,,an ,,introduction ,,to ,,philosophy by ,,george ,,stuart ,,fullerton ,professor of ,philosophy in ,columbia ,university ,new ,york ,new ,york ,the ,mac,millan ,company ,london3 ,macmillan ,co41 ,ltd4 #aiae ,norwood ,press ,j4 ,s4 ,cushing ,co4--,berwick ,smith ,co4 ,norwood1 ,mass41 ,u4,s4,a4 ,,preface ,as there cannot be said to be a beaten path in philosophy1 and as ,introductions to the subject differ widely from one another1 it is proper that ,i should give an indication of the scope of the present volume4 ,it undertakes3-- #a4 ,to point out what the word philosophy is made to cover in our universities and colleges at the present day1 and to show why it is given this meaning4 #b4 ,to explain the nature of reflective or philosophical thinking1 and to show how it differs from common thought and from science4 #c4 ,to give a general view of the main problems with which philosophers have felt called upon to deal4 #d4 ,to give an account of some of the more important types of philosophical doctrine which have arisen out of the consideration of such problems4 #e4 ,to indicate the relation of philosophy to the so-called philosophical sciences1 and to the other sciences4 #f4 ,to show1 finally1 that the study of philosophy is of value to us all1 and to give some practical admonitions on spirit and method4 ,had these admonitions been impressed upon me at a time when ,i was in especial need of guidance1 ,i feel that they would have spared me no little anxiety and confusion of mind4 ,for this reason1 ,i recommend them to the attention of the reader4 ,such is the scope of my book4 ,it aims to tell what philosophy is4 ,it is not its chief object to advocate a particular type of doctrine4 ,at the same time1 as it is impossible to treat of the problems of philosophy except from some point of view1 it will be found that1 in ,chapters ,,iii to ,,xi1 a doctrine is presented4 ,it is the same as that presented much more in detail1 and with a greater wealth of reference1 in my ,system of ,metaphysics1 which was published a short time ago4 ,in the ,notes in the back of this volume1 the reader will find references to those parts of the larger work which treat of the subjects more briefly discussed here4 ,it will be helpful to the teacher to keep the larger work on hand1 and to use more or less of the material there presented as his undergraduate classes discuss the chapters of this one4 ,other references are also given in the ,notes1 and it may be profitable to direct the attention of students to them4 ,the present book has been made as clear and simple as possible1 that no unnecessary difficulties may be placed in the path of those who enter upon the thorny road of philosophical reflection4 ,the subjects treated are deep enough to demand the serious attention of any one2 and they are subjects of fascinating interest4 ,that they are treated simply and clearly does not mean that they are treated superficially4 ,indeed1 when a doctrine is presented in outline and in a brief and simple statement1 its meaning may be more readily apparent than when it is treated more exhaustively4 ,for this reason1 ,i especially recommend1 even to those who are well acquainted with philosophy1 the account of the external world contained in ,chapter ,,iv4 ,for the doctrine ,i advocate ,i am inclined to ask especial consideration on the ground that it is1 on the whole1 a justification of the attitude taken by the plain man toward the world in which he finds himself4 ,the experience of the race is not a thing that we may treat lightly4 ,thus1 it is maintained that there is a real external world presented in our experience--not a world which we have a right to regard as the sensations or ideas of any mind4 ,it is maintained that we have evidence that there are minds in certain relations to that world1 and that we can1 within certain limits1 determine these relations4 ,it is pointed out that the plain man's belief in the activity of his mind and his notion of the significance of purposes and ends are not without justification4 ,it is indicated that theism is a reasonable doctrine1 and it is held that the human will is free in the only proper sense of the word freedom4 ,throughout it is taken for granted that the philosopher has no private system of weights and measures1 but must reason as other men reason1 and must prove his conclusions in the same sober way4 ,i have written in hopes that the book may be of use to undergraduate students4 ,they are often repelled by philosophy1 and ,i cannot but think that this is in part due to the dry and abstract form in which philosophers have too often seen fit to express their thoughts4 ,the same thoughts can be set forth in plain language1 and their significance illustrated by a constant reference to experiences which we all have--experiences which must serve as the foundation to every theory of the mind and the world worthy of serious consideration4 ,but there are many persons who cannot attend formal courses of instruction1 and who1 nevertheless1 are interested in philosophy4 ,these1 also1 ,i have had in mind2 and ,i have tried to be so clear that they could read the work with profit in the absence of a teacher4 ,lastly1 ,i invite the more learned1 if they have found my ,system of ,metaphysics difficult to understand in any part1 to follow the simple statement contained in the chapters above alluded to1 and then to return1 if they will1 to the more bulky volume4 ,,george ,,stuart ,,fullerton4 ,new ,york1 #aijf4 ,,contents ,,part ,i ,,introductory ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,the ,,word ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,past ,,and ,,in ,,the ,,present #a4 ,the ,beginnings of ,philosophy4 #b4 ,the ,greek ,philosophy at its ,height4 #c4 ,philosophy as a ,guide to ,life4 #d4 ,philosophy in the ,middle ,ages4 #e4 ,the ,modern ,philosophy4 #f4 ,what ,philosophy means in our ,time4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,common ,,thought1 ,,science1 ,,and ,,reflective ,,thought #g4 ,common ,thought4 #h4 ,scientific ,knowledge4 #i4 ,mathematics4 #aj4 ,the ,science of ,psychology4 #aa4 ,reflective ,thought4 ,,part ,,ii ,,problems ,,touching ,,the ,,external ,,world ,,chapter ,,iii ,,is ,,there ,,an ,,external ,,world8 #ab4 ,how the ,plain ,man thinks he knows the ,world4 #ac4 ,the ,psychologist and the ,external ,world4 #ad4 ,the ,telephone ,exchange4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,sensations ,,and ,,things #ae4 ,sense and ,imagination4 #af4 ,may we call ,things ,groups of ,sensations8 #ag4 ,the ,distinction between ,sensations and ,things4 #ah4 ,the ,existence of ,material ,things4 ,,chapter ,v ,,appearances ,,and ,,realities #ai4 ,things and their ,appearances4 #bj4 ,real ,things4 #ba4 ,ultimate ,real ,things4 #bb4 ,the ,bugbear of the ,unknowable4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,of ,,space #bc4 ,what we are supposed to know about ,it4 #bd4 ,space as ,necessary and ,space as ,infinite4 #be4 ,space as ,infinitely ,divisible4 #bf4 ,what is ,real ,space8 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,of ,,time #bg4 ,time as ,necessary1 ,infinite1 and ,infinitely ,divisible4 #bh4 ,the ,problem of ,past1 ,present1 and ,future4 #bi4 ,what is ,real ,time8 ,,part ,,iii ,,problems ,,touching ,,the ,,mind ,,chapter ,,viii ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,mind8 #cj4 ,primitive ,notions of ,mind4 #ca4 ,the ,mind as ,immaterial4 #cb4 ,modern ,common ,sense ,notions of the ,mind4 #cc4 ,the ,psychologist and the ,mind4 #cd4 ,the ,metaphysician and the ,mind4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,mind ,,and ,,body #ce4 ,is the ,mind in the ,body8 #cf4 ,the ,doctrine of the ,interactionist4 #cg4 ,the ,doctrine of the ,parallelist4 #ch4 ,in what ,sense ,mental ,phenomena have a ,time and ,place4 #ci4 ,objections to ,parallelism4 ,,chapter ,x ,,how ,,we ,,know ,,there ,,are ,,other ,,minds #dj4 ,is it ,certain that we know ,it8 #da4 ,the ,argument for ,other ,minds4 #db4 ,what ,other ,minds are there8 #dc4 ,the ,doctrine of ,mind-stuff4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,other ,,problems ,,of ,,world ,,and ,,mind #dd4 ,is the ,material ,world a ,mechanism8 #de4 ,the ,place of ,mind in ,nature4 #df4 ,the ,order of ,nature and ,free-will4 #dg4 ,the ,physical ,world and the ,moral ,world4 ,,part ,,iv ,,some ,,types ,,of ,,philosophical ,,theory ,,chapter ,,xii ,,their ,,historical ,,background #dh4 ,the ,doctrine of ,representative ,perception4 #di4 ,the ,step to ,idealism4 #ej4 ,the ,revolt of ,common ,sense4 #ea4 ,the ,critical ,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,realism ,,and ,,idealism #eb4 ,realism4 #ec4 ,idealism4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,monism ,,and ,,dualism #ed4 ,the ,meaning of the ,words4 #ee4 ,materialism4 #ef4 ,spiritualism4 #eg4 ,the ,doctrine of the ,one ,substance4 #eh4 ,dualism4 #ei4 ,singularism and ,pluralism4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,rationalism1 ,,empiricism1 ,,criticism1 ,,and ,,critical ,,empiricism #fj4 ,rationalism4 #fa4 ,empiricism4 #fb4 ,criticism4 #fc4 ,critical ,empiricism4 #fd4 ,pragmatism4 ,,part ,v ,,the ,,philosophical ,,sciences ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,logic #fe4 ,introductory2 the ,philosophical ,sciences4 #ff4 ,the ,traditional ,logic4 #fg4 ,the ,modern ,logic4 #fh4 ,logic and ,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,psychology #fi4 ,psychology and ,philosophy4 #gj4 ,the ,double ,affiliation of ,psychology4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,ethics ,,and ,,aesthetics #ga4 ,common ,sense ,ethics4 #gb4 ,ethics and ,philosophy4 #gc4 ,aesthetics4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,,metaphysics #gd4 ,what is ,metaphysics8 #ge4 ,epistemology4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion #gf4 ,religion and ,reflection4 #gg4 ,the ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,other ,,sciences #gh4 ,the ,philosophical and the ,non-philosophical ,sciences4 #gi4 ,the study of ,scientific ,principles and ,methods4 ,,part ,,vi ,,on ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,philosophy ,,chapter ,,xxii ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,philosophy #hj4 ,the ,question of ,practical ,utility4 #ha4 ,why ,philosophical ,studies are ,useful4 #hb4 ,metaphysics and the ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii ,,why ,,we ,,should ,,study ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy #hc4 ,the ,prominence given to the ,subject4 #hd4 ,the ,especial ,importance of ,historical ,studies to ,reflective ,thought4 #he4 ,the ,value of ,different ,points of ,view4 #hf4 ,philosophy as ,poetry and ,philosophy as ,science4 #hg4 ,how to read the ,history of ,philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv ,,some ,,practical ,,admonitions #hh4 ,be prepared to enter upon a ,new ,way of ,looking at ,things4 #hi4 ,be willing to consider ,possibilities which at first strike one as ,absurd4 #ij4 ,do not have too much ,respect for ,authority4 #ia4 ,remember that ,ordinary ,rules of ,evidence ,apply4 #ib4 ,aim at ,clearness and ,simplicity4 #ic4 ,do not hastily accept a ,doctrine4 ,,notes ,,an ,,introduction ,,to ,,philosophy ,i4 ,,introductory ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,the ,,word ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,past ,,and ,,in ,,the ,,present ,i must warn the reader at the outset that the title of this chapter seems to promise a great deal more than he will find carried out in the chapter itself4 ,to tell all that philosophy has meant in the past1 and all that it means to various classes of men in the present1 would be a task of no small magnitude1 and one quite beyond the scope of such a volume as this4 ,but it is not impossible to give within small compass a brief indication1 at least1 of what the word once signified1 to show how its signification has undergone changes1 and to point out to what sort of a discipline or group of disciplines educated men are apt to apply the word1 notwithstanding their differences of opinion as to the truth or falsity of this or that particular doctrine4 ,why certain subjects of investigation have come to be grouped together and to be regarded as falling within the province of the philosopher1 rather than certain other subjects1 will1 ,i hope1 be made clear in the body of the work4 ,only an indication can be given in this chapter4 #a4 ,,the ,,beginnings ,,of ,,philosophy4--,the ,greek historian ,herodotus 7#dhd-dbd ,b4,c47 appears to have been the first to use the verb to philosophize4 ,he makes ,croesus tell ,solon how he has heard that he from a desire of knowledge has1 philosophizing1 journeyed through many lands4 ,the word philosophizing seems to indicate that ,solon pursued knowledge for its own sake1 and was what we call an investigator4 ,as for the word philosopher 7etymologically1 a lover of wisdom71 a certain somewhat unreliable tradition traces it back to ,pythagoras 7about #ehb-ejj ,b4,c474 ,as told by ,cicero1 the story is that1 in a conversation with ,leon1 the ruler of ,phlius1 in the ,peloponnesus1 he described himself as a philosopher1 and said that his business was an investigation into the nature of things4 ,at any rate1 both the words philosopher and philosophy are freely used in the writings of the disciples of ,socrates 7#dgj-cii ,b4,c471 and it is possible that he was the first to make use of them4 ,the seeming modesty of the title philosopher--for etymologically it is a modest one1 though it has managed to gather a very different signification with the lapse of time--the modesty of the title would naturally appeal to a man who claimed so much ignorance1 as ,socrates2 and ,plato represents him as distinguishing between the lover of wisdom and the wise1 on the ground that ,god alone may be called wise4 ,from that date to this the word philosopher has remained with us1 and it has meant many things to many men4 ,but for centuries the philosopher has not been simply the investigator1 nor has he been simply the lover of wisdom4 ,an investigation into the origin of words1 however interesting in itself1 can tell us little of the uses to which words are put after they have come into being4 ,if we turn from etymology to history1 and review the labors of the men whom the world has agreed to call philosophers1 we are struck by the fact that those who head the list chronologically appear to have been occupied with crude physical speculations1 with attempts to guess what the world is made out of1 rather than with that somewhat vague something that we call philosophy to-day4 ,students of the history of philosophy usually begin their studies with the speculations of the ,greek philosopher ,thales 7b4 #fbd ,b4,c474 ,we are told that he assumed water to be the universal principle out of which all things are made1 and that he maintained that all things are full of gods4 ,we find that ,anaximander1 the next in the list1 assumed as the source out of which all things proceed and that to which they all return the infinite and indeterminate2 and that ,anaximenes1 who was perhaps his pupil1 took as his principle the all-embracing air4 ,this trio constitutes the ,ionian school of philosophy1 the earliest of the ,greek schools2 and one who reads for the first time the few vague statements which seem to constitute the sum of their contributions to human knowledge is impelled to wonder that so much has been made of the men4 ,this wonder disappears1 however1 when one realizes that the appearance of these thinkers was really a momentous thing4 ,for these men turned their faces away from the poetical and mythologic way of accounting for things1 which had obtained up to their time1 and set their faces toward ,science4 ,aristotle shows us how ,thales may have been led to the formulation of his main thesis by an observation of the phenomena of nature4 ,anaximander saw in the world in which he lived the result of a process of evolution4 ,anaximenes explains the coming into being of fire1 wind1 clouds1 water1 and earth1 as due to a condensation and expansion of the universal principle1 air4 ,the boldness of their speculations we may explain as due to a courage born of ignorance1 but the explanations they offer are scientific in spirit1 at least4 ,moreover1 these men do not stand alone4 ,they are the advance guard of an army whose latest representatives are the men who are enlightening the world at the present day4 ,the evolution of science--taking that word in the broad sense to mean organized and systematized knowledge--must be traced in the works of the ,greek philosophers from ,thales down4 ,here we have the source and the rivulet to which we can trace back the mighty stream which is flowing past our own doors4 ,apparently insignificant in its beginnings1 it must still for a while seem insignificant to the man who follows with an unreflective eye the course of the current4 ,it would take me too far afield to give an account of the ,greek schools which immediately succeeded the ,ionic3 to tell of the ,pythagoreans1 who held that all things were constituted by numbers2 of the ,eleatics1 who held that only ,being is1 and denied the possibility of change1 thereby reducing the shifting panorama of the things about us to a mere delusive world of appearances2 of ,heraclitus1 who was so impressed by the constant flux of things that he summed up his view of nature in the words3 ,everything flows2 of ,empedocles1 who found his explanation of the world in the combination of the four elements1 since become traditional1 earth1 water1 fire1 and air2 of ,democritus1 who developed a materialistic atomism which reminds one strongly of the doctrine of atoms as it has appeared in modern science2 of ,anaxagoras1 who traced the system of things to the setting in order of an infinite multiplicity of different elements1--seeds of things1--which setting in order was due to the activity of the finest of things1 ,mind4 ,it is a delight to discover the illuminating thoughts which came to the minds of these men2 and1 on the other hand1 it is amusing to see how recklessly they launched themselves on boundless seas when they were unprovided with chart and compass4 ,they were like brilliant children1 who know little of the dangers of the great world1 but are ready to undertake anything4 ,these philosophers regarded all knowledge as their province1 and did not despair of governing so great a realm4 ,they were ready to explain the whole world and everything in it4 ,of course1 this can only mean that they had little conception of how much there is to explain1 and of what is meant by scientific explanation4 ,it is characteristic of this series of philosophers that their attention was directed very largely upon the external world4 ,it was natural that this should be so4 ,both in the history of the race and in that of the individual1 we find that the attention is seized first by material things1 and that it is long before a clear conception of the mind and of its knowledge is arrived at4 ,observation precedes reflection4 ,when we come to think definitely about the mind1 we are all apt to make use of notions which we have derived from our experience of external things4 ,the very words we use to denote mental operations are in many instances taken from this outer realm4 ,we direct the attention2 we speak of apprehension1 of conception1 of intuition4 ,our knowledge is clear or obscure2 an oration is brilliant2 an emotion is sweet or bitter4 ,what wonder that1 as we read over the fragments that have come down to us from the ,pre-,socratic philosophers1 we should be struck by the fact that they sometimes leave out altogether and sometimes touch lightly upon a number of those things that we regard to-day as peculiarly within the province of the philosopher4 ,they busied themselves with the world as they saw it1 and certain things had hardly as yet come definitely within their horizon4 #b4 ,,the ,,greek ,,philosophy ,,at ,,its ,,height4--,the next succeeding period sees certain classes of questions emerge into prominence which had attracted comparatively little attention from the men of an earlier day4 ,democritus of ,abdera1 to whom reference has been made above1 belongs chronologically to this latter period1 but his way of thinking makes us class him with the earlier philosophers4 ,it was characteristic of these latter that they assumed rather navely that man can look upon the world and can know it1 and can by thinking about it succeed in giving a reasonable account of it4 ,that there may be a difference between the world as it really is and the world as it appears to man1 and that it may be impossible for man to attain to a knowledge of the absolute truth of things1 does not seem to have occurred to them4 ,the fifth century before ,christ was1 in ,greece1 a time of intense intellectual ferment4 ,one is reminded1 in reading of it1 of the splendid years of the ,renaissance in ,italy1 of the awakening of the human mind to a vigorous life which cast off the bonds of tradition and insisted upon the right of free and unfettered development4 ,athens was the center of this intellectual activity4 ,in this century arose the ,sophists1 public teachers who busied themselves with all departments of human knowledge1 but seemed to lay no little emphasis upon certain questions that touched very nearly the life of man4 ,can man attain to truth at all--to a truth that is more than a mere truth to him1 a seeming truth8 ,whence do the laws derive their authority8 ,is there such a thing as justice1 as right8 ,it was with such questions as these that the ,sophists occupied themselves1 and such questions as these have held the attention of mankind ever since4 ,when they make their appearance in the life of a people or of an individual man1 it means that there has been a rebirth1 a birth into the life of reflection4 ,when ,socrates1 that greatest of teachers1 felt called upon to refute the arguments of these men1 he met them1 so to speak1 on their own ground1 recognizing that the subjects of which they discoursed were1 indeed1 matter for scientific investigation4 ,his attitude seemed to many conservative persons in his day a dangerous one2 he was regarded as an innovator2 he taught men to think and to raise questions where1 before1 the traditions of the fathers had seemed a sufficient guide to men's actions4 ,and1 indeed1 he could not do otherwise4 ,men had learned to reflect1 and there had come into existence at least the beginnings of what we now sometimes rather loosely call the mental and moral sciences4 ,in the works of ,socrates' disciple ,plato 7#dbh-cdg ,b4,c47 and in those of ,plato's disciple ,aristotle 7#chd-cbb ,b4,c471 abundant justice is done to these fields of human activity4 ,these two1 the greatest among the ,greek philosophers1 differ from each other in many things1 but it is worthy of remark that they both seem to regard the whole sphere of human knowledge as their province4 ,plato is much more interested in the moral sciences than in the physical1 but he1 nevertheless1 feels called upon to give an account of how the world was made and out of what sort of elements4 ,he evidently does not take his own account very seriously1 and recognizes that he is on uncertain ground4 ,but he does not consider the matter beyond his jurisdiction4 ,as for ,aristotle1 that wonderful man seems to have found it possible to represent worthily every science known to his time1 and to have marked out several new fields for his successors to cultivate4 ,his philosophy covers physics1 cosmology1 zology1 logic1 metaphysics1 ethics1 psychology1 politics and economics1 rhetoric and poetics4 ,thus we see that the task of the philosopher was much the same at the period of the highest development of the ,greek philosophy that it had been earlier4 ,he was supposed to give an account of the system of things4 ,but the notion of what it means to give an account of the system of things had necessarily undergone some change4 ,the philosopher had to be something more than a natural philosopher4 #c4 ,,philosophy ,,as ,a ,,guide ,,to ,,life4--,at the close of the fourth century before ,christ there arose the schools of the ,stoics1 the ,epicureans1 and the ,skeptics4 ,in them we seem to find a somewhat new conception of philosophy--philosophy appears as chiefly a guide to life4 ,the ,stoic emphasizes the necessity of living according to nature1 and dwells upon the character of the wise man2 the ,epicurean furnishes certain selfish maxims for getting through life as pleasantly as possible2 the ,skeptic counsels apathy1 an indifference to all things1--blessed is he who expects nothing1 for he shall not be disappointed4 ,and yet1 when we examine more closely these systems1 we find a conception of philosophy not really so very different from that which had obtained before4 ,we do not find1 it is true1 that disinterested passion for the attainment of truth which is the glory of science4 ,man seems quite too much concerned with the problem of his own happiness or unhappiness2 he has grown morbid4 ,nevertheless1 the practical maxims which obtain in each of these systems are based upon a certain view of the system of things as a whole4 ,the ,stoic tells us of what the world consists2 what was the beginning and what will be the end of things2 what is the relation of the system of things to ,god4 ,he develops a physics and a logic as well as a system of ethics4 ,the ,epicurean informs us that the world originated in a rain of atoms through space2 he examines into the foundations of human knowledge2 and he proceeds to make himself comfortable in a world from which he has removed those disturbing elements1 the gods4 ,the ,skeptic decides that there is no such thing as truth1 before he enunciates the dogma that it is not worth while to worry about anything4 ,the philosophy of each school includes a view of the system of things as a whole4 ,the philosopher still regarded the universe of knowledge as his province4 #d4 ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,middle ,,ages4--,i cannot do more than mention ,neo-,platonism1 that half ,greek and half ,oriental system of doctrine which arose in the third century after ,christ1 the first system of importance after the schools mentioned above4 ,but ,i must not pass it by without pointing out that the ,neo-,platonic philosopher undertook to give an account of the origin1 development1 and end of the whole system of things4 ,in the ,middle ,ages there gradually grew up rather a sharp distinction between those things that can be known through the unaided reason and those things that can only be known through a supernatural revelation4 ,the term philosophy came to be synonymous with knowledge attained by the natural light of reason4 ,this seems to imply some sort of a limitation to the task of the philosopher4 ,philosophy is not synonymous with all knowledge4 ,but we must not forget to take note of the fact that philosophy1 even with this limitation1 constitutes a pretty wide field4 ,it covers both the physical and the moral sciences4 ,nor should we omit to notice that the scholastic philosopher was at the same time a theologian4 ,albert the ,great and ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 the famous scholastics of the thirteenth century1 had to write a ,summa ,theologiae1 or system of theology1 as well as to treat of the other departments of human knowledge4 ,why were these men not overwhelmed with the task set them by the tradition of their time8 ,it was because the task was not1 after all1 so great as a modern man might conceive it to be4 ,gil ,blas1 in ,le ,sage's famous romance1 finds it possible to become a skilled physician in the twinkling of an eye1 when ,dr4 ,sangrado has imparted to him the secret that the remedy for all diseases is to be found in bleeding the patient and in making him drink copiously of hot water4 ,when little is known about things1 it does not seem impossible for one man to learn that little4 ,during the ,middle ,ages and the centuries preceding1 the physical sciences had a long sleep4 ,men were much more concerned in the thirteenth century to find out what ,aristotle had said than they were to address questions to nature4 ,the special sciences1 as we now know them1 had not been called into existence4 #e4 ,,the ,,modern ,,philosophy4--,the submission of men's minds to the authority of ,aristotle and of the church gradually gave way4 ,a revival of learning set in4 ,men turned first of all to a more independent choice of authorities1 and then rose to the conception of a philosophy independent of authority1 of a science based upon an observation of nature1 of a science at first hand4 ,the special sciences came into being4 ,but the old tradition of philosophy as universal knowledge remained4 ,if we pass over the men of the transition period and turn our attention to ,francis ,bacon 7#aefa-afbf7 and ,rene ,descartes 7#aeif-afej71 the two who are commonly regarded as heading the list of the modern philosophers1 we find both of them assigning to the philosopher an almost unlimited field4 ,bacon holds that philosophy has for its objects ,god1 man1 and nature1 and he regards it as within his province to treat of philosophia prima 7a sort of metaphysics1 though he does not call it by this name71 of logic1 of physics and astronomy1 of anthropology1 in which he includes psychology1 of ethics1 and of politics4 ,in short1 he attempts to map out the whole field of human knowledge1 and to tell those who work in this corner of it or in that how they should set about their task4 ,as for ,descartes1 he writes of the trustworthiness of human knowledge1 of the existence of ,god1 of the existence of an external world1 of the human soul and its nature1 of mathematics1 physics1 cosmology1 physiology1 and1 in short1 of nearly everything discussed by the men of his day4 ,no man can accuse this extraordinary ,frenchman of a lack of appreciation of the special sciences which were growing up4 ,no one in his time had a better right to be called a scientist in the modern sense of the term4 ,but it was not enough for him to be a mere mathematician1 or even a worker in the physical sciences generally4 ,he must be all that has been mentioned above4 ,the conception of philosophy as of a something that embraces all departments of human knowledge has not wholly passed away even in our day4 ,i shall not dwell upon ,spinoza 7#afcb-afgg71 who believed it possible to deduce a world a priori with mathematical precision2 upon ,christian ,wolff 7#afgi-aged71 who defined philosophy as the knowledge of the causes of what is or comes into being2 upon ,fichte 7#agfb-ahad71 who believed that the philosopher1 by mere thinking1 could lay down the laws of all possible future experience2 upon ,schelling 7#agge-ahed71 who1 without knowing anything worth mentioning about natural science1 had the courage to develop a system of natural philosophy1 and to condemn such investigators as ,boyle and ,newton2 upon ,hegel 7#aggj-ahca71 who undertakes to construct the whole system of reality out of concepts1 and who1 with his immediate predecessors1 brought philosophy for a while into more or less disrepute with men of a scientific turn of mind4 ,i shall come down quite to our own times1 and consider a man whose conception of philosophy has had and still has a good deal of influence1 especially with the general public--with those to whom philosophy is a thing to be taken up in moments of leisure1 and cannot be the serious pursuit of a life4 ,knowledge of the lowest kind1 says ,herbert ,spencer1 is un-unified knowledge2 ,science is partially-unified knowledge2 ,philosophy is completely-unified knowledge4 #a ,science1 he argues1 means merely the family of the ,sciences--stands for nothing more than the sum of knowledge formed of their contributions4 ,philosophy is the fusion of these contributions into a whole2 it is knowledge of the greatest generality4 ,in harmony with this notion ,spencer produced a system of philosophy which includes the following3 ,a volume entitled ,first ,principles1 which undertakes to show what man can and what man cannot know2 a treatise on the principles of biology2 another on the principles of psychology2 still another on the principles of sociology2 and finally one on the principles of morality4 ,to complete the scheme it would have been necessary to give an account of inorganic nature before going on to the phenomena of life1 but our philosopher found the task too great and left this out4 ,now1 ,spencer was a man of genius1 and one finds in his works many illuminating thoughts4 ,but it is worthy of remark that those who praise his work in this or in that field are almost always men who have themselves worked in some other field and have an imperfect acquaintance with the particular field that they happen to be praising4 ,the metaphysician finds the reasonings of the ,first ,principles rather loose and inconclusive2 the biologist pays little heed to the ,principles of ,biology2 the sociologist finds ,spencer not particularly accurate or careful in the field of his predilection4 ,he has tried to be a professor of all the sciences1 and it is too late in the world's history for him or for any man to cope with such a task4 ,in the days of ,plato a man might have hoped to accomplish it4 #f4 ,,what ,,philosophy ,,means ,,in ,,our ,,time4--,it savors of temerity to write down such a title as that which heads the present section4 ,there are men living to-day to whom philosophy means little else than the doctrine of ,kant1 or of ,hegel1 or of the brothers ,caird1 or of ,herbert ,spencer1 or even of ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 for we must not forget that many of the seminaries of learning in ,europe and some in ,america still hold to the mediaeval church philosophy4 ,but let me gather up in a few words the purport of what has been said above4 ,philosophy once meant the whole body of scientific knowledge4 ,afterward it came to mean the whole body of knowledge which could be attained by the mere light of human reason1 unaided by revelation4 ,the several special sciences sprang up1 and a multitude of men have for a long time past devoted themselves to definite limited fields of investigation with little attention to what has been done in other fields4 ,nevertheless1 there has persisted the notion of a discipline which somehow concerns itself with the whole system of things1 rather than with any limited division of that broad field4 ,it is a notion not peculiar to the disciples of ,spencer4 ,there are many to whom philosophy is a ,weltweisheit1 a world-wisdom4 ,shall we say that this is the meaning of the word philosophy now8 ,and if we do1 how shall we draw a line between philosophy and the body of the special sciences8 ,perhaps the most just way to get a preliminary idea of what philosophy means to the men of our time is to turn away for the time being from the definition of any one man or group of men1 and to ask ourselves what a professor of philosophy in an ,american or ,european university is actually supposed to teach4 ,it is quite clear that he is not supposed to be an ,aristotle4 ,he does not represent all the sciences1 and no one expects him to lecture on mathematics1 mechanics1 physics1 chemistry1 zology1 botany1 economics1 politics1 and various other disciplines4 ,there was a time when he might have been expected to teach all that men could know1 but that time is long past4 ,nevertheless1 there is quite a group of sciences which are regarded as belonging especially to his province2 and although a man may devote a large part of his attention to some one portion of the field1 he would certainly be thought remiss if he wholly neglected the rest4 ,this group of sciences includes logic1 psychology1 ethics and aesthetics1 metaphysics1 and the history of philosophy4 ,i have not included epistemology or the theory of knowledge as a separate discipline1 for reasons which will appear later 7,chapter ,,xix72 and ,i have included the history of philosophy1 because1 whether we care to call this a special science or not1 it constitutes a very important part of the work of the teacher of philosophy in our day4 ,of this group of subjects the student who goes to the university to study philosophy is supposed to know something before he leaves its walls1 whatever else he may or may not know4 ,it should be remarked1 again1 that there is commonly supposed to be a peculiarly close relation between philosophy and religion4 ,certainly1 if any one about a university undertakes to give a course of lectures on theism1 it is much more apt to be the professor of philosophy than the professor of mathematics or of chemistry4 ,the man who has written an ,introduction to ,philosophy1 a ,psychology1 a ,logic1 and an ,outlines of ,metaphysics is very apt to regard it as his duty to add to the list a ,philosophy of ,religion4 ,the students in the theological seminaries of ,europe and ,america are usually encouraged1 if not compelled1 to attend courses in philosophy4 ,finally1 it appears to be definitely accepted that even the disciplines that we never think of classing among the philosophical sciences are not wholly cut off from a connection with philosophy4 ,when we are occupied1 not with adding to the stock of knowledge embraced within the sphere of any special science1 but with an examination of the methods of the science1 with1 so to speak1 a criticism of the foundations upon which the science rests1 our work is generally recognized as philosophical4 ,it strikes no one as odd in our day that there should be established a ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 but we should think it strange if some one announced the intention to publish a ,journal of ,philosophy and ,comparative ,anatomy4 ,it is not without its significance that1 when ,mach1 who had been professor of physics at ,prague1 was called 7in #ahie7 to the ,university of ,vienna to lecture on the history and theory of the inductive sciences1 he was made1 not professor of physics1 but professor of philosophy4 ,the case1 then1 stands thus3 a certain group of disciplines is regarded as falling peculiarly within the province of the professor of philosophy1 and the sciences which constitute it are frequently called the philosophical sciences2 moreover1 it is regarded as quite proper that the teacher of philosophy should concern himself with the problems of religion1 and should pry into the methods and fundamental assumptions of special sciences in all of which it is impossible that he should be an adept4 ,the question naturally arises3 ,why has his task come to be circumscribed as it is8 ,why should he teach just these things and no others8 ,to this question certain persons are at once ready to give an answer4 ,there was a time1 they argue1 when it seemed possible for one man to embrace the whole field of human knowledge4 ,but human knowledge grew2 the special sciences were born2 each concerned itself with a definite class of facts and developed its own methods4 ,it became possible and necessary for a man to be1 not a scientist at large1 but a chemist1 a physicist1 a biologist1 an economist4 ,but in certain portions of the great field men have met with peculiar difficulties2 here it cannot be said that we have sciences1 but rather that we have attempts at science4 ,the philosopher is the man to whom is committed what is left when we have taken away what has been definitely established or is undergoing investigation according to approved scientific methods4 ,he is ,lord of the ,uncleared ,ground1 and may wander through it in his compassless1 irresponsible way1 never feeling that he is lost1 for he has never had any definite bearings to lose4 ,those who argue in this way support their case by pointing to the lack of a general consensus of opinion which obtains in many parts of the field which the philosopher regards as his own2 and also by pointing out that1 even within this field1 there is a growing tendency on the part of certain sciences to separate themselves from philosophy and become independent4 ,thus the psychologist and the logician are sometimes very anxious to have it understood that they belong among the scientists and not among the philosophers4 ,now1 this answer to the question that we have raised undoubtedly contains some truth4 ,as we have seen from the sketch contained in the preceding pages1 the word philosophy was once a synonym for the whole sum of the sciences or what stood for such2 gradually the several sciences have become independent and the field of the philosopher has been circumscribed4 ,we must admit1 moreover1 that there is to be found in a number of the special sciences a body of accepted facts which is without its analogue in philosophy4 ,in much of his work the philosopher certainly seems to be walking upon more uncertain ground than his neighbors2 and if he is unaware of that fact1 it must be either because he has not a very nice sense of what constitutes scientific evidence1 or because he is carried away by his enthusiasm for some particular form of doctrine4 ,nevertheless1 it is just to maintain that the answer we are discussing is not a satisfactory one4 ,for one thing1 we find in it no indication of the reason why the particular group of disciplines with which the philosopher occupies himself has been left to him1 when so many sciences have announced their independence4 ,why have not these1 also1 separated off and set up for themselves8 ,is it more difficult to work in these fields than in others8 and1 if so1 what reason can be assigned for the fact8 ,take psychology as an instance4 ,how does it happen that the physicist calmly develops his doctrine without finding it necessary to make his bow to philosophy at all1 while the psychologist is at pains to explain that his book is to treat psychology as a natural science1 and will avoid metaphysics as much as possible8 ,for centuries men have been interested in the phenomena of the human mind4 ,can anything be more open to observation than what passes in a man's own consciousness8 ,why1 then1 should the science of psychology lag behind8 and why these endless disputes as to whether it can really be treated as a natural science at all8 ,again4 ,may we assume that1 because certain disciplines have taken a position of relative independence1 therefore all the rest of the field will surely come to be divided up in the same way1 and that there will be many special sciences1 but no such thing as philosophy8 ,it is hasty to assume this on no better evidence than that which has so far been presented4 ,before making up one's mind upon this point1 one should take a careful look at the problems with which the philosopher occupies himself4 ,a complete answer to the questions raised above can only be given in the course of the book1 where the main problems of philosophy are discussed1 and the several philosophical sciences are taken up and examined4 ,but ,i may say1 in anticipation1 as much as this3-- 7#a7 ,philosophy is reflective knowledge4 ,what is meant by reflective knowledge will be explained at length in the next chapter4 7#b7 ,the sciences which are grouped together as philosophical are those in which we are forced back upon the problems of reflective thought1 and cannot simply put them aside4 7#c7 ,the peculiar difficulties of reflective thought may account for the fact that these sciences are1 more than others1 a field in which we may expect to find disputes and differences of opinion4 7#d7 ,we need not be afraid that the whole field of human knowledge will come to be so divided up into special sciences that philosophy will disappear4 ,the problems with which the philosopher occupies himself are real problems1 which present themselves unavoidably to the thoughtful mind1 and it is not convenient to divide these up among the several sciences4 ,this will become clearer as we proceed4 #a ,first ,principles1 ,part ,,ii1 section #cg4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,common ,,thought1 ,,science1 ,,and ,,reflective ,,thought #g4 ,,common ,,thought4--,those who have given little attention to the study of the human mind are apt to suppose that1 when the infant opens its eyes upon the new world of objects surrounding its small body1 it sees things much as they do themselves4 ,they are ready to admit that it does not know much about things1 but it strikes them as absurd for any one to go so far as to say that it does not see things--the things out there in space before its eyes4 ,nevertheless1 the psychologist tells us that it requires quite a course of education to enable us to see things--not to have vague and unmeaning sensations1 but to see things1 things that are known to be touchable as well as seeable1 things that are recognized as having size and shape and position in space4 ,and he aims a still severer blow at our respect for the infant when he goes on to inform us that the little creature is as ignorant of itself as it is of things2 that in its small world of as yet unorganized experiences there is no self that is distinguished from other things2 that it may cry vociferously without knowing who is uncomfortable1 and may stop its noise without knowing who has been taken up into the nurse's arms and has experienced an agreeable change4 ,this chaotic little world of the dawning life is not our world1 the world of common thought1 the world in which we all live and move in maturer years2 nor can we go back to it on the wings of memory4 ,we seem to ourselves to have always lived in a world of things1--things in time and space1 material things4 ,among these things there is one of peculiar interest1 and which we have not placed upon a par with the rest1 our own body1 which sees1 tastes1 touches1 other things4 ,we cannot remember a time when we did not know that with this body are somehow bound up many experiences which interest us acutely2 for example1 experiences of pleasure and pain4 ,moreover1 we seem always to have known that certain of the bodies which surround our own rather resemble our own1 and are in important particulars to be distinguished from the general mass of bodies4 ,thus1 we seem always to have been living in a world of things and to have recognized in that world the existence of ourselves and of other people4 ,when we now think of ourselves and of other people1 we think of each of the objects referred to as possessing a mind4 ,may we say that1 as far back as we can remember1 we have thought of ourselves and of other persons as possessing minds8 ,hardly4 ,the young child does not seem to distinguish between mind and body1 and1 in the vague and fragmentary pictures which come back to us from our early life1 certainly this distinction does not stand out4 ,the child may be the completest of egoists1 it may be absorbed in itself and all that directly concerns this particular self1 and yet it may make no conscious distinction between a bodily self and a mental1 between mind and body4 ,it does not explicitly recognize its world as a world that contains minds as well as bodies4 ,but1 however it may be with the child in the earlier stages of its development1 we must all admit that the mature man does consciously recognize that the world in which he finds himself is a world that contains minds as well as bodies4 ,it never occurs to him to doubt that there are bodies1 and it never occurs to him to doubt that there are minds4 ,does he not perceive that he has a body and a mind8 ,has he not abundant evidence that his mind is intimately related to his body8 ,when he shuts his eyes1 he no longer sees1 and when he stops his ears1 he no longer hears2 when his body is bruised1 he feels pain2 when he wills to raise his hand1 his body carries out the mental decree4 ,other men act very much as he does2 they walk and they talk1 they laugh and they cry1 they work and they play1 just as he does4 ,in short1 they act precisely as though they had minds like his own4 ,what more natural than to assume that1 as he himself gives expression1 by the actions of his body1 to the thoughts and emotions in his mind1 so his neighbor does the same8 ,we must not allow ourselves to underrate the plain man's knowledge either of bodies or of minds4 ,it seems1 when one reflects upon it1 a sufficiently wonderful thing that a few fragmentary sensations should automatically receive an interpretation which conjures up before the mind a world of real things2 that1 for example1 the little patch of color sensation which ,i experience when ,i turn my eyes toward the window should seem to introduce me at once to a world of material objects lying in space1 clearly defined in magnitude1 distance1 and direction2 that an experience no more complex should be the key which should unlock for me the secret storehouse of another mind1 and lay before me a wealth of thoughts and emotions not my own4 ,from the poor1 bare1 meaningless world of the dawning intelligence to the world of common thought1 a world in which real things with their manifold properties1 things material and things mental1 bear their part1 is indeed a long step4 ,and we should never forget that he who would go farther1 he who would strive to gain a better knowledge of matter and of mind by the aid of science and of philosophical reflection1 must begin his labors on this foundation which is common to us all4 ,how else can he begin than by accepting and more critically examining the world as it seems revealed in the experience of the race8 #h4 ,,scientific ,,knowledge4--,still1 the knowledge of the world which we have been discussing is rather indefinite1 inaccurate1 and unsystematic4 ,it is a sufficient guide for common life1 but its deficiencies may be made apparent4 ,he who wishes to know matter and mind better cannot afford to neglect the sciences4 ,now1 it is important to observe that although1 when the plain man grows scientific1 great changes take place in his knowledge of things1 yet his way of looking at the mind and the world remains in general much what it was before4 ,to prevent this statement from being misunderstood1 ,i must explain it at some length4 ,let us suppose that the man in question takes up the study of botany4 ,need he do anything very different from what is done more imperfectly by every intelligent man who interests himself in plants8 ,there in the real material world before him are the same plants that he observed somewhat carelessly before4 ,he must collect his information more systematically and must arrange it more critically1 but his task is not so much to do something different as it is to do the same thing much better4 ,the same is evidently true of various other sciences1 such as geology1 zology1 physiology1 sociology4 ,some men have much accurate information regarding rocks1 animals1 the functions of the bodily organs1 the development of a given form of society1 and other things of the sort1 and other men have but little2 and yet it is usually not difficult for the man who knows much to make the man who knows little understand1 at least1 what he is talking about4 ,he is busying himself with things--the same things that interest the plain man1 and of which the plain man knows something4 ,he has collected information touching their properties1 their changes1 their relationships2 but to him1 as to his less scientific neighbor1 they are the same things they always were1--things that he has known from the days of childhood4 ,perhaps it will be admitted that this is true of such sciences as those above indicated1 but doubted whether it is true of all the sciences1 even of all the sciences which are directly concerned with things of some sort4 ,for example1 to the plain man the world of material things consists of things that can be seen and touched4 ,many of these seem to fill space continuously4 ,they may be divided1 but the parts into which they may be divided are conceived as fragments of the things1 and as of the same general nature as the wholes of which they are parts4 ,yet the chemist and the physicist tell us that these same extended things are not really continuous1 as they seem to us to be1 but consist of swarms of imperceptible atoms1 in rapid motion1 at considerable distances from one another in space1 and grouped in various ways4 ,what has now become of the world of realities to which the plain man pinned his faith8 ,it has come to be looked upon as a world of appearances1 of phenomena1 of manifestations1 under which the real things1 themselves imperceptible1 make their presence evident to our senses4 ,is this new1 real world the world of things in which the plain man finds himself1 and in which he has felt so much at home8 ,a closer scrutiny reveals that the world of atoms and molecules into which the man of science resolves the system of material things is not1 after all1 so very different in kind from the world to which the plain man is accustomed4 ,he can understand without difficulty the language in which it is described to him1 and he can readily see how a man may be led to assume its existence4 ,the atom is not1 it is true1 directly perceivable by sense1 but it is conceived as though it and its motions were thus perceivable4 ,the plain man has long known that things consist of parts which remain1 under some circumstances1 invisible4 ,when he approaches an object from a distance1 he sees parts which he could not see before2 and what appears to the naked eye a mere speck without perceptible parts is found under the microscope to be an insect with its full complement of members4 ,moreover1 he has often observed that objects which appear continuous when seen from a distance are evidently far from continuous when seen close at hand4 ,as we walk toward a tree we can see the indefinite mass of color break up into discontinuous patches2 a fabric1 which presents the appearance of an unbroken surface when viewed in certain ways may be seen to be riddled with holes when held between the eye and the light4 ,there is no man who has not some acquaintance with the distinction between appearance and reality1 and who does not make use of the distinction in common life4 ,nor can it seem a surprising fact that different combinations of atoms should exhibit different properties4 ,have we not always known that things in combination are apt to have different properties from the same things taken separately8 ,he who does not know so much as this is not fit even to be a cook4 ,no1 the imperceptible world of atoms and molecules is not by any means totally different from the world of things in which the plain man lives4 ,these little objects and groups of objects are discussed very much as we discuss the larger objects and groups of objects to which we are accustomed4 ,we are still concerned with things which exist in space and move about in space2 and even if these things are small and are not very familiarly known1 no intellectual revolution is demanded to enable a man to understand the words of the scientist who is talking about them1 and to understand as well the sort of reasonings upon which the doctrine is based4 #i4 ,,mathematics4--,let us now turn to take a glance at the mathematical sciences4 ,of course1 these have to do with things sooner or later1 for our mathematical reasonings would be absolutely useless to us if they could not be applied to the world of things2 but in mathematical reasonings we abstract from things for the time being1 confident that we can come back to them when we want to do so1 and can make use of the results obtained in our operations4 ,now1 every civilized man who is not mentally deficient can perform the fundamental operations of arithmetic4 ,he can add and subtract1 multiply and divide4 ,in other words1 he can use numbers4 ,the man who has become an accomplished mathematician can use numbers much better2 but if we are capable of following intelligently the intricate series of operations that he carries out on the paper before us1 and can see the significance of the system of signs which he uses as an aid1 we shall realize that he is only doing in more complicated ways what we have been accustomed to do almost from our childhood4 ,if we are interested1 not so much in performing the operations1 as in inquiring into what really takes place in a mind when several units are grasped together and made into a new unit1--for example1 when twelve units are thought as one dozen1--the mathematician has a right to say3 ,i leave all that to the psychologist or to the metaphysician2 every one knows in a general way what is meant by a unit1 and knows that units can be added and subtracted1 grouped and separated2 ,i only undertake to show how one may avoid error in doing these things4 ,it is with geometry as it is with arithmetic4 ,no man is wholly ignorant of points1 lines1 surfaces1 and solids4 ,we are all aware that a short line is not a point1 a narrow surface is not a line1 and a thin solid is not a mere surface4 ,a door so thin as to have only one side would be repudiated by every man of sense as a monstrosity4 ,when the geometrician defines for us the point1 the line1 the surface1 and the solid1 and when he sets before us an array of axioms1 or self-evident truths1 we follow him with confidence because he seems to be telling us things that we can directly see to be reasonable2 indeed1 to be telling us things that we have always known4 ,the truth is that the geometrician does not introduce us to a new world at all4 ,he merely gives us a fuller and a more exact account than was before within our reach of the space relations which obtain in the world of external objects1 a world we already know pretty well4 ,suppose that we say to him3 ,you have spent many years in dividing up space and in scrutinizing the relations that are to be discovered in that realm2 now tell us1 what is space8 ,is it real8 ,is it a thing1 or a quality of a thing1 or merely a relation between things8 ,and how can any man think space1 when the ideas through which he must think it are supposed to be themselves non-extended8 ,the space itself is not supposed to be in the mind2 how can a collection of non-extended ideas give any inkling of what is meant by extension8 ,would any teacher of mathematics dream of discussing these questions with his class before proceeding to the proof of his propositions8 ,it is generally admitted that1 if such questions are to be answered at all1 it is not with the aid of geometrical reasonings that they will be answered4 #aj4 ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,psychology4--,now let us come back to a science which has to do directly with things4 ,we have seen that the plain man has some knowledge of minds as well as of material things4 ,every one admits that the psychologist knows minds better4 ,may we say that his knowledge of minds differs from that of the plain man about as the knowledge of plants possessed by the botanist differs from that of all intelligent persons who have cared to notice them8 ,or is it a knowledge of a quite different kind8 ,those who are familiar with the development of the sciences within recent years have had occasion to remark the fact that psychology has been coming more and more to take its place as an independent science4 ,formerly it was regarded as part of the duty of the philosopher to treat of the mind and its knowledge2 but the psychologist who pretends to be no more than a psychologist is a product of recent times4 ,this tendency toward specialization is a natural thing1 and is quite in line with what has taken place in other fields of investigation4 ,when any science becomes an independent discipline1 it is recognized that it is a more or less limited field in which work of a certain kind is done in a certain way4 ,other fields and other kinds of work are to some extent ignored4 ,but it is quite to be expected that there should be some dispute1 especially at first1 as to what does or does not properly fall within the limits of a given science4 ,where these limits shall be placed is1 after all1 a matter of convenience2 and sometimes it is not well to be too strict in marking off one field from another4 ,it is well to watch the actual development of a science1 and to note the direction instinctively taken by investigators in that particular field4 ,if we compare the psychology of a generation or so ago with that of the present day1 we cannot but be struck with the fact that there is an increasing tendency to treat psychology as a natural science4 ,by this is not meant1 of course1 that there is no difference between psychology and the sciences that concern themselves with the world of material things--psychology has to do primarily with minds and not with bodies4 ,but it is meant that1 as the other sciences improve upon the knowledge of the plain man without wholly recasting it1 as they accept the world in which he finds himself and merely attempt to give us a better account of it1 so the psychologist may accept the world of matter and of minds recognized by common thought1 and may devote himself to the study of minds1 without attempting to solve a class of problems discussed by the metaphysician4 ,for example1 he may refuse to discuss the question whether the mind can really know that there is an external world with which it stands in relation1 and from which it receives messages along the avenues of the senses4 ,he may claim that it is no more his business to treat of this than it is the business of the mathematician to treat of the ultimate nature of space4 ,thus the psychologist assumes without question the existence of an external real world1 a world of matter and motion4 ,he finds in this world certain organized bodies that present phenomena which he regards as indicative of the presence of minds4 ,he accepts it as a fact that each mind knows its own states directly1 and knows everything else by inference from those states1 receiving messages from the outer world along one set of nerves and reacting along another set4 ,he conceives of minds as wholly dependent upon messages thus conveyed to them from without4 ,he tells us how a mind1 by the aid of such messages1 gradually builds up for itself the notion of the external world and of the other minds which are connected with bodies to be found in that world4 ,we may fairly say that all this is merely a development of and an improvement upon the plain man's knowledge of minds and of bodies4 ,there is no normal man who does not know that his mind is more intimately related to his body than it is to other bodies4 ,we all distinguish between our ideas of things and the external things they represent1 and we believe that our knowledge of things comes to us through the avenues of the senses4 ,must we not open our eyes to see1 and unstop our ears to hear8 ,we all know that we do not perceive other minds directly1 but must infer their contents from what takes place in the bodies to which they are referred--from words and actions4 ,moreover1 we know that a knowledge of the outer world and of other minds is built up gradually1 and we never think of an infant as knowing what a man knows1 much as we are inclined to overrate the minds of infants4 ,the fact that the plain man and the psychologist do not greatly differ in their point of view must impress every one who is charged with the task of introducing students to the study of psychology and philosophy4 ,it is rather an easy thing to make them follow the reasonings of the psychologist1 so long as he avoids metaphysical reflections4 ,the assumptions which he makes seem to them not unreasonable2 and1 as for his methods of investigation1 there is no one of them which they have not already employed themselves in a more or less blundering way4 ,they have had recourse to introspection1 i4e4 they have noticed the phenomena of their own minds2 they have made use of the objective method1 i4e4 they have observed the signs of mind exhibited by other persons and by the brutes2 they have sometimes experimented--this is done by the schoolgirl who tries to find out how best to tease her roommate1 and by the boy who covers and uncovers his ears in church to make the preacher sing a tune4 ,it may not be easy to make men good psychologists1 but it is certainly not difficult to make them understand what the psychologist is doing and to make them realize the value of his work4 ,he1 like the workers in the other natural sciences1 takes for granted the world of the plain man1 the world of material things in space and time and of minds related to those material things4 ,but when it is a question of introducing the student to the reflections of the philosophers the case is very different4 ,we seem to be enticing him into a new and a strange world1 and he is apt to be filled with suspicion and distrust4 ,the most familiar things take on an unfamiliar aspect1 and questions are raised which it strikes the unreflective man as highly absurd even to propose4 ,of this world of reflective thought ,i shall say just a word in what follows4 #aa4 ,,reflective ,,thought4--,if we ask our neighbor to meet us somewhere at a given hour1 he has no difficulty in understanding what we have requested him to do4 ,if he wishes to do so1 he can be on the spot at the proper moment4 ,he may never have asked himself in his whole life what he means by space and by time4 ,he may be quite ignorant that thoughtful men have disputed concerning the nature of these for centuries past4 ,and a man may go through the world avoiding disaster year after year by distinguishing with some success between what is real and what is not real1 and yet he may be quite unable to tell us what1 in general1 it means for a thing to be real4 ,some things are real and some are not2 as a rule he seems to be able to discover the difference2 of his method of procedure he has never tried to give an account to himself4 ,that he has a mind he cannot doubt1 and he has some idea of the difference between it and certain other minds2 but even the most ardent champion of the plain man must admit that he has the most hazy of notions touching the nature of his mind4 ,he seems to be more doubtful concerning the nature of the mind and its knowledge than he is concerning the nature of external things4 ,certainly he appears to be more willing to admit his ignorance in this realm4 ,and yet the man can hold his own in the world of real things4 ,he can distinguish between this thing and that1 this place and that1 this time and that4 ,he can think out a plan and carry it into execution2 he can guess at the contents of other minds and allow this knowledge to find its place in his plan4 ,all of which proves that our knowledge is not necessarily useless because it is rather dim and vague4 ,it is one thing to use a mental state2 it is another to have a clear comprehension of just what it is and of what elements it may be made up4 ,the plain man does much of his thinking as we all tie our shoes and button our buttons4 ,it would be difficult for us to describe these operations1 but we may perform them very easily nevertheless4 ,when we say that we know how to tie our shoes1 we only mean that we can tie them4 ,now1 enough has been said in the preceding sections to make clear that the vagueness which characterizes many notions which constantly recur in common thought is not wholly dispelled by the study of the several sciences4 ,the man of science1 like the plain man1 may be able to use very well for certain purposes concepts which he is not able to analyze satisfactorily4 ,for example1 he speaks of space and time1 cause and effect1 substance and qualities1 matter and mind1 reality and unreality4 ,he certainly is in a position to add to our knowledge of the things covered by these terms4 ,but we should never overlook the fact that the new knowledge which he gives us is a knowledge of the same kind as that which we had before4 ,he measures for us spaces and times2 he does not tell us what space and time are4 ,he points out the causes of a multitude of occurrences2 he does not tell us what we mean whenever we use the word cause4 ,he informs us what we should accept as real and what we should repudiate as unreal2 he does not try to show us what it is to be real and what it is to be unreal4 ,in other words1 the man of science extends our knowledge and makes it more accurate2 he does not analyze certain fundamental conceptions1 which we all use1 but of which we can usually give a very poor account4 ,on the other hand1 it is the task of reflective thought1 not in the first instance1 to extend the limits of our knowledge of the world of matter and of minds1 but rather to make us more clearly conscious of what that knowledge really is4 ,philosophical reflection takes up and tries to analyze complex thoughts that men use daily without caring to analyze them1 indeed1 without even realizing that they may be subjected to analysis4 ,it is to be expected that it should impress many of those who are introduced to it for the first time as rather a fantastic creation of problems that do not present themselves naturally to the healthy mind4 ,there is no thoughtful man who does not reflect sometimes and about some things2 but there are few who feel impelled to go over the whole edifice of their knowledge and examine it with a critical eye from its turrets to its foundations4 ,in a sense1 we may say that philosophical thought is not natural1 for he who is examining the assumptions upon which all our ordinary thought about the world rests is no longer in the world of the plain man4 ,he is treating things as men do not commonly treat them1 and it is perhaps natural that it should appear to some that1 in the solvent which he uses1 the real world in which we all rejoice should seem to dissolve and disappear4 ,i have said that it is not the task of reflective thought1 in the first instance1 to extend the limits of our knowledge of the world of matter and of minds4 ,this is true4 ,but this does not mean that1 as a result of a careful reflective analysis1 some errors which may creep into the thought both of the plain man and of the scientist may not be exploded2 nor does it mean that some new extensions of our knowledge may not be suggested4 ,in the chapters to follow ,i shall take up and examine some of the problems of reflective thought4 ,and ,i shall consider first those problems that present themselves to those who try to subject to a careful scrutiny our knowledge of the external world4 ,it is well to begin with this1 for1 even in our common experience1 it seems to be revealed that the knowledge of material things is a something less vague and indefinite than the knowledge of minds4 ,,ii4 ,,problems ,,touching ,,the ,,external ,,world ,,chapter ,,iii ,,is ,,there ,,an ,,external ,,world8 #ab4 ,,how ,,the ,,plain ,,man ,,thinks ,,he ,,knows ,,the ,,world4--,as schoolboys we enjoyed ,cicero's joke at the expense of the minute philosophers4 ,they denied the immortality of the soul2 he affirmed it2 and he congratulated himself upon the fact that1 if they were right1 they would not survive to discover it and to triumph over him4 ,at the close of the seventeenth century the philosopher ,john ,locke was guilty of a joke of somewhat the same kind4 ,i think1 said he1 nobody can1 in earnest1 be so skeptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels4 ,at least1 he that can doubt so far 7whatever he may have with his own thoughts7 will never have any controversy with me2 since he can never be sure ,i say anything contrary to his own opinion4 ,now1 in this chapter and in certain chapters to follow1 ,i am going to take up and turn over1 so that we may get a good look at them1 some of the problems that have presented themselves to those who have reflected upon the world and the mind as they seem given in our experience4 ,i shall begin by asking whether it is not possible to doubt that there is an external world at all4 ,the question cannot best be answered by a jest4 ,it may1 of course1 be absurd to maintain that there is no external world2 but surely he1 too1 is in an absurd position who maintains dogmatically that there is one1 and is yet quite unable to find any flaw in the reasonings of the man who seems to be able to show that this belief has no solid foundation4 ,and we must not forget that the men who have thought it worth while to raise just such questions as this1 during the last twenty centuries1 have been among the most brilliant intellects of the race4 ,we must not assume too hastily that they have occupied themselves with mere trivialities4 ,since1 therefore1 so many thoughtful men have found it worth while to ask themselves seriously whether there is an external world1 or1 at least1 how we can know that there is an external world1 it is not unreasonable to expect that1 by looking for it1 we may find in our common experience or in science some difficulty sufficient to suggest the doubt which at first strikes the average man as preposterous4 ,in what can such a doubt take its rise8 ,let us see4 ,i think it is scarcely too much to say that the plain man believes that he does not directly perceive an external world1 and that he1 at the same time1 believes that he does directly perceive one4 ,it is quite possible to believe contradictory things1 when one's thought of them is somewhat vague1 and when one does not consciously bring them together4 ,as to the first-mentioned belief4 ,does not the plain man distinguish between his ideas of things and the things themselves8 ,does he not believe that his ideas come to him through the avenues of the senses8 ,is he not aware of the fact that1 when a sense is disordered1 the thing as he perceives it is not like the thing as it is8 ,a blind man does not see things when they are there2 a color-blind man sees them as others do not see them2 a man suffering under certain abnormal conditions of the nervous system sees things when they are not there at all1 i4e4 he has hallucinations4 ,the thing itself1 as it seems1 is not in the man's mind2 it is the idea that is in the man's mind1 and that represents the thing4 ,sometimes it appears to give a true account of it2 sometimes it seems to give a garbled account2 sometimes it is a false representative throughout--there is no reality behind it4 ,it is1 then1 the idea that is immediately known1 and not the thing2 the thing is merely inferred to exist4 ,i do not mean to say that the plain man is conscious of drawing this conclusion4 ,i only maintain that it seems a natural conclusion to draw from the facts which he recognizes1 and that sometimes he seems to draw the conclusion half-consciously4 ,on the other hand1 we must all admit that when the plain man is not thinking about the distinction between ideas and things1 but is looking at some material object before him1 is touching it with his fingers and turning it about to get a good look at it1 it never occurs to him that he is not directly conscious of the thing itself4 ,he seems to himself to perceive the thing immediately2 to perceive it as it is and where it is2 to perceive it as a really extended thing1 out there in space before his body4 ,he does not think of himself as occupied with mere images1 representations of the object4 ,he may be willing to admit that his mind is in his head1 but he cannot think that what he sees is in his head4 ,is not the object there8 does he not see and feel it8 ,why doubt such evidence as this8 ,he who tells him that the external world does not exist seems to be denying what is immediately given in his experience4 ,the man who looks at things in this way assumes1 of course1 that the external object is known directly1 and is not a something merely inferred to exist from the presence of a representative image4 ,may one embrace this belief and abandon the other one8 ,if we elect to do this1 we appear to be in difficulties at once4 ,all the considerations which made us distinguish so carefully between our ideas of things and the things themselves crowd in upon us4 ,can it be that we know things independently of the avenues of the senses8 ,would a man with different senses know things just as we do8 ,how can any man suffer from an hallucination1 if things are not inferred from images1 but are known independently8 ,the difficulties encountered appear sufficiently serious even if we keep to that knowledge of things which seems to be given in common experience4 ,but even the plain man has heard of atoms and molecules2 and if he accepts the extension of knowledge offered him by the man of science1 he must admit that1 whatever this apparently immediately perceived external thing may be1 it cannot be the external thing that science assures him is out there in space beyond his body1 and which must be a very different sort of thing from the thing he seems to perceive4 ,the thing he perceives must1 then1 be appearance2 and where can that appearance be if not in his own mind8 ,the man who has made no study of philosophy at all does not usually think these things out2 but surely there are interrogation marks written up all over his experience1 and he misses them only because he does not see clearly4 ,by judiciously asking questions one may often lead him either to affirm or to deny that he has an immediate knowledge of the external world1 pretty much as one pleases4 ,if he affirms it1 his position does not seem to be a wholly satisfactory one1 as we have seen2 and if he denies it1 he makes the existence of the external world wholly a matter of inference from the presence of ideas in the mind1 and he must stand ready to justify this inference4 ,to many men it has seemed that the inference is not an easy one to justify4 ,one may say3 ,we could have no ideas of things1 no sensations1 if real things did not exist and make an impression upon our senses4 ,but to this it may be answered3 ,how is that statement to be proved8 ,is it to be proved by observing that1 when things are present and affect the senses1 there come into being ideas which represent the things8 ,evidently such a proof as this is out of the question1 for1 if it is true that we know external things only by inference and never immediately1 then we can never prove by observation that ideas and things are thus connected4 ,and if it is not to be proved by observation1 how shall it be proved8 ,shall we just assume it dogmatically and pass on to something else8 ,surely there is enough in the experience of the plain man to justify him in raising the question whether he can certainly know that there is an external world4 #ac4 ,,the ,,psychologist ,,and ,,the ,,external ,,world4--,we have seen just above that the doubt regarding the existence of the world seems to have its root in the familiar distinction between ideas and things1 appearances and the realities which they are supposed to represent4 ,the psychologist has much to say about ideas2 and if sharpening and making clear this distinction has anything to do with stirring up doubts1 it is natural to suppose that they should become more insistent when one has exchanged the ignorance of everyday life for the knowledge of the psychologist4 ,now1 when the psychologist asks how a given mind comes to have a knowledge of any external thing1 he finds his answer in the messages which have been brought to the mind by means of the bodily senses4 ,he describes the sense-organs and the nervous connections between these and the brain1 and tells us that when certain nervous impulses have traveled1 let us say1 from the eye or the ear to the brain1 one has sensations of sight or sound4 ,he describes for us in detail how1 out of such sensations and the memories of such sensations1 we frame mental images of external things4 ,between the mental image and the thing that it represents he distinguishes sharply1 and he informs us that the mind knows no more about the external thing than is contained in such images4 ,that a thing is present can be known only by the fact that a message from the thing is sent along the nerves1 and what the thing is must be determined from the character of the message4 ,given the image in the absence of the thing1--that is to say1 an hallucination1--the mind will naturally suppose that the thing is present4 ,this false supposition cannot be corrected by a direct inspection of the thing1 for such a direct inspection of things is out of the question4 ,the only way in which the mind concerned can discover that the thing is absent is by referring to its other experiences4 ,this image is compared with other images and is discovered to be in some way abnormal4 ,we decide that it is a false representative and has no corresponding reality behind it4 ,this doctrine taken as it stands seems to cut the mind off from the external world very completely2 and the most curious thing about it is that it seems to be built up on the assumption that it is not really true4 ,how can one know certainly that there is a world of material things1 including human bodies with their sense-organs and nerves1 if no mind has ever been able to inspect directly anything of the sort8 ,how can we tell that a sensation arises when a nervous impulse has been carried along a sensory nerve and has reached the brain1 if every mind is shut up to the charmed circle of its own ideas8 ,the anatomist and the physiologist give us very detailed accounts of the sense-organs and of the brain2 the physiologist even undertakes to measure the speed with which the impulse passes along a nerve2 the psychologist accepts and uses the results of their labors4 ,but can all this be done in the absence of any first-hand knowledge of the things of which one is talking8 ,remember that1 if the psychologist is right1 any external object1 eye1 ear1 nerve1 or brain1 which we can perceive directly1 is a mental complex1 a something in the mind and not external at all4 ,how shall we prove that there are objects1 ears1 eyes1 nerves1 and brains1--in short1 all the requisite mechanism for the calling into existence of sensations1--in an outer world which is not immediately perceived but is only inferred to exist8 ,i do not wish to be regarded as impugning the right of the psychologist to make the assumptions which he does1 and to work as he does4 ,he has a right to assume1 with the plain man1 that there is an external world and that we know it4 ,but a very little reflection must make it manifest that he seems1 at least1 to be guilty of an inconsistency1 and that he who wishes to think clearly should strive to see just where the trouble lies4 ,so much1 at least1 is evident3 the man who is inclined to doubt whether there is1 after all1 any real external world1 appears to find in the psychologist's distinction between ideas and things something like an excuse for his doubt4 ,to get to the bottom of the matter and to dissipate his doubt one has to go rather deeply into metaphysics4 ,i merely wish to show just here that the doubt is not a gratuitous one1 but is really suggested to the thoughtful mind by a reflection upon our experience of things4 ,and1 as we are all apt to think that the man of science is less given to busying himself with useless subtleties than is the philosopher1 ,i shall1 before closing this chapter1 present some paragraphs upon the subject from the pen of a professor of mathematics and mechanics4 #ad4 ,,the ,,telephone ,,exchange4--,we are accustomed to talk1 writes ,professor ,karl ,pearson1#a of the 'external world1' of the 'reality' outside us4 ,we speak of individual objects having an existence independent of our own4 ,the store of past sense-impressions1 our thoughts and memories1 although most probably they have beside their psychical element a close correspondence with some physical change or impress in the brain1 are yet spoken of as inside ourselves4 ,on the other hand1 although if a sensory nerve be divided anywhere short of the brain1 we lose the corresponding class of sense impression1 we yet speak of many sense-impressions1 such as form and texture1 as existing outside ourselves4 ,how close then can we actually get to this supposed world outside ourselves8 ,just as near but no nearer than the brain terminals of the sensory nerves4 ,we are like the clerk in the central telephone exchange who cannot get nearer to his customers than his end of the telephone wires4 ,we are indeed worse off than the clerk1 for to carry out the analogy properly we must suppose him never to have been outside the telephone exchange1 never to have seen a customer or any one like a customer--in short1 never1 except through the telephone wire1 to have come in contact with the outside universe4 ,of that 'real' universe outside himself he would be able to form no direct impression2 the real universe for him would be the aggregate of his constructs from the messages which were caused by the telephone wires in his office4 ,about those messages and the ideas raised in his mind by them he might reason and draw his inferences2 and his conclusions would be correct--for what8 ,for the world of telephonic messages1 for the type of messages that go through the telephone4 ,something definite and valuable he might know with regard to the spheres of action and of thought of his telephonic subscribers1 but outside those spheres he could have no experience4 ,pent up in his office he could never have seen or touched even a telephonic subscriber in himself4 ,very much in the position of such a telephone clerk is the conscious ego of each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves4 ,not a step nearer than those terminals can the ego get to the 'outer world1' and what in and for themselves are the subscribers to its nerve exchange it has no means of ascertaining4 ,messages in the form of sense-impressions come flowing in from that 'outside world1' and these we analyze1 classify1 store up1 and reason about4 ,but of the nature of 'things-in-themselves1' of what may exist at the other end of our system of telephone wires1 we know nothing at all4 ,but the reader1 perhaps1 remarks1 ',i not only see an object1 but ,i can touch it4 ,i can trace the nerve from the tip of my finger to the brain4 ,i am not like the telephone clerk1 ,i can follow my network of wires to their terminals and find what is at the other end of them4' ,can you1 reader8 ,think for a moment whether your ego has for one moment got away from his brain exchange4 ,the sense-impression that you call touch was just as much as sight felt only at the brain end of a sensory nerve4 ,what has told you also of the nerve from the tip of your finger to your brain8 ,why1 sense-impressions also1 messages conveyed along optic or tactile sensory nerves4 ,in truth1 all you have been doing is to employ one subscriber to your telephone exchange to tell you about the wire that goes to a second1 but you are just as far as ever from tracing out for yourself the telephone wires to the individual subscriber and ascertaining what his nature is in and for himself4 ,the immediate sense-impression is just as far removed from what you term the 'outside world' as the store of impresses4 ,if our telephone clerk had recorded by aid of a phonograph certain of the messages from the outside world on past occasions1 then if any telephonic message on its receipt set several phonographs repeating past messages1 we have an image analogous to what goes on in the brain4 ,both telephone and phonograph are equally removed from what the clerk might call the 'real outside world1' but they enable him through their sounds to construct a universe2 he projects those sounds1 which are really inside his office1 outside his office1 and speaks of them as the external universe4 ,this outside world is constructed by him from the contents of the inside sounds1 which differ as widely from things-in-themselves as language1 the symbol1 must always differ from the thing it symbolizes4 ,for our telephone clerk sounds would be the real world1 and yet we can see how conditioned and limited it would be by the range of his particular telephone subscribers and by the contents of their messages4 ,so it is with our brain2 the sounds from telephone and phonograph correspond to immediate and stored sense-impressions4 ,these sense-impressions we project as it were outwards and term the real world outside ourselves4 ,but the things-in-themselves which the sense-impressions symbolize1 the 'reality1' as the metaphysicians wish to call it1 at the other end of the nerve1 remains unknown and is unknowable4 ,reality of the external world lies for science and for us in combinations of form and color and touch--sense-impressions as widely divergent from the thing 'at the other end of the nerve' as the sound of the telephone from the subscriber at the other end of the wire4 ,we are cribbed and confined in this world of sense-impressions like the exchange clerk in his world of sounds1 and not a step beyond can we get4 ,as his world is conditioned and limited by his particular network of wires1 so ours is conditioned by our nervous system1 by our organs of sense4 ,their peculiarities determine what is the nature of the outside world which we construct4 ,it is the similarity in the organs of sense and in the perceptive faculty of all normal human beings which makes the outside world the same1 or practically the same1 for them all4 ,to return to the old analogy1 it is as if two telephone exchanges had very nearly identical groups of subscribers4 ,in this case a wire between the two exchanges would soon convince the imprisoned clerks that they had something in common and peculiar to themselves4 ,that conviction corresponds in our comparison to the recognition of other consciousness4 ,i suggest that this extract be read over carefully1 not once but several times1 and that the reader try to make quite clear to himself the position of the clerk in the telephone exchange1 i4e4 the position of the mind in the body1 as depicted by ,professor ,pearson1 before recourse is had to the criticisms of any one else4 ,one cannot find anywhere better material for critical philosophical reflection4 ,as has been seen1 our author accepts without question1 the psychological doctrine that the mind is shut up within the circle of the messages that are conducted to it along the sensory nerves1 and that it cannot directly perceive anything truly external4 ,he carries his doctrine out to the bitter end in the conclusion that1 since we have never had experience of anything beyond sense-impressions1 and have no ground for an inference to anything beyond1 we must recognize that the only external world of which we know anything is an external world built up out of sense-impressions4 ,it is1 thus1 in the mind1 and is not external at all2 it is only projected outwards1 thought of as though it were beyond us4 ,shall we leave the inconsistent position of the plain man and of the psychologist and take our refuge in this world of projected mental constructs8 ,before the reader makes up his mind to do this1 ,i beg him to consider the following3-- 7#a7 ,if the only external world of which we have a right to speak at all is a construct in the mind or ego1 we may certainly affirm that the world is in the ego1 but does it sound sensible to say that the ego is somewhere in the world8 7#b7 ,if all external things are really inside the mind1 and are only projected outwards1 of course our own bodies1 sense-organs1 nerves1 and brains1 are really inside and are merely projected outwards4 ,now1 do the sense-impressions of which everything is to be constructed come flowing in along these nerves that are really inside8 7#c7 ,can we say1 when a nerve lies entirely within the mind or ego1 that this same mind or ego is nearer to one end of the nerve than it is to the other8 ,how shall we picture to ourselves the conscious ego of each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves8 ,how can the ego place the whole of itself at the end of a nerve which it has constructed within itself8 ,and why is it more difficult for it to get to one end of a nerve like this than it is to get to the other8 7#d7 ,why should the thing at the other end of the nerve remain unknown and unknowable8 ,since the nerve is entirely in the mind1 is purely a mental construct1 can anything whatever be at the end of it without being in the mind8 ,and if the thing in question is not in the mind1 how are we going to prove that it is any nearer to one end of a nerve which is inside the mind than it is to the other8 ,if it may really be said to be at the end of the nerve1 why may we not know it quite as well as we do the end of the nerve1 or any other mental construct8 ,it must be clear to the careful reader of ,professor ,pearson's paragraphs1 that he does not confine himself strictly to the world of mere projections1 to an outer world which is really inner4 ,if he did this1 the distinction between inner and outer would disappear4 ,let us consider for a moment the imprisoned clerk4 ,he is in a telephone exchange1 about him are wires and subscribers4 ,he gets only sounds and must build up his whole universe of things out of sounds4 ,now we are supposing him to be in a telephone exchange1 to be receiving messages1 to be building up a world out of these messages4 ,do we for a moment think of him as building up1 out of the messages which came along the wires1 those identical wires which carried the messages and the subscribers which sent them8 ,never6 we distinguish between the exchange1 with its wires and subscribers1 and the messages received and worked up into a world4 ,in picturing to ourselves the telephone exchange1 we are doing what the plain man and the psychologist do when they distinguish between mind and body1--they never suppose that the messages which come through the senses are identical with the senses through which they come4 ,but suppose we maintain that there is no such thing as a telephone exchange1 with its wires and subscribers1 which is not to be found within some clerk4 ,suppose the real external world is something inner and only projected without1 mistakenly supposed by the unthinking to be without4 ,suppose it is nonsense to speak of a wire which is not in the mind of a clerk4 ,may we under such circumstances describe any clerk as in a telephone exchange8 as receiving messages8 as no nearer to his subscribers than his end of the wire8 ,may we say that sense-impressions come flowing in to him8 ,the whole figure of the telephone exchange becomes an absurdity when we have once placed the exchange within the clerk4 ,nor can we think of two clerks as connected by a wire1 when it is affirmed that every wire must really be in some clerk4 ,the truth is1 that1 in the extracts which ,i have given above and in many other passages in the same volume1 the real external world1 the world which does not exist in the mind but without it1 is much discredited1 and is yet not actually discarded4 ,the ego is placed at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves1 and it receives messages which flow in2 i4e4 the clerk is actually placed in an exchange4 ,that the existence of the exchange is afterward denied in so many words does not mean that it has not played and does not continue to play an important part in the thought of the author4 ,it is interesting to see how a man of science1 whose reflections compel him to deny the existence of the external world that we all seem to perceive and that we somehow recognize as distinct from anything in our minds1 is nevertheless compelled to admit the existence of this world at every turn4 ,but if we do admit it1 what shall we make of it8 ,shall we deny the truth of what the psychologist has to tell us about a knowledge of things only through the sensations to which they give rise8 ,we cannot1 surely1 do that4 ,shall we affirm that we know the external world directly1 and at the same time that we do not know it directly1 but only indirectly1 and through the images which arise in our minds8 ,that seems inconsistent4 ,certainly there is material for reflection here4 ,nevertheless the more we reflect on that material1 the more evident does it become that the plain man cannot be wrong in believing in the external world which seems revealed in his experiences4 ,we find that all attempts to discredit it rest upon the implicit assumption of its existence1 and fall to the ground when that existence is honestly denied4 ,so our problem changes its form4 ,we no longer ask3 ,is there an external world8 but rather3 ,what is the external world1 and how does it differ from the world of mere ideas8 #a ,the ,grammar of ,science1 #b;d ,ed41 ,london1 #aijj1 pp4 #fj-fc4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,sensations ,,and ,,things #ae4 ,,sense ,,and ,,imagination4--,every one distinguishes between things perceived and things only imagined4 ,with open eyes ,i see the desk before me2 with eyes closed1 ,i can imagine it4 ,i lay my hand on it and feel it2 ,i can1 without laying my hand on it1 imagine that ,i feel it4 ,i raise my eyes1 and see the pictures on the wall opposite me2 ,i can sit here and call before my mind the image of the door by which the house is entered4 ,what is the difference between sense and imagination8 ,it must be a difference of which we are all somehow conscious1 for we unhesitatingly distinguish between the things we perceive and the things we merely imagine4 ,it is well to remember at the outset that the two classes of experiences are not wholly different4 ,the blue color that ,i imagine seems blue4 ,it does not lose this quality because it is only imaginary4 ,the horse that ,i imagine seems to have four legs1 like a horse perceived4 ,as ,i call it before my mind1 it seems as large as the real horse4 ,neither the color1 nor the size1 nor the distribution of parts1 nor any other attribute of the sort appears to be different in the imaginary object from what it is in the object as given in sensation4 ,the two experiences are1 nevertheless1 not the same2 and every one knows that they are not the same4 ,one difference that roughly marks out the two classes of experiences from one another is that1 as a rule1 our sense-experiences are more vivid than are the images that exist in the imagination4 ,i say1 as a rule1 for we cannot always remark this difference4 ,sensations may be very clear and unmistakable1 but they may also be very faint and indefinite4 ,when a man lays his hand firmly on my shoulder1 ,i may be in little doubt whether ,i feel a sensation or do not2 but when he touches my back very lightly1 ,i may easily be in doubt1 and may ask myself in perplexity whether ,i have really been touched or whether ,i have merely imagined it4 ,as a vessel recedes and becomes a mere speck upon the horizon1 ,i may well wonder1 before ,i feel sure that it is really quite out of sight1 whether ,i still see the dim little point1 or whether ,i merely imagine that ,i see it4 ,on the other hand1 things merely imagined may sometimes be very vivid and insistent4 ,to some persons1 what exists in the imagination is dim and indefinite in the extreme4 ,others imagine things vividly1 and can describe what is present only to the imagination almost as though it were something seen4 ,finally1 we know that an image may become so vivid and insistent as to be mistaken for an external thing4 ,that is to say1 there are such things as hallucinations4 ,the criterion of vividness will not1 therefore1 always serve to distinguish between what is given in the sense and what is only imagined4 ,and1 indeed1 it becomes evident1 upon reflection1 that we do not actually make it our ultimate test4 ,we may be quite willing to admit that faint sensations may come to be confused with what is imagined1 with ideas1 but we always regard such a confusion as somebody's error4 ,we are not ready to admit that things perceived faintly are things imagined1 or that vivid ideas are things perceived by sense4 ,let us come back to the illustrations with which we started4 ,how do ,i know that ,i perceive the desk before me2 and how do ,i know that1 sitting here1 ,i imagine1 and do not see1 the front door of the house8 ,my criterion is this3 when ,i have the experience ,i call seeing my desk1 the bit of experience which presents itself as my desk is in a certain setting4 ,that is to say1 the desk seen must be in a certain relation to my body1 and this body1 as ,i know it1 also consists of experiences4 ,thus1 if ,i am to know that ,i see the desk1 ,i must realize that my eyes are open1 that the object is in front of me and not behind me1 etc4 ,the desk as seen varies with the relation to the body in certain ways that we regard as natural and explicable4 ,when ,i am near it1 the visual experience is not just what it is when ,i recede from it4 ,but how can ,i know that ,i am near the desk or far from it8 ,what do these expressions mean8 ,their full meaning will become clearer in the next chapter1 but here ,i may say that nearness and remoteness must be measured for me in experiences of some sort1 or ,i would never know anything as near to or far from my body4 ,thus1 all our sensory experiences are experiences that fall into a certain system or order4 ,it is a system which we all recognize implicitly1 for we all reject as merely imaginary those experiences which lack this setting4 ,if my eyes are shut--,i am speaking now of the eyes as experienced1 as felt or perceived1 as given in sensation--,i never say2 ,i see my desk1 no matter how vivid the image of the object4 ,those who believe in second sight sometimes talk of seeing things not in this setting1 but the very name they give to the supposed experience indicates that there is something abnormal about it4 ,no one thinks it remarkable that ,i see the desk before which ,i perceive myself to be sitting with open eyes4 ,every one would think it strange if ,i could see and describe the table in the next room1 now shut away from me4 ,when a man thinks he hears his name pronounced1 and1 turning his head1 seeks in vain for the speaker1 he sets his experience down as a hallucination4 ,he says1 ,i did not really hear that2 ,i merely imagined it4 ,may one not1 with open eyes1 have a hallucination of vision1 just as one may seem to hear one's name pronounced when no one is by8 ,certainly4 ,but in each case the experience may be proved to be a hallucination1 nevertheless4 ,it may be recognized that the sensory setting is incomplete1 though it may not1 at first1 seem so4 ,thus the unreal object which seems to be seen may be found to be a thing that cannot be touched4 ,or1 when one has attained to a relatively complete knowledge of the system of experiences recognized as sensory1 one may make use of roundabout methods of ascertaining that the experience in question does not really have the right setting4 ,thus1 the ghost which is seen by the terrified peasant at midnight1 but which cannot be photographed1 we may unhesitatingly set down as something imagined and not really seen4 ,all our sensations are1 therefore1 experiences which take their place in a certain setting4 ,this is our ultimate criterion4 ,we need not take the word of the philosopher for it4 ,we need only reflect1 and ask ourselves how we know that1 in a given case1 we are seeing or hearing or touching something1 and are not merely imagining it4 ,in every case1 we shall find that we come back to the same test4 ,in common life1 we apply the test instinctively1 and with little realization of what we are doing4 ,and if we turn to the psychologist1 whose business it is to be more exact and scientific1 we find that he gives us only a refinement of this same criterion4 ,it is important to him to distinguish between what is given in sensation and what is furnished by memory or imagination1 and he tells us that sensation is the result of a message conducted along a sensory nerve to the brain4 ,here we see emphasized the relation to the body which has been mentioned above4 ,if we ask the psychologist how he knows that the body he is talking about is a real body1 and not merely an imagined one1 he has to fall back upon the test which is common to us all4 ,a real hand is one which we see with the eyes open1 and which we touch with the other hand4 ,if our experiences of our own body had not the setting which marks all sensory experiences1 we could never say3 ,i perceive that my body is near the desk4 ,when we call our body real1 as contrasted with things imaginary1 we recognize that this group of experiences belongs to the class described2 it is given in sensation1 and is not merely thought of4 ,it will be observed that1 in distinguishing between sensations and things imaginary1 we never go beyond the circle of our experiences4 ,we do not reach out to a something beyond or behind experiences1 and say3 ,when such a reality is present1 we may affirm that we have a sensation1 and when it is not1 we may call the experience imaginary4 ,if there were such a reality as this1 it would do us little good1 for since it is not supposed to be perceived directly1 we should have to depend upon the sensations to prove the presence of the reality1 and could not turn to the reality and ask it whether we were or were not experiencing a sensation4 ,the distinction between sensations and what is imaginary is an observed distinction4 ,it can be proved that some experiences are sensory and that some are not4 ,this means that1 in drawing the distinction1 we remain within the circle of our experiences4 ,there has been much unnecessary mystification touching this supposed reality behind experiences4 ,in the next chapter we shall see in what senses the word reality may properly be used1 and in what sense it may not4 ,there is a danger in using it loosely and vaguely4 #af4 ,,may ,,we ,,call ,,things ,,groups ,,of ,,sensations8--,now1 the external world seems to the plain man to be directly given in his sense experiences4 ,he is willing to admit that the table in the next room1 of which he is merely thinking1 is known at one remove1 so to speak4 ,but this desk here before him3 is it not known directly8 ,not the mental image1 the mere representative1 but the desk itself1 a something that is physical and not mental8 ,and the psychologist1 whatever his theory of the relation between the mind and the world1 seems to support him1 at least1 in so far as to maintain that in sensation the external world is known as directly as it is possible for the external world to be known1 and that one can get no more of it than is presented in sensation4 ,if a sense is lacking1 an aspect of the world as given is also lacking2 if a sense is defective1 as in the color-blind1 the defect is reflected in the world upon which one gazes4 ,such considerations1 especially when taken together with what has been said at the close of the last section about the futility of looking for a reality behind our sensations1 may easily suggest rather a startling possibility4 ,may it not be1 if we really are shut up to the circle of our experiences1 that the physical things1 which we have been accustomed to look upon as non-mental1 are nothing more than complexes of sensations8 ,granted that there seems to be presented in our experience a material world as well as a mind1 may it not be that this material world is a mental thing of a certain kind--a mental thing contrasted with other mental things1 such as imaginary things8 ,this question has always been answered in the affirmative by the idealists1 who claim that all existence must be regarded as psychical existence4 ,their doctrine we shall consider later 7sections #di and #ec74 ,it will be noticed that we seem to be back again with ,professor ,pearson in the last chapter4 ,to this question ,i make the following answer3 ,in the first place1 ,i remark that even the plain man distinguishes somehow between his sensations and external things4 ,he thinks that he has reason to believe that things do not cease to exist when he no longer has sensations4 ,moreover1 he believes that things do not always appear to his senses as they really are4 ,if we tell him that his sensations are the things1 it shocks his common sense4 ,he answers3 ,do you mean to tell me that complexes of sensation can be on a shelf or in a drawer8 can be cut with a knife or broken with the hands8 ,he feels that there must be some real distinction between sensations and the things without him4 ,now1 the notions of the plain man on such matters as these are not very clear1 and what he says about sensations and things is not always edifying4 ,but it is clear that he feels strongly that the man who would identify them is obliterating a distinction to which his experience testifies unequivocally4 ,we must not hastily disregard his protest4 ,he is sometimes right in his feeling that things are not identical1 even when he cannot prove it4 ,in the second place1 ,i remark that1 in this instance1 the plain man is in the right1 and can be shown to be in the right4 ,things are not groups of sensations4 ,the distinction between them will be explained in the next section4 #ag4 ,,the ,,distinction ,,between ,,sensations ,,and ,,things--,suppose that ,i stand in my study and look at the fire in the grate4 ,i am experiencing sensations1 and am not busied merely with an imaginary fire4 ,but may my whole experience of the fire be summed up as an experience of sensations and their changes8 ,let us see4 ,if ,i shut my eyes1 the fire disappears4 ,does any one suppose that the fire has been annihilated8 ,no4 ,we say1 ,i no longer see it1 but nothing has happened to the fire4 ,again1 ,i may keep my eyes open1 and simply turn my head4 ,the fire disappears once more4 ,does any one suppose that my turning my head has done anything to the fire8 ,we say unhesitatingly1 my sensations have changed1 but the fire has remained as it was4 ,still1 again1 ,i may withdraw from the fire4 ,its heat seems to be diminished4 ,has the fire really grown less hot8 ,and if ,i could withdraw to a sufficient distance1 ,i know that the fire would appear to me smaller and less bright4 ,could ,i get far enough away to make it seem the faintest speck in the field of vision1 would ,i be tempted to claim that the fire shrunk and grew faint merely because ,i walked away from it8 ,surely not4 ,now1 suppose that ,i stand on the same spot and look at the fire without turning my head4 ,the stick at which ,i am gazing catches the flame1 blazes up1 turns red1 and finally falls together1 a little mass of gray ashes4 ,shall ,i describe this by saying that my sensations have changed1 or may ,i say that the fire itself has changed8 ,the plain man and the philosopher alike use the latter expression in such a case as this4 ,let us take another illustration4 ,i walk towards the distant house on the plain before me4 ,what ,i see as my goal seems to grow larger and brighter4 ,it does not occur to me to maintain that the house changes as ,i advance4 ,but1 at a given instant1 changes of a different sort make their appearance4 ,smoke arises1 and flames burst from the roof4 ,now ,i have no hesitation in saying that changes are taking place in the house4 ,it would seem foolish to describe the occurrence as a mere change in my sensations4 ,before it was my sensations that changed2 now it is the house itself4 ,we are drawing this distinction between changes in our sensations and changes in things at every hour in the day4 ,i cannot move without making things appear and disappear4 ,if ,i wag my head1 the furniture seems to dance1 and ,i regard it as a mere seeming4 ,i count on the clock's going when ,i no longer look upon its face4 ,it would be absurd to hold that the distinction is a mere blunder1 and has no foundation in our experience4 ,the rle it plays is too important for that4 ,if we obliterate it1 the real world of material things which seems to be revealed in our experience melts into a chaos of fantastic experiences whose appearances and disappearances seem to be subject to no law4 ,and it is worthy of remark that it is not merely in common life that the distinction is drawn4 ,every man of science must give heed to it4 ,the psychologist does1 it is true1 pay much attention to sensations2 but even he distinguishes between the sensations which he is studying and the material things to which he relates them1 such as brains and sense-organs4 ,and those who cultivate the physical sciences strive1 when they give an account of things and their behavior1 to lay before us a history of changes analogous to the burning of the stick and of the house1 excluding mere changes in sensations4 ,there is no physicist or botanist or zologist who has not our common experience that things as perceived by us--our experiences of things--appear or disappear or change their character when we open or shut our eyes or move about4 ,but nothing of all this appears in their books4 ,what they are concerned with is things and their changes1 and they do not consider such matters as these as falling within their province4 ,if a botanist could not distinguish between the changes which take place in a plant1 and the changes which take place in his sensations as he is occupied in studying the plant1 but should tell us that the plant grows smaller as one recedes from it1 we should set him down as weak-minded4 ,that the distinction is everywhere drawn1 and that we must not obliterate it1 is very evident4 ,but we are in the presence of what has seemed to many men a grave difficulty4 ,are not things presented in our experience only as we have sensations8 what is it to perceive a thing8 is it not to have sensations8 how1 then1 can we distinguish between sensations and things8 ,we certainly do so all the time1 in spite of the protest of the philosopher2 but many of us do so with a haunting sense that our behavior can scarcely be justified by the reason4 ,our difficulty1 however1 springs out of an error of our own4 ,grasping imperfectly the full significance of the word sensation1 we extend its use beyond what is legitimate1 and we call by that name experiences which are not sensations at all4 ,thus the external world comes to seem to us to be not really a something contrasted with the mental1 but a part of the mental world4 ,we accord to it the attributes of the latter1 and rob it of those distinguishing attributes which belong to it by right4 ,when we have done this1 we may feel impelled to say1 as did ,professor ,pearson1 that things are not really outside of us1 as they seem to be1 but are merely projected outside--thought of as if they were outside4 ,all this ,i must explain at length4 ,let us come back to the first of the illustrations given above1 the case of the fire in my study4 ,as ,i stand and look at it1 what shall ,i call the red glow which ,i observe8 ,shall ,i call it a quality of a thing1 or shall ,i call it a sensation8 ,to this ,i answer3 ,i may call it either the one or the other1 according to its setting among other experiences4 ,we have seen 7section #ae7 that sensations and things merely imaginary are distinguished from one another by their setting4 ,with open eyes we see things2 with our eyes closed we can imagine them3 we see what is before us2 we imagine what lies behind our backs4 ,if we confine our attention to the bit of experience itself1 we have no means of determining whether it is sensory or imaginary4 ,only its setting can decide that point4 ,here1 we have come to another distinction of much the same sort4 ,that red glow1 that bit of experience1 taken by itself and abstracted from all other experiences1 cannot be called either a sensation or the quality of a thing4 ,only its context can give us the right to call it the one or the other4 ,this ought to become clear when we reflect upon the illustration of the fire4 ,we have seen that one whole series of changes has been unhesitatingly described as a series of changes in my sensations4 ,why was this8 ,because it was observed to depend upon changes in the relations of my body1 my senses 7a certain group of experiences71 to the bit of experience ,i call the fire4 ,another series was described as a series of changes in the fire4 ,why8 ,because1 the relation to my senses remaining unchanged1 changes still took place1 and had to be accounted for in other ways4 ,it is a matter of common knowledge that they can be accounted for in other ways4 ,this is not a discovery of the philosopher4 ,he can only invite us to think over the matter and see what the unlearned and the learned are doing at every moment4 ,sometimes they are noticing that experiences change as they turn their heads or walk toward or away from objects2 sometimes they abstract from this1 and consider the series of changes that take place independently of this4 ,that bit of experience1 that red glow1 is not related only to my body4 ,such experiences are related also to each other2 they stand in a vast independent system of relations1 which1 as we have seen1 the man of science can study without troubling himself to consider sensations at all4 ,this system is the external world--the external world as known or as knowable1 the only external world that it means anything for us to talk about4 ,as having its place in this system1 a bit of experience is not a sensation1 but is a quality or aspect of a thing4 ,sensations1 then1 to be sensations1 must be bits of experience considered in their relation to some organ of sense4 ,they should never be confused with qualities of things1 which are experiences in a different setting4 ,it is as unpardonable to confound the two as it is to confound sensations with things imaginary4 ,we may not1 therefore1 say that things are groups of sensations4 ,we may1 if we please1 describe them as complexes of qualities4 ,and we may not say that the things we perceive are really inside of us and are merely projected outside4 ,what can inside and outside mean8 ,only this4 ,we recognize in our experience two distinct orders1 the objective order1 the system of phenomena which constitutes the material world1 and the subjective order1 the order of things mental1 to which belong sensations and ideas4 ,that is outside which belongs to the objective order4 ,the word has no other meaning when used in this connection4 ,that is inside which belongs to the subjective order1 and is contrasted with the former4 ,if we deny that there is an objective order1 an external world1 and say that everything is inside1 we lose our distinction1 and even the word inside becomes meaningless4 ,it indicates no contrast4 ,when men fall into the error of talking in this way1 what they do is to keep the external world and gain the distinction1 and at the same time to deny the existence of the world which has furnished it4 ,in other words1 they put the clerk into a telephone exchange1 and then tell us that the exchange does not really exist4 ,he is inside--of what8 ,he is inside of nothing4 ,then1 can he really be inside8 ,we see1 thus1 that the plain man and the man of science are quite right in accepting the external world4 ,the objective order is known as directly as is the subjective order4 ,both are orders of experiences2 they are open to observation1 and we have1 in general1 little difficulty in distinguishing between them1 as the illustrations given above amply prove4 #ah4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,material ,,things4--,one difficulty seems to remain and to call for a solution4 ,we all believe that material things exist when we no longer perceive them4 ,we believe that they existed before they came within the field of our observation4 ,in these positions the man of science supports us4 ,the astronomer has no hesitation in saying that the comet1 which has sailed away through space1 exists1 and will return4 ,the geologist describes for us the world as it was in past ages1 when no eye was opened upon it4 ,but has it not been stated above that the material world is an order of experiences8 and can there be such a thing as an experience that is not experienced by somebody8 ,in other words1 can the world exist1 except as it is perceived to exist8 ,this seeming difficulty has occasioned much trouble to philosophers in the past4 ,bishop ,berkeley 7#afhd-agec7 said1 ,to exist is to be perceived4 ,there are those who agree with him at the present day4 ,their difficulty would have disappeared had they examined with sufficient care the meaning of the word exist4 ,we have no right to pass over the actual uses of such words1 and to give them a meaning of our own4 ,if one thing seems as certain as any other1 it is that material things exist when we do not perceive them4 ,on what ground may the philosopher combat the universal opinion1 the dictum of common sense and of science8 ,when we look into his reasonings1 we find that he is influenced by the error discussed at length in the last section--he has confused the phenomena of the two orders of experience4 ,i have said that1 when we concern ourselves with the objective order1 we abstract or should abstract1 from the relations which things bear to our senses4 ,we account for phenomena by referring to other phenomena which we have reason to accept as their physical conditions or causes4 ,we do not consider that a physical cause is effective only while we perceive it4 ,when we come back to this notion of our perceiving a thing or not perceiving it1 we have left the objective order and passed over to the subjective4 ,we have left the consideration of things and have turned to sensations4 ,there is no reason why we should do this4 ,the physical order is an independent order1 as we have seen4 ,the man of science1 when he is endeavoring to discover whether some thing or quality of a thing really existed at some time in the past1 is not in the least concerned to establish the fact that some one saw it4 ,no one ever saw the primitive fire-mist from which1 as we are told1 the world came into being4 ,but the scientist cares little for that4 ,he is concerned only to prove that the phenomena he is investigating really have a place in the objective order4 ,if he decides that they have1 he is satisfied2 he has proved something to exist4 ,to belong to the objective order is to exist as a physical thing or quality4 ,when the plain man and the man of science maintain that a physical thing exists1 they use the word in precisely the same sense4 ,the meaning they give to it is the proper meaning of the word4 ,it is justified by immemorial usage1 and it marks a real distinction4 ,shall we allow the philosopher to tell us that we must not use it in this sense1 but must say that only sensations and ideas exist8 ,surely not4 ,this would mean that we permit him to obliterate for us the distinction between the external world and what is mental4 ,but is it right to use the word experience to indicate the phenomena which have a place in the objective order8 ,can an experience be anything but mental8 ,there can be no doubt that the suggestions of the word are unfortunate--it has what we may call a subjective flavor4 ,it suggests that1 after all1 the things we perceive are sensations or percepts1 and must1 to exist at all1 exist in a mind4 ,as we have seen1 this is an error1 and an error which we all avoid in actual practice4 ,we do not take sensations for things1 and we recognize clearly enough that it is one thing for a material object to exist and another for it to be perceived4 ,why1 then1 use the word experience8 ,simply because we have no better word4 ,we must use it1 and not be misled by the associations which cling to it4 ,the word has this great advantage3 it brings out clearly the fact that all our knowledge of the external world rests ultimately upon those phenomena which1 when we consider them in relation to our senses1 we recognize as sensations4 ,we cannot start out from mere imaginings to discover what the world was like in the ages past4 ,it is this truth that is recognized by the plain man1 when he maintains that1 in the last resort1 we can know things only in so far as we see1 touch1 hear1 taste1 and smell them2 and by the psychologist1 when he tells us that1 in sensation1 the external world is revealed as directly as it is possible that it could be revealed4 ,but it is a travesty on this truth to say that we do not know things1 but know only our sensations of sight1 touch1 taste1 hearing1 and the like4#a #a ,see the note on this chapter at the close of the volume4 ,,chapter ,v ,,appearances ,,and ,,realities #ai4 ,,things ,,and ,,their ,,appearances4--,we have seen in the last chapter that there is an external world and that it is given in our experience4 ,there is an objective order1 and we are all capable of distinguishing between it and the subjective4 ,he who says that we perceive only sensations and ideas flies in the face of the common experience of mankind4 ,but we are not yet through with the subject4 ,we all make a distinction between things as they appear and things as they really are4 ,if we ask the plain man1 ,what is the real external world8 the first answer that seems to present itself to his mind is this3 ,whatever we can see1 hear1 touch1 taste1 or smell may be regarded as belonging to the real world4 ,what we merely imagine does not belong to it4 ,that this answer is not a very satisfactory one occurred to men's minds very early in the history of reflective thought4 ,the ancient skeptic said to himself3 ,the colors of objects vary according to the light1 and according to the position and distance of the objects2 can we say that any object has a real color of its own8 ,a staff stuck into water looks bent1 but feels straight to the touch2 why believe the testimony of one sense rather than that of another8 ,such questionings led to far-reaching consequences4 ,they resulted in a forlorn distrust of the testimony of the senses1 and to a doubt as to our ability to know anything as it really is4 ,now1 the distinction between appearances and realities exists for us as well as for the ancient skeptic1 and without being tempted to make such extravagant statements as that there is no such thing as truth1 and that every appearance is as real as any other1 we may admit that it is not very easy to see the full significance of the distinction1 although we are referring to it constantly4 ,for example1 we look from our window and see1 as we say1 a tree at a distance4 ,what we are conscious of is a small bluish patch of color4 ,now1 a small bluish patch of color is not1 strictly speaking1 a tree2 but for us it represents the tree4 ,suppose that we walk toward the tree4 ,do we continue to see what we saw before8 ,of course1 we say that we continue to see the same tree2 but it is plain that what we immediately perceive1 what is given in consciousness1 does not remain the same as we move4 ,our blue patch of color grows larger and larger2 it ceases to be blue and faint2 at the last it has been replaced by an expanse of vivid green1 and we see the tree just before us4 ,during our whole walk we have been seeing the tree4 ,this appears to mean that we have been having a whole series of visual experiences1 no two of which were just alike1 and each of which was taken as a representative of the tree4 ,which of these representatives is most like the tree8 ,is the tree really a faint blue1 or is it really a vivid green8 ,or is it of some intermediate color8 ,probably most persons will be inclined to maintain that the tree only seems blue at a distance1 but that it really is green1 as it appears when one is close to it4 ,in a sense1 the statement is just2 yet some of those who make it would be puzzled to tell by what right they pick out of the whole series of experiences1 each of which represents the tree as seen from some particular position1 one individual experience1 which they claim not only represents the tree as seen from a given point but also represents it as it is4 ,does this particular experience bear some peculiar earmark which tells us that it is like the real tree while the others are unlike it8 #bj4 ,,real ,,things4--,and what is this real tree that we are supposed to see as it is when we are close to it8 ,about two hundred years ago the philosopher ,berkeley pointed out that the distinction commonly made between things as they look1 the apparent1 and things as they are1 the real1 is at bottom the distinction between things as presented to the sense of sight and things as presented to the sense of touch4 ,the acute analysis which he made has held its own ever since4 ,we have seen that1 in walking towards the tree1 we have a long series of visual experiences1 each of which differs more or less from all of the others4 ,nevertheless1 from the beginning of our progress to the end1 we say that we are looking at the same tree4 ,the images change color and grow larger4 ,we do not say that the tree changes color and grows larger4 ,why do we speak as we do8 ,it is because1 all along the line1 we mean by the real tree1 not what is given to the sense of sight1 but something for which this stands as a sign4 ,this something must be given in our experience somewhere1 we must be able to perceive it under some circumstances or other1 or it would never occur to us to recognize the visual experiences as signs1 and we should never say that in being conscious of them in succession we are looking at the same tree4 ,they are certainly not the same with each other2 how can we know that they all stand for the same thing1 unless we have had experience of a connection of the whole series with one thing8 ,this thing for which so many different visual experiences may serve as signs is the thing revealed in experiences of touch4 ,when we ask3 ,in what direction is the tree8 ,how far away is the tree8 ,how big is the tree8 we are always referring to the tree revealed in touch4 ,it is nonsense to say that what we see is far away1 if by what we see we mean the visual experience itself4 ,as soon as we move we lose that visual experience and get another1 and to recover the one we lost we must go back where we were before4 ,when we say we see a tree at a distance1 we must mean1 then1 that we know from certain visual experiences which we have that by moving a certain distance we will be able to touch a tree4 ,and what does it mean to move a certain distance8 ,in the last analysis it means to us to have a certain quantity of movement sensations4 ,thus the real world of things1 for which experiences of sight serve as signs1 is a world revealed in experiences of touch and movement1 and when we speak of real positions1 distances1 and magnitudes1 we are always referring to this world4 ,but this is a world revealed in our experience1 and it does not seem a hopeless task to discover what may properly be called real and what should be described as merely apparent1 when both the real and the apparent are open to our inspection4 ,can we not find in this analysis a satisfactory explanation of the plain man's claim that under certain circumstances he sees the tree as it is and under others he does not8 ,what he is really asserting is that one visual experience gives him better information regarding the real thing1 the touch thing1 than does another4 ,but what shall we say of his claim that the tree is really green1 and only looks blue under certain circumstances8 ,is it not just as true that the tree only looks green under certain circumstances8 ,is color any part of the touch thing8 ,is it ever more than a sign of the touch thing8 ,how can one color be more real than another8 ,now1 we may hold to ,berkeley's analysis and maintain that1 in general1 the real world1 as contrasted with the apparent1 means to us the world that is revealed in experiences of touch and movement2 and yet we may admit that the word real is sometimes used in rather different senses4 ,it does not seem absurd for a woman to ,say3 ,this piece of silk really is yellow2 it only looks white under this light4 ,we all admit that a white house may look pink under the rays of the setting sun1 and we never call it a pink house4 ,we have seen that it is not unnatural to say3 ,that tree is really green2 it is only its distance that makes it look blue4 ,when one reflects upon these uses of the word real1 one recognizes the fact that1 among all the experiences in which things are revealed to us1 certain experiences impress us as being more prominent or important or serviceable than certain others1 and they come to be called real4 ,things are not commonly seen by artificial light2 the sun is not always setting2 the tree looks green when it is seen most satisfactorily4 ,in each case1 the real color of the thing is the color that it has under circumstances that strike us as normal or as important4 ,we cannot say that we always regard as most real that aspect under which we most commonly perceive things1 for if a more unusual experience is more serviceable and really gives us more information about the thing1 we give the preference to that4 ,thus we look with the naked eye at a moving speck on the table before us1 and we are unable to distinguish its parts4 ,we place a microscope over the speck and perceive an insect with all its members4 ,the second experience is the more unusual one1 but would not every one say3 ,now we perceive the thing as it is8 #ba4 ,,ultimate ,,real ,,things4--,let us turn away from the senses of the word real1 which recognize one color or taste or odor as more real than another1 and come back to the real world of things presented in sensations of touch4 ,all other classes of sensations may be regarded as related to this as the series of visual experiences above mentioned was related to the one tree which was spoken of as revealed in them all1 the touch tree of which they gave information4 ,can we say that this world is always to be regarded as reality and never as appearance8 ,we have already seen 7section #h7 that science does not regard as anything more than appearance the real things which seem to be directly presented in our experience4 ,this pen that ,i hold in my hand seems1 as ,i pass my fingers over it1 to be continuously extended4 ,it does not appear to present an alternation of filled spaces and empty spaces4 ,i am told that it is composed of molecules in rapid motion and at considerable distances from one another4 ,i am further told that each molecule is composed of atoms1 and is1 in its turn1 not a continuous thing1 but1 so to speak1 a group of little things4 ,if ,i accept this doctrine1 as it seems ,i must1 am ,i not forced to conclude that the reality which is given in my experience1 the reality with which ,i have contrasted appearances and to which ,i have referred them1 is1 after all1 itself only an appearance8 ,the touch things which ,i have hitherto regarded as the real things that make up the external world1 the touch things for which all my visual experiences have served as signs1 are1 then1 not themselves real external things1 but only the appearances under which real external things1 themselves imperceptible1 manifest themselves to me4 ,it seems1 then1 that ,i do not directly perceive any real thing1 or1 at least1 anything that can be regarded as more than an appearance4 ,what1 then1 is the external world8 ,what are things really like8 ,can we give any true account of them1 or are we forced to say with the skeptics that we only know how things seem to us1 and must abandon the attempt to tell what they are really like8 ,now1 before one sets out to answer a question it is well to find out whether it is a sensible question to ask and a sensible question to try to answer4 ,he who asks3 ,where is the middle of an infinite line8 ,when did all time begin8 ,where is space as a whole8 does not deserve a serious answer to his questions4 ,and it is well to remember that he who asks3 ,what is the external world like8 must keep his question a significant one1 if he is to retain his right to look for an answer at all4 ,he has manifestly no right to ask us3 ,how does the external world look when no one is looking8 ,how do things feel when no one feels them8 ,how shall ,i think of things1 not as ,i think of them1 but as they are8 ,if we are to give an account of the external world at all1 it must evidently be an account of the external world2 i4e4 it must be given in terms of our experience of things4 ,the only legitimate problem is to give a true account instead of a false one1 to distinguish between what only appears and is not real and what both appears and is real4 ,bearing this in mind1 let us come back to the plain man's experience of the world4 ,he certainly seems to himself to perceive a real world of things1 and he constantly distinguishes1 in a way very serviceable to himself1 between the merely apparent and the real4 ,there is1 of course1 a sense in which every experience is real2 it is1 at least1 an experience2 but when he contrasts real and apparent he means something more than this4 ,experiences are not relegated to this class or to that merely at random1 but the final decision is the outcome of a long experience of the differences which characterize different individual experiences and is an expression of the relations which are observed to hold between them4 ,certain experiences are accepted as signs1 and certain others come to take the more dignified position of thing signified2 the mind rests in them and regards them as the real4 ,we have seen above that the world of real things in which the plain man finds himself is a world of objects revealed in experiences of touch4 ,when he asks regarding anything3 ,how far away is it8 ,how big is it8 ,in what direction is it8 it is always the touch thing that interests him4 ,what is given to the other senses is only a sign of this4 ,we have also seen 7section #h7 that the world of atoms and molecules of which the man of science tells us is nothing more than a further development of the world of the plain man4 ,the real things with which science concerns itself are1 after all1 only minute touch things1 conceived just as are the things with which the plain man is familiar4 ,they exist in space and move about in space1 as the things about us are perceived to exist in space and move about in space4 ,they have size and position1 and are separated by distances4 ,we do not perceive them1 it is true2 but we conceive them after the analogy of the things that we do perceive1 and it is not inconceivable that1 if our senses were vastly more acute1 we might perceive them directly4 ,now1 when we conclude that the things directly perceptible to the sense of touch are to be regarded as appearances1 as signs of the presence of these minuter things1 do we draw such a conclusion arbitrarily8 ,by no means4 ,the distinction between appearance and reality is drawn here just as it is drawn in the world of our common everyday experiences4 ,the great majority of the touch things about us we are not actually touching at any given moment4 ,we only see the things1 i4e4 we have certain signs of their presence4 ,none the less we believe that the things exist all the time4 ,and in the same way the man of science does not doubt the existence of the real things of which he speaks2 he perceives their signs4 ,that certain experiences are to be taken as signs of such realities he has established by innumerable observations and careful deductions from those observations4 ,to see the full force of his reasonings one must read some work setting forth the history of the atomic theory4 ,if1 then1 we ask the question3 ,what is the real external world8 it is clear that we cannot answer it satisfactorily without taking into consideration the somewhat shifting senses of the word real4 ,what is the real external world to the plain man8 ,it is the world of touch things1 of objects upon which he can lay his hands4 ,what is the real external world to the man of science8 ,it is the world of atoms and molecules1 of minuter touch things that he cannot actually touch1 but which he conceives as though he could touch them4 ,it should be observed that the man of science has no right to deny the real world which is revealed in the experience of the plain man4 ,in all his dealings with the things which interest him in common life1 he refers to this world just as the plain man does4 ,he sees a tree and walks towards it1 and distinguishes between its real and its apparent color1 its real and its apparent size4 ,he talks about seeing things as they are1 or not seeing things as they are4 ,these distinctions in his experience of things remain even after he has come to believe in atoms and molecules4 ,thus1 the touch object1 the tree as he feels it under his hand1 may come to be regarded as the sign of the presence of those entities that science seems1 at present1 to regard as ultimate4 ,does this prevent it from being the object which has stood as the interpreter of all those diverse visual sensations that we have called different views of the tree8 ,they are still the appearances1 and it1 relatively to them1 is the reality4 ,now we find that it1 in its turn1 can be used as a sign of something else1 can be regarded as an appearance of a reality more ultimate4 ,it is clear1 then1 that the same thing may be regarded both as appearance and as reality--appearance as contrasted with one thing1 and reality as contrasted with another4 ,but suppose one says3 ,i do not want to know what the real external world is to this man or to that man2 ,i want to know what the real external world is4 ,what shall we say to such a demand8 ,there is a sense in which such a demand is not purely meaningless1 though it may not be a very sensible demand to make4 ,we have seen that an increase of knowledge about things compels a man to pass from the real things of common life to the real things of science1 and to look upon the former as appearance4 ,now1 a man may arbitrarily decide that he will use the word reality to indicate only that which can never in its turn be regarded as appearance1 a reality which must remain an ultimate reality2 and he may insist upon our telling him about that4 ,how a man not a soothsayer can tell when he has come to ultimate reality1 it is not easy to see4 ,suppose1 however1 that we could give any one such information4 ,we should then be telling him about things as they are1 it is true1 but his knowledge of things would not be different in kind from what it was before4 ,the only difference between such a knowledge of things and a knowledge of things not known to be ultimate would be that1 in the former case1 it would be recognized that no further extension of knowledge was possible4 ,the distinction between appearance and reality would remain just what it was in the experience of the plain man4 #bb4 ,,the ,,bugbear ,,of ,,the ,,unknowable4--,it is very important to recognize that we must not go on talking about appearance and reality1 as if our words really meant something1 when we have quite turned our backs upon our experience of appearances and the realities which they represent4 ,that appearances and realities are connected we know very well1 for we perceive them to be connected4 ,what we see1 we can touch4 ,and we not only know that appearances and realities are connected1 but we know with much detail what appearances are to be taken as signs of what realities4 ,the visual experience which ,i call the house as seen from a distance ,i never think of taking for a representative of the hat which ,i hold in my hand4 ,this visual experience ,i refer to its own appropriate touch thing1 and not to another4 ,if what looks like a beefsteak could really be a fork or a mountain or a kitten indifferently1--but ,i must not even finish the sentence1 for the words look like and could really be lose all significance when we loosen the bond between appearances and the realities to which they are properly referred4 ,each appearance1 then1 must be referred to some particular real thing and not to any other4 ,this is true of the appearances which we recognize as such in common life1 and it is equally true of the appearances recognized as such in science4 ,the pen which ,i feel between my fingers ,i may regard as appearance and refer to a swarm of moving atoms4 ,but it would be silly for me to refer it to atoms in general4 ,the reality to which ,i refer the appearance in question is a particular group of atoms existing at a particular point in space4 ,the chemist never supposes that the atoms within the walls of his test-tube are identical with those in the vial on the shelf4 ,neither in common life nor in science would the distinction between appearances and real things be of the smallest service were it not possible to distinguish between this appearance and that1 and this reality and that1 and to refer each appearance to its appropriate reality4 ,indeed1 it is inconceivable that1 under such circumstances1 the distinction should have been drawn at all4 ,these points ought to be strongly insisted upon1 for we find certain philosophic writers falling constantly into a very curious abuse of the distinction and making much capital of it4 ,it is argued that what we see1 what we touch1 what we conceive as a result of scientific observation and reflection--all is1 in the last analysis1 material which is given us in sensation4 ,the various senses furnish us with different classes of sensations2 we work these up into certain complexes4 ,but sensations are only the impressions which something outside of us makes upon us4 ,hence1 although we seem to ourselves to know the external world as it is1 our knowledge can never extend beyond the impressions made upon us4 ,thus1 we are absolutely shut up to appearances1 and can know nothing about the reality to which they must be referred4 ,touching this matter ,herbert ,spencer writes#a as follows3 ,when we are taught that a piece of matter1 regarded by us as existing externally1 cannot be really known1 but that we can know only certain impressions produced on us1 we are yet1 by the relativity of thought1 compelled to think of these in relation to a cause--the notion of a real existence which generated these impressions becomes nascent4 ,if it be proved that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is inconsistent with itself1--that matter1 however conceived by us1 cannot be matter as it actually is1--our conception1 though transfigured1 is not destroyed3 there remains the sense of reality1 dissociated as far as possible from those special forms under which it was before represented in thought4 ,this means1 in plain language1 that we must regard everything we know and can know as appearance and must refer it to an unknown reality4 ,sometimes ,mr4 ,spencer calls this reality the ,unknowable1 sometimes he calls it the ,absolute1 and sometimes he allows it to pass by a variety of other names1 such as ,power1 ,cause1 etc4 ,he wishes us to think of it as lying behind appearances or as underlying appearances4 ,probably it has already been remarked that this ,unknowable has brought us around again to that amusing telephone exchange discussed in the third chapter4 ,but if the reader feels within himself the least weakness for the ,unknowable1 ,i beg him to consider carefully1 before he pins his faith to it1 the following3-- 7#a7 ,if we do perceive external bodies1 our own bodies and others1 then it is conceivable that we may have evidence from observation to the effect that other bodies affecting our bodies may give rise to sensations4 ,in this case we cannot say that we know nothing but sensations2 we know real bodies as well as sensations1 and we may refer the sensations to the real bodies4 7#b7 ,if we do not perceive that we have bodies1 and that our bodies are acted upon by others1 we have no evidence that what we call our sensations are due to messages which come from external things and are conducted along the nerves4 ,it is then1 absurd to talk of such external things as though they existed1 and to call them the reality to which sensations1 as appearances1 must be referred1 7#c7 ,in other words1 if there is perceived to be a telephone exchange with its wires and subscribers1 we may refer the messages received to the subscribers1 and call this1 if we choose1 a reference of appearance to reality4 ,but if there is perceived no telephone exchange1 and if it is concluded that any wires or subscribers of which it means anything to speak must be composed of what we have heretofore called messages1 then it is palpably absurd to refer the messages as a whole to subscribers not supposed to be composed of messages2 and it is a blunder to go on calling the things that we know messages1 as though we had evidence that they came from1 and must be referred to1 something beyond themselves4 ,we must recognize that1 with the general demolition of the exchange1 we lose not only known subscribers1 but the very notion of a subscriber4 ,it will not do to try to save from this wreck some unknowable subscriber1 and still pin our faith to him4 7#d7 ,we have seen that the relation of appearance to reality is that of certain experiences to certain other experiences4 ,when we take the liberty of calling the ,unknowable a reality1 we blunder in our use of the word4 ,the ,unknowable cannot be an experience either actual1 possible1 or conceived as possible1 and it cannot possibly hold the relation to any of our experiences that a real thing of any kind holds to the appearances that stand as its signs4 7#e7 ,finally1 no man has ever made an assumption more perfectly useless and purposeless than the assumption of the ,unknowable4 ,we have seen that the distinction between appearance and reality is a serviceable one1 and it has been pointed out that it would be of no service whatever if it were not possible to refer particular appearances to their own appropriate realities4 ,the realities to which we actually refer appearances serve to explain them4 ,thus1 when ,i ask3 ,why do ,i perceive that tree now as faint and blue and now as vivid and green8 the answer to the question is found in the notion of distance and position in space2 it is found1 in other words1 in a reference to the real world of touch things1 for which visual experiences serve as signs4 ,under certain circumstances1 the mountain ought to be robed in its azure hue1 and1 under certain circumstances1 it ought not4 ,the circumstances in each case are open to investigation4 ,now1 let us substitute for the real world of touch things1 which furnishes the explanation of given visual experiences1 that philosophic fiction1 that pseudo-real nonentity1 the ,unknowable4 ,now ,i perceive a tree as faint and blue1 now as bright and green2 will a reference to the ,unknowable explain why the experiences differed8 ,was the ,unknowable in the one instance farther off in an unknowable space1 and in the other nearer8 ,this1 even if it means anything1 must remain unknowable4 ,and when the chemist puts together a volume of chlorine gas and a volume of hydrogen gas to get two volumes of hydrochloric acid gas1 shall we explain the change which has taken place by a reference to the ,unknowable1 or shall we turn to the doctrine of atoms and their combinations8 ,the fact is that no man in his senses tries to account for any individual fact by turning for an explanation to the ,unknowable4 ,it is a life-preserver by which some set great store1 but which no man dreams of using when he really falls into the water4 ,if1 then1 we have any reason to believe that there is a real external world at all1 we have reason to believe that we know what it is4 ,that some know it imperfectly1 that others know it better1 and that we may hope that some day it will be known still more perfectly1 is surely no good reason for concluding that we do not know it at all4 #a ,first ,principles1 ,part ,i1 ,chapter ,,iv1 section #bf4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,of ,,space #bc4 ,,what ,,are ,,we ,,supposed ,,to ,,know ,,about ,,it4--,the plain man may admit that he is not ready to hazard a definition of space1 but he is certainly not willing to admit that he is wholly ignorant of space and of its attributes4 ,he knows that it is something in which material objects have position and in which they move about2 he knows that it has not merely length1 like a line1 nor length and breadth1 like a surface1 but has the three dimensions of length1 breadth1 and depth2 he knows that1 except in the one circumstance of its position1 every part of space is exactly like every other part1 and that1 although objects may move about in space1 it is incredible that the spaces themselves should be shifted about4 ,those who are familiar with the literature of the subject know that it has long been customary to make regarding space certain other statements to which the plain man does not usually make serious objection when he is introduced to them4 ,thus it is said3-- 7#a7 ,the idea of space is necessary4 ,we can think of objects in space as annihilated1 but we cannot conceive space to be annihilated4 ,we can clear space of things1 but we cannot clear away space itself1 even in thought4 7#b7 ,space must be infinite4 ,we cannot conceive that we should come to the end of space4 7#c7 ,every space1 however small1 is infinitely divisible4 ,that is to say1 even the most minute space must be composed of spaces4 ,we cannot1 even theoretically1 split a solid into mere surfaces1 a surface into mere lines1 or a line into mere points4 ,against such statements the plain man is not impelled to rise in rebellion1 for he can see that there seems to be some ground for making them4 ,he can conceive of any particular material object as annihilated1 and of the place which it occupied as standing empty2 but he cannot go on and conceive of the annihilation of this bit of empty space4 ,its annihilation would not leave a gap1 for a gap means a bit of empty space2 nor could it bring the surrounding spaces into juxtaposition1 for one cannot shift spaces1 and1 in any case1 a shifting that is not a shifting through space is an absurdity4 ,again1 he cannot conceive of any journey that would bring him to the end of space4 ,there is no more reason for stopping at one point than at another2 why not go on8 ,what could end space8 ,as to the infinite divisibility of space1 have we not1 in addition to the seeming reasonableness of the doctrine1 the testimony of all the mathematicians8 ,does any one of them ever dream of a line so short that it cannot be divided into two shorter lines1 or of an angle so small that it cannot be bisected8 #bd4 ,,space ,,as ,,necessary ,,and ,,space ,,as ,,infinite4--,that these statements about space contain truth one should not be in haste to deny4 ,it seems silly to say that space can be annihilated1 or that one can travel over the mountains of the moon in the hope of reaching the end of it4 ,and certainly no prudent man wishes to quarrel with that coldly rational creature the mathematician4 ,but it is well worth while to examine the statements carefully and to see whether there is not some danger that they may be understood in such a way as to lead to error4 ,let us begin with the doctrine that space is necessary and cannot be thought away4 ,as we have seen above1 it is manifestly impossible to annihilate in thought a certain portion of space and leave the other portions intact4 ,there are many things in the same case4 ,we cannot annihilate in thought one side of a door and leave the other side2 we cannot rob a man of the outside of his hat and leave him the inside4 ,but we can conceive of a whole door as annihilated1 and of a man as losing a whole hat4 ,may we or may we not conceive of space as a whole as nonexistent8 ,i do not say1 be it observed1 can we conceive of something as attacking and annihilating space8 ,whatever space may be1 we none of us think of it as a something that may be threatened and demolished4 ,i only say1 may we not think of a system of things--not a world such as ours1 of course1 but still a system of things of some sort--in which space relations have no part8 ,may we not conceive such to be possible8 ,it should be remarked that space relations are by no means the only ones in which we think of things as existing4 ,we attribute to them time relations as well4 ,now1 when we think of occurrences as related to each other in time1 we do1 in so far as we concentrate our attention upon these relations1 turn our attention away from space and contemplate another aspect of the system of things4 ,space is not such a necessity of thought that we must keep thinking of space when we have turned our attention to something else4 ,and is it1 indeed1 inconceivable that there should be a system of things 7not extended things in space1 of course71 characterized by time relations and perhaps other relations1 but not by space relations8 ,it goes without saying that we cannot go on thinking of space and at the same time not think of space4 ,those who keep insisting upon space as a necessity of thought seem to set us such a task as this1 and to found their conclusion upon our failure to accomplish it4 ,we can never represent to ourselves the nonexistence of space1 says the ,german philosopher ,kant 7#agbd-ahjd71 although we can easily conceive that there are no objects in space4 ,it would1 perhaps1 be fairer to translate the first half of this sentence as follows3 ,we can never picture to ourselves the nonexistence of space4 ,kant says we cannot make of it a ,vorstellung1 a representation4 ,this we may freely admit1 for what does one try to do when one makes the effort to imagine the nonexistence of space8 ,does not one first clear space of objects1 and then try to clear space of space in much the same way8 ,we try to think space away1 i4e4 to remove it from the place where it was and yet keep that place4 ,what does it mean to imagine or represent to oneself the nonexistence of material objects8 ,is it not to represent to oneself the objects as no longer in space1 i4e4 to imagine the space as empty1 as cleared of the objects8 ,it means something in this case to speak of a ,vorstellung1 or representation4 ,we can call before our minds the empty space4 ,but if we are to think of space as nonexistent1 what shall we call before our minds8 ,our procedure must not be analogous to what it was before2 we must not try to picture to our minds the absence of space1 as though that were in itself a something that could be pictured2 we must turn our attention to other relations1 such as time relations1 and ask whether it is not conceivable that such should be the only relations obtaining within a given system4 ,those who insist upon the fact that we cannot but conceive space as infinite employ a very similar argument to prove their point4 ,they set us a self-contradictory task1 and regard our failure to accomplish it as proof of their position4 ,thus1 ,sir ,william ,hamilton 7#aghh-ahef7 argues3 ,we are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded--as finite2 that is1 as a whole beyond which there is no further space4 ,and ,herbert ,spencer echoes approvingly3 ,we find ourselves totally unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is no space4 ,now1 whatever one may be inclined to think about the infinity of space1 it is clear that this argument is an absurd one4 ,let me write it out more at length3 ,we are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded--as finite2 that is1 as a whole in the space beyond which there is no further space4 ,we find ourselves totally unable to imagine bounds1 in the space beyond which there is no further space4 ,the words which ,i have added were already present implicitly4 ,what can the word beyond mean if it does not signify space beyond8 ,what ,sir ,william and ,mr4 ,spencer have asked us to do is to imagine a limited space with a beyond and yet no beyond4 ,there is undoubtedly some reason why men are so ready to affirm that space is infinite1 even while they admit that they do not know that the world of material things is infinite4 ,to this we shall come back again later4 ,but if one wishes to affirm it1 it is better to do so without giving a reason than it is to present such arguments as the above4 #be4 ,,space ,,as ,,infinitely ,,divisible4--,for more than two thousand years men have been aware that certain very grave difficulties seem to attach to the idea of motion1 when we once admit that space is infinitely divisible4 ,to maintain that we can divide any portion of space up into ultimate elements which are not themselves spaces1 and which have no extension1 seems repugnant to the idea we all have of space4 ,and if we refuse to admit this possibility there seems to be nothing left to us but to hold that every space1 however small1 may theoretically be divided up into smaller spaces1 and that there is no limit whatever to the possible subdivision of spaces4 ,nevertheless1 if we take this most natural position1 we appear to find ourselves plunged into the most hopeless of labyrinths1 every turn of which brings us face to face with a flat self-contradiction4 ,to bring the difficulties referred to clearly before our minds1 let us suppose a point to move uniformly over a line an inch long1 and to accomplish its journey in a second4 ,at first glance1 there appears to be nothing abnormal about this proceeding4 ,but if we admit that this line is infinitely divisible1 and reflect upon this property of the line1 the ground seems to sink from beneath our feet at once4 ,for it is possible to argue that1 under the conditions given1 the point must move over one half of the line in half a second2 over one half of the remainder1 or one fourth of the line1 in one fourth of a second2 over one eighth of the line1 in one eighth of a second1 etc4 ,thus the portions of line moved over successively by the point may be represented by the descending series3 #a_/b1 #a_/d1 #a_/h1 #a_/af1 4 4 4 ,greek omicron symbol ,now1 it is quite true that the motion of the point can be described in a number of different ways2 but the important thing to remark here is that1 if the motion really is uniform1 and if the line really is infinitely divisible1 this series must1 as satisfactorily as any other1 describe the motion of the point4 ,and it would be absurd to maintain that a part of the series can describe the whole motion4 ,we cannot say1 for example1 that1 when the point has moved over one half1 one fourth1 and one eighth of the line1 it has completed its motion4 ,if even a single member of the series is left out1 the whole line has not been passed over2 and this is equally true whether the omitted member represent a large bit of line or a small one4 ,the whole series1 then1 represents the whole line1 as definite parts of the series represent definite parts of the line4 ,the line can only be completed when the series is completed4 ,but when and how can this series be completed8 ,in general1 a series is completed when we reach the final term1 but here there appears to be no final term4 ,we cannot make zero the final term1 for it does not belong to the series at all4 ,it does not obey the law of the series1 for it is not one half as large as the term preceding it--what space is so small that dividing it by #b gives us omicron8 ,on the other hand1 some term just before zero cannot be the final term2 for if it really represents a little bit of the line1 however small1 it must1 by hypothesis1 be made up of lesser bits1 and a smaller term must be conceivable4 ,there can1 then1 be no last term to the series2 i4e4 what the point is doing at the very last is absolutely indescribable2 it is inconceivable that there should be a very last4 ,it was pointed out many centuries ago that it is equally inconceivable that there should be a very first4 ,how can a point even begin to move along an infinitely divisible line8 ,must it not before it can move over any distance1 however short1 first move over half that distance8 ,and before it can move over that half1 must it not move over the half of that8 ,can it find something to move over that has no halves8 ,and if not1 how shall it even start to move8 ,to move at all1 it must begin somewhere2 it cannot begin with what has no halves1 for then it is not moving over any part of the line1 as all parts have halves2 and it cannot begin with what has halves1 for that is not the beginning4 ,what does the point do first8 that is the question4 ,those who tell us about points and lines usually leave us to call upon gentle echo for an answer4 ,the perplexities of this moving point seem to grow worse and worse the longer one reflects upon them4 ,they do not harass it merely at the beginning and at the end of its journey4 ,this is admirably brought out by ,professor ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford 7#ahde-ahgi71 an excellent mathematician1 who never had the faintest intention of denying the possibility of motion1 and who did not desire to magnify the perplexities in the path of a moving point4 ,he writes3-- ,when a point moves along a line1 we know that between any two positions of it there is an infinite number 4 4 4 of intermediate positions4 ,that is because the motion is continuous4 ,each of those positions is where the point was at some instant or other4 ,between the two end positions on the line1 the point where the motion began and the point where it stopped1 there is no point of the line which does not belong to that series4 ,we have thus an infinite series of successive positions of a continuously moving point1 and in that series are included all the points of a certain piece of line-room4 #a ,thus1 we are told that1 when a point moves along a line1 between any two positions of it there is an infinite number of intermediate positions4 ,clifford does not play with the word infinite2 he takes it seriously and tells us that it means without any end3 ,infinite2 it is a dreadful word1 ,i know1 until you find out that you are familiar with the thing which it expresses4 ,in this place it means that between any two positions there is some intermediate position2 between that and either of the others1 again1 there is some other intermediate2 and so on without any end4 ,infinite means without any end4 ,but really1 if the case is as stated1 the point in question must be at a desperate pass4 ,i beg the reader to consider the following1 and ask himself whether he would like to change places with it3-- 7#a7 ,if the series of positions is really endless1 the point must complete one by one the members of an endless series1 and reach a nonexistent final term1 for a really endless series cannot have a final term4 7#b7 ,the series of positions is supposed to be an infinite series of successive positions4 ,the moving point must take them one after another4 ,but how can it8 ,between any two positions of the point there is an infinite number of intermediate positions4 ,that is to say1 no two of these successive positions must be regarded as next to each other2 every position is separated from every other by an infinite number of intermediate ones4 ,how1 then1 shall the point move8 ,it cannot possibly move from one position to the next1 for there is no next4 ,shall it move first to some position that is not the next8 ,or shall it in despair refuse to move at all8 ,evidently there is either something wrong with this doctrine of the infinite divisibility of space1 or there is something wrong with our understanding of it1 if such absurdities as these refuse to be cleared away4 ,let us see where the trouble lies4 #bf4 ,,what ,,is ,,real ,,space8--,it is plain that men are willing to make a number of statements about space1 the ground for making which is not at once apparent4 ,it is a bold man who will undertake to say that the universe of matter is infinite in extent4 ,we feel that we have the right to ask him how he knows that it is4 ,but most men are ready enough to affirm that space is and must be infinite4 ,how do they know that it is8 ,they certainly do not directly perceive all space1 and such arguments as the one offered by ,hamilton and ,spencer are easily seen to be poor proofs4 ,men are equally ready to affirm that space is infinitely divisible4 ,has any man ever looked upon a line and perceived directly that it has an infinite number of parts8 ,did any one ever succeed in dividing a space up infinitely8 ,when we try to make clear to ourselves how a point moves along an infinitely divisible line1 do we not seem to land in sheer absurdities8 ,on what sort of evidence does a man base his statements regarding space8 ,they are certainly very bold statements4 ,a careful reflection reveals the fact that men do not speak as they do about space for no reason at all4 ,when they are properly understood1 their statements can be seen to be justified1 and it can be seen also that the difficulties which we have been considering can be avoided4 ,the subject is a deep one1 and it can scarcely be discussed exhaustively in an introductory volume of this sort1 but one can1 at least1 indicate the direction in which it seems most reasonable to look for an answer to the questions which have been raised4 ,how do we come to a knowledge of space1 and what do we mean by space8 ,this is the problem to solve2 and if we can solve this1 we have the key which will unlock many doors4 ,now1 we saw in the last chapter that we have reason to believe that we know what the real external world is4 ,it is a world of things which we perceive1 or can perceive1 or1 not arbitrarily but as a result of careful observation and deductions therefrom1 conceive as though we did perceive it--a world1 say1 of atoms and molecules4 ,it is not an ,unknowable behind or beyond everything that we perceive1 or can perceive1 or conceive in the manner stated4 ,and the space with which we are concerned is real space1 the space in which real things exist and move about1 the real things which we can directly know or of which we can definitely know something4 ,in some sense it must be given in our experience1 if the things which are in it1 and are known to be in it1 are given in our experience4 ,how must we think of this real space8 ,suppose we look at a tree at a distance4 ,we are conscious of a certain complex of color4 ,we can distinguish the kind of color2 in this case1 we call it blue4 ,but the quality of the color is not the only thing that we can distinguish in the experience4 ,in two experiences of color the quality may be the same1 and yet the experiences may be different from each other4 ,in the one case we may have more of the same color--we may1 so to speak1 be conscious of a larger patch2 but even if there is not actually more of it1 there may be such a difference that we can know from the visual experience alone that the touch object before us is1 in the one case1 of the one shape1 and1 in the other case1 of another4 ,thus we may distinguish between the stuff given in our experience and the arrangement of that stuff4 ,this is the distinction which philosophers have marked as that between matter and form4 ,it is1 of course1 understood that both of these words1 so used1 have a special sense not to be confounded with their usual one4 ,this distinction between matter and form obtains in all our experiences4 ,i have spoken just above of the shape of the touch object for which our visual experiences stand as signs4 ,what do we mean by its shape8 ,to the plain man real things are the touch things of which he has experience1 and these touch things are very clearly distinguishable from one another in shape1 in size1 in position1 nor are the different parts of the things to be confounded with each other4 ,suppose that1 as we pass our hand over a table1 all the sensations of touch and movement which we experience fused into an undistinguishable mass4 ,would we have any notion of size or shape8 ,it is because our experiences of touch and movement do not fuse1 but remain distinguishable from each other1 and we are conscious of them as arranged1 as constituting a system1 that we can distinguish between this part of a thing and that1 this thing and that4 ,this arrangement1 this order1 of what is revealed by touch and movement1 we may call the form of the touch world4 ,leaving out of consideration1 for the present1 time relations1 we may say that the form of the touch world is the whole system of actual and possible relations of arrangement between the elements which make it up4 ,it is because there is such a system of relations that we can speak of things as of this shape or of that1 as great or small1 as near or far1 as here or there4 ,now1 ,i ask1 is there any reason to believe that1 when the plain man speaks of space1 the word means to him anything more than this system of actual and possible relations of arrangement among the touch things that constitute his real world8 ,he may talk sometimes as though space were some kind of a thing1 but he does not really think of it as a thing4 ,this is evident from the mere fact that he is so ready to make about it affirmations that he would not venture to make about things4 ,it does not strike him as inconceivable that a given material object should be annihilated2 it does strike him as inconceivable that a portion of space should be blotted out of existence4 ,why this difference8 ,is it not explained when we recognize that space is but a name for all the actual and possible relations of arrangement in which things in the touch world may stand8 ,we cannot drop out some of these relations and yet keep space1 i4e4 the system of relations which we had before4 ,that this is what space means1 the plain man may not recognize explicitly1 but he certainly seems to recognize it implicitly in what he says about space4 ,men are rarely inclined to admit that space is a thing of any kind1 nor are they much more inclined to regard it as a quality of a thing4 ,of what could it be the quality8 ,and if space really were a thing of any sort1 would it not be the height of presumption for a man1 in the absence of any direct evidence from observation1 to say how much there is of it--to declare it infinite8 ,men do not hesitate to say that space must be infinite4 ,but when we realize that we do not mean by space merely the actual relations which exist between the touch things that make up the world1 but also the possible relations1 i4e4 that we mean the whole plan of the world system1 we can see that it is not unreasonable to speak of space as infinite4 ,the material universe may1 for aught we know1 be limited in extent4 ,the actual space relations in which things stand to each other may not be limitless4 ,but these actual space relations taken alone do not constitute space4 ,men have often asked themselves whether they should conceive of the universe as limited and surrounded by void space4 ,it is not nonsense to speak of such a state of things4 ,it would1 indeed1 appear to be nonsense to say that1 if the universe is limited1 it does not lie in void space4 ,what can we mean by void space but the system of possible relations in which things1 if they exist1 must stand8 ,to say that1 beyond a certain point1 no further relations are possible1 seems absurd4 ,hence1 when a man has come to understand what we have a right to mean by space1 it does not imply a boundless conceit on his part to hazard the statement that space is infinite4 ,when he has said this1 he has said very little4 ,what shall we say to the statement that space is infinitely divisible8 ,to understand the significance of this statement we must come back to the distinction between appearances and the real things for which they stand as signs1 the distinction discussed at length in the last chapter4 ,when ,i see a tree from a distance1 the visual experience which ,i have is1 as we have seen1 not an indivisible unit1 but is a complex experience2 it has parts1 and these parts are related to each other2 in other words1 it has both matter and form4 ,it is1 however1 one thing to say that this experience has parts1 and it is another to say that it has an infinite number of parts4 ,no man is conscious of perceiving an infinite number of parts in the patch of color which represents to him a tree at a distance2 to say that it is constituted of such strikes us in our moments of sober reflection as a monstrous statement4 ,now1 this visual experience is to us the sign of the reality1 the real tree2 it is not taken as the tree itself4 ,when we speak of the size1 the shape1 the number of parts1 of the tree1 we do not have in mind the size1 the shape1 the number of parts1 of just this experience4 ,we pass from the sign to the thing signified1 and we may lay our hand upon this thing1 thus gaining a direct experience of the size and shape of the touch object4 ,we must recognize1 however1 that just as no man is conscious of an infinite number of parts in what he sees1 so no man is conscious of an infinite number of parts in what he touches4 ,he who tells me that1 when ,i pass my finger along my paper cutter1 what ,i perceive has an infinite number of parts1 tells me what seems palpably untrue4 ,when an object is very small1 ,i can see it1 and ,i cannot see that it is composed of parts2 similarly1 when an object is very small1 ,i can feel it with my finger1 but ,i cannot distinguish its parts by the sense of touch4 ,there seem to be limits beyond which ,i cannot go in either case4 ,nevertheless1 men often speak of thousandths of an inch1 or of millionths of an inch1 or of distances even shorter4 ,have such fractions of the magnitudes that we do know and can perceive any real existence8 ,the touch world of real things as it is revealed in our experience does not appear to be divisible into such2 it does not appear to be divisible even so far1 and much less does it appear to be infinitely divisible4 ,but have we not seen that the touch world given in our experience must be taken by the thoughtful man as itself the sign or appearance of a reality more ultimate8 ,the speck which appears to the naked eye to have no parts is seen under the microscope to have parts2 that is to say1 an experience apparently not extended has become the sign of something that is seen to have part out of part4 ,we have as yet invented no instrument that will make directly perceptible to the finger tip an atom of hydrogen or of oxygen1 but the man of science conceives of these little things as though they could be perceived4 ,they and the space in which they move--the system of actual and possible relations between them--seem to be related to the world revealed in touch very much as the space revealed in the field of the microscope is related to the space of the speck looked at with the naked eye4 ,thus1 when the thoughtful man speaks of real space1 he cannot mean by the word only the actual and possible relations of arrangement among the things and the parts of things directly revealed to his sense of touch4 ,he may speak of real things too small to be thus perceived1 and of their motion as through spaces too small to be perceptible at all4 ,what limit shall he set to the possible subdivision of real things8 ,unless he can find an ultimate reality which cannot in its turn become the appearance or sign of a further reality1 it seems absurd to speak of a limit at all4 ,we may1 then1 say that real space is infinitely divisible4 ,by this statement we should mean that certain experiences may be represented by others1 and that we may carry on our division in the case of the latter1 when a further subdivision of the former seems out of the question4 ,but it should not mean that any single experience furnished us by any sense1 or anything that we can represent in the imagination1 is composed of an infinite number of parts4 ,when we realize this1 do we not free ourselves from the difficulties which seemed to make the motion of a point over a line an impossible absurdity8 ,the line as revealed in a single experience either of sight or of touch is not composed of an infinite number of parts4 ,it is composed of points seen or touched--least experiences of sight or touch1 minima sensibilia4 ,these are next to each other1 and the point1 in moving1 takes them one by one4 ,but such a single experience is not what we call a line4 ,it is but one experience of a line4 ,though the experience is not infinitely divisible1 the line may be4 ,this only means that the visual or tactual point of the single experience may stand for1 may represent1 what is not a mere point but has parts1 and is1 hence1 divisible4 ,who can set a limit to such possible substitutions8 in other words1 who can set a limit to the divisibility of a real line8 ,it is only when we confuse the single experience with the real line that we fall into absurdities4 ,what the mathematician tells us about real points and real lines has no bearing on the constitution of the single experience and its parts4 ,thus1 when he tells us that between any two points on a line there are an infinite number of other points1 he only means that we may expand the line indefinitely by the system of substitutions described above4 ,we do this for ourselves within limits every time that we approach from a distance a line drawn on a blackboard4 ,the mathematician has generalized our experience for us1 and that is all he has done4 ,we should try to get at his real meaning1 and not quote him as supporting an absurdity4 #a ,seeing and ,thinking1 p4 #adi4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,of ,,time #bg4 ,,time ,,as ,,necessary1 ,,infinite1 ,,and ,,infinitely ,,divisible4--,of course1 we all know something about time2 we know it as past1 present1 and future2 we know it as divisible into parts1 all of which are successive2 we know that whatever happens must happen in time4 ,those who have thought a good deal about the matter are apt to tell us that time is a necessity of thought1 we cannot but think it2 that time is and must be infinite2 and that it is infinitely divisible4 ,these are the same statements that were made regarding space1 and1 as they have to be criticised in just the same way1 it is not necessary to dwell upon them at great length4 ,however1 we must not pass them over altogether4 ,as to the statement that time is a necessary idea1 we may freely admit that we cannot in thought annihilate time1 or think it away4 ,it does not seem to mean anything to attempt such a task4 ,whatever time may be1 it does not appear to be a something of such a nature that we can demolish it or clear it away from something else4 ,but is it necessarily absurd to speak of a system of things--not1 of course1 a system of things in which there is change1 succession1 an earlier and a later1 but still a system of things of some sort--in which there obtain no time relations8 ,the problem is1 to be sure1 one of theoretical interest merely1 for such a system of things is not the world we know4 ,and as for the infinity of time1 may we not ask on what ground any one ventures to assert that time is infinite8 ,no man can say that infinite time is directly given in his experience4 ,if one does not directly perceive it to be infinite1 must one not seek for some proof of the fact8 ,the only proof which appears to be offered us is contained in the statement that we cannot conceive of a time before which there was no time1 nor of a time after which there will be no time2 a proof which is no proof1 for written out at length it reads as follows3 we cannot conceive of a time in the time before which there was no time1 nor of a time in the time after which there will be no time4 ,as well say3 ,we cannot conceive of a number the number before which was no number1 nor of a number the number after which will be no number4 ,whatever may be said for the conclusion arrived at1 the argument is a very poor one4 ,when we turn to the consideration of time as infinitely divisible1 we seem to find ourselves confronted with the same difficulties which presented themselves when we thought of space as infinitely divisible4 ,certainly no man was immediately conscious of an infinite number of parts in the minute which just slipped by4 ,shall he assert that it did1 nevertheless1 contain an infinite number of parts8 ,then how did it succeed in passing8 how did it even begin to pass away8 ,it is infinitely divisible1 that is1 there is no end to the number of parts into which it may be divided2 those parts and parts of parts are all successive1 no two can pass at once1 they must all do it in a certain order1 one after the other4 ,thus1 something must pass first4 ,what can it be8 ,if that something has parts1 is divisible1 the whole of it cannot pass first4 ,it must itself pass bit by bit1 as must the whole minute2 and if it is infinitely divisible we have precisely the problem that we had at the outset4 ,whatever passes first cannot1 then1 have parts4 ,let us assume that it has no parts1 and bid it ,godspeed6 ,has the minute begun8 ,our minute is1 by hypothesis1 infinitely divisible2 it is composed of parts1 and those parts of other parts1 and so on without end4 ,we cannot by subdivision come to any part which is itself not composed of smaller parts4 ,the partless thing that passed1 then1 is no part of the minute4 ,that is all still waiting at the gate1 and no member of its troop can prove that it has a right to lead the rest4 ,in the same outer darkness is waiting the point on the line that misbehaved itself in the last chapter4 #bh4 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,past1 ,,present1 ,,and ,,future4--,it seems bad enough to have on our hands a minute which must pass away in successive bits1 and to discover that no bit of it can possibly pass first4 ,but if we follow with approval the reflections of certain thinkers1 we may find ourselves at such a pass that we would be glad to be able to prove that we may have on our hands a minute of any sort4 ,men sometimes are so bold as to maintain that they know time to be infinite2 would it not be well for them to prove first that they can know time at all8 ,the trouble is this2 as was pointed out long ago by ,saint ,augustine 7#ced-dcj7 in his famous ,confessions1 #a the parts of time are successive1 and of the three divisions1 past1 present1 and future1 only one can be regarded as existing3 ,those two times1 past and future1 how can they be1 when the past is not now1 and the future is not yet8 ,the present is1 it seems1 the only existent2 how long is the present8 ,even a single hour passes in fleeting moments2 as much of it as has taken flight is past1 what remains is future4 ,if we can comprehend any time that is divisible into no parts at all1 or perhaps into the minutest parts of moments1 this alone let us call present2 yet this speeds so hurriedly from the future to the past that it does not endure even for a little space4 ,if it has duration1 it is divided into a past and a future2 but the present has no duration4 ,where1 then1 is the time that we may call long8 ,is it future8 ,we do not say of the future3 it is long2 for as yet there exists nothing to be long4 ,we say3 it will be long4 ,but when8 ,if while yet future it will not be long1 for nothing will yet exist to be long4 ,and if it will be long1 when1 from a future as yet nonexistent1 it has become a present1 and has begun to be1 that it may be something that is long1 then present time cries out in the words of the preceding paragraph that it cannot be long4 ,augustine's way of presenting the difficulty is a quaint one1 but the problem is as real at the beginning of the twentieth century as it was at the beginning of the fifth4 ,past time does not exist now1 future time does not exist yet1 and present time1 it seems1 has no duration4 ,can a man be said to be conscious of time as past1 present1 and future8 ,who can be conscious of the nonexistent8 ,and the existent is not time1 it has no duration1 there is no before and after in a mere limiting point4 ,augustine's way out of the difficulty is the suggestion that1 although we cannot1 strictly speaking1 measure time1 we can measure memory and expectation4 ,before he begins to repeat a psalm1 his expectation extends over the whole of it4 ,after a little a part of it must be referred to expectation and a part of it to memory4 ,finally1 the whole psalm is extended along the memory4 ,we can measure this1 at least4 ,but how is the psalm in question extended along the memory or the expectation8 ,are the parts of it successive1 or do they thus exist simultaneously8 ,if everything in the memory image exists at once1 if all belongs to the punctual present1 to the mere point that divides past from future1 how can a man get from it a consciousness of time1 of a something whose parts cannot exist together but must follow each other8 ,augustine appears to overlook the fact that on his own hypothesis1 the present1 the only existent1 the only thing a man can be conscious of1 is an indivisible instant4 ,in such there can be no change2 the man who is shut up to such cannot be aware that the past is growing and the future diminishing4 ,any such change as this implies at least two instants1 an earlier and a later4 ,he who has never experienced a change of any sort1 who has never been conscious of the relation of earlier and later1 of succession1 cannot think of the varied content of memory as of that which has been present4 ,it cannot mean to him what memory certainly means to us2 he cannot be conscious of a past1 a present1 and a future4 ,to extract the notion of time1 of past1 present1 and future1 from an experience which contains no element of succession1 from an indivisible instant1 is as hopeless a task as to extract a line from a mathematical point4 ,it appears1 then1 that1 if we are to be conscious of time at all1 if we are to have the least conception of it1 we must have some direct experience of change4 ,we cannot really be shut up to that punctual present1 that mere point or limit between past and future1 that the present has been described as being4 ,but does this not imply that we can be directly conscious of what is not present1 that we can now perceive what does not now exist8 ,how is this possible8 ,it is not easy for one whose reading has been somewhat limited in any given field to see the full significance of the problems which present themselves in that field4 ,those who read much in the history of modern philosophy will see that this ancient difficulty touching our consciousness of time has given rise to some exceedingly curious speculations1 and some strange conclusions touching the nature of the mind4 ,thus1 it has been argued that1 since the experience of each moment is something quite distinct from the experience of the next1 a something that passes away to give place to its successor1 we cannot explain the consciousness of time1 of a whole in which successive moments are recognized as having their appropriate place1 unless we assume a something that knows each moment and knits it1 so to speak1 to its successor4 ,this something is the self or consciousness1 which is independent of time1 and does not exist in time1 as do the various experiences that fill the successive moments4 ,it is assumed to be timelessly present at all times1 and thus to connect the nonexistent past with the existent present4 ,i do not ask the reader to try to make clear to himself how anything can be timelessly present at all times1 for ,i do not believe that the words can be made to represent any clear thought whatever4 ,nor do ,i ask him to try to conceive how this timeless something can join past and present4 ,i merely wish to point out that these modern speculations1 which still influence the minds of many distinguished men1 have their origin in a difficulty which suggested itself early in the history of reflective thought1 and are by no means to be regarded as a gratuitous and useless exercise of the ingenuity4 ,they are serious attempts to solve a real problem1 though they may be unsuccessful ones1 and they are worthy of attention even from those who incline to a different solution4 #bi4 ,,what ,,is ,,real ,,time8--,from the thin air of such speculations as we have been discussing let us come back to the world of the plain man1 the world in which we all habitually live4 ,it is from this that we must start out upon all our journeys1 and it is good to come back to it from time to time to make sure of our bearings4 ,we have seen 7,chapter ,v7 that we distinguish between the real and the apparent1 and that we recognize as the real world the objects revealed to the sense of touch4 ,these objects stand to each other in certain relations of arrangement2 that is to say1 they exist in space4 ,and just as we may distinguish between the object as it appears and the object as it is1 so we may distinguish between apparent space and real space1 i4e4 between the relations of arrangement1 actual and possible1 which obtain among the parts of the object as it appears1 and those which obtain among the parts of the object as it really is4 ,but our experience does not present us only with objects in space relations2 it presents us with a succession of changes in those objects4 ,and if we will reason about those changes as we have reasoned about space relations1 many of our difficulties regarding the nature of time may1 as it seems1 be made to disappear4 ,thus we may recognize that we are directly conscious of duration1 of succession1 and may yet hold that this crude and immediate experience of duration is not what we mean by real time4 ,every one distinguishes between apparent time and real time now and then4 ,we all know that a sermon may seem long and not be long2 that the ten years that we live over in a dream are not ten real years2 that the swallowing of certain drugs may be followed by the illusion of the lapse of vast spaces of time1 when really very little time has elapsed4 ,what is this real time8 ,it is nothing else than the order of the changes which take place or may take place in real things4 ,in the last chapter ,i spoke of space as the form of the real world2 it would be better to call it a form of the real world1 and to give the same name also to time4 ,it is very clear that1 when we inquire concerning the real time of any occurrence1 or ask how long a series of such lasted1 we always look for our answer to something that has happened in the external world4 ,the passage of a star over the meridian1 the position of the sun above the horizon1 the arc which the moon has described since our last observation1 the movement of the hands of a clock1 the amount of sand which has fallen in the hourglass1 these things and such as these are the indicators of real time4 ,there may be indicators of a different sort2 we may decide that it is noon because we are hungry1 or midnight because we are tired2 we may argue that the preacher must have spoken more than an hour because he quite wore out the patience of the congregation4 ,these are more or less uncertain signs of the lapse of time1 but they cannot be regarded as experiences of the passing of time either apparent or real4 ,thus1 we see that real space and real time are the plan of the world system4 ,they are not things of any sort1 and they should not be mistaken for things4 ,they are not known independently of things1 though1 when we have once had an experience of things and their changes1 we can by abstraction from the things themselves fix our attention upon their arrangement and upon the order of their changes4 ,we can divide and subdivide spaces and times without much reference to the things4 ,but we should never forget that it would never have occurred to us to do this1 indeed1 that the whole procedure would be absolutely meaningless to us1 were not a real world revealed in our experience as it is4 ,he who has attained to this insight into the nature of time is in a position to offer what seem to be satisfactory solutions to the problems which have been brought forward above4 7#a7 ,he can see1 thus1 why it is absurd to speak of any portion of time as becoming nonexistent4 ,time is nothing else than an order1 a great system of relations4 ,one cannot drop out certain of these and leave the rest unchanged1 for the latter imply the former4 ,day-after-to-morrow would not be day-after-to-morrow1 if to-morrow did not lie between it and to-day4 ,to speak of dropping out to-morrow and leaving it the time it was conceived to be is mere nonsense4 7#b7 ,he can see why it does not indicate a measureless conceit for a man to be willing to say that time is infinite4 ,one who says this need not be supposed to be acquainted with the whole past and future history of the real world1 of which time is an aspect4 ,we constantly abstract from things1 and consider only the order of their changes1 and in this order itself there is no reason why one should set a limit at some point2 indeed1 to set such a limit seems a gratuitous absurdity4 ,he who says that time is infinite does not say much2 he is not affirming the existence of some sort of a thing2 he is merely affirming a theoretical possibility1 and is it not a theoretical possibility that there may be an endless succession of real changes in a real world8 7#c7 ,it is evident1 furthermore1 that1 when one has grasped firmly the significance of the distinction between apparent time and real time1 one may with a clear conscience speak of time as infinitely divisible4 ,of course1 the time directly given in any single experience1 the minute or the second of which we are conscious as it passes1 cannot be regarded as composed of an infinite number of parts4 ,we are not directly conscious of these subdivisions1 and it is a monstrous assumption to maintain that they must be present in the minute or second as perceived4 ,but no such single experience of duration constitutes what we mean by real time4 ,we have seen that real time is the time occupied by the changes in real things1 and the question is1 ,how far can one go in the subdivision of this time8 ,now1 the touch thing which usually is for us in common life the real thing is not the real thing for science2 it is the appearance under which the real world of atoms and molecules reveals itself4 ,the atom is not directly perceivable1 and we may assign to its motions a space so small that no one could possibly perceive it as space1 as a something with part out of part1 a something with a here and a there4 ,but1 as has been before pointed out 7section #bf71 this does not prevent us from believing the atom and the space in which it moves to be real1 and we can represent them to ourselves as we can the things and the spaces with which we have to do in common life4 ,it is with time just as it is with space4 ,we can perceive an inch to have parts2 we cannot perceive a thousandth of an inch to have parts1 if we can perceive it at all2 but we can represent it to ourselves as extended1 that is1 we can let an experience which is extended stand for it1 and can dwell upon the parts of that4 ,we can perceive a second to have duration2 we cannot perceive a thousandth of a second to have duration2 but we can conceive it as having duration1 i4e4 we can let some experience of duration stand for it and serve as its representative4 ,it is1 then1 reasonable to speak of the space covered by the vibration of an atom1 and it is equally reasonable to speak of the time taken up by its vibration4 ,it is not necessary to believe that the duration that we actually experience as a second must itself be capable of being divided up into the number of parts indicated by the denominator of the fraction that we use in indicating such a time1 and that each of these parts must be perceived as duration4 ,there is1 then1 a sense in which we may affirm that time is infinitely divisible4 ,but we must remember that apparent time--the time presented in any single experience of duration--is never infinitely divisible2 and that real time1 in any save a relative sense of the word1 is not a single experience of duration at all4 ,it is a recognition of the fact that experiences of duration may be substituted for each other without assignable limit4 7#d7 ,but what shall we say to the last problem--to the question how we can be conscious of time at all1 when the parts of time are all successive8 ,how can we even have a consciousness of crude time1 of apparent time1 of duration in any sense of the word1 when duration must be made up of moments no two of which can exist together and no one of which alone can constitute time8 ,the past is not now1 the future is not yet1 the present is a mere point1 as we are told1 and cannot have parts4 ,if we are conscious of time as past1 present1 and future1 must we not be conscious of a series as a series when every member of it save one is nonexistent8 ,can a man be conscious of the nonexistent8 ,the difficulty does seem a serious one1 and yet ,i venture to affirm that1 if we examine it carefully1 we shall see that it is a difficulty of our own devising4 ,the argument quietly makes an assumption--and makes it gratuitously--with which any consciousness of duration is incompatible1 and then asks us how there can be such a thing as a consciousness of duration4 ,the assumption is that we can be conscious only of the existent1 and this1 written out a little more at length1 reads as follows3 we can be conscious only of the now existent1 or1 in other words of the present4 ,of course1 this determines from the outset that we cannot be conscious of the past and the future1 of duration4 ,the past and the future are1 to be sure1 nonexistent from the point of view of the present2 but it should be remarked as well that the present is nonexistent from the point of view of the past or the future4 ,if we are talking of time at all we are talking of that no two parts of which are simultaneous2 it would be absurd to speak of a past that existed simultaneously with the present1 just as it would be absurd to speak of a present existing simultaneously with the past4 ,but we should not deny to past1 present1 and future1 respectively1 their appropriate existence2 nor is it by any means self-evident that there cannot be a consciousness of past1 present1 and future as such4 ,we fall in with the assumption1 it seems1 because we know very well that we are not directly conscious of a remote past and a remote future4 ,we represent these to ourselves by means of some proxy--we have present memories of times long past and present anticipations of what will be in the time to come4 ,moreover1 we use the word present very loosely2 we say the present year1 the present day1 the present hour1 the present minute1 or the present second4 ,when we use the word thus loosely1 there seems no reason for believing that there should be such a thing as a direct consciousness that extends beyond the present4 ,it appears reasonable to say3 ,no one can be conscious save of the present4 ,it should be remembered1 however1 that the generous present of common discourse is by no means identical with the ideal point between past and future dealt with in the argument under discussion4 ,we all say3 ,i now see that the cloud is moving2 ,i now see that the snow is falling4 ,but there can be no moving1 no falling1 no change1 in the timeless now with which we have been concerned4 ,is there any evidence whatever that we are shut up1 for all our immediate knowledge1 to such a now8 ,there is none whatever4 ,the fact is that this timeless now is a product of reflective thought and not a something of which we are directly conscious4 ,it is an ideal point in the real time of which this chapter has treated1 the time that is in a certain sense infinitely divisible4 ,it is first cousin to the ideal mathematical point1 the mere limit between two lines1 a something not perceptible to any sense4 ,we have a tendency to carry over to it what we recognize to be true of the very different present of common discourse1 a present which we distinguish from past and future in a somewhat loose way1 but a present in which there certainly is the consciousness of change1 of duration4 ,and when we do this1 we dig for ourselves a pit into which we proceed to fall4 ,we may1 then1 conclude that we are directly conscious of more than the present1 in the sense in which ,augustine used the word4 ,we are conscious of time1 of crude time1 and from this we can pass to a knowledge of real time1 and can determine its parts with precision4 #a ,book ,,xi1 ,chapters #ad and #ae4 ,,iii4 ,,problems ,,touching ,,the ,,mind ,,chapter ,,viii ,,what ,,is ,,the ,,mind8 #cj4 ,,primitive ,,notions ,,of ,,mind4--,the soul or mind1 that something to which we refer sensations and ideas of all sorts1 is an object that men do not seem to know very clearly and definitely1 though they feel so sure of its existence that they regard it as the height of folly to call it in question4 ,that he has a mind1 no man doubts2 what his mind is1 he may be quite unable to say4 ,we have seen 7section #g7 that children1 when quite young1 can hardly be said to recognize that they have minds at all4 ,this does not mean that what is mental is not given in their experience4 ,they know that they must open their eyes to see things1 and must lay their hands upon them to feel them2 they have had pains and pleasures1 memories and fancies4 ,in short1 they have within their reach all the materials needed in framing a conception of the mind1 and in drawing clearly the distinction between their minds and external things4 ,nevertheless1 they are incapable of using these materials2 their attention is engrossed with what is physical1--with their own bodies and the bodies of others1 with the things that they can eat1 with the toys with which they can play1 and the like4 ,it is only later that there emerges even a tolerably clear conception of a self or mind different from the physical and contrasted with it4 ,primitive man is almost as material in his thinking as is the young child4 ,of this we have traces in many of the words which have come to be applied to the mind4 ,our word spirit is from the ,latin spiritus1 originally a breeze4 ,the ,latin word for the soul1 the word used by the great philosophers all through the ,middle ,ages1 anima 7,greek1 anemos71 has the same significance4 ,in the ,greek ,new ,testament1 the word used for spirit 7pneuma7 carries a similar suggestion4 ,when we are told in the ,book of ,genesis that man became a living soul1 we may read the word literally a breath4 ,what more natural than that the man who is just awakening to a consciousness of that elusive entity the mind should confuse it with that breath which is the most striking outward and visible sign that distinguishes a living man from a dead one8 ,that those who first tried to give some scientific account of the soul or mind conceived it as a material thing1 and that it was sufficiently common to identify it with the breath1 we know from direct evidence4 ,a glance at the ,greek philosophy1 to which we owe so much that is of value in our intellectual life1 is sufficient to disclose how difficult it was for thinking men to attain to a higher conception4 ,thus1 ,anaximenes of ,miletus1 who lived in the sixth century before ,christ1 says that our soul1 which is air1 rules us4 ,a little later1 ,heraclitus1 a man much admired for the depth of his reflections1 maintains that the soul is a fiery vapor1 evidently identifying it with the warm breath of the living creature4 ,in the fifth century1 ,b4,c41 ,anaxagoras1 who accounts for the ordering of the elements into a system of things by referring to the activity of ,mind or ,reason1 calls mind the finest of things1 and it seems clear that he did not conceive of it as very different in nature from the other elements which enter into the constitution of the world4 ,democritus of ,abdera 7between #dfj and #cfj ,b4,c471 that great investigator of nature and brilliant writer1 developed a materialistic doctrine that admits the existence of nothing save atoms and empty space4 ,he conceived the soul to consist of fine1 smooth1 round atoms1 which are also atoms of fire4 ,these atoms are distributed through the whole body1 but function differently in different places--in the brain they give us thought1 in the heart1 anger1 and in the liver1 desire4 ,life lasts just so long as we breathe in and breathe out such atoms4 ,the doctrine of ,democritus was taken up by ,epicurus1 who founded his school three hundred years before ,christ--a school which lived and prospered for a very long time4 ,those who are interested in seeing how a materialistic psychology can be carried out in detail by an ingenious mind should read the curious account of the mind presented in his great poem1 ,on ,nature1 by the ,roman poet ,lucretius1 an ardent ,epicurean1 who wrote in the first century ,b4,c4 ,the school which we commonly think of contrasting with the ,epicurean1 and one which was founded at about the same time1 is that of the ,stoics4 ,certainly the ,stoics differed in many things from the ,epicureans2 their view of the world1 and of the life of man1 was a much nobler one2 but they were uncompromising materialists1 nevertheless1 and identified the soul with the warm breath that animates man4 #ca4 ,,the ,,mind ,,as ,,immaterial4--,it is scarcely too much to say that the ,greek philosophy as a whole impresses the modern mind as representing the thought of a people to whom it was not unnatural to think of the mind as being a breath1 a fire1 a collection of atoms1 a something material4 ,to be sure1 we cannot accuse those twin stars that must ever remain the glory of literature and science1 ,plato and ,aristotle1 of being materialists4 ,plato 7#dbg-cdg1 ,b4,c47 distributes1 it is true1 the three-fold soul1 which he allows man1 in various parts of the human body1 in a way that at least suggests the ,democritean distribution of mind-atoms4 ,the lowest soul is confined beneath the diaphragm2 the one next in rank has its seat in the chest2 and the highest1 the rational soul1 is enthroned in the head4 ,however1 he has said quite enough about this last to indicate clearly that he conceived it to be free from all taint of materiality4 ,as for ,aristotle 7#chd-cbb1 ,b4,c471 who also distinguished between the lower psychical functions and the higher1 we find him sometimes speaking of soul and body in such a way as to lead men to ask themselves whether he is really speaking of two things at all2 but when he specifically treats of the nous or reason1 he insists upon its complete detachment from everything material4 ,man's reason is not subjected to the fate of the lower psychical functions1 which1 as the form of the body1 perish with the body2 it enters from without1 and it endures after the body has passed away4 ,it is interesting to note1 however1 an occasional lapse even in ,aristotle4 ,when he comes to speak of the relation to the world of the ,divine ,mind1 the ,first ,cause of ,motion1 which he conceives as pure ,reason1 he represents it as touching the world1 although it remains itself untouched4 ,we seem to find here just a flavor--an inconsistent one--of the material4 ,such reflections as those of ,plato and ,aristotle bore fruit in later ages4 ,when we come down to ,plotinus the ,neo-,platonist 7#bjd-bfi1 ,a4,d471 we have left the conception of the soul as a warm breath1 or as composed of fine round atoms1 far behind4 ,it has become curiously abstract and incomprehensible4 ,it is described as an immaterial substance ,this substance is1 in a sense1 in the body1 or1 at least1 it is present to the body4 ,but it is not in the body as material things are in this place or in that4 ,it is as a whole in the whole body1 and it is as a whole in every part of the body4 ,thus the soul may be regarded as divisible1 since it is distributed throughout the body2 but it must also be regarded as indivisible1 since it is wholly in every part4 ,let the man to whom such sentences as these mean anything rejoice in the meaning that he is able to read into them6 ,if he can go as far as ,plotinus1 perhaps he can go as far as ,cassiodorus 7#dgg-egj1 ,a4,d471 and maintain that the soul is not merely as a whole in every part of the body1 but is wholly in each of its own parts4 ,upon reading such statements one's first impulse is to exclaim3 ,how is it possible that men of sense should be led to speak in this irresponsible way8 and when they do speak thus1 is it conceivable that other men should seriously occupy themselves with what they say8 ,but if one has the historic sense1 and knows something of the setting in which such doctrines come to the birth1 one cannot regard it as remarkable that men of sense should urge them4 ,no one coins them independently out of his own brain2 little by little men are impelled along the path that leads to such conclusions4 ,plotinus was a careful student of the philosophers that preceded him4 ,he saw that mind must be distinguished from matter1 and he saw that what is given a location in space1 in the usual sense of the words1 is treated like a material thing4 ,on the other hand1 he had the common experience that we all have of a relation between mind and body4 ,how do justice to this relation1 and yet not materialize mind8 ,what he tried to do is clear1 and it seems equally clear that he had good reason for trying to do it4 ,but it appears to us now that what he actually did was to make of the mind or soul a something very like an inconsistent bit of matter1 that is somehow in space1 and yet not exactly in space1 a something that can be in two places at once1 a logical monstrosity4 ,that his doctrine did not meet with instant rejection was due to the fact1 already alluded to1 that our experience of the mind is something rather dim and elusive4 ,it is not easy for a man to say what it is1 and1 hence1 it is not easy for a man to say what it is not4 ,the doctrine of ,plotinus passed over to ,saint ,augustine1 and from him it passed to the philosophers of the ,middle ,ages4 ,how extremely difficult it has been for the world to get away from it at all1 is made clearly evident in the writings of that remarkable man ,descartes4 ,descartes wrote in the seventeenth century4 ,the long sleep of the ,middle ,ages was past1 and the several sciences had sprung into a vigorous and independent life4 ,it was not enough for ,descartes to describe the relation of mind and body in the loose terms that had prevailed up to his time4 ,he had made a careful study of anatomy1 and he realized that the brain is a central organ to which messages are carried by the nerves from all parts of the body4 ,he knew that an injury to the nerve might prevent the receipt of a message1 i4e4 he knew that a conscious sensation did not come into being until something happened in the brain4 ,nor was he content merely to refer the mind to the brain in a general way4 ,he found the little pineal gland in the midst of the brain to be in what he regarded as an admirable position to serve as the seat of the soul4 ,to this convenient little central office he relegated it2 and he describes in a way that may to-day well provoke a smile the movements that the soul imparts to the pineal gland1 making it incline itself in this direction and in that1 and making it push the animal spirits1 the fluid contained in the cavities of the brain1 towards various pores4 ,thus he writes3#a ,let us1 then1 conceive of the soul as having her chief seat in the little gland that is in the middle of the brain1 whence she radiates to all the rest of the body by means of the spirits1 the nerves1 and even the blood1 which1 participating in the impressions of the spirits1 can carry them through the arteries to all the members4 ,and again3 ,thus1 when the soul wills to call anything to remembrance1 this volition brings it about that the gland1 inclining itself successively in different directions1 pushes the spirits towards divers parts of the brain1 until they find the part which has the traces that the object which one wishes to recollect has left there4 ,we must admit that ,descartes' scientific studies led him to make this mind that sits in the little pineal gland something very material4 ,it is spoken of as though it pushed the gland about2 it is affected by the motions of the gland1 as though it were a bit of matter4 ,it seems to be a less inconsistent thing than the all in the whole body soul of ,plotinus2 but it appears to have purchased its comprehensibility at the expense of its immateriality4 ,shall we say that ,descartes frankly repudiated the doctrine that had obtained for so many centuries8 ,we cannot say that2 he still held to it4 ,but how could he8 ,the reader has perhaps remarked above that he speaks of the soul as having her chief seat in the pineal gland4 ,it seems odd that he should do so1 but he still held1 even after he had come to his definite conclusions as to the soul's seat1 to the ancient doctrine that the soul is united to all the parts of the body conjointly4 ,he could not wholly repudiate a venerable tradition4 ,we have seen1 thus1 that men first conceived of the mind as material and later came to rebel against such a conception4 ,but we have seen1 also1 that the attempt to conceive it as immaterial was not wholly successful4 ,it resulted in a something that we may describe as inconsistently material rather than as not material at all4 #cb4 ,,modern ,,common ,,sense ,,notions ,,of ,,the ,,mind4--,under this heading ,i mean to sum up the opinions as to the nature of the mind usually held by the intelligent persons about us to-day who make no claim to be regarded as philosophers4 ,is it not true that a great many of them believe3-- 7#a7 ,that the mind is in the body8 7#b7 ,that it acts and reacts with matter8 7#c7 ,that it is a substance with attributes8 7#d7 ,that it is nonextended and immaterial8 ,i must remark at the outset that this collection of opinions is by no means something gathered by the plain man from his own experience4 ,these opinions are the echoes of old philosophies4 ,they are a heritage from the past1 and have become the common property of all intelligent persons who are even moderately well-educated4 ,their sources have been indicated in the preceding sections2 but most persons who cherish them have no idea of their origin4 ,men are apt to suppose that these opinions seem reasonable to them merely for the reason that they find in their own experience evidence of their truth4 ,but this is not so4 ,have we not seen above how long it took men to discover that they must not think of the mind as being a breath1 or a flame1 or a collection of material atoms8 ,the men who erred in this way were abler than most of us can pretend to be1 and they gave much thought to the matter4 ,and when at last it came to be realized that mind must not thus be conceived as material1 those who endeavored to conceive it as something else gave1 after their best efforts1 a very queer account of it indeed4 ,is it in the face of such facts reasonable to suppose that our friends and acquaintances1 who strike us as having reflective powers in nowise remarkable1 have independently arrived at the conception that the mind is a nonextended and immaterial substance8 ,surely they have not thought all this out for themselves4 ,they have taken up and appropriated unconsciously notions which were in the air1 so to speak4 ,they have inherited their doctrines1 not created them4 ,it is well to remember this1 for it may make us the more willing to take up and examine impartially what we have uncritically turned into articles of belief4 ,the first two articles1 namely1 that the mind is in the body and that it acts upon1 and is acted upon by1 material things1 ,i shall discuss at length in the next chapter4 ,here ,i pause only to point out that the plain man does not put the mind into the body quite unequivocally4 ,i think it would surprise him to be told that a line might be drawn through two heads in such a way as to transfix two minds4 ,and ,i remark1 further1 that he has no clear idea of what it means for mind to act upon body or body to act upon mind4 ,how does an immaterial thing set a material thing in motion8 ,can it touch it8 ,can it push it8 ,then what does it do8 ,but let us pass on to the last two articles of faith mentioned above4 ,we all draw the distinction between substance and its attributes or qualities4 ,the distinction was remarked and discussed many centuries ago1 and much has been written upon it4 ,i take up the ruler on my desk2 it is recognized at once as a bit of wood4 ,how8 ,it has such and such qualities4 ,my paper-knife is of silver4 ,how do ,i know it8 ,it has certain other qualities4 ,i speak of my mind4 ,how do ,i know that ,i have a mind8 ,i have sensations and ideas4 ,if ,i experienced no mental phenomena of any sort1 evidence of the existence of a mind would be lacking4 ,now1 whether ,i am concerned with the ruler1 with the paper-knife1 or with the mind1 have ,i direct evidence of the existence of anything more than the whole group of qualities8 ,do ,i ever perceive the substance8 ,in the older philosophy1 the substance 7substantia7 was conceived to be a something not directly perceived1 but only inferred to exist--a something underlying the qualities of things and1 as it were1 holding them together4 ,it was believed in by philosophers who were quite ready to admit that they could not tell anything about it4 ,for example1 ,john ,locke 7#afcb-agjd71 the ,english philosopher1 holds to it stoutly1 and yet describes it as a mere we know not what1 whose function it is to hold together the bundles of qualities that constitute the things we know4 ,in the modern philosophy men still distinguish between substance and qualities4 ,it is a useful distinction1 and we could scarcely get on without it4 ,but an increasing number of thoughtful persons repudiate the old notion of substance altogether4 ,we may1 they say1 understand by the word substance the whole group of qualities as a group--not merely the qualities that are revealed at a given time1 but all those that we have reason to believe a fuller knowledge would reveal4 ,in short1 we may understand by it just what is left when the we know not what of the ,lockian has been discarded4 ,this notion of substance we may call the more modern one2 yet we can hardly say that it is the notion of the plain man4 ,he does not make very clear to himself just what is in his thought1 but ,i think we do him no injustice in maintaining that he is something of a ,lockian1 even if he has never heard of ,locke4 ,the ,lockian substance is1 as the reader has seen1 a sort of unknowable4 ,and now for the doctrine that the mind is nonextended and immaterial4 ,with these affirmations we may heartily agree2 but we must admit that the plain man enunciates them without having a very definite idea of what the mind is4 ,he regards as in his mind all his sensations and ideas1 all his perceptions and mental images of things4 ,now1 suppose ,i close my eyes and picture to myself a barber's pole4 ,where is the image8 ,we say1 in the mind4 ,is it extended8 ,we feel impelled to answer1 ,no4 ,but it certainly seems to be extended2 the white and the red upon it appear undeniably side by side4 ,may ,i assert that this mental image has no extension whatever8 ,must ,i deny to it parts1 or assert that its parts are not side by side8 ,it seems odd to maintain that a something as devoid of parts as is a mathematical point should yet appear to have parts and to be extended4 ,on the other hand1 if we allow the image to be extended1 how can we refer it to a nonextended mind8 ,to such questions as these1 ,i do not think that the plain man has an answer4 ,that they can be answered1 ,i shall try to show in the last section of this chapter4 ,but one cannot answer them until one has attained to rather a clear conception of what is meant by the mind4 ,and until one has attained to such a conception1 the statement that the mind is immaterial must remain rather vague and indefinite4 ,as we saw above1 even the ,plotinic soul was inconsistently material rather than immaterial4 ,it was not excluded from space2 it was referred to space in an absurd way4 ,the mind as common sense conceives it1 is the successor of this ,plotinic soul1 and seems to keep a flavor of what is material after all4 ,this will come out in the next chapter1 where we shall discuss mind and body4 #cc4 ,,the ,,psychologist ,,and ,,the ,,mind4--,when we ask how the psychologist conceives of the mind1 we must not forget that psychologists are many and that they differ more or less from each other in their opinions4 ,when we say the psychologist believes this or that1 we mean usually no more than that the opinion referred to is prevalent among men of that class1 or that it is the opinion of those whom we regard as its more enlightened members4 ,taking the words in this somewhat loose sense1 ,i shall ask what the psychologist's opinion is touching the four points set forth in the preceding section4 ,how far does he agree with the plain man8 7#a7 ,there can be no doubt that he refers the mind to the body in some way1 although he may shake his head over the use of the word in4 7#b7 ,as to whether the mind acts and reacts with matter1 in any sense of the words analogous to that in which they are commonly used1 there is a division in the camp4 ,some affirm such interaction2 some deny it4 ,the matter will be discussed in the next chapter4 7#c7 ,the psychologist--the more modern one--inclines to repudiate any substance or substratum of the sort accepted in the ,middle ,ages and believed in by many men now4 ,to him the mind is the whole complex of mental phenomena in their interrelations4 ,in other words1 the mind is not an unknown and indescribable something that is merely inferred2 it is something revealed in consciousness and open to observation4 7#d7 ,the psychologist is certainly not inclined to regard the mind or any idea belonging to it as material or as extended4 ,but he does recognize implicitly1 if not explicitly1 that ideas are composite4 ,to him1 as to the plain man1 the image held in the memory or imagination seems to be extended1 and he can distinguish its parts4 ,he does not do much towards clearing away the difficulty alluded to at the close of the last section4 ,it remains for the metaphysician to do what he can with it1 and to him we must turn if we wish light upon this obscure subject4 #cd4 ,,the ,,metaphysician ,,and ,,the ,,mind4--,i have reserved for the next chapter the first two points mentioned as belonging to the plain man's doctrine of the mind4 ,in what sense the mind may be said to be in the body1 and how it may be conceived to be related to the body1 are topics that deserve to be treated by themselves in a chapter on ,mind and ,body4 ,here ,i shall consider what the metaphysician has to say about the mind as substance1 and about the mind as nonextended and immaterial4 ,it has been said that the ,lockian substance is really an unknowable4 ,no one pretends to have experience of it2 it is revealed to no sense2 it is1 indeed1 a name for a mere nothing1 for when we abstract from a thing1 in thought1 every single quality1 we find that there is left to us nothing whatever4 ,we cannot say that the substance1 in this sense of the word1 is the reality of which the qualities are appearances4 ,in ,chapter ,v we saw just what we may legitimately mean by realities and appearances1 and it was made clear that an unknowable of any sort cannot possibly be the reality to which this or that appearance is referred4 ,appearances and realities are experiences which are observed to be related in certain ways4 ,that which is not open to observation at all1 that of which we have1 and can have1 no experience1 we have no reason to call the reality of anything4 ,we have1 in truth1 no reason to talk about it at all1 for we know nothing whatever about it2 and when we do talk about it1 it is because we are laboring under a delusion4 ,this is equally true whether we are concerned with the substance of material things or with the substance of minds4 ,an unknowable is an unknowable in any case1 and we may simply discard it4 ,we lose nothing by so doing1 for one cannot lose what one has never had1 and what1 by hypothesis1 one can never have4 ,the loss of a mere word should occasion us no regret4 ,now1 we have seen that we do not lose the world of real material things in rejecting the ,unknowable 7,chapter ,v74 ,the things are complexes of qualities1 of physical phenomena2 and the more we know about these1 the more do we know about real things4 ,but we have also seen 7,chapter ,,iv7 that physical phenomena are not the only phenomena of which we have experience4 ,we are conscious of mental phenomena as well1 of the phenomena of the subjective order1 of sensations and ideas4 ,why not admit that these constitute the mind1 as physical phenomena constitute the things which belong to the external world8 ,he who says this says no more than that the mind is known and is knowable4 ,it is what it is perceived to be2 and the more we know of mental phenomena1 the more do we know of the mind4 ,shall we call the mind as thus known a substance8 ,that depends on the significance which we give to this word4 ,it is better1 perhaps1 to avoid it1 for it is fatally easy to slip into the old use of the word1 and then to say1 as men have said1 that we do not know the mind as it is1 but only as it appears to us to be--that we do not know the reality1 but only its appearances4 ,and if we keep clearly before us the view of the mind which ,i am advocating1 we shall find an easy way out of the difficulties that seem to confront us when we consider it as nonextended and immaterial4 ,certain complexes of mental phenomena--for example1 the barber's pole above alluded to--certainly appear to be extended4 ,are they really extended8 ,if ,i imagine a tree a hundred feet high1 is it really a hundred feet high8 ,has it any real size at all8 ,our problem melts away when we realize what we mean by this real size4 ,in ,chapter ,v1 ,i have distinguished between apparent space and real space4 ,real space is1 as was pointed out1 the plan of the real physical world4 ,to occupy any portion of real space1 a thing must be a real external thing2 that is1 the experiences constituting it must belong to the objective order1 they must not be of the class called mental4 ,we all recognize this1 in a way4 ,we know that a real material foot rule cannot be applied to an imaginary tree4 ,we say1 ,how big did the tree seen in a dream seem2 we do not say1 ,how big was it really8 ,if we did ask such a question1 we should be puzzled to know where to look for an answer4 ,and this for a very good reason4 ,he who asks3 ,how big was that imaginary tree really8 asks1 in effect3 ,how much real space did the unreal tree fill8 ,the question is a foolish one4 ,it assumes that phenomena not in the objective order are in the objective order4 ,as well ask how a color smells or how a sound looks4 ,when we are dealing with the material we are not dealing with the mental1 and we must never forget this4 ,the tree imagined or seen in a dream seems extended4 ,its extension is apparent extension1 and this apparent extension has no place in the external world whatever4 ,but we must not confound this apparent extension with a real mathematical point1 and call the tree nonextended in this sense4 ,if we do this we are still in the old error--we have not gotten away from real space1 but have substituted position in that space for extension in that space4 ,nothing mental can have even a position in real space4 ,to do that it would have to be a real thing in the sense indicated4 ,let us1 then1 agree with the plain man in affirming that the mind is nonextended1 but let us avoid misconception4 ,the mind is constituted of experiences of the subjective order4 ,none of these are in space--real space4 ,but some of them have apparent extension1 and we must not overlook all that this implies4 ,now for the mind as immaterial4 ,we need not delay long over this point4 ,if we mean by the mind the phenomena of the subjective order1 and by what is material the phenomena of the objective order1 surely we may and must say that the mind is immaterial4 ,the two classes of phenomena separate themselves out at once4 #a ,the ,passions1 ,articles #cd and #db4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,mind ,,and ,,body #ce4 ,,is ,,the ,,mind ,,in ,,the ,,body8--,there was a time1 as we have seen in the last chapter 7section #cj71 when it did not seem at all out of the way to think of the mind as in the body1 and very literally in the body4 ,he who believes the mind to be a breath1 or a something composed of material atoms1 can conceive it as being in the body as unequivocally as chairs can be in a room4 ,breath can be inhaled and exhaled2 atoms can be in the head1 or in the chest1 or the heart1 or anywhere else in the animal economy4 ,there is nothing dubious about this sense of the preposition in4 ,but we have also seen 7section #ca7 that1 as soon as men began to realize that the mind is not material1 the question of its presence in the body became a serious problem4 ,if ,i say that a chair is in a room1 ,i say what is comprehensible to every one4 ,it is assumed that it is in a particular place in the room and is not in some other place4 ,if1 however1 ,i say that the chair is1 as a whole1 in every part of the room at once1 ,i seem to talk nonsense4 ,this is what ,plotinus and those who came after him said about the mind4 ,are their statements any the less nonsensical because they are talking about minds8 ,when one speaks about things mental1 one must not take leave of good sense and utter unmeaning phrases4 ,if minds are enough like material things to be in anything1 they must be in things in some intelligible sense of the word4 ,it will not do to say3 ,i use the word in1 but ,i do not really mean in4 ,if the meaning has disappeared1 why continue to use the word8 ,it can only lead to mystification4 ,descartes seemed to come back to something like an intelligible meaning when he put the mind in the pineal gland in the brain4 ,yet1 as we have seen1 he clung to the old conception4 ,he could not go back to the frank materialization of mind4 ,and the plain man to-day labors under the same difficulty4 ,he puts the mind in the body1 in the brain1 but he does not put it there frankly and unequivocally4 ,it is in the brain and yet not exactly in the brain4 ,let us see if this is not the case4 ,if we ask him3 ,does the man who wags his head move his mind about8 does he who mounts a step raise his mind some inches8 does he who sits down on a chair lower his mind8 ,i think we shall find that he hesitates in his answers4 ,and if we go on to say3 ,could a line be so drawn as to pass through your image of me and my image of you1 and to measure their distance from one another8 ,i think he will say1 ,no4 ,he does not regard minds and their ideas as existing in space in this fashion4 ,furthermore1 it would not strike the plain man as absurd if we said to him3 ,were our senses far more acute than they are1 it is conceivable that we should be able to perceive every atom in a given human body1 and all its motions4 ,but would he be willing to admit that an increase in the sharpness of sense would reveal to us directly the mind connected with such a body8 ,it is not1 then1 in the body as the atoms are4 ,it cannot be seen or touched under any conceivable circumstances4 ,what can it mean1 hence1 to say that it is there8 ,evidently1 the word is used in a peculiar sense1 and the plain man cannot help us to a clear understanding of it4 ,his position becomes intelligible to us when we realize that he has inherited the doctrine that the mind is immaterial1 and that he struggles1 at the same time1 with the tendency so natural to man to conceive it after the analogy of things material4 ,he thinks of it as in the body1 and1 nevertheless1 tries to dematerialize this in4 ,his thought is sufficiently vague1 and is inconsistent1 as might be expected4 ,if we will bear in mind what was said in the closing section of the last chapter1 we can help him over his difficulty4 ,that mind and body are related there can be no doubt4 ,but should we use the word in to express this relation8 ,the body is a certain group of phenomena in the objective order2 that is1 it is a part of the external world4 ,the mind consists of experiences in the subjective order4 ,we have seen that no mental phenomenon can occupy space--real space1 the space of the external world--and that it cannot even have a position in space 7section #cd74 ,as mental1 it is excluded from the objective order altogether4 ,the mind is not1 then1 strictly speaking1 in the body1 although it is related to it4 ,it remains1 of course1 to ask ourselves how we ought to conceive the relation4 ,this we shall do later in the present chapter4 ,but1 it may be said1 it would sound odd to deny that the mind is in the body4 ,does not every one use the expression8 ,what can we substitute for it8 ,i answer3 ,if it is convenient to use the expression let us continue to do so4 ,men must talk so as to be understood4 ,but let us not perpetuate error1 and1 as occasion demands it1 let us make clear to ourselves and to others what we have a right to understand by this in when we use it4 #cf4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,interactionist4--,there is no man who does not know that his mind is related to his body as it is not to other material things4 ,we open our eyes1 and we see things2 we stretch out our hand1 and we feel them2 our body receives a blow1 and we feel pain2 we wish to move1 and the muscles are set in motion4 ,these things are matters of common experience4 ,we all perceive1 in other words1 that there is an interaction1 in some sense of the term1 between mind and body4 ,but it is important to realize that one may be quite well aware of all such facts1 and yet may have very vague notions of what one means by body and by mind1 and may have no definite theory at all of the sort of relation that obtains between them4 ,the philosopher tries to attain to a clearer conception of these things4 ,his task1 be it remembered1 is to analyze and explain1 not to deny1 the experiences which are the common property of mankind4 ,in the present day the two theories of the relation of mind and body that divide the field between them and stand opposed to each other are interactionism and parallelism4 ,i have used the word interaction a little above in a loose sense to indicate our common experience of the fact that we become conscious of certain changes brought about in our body1 and that our purposes realize themselves in action4 ,but every one who accepts this fact is not necessarily an interactionist4 ,the latter is a man who holds a certain more or less definite theory as to what is implied by the fact4 ,let us take a look at his doctrine4 ,physical things interact4 ,a billiard ball in motion strikes one which has been at rest2 the former loses its motion1 the latter begins to roll away4 ,we explain the occurrence by a reference to the laws of mechanics2 that is to say1 we point out that it is merely an instance of the uniform behavior of matter in motion under such and such circumstances4 ,we distinguish between the state of things at one instant and the state of things at the next1 and we call the former cause and the latter effect4 ,it should be observed that both cause and effect here belong to the one order1 the objective order4 ,they have their place in the external world4 ,both the balls are material things2 their motion1 and the space in which they move1 are aspects of the external world4 ,if the balls did not exist in the same space1 if the motion of the one could not be towards or away from the other1 if contact were impossible1 we would manifestly have no interaction in the sense of the word employed above4 ,as it is1 the interaction of physical things is something that we can describe with a good deal of definiteness4 ,things interact in that they stand in certain physical relations1 and undergo changes of relations according to certain laws4 ,now1 to one who conceives the mind in a grossly material way1 the relation of mind and body can scarcely seem to be a peculiar problem1 different from the problem of the relation of one physical thing to another4 ,if my mind consists of atoms disseminated through my body1 its presence in the body appears as unequivocal as the presence of a dinner in a man who has just risen from the table4 ,nor can the interaction of mind and matter present any unusual difficulties1 for mind is matter4 ,atoms may be conceived to approach each other1 to clash1 to rearrange themselves4 ,interaction of mind and body is nothing else than an interaction of bodies4 ,one is not forced to give a new meaning to the word4 ,when1 however1 one begins to think of the mind as immaterial1 the case is very different4 ,how shall we conceive an immaterial thing to be related to a material one8 ,descartes placed the mind in the pineal gland1 and in so far he seemed to make its relation to the gland similar to that between two material things4 ,when he tells us that the soul brings it about that the gland bends in different directions1 we incline to view the occurrence as very natural--is not the soul in the gland8 ,but1 on the other hand1 ,descartes also taught that the essence of mind is thought and the essence of body is extension4 ,he made the two natures so different from each other that men began to ask themselves how the two things could interact at all4 ,the mind wills1 said one philosopher1 but that volition does not set matter in motion2 when the mind wills1 ,god brings about the appropriate change in material things4 ,the mind perceives things1 said another1 but that is not because they affect it directly2 it sees things in ,god4 ,ideas and things1 said a third1 constitute two independent series2 no idea can cause a change in things1 and no thing can cause a change in ideas4 ,the interactionist is a man who refuses to take any such turn as these philosophers4 ,his doctrine is much nearer to that of ,descartes than it is to any of theirs4 ,he uses the one word interaction to describe the relation between material things and also the relation between mind and body1 nor does he dwell upon the difference between the two4 ,he insists that mind and matter stand in the one causal nexus2 that a change in the outside world may be the cause of a perception coming into being in a mind1 and that a volition may be the cause of changes in matter4 ,what shall we call the plain man8 ,i think we may call him an interactionist in embryo4 ,the stick in his hand knocks an apple off of the tree2 his hand seems to him to be set in motion because he wills it4 ,the relation between his volition and the motion of his hand appears to him to be of much the same sort as that between the motion of the stick and the fall of the apple4 ,in each case he thinks he has to do with the relation of cause and effect4 ,the opponent of the interactionist insists1 however1 that the plain man is satisfied with this view of the matter only because he has not completely stripped off the tendency to conceive the mind as a material thing4 ,and he accuses the interactionist of having fallen a prey to the same weakness4 ,certainly1 it is not difficult to show that the interactionists write as though the mind were material1 and could be somewhere in space4 ,the late ,dr4 ,mc,cosh fairly represents the thought of many1 and he was capable of expressing himself as follows2#a ,it may be difficult to ascertain the exact point or surface at which the mind and body come together and influence each other1 in particular1 how far into the body 7,descartes without proof thought it to be in the pineal gland71 but it is certain1 that when they do meet mind knows body as having its essential properties of extension and resisting energy4 ,how can an immaterial thing be located at some point or surface within the body8 ,how can a material thing and an immaterial thing come together at a point or surface8 ,and if they cannot come together1 what have we in mind when we say they interact8 ,the parallelist1 for it is he who opposes interactionism1 insists that we must not forget that mental phenomena do not belong to the same order as physical phenomena4 ,he points out that1 when we make the word interaction cover the relations of mental phenomena to physical phenomena as well as the relations of the latter to each other1 we are assimilating heedlessly facts of two different kinds and are obliterating an important distinction4 ,he makes the same objection to calling the relations between mental phenomena and physical phenomena causal4 ,if the relation of a volition to the movement of the arm is not the same as that of a physical cause to its physical effect1 why1 he argues1 do you disguise the difference by calling them by the same name8 #cg4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,parallelist4--,thus1 the parallelist is a man who is so impressed by the gulf between physical facts and mental facts that he refuses to regard them as parts of the one order of causes and effects4 ,you cannot1 he claims1 make a single chain out of links so diverse4 ,some part of a human body receives a blow2 a message is carried along a sensory nerve and reaches the brain2 from the brain a message is sent out along a motor nerve to a group of muscles2 the muscles contract1 and a limb is set in motion4 ,the immediate effects of the blow1 the ingoing message1 the changes in the brain1 the outgoing message1 the contraction of the muscles--all these are physical facts4 ,one and all may be described as motions in matter4 ,but the man who received the blow becomes conscious that he was struck1 and both interactionist and parallelist regard him as becoming conscious of it when the incoming message reaches some part of the brain4 ,what shall be done with this consciousness8 ,the interactionist insists that it must be regarded as a link in the physical chain of causes and effects--he breaks the chain to insert it4 ,the parallelist maintains that it is inconceivable that such an insertion should be made4 ,he regards the physical series as complete in itself1 and he places the consciousness1 as it were1 on a parallel line4 ,it must not be supposed that he takes this figure literally4 ,it is his effort to avoid materializing the mind that forces him to hold the position which he does4 ,to put the mind in the brain is to make of it a material thing2 to make it parallel to the brain1 in the literal sense of the word1 would be just as bad4 ,all that we may understand him to mean is that mental phenomena and physical1 although they are related1 cannot be built into the one series of causes and effects4 ,he is apt to speak of them as concomitant4 ,we must not forget that neither parallelist nor interactionist ever dreams of repudiating our common experiences of the relations of mental phenomena and physical4 ,neither one will1 if he is a man of sense1 abandon the usual ways of describing such experiences4 ,whatever his theory1 he will still say3 ,i am suffering because ,i struck my hand against that table2 ,i sat down because ,i chose to do so4 ,his doctrine is not supposed to deny the truth contained in such statements2 it is supposed only to give a fuller understanding of it4 ,hence1 we cannot condemn either doctrine simply by an uncritical appeal to such statements and to the experiences they represent4 ,we must look much deeper4 ,now1 what can the parallelist mean by referring sensations and ideas to the brain and yet denying that they are in the brain8 ,what is this reference8 ,let us come back to the experiences of the physical and the mental as they present themselves to the plain man4 ,they have been discussed at length in ,chapter ,,iv4 ,it was there pointed out that every one distinguishes without difficulty between sensations and things1 and that every one recognizes explicitly or implicitly that a sensation is an experience referred in a certain way to the body4 ,when the eyes are open1 we see2 when the ears are open1 we hear2 when the hand is laid on things1 we feel4 ,how do we know that we are experiencing sensations8 ,the setting tells us that4 ,the experience in question is given together with an experience of the body4 ,this is concomitance of the mental and the physical as it appears in the experience of us all2 and from such experiences as these the philosopher who speaks of the concomitance of physical and mental phenomena must draw the whole meaning of the word4 ,let us here sharpen a little the distinction between sensations and things4 ,standing at some distance from the tree1 ,i see an apple fall to the ground4 ,were ,i only half as far away1 my experience would not be exactly the same--,i should have somewhat different sensations4 ,as we have seen 7section #ag71 the apparent sizes of things vary as we move1 and this means that the quantity of sensation1 when ,i observe the apple from a nearer point1 is greater4 ,the man of science tells me that the image which the object looked at projects upon the retina of the eye grows larger as we approach objects4 ,the thing1 then1 may remain unchanged2 our sensations will vary according to the impression which is made upon our body4 ,again4 ,when ,i have learned something of physics1 ,i am ready to admit that1 although light travels with almost inconceivable rapidity1 still1 its journey through space does take time4 ,hence the impression made upon my eye by the falling apple is not simultaneous with the fall itself2 and if ,i stand far away it is made a little later than when ,i am near4 ,in the case in point the difference is so slight as to pass unnoticed1 but there are cases in which it seems apparent even to the unlearned that sensations arise later than the occurrences of which we take them to be the report4 ,thus1 ,i stand on a hill and watch a laborer striking with his sledge upon the distant railway4 ,i hear the sound of the blow while ,i see his tool raised above his head4 ,i account for this by saying that it has taken some time for the sound-waves to reach my ear1 and ,i regard my sensation as arising only when this has been accomplished4 ,but this conclusion is not judged sufficiently accurate by the man of science4 ,the investigations of the physiologist and the psychologist have revealed that the brain holds a peculiar place in the economy of the body4 ,if the nerve which connects the sense organ with the brain be severed1 the sensation does not arise4 ,injuries to the brain affect the mental life as injuries to other parts of the body do not4 ,hence1 it is concluded that1 to get the real time of the emergence of a sensation1 we must not inquire merely when an impression was made upon the organ of sense1 but must determine when the message sent along the nerve has reached some part of the brain4 ,the resulting brain change is regarded as the true concomitant of the sensation4 ,if there is a brain change of a certain kind1 there is the corresponding sensation4 ,it need hardly be said that no one knows as yet much about the brain motions which are supposed to be concomitants of sensations1 although a good deal is said about them4 ,it is very important to remark that in all this no new meaning has been given to the word concomitance4 ,the plain man remarks that sensations and their changes must be referred to the body4 ,with the body disposed in a certain way1 he has sensations of a certain kind2 with changes in the body1 the sensations change4 ,he does not perceive the sensations to be in the body4 ,as ,i recede from a house ,i have a whole series of visual experiences differing from each other and ending in a faint speck which bears little resemblance to the experience with which ,i started4 ,i have had1 as we say1 a series of sensations1 or groups of such4 ,did any single group1 did the experience which ,i had at any single moment1 seem to me to be in my body8 ,surely not4 ,its relation to my body is other than that4 ,and when the man of science1 instead of referring sensations vaguely to the body1 refers them to the brain1 the reference is of precisely the same nature4 ,from our common experience of the relation of the physical and the mental he starts out4 ,he has no other ground on which to stand4 ,he can only mark the reference with greater exactitude4 ,i have been speaking of the relation of sensations to the brain4 ,it is scarcely necessary for me to show that all other mental phenomena must be referred to the brain as well1 and that the reference must be of the same nature4 ,the considerations which lead us to refer ideas to the brain are set forth in our physiologies and psychologies4 ,the effects of cerebral disease1 injuries to the brain1 etc41 are too well known to need mention2 and it is palpably as absurd to put ideas in the brain as it is to put sensations there4 ,now1 the parallelist1 if he be a wise man1 will not attempt to explain the reference of mental phenomena to the brain--to explain the relation between mind and matter4 ,the relation appears to be unique4 ,certainly it is not identical with the relation between two material things4 ,we explain things1 in the common acceptation of the word1 when we show that a case under consideration is an exemplification of some general law--when we show1 in other words1 that it does not stand alone4 ,but this does stand alone1 and is admitted to stand alone4 ,we admit as much when we say that the mind is immaterial1 and yet hold that it is related to the body4 ,we cannot1 then1 ask for an explanation of the relation4 ,but this does not mean that the reference of mental phenomena to the body is a meaningless expression4 ,we can point to those experiences of concomitance that we all have1 distinguish them carefully from relations of another kind1 and say3 ,this is what the word means1 whether it be used by the plain man or by the man of science4 ,i have said above3 ,if there is a brain change of a certain kind1 there is the corresponding sensation4 ,perhaps the reader will feel inclined to say here3 ,if you can say as much as this1 why can you not go a little farther and call the brain change the cause of the sensation8 ,but he who speaks thus1 forgets what has been said above about the uniqueness of the relation4 ,in the objective order of our experiences1 in the external world1 we can distinguish between antecedents and consequents1 between causes and their effects4 ,the causes and their effects belong to the one order1 they stand in the same series4 ,the relation of the physical to the mental is1 as we have seen1 a different relation4 ,hence1 the parallelist seems justified in objecting to the assimilation of the two4 ,he prefers the word concomitance1 just because it marks the difference4 ,he does not mean to indicate that the relation is any the less uniform or dependable when he denies that it is causal4 #ch4 ,,in ,,what ,,sense ,,mental ,,phenomena ,,have ,a ,,time ,,and ,,place4--,we have seen in ,chapters ,,vi and ,,vii what space and time--real space and time--are4 ,they are the plan of the real external world and its changes2 they are aspects of the objective order of experience4 ,to this order no mental phenomenon can belong4 ,it cannot1 as we have seen 7section #ce71 occupy any portion of space or even have a location in space4 ,it is equally true that no series of mental changes can occupy any portion of time1 real time1 or even fill a single moment in the stream of time4 ,there are many persons to whom this latter statement will seem difficult of acceptance2 but the relation of mental phenomena to space and to time is of the same sort1 and we can consider the two together4 ,psychologists speak unhesitatingly of the localization of sensations in the brain1 and they talk as readily of the moment at which a sensation arises and of the duration of the sensation4 ,what can they mean by such expressions8 ,we have seen that sensations are not in the brain1 and their localization means only the determination of their concomitant physical phenomena1 of the corresponding brain-change4 ,and it ought to be clear even from what has been said above that1 in determining the moment at which a sensation arises1 we are determining only the time of the concomitant brain process4 ,why do we say that a sensation arises later than the moment at which an impression is made upon the organ of sense and earlier than the resulting movement of some group of muscles8 ,because the change in the brain1 to which we refer the sensation1 occurs later than the one and earlier than the other4 ,this has a place in real time1 it belongs to that series of world changes whose succession constitutes real time4 ,if we ask when anything happened1 we always refer to this series of changes4 ,we try to determine its place in the world order4 ,thus1 we ask3 ,when was ,julius ,caesar born8 ,we are given a year and a day4 ,how is the time which has elapsed since measured8 ,by changes in the physical world1 by revolutions of the earth about the sun4 ,we ask3 ,when did he conceive the plan of writing his ,commentaries8 ,if we get an answer at all1 it must be an answer of the same kind--some point in the series of physical changes which occur in real time must be indicated4 ,where else should we look for an answer8 ,in point of fact1 we never do look elsewhere4 ,again4 ,we have distinguished between apparent space and real space 7section #cd74 ,we have seen that1 when we deny that a mental image can occupy any portion of space1 we need not think of it as losing its parts and shrivelling to a point4 ,we may still attribute to it apparent space2 may affirm that it seems extended4 ,let us mark the same distinction when we consider time4 ,the psychologist speaks of the duration of a sensation4 ,has it real duration8 ,it is not in time at all1 and1 of course1 it cannot1 strictly speaking1 occupy a portion of time4 ,but we can try to measure the duration of the physical concomitant1 and call this the real duration of the sensation4 ,we all distinguish between the real time of mental phenomena1 in the sense indicated just above1 and the apparent time4 ,we know very well that the one may give us no true measure of the other4 ,a sermon seems long2 was it really long8 ,there is only one way of measuring its real length4 ,we must refer to the clock1 to the sun1 to some change in the physical world4 ,we seem to live years in a dream2 was the dream really a long one8 ,the real length can only be determined1 if at all1 by a physical reference4 ,those apparent years of the dream have no place in the real time which is measured by the clock4 ,we do not have to cut it and insert them somewhere4 ,they belong to a different order1 and cannot be inserted any more than the thought of a patch can be inserted in a rent in a real coat4 ,we see1 thus1 when we reflect upon the matter1 that mental phenomena cannot1 strictly speaking1 be said to have a time and place4 ,he who attributes these to them materializes them4 ,but their physical concomitants have a time and place1 and mental phenomena can be ordered by a reference to these4 ,they can be assigned a time and place of existing in a special sense of the words not to be confounded with the sense in which we use them when we speak of the time and place of material things4 ,this makes it possible to relate every mental phenomenon to the world system in a definite way1 and to distinguish it clearly from every other1 however similar4 ,we need not1 when we come to understand this1 change our usual modes of speech4 ,we may still say3 ,the pain ,i had two years ago is like the pain ,i have to-day2 my sensation came into being at such a moment2 my regret lasted two days4 ,we speak that we may be understood2 and such phrases express a truth1 even if they are rather loose and inaccurate4 ,but we must not be deceived by such phrases1 and assume that they mean what they have no right to mean4 #ci4 ,,objections ,,to ,,parallelism4--,what objections can be brought against parallelism8 ,it is sometimes objected by the interactionist that it abandons the plain man's notion of the mind as a substance with its attributes1 and makes of it a mere collection of mental phenomena4 ,it must be admitted that the parallelist usually holds a view which differs rather widely from that of the unlearned4 ,but even supposing this objection well taken1 it can no longer be regarded as an objection specifically to the doctrine of parallelism1 for the view of the mind in question is becoming increasingly popular1 and it is now held by influential interactionists as well as by parallelists4 ,one may believe that the mind consists of ideas1 and may still hold that ideas can cause motions in matter4 ,there is1 however1 another objection that predisposes many thoughtful persons to reject parallelism uncompromisingly4 ,it is this4 ,if we admit that the chain of physical causes and effects1 from a blow given to the body to the resulting muscular movements made in self-defense1 is an unbroken one1 what part can we assign to the mind in the whole transaction8 ,has it done anything8 ,is it not reduced to the position of a passive spectator8 ,must we not regard man as a physical automaton with parallel psychical states8 ,such an account of man cannot fail to strike one as repugnant2 and yet it is the parallelist himself whom we must thank for introducing us to it4 ,the account is not a caricature from the pen of an opponent4 ,an automaton1 writes ,professor ,clifford1#b is a thing that goes by itself when it is wound up1 and we go by ourselves when we have had food4 ,excepting the fact that other men are conscious1 there is no reason why we should not regard the human body as merely an exceedingly complicated machine which is wound up by putting food into the mouth4 ,but it is not merely a machine1 because consciousness goes with it4 ,the mind1 then1 is to be regarded as a stream of feelings which runs parallel to1 and simultaneous with1 a certain part of the action of the body1 that is to say1 that particular part of the action of the brain in which the cerebrum and the sensory tracts are excited4 ,the saving statement that the body is not merely a machine1 because consciousness goes with it1 does not impress one as being sufficient to redeem the illustration4 ,who wants to be an automaton with an accompanying consciousness8 ,who cares to regard his mind as an epiphenomenon--a thing that exists1 but whose existence or nonexistence makes no difference to the course of affairs8 ,the plain man's objection to such an account of himself seems to be abundantly justified4 ,as ,i have said earlier in this chapter1 neither interactionist nor parallelist has the intention of repudiating the experience of world and mind common to us all4 ,we surely have evidence enough to prove that minds count for something4 ,no house was ever built1 no book was ever written1 by a creature without a mind2 and the better the house or book1 the better the mind4 ,that there is a fixed and absolutely dependable relation between the planning mind and the thing accomplished1 no man of any school has the right to deny4 ,the only legitimate question is3 ,what is the nature of the relation8 ,is it causal1 or should it be conceived to be something else8 ,the whole matter will be more fully discussed in ,chapter ,,xi4 ,this chapter ,i shall close with a brief summary of the points which the reader will do well to bear in mind when he occupies himself with parallelism4 7#a7 ,parallelism is a protest against the interactionist's tendency to materialize the mind4 7#b7 ,the name is a figurative expression1 and must not be taken literally4 ,the true relation between mental phenomena and physical is given in certain common experiences that have been indicated1 and it is a unique relation4 7#c7 ,it is a fixed and absolutely dependable relation4 ,it is impossible that there should be a particular mental fact without its corresponding physical fact2 and it is impossible that this physical fact should occur without its corresponding mental fact4 7#d7 ,the parallelist objects to calling this relation causal1 because this obscures the distinction between it and the relation between facts both of which are physical4 ,he prefers the word concomitance4 7#e7 ,such objections to parallelism as that cited above assume that the concomitance of which the parallelist speaks is analogous to physical concomitance4 ,the chemist puts together a volume of hydrogen gas and a volume of chlorine gas1 and the result is two volumes of hydrochloric acid gas4 ,we regard it as essential to the result that there should be the two gases and that they should be brought together4 ,but the fact that the chemist has red hair we rightly look upon as a concomitant phenomenon of no importance4 ,the result would be the same if he had black hair or were bald4 ,but this is not the concomitance that interests the parallelist4 ,the two sorts of concomitance are alike only in the one point4 ,some phenomenon is regarded as excluded from the series of causes and effects under discussion4 ,on the other hand1 the difference between the two is all-important2 in the one case1 the concomitant phenomenon is an accidental circumstance that might just as well be absent2 in the other1 it is nothing of the sort2 it cannot be absent--the mental fact must exist if the brain-change in question exists4 ,it is quite possible that1 on reading this list of points1 one may be inclined to make two protests4 ,first3 ,is a parallelism so carefully guarded as this properly called parallelism at all8 ,to this ,i answer3 ,the name matters little4 ,i have used it because ,i have no better term4 ,certainly1 it is not the parallelism which is sometimes brought forward1 and which peeps out from the citation from ,clifford4 ,it is nothing more than an insistence upon the truth that we should not treat the mind as though it were a material thing4 ,if any one wishes to take the doctrine and discard the name1 ,i have no objection4 ,as so guarded1 the doctrine is1 ,i think1 true4 ,second3 ,if it is desirable to avoid the word cause1 in speaking of the relation of the mental and the physical1 on the ground that otherwise we give the word a double sense1 why is it not desirable to avoid the word concomitance8 ,have we not seen that the word is ambiguous8 ,i admit the inconsistency and plead in excuse only that ,i have chosen the lesser of two evils4 ,it is fatally easy to slip into the error of thinking of the mind as though it were material and had a place in the physical world4 ,in using the word concomitance ,i enter a protest against this4 ,but ,i have1 of course1 no right to use it without showing just what kind of concomitance ,i mean4 #a ,first and ,fundamental ,truths1 ,book ,i1 ,part ,,ii1 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,new ,york1 #ahhi4 #b ,lectures and ,essays1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #eg4 ,london1 #ahgi4 ,,chapter ,x ,,how ,,we ,,know ,,there ,,are ,,other ,,minds #dj4 ,,is ,,it ,,certain ,,that ,,we ,,know ,,it8--,i suppose there is no man in his sober senses who seriously believes that no other mind than his own exists4 ,there is1 to be sure1 an imaginary being more or less discussed by those interested in philosophy1 a creature called the ,solipsist1 who is credited with this doctrine4 ,but men do not become solipsists1 though they certainly say things now and then that other men think logically lead to some such unnatural view of things2 and more rarely they say things that sound as if the speaker1 in some moods1 at least1 might actually harbor such a view4 ,thus the philosopher ,fichte 7#agfb-ahad7 talks in certain of his writings as though he believed himself to be the universe1 and his words cause ,jean ,paul ,richter1 the inimitable1 to break out in his characteristic way3 ,the very worst of it all is the lazy1 aimless1 aristocratic1 insular life that a god must lead2 he has no one to go with4 ,if ,i am not to sit still for all time and eternity1 if ,i let myself down as well as ,i can and make myself finite1 that ,i may have something in the way of society1 still ,i have1 like petty princes1 only my own creatures to echo my words4 4 4 4 ,every being1 even the highest ,being1 wishes something to love and to honor4 ,but the ,fichtean doctrine that ,i am my own body-maker leaves me with nothing whatever--with not so much as the beggar's dog or the prisoner's spider4 4 4 4 ,truly ,i wish that there were men1 and that ,i were one of them4 4 4 4 ,if there exists1 as ,i very much fear1 no one but myself1 unlucky dog that ,i am1 then there is no one at such a pass as ,i4 ,just how much ,fichte's words meant to the man who wrote them may be a matter for dispute4 ,certainly no one has shown a greater moral earnestness or a greater regard for his fellowmen than this philosopher1 and we must not hastily accuse any one of being a solipsist4 ,but that to certain men1 and1 indeed1 to many men1 there have come thoughts that have seemed to point in this direction--that not a few have had doubts as to their ability to prove the existence of other minds--this we must admit4 ,it appears somewhat easier for a man to have doubts upon this subject when he has fallen into the idealistic error of regarding the material world1 which seems to be revealed to him1 as nothing else than his ideas or sensations or impressions4 ,if we will draw the whole telephone exchange into the clerk1 there seems little reason for not including all the subscribers as well4 ,if other men's bodies are my sensations1 may not other men's minds be my imaginings8 ,but doubts may be felt also by those who are willing to admit a real external world4 ,how do we know that our inference to the existence of other minds is a justifiable inference8 ,can there be such a thing as verification in this field8 ,for we must remember that no man is directly conscious of any mind except his own4 ,men cannot exhibit their minds to their neighbors as they exhibit their wigs4 ,however close may seem to us to be our intercourse with those about us1 do we ever attain to anything more than our ideas of the contents of their minds8 ,we do not experience these contents2 we picture them1 we represent them by certain proxies4 ,to be sure1 we believe that the originals exist1 but can we be quite sure of it8 ,can there be a proof of this right to make the leap from one consciousness to another8 ,we seem to assume that we can make it1 and then we make it again and again2 but suppose1 after all1 that there were nothing there4 ,could we ever find out our error8 ,and in a field where it is impossible to prove error1 must it not be equally impossible to prove truth8 ,the doubt has seemed by no means a gratuitous one to certain very sensible practical men4 ,it is wholly impossible1 writes ,professor ,huxley1#a absolutely to prove the presence or absence of consciousness in anything but one's own brain1 though by analogy1 we are justified in assuming its existence in other men4 ,the existence of my conception of you in my consciousness1 says ,clifford1#b carries with it a belief in the existence of you outside of my consciousness4 4 4 4 ,how this inference is justified1 how consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of itself1 ,i do not pretend to say3 ,i need not untie a knot which the world has cut for me long ago4 ,it may very well be that ,i myself am the only existence1 but it is simply ridiculous to suppose that anybody else is4 ,the position of absolute idealism may1 therefore1 be left out of count1 although each individual may be unable to justify his dissent from it4 ,these are writers belonging to our own modern age1 and they are men of science4 ,both of them deny that the existence of other minds is a thing that can be proved2 but the one tells us that we are justified in assuming their existence1 and the other informs us that1 although it may very well be that no other mind exists1 we may leave that possibility out of count4 ,neither position seems a sensible one4 ,are we justified in assuming what cannot be proved8 or is the argument from analogy really a proof of some sort8 ,is it right to close our eyes to what may very well be1 just because we choose to do so8 ,the fact is that both of these writers had the conviction1 shared by us all1 that there are other minds1 and that we know something about them2 and yet neither of them could see that the conviction rested upon an unshakable foundation4 ,now1 ,i have no desire to awake in the mind of any one a doubt of the existence of other minds4 ,but ,i think we must all admit that the man who recognizes that such minds are not directly perceived1 and who harbors doubts as to the nature of the inference which leads to their assumption1 may1 perhaps1 be able to say that he feels certain that there are other minds2 but must we not at the same time admit that he is scarcely in a position to say3 it is certain that there are other minds8 ,the question will keep coming back again3 ,may there not1 after all1 be a legitimate doubt on the subject8 ,to set this question at rest there seems to be only one way1 and that is this3 to ascertain the nature of the inference which is made1 and to see clearly what can be meant by proof when one is concerned with such matters as these4 ,if it turns out that we have proof1 in the only sense of the word in which it is reasonable to ask for proof1 our doubt falls away of itself4 #da4 ,,the ,,argument ,,for ,,other ,,minds4--,i have said early in this volume 7section #g7 that the plain man perceives that other men act very much as he does1 and that he attributes to them minds more or less like his own4 ,he reasons from like to like--other bodies present phenomena which1 in the case of his own body1 he perceives to be indicative of mind1 and he accepts them as indicative of mind there also4 ,the psychologist makes constant use of this inference2 indeed1 he could not develop his science without it4 ,john ,stuart ,mill 7#ahjf-ahgc71 whom it is always a pleasure to read because he is so clear and straightforward1 presents this argument in the following form3#c-- ,by what evidence do ,i know1 or by what considerations am ,i led to believe1 that there exist other sentient creatures2 that the walking and speaking figures which ,i see and hear1 have sensations and thoughts1 or1 in other words1 possess ,minds8 ,the most strenuous ,intuitionist does not include this among the things that ,i know by direct intuition4 ,i conclude it from certain things1 which my experience of my own states of feeling proves to me to be marks of it4 ,these marks are of two kinds1 antecedent and subsequent2 the previous conditions requisite for feeling1 and the effects or consequences of it4 ,i conclude that other human beings have feelings like me1 because1 first1 they have bodies like me1 which ,i know1 in my own case1 to be the antecedent condition of feelings2 and because1 secondly1 they exhibit the acts1 and other outward signs1 which in my own case ,i know by experience to be caused by feelings4 ,i am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by a uniform sequence1 of which the beginning is modifications of my body1 the middle is feelings1 the end is outward demeanor4 ,in the case of other human beings ,i have the evidence of my senses for the first and last links of the series1 but not for the intermediate link4 ,i find1 however1 that the sequence between the first and last is as regular and constant in those other cases as it is in mine4 ,in my own case ,i know that the first link produces the last through the intermediate link1 and could not produce it without4 ,experience1 therefore1 obliges me to conclude that there must be an intermediate link2 which must either be the same in others as in myself1 or a different one4 ,i must either believe them to be alive1 or to be automatons2 and by believing them to be alive1 that is1 by supposing the link to be of the same nature as in the case of which ,i have experience1 and which is in all respects similar1 ,i bring other human beings1 as phenomena1 under the same generalizations which ,i know by experience to be the true theory of my own existence4 ,and in doing so ,i conform to the legitimate rules of experimental inquiry4 ,the process is exactly parallel to that by which ,newton proved that the force which keeps the planets in their orbits is identical with that by which an apple falls to the ground4 ,it was not incumbent on ,newton to prove the impossibility of its being any other force2 he was thought to have made out his point when he had simply shown that no other force need be supposed4 ,we know the existence of other beings by generalization from the knowledge of our own2 the generalization merely postulates that what experience shows to be a mark of the existence of something within the sphere of our consciousness1 may be concluded to be a mark of the same thing beyond that sphere4 ,now1 the plain man accepts the argument from analogy1 here insisted upon1 every day of his life4 ,he is continually forming an opinion as to the contents of other minds on a basis of the bodily manifestations presented to his view4 ,the process of inference is so natural and instinctive that we are tempted to say that it hardly deserves to be called an inference4 ,certainly the man is not conscious of distinct steps in the process2 he perceives certain phenomena1 and they are at once illuminated by their interpretation4 ,he reads other men as we read a book--the signs on the paper are scarcely attended to1 our whole thought is absorbed in that for which they stand4 ,as ,i have said above1 the psychologist accepts the argument1 and founds his conclusions upon it4 ,upon what ground can one urge that this inference to other minds is a doubtful one8 ,it is made universally4 ,we have seen that even those who have theoretic objections against it1 do not hesitate to draw it1 as a matter of fact4 ,it appears unnatural in the extreme to reject it4 ,what can induce men to regard it with suspicion8 ,i think the answer to this question is rather clearly suggested in the sentence already quoted from ,professor ,huxley3 ,it is wholly impossible absolutely to prove the presence or absence of consciousness in anything but one's own brain1 though1 by analogy1 we are justified in assuming its existence in other men4 ,here ,professor ,huxley admits that we have something like a proof1 for he regards the inference as justified4 ,but he does not think that we have absolute proof--the best that we can attain to appears to be a degree of probability falling short of the certainty which we should like to have4 ,now1 it should be remarked that the discredit cast upon the argument for other minds has its source in the fact that it does not satisfy a certain assumed standard4 ,what is that standard8 ,it is the standard of proof which we may look for and do look for where we are concerned to establish the existence of material things with the highest degree of certainty4 ,there are all sorts of indirect ways of proving the existence of material things4 ,we may read about them in a newspaper1 and regard them as highly doubtful2 we may have the word of a man whom1 on the whole1 we regard as veracious2 we may infer their existence1 because we perceive that certain other things exist1 and are to be accounted for4 ,under certain circumstances1 however1 we may have proof of a different kind3 we may see and touch the things themselves4 ,material things are open to direct inspection4 ,such a direct inspection constitutes absolute proof1 so far as material things are concerned4 ,but we have no right to set this up as our standard of absolute proof1 when we are talking about other minds4 ,in this field it is not proof at all4 ,anything that can be directly inspected is not another mind4 ,we cannot cast a doubt upon the existence of colors by pointing to the fact that we cannot smell them4 ,if they could be smelt1 they would not be colors4 ,we must in each case seek a proof of the appropriate kind4 ,what have we a right to regard as absolute proof of the existence of another mind8 ,only this3 the analogy upon which we depend in making our inference must be a very close one4 ,as we shall see in the next section1 the analogy is sometimes very remote1 and we draw the inference with much hesitation1 or1 perhaps1 refuse to draw it at all4 ,it is not1 however1 the kind of inference that makes the trouble2 it is the lack of detailed information that may serve as a basis for inference4 ,our inference to other minds is unsatisfactory only in so far as we are ignorant of our own minds and bodies and of other bodies4 ,were our knowledge in these fields complete1 we should know without fail the signs of mind1 and should know whether an inference were or were not justified4 ,and justified here means proved--proved in the only sense in which we have a right to ask for proof4 ,no single fact is known that can discredit such a proof4 ,our doubt is1 then1 gratuitous and can be dismissed4 ,we may claim that we have verification of the existence of other minds4 ,such verification1 however1 must consist in showing that1 in any given instance1 the signs of mind really are present4 ,it cannot consist in presenting minds for inspection as though they were material things4 ,one more matter remains to be touched upon in this section4 ,it has doubtless been observed that ,mill1 in the extract given above1 seems to place feelings1 in other words1 mental phenomena1 between one set of bodily motions and another4 ,he makes them the middle link in a chain whose first and third links are material4 ,the parallelist cannot treat mind in this way4 ,he claims that to make mental phenomena effects or causes of bodily motions is to make them material4 ,must1 then1 the parallelist abandon the argument for other minds8 ,not at all4 ,the force of the argument lies in interpreting the phenomena presented by other bodies as one knows by experience the phenomena of one's own body must be interpreted4 ,he who concludes that the relation between his own mind and his own body can best be described as a parallelism1 must judge that other men's minds are related to their bodies in the same way4 ,he must treat his neighbor as he treats himself4 ,the argument from analogy remains the same4 #db4 ,,what ,,other ,,minds ,,are ,,there8--,that other men have minds nobody really doubts1 as we have seen above4 ,they resemble us so closely1 their actions are so analogous to our own1 that1 although we sometimes give ourselves a good deal of trouble to ascertain what sort of minds they have1 we never think of asking ourselves whether they have minds4 ,nor does it ever occur to the man who owns a dog1 or who drives a horse1 to ask himself whether the creature has a mind4 ,he may complain that it has not much of a mind1 or he may marvel at its intelligence--his attitude will depend upon the expectations which he has been led to form4 ,but regard the animal as he would regard a bicycle or an automobile1 he will not4 ,the brute is not precisely like us1 but its actions bear an unmistakable analogy to our own2 pleasure and pain1 hope and fear1 desire and aversion1 are so plainly to be read into them that we feel that a man must be high gravel blind not to see their significance4 ,nevertheless1 it has been possible for man1 under the prepossession of a mistaken philosophical theory1 to assume the whole brute creation to be without consciousness4 ,when ,descartes had learned something of the mechanism of the human body1 and had placed the human soul--hospes comesque corporis--in the little pineal gland in the midst of the brain1 the conception in his mind was not unlike that which we have when we picture to ourselves a locomotive engine with an engineer in its cab4 ,the man gives intelligent direction2 but1 under some circumstances1 the machine can do a good deal in the absence of the man2 if it is started1 it can run of itself1 and to do this1 it must go through a series of complicated motions4 ,descartes knew that many of the actions performed by the human body are not the result of conscious choice1 and that some of them are in direct contravention of the will's commands4 ,the eye protects itself by dropping its lid1 when the hand is brought suddenly before it2 the foot jerks away from the heated object which it has accidentally touched4 ,the body was seen to be a mechanism relatively independent of the mind1 and one rather complete in itself4 ,joined with a soul1 the circle of its functions was conceived to be widened2 but even without the assistance of the soul1 it was thought that it could keep itself busy1 and could do many things that the unreflective might be inclined to attribute to the efficiency of the mind4 ,the bodies of the brutes ,descartes regarded as mechanisms of the same general nature as the human body4 ,he was unwilling to allow a soul to any creature below man1 so nothing seemed left to him save to maintain that the brutes are machines without consciousness1 and that their apparently purposive actions are to be classed with such human movements as the sudden closing of the eye when it is threatened with the hand4 ,the melancholy results of this doctrine made themselves evident among his followers4 ,even the mild and pious ,malebranche could be brutal to a dog which fawned upon him1 under the mistaken notion that it did not really hurt a dog to kick it4 ,all this reasoning men have long ago set aside4 ,for one thing1 it has come to be recognized that there may be consciousness1 perhaps rather dim1 blind1 and fugitive1 but still consciousness1 which does not get itself recognized as do our clearly conscious purposes and volitions4 ,many of the actions of man which ,descartes was inclined to regard as unaccompanied by consciousness may not1 in fact1 be really unconscious4 ,and1 in the second place1 it has come to be realized that we have no right to class all the actions of the brutes with those reflex actions in man which we are accustomed to regard as automatic4 ,the belief in animal automatism has passed away1 it is to be hoped1 never to return4 ,that lower animals have minds we must believe4 ,but what sort of minds have they8 ,it is hard enough to gain an accurate notion of what is going on in a human mind4 ,men resemble each other more or less closely1 but no two are precisely alike1 and no two have had exactly the same training4 ,i may misunderstand even the man who lives in the same house with me and is nearly related to me4 ,does he really suffer and enjoy as acutely as he seems to8 or must his words and actions be accepted with a discount8 ,the greater the difference between us1 the more danger that ,i shall misjudge him4 ,it is to be expected that men should misunderstand women2 that men and women should misunderstand children2 that those who differ in social station1 in education1 in traditions and habits of life1 should be in danger of reading each other as one reads a book in a tongue imperfectly mastered4 ,when these differences are very great1 the task is an extremely difficult one4 ,what are the emotions1 if he has any1 of the ,chinaman in the laundry near by8 ,his face seems as difficult of interpretation as are the hieroglyphics that he has pasted up on his window4 ,when we come to the brutes1 the case is distinctly worse4 ,we think that we can attain to some notion of the minds to be attributed to such animals as the ape1 the dog1 the cat1 the horse1 and it is not nonsense to speak of an animal psychology4 ,but who will undertake to tell us anything definite of the mind of a fly1 a grasshopper1 a snail1 or a cuttlefish8 ,that they have minds1 or something like minds1 we must believe2 what their minds are like1 a prudent man scarcely even attempts to say4 ,in our distribution of minds may we stop short of even the very lowest animal organisms8 ,it seems arbitrary to do so4 ,more than that2 some thoughtful men have been led by the analogy between plant life and animal life to believe that something more or less remotely like the consciousness which we attribute to animals must be attributed also to plants4 ,upon this belief ,i shall not dwell1 for here we are evidently at the limit of our knowledge1 and are making the vaguest of guesses4 ,no one pretends that we have even the beginnings of a plant psychology4 ,at the same time1 we must admit that organisms of all sorts do bear some analogy to each other1 even if it be a remote one2 and we must admit also that we cannot prove plants to be wholly devoid of a rudimentary consciousness of some sort4 ,as we begin with man and descend the scale of beings1 we seem1 in the upper part of the series1 to be in no doubt that minds exist4 ,our only question is as to the precise contents of those minds4 ,further down we begin to ask ourselves whether anything like mind is revealed at all4 ,that this should be so is to be expected4 ,our argument for other minds is the argument from analogy1 and as we move down the scale our analogy grows more and more remote until it seems to fade out altogether4 ,he who harbors doubts as to whether the plants enjoy some sort of psychic life1 may well find those doubts intensified when he turns to study the crystal2 and when he contemplates inorganic matter he should admit that the thread of his argument has become so attenuated that he cannot find it at all4 #dc4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,mind-,,stuff4--,nevertheless1 there have been those who have attributed something like consciousness even to inorganic matter4 ,if the doctrine of evolution be true1 argues ,professor ,clifford1#d we shall have along the line of the human pedigree a series of imperceptible steps connecting inorganic matter with ourselves4 ,to the later members of that series we must undoubtedly ascribe consciousness1 although it must1 of course1 have been simpler than our own4 ,but where are we to stop8 ,in the case of organisms of a certain complexity1 consciousness is inferred4 ,as we go back along the line1 the complexity of the organism and of its nerve-action insensibly diminishes2 and for the first part of our course we see reason to think that the complexity of consciousness insensibly diminishes also4 ,but if we make a jump1 say to the tunicate mollusks1 we see no reason there to infer the existence of consciousness at all4 ,yet not only is it impossible to point out a place where any sudden break takes place1 but it is contrary to all the natural training of our minds to suppose a breach of continuity so great4 ,we must not1 says ,clifford1 admit any breach of continuity4 ,we must assume that consciousness is a complex of elementary feelings1 or rather of those remoter elements which cannot even be felt1 but of which the simplest feeling is built up4 ,we must assume that such elementary facts go along with the action of every organism1 however simple2 but we must assume also that it is only when the organism has reached a certain complexity of nervous structure that the complex of psychic facts reaches the degree of complication that we call ,consciousness4 ,so much for the assumption of something like mind in the mollusk1 where ,clifford cannot find direct evidence of mind4 ,but the argument does not stop here3 ,as the line of ascent is unbroken1 and must end at last in inorganic matter1 we have no choice but to admit that every motion of matter is simultaneous with some 4 4 4 fact or event which might be part of a consciousness4 ,of the universal distribution of the elementary constituents of mind ,clifford writes as follows3 ,that element of which1 as we have seen1 even the simplest feeling is a complex1 ,i shall call ,mind-stuff4 ,a moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or consciousness2 but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff4 ,when molecules are so combined together as to form the film on the under side of a jellyfish1 the elements of mind-stuff which go along with them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of ,sentience4 ,when the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous system of a vertebrate1 the corresponding elements of mind-stuff are so combined as to form some kind of consciousness2 that is to say1 changes in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked together that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other4 ,when matter takes the complex form of a living human brain1 the corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness1 having intelligence and volition4 ,this is the famous mind-stuff doctrine4 ,it is not a scientific doctrine1 for it rests on wholly unproved assumptions4 ,it is a play of the speculative fancy1 and has its source in the author's strong desire to fit mental phenomena into some general evolutionary scheme4 ,as he is a parallelist1 and cannot make of physical phenomena and of mental one single series of causes and effects1 he must attain his end by making the mental series complete and independent in itself4 ,to do this1 he is forced to make several very startling assumptions3-- 7#a7 ,we have seen that there is evidence that there is consciousness somewhere--it is revealed by certain bodies4 ,clifford assumes consciousness1 or rather its raw material1 mind-stuff1 to be everywhere4 ,for this assumption we have not a whit of evidence4 7#b7 ,to make of the stuff thus attained a satisfactory evolutionary series1 he is compelled to assume that mental phenomena are related to each other much as physical phenomena are related to each other4 ,this notion he had from ,spinoza1 who held that1 just as all that takes place in the physical world must be accounted for by a reference to physical causes1 so all happenings in the world of ideas must be accounted for by a reference to mental causes1 i4e4 to ideas4 ,for this assumption there is no more evidence than for the former4 7#c7 ,finally1 to bring the mental phenomena we are familiar with1 sensations of color1 sound1 touch1 taste1 etc41 into this evolutionary scheme1 he is forced to assume that all such mental phenomena are made up of elements which do not belong to these classes at all1 of something that cannot even be felt4 ,for this assumption there is as little evidence as there is for the other two4 ,the fact is that the mind-stuff doctrine is a castle in the air4 ,it is too fanciful and arbitrary to take seriously4 ,it is much better to come back to a more sober view of things1 and to hold that there is evidence that other minds exist1 but no evidence that every material thing is animated4 ,if we cannot fit this into our evolutionary scheme1 perhaps it is well to reexamine our evolutionary scheme1 and to see whether some misconception may not attach to that4 #a ,collected ,essays1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bai1 ,new ,york1 #aijb4 #b ,on the ,nature of ,things-in-,themselves1 in ,lectures and ,essays1 ,vol4 ,,ii4 #c ,examination of ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 ,chapter ,,xii4 #d ,on the ,nature of ,things-in-,themselves4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,other ,,problems ,,of ,,world ,,and ,,mind #dd4 ,,is ,,the ,,material ,,world ,a ,,mechanism8--,so far we have concerned ourselves with certain leading problems touching the external world and the mind1--problems which seem to present themselves unavoidably to those who enter upon the path of reflection4 ,and we have seen1 ,i hope1 that there is much truth1 as well as some misconception1 contained in the rather vague opinions of the plain man4 ,but the problems that we have taken up by no means exhaust the series of those that present themselves to one who thinks with patience and persistency4 ,when we have decided that men are not mistaken in believing that an external world is presented in their experience2 when we have corrected our first crude notions of what this world is1 and have cleared away some confusions from our conceptions of space and time2 when we have attained to a reasonably clear view of the nature of the mind1 and of the nature of its connection with the body2 when we have escaped from a tumble into the absurd doctrine that no mind exists save our own1 and have turned our backs upon the rash speculations of the adherents of mind-stuff2 there still remain many points upon which we should like to have definite information4 ,in the present chapter ,i shall take up and turn over a few of these1 but it must not be supposed that one can get more than a glimpse of them within such narrow limits4 ,first of all we will raise the question whether it is permissible to regard the material world1 which we accept1 as through and through a mechanism4 ,there can be little doubt that there is a tendency on the part of men of science at the present day so to regard it4 ,it should1 of course1 be frankly admitted that no one is in a position to prove that1 from the cosmic mist1 in which we grope for the beginnings of our universe1 to the organized whole in which vegetable and animal bodies have their place1 there is an unbroken series of changes all of which are explicable by a reference to mechanical laws4 ,chemistry1 physics1 and biology are still separate and distinct realms1 and it is at present impossible to find for them a common basis in mechanics4 ,the belief of the man of science must1 hence1 be regarded as a faith2 the doctrine of the mechanism of nature is a working hypothesis1 and it is unscientific to assume that it is anything more4 ,there can be no objection to a frank admission that we are not here walking in the light of established knowledge4 ,but it does seem to savor of dogmatism for a man to insist that no increase in our knowledge can ever reveal that the physical world is an orderly system throughout1 and that all the changes in material things are explicable in terms of the one unified science4 ,earnest objections have1 however1 been made to the tendency to regard nature as a mechanism4 ,to one of the most curious of them we have been treated lately by ,dr4 ,ward in his book on ,naturalism and ,agnosticism4 ,it is there ingeniously argued that1 when we examine with care the fundamental concepts of the science of mechanics1 we find them to be self-contradictory and absurd4 ,it follows that we are not justified in turning to them for an explanation of the order of nature4 ,the defense of the concepts of mechanics we may safely leave to the man of science2 remembering1 of course1 that1 when a science is in the making1 it is to be expected that the concepts of which it makes use should undergo revision from time to time4 ,but there is one general consideration that it is not well to leave out of view when we are contemplating such an assault upon the notion of the world as mechanism as is made by ,dr4 ,ward4 ,it is this4 ,such attacks upon the conception of mechanism are not purely destructive in their aim4 ,the man who makes them wishes to destroy one view of the system of things in order that he may set up another4 ,if the changes in the system of material things cannot be accounted for mechanically1 it is argued1 we are compelled to turn for our explanation to the action and interaction of minds4 ,this seems to give mind a very important place in the universe1 and is believed to make for a view of things that guarantees the satisfaction of the highest hopes and aspirations of man4 ,that a recognition of the mechanical order of nature is incompatible with such a view of things as is just above indicated1 ,i should be the last to admit4 ,the notion that it is so is1 ,i believe1 a dangerous error4 ,it is an error that tends to put a man out of sympathy with the efforts of science to discover that the world is an orderly whole1 and tempts him to rejoice in the contemplation of human ignorance4 ,but the error is rather a common one2 and see to what injustice it may lead one4 ,it is concluded that the conception of matter is an obscure one2 that we do not know clearly what we mean when we speak of the mass of a body2 that there are disputes as to proper significance to be given to the words cause and effect2 that the laws of motion1 as they are at present formulated1 do not seem to account satisfactorily for the behavior of all material particles4 ,from this it is inferred that we must give up the attempt to explain mechanically the order of physical things4 ,now1 suppose that it were considered a dangerous and heterodox doctrine1 that the changes in the system of things are due to the activities of minds4 ,would not those who now love to point out the shortcomings of the science of mechanics discover a fine field for their destructive criticism8 ,are there no disputes as to the ultimate nature of mind8 ,are men agreed touching the relations of mind and matter8 ,what science even attempts to tell us how a mind1 by an act of volition1 sets material particles in motion or changes the direction of their motion8 ,how does one mind act upon another1 and what does it mean for one mind to act upon another8 ,if the science of mechanics is not in all respects as complete a science as it is desirable that it should be1 surely we must admit that when we turn to the field of mind we are not dealing with what is clear and free from difficulties4 ,only a strong emotional bias can lead a man to dwell with emphasis upon the difficulties to be met with in the one field1 and to pass lightly over those with which one meets in the other4 ,one may1 however1 refuse to admit that the order of nature is throughout mechanical1 without taking any such unreasonable position as this4 ,one may hold that many of the changes in material things do not appear to be mechanical1 and that it is too much of an assumption to maintain that they are such1 even as an article of faith4 ,thus1 when we pass from the world of the inorganic to that of organic life1 we seem to make an immense step4 ,no one has even begun to show us that the changes that take place in vegetable and animal organisms are all mechanical changes4 ,how can we dare to assume that they are8 ,with one who reasons thus we may certainly feel a sympathy4 ,the most ardent advocate of mechanism must admit that his doctrine is a working hypothesis1 and not proved to be true4 ,its acceptance would1 however1 be a genuine convenience from the point of view of science1 for it does introduce1 at least provisionally1 a certain order into a vast number of facts1 and gives a direction to investigation4 ,perhaps the wisest thing to do is1 not to combat the doctrine1 but to accept it tentatively and to examine carefully what conclusions it may seem to carry with it--how it may affect our outlook upon the world as a whole4 #de4 ,,the ,,place ,,of ,,mind ,,in ,,nature4--,one of the very first questions which we think of asking when we contemplate the possibility that the physical world is throughout a mechanical system is this3 ,how can we conceive minds to be related to such a system8 ,that minds1 and many minds1 do exist1 it is not reasonable to doubt4 ,what shall we do with them8 ,one must not misunderstand the mechanical view of things4 ,when we use the word machine1 we call before our minds certain gross and relatively simple mechanisms constructed by man4 ,between such and a flower1 a butterfly1 and a human body1 the difference is enormous4 ,he who elects to bring the latter under the title of mechanism cannot mean that he discerns no difference between them and a steam engine or a printing press4 ,he can only mean that he believes he might1 could he attain to a glimpse into their infinite complexity1 find an explanation of the physical changes which take place in them1 by a reference to certain general laws which describe the behavior of material particles everywhere4 ,and the man who1 having extended his notion of mechanism1 is inclined to overlook the fact that animals and men have minds1 that thought and feeling1 plan and purpose1 have their place in the world1 may justly be accused of a headlong and heedless enthusiasm4 ,whatever may be our opinion on the subject of the mechanism of nature1 we have no right to minimize the significance of thought and feeling and will4 ,between that which has no mind and that which has a mind there is a difference which cannot be obliterated by bringing both under the concept of mechanism4 ,it is a difference which furnishes the material for the sciences of psychology and ethics1 and gives rise to a whole world of distinctions which find no place in the realm of the merely physical4 ,there are1 then1 minds as well as bodies2 what place shall we assign to these minds in the system of nature8 ,several centuries ago it occurred to the man of science that the material world should be regarded as a system in which there is constant transformation1 but in which nothing is created4 ,this way of looking at things expressed itself formerly in the statement that1 through all the changes that take place in the world1 the quantity of matter and motion remains the same4 ,to-day the same idea is better expressed in the doctrine of the eternity of mass and the conservation of energy4 ,in plain language1 this doctrine teaches that every change in every part of the physical world1 every motion in matter1 must be preceded by physical conditions which may be regarded as the equivalent of the change in question4 ,but this makes the physical world a closed system1 a something complete in itself4 ,where is there room in such a system for minds8 ,it does indeed seem hard to find in such a system a place for minds1 if one conceives of minds as does the interactionist4 ,we have seen 7section #cf7 that the interactionist makes the mind act upon matter very much as one particle of matter is supposed to act upon another4 ,between the physical and the mental he assumes that there are causal relations2 i4e4 physical changes must be referred to mental causes sometimes1 and mental changes to physical4 ,this means that he finds a place for mental facts by inserting them as links in the one chain of causes and effects with physical facts4 ,if he is not allowed to break the chain and insert them1 he does not know what to do with them4 ,the parallelist has not the same difficulty to face4 ,he who holds that mental phenomena must not be built into the one series of causes and effects with physical phenomena may freely admit that physical phenomena form a closed series1 an orderly system of their own1 and he may yet find a place in the world for minds4 ,he refuses to regard them as a part of the world-mechanism1 but he relates them to physical things1 conceiving them as parallel to the physical in the sense described 7sections #cg-ci74 ,he insists that1 even if we hold that there are gaps in the physical order of causes and effects1 we cannot conceive these gaps to be filled by mental phenomena1 simply because they are mental phenomena4 ,they belong to an order of their own4 ,hence1 the assumption that the physical series is unbroken does not seem to him to crowd mental phenomena out of their place in the world at all4 ,they must1 in any case1 occupy the place that is appropriate to them 7section #ch74 ,it will be noticed that this doctrine that the chain of physical causes and effects is nowhere broken1 and that mental phenomena are related to it as the parallelist conceives them to be1 makes the world-system a very orderly one4 ,every phenomenon has its place in it1 and can be accounted for1 whether it be physical or mental4 ,to some1 the thought that the world is such an orderly thing is in the highest degree repugnant4 ,they object that1 in such a world1 there is no room for free-will2 and they object1 further1 that there is no room for the activity of minds4 ,both of these objections ,i shall consider in this chapter4 ,but first1 ,i must say a few words about a type of doctrine lately insisted upon1#a which bears some resemblance to interactionism as we usually meet with it1 and1 nevertheless1 tries to hold on to the doctrine of the conservation of energy4 ,it is this3-- ,the concept of energy is stretched in such a way as to make it cover mental phenomena as well as physical4 ,it is claimed that mental phenomena and physical phenomena are alike manifestations of energy1 and that the coming into being of a consciousness is a mere transformation1 a something to be accounted for by the disappearance from the physical world of a certain equivalent--perhaps of some motion4 ,it will be noticed that this is one rather subtle way of obliterating the distinction between mental phenomena and physical4 ,in so far it resembles the interactionist's doctrine4 ,in criticism of it we may say that he who accepts it has wandered away from a rather widely recognized scientific hypothesis1 and has substituted for it a very doubtful speculation for which there seems to be no whit of evidence4 ,it is1 moreover1 a speculation repugnant to the scientific mind1 when its significance is grasped4 ,shall we assume without evidence that1 when a man wakes in the morning and enjoys a mental life suspended or diminished during the night1 his thoughts and feelings have come into being at the expense of his body8 ,shall we assume that the mass of his body has been slightly diminished1 or that motions have disappeared in a way that cannot be accounted for by a reference to the laws of matter in motion8 ,this seems an extraordinary assumption1 and one little in harmony with the doctrine of the eternity of mass and the conservation of energy as commonly understood4 ,we need not take it seriously so long as it is quite unsupported by evidence4 #df4 ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,nature ,,and ,,free-,,will4--,in a world as orderly as1 in the previous section1 this world is conceived to be1 is there any room for freedom8 ,what if the man of science is right in suspecting that the series of physical causes and effects is nowhere broken8 ,must we then conclude that we are never free8 ,to many persons it has seemed that we are forced to draw this conclusion1 and it is not surprising that they view the doctrine with dismay4 ,they argue3 ,mental phenomena are made parallel with physical1 and the order of physical phenomena seems to be determined throughout1 for nothing can happen in the world of matter unless there is some adequate cause of its happening4 ,if1 then1 ,i choose to raise my finger1 that movement must be admitted to have physical causes1 and those causes other causes1 and so on without end4 ,if such a movement must always have its place in a causal series of this kind1 how can it be regarded as a free movement8 ,it is determined1 and not free4 ,now1 it is far from a pleasant thing to watch the man of science busily at work trying to prove that the physical world is an orderly system1 and all the while to feel in one's heart that the success of his efforts condemns one to slavery4 ,it can hardly fail to make one's attitude towards science that of alarm and antagonism4 ,from this ,i shall try to free the reader by showing that our freedom is not in the least danger1 and that we may look on unconcerned4 ,when we approach that venerable dispute touching the freedom of the will1 which has inspired men to such endless discussions1 and upon which they have written with such warmth and even acrimony1 the very first thing to do is to discover what we have a right to mean when we call a man free4 ,as long as the meaning of the word is in doubt1 the very subject of the dispute is in doubt4 ,when may we1 then1 properly call a man free8 ,what is the normal application of the term8 ,i raise my finger4 ,every man of sense must admit that1 under normal conditions1 ,i can raise my finger or keep it down1 as ,i please4 ,there is no ground for a difference of opinion so far4 ,but there is a further point upon which men differ4 ,one holds that my pleasing and the brain-change that corresponds to it have their place in the world-order2 that is1 he maintains that every volition can be accounted for4 ,another holds that1 under precisely the same circumstances1 one may please or not please2 which means that the pleasing cannot be wholly accounted for by anything that has preceded4 ,the first man is a determinist1 and the second a free-willist4 ,i beg the reader to observe that the word free-willist is in quotation marks1 and not to suppose that it means simply a believer in the freedom of the will4 ,when in common life we speak of a man as free1 what do we understand by the word8 ,usually we mean that he is free from external compulsion4 ,if my finger is held by another1 ,i am not free to raise it4 ,but ,i may be free in this sense1 and yet one may demur to the statement that ,i am a free man4 ,if a pistol be held to my head with the remark1 ,hands up6 my finger will mount very quickly1 and the bystanders will maintain that ,i had no choice4 ,we speak in somewhat the same way of men under the influence of intoxicants1 of men crazed by some passion and unable to take into consideration the consequences of their acts1 and of men bound by the spell of hypnotic suggestion4 ,indeed1 whenever a man is in such a condition that he is glaringly incapable of leading a normal human life and of being influenced by the motives that commonly move men1 we are inclined to say that he is not free4 ,but does it ever occur to us to maintain that1 in general1 the possession of a character and the capacity of being influenced by considerations make it impossible for a man to be free8 ,surely not4 ,if ,i am a prudent man1 ,i will invest my money in good securities4 ,is it sensible to say that ,i cannot have been free in refusing a twenty per cent investment1 because ,i am by nature prudent8 ,am ,i a slave because ,i eat when ,i am hungry1 and can ,i partake of a meal freely1 only when there is no reason why ,i should eat at all8 ,he who calls me free only when my acts do violence to my nature or cannot be justified by a reference to anything whatever has strange notions of freedom4 ,patriots1 poets1 moralists1 have had much to say of freedom2 men have lived for it1 and have died for it2 men love it as they love their own souls4 ,is the object of all this adoration the metaphysical absurdity indicated above8 ,to insist that a man is free only in so far as his actions are unaccountable is to do violence to the meaning of a word in very common use1 and to mislead men by perverting it to strange and unwholesome uses4 ,yet this is done by the free-willist4 ,he keeps insisting that man is free1 and then goes on to maintain that he cannot be free unless he is free4 ,he does not1 unfortunately1 supply the quotation marks1 and he profits by the natural mistake in identity4 ,as he defines freedom it becomes freedom1 which is a very different thing4 ,what is this freedom8 ,it is not freedom from external constraint4 ,it is not freedom from overpowering passion4 ,it is freedom from all the motives1 good as well as bad1 that we can conceive of as influencing man1 and freedom also from oneself4 ,it is well to get this quite clear4 ,the free-willist maintains that1 in so far as a man is free1 his actions cannot be accounted for by a reference to the order of causes at all--not by a reference to his character1 hereditary or acquired2 not by a reference to his surroundings4 ,free actions1 in so far as they are free1 have1 so to speak1 sprung into being out of the void4 ,what follows from such a doctrine8 ,listen3-- 7#a7 ,it follows that1 in so far as ,i am free1 ,i am not the author of what appear to be my acts2 who can be the cause of causeless actions8 7#b7 ,it follows that no amount of effort on my part can prevent the appearance of free acts of the most deplorable kind4 ,if one can condition their appearance or non-appearance1 they are not free acts4 7#c7 ,it follows that there is no reason to believe that there will be any congruity between my character and my free acts4 ,i may be a saint by nature1 and freely act like a scoundrel4 7#d7 ,it follows that ,i can deserve no credit for free acts4 ,i am not their author4 7#e7 ,it follows that1 in so far as ,i am free1 it is useless to praise me1 to blame me1 to punish me1 to endeavor to persuade me4 ,i must be given over to unaccountable sainthood or to a reprobate mind1 as it happens to happen4 ,i am quite beyond the pale of society1 for my neighbor cannot influence my free acts any more than ,i can4 7#f7 ,it follows that1 in so far as ,i am free1 ,i am in something very like a state of slavery2 and yet1 curiously enough1 it is a slavery without a master4 ,in the old stories of ,fate1 men were represented as puppets in the hand of a power outside themselves4 ,here ,i am a puppet in no hand2 but ,i am a puppet just the same1 for ,i am the passive spectator of what appear to be my acts4 ,i do not do the things ,i seem to do4 ,they are done for me or in me--or1 rather1 they are not done1 but just happen4 ,such freedom is a wretched thing to offer to a man who longs for freedom2 for the freedom to act out his own impulses1 to guide his life according to his own ideals4 ,it is a mere travesty on freedom1 a fiction of the philosophers1 which inspires respect only so long as one has not pierced the disguise of its respectable name4 ,true freedom is not a thing to be sought in a disorderly and chaotic world1 in a world in which actions are inexplicable and character does not count4 ,let us rinse our minds free of misleading verbal associations1 and let us realize that a free-will neighbor would certainly not be to us an object of respect4 ,he would be as offensive an object to have in our vicinity as a free-will gun or a free-will pocketknife4 ,he would not be a rational creature4 ,our only concern need be for freedom1 and this is in no danger in an orderly world4 ,we all recognize this truth1 in a way4 ,we hold that a man of good character freely chooses the good1 and a man of evil character freely chooses evil4 ,is not this a recognition of the fact that the choice is a thing to be accounted for1 and is1 nevertheless1 a free choice8 ,i have been considering above the world as it is conceived to be by the parallelist1 but1 to the reader who may not incline towards parallelism1 ,i wish to point out that these reasonings touching the freedom of the will concern the interactionist just as closely4 ,they have no necessary connection with parallelism4 ,the interactionist1 as well as the parallelist1 may be a determinist1 a believer in freedom1 or he may be a free-willist4 ,he regards mental phenomena and physical phenomena as links in the one chain of causes and effects4 ,shall he hold that certain mental links are free-will links1 that they are wholly unaccountable8 ,if he does1 all that has been said above about the free-willist applies to him4 ,he believes in a disorderly world1 and he should accept the consequences of his doctrine4 #dg4 ,,the ,,physical ,,world ,,and ,,the ,,moral ,,world4--,i have said a little way back that1 when we think of bodies as having minds1 we are introduced to a world of distinctions which have no place in the realm of the merely physical4 ,one of the objections made to the orderly world of the parallelist was that in it there is no room for the activity of minds4 ,before we pass judgment on this matter1 we should try to get some clear notion of what we may mean by the word activity4 ,the science of ethics must go by the board1 if we cannot think of men as doing anything1 as acting rightly or acting wrongly4 ,let us conceive a billiard ball in motion to come into collision with one at rest4 ,we commonly speak of the first ball as active1 and of the second as the passive subject upon which it exercises its activity4 ,are we justified in thus speaking8 ,in one sense1 of course1 we are4 ,as ,i have several times had occasion to remark1 we are1 in common life1 justified in using words rather loosely1 provided that it is convenient to do so1 and that it does not give rise to misunderstandings4 ,but1 in a stricter sense1 we are not justified in thus speaking1 for in doing so we are carrying over into the sphere of the merely physical a distinction which does not properly belong there1 but has its place in another realm4 ,the student of mechanics tells us that the second ball has affected the first quite as much as the first has affected the second4 ,we cannot simply regard the first as cause and the second as effect1 nor may we regard the motion of the first as cause and the subsequent motion of the second as its effect alone4 ,the whole situation at the one instant--both balls1 their relative positions and their motion and rest--must be taken as the cause of the whole situation at the next instant1 and in this whole situation the condition of the second ball has its place as well as that of the first4 ,if1 then1 we insist that to have causal efficiency is the same thing as to be active1 we should also admit that the second ball was active1 and quite as active as the first4 ,it has certainly had as much to do with the total result4 ,but it offends us to speak of it in this way4 ,we prefer to say that the first was active and the second was acted upon4 ,what is the source of this distinction8 ,its original source is to be found in the judgments we pass upon conscious beings1 bodies with minds2 and it could never have been drawn if men had not taken into consideration the relations of minds to the changes in the physical world4 ,as carried over to inanimate things it is a transferred distinction2 and its transference to this field is not strictly justifiable1 as has been indicated above4 ,i must make this clear by an illustration4 ,i hurry along a street towards the university1 because the hour for my lecture is approaching4 ,i am struck down by a falling tile4 ,in my advance up the street ,i am regarded as active2 in my fall to the ground ,i am regarded as passive4 ,now1 looking at both occurrences from the purely physical point of view1 we have nothing before us but a series of changes in the space relations of certain masses of matter2 and in all those changes both my body and its environment are concerned4 ,as ,i advance1 my body cannot be regarded as the sole cause of the changes which are taking place4 ,my progress would be impossible without the aid of the ground upon which ,i tread4 ,nor can ,i accuse the tile of being the sole cause of my demolition4 ,had ,i not been what ,i was and where ,i was1 the tile would have fallen in vain4 ,i must be regarded as a concurrent cause of my own disaster1 and my unhappy state is attributable to me as truly as it is to the tile4 ,why1 then1 am ,i in the one case regarded as active and in the other as passive8 ,in each case ,i am a cause of the result4 ,how does it happen that1 in the first instance1 ,i seem to most men to be the cause1 and in the second to be not a cause at all8 ,the rapidity of my motion in the first instance cannot account for this judgment4 ,he who rides in the police van and he who is thrown from the car of a balloon may move with great rapidity and yet be regarded as passive4 ,men speak as they do because they are not content to point out the physical antecedents of this and that occurrence and stop with that4 ,they recognize that1 between my advance up the street and my fall to the ground there is one very important difference4 ,in the first case what is happening may be referred to an idea in my mind4 ,were the idea not there1 ,i should not do what ,i am doing4 ,in the second case1 what has happened cannot be referred to an idea in my mind4 ,here we have come to the recognition that there are such things as purposes and ends2 that an idea and some change in the external world may be related as plan and accomplishment4 ,in other words1 we have been brought face to face with what has been given the somewhat misleading name of final cause4 ,in so far as that in the bringing about of which ,i have had a share is my end1 ,i am active2 in so far as it is not my end1 but comes upon me as something not planned1 ,i am passive4 ,the enormous importance of the distinction may readily be seen2 it is only in so far as ,i am a creature who can have purposes1 that desire and will1 foresight and prudence1 right and wrong1 can have a significance for me4 ,i have dwelt upon the meaning of the words activity and passivity1 and have been at pains to distinguish them from cause and effect1 because the two pairs of terms have often been confounded with each other1 and this confusion has given rise to a peculiarly unfortunate error4 ,it is this error that lies at the foundation of the objection referred to at the beginning of this section4 ,we have seen that certain men of science are inclined to look upon the physical world as a great system1 all the changes in which may be accounted for by an appeal to physical causes4 ,and we have seen that the parallelist regards ideas1 not as links in this chain1 but as parallel with physical changes4 ,it is argued by some that1 if this is a true view of things1 we must embrace the conclusion that the mind cannot be active at all1 that it can accomplish nothing4 ,we must look upon the mind as an epiphenomenon1 a useless decoration2 and must regard man as a physical automaton with parallel psychical states4 ,such abuse of one's fellow-man seems unchristian1 and it is wholly uncalled for on any hypothesis4 ,our first answer to it is that it seems to be sufficiently refuted by the experiences of common life4 ,we have abundant evidence that men's minds do count for something4 ,i conclude that ,i want a coat1 and ,i order one of my tailor2 he believes that ,i will pay for it1 he wants the money1 and he makes the coat2 his man desires to earn his wages and he delivers it4 ,if ,i had not wanted the coat1 if the tailor had not wanted my money1 if the man had not wanted to earn his wages1 the end would not have been attained4 ,no philosopher has the right to deny these facts4 ,ah6 but1 it may be answered1 these three wants are not supposed to be the causes of the motions in matter which result in my appearing well-dressed on ,sunday4 ,they are only concomitant phenomena4 ,to this ,i reply3 ,what of that8 ,we must not forget what is meant by such concomitance 7section #ci74 ,we are dealing with a fixed and necessary relation1 not with an accidental one4 ,if these wants had been lacking1 there would have been no coat4 ,so my second answer to the objector is1 that1 on the hypothesis of the parallelist1 the relations between mental phenomena and physical phenomena are just as dependable as that relation between physical phenomena which we call that of cause and effect4 ,moreover1 since activity and causality are not the same thing1 there is no ground for asserting that the mind cannot be active1 merely because it is not material and1 hence1 cannot be1 strictly speaking1 a cause of motions in matter4 ,the plain man is entirely in the right in thinking that minds are active4 ,the truth is that nothing can be active except as it has a mind4 ,the relation of purpose and end is the one we have in view when we speak of the activity of minds4 ,it is1 thus1 highly unjust to a man to tell him that he is a physical automaton with parallel psychical states1 and that he is wound up by putting food into his mouth4 ,he who hears this may be excused if he feels it his duty to emit steam1 walk with a jerk1 and repudiate all responsibility for his actions4 ,creatures that think1 form plans1 and act1 are not what we call automata4 ,it is an abuse of language to call them such1 and it misleads us into looking upon them as we have no right to look upon them4 ,if men really were automata in the proper sense of the word1 we could not look upon them as wise or unwise1 good or bad2 in short1 the whole world of moral distinctions would vanish4 ,perhaps1 in spite of all that has been said in this and in the preceding section1 some will feel a certain repugnance to being assigned a place in a world as orderly as our world is in this chapter conceived to be--a world in which every phenomenon1 whether physical or mental1 has its definite place1 and all are subject to law4 ,but ,i suppose our content or discontent will not be independent of our conception of what sort of a world we conceive ourselves to be inhabiting4 ,if we conclude that we are in a world in which ,god is revealed1 if the orderliness of it is but another name for ,divine ,providence1 we can scarcely feel the same as we would if we discovered in the world nothing of the ,divine4 ,i have in the last few pages been discussing the doctrine of purposes and ends1 teleology1 but ,i have said nothing of the significance of that doctrine for ,theism4 ,the reader can easily see that it lies at the very foundation of our belief in ,god4 ,the only arguments for theism that have had much weight with mankind have been those which have maintained there are revealed in the world generally evidences of a plan and purpose at least analogous to what we discover when we scrutinize the actions of our fellow-man4 ,such arguments are not at the mercy of either interactionist or parallelist4 ,on either hypothesis they stand unshaken4 ,with this brief survey of some of the most interesting problems that confront the philosopher1 ,i must content myself here4 ,now let us turn and see how some of the fundamental problems treated in previous chapters have been approached by men belonging to certain well-recognized schools of thought4 ,and since it is peculiarly true in philosophy that1 to understand the present1 one must know something of the past1 we shall begin by taking a look at the historical background of the types of philosophical doctrine to which reference is constantly made in the books and journals of the day4 #a ,ostwald1 ,vorlesungen ber ,naturphilosophie1 s4 #cif4 ,leipzig1 #aijb4 ,,iv4 ,,some ,,types ,,of ,,philosophical ,,theory ,,chapter ,,xii ,,their ,,historical ,,background #dh4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,representative ,,perception4--,we have seen in ,chapter ,,ii that it seems to the plain man abundantly evident that he really is surrounded by material things and that he directly perceives such things4 ,this has always been the opinion of the plain man and it seems probable that it always will be4 ,it is only when he begins to reflect upon things and upon his knowledge of them that it occurs to him to call it in question4 ,very early in the history of speculative thought it occurred to men1 however1 to ask how it is that we know things1 and whether we are sure we do know them4 ,the problems of reflection started into life1 and various solutions were suggested4 ,to tell over the whole list would take us far afield1 and we need not1 for the purpose we have in view1 go back farther than ,descartes1 with whom philosophy took a relatively new start1 and may be said to have become1 in spirit and method1 at least1 modern4 ,i have said 7section #ca7 that ,descartes 7#aeif-afej7 was fairly well acquainted with the functioning of the nervous system1 and has much to say of the messages which pass along the nerves to the brain4 ,the same sort of reasoning that leads the modern psychologist to maintain that we know only so much of the external world as is reflected in our sensations led him to maintain that the mind is directly aware of the ideas through which an external world is represented1 but can know the world itself only indirectly and through these ideas4 ,descartes was put to sore straits to prove the existence of an external world1 when he had once thus placed it at one remove from us4 ,if we accept his doctrine1 we seem to be shut up within the circle of our ideas1 and can find no door that will lead us to a world outside4 ,the question will keep coming back3 ,how do we know that1 corresponding to our ideas1 there are material things1 if we have never perceived1 in any single instance1 a material thing8 ,and the doubt here suggested may be reinforced by the reflection that the very expression a material thing ought to be meaningless to a man who1 having never had experience of one1 is compelled to represent it by the aid of something so different from it as ideas are supposed to be4 ,can material things really be to such a creature anything more than some complex of ideas8 ,the difficulties presented by any philosophical doctrine are not always evident at once4 ,descartes made no scruple of accepting the existence of an external world1 and his example has been followed by a very large number of those who agree with his initial assumption that the mind knows immediately only its own ideas4 ,preminent among such we must regard ,john ,locke1 the ,english philosopher 7#afcb-agjd71 whose classic work1 ,an ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 should not be wholly unknown to any one who pretends to an interest in the ,english literature4 ,admirably does ,locke represent the position of what very many have regarded as the prudent and sensible man1--the man who recognizes that ideas are not external things1 and that things must be known through ideas1 and yet holds on to the existence of a material world which we assuredly know4 ,he recognizes1 it is true1 that some one may find a possible opening for the expression of a doubt1 but he regards the doubt as gratuitous2 ,i think nobody can1 in earnest1 be so skeptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels4 ,as we have seen 7section #ab71 he meets the doubt with a jest4 ,nevertheless1 those who read with attention ,locke's admirably clear pages must notice that he does not succeed in really setting to rest the doubt that has suggested itself4 ,it becomes clear that ,locke felt so sure of the existence of the external world because he now and then slipped into the inconsistent doctrine that he perceived it immediately1 and not merely through his ideas4 ,are those things which he sees and feels external things8 ,does he see and feel them directly1 or must he infer from his ideas that he sees and feels them8 ,if the latter1 why may one not still doubt8 ,evidently the appeal is to a direct experience of material things1 and ,locke has forgotten that he must be a ,lockian4 ,i have often remarked1 in many instances1 writes ,descartes1 that there is a great difference between an object and its idea4 ,how could the man possibly have remarked this1 when he had never in his life perceived the object corresponding to any idea1 but had been altogether shut up to ideas8 ,thus ,i see1 whilst ,i write this1 says ,locke1#a ,i can change the appearance of the paper1 and by designing the letters tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment1 by barely drawing my pen over it1 which will neither appear 7let me fancy as much as ,i will71 if my hand stands still1 or though ,i move my pen1 if my eyes be shut2 nor1 when those characters are once made on the paper1 can ,i choose afterward but see them as they are2 that is1 have the ideas of such letters as ,i have made4 ,whence it is manifest1 that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination1 when ,i find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thought do not obey them2 nor yet cease to be1 whenever ,i shall fancy it2 but continue to affect the senses constantly and regularly1 according to the figures ,i made them4 ,locke is as bad as ,descartes4 ,evidently he regards himself as able to turn to the external world and perceive the relation that things hold to ideas4 ,such an inconsistency may escape the writer who has been guilty of it1 but it is not likely to escape the notice of all those who come after him4 ,some one is sure to draw the consequences of a doctrine more rigorously1 and to come to conclusions1 it may be1 very unpalatable to the man who propounded the doctrine in the first instance4 ,the type of doctrine represented by ,descartes and ,locke is that of ,representative ,perception4 ,it holds that we know real external things only through their mental representatives4 ,it has also been called ,hypothetical ,realism1 because it accepts the existence of a real world1 but bases our knowledge of it upon an inference from our sensations or ideas4 #di4 ,,the ,,step ,,to ,,idealism4--,the admirable clearness with which ,locke writes makes it the easier for his reader to detect the untenability of his position4 ,he uses simple language1 and he never takes refuge in vague and ambiguous phrases4 ,when he tells us that the mind is wholly shut up to its ideas1 and then later assumes that it is not shut up to its ideas1 but can perceive external things1 we see plainly that there must be a blunder somewhere4 ,george ,berkeley 7#afhd-agec71 ,bishop of ,cloyne1 followed out more rigorously the consequences to be deduced from the assumption that all our direct knowledge is of ideas2 and in a youthful work of the highest genius entitled ,the ,principles of ,human ,knowledge1 he maintained that there is no material world at all4 ,when we examine with care the objects of sense1 the things which present themselves to us1 he argues1 we find that they resolve themselves into sensations1 or ideas of sense4 ,what can we mean by the word apple1 if we do not mean the group of experiences in which alone an apple is presented to us8 ,the word is nothing else than a name for this group as a group4 ,take away the color1 the hardness1 the odor1 the taste2 what have we left8 ,and color1 hardness1 odor1 taste1 and anything else that may be referred to any object as a quality1 can exist1 he claims1 only in a perceiving mind2 for such things are nothing else than sensations1 and how can there be an unperceived sensation8 ,the things which we perceive1 then1 he calls complexes of ideas4 ,have we any reason to believe that these ideas1 which exist in the mind1 are to be accepted as representatives of things of a different kind1 which are not mental at all8 ,not a shadow of a reason1 says ,berkeley2 there is simply no basis for inference at all1 and we cannot even make clear what it is that we are setting out to infer under the name of matter4 ,we need not1 therefore1 grieve over the loss of the material world1 for we have suffered no loss2 one cannot lose what one has never had4 ,thus1 the objects of human knowledge1 the only things of which it means anything to speak1 are3 7#a7 ,ideas of ,sense2 7#b7 ,ideas of ,memory and ,imagination2 7#c7 ,the ,passions and ,operations of the ,mind2 and 7#d7 ,the ,self that perceives all ,these4 ,from ,locke's position to that of ,berkeley was a bold step1 and it was much criticised1 as well it might be4 ,it was felt then1 as it has been felt by many down to our own time1 that1 when we discard an external world distinct from our ideas1 and admit only the world revealed in our ideas1 we really do lose4 ,it is legitimate to criticise ,berkeley1 but it is not legitimate to misunderstand him2 and yet the history of his doctrine may almost be called a chronicle of misconceptions4 ,it has been assumed that he drew no distinction between real things and imaginary things1 that he made the world no better than a dream1 etc4 ,arbuthnot1 ,swift1 and a host of the greater and lesser lights in literature1 from his time to ours1 have made merry over the supposed unrealities in the midst of which the ,berkeleian must live4 ,but it should be remembered that ,berkeley tried hard to do full justice to the world of things in which we actually find ourselves2 not a hypothetical1 inferred1 unperceived world1 but the world of the things we actually perceive4 ,he distinguished carefully between what is real and what is merely imaginary1 though he called both ideas2 and he recognized something like a system of nature4 ,and1 by the argument from analogy which we have already examined 7section #da71 he inferred the existence of other finite minds and of a ,divine ,mind4 ,but just as ,john ,locke had not completely thought out the consequences which might be deduced from his own doctrines1 so ,berkeley left1 in his turn1 an opening for a successor4 ,it was possible for that acutest of analysts1 ,david ,hume 7#agaa-aggf71 to treat him somewhat as he had treated ,locke4 ,among the objects of human knowledge ,berkeley had included the self that perceives things4 ,he never succeeded in making at all clear what he meant by this object2 but he regarded it as a substance1 and believed it to be a cause of changes in ideas1 and quite different in its nature from all the ideas attributed to it4 ,but ,hume maintained that when he tried to get a good look at this self1 to catch it1 so to speak1 and to hold it up to inspection1 he could not find anything whatever save perceptions1 memories1 and other things of that kind4 ,the self is1 he said1 but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity1 and are in a perpetual flux and movement4 ,as for the objects of sense1 our own bodies1 the chairs upon which we sit1 the tables at which we write1 and all the rest--these1 argues ,hume1 we are impelled by nature to think of as existing continuously1 but we have no evidence whatever to prove that they do thus exist4 ,are not the objects of sense1 after all1 only sensations or impressions8 ,do we not experience these sensations or impressions interruptedly8 ,who sees or feels a table continuously day after day8 ,if the table is but a name for the experiences in question1 if we have no right to infer material things behind and distinct from such experiences1 are we not forced to conclude that the existence of the things that we see and feel is an interrupted one8 ,hume certainly succeeded in raising more questions than he succeeded in answering4 ,we are compelled to admire the wonderful clearness and simplicity of his style1 and the acuteness of his intellect1 in every chapter4 ,but we cannot help feeling that he does injustice to the world in which we live1 even when we cannot quite see what is wrong4 ,does it not seem certain to science and to common sense that there is an order of nature in some sense independent of our perceptions1 so that objects may be assumed to exist whether we do or do not perceive them8 ,when we read ,hume we have a sense that we are robbed of our real external world2 and his account of the mind makes us feel as a badly tied sheaf of wheat may be conceived to feel--in danger of falling apart at any moment4 ,berkeley we unhesitatingly call an ,idealist1 but whether we shall apply the name to ,hume depends upon the extension we are willing to give to it4 ,his world is a world of what we may broadly call ideas2 but the tendencies of his philosophy have led some to call it a ,skepticism4 #ej4 ,,the ,,revolt ,,of ,,common ,,sense4--,hume's reasonings were too important to be ignored1 and his conclusions too unpalatable to satisfy those who came after him4 ,it seemed necessary to seek a way of escape out of this world of mere ideas1 which appeared to be so unsatisfactory a world4 ,one of the most famous of such attempts was that made by the ,scotchman ,thomas ,reid 7#agaj-agif74 ,at one time ,reid regarded himself as the disciple of ,berkeley1 but the consequences which ,hume deduced from the principles laid down by the former led ,reid to feel that he must build upon some wholly different foundation4 ,he came to the conclusion that the line of philosophers from ,descartes to ,hume had made one capital error in assuming that nothing is perceived but what is in the mind that perceives it4 ,once admit1 says ,reid1 that the mind perceives nothing save ideas1 and we must also admit that it is impossible to prove the existence either of an external world or of a mind different from a bundle of perceptions4 ,hence1 ,reid maintains that we perceive--not infer1 but perceive--things external to the mind4 ,he writes3#b-- ,let a man press his hand against the table--he feels it hard4 ,but what is the meaning of this8 ,the meaning undoubtedly is1 that he hath a certain feeling of touch1 from which he concludes1 without any reasoning1 or comparing ideas1 that there is something external really existing1 whose parts stick so firmly together that they cannot be displaced without considerable force4 ,there is here a feeling1 and a conclusion drawn from it1 or some way suggested by it4 ,in order to compare these1 we must view them separately1 and then consider by what tie they are connected1 and wherein they resemble one another4 ,the hardness of the table is the conclusion1 the feeling is the medium by which we are led to that conclusion4 ,let a man attend distinctly to this medium1 and to the conclusion1 and he will perceive them to be as unlike as any two things in nature4 ,the one is a sensation of the mind1 which can have no existence but in a sentient being2 nor can it exist one moment longer than it is felt2 the other is in the table1 and we conclude1 without any difficulty1 that it was in the table before it was felt1 and continues after the feeling is over4 ,the one implies no kind of extension1 nor parts1 nor cohesion2 the other implies all these4 ,both1 indeed1 admit of degrees1 and the feeling1 beyond a certain degree1 is a species of pain2 but adamantine hardness does not imply the least pain4 ,and as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness1 so neither can our reason perceive the least tie or connection between them2 nor will the logician ever be able to show a reason why we should conclude hardness from this feeling1 rather than softness1 or any other quality whatsoever4 ,but1 in reality1 all mankind are led by their constitution to conclude hardness from this feeling4 ,it is well worth while to read this extract several times1 and to ask oneself what ,reid meant to say1 and what he actually said4 ,he is objecting1 be it remembered1 to the doctrine that the mind perceives immediately only its own ideas or sensations and must infer all else4 ,his contention is that we perceive external things4 ,does he say this8 ,he says that we have feelings of touch from which we conclude that there is something external2 that there is a feeling1 and a conclusion drawn from it1 or some way suggested by it2 that the hardness of the table is the conclusion1 and the feeling is the medium by which we are led to the conclusion4 ,could ,descartes or ,locke have more plainly supported the doctrine of representative perception8 ,how could ,reid imagine he was combatting that doctrine when he wrote thus8 ,the point in which he differs from them is this3 he maintains that we draw the conclusion in question without any reasoning1 and1 indeed1 in the absence of any conceivable reason why we should draw it4 ,we do it instinctively2 we are led by the constitution of our nature4 ,in effect ,reid says to us3 ,when you lay your hand on the table1 you have a sensation1 it is true1 but you also know the table is hard4 ,how do you know it8 ,i cannot tell you2 you simply know it1 and cannot help knowing it2 and that is the end of the matter4 ,reid's doctrine was not without its effect upon other philosophers4 ,among them we must place ,sir ,william ,hamilton 7#aghh-ahef71 whose writings had no little influence upon ,british philosophy in the last half of the last century4 ,hamilton complained that ,reid did not succeed in being a very good ,natural ,realist1 and that he slipped unconsciously into the position he was concerned to condemn4 ,sir ,william tried to eliminate this error1 but the careful reader of his works will find to his amusement that this learned author gets his feet upon the same slippery descent4 ,and much the same thing may be said of the doctrine of ,herbert ,spencer 7#ahbj-aijc71 who claims that1 when we have a sensation1 we know directly that there is an external thing1 and then manages to sublimate that external thing into an ,unknowable1 which we not only do not know directly1 but even do not know at all4 ,all of these men were anxious to avoid what they regarded as the perils of ,idealism1 and yet they seem quite unable to retain a foothold upon the position which they consider the safer one4 ,reid called his doctrine the philosophy of ,common ,sense1 and he thought he was coming back from the subtleties of the metaphysicians to the standpoint of the plain man4 ,that he should fall into difficulties and inconsistencies is by no means surprising4 ,as we have seen 7section #ab71 the thought of the plain man is far from clear4 ,he certainly believes that we perceive an external world of things1 and the inconsistent way in which ,descartes and ,locke appeal from ideas to the things themselves does not strike him as unnatural4 ,why should not a man test his ideas by turning to things and comparing the former with the latter8 ,on the other hand1 he knows that to perceive things we must have sense organs and sensations1 and he cannot quarrel with the psychologists for saying that we know things only in so far as they are revealed to us through our sensations4 ,how does he reconcile these two positions8 ,he does not reconcile them4 ,he accepts them as they stand4 ,reid and various other philosophers have tried to come back to ,common ,sense and to stay there4 ,now1 it is a good position to come back to for the purpose of starting out again4 ,the experience of the plain man1 the truths which he recognizes as truths1 these are not things to be despised4 ,many a man whose mind has been1 as ,berkeley expresses it1 debauched by learning1 has gotten away from them to his detriment1 and has said very unreasonable things4 ,but ,common ,sense cannot be the ultimate refuge of the philosopher2 it can only serve him as material for investigation4 ,the scholar whose thought is as vague and inconsistent as that of the plain man has little profit in the fact that the apparatus of his learning has made it possible for him to be ponderously and unintelligibly vague and inconsistent4 ,hence1 we may have the utmost sympathy with ,reid's protest against the doctrine of representative perception1 and we may1 nevertheless1 complain that he has done little to explain how it is that we directly know external things and yet cannot be said to know things except in so far as we have sensations or ideas4 #ea4 ,,the ,,critical ,,philosophy4--,the ,german philosopher1 ,immanuel ,kant 7#agbd-ahjd71 was moved1 by the skeptical conclusions to which ,hume's philosophy seemed to lead1 to seek a way of escape1 somewhat as ,reid was4 ,but he did not take refuge in ,common ,sense2 he developed an ingenious doctrine which has had an enormous influence in the philosophical world1 and has given rise to a ,kantian literature of such proportions that no man can hope to read all of it1 even if he devotes his life to it4 ,in ,germany and out of it1 it has for a hundred years and more simply rained books1 pamphlets1 and articles on ,kant and his philosophy1 some of them good1 many of them far from clear and far from original4 ,hundreds of ,german university students have taken ,kant as the subject of the dissertation by which they hoped to win the degree of ,doctor of ,philosophy2--,i was lately offered two hundred and seventy-four such dissertations in one bunch2--and no student is supposed to have even a moderate knowledge of philosophy who has not an acquaintance with that famous work1 the ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,it is to be expected from the outset that1 where so many have found so much to say1 there should reign abundant differences of opinion4 ,there are differences of opinion touching the interpretation of ,kant1 and touching the criticisms which may be made upon1 and the development which should be given to1 his doctrine4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible to go into all these things here2 and ,i shall do no more than indicate1 in untechnical language and in briefest outline1 what he offers us in place of the philosophy of ,hume4 ,kant did not try to refute1 as did ,reid1 the doctrine1 urged by ,descartes and by his successors1 that all those things which the mind directly perceives are to be regarded as complexes of ideas4 ,on the contrary1 he accepted it1 and he has made the words phenomenon and noumenon household words in philosophy4 ,the world which seems to be spread out before us in space and time is1 he tells us1 a world of things as they are revealed to our senses and our intelligence2 it is a world of manifestations1 of phenomena4 ,what things-in-themselves are like we have no means of knowing2 we know only things as they appear to us4 ,we may1 to be sure1 talk of a something distinct from phenomena1 a something not revealed to the senses1 but thought of1 a noumenon2 but we should not forget that this is a negative conception2 there is nothing in our experience that can give it a filling1 for our experience is only of phenomena4 ,the reader will find an unmistakable echo of this doctrine in ,herbert ,spencer's doctrine of the ,unknowable and its manifestations4 ,now1 ,berkeley had called all the things we immediately perceive ideas4 ,as we have seen1 he distinguished between ideas of sense and ideas of memory and imagination4 ,hume preferred to give to these two classes different names--he called the first impressions and the second ideas4 ,the associations of the word impression are not to be mistaken4 ,locke had taught that between ideas in the memory and genuine sensations there is the difference that the latter are due to the brisk acting of objects without us4 ,objects impress us1 and we have sensations or impressions4 ,to be sure1 ,hume1 after employing the word impression1 goes on to argue that we have no evidence that there are external objects1 which cause impressions4 ,but he retains the word impression1 nevertheless1 and his use of it perceptibly colors his thought4 ,in ,kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena we have the lineal descendant of the old distinction between the circle of our ideas and the something outside of them that causes them and of which they are supposed to give information4 ,hume said we have no reason to believe such a thing exists1 but are impelled by our nature to believe in it4 ,kant is not so much concerned to prove the nonexistence of noumena1 things-in-themselves1 as he is to prove that the very conception is an empty one4 ,his reasonings seem to result in the conclusion that we can make no intelligible statement about things so cut off from our experience as noumena are supposed to be2 and one would imagine that he would have felt impelled to go on to the frank declaration that we have no reason to believe in noumena at all1 and had better throw away altogether so meaningless and useless a notion4 ,but he was a conservative creature1 and he did not go quite so far4 ,so far there is little choice between ,kant and ,hume4 ,certainly the former does not appear to have rehabilitated the external world which had suffered from the assaults of his predecessors4 ,what important difference is there between his doctrine and that of the man whose skeptical tendencies he wished to combat8 ,the difference is this3 ,descartes and ,locke had accounted for our knowledge of things by maintaining that things act upon us1 and make an impression or sensation--that their action1 so to speak1 begets ideas4 ,this is a very ancient doctrine as well as a very modern one2 it is the doctrine that most men find reasonable even before they devote themselves to the study of philosophy4 ,the totality of such impressions received from the external world1 they are accustomed to regard as our experience of external things2 and they are inclined to think that any knowledge of external things not founded upon experience can hardly deserve the name of knowledge4 ,now1 ,hume1 when he cast doubt upon the existence of external things1 did not1 as ,i have said above1 divest himself of the suggestions of the word impression4 ,he insists strenuously that all our knowledge is founded upon experience2 and he holds that no experience can give us knowledge that is necessary and universal4 ,we know things as they are revealed to us in our experience2 but who can guarantee that we may not have new experiences of a quite different kind1 and which flatly contradict the notions which we have so far attained of what is possible and impossible1 true and untrue4 ,it is here that ,kant takes issue with ,hume4 ,a survey of our knowledge makes clear1 he thinks1 that we are in the possession of a great deal of information that is not of the unsatisfactory kind that1 according to ,hume1 all our knowledge of things must be4 ,there1 for example1 are all the truths of mathematics4 ,when we enunciate a truth regarding the relations of the lines and angles of a triangle1 we are not merely unfolding in the predicate of our proposition what was implicitly contained in the subject4 ,there are propositions that do no more than this2 they are analytical1 i4e4 they merely analyze the subject4 ,thus1 when we say3 ,man is a rational animal1 we may merely be defining the word man--unpacking it1 so to speak4 ,but a synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate is not contained in the subject2 it adds to one's information4 ,the mathematical truths are of this character4 ,so also is the truth that everything that happens must have a cause4 ,do we connect things with one another in this way merely because we have had experience that they are thus connected8 ,is it because they are given to us connected in this way8 ,that cannot be the case1 ,kant argues1 for what is taken up as mere experienced act cannot be known as universally and necessarily true4 ,we perceive that these things must be so connected4 ,how shall we explain this necessity8 ,we can only explain it1 said ,kant1 in this way3 ,we must assume that what is given us from without is merely the raw material of sensation1 the matter of our experience2 and that the ordering of this matter1 the arranging it into a world of phenomena1 the furnishing of form1 is the work of the mind4 ,thus1 we must think of space1 time1 causality1 and of all other relations which obtain between the elements of our experience1 as due to the nature of the mind4 ,it perceives the world of phenomena that it does1 because it constructs that world4 ,its knowledge of things is stable and dependable because it cannot know any phenomenon which does not conform to its laws4 ,the water poured into a cup must take the shape of the cup2 and the raw materials poured into a mind must take the form of an orderly world1 spread out in space and time4 ,kant thought that with this turn he had placed human knowledge upon a satisfactory basis1 and had1 at the same time1 indicated the limitations of human knowledge4 ,if the world we perceive is a world which we make2 if the forms of thought furnished by the mind have no other function than the ordering of the materials furnished by sense2 then what can we say of that which may be beyond phenomena8 ,what of noumena8 ,it seems clear that1 on ,kant's principles1 we ought not to be able to say anything whatever of noumena4 ,to say that such may exist appears absurd4 ,all conceivable connection between them and existing things as we know them is cut off4 ,we cannot think of a noumenon as a substance1 for the notions of substance and quality have been declared to be only a scheme for the ordering of phenomena4 ,nor can we think of one as a cause of the sensations that we unite into a world1 for just the same reason4 ,we are shut up logically to the world of phenomena1 and that world of phenomena is1 after all1 the successor of the world of ideas advocated by ,berkeley4 ,this is not the place to discuss at length the value of ,kant's contribution to philosophy4#c ,there is something terrifying in the prodigious length at which it seems possible for men to discuss it4 ,kant called his doctrine ,criticism1 because it undertook to establish the nature and limits of our knowledge4 ,by some he has been hailed as a great enlightener1 and by others he has been accused of being as dogmatic in his assumptions as those whom he disapproved4 ,but one thing he certainly has accomplished4 ,he has made the words phenomena and noumena familiar to us all1 and he has induced a vast number of men to accept it as established fact that it is not worth while to try to extend our knowledge beyond phenomena4 ,one sees his influence in the writings of men who differ most widely from one another4 #a ,essay1 ,book ,,iv1 ,chapter ,,xi1 section #g4 #b ,an ,inquiry into the ,human ,mind1 ,chapter ,v1 section #e4 #c ,the reader will find a criticism of the ,critical ,philosophy in ,chapter ,,xv4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,realism ,,and ,,idealism #eb4 ,,realism4--,the plain man is a realist4 ,that is to say1 he believes in a world which is not to be identified with his own ideas or those of any other mind4 ,at the same time1 as we have seen 7section #ab71 the distinction between the mind and the world is by no means clear to him4 ,it is not difficult1 by judicious questioning1 to set his feet upon the slippery descent that shoots a man into idealism4 ,the vague realism of the plain man may be called ,nave or ,unreflective ,realism4 ,it has been called by some ,natural ,realism1 but the latter term is an unfortunate one4 ,it is1 of course1 natural for the unreflective man to be unreflective1 but1 on the other hand1 it is also natural for the reflective man to be reflective4 ,besides1 in dubbing any doctrine natural1 we are apt to assume that doctrines contrasted with it may properly be called unnatural or artificial4 ,it is an ancient rhetorical device1 to obtain sympathy for a cause in which one may happen to be interested by giving it a taking name2 but it is a device frowned upon by logic and by good sense4 ,one kind of realism is1 then1 nave realism4 ,it is the position from which we all set out1 when we begin to reflect upon the system of things4 ,it is the position to which some try to come back1 when their reflections appear to be leading them into strange or unwelcome paths4 ,we have seen how ,thomas ,reid 7section #ej7 recoiled from the conclusions to which the reasonings of the philosophers had brought him1 and tried to return to the position of the plain man4 ,the attempt was a failure1 and was necessarily a failure1 for ,reid tried to come back to the position of the plain man and still be a philosopher4 ,he tried to live in a cloud and1 nevertheless1 to see clearly--a task not easy to accomplish4 ,it should be remarked1 however1 that he tried1 at least1 to insist that we know the external world directly4 ,we may divide realists into two broad classes1 those who hold to this view1 and those who maintain that we know it only indirectly and through our ideas4 ,the plain man belongs1 of course1 to the first class1 if it is just to speak of a man who says inconsistent things as being wholly in any one class4 ,certainly he is willing to assert that the ground upon which he stands and the staff in his hand are perceived by him directly4 ,but we are compelled to recognize that there are subdivisions in this first class of realists4 ,reid tried to place himself beside the plain man and failed to do so4 ,hamilton 7section #ej7 tried also1 and he is not to be classed precisely either with the plain man or with ,reid4 ,he informs us that the object as it appears to us is a composite something to the building up of which the knowing mind contributes its share1 the medium through which the object is perceived its share1 and the object in itself its share4 ,he suggests1 by way of illustration1 that the external object may contribute one third4 ,this seems to make1 at least1 something external directly known4 ,but1 on the other hand1 he maintains that the mind knows immediately only what is in immediate contact with the bodily organ--with the eyes1 with the hands1 etc42 and he believes it knows this immediately because it is actually present in all parts of the body4 ,and1 further1 in distinguishing as he does between existence as it is in itself and existence as it is revealed to us1 and in shutting us up to the latter1 he seems to rob us even of the modicum of externality that he has granted us4 ,i have already mentioned ,herbert ,spencer 7section #ej7 as a man not without sympathy for the attempt to rehabilitate the external world4 ,he is very severe with the insanities of idealism4 ,he is not willing even to take the first step toward it4 ,he writes3#a ,the postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations--that we certainly know we have these1 and that if there be anything beyond these serving as cause for them1 it can be known only by inference from them4 ,i shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if ,i call in question this postulate2 and the surprise will rise into astonishment if ,i distinctly deny it4 ,yet ,i must do this4 ,limiting the proposition to those epiperipheral feelings produced in us by external objects 7for these are alone in question71 ,i see no alternative but to affirm that the thing primarily known is not that a sensation has been experienced1 but that there exists an outer object4 ,according to this1 the outer object is not known through an inference2 it is known directly4 ,but do not be in haste to class ,spencer with the plain man1 or with ,reid4 ,listen to a citation once before made 7section #bb71 but worth repeating in this connection3 ,when we are taught that a piece of matter1 regarded by us as existing externally1 cannot be really known1 but that we can know only certain impressions produced on us1 we are yet1 by the relativity of thought1 compelled to think of these in relation to a cause--the notion of a real existence which generated these impressions becomes nascent4 ,if it be proved that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is inconsistent with itself1--that matter1 however conceived by us1 cannot be matter as it actually is1--our conception1 though transfigured1 is not destroyed3 there remains the sense of reality1 dissociated as far as possible from those special forms under which it was before represented in thought4 ,it is interesting to place the two extracts side by side4 ,in the one1 we are told that we do not know external objects by an inference from our sensations2 in the other we are taught that the piece of matter which we regard as existing externally cannot be really known2 that we can know only certain impressions produced on us1 and must refer them to a cause2 that this cause cannot be what we think it4 ,it is difficult for the man who reads such statements not to forget that ,spencer regarded himself as a realist who held to a direct knowledge of something external4 ,there are1 as it is evident1 many sorts of realists that may be gathered into the first class mentioned above--men who1 however inconsistent they may be1 try1 at least1 to maintain that our knowledge of the external world is a direct one4 ,and it is equally true that there are various sorts of realists that may be put into the second class4 ,these men have been called ,hypothetical ,realists4 ,in the last chapter it was pointed out that ,descartes and ,locke belong to this class4 ,both of these men believed in an external world1 but believed that its existence is a thing to be inferred4 ,now1 when a man has persuaded himself that the mind can know directly only its own ideas1 and must infer the world which they are supposed to represent1 he may conceive of that external world in three different ways4 7#a7 ,he may believe that what corresponds to his idea of a material object1 for example1 an apple1 is in very many respects like the idea in his mind4 ,thus1 he may believe that the odor1 taste1 color1 hardness1 etc41 that he perceives directly1 or as ideas1 have corresponding to them real external odor1 taste1 color1 hardness1 etc4 ,it is not easy for a man to hold to this position1 for a very little reflection seems to make it untenable2 but it is theoretically possible for one to take it1 and probably many persons have inclined to the view when they have first been tempted to believe that the mind perceives directly only its ideas4 7#b7 ,he may believe that such things as colors1 tastes1 and odors cannot be qualities of external bodies at all1 but are only effects1 produced upon our minds by something very different in kind4 ,we seem to perceive bodies1 he may argue1 to be colored1 to have taste1 and to be odorous2 but what we thus perceive is not the external thing2 the external thing that produces these appearances cannot be regarded as having anything more than solidity1 extension1 figure1 motion or rest1 and number4 ,thus did ,locke reason4 ,to him the external world as it really exists1 is1 so to speak1 a paler copy of the external world as we seem to perceive it4 ,it is a world with fewer qualities1 but1 still1 a world with qualities of some kind4 7#c7 ,but one may go farther than this4 ,one may say3 ,how can ,i know that even the extension1 number1 and motion of the things which ,i directly perceive have corresponding to them extension1 number1 and motion1 in an outer world8 ,if what is not colored can cause me to perceive color1 why may not that which is not extended cause me to perceive extension8 ,and1 moved by such reflections1 one may maintain that there exists outside of us that which we can only characterize as an ,unknown ,cause1 a ,reality which we cannot more nearly define4 ,this last position resembles very closely one side of ,spencer's doctrine--that represented in the last of the two citations1 as the reader can easily see4 ,it is the position of the follower of ,immanuel ,kant who has not yet repudiated the noumenon or thing-in-itself discussed in the last chapter 7section #ea74 ,i am not concerned to defend any one of the varieties of ,direct or of ,hypothetical ,realism portrayed above4 ,but ,i wish to point out that they all have some sort of claim to the title ,realism1 and to remind the reader that1 when we call a man a realist1 we do not do very much in the way of defining his position4 ,i may add that the account of the external world contained in ,chapter ,,iv is a sort of realism also4 ,if this last variety1 which ,i advocate1 must be classified1 let it be placed in the first broad class1 for it teaches that we know the external world directly4 ,but ,i sincerely hope that it will not be judged wholly by the company it keeps1 and that no one will assign to it either virtues or defects to which it can lay no just claim4 ,before leaving the subject of realism it is right that ,i should utter a note of warning touching one very common source of error4 ,it is fatally easy for men to be misled by the names which are applied to things4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton invented for a certain type of metaphysical doctrine the offensive epithet nihilism4 ,it is a type which appeals to many inoffensive and pious men at the present day1 some of whom prefer to call themselves idealists4 ,many have been induced to become free-willists because the name has suggested to them a proper regard for that freedom which is justly dear to all men4 ,we can scarcely approach with an open mind an account of ideas and sensations which we hear described as sensationalism1 or worse yet1 as sensualism4 ,when a given type of philosophy is set down as dogmatism1 we involuntarily feel a prejudice against it4 ,he who reads as reflectively as he should will soon find out that philosophers call names much as other men do1 and that one should always be on one's guard4 ,every form of phenomenalism1 asseverated a learned and energetic old gentleman1 who for many years occupied a chair in one of our leading institutions of learning1 necessarily leads to atheism4 ,he inspired a considerable number of students with such a horror for phenomenalism that they never took pains to find out what it was4 ,i mention these things in this connection1 because ,i suspect that not a few in our own day are unduly influenced by the associations which cling to the words realism and idealism4 ,realism in literature1 as many persons understand it1 means the degradation of literature to the portrayal of what is coarse and degrading1 in a coarse and offensive way4 ,realism in painting often means the laborious representation upon canvas of things from which we would gladly avert our eyes if we met them in real life4 ,with the word idealism1 on the other hand1 we are apt to connect the possession of ideals1 a regard for what is best and noblest in life and literature4 ,the reader must have seen that realism in the philosophic sense of the word has nothing whatever to do with realism in the senses just mentioned4 ,the word is given a special meaning1 and it is a weakness to allow associations drawn from other senses of the word to color our judgment when we use it4 ,and it should be carefully held in view that the word idealism is given a special sense when it is used to indicate a type of doctrine contrasted with the doctrine of the realist4 ,some forms of philosophical idealism have undoubtedly been inspiring2 but some have been1 and are1 far from inspiring4 ,they should not be allowed to posture as saints merely because they are cloaked with an ambiguous name4 #ec4 ,,idealism4--,idealism we may broadly define as the doctrine that all existence is mental existence4 ,so far from regarding the external world as beyond and independent of mind1 it maintains that it can have its being only in consciousness4 ,we have seen 7section #di7 how men were led to take the step to idealism4 ,it is not a step which the plain man is impelled to take without preparation4 ,to say that the real world of things in which we perceive ourselves to live and move is a something that exists only in the mind strikes him as little better than insane4 ,he who becomes an idealist usually does so1 ,i think1 after weighing the arguments presented by the hypothetical realist1 and finding that they seem to carry one farther than the latter appears to recognize4 ,the type of idealism represented by ,berkeley has been called ,subjective ,idealism4 ,ordinarily our use of the words subjective and objective is to call attention to the distinction between what belongs to the mind and what belongs to the external order of things4 ,my sensations are subjective1 they are referred to my mind1 and it is assumed that they can have no existence except in my mind2 the qualities of things are regarded as objective1 that is1 it is commonly believed that they exist independently of my perception of them4 ,of course1 when a man becomes an idealist1 he cannot keep just this distinction4 ,the question may1 then1 fairly be raised3 ,how can he be a subjective idealist8 ,has not the word subjective lost its significance8 ,to this one has to answer3 ,it has1 and it has not4 ,the man who1 with strict consistency1 makes the desk at which he sits as much his idea as is the pain in his finger or his memory of yesterday1 cannot keep hold of the distinction of subjective and objective4 ,but men are not always as consistent as this4 ,remember the illustration of the telephone exchange 7section #ad74 ,the mind is represented as situated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves2 and then brain1 nerves1 and all else are turned into ideas in this mind1 which are merely projected outwards4 ,now1 in placing the mind at a definite location in the world1 and contrasting it with the world1 we retain the distinction between subjective and objective--what is in the mind can be distinguished from what is beyond it4 ,on the other hand1 in making the whole system of external things a complex of ideas in the mind1 we become idealists1 and repudiate realism4 ,the position is an inconsistent one1 of course1 but it is possible for men to take it1 for men have taken it often enough4 ,the idealism of ,professor ,pearson 7section #ad7 is more palpably subjective than that of ,berkeley1 for the latter never puts the mind in a telephone exchange4 ,nevertheless1 he names the objects of sense1 which other men call material things1 ideas1 and he evidently assimilates them to what we commonly call ideas and contrast with things4 ,moreover1 he holds them in some of the contempt which men reserve for mere ideas1 for he believes that idolaters might be induced to give over worshiping the heavenly bodies could they be persuaded that these are nothing more than their own ideas4 ,with the various forms of subjective idealism it is usual to contrast the doctrine of ,objective ,idealism4 ,this does not maintain that the world which ,i perceive is my idea2 it maintains that the world is idea4 ,it is rather a nice question1 and one which no man should decide without a careful examination of the whole matter1 whether we have any right to retain the word idea when we have rubbed out the distinction which is usually drawn between ideas and external things4 ,if we maintain that all men are always necessarily selfish1 we stretch the meaning of the word quite beyond what is customary1 and selfishness becomes a thing we have no reason to disapprove1 since it characterizes saint and sinner alike4 ,similarly1 if we decide to name idea1 not only what the plain man and the realist admit to have a right to that name1 but also the great system which these men call an external material world1 it seems right to ask2 ,why use the word idea at all8 ,what does it serve to indicate8 ,not a distinction1 surely1 for the word seems to be applicable to all things without distinction4 ,such considerations as these lead me to object to the expression objective idealism3 if the doctrine is really objective1 i4e4 if it recognizes a system of things different and distinct from what men commonly call ideas1 it scarcely seems to have a right to the title idealism2 and if it is really idealism1 and does not rob the word idea of all significance1 it can scarcely be objective in any proper sense of the word4 ,manifestly1 there is need of a very careful analysis of the meaning of the word idea1 and of the proper significance of the terms subjective and objective1 if error is to be avoided and language used soberly and accurately4 ,those who are not in sympathy with the doctrine of the objective idealists think that in such careful analysis and accurate statement they are rather conspicuously lacking4 ,we think of ,hegel 7#aggj-ahca7 as the typical objective idealist4 ,it is not easy to give an accurate account of his doctrine1 for he is far from a clear writer1 and he has made it possible for his many admirers to understand him in many ways4 ,but he seems to have accepted the system of things that most men call the real external world1 and to have regarded it as the ,divine ,reason in its self-development4 ,and most of those whom we would to-day be inclined to gather together under the title of objective idealists appear to have been much influenced1 directly or indirectly1 by his philosophy4 ,there are1 however1 great differences of opinion among them1 and no man should be made responsible for the opinions of the class as a class4 ,i have said a few pages back that some forms of idealism are inspiring1 and that some are not4 ,bishop ,berkeley called the objects of sense ideas4 ,he regarded all ideas as inactive1 and thought that all changes in ideas--and this includes all the changes that take place in nature--must be referred to the activity of minds4 ,some of those changes he could refer to finite minds1 his own and others4 ,most of them he could not1 and he felt impelled to refer them to a ,divine ,mind4 ,hence1 the world became to him a constant revelation of ,god2 and he uses the word ,god in no equivocal sense4 ,it does not signify to him the system of things as a whole1 or an ,unknowable1 or anything of the sort4 ,it signifies a spirit akin to his own1 but without its limitations4 ,he writes3#b-- ,a human spirit or person is not perceived by sense1 as not being an idea2 when1 therefore1 we see the color1 size1 figure1 and motions of a man1 we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds2 and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves4 ,hence1 it is plain we do not see a man1--if by man is meant that which lives1 moves1 perceives1 and thinks as we do1--but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion1 like to ourselves1 accompanying and represented by it4 ,and after the same manner we see ,god2 all the difference is that1 whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind1 whithersoever we direct our view1 we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the ,divinity--everything we see1 hear1 feel1 or any wise perceive by sense1 being a sign or effect of the power of ,god2 as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men4 ,with ,berkeley's view of the world as a constant revelation of ,god1 many men will sympathize who have little liking for his idealism as idealism4 ,they may criticise in detail his arguments to prove the nonexistence of a genuinely external world1 but they will be ready to admit that his doctrine is an inspiring one in the view that it takes of the world and of man4 ,with this ,i wish to contrast the doctrine of another idealist1 ,mr4 ,bradley1 whose work1 ,appearance and ,reality1 has been much discussed in the last few years1 in order that the reader may see how widely different forms of idealism may differ from each other1 and how absurd it is to praise or blame a man's philosophy merely on the ground that it is idealistic4 ,mr4 ,bradley holds that those aspects of our experience which we are accustomed to regard as real--qualities of things1 the relations between things1 the things themselves1 space1 time1 motion1 causation1 activity1 the self--turn out when carefully examined to be self-contradictory and absurd4 ,they are not real2 they are unrealities1 mere appearances4 ,but these appearances exist1 and1 hence1 must belong to reality4 ,this reality must be sentient1 for there is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence4 ,now1 what is this reality with which appearances--the whole world of things which seem to be given in our experience--are contrasted8 ,mr4 ,bradley calls it the ,absolute1 and indicates that it is what other men recognize as the ,deity4 ,how shall we conceive it8 ,we are told that we are to conceive it as consisting of the contents of finite minds1 or centers of experience1 subjected to an all-pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all material4 ,in the ,absolute1 finite things are transmuted and lose their individual natures4 ,what does this mean in plain language8 ,it means that there are many finite minds of a higher and of a lower order1 centers of experience1 and that the contents of these are unreal appearances4 ,there is not a ,god or ,absolute outside of and distinct from these1 but rather one that in some sense is their reality4 ,this mass of unrealities transfused and transmuted so that no one of them retains its individual nature is the ,absolute4 ,that is to say1 time must become indistinguishable from space1 space from motion1 motion from the self1 the self from the qualities of things1 etc41 before they are fit to become constituents of the ,absolute and to be regarded as real4 ,as the reader has seen1 this ,absolute has nothing in common with the ,god in which ,berkeley believed1 and in which the plain man usually believes4 ,it is the night in which all cats are gray1 and there appears to be no reason why any one should harbor toward it the least sentiment of awe or veneration4 ,whether such reasonings as ,mr4 ,bradley's should be accepted as valid or should not1 must be decided after a careful examination into the foundations upon which they rest and the consistency with which inferences are drawn from premises4 ,i do not wish to prejudge the matter4 ,but it is worth while to set forth the conclusions at which he arrives1 that it may be clearly realized that the associations which often hang about the word idealism should be carefully stripped away when we are forming our estimate of this or that philosophical doctrine4 #a ,principles of ,psychology1 ,part ,,vii1 ,chapter ,,vi1 section #djd4 #b ,principles1 section #adh4 ,,chapter ,,xiv ,,monism ,,and ,,dualism #ed4 ,,the ,,meaning ,,of ,,the ,,words4--,in common life men distinguish between minds and material things1 thus dividing the things1 which taken together make up the world as we know it1 into two broad classes4 ,they think of minds as being very different from material objects1 and of the latter as being very different from minds4 ,it does not occur to them to find in the one class room for the other1 nor does it occur to them to think of both classes as manifestations or aspects of some one underlying reality4 ,in other words1 the plain man to-day is a ,dualist4 ,in the last chapter 7section #eb7 ,i have called him a ,nave ,realist2 and here ,i shall call him a ,nave ,dualist1 for a man may regard mind and matter as quite distinct kinds of things1 without trying to elevate his opinion1 through reflection1 into a philosophical doctrine4 ,the reflective man may stand by the opinion of the plain man1 merely trying to make less vague and indefinite the notions of matter and of mind4 ,he then becomes a ,philosophical ,dualist4 ,there are several varieties of this doctrine1 and ,i shall consider them a little later 7section #eh74 ,but it is possible for one to be less profoundly impressed by the differences which characterize matter and mind4 ,one may feel inclined to refer mental phenomena to matter1 and to deny them the prominence accorded them by the dualist4 ,on the other hand1 one may be led by one's reflections to resolve material objects into mere ideas1 and to claim that they can have no existence except in a mind4 ,finally1 it is possible to hold that both minds and material things1 as we know them1 are only manifestations1 phenomena1 and that they must be referred to an ulterior reality or substance4 ,one may claim that they are aspects of the one reality1 which is neither matter nor mind4 ,these doctrines are different forms of ,monism4 ,in whatever else they differ from one another1 they agree in maintaining that the universe does not contain two kinds of things fundamentally different4 ,out of the duality of things as it seems to be revealed to the plain man they try to make some kind of a unity4 #ce4 ,,materialism4--,the first of the forms of monism above mentioned is ,materialism4 ,it is not a doctrine to which the first impulse of the plain man leads him at the present time4 ,even those who have done no reading in philosophy have inherited many of their ways of looking at things from the thinkers who lived in the ages past1 and whose opinions have become the common property of civilized men4 ,for more than two thousand years the world and the mind have been discussed1 and it is impossible for any of us to escape from the influence of those discussions and to look at things with the primitive simplicity of the wholly untutored4 ,but it was not always so4 ,there was a time when men who were not savages1 but possessed great intellectual vigor and much cultivation1 found it easy and natural to be materialists4 ,this ,i have spoken of before 7section #cj71 but it will repay us to take up again a little more at length the clearest of the ancient forms of materialism1 that of the ,atomists1 and to see what may be said for and against it4 ,democritus of ,abdera taught that nothing exists except atoms and empty space4 ,the atoms1 he maintained1 differ from one another in size1 shape1 and position4 ,in other respects they are alike4 ,they have always been in motion4 ,perhaps he conceived of that motion as originally a fall through space1 but there seems to be uncertainty upon this point4 ,however1 the atoms in motion collide with one another1 and these collisions result in mechanical combinations from which spring into being world-systems4 ,according to this doctrine1 nothing comes from nothing1 and nothing can become nonexistent4 ,all the changes which have ever taken place in the world are only changes in the position of material particles--they are regroupings of atoms4 ,we cannot directly perceive them to be such1 for our senses are too dull to make such fine observations1 but our reason tells us that such is the case4 ,where1 in such a world as this1 is there room for mind1 and what can we mean by mind8 ,democritus finds a place for mind by conceiving it to consist of fine1 smooth1 round atoms1 which are the same as the atoms which constitute fire4 ,these are distributed through the whole body1 and lie among the other atoms which compose it4 ,they are inhaled with and exhaled into the outer air4 ,while they are in the body their functions are different according as they are located in this organ or in that4 ,in the brain they give rise to thought1 in the heart to anger1 and in the liver to desire4 ,i suppose no one would care1 at the present time1 to become a ,democritean4 ,the ,reason1 which tells us that the mind consists of fine1 round atoms1 appears to have nothing but its bare word to offer us4 ,but1 apart from this1 a peculiar difficulty seems to face us2 even supposing there are atoms of fire in the brain1 the heart1 and the liver1 what are the thought1 anger1 and desire1 of which mention is made8 ,shall we conceive of these last as atoms1 as void space1 or as the motion of atoms8 ,there really seems to be no place in the world for them1 and these are the mind so far as the mind appears to be revealed--they are mental phenomena4 ,it does not seem that they are to be identified with anything that the ,atomistic doctrine admits as existing4 ,they are simply overlooked4 ,is the modern materialism more satisfactory8 ,about half a century ago there was in the scientific world something like a revival of materialistic thinking4 ,it did not occur to any one to maintain that the mind consists of fine atoms disseminated through the body1 but statements almost as crude were made4 ,it was said1 for example1 that the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile4 ,it seems a gratuitous labor to criticise such statements as these in detail4 ,there are no glands the secretions of which are not as unequivocally material as are the glands themselves4 ,this means that such secretions can be captured and analyzed2 the chemical elements of which they are composed can be enumerated4 ,they are open to inspection in precisely the same way as are the glands which secrete them4 ,does it seem reasonable to maintain that thoughts and feelings are related to brains in this way8 ,does the chemist ever dream of collecting them in a test tube1 and of drawing up for us a list of their constituent elements8 ,when the brain is active1 there are1 to be sure1 certain material products which pass into the blood and are finally eliminated from the body2 but among these products no one would be more surprised than the materialist to discover pains and pleasures1 memories and anticipations1 desires and volitions4 ,this talk of thought as a secretion we can afford to set aside4 ,nor need we take much more seriously the seemingly more sober statement that thought is a function of the brain4 ,there is1 of course1 a sense in which we all admit the statement2 minds are not disembodied1 and we have reason to believe that mind and brain are most intimately related4 ,but the word function is used in a very broad and loose sense when it serves to indicate this relation2 and one may employ it in this way without being a materialist at all4 ,in a stricter sense of the word1 the brain has no functions that may not be conceived as mechanical changes1--as the motion of atoms in space1--and to identify mental phenomena with these is inexcusable4 ,it is not theoretically inconceivable that1 with finer senses1 we might directly perceive the motions of the atoms in another man's brain2 it is inconceivable that we should thus directly perceive his melancholy or his joy2 they belong to another world4 #ef4 ,,spiritualism4--,the name ,spiritualism is sometimes given to the doctrine that there is no existence which we may not properly call mind or spirit4 ,it errs in the one direction as materialism errs in the other4 ,one must not confound with this doctrine that very different one1 ,spiritism1 which teaches that a certain favored class of persons called mediums may bring back the spirits of the departed and enable us to hold communication with them4 ,such beliefs have always existed among the common people1 but they have rarely interested philosophers4 ,i shall have nothing to say of them in this book4 ,there have been various kinds of spiritualists4 ,the name may be applied to the idealists1 from ,berkeley down to those of our day2 at some of the varieties of their doctrine we have taken a glance 7sections #di1 #ec74 ,to these we need not recur2 but there is one type of spiritualistic doctrine which is much discussed at the present day and which appears to appeal strongly to a number of scientific men4 ,we must consider it for a moment4 ,we have examined ,professor ,clifford's doctrine of ,mind-stuff 7section #dc74 ,clifford maintained that all the material things we perceive are our perceptions--they are in our consciousness1 and are not properly external at all4 ,but1 believing1 as he did1 that all nature is animated1 he held that every material thing1 every perception1 may be taken as a revelation of something not in our consciousness1 of a mind or1 at least1 of a certain amount of mind-stuff4 ,how shall we conceive the relation between what is in our mind and the something corresponding to it not in our mind8 ,we must1 says ,clifford1 regard the latter as the reality of which the former is the appearance or manifestation4 ,what ,i perceive as your brain is really in itself your consciousness1 is ,you2 but then that which ,i call your brain1 the material fact1 is merely my perception4 ,this doctrine is ,panpsychism1 in the form in which it is usually brought to our attention4 ,it holds that the only real existences are minds1 and that physical phenomena must be regarded as the manifestations under which these real existences make us aware of their presence4 ,the term panpsychism may1 it is true1 be used in a somewhat different sense4 ,it may be employed merely to indicate the doctrine that all nature is animated1 and without implying a theory as to the relation between bodies perceived and the minds supposed to accompany them4 ,what shall we say to panpsychism of the type represented by ,clifford8 ,it is1 ,i think1 sufficiently answered in the earlier chapters of this volume3-- 7#a7 ,if ,i call material facts my perceptions1 ,i do an injustice to the distinction between the physical and the mental 7,chapter ,,iv74 7#b7 ,if ,i say that all nature is animated1 ,i extend illegitimately the argument for other minds 7,chapter ,x74 7#c7 ,if ,i say that mind is the reality of which the brain is the appearance1 ,i misconceive what is meant by the distinction between appearance and reality 7,chapter ,v74 #eg4 ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,one ,,substance4--,in the seventeenth century ,descartes maintained that1 although mind and matter may justly be regarded as two substances1 yet it should be recognized that they are not really independent substances in the strictest sense of the word1 but that there is only one substance1 in this sense1 and mind and matter are1 as it were1 its attributes4 ,his thought was that by attribute we mean that which is not independent1 but must be referred to something else2 by substance1 we mean that which exists independently and is not referred to any other thing4 ,it seemed to follow that there could be only one substance4 ,spinoza modified ,descartes' doctrine in that he refused to regard mind and matter as substances at all4 ,he made them unequivocally attributes of the one and only substance1 which he called ,god4 ,the thought which influenced ,spinoza had impressed many minds before his time1 and it has influenced many since4 ,one need not follow him in naming the unitary something to which mind and matter are referred substance4 ,one may call it ,being1 or ,reality1 or the ,unknowable1 or ,energy1 or the ,absolute1 or1 perhaps1 still something else4 ,the doctrine has taken many forms1 but he who reads with discrimination will see that the various forms have much in common4 ,they agree in maintaining that matter and mind1 as they are revealed in our experience1 are not to be regarded as1 in the last analysis1 two distinct kinds of thing4 ,they are1 rather1 modes or manifestations of one and the same thing1 and this is not to be confounded with either4 ,those who incline to this doctrine take issue with the materialist1 who assimilates mental phenomena to physical2 and they oppose the idealist1 who assimilates physical phenomena to mental1 and calls material things ideas4 ,we have no right1 they argue1 to call that of which ideas and things are manifestations either mind or matter4 ,it is to be distinguished from both4 ,to this doctrine the title of ,monism is often appropriated4 ,in this chapter ,i have used the term in a broader sense1 for both the materialist and the spiritualist maintain that there is in the universe but one kind of thing4 ,nevertheless1 when we hear a man called a monist without qualification1 we may1 perhaps1 be justified in assuming1 in the absence of further information1 that he holds to some one of the forms of doctrine indicated above4 ,there may be no logical justification for thus narrowing the use of the term1 but logical justification goes for little in such matters4 ,various considerations have moved men to become monists in this sense of the word4 ,some have been influenced by the assumption--one which men felt impelled to make early in the history of speculative thought--that the whole universe must be the expression of some unitary principle4 ,a rather different argument is well illustrated in the writings of ,professor ,hffding1 a learned and acute writer of our own time4 ,it has influenced so many that it is worth while to delay upon it4 ,professor ,hffding holds that mental phenomena and physical phenomena must be regarded as parallel 7see ,chapter ,,ix71 and that we must not conceive of ideas and material things as interacting4 ,he writes3#a-- ,if it is contrary to the doctrine of the persistence of physical energy to suppose a transition from the one province to the other1 and if1 nevertheless1 the two provinces exist in our experience as distinct1 then the two sets of phenomena must be unfolded simultaneously1 each according to its laws1 so that for every phenomenon in the world of consciousness there is a corresponding phenomenon in the world of matter1 and conversely 7so far as there is reason to suppose that conscious life is correlated with material phenomena74 ,the parallels already drawn point directly to such a relation2 it would be an amazing accident1 if1 while the characteristic marks repeated themselves in this way1 there were not at the foundation an inner connection4 ,both the parallelism and the proportionality between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an identity at bottom4 ,the difference which remains in spite of the points of agreement compels us to suppose that one and the same principle has found its expression in a double form4 ,we have no right to take mind and body for two beings or substances in reciprocal interaction4 ,we are1 on the contrary1 impelled to conceive the material interaction between the elements composing the brain and nervous system as an outer form of the inner ideal unity of consciousness4 ,what we in our inner experience become conscious of as thought1 feeling1 and resolution1 is thus represented in the material world by certain material processes of the brain1 which as such are subject to the law of the persistence of energy1 although this law cannot be applied to the relation between cerebral and conscious processes4 ,it is as though the same thing were said in two languages4 ,some monists are in the habit of speaking of the one ,being to which they refer phenomena of all sorts as the ,absolute4 ,the word is a vague one1 and means very different things in different philosophies4 ,it has been somewhat broadly defined as the ultimate principle of explanation of the universe4 ,he who turns to one principle of explanation will conceive the ,absolute in one way1 and he who turns to another will1 naturally1 understand something else by the word4 ,thus1 the idealist may conceive of the ,absolute as an all-inclusive ,mind1 of which finite minds are parts4 ,to ,spencer1 it is the ,unknowable1 a something behind the veil of phenomena4 ,sometimes it means to a writer much the same thing that the word ,god means to other men2 sometimes it has a significance at the farthest remove from this 7section #ec74 ,indeed1 the word is so vague and ambiguous1 and has proved itself the mother of so many confusions1 that it would seem a desirable thing to drop it out of philosophy altogether1 and to substitute for it some less ambiguous expression4 ,it seems clear from the preceding pages1 that1 before one either accepts or rejects monism1 one should very carefully determine just what one means by the word1 and should scrutinize the considerations which may be urged in favor of the particular doctrine in question4 ,there are all sorts of monism1 and men embrace them for all sorts of reasons4 ,let me beg the reader to bear in mind2-- 7#a7 ,the monist may be a materialist2 he may be an idealist2 he may be neither4 ,in the last case1 he may1 with ,spinoza1 call the one ,substance ,god2 that is1 he may be a ,pantheist4 ,on the other hand1 he may1 with ,spencer1 call it the ,unknowable1 and be an ,agnostic4 ,other shades of opinion are open to him1 if he cares to choose them4 7#b7 ,it does not seem wise to assent hastily to such statements as2 ,the universe is the manifestation of one unitary ,being2 or3 ,mind and matter are the expression of one and the same principle4 ,we find revealed in our experience mental phenomena and physical phenomena4 ,in what sense they are one1 or whether they are one in any sense1--this is something to be determined by an examination of the phenomena and of the relations in which we find them4 ,it may turn out that the universe is one only in the sense that all phenomena belong to the one orderly system4 ,if we find that this is the case1 we may still1 if we choose1 call our doctrine monism1 but we should carefully distinguish such a monism from those represented by ,hffding and ,spencer and many others4 ,there seems little reason to use the word1 when the doctrine has been so far modified4 #eh4 ,,dualism4--,the plain man finds himself in a world of physical things and of minds1 and it seems to him that his experience directly testifies to the existence of both4 ,this means that the things of which he has experience appear to belong to two distinct classes4 ,it does not mean1 of course1 that he has only two kinds of experiences4 ,the phenomena which are revealed to us are indefinitely varied2 all physical phenomena are not just alike1 and all mental phenomena are not just alike4 ,nevertheless1 amid all the bewildering variety that forces itself upon our attention1 there stands out one broad distinction1 that of the physical and the mental4 ,it is a distinction that the man who has done no reading in the philosophers is scarcely tempted to obliterate2 to him the world consists of two kinds of things widely different from each other2 minds are not material things and material things are not minds4 ,we are justified in regarding this as the opinion of the plain man even when we recognize that1 in his endeavor to make clear to himself what he means by minds1 he sometimes speaks as though he were talking about something material or semi-material4 ,now1 the materialist allows these two classes to run together2 so does the idealist4 ,the one says that everything is matter2 the other1 that everything is mind4 ,it would be foolish to maintain that nothing can be said for either doctrine1 for men of ability have embraced each4 ,but one may at least say that both seem to be refuted by our common experience of the world1 an experience which1 so far as it is permitted to testify at all1 lifts up its voice in favor of ,dualism4 ,dualism is sometimes defined as the doctrine that there are in the world two kinds of substances1 matter and mind1 which are different in kind and should be kept distinct4 ,there are dualists who prefer to avoid the use of the word substance1 and to say that the world of our experiences consists of physical phenomena and of mental phenomena1 and that these two classes of facts should be kept separate4 ,the dualist may maintain that we have a direct knowledge of matter and of mind1 and he may content himself with such a statement1 doing little to make clear what we mean by matter and by mind4 ,in this case1 his position is little different from that of the plain man who does not attempt to philosophize4 ,thomas ,reid 7section #ej7 belongs to this class4 ,on the other hand1 the dualist may attempt to make clear1 through philosophical reflection1 what we mean by the matter and mind which experience seems to give us4 ,he may conclude3-- 7#a7 ,that he must hold1 as did ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 that we perceive directly only physical and mental phenomena1 but are justified in inferring that1 since the phenomena are different1 there must be two kinds of underlying substances to which the phenomena are referred4 ,thus1 he may distinguish between the two substances and their manifestations1 as some monists distinguish between the one substance and its manifestations4 7#b7 ,or he may conclude that it is futile to search for substances or realities of any sort behind phenomena1 arguing that such realities are never revealed in experience1 and that no sound reason for their assumption can be adduced4 ,in this case1 he may try to make plain what mind and matter are1 by simply analyzing our experiences of mind and matter and coming to a clearer comprehension of their nature4 ,as the reader has probably remarked1 the philosophy presented in the earlier chapters of this book 7,chapters ,,iii to ,,xi7 is dualistic as well as realistic4 ,that is to say1 it refuses to rub out the distinction between physical phenomena and mental phenomena1 either by dissolving the material world into ideas2 by calling ideas secretions or functions of the brain2 or by declaring them one in a fictitious entity behind the veil and not supposed to be exactly identical with either4 ,and as it teaches that the only reality that it means anything to talk about must be found in experience1 it is a dualism of the type described in the paragraph which immediately precedes4 ,such a philosophy does not seem to do violence to the common experience of minds and of physical things shared by us all1 whether we are philosophers or are not4 ,it only tries to make clear what we all know dimly and vaguely4 ,this is1 ,i think1 a point in its favor4 ,however1 men of great ability and of much learning have inclined to doctrines very different2 and we have no right to make up our minds on such a subject as this without trying to give them an attentive and an impartial hearing4 #ei4 ,,singularism ,,and ,,pluralism4--,there are those who apply to the various forms of monism the title ,singularism1 and who contrast with this ,pluralism1 a word which is meant to cover the various doctrines which maintain that there is more than one ultimate principle or being in the universe4 ,it is argued that we should have some word under which we may bring such a doctrine1 for example1 as that of the ,greek philosopher ,empedocles 7born about #dij ,b4,c474 ,this thinker made earth1 water1 fire1 and air the four material principles or roots of things4 ,he was not a monist1 and we can certainly not call him a dualist4 ,again4 ,the term pluralism has been used to indicate the doctrine that individual finite minds are not parts or manifestations of one all-embracing ,mind1--of ,god or the ,absolute1--but are relatively independent beings4 ,this doctrine has been urged in our own time1 with eloquence and feeling1 by ,professor ,howison4#b ,here we have a pluralism which is idealistic1 for it admits in the universe but one kind of thing1 minds2 and yet refuses to call itself monistic4 ,it will readily be seen that in this paragraph and in the one preceding the word is used in different senses4 ,i have added the above sentences to this chapter that the reader may have an explanation of the meaning of a word sometimes met with4 ,but the title of the chapter is ,monism and ,dualism1 and it is of this contrast that it is especially important to grasp the significance4 #a ,outlines of ,psychology1 pp4 #fd-fe1 ,english translation1 #ahia4 #b ,the ,limits of ,evolution1 and ,other ,essays1 revised edition4 ,new ,york1 #aije4 ,,chapter ,,xv ,,rationalism1 ,,empiricism1 ,,criticism1 ,,and ,,critical ,,empiricism #fj4 ,,rationalism4--,as the content of a philosophical doctrine must be determined by the initial assumptions which a philosopher makes and by the method which he adopts in his reasonings1 it is well to examine with some care certain broad differences in this respect which characterize different philosophers1 and which help to explain how it is that the results of their reflections are so startlingly different4 ,i shall first speak of ,rationalism1 which ,i may somewhat loosely define as the doctrine that the reason can attain truths independently of observation--can go beyond experienced fact and the deductions which experience seems to justify us in making from experienced fact4 ,the definition cannot mean much to us until it is interpreted by a concrete example1 and ,i shall turn to such4 ,it must1 however1 be borne in mind that the word rationalism is meant to cover a great variety of opinions1 and we have said comparatively little about him when we have called a man a rationalist in philosophy4 ,men may agree in believing that the reason can go beyond experienced fact1 and yet may differ regarding the particular truths which may be thus attained4 ,now1 when ,descartes found himself discontented with the philosophy that he and others had inherited from the ,middle ,ages1 and undertook a reconstruction1 he found it necessary to throw over a vast amount of what had passed as truth1 if only with a view to building up again upon a firmer foundation4 ,it appeared to him that much was uncritically accepted as true in philosophy and in the sciences which a little reflection revealed to be either false or highly doubtful4 ,accordingly1 he decided to clear the ground by a sweeping doubt1 and to begin his task quite independently4 ,in accordance with this principle1 he rejected the testimony of the senses touching the existence of a world of external things4 ,do not the senses sometimes deceive us8 ,and1 since men seem to be liable to error in their reasonings1 even in a field so secure as that of mathematical demonstration1 he resolved further to repudiate all the reasonings he had heretofore accepted4 ,he would not even assume himself to be in his right mind and awake2 might he not be the victim of a diseased fancy1 or a man deluded by dreams8 ,could anything whatever escape this all-devouring doubt8 ,one truth seemed unshakable3 his own existence1 at least1 emerged from this sea of uncertainties4 ,i may be deceived in thinking that there is an external world1 and that ,i am awake and really perceive things2 but ,i surely cannot be deceived unless ,i exist4 ,cogito1 ergo sum--,i think1 hence ,i exist2 this truth ,descartes accepted as the first principle of the new and sounder philosophy which he sought4 ,as we read farther in ,descartes we discover that he takes back again a great many of those things that he had at the outset rejected as uncertain4 ,thus1 he accepts an external world of material things4 ,how does he establish its existence8 ,he cannot do it as the empiricist does it1 by a reference to experienced fact1 for he does not believe that the external world is directly given in our experience4 ,he thinks we are directly conscious only of our ideas of it1 and must somehow prove that it exists over against our ideas4 ,by his principles1 ,descartes is compelled to fall back upon a curious roundabout argument to prove that there is a world4 ,he must first prove that ,god exists1 and then argue that ,god would not deceive us into thinking that it exists when it does not4 ,now1 when we come to examine ,descartes' reasonings in detail we find what appear to us some very uncritical assumptions4 ,thus1 he proves the existence of ,god by the following argument3-- ,i exist1 and ,i find in me the idea of ,god2 of this idea ,i cannot be the author1 for it represents something much greater than ,i1 and its cause must be as great as the reality it represents4 ,in other words1 nothing less than ,god can be the cause of the idea of ,god which ,i find in me1 and1 hence1 ,i may infer that ,god exists4 ,where did ,descartes get this notion that every idea must have a cause which contains as much external reality as the idea does represented reality8 ,how does he prove his assumption8 ,he simply appeals to what he calls the natural light1 which is for him a source of all sorts of information which cannot be derived from experience4 ,this natural light furnishes him with a vast number of eternal truths1 these he has not brought under the sickle of his sweeping doubt1 and these help him to build up again the world he has overthrown1 beginning with the one indubitable fact discussed above4 ,to the men of a later time many of ,descartes' eternal truths are simply inherited philosophical prejudices1 the results of the reflections of earlier thinkers1 and in sad need of revision4 ,i shall not criticise them in detail4 ,the important point for us to notice is that we have here a type of philosophy which depends upon truths revealed by the reason1 independently of experience1 to carry one beyond the sphere of experience4 ,i again remind the reader that there are all sorts of rationalists1 in the philosophical sense of the word4 ,some trust the power of the unaided reason without reserve4 ,thus ,spinoza1 the pantheist1 made the magnificent but misguided attempt to deduce the whole system of things physical and things mental from what he called the attributes of ,god1 ,extension and ,thought4 ,on the other hand1 one may be a good deal of an empiricist1 and yet something of a rationalist1 too4 ,thus ,professor ,strong1 in his recent brilliant book1 ,why the ,mind has a ,body1 maintains that we know intuitively that other minds than our own exist2 know it without gathering our information from experience1 and without having to establish the fact in any way4 ,this seems1 at least1 akin to the doctrine of the natural light1 and yet no one can say that ,professor ,strong does not1 in general1 believe in a philosophy of observation and experiment4 #fa4 ,,empiricism4--,i suppose every one who has done some reading in the history of philosophy will1 if his mother tongue be ,english1 think of the name of ,john ,locke when empiricism is mentioned4 ,locke1 in his ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 undertakes to inquire into the original1 certainty1 and extent of human knowledge1 together with the grounds and degrees of belief1 opinion1 and assent4 ,his sober and cautious work1 which was first published in #afij1 was peculiarly ,english in character2 and the spirit which it exemplifies animates also ,locke's famous successors1 ,george ,berkeley 7#afhd-agec71 ,david ,hume 7#agaa-aggf71 and ,john ,stuart ,mill 7#ahjf-ahgc74 ,although ,locke was a realist1 ,berkeley an idealist1 ,hume a skeptic1 and ,mill what has been called a sensationalist2 yet all were empiricists of a sort1 and emphasized the necessity of founding our knowledge upon experience4 ,now1 ,locke was familiar with the writings of ,descartes1 whose work he admired1 but whose rationalism offended him4 ,the first book of the ,essay is devoted to the proof that there are in the mind of man no innate ideas and no innate principles4 ,that is to say1 ,locke tries to show that one must not seek1 in the natural light to which ,descartes turned1 a distinct and independent source of information1 ,let us1 then1 he continues1 suppose the mind to be1 as we say1 white paper1 void of all characters1 without any ideas2 how comes it to be furnished8 ,whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it1 with an almost endless variety8 ,whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge8 ,to this ,i answer in one word1 from experience2 in that all our knowledge is founded1 and from that it ultimately derives itself4 ,our observation1 employed either about external sensible objects1 or about the internal operations of our minds1 perceived and reflected on by ourselves1 is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking4 ,these two are the fountains of knowledge1 from whence all the ideas we have1 or can naturally have1 do spring4 #a ,thus1 all we know and all we ever shall know of the world of matter and of minds must rest ultimately upon observation1--observation of external things and of our own mind4 ,we must clip the erratic wing of a reason which seeks to soar beyond such knowledge2 which leaves the solid earth1 and hangs suspended in the void4 ,but hold1 exclaims the critical reader2 have we not seen that ,locke1 as well as ,descartes 7section #dh71 claims to know what he cannot prove by direct observation or even by a legitimate inference from what has been directly observed8 ,does he not maintain that the mind has an immediate knowledge or experience only of its own ideas8 ,how can he prove that there are material extended things outside causing these ideas8 ,and if he cannot prove it by an appeal to experience1 to direct observation1 is he not1 in accepting the existence of the external world at all1 just as truly as ,descartes1 a rationalist8 ,the objection is well taken4 ,on his own principles1 ,locke had no right to believe in an external world4 ,he has stolen his world1 so to speak2 he has taken it by violence4 ,nevertheless1 as ,i pointed out in the section above referred to1 ,locke is not a rationalist of malice prepense4 ,he tries to be an empiricist4 ,he believes in the external world because he thinks it is directly revealed to the senses--he inconsistently refers to experience as evidence of its existence4 ,it has often been claimed by those who do not sympathize with empiricism that the empiricists make assumptions much as others do1 but have not the grace to admit it4 ,i think we must frankly confess that a man may try hard to be an empiricist and may not be wholly successful4 ,moreover1 reflection forces us to the conclusion that when we have defined empiricism as a doctrine which rests throughout upon an appeal to experience we have not said anything very definite4 ,what is experience8 ,what may we accept as directly revealed fact8 ,the answer to such questions is far from an easy one to give4 ,it is a harder matter to discuss intelligently than any one can at all realize until he has spent some years in following the efforts of the philosophers to determine what is revealed fact4 ,we are supposed to have experience of our own minds1 of space1 of time1 of matter4 ,what are these things as revealed in our experience8 ,we have seen in the earlier chapters of this book that one cannot answer such questions off-hand4 #fb4 ,,criticism4--,i have in another chapter 7section #ea7 given a brief account of the philosophy of ,immanuel ,kant4 ,he called his doctrine ,criticism1 and he distinguished it from ,dogmatism and ,empiricism4 ,every philosophy that transcends experience1 without first critically examining our faculty of knowledge and determining its right to spread its wings in this way1 ,kant calls dogmatism4 ,the word seems rather an offensive one1 in its usual signification1 at least2 and it is as well not to use it4 ,as ,kant used the word1 ,descartes was a dogmatist2 but let us rather call him a rationalist4 ,he certainly had no intention of proceeding uncritically1 as we shall see a little later4 ,if we call him a dogmatist we seem to condemn him in advance1 by applying to him an abusive epithet4 ,empiricism1 according to ,kant1 confines human knowledge to experience1 and thus avoids the errors which beset the dogmatist4 ,but then1 as ,hume seemed to have shown1 empiricism must run out into skepticism4 ,if all our knowledge has its foundations in experience1 how can we expect to find in our possession any universal or necessary truths8 ,may not a later experience contradict an earlier8 ,how can we be sure that what has been will be8 ,can we know that there is anything fixed and certain in our world8 ,skepticism seemed a forlorn doctrine1 and1 casting about for a way of escape from it1 ,kant hit upon the expedient which ,i have described4 ,so long as we maintain that our knowledge has no other source than the experiences which the world imprints upon us1 so to speak1 from without1 we are without the power of prediction1 for new experiences may annihilate any generalizations we have founded upon those already vouchsafed us2 but if we assume that the world upon which we gaze1 the world of phenomena1 is made what it is by the mind that perceives it1 are we not in a different position8 ,suppose1 for example1 we take the statement that there must be an adequate cause of all the changes that take place in the world4 ,can a mere experience of what has been in the past guarantee that this law will hold good in the future8 ,but1 when we realize that the world of which we are speaking is nothing more than a world of phenomena1 of experiences1 and realize further that this whole world is constructed by the mind out of the raw materials furnished by the senses1 may we not have a greater confidence in our law8 ,if it is the nature of the mind to connect the phenomena presented to it with one another as cause and effect1 may we not maintain that no phenomenon can possibly make its appearance that defies the law in question8 ,how could it appear except under the conditions laid upon all phenomena8 ,if it is our nature to think the world as an orderly one1 and if we can know no world save the one we construct ourselves1 the orderliness of all the things we can know seems to be guaranteed to us4 ,it will be noticed that ,kant's doctrine has a negative side4 ,he limits our knowledge to phenomena1 to experiences1 and he is himself1 in so far1 an empiricist4 ,but in that he finds in experience an order1 an arrangement of things1 not derived from experience in the usual sense of the word1 he is not an empiricist4 ,he has paid his own doctrine the compliment of calling it criticism1 as ,i have said4 ,now1 ,i beg the reader to be here1 as elsewhere1 on his guard against the associations which attach to words4 ,in calling ,kant's doctrine the critical philosophy1 we are in some danger of uncritically assuming and leading others to believe uncritically that it is free from such defects as may be expected to attach to dogmatism and to empiricism4 ,such a position should not be taken until one has made a most careful examination of each of the three types of doctrine1 of the assumptions which it makes1 and of the rigor with which it draws inferences upon the basis of such assumptions4 ,that we may be the better able to withstand undue influence1 ,i call attention to the following points3-- 7#a7 ,we must bear in mind that the attempt to make a critical examination into the foundations of our knowledge1 and to determine its scope1 is by no means a new thing4 ,among the ,greeks1 ,plato1 ,aristotle1 the ,stoics1 the ,epicureans1 and the ,skeptics1 all attacked the problem4 ,it did not1 of course1 present itself to these men in the precise form in which it presented itself to ,kant1 but each and all were concerned to find an answer to the question3 ,can we know anything with certainty2 and1 if so1 what8 ,they may have failed to be thoroughly critical1 but they certainly made the attempt4 ,i shall omit mention of the long series of others1 who1 since that time1 have carried on the tradition1 and shall speak only of ,descartes and ,locke1 whom ,i have above brought forward as representatives of the two types of doctrine that ,kant contrasts with his own4 ,to see how strenuously ,descartes endeavored to subject his knowledge to a critical scrutiny and to avoid unjustifiable assumptions of any sort1 one has only to read that charming little work of genius1 the ,discourse on the ,method of ,rightly ,conducting the ,reason4 ,in his youth ,descartes was1 as he informs us1 an eager student2 but1 when he had finished the whole course of education usually prescribed1 he found himself so full of doubts and errors that he did not feel that he had advanced in learning at all4 ,yet he had been well tutored1 and was considered as bright in mind as others4 ,he was led to judge his neighbor by himself1 and to conclude that there existed no such certain science as he had been taught to suppose4 ,having ripened with years and experience1 ,descartes set about the task of which ,i have spoken above1 the task of sweeping away the whole body of his opinions and of attempting a general and systematic reconstruction4 ,so important a work should be1 he thought1 approached with circumspection2 hence1 he formulated certain ,rules of ,method4 ,the first1 he writes1 was never to accept anything for true which ,i did not clearly know to be such2 that is1 carefully to avoid haste and prejudice1 and to include nothing more in my judgments than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all reason for doubt4 ,such was our philosopher's design1 and such the spirit in which he set about it4 ,we have seen the result above4 ,it is as if ,descartes had decided that a certain room full of people did not appear to be free from suspicious characters1 and had cleared out every one1 afterwards posting himself at the door to readmit only those who proved themselves worthy4 ,when we examine those who succeeded in passing muster1 we discover he has favored all his old friends4 ,he simply cannot doubt them2 are they not vouched for by the natural light8 ,nevertheless1 we must not forget that ,descartes sifted his congregation with much travail of spirit4 ,he did try to be critical4 ,as for ,john ,locke1 he reveals in the ,epistle to the ,reader1 which stands as a preface to the ,essay1 the critical spirit in which his work was taken up4 ,were it fit to trouble thee1 he writes1 with the history of this ,essay1 ,i should tell thee1 that five or six friends meeting at my chamber1 and discoursing on a subject very remote from this1 found themselves quickly at a stand1 by the difficulties that rose on every side4 ,after we had a while puzzled ourselves1 without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us1 it came into my thoughts1 that we took a wrong course2 and that before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature1 it was necessary to examine our own abilities1 and to see what objects our understandings were1 or were not1 fitted to deal with4 ,this problem1 proposed by himself to his little circle of friends1 ,locke attacked with earnestness1 and as a result he brought out many years later the work which has since become so famous4 ,the book is literally a critique of the reason1 although a very different critique from that worked out by ,kant4 ,if1 by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding1 says ,locke1 ,i can discover the powers thereof1 how far they reach1 to what things they are in any degree proportionate1 and where they fail us2 ,i suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension2 to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether2 and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities4 #b ,to the difficulties of the task our author is fully alive3 ,the understanding1 like the eye1 whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things1 takes no notice of itself2 and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance1 and make it its own object4 ,but whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry1 whatever it be that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves1 sure ,i am that all the light we can let in upon our own minds1 all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings1 will not only be very pleasant1 but bring us great advantage1 in directing our thoughts in the search1 of other things4 #c 7#b7 ,thus1 many men have attempted to produce a critical philosophy1 and in much the same sense as that in which ,kant uses the words4 ,those who have come after them have decided that they were not sufficiently critical1 that they have made unjustifiable assumptions4 ,when we come to read ,kant1 we will1 if we have read the history of philosophy with profit1 not forget to ask ourselves if he has not sinned in the same way4 ,for example1 we will ask2-- 7a7 ,was ,kant right in maintaining that we find in experience synthetic judgments 7section #ea7 that are not founded upon experience1 but yield such information as is beyond the reach of the empiricist8 ,there are those who think that the judgments to which he alludes in evidence of his contention--the mathematical1 for instance--are not of this character4 7b7 ,was he justified in assuming that all the ordering of our world is due to the activity of mind1 and that merely the raw material is given us through the senses8 ,there are many who demur against such a statement1 and hold that it is1 if not in all senses untrue1 at least highly misleading1 since it seems to argue that there is no really external world at all4 ,moreover1 they claim that the doctrine is neither self-evident nor susceptible of proper proof4 7c7 ,was ,kant justified in assuming that1 even if we attribute the form or arrangement of the world we know to the native activity of the mind1 the necessity and universality of our knowledge is assured8 ,let us grant that the proposition1 whatever happens must have an adequate cause1 is a form of thought4 ,what guarantee have we that the forms of thought must ever remain changeless8 ,if it is an assumption for the empiricist to declare that what has been true in the past will be true in the future1 that earlier experiences of the world will not be contradicted by later2 what is it for the ,kantian to maintain that the order which he finds in his experience will necessarily and always be the order of all future experiences8 ,transferring an assumption to the field of mind does not make it less of an assumption4 ,thus1 it does not seem unreasonable to charge ,kant with being a good deal of a rationalist4 ,he tried to confine our knowledge to the field of experience1 it is true2 but he made a number of assumptions as to the nature of experience which certainly do not shine by their own light1 and which many thoughtful persons regard as incapable of justification4 ,kant's famous successors in the ,german philosophy1 ,fichte 7#agfb-ahad71 ,schelling 7#agge-ahed71 ,hegel 7#aggj-ahca71 and ,schopenhauer 7#aghh-ahfj71 all received their impulse from the critical philosophy1 and yet each developed his doctrine in a relatively independent way4 ,i cannot here take the space to characterize the systems of these men2 ,i may merely remark that all of them contrast strongly in doctrine and method with the ,british philosophers mentioned in the last section1 ,locke1 ,berkeley1 ,hume1 and ,mill4 ,they are un-empirical1 if one may use such a word2 and1 to one accustomed to reading the ,english philosophy1 they seem ever ready to spread their wings and hazard the boldest of flights without a proper realization of the thinness of the atmosphere in which they must support themselves4 ,however1 no matter what may be one's opinion of the actual results attained by these ,german philosophers1 one must frankly admit that no one who wishes to understand clearly the development of speculative thought can afford to dispense with a careful reading of them4 ,much even of the ,english philosophy of our own day must remain obscure to those who have not looked into their pages4 ,thus1 the thought of ,kant and ,hegel molded the thought of ,thomas ,hill ,green 7#ahcf-ahhb7 and of the brothers ,caird2 and their influence has made itself widely felt both in ,england and in ,america4 ,one cannot criticise intelligently books written from their standpoint1 unless one knows how the authors came by their doctrine and out of what it has been developed4 #fc4 ,,critical ,,empiricism4--,we have seen that the trouble with the rationalists seemed to be that they made an appeal to eternal truths1 which those who followed them could not admit to be eternal truths at all4 ,they proceeded on a basis of assumptions the validity of which was at once called in question4 ,locke1 the empiricist1 repudiated all this1 and then also made assumptions which others could not1 and cannot1 approve4 ,kant did something of much the same sort2 we cannot regard his criticism as wholly critical4 ,how can we avoid such errors8 ,how walk cautiously1 and go around the pit into which1 as it seems to us1 others have fallen8 ,i may as well tell the reader frankly that he sets his hope too high if he expects to avoid all error and to work out for himself a philosophy in all respects unassailable4 ,the difficulties of reflective thought are very great1 and we should carry with us a consciousness of that fact and a willingness to revise our most cherished conclusions4 ,our initial difficulty seems to be that we must begin by assuming something1 if only as material upon which to work4 ,we must begin our philosophizing somewhere4 ,where shall we begin8 ,may we not fall into error at the very outset8 ,the doctrine set forth in the earlier chapters of this volume maintains that we must accept as our material the revelation of the mind and the world which seems to be made in our common experience1 and which is extended and systematized in the sciences4 ,but it insists that we must regard such an acceptance as merely provisional1 must subject our concepts to a careful criticism1 and must always be on our guard against hasty assumptions4 ,it emphasizes the value of the light which historical study casts upon the real meaning of the concepts which we all use and must use1 but which have so often proved to be stones of stumbling in the path of those who have employed them4 ,its watchword is analysis1 always analysis2 and a settled distrust of what have so often passed as self-evident truths4 ,it regards it as its task to analyze experience1 while maintaining that only the satisfactory carrying out of such an analysis can reveal what experience really is1 and clear our notions of it from misinterpretations4 ,no such attempt to give an account of experience can be regarded as fundamentally new in its method4 ,every philosopher1 in his own way1 criticises experience1 and seeks its interpretation4 ,but one may1 warned by the example of one's predecessors1 lay emphasis upon the danger of half-analyses and hasty assumptions1 and counsel the observance of sobriety and caution4 ,for convenience1 ,i have called the doctrine ,critical ,empiricism4 ,i warn the reader against the seductive title1 and advise him not to allow it to influence him unduly in his judgment of the doctrine4 #fd4 ,,pragmatism4--,it seems right that ,i should1 before closing this chapter1 say a few words about ,pragmatism1 which has been so much discussed in the last few years4 ,in #ahgh ,mr4 ,charles ,s4 ,peirce wrote an article for the ,popular ,science ,monthly in which he proposed as a maxim for the attainment of clearness of apprehension the following3 ,consider what effects1 which might conceivably have practical bearings1 we conceive the object of our conception to have4 ,then1 our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object4 ,this thought has been taken up by others and given a development which ,mr4 ,peirce regards with some suspicion4 ,he refers#d especially to the development it has received at the hands of ,professor ,william ,james1 in his two essays1 ,the ,will to ,believe and ,philosophical ,conceptions and ,practical ,results4 #e ,professor ,james is often regarded as foremost among the pragmatists4 ,i shall not attempt to define pragmatism1 for ,i do not believe that the doctrine has yet attained to that definiteness of formulation which warrants a definition4 ,we seem to have to do not so much with a clear-cut doctrine1 the limits and consequences of which have been worked out in detail1 as with a tendency which makes itself apparent in the works of various writers under somewhat different forms4 ,i may roughly describe it as the tendency to take that to be true which is useful or serviceable4 ,it is well illustrated in the two essays to which reference is made above4 ,thus1 ,professor ,james dwells upon the unsatisfactoriness and uncertainty of philosophical and scientific knowledge3 ,objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with1 but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found8 ,now1 among those things regarding which it appears impossible to attain to intellectual certitude1 there are matters of great practical moment1 and which affect deeply the conduct of life2 for example1 the doctrines of religion4 ,here a merely skeptical attitude seems intolerable4 ,in such cases1 argues ,professor ,james1 we have the right to believe at our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will4 ,it is important to notice that there is no question here of a logical right4 ,we are concerned with matters regarding which1 according to ,professor ,james1 we cannot look for intellectual evidence4 ,it is assumed that we believe simply because we choose to believe--we believe arbitrarily4 ,it is further important to notice that what is a live hypothesis to one man need not tempt the will of another man at all4 ,as our author points out1 a ,turk would naturally will to believe one thing and a ,christian would will to believe another4 ,each would will to believe what struck him as a satisfactory thing to believe4 ,what shall we say to this doctrine8 ,i think we must say that it is clearly not a philosophical method of attaining to truth4 ,hence1 it has not properly a place in this chapter among the attempts which have been made to attain to the truth of things4 ,it is1 in fact1 not concerned with truths1 but with assumptions1 and with assumptions which are supposed to be made on the basis of no evidence4 ,it is concerned with seemings4 ,the distinction is a very important one4 ,our ,turk cannot1 by willing to believe it1 make his hypothesis true2 but he can make it seem true4 ,why should he wish to make it seem true whether it is true or not8 ,why should he strive to attain to a feeling of subjective certainty1 not by logically resolving his doubts1 but by ignoring them8 ,the answer is given us by our author4 ,he who lives in the midst of doubts1 and refuses to cut his knot with the sword of belief1 misses the good of life4 ,this is a practical problem1 and one of no small moment4 ,in the last section of this book ,i have tried to indicate what it is wise for a man to do when he is confronted by doubts which he cannot resolve4 ,into the general question whether even a false belief may not1 under some circumstances1 be more serviceable than no belief at all1 ,i shall not enter4 ,the point ,i wish to emphasize is that there is all the difference in the world between producing a belief and proving a truth4 ,we are compelled to accept it as a fact that men1 under the influence of feeling1 can believe in the absence of evidence1 or1 for that matter1 can believe in spite of evidence4 ,but a truth cannot be established in the absence of evidence or in the face of adverse evidence4 ,and there is a very wide field in which it is made very clear to us that beliefs adopted in the absence of evidence are in danger of being false beliefs4 ,the pragmatist would join with the rest of us in condemning the ,turk or the ,christian who would simply will to believe in the rise or the fall of stocks1 and would refuse to consult the state of the market4 ,some hypotheses are1 in the ordinary course of events1 put to the test of verification4 ,we are then made painfully aware that beliefs and truths are quite distinct things1 and may not be in harmony4 ,now1 the pragmatist does not apply his principle to this field4 ,he confines it to what may not inaptly be called the field of the unverifiable4 ,the ,turk1 who wills to believe in the hypothesis that appeals to him as a pious ,turk1 is in no such danger of a rude awakening as is the man who wills to believe that stocks will go up or down4 ,but mark what this means3 it means that he is not in danger of finding out what the truth really is4 ,it does not mean that he is in possession of the truth4 ,so ,i say1 the doctrine which we are discussing is not a method of attaining to truth4 ,what it really attempts to do is to point out to us how it is prudent for us to act when we cannot discover what the truth is4#f #a ,an ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chapter ,i1 section #b4 #b ,book ,i1 ,chapter ,i1 section #d4 #c ,book ,i1 ,chapter ,i1 section #a4 #d ,dictionary of ,philosophy and ,psychology1 article ,pragmatism4 #e ,published in #ahig and #ahih4 #f ,for references to later developments of pragmatism1 see the note on page #cab4 ,v4 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,sciences ,,chapter ,,xvi ,,logic #fe4 ,,introductory3 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,sciences4--,i have said in the first chapter of this book 7section #f7 that there is quite a group of sciences that are regarded as belonging peculiarly to the province of the teacher of philosophy to-day4 ,having1 in the chapters preceding1 given some account of the nature of reflective thought1 of the problems touching the world and the mind which present themselves to those who reflect1 and of some types of philosophical theory which have their origin in such reflection1 ,i turn to a brief consideration of the philosophical sciences4 ,among these ,i included logic1 psychology1 ethics1 and aesthetics1 metaphysics1 and the history of philosophy4 ,i did not include epistemology or the theory of knowledge as a separate discipline1 and my reasons for this will appear in ,chapter ,,xix4 ,i remarked that1 to complete the list1 we should have to add the philosophy of religion and an investigation into the principles and methods of the sciences generally4 ,why1 it was asked1 should this group of disciplines be regarded as the field of the philosopher1 when others are excluded8 ,the answer to this question which finds the explanation of the fact to lie in a mere historical accident was declared unsatisfactory1 and it was maintained that the philosophical sciences are those in which we find ourselves carried back to the problems of reflective thought4 ,with a view to showing the truth of this opinion1 ,i shall take up one by one the philosophical sciences4 ,of the history of philosophy ,i shall not speak in this part of the work1 but shall treat of it in ,chapter ,,xxiii4 #ff4 ,,the ,,traditional ,,logic4--,most of us begin our acquaintance with logic in the study of some such elementary manual as ,jevons' ,lessons in ,logic4 ,in such books we are shown how terms represent things and classes of things or their attributes1 and how we unite them into propositions or statements4 ,it is indicated at length what statements may be made on a basis of certain other statements and what may not2 and emphasis is laid upon the dangers which arise out of a misunderstanding of the language in which we are forced to express our thoughts4 ,finally1 there are described for us the experimental methods by which the workers in the sciences have attained to the general information about the world which has become our heritage4 ,such books are useful4 ,it is surely no small profit for a student to gain the habit of scrutinizing the steps by which he has come into the possession of a certain bit of information1 and to have a quick eye for loose and inconsistent reasonings4 ,but it is worthy of remark that one may study such a book as this and yet remain pretty consistently on what may be called the plane of the common understanding4 ,one seems to make the assumptions made in all the special sciences1 e4g4 the assumption that there is a world of real things and that we can know them and reason about them4 ,we are not introduced to such problems as3 ,what is truth8 and ,is any knowledge valid8 ,nor does it seem at once apparent that the man who is studying logic in this way is busying himself with a philosophical discipline4 #fg4 ,,the ,,modern ,,logic4--,it is very puzzling for the student to turn from such a text-book as the one above mentioned to certain others which profess to be occupied with the same science1 and which1 yet1 appear to treat of quite different things4 ,thus1 in ,dr4 ,bosanquet's little work on ,the ,essentials of ,logic1 the reader is at once plunged into such questions as the nature of knowledge1 and what is meant by the real world4 ,we seem to be dealing with metaphysics1 and not with logic1 as we have learned to understand the term4 ,how is it that the logician comes to regard these things as within his province8 ,a multitude of writers at the present day are treating logic in this way1 and in some great prominence is given to problems which the philosopher recognizes as indisputably his own4 ,the term modern logic is often employed to denote a logic of this type2 one which does not1 after the fashion of the natural sciences generally1 proceed on the basis of certain assumptions1 and leave deeper questions to some other discipline1 but tries to get to the bottom of things for itself4 ,the tendency to run into metaphysics is peculiarly marked in those writers who have been influenced by the work of the philosopher ,hegel4 ,i shall not here ask why those who belong to one school are more inclined to be metaphysical than are those who belong to another1 but shall approach the broader question why the logicians generally are inclined to be more metaphysical than those who work in certain other special sciences1 such as mathematics1 for example4 ,of the general tendency there can be no question4 ,the only problem is3 ,why does this tendency exist8 #fh4 ,,logic ,,and ,,philosophy4--,let us contrast the science of arithmetic with logic2 and let us notice1 regarding it1 the following points3-- ,it is1 like logic1 a general science1 in that the things treated of in many sciences may be numbered4 ,it considers only a certain aspect of the things4 ,now1 that things may be counted1 added together1 subtracted1 etc41 is guaranteed by the experience of the plain man2 and the methods of determining the numerical relations of things are gradually developed before his eyes1 beginning with operations of great simplicity4 ,moreover1 verification is possible1 and within certain limits verification by direct inspection4 ,to this we may add1 that there has gradually been built up a fine system of unambiguous symbols1 and it is possible for a man to know just what he is dealing with4 ,thus1 a certain beaten path has been attained1 and a man may travel this very well without having forced on his attention the problems of reflective thought4 ,the knowledge of numbers with which he starts is sufficient equipment with which to undertake the journey4 ,that one is on the right road is proved by the results one obtains4 ,as a rule1 disputes can be settled by well-tried mathematical methods4 ,there is1 then1 a common agreement as to initial assumptions and methods of work1 and useful results are attained which seem to justify both4 ,here we have the normal characteristics of a special science4 ,we must not forget1 however1 that1 even in the mathematical sciences1 before a beaten path was attained1 disputes as to the significance of numbers and the cogency of proofs were sufficiently common4 ,and we must bear in mind that even to-day1 where the beaten path does not seem wholly satisfactory1 men seem to be driven to reflect upon the significance of their assumptions and the nature of their method4 ,thus1 we find it not unnatural that a man should be led to ask2 ,what is a minus quantity really8 ,can anything be less than nothing8 or that he should raise the questions3 ,can one rightly speak of an infinite number8 ,can one infinite number be greater than another1 and1 if so1 what can greater mean8 ,what are infinitesimals8 and what can be meant by different orders of infinitesimals8 ,he who has interested himself in such questions as these has betaken himself to philosophical reflection4 ,they are not answered by employing mathematical methods4 ,let us now turn to logic4 ,and let us notice1 to begin with1 that it is broader in its application than the mathematical sciences4 ,it is concerned to discover what constitutes evidence in every field of investigation4 ,there is1 it is true1 a part of logic that may be developed somewhat after the fashion of mathematics4 ,thus1 we may examine the two statements3 ,all men are mortal1 and ,caesar is a man2 and we may see clearly that1 given the truth of these1 we must admit that ,caesar is mortal4 ,we may make a list of possible inferences of this kind1 and point out under what circumstances the truth of two statements implies the truth of a third1 and under what circumstances the inference cannot be made4 ,our results can be set forth in a system of symbols4 ,as in mathematics1 we may abstract from the particular things reasoned about1 and concern ourselves only with the forms of reasoning4 ,this gives us the theory of the syllogism2 it is a part of logic in which the mathematician is apt to feel very much at home4 ,but this is by no means all of logic4 ,let us consider the following points3-- 7#a7 ,we are not concerned to know only what statements may be made on the basis of certain other statements4 ,we want to know what is true and what is false4 ,we must ask3 ,has a man the right to set up these particular statements and to reason from them8 ,that some men accept as true premises which are repudiated by others is an undoubted fact4 ,thus1 it is maintained by certain philosophers that we may assume that any view of the universe which is repellant to our nature cannot be true4 ,shall we allow this to pass unchallenged8 ,and in ethics1 some have held that it is under all circumstances wrong to lie2 others have denied this1 and have held that in certain cases--for example1 to save life or to prevent great and unmerited suffering--lying is permissible4 ,shall we interest ourselves only in the deductions that each man makes from his assumed premises1 and pay no attention to the truth of the premises themselves8 7#b7 ,again4 ,the vast mass of the reasonings that interest men are expressed in the language that we all use and not in special symbols4 ,but language is a very imperfect instrument1 and all sorts of misunderstandings are possible to those who express their thoughts in it4 ,few men know exactly how much is implied in what they are saying4 ,if ,i say3 ,all men are mortal1 and an angel is not a man2 therefore1 an angel is not mortal2 it is not at once apparent to every one in what respect my argument is defective4 ,he who argues3 ,feathers are light2 light is contrary to darkness2 hence1 feathers are contrary to darkness2 is convicted of error without difficulty4 ,but arguments of the same kind1 and quite as bad1 are to be found in learned works on matters less familiar to us1 and we often fail to detect the fallacy4 ,thus1 ,herbert ,spencer argues1 in effect1 in the fourth and fifth chapters of his ,first ,principles1 as follows3-- ,we are conscious of the ,unknowable1 ,the ,unknowable lies behind the veil of phenomena1 ,hence1 we are conscious of what lies behind the veil of phenomena4 ,it is only the critical reader who notices that the ,unknowable in the first line is the raw material of consciousness1 and the ,unknowable in the second is something not in consciousness at all4 ,the two senses of the word light are not more different from one another4 ,such apparent arguments abound1 and it often requires much acuteness to be able to detect their fallacious character4 ,when we take into consideration the two points indicated above1 we see that the logician is at every turn forced to reflect upon our knowledge as men do not ordinarily reflect4 ,he is led to ask3 ,what is truth8 ,he cannot accept uncritically the assumptions which men make2 and he must endeavor to become very clearly conscious of the real meaning and the whole meaning of statements expressed in words4 ,even in the simple logic with which we usually begin our studies1 we learn to scrutinize statements in a reflective way2 and when we go deeper1 we are at once in contact with philosophical problems4 ,it is evidently our task to attain to a clearer insight into the nature of our experience and the meaning of proof than is attainable by the unreflective4 ,logic1 then1 is a reflective science1 and it is not surprising that it has held its place as one of the philosophical sciences4 ,,chapter ,,xvii ,,psychology #fi4 ,,psychology ,,and ,,philosophy4--,i think ,i have said enough in ,chapter ,,ii 7section #aj7 about what we mean when we speak of psychology as a natural science and as an independent discipline4 ,certainly there are many psychologists who would not care to be confused with the philosophers1 and there are some that regard philosophy with suspicion4 ,nevertheless1 psychology is commonly regarded as belonging to the philosophical group4 ,that this is the case can scarcely be thought surprising when we see how the psychologist himself speaks of the relation of his science to philosophy4 ,i have kept1 writes ,professor ,james#a in that delightful book which has become the common property of us all1 close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book4 ,every natural science assumes certain data uncritically1 and declines to challenge the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain1 and from which its own deductions are carried on4 ,psychology1 the science of finite individual minds1 assumes as its data 7#a7 thoughts and feelings1 and 7#b7 a physical world in time and space with which they coexist1 and which 7#c7 they know4 ,of course1 these data themselves are discussable2 but the discussion of them 7as of other elements7 is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this book4 ,this is an admirable statement of the scope of psychology as a natural science1 and also of the relations of metaphysics to the sciences4 ,but it would not be fair to ,professor ,james to take this sentence alone1 and to assume that1 in his opinion1 it is easy to separate psychology altogether from philosophy4 ,the reader1 he tells us in the next paragraph1 will in vain seek for any closed system in the book4 ,it is mainly a mass of descriptive details1 running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with4 ,and in the opening sentence of the preface he informs us that some of his chapters are more metaphysical than is suitable for students going over the subject for the first time4 ,that the author is right in maintaining that it is not easy to draw a clear line between philosophy and psychology1 and to declare the latter wholly independent1 ,i think we must concede4 ,an independent science should be sure of the things with which it is dealing4 ,where these are vague and indefinite1 and are the subject of constant dispute1 it cannot march forward with assurance4 ,one is rather forced to go back and examine the data themselves4 ,the beaten track of the special science has not been satisfactorily constructed4 ,we are forced to admit that the science of psychology has not yet emerged from the state in which a critical examination of its foundations is necessary1 and that the construction of the beaten path is still in progress4 ,this ,i shall try to make clear by illustrations4 ,the psychologist studies the mind1 and his ultimate appeal must be to introspection1 to a direct observation of mental phenomena1 and of their relations to external things4 ,now1 if the observation of mental phenomena were a simple and an easy thing2 if the mere fact that we are conscious of sensations and ideas implied that we are clearly conscious of them and are in a position to describe them with accuracy1 psychology would be a much more satisfactory science than it is4 ,but we are not thus conscious of our mental life4 ,we can and do use our mental states without being able to describe them accurately4 ,in a sense1 we are conscious of what is there1 but our consciousness is rather dim and vague1 and in our attempts to give an account of it we are in no little danger of giving a false account4 ,thus1 the psychologist assumes that we perceive both physical phenomena and mental--the external world and the mind4 ,he takes it for granted that we perceive mental phenomena to be related to physical4 ,he is hardly in a position to make this assumption1 and then to set it aside as a thing he need not further consider4 ,does he not tell us1 as a result of his investigations1 that we can know the external world only as it is reflected in our sensations1 and thus seem to shut the mind up within the circle of mental phenomena merely1 cutting off absolutely a direct knowledge of what is extra-mental8 ,if we can know only mental phenomena1 the representatives of things1 at first hand1 how can we tell that they are representatives8 and what becomes of the assumption that we perceive that mind is related to an external world8 ,it may be said1 this problem the psychologist may leave to the metaphysician4 ,certainly1 it is one of those problems that the metaphysician discusses2 it has been treated in ,chapter ,,iv4 ,but my contention is1 that he who has given no thought to the matter may easily fall into error as to the very nature of mental phenomena4 ,for example1 when we approach or recede from a physical object we have a series of experiences which are recognized as sensational4 ,when we imagine a tree or a house we are also experiencing a mental phenomenon4 ,all these experiences seem plainly to have extension in some sense of the word4 ,we appear to perceive plainly part out of part4 ,in so far1 these mental things seem to resemble the physical things which we contrast with what is mental4 ,shall we say that1 because these things are mental and not physical1 their apparent extension is a delusion8 ,shall we say that they really have no parts8 ,such considerations have impelled psychologists of eminence to maintain1 in flat contradiction to what seems to be the unequivocal testimony of direct introspection1 that the total content of consciousness at any moment must be looked upon as an indivisible1 part-less unit4 ,we cannot1 then1 depend merely on direct introspection4 ,it is too uncertain in its deliverances4 ,if we would make clear to ourselves what mental phenomena really are1 and how they differ from physical phenomena1 we must fall back upon the reflective analysis of our experience which occupies the metaphysician 7section #cd74 ,until we have done this1 we are in great danger of error4 ,we are actually uncertain of our materials4 ,again4 ,the psychologist speaks of the relation of mind and body4 ,some psychologists incline to be parallelists1 some are warm advocates of interactionism4 ,now1 any theory of the relation of mind to body must depend on observation ultimately4 ,if we had not direct experience of a relation between the physical and the mental somewhere1 no hypothesis on the subject would ever have emerged4 ,but our experiences are not perfectly clear and unequivocal to us4 ,their significance does not seem to be easily grasped4 ,to comprehend it one is forced to that reflective examination of experience which is characteristic of the philosopher 7,chapter ,,ix74 ,here it may again be said3 ,leave the matter to the meta-physician and go on with your psychological work4 ,i answer3 ,the psychologist is not in the same position as the botanist or the zologist4 ,he is studying mind in its relation to body4 ,it cannot but be unsatisfactory to him to leave that relation wholly vague2 and1 as a matter of fact1 he usually takes up with one theory or another4 ,we have seen 7section #cf7 that he may easily adopt a theory that leads him to overlook the great difference between physical phenomena and mental phenomena1 and to treat them as though they were the same4 ,this one may do in spite of all that introspection has to say about the gulf that separates them4 ,psychology is1 then1 very properly classed among the philosophical sciences4 ,the psychologist is not sufficiently sure of his materials to be able to dispense with reflective thought1 in many parts of his field4 ,some day there may come to be a consensus of opinion touching fundamental facts1 and the science may become more independent4 ,a beaten track may be attained2 but that has not yet been done4 #gj4 ,,the ,,double ,,affiliation ,,of ,,psychology4--,in spite of what has been said above1 we must not forget that psychology is a relatively independent science4 ,one may be a useful psychologist without knowing much about philosophy4 ,as in logic it is possible to write a text-book not greatly different in spirit and method from text-books concerned with the sciences not classed as philosophical1 so it is possible to make a useful study of mental phenomena without entering upon metaphysical analyses4 ,in science1 as in common life1 we can use concepts without subjecting them to careful analysis4 ,thus1 our common experience reveals that mind and body are connected4 ,we may1 for a specific purpose1 leave the nature of this connection vague1 and may pay careful attention to the physiological conditions of mental phenomena1 studying in detail the senses and the nervous system4 ,we may1 further1 endeavor to render our knowledge of mental phenomena more full and accurate by experimentation4 ,in doing this we may be compelled to make use of elaborate apparatus4 ,of such mechanical aids to investigation our psychological laboratories are full4 ,it is to such work as this that we owe what is called the physiological and the experimental psychology4 ,one can carry on such investigations without being a metaphysician4 ,but one can scarcely carry them on without having a good knowledge of certain sciences not commonly supposed to be closely related to psychology at all4 ,thus1 one should be trained in chemistry and physics and physiology1 and should have a working knowledge of laboratory methods4 ,moreover1 it is desirable to have a sufficient knowledge of mathematics to enable one to handle experimental data4 ,the consideration of such facts as these sometimes leads men to raise the question3 ,should psychology affiliate with philosophy or with the physical sciences8 ,the issue is an illegitimate one4 ,psychology is one of the philosophical sciences1 and cannot dispense with reflection2 but that is no reason why it should not acknowledge a close relation to certain physical sciences as well4 ,parts of the field can be isolated1 and one may work as one works in the natural sciences generally2 but if one does nothing more1 one's concepts remain unanalyzed1 and1 as we have seen in the previous section1 there is some danger of actual misconception4 #a ,psychology1 ,preface4 ,,chapter ,,xviii ,,ethics ,,and ,,aesthetics #ga4 ,,common ,,sense ,,ethics4--,we may1 if we choose1 study the actions of men merely with a view to ascertaining what they are and describing them accurately4 ,something like this is done by the anthropologist1 who gives us an account of the manners and customs of the various races of mankind2 he tells us what is2 he may not regard it as within his province at all to inform us regarding what ought to be4 ,but men do not merely act2 they judge their actions in the light of some norm or standard1 and they distinguish between them as right and wrong4 ,the systematic study of actions as right and wrong yields us the science of ethics4 ,like psychology1 ethics is a special science4 ,it is concerned with a somewhat limited field of investigation1 and is not to be confounded with other sciences4 ,it has a definite aim distinct from theirs4 ,and1 also like psychology1 ethics is classed as one of the philosophical sciences1 and its relation to philosophy is supposed to be closer than that of such sciences as physics and mathematics4 ,it is fair to ask why this is so4 ,why cannot ethics proceed on the basis of certain assumptions independently1 and leave to some other discipline the whole question of an inquiry into the nature and validity of those assumptions8 ,about half a century ago ,dr4 ,william ,whewell1 one of the most learned of ,english scholars1 wrote a work entitled ,the ,elements of ,morality1 in which he attempted to treat the science of ethics as it is generally admitted that one may treat the science of geometry4 ,the book was rather widely read a generation since1 but we meet with few references to it in our time4 ,morality and the philosophy of morality1 argues the author1 differ in the same manner and in the same degree as geometry and the philosophy of geometry4 ,of these two subjects1 geometry consists of a series of positive and definite propositions1 deduced one from another1 in succession1 by rigorous reasoning1 and all resting upon certain definitions and self-evident axioms4 ,the philosophy of geometry is quite a different subject2 it includes such inquiries as these3 ,whence is the cogency of geometrical proof8 ,what is the evidence of the axioms and definitions8 ,what are the faculties by which we become aware of their truth8 and the like4 ,the two kinds of speculation have been pursued1 for the most part1 by two different classes of persons1--the geometers and the metaphysicians2 for it has been far more the occupation of metaphysicians than of geometers to discuss such questions as ,i have stated1 the nature of geometrical proofs1 geometrical axioms1 the geometrical faculty1 and the like4 ,and if we construct a complete system of geometry1 it will be almost exactly the same1 whatever be the views which we take on these metaphysical questions4 #a ,such a system ,dr4 ,whewell wishes to construct in the field of ethics4 ,his aim is to give us a view of morality in which moral propositions are deduced from axioms1 by successive steps of reasoning1 so far as to form a connected system of moral truth4 ,such a sure and connected knowledge of the duties of man would1 he thinks1 be of the greatest importance4 ,in accordance with this purpose1 ,dr4 ,whewell assumes that humanity1 justice1 truth1 purity1 order1 earnestness1 and moral purpose are fundamental principles of human action2 and he thinks that all who admit as much as this will be able to go on with him in his development of a system of moral rules to govern the life of man4 ,it would hardly be worth while for me to speak at length of a way of treating ethics so little likely to be urged upon the attention of the reader who busies himself with the books which are appearing in our own day1 were it not that we have here an admirable illustration of the attempt to teach ethics as though it were such a science as geometry4 ,the shortcomings of the method become very evident to one who reads the work attentively4 ,thus1 we are forced to ask ourselves1 have we really a collection of ultimate moral principles which are analogous to the axioms of geometry8 ,for example1 to take but a single instance1 ,dr4 ,whewell formulates the ,principle of ,truth as follows3 ,we must conform to the universal understanding among men which the use of language implies2#b and he remarks later2 ,the rules3 ,lie not1 ,perform your promise1 are of universal validity2 and the conceptions of lie and of promise are so simple and distinct that1 in general1 the rules may be directly and easily applied4 #c ,now1 we are struck by the fact that this affirmation of the universal validity of the principle of truth is made in a chapter on ,cases of ,conscience1 in a chapter concerned with what seem to be conflicts between duties2 and this chapter is followed by one which treats of ,cases of ,necessity1 i4e4 cases in which a man is to be regarded as justified in violating common rules when there seems to be urgent reason for so doing4 ,we are told that the moralist cannot say3 ,lie not1 except in great emergencies2 but must say3 ,lie not at all4 ,but we are also told that he must grant that there are cases of necessity in which transgressions of moral rules are excusable2 and this looks very much as if he said3 ,go on and do the thing while ,i close my eyes4 ,this hardly seems to give us a sure and connected knowledge of the duties of man deduced from axiomatic principles4 ,on what authority shall we suspend for the time being this axiomatic principle or that8 ,is there some deeper principle which lends to each of them its authority1 and which may1 for cause1 withdraw it8 ,there is no hint of such in the treatment of ethics which we are considering1 and we seem to have on our hands1 not so much a science1 as a collection of practical rules1 of the scope of which we are more or less in the dark4 ,the interesting thing to notice is that this view of ethics is very closely akin to that adapted unconsciously by the majority of the persons we meet who have not interested themselves much in ethics as a science4 ,by the time that we have reached years of discretion we are all in possession of a considerable number of moral maxims4 ,we consider it wrong to steal1 to lie1 to injure our neighbor4 ,such maxims lie in our minds side by side1 and we do not commonly think of criticising them4 ,but now and then we face a situation in which one maxim seems to urge one course of action and another maxim a contrary one4 ,shall we tell the truth and the whole truth1 when so doing will bring grave misfortune upon an innocent person8 ,and now and then we are brought to the realization that all men do not admit the validity of all our maxims4 ,judgments differ as to what is right and what is wrong4 ,who shall be the arbiter8 ,not infrequently a rough decision is arrived at in the assumption that we have only to interrogate conscience--in the assumption1 in other words1 that we carry a watch which can be counted upon to give the correct time1 even if the timepieces of our neighbors are not to be depended upon4 ,the common sense ethics cannot be regarded as very systematic and consistent1 or as very profound4 ,it is a collection of working rules1 of practical maxims2 and1 although it is impossible to overestimate its value as a guide to life1 its deficiencies1 when it is looked at critically1 become evident1 ,i think1 even to thoughtful persons who are not scientific at all4 ,many writers on ethics have simply tried to turn this collection of working rules into a science1 somewhat as ,dr4 ,whewell has done4 ,this is the peculiar weakness of those who have been called the intuitionalists--though ,i must warn the reader against assuming that this term has but the one meaning1 and that all those to whom it has been applied should be placed in the same class4 ,here it is used to indicate those who maintain that we are directly aware of the validity of certain moral principles1 must accept them as ultimate1 and need only concern ourselves with the problem of their application4 #gb4 ,,ethics ,,and ,,philosophy4--,when ,john ,locke maintained that there are no innate practical principles1 or innate moral maxims1 he pointed in evidence to the enormities practiced without remorse in different ages and by different peoples4 ,the list he draws up is a curious and an interesting one4#d ,in our day it has pretty generally come to be recognized by thoughtful men that a man's judgments as to right and wrong reflect the phase of civilization1 or the lack of it1 which he represents1 and that their significance cannot be understood when we consider them apart from their historic setting4 ,this means that no man's conscience is set up as an ultimate standard1 but that every man's conscience is regarded as furnishing material which the science of ethics must take into account4 ,may we1 broadening the basis upon which we are to build1 and studying the manners1 customs1 and moral judgments of all sorts and conditions of men1 develop an empirical science of ethics which will be independent of philosophy8 ,it does not seem that we can do this4 ,we are concerned with psychological phenomena1 and their nature and significance are by no means beyond dispute4 ,for example1 there is the feeling of moral obligation1 of which ethics has so much to say4 ,what is this feeling1 and what is its authority8 ,is it a thing to be explained8 ,can it impel a man1 let us say1 a bigot1 to do wrong8 ,and what can we mean by credit and discredit1 by responsibility and free choice1 and other concepts of the sort8 ,all this must remain very vague to one who has not submitted his ethical concepts to reflective analysis of the sort that we have a right to call philosophical4 ,furthermore1 it does not seem possible to decide what a man should or should not do1 without taking into consideration the circumstances in which he is placed4 ,the same act may be regarded as benevolent or the reverse according to its context4 ,if we will but grant the validity of the premises from which the medieval churchman reasoned1 we may well ask whether1 in laying hands violently upon those who dared to form independent judgments in matters of religion1 he was not conscientiously doing his best for his fellow-man4 ,he tried by all means to save some1 and to what he regarded as a most dangerous malady he applied a drastic remedy4 ,by what standard shall we judge him8 ,there can be no doubt that our doctrine of the whole duty of man must be conditioned by our view of the nature of the world in which man lives and of man's place in the world4 ,has ethics nothing to do with religion8 ,if we do not believe in ,god1 and if we think that man's life ends with the death of the body1 it is quite possible that we shall set for him an ethical standard which we should have to modify if we adopted other beliefs4 ,the relation of ethics to religion is a problem that the student of ethics can scarcely set aside4 ,it seems1 then1 that the study of ethics necessarily carries us back to world problems which cannot be approached except by the path of philosophical reflection4 ,we shall see in ,chapter ,,xx that the theistic problem certainly belongs to this class4 ,it is worthy of our consideration that the vast majority of writers on ethics have felt strongly that their science runs out into metaphysics4 ,we can scarcely afford to treat their testimony lightly4 ,certainly it is not possible for one who has no knowledge of philosophy to understand the significance of the ethical systems which have appeared in the past4 ,the history of ethics may be looked upon as a part of the history of philosophy4 ,only on the basis of some general view as to nature and man have men decided what man ought to do4 ,as we have seen above1 this appears sufficiently reasonable4 #gc4 ,,aesthetics4--,of aesthetics1 or the science of the beautiful1 ,i shall say little4 ,there is somewhat the same reason for including it among the philosophical sciences that there is for including ethics4 ,those who have paid little attention to science or to philosophy are apt to dogmatize about what is and what is not beautiful just as they dogmatize about what is and what is not right4 ,they say unhesitatingly2 ,this object is beautiful1 and that one is ugly4 ,it is as if they said3 ,this one is round1 and that one square4 ,often it quite escapes their attention that what they now regard as beautiful struck them as unattractive a short time before2 and will1 perhaps1 when the ceaseless change of the fashions has driven it out of vogue1 seem strange and unattractive once more4 ,nor do they reflect upon the fact that others1 who seem to have as good a right to an opinion as they1 do not agree with them in their judgments2 nor upon the further fact that the standard of beauty is a thing that has varied from age to age1 differs widely in different countries1 and presents minor variations in different classes even in the same community4 ,the dogmatic utterances of those who are keenly susceptible to the aesthetic aspects of things but are not given to reflection stand in striking contrast to the epitome of the popular wisdom expressed in the skeptical adage that there is no disputing about tastes4 ,we cannot interpret this adage broadly and take it literally1 for then we should have to admit that men's judgments as to the beautiful cannot constitute the material of a science at all1 and that there can be no such thing as progress in the fine arts4 ,the notion of progress implies a standard1 and an approximation to an ideal4 ,few would dare to deny that there has been progress in such arts as painting and music2 and when one has admitted so much as this1 one has virtually admitted that a science of aesthetics is1 at least1 possible4 ,the science studies the facts of the aesthetic life as ethics studies the facts of the moral life4 ,it can take no man's taste as furnishing a standard3 it must take every man's taste as a fact of significance4 ,it is driven to reflective analysis--to such questions as1 what is beauty8 and what is meant by aesthetic progress8 ,it deals with elusive psychological facts the significance of which is not easily grasped4 ,it is a philosophical science1 and is by no means in a position to follow a beaten path1 dispensing with a reflective analysis of its materials4 #a ,preface4 #b section #bfi4 #c section #cgf4 #d ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,i1 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,,chapter ,,xix ,,metaphysics #gd4 ,,what ,,is ,,metaphysics8--,the reader has probably already remarked that in some of the preceding chapters the adjectives metaphysical and philosophical have been used as if they were interchangeable1 in certain connections1 at least4 ,this is justified by common usage2 and in the present chapter ,i shall be expected by no one1 ,i think1 to prove that metaphysics is a philosophical discipline4 ,my task will rather be to show how far the words metaphysics and philosophy have a different meaning4 ,in ,chapters ,,iii to ,,xi1 ,i have given a general view of the problems which present themselves to reflective thought1 and ,i have indicated that they are not problems which can conveniently be distributed among the several special sciences4 ,is there an external world8 ,what is it8 ,what are space and time8 ,what is the mind8 ,how are mind and body related8 ,how do we know that there are other minds than ours8 etc4 ,these have been presented as philosophical problems2 and when we turn back to the history of speculative thought we find that they are just the problems with which the men whom we agree to call philosophers have chiefly occupied themselves4 ,but when we turn to our treatises on metaphysics1 we also find that these are the problems there discussed4 ,such treatises differ much among themselves1 and the problems are not presented in the same form or in the same order2 but one who can look beneath the surface will find that the authors are busied with much the same thing--with some or all of the problems above mentioned4 ,how1 then1 does metaphysics differ from philosophy8 ,the difference becomes clear to us when we realize that the word philosophy has a broader and looser signification1 and that metaphysics is1 so to speak1 the core1 the citadel1 of philosophy4 ,we have seen 7,chapter ,,ii7 that the world and the mind1 as they seem to be presented in the experience of the plain man1 do not stand forth with such clearness and distinctness that he is able to answer intelligently the questions we wish to ask him regarding their nature4 ,it is not merely that his information is limited2 it is vague and indefinite as well4 ,and we have seen1 too1 that1 however the special sciences may increase and systematize his information1 they do not clear away such vagueness4 ,the man still uses such concepts as inner and outer1 reality1 the mind1 space1 and time1 with no very definite notion of what they mean4 ,now1 the attempt to clear away this vagueness by the systematic analysis of such concepts--in other words1 the attempt to make a thorough analysis of our experience--is metaphysics4 ,the metaphysician strives to limit his task as well as he may1 and to avoid unnecessary excursions into the fields occupied by the special sciences1 even those which lie nearest to his own1 such as psychology and ethics4 ,there is a sense in which he may be said to be working in the field of a special science1 though he is using as the material for his investigations concepts which are employed in many sciences2 but it is clear that his discipline is not a special science in the same sense in which geometry and physics are special sciences4 ,nevertheless1 the special sciences stand1 as we have already seen in the case of several of them1 very near to his own4 ,if he broadens his view1 and deliberately determines to take a survey of the field of human knowledge as illuminated by the analyses that he has made1 he becomes something more than a metaphysician2 he becomes a philosopher4 ,this does not in the least mean that he becomes a storehouse of miscellaneous information1 and an authority on all the sciences4 ,sometimes the philosophers have attempted to describe the world of matter and of mind as though they possessed some mysterious power of knowing things that absolved them from the duty of traveling the weary road of observation and experiment that has ended in the sciences as we have them4 ,when they have done this1 they have mistaken the significance of their calling4 ,a philosopher has no more right than another man to create information out of nothing4 ,but it is possible1 even for one who is not acquainted with the whole body of facts presented in a science1 to take careful note of the assumptions upon which that science rests1 to analyze the concepts of which it makes use1 to mark the methods which it employs1 and to gain a fair idea of its scope and of its relation to other sciences4 ,such a reflection upon our scientific knowledge is philosophical reflection1 and it may result in a classification of the sciences1 and in a general view of human knowledge as a whole4 ,such a view may be illuminating in the extreme2 it can only be harmful when its significance is misunderstood4 ,but1 it may be argued1 why may not the man of science do all this for himself8 ,why should he leave it to the philosopher1 who is presumably less intimately acquainted with the sciences than he is8 ,to this ,i answer3 ,the work should1 of course1 be done by the man who will do it best4 ,all our subdivision of labor should be dictated by convenience4 ,but ,i add1 that experience has shown that the workers in the special sciences have not as a rule been very successful when they have tried to philosophize4 ,science is an imperious mistress2 she demands one's utmost efforts2 and when a man turns to philosophical reflection merely by the way1 and in the scraps of time at his disposal after the day's work is done1 his philosophical work is apt to be rather superficial4 ,moreover1 it does not follow that1 because a man is a good mathematician or chemist or physicist1 he is gifted with the power of reflective analysis4 ,then1 too1 such men are apt to be imperfectly acquainted with what has been done in the past2 and those who are familiar with the history of philosophy often have occasion to remark that what is laid before them1 in ignorance of the fact that it is neither new nor original1 is a doctrine which has already made its appearance in many forms and has been discussed at prodigious length in the centuries gone by4 ,in certain sciences it seems possible to ignore the past1 to a great extent1 at least4 ,what is worth keeping has been kept1 and there is a solid foundation on which to build for the future4 ,but with reflective thought it is not so4 ,there is no accepted body of doctrine which we have the right to regard as unassailable4 ,we should take it as a safe maxim that the reflections of men long dead may be profounder and more worthy of our study than those urged upon our attention by the men of our day4 ,and this leads me to make a remark upon the titles given to works on metaphysics4 ,it seems somewhat misleading to label them3 ,outlines of ,metaphysics or ,elements of ,metaphysics4 ,such titles suggest that we are dealing with a body of doctrine which has met with general acceptance1 and may be compared with that found in handbooks on the special sciences4 ,but we should realize that1 when we are concerned with the profounder investigations into the nature of our experience1 we tread upon uncertain ground and many differences of opinion obtain4 ,we should1 if possible1 avoid a false semblance of authority4 #ge4 ,,epistemology4--,we hear a great deal at the present day of ,epistemology1 or the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,i have not classed it as a distinct philosophical science1 for reasons which will appear below4 ,we have seen in ,chapter ,,xvi that it is possible to treat of logic in a simple way without growing very metaphysical2 but we have also seen that when we go deeply into questions touching the nature of evidence and what is meant by truth and falsity1 we are carried back to philosophical reflection at once4 ,we may1 for convenience1 group together these deeper questions regarding the nature of knowledge and its scope1 and call the subject of our study ,epistemology4 ,but it should be remarked1 in the first place1 that1 when we work in this field1 we are exercising a reflective analysis of precisely the type employed in making the metaphysical analyses contained in the earlier chapters of this book4 ,we are treating our experience as it is not treated in common thought and in science4 ,and it should be remarked1 in the second place1 that the investigation of our knowledge inevitably runs together with an investigation into the nature of things known1 of the mind and the world4 ,suppose that ,i give the titles of the chapters in ,part ,,iii of ,mr4 ,hobhouse's able work on ,the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,they are as follows3 ,validity2 the ,validity of ,knowledge2 the ,conception of ,external ,reality2 ,substance2 the ,conception of ,self2 ,reality as a ,system2 ,knowledge and ,reality2 the ,grounds of ,knowledge and ,belief4 ,are not these topics metaphysical8 ,let us ask ourselves how it would affect our views of the validity and of the limits of our knowledge1 if we were converted to the metaphysical doctrines of ,john ,locke1 or of ,bishop ,berkeley1 or of ,david ,hume1 or of ,thomas ,reid1 or of ,immanuel ,kant4 ,we may1 then1 regard epistemology as a part of logic--the metaphysical part--or as a part of metaphysics2 it does not much matter which we call it1 since we mean the same thing4 ,but its relation to metaphysics is such that it does not seem worth while to call it a separate discipline4 ,before leaving this subject there is one more point upon which ,i should touch1 if only to obviate a possible misunderstanding4 ,we find in ,professor ,cornelius's clear little book1 ,an ,introduction to ,philosophy 7,leipzig1 #aijc2 it has unhappily not yet been translated into ,english71 that metaphysics is repudiated altogether1 and epistemology is set in its place4 ,but this rejection of metaphysics does not necessarily imply the denial of the value of such an analysis of our experience as ,i have in this work called metaphysical4 ,metaphysics is taken to mean1 not an analysis of experience1 but a groping behind the veil of phenomena for some reality not given in experience4 ,in other words1 what ,professor ,cornelius condemns is what many of the rest of us also condemn under another name4 ,what he calls metaphysics1 we call bad metaphysics2 and what he calls epistemology1 we call metaphysics4 ,the dispute is really a dispute touching the proper name to apply to reflective analysis of a certain kind4 ,as it is the fashion in certain quarters to abuse metaphysics1 ,i set the reader on his guard4 ,some kinds of metaphysics certainly ought to be repudiated under whatever name they may be presented to us4 ,,chapter ,,xx ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion #gf4 ,,religion ,,and ,,reflection4--,a man may be through and through ethical in his thought and feeling1 and yet know nothing of the science of ethics4 ,he may be possessed of the finest aesthetic taste1 and yet may know nothing of the science of aesthetics4 ,it is one thing to be good1 and another to know clearly what goodness means2 it is one thing to love the beautiful1 and another to know how to define it4 ,just so a man may be thoroughly religious1 and may1 nevertheless1 have reflected very little upon his religious belief and the foundations upon which it rests4 ,this does not mean that his belief is without foundation4 ,it may have a firm basis or it may not4 ,but whatever the case may be1 he is not in a position to say much about it4 ,he feels that he is right1 but he cannot prove it4 ,the man is1 ,i think we must admit1 rather blind as to the full significance of his position1 and he is1 in consequence1 rather helpless4 ,such a man is menaced by certain dangers4 ,we have seen in the chapter on ethics that men are by no means at one in their judgments as to the rightness or wrongness of given actions4 ,and it requires a very little reflection to teach us that men are not at one in their religious notions4 ,god and ,his nature1 the relation of ,god to man1 what the religious life should be1 these things are the subject of much dispute2 and some men hold opinions regarded by others as not merely erroneous but highly pernicious in their influence4 ,shall a man simply assume that the opinions which he happens to hold are correct1 and that all who differ with him are in error8 ,he has not framed his opinions quite independently for himself4 ,we are all influenced by what we have inherited from the past1 and what we inherit may be partly erroneous1 even if we be right in the main4 ,moreover1 we are all liable to prejudices1 and he who has no means of distinguishing such from sober truths may admit into his creed many errors4 ,the lesson of history is very instructive upon this point4 ,the fact is that a man's religious notions reflect the position which he occupies in the development of civilization very much as do his ethical notions4 ,again4 ,even supposing that a man has enlightened notions and is living a religious life that the most instructed must approve2 if he has never reflected1 and has never tried to make clear to himself just what he really does believe and upon what grounds he believes it1 how will it be with him when his position is attacked by another8 ,men are1 as ,i have said1 not at one in these matters1 and there are few or none of the doctrines put forward as religions that have not been attacked again and again4 ,now1 those who depend only upon an instinctive feeling may be placed in the very painful position of seeing no answer to the objections brought against them4 ,what is said may seem plausible2 it may even seem true1 and is it right for a man to oppose what appears to be the truth8 ,one may be shocked and pained1 and may feel that he who makes the assault cannot be right1 and yet may be forced to admit that a relentless logic1 or what presents itself as such1 has every appearance of establishing the repellent truth that robs one of one's dearest possession4 ,the situation is an unendurable one2 it is that of the man who guards a treasure and recognizes that there is no lock on the door4 ,surely1 if there is error mixed with truth in our religious beliefs1 it is desirable that we should have some way of distinguishing between the truth and the error4 ,and if our beliefs really have a foundation1 it is desirable that we should know what that foundation is1 and should not be at the mercy of every passer-by who takes the notion to throw a stone at us4 ,but these desirable ends1 it seems clear1 cannot be attained without reflection4 #gg4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion4--,the reflection that busies itself with these things results in what is called the philosophy of religion4 ,to show that the name is an appropriate one and that we are concerned with a philosophical discipline1 ,i shall take up for a moment the idea of ,god1 which most men will admit has a very important place in our conception of religion4 ,does ,god exist8 ,we may feel very sure that ,he does1 and yet be forced to admit that the evidence of ,his existence is not so clear and undeniable as to compel the assent of every one4 ,we do not try to prove the existence of the men we meet and who talk to us4 ,no one thinks of denying their existence2 it is taken for granted4 ,even the metaphysician1 when he takes up and discusses the question whether we can prove the existence of any mind beyond our own1 does not seriously doubt whether there are other minds or not4 ,it is not so much what we know1 as how we know it1 that interests him4 ,but with the existence of ,god it is different4 ,that men do not think that an examination of the evidence can be dispensed with is evident from the books that are written and lectures that are delivered year after year4 ,there seem to be honest differences of opinion1 and we feel compelled to offer men proofs--to show that belief is reasonable4 ,how shall we determine whether this world in which we live is such a world that we may take it as a revelation of ,god8 ,and of what sort of a ,being are we speaking when we use the word ,god8 ,the question is not an idle one1 for men's conceptions have differed widely4 ,there is the savage1 with a conception that strikes the modern civilized man as altogether inadequate2 there is the thoughtful man of our day1 who has inherited the reflections of those who have lived in the ages gone by4 ,and there is the philosopher1 or1 perhaps1 ,i should rather say1 there are the philosophers4 ,have they not conceived of ,god as a group of abstract notions1 or as a something that may best be described as the ,unknowable1 or as the ,substance which is the identity of thought and extension1 or as the external world itself8 ,all have not sinned in this way1 but some have1 and they are not men whom we can ignore4 ,if we turn from all such notions and1 in harmony with the faith of the great body of religious men in the ages past1 some of whom were philosophers but most of whom were not1 cling close to the notion that ,god is a mind or spirit1 and must be conceived according to the analogy1 at least1 of the human mind1 the mind we most directly know--if we do this1 we are still confronted by problems to which the thoughtful man cannot refuse attention4 ,what do we mean by a mind8 ,this is a question to which one can scarcely give an intelligent answer unless one has exercised one's faculty of philosophic reflection4 ,and upon what sort of evidence does one depend in establishing the existence of minds other than one's own8 ,this has been discussed at length in ,chapter ,x1 and the problem is certainly a metaphysical one4 ,and if we believe that the ,divine ,mind is not subject to the limitations which confine the human1 how shall we conceive it8 ,the question is an important one4 ,some of the philosophers and theologians who have tried to free the ,divine ,mind from such limitations have taken away every positive mark by which we recognize a mind to be such1 and have left us a naked ,absolute which is no better than a labeled vacuum4 ,moreover1 we cannot refuse to consider the question of ,god's relation to the world4 ,this seems to lead back to the broader question3 ,how are we to conceive of any mind as related to the world8 ,what is the relation between mind and matter8 ,if any subject of inquiry may properly be called metaphysical1 surely this may be4 ,we see1 then1 that there is little wonder that the thoughtful consideration of the facts and doctrines of religion has taken its place among the philosophical sciences4 ,aesthetics has been called applied psychology2 and ,i think it is scarcely too much to say that we are here concerned with applied metaphysics1 with the attempt to obtain a clear understanding of the significance of the facts of religion in the light of those ultimate analyses which reveal to us the real nature of the world of matter and of minds4 ,,chapter ,,xxi ,,philosophy ,,and ,,the ,,other ,,sciences #gh4 ,,the ,,philosophical ,,and ,,non-,,philosophical ,,sciences4--,we have seen in the preceding chapters that certain of the sciences can scarcely be cultivated successfully in complete separation from philosophy4 ,it has also been indicated in various places that the relation of other sciences to philosophy is not so close4 ,thus1 the sciences of arithmetic1 algebra1 and geometry may be successfully prosecuted by a man who has reflected little upon the nature of numbers and who has never asked himself seriously what he means by space4 ,the assumptions which he is justified in making1 and the kind of operations which he has the right to perform1 do not seem1 as a rule1 to be in doubt4 ,so it is also in the sciences of chemistry and physics4 ,there is nothing to prevent the chemist or the physicist from being a philosopher1 but he is not compelled to be one4 ,he may push forward the investigations proper to his profession regardless of the type of philosophy which it pleases him to adopt4 ,whether he be a realist or an idealist1 a dualist or a monist1 he should1 as chemist or physicist1 treat the same sort of facts in the same sort of a way4 ,his path appears to be laid out for him1 and he can do work the value of which is undisputed by traveling quietly along it1 and without stopping to consider consciously what kind of a path it is4 ,there are many who work in this way1 and they succeed in making important contributions to human knowledge4 ,such sciences as these ,i call the non-philosophical sciences to distinguish them from the group of sciences ,i have been discussing at length4 ,what marks them out is1 that the facts with which the investigator has to deal are known by him with sufficient clearness to leave him usually in little doubt as to the use which he can make of them4 ,his knowledge is clear enough for the purpose in hand1 and his work is justified by its results4 ,what is the relation of such sciences as these to philosophy8 #gi4 ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,scientific ,,principles ,,and ,,methods4--,it is one thing to have the instinct of the investigator and to be able to feel one's way along the road that leads to new knowledge of a given kind1 and it is another thing to have the reflective turn of mind that makes one clearly conscious of just what one has been doing and how one has been doing it4 ,men reasoned before there was a science of logic1 and the sciences made their appearance before what may be called the logic of the sciences had its birth4 ,it may be truly asserted1 writes ,professor ,jevons1#a that the rapid progress of the physical sciences during the last three centuries has not been accompanied by a corresponding advance in the theory of reasoning4 ,physicists speak familiarly of ,scientific ,method1 but they could not readily describe what they mean by that expression4 ,profoundly engaged in the study of particular classes of natural phenomena1 they are usually too much engrossed in the immense and ever accumulating details of their special sciences to generalize upon the methods of reasoning which they unconsciously employ4 ,yet few will deny that these methods of reasoning ought to be studied1 especially by those who endeavor to introduce scientific order into less successful and methodical branches of knowledge4 ,professor ,jevons suggests that it is lack of time and attention that prevents the scientific investigator from attaining to a clear conception of what is meant by scientific method4 ,this has something to do with it1 but ,i think we may also maintain that the work of the investigator and that of the critic are somewhat different in kind1 and require somewhat different powers of mind4 ,we find a parallel to this elsewhere4 ,both in literature and in art men may be in the best sense productive1 and yet may be poor critics4 ,we are often wofully disappointed when we attend a lecture on poetry by a poet1 or one on painting by an artist4 ,it may be said3 ,if what is maintained above regarding the possibility of prosecuting scientific researches without having recourse to reflective thought is true1 why should the man of science care whether the principles and methods of the non-philosophical sciences are investigated or are merely taken for granted8 ,i answer3 ,it should be observed that the statements made in the last section were somewhat guarded4 ,i have used the expressions as a rule and usually4 ,i have spoken thus because one can work in the way described1 without danger of error1 only where a beaten track has been attained and is followed4 ,in ,chapter ,,xvi it was pointed out that even in the mathematical sciences one may be forced to reflect upon the significance of one's symbols4 ,as ,i write this1 a pamphlet comes to hand which is concerned to prove that every cause is potentially capable of producing several effects1 and proves it by claiming that the square root of four 7square root symbol#d7 is a cause which may have as effect either two 7#b7 or minus two 7-#b74 ,is this mathematical reasoning8 ,are mathematical relations ever those of cause and effect8 ,and may one on the basis of such reasonings claim that in nature the relation of cause and effect is not a fixed and invariable one8 ,even where there is a beaten track1 there is some danger that men may wander from it4 ,and on the confines of our knowledge there are fields in which the accepted road is yet to be established4 ,science makes constant use of hypotheses as an aid to investigation4 ,what hypotheses may one frame1 and what are inadmissible8 ,how important an investigation of this question may be to the worker in certain branches of science will be clear to one who will read with attention ,professor ,poincar's brilliant little work on ,science and ,hypothesis4 #b ,there is no field in art1 literature1 or science in which the work of the critic is wholly superfluous4 ,there are periods in the growth of science1 writes ,professor ,pearson in his deservedly popular work1 ,the ,grammar of ,science1 #c when it is well to turn our attention from its imposing superstructure and to examine carefully its foundations4 ,the present book is primarily intended as a criticism of the fundamental concepts of modern science1 and as such finds its justification in the motto placed upon its title-page4 ,the motto in question is a quotation from the ,french philosopher ,cousin3 ,criticism is the life of science4 ,we have seen in ,chapter ,,xvi that a work on logic may be a comparatively simple thing4 ,it may describe the ways in which men reason when they reason correctly1 and may not go deep into metaphysical questions4 ,on the other hand1 it may be deeply metaphysical4 ,when we approach the part of logic which deals with the principles and methods of the sciences1 this difference is forced upon our attention4 ,one may set forth the assumptions upon which a science rests1 and may describe the methods of investigation employed1 without going much below the plane of common thought4 ,as a type of such works ,i may mention the useful treatise by ,professor ,jevons cited earlier in this chapter4 ,on the other hand1 our investigations may be more profound1 and we may scrutinize the very foundations upon which a science rests4 ,both the other works referred to illustrate this method of procedure4 ,for example1 in ,the ,grammar of ,science1 we find our author discussing1 under the title ,the ,facts of ,science1 such problems as the following3 the ,reality of ,things2 ,sense-impressions and ,consciousness2 the ,nature of ,thought2 the ,external ,universe2 ,sensations as the ,ultimate ,source of the ,materials of ,knowledge2 and the ,futility of ,things-in-themselves4 ,the philosophical character of such discussions does not need to be pointed out at length4 #a ,the ,principles ,of ,science1 ,london1 #ahgd1 ,preface4 #b ,english translation1 ,new ,york1 #aije4 #c ,second edition1 ,london1 #aijj4 ,,vi4 ,,on ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,philosophy ,,chapter ,,xxii ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,the ,,study ,,of ,,philosophy #hj4 ,,the ,,question ,,of ,,practical ,,utility4--,why should men study philosophy8 ,the question is a natural one1 for man is a rational being1 and when the worth of a thing is not at once evident to him1 he usually calls for proof of its worth4 ,our professional schools1 with the exception of schools of theology1 usually pay little attention to philosophical studies2 but such studies occupy a strong position in our colleges1 and a vast number of persons not students in the technical sense think it worth while to occupy themselves with them more or less4 ,wherever liberal studies are prosecuted they have their place1 and it is an honored place4 ,is this as it should be8 ,before we ask whether any given study is of practical value1 it is wise to determine what the word practical shall be taken to mean4 ,shall we say that we may call practical only such learning as can be turned to direct account in earning money later8 ,if we restrict the meaning of the word in this way1 we seem to strike a blow at liberal studies in general4 ,thus1 no one would think of maintaining that the study of mathematics is not of practical value--sometimes and to some persons4 ,the physicist and the engineer need to know a good deal about mathematics4 ,but how is it with the merchant1 the lawyer1 the clergyman1 the physician8 ,how much of their algebra1 geometry1 and trigonometry do these remember after they have become absorbed in the practice of their several callings1 and how often do they find it necessary to use anything beyond certain simple rules of arithmetic8 ,sometimes we are tempted to condemn the study of the classics as unpractical1 and to turn instead to the modern languages and to the physical sciences4 ,now1 it is1 of course1 a fair question to ask what should and what should not be regarded as forming part of a liberal education1 and ,i shall make no effort to decide the question here4 ,but it should be borne well in mind that one cannot decide it by determining what studies are practical in the sense of the word under discussion4 ,if we keep strictly to this sense1 the modern languages are to the majority of ,americans of little more practical value than are the ,latin and ,greek4 ,we scarcely need them except when we travel abroad1 and when we do that we find that the concierge and the waiter use ,english with surprising fluency4 ,as for the sciences1 those who expect to earn a living through a knowledge of them1 seek1 as a rule1 that knowledge in a technical or professional school1 and the rest of us can enjoy the fruit of their labors without sharing them4 ,it is a popular fallacy that because certain studies have a practical value to the world at large1 they must necessarily have a practical value to every one1 and can be recommended to the individual on that account4 ,it is worth while to sit down quietly and ask oneself how many of the bits of information acquired during the course of a liberal education are directly used in the carrying on of a given business or in the practice of a given profession4 ,nevertheless1 we all believe that liberal education is a good thing for the individual and for the race4 ,one must not too much restrict the meaning of the word practical4 ,a civilized state composed of men who know nothing save what has a direct bearing upon their especial work in life is an absurdity2 it cannot exist4 ,there must be a good deal of general enlightenment and there must be a considerable number of individuals who have enjoyed a high measure of enlightenment4 ,this becomes clear if we consider the part played in the life of the state by the humblest tradesman4 ,if he is to be successful1 he must be able to read1 write1 and keep his accounts1 and make1 let us say1 shoes4 ,but when we have said this1 we have summed him up as a workman1 but not as a man1 and he is also a man4 ,he may marry1 and make a good or a bad husband1 and a good or a bad father4 ,he stands in relations to his neighborhood1 to the school1 and to the church2 and he is not without his influence4 ,he may be temperate or intemperate1 frugal or extravagant1 law-abiding or the reverse4 ,he has his share1 and no small share1 in the government of his city and of his state4 ,his influence is indeed far-reaching1 and that it may be an influence for good1 he is in need of all the intellectual and moral enlightenment that we can give him4 ,it is of the utmost practical utility to the state that he should know a vast number of things which have no direct bearing upon the making and mending of shoes4 ,and if this is true in the case of the tradesman1 it is scarcely necessary to point out that the physician1 the lawyer1 the clergyman1 and the whole army of those whom we regard as the leaders of men and the molders of public opinion have spheres of non-professional activity of great importance to the state4 ,they cannot be mere specialists if they would4 ,they must influence society for good or ill2 and if they are ignorant and unenlightened1 their influence cannot be good4 ,when we consider the life of man in a broad way1 we see how essential it is that many men should be brought to have a share in what has been gained by the long travail of the centuries past4 ,it will not do to ask at every step whether they can put to direct professional use every bit of information gained4 ,literature and science1 sweetness and light1 beauty and truth1 these are the heritage of the modern world2 and unless these permeate its very being1 society must undergo degeneration4 ,it is this conviction that has led to the high appreciation accorded by intelligent men to courses of liberal study1 and among such courses those which we have recognized as philosophical must take their place4 #ha4 ,,why ,,philosophical ,,studies ,,are ,,useful4--,but let us ask a little more specifically what is to be gained by pursuing distinctively philosophical studies4 ,why should those who go to college1 or intelligent persons who cannot go to college1 care to interest themselves in logic and ethics1 psychology and metaphysics8 ,are not these studies rather dry1 in the first place1 and rather profitless1 in the second8 ,as to the first point1 ,i should stoutly maintain that if they are dry1 it is somebody's fault4 ,the most sensational of novels would be dry if couched in the language which some philosophers have seen fit to use in expressing their thoughts4 ,he who defines existence as the still and simple precipitate of the oscillation between beginning to be and ceasing to be has done his best to alienate our affections from the subject of his predilection4 ,but it is not in the least necessary to talk in this way about matters philosophical4 ,he who is not a slave to tradition can use plain and simple language4 ,to be sure1 there are some subjects1 especially in the field of metaphysics1 into which the student cannot expect to see very deeply at the outset of his studies4 ,men do not expect to understand the more difficult problems of mathematics without making a good deal of preparation2 but1 unhappily1 they sometimes expect to have the profoundest problems of metaphysics made luminous to them in one or two popular lectures4 ,philosophical studies are not dry1 when men are properly taught1 and are in a position to understand what is said4 ,they deal with the most fascinating of problems4 ,it is only necessary to pierce through the husk of words which conceals the thoughts of the philosopher1 and we shall find the kernel palatable1 indeed4 ,nor are such studies profitless1 to take up our second point4 ,let us see what we may gain from them4 ,let us begin with logic--the traditional logic commonly taught to beginners4 ,is it worth while to study this8 ,surely it is4 ,no one who has not tried to introduce the average under-graduate to logic can realize how blindly he uses his reasoning powers1 how unconscious he is of the full meaning of the sentences he employs1 how easily he may be entrapped by fallacious reasonings where he is not set on his guard by some preposterous conclusion touching matters with which he is familiar4 ,and he is not merely unconscious of the lapses in his processes of reasoning1 and of his imperfect comprehension of the significance of his statements2 he is unconscious also of the mass of inherited and acquired prejudices1 often quite indefensible1 which he unquestioningly employs as premises4 ,he fairly represents the larger world beyond the walls of the college4 ,it is a world in which prejudices are assumed as premises1 and loose reasonings pass current and are unchallenged until they beget some unpalatable conclusion4 ,it is a world in which men take little pains to think carefully and accurately unless they are dealing with something touching which it is practically inconvenient to make a mistake4 ,he who studies logic in the proper way is not filling his mind with useless facts2 he is simply turning the light upon his own thinking mind1 and realizing more clearly what he has always done rather blindly and blunderingly4 ,he may completely forget the ,barbara1 ,celarent1 ,darii1 ,ferioque prioris1 and he may be quite unable to give an account of the moods and figures of the syllogism2 but he cannot lose the critical habit if he once has acquired it1 and he cannot but be on his guard against himself as well as against others4 ,there is a keen pleasure in gaining such insight4 ,it gives a feeling of freedom and power1 and rids one of that horrid sense that1 although this or that bit of reasoning is certainly bad1 it is impossible to tell just what is the matter with it4 ,and as for its practical utility1 if it is desirable to get rid of prejudice and confusion1 and to possess a clear and reasonable mind1 then anything that makes for this must be of value4 ,of the desirability that all who can afford the luxury of a liberal education should do some serious reading in ethics1 it seems hardly necessary to speak4 ,the deficiencies of the ethics of the unreflective have already been touched upon in ,chapter ,,xviii4 ,but ,i cannot forbear dwelling upon it again4 ,what thoughtful man is not struck with the variety of ethical standards which obtain in the same community8 ,the clergyman who has a strong sense of responsibility for the welfare of his flock is sometimes accused of not sufficiently realizing the importance of a frank expression of the whole truth about things2 the man of science1 whose duty it seems to be to peer into the mysteries of the universe1 and to tell what he sees or what he guesses1 is accused of an indifference to the effect which his utterances may have upon the less enlightened who hear him speak2 many criticise the lawyer for a devotion to the interests of his client which is at times in doubtful harmony with the interests of justice in the larger sense2 in the business world commercial integrity is exalted1 and lapses from the ethical code which do not assail this cardinal virtue are not always regarded with equal seriousness4 ,it is as though men elected to worship at the shrine of a particular saint1 and were inclined to overlook the claims of others4 ,for all this there is1 of course1 a reason2 such things are never to be looked upon as mere accident4 ,but this does not mean that these more or less conflicting standards are all to be accepted as satisfactory and as ultimate4 ,it is inevitable that those who study ethics seriously1 who really reflect upon ethical problems1 should sometimes criticise the judgments of their fellow-men rather unfavorably4 ,of such independent criticism many persons have a strong distrust4 ,i am reminded here of an eminent mathematician who maintained that the study of ethics has a tendency to distort the student's judgments as to what is right and what is wrong4 ,he had observed that there is apt to be some divergence of opinion between those who think seriously upon morals and those who do not1 and he gave the preference to the unthinking majority4 ,now1 there is undoubtedly danger that the independent thinker may be betrayed into eccentricities of opinion which are unjustifiable and are even dangerous4 ,but it seems a strange doctrine that it is1 on the whole1 safer not to think1 but rather to drift on the stream of public opinion4 ,in other fields we are not inclined to believe that the ignorant man1 who has given no especial attention to a subject1 is the one likely to be right4 ,why should it be so in morals8 ,that the youth who goes to college to seek a liberal education has a need of ethical studies becomes very plain when we come to a realization of the curious limitations of his ethical training as picked up from his previous experience of the world4 ,he has some very definite notions as to right and wrong4 ,he is as ready to maintain the desirability of benevolence1 justice1 and veracity1 as was ,bishop ,butler1 who wrote the famous ,analogy 2 although1 to be sure1 he is most inarticulate when called upon to explain what constitutes benevolence1 justice1 or veracity4 ,but the strangest thing is1 that he seems to place some of the most important decisions of his whole life quite outside the realm of right and wrong4 ,he may admit that a man should not undertake to be a clergyman1 unless he possesses certain qualifications of mind and character which evidently qualify him for that profession4 ,but he does not see why he has not the right to become a wearisome professor or an incompetent physician1 if he chooses to enter upon such a career4 ,is a man not free to take up what profession he pleases8 ,he must take the risk1 of course2 but if he fails1 he fails4 ,and when he is asked to consider from the point of view of ethics the question of marriage and its responsibilities1 he is at first inclined to consider the whole subject as rather a matter for jest4 ,has a man not the right to marry or remain single exactly as he pleases8 ,and is he not free to marry any one whom he can persuade to accept him8 ,to be sure1 he should be a little careful about marrying quite out of his class1 and he should not be hopelessly careless about money matters4 ,thus1 a decision1 which may affect his whole life as much as any other that he can be called upon to make1 which may practically make it or mar it1 is treated as though it were not a matter of grave concern1 but a private affair1 entailing no serious consequences to any one and calling for no reflection4 ,i wish it could be said that the world outside of the college regarded these matters in another light4 ,but the student faithfully represents the opinions current in the community from which he comes4 ,and he represents1 unhappily1 the teachings of the stage and of the world of current fiction4 ,the influence of these is too often on the side of inconsiderate passion1 which stirs our sympathy and which lends itself to dramatic effect4 ,with the writers of romance the ethical philosophers have an ancient quarrel4 ,it may be said3 ,but the world gets along very well as it is1 and without brooding too much upon ethical problems4 ,to this we may answer3 ,does the world get along so very well1 after all8 ,are there no evils that foresight and some firmness of character might have obviated8 ,and when we concern ourselves with the educated classes1 at least1 the weight of whose influence is enormous1 is it too much to maintain that they should do some reading and thinking in the field of ethics8 should strive to attain to clear vision and correct judgment on the whole subject of man's duties8 ,just at the present time1 when psychological studies have so great a vogue1 one scarcely feels compelled to make any sort of an apology for them4 ,it is assumed on all hands that it is desirable to study psychology1 and courses of lectures are multiplied in all quarters4 ,probably some of this interest has its root in the fallacy touched upon earlier in this chapter4 ,the science of psychology has revolutionized educational theory4 ,when those of us who have arrived at middle life look back and survey the tedious and toilsome path along which we were unwillingly driven in our schoolboy days1 and then see how smooth and pleasant it has been made since1 we are impelled to honor all who have contributed to this result4 ,moreover1 it seems very clear that teachers of all grades should have some acquaintance with the nature of the minds that they are laboring to develop1 and that they should not be left to pick up their information for themselves--a task sufficiently difficult to an unobservant person4 ,these considerations furnish a sufficient ground for extolling the science of psychology1 and for insisting that studies in it should form some part of the education of a teacher4 ,but why should the rest of us care for such studies8 ,to this one may answer1 in the first place1 that nearly all of us have1 or ought to have1 some responsibility for the education of children2 and1 in the second1 that we deal with the minds of others every day in every walk in life1 and it can certainly do no harm to have our attention called to the way in which minds function4 ,to be sure1 some men are by nature tactful1 and instinctively conscious of how things strike the minds of those about them4 ,but even such persons may gain helpful suggestions1 and1 at least1 have the habit of attention to the mental processes of others confirmed in them4 ,how often we are impressed at church1 at the public lecture1 and in private conversations1 with the fact that the speaker lives in blissful unconsciousness of what can be understood by or can possibly interest his hearers6 ,for the confirmed bore1 there is1 perhaps1 no cure2 but it seems as though something might be done for those who are afflicted to a minor degree4 ,and this brings me to another consideration1 which is that a proper study of psychology ought to be of service in revealing to a man his own nature4 ,it should show him what he is1 and this is surely a first step toward becoming something better4 ,it is wonderful how blind men may be with regard to what passes in their own minds and with regard to their own peculiarities4 ,when they learn to reflect1 they come to a clearer consciousness of themselves--it is as though a lamp were lighted within them4 ,one may1 it is true1 study psychology without attaining to any of the good results suggested above2 but1 for that matter1 there is no study which may not be pursued in a profitless way1 if the teacher be sufficiently unskilled and the pupil sufficiently thoughtless4 #hb4 ,,metaphysics ,,and ,,philosophy ,,of ,,religion4--,perhaps it will be said3 ,for such philosophical studies as the above a good defense may perhaps be made1 but can one defend in the same way the plunge into the obscurities of metaphysics8 ,in this field no two men seem to be wholly agreed1 and if they were1 what would it signify8 ,whether we call ourselves monists or dualists1 idealists or realists1 ,lockians or ,kantians1 must we not live and deal with the things about us in much the same way8 ,those who have dipped into metaphysical studies deeply enough to see what the problems discussed really are2 who have been able to reach the ideas concealed1 too often1 under a rather forbidding terminology2 who are not of the dogmatic turn of mind which insists upon unquestioned authority and is repelled by the uncertainties which must confront those who give themselves to reflective thought1--these will hardly need to be persuaded that it is desirable to give some attention to the question3 ,what sort of a world1 after all1 is this world in which we live8 ,what is its meaning8 ,to many men the impulse to peer into these things is over-powering1 and the pleasure of feeling their insight deepen is extremely keen4 ,what deters us in most instances is not the conviction that such investigations are not1 or should not be1 interesting1 but rather the difficulty of the approach4 ,it is not easy to follow the path which leads from the world of common thought into the world of philosophical reflection4 ,one becomes bewildered and discouraged at the outset4 ,sometimes1 after listening to the directions of guides who disagree among themselves1 we are tempted to believe that there can be no certain path to the goal which we have before us4 ,but1 whatever the difficulties and uncertainties of our task1 a little reflection must show that it is not one which has no significance for human life4 ,men can1 it is true1 eat and sleep and go through the routine of the day1 without giving thought to science or religion or philosophy1 but few will defend such an existence4 ,as a matter of fact1 those who have attained to some measure of intellectual and moral development do assume1 consciously or unconsciously1 some rather definite attitude toward life1 and this is not independent of their conviction as to what the world is and means4 ,metaphysical speculations run out into the philosophy of religion2 and1 on the other hand1 religious emotions and ideals have again and again prompted men to metaphysical construction4 ,a glance at history shows that it is natural to man to embrace some attitude toward the system of things1 and to try to justify this by reasoning4 ,vigorous and independent minds have given birth to theories1 and these have been adopted by others4 ,the influence of such theories upon the evolution of humanity has been enormous4 ,ideas have ruled and still rule the world1 some of them very abstract ideas4 ,it does not follow that one is uninfluenced by them1 when one has no knowledge of their source or of their original setting4 ,they become part of the intellectual heritage of us all1 and we sometimes suppose that we are responsible for them ourselves4 ,has not the fact that an idealistic or a materialistic type of thought has been current at a particular time influenced the outlook on life of many who have themselves devoted little attention to philosophy8 ,it would be interesting to know how many1 to whom ,spencer is but a name1 have felt the influence of the agnosticism of which he was the apostle4 ,i say this without meaning to criticise here any of the types of doctrine referred to4 ,my thesis is only that philosophy and life go hand in hand1 and that the prying into the deeper mysteries of the universe cannot be regarded as a matter of no practical moment4 ,its importance ought to be admitted even by the man who has little hope that he will himself be able to attain to a doctrine wholly satisfactory and wholly unshakable4 ,for1 if the study of the problems of metaphysics does nothing else for a given individual1 it1 at least1 enables him to comprehend and criticise intelligently the doctrines which are presented for his acceptance by others4 ,it is a painful thing to feel quite helpless in the face of plausible reasonings which may threaten to rob us of our most cherished hopes1 or may tend to persuade us of the vanity of what we have been accustomed to regard as of highest worth4 ,if we are quite unskilled in the examination of such doctrines1 we may be captured by the loosest of arguments--witness the influence of ,spencer's argument for the ,unknowable1 in the ,first ,principles2 and if we are ignorant of the history of speculative thought1 we may be carried away by old and exploded notions which pose as modern and impressive only because they have been given a modern dress4 ,we can1 of course1 refuse to listen to those who would talk with us4 ,but this savors of bigotry1 and the world will certainly not grow wiser1 if men generally cultivate a blind adherence to the opinions in which they happen to be brought up4 ,a cautious conservatism is one thing1 and blind obstinacy is another4 ,to the educated man 7and it is probable that others will have to depend on opinions taken at second hand7 a better way of avoiding error is open4 ,finally1 it will not do to overlook the broadening influence of such studies as we are discussing4 ,how dogmatically men are in the habit of expressing themselves upon those obscure and difficult problems which deal with matters that lie on the confines of human knowledge6 ,such an assumption of knowledge cannot but make us uncomprehending and unsympathetic4 ,there are many subjects upon which1 if we hold an opinion at all1 we should hold it tentatively1 waiting for more light1 and retaining a willingness to be enlightened4 ,many a bitter and fruitless quarrel might be avoided1 if more persons found it possible to maintain this philosophical attitude of mind4 ,philosophy is1 after all1 reflection1 and the reflective man must realize that he is probably as liable to error as are other men4 ,he is not infallible1 nor has the limit of human knowledge been attained in his day and generation4 ,he who realizes this will not assume that his neighbor is always wrong1 and he will come to have that wide1 conscientious tolerance1 which is not indifference1 but which is at the farthest remove from the zeal of mere bigotry4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii ,,why ,,we ,,should ,,study ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy #hc4 ,,the ,,prominence ,,given ,,to ,,the ,,subject4--,when one reflects upon the number of lecture courses given every year at our universities and colleges on the history of philosophy1 one is struck by the fact that philosophy is not treated as are most other subjects with which the student is brought into contact4 ,if we study mathematics1 or chemistry1 or physics1 or physiology1 or biology1 the effort is made to lay before us in a convenient form the latest results which have been attained in those sciences4 ,of their history very little is said2 and1 indeed1 as we have seen 7section #f71 lectures on the history of the inductive sciences are apt to be regarded as philosophical in their character and aims rather than as merely scientific4 ,the interest in the history of philosophy is certainly not a diminishing one4 ,text-books covering the whole field or a part of it are multiplied2 extensive studies are made and published covering the work of individual philosophers2 innumerable historical discussions make their appearance in the pages of current philosophical journals4 ,no student is regarded as fairly acquainted with philosophy who knows nothing of ,plato and ,aristotle1 ,descartes and ,spinoza1 ,berkeley and ,hume1 ,kant and ,hegel1 and the rest4 ,we should look upon him as having a very restricted outlook if he had read only the works of the thinkers of our own day2 indeed1 we should not expect him to have a proper comprehension even of these1 for their chapters must remain blind and meaningless to one who has no knowledge of what preceded them and has given birth to the doctrines there set forth4 ,it is a fair question to ask3 ,why is philosophy so bound up with the study of the past8 ,why may we not content ourselves with what has up to the present been attained1 and omit a survey of the road along which our predecessors have traveled8 #hd4 ,,the ,,especial ,,importance ,,of ,,historical ,,studies ,,to ,,reflective ,,thought4--,in some of the preceding chapters dealing with the various philosophical sciences1 it has been indicated that1 in the sciences we do not regard as philosophical1 men may work on the basis of certain commonly accepted assumptions and employ methods which are generally regarded as trustworthy within the given field4 ,the value both of the fundamental assumptions and of the methods of investigation appear to be guaranteed by the results attained4 ,there are not merely observation and hypothesis2 there is also verification1 and where this is lacking1 men either abandon their position or reserve their judgment4 ,thus1 a certain body of interrelated facts is built up1 the significance of which1 in many fields at least1 is apparent even to the layman4 ,nor is it wholly beyond him to judge whether the results of scientific investigations can be verified4 ,an eclipse1 calculated by methods which he is quite unable to follow1 may occur at the appointed hour and confirm his respect for the astronomer4 ,the efficacy of a serum in the cure of diseases may convince him that work done in the laboratory is not labor lost4 ,it seems evident that the several sciences do really rise on stepping stones of their dead selves1 and that those selves of the past are really dead and superseded4 ,who would now think of going back for his science to ,plato's ,timaeus1 or would accept the description of the physical world contained in the works of ,aristotle8 ,what chemist or physicist need busy himself with the doctrine of atoms and their clashings presented in the magnificent poem of ,lucretius8 ,who can forbear a smile--a sympathetic one--when he turns over the pages of ,augustine's ,city of ,god1 and sees what sort of a world this remarkable man believed himself to inhabit8 ,it is the historic and human interest that carries us back to these things4 ,we say3 ,what ingenuity6 what a happy guess6 how well that was reasoned in the light of what was actually known about the world in those days6 ,but we never forget that what compels our admiration does so because it makes us realize that we stand in the presence of a great mind1 and not because it is a foundation-stone in the great edifice which science has erected4 ,but it is not so in philosophy4 ,it is not possible to regard the philosophical reflections of ,plato and of ,aristotle as superseded in the same sense in which we may so regard their science4 ,the reason for this lies in the difference between scientific thought and reflective thought4 ,the two have been contrasted in ,chapter ,,ii of this volume4 ,it was there pointed out that the sort of thinking demanded in the special sciences is not so very different from that with which we are all familiar in common life4 ,science is more accurate and systematic1 it has a broader outlook1 and it is free from the imperfections which vitiate the uncritical and fragmentary knowledge which experience of the world yields the unscientific4 ,but1 after all1 the world is much the same sort of a world to the man of science and to his uncritical neighbor4 ,the latter can1 as we have seen1 understand what1 in general1 the former is doing1 and can appropriate many of his results4 ,on the other hand1 it often happens that the man who has not1 with pains and labor1 learned to reflect1 cannot even see that the philosopher has a genuine problem before him4 ,thus1 the plain man accepts the fact that he has a mind and that it knows the world4 ,that both mental phenomena and physical phenomena should be carefully observed and classified he may be ready to admit4 ,but that the very conceptions of mind and of what it means to know a world are vague and indefinite in the extreme1 and stand in need of careful analysis1 he does not realize4 ,in other words1 he sees that our knowledge needs to be extended and rendered more accurate and reliable1 but he does not see that1 if we are to think clearly and consciously1 all our knowledge needs to be gone over in a different way4 ,in common life it is quite possible to use in the attainment of practical ends knowledge which has not been analyzed and of the full meaning of which we are ignorant4 ,i hope it has become evident in the course of this volume that something closely analogous is true in the field of science4 ,the man of science may measure space and time1 and may study the phenomena of the human mind1 without even attempting to answer all the questions which may be raised as to what is meant1 in the last analysis1 by such concepts as space1 time1 and the mind4 ,that such concepts should be analyzed has1 ,i hope1 been made clear1 if only that erroneous and misleading notions as to these things should be avoided4 ,but when a man with a genius for metaphysical analysis addresses himself to this task1 he cannot simply hand the results attained by his reflections over to his less reflective fellow-man4 ,his words are not understood2 he seems to be dealing with shadows1 with unrealities2 he has passed from the real world of common thought into another world which appears to have little relation to the former4 ,nor can verification1 indubitable proof1 be demanded and furnished as it can in many parts of the field cultivated by the special sciences4 ,we may judge science fairly well without ourselves being scientists1 but it is not possible to judge philosophy without being to some extent a philosopher4 ,in other words1 the conclusions of reflective thought must be judged by following the process and discovering its cogency or the reverse4 ,thus1 when the philosopher lays before us an argument to prove that we must regard the only ultimate reality in the world as unknowable1 and must abandon our theistic convictions1 how shall we make a decision as to whether he is right or is wrong8 ,may we expect that the day will come when he will be justified or condemned as is the astronomer on the day predicted for an eclipse8 ,neither the philosophy of ,locke1 nor that of ,descartes1 nor that of ,kant1 can be vindicated as can a prediction touching an eclipse of the sun4 ,to judge these men1 we must learn to think with them1 to survey the road by which they travel2 and this we cannot do until we have learned the art4 ,whether we like to admit it or not1 we must admit1 if we are fair-minded and intelligent1 that philosophy cannot speak with the same authority as science1 where science has been able to verify its results4 ,there are1 of course1 scientific hypotheses and speculations which should be regarded as being quite as uncertain as anything brought forward by the philosophers4 ,but1 admitting this1 the fact remains that there is a difference between the two fields as a whole1 and that the philosopher should learn not to speak with an assumption of authority4 ,no final philosophy has been attained1 so palpably firm in its foundation1 and so admittedly trustworthy in its construction1 that we are justified in saying3 ,now we need never go back to the past unless to gratify the historic interest4 ,it is a weakness of young men1 and of older men of partisan temper1 to feel very sure of matters which1 in the nature of things1 must remain uncertain4 ,since these things are so1 and since men possess the power of reflection in very varying degree1 it is not surprising that we find it worth while to turn back and study the thoughts of those who have had a genius for reflection1 even though they lived at a time when modern science was awaiting its birth4 ,some things cannot be known until other things are known2 often there must be a vast collection of individual facts before the generalizations of science can come into being4 ,but many of the problems with which reflective thought is still struggling have not been furthered in the least by information which has been collected during the centuries which have elapsed since they were attacked by the early ,greek philosophers4 ,thus1 we are still discussing the distinction between appearance and reality1 and many and varied are the opinions at which philosophers arrive4 ,but ,thales1 who heads the list of the ,greek philosophers1 had quite enough material1 given in his own experience1 to enable him to solve this problem as well as any modern philosopher1 had he been able to use the material4 ,he who is familiar with the history of philosophy will recognize that1 although one may smile at ,augustine's accounts of the races of men1 and of the spontaneous generation of small animals1 no one has a right to despise his profound reflections upon the nature of time and the problems which arise out of its character as past1 present1 and future4 ,the fact is that metaphysics does not lag behind because of our lack of material to work with4 ,the difficulties we have to face are nothing else than the difficulties of reflective thought4 ,why can we not tell clearly what we mean when we use the word self1 or speak of knowledge1 or insist that we know an external world8 ,are we not concerned with the most familiar of experiences8 ,to be sure we are--with experiences familiarly1 but vaguely and unanalytically1 known and1 hence1 only half known4 ,all these experiences the great men of the past had as well as we2 and if they had greater powers of reflection1 perhaps they saw more deeply into them than we do4 ,at any rate1 we cannot afford to assume that they did not4 ,one thing1 however1 ,i must not omit to mention4 ,although one man cannot turn over bodily the results of his reflection to another1 it by no means follows that he cannot give the other a helping hand1 or warn him of dangers by himself stumbling into pitfalls1 as the case may be4 ,we have an indefinite advantage over the solitary thinkers who opened up the paths of reflection1 for we have the benefit of their teaching4 ,and this brings me to a consideration which ,i must discuss in the next section4 #he4 ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,different ,,points ,,of ,,view4--,the man who has not read is like the man who has not traveled--he is not an intelligent critic1 for he has nothing with which to compare what falls within the little circle of his experiences4 ,that the prevailing architecture of a town is ugly can scarcely impress one who is acquainted with no other town4 ,if we live in a community in which men's manners are not good1 and their standard of living not the highest1 our attention does not dwell much upon the fact1 unless some contrasted experience wakes within us a clear consciousness of the difference4 ,that to which we are accustomed we accept uncritically and unreflectively4 ,it is difficult for us to see it somewhat as one might see it to whom it came as a new experience4 ,of course1 there may be in the one town buildings of more and of less architectural beauty2 and there may be in the one community differences of opinion that furnish intellectual stimulus and keep awake the critical spirit4 ,still1 there is such a thing as a prevalent type of architecture1 and there is such a thing as the spirit of the times4 ,he who is carried along by the spirit of the age may easily conclude that what is1 is right1 because he hears few raise their voices in protest4 ,to estimate justly the type of thought in which he has been brought up1 he must have something with which to compare it4 ,he must stand at a distance1 and try to judge it as he would judge a type of doctrine presented to him for the first rime4 ,and in the accomplishment of this task he can find no greater aid than the study of the history of philosophy4 ,it is at first something of a shock to a man to discover that assumptions which he has been accustomed to make without question have been frankly repudiated by men quite as clever as he1 and1 perhaps1 more critical4 ,it opens the eyes to see that his standards of worth have been weighed by others and have been found wanting4 ,it may well incline him to reexamine reasonings in which he has detected no flaw1 when he finds that acute minds have tried them before1 and have declared them faulty4 ,nor can it be without its influence upon his judgment of the significance of a doctrine1 when it becomes plain to him that this significance can scarcely be fully comprehended until the history of the doctrine is known4 ,for example1 he thinks of the mind as somehow in the body1 as interacting with it1 as a substance1 and as immaterial4 ,in the course of his reading it begins to dawn upon his consciousness that he has not thought all this out for himself2 he has taken these notions from others1 who in turn have had them from their predecessors4 ,he begins to realize that he is not resting upon evidence independently found in his own experience1 but has upon his hands a sheaf of opinions which are the echoes of old philosophies1 and whose rise and development can be traced over the stretch of the centuries4 ,can he help asking himself1 when he sees this1 whether the opinions in question express the truth and the whole truth8 ,is he not forced to take the critical attitude toward them8 ,and when he views the succession of systems which pass in review before him1 noting how a truth may be dimly seen by one writer1 denied by another1 taken up again and made clearer by a third1 and so on1 how can he avoid the reflection that1 as there was some error mixed with the truth presented in earlier systems1 so there probably is some error in whatever may happen to be the form of doctrine generally received in his own time8 ,the evolution of humanity is not yet at an end2 men still struggle to see clearly1 and fall short of the ideal2 it must be a good thing to be freed from the dogmatic assumption of finality natural to the man of limited outlook4 ,in studying the history of philosophy sympathetically we are not merely calling to our aid critics who possess the advantage of seeing things from a different point of view1 but we are reminding ourselves that we1 too1 are human and fallible4 #hf4 ,,philosophy ,,as ,,poetry1 ,,and ,,philosophy ,,as ,,science4--,the recognition of the truth that the problems of reflection do not admit of easy solution and that verification can scarcely be expected as it can in the fields of the special sciences1 need not1 even when it is brought home to us1 as it is apt to be1 by the study of the history of philosophy1 lead us to believe that philosophies are like the fashions1 a something gotten up to suit the taste of the day1 and to be dismissed without regret as soon as that taste changes4 ,philosophy is sometimes compared with poetry4 ,it is argued that each age must have its own poetry1 even though it be inferior to that which it has inherited from the past4 ,just so1 it is said1 each age must have its own philosophy1 and the philosophy of an earlier age will not satisfy its demands4 ,the implication is that in dealing with philosophy we are not concerned with what is true or untrue in itself considered1 but with what is satisfying to us or the reverse4 ,now1 it would sound absurd to say that each age must have its own geometry or its own physics4 ,the fact that it has long been known that the sum of the interior angles of a plane triangle is equal to two right angles1 does not warrant me in repudiating that truth2 nor am ,i justified in doing so1 and in believing the opposite1 merely because ,i find the statement uninteresting or distasteful4 ,when we are dealing with such matters as these1 we recognize that truth is truth1 and that1 if we mistake it or refuse to recognize it1 so much the worse for us4 ,is it otherwise in philosophy8 ,is it a perfectly proper thing that1 in one age1 men should be idealists1 and in another1 materialists2 in one1 theists1 and in another1 agnostics8 ,is the distinction between true and false nothing else than the distinction between what is in harmony with the spirit of the times and what is not8 ,that it is natural that there should be such fluctuations of opinion1 we may freely admit4 ,many things influence a man to embrace a given type of doctrine1 and1 as we have seen1 verification is a difficult problem4 ,but have we here1 any more than in other fields1 the right to assume that a doctrine was true at a given time merely because it seemed to men true at that time1 or because they found it pleasing8 ,the history of science reveals that many things have long been believed to be true1 and1 indeed1 to be bound up with what were regarded as the highest interests of man1 and that these same things have later been discovered to be false--not false merely for a later age1 but false for all time2 as false when they were believed in as when they were exploded and known to be exploded4 ,no man of sense believes that the ,ptolemaic system was true for a while1 and that then the ,copernican became true4 ,we say that the former only seemed true1 and that the enthusiasm of its adherents was a mistaken enthusiasm4 ,it is well to remember that philosophies are brought forward because it is believed or hoped that they are true4 ,a fairy tale may be recited and may be approved1 although no one dreams of attaching faith to the events narrated in it4 ,but a philosophy attempts to give us some account of the nature of the world in which we live4 ,if the philosopher frankly abandons the attempt to tell us what is true1 and with a ,celtic generosity addresses himself to the task of saying what will be agreeable to us1 he loses his right to the title4 ,it is not enough that he stirs our emotions1 and works up his unrealities into something resembling a poem4 ,it is not primarily his task to please1 as it is not the task of the serious worker in science to please those whom he is called upon to instruct4 ,truth is truth1 whether it be scientific truth or philosophical truth4 ,and error1 no matter how agreeable or how nicely adjusted to the temper of the times1 is always error4 ,if it is error in a field in which the detection and exposure of error is difficult1 it is the more dangerous1 and the more should we be on our guard against it4 ,we may1 then1 accept the lesson of the history of philosophy1 to wit1 that we have no right to regard any given doctrine as final in such a sense that it need no longer be held tentatively and as subject to possible revision2 but we need not1 on that account1 deny that philosophy is1 what it has in the past been believed to be1 an earnest search for truth4 ,a philosophy that did not even profess to be this would not be listened to at all4 ,it would be regarded as too trivial to merit serious attention4 ,if we take the word science in the broad sense to indicate a knowledge of the truth more exact and satisfactory than that which obtains in common life1 we may say that every philosophy worthy of the name is1 at least1 an attempt at scientific knowledge4 ,of course1 this sense of the word science should not be confused with that in which it has been used elsewhere in this volume4 #hg4 ,,how ,,to ,,read ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,philosophy4--,he who takes up the history of philosophy for the first time is apt to be impressed with the fact that he is reading something that might not inaptly be called the history of human error4 ,it begins with crude and1 to the superficial spectator1 seemingly childish attempts in the field of physical science4 ,there are clever guesses at the nature of the physical world1 but the boldest of speculations are entered upon with no apparent recognition of the difficulty of the task undertaken1 and with no realization of the need for caution4 ,somewhat later a different class of problems makes its appearance--the problems which have to do with the mind and with the nature of knowledge1 reflective problems which scarcely seem to have come fairly within the horizon of the earliest thinkers4 ,these problems even the beginner may be willing to recognize as philosophical2 but he may conscientiously harbor a doubt as to the desirability of spending time upon the solutions which are offered4 ,system rises after system1 and confronts him with what appear to be new questions and new answers4 ,it seems as though each philosopher were constructing a world for himself independently1 and commanding him to accept it1 without first convincing him of his right to assume this tone of authority and to set up for an oracle4 ,in all this conflict of opinions where shall we seek for truth8 ,why should we accept one man as a teacher rather than another8 ,is not the lesson to be gathered from the whole procession of systems best summed up in the dictum of ,protagoras3 ,man is the measure of all things--each has his own truth1 and this need not be truth to another8 ,this1 ,i say1 is a first impression and a natural one4 ,i hasten to add3 this should not be the last impression of those who read with thoughtful attention4 ,one thing should be emphasized at the outset3 nothing will so often bear rereading as the history of philosophy4 ,when we go over the ground after we have obtained a first acquaintance with the teachings of the different philosophers1 we begin to realize that what we have in our hands is1 in a sense1 a connected whole4 ,we see that if ,plato and ,aristotle had not lived1 we could not have had the philosophy which passed current in the ,middle ,ages and furnished a foundation for the teachings of the ,church4 ,we realize that without this latter we could not have had ,descartes1 and without ,descartes we could not have had ,locke and ,berkeley and ,hume4 ,and had not these lived1 we should not have had ,kant and his successors4 ,other philosophies we should undoubtedly have had1 for the busy mind of man must produce something4 ,but whatever glimpses at the truth these men have vouchsafed us have been guaranteed by the order of development in which they have stood4 ,they could not independently have written the books that have come down to us4 ,this should be evident from what has been said earlier in this chapter and elsewhere in this book4 ,let us bear in mind that a philosopher draws his material from two sources4 ,first of all1 he has the experience of the mind and the world which is the common property of us all4 ,but it is1 as we have seen1 by no means easy to use this material4 ,it is vastly difficult to reflect4 ,it is fatally easy to misconceive what presents itself in our experience4 ,with the most earnest effort to describe what lies before us1 we give a false description1 and we mislead ourselves and others4 ,in the second place1 the philosopher has the interpretations of experience which he has inherited from his predecessors4 ,the influence of these is enormous4 ,each age has1 to a large extent1 its problems already formulated or half formulated for it4 ,every man must have ancestors1 of some sort1 if he is to appear upon this earthly stage at all2 and a wholly independent philosopher is as impossible a creature as an ancestorless man4 ,we have seen how ,descartes 7section #fj7 tried to repudiate his debt to the past1 and how little successful he was in doing so4 ,now1 we make a mistake if we overlook the genius of the individual thinker4 ,the history of speculative thought has many times taken a turn which can only be accounted for by taking into consideration the genius for reflective thought possessed by some great mind4 ,in the crucible of such an intellect1 old truths take on a new aspect1 familiar facts acquire a new and a richer meaning4 ,but we also make a mistake if we fail to see in the writings of such a man one of the stages which has been reached in the gradual evolution of human thought1 if we fail to realize that each philosophy is to a great extent the product of the past4 ,when one comes to understand these things1 the history of philosophy no longer presents itself as a mere agglomeration of arbitrary and independent systems4 ,and an attentive reading gives us a further key to the interpretation of what seemed inexplicable4 ,we find that there may be distinct and different streams of thought1 which1 for a while1 run parallel without commingling their waters4 ,for centuries the ,epicurean followed his own tradition1 and walked in the footsteps of his own master4 ,the ,stoic was of sterner stuff1 and he chose to travel another path4 ,to this day there are adherents of the old church philosophy1 ,neo-,scholastics1 whose ways of thinking can only be understood when we have some knowledge of ,aristotle and of his influence upon men during the ,middle ,ages4 ,we ourselves may be ,kantians or ,hegelians1 and the man at our elbow may recognize as his spiritual father ,comte or ,spencer4 ,it does not follow that1 because one system follows another in chronological order1 it is its lineal descendant4 ,but some ancestor a system always has1 and if we have the requisite learning and ingenuity1 we need not find it impossible to explain why this thinker or that was influenced to give his thought the peculiar turn that characterizes it4 ,sometimes many influences have conspired to attain the result1 and it is no small pleasure to address oneself to the task of disentangling the threads which enter into the fabric4 ,moreover1 as we read thus with discrimination1 we begin to see that the great men of the past have not spoken without appearing to have sufficient reason for their utterances in the light of the times in which they lived4 ,we may make it a rule that1 when they seem to be speaking arbitrarily1 to be laying before us reasonings that are not reasonings1 dogmas for which no excuse seems to be offered1 the fault lies in our lack of comprehension4 ,until we can understand how a man1 living in a certain century1 and breathing a certain moral and intellectual atmosphere1 could have said what he did1 we should assume that we have read his words1 but not his real thought4 ,for the latter there is always a psychological1 if not a logical1 justification4 ,and this brings me to the question of the language in which the philosophers have expressed their thoughts4 ,the more attentively one reads the history of philosophy1 the clearer it becomes that the number of problems with which the philosophers have occupied themselves is not overwhelmingly great4 ,if each philosophy which confronts us seems to us quite new and strange1 it is because we have not arrived at the stage at which it is possible for us to recognize old friends with new faces4 ,the same old problems1 the problems which must ever present themselves to reflective thought1 recur again and again4 ,the form is more or less changed1 and the answers which are given to them are not1 of course1 always the same4 ,each age expresses itself in a somewhat different way4 ,but sometimes the solution proposed for a given problem is almost the same in substance1 even when the two thinkers we are contrasting belong to centuries which lie far apart4 ,in this case1 only our own inability to strip off the husk and reach the fruit itself prevents us from seeing that we have before us nothing really new4 ,thus1 if we read the history of philosophy with patience and with discrimination1 it grows luminous4 ,we come to feel nearer to the men of the past4 ,we see that we may learn from their successes and from their failures2 and if we are capable of drawing a moral at all1 we apply the lesson to ourselves4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv ,,some ,,practical ,,admonitions #hh4 ,,be ,,prepared ,,to ,,enter ,,upon ,a ,,new ,,way ,,of ,,looking ,,at ,,things4--,we have seen that reflective thought tries to analyze experience and to attain to a clear view of the elements that make it up--to realize vividly what is the very texture of the known world1 and what is the nature of knowledge4 ,it is possible to live to old age1 as many do1 without even a suspicion that there may be such a knowledge as this1 and nevertheless to possess a large measure of rather vague but very serviceable information about both minds and bodies4 ,it is something of a shock to learn that a multitude of questions may be asked touching the most familiar things in our experience1 and that our comprehension of those things may be so vague that we grope in vain for an answer4 ,space1 time1 matter1 minds1 realities1--with these things we have to do every day4 ,can it be that we do not know what they are8 ,then we must be blind1 indeed4 ,how shall we set about enlightening our ignorance8 ,not as we have enlightened our ignorance heretofore4 ,we have added fact to fact2 but our task now is to gain a new light on all facts1 to see them from a different point of view2 not so much to extend our knowledge as to deepen it4 ,it seems scarcely necessary to point out that our world1 when looked at for the first time in this new way1 may seem to be a new and strange world4 ,the real things of our experience may appear to melt away1 to be dissolved by reflection into mere shadows and unrealities4 ,well do ,i remember the consternation with which1 when almost a schoolboy1 ,i first made my acquaintance with ,john ,stuart ,mill's doctrine that the things about us are permanent possibilities of sensation4 ,to ,mill1 of course1 chairs and tables were still chairs and tables1 but to me they became ghosts1 inhabitants of a phantom world1 to find oneself in which was a matter of the gravest concern4 ,i suspect that this sense of the unreality of things comes often to those who have entered upon the path of reflection1 ,it may be a comfort to such to realize that it is rather a thing to be expected4 ,how can one feel at home in a world which one has entered for the first time8 ,one cannot become a philosopher and remain exactly the man that one was before4 ,men have tried to do it1--,thomas ,reid is a notable instance 7section #ej72 but the result is that one simply does not become a philosopher4 ,it is not possible to gain a new and a deeper insight into the nature of things1 and yet to see things just as one saw them before one attained to this4 ,if1 then1 we are willing to study philosophy at all1 we must be willing to embrace new views of the world1 if there seem to be good reasons for so doing4 ,and if at first we suffer from a sense of bewilderment1 we must have patience1 and must wait to see whether time and practice may not do something toward removing our distress4 ,it may be that we have only half understood what has been revealed to us4 #hi4 ,,be ,,willing ,,to ,,consider ,,possibilities ,,which ,,at ,,first ,,strike ,,one ,,as ,,absurd4--,it must be confessed that the philosophers have sometimes brought forward doctrines which seem repellent to good sense1 and little in harmony with the experience of the world which we have all our lives enjoyed4 ,shall we on this account turn our backs upon them and refuse them an impartial hearing8 ,thus1 the idealist maintains that there is no existence save psychical existence2 that the material things about us are really mental things4 ,one of the forms taken by this doctrine is that alluded to above1 that things are permanent possibilities of sensation4 ,i think it can hardly be denied that this sounds out of harmony with the common opinion of mankind4 ,men do not hesitate to distinguish between minds and material things1 nor do they believe that material things exist only in minds4 ,that dreams and hallucinations exist only in minds they are very willing to admit2 but they will not admit that this is true of such things as real chairs and tables4 ,and if we ask them why they take such a position1 they fall back upon what seems given in experience4 ,now1 as the reader of the earlier chapters has seen1 ,i think that the plain man is more nearly right in his opinion touching the existence of a world of non-mental things than is the idealistic philosopher4 ,the latter has seen a truth and misconceived it1 thus losing some truth that he had before he began to reflect4 ,the former has not seen the truth which has impressed the idealist1 and he has held on to that vague recognition that there are two orders of things given in our experience1 the physical and the mental1 which seems to us so unmistakable a fact until we fall into the hands of the philosophers4 ,but all this does not prove that we have a right simply to fall back upon common sense1 and refuse to listen to the idealist4 ,the deliverances of unreflective common sense are vague in the extreme2 and though it may seem to assure us that there is a world of things non-mental1 its account of that world is confused and incoherent4 ,he who must depend on common sense alone can find no answer to the idealists2 he refuses to follow them1 but he cannot refute them4 ,he is reduced to dogmatic denial4 ,this is in itself an uncomfortable position4 ,and when we add to this the reflection that such a man loses the truth which the idealist emphasizes1 the truth that the external world of which we speak must be1 if we are to know it at all1 a world revealed to our senses1 a world given in our experience1 we see that he who stops his ears remains in ignorance4 ,the fact is that the man who has never weighed the evidence that impresses the idealist is not able to see clearly what is meant by that external world in which we all incline to put such faith4 ,we may say that he feels a truth blindly1 but does not see it4 ,let us take another illustration4 ,if there is one thing that we feel to be as sure as the existence of the external world1 it is that there are other minds more or less resembling our own4 ,the solipsist may try to persuade us that the evidence for such minds is untrustworthy4 ,we may see no flaw in his argument1 but he cannot convince us4 ,may we ignore him1 and refuse to consider the matter at all8 ,surely not1 if we wish to substitute clear thinking for vague and indefinite opinion4 ,we should listen with attention1 strive to understand all the reasonings laid before us1 and then1 if they seem to lead to conclusions really not in harmony with our experience1 go carefully over the ground and try to discover the flaw in them4 ,it is only by doing something like this that we can come to see clearly what is meant when we speak of two or more minds and the relation between them4 ,the solipsist can help us1 and we should let him do it4 ,we should1 therefore1 be willing to consider seriously all sorts of doctrines which may at first strike us as unreasonable4 ,i have chosen two which ,i believe to contain error4 ,but the man who approaches a doctrine which impresses him as strange has no right to assume at the outset that it contains error4 ,we have seen again and again how easy it is to misapprehend what is given in experience4 ,the philosopher may be in the right1 and what he says may repel us because we have become accustomed to certain erroneous notions1 and they have come to seem self-evident truths4 #ij4 ,,do ,,not ,,have ,,too ,,much ,,respect ,,for ,,authority4--,but if it is an error to refuse to listen to the philosopher1 it is surely no less an error to accord him an authority above what he has a right to demand4 ,bear in mind what was said in the last chapter about the difference between the special sciences and philosophy4 ,there is in the latter field no body of doctrine that we may justly regard as authoritative4 ,there are schools of philosophy1 and their adherents fall into the very human error of feeling very sure that they and those who agree with them are right2 and the emphasis with which they speak is apt to mislead those who are not well informed4 ,i shall say a few words about the dangers of the school4 ,if we look about us1 we are impressed by the fact that there are schools of philosophy1 somewhat as there are religious sects and political parties4 ,an impressive teacher sets the mark of his personality and of his preferences upon those who come under his influence4 ,they are not at an age to be very critical1 and1 indeed1 they have not as yet the requisite learning to enable them to be critical4 ,they keep the trend which has been given them early in life1 and1 when they become teachers1 they pass on the type of thought with which they have been inoculated1 and the circle widens4 ,schools may arise1 of course1 in a different way4 ,an epoch-making book may sweep men off of their feet and make of them passionate adherents4 ,but he who has watched the development of the ,american universities during the last twenty-five years must be impressed with the enormous influence which certain teachers have had in giving a direction to the philosophic thought of those who have come in contact with them4 ,we expect the pupils of a given master to have a given shade of opinion1 and very often we are not disappointed in our guess4 ,it is entirely natural that this should be so4 ,those who betake themselves to the study of philosophy are men like other men4 ,they have the same feelings1 and the bending of the twig has the same significance in their case that it has in that of others4 ,it is no small compliment to a teacher that he can thus spread his influence1 and leave his proxies even when he passes away4 ,but1 when we strive to put off humanity and to look at the whole matter under the cold light of reason1 we may well ask ourselves1 whether he who unconsciously accepts his philosophy1 in whole or in part1 because it has been the philosophy of his teacher1 is not doing what is done by those persons whose politics and whose religion take their color from such accidental circumstances as birth in a given class or family traditions8 ,i am far from saying that it is1 in general1 a bad thing for the world that men should be influenced in this way by one another4 ,i say only that1 when we look at the facts of the case1 we must admit that even our teachers of philosophy do not always become representatives of the peculiar type of thought for which they stand1 merely through a deliberate choice from the wealth of material which the history of speculative thought lays before them4 ,they are influenced by others to take what they do take1 and the traces of this influence are apt to remain with them through life4 ,he who wishes to be entirely impartial must be on his guard against such influences as these1 and must distrust prejudices for or against certain doctrines1 when he finds that he imbibed them at an uncritical age and has remained under their influence ever since4 ,some do appear to be able to emancipate themselves1 and to outgrow what they first learned4 ,it is1 as ,i have said1 natural that there should be a tendency to form schools in philosophy4 ,and there are certain things that make this somewhat uncritical acceptance of a doctrine very attractive4 ,in the first place1 if we are willing to take a system of any sort as a whole1 it saves us a vast amount of trouble4 ,we seem to have a citadel1 a point of vantage from which we can look out upon life and interpret it4 ,if the house we live in is not in all respects ideal1 at least it is a house1 and we are not homeless4 ,there is nothing more intolerable to most men than the having of no opinions4 ,they will change one opinion for another1 but they will rarely consent to do without altogether4 ,it is something to have an answer to offer to those who persist in asking questions2 and it is something to have some sort of ground under one's feet1 even if it be not very solid ground4 ,again4 ,man is a social creature1 and he is greatly fortified in his opinions by the consciousness that others share them with him4 ,if we become adherents of a school1 we have the agreeable consciousness that we are not walking alone through the maze of speculations that confronts those who reflect4 ,there appears to be a traveled way in which we may have some confidence4 ,are we not following the crowd1 or1 at least1 a goodly number of the pilgrims who are seeking the same goal with ourselves8 ,under such circumstances we are not so often impelled to inquire anxiously whether we are after all upon the right road4 ,we assume that we have made no mistake4 ,under such circumstances we are apt to forget that there are many such roads1 and that these have been traveled in ages past by troops very much like our own1 who also cherished the hope that they were upon the one and only highway4 ,in other words1 we are apt to forget the lesson of the history of philosophy4 ,this is a serious mistake4 ,and what intensifies our danger1 if we belong to a school which happens to be dominant and to have active representatives1 is that we get very little real criticism4 ,the books that we write are usually criticised by those who view our positions sympathetically1 and who are more inclined to praise than to blame4 ,he who looks back upon the past is struck with the fact that books which have been lauded to the skies in one age have often been subjected to searching criticism and to a good deal of condemnation in the next4 ,something very like this is to be expected of books written in our own time4 ,it is1 however1 a pity that we should have to wait so long for impartial criticism4 ,this leads me to say a word of the reviews which fill our philosophical journals1 and which we must read1 for it is impossible to read all the books that come out1 and yet we wish to know something about them4 ,to the novice it is something of a surprise to find that books by men whom he knows to be eminent for their ingenuity and their learning are condemned in very offhand fashion by quite young men1 who as yet have attained to little learning and to no eminence at all4 ,one sometimes is tempted to wonder that men admittedly remarkable should have fathered such poor productions as we are given to understand them to be1 and should have offered them to a public that has a right to be indignant4 ,now1 there can be no doubt that1 in philosophy1 a cat has the right to look at a king1 and has also a right to point out his misdoings1 if such there be4 ,but it seems just to indicate that1 in this matter1 certain cautions should be observed4 ,if a great man has been guilty of an error in reasoning1 there is no reason why it should not be pointed out by any one who is capable of detecting it4 ,the authority of the critic is a matter of no moment where the evidence is given4 ,in such a case1 we take a suggestion and we do the criticising for ourselves4 ,but where the evidence is not given1 where the justice of the criticism is not proved1 the case is different4 ,here we must take into consideration the authority of the critic1 and1 if we follow him at all1 we must follow him blindly4 ,is it safe to do this8 ,it is never safe in philosophy1 or1 at any rate1 it is safe so seldom that the exceptions are not worth taking into account4 ,men write from the standpoint of some school of opinion2 and1 until we know their prepossessions1 their statements that this is good1 that is bad1 the third thing is profound1 are of no significance whatever4 ,we should simply set them aside1 and try to find out from our reviewer what is contained in the book under criticism4 ,one of the evils arising out of the bias ,i am discussing is1 that books and authors are praised or condemned indiscriminately because of their point of view1 and little discrimination is made between good books and poor books4 ,there is all the difference in the world between a work which can be condemned only on the ground that it is realistic or idealistic in its standpoint1 and those feeble productions which are to be condemned from every point of view4 ,if we consistently carry out the principle that we may condemn all those who are not of our party1 we must give short shrift to a majority of the great men of the past4 ,so ,i say1 beware of authority in philosophy1 and1 above all1 beware of that most insidious form of authority1 the spirit of the school4 ,it cannot but narrow our sympathies and restrict our outlook4 #ia4 ,,remember ,,that ,,ordinary ,,rules ,,of ,,evidence ,,apply4--,what ,i am going to say in this section is closely related to what has been said just above4 ,to the disinterested observer it may seem rather amusing that one should think it worth while to try to show that we have not the right to use a special set of weights and measures when we are dealing with things philosophical4 ,there was a time when men held that a given doctrine could be philosophically false1 and1 at the same time1 theologically true2 but surely the day of such twists and turnings is past6 ,i am by no means sure that it is past4 ,with the lapse of time1 old doctrines take on new aspects1 and come to be couched in a language that suits the temper of the later age4 ,sometimes the doctrine is veiled and rendered less startling1 but remains essentially what it was before1 and may be criticised in much the same way4 ,i suppose we may say that every one who is animated by the party spirit discussed above1 and who holds to a group of philosophical tenets with a warmth of conviction out of proportion to the authority of the actual evidence which may be claimed for them1 is tacitly assuming that the truth or falsity of philosophical dogmas is not wholly a matter of evidence1 but that the desires of the philosopher may also be taken into account4 ,this position is often taken unconsciously4 ,thus1 when1 instead of proving to others that a given doctrine is false1 we try to show them that it is a dangerous doctrine1 and leads to unpalatable consequences1 we assume that what seems distasteful cannot be true1 and we count on the fact that men incline to believe what they like to believe4 ,may we give this position the dignity of a philosophical doctrine and hold that1 in the somewhat nebulous realm inhabited by the philosopher1 men are not bound by the same rules of evidence that obtain elsewhere8 ,that this is actually done1 those who read much in the field of modern philosophy are well aware4 ,several excellent writers have maintained that we need not1 even if there seems to be evidence for them1 accept views of the universe which do not satisfy our whole nature4 ,we should not confuse with this position the very different one which maintains that we have a right to hold tentatively1 and with a willingness to abandon them should evidence against them be forthcoming1 views which we are not able completely to establish1 but which seem reasonable4 ,one may do this with perfect sincerity1 and without holding that philosophical truth is in any way different from scientific truth4 ,but the other position goes beyond this2 it assumes that man must be satisfied1 and that only that can be true which satisfies him4 ,i ask1 is it not significant that such an assumption should be made only in the realm of the unverifiable8 ,no man dreams of maintaining that the rise and fall of stocks will be such as to satisfy the whole nature even of the elect1 or that the future history of man on this planet is a thing to be determined by some philosopher who decides for us what would or would not be desirable4 ,surely all truths of election--those truths that we simply choose to have true--are something much less august than that ,truth of ,evidence which sometimes seems little to fall in with our desires1 and in the face of which we are humble listeners1 not dictators4 ,before the latter we are modest2 we obey1 lest we be confounded4 ,and if1 in the philosophic realm1 we believe that we may order ,truth about1 and make her our slave1 is it not because we have a secret consciousness that we are not dealing with ,truth at all1 but with ,opinion1 and with ,opinion that has grown insolent because she cannot be drawn from her obscurity and be shown to be what she is8 ,sometimes it is suddenly revealed to a man that he has been accepting two orders of truth4 ,i once walked and talked with a good scholar who discoursed of high themes and defended warmly certain theses4 ,i said to him3 ,if you could go into the house opposite1 and discover unmistakably whether you are in the right or in the wrong1--discover it as unmistakably as you can discover whether there is or is not furniture in the drawing-room1--would you go8 ,he thought over the matter for a while1 and then answered frankly2 ,no6 ,i should not go2 ,i should stay out here and argue it out4 #ib4 ,,aim ,,at ,,clearness ,,and ,,simplicity4--,there is no department of investigation in which it is not desirable to cultivate clearness and simplicity in thinking1 speaking1 and writing4 ,but there are certain reasons why we should be especially on our guard in philosophy against the danger of employing a tongue not understanded of the people4 ,there are dangerous pitfalls concealed under the use of technical words and phrases4 ,the value of technical expressions in the special sciences must be conceded4 ,they are supposed to be more exact and less ambiguous than terms in ordinary use1 and they mark an advance in our knowledge of the subject4 ,the distinctions which they indicate have been carefully drawn1 and appear to be of such authority that they should be generally accepted4 ,sometimes1 as1 for example1 in mathematics1 a conventional set of symbols may quite usurp the function of ordinary language1 and may enormously curtail the labor of setting forth the processes and results of investigation4 ,but we must never forget that we have not in philosophy an authoritative body of truth which we have the right to impose upon all who enter that field4 ,a multitude of distinctions have been made and are made2 but the representatives of different schools of thought are not at one touching the value and significance of these distinctions4 ,if we coin a word or a phrase to mark such1 there is some danger that we fall into the habit of using such words or phrases1 as we use the coins in our purse1 without closely examining them1 and with the ready assumption that they must pass current everywhere4 ,thus1 there is always a possibility that our technical expressions may be nothing less than crystallized error4 ,against this we should surely be on our guard4 ,again4 ,when we translate the language of common life into the dialect of the learned1 there is danger that we may fall into the error of supposing that we are adding to our knowledge1 even though we are doing nothing save to exchange one set of words for another4 ,thus1 we all know very well that one mind can communicate with another4 ,one does not have to be a scholar to be aware of this4 ,if we choose to call this intersubjective intercourse1 we have given the thing a sounding name2 but we know no more about it than we did before4 ,the problem of the relation between minds1 and the way in which they are to be conceived as influencing each other1 remains just what it was4 ,so1 also1 we recognize the everyday fact that we know both ourselves and what is not ourselves4 ,shall we call this knowledge of something not ourselves self-transcendence8 ,we may do so if we wish1 but we ought to realize that this bestowal of a title makes no whit clearer what is meant by knowledge4 ,unhappily1 men too often believe that1 when they have come into the possession of a new word or phrase1 they have gained a new thought4 ,the danger is great in proportion to the breadth of the gulf which separates the new dialect from the old language of common life in which we are accustomed to estimate things4 ,many a philosopher would be bereft1 indeed1 were he robbed of his vocabulary and compelled to express his thoughts in ordinary speech4 ,the theories which are implicit in certain recurring expressions would be forced to come out into the open1 and stand criticism without disguise4 ,but can one write philosophical books without using words which are not in common use among the unphilosophic8 ,i doubt it4 ,some such words it seems impossible to avoid4 ,however1 it does seem possible to bear in mind the dangers of a special philosophical terminology and to reduce such words to a minimum4 ,finally1 we may appeal to the humanity of the philosopher4 ,the path to reflection is a sufficiently difficult one as it is2 why should he roll rocks upon it and compel those who come after him to climb over them8 ,if truths are no truer for being expressed in a repellent form1 why should he trick them out in a fantastic garb8 ,what we want is the naked truth1 and we lose time and patience in freeing our mummy from the wrappings in which learned men have seen fit to encase it4 #ic4 ,,do ,,not ,,hastily ,,accept ,a ,,doctrine4--,this brings me to the last of the maxims which ,i urge upon the attention of the reader4 ,all that has been said so far may be regarded as leading up to it4 ,the difficulty that confronts us is this3 ,on the one hand1 we must recognize the uncertainty that reigns in this field of investigation4 ,we must ever weigh probabilities and possibilities2 we do not find ourselves in the presence of indubitable truths which all competent persons stand ready to admit4 ,this seems to argue that we should learn to suspend judgment1 and should be most wary in our acceptance of one philosophical doctrine and our rejection of another4 ,on the other hand1 philosophy is not a mere matter of intellectual curiosity4 ,it has an intimate connection with life4 ,as a man thinks1 so is he1 to a great extent1 at least4 ,how1 then1 can one afford to remain critical and negative8 ,to counsel this seems equivalent to advising that one abandon the helm and consent to float at the mercy of wind and tide4 ,the difficulty is a very real one4 ,it presents itself insistently to those who have attained to that degree of intellectual development at which one begins to ask oneself questions and to reflect upon the worth and meaning of life4 ,an unreflective adherence to tradition no longer satisfies such persons4 ,they wish to know why they should believe in this or that doctrine1 and why they should rule their lives in harmony with this or that maxim4 ,shall we advise them to lay hold without delay of a set of philosophical tenets1 as we might advise a disabled man to aid himself with any staff that happens to come to hand8 ,or shall we urge them to close their eyes to the light1 and to go back again to the old unreflective life8 ,neither of these counsels seems satisfactory1 for both assume tacitly that it does not much matter what the truth is1 and that we can afford to disregard it4 ,perhaps we may take a suggestion from that prudent man and acute philosopher1 ,descartes4 ,discontented with the teachings of the schools as they had been presented to him1 he resolved to set out upon an independent voyage of discovery1 and to look for a philosophy of his own4 ,it seemed necessary to him to doubt1 provisionally at least1 all that he had received from the past4 ,but in what house should he live while he was reconstructing his old habitation8 ,without principles of some sort he could not live1 and without reasonable principles he could not live well4 ,so he framed a set of provisional rules1 which should guide his life until he had new ground beneath his feet4 ,when we examine these rules1 we find that1 on the whole1 they are such as the experience of mankind has found prudent and serviceable4 ,in other words1 we discover that ,descartes1 until he was in a position to see clearly for himself1 was willing to be led by others4 ,he was a unit in the social order1 and he recognized that truth4 ,it does not seem out of place to recall this fact to the consciousness of those who are entering upon the reflective life4 ,those who are rather new to reflection upon philosophical matters are apt to seize single truths1 which are too often half-truths1 and to deduce their consequences remorselessly4 ,they do not always realize the extreme complexity of society1 or see the full meaning of the relations in which they stand to the state and to the church4 ,breadth of view can only come with an increase of knowledge and with the exercise of reflection4 ,for this reason ,i advise patience1 and a willingness to accept the established order of things until one is very sure that one has attained to some truth--some real truth1 not a mere truth of election--which may serve as the basis of a reconstruction4 ,the first glimpses of truth cannot be depended upon to furnish such a foundation4 ,thus1 we may suspend judgment1 and1 nevertheless1 be ready to act4 ,but is not this a mere compromise8 ,certainly4 ,all life is a compromise2 and in the present instance it means only that we should keep our eyes open to the light1 whatever its source1 and yet should nourish that wholesome self-distrust that prevents a man from being an erratic and revolutionary creature1 unmindful of his own limitations4 ,prudent men in all walks in life make this compromise1 and the world is the better for it4 ,,notes ,,chapter ,i1 sections #a-e4 ,if the student will take a good history of philosophy1 and look over the accounts of the different systems referred to1 he will see the justice of the position taken in the text1 namely1 that philosophy was formerly synonymous with universal knowledge4 ,it is not necessary1 of course1 to read the whole history of philosophy to attain this end4 ,one may take such a text-book as ,ueberweg's ,history of ,philosophy1 and run over the summaries contained in the large print4 ,to see how the conception of what constitutes universal knowledge changed in successive ages1 compare ,thales1 the ,sophists1 ,aristotle1 the ,schoolmen1 ,bacon1 and ,descartes4 ,for the ancient philosophy one may consult ,windelband's ,history of the ,ancient ,philosophy1 a clear and entertaining little work 7,english translation1 ,n4,y41 #ahii74 ,in ,professor ,paulsen's ,introduction to ,philosophy 7,english translation1 ,n4,y41 #ahie71 there is an interesting introductory chapter on ,the ,nature and ,import of ,philosophy 7pp4 #a-da74 ,the author pleads for the old notion of philosophy as universal knowledge1 though he does not1 of course1 mean that the philosopher must be familiar with all the details of all the sciences4 ,section #f4 ,in justification of the meaning given to the word philosophy in this section1 ,i ask the reader to look over the list of courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading universities at home and abroad4 ,there is a certain consensus of opinion as to what properly comes under the title1 even among those who differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,ii1 sections #g-aj4 ,read the chapter on ,the ,mind and the ,world in ,common ,thought and in ,science 7,chapter ,i7 in my ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,n4,y41 #aijd4 ,one can be brought to a vivid realization of the fact that the sciences proceed upon a basis of assumptions which they do not attempt to analyze and justify1 if one will take some elementary work on arithmetic or geometry or psychology and examine the first few chapters1 bearing in mind what philosophical problems may be drawn from the materials there treated4 ,section #aa4 ,the task of reflective thought and its difficulties are treated in the chapter entitled ,how ,things are ,given in ,consciousness 7,chapter ,,iii71 in my ,system of ,metaphysics4 ,,chapter ,,iii1 sections #ab-ac4 ,read ,the ,inadequacy of the ,psychological ,standpoint1 ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,i call especial attention to the illustration of the man in the cell 7pp4 #ah ff474 ,it would be a good thing to read these pages with the class1 and to impress upon the students the fact that those who have doubted or denied the existence of the external material world have1 if they have fallen into error1 fallen into a very natural error1 and are not without some excuse4 ,section #ad4 ,see ,the ,metaphysics of the ,telephone ,exchange1 ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapter ,,xxii1 where ,professor ,pearson's doctrine is examined at length1 with quotations and references4 ,it is interesting to notice that a doubt of the external world has always rested upon some sort of a telephone exchange argument2 naturally1 it could not pass by that name before the invention of the telephone1 but the reasoning is the same4 ,it puts the world at one remove1 shutting the mind up to the circle of its ideas2 and then it doubts or denies the world1 or1 at least1 holds that its existence must be proved in some roundabout way4 ,compare ,descartes1 ,of the ,existence of ,material ,things1 ,meditations1 ,,vi4 ,,chapter ,,iv1 sections #ae-ah4 ,see ,chapters ,,vi and ,,vii1 ,what we mean by the ,external ,world1 and ,sensations and ',things1' in my ,system of ,metaphysics4 ,in that work the discussion of the distinction between the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed in ,chapter ,,xxiii1 ,the ,distinction between the ,world and the ,mind4 ,this was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter4 ,as it is possible that the reader may be puzzled by differences of expression which obtain in the two books1 a word of explanation is not out of place4 ,in the ,metaphysics1 for example1 it is said that sensations so connect themselves together as to form what we call the system of material things 7p4 #aje74 ,it is intimated in a footnote that this is a provisional statement and the reader is referred to later chapters4 ,now1 in the present book 7sections #af-ag71 it is taught that we may not call material things groups of sensations4 ,the apparent contradiction is due to the fact that1 in this volume1 the full meaning of the word sensation is exhibited at the outset1 and sensations1 as phenomena of the subjective order1 are distinguished from the phenomena of the objective order which constitute the external world4 ,in the earlier work the word sensation was for a while used loosely to cover all our experiences that do not belong to the class called imaginary1 and the distinction between the subjective and objective in this realm was drawn later 7,chapter ,,xxiii74 ,i think the present arrangement is the better one1 as it avoids from the outset the suggestion that the real world is something subjective--our sensations or ideas--and thus escapes the idealistic flavor which almost inevitably attaches to the other treatment1 until the discussion is completed1 at least4 ,,chapter ,v1 sections #aj-ba4 ,see ,chapters ,,viii and ,,ix1 ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,the ,distinction between ,appearance and ,reality and ,the ,significance of the ,distinction4 ,section #bb4 ,see ,chapter ,,xxvi1 ,the ,world as ,unperceived1 and the ',unknowable1' where ,spencer's doctrine is examined at length1 and references are given4 ,i think it is very important that the student should realize that the ,unknowable is a perfectly useless assumption in philosophy1 and can serve no purpose whatever4 ,,chapter ,,vi1 sections #bc-be4 ,see ,chapters ,x and ,,xi1 ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,the ,kantian ,doctrine of ,space and ,difficulties connected with the ,kantian ,doctrine of ,space4 ,it would be an excellent thing for the student1 after he has read the above chapters1 to take up ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 and read and analyze the argument of ,antinomies ,i and ,,ii1 with the ,observations appended4 ,one can understand these arguments without being familiar with the ,critique as a whole2 at any rate1 the account of ,kant's philosophy contained in section #ea of this book will serve to explain his use of certain terms1 such as the laws of our sensibility4 ,kant's reasonings are very curious and interesting in this part of his book4 ,it seems to be proved that the world must be endless in space and without a beginning or end in time1 and just as plausibly proved that it cannot be either4 ,it seems to be proved that finite spaces and times are infinitely divisible1 and at the same time that they cannot be infinitely divisible4 ,the situation is an amusing one1 and rendered not the less amusing by the seriousness with which the mutually destructive arguments are taken4 ,when the student meets such a tangle in the writings of any philosopher1 ,i ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that is at fault--at least1 let him not assume that it is4 ,the fault probably lies with a human reason4 ,section #bf4 ,see ,chapter ,,xii1 ,the ,berkeleian ,doctrine of ,space1 in my ,system of ,metaphysics4 ,the argument ought not to be difficult to one who has mastered ,chapter ,v of this volume4 ,,chapter ,,vii1 sections #bg-bi4 ,compare ,chapter ,,xiii1 ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,of ,time4 ,with the chapters on ,space and ,time it would be well for the student to read ,chapter ,,xiv1 ,the ,real ,world in ,space and ,time1 where it is made clear why we have no hesitation in declaring space and time to be infinite1 although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of knowledge to declare the material world infinite4 ,,chapter ,,viii1 sections #cj-cb4 ,read1 in the ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapters ,v and ,,xvii1 ,the ,self or ,knower and ,the ,atomic ,self4 ,section #cc4 ,the suggestions1 touching the attitude of the psychologist toward the mind1 contained in the preface to ,professor ,william ,james's ,psychology are very interesting and instructive4 ,,chapter ,,ix1 sections #ce-cf4 ,for a strong argument in favor of interactionism see ,james's ,psychology1 ,chapter ,v4 ,i wish the student would1 in reading it1 bear in mind what is said in my chapter on ,the ,atomic ,self1 above referred to4 ,the subject should be approached with an open mind1 and one should suspend judgment until both sides have been heard from4 ,section #cg4 ,descartes held that the lower animals are automata and that their actions are not indicative of consciousness2 he regarded their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the little pineal gland4 ,professor ,huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended it so as to include man4 ,he regarded consciousness as a collateral product of the working of the body1 related to it somewhat as is the steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine4 ,he made it an effect1 but not a cause1 of motions4 ,see ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapter ,,xviii1 ,the ,automaton ,theory3 its ,genesis4 ,we owe the doctrine of parallelism1 in its original form1 to ,spinoza4 ,it was elaborated by ,w4 ,k4 ,clifford1 and to him the modern interest in the subject is largely due4 ,the whole subject is discussed at length in my ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapters ,,xix-,,xxi4 ,the titles are3 ,the ,automaton ,theory3 ,parallelism1 ,what is ,parallelism8 and ,the ,man and the ,candlestick4 ,clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in ,professor ,strong's recent brilliant work1 ,why the ,mind has a ,body ,n4,y41 #aijc4 ,section #ch4 ,see ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapter ,,xxiv1 ,the ,time and ,place of ,sensations and ,ideas4 ,,chapter ,x1 sections #dj-db4 ,see ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapters ,,xxvii and ,,xxviii1 ,the ,existence of ,other ,minds1 and ,the ,distribution of ,minds4 ,writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other minds4 7#a7 ,i have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference4 ,this is the position usually taken4 7#b7 ,we have seen that ,huxley and ,clifford cast doubts upon the validity of the inference1 but1 nevertheless1 made it4 ,professor ,strong1 in the work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter1 maintains that it is not an inference1 and that we do not directly perceive other minds1 but that we are assured of their existence just the same4 ,he makes our knowledge an intuition in the old-fashioned sense of the word1 a something to be accepted but not to be accounted for4 7#c7 ,writers who have been influenced more or less by the ,neo-,kantian or ,neo-,hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the existence of our own4 ,i have never seen a systematic and detailed exposition of this doctrine4 ,it appears rather in the form of hints dropped in passing4 ,a number of such are to be found in ,taylor's ,elements of ,metaphysics4 ,section #dc4 ,the ,mind-stuff doctrine is examined at length and its origin discussed in ,chapter ,,xxxi of the ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,mental ,phenomena and the ,causal ,nexus4 ,it is well worth while for the student to read the whole of ,clifford's essay ,on the ,nature of ,things-in-themselves1 even if he is pressed for time4 ,,chapter ,,xi1 section #dd4 ,see ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapter ,,xv1 ,the ,world as ,mechanism4 ,section #de4 ,see ,chapter ,,xxxi1 ,the ,place of ,mind in ,nature4 ,section #df4 ,for a definition of ,fatalism1 and a description of its difference from the scientific doctrine of ,determinism1 see ,chapter ,,xxxiii1 ,fatalism1 ',freewill' and ,determinism4 ,for a vigorous defense of ,freewill 7which is not1 in my opinion1 free will at all1 in the common acceptation of the word7 see ,professor ,james's ,essay on ,the ,dilemma of the ,determinist1 in his volume1 ,the ,will to ,believe4 ,fatalism and ,determinism are constantly confused1 and much of the opposition to ,determinism is attributable to this confusion4 ,section #dg4 ,see ,chapter ,,xxxii1 ,mechanism and ,teleology4 ,,chapter ,,xii1 section #dh4 ,the notes to ,chapter ,,iii 7see above7 are in point here4 ,it is well worth the student's while to read the whole of ,chapter ,,xi1 ,book ,,iv1 of ,locke's ,essay4 ,it is entitled ,of our ,knowledge of the ,existence of ,other ,things4 ,notice the headings of some of his sections3-- ,section #a4 ,it is to be had only by sensation4 ,section #b4 ,instance whiteness of this paper4 ,section #c4 ,this1 though not so certain as demonstration1 yet may be called ',knowledge1' and proves the existence of things without us4 ,locke's argument proceeds1 as we have seen1 on the assumption that we perceive external things directly1--an assumption into which he slips unawares1--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly what is external4 ,this makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has not absolute proof1 after all4 ,the section that closes the discussion is entitled3 ,folly to expect demonstration in everything4 ,section #di4 ,i wish that ,i could believe that every one of my readers would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through ,berkeley's ,principles of ,human ,knowledge and his ,three ,dialogues between ,hylas and ,philonous4 ,clearness of thought1 beauty of style1 and elevation of sentiment characterize them throughout4 ,the ,principles is a systematic treatise4 ,if one has not time to read it all1 one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the first forty-one sections4 ,for brief readings in class1 to illustrate ,berkeley's reasoning1 one may take sections #a-c1 #ad1 #ah-bj1 and #ch4 ,the ,dialogues is a more popular work4 ,as the etymology of the names in the title suggests1 we have in it a dispute between a man who pins his faith to matter and an idealist4 ,the aim of the book is to confute skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism4 ,for ,hume's treatment of the external world1 see his ,treatise of ,human ,nature1 ,part ,,iv1 section #b4 ,for his treatment of the mind1 see ,part ,,iv1 section #f4 ,section #ej4 ,reid repeats himself a great deal1 for he gives us asseveration rather than proof4 ,one can get the gist of his argument by reading carefully a few of his sections4 ,it would be a good exercise to read in class1 if time permitted1 the two sections of his ,inquiry entitled ,of ,extension 7,chapter ,v1 section #e71 and ,of ,perception in ,general 7,chapter ,,vi1 section #bj74 ,section #ea4 ,for an account of the critical ,philosophy1 see ,falckenberg's ,history of ,modern ,philosophy 7,english translation1 ,n4,y41 #ahic74 ,compare with this the accounts in the histories of philosophy by ,ueberweg and ,hffding 7,english translation of the latter1 ,london1 #aijj74 ,full bibliographies are to be found especially in ,ueberweg4 ,it is well to look at the philosophy of ,kant through more than one pair of eyes4 ,thus1 if one reads ,morris's ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason 7,chicago1 #ahhb71 one should read also ,sidgwick's ,lectures on the ,philosophy of ,kant 7,n4,y41 #aije74 ,,chapter ,,xiii1 section #eb4 ,it is difficult to see how ,hamilton could regard himself as a natural realist 7the word is employed by him74 ,see his ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 ,,viii1 where he develops his doctrine4 ,he seems to teach1 in spite of himself1 that we can know directly only the impressions that things make on us1 and must infer all else3 ,our whole knowledge of mind and matter is1 thus1 only relative2 of existence1 absolutely and in itself1 we know nothing4 ,whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of hypothetical realism described in the text8 ,perhaps we may put the plain man1 who has not begun to reflect1 in the first class4 ,john ,locke is a good representative of the second2 see the ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 ,book ,,ii1 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,herbert ,spencer belonged to the third while he wrote ,chapter ,v of his ,first ,principles of ,philosophy4 ,section #ec4 ,i have said enough of the ,berkeleian idealism in the notes on ,chapter ,,xii4 ,as a good illustration of objective idealism in one of its forms ,i may take the doctrine of ,professor ,royce2 see his address1 ,the ,conception of ,god 7,n4,y41 #aijb74 ,mr4 ,bradley's doctrine is criticised in ,chapter ,,xxxiv 7entitled ,of ,god71 ,system of ,metaphysics4 ,,chapter ,,xiv1 section #ee4 ,see ,system of ,metaphysics1 ,chapter ,,xvi1 ,the ,insufficiency of ,materialism4 ,section #ef4 ,professor ,strong's volume1 ,why the ,mind has a ,body 7,n4,y41 #aijc71 advocates a panpsychism much like that of ,clifford4 ,it is very clearly written1 and with ,clifford's essay on ,the ,nature of ,things-in-themselves1 ought to give one a good idea of the considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists4 ,section #eg4 ,the pantheistic monism of ,spinoza is of such importance historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its meaning4 ,i have discussed this at length in two earlier works3 ,the ,philosophy of ,spinoza 7,n4,y41 #ahid7 and ,on ,spinozistic ,immortality4 ,the student is referred to the account of ,spinoza's ,god or ,substance contained in these4 ,see1 especially1 the ,introductory ,note in the back of the first-mentioned volume4 ,professor ,royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist2 see the volume referred to in the note above 7section #ec74 ,his ,absolute1 or ,god1 is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite minds are parts4 ,section #eh4 ,sir ,william ,hamilton's dualism is developed in his ,lectures on ,metaphysics1 ,,viii4 ,he writes3 ,mind and matter1 as known or knowable1 are only two different series of phenomena or qualities2 as unknown and unknowable1 they are the two substances in which these two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere4 ,the existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are compelled to make1 from the existence of known phenomena2 and the distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one4 ,,chapter ,,xv1 section #fj4 ,the reader will find ,descartes's path traced in the ,meditations4 ,in ,i1 we have his sweeping doubt2 in ,,ii1 his doctrine as to the mind2 in ,,iii1 the existence of ,god is established2 in ,,vi1 he gets around to the existence of the external world4 ,we find a good deal of the natural light in the first part of his ,principles of ,philosophy4 ,section #fa4 ,we have an excellent illustration of ,locke's inconsistency in violating his own principles and going beyond experience1 in his treatment of ,substance4 ,read1 in his ,essay1 ,book ,i1 ,chapter ,,iv1 section #ah1 and ,book ,,ii1 ,chapter ,,xxiii1 section #d4 ,these sections are not long1 and might well be read and analyzed in class4 ,section #fb4 ,see the note to section #ea4 ,section #fd4 ,i write this note 7in #aijh7 to give the reader some idea of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism4 ,there has been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three years1 but ,i am not able to say even yet that we have to do with a clear-cut doctrine1 the limits and consequences of which have been worked out in detail4 ,hence1 ,i prefer to leave section #fd as ,i first wrote it1 merely supplementing it here4 ,we may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to be ,professor ,william ,james1 ,dr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller1 and ,professor ,john ,dewey4 ,the first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume entitled ,pragmatism 7,london1 #aijg72 the second1 who calls his doctrine ,humanism1 but declares himself a pragmatist1 and in essential agreement with ,professor ,james1 has published two volumes of philosophical essays entitled ,humanism 7,london1 #aijc7 and ,studies in ,humanism 7,london1 #aijg72 the third has developed his position in the first four chapters of the ,studies in ,logical ,theory 7,chicago1 #aijc74 ,professor ,james1 in his ,pragmatism 7,lecture ,,ii71 says that pragmatism1 at the outset1 at least1 stands for no particular results4 ,it has no dogmas1 and no doctrines save its method4 ,this method means3 ,the attitude of looking away from first things1 principles1 'categories1' supposed necessities2 and of looking towards last things1 fruits1 consequences1 facts4 ,he remarks further1 however1 that pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense1 as signifying a certain theory of truth 7pp4 #ed-ee74 ,this theory is brought forward in ,lecture ,,vi4 ,the theory maintains that3 ,true ideas are those that we can assimilate1 validate1 corroborate1 and verify4 ,false ideas are those that we can not 7p4 #bja74 ,this sounds as though ,professor ,james abandoned his doctrine touching the ,turk and the ,christian mentioned in section #fd4 ,but what do the words verification and validation pragmatically mean8 ,we are told that they signify certain practical consequences of the verified and validated idea4 ,our ideas may be said to agree with reality when they lead us1 through acts and other ideas which they instigate1 up to or towards other parts of experience with which we feel that the original ideas remain in agreement4 ,the connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive1 harmonious1 satisfactory4 ,this function of agreeable leading is what we mean by an idea's verification 7p4 #bjb74 ,thus1 we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in which the word has usually been employed heretofore4 ,the tendency to take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned4 ,that ,professor ,james does not really leave his ,turk in the lurch becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does take4 ,see1 for example1 his pragmatic argument for free-will4 ,the doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of relief 7pp4 #aaj-aba74 ,briefly stated1 ,dr4 ,schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made1 and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them4 ,it is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of ,professor ,james1 and ,i shall not dwell upon it4 ,dr4 ,schiller's essays are very entertainingly written4 ,professor ,dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from the above to merit another title4 ,in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,volume ,,iv1 ,no4 #d1 ,professor ,dewey brings out the distinction between his own position and that of ,professor ,james4 ,to the periodical literature on pragmatism ,i cannot refer in detail4 ,professor ,james defends his position against misconceptions in the ,philosophical ,review1 ,volume ,,xvii1 ,no4 #a4 ,see1 on the other side1 ,professor ,perry1 in the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,volume ,,iv1 pp4 #cfe and #dba2 ,professor ,hibben1 ,philosophical ,review1 ,,xvii1 #d2 and ,dr4 ,carus1 ,the ,monist1 ,july1 #aijh4 ,,chapter ,,xvi1 sections #fe-fh4 ,to see how the logicians have regarded their science and its relation to philosophy1 see2 ,keynes's ,formal ,logic 7,london1 #ahid71 ,introduction2 ,hobhouse's ,theory of ,knowledge 7,london1 #ahif71 ,introduction2 ,aikins's ,the ,principles of ,logic 7,n4,y41 #aijb71 ,introduction2 and ,creighton's ,introductory ,logic 7,n4,y41 #ahih71 ,preface4 ,professor ,aikins writes3 ,thus1 in so far as logic tries to make us reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way in which their relations involve each other1 it is a kind of simple metaphysics studied for a practical end4 ,professor ,creighton says1 ,although in treating the syllogistic logic ,i have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation1 ,i have both here1 and when dealing with the inductive methods1 endeavored to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way1 and to prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book4 ,john ,stuart ,mill tried not to be metaphysical2 but let the reader examine1 say1 his third chapter1 ,of the ,things denoted by ,names1 or look over ,book ,,vi1 in his ,system of ,logic4 ,professor ,sigwart's great work1 ,logik 7,freiburg1 #b;d edition1 ,volume ,i1 #ahhi1 ,volume ,,ii1 #ahic71 may almost be called a philosophy of logic4 ,,chapter ,,xvii1 section #fi4 ,compare with ,professor ,james's account of the scope of psychology the following from ,professor ,baldwin3 ,the question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics1 over which a fierce warfare has been waged in recent years1 is now fairly settled by the adjustment of mutual claims4 4 4 4 ,the terms of the adjustment of which ,i speak are briefly these3 on the one hand1 empirical investigation must precede rational interpretation1 and this empirical investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and preconception2 on the other hand1 rational interpretation must be equally free in its own province1 since progress from the individual to the general1 from the detached fact to its universal meaning1 can be secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses1 both metaphysical and speculative4 ,starting from the empirical we run out at every step into the metempirical4 ,handbook of ,psychology1 ,preface1 pp4 iii and iv4 ,,chapter ,,xviii1 section #ga4 ,the teacher might very profitably take extracts from the two chapters of ,whewell's ,elements of ,morality referred to in the text1 and read them with the class4 ,it is significant of the weakness of ,whewell's position that he can give us advice as long as we do not need it1 but1 when we come to the cross-roads1 he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual conscience1 and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide us4 ,section #gb4 ,wundt1 in his volume ,the ,facts of the ,moral ,life 7,n4,y41 #ahig71 tries to develop an empirical science of ethics independent of metaphysics2 see the ,preface4 ,compare with this3 ,martineau's ,types of ,ethical ,theory 7,london1 #ahhe71 ,preface2 ,t4 ,h4 ,green's ,prolegomena to ,ethics1 ,introduction2 ,muirhead's ,the ,elements of ,ethics 7,n4,y41 #ahib72 ,mackenzie's ,a ,manual of ,ethics 7,london1 #ahic72 ,jodl's ,gesduchte der ,ethik 7,stuttgart1 #ahhb71 ,preface4 ,i give but a few references1 but they will serve to illustrate how close1 in the opinion of ethical writers1 is the relation between ethics and philosophy4 ,,chapter ,,xix1 section #gd4 ,the student who turns over the pages of several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial similarity that is apt to obtain among them4 ,one sees the field mapped out into ,ontology 7the science of ,being or ,reality71 ,rational ,cosmology1 and ,rational ,psychology4 ,these titles are mediaeval landmarks which have been left standing4 ,i may as well warn the reader that two men who discourse of ,ontology may not be talking about the same thing at all4 ,bear in mind what was said in section #eg of the different ways of conceiving the ,one ,substance2 and bear in mind also what was said in ,chapter ,v of the proper meaning of the word reality4 ,i have discarded the above titles in my ,system of ,metaphysics1 because ,i think it is better and less misleading to use plain and unambiguous language4 ,section #ge4 ,see the note to ,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,chapter ,,xx1 sections #gf-gg4 ,one can get an idea of the problems with which the philosophy of religion has to deal by turning to my ,system of ,metaphysics and reading the two chapters entitled ,of ,god1 at the close of the book4 ,it would be interesting to read and criticise in class some of the theistic arguments that philosophers have brought forward4 ,quotations and references are given in ,chapter ,,xxxiv4 ,,chapter ,,xxi1 sections #gh-gi4 ,what is said of the science of logic1 in ,chapter ,,xvi1 has1 of course1 a bearing upon these sections4 ,i suggest that the student examine a few chapters of ,the ,grammar of ,science2 the book is very readable4 ,,chapter ,,xxii1 sections #hj-hb4 ,the reader will find in lectures ,i and ,,ii in ,sir ,william ,hamilton's ,lectures on ,metaphysics a discussion of the utility of philosophy4 ,it has a pleasant1 old-fashioned flavor1 and contains some good thoughts4 ,what is said in ,chapters ,,xvi-,,xxi of the present volume has a good deal of bearing upon the subject4 ,see especially what is said in the chapters on logic1 ethics1 and the philosophy of religion4 ,,chapter ,,xxiii1 sections #hc-hg4 ,there is a rather brief but good and thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the comprehension of philosophical doctrines in ,falckenberg's ,history of ,modern ,philosophy 7,english translation1 ,n4,y41 #ahic72 see the ,introduction4 ,we have a good illustration of the fact that there may be parallel streams of philosophic thought 7section #hg7 when we turn to the ,stoics and the ,epicureans4 ,zeno and ,epicurus were contemporaries1 but they were men of very dissimilar character1 and the schools they founded differed widely in spirit4 ,zeno went back for his view of the physical world to ,heraclitus1 and for his ethics to the ,cynics4 ,epicurus borrowed his fundamental thoughts from ,democritus4 ,on the other hand1 philosophers may sometimes be regarded as links in the one chain4 ,witness the series of ,german thinkers3 ,kant1 ,fichte1 ,schelling1 ,hegel1 ,schopenhauer2 or the series of ,british thinkers3 ,locke1 ,berkeley1 ,hume1 ,mill4 ,herbert ,spencer represents a confluence of the streams4 ,the spirit of his doctrine is predominantly ,british2 but he got his ,unknowable from ,kant1 through ,hamilton and ,mansel4 ,at any point in a given stream there may be a division4 ,thus1 ,kant was awakened to his creative effort by ,hume4 ,but ,mill is also the successor of ,hume1 and more truly the successor1 for he carries on the traditional way of approaching philosophical problems1 while ,kant rebels against it1 and heads a new line4 ,,chapter ,,xxiv1 sections #hh-ic4 ,i hardly think it is necessary for me to comment upon this chapter4 ,the recommendations amount to this3 that a man should be fair-minded and reasonable1 free from partisanship1 cautious1 and able to suspend judgment where the evidence is not clear2 also that where the light of reason does not seem to him to shine brightly and to illumine his path as he could wish1 he should be influenced in his actions by the reflection that he has his place in the social order1 and must meet the obligations laid upon him by this fact4 ,when the pragmatist emphasizes the necessity of accepting ideals and living by them1 he is doing us a service4 ,but we must see to it that he does not lead us into making arbitrary decisions and feeling that we are released from the duty of seeking for evidence4 ,read together sections #fd1 #ia1 and #ic4 ,,index ,absolute1 ,the3 ,spencer's doctrine of1 #gj2 ,bradley's1 #aia-aib2 meanings of the word1 #bja2 reference1 #cab4 ,activity and ,passivity3 meaning of1 #aei-afa2 confused with cause and effect1 #aei-afa2 activity of mind1 #afb-afc4 ,aesthetics3 a philosophical discipline1 #bdb-bdc4 ,agnosticism3 #bjb4 ,aikins3 #cad4 ,albert the ,great3 scope of his labors1 #i4 ,analytical ,judgments3 defined1 #agh4 ,anaxagoras3 his doctrine1 #d2 on the soul1 #aja4 ,anaximander3 his doctrine1 #c4 ,anaximenes3 his doctrine1 #c2 on the soul1 #aja4 ,appearances3 doubt of their objectivity1 #ce2 realities and1 #ei ff42 apparent and real space1 #hj-hg2 apparent and real time1 #ic-ii2 apparent and real extension1 #aac2 measurement of apparent time1 #abh2 appearance and reality1 ,bradley's doctrine1 #aia-aib4 ,aristotle3 reference to ,thales1 #c2 scope of his philosophy1 #g2 authority in the ,middle ,ages1 #i2 on the soul1 #ajb-ajc4 ,arithmetic3 compared with logic1 #bbe-bbf4 ,atoms3 nature of our knowledge of1 #bb-bc2 also1 #fe-fg2 doctrine of ,democritus1 #aid-aie4 ,augustine3 on time as past1 present1 and future1 #ij ff42 on soul and body1 #ajd2 as scientist and as philosopher1 #bgh4 ,authority3 in philosophy1 #bia-bif4 ,automatism3 the automaton theory1 #abi-acj2 animal automatism1 #ada-adb2 activity of mind and automatism1 #afb2 references1 #cjh-cji4 ,automaton3 see ,automatism4 ,bacon1 ,francis3 his conception of philosophy1 #aj4 ,baldwin3 on psychology and metaphysics1 #cad4 ,berkeley3 referred to1 #ef2 on appearance and reality1 #fa-fc2 his idealism1 #afh-agj2 his theism1 #aij-aia2 references to his works1 #caj4 ,body and ,mind3 see ,mind and ,body4 ,bosanquet3 his logic1 #bce4 ,bradley3 his ,absolute1 #aia-aib2 reference given1 #caa4 ,breath3 mind conceived to be1 #aja4 ,cassiodorus3 on soul and body1 #ajc-ajd4 ,cause and ,effect2 meaning of words1 #aah-abj2 relation of mental and material not causal1 #aba-abf2 see also1 #acb2 cause and effect1 activity and passivity1 #aei ff4 ,child3 its knowledge of the world1 #ah-ai4 ,cicero3 ,pythagoras' use of word philosopher1 #b2 on immortality1 #cb4 ,clifford1 ,w4 ,k43 on infinite divisibility of space1 #gi-hj2 on other minds1 #ace2 on mind-stuff1 #add-adf2 his panpsychism1 #aig-aih2 his parallelism1 #cjh-cji2 references on mind-stuff1 #cji4 ,common ,sense3 notions of mind and body1 #ajf ff42 ,reid's doctrine1 #aga-agd2 common sense ethics1 #bcf-bdj4 ,common ,thought3 what it is1 #ah-bj4 ,concomitance3 see ,mind and ,body4 ,copernican ,system3 #bhb4 ,cornelius3 on metaphysics1 #bdi4 ,creighton3 #cad4 ,critical ,empiricism3 the doctrine1 #bah-bai4 ,critical ,philosophy3 outlined1 #age-ahj2 criticised1 #baa-bah2 references1 #caa4 ,croesus3 #a4 ,democritus3 doctrine referred to1 #d2 his place in the history of philosophy1 #e2 on the soul1 #aja-ajb2 his materialism examined1 #aid-aie4 ,descartes3 conception of philosophy1 #aj2 on mind and body1 #aje-ajf2 also1 #aai2 on animal automatism1 #ada-adb2 on the external world1 #afc-afh2 on substance1 #aih2 his rationalism1 #bjf-bji2 the natural light1 #bjh2 his attempt at a critical philosophy1 #bad2 his rules of method1 #bad2 provisional rules of life1 #cja-cjb2 reference given1 #cjf2 reference to his automatism1 #cjh2 references to the ,meditations1 #cab4 ,determinism3 #aee-aei2 references1 #cji-caj4 ,dewey1 ,john3 #cab-cad4 ,dogmatism3 ,kant's use of term1 #baa-bab4 ,dualism3 what1 #aic2 varieties of1 #bjb-bjd2 the present volume dualistic1 #bjd2 ,hamilton's1 #cab4 ,eleatics3 their doctrine1 #d4 ,empedocles3 his doctrine1 #d2 a pluralist1 #bje4 ,empiricism3 the doctrine1 #bji-baa2 ,kant on1 #bab2 critical empiricism1 #bah-bai4 ,energy3 conservation of1 #aea-aed4 ,epicureans3 their view of philosophy1 #g-h2 their materialism1 #ajb4 ,epiphenomenon3 the mind as1 #afb4 ,epistemology3 its place among the philosophical sciences1 #bdg-bdi4 ,ethics3 and the mechanism of nature1 #aei-afd2 common sense ethics1 #bcf-bdj2 ,whewell criticised1 #bch-bdj2 philosophy and1 #bdj-bdb2 utility of1 #bfe-bfg2 references1 #cae4 ,evidence3 in philosophy1 #bif-bih4 ,existence3 of material things1 #ef-eh2 also1 #afe-aib4 ,experience3 suggestions of the word1 #eh2 ,hume's doctrine of what it yields1 #agj-aga2 ,descartes and ,locke1 #agh2 ,kant's view of1 #agi2 empiricism1 #bji-baa2 critical empiricism1 #bah-bai4 ,experimental ,psychology3 its scope1 #bcd-bce4 ,explanation3 of relation of mind and body1 #abe-abf4 ,external ,world3 its existence1 #cb ff42 plain man's knowledge of1 #cb-cf2 psychologist's attitude1 #cf-ch2 the telephone exchange1 #ch-dd2 what the external world is1 #de-eh2 its existence discussed1 #ef-eh2 a mechanism1 #adg-aej2 knowledge of1 theories1 #afe-ahj2 ,descartes on1 #bjg-bjh2 psychologist's attitude discussed1 #bcj-bcd4 ,falckenberg3 #caa1 #caf4 ,fate3 #aeh2 literature on fatalism1 #cji-caj4 ,fichte3 on philosophic method1 #aj2 solipsistic utterances1 #acc4 ,final ,cause3 what1 #afa4 ,form and ,matter3 the distinction between1 #hb-hc2 space as form1 #hb-hd2 time as form1 #id2 ,kant's doctrine of forms1 #agi2 the same criticised1 #baf-bag4 ,free-will3 and the order of nature1 #aed-aei2 determinism and free-will-ism1 #aee-aei2 literature referred to1 #cji-caj4 ,god3 revealed in the world1 #afc-afd2 ,berkeley on argument for1 #aij-aia2 ,spinoza on ,god or substance1 #aii2 ,descartes' argument for1 #bjh2 influence of belief on ethics1 #bda2 conceptions of1 #beb-bec2 relation to the world1 #bec-bed2 monistic conception of1 #cab2 references1 #cad4 ,greek ,philosophy3 ,pre-,socratic characterized1 #b-e2 conception of philosophy from ,sophists to ,aristotle1 #e-g2 the ,stoics1 ,epicureans1 and ,skeptics1 #g-h4 ,green1 ,t4 ,h43 #bah1 #cae4 ,hamilton1 ,sir ,w43 on space1 #gf2 on the external world1 #agd2 also1 #ahb2 reference1 #caa2 his dualism1 #cab2 on utility of philosophy1 #caf4 ,hegel3 his conception of philosophy1 #aa2 an objective idealist1 #aij4 ,heraclitus3 his doctrine1 #d2 on the soul1 #aja4 ,herodotus3 #a-b4 ,history of ,philosophy3 much studied1 #bgc-bgd2 its importance1 #bgd-bha2 how to read it1 #bha-bhg2 references1 #caf4 ,hobhouse3 on theory of knowledge1 #bdh2 reference1 #cab4 ,hffding3 his monism1 #bjj-bja2 his history of philosophy1 #caa4 ,howison3 on pluralism1 #bje4 ,humanism3 #cab-cac4 ,hume3 his doctrine1 #agj-aga2 use of word impression1 #agg2 influence on ,kant1 #agg-agh4 ,huxley3 on other minds1 #ace1 #ach2 on automatism1 #cjh4 ,hypothetical ,realism3 see ,realism4 ,idealism3 in ,berkeley and ,hume1 #afh-aga2 general discussion of the varieties of1 #ahg-aib2 proper attitude toward1 #bhi-bia4 ,ideas3 distinguished from things1 #cc-cf2 in psychology1 #cf-ch2 ,berkeley's use of the word1 #afh-agj2 ,hume's use of the word1 #agg4 ,imagination3 contrasted with sense1 #de-di2 extension of imagined things1 #aac4 ,immateriality3 of mind1 see ,plotinus1 and ,mind4 ,impression3 ,hume's use of word1 #agg4 ,infinity3 infinity and infinite divisibility of space1 #gc-hj2 of time1 #hh-ij2 also1 #ie-ig2 mathematics and1 #bbf4 ,inside3 meaning of word1 #ee4 ,interactionism3 see ,mind and ,body4 ,intuitionalists2 defined1 #bdj4 ,ionian ,school3 #c4 ,james1 ,w43 on pragmatism1 #bbj-bbb and #cab-cac2 on psychology and metaphysics1 #bcj-bca2 on interactionism1 reference1 #cjh2 on free-will1 #cji-caj4 ,jevons3 his logic1 #bbd2 on study of scientific method1 #bef4 ,jodl3 #cae4 ,kant3 on space1 #ge2 his critical philosophy1 #age-ahj2 his philosophy criticised1 #baa-bah2 references to1 #cjg1 #caa4 ,keynes3 #cad4 ,localisation3 of sensations1 what1 #abg4 ,locke1 ,john3 on doubt of external world1 #cb2 on substance1 #ajh2 on perception of external world1 #aff-afh2 his empiricism1 #bji-baj2 his attempt at a critical philosophy1 #bae-baf2 on innate moral principles1 #bdj2 reference to ,essay1 #caj2 his hypothetical realism1 #caa2 treatment of substance1 references1 #cab4 ,logic2 the traditional1 #bbd2 modern logic1 #bbd-bbe2 ,jevons and ,bosanquet referred to1 #bbd-bbe2 philosophy and1 #bbe-bbi2 compared with arithmetic1 #bbe-bbg2 deeper problems of1 #bbg2 ,spencer cited1 #bbh2 utility of1 #bfd-bfe2 references1 #cad4 ,lucretius3 his materialistic psychology1 #ajb4 ,mach3 #ad4 ,mackenzie3 #cae4 ,malebranche3 referred to1 #adb4 ,martineau3 #cae4 ,materialism3 primitive man's notion of mind1 #ajj-aja2 materialism in the ,greek philosophy1 #aja-ajb2 refutation of1 #aaa-acb2 general account of1 #aid-aig4 ,mathematics3 nature of mathematical knowledge1 #bc-be2 arithmetic compared with logic1 #bbe-bbf2 mathematical relations and cause and effect1 #beg2 mathematical methods1 #bef-beg4 ,matter3 what is meant by material things1 #ea-eh2 the material world a mechanism1 #adg-aej4 ,matter and ,form3 see ,form and ,matter4 ,mc,cosh3 on mind and body1 #abj4 ,mechanism3 the material world a1 #adg-aej2 objections to the doctrine1 #adh-aej2 mind and mechanism1 #aea-aed2 mechanism and morals1 #aei-afd2 mechanism and teleology1 reference1 #caj4 ,metaphysician3 on the mind1 #aaa ff4 ,metaphysics3 psychology and1 #bcj-bcd2 distinguished from philosophy1 #bdd-bde2 uncertainty of1 #bdg2 utility of1 #bfi-bgb2 traditional divisions of1 #cae4 ,method3 scientific method1 #bef-bei4 ,middle ,ages3 view of philosophy in1 #h-i4 ,mill1 ,j4 ,s43 the argument for other minds1 #acf-ach2 on permanent possibilities of sensation1 #bhi2 his logic1 #cad4 ,mind3 the child's notion of1 #ajj2 regarded as breath1 #aja2 suggestions of ,latin1 ,greek1 and ,hebrew words for mind or soul1 #aja2 materialistic views of1 in ,greek philosophy1 #aja-ajb2 ,plato and ,aristotle on nature of1 #ajb-ajc2 doctrine of ,plotinus1 #ajc2 of ,cassiodorus1 #ajc2 of ,augustine1 #ajd2 of ,descartes1 #aje-ajf2 modern common sense notions of mind1 #ajf-aaj2 mind as substance1 ,locke quoted1 #ajh-aji2 psychologist's notion of1 #aaj-aaa2 what the mind is1 #aaa-aad2 place of mind in nature1 #aea-aed2 minds active1 #afb-afc2 see also1 ,mind and ,body1 and ,other ,minds4 ,mind and ,body3 is the mind in the body1 #aae-aag2 plain man's notion of1 #aaf2 interactionism1 #aag-aba2 doctrine of ,descartes and his successors1 #aai-abj2 plain man as interactionist1 #abj2 ,mc,cosh quoted1 #abj-aba2 objection to interactionism1 #aba2 parallelism1 #aba-abf2 its foundation in experience1 #abc-abd2 meaning of word concomitance1 #abc-abe2 time and place of mental phenomena1 #abf-abi2 objections to parallelism1 #abi-acb2 ,clifford's parallelism criticised1 #acj2 mental phenomena and causality1 #abi2 double sense of word concomitance1 #aca-acb2 mind and the mechanism of the world1 #aea-aed2 mechanism and morals1 #aei-afd2 concomitant phenomena and attainment of ends1 #afb2 references given on other minds and mind-stuff1 #cji2 see also1 ,other ,minds4 ,mind-stuff3 see ,other ,minds4 ,minima ,sensibilia3 #hg4 ,modern ,philosophy3 conception of philosophy in1 #i-ab4 ,monism3 what1 #aic-aid2 varieties of1 #aid-bjb2 narrower sense of word1 #aih-bjb4 ,moral ,distinctions3 their foundation1 #aei-afd4 ,muirhead3 #cae4 ,nave ,realism3 #aha4 ,natural ,light3 term used by ,descartes1 #bjh4 ,natural ,realism3 see ,realism4 ,nature3 place of mind in1 #aea-aed2 order of nature and free-will1 #aed-aei4 ,neo-,platonism3 referred to1 #h2 on the soul as immaterial1 #ajc4 ,nihilism3 word used by ,hamilton1 #ahf4 ,noumena3 see ,phenomena4 ,objective ,idealism3 #ahi-aij2 reference to ,royce1 #caa4 ,objective ,order3 contrasted with the subjective1 #ee4 ,ontology3 what1 #cae4 ,orders of ,experience3 the subjective and the objective1 #ee2 see also1 #aad4 ,other ,minds3 their existence1 #acc-acf2 ,fichte referred to1 #acc2 ,richter quoted1 #acc2 ,huxley and ,clifford on proof of1 #ace2 the argument for1 #acf-adj2 ,mill quoted1 #acf-ach2 ,huxley criticised1 #ach-adj2 what minds are there8 #adj-add2 ,descartes quoted1 #ada-adb2 ,malebranche1 #adb2 the limits of psychic life1 #adb-add2 mind-stuff1 #add-adf2 proper attitude toward solipsism1 #bia4 ,outside3 meaning of word1 #ee4 ,panpsychism3 the doctrine1 #aih2 references given1 #caa4 ,pantheism3 #bjb4 ,parallelism3 see ,mind and ,body4 ,paulsen3 on nature of philosophy1 #cje4 ,pearson3 the telephone exchange1 #ch ff42 on scientific principles and method1 #beh-bei2 reference given1 #cjf4 ,peirce1 ,c4 ,s43 on pragmatism1 #bai-bbj4 ,perception3 see ,representative ,perception4 ,phenomena and ,noumena3 ,kant's distinction between1 #agf-ahj4 ,philosophical ,sciences3 enumerated1 #ac2 why grouped together1 #ac-ag2 examined in detail1 #bbc-bei4 ,philosophy3 meaning of word1 and history of its use1 #a ff42 what the word now covers1 #ab-ag2 problems of1 #cb-afd2 historical background of modern philosophy1 #afe-ahj2 types of1 #aha-bbb2 logic and1 #bbe-bbi2 psychology and1 #bcj-bcd2 ethics and1 #bdj-bdb2 aesthetics and1 #bdb-bdc2 metaphysics distinguished from1 #bdd-bde2 religion and1 #bej-bed2 the non-philosophical sciences and1 #bee-bei2 utility of1 #bfc-bgb2 history of1 #bgc-bhg2 verification in1 #bgf-bgg2 as poetry and as science1 #bha-bhc2 how systems arise1 #bhc-bhg2 practical admonitions1 #bhh-cjc2 authority in1 #bia-bif2 ordinary rules of evidence in1 #bif-bih4 ,physiological ,psychology3 what it is1 #bcd4 ,pineal ,gland2 as seat of the soul1 #aje4 ,place3 of mental phenomena1 see ,space4 ,plain ,man3 his knowledge of the world1 #ai-bj2 also1 #cb-cf2 his knowledge of space1 #gc2 on mind and body1 #ajf-aaj2 his interactionism1 #abj4 ,plants3 psychic life in1 #adc4 ,plato3 use of word philosopher1 #b2 scope of his philosophy1 #f-g2 on the soul1 #ajb-ajc4 ,plotinus3 the soul as immaterial1 #ajc4 ,pluralism and ,singularism3 described1 #bjd-bje4 ,poetry and ,philosophy3 #bha-bhc4 ,poincar3 referred to1 #beh4 ,pragmatism3 the doctrine1 #bai-bbb2 see also1 #bif-bih1 #cjj-cjc1 and #cab-cad2 will to believe1 references1 #caj1 #cab4 ,present3 meaning of the present1 #ig-ii4 ,psychology3 psychological knowledge characterized1 #be-bh2 attitude of psychologist toward external world1 #cf-ch2 toward mind1 #aaj-aaa2 philosophy and1 #bcj-bcd2 double affiliation of1 #bcd-bce2 utility of1 #bfh-bfi2 metaphysics and1 #cac2 rational1 #cae4 ,ptolemaic ,system2 #bhb4 ,pythagoras3 the word philosopher1 #b4 ,pythagoreans3 their doctrine1 #d4 ,qualities of ,things3 contrasted with sensations1 #ea-ef4 ,rational ,cosmology3 #cae4 ,rationalism3 the doctrine1 #bjf-bji4 ,rational ,psychology3 #cae4 ,real3 see ,reality4 ,realism3 hypothetical realism1 #afh2 natural realism1 #agd2 general discussion of realism and its varieties1 #aha-ahg2 ambiguity of the word1 #ahf-ahg4 ,reality3 contrasted with appearance1 #ce2 in psychology1 #cf-ch2 the telephone exchange and1 #ch ff42 things and their appearances1 #ei-fa2 real things1 #fa-fc2 ultimate real things1 #fc-fh2 the ,unknowable as ,reality1 #fh-gb2 real space1 #hj-hg2 real time1 #ic-ii2 substance as reality1 #aaa2 real and apparent extension1 #aac-aad2 measurement of apparent time1 #abh2 ,bradley's doctrine of reality1 #aia-aib2 ,clifford's panpsychism and reality1 #aig-aih4 ,reflective ,thought3 its nature1 #bh-ca4 ,reid1 ,thomas3 doctrine of common sense1 #aga-agd2 references1 #caj4 ,religion3 philosophy and1 #bej-bed2 conceptions of ,god1 #beb-bec2 ,god and the world1 #bec-bed2 see ,god4 ,representative ,perception3 plain man's position1 #cb-cf2 the psychologist1 #cf-ch2 telephone exchange doctrine1 #ch-dd2 the true distinction between sensations and things1 #de-eh2 the doctrine of1 #afe-afh2 ,descartes and ,locke quoted1 #afe-afh4 ,richter1 ,jean ,paul3 on the solipsist1 #acc4 ,royce3 an objective idealist1 #caa2 a monist1 #cab4 ,schelling3 attitude toward natural philosophy1 #aj4 ,schiller3 on ,humanism1 #cab-cac4 ,schools3 in philosophy1 #bia-bif4 ,science3 philosophy and the special sciences1 #ab-ag2 the philosophical sciences1 #ac ff42 nature of scientific knowledge1 #ba-bh2 compared with reflective thought1 #bi-ca2 science and the world as mechanism1 #adh2 the conservation of energy1 #aea-aed2 philosophical sciences examined in detail1 #bbc-bei2 science and metaphysical analysis1 #bdf-bdg2 the non-philosophical sciences and philosophy1 #bee-bei2 study of scientific principles1 #bef-bei2 verification in science and in philosophy1 #bge-bgg2 philosophy as science1 #bha-bhc4 ,scientific ,knowledge3 see ,science4 ,sensations3 knowledge of things through1 #cc-dd2 sense and imagination contrasted1 #de-di2 are things groups of1 #di-ea2 distinction between things and1 #ea-ef2 use of the word in this volume and in the ,system of ,metaphysics1 #cjf-cjg4 ,sidgwick3 on ,kant1 #caa4 ,sigwart3 #cad4 ,singularism and ,pluralism3 described1 #bjd-bje4 ,skeptics3 their view of philosophy1 #g-h2 their doubt of reality1 #ei2 ,hume's skepticism1 #aga4 ,socrates3 use of words philosopher and philosophy1 #b2 attitude toward sophism1 #f4 ,solipsism3 see ,other ,minds4 ,solon3 #a4 ,sophists3 characterized1 #f4 ,soul3 see ,mind4 ,space3 plain man's knowledge of1 #gc2 said to be necessary1 infinite and infinitely divisible1 #gc-gd2 discussion of it as necessary and as infinite1 #gd-gg2 ,kant1 ,hamilton1 and ,spencer quoted1 #ge-gg2 as infinitely divisible1 the moving point1 #gg-hj2 ,clifford quoted1 #gi-hj2 real space and apparent1 #hj-hg2 matter and form1 #hb-hd2 extension of imaginary things1 #aac2 place of mental phenomena1 #aae-aag1 also1 #abf-abi4 ,spencer1 ,herbert3 his definition of philosophy1 #aa2 his work criticised1 #aa-ab2 on the ,unknowable as ultimate ,reality1 #fi-gj2 ,spencer as natural realist1 #agd2 influenced by ,kant's doctrine1 #agf2 his inconsistent doctrine of the external world1 #ahc-ahd2 defective logic1 #bbh2 influence of agnosticism1 #bga2 references given1 #cjg1 #caa4 ,spinoza3 his a priori method1 #aj2 on ,god or substance1 #aii2 his rationalism1 #bjh2 his parallelism1 #cjh2 references1 #caa-cab4 ,spiritualism3 the doctrine1 #aig-aih4 ,stoics3 their view of philosophy1 #g-h2 their materialism1 #ajb4 ,strong3 on other minds1 #bji2 references to1 #cji1 #caa4 ,subjective ,idealism3 #ahg-ahh4 ,subjective ,order3 contrasted with objective1 #ee4 ,substance3 meaning of word1 #ajh2 ,locke on1 #ajh2 mind as substance1 #aaa-aab2 doctrine of the ,one ,substance1 #aih-bjb4 ,synthetic ,judgments3 defined1 #agi4 ,systems of ,philosophy3 their relations to each other1 #bhc-bhg4 ,taylor3 on other minds1 #cji4 ,teleology3 what1 #afc2 reference1 #caj4 ,telephone ,exchange3 doctrine of the external world as messages1 #ch-dd4 ,thales3 his doctrine1 #c4 ,theism3 see ,god4 ,theory of ,knowledge3 see ,epistemology4 ,things3 our knowledge of1 #ah-bc2 contrast of ideas and1 #cc-cf2 same contrast in psychology1 #cf-ch2 sensations and things1 #de ff42 existence of1 #ef-eh2 contrasted with appearances1 #ei ff42 real things1 #fa ff42 the space of real things1 #hj-hg4 ,thomas ,aquinas3 scope of his labors1 #i4 ,time3 as necessary1 infinite1 and infinitely divisible1 #hh-ij2 problem of knowing past1 present1 and future1 #ij-ic2 ,augustine quoted1 #ij-ia2 timeless self criticised1 #ib-ic2 real time and apparent1 #ic-ii2 real time as necessary1 infinite1 and infinitely divisible1 #ie-ig2 consciousness of time1 #ig-ii2 mental phenomena and time1 #abf-abi4 ,timeless ,self3 #ib-ic4 ,touch3 the real world revealed in experiences of1 #fa-fc4 ,truth3 pragmatism and1 #bai-bbb and #cab-cad2 ,whewell on veracity1 #bch-bci2 criterion of truth in philosophy1 #bif-bih2 also1 #cjj-cjc4 ,ueberweg3 #cje1 #caa4 ,ultimate ,reality3 see ,reality4 ,unknowable3 as ,reality1 #fh-gb2 see ,spencer4 ,utility3 of liberal studies1 #bfj-bfc2 of philosophy1 #cfc-bgb4 ,verification3 in science and in philosophy1 #bge-bgg4 ,ward1 ,james3 on concepts of mechanics1 #adh4 ,weltweisheit3 philosophy as1 #ab4 ,whewell3 his common sense ethics1 #bcf-bdj2 referred to1 #cae4 ,will3 see ,free-will4 ,will to ,believe3 see ,pragmatism4 ,windelband3 #cje4 ,wolff1 ,christian3 definition of philosophy1 #aj4 ,world3 see ,external ,world4 ,wundt3 ethics referred to1 #cae4