    
forth8  ,,anytus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3    
,let me trouble you with one more       
question4 ,when we say that we should be
 right in sending him to the physicians 
if we wanted him to be a physician1 do  

we mean that we should be right in      
sending him to those who profess the    
art1 rather than to those who do not1   
and to those who demand payment for     
teaching the art1 and profess to teach  
it to any one who will come and learn8  
,and if these were our reasons1 should  
we not be right in sending him8         
,,anytus3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and might 
not the same be said of flute-playing1  
and of the other arts8 ,would a man who 
wanted to make another a flute-player   
refuse to send him to those who profess 
to teach the art for money1 and be      
plaguing other persons to give him      
instruction1 who are not professed      
teachers and who never had a single     
disciple in that branch of knowledge    
which he wishes him to acquire--would   
not such conduct be the height of folly8
  ,,anytus3 ,yes1 by ,zeus1 and of      
ignorance too4  ,,socrates3 ,very good4 
,and now you are in a position to advise
 with me about my friend ,meno4 ,he has 
been telling me1 ,anytus1 that he       

desires to attain that kind of wisdom   
and virtue by which men order the state 
or the house1 and honour their parents1 
and know when to receive and when to    
send away citizens and strangers1 as a  
good man should4 ,now1 to whom should he
 go in order that he may learn this     
virtue8 ,does not the previous argument 
imply clearly that we should send him to
 those who profess and avouch that they 
are the common teachers of all ,hellas1 
and are ready to impart instruction to  
any one who likes1 at a fixed price8    
,,anytus3 ,whom do you mean1 ,socrates8 
,,socrates3 ,you surely know1 do you    
not1 ,anytus1 that these are the people 
whom mankind call ,sophists8  ,,anytus3 
,by ,heracles1 ,socrates1 forbear6 ,i   
only hope that no friend or kinsman or  
acquaintance of mine1 whether citizen or
 stranger1 will ever be so mad as to    
allow himself to be corrupted by them2  
for they are a manifest pest and        
corrupting influence to those who have  
to do with them4  ,,socrates3 ,what1    

,anytus8 ,of all the people who profess 
that they know how to do men good1 do   
you mean to say that these are the only 
ones who not only do them no good1 but  
positively corrupt those who are        
entrusted to them1 and in return for    
this disservice have the face to demand 
money8 ,indeed1 ,i cannot believe you2  
for ,i know of a single man1            
,protagoras1 who made more out of his   
craft than the illustrious ,pheidias1   
who created such noble works1 or any ten
 other statuaries4 ,how could that be8  
,a mender of old shoes1 or patcher up of
 clothes1 who made the shoes or clothes 
worse than he received them1 could not  
have remained thirty days undetected1   
and would very soon have starved2       
whereas during more than forty years1   
,protagoras was corrupting all ,hellas1 
and sending his disciples from him worse
 than he received them1 and he was never
 found out4 ,for1 if ,i am not mistaken1
 he was about seventy years old at his  
death1 forty of which were spent in the 

practice of his profession2 and during  
all that time he had a good reputation1 
which to this day he retains3 and not   
only ,protagoras1 but many others are   
well spoken of2 some who lived before   
him1 and others who are still living4   
,now1 when you say that they deceived   
and corrupted the youth1 are they to be 
supposed to have corrupted them         
consciously or unconsciously8 ,can those
 who were deemed by many to be the      
wisest men of ,hellas have been out of  
their minds8  ,,anytus3 ,out of their   
minds6 ,no1 ,socrates2 the young men who
 gave their money to them were out of   
their minds1 and their relations and    
guardians who entrusted their youth to  
the care of these men were still more   
out of their minds1 and most of all1 the
 cities who allowed them to come in1 and
 did not drive them out1 citizen and    
stranger alike4  ,,socrates3 ,has any of
 the ,sophists wronged you1 ,anytus8    
,what makes you so angry with them8     
,,anytus3 ,no1 indeed1 neither ,i nor   

any of my belongings has ever had1 nor  
would ,i suffer them to have1 anything  
to do with them4  ,,socrates3 ,then you 
are entirely unacquainted with them8    
,,anytus3 ,and ,i have no wish to be    
acquainted4  ,,socrates3 ,then1 my dear 
friend1 how can you know whether a thing
 is good or bad of which you are wholly 
ignorant8  ,,anytus3 ,quite well2 ,i am 
sure that ,i know what manner of men    
these are1 whether ,i am acquainted with
 them or not4  ,,socrates3 ,you must be 
a diviner1 ,anytus1 for ,i really cannot
 make out1 judging from your own words1 
how1 if you are not acquainted with     
them1 you know about them4 ,but ,i am   
not enquiring of you who are the        
teachers who will corrupt ,meno 7let    
them be1 if you please1 the ,sophists72 
,i only ask you to tell him who there is
 in this great city who will teach him  
how to become eminent in the virtues    
which ,i was just now describing4 ,he is
 the friend of your family1 and you will
 oblige him4  ,,anytus3 ,why do you not 

tell him yourself8  ,,socrates3 ,i have 
told him whom ,i supposed to be the     
teachers of these things2 but ,i learn  
from you that ,i am utterly at fault1   
and ,i dare say that you are right4 ,and
 now ,i wish that you1 on your part1    
would tell me to whom among the         
,athenians he should go4 ,whom would you
 name8  ,,anytus3 ,why single out       
individuals8 ,any ,athenian gentleman1  
taken at random1 if he will mind him1   
will do far more good to him than the   
,sophists4  ,,socrates3 ,and did those  
gentlemen grow of themselves2 and       
without having been taught by any one1  
were they nevertheless able to teach    
others that which they had never learned
 themselves8  ,,anytus3 ,i imagine that 
they learned of the previous generation 
of gentlemen4 ,have there not been many 
good men in this city8  ,,socrates3     
,yes1 certainly1 ,anytus2 and many good 
statesmen also there always have been   
and there are still1 in the city of     
,athens4 ,but the question is whether   

they were also good teachers of their   
own virtue2--not whether there are1 or  
have been1 good men in this part of the 
world1 but whether virtue can be taught1
 is the question which we have been     
discussing4 ,now1 do we mean to say that
 the good men of our own and of other   
times knew how to impart to others that 
virtue which they had themselves2 or is 
virtue a thing incapable of being       
communicated or imparted by one man to  
another8 ,that is the question which ,i 
and ,meno have been arguing4 ,look at   
the matter in your own way3 ,would you  
not admit that ,themistocles was a good 
man8  ,,anytus3 ,certainly2 no man      
better4  ,,socrates3 ,and must not he   
then have been a good teacher1 if any   
man ever was a good teacher1 of his own 
virtue8  ,,anytus3 ,yes certainly1--if  
he wanted to be so4  ,,socrates3 ,but   
would he not have wanted8 ,he would1 at 
any rate1 have desired to make his own  
son a good man and a gentleman2 he could
 not have been jealous of him1 or have  

intentionally abstained from imparting  
to him his own virtue4 ,did you never   
hear that he made his son ,cleophantus a
 famous horseman2 and had him taught to 
stand upright on horseback and hurl a   
javelin1 and to do many other marvellous
 things2 and in anything which could be 
learned from a master he was well       
trained8 ,have you not heard from our   
elders of him8  ,,anytus3 ,i have4      
,,socrates3 ,then no one could say that 
his son showed any want of capacity8    
,,anytus3 ,very likely not4  ,,socrates3
 ,but did any one1 old or young1 ever   
say in your hearing that ,cleophantus1  
son of ,themistocles1 was a wise or good
 man1 as his father was8  ,,anytus3 ,i  
have certainly never heard any one say  
so4  ,,socrates3 ,and if virtue could   
have been taught1 would his father      
,themistocles have sought to train him  
in these minor accomplishments1 and     
allowed him who1 as you must remember1  
was his own son1 to be no better than   
his neighbours in those qualities in    

which he himself excelled8  ,,anytus3   
,indeed1 indeed1 ,i think not4          
,,socrates3 ,here was a teacher of      
virtue whom you admit to be among the   
best men of the past4 ,let us take      
another1--,aristides1 the son of        
,lysimachus3 would you not acknowledge  
that he was a good man8  ,,anytus3 ,to  
be sure ,i should4  ,,socrates3 ,and did
 not he train his son ,lysimachus better
 than any other ,athenian in all that   
could be done for him by the help of    
masters8 ,but what has been the result8 
,is he a bit better than any other      
mortal8 ,he is an acquaintance of yours1
 and you see what he is like4 ,there is 
,pericles1 again1 magnificent in his    
wisdom2 and he1 as you are aware1 had   
two sons1 ,paralus and ,xanthippus4     
,,anytus3 ,i know4  ,,socrates3 ,and you
 know1 also1 that he taught them to be  
unrivalled horsemen1 and had them       
trained in music and gymnastics and all 
sorts of arts--in these respects they   
were on a level with the best--and had  

he no wish to make good men of them8    
,nay1 he must have wished it4 ,but      
virtue1 as ,i suspect1 could not be     
taught4 ,and that you may not suppose   
the incompetent teachers to be only the 
meaner sort of ,athenians and few in    
number1 remember again that ,thucydides 
had two sons1 ,melesias and ,stephanus1 
whom1 besides giving them a good        
education in other things1 he trained in
 wrestling1 and they were the best      
wrestlers in ,athens3 one of them he    
committed to the care of ,xanthias1 and 
the other of ,eudorus1 who had the      
reputation of being the most celebrated 
wrestlers of that day4 ,do you remember 
them8  ,,anytus3 ,i have heard of them4 
,,socrates3 ,now1 can there be a doubt  
that ,thucydides1 whose children were   
taught things for which he had to spend 
money1 would have taught them to be good
 men1 which would have cost him nothing1
 if virtue could have been taught8 ,will
 you reply that he was a mean man1 and  
had not many friends among the          

,athenians and allies8 ,nay1 but he was 
of a great family1 and a man of         
influence at ,athens and in all ,hellas1
 and1 if virtue could have been taught1 
he would have found out some ,athenian  
or foreigner who would have made good   
men of his sons1 if he could not himself
 spare the time from cares of state4    
,once more1 ,i suspect1 friend ,anytus1 
that virtue is not a thing which can be 
taught8  ,,anytus3 ,socrates1 ,i think  
that you are too ready to speak evil of 
men3 and1 if you will take my advice1 ,i
 would recommend you to be careful4     
,perhaps there is no city in which it is
 not easier to do men harm than to do   
them good1 and this is certainly the    
case at ,athens1 as ,i believe that you 
know4  ,,socrates3 ,o ,meno1 think that 
,anytus is in a rage4 ,and he may well  
be in a rage1 for he thinks1 in the     
first place1 that ,i am defaming these  
gentlemen2 and in the second place1 he  
is of opinion that he is one of them    
himself4 ,but some day he will know what

 is the meaning of defamation1 and if he
 ever does1 he will forgive me4         
,meanwhile ,i will return to you1 ,meno2
 for ,i suppose that there are gentlemen
 in your region too8  ,,meno3 ,certainly
 there are4  ,,socrates3 ,and are they  
willing to teach the young8 and do they 
profess to be teachers8 and do they     
agree that virtue is taught8  ,,meno3   
,no indeed1 ,socrates1 they are anything
 but agreed2 you may hear them saying at
 one time that virtue can be taught1 and
 then again the reverse4  ,,socrates3   
,can we call those teachers who do not  
acknowledge the possibility of their own
 vocation8  ,,meno3 ,i think not1       
,socrates4  ,,socrates3 ,and what do you
 think of these ,sophists1 who are the  
only professors8 ,do they seem to you to
 be teachers of virtue8  ,,meno3 ,i     
often wonder1 ,socrates1 that ,gorgias  
is never heard promising to teach       
virtue3 and when he hears others        
promising he only laughs at them2 but he
 thinks that men should be taught to    

speak4  ,,socrates3 ,then do you not    
think that the ,sophists are teachers8  
,,meno3 ,i cannot tell you1 ,socrates2  
like the rest of the world1 ,i am in    
doubt1 and sometimes ,i think that they 
are teachers and sometimes not4         
,,socrates3 ,and are you aware that not 
you only and other politicians have     
doubts whether virtue can be taught or  
not1 but that ,theognis the poet says   
the very same thing8  ,,meno3 ,where    
does he say so8  ,,socrates3 ,in these  
elegiac verses 7,theog473  ',eat and    
drink and sit with the mighty1 and make 
yourself agreeable to them2 for from the
 good you will learn what is good1 but  
if you mix with the bad you will lose   
the intelligence which you already      
have4'  ,do you observe that here he    
seems to imply that virtue can be       
taught8  ,,meno3 ,clearly4  ,,socrates3 
,but in some other verses he shifts     
about and says 7,theog473  ',if         
understanding could be created and put  
into a man1 then they' 7who were able to

 perform this feat7 'would have obtained
 great rewards4'  ,and again3--  ',never
 would a bad son have sprung from a good
 sire1 for he would have heard the voice
 of instruction2 but not by teaching    
will you ever make a bad man into a good
 one4'  ,and this1 as you may remark1 is
 a contradiction of the other4  ,,meno3 
,clearly4  ,,socrates3 ,and is there    
anything else of which the professors   
are affirmed not only not to be teachers
 of others1 but to be ignorant          
themselves1 and bad at the knowledge of 
that which they are professing to teach8
 or is there anything about which even  
the acknowledged 'gentlemen' are        
sometimes saying that 'this thing can be
 taught1' and sometimes the opposite8   
,can you say that they are teachers in  
any true sense whose ideas are in such  
confusion8  ,,meno3 ,i should say1      
certainly not4  ,,socrates3 ,but if     
neither the ,sophists nor the gentlemen 
are teachers1 clearly there can be no   
other teachers8  ,,meno3 ,no4           

,,socrates3 ,and if there are no        
teachers1 neither are there disciples8  
,,meno3 ,agreed4  ,,socrates3 ,and we   
have admitted that a thing cannot be    
taught of which there are neither       
teachers nor disciples8  ,,meno3 ,we    
have4  ,,socrates3 ,and there are no    
teachers of virtue to be found anywhere8
  ,,meno3 ,there are not4  ,,socrates3  
,and if there are no teachers1 neither  
are there scholars8  ,,meno3 ,that1 ,i  
think1 is true4  ,,socrates3 ,then      
virtue cannot be taught8  ,,meno3 ,not  
if we are right in our view4 ,but ,i    
cannot believe1 ,socrates1 that there   
are no good men3 ,and if there are1 how 
did they come into existence8           
,,socrates3 ,i am afraid1 ,meno1 that   
you and ,i are not good for much1 and   
that ,gorgias has been as poor an       
educator of you as ,prodicus has been of
 me4 ,certainly we shall have to look to
 ourselves1 and try to find some one who
 will help in some way or other to      
improve us4 ,this ,i say1 because ,i    

observe that in the previous discussion 
none of us remarked that right and good 
action is possible to man under other   
guidance than that of knowledge         
7episteme72--and indeed if this be      
denied1 there is no seeing how there can
 be any good men at all4  ,,meno3 ,how  
do you mean1 ,socrates8  ,,socrates3 ,i 
mean that good men are necessarily      
useful or profitable4 ,were we not right
 in admitting this8 ,it must be so4     
,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and in      
supposing that they will be useful only 
if they are true guides to us of        
action--there we were also right8       
,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,but when we 
said that a man cannot be a good guide  
unless he have knowledge 7phrhonesis71  
this we were wrong4  ,,meno3 ,what do   
you mean by the word 'right'8           
,,socrates3 ,i will explain4 ,if a man  
knew the way to ,larisa1 or anywhere    
else1 and went to the place and led     
others thither1 would he not be a right 
and good guide8  ,,meno3 ,certainly4    

,,socrates3 ,and a person who had a     
right opinion about the way1 but had    
never been and did not know1 might be a 
good guide also1 might he not8  ,,meno3 
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and while he  
has true opinion about that which the   
other knows1 he will be just as good a  
guide if he thinks the truth1 as he who 
knows the truth8  ,,meno3 ,exactly4     
,,socrates3 ,then true opinion is as    
good a guide to correct action as       
knowledge2 and that was the point which 
we omitted in our speculation about the 
nature of virtue1 when we said that     
knowledge only is the guide of right    
action2 whereas there is also right     
opinion4  ,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3   
,then right opinion is not less useful  
than knowledge8  ,,meno3 ,the           
difference1 ,socrates1 is only that he  
who has knowledge will always be right2 
but he who has right opinion will       
sometimes be right1 and sometimes not4  
,,socrates3 ,what do you mean8 ,can he  
be wrong who has right opinion1 so long 

as he has right opinion8  ,,meno3 ,i    
admit the cogency of your argument1 and 
therefore1 ,socrates1 ,i wonder that    
knowledge should be preferred to right  
opinion--or why they should ever differ4
  ,,socrates3 ,and shall ,i explain this
 wonder to you8  ,,meno3 ,do tell me4   
,,socrates3 ,you would not wonder if you
 had ever observed the images of        
,daedalus 7,compare ,euthyphro72 but    
perhaps you have not got them in your   
country8  ,,meno3 ,what have they to do 
with the question8  ,,socrates3 ,because
 they require to be fastened in order to
 keep them1 and if they are not fastened
 they will play truant and run away4    
,,meno3 ,well1 what of that8            
,,socrates3 ,i mean to say that they are
 not very valuable possessions if they  
are at liberty1 for they will walk off  
like runaway slaves2 but when fastened1 
they are of great value1 for they are   
really beautiful works of art4 ,now this
 is an illustration of the nature of    
true opinions3 while they abide with us 

they are beautiful and fruitful1 but    
they run away out of the human soul1 and
 do not remain long1 and therefore they 
are not of much value until they are    
fastened by the tie of the cause2 and   
this fastening of them1 friend ,meno1 is
 recollection1 as you and ,i have agreed
 to call it4 ,but when they are bound1  
in the first place1 they have the nature
 of knowledge2 and1 in the second place1
 they are abiding4 ,and this is why     
knowledge is more honourable and        
excellent than true opinion1 because    
fastened by a chain4  ,,meno3 ,what you 
are saying1 ,socrates1 seems to be very 
like the truth4  ,,socrates3 ,i too     
speak rather in ignorance2 ,i only      
conjecture4 ,and yet that knowledge     
differs from true opinion is no matter  
of conjecture with me4 ,there are not   
many things which ,i profess to know1   
but this is most certainly one of them4 
,,meno3 ,yes1 ,socrates2 and you are    
quite right in saying so4  ,,socrates3  
,and am ,i not also right in saying that

 true opinion leading the way perfects  
action quite as well as knowledge8      
,,meno3 ,there again1 ,socrates1 ,i     
think you are right4  ,,socrates3 ,then 
right opinion is not a whit inferior to 
knowledge1 or less useful in action2 nor
 is the man who has right opinion       
inferior to him who has knowledge8      
,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,and surely 
the good man has been acknowledged by us
 to be useful8  ,,meno3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,seeing then that men become
 good and useful to states1 not only    
because they have knowledge1 but because
 they have right opinion1 and that      
neither knowledge nor right opinion is  
given to man by nature or acquired by   
him--7do you imagine either of them to  
be given by nature8  ,,meno3 ,not ,i47  
,,socrates3 ,then if they are not given 
by nature1 neither are the good by      
nature good8  ,,meno3 ,certainly not4   
,,socrates3 ,and nature being excluded1 
then came the question whether virtue is
 acquired by teaching8  ,,meno3 ,yes4   

,,socrates3 ,if virtue was wisdom 7or   
knowledge71 then1 as we thought1 it was 
taught8  ,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and
 if it was taught it was wisdom8        
,,meno3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and if
 there were teachers1 it might be       
taught2 and if there were no teachers1  
not8  ,,meno3 ,true4  ,,socrates3 ,but  
surely we acknowledged that there were  
no teachers of virtue8  ,,meno3 ,yes4   
,,socrates3 ,then we acknowledged that  
it was not taught1 and was not wisdom8  
,,meno3 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and   
yet we admitted that it was a good8     
,,meno3 ,yes4  ,,socrates3 ,and the     
right guide is useful and good8  ,,meno3
 ,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,and the only 
right guides are knowledge and true     
opinion--these are the guides of man2   
for things which happen by chance are   
not under the guidance of man3 but the  
guides of man are true opinion and      
knowledge4  ,,meno3 ,i think so too4    
,,socrates3 ,but if virtue is not       
taught1 neither is virtue knowledge4    

,,meno3 ,clearly not4  ,,socrates3 ,then
 of two good and useful things1 one1    
which is knowledge1 has been set aside1 
and cannot be supposed to be our guide  
in political life4  ,,meno3 ,i think    
not4  ,,socrates3 ,and therefore not by 
any wisdom1 and not because they were   
wise1 did ,themistocles and those others
 of whom ,anytus spoke govern states4   
,this was the reason why they were      
unable to make others like              
themselves--because their virtue was not
 grounded on knowledge4  ,,meno3 ,that  
is probably true1 ,socrates4            
,,socrates3 ,but if not by knowledge1   
the only alternative which remains is   
that statesmen must have guided states  
by right opinion1 which is in politics  
what divination is in religion2 for     
diviners and also prophets say many     
things truly1 but they know not what    
they say4  ,,meno3 ,so ,i believe4      
,,socrates3 ,and may we not1 ,meno1     
truly call those men 'divine' who1      
having no understanding1 yet succeed in 

many a grand deed and word8  ,,meno3    
,certainly4  ,,socrates3 ,then we shall 
also be right in calling divine those   
whom we were just now speaking of as    
diviners and prophets1 including the    
whole tribe of poets4 ,yes1 and         
statesmen above all may be said to be   
divine and illumined1 being inspired and
 possessed of ,god1 in which condition  
they say many grand things1 not knowing 
what they say4  ,,meno3 ,yes4           
,,socrates3 ,and the women too1 ,meno1  
call good men divine--do they not8 and  
the ,spartans1 when they praise a good  
man1 say 'that he is a divine man4'     
,,meno3 ,and ,i think1 ,socrates1 that  
they are right2 although very likely our
 friend ,anytus may take offence at the 
word4  ,,socrates3 ,i do not care2 as   
for ,anytus1 there will be another      
opportunity of talking with him4 ,to sum
 up our enquiry--the result seems to be1
 if we are at all right in our view1    
that virtue is neither natural nor      
acquired1 but an instinct given by ,god 

to the virtuous4 ,nor is the instinct   
accompanied by reason1 unless there may 
be supposed to be among statesmen some  
one who is capable of educating         
statesmen4 ,and if there be such an one1
 he may be said to be among the living  
what ,homer says that ,tiresias was     
among the dead1 'he alone has           
understanding2 but the rest are flitting
 shades'2 and he and his virtue in like 
manner will be a reality among shadows4 
,,meno3 ,that is excellent1 ,socrates4  
,,socrates3 ,then1 ,meno1 the conclusion
 is that virtue comes to the virtuous by
 the gift of ,god4 ,but we shall never  
know the certain truth until1 before    
asking how virtue is given1 we enquire  
into the actual nature of virtue4 ,i    
fear that ,i must go away1 but do you1  
now that you are persuaded yourself1    
persuade our friend ,anytus4 ,and do not
 let him be so exasperated2 if you can  
conciliate him1 you will have done good 
service to the ,athenian people4